Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard

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061-19751016-ADV-01-07-EN
Parent Document Number
061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN
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SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DILLARD

While 1 am in agreement with the Opinion and the approach taken by

the Court, my reasons do not altogether coincide with those set out in the
Opinion. Furthermore it seems to me desirable to make a few comments
touching the operative clauses of the Opinion and especiallythe significance
which, in my view,attaches to the response to Question II. This furnishes my
excuse for appending aseparate opinion.

At the very threshold of our enquiry doubts assaile4 me as to both the
existence and relevance of any legalquestion. UnlesstheCourt wereseisedof

a legalquestion it would not be competent to respond to therequest inlight of
Article 96(1) of theCharter of the United Nations. On the other hand, evenif
a legal question were present, its lack of apparent relevance to any
contemporary problem might well induce the Court to invoke, however,
reluctantly, its discretionary power of refusal conferred upon it by Articl65
(1) of its Statute.

These doubts were prompted by two significant facts. First it was
immediately apparent that the two questions wereexclusivelyconfined to an
historical period and second they raised no issuewhateveras to the legitimacy
of Spain's original occupation of the territory or its present authority over it.
It appeared, therefore, that the two questionsinvited an enquiry which, while
no doubt historically fascinating, was far removed from any contemporary

problem whatever '.
Furtherrnore, it was urged upon the Court that it should confine itself to a
strict and literal reading of the questions for fear otherwise that it might
trespasson the prerogatives of the General Assembly. This viewwas fortified
by the argument that during the debates in the Fourth Committee, Spain and

a number of other delegates among the 43 who had abstained in the voting,
objected to themanner in whichthequestionshad been framed. Nevertheless,
despite these objections, they emerged and were voted on in the historically
confined manner referred to above.
Spain strenuously urged upon the Court the view that the questions were
merely "academic" or "historical". Its argument was based on the premise

that the General Assembly had already decided on both the principles and

1 Readersof JudgePetrén'sseparateopinion wilobservethatheentertainedsimilar
doubts.117 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

methods to be applied to the decolonization process and furthermore the
decision carried the concurrence of both the Kingdom of Morocco and the

IslamicRepublic of Mauritania.The reply to the two questions would thus be
devoid of object or purpose. The Opinion has dealt with this argument in
great detail in paragraphs 48-74and no repetition iscalled for in this separate
opinion.
The doubts which assailed me were not grounded on the same premise as

that advanced by Spain and analysed in the Opinion. They centred on the
proper scope of theCourt's powersof interpretation in light of thecontention
that the questions were clear, precise, legal and relevant. This string of
assertionsleft open the natural enquiry "relevant to what", an enquiry which
also bore upon the legal character of the questions as well.

The notion that a legalquestion issimply one that invitesan answer "based
on law" appears to be question-begging and it derives no added authority by
virtue of being frequently repeated. Nor is it apparent that an exclusively
historical question could be automatically converted into a legal one merely
because of the useof a legal term such as terranullius or because thequestion
itself baptized the term "ties" with a legal label by referring to them as "legal

ties" a devicewhich also appeared to bequestion-begging.More important, it
seemed difficult to discern any contemporary legal relevance to any answer
the Court might give if it were confined to the status of a territory some 90
years agothe title to which was not in dispute then or now.

Finally itdid notappear to me sufficientto say that the questions would be
rendered legallyrelevanton the mere assumption that theanswers would tend
to enlighten the General Assembly in the exercise of its political functions.
Absent from this assumption was the notion of contemporary legal
relevance l.

It is immediately apparent that thesedoubts werebased on the assumption
that the Court was strictly confined to a literal reading of the two questions.

Wisely,however, the Court, as revealed in paragraph 52,did not so confine
itself but instead located the two questions in the total context of the
contemporary decolonization process.An analysis of the genesisand terms of
resolution 3292(XXIX) whichtheCourt hasundertaken in paragraphs 66-69

Although madein connectionwith a contentious case, a dictumin the Northern
Cameroons case bearson the observationabove. In the courseof its reasoning the
Court stated"...itisnotthefunctionof acourtmerelytoprovideabasisforpolitical
actionif noquestionof actual legalrightsisinvolved"(I.C.J. Reports 196p.37).118 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP.DILLARD)

clearly justifies this approach. Furthermore it is fully justified by the
jurisprudence of the Court. As stated in the Certain Expensesof the United

Nations case it cannot be assumed that the General Assembly seeks:

"... to fetter or hamper the Court in the discharge of its judicial
functions; the Court must have full liberty to consider al1relevant data
available to it in forming an opinion on a question posed to it for an
advisory opinion" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 157).

While stated in general terms and in a different context this well-known
dictum appears relevant. Perhaps even more relevant is the equally
well-known pronouncement of Judge Lauterpacht in the case concerning

Voting Procedurein Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning
the Territory of South West Africa. He was concerned with a question
incidental to the one asked and its relation to the role of the Court. His
statement deserves the respect it has generated.

"1cannot disregard that aspect of the matter on the alleged ground
that the Court cannot answer this-or any other legal question
-incidental to the Opinion, seeing that the General Assembly
has notspecificallyasked for an answer to these questions. The General

Assembly has asked only one substantive question; that issue,and that
issueonly, isanswered inthe operative part of theunanimousOpinion of
theCourt. Clearly, in order to reply tothat question, the Court isbound
in thecourse of its reasoning to consider andto answer a variety of legal
questions. This isof the veryessenceofitsjudicial function which makes
it possible for it to render Judgments and Opinions which carry

conviction and clarify the law."(I.C.J. Reports 1955,pp. 92-93.)

Statements of similar import could be culled from many other cases. It
results from the above that there is nothing in thejurisprudence of the Court
which can support the proposition that it would be presumptuous on its part
toso interpret the questions as to givethem a contemporary legalsignificance
by invoking the larger context in which they are framed. By so locating the

questions inthecontemporary setting of the decolonization processthe Court
has thus, in my opinion, countered the view that the question invited an
answer of a purely "academic" or "historical" character.
In addition to providing a contemporary setting for the questions it has
alsoemphasized the importance of resolution 1514(XV) in sofaras it applies
to the Western Sahara as well as other resolutions dealing with the

decolonization of that territory. This in turn has a distinct bearing on an
important aspect of one of the operative clauses and especially the response
to Question II.119 WESTERNSAHARA (SEP.OP. DILLARD)

Turning specifically to Question II in the operative clauses it will be
observed that the specific reference to paragraph 162 incorporates that

paragraph into the operative part of the Opinion. Otherwisethe reply would
not be responsive to the question since obviouslythe question did not ask the
Court merely to conjirm the existence of legal ties but to determine their
nature. Furthermore paragraph 162 is not, properly speaking, part of the
reasoning of the Court but a statement of conclusions drawn from its
reasoning. An understanding of the thrust and significanceof the answer to

Question IIthus focuses on that paragraph.
It will be observed that paragraph 162breaks down into three parts. The
first, dealing with legal ties, proclaims the existence of "legal ties of
allegiance" between the Sultan of Morocco and "some of the tribes found in
Western Sahara" and also the existence of "rights" including some that relate
to the land which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity and

Western Sahara.
In the second part, dealing with territorial sovereignty, the Court
concludes, however, that the materials and information presented to it "do
not establish any tieof territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western
Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity".

Finally in the third part, dealing with self-determination, the Court asserts
that no ties were of such a nature as to affect the application of resolution
1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and in particular no ties
which might affect the "principle of self-determination through the free and
genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory".

Whether the first conclusion is sufficientlysupported by the evidence is, in

my view, questionable. The matter is largely one of interpreting many
complex sets of disputed historical facts and intangible relations in oider to
determine their significance in light of the "principles and procedures to be
applied in the decolonization of Western Sahara". The debates in the Fourth
Committee provided no specificclue as to the meaning to be attached to the
term "legal ties"and theOpinion in paragraph 85merelylocatesthemeaning

in the context of the decolonization process, "...in conformity with
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14December 1960".
However,no matter what may be said about it,the firstconclusion seemsto
me to be ofminor importance when consideration isgiven to the relationship
between al1three conclusions and the overriding significance of the second
and third.

Thesecondconclusion, which carries mycompleteconcurrence, that no tie
of territorial sovereignty existed between the Western Sahara and the
Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity is, of course, critically
significant and especially so in light of the debates in the Fourth Committee
and the legal controversy which prompted the request for the present
Advisory Opinion. The matter has been thoroughly analysed in the Opinion

and repetition would be superfluous. It may be helpful, however, to120 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP. OP. DILLARD)

emphasize at least three implications which, in my view, flow from this
conclusion.

First, it negates the notion advanced by the two interested States that the
territory was, legally speaking, an integral part of a "parent" State (the
Kingdom of Morocco) or that it was "included" within the confines of what
has now emerged as the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. It follows that the
image of a kind of colonial amputation beginning in 1884 of a pre-existing
territorial unity is distorted.

Second, it implies that any claim to what has been called automatic
retrocession is not applicable to the Western Sahara and therefore it was
unnecessary for the Court to pronounce ugon the principle of territorial
integrity embedded in paragraph 6 of resolution1514 (XV) '.
Third, while it may not have resolved every legal aspect of the,problems
debated in the Fourth Committee it has certainly done so with respect to the

principal controversy which stimulated the adoption of resolution 3292
(XXIX).
The implications above appearto meto be warranted evenif it isconceded
with respect to Morocco that the legal tiesnoted in the restrained conclusion
in paragraph 129 of the Opinion can be said to have been established. The
implications also hold for the Islamic Republic of Mauritania even if full

weight isgiven to the nature of the legal tiessummarized in paragraph 152 of
the Opinion.
The relativelack of importance of these ties is,in my view,further fortified
when consideration is paid to the third point stressed in paragraph 162
dealing with the potential application of resolution 1514 (XV) and the
principle of self-determination.

It willbe recalled that paragrap162 reaffirmsthecontinuing applicability
of resolution 1514 (XV). It asserts thanolegal tiesafectthis conclusion and

it places renewed emphasis on the principle of self-determination "through
the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory".

