Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel

Document Number
077-19880426-ADV-01-02-EN
Parent Document Number
077-19880426-ADV-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SCHWEBEL

1havevoted in favour ofthe Court's AdvisoryOpinion because 1think
that itsessentialconclusion - that there is a dispute between the United
Nations andthe UnitedStatesoverthe interpretation orapplication ofthe
Headquarters Agreement - istenable. In myview,however,the question
put to the Court admits ofmore than one answer.Theanswergivenbythe
Court isnot the answerwhich 1believein al1respectsto be required.
Asthe Court recordsinparagraph 1 ofitsOpinion, the General Assem-
bly, in requestingthe Court's advisory opinion as to whetherthe United
Statesis under an obligation to enter into arbitration in accordance with
section 21 ofthe Headquarters Agreement, affirmedthe position of the

Secretary-General"that a dispute existsbetweenthe United Nations and
the host country concerning the interpretation or application of the
Agreement . . ."(resolution 42/229B). In its companion resolution
42/229A, also adopted on 2 March 1988,the General Assembly con-
sidered
"that a dispute exists between the United Nations and the United
States ...concerningthe interpretation or application of the Head-
quarters Agreement, and that the dispute settlementprocedure set
out in section 21ofthe Agreement shouldbe setin operation".

That is toSay,the General Assembly,after twice answering the question
on which it seeksthe advice of the Court,the principaljudicial organ of
the United Nations, requested the Court's opinion on that question.
Thereafter, on 23March 1988,whileproceedingsinthe Court werepend-
ing,the General Assemblyreaffirmedits answerby holding

"that a dispute exists between the United Nations and the United
States... concerningthe interpretation or application of the Head-
quarters Agreement, and that the dispute settlement procedure
provided for under section 21 of the Agreement ... should be set in
operation ..." (resolution 42/230).

In responding to the General Assembly's question posed in this
fashion,the Court makesholdings ofunchallengeable cogency.It is axio-
maticthat,onthe international legalplane,national lawcannot derogate
frominternational law,that a Statecannot avoiditsinternational respon-
sibilityby the enactment of domestic legislation which conflicts with its
international obligations. It is evident that a party to an agreement con-
taining an obligation to arbitrate any dispute over its interpretation or
application cannot legallyavoidthat obligation by denyingthe existence
ofadisputeor by maintainingthat arbitration ofitwouldnot serveauseful
purpose.Itisacceptedthataprovisionofatreaty(oracontract)prescribingthe international arbitration of any dispute arising thereunder does not
require, as a prerequisite for its implementation,the exhaustion of local
remedies. 1agreenot only with these restatements of legalprinciple but
also with the findings in this case that the dispute between the United
Nations and the United Stateshas notbeen settled by suchnegotiationas
has takenplace,andthattheparties havenot agreedupon a modeofsettle-
ment other than arbitration.

My difference of perspective with the Court turns on whetherthe dis-
pute between the United Nations and the United States at this juncture
concerns "the interpretation or application" of the Headquarters Agree-
ment. The nub of my appreciation of the facts of the caseis that there is
essentialagreement betweenthe United Nations and the UnitedStates on
the interpretation of the Headquarters Agreement. Whether there cur-
rently isa dispute overits applicationis not so clear.
Itcan be concluded, astheCourt concludes,that, bythe course of con-
ductwhichtheGovernment ofthe UnitedStateshas followedwithrespect
to the continuedfunctioning ofthe officein New York Cityofthe Obser-
ver Mission to the United Nations of the PalestineLiberation Organiza-
tion, a dispute has arisen between the United Nations and the United
States"concerning the. ..application of thisAgreement. ..".But,in rny
view,thefacts ofthe casealternativelyallowthe conclusionthat, sincethe

effectiveapplication ofthe United States Act at issue - the Anti-Terror-
ism Act - to the PLO'sNew York officehas been deferredpending the
outcome of litigation now in progressin the United StatesDistrict Court
for the Southern District of New York, a dispute over the application of
the Headquarters Agreementwillariseifand whentheresult ofthat litiga-
tionis effectivelyto applythat Acttothe PLO'soffice.Explanation ofthis
alternativeconclusion,as well as of the parties' coincidenceof viewson
the interpretation ofthe Headquarters Agreement,requires an exposition
of somesalient facts ofthe case.
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987,in addition to the central provisions
quoted bythe Court inparagraph 9 ofitsOpinion, contains "findings" of
the United States Congress about activities of the PL0 and "determina-
tions" thatthe PL0 isa"terroristorganization"which"should notbenefit
fromoperatinginthe United States";directs the AttorneyGeneral to take
the necessarystepsand institutethe necessarylegalaction to "effectuate"
theAct; and givesappropriatecourts ofthe UnitedStatesauthority, atthe
Attorney General's instance,to "enforce" the Act.

Whenlegislationofthissubstance wasinitiallyintroduced, Secretaryof
StateShultz on 29January 1987wrote SenatorDole that :

"The PL0 Observer Mission in New York was established as a
consequence of General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) of November 22,1974,which invitedthe PL0 to participate as an ob-
serverin the sessionsand work at the General Assembly.The PL0
Observer Missionrepresentsthe PL0 inthe UN; itisin no senseac-
creditedtothe US.TheUShasmadeclearthat PL0 ObserverMission
personnel are present in the United Statessolelyin their capacityas
'invitees'oftheUnitedNationswithinthemeaningofthe Headquar-
ters Agreement ...we therefore are under an obligationto permit
PL0 Observer Missionpersonnelto enter and remainin the United
Statesto carry out their officialfunctions at UN headquarters ..."
(CongressionalRecord,Vol. 133,No. 78,14 May 1987,p.S6449).

At the 126thmeeting of the United Nations Cornmitteeon Relations
with the Host Country, on 14October 1987,the Observerfor the PL0
drew attention to an amendment to the State Department authorization
bill containingprovisionslater to be reflectedinthe Anti-TerrorismAct.
He quotedthe letterofthe SecretaryofStateof29January.Therepresen-
tative of the United Statesresponded that, "in the opinion of the Execu-
tive Branch, closingofthe PL0 Missionwouldnotbe consistentwiththe
host country's obligations under the Headquarters Agreement". The
LegalCounsel of the United Nations then declared that "the Organiza-
tion shared the legalopinion expressedin the letter of Secretaryof State
Shultzof29January 1987"(A/42/26, pp. 11 -12).
Senator Dole did not agreewiththe position of the Secretaryof State,
and opinion in the Senate and House was divided. When a conference
report on the ForeignRelationsAuthorizationAct wasintroducedto the
Senate,containingthetitleembodyingthe Anti-TerrorismAct,the Chair-
man ofthe Cornmitteeon ForeignRelations,SenatorPell,declared :

"the administrationhas expressedconcernthat the languageon the
PL0 mightrequirethe closingofthe ObserverMissiontothe United
Nations in violationof USobligations under international law.The
billlanguage,as 1read it,doesnot necessarilyrequirethe closureof
the PL0 ObserverMissiontothe United Nations,sinceitis an estab-
lished rule of statutory interpretation that US courts will construe
congressionalstatutesasconsistentwithUSobligationsunder inter-
national law,if suchconstructionis at al1plausible.

The proponents of closingthe PL0 missionarguethatthe United
Statesisunder no legalobligationto host observer missions.Ifthey
arerightasamatterofinternationallaw,thenthelanguageinthisbill
wouldrequirethe closureofthe PL0 Observer Mission. On the other hand, ifthe United Statesis under a legalobligation
asthe hostcountry ofthe United Nations to allowobservermissions
recognized by the General Assembly,then the language in this bill
cannot be construed, in my opinion, as requiring the closure of the
PL0 Observer Mission. The bill makes no mention of the PL0
Mission to the United Nations and the proponents never indicated
an intent to violate US obligations under international law. Rather,
they asserted that closure of the New York PL0 office was not a
violation of international law and that they were proceeding on
this basis." (CongressionalRecord,Vol. 133,No. 200, 16December
1987,pp. S18185-S18186.)

Beforedevelopments had reachedthis stage, the Secretary-Generalon
13October 1987wrote to the Permanent Representative of the United
Statesexpressinghis serious concern at the adoption bythe Senate of an
amendment which sought to make unlawful the maintenance within the
United States of any officeofthe PLO. He recalled the terms ofthe letter
of 29 January 1987of the Secretary of State, and declared that, "1am
in agreement with the views expressed by the Secretary of State in this
matter. .."
On 7 December 1987,the Secretary-General wrote to Ambassador
Waltersin the followingterms :

"it isthe legalposition ofthe United Nations that the membersofthe
PL0 ObserverMissionare,byvirtue ofGeneral Assemblyresolution
3237 (XXIX), invitees to the United Nations and that the United
States is under an obligation to permit PL0 personnel to enter and
remaininthe United States to carryouttheir officia1functionsatthe
United Nations under the Headquarters Agreement. This position
...coincides with the position taken by the United States Adminis-
trationintheletter...bythe SecretaryofStateon29January 1987. ..

Evenatthis late stage,1verymuch hope that itwillbe possiblefor
the Administration,in line with its own legalposition, to act to pre-
ventthe adoption ofthis legislation. However,1would be gratefulif
you couldconfirmthat evenifthisproposedlegislation becomeslaw,
the present arrangementsfor the PL0 Observer Mission would not
be curtailed orotherwiseaffected.Without suchassurance,a dispute
between the United Nations and the United States concerning the
interpretation or application ofthe Headquarters Agreementwould
exist and 1 would be obliged to enter into the dispute settlement
procedure foreseenunder section21ofthe UN Headquarters Agree-
ment. .."

The legislation nevertheless having been adopted, and, having beenmade part of the State Department's authorization to expend funds,
signedinto lawbythe President,the ActingPermanentRepresentative of
the United States,AmbassadorOkun,wrote to the Secretary-General on
5January 1988 :

"The legislation to which your lettersreferis part of the 'Foreign
RelationsAuthorization Act,FiscalYears 1988and 1989',signedby
PresidentReagan on December 22.Section 1003ofthis law,relating
to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), is to take effect
ninety days after that date. Because the provisions concerningthe
PL0 Observer Mission may infringe on the President's constitu-
tional authority and, ifimplemented,wouldbe contrary to our inter-
national legal obligationsunder the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement, the Administration intends, during the ninety-day
period before this provision is to take effect,to engage inonsulta-
ions with the Congressin an effort to resolvethis matter."

On 14 January 1988, the Secretary-General wrote to Ambassador
Waltersrestatingterms ofpreviousexchanges and stating :
"1,of course, welcomethe intentions ofthe US Administration to
make use ofthe 90-dayperiod in the way described by Ambassador

Okun, and explained in greater detail by the Legal Adviser of the
StateDepartment,JudgeSofaer, in hismeetingwiththe Legal Coun-
sel on 12January. Nevertheless, neither the letter of Ambassador
Okun nor the statementsmade by Judge Sofaerconstitute the assur-
ance 1had soughtin myletterof7December 1987nor dothey ensure
that full respect for the Headquarters Agreement can be assumed.
Under these circumstances, a dispute existsbetween the Organiza-
tion and the UnitedStatesconcerningtheinterpretation and applica-
tion ofthe Headquarters Agreementand 1hereby invokethe dispute
settlement procedure set out in section 21 of the said Agreement.''

On 2 February 1988,the Secretary-General wrote again to Ambas-
sador Walters,inthe termssetoutinparagraph 19ofthe Court's Opinion.
On 11 February 1988, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations,
Mr. Fleischhauer, wrote to Judge Sofaer,informing him that the United
Nations had chosen Eduardo JiménezdeAréchaga,formerPresident and
Judge of the International Court of Justice, to be its arbitrator "in the
event of arbitrationunder section 21 ..."and, in view of the governing
time constraints, urged thatthe United Statesinformthe United Nations
assoon as possible ofitschoice of an arbitrator.

Resolution 42/229 Bwas adopted by a voteof 143to none. TheUnited
Statesdidnotparticipate in thevote.AmbassadorOkun gavethe explana-
tion which is quoted in paragraph 22ofthe Court's Opinion. On 4 March 1988,followingthe adoption of resolutions 42/229A and
42/229 B,the ~ecretary-~eneral wrote to Ambassador Walters observing
thathe had not receivedan officialresponse to hislettersin whichhehad
sought
"assurances regarding the non-application or the deferral of the

application of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987to the PL0 Observer
Missionnor ...aresponse ...regardingthe choiceofanarbitrator by
the United States".

He continued that

"it is myhopethat it willstillprovepossibleforthe United States to
reconcileits domestic legislation with its international obligations.
Should this not be the case then 1trust that the United States will
recognizethe existenceofadispute and agreeto theutilization ofthe
disputesettlementprocedure provided for insection 21ofthe Head-
quarters Agreement,and that inthe interimperiod the statusquowill
be maintained."

On 11March 1988,AmbassadorOkun wrote to the Secretary-General
in the terms quoted in paragraph 24 of the Court's Opinion. The Secre-
tary-Generalprotested Ambassor Okun'sletter of 11March 1988and by
letter of 15Marchrepliedinthe followingterms:
"in the view ofthe United Nations the decision taken by the United
StatesGovernmentasoutlinedin the letter is a clearviolation ofthe
Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the
United States.In particular, 1cannotaccept the statementcontained
in theletter that the United States may act irrespective of its obliga-
tionsunder the Headquarters Agreement, and 1would ask you to
reconsiderthe seriousimplicationsofthis statementgiventhe respon-

sibilitiesofthe United States asthe host country.

1must also take issue with the conclusion reached in your letter
thatthe United States believesthat submission ofthis matter to arbi-
tration wouldnot serveauseful purpose. TheUnited Nations conti-
nues to believethat the machinery providedforin the Headquarters
Agreementisthe proper frameworkforthe settlement ofthisdispute
and 1cannot agree that arbitration would serve no useful purpose.
Onthe contrary,in the present case,it would servethe verypurpose
for which the provisions of section 21 were included in the Agree-
ment, namelythe settlement of a disputearisingfrom the interpreta-
tion or application ofthe Agreement."

