WESTERN SAHARA (ADVISORY OPINION) 69
that Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of
colonization by Spain wasnota territorybelonging to no-one (terranulliu;)
with regard to Question II,
by 14votesto 2,
that there werelegalties betweenthisterritory and the Kingdom of Morocco
of the kinds indicated in paragraph 162of this Opinion;
by 15votesto 1,
that there werelegal tiesbetweenthisterritory and the Mauritanian entity of
the kinds indicated in paragraph 162of this Opinion.
Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative, at the
Peace Palace,The Hague, this sixteenth day of October, one thousand nine
hundred and seventy-five,in two copies, of which one willbe placed in the
archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
(Signed) Manfred LACHS,
President.
(Signed S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.
Judge GROSmakes the followingdeclaration:
[Translation]
The request for advisory opinion, as1 understand it, puts to the Court a
precisequestion,relating toa certain legalcontroversy,to whichtheAdvisory
Opinion gives a complex reply; 1 was in agreement with the Court only in
respect of one part of that reply, whichwould have preferred to separate
from the rest ofthe operative part of the Opinion. Myanalysisof thefacts of
thecaseand the rulesofinterpretation whichshouldbeappliedtothemdiffers
fromtheobservationsmade bytheCourt, and 1consideritnecessarytogivea
brief account of the reasons for my approach to the problems raised by
examination oftheGeneralAssembly'srequest,the objectofwhichappearsto
meto be morelimited than that adopted in theAdvisoryOpinion.
1. In everycase,whether contentious or advisory,the firstquestion which
arisesfor a court is:What isbeing asked for? In the present case, right from WESTERNSAHARA (DECL. GROS) 70
the beginning of the proceedings it wasapparent that the General Assembly
was asking theCourt to giveit an opinion on a precise legal question, defined
as springing from a "legal controversy [which]arose" during the discussion
"over thestatus of thesaid Territory at the time of its colonization by Spain";
in the documentation supplied by the Secretary-General concerning the
period 1958-1974there is no trace of any specific legal question between
Morocco and Spain, which however the present Advisory Opinion has
described as a "legal dispute... regarding the Territory" (Order of 22 May
1975and para. 9 of the Opinion). 1therefore voted against the Order of 22
May, which, while it was devoted to the composition of the Court, inevitably
settled the question of the legal nature of the Opinion, as had already
happened in 1971(Legal ConsequencesforStates oftheContinuedPresenceof
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970),I.C.J. Reports 1971,pp. 16 K.) The problem 1
will deal with first is that of the definition of the object of the present request
for opinion, apart from the consequences of the Order on the composition of
the Court (cf. on this point para. 7 below). 1 consider that there is no
dispute - since that is the word used by the Court- between Morocco and
Spain, but a legal question raised by the Government of Morocco before the
General Assembly,with the support of the Mauritanian Government only in
1974,whichmaybe analysed as amultilateral legalcontroversy in adebateon
the future status of the territory of Western Sahara (hereinafter referred to as
the Territory). The subject of that legal question is as follows: is Morocco
entitled to claim reintegration of the Territory into the national territory of
the Kingdom of Morocco, to which itbelonged, according to Morocco, at the
time of colonization by Spain? Such is therefore the precise legal question,
and the sole question, to be answered by the Court; 1therefore regard the
reasoning of the Advisory Opinion on other subjects as unrelated to the
object of the request.
2. There is no need to dwell at length on the nature of the alleged dispute
between two Stateson such a question.The Court should examinethe titlesof
the Sherifian Empire prior to the time of coionization by Spain, even though
the date of 1884werenot a rigiddate.Proof of thesovereignty of the Sherifian
Empire isnecessarily a proof prior to the action of the Government of Spain,
and independent thereof; sincethe claim wasbased on thedetachment of part
of the territory of the Empire, it entails the need to prove prior appurtenance
to the territory of a State which wasthen recognized by the community of
States. Spain may of course have been one witness, among others, of the
situation, but it cannot be a party to a bilateral legal dispute which
"continued to subsist" (para. 36 of the Opinion) with the Kingdom of
Morocco over facts and a legal situation existing 90 years ago. For a dispute
really to exist between two States, it is necessary, as Judge Morelli, and
subsequently Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, have explained, in the Northern
Cameroons case(1.C.J.Reports 1963,p. 109),and subsequentlythecase of the
Advisory Opinion of 21June 1971(I.C.J. Reports 1971,p. 314),that: WESTERN SAHARA (DECL.GROS) 71
"... the one party [orparties]should be making, or should have made, a
complaint, claim or protest aboutan act, omission or course of conduct,
presënt or past of the other party, which the latter refutes, rejects or
denies the validity of, either expressly, or else implicitly by persisting in
the acts, omissions or conduct complained of, or by failing to take the
action or make the reparation, demanded".
It is not enough that two States may havedifferent or even opposing views
asto an event or~situationfor there tobe acontentious case,and the end of the
passagequoted makesthisclear: ifit isnot possible for any satisfaction for the
claim of the one State to be obtained from the other, there is no dispute
between them. Now what responsecould the Government of Spain make to a
claim of theGovernment of Morocco concerning the right of reintegration of
the Territory into theKingdom of Morocco, when these two Governments
have specifically agreed to effect the decolonization of the Territory by a
procedure set in motion within the United Nations, except to reply that it had
no competence to settle by itself this problem which the two Governments,
along with many others, are debating & various United Nations bodies. Even
if the Government of Spain had agreed to support the claim of the
Government of Morocco, such an attitude would havebeen without any legal
effect in the international sphere. The two Governments have explicitly
chosen decolonization in the context of the United Nations, in order to study
and ultimatelysettle thefuture of theTerritory, with the other Membersof the
United Nations. There is no bilateral dispute which is detachable from the
United Nations debate on the decolonization; there is no bilateral dispute at
all, nor has there ever been any such dispute.
3. In the Advisory Opinion the Court has not re-used the expression
"legal dispute. ..regarding the Territory" between the Governments of
Morocco and Spain, used inthe Order of 22May;paragraphs 34to 41slightly
modify the analysis, and refer to a legal controversy which arose not in
bilateral relations but during theproceedings of theGeneral Assembly,and in
relation tomatters with whichitwasdealing. Buttheground of theOrder of 22
May was an alleged bilateral dispute, since a judgead hoc was accepted for
Morocco and refused for Mauritania. Despite the stylisticdevelopment in the
Opinion, the reasoning is still that a legal controversy continued to subsist
between Morocco and Spain, and this is, itseemsto me, not maintainable for
the reasons of substance which 1 have briefly outlined. It is also not
maintainable in the light of,the history of how the alleged dispute took
concrete shape. When examAing the documents submitted, the Court has
correctly noted that between 1958and 1974the controversy had several
aspects. Between1966and 1974itsofar faded away that itwasleftasidebythe
claimant State, apart from reservations intended to prevent it being argued
that its legal contention had been abandoned. Prior to 1966,however, the
opposition ofviewsbetween Morocco and Spain nevergotbeyondthestage of
bilateral diplomatic conversations, or discussions of principle in the United WESTERNSAHARA (DECL.GROS) 72
Nations; the dossier before the Court does not contain a single trace of a
negotiation which might appearto be a preliminary to the crystallization of a
bilateral dispute. After having tried the wayof negotiation with Spain inorder
to obtain solutions the nature of which the dossier does not make clear, the
Government of Morocco stated on 7 June 1966that it would choose another
way, that of "the liberation and independence of the Moroccan people of
so-called Spanish Sahara ...in the conviction that unity could be achieved
onlythroughliberation and independence. .."(A/AC.109/SR.436, p. 8).The
allegeddispute had not crystallized up to that time, and insubsequent debates
itwasnot until the 1974sessionof theGeneral Assemblythat, according to the
Court, it "reappeared".
4. In connection with the Advisory Opinion of 21June 1971 (I.C.J.
Reports 1971,pp. 329-330),1have enquired into the elements for solution of
the problem posed by the parallel existence of a dispute between two or more
States and of a situation of which the political organ of the United Nations
was seised,and 1then took the viewthat the factthat a general situation was
being dealt with within the United Nations could not bring about the
disappearanceof the element of a dispute between States ifthere existed such
an element,and that in eachcasethe firstquestion waswhether one isor isnot
confronted with what is really a dispute. 1do not see that in the present case
there is any dispute between Morocco and Spain; there cannot be a dispute
over a legal issue which neither of the States can resolve by themselves.The
disagreement in al1 the United Nations debates concerns a problem any
solution of which is meaningless unless it isvalid erga omnes; in the present
case there is no bilateral dispute which can be detached from the general
discussion of the claim of the Government of Morocco to re-integration of
the Territory, but what isdetachable from the general discussion isa point of
law of general interest on which the General Assembly considers itself
insufficiently informed, and which it asks the Court to settle in order to be
able to continue its examination of the decolonization of the Territory. This
point may of course be of more particular interest to certain member States,
and that isthe reason whythey are mentioned in resolution 3292(XXIX), but
these States are not making specificclaims against each other, and there isno
dispute.