This part of the operative clause invites comment of three kinds. At the

This controversial matter is alluded to in the Opinion in connection with the
arguments of the two interested States. It isalso alluded to in paragraphs 57,58and 59.
The Court might have felt called upon to consider the matter more fullyhad it decided
that the Moroccan claim tommemorial possession had been established.
My personal view isthat both the genesisand language of parag6of resolution
1514(XV),especially when read in light of principles VI1IXdof resolution 1541
(XV), make it unlikely that paragraph 6 could justifiably be applied to the
decolonization of the Western Sahara as a principle of territorial integrity overriding
the right of the people to self-determination which has been so firmlyannounced in al1
the resolutions dealing with that particular area.121 WESTERNSAHARA (SEP. OP. DILLARD)

broadest level there is the problem of determining whether the right of
self-determination in thecontext of non-self-governing territories can qualify
asa norm of contemporary international law;secondthere isthemore limited
level concerned with the impact of the right in possibly rendering without

object the historically oriented questions posed in resolution 3292 (XXIX)
and finally there is the delicate problem of determining the extent if any by
which the "right"limitsthe possible policies open to the General Assembly in
the decolonization process of the Western Sahara. 1 shall deal with each
briefly.

As is well known the first problem has elicited conflicting views which, in
terms of opposing poles, may be described as follows. Atone extreme is the
contention that even if a particular resolution of the General Assemblyisnot
binding, thecumulative impact of many resolutions when similar in content,
voted for by overwhelming majorities and frequently repeated over a period

of time may give rise to a general opiniojuris and thus constitute a norm of
customary international law. According to this view, this is the precise
situation manifested by the long list of resolutions which, following in
the wake of resolution 1514 (XV), have proclaimed the principle of
self-determination to be an operative right in the decolonization of

non-self-governing territories.
At the opposite pole are those who, resisting generally the law-creating
powers of the General Assembly,deny that theprinciplehas developed into a
"right" withcorresponding obligations or that the practice of decolonization
has been more than an example of a usage dictated by political expediency or
convenience and one which, in addition, has been neither constant nor

uniform.
I need not dwell on the theoretical aspects of this broad problem which, as
everyone knows, commands an immense literature 1.Suffice it to cal1
attention to the fact that the present Opinion is forthright in proclaiming the
existence of the "right" in so far as the present proceedings are concerned.

This is made explicit in paragraph 56 and is fortified by calling into play
two dicta in the Namibia case (I.C.J.Reports 1971,p. 31)to which are added
an analysis of the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly dealing in
general with itsdecolonization policy and in particular with those resolutions
centring on the Western Sahara (Opinion, paras. 60-65).

The pronouncements of the Court thus indicate, in my view,that a norm of
international law has emerged applicable to the decolonization of those
non-self-governing territories which are under the aegis of the United
Nations.

It should be added that the force of these pronouncements is in no way
diminished by virtue of the theoretically non-binding character of an

My statementof the contrasting "poles" draws on an article (Emerson, "Self
Determination", 65 AJIL (1971) 459) in which some of the opposing views of Dr.
RosalynHigginsand Professor LeoCrossare crisply summarized.122 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

advisoryopinion. It isa misconception, no lessreal for being widelyheld,that

in this respect an advisory opinion differs markedly from a judgment in a
contentious case. This follows because, as with a declaratory judgment and
also a judgment in a contentious case, it is in its statement of the law along
with its assessment of facts that the Court fulfillsits principal function.
In its Opinion, the Court deals extensively with the second problem noted

above. Indeed itsdiscussion of thenumerous resolutions including resolution
3292(XXIX) isprimarily directed toward countering theSpanish contention
that the principle of self-determination has the effect of rendering entirely
without object or purpose the historically oriented questions referred to the
Court. On this point 1have little to add except to reinforce the conclusion of
the Court by one observation. The Spanish argument, as previouslynoted, is

rested on the premise that the General Assemblyhad already foreclosed itself
by its former resolutions or that a kind of estoppel was operative against the
claims of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
by virtue of their approval of them. But this contention attempts to prove too
much since clearly the General Assembly has not forfeited its paramount

supervisory power over any future decolonization process including the
Western Sahara. On the other hand the right of self-determination may bear
upon the character and scope of that power.
This brings me to the third problem referred to earlier. To what extent, if
any, does theright of self-determinationlimitthepossible policy choicesopen
to the General Assembly?The Court has treated this delicate question with

greatcircumspection in paragraphs 71and 72of theOpinion. In theformer it
states that the right of self-determination "leaves the General Assembly a
measure of discretion with respect to theforrns andprocedures by which that
right is to be realized" (emphasis added). In the latter it calls attention to
"various possibilities" which exist for the future action of the General

Assemblyas"for instance with regard to consultations between theinterested
States, and the procedures and guarantees required for ensuring a free and
genuine expression of the will of the people".

It seemed hardly necessary to make more explicit the cardinal restraint
which the legal right of self-determination imposes. That restraint may be

captured in a singlesentence. It is for the people to determine the destiny of
the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people. Viewed in this
perspective it becomesalmost self-evident that theexistence of ancient "legal
ties" of the kind described in the Opinion, while they may influencesome of
theprojected procedures for decolonization, can haveonly a tangential effect
in the ultimate choicesavailable to the people.This in turn fortifiesthe view,

expressedearlier, that the first conclusion in paragraph 162of the Opinion is
of limited significance.
At one point Spain asserted,principally in itswritten statement, that in the
free exercise of the population's right to self-determination allowance rnust
be made for the independenceof the territoryas a legalpossibility. She drew

this conclusion from an analysis of resolution 1541 (XV) and the broader123 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP.DILLARD)

options designated in resolution 2625 (XXV). She also intimated that the
General Assembly had committed itself to holding a referendum. 1can find

nothing in these resolutions, however, or in the legal aspects of the "iight"
itself which compels such conclusions.On the contrary it may be suggested
that self-determination is satisfied by a free choice not by a particular
consequenceof that choice or a particular method of exercising it.

Themany votes caston specificquestions in the operative clauses,coupled
with the elaborate reasoningof the Court, tended, in my view, toput into too
dispersed a focus whab were the two centrally significant aspects of the

Court's Opinion. This has been my excuse for emphasizingQuestion II.
Inow turn briefly to Question 1.Not withoutsome misgivings 1voted with
the majority in favour of responding to this question. Having done so 1
concurred without any misgivingsin the conclusion that the territory, at the
time of colonization, was not terra nullius.

My misgivings were prompted by the seeming irrelevanceof the question
even when viewed inthecontextofthecontemporary decolonization process.

The concept of terra nulliushas meaning with reference and only with
reference to the well-established principle of international law that title to
territory maybe acquired through "effective occupation". A conditionto the

legitimacy of this method of acquiring original title is that the territory be
sans maître, i.e., terra nullius.Furthermore the problem becomes legally
important only when the legitimacy of the occupation either as originally
manifested oras geographicallyextended ischallenged by a third Stateas was
true in many cases of which the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (P.C.Z.J.,
SeriesA/B, No. 53) .he Island ofPalmas (UNRZAA,Vol. II, p. 829),and the

ClippertonIsland (ibid., p. 1105)cases furnish familiar examples.

In the present request no issue whatever was posed concerning the
legitimacy of Spain's original exercise of authority over the territory.
Furthermore, no State appearing before the Court, including Spain,asserted
that the territory wasterra nullius.How then could it be deemed relevant?

The answer, in my view, is quite subtle. As the questions were presented in
resolution 3292 (XXIX) the Court could not, a priori, dismiss Question 1
beeause had the Court come to the conclusion that the territory was sans
maître it would have automatically eliminated the principal contentions of
both the Kingdom of Morocco and the IslamicRepublic of Mauritania that

theterritory at thetimeofcolonization belongedto theformer or was included
as an integral part of the domain of the latter. The question therefore124 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

appeared to have a certain remote legal relevance. This seemed to justify

responding to the question. It helped to clear the decks for Question II.

At the same timeit was arguablethat the two questions wereso linked that
to avoid circular reasoning the second had to be considered before the first
could be analysed.On theotherhand it waspossible to respond to thesecond

question without reference to the fikt.

This seemingdifficultywascompounded by another. Themanner in which
the two questions were framed and linked together appeared to confront the
Court with what, in logicaldiscourse, is known as a loaded question. Thus a

literal reading of the two questionsappeared to compel the conclusion that if
the answer to the firstquestion was that Western Sahara was not terranullius
then by necessary implication there must have been legal ties between the
territory and that of the two interested States. But this was the subject of the
second question and remained to be determined. These difficultieswere not,
however, insurmountableand wereeasilyovercome. The conclusion that the

territory was not sans maîtredid not imply that it was under the sovereignty
of either of the interested States because of the presence in the area of
independent tribes with a degree of political and social organization.

The conclusion that the Western Sahara was not sans maître has been

analysed in the Opinion and 1 am disposed merely to add a few words.
Despite a measure of doctrinal discord on the subject of sparsely inhabited
lands a controlling factor in the present case centred on the nature of the
Spanish occupation. Not merely was it effected through numerous treaties
with independent tribes, the treaties themselves were of a special character.
Thisisimportant because thetreaties, of whichthe BonelliTreaty of 1884was

a prototype, did not provide for more than a relationship of protection. As
was cryptically put in the proceedings: you do not protect a terra nullius.On
this point there is little disagreement.

Having disposed of my viewson both Questions 1and II it remains for me
only to offer certain comments on the general posture of the case.
In paragraphs 87 and 88 of the Opinion the Court makes clear that it was

not insensitive to the particular characteristics and circumstances which
dominated life in the vast Saharan area. Furthermore it took these
characteristics and circumstances into consideration in its analysis of the
questions addressed to it.
In this separate opinion 1have felt it incumbent upon me to emphasizethe
contemporary legal significance of what, in my view,the Court has decided.125 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

In doing so 1havedowngraded the importance of legalties.Atthe sametime
1wishto record that 1was not unaware of the need to consider the facts in
light of the circumstances of time and place.
In doing so 1shall venture, even at the risk of appearing pedagogical, to
indicate two distinct approaches which could be taken in analysing the
fascinatingproblem ofdeterminingthe nature of legaltiesina timelongpast
and in an area with its own peculiar attributes. One approach is highly
analytical; the other is more broadly oriented and in effect challenges the

premiseon whichthe firstis rested. 1turn firstto the analytical approach.