TheAttorneyGeneral ofthe United Stateswrotethe Permanent Obser-
ver of the PL0 Mission to the United Nations on 11March 1988in the
terms set out in paragraph 25ofthe Court's Opinion.The PL0 Observerreplied on 14Marchinthetermscontainedinparagraph 27ofthe Court's
Opinion. Attorney General Meese responded by letter of 21 March as
quoted in paragraph 27ofthe Court's Opinion.

In itswritten statementsubmitted tothe Court in the current proceed-
ings, the United States repeated the substance of Ambassador Okun's
letter of 11March. It observedthat, sincethe PL0 Mission had not com-
plied with the Attorney General's order, a lawsuit had been filed to
compelcompliance.Thestatementcontinued :
"That litigation will afford an opportunity forthe PL0 and other
interestedparties to raise legal challengesto enforcement ofthe Act
against the PL0 Mission. The United States will take no action to
close the Mission pending a decision in that litigation. Since the
matter is still pending in Ourcourts, we do not believe arbitration
wouldbe appropriateor timely."

In the written statement of the Secretary-General, the Secretary-Gen-
eral, in recounting the factual history of the matter, recalled the terms of
his letter of 7 December 1987and stated that
"a disputewould only existif the United States Government would
fail to provide an assurance that the existing arrangements for
the PL0 Observer Mission would not be curtailed or otherwise
affected ...".

Oncethe Acthad become law,the written statementcontinued,

"In the view ofthe Secretary-General,in the absenceof anyassur-
anceas tothe maintenance ofthe existingarrangementsforthe PL0
ObserverMission,theincompatibility ofthisActwiththeobligations
ofthe hostcountry under the Headquarters Agreementcreatedadis-
pute within the meaning of section 21ofthe Agreement."
The Secretary-General further argued that :

"The automaticity of the process of bringing the ATA [Anti-
Terrorism Act]intoforce which was initiated with the signingofthe
ATA into law, objectivelyconstitutes an immediatethreat to bring
about the closure of the facility from which PL0 representation to
the United Nations is accomplished, and this imrnediate threat is
itself. .sufficientto createa dispute in the absence of an assurance
from the Executive Branch that the legislation will not be enforced
or that the existing arrangementsfor the PL0 Observer Mission in
New Yorkwillnot be affected or otherwise curtailed."
The Secretary-Generalat the sametime concluded :

"the United Nations believesthat a dispute has existed between the United Nations and the United Statesfrom the moment of the sign-
inginto lawofthe ATA.Nor can therebeanydoubt that thisdispute
concerns the interpretation or application of the Headquarters
Agreement.The Secretary of State of the United States and various

representatives ofthe United Statesin the HostCountryCommittee
and the General Assemblyhave clearlyand consistently recognized
that thePL0 Observer Mission personnel are present in the United
Statesin their capacityas invitees of the United Nations within the
meaning ofthe Headquarters Agreement,and the Secretary-General
has repeatedly taken the position that the ATAis inconsistent with
the Headquarters Agreement.Thus,the forma1conditionsfor invok-
ingsection21ofthe Headquarters Agreementareclearlyestablished
and the proceduralobligations ofthe parties,therefore, havebecome
effective."

On the basis of this record, what conclusions may be drawn as to the
current existenceofa dispute betweenthe United Nations and the United
States over the interpretation or application of the Headquarters Agree-
ment ?
Asthe Court rightlyemphasizesin itsOpinion,whetherthere existsan
international dispute is amatter for objective determination. The mere
assertion ordenial ofthe existenceofadispute byone(orboth) sidesisnot
dispositive.The Court also recalls itslassicdefinition of a dispute as "a
disagreement on a point of law, a conflict of legal viewsor interestse-
tween two persons". 1sthere such disagreement or conflict in this case
overthe interpretation ofthe Headquarters Agreement?

1do not believe so. On the contrary, throughout there has been and
remains a strikingconcordance of viewbetweenthe authorized represen-
- tatives ofthe United Nations and the United Stateson the interpretation
of the Headquarters Agreement. Thus the Secretaryof Stateat the outset
declaredthat the UnitedStates isunder "an obligationto permit PL0 Ob-
serverMissionpersonnel to enter and remain inthe UnitedStatesto carry
out their officia1functions at United Nations headquarters ...".The
Legal Counsel of the United Nations announced that "The Organi-
zation shared" that "legal opinion ...". The Secretary-General then
declaredthat, "1amin agreementwiththeviewsexpressedbythe Secretary
of Stateinthismatter. ..".He subsequentlyspecified thatthe position of
the United Nations "coincides with the position taken by the United
States.. ."Forits part, the United States,afterthe signinginto lawofthe
Act, reiterated that, "if implemented," the Act "would be contrary to
Our international legal obligations under the United Nations Head-
quarters Agreement. ..".

The United Stateshas not retreated from that position nor, of course,
hastheUnited Nations.Thisisnot my singularconclusion;it isonewhichhasbeen widelyand recurrentlyaffirmed inthe course ofGeneral Assem-
bly debate ofthe matter, and as recently as 23March 1988.

Thus on 29 February 1988,the representative of Zimbabwe declared
that, "Thelegalopinionexpressedinthe letterfromMr.Shultzwasshared
by the Secretary-GeneraI and the United Nations Legal Counsel ..."
(A/42/PV.101, p. 33). The representative of the Federal Republic of
Germany,speaking on behalf of the 12Statesmembers of the European
Community,stated that
"they fullysharethe viewsalready expressed by both the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and the United States Secretary of
State...to the effectthatthe United Statesis under an obligation to
permit PL0 Observer Mission personnel to enter and remain in the
United States to carry out their officia1functions at United Nations
Headquarters" (ibid.,pp. 51-52).

Therepresentative of Czechoslovakia,usingvirtuallyidentical language,
recailed that "those facts were recognized unreservedly . . . by
Mr.George Shultz,Secretaryof State ..."(ibid.,p. 82).Therepresentative
of Denmark, speaking on behalf of the five Nordic countries, declared
that "The Nordic countriesfullysharethe viewson this questionalready
expressed by both the Secretary-General and the Secretary of State ..."
(ibid.,p. 101).
Similarly,on4 March 1988,the representative of Austria declared :
"It is our understanding from the discussion of the matter during
the workofthe SixthCommitteethat the applicability ofthe relevant
provisions of the Headquarters Agreement to the PL0 Observer
Mission and its personnel is not being disputed by any delegation,
includingthe delegation ofthe host country."

The representative of Bangladesh the day before put it in the following
terms :
"The Secretary of State of the United States, in a letter to the
Senate, stated as early as 29January 1987that the host country was

'underanobligationto permit PL0 ObserverMissionpersonnelto
enter and remain in the United States to cany out their officia1
functionsatUnitedNationsHeadquarters'.

That view is shared by 145Members of the United Nations, which
voted infavour ofGeneral Assemblyresolution 43/210B,whichwas
adopted on 17December 1987 - with the soleexception of a single
MemberState. Such unanimity of opinion on the interpretation of a
legalprovision istrulyunprecedented." (A/42/PV.102, p. 68.)

Finally, on 23 March 1988,at the last resumed session of the General
Assembly,the representative of Burma concluded that :51 HEADQUARTERSAGREEMENT (SEP .P.SCHWEBEL)

"The subjectunder dispute cannot be seen as relatingto the sub- .
stantive interpretation of this issue in respect of the Headquarters
Agreement,foritisevidentfromwhathasbeen expressedbytherele-
vantauthoritiesofthe United StatesAdministrationthat itcannotbe
said that there is a controversyover such an interpretation between
the position taken by them and the viewsof the Secretary-General
and the virtually unanimous views expressed by Member States."
(A/42/PV.107, pp. 28-30.)

In view of the demonstrated consistency of the views of the United
Nations andthe United Stateson the interpretation ofthe Headquarters
Agreement,1amunpersuaded bythe Court'sconclusionthat "the oppos-
ing attitudes of the parties" giverise to a dispute "concerningthe inter-
pretation orapplication" oftheHeadquarters Agreement.Insofarasthat
conclusionrelates to application, it is not without force; in so far as it
relates to interpretation, the above recitation of the facts of the case in
myviewdemonstratesthat it isnot wholly convincing.

It is ofcoursetrue that, where the breach by a State of its obligations
under a treaty is manifest and undenied, such breach does not escape a
jurisdictional clause which affords a court - such as this Court - the
authority to decide disputes overthat treaty'sinterpretation or applica-

tion. Counselforthe United Statesso arguedinthe caseof UnitedStates
Diplomatieand ConsularStaffin Tehran(I.C.J.Pleadings,p.279),andthat
argument, apparently accepted by the Court, remains persuasive.But it
doesnotfollowthat,in aparticular case,the existenceornon-existenceof
adisputeovertheinterpretationofatreatyisunaffectedbythe articulated
concordance of views of the parties concerning its interpretation.
In the casebefore the Court, if the question of application of the Head-
quarters Agreementis for purposes of analysisput aside,it does appear
that the viewsof the parties on its interpretation "coincide" (to use the
term employedbythe Secretary-General).

That being said, 1 nevertheless recognizethat there is logic in and
authorityfor the position that everyallegationby a party of a breach of

atreatyprovision - howevermanifestand admittedbytheotherparty -
necessarilyentails elementsof interpretation @ythe parties and by any
court adjudging them), because an application or misapplication of a
treaty,howeverclear,isrootedin aninterpretation ofit.Butwhenaparty
actuallyalleges,ifnotinformtheninsubstance,onlyafailureto applythe
treaty, and makes clearthat there is no dispute overits interpretation, is
there,forpurposes of dispute settlement,a dispute overthe treaty'sinter-
pretation? 1havemydoubts.

The essentialquestion at issuein this caseis whetherthere is a dispute
overthe applicationoftheHeadquarters Agreement.TheCourt acknow-ledgesthat there maybe question about whetherthe Anti-TerrorismAct
has been applied orwhetherthe Actwillonlyhavereceived effectiveap-
plicationwhen orif,on completionof currentUnited Statesjudicialpro-
ceedings,the PL0 Mission is in fact closed. It maintains, however,that
this isnot decisiveas regardssection21 ofthe Headquarters Agreement,
sincethat Agreementrefersto anydispute concerningitsinterpretationor
application and not the application of measures taken in the municipal
lawofthe United States.
The Court is ofcoursecorrectin pointing outthat the issue beforethe
Court isthat of the application of the Headquarters Agreementand not
that of the application of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Butif the Act is not
effectivelyapplied to the PL0 Observer Mission,what content is there
to a dispute overthe application of the Headquarters Agreement?
It should be recalled that the Secretary-Generaldid not consistently
treatthe signinginto lawoftheActasgivingriseofitselfto adisputeover

the application ofthe Headquarters Agreement.Thisismadeclearbythe
termsofhisletterof7December1987,inwhichherequestedofthe United
States confirmation that, even if the then proposed legislation were to
becomelaw,
"the present arrangementsforthe PL0 ObserverMissionwouldnot
becurtailedorotherwiseaffected.Without suchassurance,adispute
between the United Nations and the United Statesconcerning the
interpretationorapplication ofthe Headquarters Agreementwould
exist..."

Thereafter,findingstatementsmade bythe United Statesnotto constitute
the assurances which he had sought, on 14January 1988he declared a
dispute to exist. However, on 2 February, the Secretary-General wrote
that:

"sincethe United Statessofar has not been in a position to giveap-
propriate assurances regardingthe deferral ofthe application ofthe
law to the PL0 Observer Mission,the time is rapidly approaching
when 1willhave no alternativebut to proceed either together with
the United States withinthe framework of section 21 of the Head-
quartersAgreementorbyinformingtheGeneralAssemblyoftheim-
passethat has been reached".

Even after the General Assemblyrequested an advisory opinion of the
Court, the Secretary-Generalon 4 March 1988referred to "assurances
regardingthe non-application or deferral of application" of the Act,and
trusted that the United Stateswouldrecognizethe existenceof a dispute
shoulditnot provepossibleforthe United Statesto reconcileitsdomestic
legislation with its international obligations. In his written statement
submittedto this Court,the Secretary-Generalcontended that there is a
disputewithinthe meaningofsection21ofthe Headquarters Agreement
"in the absence of any assurance as to the maintenance of the existing
arrangements for the PL0 Observer Mission". The Secretary-General53 HEADQUARTERSAGREEMENT (SEP . P.SCHWEBEL)

maintained in his written statement that a threat to close the PL0
Mission createda dispute

"in the absence of an assurancefromthe Executive Branch that the
legislationwillnot be enforced orthat existingarrangements forthe
PL0 ObserverMissionin NewYorkwillnotbeaffected orotherwise
curtailed".
For its part, after the Act became law, the United States initially ob-

semedthat ithad not yettaken actionaffectingthe functioningofthe PL0
Mission.Oncethe AttorneyGeneral had determined that hewasrequired
bythe Actto closethe NewYorkofficeofthe PL0 ObserverMission,and
instituted action in the District Court, he declared that: "The United
Stateswilltake no action to closethe Missionpending a decision in that
litigation." This position was reiterated by the United Statesmorethan
once.

Thus it is clear that the Secretary-Generalrepeatedlyindicated that, if
the United States were to provide assurances that current arrangements
forthe PL0 Missionwouldbe "maintained" andthat application to it of
the Actwould be "deferred", a dispute overthe interpretation and appli-
cation ofthe Headquarters Agreementwouldnotarise.TheUnited States
hasprovidedassurancesinthis vein,though only"Until the United States

courts have determined" whether that Act "requires closure of the PL0
Observer Mission".

However important that condition is, it does not vitiate the utility of
these assurances. It isnot clearwhythese assurances ofthe United States
maynot be treated assufficientassurances ofthe maintenance ofexisting
arrangementsfor the PL0 ObserverMission,pendingthe outcome ofliti-
gationin United Statescourts.Naturallyit isforthe Secretary-Generalto
decide whether assurances which he seeks are sufficient or insufficient.
Nevertheless, the assurances ofthe United Statesbear upon an objective
determination ofwhether,now,adispute existsovertheapplication ofthe
Headquarters Agreement.