5.Apart from the important legal interest of principle involved in the
discussion of the point, the principal consequence of the difference between
the alleged bilateral dispute and a legal question falling within the advisory
competence of the Court has been an erroneous decison taken as to the
composition of the Court, and further the fact that the presentation of the
Advisory Opinion is a precise transposition of what is customary in
contentious proceedings. 1find it regrettable that the Court should in the
Opinion haveconfirmed the viewprovisionally taken in the Order of 22 May,
and-associating myself with the reservations of other Members of the
Court- 1maintain that that analysis did not take account of the necessary
conditions for the existence of real disputes to be recognized. This isal1the
more so in that, by conceding in the advisory opinion that the subject of its WESTERNSAHARA(DECL.GROS) 73
examination depended on the interpretation of the decolonization action of
the Territory, the Court in effectabandoned the viewthat there wasabilateral
opposition between Morocco and Spain as to the re-integration of the
Territory into theKingdom of Morocco.
6. The question whether, within the decolonization process of Western
Sahara commenced by the United Nations, one or two States can invoke a
right to re-integration of theTerritory soas toome under their sovereignty is
a legal question within the meaning of Article 65 of the Statute of the Court,
and it is proper to give a reply thereto. But the definition of legal questions
within the meaning of Article 65, as formulated in a general way in
paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Advisory Opinion, seems to me dangerously
inaccurate. 1 shall merely recall that when the Court gives an advisory
opinion on a question of law it Statesthe law. The absence of binding force
does not transform the judicial operation into a legal consultation, which
may be made use of or not according to choice. The advisory opinion
determines the law applicable to the question put; it is possible for the body
which sought the opinion not to follow it in its action, but that body is aware
that no position adopted contrary to the Court's pronouncement will have
any effectiveness whatsoever in the legal sphere. In the present case, as
defined in the Advisory Opinion, this point is no longer in doubt; since the
question put has been found to be a legal one, and since a reply could be
regarded as capable of influencing the United Nations action of
decolonization of the Territory, the Court could exercise its function as a
judicial organ on such a question in the normal way, unlike the case
contemplated in 1963 when it stated that: "it is not the function of a Court
merely to provide a basis for political action if no question of actual legal
rights is involved" (I.C.J. Reports 1963,p. 37, emphasis added). The Court's
reply concerns a claim of right to re-integration of theTerritory at thepresent
time, and the fact that the first test of that right was that of the titles prior to
colonization does not make such a question abstract or academic. That isnot
so with regard to the other part of the reply which the Court has given in
paragraph 162of theOpinion, as weshall seein paragraphs 1Oand 12of these
observations; it is the application of this theory, which gives an extensive
meaning to Article 65 of the Statute, to the operative part of the Opinion
which shows how improper it is.
7. To conclude on this aspect of the problems of competence which have
arisen for the Court,1shall merely observe that once again the commitments
entered into in an Order on a preliminary question have tied the Court's
hands. The recitals in the Order of 22 May 1975 were based on the
"appearance" of a dispute between Morocco and Spain and of a requeston a
legal question pending between two or more States within the meaning of
Article 89 of the Rules; the verb "appear" is used four times. The Court
however then went on to Saythat its conclusions did not prejudge its position
on any of thequestionssubsequently to be decided,competence,propriety of
replying to the request, merits. Despite the effective disappearance of the
bilateral dispute in the Court's train of reasoning in its Opinion, and the veil WESTERN SAHARA (DECL. GROS) 74
drawn over the existence of a legal question pending between States, the
Court has been unable or unwilling to modify what it said in May 1975,
although thereason for the appointment of ajudge ad hocdoes not stand. The
third recital in the Order states that the Court "includes upon the Bench a
judge of the nationality of Spain, the administering Power of Western
aha ara" ;havepointed out in paragraphs 2and 4 above that Spain was not,
on the basis of that or any other status, a party to a bilateral dispute, orto the
settlement of a legal question pending between two or more States. By
deciding that the question put to the Court was linked to the pursuit of the
General Assembly'sdecolonization process, the Court impliedlyadmits that
the justification for its cornpetence is no longer the dispute which there
"appeared" to be in May 1975. Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and 1
commented in 1971 on the regrettable effects of these Orders on the
composition of the Court which irrevocably prejudge the merits (I.C.J.
Reports 1971,p. 316,pp. 325-326and 330). 1should add, in the present case,
thattheCourt allowed one of its Members to sitalthough hehad in theUnited
Nations committed himself on one element in the discussion(on thispoint cf.
I.C.J.Reports 1971,the dissenting opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, p. 309,
and my own observations on pp. 311 ff.).
8. My observations on the problerns raised by the Government of
Mauritania essentiallydo not differfrom those of the Court; 1would however
observe that the legal position of the Government of Mauritania in the
proceedings before the Court was peculiar, inasmuch as prior to 1974it did
not seek to set up its claim for reintegration of the Territory into its national
territory against the normal pursuit of the procedure for self-determination
of the population of the Territory in the United Nations context.
9. The above considerations asto theproper interpretation of Article 65of
the Statute and the precise object of the request for advisory opinion enable
meto be brief in explaining my negativevoteasto the propriety of replying to
the first question in the request. Since the Court decided to reply to this
question in the very terms in which ithas been put, 1took the view that the
question wasnot a legalone, that it waspurelyacademic and served no useful
purpose, and 1share the views ofJudge Dillard asto itsbeing a "loaded" one.
The Advisory Opinion rightly recognizes that the concept of terranulliuswas
never relied on by any of the States interested in the status of the Territory at
the time of colonization; no treaty or diplomatic document has been
produced relying on this concept in connection with Western Sahara, and
States at the time spoke only of zones of influence. With regard to a territory WESTERNSAHARA (DECL.GROS) 75
in respect of whichtheconceptmakesno appearance in thepractice of States,
it is a sterile exercise to ask the Court to pronounce on a hypothetical
situation; itis not for a court to enquire into what would have happened in
1884if Stateshad relied on thisconcept,but into what did happen. If the real
questionput by the General Assembly,in the thinking of those whodrafted it,
was what was the legal status of the Territory under international law at the
time, it duplicated the second question, to which the Court has, almost
unanimously,agreed to reply.
Having said that, since the Court has decided to give a reply to the first
question, and since our rules do not permit an abstention, 1have voted with
al1my colleagues that the Territory was not nulliusbefore colonization; for 1
consider that the independent tribes travellingoverthe territory, or stopping
in certain places, exercised a de facto authority which was sufficiently
recognized for there to have been no terra nullius.
10. The Court has not adopted the simplest way of giving its reply to the
second question, since the reply itself, inasmuch as it is effected by
cross-reference to paragraph 162 of the reasoning, is enigmatic, as is the
paragraph referred to, in which a positive finding of what aresaid to be legal
ties of allegiance between certain nomadic tribes of the territory and the
Emperor of Morocco at thetime of colonization, and alsoother ties whichare
said tobe legal,thistime between the Mauritanian entity and the Territory, is
combined with a negative decision asto the existenceof anytie of sovereignty
overthe territory on the part of the Emperor of Morocco or the Mauritanian
entity,the conclusion being that no legal tie exists which could influence the
principle of self-determinationthrough thefree and genuine expression ofthe
will of the peoples of the Territory (with a fresh cross-reference here to
paras. 54-59of the opinion).
The second part of paragraph 162,concerning the question of territorial
sovereignty, is the only one which corresponds to the question put in the
request for opinion. The object of the request, as 1 said in my very first
paragraph above, was to obtain the opinion of the Court on a claim of the
Government of Morocco to the reintegration of the Territory in the national
territory of Morocco, and on a parallel claim by the Government of
Mauritania based on the concept of the Mauritanian entity at the time in
question, which advisory opinion was necessary prior to pursuit of the
decolonization of the territory. 1agree with the views and decision of the
Court on this point of law.
On the other hand, if paragraph 162 had been divided into two, 1would
have voted against the firstpart which relates to the "legal ties"otheran the
tie of territorial sovereignty,ecause those ties are not legal ties but ethnic,
religious or cultural ties, ties ofcontact of a civilization with what lies on its
periphery and outside it, and which do not touch on its own nature. 1must WESTERNSAHARA (DECL. GROS) 76
therefore make a fewobservations on thepart of the Court's replywith which
1disagree, both as regards the reasoning and the conclusion (for Morocco,
paras. 105, 106, 107, 129; for Mauritania, paras. 151 and 152; for the
conclusion, para. 162).