Under thisapproach itwouldseemobviousthat themeaning of "legal ties"
can onlybeunderstood by ascribing to theterm "ties" aspecialcharacteristic
which differentiatesit from other kinds of ties, namely the characteristic of
being "legal". Admittedlythis raisesa difficultpoint sinceit appearsto invite
a preliminary analysisof what is meant by "law" which, likethe concept of
"sovereignty", jurists, philosophers and political theorists have debated for
sometwo thousand years.

Neverthelessif intellectual confusion is to be avoided the effort must be
madeto provide a specificcriterion by whichto differentiate one kind of tie
from another. Applied to the Western Sahara a tie, say betweenthe Sultan
and Ma ul-'Aineenor the Emir of the Adrar and the chiefsof nomadic tribes
can becharacterized asa legalone only if it expressesa relationshipin which
there is a sense of obligation of a special kind. Put more concretely the
evidence must support the view that the inhabitants of the territory had a
sense that the wishesof the Sultan or the Emir (however expressedand by

whatever investiture of authority) not only "should" be obeyed out of a
feelingof religiousaffiliationorcourtesy,but "must" be obeyedout ofa sense
of deferential obligation.This senseofobligationneednot be inspired by the
fear of sanctions, neverthelessit must exist in theenseof being pervasively
felt aspart of the wayof lifeof the people.The point isthat it isthis quality
which,at least intellectually,differentiates a tie based on religious,cultural,
ethnic, linguisticor other factors from one that islegal.

The broader approach which, in view of the posture of the case, is
applicable more particularly to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania asserts
that a concept oflawand henceof "legal"tiesismisconceivedifpatterned on
the kind of sense of obligation which now prevails in post-Reformation
westernoriented societies.In thesesocieties,eversincethe Reformation, the
senseof obligation to the sovereignhas been sharply focusedon his secular
authority which is not only paramount but permits a dissociation between
obligations owed to the State and those owedto religiousauthority.

Concepts of this kind are not applicable to a society,uch as prevailed in
the Sahara, inwhichadistinction between modesof authority are notsharply

delineated and are not part of the consciousnessof people. It is artificial,126 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

therefore, to saythata tieisnot "legal" merelybecause it failsto qualify asone
in which a sense of obligation is owed vertically to the secular power of
someone with authority. The manifestation of power is neither secular nor
religious since the distinction, itself, has little meaning.

From al1this it follows that the relation between those in power in the
Mauritanian entity on the one hand and the wandering tribes, on the other
hand, is of secondary importance. The important thing is that the tribes
criss-crossing in the Western Sahara felt thernselves to be a part of a larger
wholè, whilealso claimingrights in the territory focused on the intermittent

possession of water-holes, burial grounds and grazing pastures. All this
should sufficeto characterize ties as being legal once we rid ourselves of the
preconceptions which identify "legal" with deference to mere secular
authority. Such an identification, applied to the Western Sahara, would be
responsive neither to reality nor to any notion of law then prevalent in time
and space.

While, in my view, the evidence failed to support any claim to territorial
sovereignty and while 1thought the evidence of sufficient allegiance to the
Sultan of Morocco was questionable, yet considerations of the kind noted
above made me reluctant to vote against the existence of any legal ties
whatever. At the sametime it seemsto be abundantly clear that attributing the
quality of being "legal" to the ties which existed in 1884has only limited

significance in the contemporary setting of the decolonization process. The
legal component only appears as a kind of gl-osson the bigger reality. The
bigger reality lies in the possibleense of unity and belonging which the
people themselves feel with respect to their own or neighbouring territories.
This can only be adequately determined by consulting them one way or
another. There is nothing to preclude them fromexpressing that feeling in

accordance with whatever procedures the General Assembly may see fit to
adopt including the choices indicated in resolutions 1541 (XV) and 2625
(XXV).

(Signed) Hardy C. DILLARD.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DILLARD

While 1 am in agreement with the Opinion and the approach taken by

the Court, my reasons do not altogether coincide with those set out in the
Opinion. Furthermore it seems to me desirable to make a few comments
touching the operative clauses of the Opinion and especiallythe significance
which, in my view,attaches to the response to Question II. This furnishes my
excuse for appending aseparate opinion.

At the very threshold of our enquiry doubts assaile4 me as to both the
existence and relevance of any legalquestion. UnlesstheCourt wereseisedof

a legalquestion it would not be competent to respond to therequest inlight of
Article 96(1) of theCharter of the United Nations. On the other hand, evenif
a legal question were present, its lack of apparent relevance to any
contemporary problem might well induce the Court to invoke, however,
reluctantly, its discretionary power of refusal conferred upon it by Articl65
(1) of its Statute.

These doubts were prompted by two significant facts. First it was
immediately apparent that the two questions wereexclusivelyconfined to an
historical period and second they raised no issuewhateveras to the legitimacy
of Spain's original occupation of the territory or its present authority over it.
It appeared, therefore, that the two questionsinvited an enquiry which, while
no doubt historically fascinating, was far removed from any contemporary

problem whatever '.
Furtherrnore, it was urged upon the Court that it should confine itself to a
strict and literal reading of the questions for fear otherwise that it might
trespasson the prerogatives of the General Assembly. This viewwas fortified
by the argument that during the debates in the Fourth Committee, Spain and

a number of other delegates among the 43 who had abstained in the voting,
objected to themanner in whichthequestionshad been framed. Nevertheless,
despite these objections, they emerged and were voted on in the historically
confined manner referred to above.
Spain strenuously urged upon the Court the view that the questions were
merely "academic" or "historical". Its argument was based on the premise

that the General Assembly had already decided on both the principles and

1 Readersof JudgePetrén'sseparateopinion wilobservethatheentertainedsimilar
doubts. OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. DILLARD

[Traduction]

Je souscrià l'avisetà la conception d'ensemble quia guidé laCour, mais

pour des motifs qui ne coïncident pas entièrement aveclessien's. Enoutre, il
me paraît utile de présenter quelques observationsau sujet du dispositif et
surtout de la portée qui, à mon sens, doit être attribuéeà la réponse à la
question II. C'estcequi m'inciteà joindre àl'avisune opinion individuelle.

Audébutde nos travaux ilm'avaitparu douteux que la Cour eût étésaisie
d'une question juridique pertinente. Faute d'être saisie d'un question juri-
dique, la Cour ne serait pas compétente pour donner suite à la requête,vu
l'article6, paragraphe 1,de la Charte des Nations Unies. D'unautre côté,
une questionjuridique quisembleraitnemettreenjeu aucun problèmeactuel
pourrait fort bien inciter la Cour à invoquer, même à regret, le pouvoir
discrétionnaire de refuser de répondre que lui reconnaît l'article 65, pa-
ragra~he l.du Statut.
W.
Mesdoutes tenaient à deux faits importants. Tout d'abord il apparaissait
d'embléeque les deux questions portaient exclusivement sur une période
historique; ensuite elles ne mettaient aucunement en cause la légitimitéde
l'occupation originelledu territoirepar l'Espagne nisonautoritéprésentesur
celui-ci. II seinblait donc que les deux questions invitaient la Cour faire
des recherches, sans doute passionnantes sur le plan historique, mais fort
éloignéed se tout problèmecontemporain 1.
En outre, on a plaidéque la Cour devrait s'en tenir au sens littéraldes
questions pour ne pas risquer d'empiétersur lesprérogativesde l'Assemblée

générale.Cettethèsaetrouvéun appuidans l'argument selonlequel,aucours
des débats dela Quatrième Commission, l'Espagneet un certain nombre
d'autres délégationsp ,armi les quarante-trois qui devaient s'abstenir lors
du vote final, avaient contestéle libellé des questionsposées.Malgréces
objections cependant, lesquestions,limitéescommeila étéindiqué ci-dessus
à une périodede l'histoire, ontpris corps et ont étésoumisesu scrutin.
L'Espagne a soutenu avec insistance devant la Cour que les questions
étaient purement «académiques»ou «historiques ».La prémissedont par-

tait cettethèseétaitquel'Assemblée générale avait déjàarrêtélesprincipes et

Leslecteursde l'opinion individuede M. Petrénnoterontqu'iléprouvaitdes
doutes analogues.117 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

methods to be applied to the decolonization process and furthermore the
decision carried the concurrence of both the Kingdom of Morocco and the

IslamicRepublic of Mauritania.The reply to the two questions would thus be
devoid of object or purpose. The Opinion has dealt with this argument in
great detail in paragraphs 48-74and no repetition iscalled for in this separate
opinion.
The doubts which assailed me were not grounded on the same premise as

that advanced by Spain and analysed in the Opinion. They centred on the
proper scope of theCourt's powersof interpretation in light of thecontention
that the questions were clear, precise, legal and relevant. This string of
assertionsleft open the natural enquiry "relevant to what", an enquiry which
also bore upon the legal character of the questions as well.

The notion that a legalquestion issimply one that invitesan answer "based
on law" appears to be question-begging and it derives no added authority by
virtue of being frequently repeated. Nor is it apparent that an exclusively
historical question could be automatically converted into a legal one merely
because of the useof a legal term such as terranullius or because thequestion
itself baptized the term "ties" with a legal label by referring to them as "legal

ties" a devicewhich also appeared to bequestion-begging.More important, it
seemed difficult to discern any contemporary legal relevance to any answer
the Court might give if it were confined to the status of a territory some 90
years agothe title to which was not in dispute then or now.

Finally itdid notappear to me sufficientto say that the questions would be
rendered legallyrelevanton the mere assumption that theanswers would tend
to enlighten the General Assembly in the exercise of its political functions.
Absent from this assumption was the notion of contemporary legal
relevance l.

It is immediately apparent that thesedoubts werebased on the assumption
that the Court was strictly confined to a literal reading of the two questions.