The fact isthat the PL0 Observer Missiontothe United Nations func-
tions. It has notbeen closed;its activitiesgiveno signofhavingbeen "af-
fected orotherwisecurtailed". Itistrue that ithastheburden ofdefending
itself in United Nations fora and in the United States District Court
against the threat of closure. But an objective appraisal of the matter
surelysustainsthe conclusionthatthe PLO,intheopinion ofthe members
of the United Nations and in public opinion, has not been adversely
affected by the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act and action in pur-
suance of it. On the contras., it appears to have significantlybenefited. If the PL0 had closed down its officein New York Cityin response to
the Attorney Generai's determination,a dispute over the application of
the Headquarters Agreement undoubtedly would have existed from the
time ofthat closure.Asit is,the issue of whether the PL0 actuallywillbe
required to closeits NewYorkofficehasnot been definitivelydetermined
by the Attorney General;that issue rather isbefore the District Courtfor
the SouthernDistrict of NewYork.
In oral proceedingsbefore this Court,the LegalCounsel ofthe United
Nations took the position in answer to a question that, if United States
courts were to hold that the Anti-Terrorism Act cannot lawfully be en-
forced against the PL0 Observer Mission, that would not mean that the
disputehad neverexistedbut would merelyput anendto thedispute. That
is a reasonableinterpretation ofthe facts and one which leads meto con-
cludethat theCourt's Opinion istenable. Butitisnotanecessaryinterpre-

tation, particularly in view of the Secretary-General having repeatedly
conditioned the existence of a dispute upon the absence of assurances
from the United States of the maintenance of existing arrangements for
the functioning ofthe PL0 Observer Mission.

The question in the end comes to whether the United States now is
bound to arbitratethe dispute,or whether it will only be sobound in the
eventthatthe District Courtshould orderthat the Actbe enforced against
the PL0 ObserverMission. Should proceedingsbefore the District Court
and any appealstherefrom be maintained, the possibilities of municipal
judgment are several.It could be held that the Actapplies tothe PL0 Ob-
server Mission, in which event the United States has inferred that ithen
will regard arbitration of the resultant dispute as "timely and appropri-
ate". Alternatively,havingregard to the reasoning of Senator Pell set out
above or onother grounds,it could be held thatthe Actdoes not apply to
the PL0 Observer Mission,in which event,if a disputerequiringarbitra-
tion ever existed, it no longer will. Or it could be held that, in view of
the AdvisoryOpinion of this Court,and in viewof the fact thatthe Anti-
Terrorism Act does not mention, and accordingly cannot be interpreted
as derogating from, arbitral obligations of the United States under the
Headquarters Agreement, in any event the United States is bound to
arbitratethe dispute.There maybe other possibilities aswell.

Apossible interpretation of section21of the Headquarters Agreement
which 1do notfindsustainable isthat, because it contains what in arbitra-
tion circles is characterized as an imperfect or incomplete clause, that

clause permits a party not to appoint an arbitrator if it so chooses.
Section21,paragraph (a),provides :

"Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States
concerning the interpretation or application of this agreement ...
which is not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settle- ment, shallbereferred forfinal decisionto atribunal ofthree arbitra-
tors, oneto be named bythe Secretary-General,one to be named by
the Secretaryof Stateofthe United States,and thethirdto be chosen
by the two, or, if they should fail to agree upon a third, then by the
President of the InternationalCourt of Justice."

The clause is incompletein that, while it contains provision for appoint-
ment ofathirdarbitrator by anappointing authority, itcontains no provi-
sionforan appointing authoritytoappointanarbitrator whomaparty has

failed to appoint. Arbitration clauses which are more prudently crafted
characteristically do contain such provision.

The International Law Commission of the United Nations in its early
yearsmade avigorous and searchingeffort to block loopholesin the pro-
cess of international arbitration. The absence of provision for appoint-
ment by an appointing authority of anarbitrator whom aparty has failed
to appoint wasseen asalargeloophole. Despitethe progressivecharacter
and technical excellenceof the draft prepared by the Commission atthe
instance of its special rapporteur, Professor Georges Scelle,the General
Assembly's majority proved in large measure unwilling to accept the
Commission'swork;itpreferred to keep loopholesopen, to maintain the
diplomatic fiexibility of interpretation and action which often has de-
tracted from the judicial character of the processes of international arbi-
tration. Bearinginmindthishistory,itmightbeargued thatthearbitration
provisions oftheHeadquarters Agreementweredeliberatelydraftedsoas
to omit provision for third-party appointment of an arbitrator whom a
party failed to appoint in order to afford the parties an ultimate exitfrom
an obligation which in a particular case one or the other might find
exigent.

1do not believethat such a contention would be correct in the current
case,not because the Headquarters Agreementwas concluded before the
General Assembly reacted as described to the Commission's draft, but
because the Court has decisively and soundly rejected it in analogous
circumstances.
In its advisoryproceedings on the InterpretationofPeaceTreatieswith
Bulgaria,HungaïyandRornania,the arbitration clause before the Court
was in pertinent part essentially the same as that of the Headquarters
Agreement. That is to Say,while it provided for an appointing authority
(inthat case,the Secretary-General)to appointthe third member should
the two parties fail to agree upon him, it contained no provision for the
appointment by an appointing authority of an arbitrator who in the first
place wasto be named by a party.

In disputesbetween Bulgaria,Hungary and Romaniaontheonehand,
and certain Allied and Associated Powers signatories to the Treaties ofPeaceonthe other, the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
refused to appoint arbitratorsin pursuance ofhe arbitration clause of
the Treaties. The Court held that"al1the conditions required for the
commencement of the stage of the settlement of disputes" by the arbitral
commissions "have been fulfilled", and concluded :

"In viewofthefact thatthe Treatiesprovide that any disputeshall
be referred to a Commission'attherequest ofeitherparty',it follows
that either party is obligated, at the request of theother to co-
operate in constituting the Commission, in particular by appointing
its representative. Otherwise the method of settlement by Commis-
sions provided for in the Treaties would completelyail in its pur-
pose." (Z.C.J.Reports1950,p. 77.)

(Signe dt)phen M. SCHWEBEL.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SCHWEBEL

1havevoted in favour ofthe Court's AdvisoryOpinion because 1think
that itsessentialconclusion - that there is a dispute between the United
Nations andthe UnitedStatesoverthe interpretation orapplication ofthe
Headquarters Agreement - istenable. In myview,however,the question
put to the Court admits ofmore than one answer.Theanswergivenbythe
Court isnot the answerwhich 1believein al1respectsto be required.
Asthe Court recordsinparagraph 1 ofitsOpinion, the General Assem-
bly, in requestingthe Court's advisory opinion as to whetherthe United
Statesis under an obligation to enter into arbitration in accordance with
section 21 ofthe Headquarters Agreement, affirmedthe position of the

Secretary-General"that a dispute existsbetweenthe United Nations and
the host country concerning the interpretation or application of the
Agreement . . ."(resolution 42/229B). In its companion resolution
42/229A, also adopted on 2 March 1988,the General Assembly con-
sidered
"that a dispute exists between the United Nations and the United
States ...concerningthe interpretation or application of the Head-
quarters Agreement, and that the dispute settlementprocedure set
out in section 21ofthe Agreement shouldbe setin operation".

That is toSay,the General Assembly,after twice answering the question
on which it seeksthe advice of the Court,the principaljudicial organ of
the United Nations, requested the Court's opinion on that question.
Thereafter, on 23March 1988,whileproceedingsinthe Court werepend-
ing,the General Assemblyreaffirmedits answerby holding

"that a dispute exists between the United Nations and the United
States... concerningthe interpretation or application of the Head-
quarters Agreement, and that the dispute settlement procedure
provided for under section 21 of the Agreement ... should be set in
operation ..." (resolution 42/230).

In responding to the General Assembly's question posed in this
fashion,the Court makesholdings ofunchallengeable cogency.It is axio-
maticthat,onthe international legalplane,national lawcannot derogate
frominternational law,that a Statecannot avoiditsinternational respon-
sibilityby the enactment of domestic legislation which conflicts with its
international obligations. It is evident that a party to an agreement con-
taining an obligation to arbitrate any dispute over its interpretation or
application cannot legallyavoidthat obligation by denyingthe existence
ofadisputeor by maintainingthat arbitration ofitwouldnot serveauseful
purpose.Itisacceptedthataprovisionofatreaty(oracontract)prescribing OPINION INDIVIDUELLEDE M. SCHWEBEL

[Traduction]
J'aivotépourl'avis consultatifdelaCour carje pensequesaconclusion
essentielle- qu'ilexisteun différend entrel'organisation des Nations

Unies et les Etats-Unis au sujet de l'interprétationou de l'application
de l'accord de siège - est défendable.A mon avis,plusieurs réponses
peuventtoutefoisêtredonnées àla questionposéeàla Cour. Laréponse
de la Cour n'estpas cellequi, selon moi, doit être donnéàtous égards.
Commeil estindiquéauparagraphe1 del'avisdela Cour,l'Assemblée
générale, en demandant àla Cour un avis consultatifsur la question de
savoirsiles Etats-Unissonttenus derecourir àl'arbitrageconformément
àla section21de l'accordde siège,a confirméla position du Secrétaire
généraq luiaconstaté((l'existenced'undifférendentrel'organisation des
Nations Unies etle pays hôte quant àl'interprétationou l'applicationde
l'accord..» (résolution42/229B). Dans la résolution42/229A qui ac-
compagnaitcellequivientd'être citée,adoptéeégalementle2mars 1988,
l'Assemblée générale a considéré:
«qu'un différendexisteentrel'organisation des Nations Uniesetles

Etats-Unisd'Amérique ..quant àl'interprétationoul'applicationde
l'accord de siège,et que la procédurede règlementdes différends
viséeàla section21de l'accorddevraitêtreengagée».
En d'autrestermes,aprèsavoirrépondudeux fois àla question au sujet
delaquelle elledemandel'avisdela Cour,quiestleprincipal organejudi-
ciaire de l'organisation des Nations Unies, l'Assembléegénérale a de-
mandé à la Cour son avissur cettequestion.Par la suite,le 23mars 1988,
alors que la procédure devantla Cour sepoursuivait,l'Assemblée géné-
rale a répondudans lemême sensàcettequestion enconsidérant

((qu'undifférendexisteentrel'organisation desNationsUniesetles
Etats-Unis..quant à l'interprétationoà l'applicationdel'accordde
siège,et que laprocédurede règlement des différendvsiséeàla sec-
tion 21del'accord ..devraitêtreengagée ..»(résolution42/230).

En répondant à la questionposée encestermespar l'Assembléegéné-
rale, la Cour s'estprononcéesur certains points d'une manière incon-
testable. Il est certain que, dans l'ordre juridique international, le droit
interne ne peut déroger audroit international et qu'un Etat ne peut se

soustraire à sa responsabilité internationale en promulguant une loi
interne contraire à ses obligations internationales. Il est évidentqu'une
partie à un accord prévoyant uneobligation de soumettre à l'arbitrage
tout différendquant à son interprétationou son application ne peut
juridiquement se soustraireà cette obligationen refusant de reconnaître
l'existenced'undifférendou en soutenant qu'il neseraitd'aucune utilitéthe international arbitration of any dispute arising thereunder does not
require, as a prerequisite for its implementation,the exhaustion of local
remedies. 1agreenot only with these restatements of legalprinciple but
also with the findings in this case that the dispute between the United
Nations and the United Stateshas notbeen settled by suchnegotiationas
has takenplace,andthattheparties havenot agreedupon a modeofsettle-
ment other than arbitration.

My difference of perspective with the Court turns on whetherthe dis-
pute between the United Nations and the United States at this juncture
concerns "the interpretation or application" of the Headquarters Agree-
ment. The nub of my appreciation of the facts of the caseis that there is
essentialagreement betweenthe United Nations and the UnitedStates on
the interpretation of the Headquarters Agreement. Whether there cur-
rently isa dispute overits applicationis not so clear.
Itcan be concluded, astheCourt concludes,that, bythe course of con-
ductwhichtheGovernment ofthe UnitedStateshas followedwithrespect
to the continuedfunctioning ofthe officein New York Cityofthe Obser-
ver Mission to the United Nations of the PalestineLiberation Organiza-
tion, a dispute has arisen between the United Nations and the United
States"concerning the. ..application of thisAgreement. ..".But,in rny
view,thefacts ofthe casealternativelyallowthe conclusionthat, sincethe

effectiveapplication ofthe United States Act at issue - the Anti-Terror-
ism Act - to the PLO'sNew York officehas been deferredpending the
outcome of litigation now in progressin the United StatesDistrict Court
for the Southern District of New York, a dispute over the application of
the Headquarters Agreementwillariseifand whentheresult ofthat litiga-
tionis effectivelyto applythat Acttothe PLO'soffice.Explanation ofthis
alternativeconclusion,as well as of the parties' coincidenceof viewson
the interpretation ofthe Headquarters Agreement,requires an exposition
of somesalient facts ofthe case.
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987,in addition to the central provisions
quoted bythe Court inparagraph 9 ofitsOpinion, contains "findings" of
the United States Congress about activities of the PL0 and "determina-
tions" thatthe PL0 isa"terroristorganization"which"should notbenefit
fromoperatinginthe United States";directs the AttorneyGeneral to take
the necessarystepsand institutethe necessarylegalaction to "effectuate"
theAct; and givesappropriatecourts ofthe UnitedStatesauthority, atthe
Attorney General's instance,to "enforce" the Act.