11. The description given in the Opinion of the Saharan desert and of
nomadic life in 1884 is an idyllic vision of what was a harsh reality. At the
time, the Saharan desert was still the frontierless sea of sand used by the
caravans asconvoys usean ocean, for the ,wrposes of a well-known trade; the
desert was a way ofaccess to markets on it: periphery. The relation between
the territory and human beings was affected by these aspects, and the
organization of the populations of thedesert reflectsthese special conditions
of life:caravans, thequest for pastures, oases,defence or conquest,protection
and submission between tribes - with regard to which testimonyproduced to
the Court, and not disputed, was to the effectthat in modern times there are
173 Moorish tribes. Since the Court was unable to cary out any specific
research,it isvain to makegeneralizations, in theabsence of any reliable data,
on the linesthat there was "allegiance" between the Emperor of Morocco and
"some" of the nomadic tribes, or "some rights relating to the land", between
the Territory and the Mauritanian entity, when the Court would be quite
unable to say either what were the tribes concerned in 1884,to what extent
and for what period, nor in what effectiveexercise of rights relating to the
land the tribes and the Mauritanian entity were combined, nor what tribes,
nor for what period. It is the duty of acourt to establishfacts, that isto sayto
make findings as to their existence, and it confers a legal meaning upon them
by its decision; a court may neither suppose the existence of factsnoreduce
them from hypotheses unsupported by evidence. How can one speak of a
legal tie of allegiance, a concept of feudal law in an extremely hierarchical
Society,in which allegiance was an obligation which was assumed formally
and publicly, which was known to all, was relied on on both sides, and was
backed by specific procedures and not merely by the force of arms. The
political situation, in the broadest senseof the term, of the tribes of the desert
is that of independence asserted by arms, independence both between the
tribes themselves and with regard to what lay on the periphery of their
travelling grounds. To give the term allegiance its traditional sense, more
wouldhave to be said than that itwas possible that the Sultan displayedsome
authority over some unidentified tribes of the desert (para. 105 of the
Opinion). As to the observations and deductions made as to the role of the
various Tekna tribes, also unidentified, these seem to me injudicious, mere a
posterioriconstructions of a littleknown epoch. On the basis of thedossier as
it stands, and of the studies of this period by geographers, historians,
explorers and soldiers, the Saharan desert and its tribes did not recognize
allegiance in the legal sense of the word, and sporadic contacts or
relationships with the outside world did not affect the peculiarity and
exclusivity-of their way of life. If the desert is a separateworld, it is an
autonomous world in the conception of its relationships with those who have
a different way of life. WESTERN SAHARA (DECL. GROS) 77
12. Contact-relationships of which the duration is unknown, and the
existence of which at the period of colonization is supposed rather than
proved, do not afford possible material for the Court to examine and on
which to reply,and by doing so it overstepsthe limits of the powers conferred
upon it by Article 65 of its Statute (cf. para.6 above). By means of the
extensive interpretation given to Article65,whereby the Court wasled to put
to itselfa secondquestion, that of the legaltiesotherhan sovereigntyoverthe
Territory at the period under consideration, which was the solesubject of the
controversy which gave rise to the request for opinion,theCourt purports to
be replying to a legal question, but the ties which it describes as legal would
only be so if, after having established their existence, the Court could in
any way, by determining their significance, produce an effect on the
decolonization of the Territory. The Court cannot attribute a legal nature to
facts which do not intrinsically possess it; a court does not create the law, it
establishes it. If there is nole of law making it possible for it to assert the
existence of the alleged legal ties, the Court oversteps its role as a judicial
organ by describing them as legal, and its finding is not a legal finding;the
Court's statement in paragraph 73 of the Opinion that questions put in a
request for opinion must have "a practical and contemporary effect" if they
are not to be "devoid of object or purpose", does not suffice,for the Court
does not in this fieldhave capacity to "give advice" to the General Assembly
which would have a practical effect. Whether such factors existed in 1884 or
not - which has not been "established" in thejudicial sense of the word - the
General Assembly would be free to take them into account together with
other contemporary factors, which also do not fa11within the Court's
competence, because economics, sociology and human geography are not
law. In 1962 the Court said: "in accordance with Article 65 of its Statute, the
Court can give an advisory opinion only on a legal question. If a question is
not a legalone,the Court has no discretion in the matter" (AdvisoryOpinion
of 20 July 1962, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,para-
graph2,ofthe Charter),I.C.J.Reports 1962,p. 155).
13. 1expressed myviewin 1974 astothecurrent trend in theCourt to reply
to problems which it raises itself rather than to that which is submitted to it,
and can only endorse what 1said then (I.C.J. Reports 1974.pp. 148-149). In
the present case, the way in which the operative part of the Advisory Opinion
has been drawn has obliged me to vote in a way as unsatisfactory as that
drafting itself, as isshown by the various opinions in relation to the apparent
quasi-unanimity. Likeother Members of the Court, 1was faced only with the
choice between agreeing or disagreeingsubject in eithereventto reservations.
1 voted in favour of the adoption of the operative clause, and thus of
paragraph 162, because of the part thereof concerning the object of the
request, as 1havedefined it above, that isto sayverification of theexistence of
legaltiesofappurtenance or dependence of thepopulation of theTerritory, at
the period under consideration, vis-à-vis an external political authority -in
short, tiesrelating to thesovereignty which wasclaimedbefore theCourt; and
the role of the Court went no further than that.
69 SAHARA OCCIDENTAL (AVISCONSULTATIF)
que le Sahara occidental (Rio de Oro et Sakiet El Hamra) n'était pasun
territoire sans maître (terra nulliua su) moment de la colonisation par
l'Espagne;
En ce qui concerne la question II,
par quatorze voix contre deux,
que le territoire avait, avec le Royaume du Maroc, des liens juridiques
possédantles caractères indiqués auparagraphe 162du présentavis;
par quinze voix contre une,
que le territoire avait, avec l'ensemble mauritanien, des liens juridiques
possédantlescaractères indiqués auparagraphe 162du présentavis.
Fait en français et en anglais, le texte français faisant foi, au palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le seize octobre mil neuf cent soixante-quinze, en deux
exemplaires, dont l'un restera déposé aux archivesde la Cour et dont l'autre
sera transmis au Secrétaire généradle l'organisation des Nations Unies.
Le Président,
(Signé) Manfred LACHS.
Le Greffier,
(Signé) S. AQUARONE.
M. GROS,juge, fait la déclaration suivante:
Telle que je l'entends, la requête pouravis consultatif pose à la Cour une
question précise,relativeunecertainecontroversejuridique, àlaquelle l'avis
consultatif donne uneréponsecomplexe;je n'aiétéd'accord avecla Courque
pour une partie de cette réponseque j'aurais souhaitéisoler du reste de la
partie dispositive de I'avis. Monanalyse des faits de la cause et des règlesde
l'interprétation qu'il convient de leur appliquer est différente des observa-
tions faites par la Cour etje crois nécessaired'exposer brièvementlesraisons
de mon approche des problèmes soulevés par l'étudede la requêtede
l'Assembléegénéraledont l'objet me paraît plus limitéque celui retenu dans
l'avisconsultatif.
1. Dans toute affaire contentieuse ou consultative, la première question
qui seposeaujuge est: quel estl'objetde lademande? En l'espèceilestapparu WESTERN SAHARA (ADVISORY OPINION) 69
that Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of
colonization by Spain wasnota territorybelonging to no-one (terranulliu;)
with regard to Question II,
by 14votesto 2,
that there werelegalties betweenthisterritory and the Kingdom of Morocco
of the kinds indicated in paragraph 162of this Opinion;
by 15votesto 1,
that there werelegal tiesbetweenthisterritory and the Mauritanian entity of
the kinds indicated in paragraph 162of this Opinion.
Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative, at the
Peace Palace,The Hague, this sixteenth day of October, one thousand nine
hundred and seventy-five,in two copies, of which one willbe placed in the
archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
(Signed) Manfred LACHS,
President.
(Signed S. AQUARONE,
Registrar.
Judge GROSmakes the followingdeclaration:
[Translation]
The request for advisory opinion, as1 understand it, puts to the Court a
precisequestion,relating toa certain legalcontroversy,to whichtheAdvisory
Opinion gives a complex reply; 1 was in agreement with the Court only in
respect of one part of that reply, whichwould have preferred to separate
from the rest ofthe operative part of the Opinion. Myanalysisof thefacts of
thecaseand the rulesofinterpretation whichshouldbeappliedtothemdiffers
fromtheobservationsmade bytheCourt, and 1consideritnecessarytogivea
brief account of the reasons for my approach to the problems raised by
examination oftheGeneralAssembly'srequest,the objectofwhichappearsto
meto be morelimited than that adopted in theAdvisoryOpinion.
1. In everycase,whether contentious or advisory,the firstquestion which
arisesfor a court is:What isbeing asked for? In the present case, right from 70 SAHARA OCCIDENTAL(DÉCL. GROS)
dèsledébutde laprocédureque l'Assembléegénérale demandait àla Cour de
luidonner un avissurune questionjuridique précise,définiecomme résultant
d'une ((controverse juridique [qui] a surgi au cours des débatsau sujet du
statut dudit territoire au moment de sa colonisation par l'Espagne »;dans la
documentation fournie par le Secrétairegénéraslur la période1958-1974 ne
se trouve aucunetrace d'une questionjuridique particulièreentre le Maroc et
l'Espagneque,cependant, leprésentavisconsultatifa qualifiéede «différend
juridique relatif au territo»r(ordonnance du 22 mai 1975 et paragraphe 9
de I'avis).J'ai donc votécontre I'ordonnance du22 mai qui, consacréeà la
composition de la Cour, a inévitablementtranché la question du caractère
juridique de I'avis, comme déjà en 1971 (Conséquencesjuridiques pour les
Etats de la présencecontinue de l'Afriquedu Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest
africain) nonobstant la résolution76 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité,C.I.J.