Wisely,however, the Court, as revealed in paragraph 52,did not so confine
itself but instead located the two questions in the total context of the
contemporary decolonization process.An analysis of the genesisand terms of
resolution 3292(XXIX) whichtheCourt hasundertaken in paragraphs 66-69

Although madein connectionwith a contentious case, a dictumin the Northern
Cameroons case bearson the observationabove. In the courseof its reasoning the
Court stated"...itisnotthefunctionof acourtmerelytoprovideabasisforpolitical
actionif noquestionof actual legalrightsisinvolved"(I.C.J. Reports 196p.37). SAHARAOCCIDENTAL(OP.IND. DILLARD) 117

lesméthodesqui devaient régir leprocessus de décolonisation,et qu'en outre
le Royaume du Maroc et la République islamique de Mauritanie y avaient
tous deux acquiescé. Une réponse aux deux questions n'aurait dotic aucun
but et aucun objet. L'avis traite longuement de cet argument dans les

paragraphes 48 à 74 et ilest inutile d'y revenir dans la présente opinion
individuelle.
Lesdoutes quej'éprouvaisne reposaient pas sur la prémisseainsi avancée
par l'Espagne, qui est examinéedans l'avis. Ils concernaient essentiellement
l'étendue véritable des pouvoirs d'interprétationde la Cour, dans un cas où

l'on affirmait que les questions étaient claires,précises,juridiques et perti-
nentes. Cette séried'affirmations amenait tout naturellement àse demander:
« pertinentes par rapport à quoi », ce qui intéresse également lanature juri-
dique desquestions.
L'idée qu'estjuridique toute question appelant une réponse « fondéeen

droit »paraît être une pétitionde principe qui ne devient pas plus convain-
cante pour être fréquemmentrépetée.Il ne semblepas non plus qu'il suffise,
pour transformer automatiquement une question exclusivement historique
en unequestionjuridique, deseservird'une expressionjuridique comme terra

nullius,ou de coller au terme «liens » une étiquette juridique en parlant de
«liens juridiques », ce qui a toute l'apparence d'un nouvelle pétition de
principe. Chose plus importante, on a du mal à discerner quelle pertinence
juridique pourrait avoir de nosjours une réponsede la Cour qui se bornerait
àdéfinirlestatut d'un territoire ily a quelque quatre-vingt-dix ans, alors que

le titre sur ce territoire n'a pas étémis en doute à l'époque etne l'est pas
aujourd'hui.
Enfin, il ne me paraissait pas suffisant dedireque lesquestions deviennent
juridiquement pertinentes si l'on admet que les réponses contribueront à
éclairerl'Assembléegénérale dans l'exercicede sesfonctions politiques.Cela

ne résout pas eneffetleproblème de leurpertinence juridique actuelle1.

On voit que ces doutes procédaientde l'idéeque la Cour devrait s'entenir
au senslittéraldesdeuxquestions.Trèssagement, cependant, laCour,comme
le montre le paragraphe 52 de son avis, n'a pas procédé ainsi;elle a au
contraire replacélesdeux questions dans lecontexte global de la décolonisa-

tion actuelle. Une analyse de la genèseet des termes de la résolution3292
(XXIX), que l'on trouve.aux paragraphes 66 à 69 de l'avis,justifie en termes

'1Bienqu'elleaitété fadiensuneaffairecontentieuse, uneonclusionfigurantdans
l'arrêstur leCameroun septentrionalmérited'êtreappelée ic. aCour a dit,dansles
motifsdecetarrêt:« untribunaln'apas simplement pourfonctiondefournir une base
d'action politique alors qu'aucune question juridiuoencernant desdroits effectifs
n'estenjeu »(C.I.J. Recueil1963,p.37).118 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP.DILLARD)

clearly justifies this approach. Furthermore it is fully justified by the
jurisprudence of the Court. As stated in the Certain Expensesof the United

Nations case it cannot be assumed that the General Assembly seeks:

"... to fetter or hamper the Court in the discharge of its judicial
functions; the Court must have full liberty to consider al1relevant data
available to it in forming an opinion on a question posed to it for an
advisory opinion" (I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 157).

While stated in general terms and in a different context this well-known
dictum appears relevant. Perhaps even more relevant is the equally
well-known pronouncement of Judge Lauterpacht in the case concerning

Voting Procedurein Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning
the Territory of South West Africa. He was concerned with a question
incidental to the one asked and its relation to the role of the Court. His
statement deserves the respect it has generated.

"1cannot disregard that aspect of the matter on the alleged ground
that the Court cannot answer this-or any other legal question
-incidental to the Opinion, seeing that the General Assembly
has notspecificallyasked for an answer to these questions. The General

Assembly has asked only one substantive question; that issue,and that
issueonly, isanswered inthe operative part of theunanimousOpinion of
theCourt. Clearly, in order to reply tothat question, the Court isbound
in thecourse of its reasoning to consider andto answer a variety of legal
questions. This isof the veryessenceofitsjudicial function which makes
it possible for it to render Judgments and Opinions which carry

conviction and clarify the law."(I.C.J. Reports 1955,pp. 92-93.)

Statements of similar import could be culled from many other cases. It
results from the above that there is nothing in thejurisprudence of the Court
which can support the proposition that it would be presumptuous on its part
toso interpret the questions as to givethem a contemporary legalsignificance
by invoking the larger context in which they are framed. By so locating the

questions inthecontemporary setting of the decolonization processthe Court
has thus, in my opinion, countered the view that the question invited an
answer of a purely "academic" or "historical" character.
In addition to providing a contemporary setting for the questions it has
alsoemphasized the importance of resolution 1514(XV) in sofaras it applies
to the Western Sahara as well as other resolutions dealing with the

decolonization of that territory. This in turn has a distinct bearing on an
important aspect of one of the operative clauses and especially the response
to Question II. SAHARA OCCIDENTAL(0P. IND. DILLARD) 118

clairs cette méthode, commele fait aussi pleinement la jurisprudence de la
Cour. Ainsi que la Cour l'a dit dans l'affaire dCertaines dépensesdes
Nations Unies,on ne saurait supposer que l'Assembléegénéralecherche à

«lier ou gêner laCour dans l'exercicede ses fonctions judiciaires; la
Cour doit avoir la pleinelibertéd'examiner touslesélémentspertinents
dont elledispose pour se faire une opinion sur une question qui lui est
poséeen vued'un avisconsultatif »(C.I.J.Recueil 1962,p. 157).

Bienqu'ellesoit formuléeen termes généraux et s'appliqueà un contexte
diKérent,cettedéclarationbien connueparaît icipertinente. Maisladéclara-
tion non moins célèbrede M. Lauterpacht dans l'affaire concernant la
Procédurede vote applicable auxquestions touchant les rapportset pétitions
relatifs au territoire du Sud-Ouest africainstpeut-êtreplus encore. Cette
déclaration, concernant unequestionen marge de celleposée àla Cour ainsi
quesesrapports aveclerôledecelle-ci,méritetout lerespect qu'ellea inspiré:

«Jenepuis négligercetaspectdel'affairesousprétextequelaCour ne
peut répondre à cettequestion- ou à toute autre questionjuridiqu-
se rattachantà l'avis,attendu que l'Assembléegénéralen'a pas spéci-
fiquementdemandéderéponse à cesquestions.L'Assembléegénéran l'a
poséqu'une question de fond et cette question, cette seule question,
trouve sa 'iéponsedans le dispositif de l'avis unanime de la Cour.
Evidemment,pour répondre à cettequestion,la Cour esttenue,dans son

raisonnement, d'examiner un certain nombre de questions juridiques
variéeset d'yrépondre.C'estlà l'essence mêmd eesa fonctionjudiciaire
qui lui permet de rendre des arrêtset d'émettre desavis qui emportent
conviction et éclaircissentledroit.C.I.J.Recueil 1955,p. 92à 93.)

On pourrait trouver desénoncésd'une teneursemblable dans biend'autres
affaires.Il en ressort que rien, dans lajurisprudence de la Cour, ne saurait
justifier l'idéequ'ilserait présomptueuxde sa part d'interpréterlesquestions
de manière à leur donner un sensjuridique contemporain en sereportant au
cadre plusvastedans lequelellessesituent. En replaçant lesquestionsdans le
cadre contemporain de la décolonisation, laCour a réfuté d'après moi la
thèseselon laquelle les questions appelaient une réponse purement acadé-
mique »ou «historique B.
La Cour n'a pas seulement donnéun cadre contemporain aux questions;

elle a souligné l'importancede la résolution1514 (XV) dans la mesure où
celle-cis'applique au Sahara occidental, ainsi que celle d'autres résolutions
relativesàladécolonisationdeceterritoire.Cela n'estpas sans influersur un
aspect important de l'une des clauses du dispositif et notamment sur la
réponse à la question II.119 WESTERNSAHARA (SEP.OP. DILLARD)

Turning specifically to Question II in the operative clauses it will be
observed that the specific reference to paragraph 162 incorporates that

paragraph into the operative part of the Opinion. Otherwisethe reply would
not be responsive to the question since obviouslythe question did not ask the
Court merely to conjirm the existence of legal ties but to determine their
nature. Furthermore paragraph 162 is not, properly speaking, part of the
reasoning of the Court but a statement of conclusions drawn from its
reasoning. An understanding of the thrust and significanceof the answer to

Question IIthus focuses on that paragraph.
It will be observed that paragraph 162breaks down into three parts. The
first, dealing with legal ties, proclaims the existence of "legal ties of
allegiance" between the Sultan of Morocco and "some of the tribes found in
Western Sahara" and also the existence of "rights" including some that relate
to the land which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity and

Western Sahara.
In the second part, dealing with territorial sovereignty, the Court
concludes, however, that the materials and information presented to it "do
not establish any tieof territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western
Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity".

Finally in the third part, dealing with self-determination, the Court asserts
that no ties were of such a nature as to affect the application of resolution
1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and in particular no ties
which might affect the "principle of self-determination through the free and
genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory".

Whether the first conclusion is sufficientlysupported by the evidence is, in

my view, questionable. The matter is largely one of interpreting many
complex sets of disputed historical facts and intangible relations in oider to
determine their significance in light of the "principles and procedures to be
applied in the decolonization of Western Sahara". The debates in the Fourth
Committee provided no specificclue as to the meaning to be attached to the
term "legal ties"and theOpinion in paragraph 85merelylocatesthemeaning

in the context of the decolonization process, "...in conformity with
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14December 1960".
However,no matter what may be said about it,the firstconclusion seemsto
me to be ofminor importance when consideration isgiven to the relationship
between al1three conclusions and the overriding significance of the second
and third.