Whenlegislationofthissubstance wasinitiallyintroduced, Secretaryof
StateShultz on 29January 1987wrote SenatorDole that :

"The PL0 Observer Mission in New York was established as a
consequence of General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) ofde le soumettre à l'arbitrage. Il est admis qu'une disposition d'un traité
(ou d'un contrat) prescrivant la soumission àun arbitrage international
de tout différendqui en découleraitn'exigepas, comme condition préa-
lable àsonexécution,l'épuisementdesvoiesde recoursinternes. Je sous-
cris non seulement à la réaffirmationde ces principes juridiques, mais
égalementaux conclusionsenl'espèce selonlesquelles ledifférendentre
l'organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis n'a pas étéréglé par

lesnégociationsqui ont déjàeulieu,et quelesparties ne sontpas conve-
nues d'unmode de règlementautre que l'arbitrage.
Ma divergencedevuesaveclaCourporte surla question de savoirsile
différend entre l'organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis à ce
stade concerne((l'interprétationoul'application »de l'accordde siège.A
mon avis, lesfaits de l'affaire montrent que l'organisation des Nations
Unies et les Etats-Unissont essentiellementd'accord sur l'interprétation
de l'accordde siège.La question de savoirsiun différendexisteactuelle-
ment sur sonapplication n'estpas si évidente.
On peut conclure, comme l'a fait la Cour, qu'en raison du comporte-
mentadoptépar leGouvernementdesEtats-Unisàl'égard du maintien en
fonctionnement du bureau à New York de la mission d'observation de
l'organisation de libérationde la Palestineauprès de l'organisation des
Nations Uniesun différendestnéentrel'organisation desNations Unies
etlesEtats-Unis «au sujet de..l'application de cetaccord... Selonmoi,
lesfaits de l'affaire permettentpar ailleurs de conclureque, commel'ap-
plication effectivede la loi des Etats-Unisen question- la loi contre le
terrorisme - aubureau deI'OLP àNewYorka été renvoyéeenattendant

l'issuede la procédure judiciaire en cours devant le tribunal du district
sud de New York,un différendquant àl'application de l'accordde siège
ne naîtra que si ce tribunal décidait quecette loi doit effectivements'ap-
pliquer au bureau de I'OLP.Pour expliquercetteautre conclusion,ainsi
que la concordance de vues des parties sur l'interprétation de l'accord
de siège,il convient d'exposer certains des faits saillants de la présente
affaire.
Outrelesdispositions essentiellescitéespar laCour auparagraphe 9de
son avis,la loi de1987contre leterrorisme contient un ((exposédes mo-
tifs»du CongrèsdesEtats-Unissur les activitésde 1'OLPetdes «conclu-
sions» selon lesquelles l'OLP est une «organisationterroriste » qui «ne
[devrait]pas avoir l'autorisation d'opéreraux Etats-Unis»; elle donne
pour instructionsàl'AttorneyGeneraldeprendre lesmesuresetd'engager
lesprocéduresnécessairespour «donner effet »àla loi, ethabilite lestri-
bunaux compétentsdes Etats-Unis, sur demande de l'AttorneyGeneral à
«assurerl'application»de la loi.
Lorsqu'une proposition de cette nature a étéprésentée pourla pre-

mièrefois,lesecrétaired'EtatShultzaécritcequisuitle29janvier 1987au
sénateur Dole:

«La mission d'observation de l'OLP à New York a été établie
comme suite àla résolution3237(XXIX) adoptéepar l'Assemblée November 22,1974,which invitedthe PL0 to participate as an ob-
serverin the sessionsand work at the General Assembly.The PL0
Observer Missionrepresentsthe PL0 inthe UN; itisin no senseac-
creditedtothe US.TheUShasmadeclearthat PL0 ObserverMission
personnel are present in the United Statessolelyin their capacityas
'invitees'oftheUnitedNationswithinthemeaningofthe Headquar-
ters Agreement ...we therefore are under an obligationto permit
PL0 Observer Missionpersonnelto enter and remainin the United
Statesto carry out their officialfunctions at UN headquarters ..."
(CongressionalRecord,Vol. 133,No. 78,14 May 1987,p.S6449).

At the 126thmeeting of the United Nations Cornmitteeon Relations
with the Host Country, on 14October 1987,the Observerfor the PL0
drew attention to an amendment to the State Department authorization
bill containingprovisionslater to be reflectedinthe Anti-TerrorismAct.
He quotedthe letterofthe SecretaryofStateof29January.Therepresen-
tative of the United Statesresponded that, "in the opinion of the Execu-
tive Branch, closingofthe PL0 Missionwouldnotbe consistentwiththe
host country's obligations under the Headquarters Agreement". The
LegalCounsel of the United Nations then declared that "the Organiza-
tion shared the legalopinion expressedin the letter of Secretaryof State
Shultzof29January 1987"(A/42/26, pp. 11 -12).
Senator Dole did not agreewiththe position of the Secretaryof State,
and opinion in the Senate and House was divided. When a conference
report on the ForeignRelationsAuthorizationAct wasintroducedto the
Senate,containingthetitleembodyingthe Anti-TerrorismAct,the Chair-
man ofthe Cornmitteeon ForeignRelations,SenatorPell,declared :

"the administrationhas expressedconcernthat the languageon the
PL0 mightrequirethe closingofthe ObserverMissiontothe United
Nations in violationof USobligations under international law.The
billlanguage,as 1read it,doesnot necessarilyrequirethe closureof
the PL0 ObserverMissiontothe United Nations,sinceitis an estab-
lished rule of statutory interpretation that US courts will construe
congressionalstatutesasconsistentwithUSobligationsunder inter-
national law,if suchconstructionis at al1plausible.

The proponents of closingthe PL0 missionarguethatthe United
Statesisunder no legalobligationto host observer missions.Ifthey
arerightasamatterofinternationallaw,thenthelanguageinthisbill
wouldrequirethe closureofthe PL0 Observer Mission. généralel,e22novembre 1974,quiinvitaitl'OLPàparticiper aux ses-
sions et aux travaux de l'Assembléegénérale en qualité d'observa-
teur. La mission d'observation de l'organisation de libérationde la
Palestine représentel'OLP auprès de l'organisation des Nations
Unies; elle n'estenaucunemanièreaccréditéeauprès du Gouverne-

ment desEtats-Unis.LesEtats-Unisontfaitclairementsavoir queles
membresdu personnel de la mission d'observationde l'OLPne sont
présentsaux Etats-Unis qu'en qualitéde ((personnes invitées »par
l'organisation desNations Unies,au sensde l'accorddesiège.Donc,
nous avons l'obligation d'autoriser les membres du personnel de la
mission d'observation de l'OLP à entrer et à demeurer aux Etats-
Unispour s'acquitterdeleursfonctions officiellesau Siègedel'Orga-
nisationdesNations Unies ..»(CongressionalRecord,vol. 133n ,o78,
14mai 1987,p. S6449.)

Ala 126eséanceducomitédesrelations aveclepayshôte,le 14octobre
1987,l'observateurde l'OLPa appelé l'attention surun amendement au
projetdeloidefinances relativeau départementd'Etatcontenantdes dis-
positions qui devaientêtrereprisespar la suite dansla loicontre leterro-
risme. Il a citéla lettre du 29janvier du secrétaired'Etat. Lereprésentant
des Etats-Unis a répondu que «de l'avisde l'exécutif,la fermeture de la
mission de l'OLPne serait pas conforme aux obligationsdu pays hôte en
vertu de l'accordde siège».Le conseillerjuridique de l'organisation des
Nations Unies a alors déclaré que((l'organisation partageait l'opinion
juridique expriméedans la lettre du secrétaired'Etat Shultz en date du
29janvier 1987))(A/42/26, p. 11-12).
Le sénateur Dolen'a pas souscrit à la position du secrétaired'Etat et
les avisétaient partagésau Sénatet à la chambre. Lorsqu'un rapport de
la commission de conciliation sur la loi d'ouverture de créditspour les
affairesétrangères,contenantle texte de la loi contreleterrorisme, a été
présenté au Sénat,leprésidentdelacommissiondesaffaires étrangères,le
sénateurPell,a déclaré :

((le gouvernement craint que la formulation du texte concernant
I'OLP n'exige la fermeture de la mission d'observation de l'OLP
auprèsde l'organisation des Nations Unies, en violation d'obliga-
tions que lesEtats-Unisont contractéesen droitinternational.Selon
moi,lestermesdelaloin'exigentpas nécessairementlafermeture de
la mission d'observation de 1'OLPauprès de l'organisation des
Nations Unies,car c'estune règleconsacréed'interprétation deslois
que les tribunaux américains interprètentles lois du Congrèsdans

un senscompatible aveclesobligationsdesEtats-Unis endroitinter-
national, pour que cetteinterprétation soitplausible.
Lespartisans delafermeture delamissionde I'OLPaffirmentque
les Etats-Unisne sont pasjuridiquement tenus d'accueillir des mis-
sionsd'observation.S'ilsontraison surleplan du droitinternational,
alorslestermesdelaloi exigentlafermeture delamissiond'observa-
tion de l'OLP. On the other hand, ifthe United Statesis under a legalobligation
asthe hostcountry ofthe United Nations to allowobservermissions
recognized by the General Assembly,then the language in this bill
cannot be construed, in my opinion, as requiring the closure of the
PL0 Observer Mission. The bill makes no mention of the PL0
Mission to the United Nations and the proponents never indicated
an intent to violate US obligations under international law. Rather,
they asserted that closure of the New York PL0 office was not a
violation of international law and that they were proceeding on
this basis." (CongressionalRecord,Vol. 133,No. 200, 16December
1987,pp. S18185-S18186.)

Beforedevelopments had reachedthis stage, the Secretary-Generalon
13October 1987wrote to the Permanent Representative of the United
Statesexpressinghis serious concern at the adoption bythe Senate of an
amendment which sought to make unlawful the maintenance within the
United States of any officeofthe PLO. He recalled the terms ofthe letter
of 29 January 1987of the Secretary of State, and declared that, "1am
in agreement with the views expressed by the Secretary of State in this
matter. .."
On 7 December 1987,the Secretary-General wrote to Ambassador
Waltersin the followingterms :

"it isthe legalposition ofthe United Nations that the membersofthe
PL0 ObserverMissionare,byvirtue ofGeneral Assemblyresolution
3237 (XXIX), invitees to the United Nations and that the United
States is under an obligation to permit PL0 personnel to enter and
remaininthe United States to carryouttheir officia1functionsatthe
United Nations under the Headquarters Agreement. This position
...coincides with the position taken by the United States Adminis-
trationintheletter...bythe SecretaryofStateon29January 1987. ..

Evenatthis late stage,1verymuch hope that itwillbe possiblefor
the Administration,in line with its own legalposition, to act to pre-
ventthe adoption ofthis legislation. However,1would be gratefulif
you couldconfirmthat evenifthisproposedlegislation becomeslaw,
the present arrangementsfor the PL0 Observer Mission would not
be curtailed orotherwiseaffected.Without suchassurance,a dispute
between the United Nations and the United States concerning the
interpretation or application ofthe Headquarters Agreementwould
exist and 1 would be obliged to enter into the dispute settlement
procedure foreseenunder section21ofthe UN Headquarters Agree-
ment. .."

The legislation nevertheless having been adopted, and, having been Parcontre,silesEtats-Unissont,en tant quepayshôte del'organi-
sation des Nations Unies, juridiquement tenus d'autoriser les mis-
sionsd'observation reconnues par l'Assemblée généralo e, ne peut
alors,mon avis,interpréterlaloicommeexigeantlafermeture dela
mission d'observation de l'OLP.La loine fait aucune mention de la
mission de 1'OLPauprèsde l'organisation des Nations Unies et ses

partisans n'ont jamais indiquéla moindre intention d'aller à l'en-
contre d'obligations de droit international contractéespar les Etats-
Unis. Cequ'ilsontaffirméc'estquela fermeture du bureau de SOLP
àNew York ne constituepas une violation du droit international et
qu'ils partaient de ce principe.» (CongressionalRecord, vol. 133,
no200,16 décembre1987,p. S18185-S18186.)

Avantque les événementn seprennent une telletournure,le 13octobre
1987le Secrétairegénéraa l écritau représentant permanent des Etats-
Unis pour luiexprimer sesgravespréoccupations à la suite de l'adoption
par le Sénat d'un amendementtendant à rendre illégalle maintien aux
Etats-Unis de tout bureau de l'OLP. Il a rappeléles termes de la lettredu
29janvier 1987du secrétaire d'Etat eta déclaré«je suisenaccord avecles
vues expriméespar lesecrétaired'Etat sur cettequestion ..))

Le 7 décembre1987,le Secrétairegénéraal écritce qui suit à M. Wal-
ters:

«la positionjuridique del'organisation desNations Unies estlasui-
vante: les membres de la mission d'observation de l'OLP sont, en
vertu de la résolution3237(XXIX) de l'Assembléegénérale, des in-
vitésdel'organisation desNations UniesetlesEtats-Unissonttenus
d'autoriserlesmembresdu personnel del'OLP àentrer etàséjourner
aux Etats-Unis pour s'acquitter de leurs fonctions officiellesauprès
de l'organisation des Nations Unies conformément à l'accord de
siège.Cette position..conïcide aveccelleadoptéepar le Gouverne-
mentdes Etats-Unis dansla lettre que le secrétaired'Etat a adressée
le 29janvier 1987...
Même à ce stade avancé,j'espère vivemenq tue le Gouvernement
desEtats-Unis aurala possibilité,conformémentàsapropreposition
juridique, deprendre des mesurespour empêcherl'adoption decette

loi. Je vous serais toutefois obligéde bien vouloir confirmer que
même sila loi envisagéeest adoptée,les arrangementsactuellement
en vigueur en ce qui concerne la mission d'observation de l'OLP ne
serontnirestreintsniautrement affectés.Faute d'unetelleassurance,
il s'avérerait qu'undifférendexisteentre l'organisation des Nations
Unies et les Etats-Unis quantàl'interprétation ouàl'application de
l'accord de siège,auquel cas je me verrais dans l'obligation d'en-
tamerlaprocédurederèglementdesdifférendsprévue àla section21
de l'accordde siège..))

La loi ayanttoutefois étéadoptée et incorporéà ela loi d'ouverture demade part of the State Department's authorization to expend funds,
signedinto lawbythe President,the ActingPermanentRepresentative of
the United States,AmbassadorOkun,wrote to the Secretary-General on
5January 1988 :

"The legislation to which your lettersreferis part of the 'Foreign
RelationsAuthorization Act,FiscalYears 1988and 1989',signedby
PresidentReagan on December 22.Section 1003ofthis law,relating
to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), is to take effect
ninety days after that date. Because the provisions concerningthe
PL0 Observer Mission may infringe on the President's constitu-
tional authority and, ifimplemented,wouldbe contrary to our inter-
national legal obligationsunder the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement, the Administration intends, during the ninety-day
period before this provision is to take effect,to engage inonsulta-
ions with the Congressin an effort to resolvethis matter."