Recueil1971,p. 16et suiv.). Leproblèmequeje traiteraid'abord estceluide la
définitionde l'objet de la présentedemande d'avis, en dehors des consé-
quences de I'ordonnance sur la composition de la Cour (cf. sur ce point le
paragraphe 7 infra).Je considèrequ'iln'existepas de différen- puisque le
mot est employépar la Cour - entre le Maroc et l'Espagne, mais une
questionjuridique soulevéepar le Gouvernement du Maroc devant I'Assem-
bléegénéraleà , laquelle s'estassociée1974 seulement le Gouvernement de
la Mauritanie, s'analysant en une controversejuridique multilatérale dans un
débatsur lestatutfutur du territoire du Sahara occidental (désignédésormais
comme le Territoire). L'objet de cette question juridique est le suivant: le
Maroc est-il en droit de réclamer la réintégrationdu Territoire dans le
territoire national du Royaume du Maroc auquel il appartenait, selon cet
Etat, au moment de la colonisation espagnole? Telle est donc la question
juridique préciseà laquelle la Cour doit répondre et à celle-ci seulement, ce
qui m'amène à tenir les développements de I'avis consultatif sur d'autres
sujets comme dépourvusde rapport avec l'objet de la requête.
2. Iln'estpas nécessaire d'insisterlonguement sur lecaractèredu prétendu
différendentredeux Etatssur une tellequestion. La Cour devait examiner les
titres de l'Empire chérifienavant le moment de la colonisation espagnole,
mêmesi la date de 1884 n'était pasune date rigide. La preuve de la
souverainetéde l'Empirechérifien estnécessairementune preuveantérieureà
l'action du Gouvernement de l'Espagne et indépendante de cette action; la
réclamation étant fondée surle détachement d'une partie du territoire de
l'Empire entraîne la nécessitéde prouver l'appartenance antérieure au
territoire d'un Etat alors reconnu par la communauté des Etats. L'Espagne
peut, certes, avoir étéun témoinde la situation parmi d'autres, mais elle ne
peut pas être unepartie à un différendjuridique bilatéral qu« a persist»
(par. 36 de I'avis)avec le Royaume du Maroc surdes faits et une situation de
droit advenus il y a quatre-vingt-dix ans. Pour qu'un différend existe
réellement entre deux Etats il faut, comme M. Morelli puis sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice l'ont exposé en l'affaire du Cameroun septentrional (C.I.J.
Recueil1963,p. 109)et en cellede I'avisd21 juin 1971(C.I.J. Recueil1971,
p.3 14),que: WESTERNSAHARA (DECL. GROS) 70
the beginning of the proceedings it wasapparent that the General Assembly
was asking theCourt to giveit an opinion on a precise legal question, defined
as springing from a "legal controversy [which]arose" during the discussion
"over thestatus of thesaid Territory at the time of its colonization by Spain";
in the documentation supplied by the Secretary-General concerning the
period 1958-1974there is no trace of any specific legal question between
Morocco and Spain, which however the present Advisory Opinion has
described as a "legal dispute... regarding the Territory" (Order of 22 May
1975and para. 9 of the Opinion). 1therefore voted against the Order of 22
May, which, while it was devoted to the composition of the Court, inevitably
settled the question of the legal nature of the Opinion, as had already
happened in 1971(Legal ConsequencesforStates oftheContinuedPresenceof
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970),I.C.J. Reports 1971,pp. 16 K.) The problem 1
will deal with first is that of the definition of the object of the present request
for opinion, apart from the consequences of the Order on the composition of
the Court (cf. on this point para. 7 below). 1 consider that there is no
dispute - since that is the word used by the Court- between Morocco and
Spain, but a legal question raised by the Government of Morocco before the
General Assembly,with the support of the Mauritanian Government only in
1974,whichmaybe analysed as amultilateral legalcontroversy in adebateon
the future status of the territory of Western Sahara (hereinafter referred to as
the Territory). The subject of that legal question is as follows: is Morocco
entitled to claim reintegration of the Territory into the national territory of
the Kingdom of Morocco, to which itbelonged, according to Morocco, at the
time of colonization by Spain? Such is therefore the precise legal question,
and the sole question, to be answered by the Court; 1therefore regard the
reasoning of the Advisory Opinion on other subjects as unrelated to the
object of the request.
2. There is no need to dwell at length on the nature of the alleged dispute
between two Stateson such a question.The Court should examinethe titlesof
the Sherifian Empire prior to the time of coionization by Spain, even though
the date of 1884werenot a rigiddate.Proof of thesovereignty of the Sherifian
Empire isnecessarily a proof prior to the action of the Government of Spain,
and independent thereof; sincethe claim wasbased on thedetachment of part
of the territory of the Empire, it entails the need to prove prior appurtenance
to the territory of a State which wasthen recognized by the community of
States. Spain may of course have been one witness, among others, of the
situation, but it cannot be a party to a bilateral legal dispute which
"continued to subsist" (para. 36 of the Opinion) with the Kingdom of
Morocco over facts and a legal situation existing 90 years ago. For a dispute
really to exist between two States, it is necessary, as Judge Morelli, and
subsequently Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, have explained, in the Northern
Cameroons case(1.C.J.Reports 1963,p. 109),and subsequentlythecase of the
Advisory Opinion of 21June 1971(I.C.J. Reports 1971,p. 314),that:71 SAHARAOCCIDENTAL(DÉCL. GROS)
l'unedes parties [oulesparties] formule ou ait formulé,àpropos d'une
action, d'une omission ou d'un comportement présentsou passésde
l'autre Partie, un grief, une prétention ou une protestation que ladite
Partie conteste, rejette ou dont elle dénie lavalidité,soit expressément,
soit implicitement en persistant dans l'action, l'omission ou le compor-
tement incriminés,ou bien en ne prenant pas la mesure demandée,ou
encore en n'accordant pas la réparation souhaité».
IInesuffitpas que deux Etatsaient desthèsesdifférentesou mêmeopposées
sur un événemeno t u une situation pour qu'ily ait une affairecontentieuse et
la fin du passage citéle montre bien; si'Etat réclamantne peut obtenir de
l'autre Etat aucune satisfaction de sa réclamation,il n'y a pas de différend
entre eux. Or, que pouvait répondre le Gouvernement de I'Espagne à une
demande du Gouvernement du Maroc concernant le droit de réintégration
du Territoire dans le Royaume du Maroc,alors que cesdeux gouvernements
ont formellement acceptéde procéderà la décolonisation du Territoire par
une procédureentreprise au sein de l'organisation des Nations Unies, sinon
qu'il n'avait pas compétence pour déciderseul ce problème que les deux
gouvernements, avec bien d'autres, débattent dans divers organes des
Nations Unies. Mêmesi le Gouvernement de l'Espagne avait accepté
d'appuyer la revendication du Gouvernement du Maroc, une telle attitude
eût été dépourvued'effet juridique sur le plan international. Les deux
-ouvernements ont choisi formellement la décolonisation dans le cadre des
Nations Unies pour étudieret finalement réglerl'avenirdu Territoire,avec les
autres Membres des Nations Unies. 11n'y a pas de différend bilatéral
détachabledu débatsur la décolonisationaux Nations Unies, il n'ya pas de
différendbilatéraldu tout et il n'yen a jamais eu.
3. La Cour n'a pas repris dans l'avis consultatif les termes ((différend
juridique relatif au territoi»eentre les Gouvernements du Maroc et de
l'Espagne, utilisésdans l'ordonnance du 22 mai: les paragraphes 34 à 41
modifient légèrement l'analyse ep tarlent de controverse juridique néeen
dehors de relations bilatérales, lorsdes débatsaux Nations Unies et au sujet
de problèmestraitéspar l'AssembléegénéraleM . ais lemotif de l'ordonnance
du 22 mai étaitbien un prétendu différendbilatéral puisqu'un juge ad hoc
étaitadmispour le Maroc et refusépour la Mauritanie. Et, malgrêl'évolution
du style de I'avis, leraisonnement demeure qu'une controverse juridique a
persistéentre le Maroc et I'Espagne etceci est, me semble-t-il, insoutenable
pour les motifs de fond brièvement rappelés.C'est également insoutenable
dans l'histoire de la concrétisationdu prétendu différend.En examinant les
documents présentésla Cour rappelle justement que, entre 1958 et 1974,la
controverse eut plusieurs aspects. Entre 1966et 1974elle s'estompe au point
d'êtrelaisséede côté par le réclamant, en dehors de réservesdestinées à
maintenir sa thèsejuridique contre l'argument d'abandon. Mais, avant 1966,
l'opposition de vues entre Maroc et Espagne n'a jamais dépasséle stade de
l'entretien diplomatique bilatéralou du débatd'idéesaux Nations Unies; le
dossiersoumis à la Cour ne comporte pas une seule trace de négociation qui WESTERN SAHARA (DECL.GROS) 71
"... the one party [orparties]should be making, or should have made, a
complaint, claim or protest aboutan act, omission or course of conduct,
presënt or past of the other party, which the latter refutes, rejects or
denies the validity of, either expressly, or else implicitly by persisting in
the acts, omissions or conduct complained of, or by failing to take the
action or make the reparation, demanded".