Thesecondconclusion, which carries mycompleteconcurrence, that no tie
of territorial sovereignty existed between the Western Sahara and the
Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity is, of course, critically
significant and especially so in light of the debates in the Fourth Committee
and the legal controversy which prompted the request for the present
Advisory Opinion. The matter has been thoroughly analysed in the Opinion

and repetition would be superfluous. It may be helpful, however, to SAHARA OCCIDENTAL(OP. IND. DILLARD) 119

Pour en venir précisémentà la question II, on constatera que le para-
graphe 162 de I'avis fait partie du dispositif dans la mesure où il y est

spécialementvisé.S'ilen avait été autrementI'avisn'aurait pas répondu àla
question puisque, de toute évidence,la Courn'était pas simplement priéede
conjirmerI'existencede liensjuridiques mais aussid'en déterminerla nature.
En outre, le paragraphe 162 ne fait pas à proprement parler partie du
raisonnement de la Cour, il énonceles conclusions qui découlent de son
raisonnement. Toute la force et tout lesensde la réponseàla question II sont

donc concentrésdans ce paragraphe.
On remarquera que le paragraphe 162 se subdivise en trois parties. La
première, relative aux liens juridiques, proclame I'existence de «liens juri-
diques d'allégeance » entre lesultan du Maroc et «certaines des tribus vivant
sur le territoire du Sahara occidental », ainsi que I'existenced« droits »,y
compris certains droits relatifslaterre,qui constituaient desliensjuridiques

entre l'ensemble mauritanien et le Sahara occidental.
Dans la deuxième partie, concernant la souveraineté territoriale, la Cour
conclut toutefois que leséléments et renseignementsportésàsa connaissance
«n'établissentI'existence d'aucun lien de souveraineté territoriale entre le
territoire du Sahara occidental d'une part, le Royaume du Maroc ou
l'ensemble mauritanien d'autre vart ».
Enfin, dans la troisième partie, qui traite de l'autodétermination, laCour

affirme qu'il n'existait aucun liende nature à modifier l'application de la
résolution 1514(XV) quant à la décolonisation du Sahara occidental et en
particulier aucun qui puisse modifier«l'application du principe d'autodéter-
mination grâce à l'expression libre et authentique de la volonté des popula-
tions du territoire.

A mon sens on peut se demander si la première conclusion repose sur des
preuves suffisantes. II s'agit surtout en effet d'interpréter une masse de faits
historiquescontestésetderapports intangibles et d'enapprécierla portéepar
rapport aux «principes et procéduresà appliquerdans-la décolonisation-du
Sahara occidental ». Les débats de la Quatrième Commission n'apportent
rien de précisau sujet du sens à donner aux termes «liensjuridiques » et le
paragraphe 85de I'avisne faitque lesrattacher au contexte de la décolonisa-

tion «en conformitéavec la résolution1514(XV)du 14décembre1960».

Cependant, et quoi qu'on puisse en dire, cette première conclusion me
paraît jouer un rôle assez mineur si l'on tient compte des rapports entre les
trois conclusions et de l'importance primordiale que revêtent la deuxièmeet
la troisième.

J'approuve entièrement la deuxièmeconclusion selon laquelle il n'existait
aucun lien juridique de souveraineté territorialeentre le Sahara occidental
d'une part et le Royaume du Maroc ou l'ensemble mauritanien d'autre part,
car elle revêtune importance capitale, tout particulièrementà la lumièredes
débats dela Quatrième Commission et de la controverse juridique qui est à
l'originede la présentedemande d'avisconsultatif. Laquestion a étéanalysée

àfonddans I'avisettoute répétition seraitsuperflue.IIpeut toutefoisêtreutile120 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP. OP. DILLARD)

emphasize at least three implications which, in my view, flow from this
conclusion.

First, it negates the notion advanced by the two interested States that the
territory was, legally speaking, an integral part of a "parent" State (the
Kingdom of Morocco) or that it was "included" within the confines of what
has now emerged as the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. It follows that the
image of a kind of colonial amputation beginning in 1884 of a pre-existing
territorial unity is distorted.

Second, it implies that any claim to what has been called automatic
retrocession is not applicable to the Western Sahara and therefore it was
unnecessary for the Court to pronounce ugon the principle of territorial
integrity embedded in paragraph 6 of resolution1514 (XV) '.
Third, while it may not have resolved every legal aspect of the,problems
debated in the Fourth Committee it has certainly done so with respect to the

principal controversy which stimulated the adoption of resolution 3292
(XXIX).
The implications above appearto meto be warranted evenif it isconceded
with respect to Morocco that the legal tiesnoted in the restrained conclusion
in paragraph 129 of the Opinion can be said to have been established. The
implications also hold for the Islamic Republic of Mauritania even if full

weight isgiven to the nature of the legal tiessummarized in paragraph 152 of
the Opinion.
The relativelack of importance of these ties is,in my view,further fortified
when consideration is paid to the third point stressed in paragraph 162
dealing with the potential application of resolution 1514 (XV) and the
principle of self-determination.

It willbe recalled that paragrap162 reaffirmsthecontinuing applicability
of resolution 1514 (XV). It asserts thanolegal tiesafectthis conclusion and

it places renewed emphasis on the principle of self-determination "through
the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory".

This part of the operative clause invites comment of three kinds. At the

This controversial matter is alluded to in the Opinion in connection with the
arguments of the two interested States. It isalso alluded to in paragraphs 57,58and 59.
The Court might have felt called upon to consider the matter more fullyhad it decided
that the Moroccan claim tommemorial possession had been established.
My personal view isthat both the genesisand language of parag6of resolution
1514(XV),especially when read in light of principles VI1IXdof resolution 1541
(XV), make it unlikely that paragraph 6 could justifiably be applied to the
decolonization of the Western Sahara as a principle of territorial integrity overriding
the right of the people to self-determination which has been so firmlyannounced in al1
the resolutions dealing with that particular area. SAHARA OCClDENTAL(0P. IND. DILLARD) 120

desoulignerau moinstroisdesconséquencesquidécoulentselonmoidecette
conclusion.
Premièrement, elleapporte un démenti a l'idée mise enavant par lesdeux

Etats intéressésselon laquelle le territoire faisait, juridiquement parlant,
partie intégrante d'un Etat ((parent » (le Royaume du Maroc) ou était
«inclus » dans les limites de ce qui constitue aujourd'hui la République
islamiquede Mauritanie. Il s'ensuitque letableau de l'amputation coloniale
d'une unité territoriale préexistante partir de 1884estun tableau déformé.
Deuxièmement,cette conclusion implique que toute prétention à ce que
l'ona appelé une rétrocessionautomatiquene saurait s'appliquer auSahara

occidental et qu'il étaitdonc superflu de se prononcer sur le principe de
l'intégritéterritoriale proclaméapuaragraphe 6de larésolution1514(XV) 1.
Troisièmement,bien quecetteconclusion n'aitpeut-êtrepasrésolutousles
aspectsjuridiques desproblèmesdébattus àla QuatrièmeCommission,ellea
ceitainement eu cet effet pour ce qui est de -la controverse principale à
l'originede l'adoption de la résolution3292(XXIX).
Lesconsidérationsci-dessusmeparaissentjustifiées mêmeIs'ionadmet,en
ce qui concerne le Maroc, que les liensjuridiques mentionnésdans la brève

conclusionfigurantau paragraphe 129del'avisont étéétabliC s.esconsidéra-
tions valent aussipour la Républiqueislamiquede Mauritanie, même sIi'on
ne sous-estimepas la nature des liensjuridiques indiquéssommairement au
paragraphe 152.
Lemanque relatif d'importance de cesliens estencoreplus évidenta mon
avissi l'ontient compte du troisièmepoint soulignéauparagraphe 162,qui a
traità l'application éventuellede la résolution1514(XV)et au principe de

l'autodétermination.

On se rappellera qu'il est réaffirméau paragraphe 162 de l'avis que la
résolution 1514(XV)demeureapplicable. La Cour déclareen effetqu'aucun
lienjuridique nemodijiecetteconclusionet ellemetdenouveau l'accentsurle

principe del'autodétermination «grâce à l'expressionlibreet authentique de
la volontédes populations du territoiren.
Cettepartie du disposit,ifde l'avisappelletrois observationsdistinctes.Sur

il'avis mentionne cette question controverséeà propos des arguments présentés
par lesdeux Etats intéresséyIest aussi fait allusion aux paragraphes 57,58et 59. La
Couraurait pu secroire obligée d'examinerla question plus à fond si elleavait décidé
quPersonnellement,je considère que,vu la genèseet la formulation du par6gdephe
la résolution514(XV),particulièrementsi on la rapproche des prinVI1eetIX de
la résolution 1541(XV),il est peu probable qu'on soit justifiéà l'appliquer à la
décolonisation du Sahara occidental en tant que principe d'intégritéterritoriale
l'emportant sur le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes,qui est si fermement
énoncédans toutes les résolutionsconcernant la région.121 WESTERNSAHARA (SEP. OP. DILLARD)

broadest level there is the problem of determining whether the right of
self-determination in thecontext of non-self-governing territories can qualify
asa norm of contemporary international law;secondthere isthemore limited
level concerned with the impact of the right in possibly rendering without

object the historically oriented questions posed in resolution 3292 (XXIX)
and finally there is the delicate problem of determining the extent if any by
which the "right"limitsthe possible policies open to the General Assembly in
the decolonization process of the Western Sahara. 1 shall deal with each
briefly.

As is well known the first problem has elicited conflicting views which, in
terms of opposing poles, may be described as follows. Atone extreme is the
contention that even if a particular resolution of the General Assemblyisnot
binding, thecumulative impact of many resolutions when similar in content,
voted for by overwhelming majorities and frequently repeated over a period

of time may give rise to a general opiniojuris and thus constitute a norm of
customary international law. According to this view, this is the precise
situation manifested by the long list of resolutions which, following in
the wake of resolution 1514 (XV), have proclaimed the principle of
self-determination to be an operative right in the decolonization of

non-self-governing territories.
At the opposite pole are those who, resisting generally the law-creating
powers of the General Assembly,deny that theprinciplehas developed into a
"right" withcorresponding obligations or that the practice of decolonization
has been more than an example of a usage dictated by political expediency or
convenience and one which, in addition, has been neither constant nor

uniform.
I need not dwell on the theoretical aspects of this broad problem which, as
everyone knows, commands an immense literature 1.Suffice it to cal1
attention to the fact that the present Opinion is forthright in proclaiming the
existence of the "right" in so far as the present proceedings are concerned.