On 14 January 1988, the Secretary-General wrote to Ambassador
Waltersrestatingterms ofpreviousexchanges and stating :
"1,of course, welcomethe intentions ofthe US Administration to
make use ofthe 90-dayperiod in the way described by Ambassador

Okun, and explained in greater detail by the Legal Adviser of the
StateDepartment,JudgeSofaer, in hismeetingwiththe Legal Coun-
sel on 12January. Nevertheless, neither the letter of Ambassador
Okun nor the statementsmade by Judge Sofaerconstitute the assur-
ance 1had soughtin myletterof7December 1987nor dothey ensure
that full respect for the Headquarters Agreement can be assumed.
Under these circumstances, a dispute existsbetween the Organiza-
tion and the UnitedStatesconcerningtheinterpretation and applica-
tion ofthe Headquarters Agreementand 1hereby invokethe dispute
settlement procedure set out in section 21 of the said Agreement.''

On 2 February 1988,the Secretary-General wrote again to Ambas-
sador Walters,inthe termssetoutinparagraph 19ofthe Court's Opinion.
On 11 February 1988, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations,
Mr. Fleischhauer, wrote to Judge Sofaer,informing him that the United
Nations had chosen Eduardo JiménezdeAréchaga,formerPresident and
Judge of the International Court of Justice, to be its arbitrator "in the
event of arbitrationunder section 21 ..."and, in view of the governing
time constraints, urged thatthe United Statesinformthe United Nations
assoon as possible ofitschoice of an arbitrator.

Resolution 42/229 Bwas adopted by a voteof 143to none. TheUnited
Statesdidnotparticipate in thevote.AmbassadorOkun gavethe explana-
tion which is quoted in paragraph 22ofthe Court's Opinion.créditsdu départementd'Etat, promulguéepar le Président,lereprésen-
tant permanent par intérimdesEtats-Unis, M.Okun, a écritencestermes

au Secrétairegénéralle 5janvier 1988:

«Laloimentionnéedansvoslettresfait partie du ForeignRelations
Authorization Act,Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989,que le président
Reagan a signéle22décembre.Lasection 1003decetteloi,quiatrait
à l'organisation de libération dela Palestine (OLP), doit entrer en
vigueur quatre-vingt-dixjours après cette date. Etant donnéque les
dispositions concernant la mission d'observation de I'OLP pour-
raient empiétersurlespouvoirsconstitutionnelsdu Présidentetque,
si ellesétaientappliquées,ellesseraientcontrairesànos obligations

juridiques internationales découlant de l'accord de siège avec l'Or-
ganisation des Nations Unies, le gouvernement a l'intention de
mettre à profit le délaide quatre-vingt-dixjours qui doit précéder
l'entrée envigueur de cette disposition pour engager des consulta-
tions avecle Congrèsafinde réglerla question.»
Le 14janvier 1988,le Secrétairegénéraal écritàM.Walters en rappe-
lant lestermes des échangesdevues antérieurs eten déclarant :

«Bienentendu,je me félicite que leGouvernement desEtats-Unis
ait l'intention d'utiliser le délaide quatre-vingt-dixjours de la ma-
nière indiquéepar l'ambassadeur Okun et expliquéeplus en détail
par le conseillerjuridique du départementd'Etat, lejuge Sofaer,au
coursdel'entretienqu'ila eu avecleconseillerjuridique del'organi-
sationdesNationsUniesle 12janvier. Néanmoins, ni lalettredel'am-
bassadeur Okun ni lesdéclarationsfaitespar lejuge Sofaerne cons-
tituent l'assurance que j'ai demandéedans ma lettre du 7 décembre
1987,pas plus qu'ellesne permettent de compter sur lepleinrespect
de l'accord de siège.Cela étant,il existe un différend entrel'Orga-

nisation et les Etats-Unis au sujet de l'interprétation etde l'applica-
tion de l'accordde siègeetj'invoque par la présentela procédurede
règlementdesdifférendsénoncée àla section21del'accord susdit.»
Le 2 février1988,le Secrétairegénéraal écritànouveau à M. Walters,
dans lestermesénoncésau paragraphe 19de l'avisde la Cour.
Le 11février1988,leconseillerjuridique de l'organisation desNations
Unies, M. Fleischhauer, a écrità M. Sofaer, pour lui faire savoir que
l'organisation des Nations Unies avait choisi M. Eduardo Jiménezde
Aréchaga,ancien Présidentetjuge de la Cour internationale de Justice,

pour êtresonarbitre «en casd'arbitrageauxtermesdela section21 ..»et,
étantdonné les contraintes de temps, il l'a prié instamment de faire
connaître le plus tôt possiblàl'organisation des Nations Unies le nom
de l'arbitre choisipar les Etats-Unis.
Larésolution42/229Ba étéadoptép ear 143voixcontrezéro.LesEtats-
Unisn'ont pasparticipéauvote. M.Okun a expliquécettepositionquiest
rappelée auparagraphe22de l'avisconsultatif. On 4 March 1988,followingthe adoption of resolutions 42/229A and
42/229 B,the ~ecretary-~eneral wrote to Ambassador Walters observing
thathe had not receivedan officialresponse to hislettersin whichhehad
sought
"assurances regarding the non-application or the deferral of the

application of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987to the PL0 Observer
Missionnor ...aresponse ...regardingthe choiceofanarbitrator by
the United States".

He continued that

"it is myhopethat it willstillprovepossibleforthe United States to
reconcileits domestic legislation with its international obligations.
Should this not be the case then 1trust that the United States will
recognizethe existenceofadispute and agreeto theutilization ofthe
disputesettlementprocedure provided for insection 21ofthe Head-
quarters Agreement,and that inthe interimperiod the statusquowill
be maintained."

On 11March 1988,AmbassadorOkun wrote to the Secretary-General
in the terms quoted in paragraph 24 of the Court's Opinion. The Secre-
tary-Generalprotested Ambassor Okun'sletter of 11March 1988and by
letter of 15Marchrepliedinthe followingterms:
"in the view ofthe United Nations the decision taken by the United
StatesGovernmentasoutlinedin the letter is a clearviolation ofthe
Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the
United States.In particular, 1cannotaccept the statementcontained
in theletter that the United States may act irrespective of its obliga-
tionsunder the Headquarters Agreement, and 1would ask you to
reconsiderthe seriousimplicationsofthis statementgiventhe respon-

sibilitiesofthe United States asthe host country.

1must also take issue with the conclusion reached in your letter
thatthe United States believesthat submission ofthis matter to arbi-
tration wouldnot serveauseful purpose. TheUnited Nations conti-
nues to believethat the machinery providedforin the Headquarters
Agreementisthe proper frameworkforthe settlement ofthisdispute
and 1cannot agree that arbitration would serve no useful purpose.
Onthe contrary,in the present case,it would servethe verypurpose
for which the provisions of section 21 were included in the Agree-
ment, namelythe settlement of a disputearisingfrom the interpreta-
tion or application ofthe Agreement."

TheAttorneyGeneral ofthe United Stateswrotethe Permanent Obser-
ver of the PL0 Mission to the United Nations on 11March 1988in the
terms set out in paragraph 25ofthe Court's Opinion.The PL0 Observer Le 4 mars 1988,à la suite de l'adoption des résolutions42/229A et
42/229B,le Secrétairegénéraal écritàM. Walters pour lui faire remar-

quer qu'iln'avaitpas reçuderéponseofficielleàseslettresdans lesquelles
il demandait
des assurancesque la loi contre leterrorisme de 1987ne seraitpas
appliquée àla mission permanente d'observation de l'organisation
de libérationde la Palestine, ou que son application serait différée,
[ni]..de réponse ..concernant la désignation d'un arbitrepar les
Etats-Unis ».

Il a ensuitedéclaré:

«Lj'exprime]l'espoir qu'il serait encore possible aux Etats-Unis de
concilierleur législationinterne et leurs obligationsinternationales.
Cependant, siteln'étaitpasle cas,Ljesuis]confiantque lesEtats-Unis
reconnaîtraient l'existencedu différend et accepteraientde recourir
àla procédure derèglement desdifférendsprévueàla section 21de
l'accord de siègeet que, dans l'intervalle, le statu quo serait main-
tenu.»
Le 11mars 1988,M.Okun a écritau Secrétairegénéradlans lestermes
citésau paragraphe 24 de l'avisde la Cour. Le Secrétairegénéraal pro-

testécontrelalettredu 11marsde M.Okun etdansune lettredu 15marsa
réponduen cestermes:
«selon l'organisation des Nations Unies, la décisionprise par le
Gouvernement desEtats-Unis,telle qu'elle estexposée dansla lettre,
constitue une violation flagrante de l'accord de siègeconclu entre
l'organisation desNationsUnieset lesEtats-Unis.Plusparticulière-
ment,je ne sauraisaccepterque les Etats-Unispuissentprendre une
mesure, comme il est dit dansla lettre, quellesque soient les obliga-

tions qui leurincombentenvertu de l'accordde siège,etje voudrais
vous demander de réfléchir à nouveau aux graves conséquences
d'une pareilledéclaration,étantdonnélesresponsabilitésquiincom-
bent aux Etats-Unisen tant que pays hôte.
Je doisaussicontester la conclusionà laquellevousparvenezdans
votre lettre, àsavoirque les Etats-Unis estimentque soumettre cette
affaireà l'arbitrage ne serait d'aucune utilité.L'Organisation des
Nations Unies reste persuadée que ledispositif prévudans l'accord
de siègeconstitue le cadre approprié pour le règlementde ce diffé-
rend etje nepeux admettre que l'arbitragene seraitd'aucune utilité.
Bien au contraire, dans le cas présent,il servirait l'objectif même
pour lequel les dispositions de la section 21 ont étéincluses dans
l'accord,àsavoirpermettrele règlementd'un différendrésultant de
l'interprétation oude l'application del'accord.

L'AttorneyGeneraldesEtats-Unis a écritune lettre à l'observateurper-
manent de la mission de l'OLP auprès de l'organisation des Nations
Unies le 11mars 1988dans lestermesénoncésauparagraphe 25de l'avisreplied on 14Marchinthetermscontainedinparagraph 27ofthe Court's
Opinion. Attorney General Meese responded by letter of 21 March as
quoted in paragraph 27ofthe Court's Opinion.

In itswritten statementsubmitted tothe Court in the current proceed-
ings, the United States repeated the substance of Ambassador Okun's
letter of 11March. It observedthat, sincethe PL0 Mission had not com-
plied with the Attorney General's order, a lawsuit had been filed to
compelcompliance.Thestatementcontinued :
"That litigation will afford an opportunity forthe PL0 and other
interestedparties to raise legal challengesto enforcement ofthe Act
against the PL0 Mission. The United States will take no action to
close the Mission pending a decision in that litigation. Since the
matter is still pending in Ourcourts, we do not believe arbitration
wouldbe appropriateor timely."

In the written statement of the Secretary-General, the Secretary-Gen-
eral, in recounting the factual history of the matter, recalled the terms of
his letter of 7 December 1987and stated that
"a disputewould only existif the United States Government would
fail to provide an assurance that the existing arrangements for
the PL0 Observer Mission would not be curtailed or otherwise
affected ...".

Oncethe Acthad become law,the written statementcontinued,

"In the view ofthe Secretary-General,in the absenceof anyassur-
anceas tothe maintenance ofthe existingarrangementsforthe PL0
ObserverMission,theincompatibility ofthisActwiththeobligations
ofthe hostcountry under the Headquarters Agreementcreatedadis-
pute within the meaning of section 21ofthe Agreement."
The Secretary-General further argued that :

"The automaticity of the process of bringing the ATA [Anti-
Terrorism Act]intoforce which was initiated with the signingofthe
ATA into law, objectivelyconstitutes an immediatethreat to bring
about the closure of the facility from which PL0 representation to
the United Nations is accomplished, and this imrnediate threat is
itself. .sufficientto createa dispute in the absence of an assurance
from the Executive Branch that the legislation will not be enforced
or that the existing arrangementsfor the PL0 Observer Mission in
New Yorkwillnot be affected or otherwise curtailed."
The Secretary-Generalat the sametime concluded :

"the United Nations believesthat a dispute has existed between thedela Cour. L'observateurde 1'OLPa répondu le14mars dans les termes
énoncéa su paragraphe 27de l'avisdela Cour.L'AttorneyGeneral Meese

arépondudansunelettredu21marscitéeauparagraphe 27del'avisdela
Cour.
Dansleur exposéécritsoumisàla Couren l'espèce,lesEtats-Unisont
répété l'essentieldela lettredu 11mars de M. Okun. Ils ont fait observer
que comme la mission de l'OLP ne s'étaitpas conforméeà l'ordre de
l'Attorney Generalu,ne procédure judiciaire avait été engagép eour la
contraindre à s'exécuter.Dans leur exposé, les Etats-Unisont indiqué:

«Cette procédure permettraàl'OLPet autres intéressés de s'op-
poser par desmoyensdedroit àcequ'une mesurede contraintesoit
prise contrelamissionde1'OLPpourfaireappliquerla loi.Dansl'at-
tente d'une décisionjudiciaire, lesEtats-Unisne prendront aucune
mesure pour faire fermer la mission.La question ayant été portée
devant nos tribunaux, nous pensons qu'un arbitrage ne serait pas
opportun et que ce n'estpas le momentpour yrecourir.»
Dansson exposéécrit,leSecrétairegénéral, e tnagantl'historique des

faitsde l'affaire,a rappeléles termesde salettredu 7décembre1987et a
déclaré:
«il n'y aurait différend quesi le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis ne
fournissaitpasl'assurancequelesarrangementsenvigueurencequi
concernela missiond'observationde l'OLPne seraientni restreints
ni autrement affecté.))