It is not enough that two States may havedifferent or even opposing views
asto an event or~situationfor there tobe acontentious case,and the end of the
passagequoted makesthisclear: ifit isnot possible for any satisfaction for the
claim of the one State to be obtained from the other, there is no dispute
between them. Now what responsecould the Government of Spain make to a
claim of theGovernment of Morocco concerning the right of reintegration of
the Territory into theKingdom of Morocco, when these two Governments
have specifically agreed to effect the decolonization of the Territory by a
procedure set in motion within the United Nations, except to reply that it had
no competence to settle by itself this problem which the two Governments,
along with many others, are debating & various United Nations bodies. Even
if the Government of Spain had agreed to support the claim of the
Government of Morocco, such an attitude would havebeen without any legal
effect in the international sphere. The two Governments have explicitly
chosen decolonization in the context of the United Nations, in order to study
and ultimatelysettle thefuture of theTerritory, with the other Membersof the
United Nations. There is no bilateral dispute which is detachable from the
United Nations debate on the decolonization; there is no bilateral dispute at
all, nor has there ever been any such dispute.
3. In the Advisory Opinion the Court has not re-used the expression
"legal dispute. ..regarding the Territory" between the Governments of
Morocco and Spain, used inthe Order of 22May;paragraphs 34to 41slightly
modify the analysis, and refer to a legal controversy which arose not in
bilateral relations but during theproceedings of theGeneral Assembly,and in
relation tomatters with whichitwasdealing. Buttheground of theOrder of 22
May was an alleged bilateral dispute, since a judgead hoc was accepted for
Morocco and refused for Mauritania. Despite the stylisticdevelopment in the
Opinion, the reasoning is still that a legal controversy continued to subsist
between Morocco and Spain, and this is, itseemsto me, not maintainable for
the reasons of substance which 1 have briefly outlined. It is also not
maintainable in the light of,the history of how the alleged dispute took
concrete shape. When examAing the documents submitted, the Court has
correctly noted that between 1958and 1974the controversy had several
aspects. Between1966and 1974itsofar faded away that itwasleftasidebythe
claimant State, apart from reservations intended to prevent it being argued
that its legal contention had been abandoned. Prior to 1966,however, the
opposition ofviewsbetween Morocco and Spain nevergotbeyondthestage of
bilateral diplomatic conversations, or discussions of principle in the Unitedpuisse paraître un préliminaireà la concrétisation d'un différend bilatéral.
Après avoir tenté lavoie de la négociation avecl'Espagne pour obtenir des
solutions que le dossier ne précise pas, leGouvernement du Maroc a déclaré
le 7 juin 1966 choisir une autre voie, celle de« la libération et de I'indé-
pendance des populations marocaines du Sahara dit espagnol ..per-
suadé que.le chemin de l'unité passepar la libération et l'indépendance »
(A/AC.109/SR.436, p. 8). Le prétendu différend ne s'était pas concrétisé
jusqu'alors et dans lesdébatsultérieursil faut attendre la sessiondeAssem-
bléegénéralede 1974où,selonla Cour, il « reparaît».
4. Ayant recherché à propos de l'avis consultatif du 21 juin 1971(C.Z.J.
Recueil 1971, p. 329-330) les élémentsde solution du problème que pose
l'existence parallèle d'un différendentre deux ou plusieurs Etats et d'une
situation dont serait saisi un organe politique des Nations Unies, je con-
sidéraisque le fait detraiter une situation générale au seindes NationsUnies
ne pouvait fairedisparaître l'élément-différendntre Etats, s'il enexisteun à
la base de cette situation généraleet que, dans chaque cas, la première
question étaitde savoir sil'on esten présenceou non d'un véritabledifférend.
Je ne vois pas que, dans le cas présent,il y ait de différendentre Maroc et
Espagne; ilne peut pas y avoir de différendsurun point de droit que niunni
l'autre de ces Etats ne peuvent trancher par eux-mêmes.La contestation dans
tous lesdébatsaux Nations Unies porte sur un problèmedont la solution n'a
de sens que si elleest valable eromnes; en l'espèceil n'ya pas de différend
bilatéraldétachable du débatgénéralsur la réclamation du Gouvernement
du Maroc de réintégration du Territoiremais ce qui est détachabledu débat
généralc'est un point de droit d'intérêt générp alur lequel l'Assemblée
générales'estimemal informéeet qu'elle demande à la Cour de déterminer
afin de pouvoir poursuivïe l'examen de la décolonisation du Territoire. Ce
point peut certes intéresser plus spécialementtels Etats Membres et c'est la
raison pour laquelle ilssont mentionnésdans la résolution3292(XXIX), ces
Etats ne s'opposent pas des réclamations particulières,il n'ya pas différend.
5. Hors l'important intérêt juridiquede principe que comporte la discus-
sion du point, la différence entre le prétendu différend bilatéral et une
question juridique relevant de la compétence consultative de la Cour a eu
pour effetprincipal une décisionerronéeprise sur la composition de la Cour
et en second lieu que la présentation de l'avis consultatif a été exactement
transposée des habitudes du contentieux. Je regrette que la Cour ait confirmé
dans l'avis lathèseprovisoirement adoptée dans l'ordonnance du 22 mai et,
mejoignant aux réservesd'autres membresde la Cour, je maintiens que cette
analyse n'a pas tenu compte des conditions nécessaires pour admettre
l'existencede différendsréels.Ceci d'autant plus qu'en admettant dans l'avis
consultatif que l'objetde sonexamen dépendaitde l'interprétationde l'action
de décolonisation du Territoire, la Cour abandonnait en pratique la thèsede WESTERNSAHARA (DECL.GROS) 72
Nations; the dossier before the Court does not contain a single trace of a
negotiation which might appearto be a preliminary to the crystallization of a
bilateral dispute. After having tried the wayof negotiation with Spain inorder
to obtain solutions the nature of which the dossier does not make clear, the
Government of Morocco stated on 7 June 1966that it would choose another
way, that of "the liberation and independence of the Moroccan people of
so-called Spanish Sahara ...in the conviction that unity could be achieved
onlythroughliberation and independence. .."(A/AC.109/SR.436, p. 8).The
allegeddispute had not crystallized up to that time, and insubsequent debates
itwasnot until the 1974sessionof theGeneral Assemblythat, according to the
Court, it "reappeared".
4. In connection with the Advisory Opinion of 21June 1971 (I.C.J.
Reports 1971,pp. 329-330),1have enquired into the elements for solution of
the problem posed by the parallel existence of a dispute between two or more
States and of a situation of which the political organ of the United Nations
was seised,and 1then took the viewthat the factthat a general situation was
being dealt with within the United Nations could not bring about the
disappearanceof the element of a dispute between States ifthere existed such
an element,and that in eachcasethe firstquestion waswhether one isor isnot
confronted with what is really a dispute. 1do not see that in the present case
there is any dispute between Morocco and Spain; there cannot be a dispute
over a legal issue which neither of the States can resolve by themselves.The
disagreement in al1 the United Nations debates concerns a problem any
solution of which is meaningless unless it isvalid erga omnes; in the present
case there is no bilateral dispute which can be detached from the general
discussion of the claim of the Government of Morocco to re-integration of
the Territory, but what isdetachable from the general discussion isa point of
law of general interest on which the General Assembly considers itself
insufficiently informed, and which it asks the Court to settle in order to be
able to continue its examination of the decolonization of the Territory. This
point may of course be of more particular interest to certain member States,
and that isthe reason whythey are mentioned in resolution 3292(XXIX), but
these States are not making specificclaims against each other, and there isno
dispute.
5.Apart from the important legal interest of principle involved in the
discussion of the point, the principal consequence of the difference between
the alleged bilateral dispute and a legal question falling within the advisory
competence of the Court has been an erroneous decison taken as to the
composition of the Court, and further the fact that the presentation of the
Advisory Opinion is a precise transposition of what is customary in
contentious proceedings. 1find it regrettable that the Court should in the
Opinion haveconfirmed the viewprovisionally taken in the Order of 22 May,
and-associating myself with the reservations of other Members of the
Court- 1maintain that that analysis did not take account of the necessary
conditions for the existence of real disputes to be recognized. This isal1the
more so in that, by conceding in the advisory opinion that the subject of its73 SAHARA OCCIDENTAL(DÉCL.GROS)
l'opposition bilatérale Maroc-Espagne surla réintégration du Territoiredans
le Royaume du Maroc.
6. La question de savoir si, dans l'action entaméepar les Nations Unies
pour la décolonisation du Sahara occidental, un ou deux Etats peuvent
invoquer un droit àréintégrationdu Territoiresous leur souverainetéest une
questionjuridique au sens de I'article65du Statutde la Cour et ilconvient d'y
répondre. Mais la définition des questions juridiques selon l'article 65 telle
que I'avisconsultatif la formule de façon générale auxparagraphes 18et 19
me paraît dangereusement inexacte. Je rappellerai seulement que la Cour,
lorsqu'elle rend un avis consultatif sur une question de droit, dit le droit.