This is made explicit in paragraph 56 and is fortified by calling into play
two dicta in the Namibia case (I.C.J.Reports 1971,p. 31)to which are added
an analysis of the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly dealing in
general with itsdecolonization policy and in particular with those resolutions
centring on the Western Sahara (Opinion, paras. 60-65).

The pronouncements of the Court thus indicate, in my view,that a norm of
international law has emerged applicable to the decolonization of those
non-self-governing territories which are under the aegis of the United
Nations.

It should be added that the force of these pronouncements is in no way
diminished by virtue of the theoretically non-binding character of an

My statementof the contrasting "poles" draws on an article (Emerson, "Self
Determination", 65 AJIL (1971) 459) in which some of the opposing views of Dr.
RosalynHigginsand Professor LeoCrossare crisply summarized. SAHARAOCCIDENTAL (OP. IND. DILLARD) 121

le plan plus général, la questionse pose de savoir si le droit à I'autodéter-
mination d'un territoire non autonome veutêtreconsidérécommeunenorme
du droit international contemporain; ensuite, sur un plan plus limité,on peut
se demander dans quelle mesure ce droit peut rendre sans objet lesquestions
de nature historique que pose la résolution 3292 (XXIX); enfin, il y a le

problème délicctqui consiste à établirsi et dans quelle mesure ce ((droit »
limite lesoptions politiquesouvertes àl'Assembléegénérale dans ladécoloni-
sation du Sahara occidental. Je vais examiner brièvement chacun de ces
problèmes.

Chacun sait que lepremier a suscitédes opinions divergentesqui, si l'onen
prend lesdeux manifestations extrêmes,peuventsedécrire comme suit. D'un
côté, on prétendque même siune résolution isoléede l'Assembléegénérale
n'a pas force obligatoire, l'effetcumulatif de nombreuses résolutions d'un
contenu semblable, votéespar une forte majorité et fréquemment réitérées

pendant un certain laps de temps, peut devenirl'expression d'une opiniojuris
et constituer ainsi une norme de droit coutumier international. selon cette
thèse,c'estprécisémentlecas pour la longueliste de résolutions qui,àla suite
de la résolution 1514 (XV), ont proclamé que le principe de I'autodéter-

mination était un droit applicable à la décolonisation des territoires non
autonomes.
A l'autre extrême,on trouve ceuxqui,généralement opposés aux pouvoirs
de créerledroit de l'Assembléegénéraler,efusent d'admettre que le principe
soit devenu un droit ))assorti d'obligations correspondantes ou que la

pratique de la décolonisation ait étéautre chose qu'un usage dictépar des
considérationsd'opportunitéou de commodité politique,et qui d'ailleurs n'a
été ni constant ni uniforme.
Je n'ai pasàm'attarder sur lesaspects théoriquesde ce vasteproblèmequi,

comme chacun sait, a inspiré toute unelitérature1.11suffitde relever que le
présentavis affirmenettement l'existencede ce ((droit )dans l'optique de la
orésenteaffaire.
Cette affirmation est faite explicitementau paragraphe 56et renforcéepar

deux citations tiréesde l'affaire de la Namibie (C.I.J. Recueil 1971,p. 31),
auxquelles s'ajoute une analyse des nombreuses résolutions dans lesquelles
l'Assembléegénéraletraite d'une manièregénérald ee sa politique dedécolo-
nisation, et en particulier des résolutionsportant spécialement surle Sahara
occidental (avis, par. 60-65).

Les prises de position de la Cour indiquent donc à mon avis l'apparition
d'une norme de droit international applicable à la décolonisation des
territoires non auionomes placéssous l'égide desNations Unies.

Il convient d'ajouter que ces prises de position ne sont pas affaiblies par le

fait qu'en théorie un avis consultatif n'est pas obligatoire. Une idéetrès

Mon exposédes deux ((extrêmes >)s'inspire d'unarticle (Emerson«Self Deter-
mination »,65 AJIL(1971) 459)ou certaines des thèsesopposéesde MmeHigginset de
M. LeoGross sont adroitement résumées.122 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

advisoryopinion. It isa misconception, no lessreal for being widelyheld,that

in this respect an advisory opinion differs markedly from a judgment in a
contentious case. This follows because, as with a declaratory judgment and
also a judgment in a contentious case, it is in its statement of the law along
with its assessment of facts that the Court fulfillsits principal function.
In its Opinion, the Court deals extensively with the second problem noted

above. Indeed itsdiscussion of thenumerous resolutions including resolution
3292(XXIX) isprimarily directed toward countering theSpanish contention
that the principle of self-determination has the effect of rendering entirely
without object or purpose the historically oriented questions referred to the
Court. On this point 1have little to add except to reinforce the conclusion of
the Court by one observation. The Spanish argument, as previouslynoted, is

rested on the premise that the General Assemblyhad already foreclosed itself
by its former resolutions or that a kind of estoppel was operative against the
claims of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
by virtue of their approval of them. But this contention attempts to prove too
much since clearly the General Assembly has not forfeited its paramount

supervisory power over any future decolonization process including the
Western Sahara. On the other hand the right of self-determination may bear
upon the character and scope of that power.
This brings me to the third problem referred to earlier. To what extent, if
any, does theright of self-determinationlimitthepossible policy choicesopen
to the General Assembly?The Court has treated this delicate question with

greatcircumspection in paragraphs 71and 72of theOpinion. In theformer it
states that the right of self-determination "leaves the General Assembly a
measure of discretion with respect to theforrns andprocedures by which that
right is to be realized" (emphasis added). In the latter it calls attention to
"various possibilities" which exist for the future action of the General

Assemblyas"for instance with regard to consultations between theinterested
States, and the procedures and guarantees required for ensuring a free and
genuine expression of the will of the people".

It seemed hardly necessary to make more explicit the cardinal restraint
which the legal right of self-determination imposes. That restraint may be

captured in a singlesentence. It is for the people to determine the destiny of
the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people. Viewed in this
perspective it becomesalmost self-evident that theexistence of ancient "legal
ties" of the kind described in the Opinion, while they may influencesome of
theprojected procedures for decolonization, can haveonly a tangential effect
in the ultimate choicesavailable to the people.This in turn fortifiesthe view,

expressedearlier, that the first conclusion in paragraph 162of the Opinion is
of limited significance.
At one point Spain asserted,principally in itswritten statement, that in the
free exercise of the population's right to self-determination allowance rnust
be made for the independenceof the territoryas a legalpossibility. She drew

this conclusion from an analysis of resolution 1541 (XV) and the broader SAHARA OCCIDENTAL(OP. IND. DILLARD)
122
répandue,mais qui n'en est pas moins erronéepour autant, voudrait qu'à cet

égardun avis consultatif diffère profondément d'un arrêtrendu au conten-
tieux. Or, de mêmeque dans un jugement déclaratoire ou un arrêtconten-
tieux, c'esten disant le droit en mêmetemps qu'elle apprécieles faits que la
Cour exerce sa principale fonction.
Dans son avis, la Cour s'étendlonguement sur le deuxième problème

mentionné plus haut. Son analyse des nombreuses résolutions, y compris la
résolution3292 (XXIX), vise avant tout à réfuter lathèseespagnole selon
laquelle leprincipe de l'autodétermination a pour effetde rendre entièrement
sansobjet etsansbut lesquestions de caractère historique soumises àla Cour.
Sur ce point, je n'ai pas grand-choseà ajouter à l'avis,mais je renforcerai la

conclusion dela Cour par uneobservation. La thèseespagnole,comme ila été
soulignéplus haut, repose surla prémisseque l'Assembléegénérale estliéepar
ses résolutionsantérieures ouqu'il existeune sorte d'estoppelapplicable aux
revendications du Royaume du Maroc et de la ~é~ubli~ue-islamique de
Mauritanie du fait qu'ils avaient acquiescé à ces résolutions.Mais c'est là

vouloir trop car il est évident que l'Assembléegénéralen'a pas
renoncé àsonpouvoirprimordial de surveillancedesdécolonisationsfutures,
y compris celle du Sahara occidental. Le droit à l'autodétermination peut
cependant influencer la nature et la portéede ce pouvoir.
Cela m'amèneau troisièmeproblèmedont j'ai parlé. Dansquellemesure le

droit à l'autodétermination pourrait-il limiter, le cas échéant,les options
politiques qui s'ouvrent à l'Assembléegénérale?La Cour a traité de cette
question délicate avec une grande pmdence aux paragraphes 71 et 72 de
l'avis. Dans le premier de ces paragraphes, elle déclare que l'Assemblée
générale conserve une ((certaine latitude quant aux formes et aux procédés
selon lesquels ce droit doit êtremis en Œuvre » (les italiques sont de moi).

Dans le deuxième, elle appelle l'attention sur les ((diverses possibilités»
d'action qui s'offrent à l'Assembléegénérale comme((par exemple les
consultations entre les Etats intéresséset les procédures et garanties néces-
saires pour assurer l'expression libre et authentique de la volonté des
populations B.

Iln'étaitguèrebesoin d'êtreplusexpliciteau sujetdela limitation essentielle
imposéepar le droit à l'autodétermination. Cette limitation peut s'exprimer
en une phrase: c'estla population qui détermine ledestin du territoire et non
l'inverse. Dans cette perspective, c'est presque un truisme que de dire que
l'existence de « liens juridiques))anciens du type décrit dans l'avis peut

influencer certaines des méthodesenvisagéespour la décolonisation, mais ne
saurait avoir qu'un effet marginal sur les choix offerts en définitiveaux
habitants. Cela renforce d'ailleurs'idée,que j'ai déjàexprimée,de la portée
limitéeàattribuer àla premièreconclusion duparagraphe 162de l'avis.

A un certainmoment l'Espagne a affirmé,dans sonexposéécritprincipale-
ment, que dans le libre exercice du droit des populations àl'autodétermina-
tion, ilfallait prévoirla possibilité juridiquede l'indépendancedu territoire.
Cette conclusion s'appuyait sur une analyse de la résolution 1541 (XV)123 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP.DILLARD)

options designated in resolution 2625 (XXV). She also intimated that the
General Assembly had committed itself to holding a referendum. 1can find

nothing in these resolutions, however, or in the legal aspects of the "iight"
itself which compels such conclusions.On the contrary it may be suggested
that self-determination is satisfied by a free choice not by a particular
consequenceof that choice or a particular method of exercising it.