Aprèslapromulgationdelaloi,leSecrétairegénéra alrappeléaussidans
son exposé :

«[qu'il]a considéréqu'en l'absence de toute assurance quant au
maintien des arrangements en vigueurconcernant la mission d'ob-
servationdel'OLP,l'incompatibilitéde cetteloiavecles obligations
imposéesau pays hôte par l'accordde siègedonnait naissance àun
différendau sensdela section21de l'accord. D

LeSecrétairegénéra alsoutenu en outre que
«Le processus automatique d'entréeen vigueur de la LAT uoi
contreleterrorisme],déclenchépar sapromulgationmêmec ,onstitue
objectivementune menace immédiatede provoquerla fermeturede
l'installation à partir de laquelle l'OLP assure sa représentationà
l'ONU, et cettemenaceimmédiats euffitensoi ..àdonnernaissance
àun différendenl'absencedetoute assurancedelapart del'exécutif
que la loine serapas appliquéeou que les arrangements en vigueur
touchant lamissiond'observationdeI'OLP àNewYorkneserontni

restreintniautrementaffectésn .
Le Secrétairegénéra alaussiconclu:

«l'ONU considèrequ'un différend aexistéentre elle-même et les United Nations and the United Statesfrom the moment of the sign-
inginto lawofthe ATA.Nor can therebeanydoubt that thisdispute
concerns the interpretation or application of the Headquarters
Agreement.The Secretary of State of the United States and various

representatives ofthe United Statesin the HostCountryCommittee
and the General Assemblyhave clearlyand consistently recognized
that thePL0 Observer Mission personnel are present in the United
Statesin their capacityas invitees of the United Nations within the
meaning ofthe Headquarters Agreement,and the Secretary-General
has repeatedly taken the position that the ATAis inconsistent with
the Headquarters Agreement.Thus,the forma1conditionsfor invok-
ingsection21ofthe Headquarters Agreementareclearlyestablished
and the proceduralobligations ofthe parties,therefore, havebecome
effective."

On the basis of this record, what conclusions may be drawn as to the
current existenceofa dispute betweenthe United Nations and the United
States over the interpretation or application of the Headquarters Agree-
ment ?
Asthe Court rightlyemphasizesin itsOpinion,whetherthere existsan
international dispute is amatter for objective determination. The mere
assertion ordenial ofthe existenceofadispute byone(orboth) sidesisnot
dispositive.The Court also recalls itslassicdefinition of a dispute as "a
disagreement on a point of law, a conflict of legal viewsor interestse-
tween two persons". 1sthere such disagreement or conflict in this case
overthe interpretation ofthe Headquarters Agreement?

1do not believe so. On the contrary, throughout there has been and
remains a strikingconcordance of viewbetweenthe authorized represen-
- tatives ofthe United Nations and the United Stateson the interpretation
of the Headquarters Agreement. Thus the Secretaryof Stateat the outset
declaredthat the UnitedStates isunder "an obligationto permit PL0 Ob-
serverMissionpersonnel to enter and remain inthe UnitedStatesto carry
out their officia1functions at United Nations headquarters ...".The
Legal Counsel of the United Nations announced that "The Organi-
zation shared" that "legal opinion ...". The Secretary-General then
declaredthat, "1amin agreementwiththeviewsexpressedbythe Secretary
of Stateinthismatter. ..".He subsequentlyspecified thatthe position of
the United Nations "coincides with the position taken by the United
States.. ."Forits part, the United States,afterthe signinginto lawofthe
Act, reiterated that, "if implemented," the Act "would be contrary to
Our international legal obligations under the United Nations Head-
quarters Agreement. ..".

The United Stateshas not retreated from that position nor, of course,
hastheUnited Nations.Thisisnot my singularconclusion;it isonewhich Etats-Unis àcompter du moment ou la LATa été promulguée I.l ne
peut faire dedoute non plus que ce différendconcerne l'interpréta-
tion ou l'application de l'accord de siège.Le secrétaire d'Etat des
Etats-Unis et diversreprésentantsdes Etats-Unis au comitédesrela-
tions aveclepays hôte et à l'Assembléegénérao lent reconnu claire-
ment et de façon suiviequelepersonnel de la mission d'observation
de I'OLPse trouve aux Etats-Unis en qualitéd'invitéde l'ONU au
sens de l'accord de siège,et le Secrétaire généraa l fait valoir à
maintes reprisesque la LATestincompatible avecl'accordde siège.
En d'autres termes, les conditions formelles nécessairespour invo-
quer la section 21de l'accordde siègesont manifestement réunieset
les obligations de procéduredesparties ont donc pris effet. »

Surlabase de cesfaits, quelles conclusionspeut-on tirer quant àl'exis-

tence actuellement d'undifférendentrel'organisation desNations Unies
etlesEtats-Unisausujetdel'interprétationou del'applicationdel'accord
de siège?
Comme la Cour l'a àjuste titrefaitremarquer dans son avis,l'existence
d'un différendinternational demande à être établie objectivement. La
simple affirmation ou contestation de l'existenced'un différendpar une
partie (ou lesdeux) n'estpas déterminante.La Cour a égalementrappelé
sa définitionclassique d'un différendquiest ((un désaccordsur un point
de droit ou defait,une contradiction,une opposition dethèsesjuridiques
ou d'intérêtesntre deuxpersonnes 9. Ya-t-ilun désaccord,une contradic-
tion ou une opposition dans cette affaire au sujet de l'interprétationde
l'accord desiège?
Je ne le pense pas. Au contraire, il y a toujours eu et il subsiste une
concordance de vues remarquable entre les représentants autorisésde
l'organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unissurl'interprétationde

l'accord desiège. Ainsi,le secrétaired'Etat avait dèsle débutde l'affaire
déclaréqueles Etats-Unis se trouvaient ((dans l'obligation de permettre
au personnel de la mission d'observation de I'OLPd'entrer aux Etats-
Unis etd'ydemeurer pour s'acquitterde sesfonctions officiellesau Siège
del'organisation desNations Unies ..>)Leconseillerjuridique del'Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies a fait savoir que «l'Organisation partageait
cette opinionjuridique ..))Le Secrétaire généraal ensuite déclaré : «Je
suis en accord avec les vues expriméespar le secrétaired'Etat sur cette
question...))11a aussi indiqué que la position de l'organisation des
Nations Unies <coïncide avec celle adoptéepar les Etats-Unis ..D Pour
leur part, les Etats-Unis,après la promulgation de la loi, ont réaffirmé
que «si elles étaient appliquées» les dispositions de la loi ((seraient
contraires ànos obligationsjuridiques internationalesdécoulant de I'ac-
cord de siègeavecl'organisation des Nations Unies ..»
Les Etats-Unis ne sont pas revenus sur cette position et, bien entendu,

l'organisation des Nations Unies ne l'a pasfaitnon plus. Ce n'estpas làhasbeen widelyand recurrentlyaffirmed inthe course ofGeneral Assem-
bly debate ofthe matter, and as recently as 23March 1988.

Thus on 29 February 1988,the representative of Zimbabwe declared
that, "Thelegalopinionexpressedinthe letterfromMr.Shultzwasshared
by the Secretary-GeneraI and the United Nations Legal Counsel ..."
(A/42/PV.101, p. 33). The representative of the Federal Republic of
Germany,speaking on behalf of the 12Statesmembers of the European
Community,stated that
"they fullysharethe viewsalready expressed by both the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and the United States Secretary of
State...to the effectthatthe United Statesis under an obligation to
permit PL0 Observer Mission personnel to enter and remain in the
United States to carry out their officia1functions at United Nations
Headquarters" (ibid.,pp. 51-52).

Therepresentative of Czechoslovakia,usingvirtuallyidentical language,
recailed that "those facts were recognized unreservedly . . . by
Mr.George Shultz,Secretaryof State ..."(ibid.,p. 82).Therepresentative
of Denmark, speaking on behalf of the five Nordic countries, declared
that "The Nordic countriesfullysharethe viewson this questionalready
expressed by both the Secretary-General and the Secretary of State ..."
(ibid.,p. 101).
Similarly,on4 March 1988,the representative of Austria declared :
"It is our understanding from the discussion of the matter during
the workofthe SixthCommitteethat the applicability ofthe relevant
provisions of the Headquarters Agreement to the PL0 Observer
Mission and its personnel is not being disputed by any delegation,
includingthe delegation ofthe host country."

The representative of Bangladesh the day before put it in the following
terms :
"The Secretary of State of the United States, in a letter to the
Senate, stated as early as 29January 1987that the host country was

'underanobligationto permit PL0 ObserverMissionpersonnelto
enter and remain in the United States to cany out their officia1
functionsatUnitedNationsHeadquarters'.

That view is shared by 145Members of the United Nations, which
voted infavour ofGeneral Assemblyresolution 43/210B,whichwas
adopted on 17December 1987 - with the soleexception of a single
MemberState. Such unanimity of opinion on the interpretation of a
legalprovision istrulyunprecedented." (A/42/PV.102, p. 68.)

Finally, on 23 March 1988,at the last resumed session of the General
Assembly,the representative of Burma concluded that :ma conclusion personnelle, mais celle qui a étélargement età maintes
reprises réaffirméeau cours des débats que l'Assembléegénérale a
consacrésàcette question, etencorerécemmentle23mars 1988.
Ainsi, le29 février1988,le représentantdu Zimbabwe a déclaré que
«l'opinionjuridique expriméedansla lettre de M. Shultza étépartagée
par le Secrétaire généraelt le conseillerjuridique des Nations Unies...))
(A/42/PV.101, p. 33).Le représentantde la Républiquefédérald e'Alle-

magne,parlantau nomdesdouzeEtatsmembresdela Communautééco-
nomiqueeuropéenne,a déclaré que cesEtats
«partagent sans réservele point de vue exprimé aussibien par le
Secrétaire généra dle l'organisation des Nations Unies que par le
secrétaired'Etat américain..à savoirque les Etats-Unissonttenus
de permettre au personnel de la mission d'observation de l'OLP
d'entrerauxEtats-Unisetd'ydemeurerpour s'acquitterde sesfonc-
tions officielles au Siègede l'Organisation des Nations Unies»
(ibid.,p. 51-52).

Lereprésentantdela Tchécoslovaquieu , tilisantpratiquement lesmêmes
termes, a rappeléque«ces faitsont été reconnus sans réserve ..[par]le
secrétaired'Etat, M. Shultz...» (ibid.,p. 82). Lereprésentantdu Dane-
mark, parlant au nom des cinq pays nordiques, a déclaréque «les pays
nordiquespartagent totalementlespoints devuedéjàexprimés àcesujet
par le Secrétairegénéralleetsecrétaired'Eta... (ibid., p. 101).

De mêmel,e le'mars 1988,lereprésentantde l'Autrichea déclaré:
«Nous déduisonsdel'examendela questioneffectuéàla Sixième
Commissionque l'applicabilitédesdispositionspertinentes de l'ac-
cord de siègeàla missiond'observationde I'OLPet àsonpersonnel
n'estcontestéepar aucunedélégation,pas même parla délégationdu

pays hôte.»
Laveille,lereprésentantdu Bangladesh s'étaitexpriméen cestermes :

«Le secrétaired'Etat des Etats-Unis, dans une lettre au Sénat,

déclaraitdèsle 29janvier 1987quelepayshôte était
«dans l'obligation d'autoriserla missiond'observationde I'OLP
et son personnel àentrer et àdemeureraux Etats-Unis pour s'ac-
quitterdeleursfonctionsofficiellesau Siègedel'organisation des
Nations Unies».
Cepoint devue estpartagépar les centquarante-cinq Membresdes
Nations Unies qui ont votépour la résolution42/210B du 17dé-
cembre 1987de l'Assembléegénérale, àl'exceptiond'un seul Etat.
Une telleunanimité sur l'interprétatid'une dispositionjuridique
estvraimentsansprécédent. »(A/42/PV. 102,p. 68.)

Enfin,le23mars 1988,àlareprisedela sessiondel'Assemblée généralel,e
représentantdela Birmaniea concluque :51 HEADQUARTERSAGREEMENT (SEP .P.SCHWEBEL)

"The subjectunder dispute cannot be seen as relatingto the sub- .
stantive interpretation of this issue in respect of the Headquarters
Agreement,foritisevidentfromwhathasbeen expressedbytherele-
vantauthoritiesofthe United StatesAdministrationthat itcannotbe
said that there is a controversyover such an interpretation between
the position taken by them and the viewsof the Secretary-General
and the virtually unanimous views expressed by Member States."
(A/42/PV.107, pp. 28-30.)

In view of the demonstrated consistency of the views of the United
Nations andthe United Stateson the interpretation ofthe Headquarters
Agreement,1amunpersuaded bythe Court'sconclusionthat "the oppos-
ing attitudes of the parties" giverise to a dispute "concerningthe inter-
pretation orapplication" oftheHeadquarters Agreement.Insofarasthat
conclusionrelates to application, it is not without force; in so far as it
relates to interpretation, the above recitation of the facts of the case in
myviewdemonstratesthat it isnot wholly convincing.

It is ofcoursetrue that, where the breach by a State of its obligations
under a treaty is manifest and undenied, such breach does not escape a
jurisdictional clause which affords a court - such as this Court - the
authority to decide disputes overthat treaty'sinterpretation or applica-

tion. Counselforthe United Statesso arguedinthe caseof UnitedStates
Diplomatieand ConsularStaffin Tehran(I.C.J.Pleadings,p.279),andthat
argument, apparently accepted by the Court, remains persuasive.But it
doesnotfollowthat,in aparticular case,the existenceornon-existenceof
adisputeovertheinterpretationofatreatyisunaffectedbythe articulated
concordance of views of the parties concerning its interpretation.
In the casebefore the Court, if the question of application of the Head-
quarters Agreementis for purposes of analysisput aside,it does appear
that the viewsof the parties on its interpretation "coincide" (to use the
term employedbythe Secretary-General).