L'absence de force obligatoire ne transforme pas la démarche judiciaire en
consultation juridique qu'on utilise ou non à sa guise. L'avis consultatif
déterminele droit applicable à la question posée;il est possible que l'organe
qui ademandéI'avisne lesuivepas dans son action, mais cet organe saitqu'il
ne pourrait adopter une position contraire au prononcé dela Cour avec une
efficacitéquelconque sur le plan juridique. Dans le cas présenttel qu'il a été
définidans I'avisconsultatif ce point n'estplus en doute; puisque la question
poséeétait reconnue comme juridique et qu'une réponse pouvait être en-
visagéecomme susceptible d'influer sur l'action de décolonisation du Terri-
toire parl'organisation des Nations Unies, la Cour pouvait exercernormale-
ment sa fonction d'organe judiciaire sur une tellequestion, àla différencedu
cas envisagéen 1963où elledéclarait: ((un tribunal n'a pas simplement pour
fonction de fournir une base d'action politique alors qu'aucune question
juridique concernant des droits efectifs n'est en jeu » (C.I.J.Recueil 1963,
p. 37; les italiques sont ajoutés). La réponse de la Cour concerne une
prétentionàun droit de réintégration du Territoiredans lemoment présentet
le fait que la première épreuvede ce droit était celledes titres antérieursà la
colonisation ne donne pas un caractère abstrait ou académique à une telle
question. IIn'enestpas de mêmepour l'autre partie de la réponseque la Cour
a donnée dans le paragraphe 162 de I'avis, comme nous le verrons aux
paragraphes 10et 12de ces observations; c'est l'application de cette théorie
extensivedu sens de I'article65du Statut àla partie dispositive deI'avisqui en
montre lecaractère abusif.
7. Pour en terminer avec cet aspect des problèmes de compétence quise
posaient à la Cour, je remarquerai seulement que les engagements pris dans
une ordonnance sur une question préliminaire ont, une fois de plus, liéla
Cour. Les considérants de l'ordonnance du 22 mai 1975 se fondent sur des
((apparences ))de différendentre Maroc et Espagne et de demande sur une
question juridique pendante entre deux ou plusieurs Etats au sens de l'ar-
ticle 89 du Règlement;le verbe a paraître » est employéquatre fois. Mais la
Cour ajoutait que ses conclusions ne préjugeaient sa position sur aucune
des questions àdéciderdans la suite,compétence,opportunité de répondreà
la demande, fond. Malgré la disparition pratique du différendbilatéraldans
la chaîne de raisonnements de la Cour dans son avis et le voile posé sur WESTERNSAHARA(DECL.GROS) 73
examination depended on the interpretation of the decolonization action of
the Territory, the Court in effectabandoned the viewthat there wasabilateral
opposition between Morocco and Spain as to the re-integration of the
Territory into theKingdom of Morocco.
6. The question whether, within the decolonization process of Western
Sahara commenced by the United Nations, one or two States can invoke a
right to re-integration of theTerritory soas toome under their sovereignty is
a legal question within the meaning of Article 65 of the Statute of the Court,
and it is proper to give a reply thereto. But the definition of legal questions
within the meaning of Article 65, as formulated in a general way in
paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Advisory Opinion, seems to me dangerously
inaccurate. 1 shall merely recall that when the Court gives an advisory
opinion on a question of law it Statesthe law. The absence of binding force
does not transform the judicial operation into a legal consultation, which
may be made use of or not according to choice. The advisory opinion
determines the law applicable to the question put; it is possible for the body
which sought the opinion not to follow it in its action, but that body is aware
that no position adopted contrary to the Court's pronouncement will have
any effectiveness whatsoever in the legal sphere. In the present case, as
defined in the Advisory Opinion, this point is no longer in doubt; since the
question put has been found to be a legal one, and since a reply could be
regarded as capable of influencing the United Nations action of
decolonization of the Territory, the Court could exercise its function as a
judicial organ on such a question in the normal way, unlike the case
contemplated in 1963 when it stated that: "it is not the function of a Court
merely to provide a basis for political action if no question of actual legal
rights is involved" (I.C.J. Reports 1963,p. 37, emphasis added). The Court's
reply concerns a claim of right to re-integration of theTerritory at thepresent
time, and the fact that the first test of that right was that of the titles prior to
colonization does not make such a question abstract or academic. That isnot
so with regard to the other part of the reply which the Court has given in
paragraph 162of theOpinion, as weshall seein paragraphs 1Oand 12of these
observations; it is the application of this theory, which gives an extensive
meaning to Article 65 of the Statute, to the operative part of the Opinion
which shows how improper it is.
7. To conclude on this aspect of the problems of competence which have
arisen for the Court,1shall merely observe that once again the commitments
entered into in an Order on a preliminary question have tied the Court's
hands. The recitals in the Order of 22 May 1975 were based on the
"appearance" of a dispute between Morocco and Spain and of a requeston a
legal question pending between two or more States within the meaning of
Article 89 of the Rules; the verb "appear" is used four times. The Court
however then went on to Saythat its conclusions did not prejudge its position
on any of thequestionssubsequently to be decided,competence,propriety of
replying to the request, merits. Despite the effective disappearance of the
bilateral dispute in the Court's train of reasoning in its Opinion, and the veill'existenced'une questionjuridique pendante entre des Etats, la Cour n'a pas
voulu ou pu modifier le prononcé de mai 1975 alors que la raison de la
désignation d'un juge ad hoc ne tient pas. Le troisième considérant de
l'ordonnance déclareque la Cour «compte sur le siège un jugeressortissant
de l'Espagne, Puissance administrante du Sahara occidental »; j'ai indiqué
aux paragraphes2 et4ci-dessusque, àcetitre ou àun autre, l'Espagne n'avait
pas étépartie à un différend bilatéral, ni au règlement d'une question
juridique pendanteentre deux ou plusieursEtats. En décidantquelaquestion
posée à la Cour étaitreliéeà la poursuite de l'action de décolonisation par
l'Assembléegénéralel,a Cour admet implicitement que lajustification de sa
compétence n'est plus le différend « apparu » en mai 1975. Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice et moi-mêmeavons commentéen 1971les regrettables effetsde
cesordonnances surlacomposition de laCour qui préjugentirrévocablement
lefond (C.I.J.Recueil1971,p. 316,325-326et 330).Je doisajouter, dans lecas
présent,que la Cour a laissé siéger unde ses membres alors qu'il avait pris
position aux Nations Unies sur un élément dudébat(cf. sur ce point C.I.J.
Recueil 1971,l'opinion dissidente de sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, p. 309, et mes
observations, p. 311et suiv.).
8. Mes observations sur les problèmes poséspar le Gouvernement de la
Mauritanie ne s'écartentpas, pour l'essentiel,de cellesde la Cour; cependant
je remarquerai que la position juridique du Gouvernement de la Mauritanie
dans la procédure devant la Cour était particulière puisqu'il n'avait pas
prétendu opposer, avant 1974,sa prétention de réintégration du Territoire
dans son territoire nationalla poursuite normalede la procédured'autodé-
termination des populations du Territoire dans le cadre des Nations Unies.
9. Les considérations qui précèdent sur l'interprétation qu'il conviendte
donner à l'article 65 du Statut et sur l'objet exact de la demande d'avis me
permettent d'êtrebref dans l'explication de mon vote négatif sur I'oppor-
tunitéderépondreàla premièrequestioncontenue dans lademande. LaCour
ayant décidéde répondre à cette question dans les termes mêmesoù elle est
posée,j'ai considéréque la question n'était pas juridique, qu'elle était
purement académiqueet sans portée utileetje partage lesvuesde M. Dillard
sur son caractère tendancieux (a loaded question).L'avis consultatif recon-
naît, àjuste titre, que la notion de terra nulliusn'a jamais été invoquéear
aucun des Etats intéressésau statut du Territoire au moment de la colonisa-
tion;aucun traitéou document diplomatique n'aétéproduit qui invoquecette
notion à propos du Sahara occidental et les Etats ne parlent alors que de WESTERN SAHARA (DECL. GROS) 74
drawn over the existence of a legal question pending between States, the
Court has been unable or unwilling to modify what it said in May 1975,
although thereason for the appointment of ajudge ad hocdoes not stand. The
third recital in the Order states that the Court "includes upon the Bench a
judge of the nationality of Spain, the administering Power of Western
aha ara" ;havepointed out in paragraphs 2and 4 above that Spain was not,
on the basis of that or any other status, a party to a bilateral dispute, orto the
settlement of a legal question pending between two or more States. By
deciding that the question put to the Court was linked to the pursuit of the
General Assembly'sdecolonization process, the Court impliedlyadmits that
the justification for its cornpetence is no longer the dispute which there
"appeared" to be in May 1975. Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and 1
commented in 1971 on the regrettable effects of these Orders on the
composition of the Court which irrevocably prejudge the merits (I.C.J.
Reports 1971,p. 316,pp. 325-326and 330). 1should add, in the present case,
thattheCourt allowed one of its Members to sitalthough hehad in theUnited
Nations committed himself on one element in the discussion(on thispoint cf.
I.C.J.Reports 1971,the dissenting opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, p. 309,
and my own observations on pp. 311 ff.).
8. My observations on the problerns raised by the Government of
Mauritania essentiallydo not differfrom those of the Court; 1would however
observe that the legal position of the Government of Mauritania in the
proceedings before the Court was peculiar, inasmuch as prior to 1974it did
not seek to set up its claim for reintegration of the Territory into its national
territory against the normal pursuit of the procedure for self-determination
of the population of the Territory in the United Nations context.
9. The above considerations asto theproper interpretation of Article 65of
the Statute and the precise object of the request for advisory opinion enable
meto be brief in explaining my negativevoteasto the propriety of replying to
the first question in the request. Since the Court decided to reply to this
question in the very terms in which ithas been put, 1took the view that the
question wasnot a legalone, that it waspurelyacademic and served no useful
purpose, and 1share the views ofJudge Dillard asto itsbeing a "loaded" one.