Themany votes caston specificquestions in the operative clauses,coupled
with the elaborate reasoningof the Court, tended, in my view, toput into too
dispersed a focus whab were the two centrally significant aspects of the

Court's Opinion. This has been my excuse for emphasizingQuestion II.
Inow turn briefly to Question 1.Not withoutsome misgivings 1voted with
the majority in favour of responding to this question. Having done so 1
concurred without any misgivingsin the conclusion that the territory, at the
time of colonization, was not terra nullius.

My misgivings were prompted by the seeming irrelevanceof the question
even when viewed inthecontextofthecontemporary decolonization process.

The concept of terra nulliushas meaning with reference and only with
reference to the well-established principle of international law that title to
territory maybe acquired through "effective occupation". A conditionto the

legitimacy of this method of acquiring original title is that the territory be
sans maître, i.e., terra nullius.Furthermore the problem becomes legally
important only when the legitimacy of the occupation either as originally
manifested oras geographicallyextended ischallenged by a third Stateas was
true in many cases of which the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (P.C.Z.J.,
SeriesA/B, No. 53) .he Island ofPalmas (UNRZAA,Vol. II, p. 829),and the

ClippertonIsland (ibid., p. 1105)cases furnish familiar examples.

In the present request no issue whatever was posed concerning the
legitimacy of Spain's original exercise of authority over the territory.
Furthermore, no State appearing before the Court, including Spain,asserted
that the territory wasterra nullius.How then could it be deemed relevant?

The answer, in my view, is quite subtle. As the questions were presented in
resolution 3292 (XXIX) the Court could not, a priori, dismiss Question 1
beeause had the Court come to the conclusion that the territory was sans
maître it would have automatically eliminated the principal contentions of
both the Kingdom of Morocco and the IslamicRepublic of Mauritania that

theterritory at thetimeofcolonization belongedto theformer or was included
as an integral part of the domain of the latter. The question therefore SAHARA OCCIDENTAL(OP. IND. DILLARD) 123

et sur les options plus larges envisagéesdans la résolution2625 (XXV).
L'Espagnemaintenait aussique l'Assemblée généraleavait prisparti pourla
tenue d'un référendum.Je ne vois cependant rien dans les résolutionsde
l'Assemblée nidans lesaspectsjuridiquesdu «droit »lui-même quiimposede
telles conclusions. Au contraire on peut dire que l'autodétermination se
caractérisepar un librechoixet non pas par uneconséquenceparticulièrede
cechoix ou par un mode particulier de l'exercicedu choix lui-même.

Les votes successifssur des questions précisesfigurant dans le dispositif,

venant aprèsdesmotifstrès fouillést,endent selon moi àrendre quelque peu
diffuslesaspectsessentielsdel'avisdela Cour. C'estla raison pour laquelleje
mesuisattardésur la question II.
J'en viens maintenant brièvement à la question 1. Non sans quelque
hésitation,je me suisjointàla majorité quis'estprononcéeen faveur d'une
réponse à cettequestion. L'ayant fait,j'ai souscritsanshésitation cetteàois
la conclusion que le territoire n'était pas terra nullius au moment de la
colonisation.
Mon hésitation étaitdue au fait que la question paraissait dépourvuede
pertinence mêmequand on la resituait dans le cadre de la décolonisation
contemporaine.
La notion de terra nullius n'ade sens qu'en rapport avecle principe bien

établide droit international suivant lequelun territoire peut être acquis par
«l'occupation effective». Cette façon d'obtenir un titre originaire est su-
bordonnée à la conditionque le territoire soit sans maître, c'est-à-direqu'il
soit terra nullius.De plus,leproblèmene revêt ne importancejuridique que
quand la légitimetéde l'occupation telle qu'elles'estréaliséel'origineou
telle qu'elles'estétenduegéographiquementpar la suiteest contestéepar un
Etat tiers, comme on l'a vu dans de nombreuses affaires, dont celles du
Groënlandoriental (C.P.J.I. sériesA/B no53)d ,e I'lle de Palmas (Nations
Unies, Recueildes sentencesarbitrales, vol. II, p.9)et de I'Ile Clipperton
(ibid.,p.1105)fournissent des exemplesbienconnus.
En l'espècepersonne n'a contestéqu'àl'origine l'Espagneait pu Iégitime-
ment exercerson autoritésur le territoire. En outre, aucun des Etats qui se

sont présentésdevant la Cour, y compris l'Espagne, n'a affirméque le
territoire était terra nullius. Comment cette question peut-elle alors être
considéréecommepertinente?
A mon avis, le réponse à cela est assezsubtile. De la manièredont les
questions étaient présentéesdans la résolution 3292 (XXIX), la Cour ne
pouvait écarter àpriori la question1,parce que, si elle était parvenuàla
conclusion que leterritoire était sansmaître,celaauraitanéantiipsofacto les
thèsesprincipales présentéeasussibien par le Royaumedu Marocque par la
République islamiquede Mauritanie, suivant lesquelles au moment de la
colonisation le territoire appartenait au premier ou était inclus dans la124 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

appeared to have a certain remote legal relevance. This seemed to justify

responding to the question. It helped to clear the decks for Question II.

At the same timeit was arguablethat the two questions wereso linked that
to avoid circular reasoning the second had to be considered before the first
could be analysed.On theotherhand it waspossible to respond to thesecond

question without reference to the fikt.

This seemingdifficultywascompounded by another. Themanner in which
the two questions were framed and linked together appeared to confront the
Court with what, in logicaldiscourse, is known as a loaded question. Thus a

literal reading of the two questionsappeared to compel the conclusion that if
the answer to the firstquestion was that Western Sahara was not terranullius
then by necessary implication there must have been legal ties between the
territory and that of the two interested States. But this was the subject of the
second question and remained to be determined. These difficultieswere not,
however, insurmountableand wereeasilyovercome. The conclusion that the

territory was not sans maîtredid not imply that it was under the sovereignty
of either of the interested States because of the presence in the area of
independent tribes with a degree of political and social organization.

The conclusion that the Western Sahara was not sans maître has been

analysed in the Opinion and 1 am disposed merely to add a few words.
Despite a measure of doctrinal discord on the subject of sparsely inhabited
lands a controlling factor in the present case centred on the nature of the
Spanish occupation. Not merely was it effected through numerous treaties
with independent tribes, the treaties themselves were of a special character.
Thisisimportant because thetreaties, of whichthe BonelliTreaty of 1884was

a prototype, did not provide for more than a relationship of protection. As
was cryptically put in the proceedings: you do not protect a terra nullius.On
this point there is little disagreement.

Having disposed of my viewson both Questions 1and II it remains for me
only to offer certain comments on the general posture of the case.
In paragraphs 87 and 88 of the Opinion the Court makes clear that it was

not insensitive to the particular characteristics and circumstances which
dominated life in the vast Saharan area. Furthermore it took these
characteristics and circumstances into consideration in its analysis of the
questions addressed to it.
In this separate opinion 1have felt it incumbent upon me to emphasizethe
contemporary legal significance of what, in my view,the Court has decided. SAHARAOCCIDENTAL(OP.IND. DILLARD) 124

seconde comme partie intégrante de son domaine. La question paraissait
donc posséderune certaine pertinencejuridique, encore qu'assezlointaine. II

paraissait alors justifiéd'y répondre. Cela contribuait à déblayerle terrain
pour la question II.
On pouvait en mêmetemps soutenir que les deux questions étaient
tellement liéesque pour éviterde tourner en rond dans le raisonnement il
fallait examiner la seconde avant de pouv.oir analyser la première. En
revanche ilétait possiblede répondreàlaseconde en faisant abstraction de la

première.
Cette difficultéapparente était aggravéepar une autre. La manièredont les
deux questionsétaient posées et liéesl'une àl'autre paraissait placer la Cour
devant ce qu'on appelle en logique une question tendancieuse. Interprétées
littéralement,les deux questions semblaient devoir forcer à conclure que si
l'on répondait àla premièreque leSahara occidental n'étaitpas terra nullius,

alors, par une conséquencenécessaire,il devaity avoir eu des liensjuridiques
entre ceterritoire et lesterritoiresdesdeux Etats intéressé. r c'étaitlà l'objet
de la deuxièmequestion sur laquelle il restait à se prononcer. Les difficultés
n'étaient cependant pas insurmontables et il était facile d'y obvier. La
conclusion que le territoire n'étaitas sans maître ne signifiait pas qu'il était

sous la souveraineté de l'un ou l'autre des Etats intéressés,étant donnéla
présencedans la régionde tribus indépendantes disposant d'une certaine
organisation socialeet politique.
La conclusion que leSahara occidental n'était passans maître est analysée
dans l'avis et je me contenterai d'ajouter quelques mots à ce sujet. Malgré
certaines divergencesdoctrinales au sujet des terres faiblement peuplées,un

élément décisia f étéen l'espècela nature de l'occupation espagnole. Non
seulement cette occupation s'est réaliséeà la suite de nombreux traités
conclus avec des tribus indépendantes, mais les traités eux-mêmesétaient
d'un caractère particulier. C'est là un point important parce que ces ins-
truments, dont le traitéBonelli de 1884est le prototype, ne prévoyaientrien

d'autre que des rapports de protection. Selon la formule mystérieuse em-
ployéependant l'instance: on ne protège pas une terra nullius.C'est là un
point qui n'est guèredisputé.

Ayant exprimé mes vues sur les questions 1et II, il ne me reste plus qu'à
formuler certaines observations sur les aspectsgénérauxde l'affaire.
Aux paragraphes 87et 88de l'avis,la Cour montre qu'elle a étésensibleaux
caractéristiques et conditions particulières de la vie dans la vaste région

saharienne. Elle a pris en outre ces caractéristiques et ces conditions en
considération dans son analyse des questionsqui lui ont été adressées.