That being said, 1 nevertheless recognizethat there is logic in and
authorityfor the position that everyallegationby a party of a breach of

atreatyprovision - howevermanifestand admittedbytheotherparty -
necessarilyentails elementsof interpretation @ythe parties and by any
court adjudging them), because an application or misapplication of a
treaty,howeverclear,isrootedin aninterpretation ofit.Butwhenaparty
actuallyalleges,ifnotinformtheninsubstance,onlyafailureto applythe
treaty, and makes clearthat there is no dispute overits interpretation, is
there,forpurposes of dispute settlement,a dispute overthe treaty'sinter-
pretation? 1havemydoubts.

The essentialquestion at issuein this caseis whetherthere is a dispute
overthe applicationoftheHeadquarters Agreement.TheCourt acknow- «Ce différendne peut pas êtresimplement considéré commeune
question d'interprétation quant au fond du problème vis-à-vis de
l'accord de siège,car il est évident qu'aprèsce que les autorités
compétentes desEtats-Unis ont dit en la matière que l'on ne peut
pas dire qu'il y ait un conflit quant cette interprétation entre la
position adoptée par les autoritésaméricainesd'une part et l'opi-

nion expriméepar le Secrétairegénéral elta quasi-totalitédes Etats
Membres, d'autrepart. »(A/42/PV. 107,p. 28-30.)

Comptetenu de cette concordance de vues évidenteentre l'organisa-
tion desNations UniesetlesEtats-Unis surl'interprétationdel'accord de
siège,jene suispas convaincu parla conclusion delaCour selon laquelle
«l'attitude opposéedes parties » donne naissance à un différend«au
sujet del'interprétationou del'application»del'accordde siège.Dans la
mesureoù cette conclusion serapporte à l'application, ellen'estpas sans
valeur; dansla mesure où ellese rapporte àl'interprétation,l'exposé des
faits de l'affaire évoquéplushaut démontre àmon avis qu'elle n'estpas
tout àfait convaincante.
Certes, il estvrai que lorsque la violation par un Etat des obligations
que lui impose un traitéestmanifeste et incontestable ellen'échappepas
aux effetsd'une clausejuridictionnelle qui confèreàune cour - comme
la Cour elle-même - le pouvoir de se prononcer sur des différendsau
sujet de l'interprétationou de l'application de ce traité.Le conseil des
Etats-Unisa soutenu cepoint de vue dans l'affairedu Personneldiploma-
tiqueetconsulairedesEtats-Unis à Téhéra(nC.I.J.Mémoiresp ,. 279)etcet
argument, quia apparemmentétéaccepté par la Cour, reste convaincant.

Mais il ne s'ensuitpas que, dansune affairedéterminée,la concordance
devuesdémontrée desparties au sujetdel'interprétationestsans effetsur
l'existence ou l'inexistence d'un différend concernant l'interprétation
d'untraité.Dansl'affairesoumiseàlaCour,si laquestion del'application
de l'accordde siège estécartéepour lesbesoins de l'analyse,il ne semble
pas que lesvuesdesparties sur soninterprétation «concident»(pouruti-
liserleterme employépar le Secrétairegénéral).
Celaétant dit,je reconnaisnéanmoinsqu'ilya une certaine logique et
cohérencedans la position selon laquelle toute allégationd'une partie
concernant une violation d'une disposition conventionnelle - mêmesi
elle est évidente et admisepar l'autreparti- comporte nécessairement
desélémentd s'interprétation(par lesparties etpartouttribunal chargéde
seprononcer à cesujet),carune application ouune mauvaise application
d'untraité,quelle que soitlaclartédesesdispositions, estliéesoninter-
prétation.Maislorsqu'unepartie selimite a soutenir effectivement,sinon
dansla forme du moins dans le fond, quele traitén'apas été appliquéet
indique clairement qu'il n'existe pas de différendau sujet de son inter-
prétation, ya-t-il, aux fins du règlement du différend,un différendau
sujet de l'interprétationdutraité?'endoute.

La question essentielle qui se pose dans cette affaire est de savoir s'il
existeun différendau sujet de l'application de l'accordde siège.La Courledgesthat there maybe question about whetherthe Anti-TerrorismAct
has been applied orwhetherthe Actwillonlyhavereceived effectiveap-
plicationwhen orif,on completionof currentUnited Statesjudicialpro-
ceedings,the PL0 Mission is in fact closed. It maintains, however,that
this isnot decisiveas regardssection21 ofthe Headquarters Agreement,
sincethat Agreementrefersto anydispute concerningitsinterpretationor
application and not the application of measures taken in the municipal
lawofthe United States.
The Court is ofcoursecorrectin pointing outthat the issue beforethe
Court isthat of the application of the Headquarters Agreementand not
that of the application of the Anti-Terrorism Act. Butif the Act is not
effectivelyapplied to the PL0 Observer Mission,what content is there
to a dispute overthe application of the Headquarters Agreement?
It should be recalled that the Secretary-Generaldid not consistently
treatthe signinginto lawoftheActasgivingriseofitselfto adisputeover

the application ofthe Headquarters Agreement.Thisismadeclearbythe
termsofhisletterof7December1987,inwhichherequestedofthe United
States confirmation that, even if the then proposed legislation were to
becomelaw,
"the present arrangementsforthe PL0 ObserverMissionwouldnot
becurtailedorotherwiseaffected.Without suchassurance,adispute
between the United Nations and the United Statesconcerning the
interpretationorapplication ofthe Headquarters Agreementwould
exist..."

Thereafter,findingstatementsmade bythe United Statesnotto constitute
the assurances which he had sought, on 14January 1988he declared a
dispute to exist. However, on 2 February, the Secretary-General wrote
that:

"sincethe United Statessofar has not been in a position to giveap-
propriate assurances regardingthe deferral ofthe application ofthe
law to the PL0 Observer Mission,the time is rapidly approaching
when 1willhave no alternativebut to proceed either together with
the United States withinthe framework of section 21 of the Head-
quartersAgreementorbyinformingtheGeneralAssemblyoftheim-
passethat has been reached".

Even after the General Assemblyrequested an advisory opinion of the
Court, the Secretary-Generalon 4 March 1988referred to "assurances
regardingthe non-application or deferral of application" of the Act,and
trusted that the United Stateswouldrecognizethe existenceof a dispute
shoulditnot provepossibleforthe United Statesto reconcileitsdomestic
legislation with its international obligations. In his written statement
submittedto this Court,the Secretary-Generalcontended that there is a
disputewithinthe meaningofsection21ofthe Headquarters Agreement
"in the absence of any assurance as to the maintenance of the existing
arrangements for the PL0 Observer Mission". The Secretary-Generalreconnaîtquelaquestiondesavoirsilaloicontreleterrorismeaété appli-
quéeou si la loi n'aurait regu qu'une application effectivepourrait se
poser si,àl'issuede la procédurejudiciaireen cours devant un tribunal
des Etats-Unis,lamissiondeI'OLPétaiteffectivementfermée.Toutefois,
ellemaintient que cette question n'estpas déterminanteau regard de la
section21de l'accordde siège,car cet accord visetout différendau sujet

de son interprétationou de son application et non l'application des
mesuresprises dans le droit internedes Etats-Unis.
Certes, la Cour a raison de faire observer que la question qui lui est
soumiseconcernel'application de l'accordde siègeet non l'application
delaloicontreleterrorisme.Maissicetteloin'estpaseffectivementappli-
quéeàlamissiond'observationdel'OLP,quelcontenupeut avoirun dif-
férendau sujetdel'applicationdel'accordde siège?
Ilconvientderappelerquele Secrétairegénérn alapas toujours consi-
déré que la promulgation de la loi donnait naissance à un différendau
sujet de l'applicationde l'accordde siège.Cela ressort des termes de sa
lettre du7décembre1987,dans laquelleil a demandé aux Etats-Unisde
confirmer,sila loi envisagéeétaitpromulguée,que :

lesarrangementsactuellementenvigueurencequiconcernelamis-
sion d'observationde l'OLPne seront ni restreintsni autrement af-
fectés.Faute d'une telle assurance, il s'avérerait qu'undifférend
existeentrel'organisation desNations Unies etlesEtats-Unisquant
àl'interprétationouà l'applicationdel'accordde siège..»

Par la suite, constatant que les déclarations faitespar les Etats-Unis ne
constituaientpas lesassurancesqu'ilavaitdemandées,le 14 janvier 1988,
il a déclarqu'un différendexistait. Toutefois,le 2 février, leSecrétaire
généraa l écritcequi suit:
((puisqueles Etats-Unis,àcejour, n'ont pas été en mesurede don-
ner lesassurancesappropriéesd'une suspensionde l'applicationde
la loi àla missiond'observationde l'OLP,le moment seravite venu
oùje n'auraid'autrechoixqued'agir, soitaveclesEtats-Unisdansle
cadredelasection21del'accorddesiège,soiteninformant 1'Assem-

blée générad leel'impassedans laquellenous sommes».

Même après quel'Assemblée générale eut demandéun avisconsultatifà
la Cour,le4 mars 1988,le Secrétairegénérs a'lestréféraux ((assurances
que la loine seraitpas appliquéeou queson applicationseraitdifférée»,
et a exprimél'espoirque les Etats-Unisreconnaîtraient l'existenced'un
différendau casoù ilne seraitpas possiblepour lesEtats-Unisde conci-
lierleurlégislationinterne etleursobligationsinternationales.Dans l'ex-

posé écritqu'ila soumis à la Cour, le Secrétaire généralsoutenu qu'il
existaitun différendau sensdela section21del'accorddesiège«en l'ab-
sencedetoute assurancequant au maintien des arrangements envigueur
ausujetdelamissiond'observationde170LP».LeSecrétairegénéra alfait53 HEADQUARTERSAGREEMENT (SEP . P.SCHWEBEL)

maintained in his written statement that a threat to close the PL0
Mission createda dispute

"in the absence of an assurancefromthe Executive Branch that the
legislationwillnot be enforced orthat existingarrangements forthe
PL0 ObserverMissionin NewYorkwillnotbeaffected orotherwise
curtailed".
For its part, after the Act became law, the United States initially ob-

semedthat ithad not yettaken actionaffectingthe functioningofthe PL0
Mission.Oncethe AttorneyGeneral had determined that hewasrequired
bythe Actto closethe NewYorkofficeofthe PL0 ObserverMission,and
instituted action in the District Court, he declared that: "The United
Stateswilltake no action to closethe Missionpending a decision in that
litigation." This position was reiterated by the United Statesmorethan
once.

Thus it is clear that the Secretary-Generalrepeatedlyindicated that, if
the United States were to provide assurances that current arrangements
forthe PL0 Missionwouldbe "maintained" andthat application to it of
the Actwould be "deferred", a dispute overthe interpretation and appli-
cation ofthe Headquarters Agreementwouldnotarise.TheUnited States
hasprovidedassurancesinthis vein,though only"Until the United States

courts have determined" whether that Act "requires closure of the PL0
Observer Mission".

However important that condition is, it does not vitiate the utility of
these assurances. It isnot clearwhythese assurances ofthe United States
maynot be treated assufficientassurances ofthe maintenance ofexisting
arrangementsfor the PL0 ObserverMission,pendingthe outcome ofliti-
gationin United Statescourts.Naturallyit isforthe Secretary-Generalto
decide whether assurances which he seeks are sufficient or insufficient.
Nevertheless, the assurances ofthe United Statesbear upon an objective
determination ofwhether,now,adispute existsovertheapplication ofthe
Headquarters Agreement.

The fact isthat the PL0 Observer Missiontothe United Nations func-
tions. It has notbeen closed;its activitiesgiveno signofhavingbeen "af-
fected orotherwisecurtailed". Itistrue that ithastheburden ofdefending
itself in United Nations fora and in the United States District Court
against the threat of closure. But an objective appraisal of the matter
surelysustainsthe conclusionthatthe PLO,intheopinion ofthe members
of the United Nations and in public opinion, has not been adversely
affected by the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act and action in pur-
suance of it. On the contras., it appears to have significantlybenefited.valoirdans sonexposéécritqu'une menacedefermeturedelamissionde
l'OLPdonnait naissanceàun différend
«en l'absencedetoute assurancedelapart de l'exécutifquelaloine

seraitpas appliquéeou que lesarrangementsenvigueurtouchant la
missiond'observationdel'OLPàNewYorkne seraientni restreints
ni autrement affectés».
Pour leur part, aprèsla promulgation de la loi, les Etats-Unisonttout
d'abord fait observer qu'ils n'avaient pris aucune mesure susceptible
d'entraver le fonctionnementde la mission de l'OLP.Aprèsavoirjugé

qu'il étaittenu par la loide fermerlebureau de New Yorkdela mission
d'observationde l'OLPet intenté une action devantun tribunal de dis-
trict, l'AttornGeneral a déclaré que : «les Etats-Unisne prendront pas
d'autresmesurespour fermerlebureaudela missionavantqueletribunal
ait rendu sa décision».LesEtats-Unisont réaffirmé cettp eosition àplu-
sieursreprises.
Il est donc évidentque le Secrétaire généraal, àmaintes reprises,fait
savoir que si les Etats-Unis donnaient des assurances que les arrange-
ments envigueurau sujetdelamissiondeYOLPseraient«maintenus )et
quel'applicationdelaloiàcettemissionserait ((différé»e,iln'yauraitpas
de différendau sujet del'interprétationet del'applicationde l'accordde
siège.Les Etats-Unis ont donné detelles assurances,ne serait-ce qu'en

employantlestermes«tant que lestribunaux des Etats-Unisne seseront
pasprononcés D surlaquestiondesavoirsilaloi «exigelafermeturedela
missiond'observationdel'OLP».
Quelle que soit l'importance de cette condition, elle n'ôte pas toute
utilitéà ces assurances. On ne sait pas pourquoi ces assurances des
Etats-Unisne peuvent pas êtreconsidéréec sommedes assurancessuffi-
santessur lemaintien desarrangementsenvigueurau sujetdela mission
d'observation de I'OLP,dans l'attente de l'issue dela procédure judi-
ciaire engagéedevant les tribunaux des Etats-Unis. Naturellement, il
appartientau Secrétairegénérad le dire si les assurances qu'ildemande
sont suffisantes ou non. Néanmoins, les assurances des Etats-Unis
sont utilespour se prononcer objectivementsur la question de savoirs'il