The Advisory Opinion rightly recognizes that the concept of terranulliuswas
never relied on by any of the States interested in the status of the Territory at
the time of colonization; no treaty or diplomatic document has been
produced relying on this concept in connection with Western Sahara, and
States at the time spoke only of zones of influence. With regard to a territory75 SAHARA OCCIDENTAL (DÉCL.GROS)
zonkd'influence. Pour un territoire àpropos duquel la notion n'apparaît pas
dans la pratique des Etats, c'estun exerciced'écolede demander àlaCour de
se prononcer sur une situation hypothétique; lejuge ne recherchepas ce qui
aurait pu se passer en 1884si les Etats avaient invoqué cette notion, mais ce
qui s'estpassé.Si la véritable question poséepar l'Assembléegénéraleétait,
dans l'esprit de ses auteurs, le statut juridique du Territoire selon le droit
international de l'époque, ellefaisait double emploi avec la deuxième
question àlaquelle la Cour, pres&e àl'unanimité,a acceptéde répondre.
Celadit, puisque laCoura décidé de répondre àcettepremièrequestion,et
que nos règlesnepermettentpasl'abstention, j'ai votéavectousmescollègues
que leTerritoiren'était passans maître avantla colonisation. J'estimeen effet
quelestribusindépendantesquiparcouraient leTerritoire ou s'yarrêtaient en
certains lieux exerçaient une autorité de fait suffisamment reconnue pour
qu'il n'y ait pas eu terre sans maître.
10. La solution choisie par la Cour pour donner sa réponseàla deuxième
question n'est pas la plus simple puisque, procédant par renvoi au para-
graphe 162du raisonnement,laréponseelle-mêmeesténigmatiqueautantque
ce paragraphe qui associeune constatation positive de liens dits juridiques
d'allégeanceentre certaines tribus nomades du Territoire et l'empereur du
Maroc au moment de la colonisation, en mêmetemps que d'autres liens dits
juridiques, cette fois entre l'ensemble mauritanien et le Territoire, à une
décisionnégativesurl'existenced'unliendesouverainetésurleTerritoire dela
part de l'Empire du Maroc ou de l'ensemblemauritanien, avecla conclusion
qu'aucun lienjuridique n'existequi pourrait influersur le principe d'autodé-
termination par l'expressionlibreet,authentique delavolontédespopulations
du Territoire (ceciavecnouveau renvoiaux paragraphes 54 à 59de l'avis).
La deuxième partie du paragraphe 162 concernant la question de la
souverainetéterritoriale est la seulequicorresponde à la question poséedans
la requêtepouravis. L'objetde la requête,commeje l'aidit dèsleparagraphe
premier ci-dessus, était d'obtenir l'avis de la Cour sur une prétention du
Gouvernement du Maroc tendant à la réintégratiundu Territoire dans le
territoire national marocain etsuruneprétention parallèle du Gouvernement
de la Mauritanie fondée sur la notion d'ensemble mauritanien au moment
considéréa ,vis consultatif nécessaireavant de poursuivrel'action de décolo-
nisationduTerritoire. Je partage lesvuesetladécisionde la Coursur cepoint
de droit.
Par contre, si leparagraphe 162avaitétédiviséen deux,j'aurais votécontre
la première partie visant les ((liens juridiques » autres que celui de la
souveraineté territoriale parce que ces liens ne sont pas des liens juridiques
mais des liens ethniques, religieux ou culturels, des liens de contact d'une
civilisation aveccequi luiestpériphériqueetextérieurquin'entamentpas son WESTERNSAHARA (DECL.GROS) 75
in respect of whichtheconceptmakesno appearance in thepractice of States,
it is a sterile exercise to ask the Court to pronounce on a hypothetical
situation; itis not for a court to enquire into what would have happened in
1884if Stateshad relied on thisconcept,but into what did happen. If the real
questionput by the General Assembly,in the thinking of those whodrafted it,
was what was the legal status of the Territory under international law at the
time, it duplicated the second question, to which the Court has, almost
unanimously,agreed to reply.
Having said that, since the Court has decided to give a reply to the first
question, and since our rules do not permit an abstention, 1have voted with
al1my colleagues that the Territory was not nulliusbefore colonization; for 1
consider that the independent tribes travellingoverthe territory, or stopping
in certain places, exercised a de facto authority which was sufficiently
recognized for there to have been no terra nullius.
10. The Court has not adopted the simplest way of giving its reply to the
second question, since the reply itself, inasmuch as it is effected by
cross-reference to paragraph 162 of the reasoning, is enigmatic, as is the
paragraph referred to, in which a positive finding of what aresaid to be legal
ties of allegiance between certain nomadic tribes of the territory and the
Emperor of Morocco at thetime of colonization, and alsoother ties whichare
said tobe legal,thistime between the Mauritanian entity and the Territory, is
combined with a negative decision asto the existenceof anytie of sovereignty
overthe territory on the part of the Emperor of Morocco or the Mauritanian
entity,the conclusion being that no legal tie exists which could influence the
principle of self-determinationthrough thefree and genuine expression ofthe
will of the peoples of the Territory (with a fresh cross-reference here to
paras. 54-59of the opinion).
The second part of paragraph 162,concerning the question of territorial
sovereignty, is the only one which corresponds to the question put in the
request for opinion. The object of the request, as 1 said in my very first
paragraph above, was to obtain the opinion of the Court on a claim of the
Government of Morocco to the reintegration of the Territory in the national
territory of Morocco, and on a parallel claim by the Government of
Mauritania based on the concept of the Mauritanian entity at the time in
question, which advisory opinion was necessary prior to pursuit of the
decolonization of the territory. 1agree with the views and decision of the
Court on this point of law.
On the other hand, if paragraph 162 had been divided into two, 1would
have voted against the firstpart which relates to the "legal ties"otheran the
tie of territorial sovereignty,ecause those ties are not legal ties but ethnic,
religious or cultural ties, ties ofcontact of a civilization with what lies on its
periphery and outside it, and which do not touch on its own nature. 1mustcaractèrepropre. Il me fautdonc faire quelquesremarques sur ce'ttepartie de
la réponse de la Cour avec laquelle je suis en désaccord, tant sur le
raisonnement que la conclusion (par. 105,106,107,129pour le Maroc; 151et
152pour la Mauritanie; 162pour la conclusion).
11. La description du désert saharien et de la vie nomade vers 1884faite
dans l'avis estune vision bucolique de réalitéssévères.A l'époque,le désert
saharien estencorecette mer desable sans frontièreque lescaravanes utilisent
comme d'esconvois un océan,assurant un commerce qui est bien connu; le
désert est une voie d'accès aux marchés périphériques.La relation du
territoire avec les hommes est affectéepar ces traits et l'organisation des
populations du désert reflètecesconditions particulières de vie, la caravane,
la recherche des terrains de pacage, les oasis, la défense ou la conquête, la
protection etlasoumission entre lestribus àpropos desquellesun témoignage
produit devant la Cour et non contesté déclare que,à l'époque contempo-
raine, on compterait cent soixante-treizetribus maures. La Cour n'ayant pu
précisersesrecherches, ilest vain de généralise,n dehors de toutes données
véritables,qu'il y avait une « allégeance » entre l'empereur du Maroc et
« certaines» tribus nomades ou « certains droits relatifs à la t»rentre le
Territoire et l'ensemble mauritanien, alors que la Cour ne pourrait dire ni
quellestribus étaient concernéesen 1884,avecquelle efficacitéet pour quelle
durée, ni quel exercice effectif de droits relatifs à la terre confondaient
l'ensemble mauritanien et les tribus, quelles tribus et pour quelle durée. Le
juge doit établir des faits, c'est-à-direconstater leur existenceet il leur donne
un sensjuridique par sa décision;il ne peut ni supposer l'existencede faits ni
les déduire d'hypothèses non documentées.Comment parler d'un lien juri-
dique d'allégeance, notion de droit féodaldans une société hiérarchisée à
l'extrême où l'allégeance était une obligation formellementet publiquement
assumée,connuede tous, invoquéede part et d'autre, et sanctionnéepar des
procédureset pas seulement la contrainte armée.La situation politique, au
sens le plus large du mot, des tribus du déseriest celle d'une indépendance
affirméepar lesarmes entre cestribus elles-mêmeset àl'égardde la périphérie
de leurs territoires de parcours. Pour donner au terme allégeance son sens
traditionnel il eût fallu dire davantage que la possibilité de manifesta-
tions d'une autoritédu Sultan sur certaines tribus du désert non identifiées
(par.105de l'avis).Quant aux indications et déductionsapportéessurle rôle
desdifférentestribus des Tekna, égalementnon identifiées,ellesme semblent
aventureuses et de simples constructions à posteriori d'une époque peu
connue. Dans l'étatdu dossier et des ouvrages de géographes, historiens,
explorateurs ou militaires sur cette époque,le désert saharienet sestribus ne
reconnaissent pas d'allégeance au sensjuridique du mot et des contacts ou
relations épisodiques avec l'extérieur n'entament pas la singularitéetI'ex-
clusivismede leur mode de vie. Si le désertest bien un monde à part, c'estun
monde autonome dans la conception de ses rapports avec qui vit autrement. WESTERNSAHARA (DECL. GROS) 76
therefore make a fewobservations on thepart of the Court's replywith which
1disagree, both as regards the reasoning and the conclusion (for Morocco,
paras. 105, 106, 107, 129; for Mauritania, paras. 151 and 152; for the
conclusion, para. 162).