Dans la présente opinion individuelle, j'ai cru devoir souligner la portée
juridique actuelle de ce que, pour moi, la Cour a décidé.Ce faisant j'ai125 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

In doing so 1havedowngraded the importance of legalties.Atthe sametime
1wishto record that 1was not unaware of the need to consider the facts in
light of the circumstances of time and place.
In doing so 1shall venture, even at the risk of appearing pedagogical, to
indicate two distinct approaches which could be taken in analysing the
fascinatingproblem ofdeterminingthe nature of legaltiesina timelongpast
and in an area with its own peculiar attributes. One approach is highly
analytical; the other is more broadly oriented and in effect challenges the

premiseon whichthe firstis rested. 1turn firstto the analytical approach.

Under thisapproach itwouldseemobviousthat themeaning of "legal ties"
can onlybeunderstood by ascribing to theterm "ties" aspecialcharacteristic
which differentiatesit from other kinds of ties, namely the characteristic of
being "legal". Admittedlythis raisesa difficultpoint sinceit appearsto invite
a preliminary analysisof what is meant by "law" which, likethe concept of
"sovereignty", jurists, philosophers and political theorists have debated for
sometwo thousand years.

Neverthelessif intellectual confusion is to be avoided the effort must be
madeto provide a specificcriterion by whichto differentiate one kind of tie
from another. Applied to the Western Sahara a tie, say betweenthe Sultan
and Ma ul-'Aineenor the Emir of the Adrar and the chiefsof nomadic tribes
can becharacterized asa legalone only if it expressesa relationshipin which
there is a sense of obligation of a special kind. Put more concretely the
evidence must support the view that the inhabitants of the territory had a
sense that the wishesof the Sultan or the Emir (however expressedand by

whatever investiture of authority) not only "should" be obeyed out of a
feelingof religiousaffiliationorcourtesy,but "must" be obeyedout ofa sense
of deferential obligation.This senseofobligationneednot be inspired by the
fear of sanctions, neverthelessit must exist in theenseof being pervasively
felt aspart of the wayof lifeof the people.The point isthat it isthis quality
which,at least intellectually,differentiates a tie based on religious,cultural,
ethnic, linguisticor other factors from one that islegal.

The broader approach which, in view of the posture of the case, is
applicable more particularly to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania asserts
that a concept oflawand henceof "legal"tiesismisconceivedifpatterned on
the kind of sense of obligation which now prevails in post-Reformation
westernoriented societies.In thesesocieties,eversincethe Reformation, the
senseof obligation to the sovereignhas been sharply focusedon his secular
authority which is not only paramount but permits a dissociation between
obligations owed to the State and those owedto religiousauthority.

Concepts of this kind are not applicable to a society,uch as prevailed in
the Sahara, inwhichadistinction between modesof authority are notsharply

delineated and are not part of the consciousnessof people. It is artificial, SAHARAOCCIDENTAL(OP. IND. DILLARD) 125

quelque peu minimisél'importance des liensjuridiques. Je tienscependant à
bien marquer que j'étaistout àfait conscient de la nécessitde considérerles
faits en fonction des circonstances de temps et de lieu.
A cet égardje me permettrai, au risque de paraître professoral,d'indiquer

deux méthodes distinctes susceptibles d'être appliquéespour analyser le
problème captivant qui consiste à déterminer lanature des liensjuridiques à
uneépoquedepuislongtemps révolueetdans une régionprésentant destraits
singuliers. L'une d'elle est hautement analytique; l'autre suit une démarche
plus ample et contredit en fait le postulat sur lequel repose la première.Je

prendrai d'abord la méthode analytique.
Dans cette méthode il paraît évident que le sens de l'expression «liens
juridiques » ne peut être compris que si I'on reconnaît aux « liens» une
caractéristique spéciale qui les différencie d'autres types de liens, cette
caractéristique étantqu'ils sont ((juridique». Bien sûr, on se heurte à une
difficulté,dans la mesure où cela paraît exiger une analyse préalable de ce

qu'on entend par le « droit »,concept que lesjuristes, les philosophes et les
spécialistesdes sciences politiques discutent depuis quelque deux mille ans,
de mêmeque celui de « souveraineté».
Néanmoins,si I'onveut évitertoute confusion intellectuelle, ilconvient de
s'efforcer de choisir un critère précis permettant de différencierun type de

lien d'un autre. Danslecas du Sahara occidental un lienexistant,disonsentre
leSultan et Ma elAïnin ou l'émirde l'Adrar et leschefsde tribusnomades,ne
peut êtrequalifiéde juridique que s'iltraduit une relation qui se caractérise
par un sentiment d'obligation d'une nature particulière. Plus concrètement,
les preuves dont on dispose doivent montrer que les habitants du territoire
étaient animéspar la conviction que les désirsdu Sultan ou de l'émir(de

quelque façon qu'ils s'expriment et par quelque autorité que ce soit) ne
devaient pas seulementêtre accomplis pour des considérations d'obédience
religieuse ou de courtoisie mais qu'il fallait qu'ils le soient dans un esprit
d'obligation déférente.Ce sentiment d'obligationda pas àêtre inspiré par la
crainte desanctions, mais ildoit pénétrertout lemode de viede lapopulation.
C'estcet aspectqualitatif qui, sur leplan intellectuelau moins, différencieun

lien fondésurlareligion,laculture,la race,lalangueoud'autres facteurs d'un
lien qui estjuridique.
La méthodeplus ample, qui s'applique plus particulièrement à la Répu-
blique islamique de Mauritanie dans l'affaire actuelle, reposesur leprincipe
qu'un concept «juridique »et donc de liens((juridiques»estinapplicable s'il
repose sur la notion d'obligation aujourd'hui répandue dans les sociétésdu

type occidental d'après la Réforme.Dans ces sociétésd ,epuis la Réforme,le
sentiment d'obligation au souverain est cantonnéau domaine de son auto-
ritéséculière,ce qui est non seulement fondamental, mais permet de diffé-
rencier lesobligations à l'égardde 1'Etatde celles qui sont dues aux autorités
religieuses.
w
Des notions semblablesne s'appliquent pas àune sociétécommecelle qui
existait au Sahara où I'on ne distinguait pas nettemen1 entre divers modes
d'autoritéet où laconsciencepopulaire restaitfermée àcesdistinctions. Ilest

117126 WESTERNSAHARA(SEP.OP. DILLARD)

therefore, to saythata tieisnot "legal" merelybecause it failsto qualify asone
in which a sense of obligation is owed vertically to the secular power of
someone with authority. The manifestation of power is neither secular nor
religious since the distinction, itself, has little meaning.

From al1this it follows that the relation between those in power in the
Mauritanian entity on the one hand and the wandering tribes, on the other
hand, is of secondary importance. The important thing is that the tribes
criss-crossing in the Western Sahara felt thernselves to be a part of a larger
wholè, whilealso claimingrights in the territory focused on the intermittent

possession of water-holes, burial grounds and grazing pastures. All this
should sufficeto characterize ties as being legal once we rid ourselves of the
preconceptions which identify "legal" with deference to mere secular
authority. Such an identification, applied to the Western Sahara, would be
responsive neither to reality nor to any notion of law then prevalent in time
and space.

While, in my view, the evidence failed to support any claim to territorial
sovereignty and while 1thought the evidence of sufficient allegiance to the
Sultan of Morocco was questionable, yet considerations of the kind noted
above made me reluctant to vote against the existence of any legal ties
whatever. At the sametime it seemsto be abundantly clear that attributing the
quality of being "legal" to the ties which existed in 1884has only limited

significance in the contemporary setting of the decolonization process. The
legal component only appears as a kind of gl-osson the bigger reality. The
bigger reality lies in the possibleense of unity and belonging which the
people themselves feel with respect to their own or neighbouring territories.
This can only be adequately determined by consulting them one way or
another. There is nothing to preclude them fromexpressing that feeling in

accordance with whatever procedures the General Assembly may see fit to
adopt including the choices indicated in resolutions 1541 (XV) and 2625
(XXV).

(Signed) Hardy C. DILLARD. SAHARA OCCIDENTAL (OP.IND. DILLARD) 126

donc artificiel de dire qu'un lien n'est pas ((juridi»simplement parce
qu'on ne peut découvrir aucun sentiment d'obligation allant, verticalement,

au pouvoir séculierou à une personne revêtuede l'autorité. Les manifes-
tations du pouvoir ne sont ni laïques ni religieuses,la distinction elle-même
n'ayant guèrede sens.
Il en résulteque la relationentre lesdétenteursdu pouvoir dans l'ensemble
mauritanien d'une part et les tribus errantes de l'autre ne présente qu'une
importance secondaire. Ce qui compte c'estque lestribus qui sillonnaient en

tous sensleSahara occidentalestimaientfaire partie de quelque chosede plus
vaste, tout en affirmant avoir dans le territoire des droits concernant la
possession intermittente de puits, de cimetièreset de pâturages. Cet élément
devrait suffireàcaractériserlesliens commedesliensjuridiques,une foisque
nous nous débarrassons des idéespréconçues qui assimilent les lien«juri-
diques » à la déférenceà une simple autorité laïque. Si on l'applique au
Sahara occidental, cette assimilation ne correspond ni aux réalitésni à une

notion de droit qui aurait alors prévaluedans le temps et dans l'espace.
Si, à mon avis, les élémentsdu dossier ne viennent pas à l'appui d'une
prétention quelconque à la souveraineté territoriale,et si les preuves d'une
allégeancesuffisante au sultan du Maroc m'ont paru peu convaincantes, des
considérations comme celles que je viens d'exposer m'ont retenu de me
prononcer contre l'existence de liens juridiques quels qu'ils soieIl.me

semble néanmoins tout à fait clair qu'attribuer la qualité de juridique aux
liens qui existaient en 1884n'a qu'unintérêt limdans le cadre contempo-
rain de la décolonisation. L'élémenjturidique n'estplus alors qu'une sorte de
vernis masquant des réalitésplus larges. Ces réalitésplus larges sont le
sentiment d'unité et de solidarité que les habitantseux-rnêmespeuvent
éprouverpar rapport àleurterritoire ou àdesterritoires voisins.Cesentiment

ne peut semanifester de façon adéquate quesilespopulations sontconsultées
d'une façon ou d'une autre. Rien ne les empêchede l'exprimer suivant les
modalités, qùelles qu'elles soient, que l'Assembléegénéralejugera utile
d'adopter, et englobant les options indiquéesdans les résolutions1 (XV)
et 2625(XXV).

(Signé )ardy C. DILLARD.

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Document Long Title

Separate Opinion of Judge Dillard

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