existeactuellementun différendau sujet de l'applicationde l'accordde
siège.
Lefait estquelamissiond'observationde 1'OLPauprèsdel'organisa-
tion desNations Uniesfonctionne.Ellen'apas été fermée;riennemontre
que ses activitésaient été«restreintes ou autrement affectées».Il est
vrai que la mission doit se défendredans le cadre de l'organisation des
Nations Unies et devant le tribunal de district des Etats-Unis contre la
menace de sa fermeture. Mais une évaluationobjective de la question
confirmecertainementlaconclusionselonlaquelleI'OLP,commelepen-
sent les Membres de l'organisation des Nations Unies et l'opinionpu-
blique,n'apas étégravementgênp éarla promulgationdelaloi contrele
terrorismeetpar lesmesuresadoptéesenvertudecetexte.Aucontraire,il

semblemême qu'elle enaitbénéficié. If the PL0 had closed down its officein New York Cityin response to
the Attorney Generai's determination,a dispute over the application of
the Headquarters Agreement undoubtedly would have existed from the
time ofthat closure.Asit is,the issue of whether the PL0 actuallywillbe
required to closeits NewYorkofficehasnot been definitivelydetermined
by the Attorney General;that issue rather isbefore the District Courtfor
the SouthernDistrict of NewYork.
In oral proceedingsbefore this Court,the LegalCounsel ofthe United
Nations took the position in answer to a question that, if United States
courts were to hold that the Anti-Terrorism Act cannot lawfully be en-
forced against the PL0 Observer Mission, that would not mean that the
disputehad neverexistedbut would merelyput anendto thedispute. That
is a reasonableinterpretation ofthe facts and one which leads meto con-
cludethat theCourt's Opinion istenable. Butitisnotanecessaryinterpre-

tation, particularly in view of the Secretary-General having repeatedly
conditioned the existence of a dispute upon the absence of assurances
from the United States of the maintenance of existing arrangements for
the functioning ofthe PL0 Observer Mission.

The question in the end comes to whether the United States now is
bound to arbitratethe dispute,or whether it will only be sobound in the
eventthatthe District Courtshould orderthat the Actbe enforced against
the PL0 ObserverMission. Should proceedingsbefore the District Court
and any appealstherefrom be maintained, the possibilities of municipal
judgment are several.It could be held that the Actapplies tothe PL0 Ob-
server Mission, in which event the United States has inferred that ithen
will regard arbitration of the resultant dispute as "timely and appropri-
ate". Alternatively,havingregard to the reasoning of Senator Pell set out
above or onother grounds,it could be held thatthe Actdoes not apply to
the PL0 Observer Mission,in which event,if a disputerequiringarbitra-
tion ever existed, it no longer will. Or it could be held that, in view of
the AdvisoryOpinion of this Court,and in viewof the fact thatthe Anti-
Terrorism Act does not mention, and accordingly cannot be interpreted
as derogating from, arbitral obligations of the United States under the
Headquarters Agreement, in any event the United States is bound to
arbitratethe dispute.There maybe other possibilities aswell.

Apossible interpretation of section21of the Headquarters Agreement
which 1do notfindsustainable isthat, because it contains what in arbitra-
tion circles is characterized as an imperfect or incomplete clause, that

clause permits a party not to appoint an arbitrator if it so chooses.
Section21,paragraph (a),provides :

"Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States
concerning the interpretation or application of this agreement ...
which is not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settle- Si l'OLP avait fermé son bureau à New York pour se conformer à la
décisionde l'Attorney Generalu , n différendau sujet de l'application de
l'accord de siègeaurait sans aucun doute existédèsle moment de cette
fermeture. A l'heure actuelle, l'AttorneyGeneralne s'est pas prononcé
définitivementsur la question de savoirsi I'OLPsera effectivementtenue
de fermer son bureau à New York; c'est au tribunal du district sud de
New York qu'ilappartient de trancher cettequestion.
Durant la procédure orale devant la Cour, le conseillerjuridique de
l'Organisationdes Nations Unies a dit, enréponse àune question,que si
lestribunaux des Etats-Unisdevaientconclure que la loi contre leterro-
rismene peut juridiquement être appliquée contrela mission d'observa-
tion del'OLP,celanevoudrait pas direqueledifférendn'a jamais existé,
mais simplement qu'il apris fin. Il s'agitlà d'une interprétation raison-
nable des faits qui m'amène à conclure que l'avis de la Cour est défen-
dable. Mais ce n'est pas une interprétation nécessaire,en particulier,

comptetenu du fait que le Secrétairegénéraal maintesfois subordonné
l'existenced'un différendàl'absence d'assurance des Etats-Unisconcer-
nant lemaintiendesarrangementsenvigueur au sujetdu fonctionnement
de la mission d'observationde I'OLP.
La question revient àsavoir siles Etats-Unissontmaintenant tenus de
soumettre àl'arbitrage le différend, ous'ilsne le seront qu'au cas où le
tribunal de district ordonnait l'application de la loi mission d'obser-
vation de l'OLP.Sila procédure engagéedevantletribunal de district et
lesrecours éventuelsétaientmenésjusqu'à leurterme,plusieursdécisions
pourraient être rendues surle plan interne. 11pourrait être concluque la
lois'applique àla mission d'observation de 1'OLP;lesEtats-Unis ont dé-
claréquedans cecasilsconsidérerontlasoumission à l'arbitragedu diffé-
rend comme ((opportun et approprié ».Au contraire,si l'ons'appuie sur
leraisonnement du sénateurPellexposéci-dessusou surd'autres motifs,

il pourrait êtreconcluquela loi ne s'applique pasàla mission de I'OLP;
dans cecassiun différendexigeantun arbitrage a existé,ilprendraitfin.Il
pourrait égalementêtreconcluque,comptetenudel'avisconsultatifdela
Cour etdu faitque laloicontreleterrorismenementionne pas les obliga-
tionsdesEtats-Unis de recourir à l'arbitrage envertu de l'accordde siège
etne peut donc êtreinterprétéceomme dérogeant à de telles obligations,
les Etats-Unis seraient en tout état de causetenus de soumettreàl'arbi-
trageledifférend.D'autrespossibilitéspourraient égalementêtreenvisa-
gées.
Une interprétationpossiblede la section 21de l'accordde siègequeje
nejuge pasdéfendableestlasuivante :commecetinstrumentcontient une
clause que les spécialistesde l'arbitrage qualifient d'imparfaite ou d'in-
complète, celle-cipermet àunepartie de nepas désignerun arbitre sielle
en décideainsi.La section21,alinéaa),prévoit:

((Tout différend entre l'organisation des Nations Unies et les
Etats-Unis au sujet de l'interprétation oude l'application du présent
accord ..sera,s'il n'estpas régpar voiedenégociationsoupar tout ment, shallbereferred forfinal decisionto atribunal ofthree arbitra-
tors, oneto be named bythe Secretary-General,one to be named by
the Secretaryof Stateofthe United States,and thethirdto be chosen
by the two, or, if they should fail to agree upon a third, then by the
President of the InternationalCourt of Justice."

The clause is incompletein that, while it contains provision for appoint-
ment ofathirdarbitrator by anappointing authority, itcontains no provi-
sionforan appointing authoritytoappointanarbitrator whomaparty has

failed to appoint. Arbitration clauses which are more prudently crafted
characteristically do contain such provision.

The International Law Commission of the United Nations in its early
yearsmade avigorous and searchingeffort to block loopholesin the pro-
cess of international arbitration. The absence of provision for appoint-
ment by an appointing authority of anarbitrator whom aparty has failed
to appoint wasseen asalargeloophole. Despitethe progressivecharacter
and technical excellenceof the draft prepared by the Commission atthe
instance of its special rapporteur, Professor Georges Scelle,the General
Assembly's majority proved in large measure unwilling to accept the
Commission'swork;itpreferred to keep loopholesopen, to maintain the
diplomatic fiexibility of interpretation and action which often has de-
tracted from the judicial character of the processes of international arbi-
tration. Bearinginmindthishistory,itmightbeargued thatthearbitration
provisions oftheHeadquarters Agreementweredeliberatelydraftedsoas
to omit provision for third-party appointment of an arbitrator whom a
party failed to appoint in order to afford the parties an ultimate exitfrom
an obligation which in a particular case one or the other might find
exigent.

1do not believethat such a contention would be correct in the current
case,not because the Headquarters Agreementwas concluded before the
General Assembly reacted as described to the Commission's draft, but
because the Court has decisively and soundly rejected it in analogous
circumstances.
In its advisoryproceedings on the InterpretationofPeaceTreatieswith
Bulgaria,HungaïyandRornania,the arbitration clause before the Court
was in pertinent part essentially the same as that of the Headquarters
Agreement. That is to Say,while it provided for an appointing authority
(inthat case,the Secretary-General)to appointthe third member should
the two parties fail to agree upon him, it contained no provision for the
appointment by an appointing authority of an arbitrator who in the first
place wasto be named by a party.

In disputesbetween Bulgaria,Hungary and Romaniaontheonehand,
and certain Allied and Associated Powers signatories to the Treaties of autre mode de règlementagréépar les parties, soumis aux fins de
décisiondéfinitive àun tribunal composéde troisarbitres, dont l'un
sera désignépar le Secrétairegénérall',autrepar le Secrétaired'Etat
des Etats-Unis, etletroisièmechoisipar lesdeux autres,ou, àdéfaut
d'accord entre eux sur ce choix, par le Présidentde la Cour interna-
tionale deJustice.»

Cetteclause estincomplètecarsiellecontientune dispositionconcernant
la désignationd'un troisièmearbitre par une autoritédéterminéee ,llene

contientaucune dispositionprévoyant qu'une telleautoritédoitdésigner
l'arbitre qu'unepartie s'estabstenue de désigner.Lesclauses d'arbitrage
q.i.sontrédigéea svecplus deprécaution contiennentbienunetelledispo-
sition.
Dans lespremièresannéesde ses activités,la Commission du droit in-
ternational a déployédes effortsénergiquee stintensifs pour comblerles
lacunes dela procédure d'arbitrage international.L'absenced'une dispo-
sitionconcernant la désignationpar une autoritédéterminéed'un arbitre
qu'une partie s'est abstenue de désignera été considéréceomme une
lacune grave. En dépitdu caractèreprogressif et de l'excellentequalité
technique du projet établipar la Commissionsur la base de celui de son
rapporteur spécial,M.Georges Scelle,la majoritédel'Assemblée générale

nes'estpasmontréedansunelargemesuredisposée à approuverlestravaux
de la Commission; elle a préféré maintenirdes échappatoires, pour
conservertoute la souplesse diplomatique voulue quant àl'interprétation
de mesures qui ont souventréduit le caractèrejudiciairede la procédure
d'arbitrage international. Cet historique montre qu'il peut être soutenu
que les dispositionsd'arbitrage de l'accord de siègeont étédélibérément
rédigéesde façon à omettre une disposition concernant la désignation
par un tiers d'un arbitre qu'une partie s'est abstenue de désignerpour
donner la possibilitéà chacune des parties d'échapper finalement à une
obligationdontl'autrepourraitexigerlerespectdansuneaffairedéterminée.
Je ne pense pas qu'une telle argumentationserait justifiéedansla pré-
sente affaire, non parce que l'accord de siège a été conclu avant que

l'Assembléegénéralen'ait réagi comme ellel'a fait devant le projet de
la Commission mais parce que la Cour l'a résolumentet raisonnable-
ment rejetéedans descirconstancesanalogues.
Dans la procédure consultative dans l'affaire de l'Interprétatiodes
traitésdepaix conclus avecla Bulgarie, laHongrie etla Roumanie, le pas-
sagepertinent dela claused'arbitrage examinépar la Courétaitessentiel-
lementle mêmeque celuide l'accordde siège.En d'autrestermes, sicette
clauseprévoyaitlapossibilitépouruneautorité(enl'occurrence,leSecré-
taire général)de désignerun troisièmearbitre àdéfaut d'accord entreles
deuxpartiessur cechoix,ellenecontenaitaucunedispositionconcernant
la désignationpar une autoritédéterminée d'unarbitre quidevaitpréala-
blementêtredésigné par une partie.

Dans lesdifférendsentrela Bulgarie,la Hongrie etla Roumanied'une
part et certaines puissances alliéeset associéessignataires des traités dePeaceonthe other, the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
refused to appoint arbitratorsin pursuance ofhe arbitration clause of
the Treaties. The Court held that"al1the conditions required for the
commencement of the stage of the settlement of disputes" by the arbitral
commissions "have been fulfilled", and concluded :

"In viewofthefact thatthe Treatiesprovide that any disputeshall
be referred to a Commission'attherequest ofeitherparty',it follows
that either party is obligated, at the request of theother to co-
operate in constituting the Commission, in particular by appointing
its representative. Otherwise the method of settlement by Commis-
sions provided for in the Treaties would completelyail in its pur-
pose." (Z.C.J.Reports1950,p. 77.)

(Signe dt)phen M. SCHWEBEL.paix de l'autre,les Gouvernementsde la Bulgarie,dela Hongrie et de la

Roumanieont refuséde désigner desarbitres en application dela clause
d'arbitrage des traités.La Cour a constatéque «toutes les conditions
requisespour quesoitouvertelaphase du règlementdesdifférends»par
lescommissionsd'arbitrage«sont remplies»et a conclu :
«Lestraitésprévoyantquetout différendserasoumisauxcommis-
sions «à la requêtede l'une ou l'autre des parties», il en résulte

quechacuned'ellesesttenue, à larequêtedel'autre,decoopéreràla
constitution de la commission,notamment en désignantson repré-
sentant.S'il enétaitautrement,laméthodederèglementpar commis-
sions instituéespar les traités manqueraitcomplètementson but.»
(C.Z.J.Recueil1950,p. 77.)

(Signé)StephenM. SCHWEBEL.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Separate Opinion of Judge Schwebel

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