11. The description given in the Opinion of the Saharan desert and of
nomadic life in 1884 is an idyllic vision of what was a harsh reality. At the
time, the Saharan desert was still the frontierless sea of sand used by the
caravans asconvoys usean ocean, for the ,wrposes of a well-known trade; the
desert was a way ofaccess to markets on it: periphery. The relation between
the territory and human beings was affected by these aspects, and the
organization of the populations of thedesert reflectsthese special conditions
of life:caravans, thequest for pastures, oases,defence or conquest,protection
and submission between tribes - with regard to which testimonyproduced to
the Court, and not disputed, was to the effectthat in modern times there are
173 Moorish tribes. Since the Court was unable to cary out any specific
research,it isvain to makegeneralizations, in theabsence of any reliable data,
on the linesthat there was "allegiance" between the Emperor of Morocco and
"some" of the nomadic tribes, or "some rights relating to the land", between
the Territory and the Mauritanian entity, when the Court would be quite
unable to say either what were the tribes concerned in 1884,to what extent
and for what period, nor in what effectiveexercise of rights relating to the
land the tribes and the Mauritanian entity were combined, nor what tribes,
nor for what period. It is the duty of acourt to establishfacts, that isto sayto
make findings as to their existence, and it confers a legal meaning upon them
by its decision; a court may neither suppose the existence of factsnoreduce
them from hypotheses unsupported by evidence. How can one speak of a
legal tie of allegiance, a concept of feudal law in an extremely hierarchical
Society,in which allegiance was an obligation which was assumed formally
and publicly, which was known to all, was relied on on both sides, and was
backed by specific procedures and not merely by the force of arms. The
political situation, in the broadest senseof the term, of the tribes of the desert
is that of independence asserted by arms, independence both between the
tribes themselves and with regard to what lay on the periphery of their
travelling grounds. To give the term allegiance its traditional sense, more
wouldhave to be said than that itwas possible that the Sultan displayedsome
authority over some unidentified tribes of the desert (para. 105 of the
Opinion). As to the observations and deductions made as to the role of the
various Tekna tribes, also unidentified, these seem to me injudicious, mere a
posterioriconstructions of a littleknown epoch. On the basis of thedossier as
it stands, and of the studies of this period by geographers, historians,
explorers and soldiers, the Saharan desert and its tribes did not recognize
allegiance in the legal sense of the word, and sporadic contacts or
relationships with the outside world did not affect the peculiarity and
exclusivity-of their way of life. If the desert is a separateworld, it is an
autonomous world in the conception of its relationships with those who have
a different way of life.77 SAHARA OCCIDENTAL(DÉCL.GROS)
12. Des rapports de contact dont la durée est inconnue et l'existence à
l'époquedela colonisationsupposéeplutôt que prouvéeneconstituentpas un
objetpossibled'étudeetde réponse pourlaCour qui, en yprocédant,excède
lespouvoirsqueluiconfère l'article 65 de son Statut (cf. pa6.ci-dessus).Par
l'effetde l'interprétation extensivedonnéeà l'article65 qui l'a amenéeà se
poser une secondequestion, celle des liensjuridiques autres quela souverai-
neté surteTerritoire àl'époqueconsidérées ,eul objet de la controversequi a
provoqué la requête pouravis, la Cour prétend répondre à une question
juridique mais lesliensqu'ellequalifiedejuridiques ne leseraientque si,après
en avoir établiI'existence,la Cour pouvait, d'une manièrequelconque par la
détermination de sa portée, produire un effet sur l'action de décolonisation
du Territoire. La Cour ne peut attribuer un caractèrejuridique àdesfaitsqui
ne l'ont pas en eux-mêmes;lejuge ne crée pas ledroit, il l'établit.S'iln'y a
aucune règlede droit qui lui permette d'affirmer I'existencedes prétendus
liensjuridiques, la Cour sort de son rôle d'organe judiciaire en les qualifiant
de juridiques et son prononcé n'est pas un prononcé de droit; l'indication
donnéepar la Cour au paragraphe 73 de l'avis selon laquelle il faut que des
questions poséesdans une demande d'avis aient « un effetpratique àl'heure
actuelle» pour nepasêtre dépourvuesd'objet oude but »ne peut suffirecar
la Cour n'a pas,-en la matière, qualité pour adonner des conseils » à
l'Assembléegénéralequi puissent avoir un effet pratique. Pour de tels
facteurs, qu'ils aient existéen1884 - ce qui n'a pas été établi au sens
judiciaire du mot - ou non, l'Assembléegénéraleserait librede les prendre
en considération aussi bien que d'autres facteurs contemporains qui ne
relèventpas davantage de lacompétencedela Cour, parce que l'économie,la
sociologieou la géographie humaine ne sont pas le droit. La Cour disait en
1962:« conformémentàl'article 65 du StatutlaCour ne peut donner un avis
que surunequestionjuridique. Siunequestion n'estpasjuridique, laCour n'a
pas de pouvoir discrétionnaire en la matièreP (avis consultatif du20juillet
1962, Certaines dépenses des Nations Unies (article17,paragraphe2, de la
Charte), C.I.J. Recueil1962,p. 155).
13.J'ai exprimémon sentiment en 1974 sur cette nouvelle tendance de la
Cour à répondreà des problèmes qu'ellese pose plutôt qu'à celui qui lui est
posé et ne puis que reprendre mes observations d'alors(C.Z.J.Recueil1974,
p. 148-149).Dans le cas présentj'ai étécontraint par la formulation de la
partie dispositive de l'avisconsultatif àun vote aussipeu satisfaisantquecette
formulation elle-mêmec ,ommelemontrent lesdiverses opinions par rapport
à l'apparente quasi-unanimité. Comme d'autres, je n'ai eu le choix qu'entre
une approbation ou un désaccord égalementqualifiésde réserves;j'ai voté
pour l'approbation du dispositif, donc du paragraphe 162, à cause de sa
partie relative àl'objet de la demande, tel que je l'ai définiici, c'est-à-dire la
vérificationde I'existence de liensjuridiques d'appartenance ou de dépen-
dance des populations du Territoire, à l'époque considérée, parrapport à
une autoritépolitiqueextérieure,en un motdes liens relatifs àlasouveraineté
réclaméedevant la Cour; et là s'arrêtait le rôledela Cour. WESTERN SAHARA (DECL. GROS) 77
12. Contact-relationships of which the duration is unknown, and the
existence of which at the period of colonization is supposed rather than
proved, do not afford possible material for the Court to examine and on
which to reply,and by doing so it overstepsthe limits of the powers conferred
upon it by Article 65 of its Statute (cf. para.6 above). By means of the
extensive interpretation given to Article65,whereby the Court wasled to put
to itselfa secondquestion, that of the legaltiesotherhan sovereigntyoverthe
Territory at the period under consideration, which was the solesubject of the
controversy which gave rise to the request for opinion,theCourt purports to
be replying to a legal question, but the ties which it describes as legal would
only be so if, after having established their existence, the Court could in
any way, by determining their significance, produce an effect on the
decolonization of the Territory. The Court cannot attribute a legal nature to
facts which do not intrinsically possess it; a court does not create the law, it
establishes it. If there is nole of law making it possible for it to assert the
existence of the alleged legal ties, the Court oversteps its role as a judicial
organ by describing them as legal, and its finding is not a legal finding;the
Court's statement in paragraph 73 of the Opinion that questions put in a
request for opinion must have "a practical and contemporary effect" if they
are not to be "devoid of object or purpose", does not suffice,for the Court
does not in this fieldhave capacity to "give advice" to the General Assembly
which would have a practical effect. Whether such factors existed in 1884 or
not - which has not been "established" in thejudicial sense of the word - the
General Assembly would be free to take them into account together with
other contemporary factors, which also do not fa11within the Court's
competence, because economics, sociology and human geography are not
law. In 1962 the Court said: "in accordance with Article 65 of its Statute, the
Court can give an advisory opinion only on a legal question. If a question is
not a legalone,the Court has no discretion in the matter" (AdvisoryOpinion
of 20 July 1962, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,para-
graph2,ofthe Charter),I.C.J.Reports 1962,p. 155).
13. 1expressed myviewin 1974 astothecurrent trend in theCourt to reply
to problems which it raises itself rather than to that which is submitted to it,
and can only endorse what 1said then (I.C.J. Reports 1974.pp. 148-149). In
the present case, the way in which the operative part of the Advisory Opinion
has been drawn has obliged me to vote in a way as unsatisfactory as that
drafting itself, as isshown by the various opinions in relation to the apparent
quasi-unanimity. Likeother Members of the Court, 1was faced only with the
choice between agreeing or disagreeingsubject in eithereventto reservations.
1 voted in favour of the adoption of the operative clause, and thus of
paragraph 162, because of the part thereof concerning the object of the
request, as 1havedefined it above, that isto sayverification of theexistence of
legaltiesofappurtenance or dependence of thepopulation of theTerritory, at
the period under consideration, vis-à-vis an external political authority -in
short, tiesrelating to thesovereignty which wasclaimedbefore theCourt; and
the role of the Court went no further than that.
Declaration of Judge Gros (translation, as appended immediately after the advisory opinion)