Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs

Document Number
065-19801220-ADV-01-02-EN
Parent Document Number
065-19801220-ADV-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE LACHS

The Court, having analysed the different views on the subject, turns
away from the Agreement between the World Health Organization and
Egypt of 25 March 1951 and the applicability of a specific provision
(Section 37),or rather part ofit,in theevent of the WHO or Egypt wishing
to have the Regional Office now situated at Alexandria transferred from

E~YP~.
In my view, this Agreement is, as its title indicates, an "Agreement for
the purpose of determining the privileges, immunities and facilities to be
granted in Egypt by the Govemment to the Organization, to the repre-
sentatives of its members and to its experts and officials'' and, as the
preamble adds, "in particular with regard to its arrangements in the
Eastern Mediterranean Region", which include a Regional Officein Alex-
andria. It belongs to the family of those instruments which have grownin
number in recent years with the birth and development of international
organizations, concluded between them and States on whose territories
their offices are located. But even a cursory perusal of these many agree-
ments leads to theconclusion that they areaveryheterogeneous collection.
Whatever analogies maybedrawn, therefore, they shouldnot be allowedto
obscure the fact that the 1951Agreement does not enshrine any decision
concerning the establishment of the office at Alexandria. It differs from
many other instruments which proclaim the establishment and location of

theseat as their purpose, e.g.,theAgreement between the United States of
America and the United Nations concluded "to establish the seat of the
United Nations in the City of New York and to regulate questions arising
as a result thereof" (Preamble, and cf. Art. 2). More thorough analysis
discloses that very many of its provisions are identical with those of the
1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies, whch Egypt was not to ratify until 1954.Moreover, it is clear
from the merely matter-of-factmention of the Regional Officein the 1951
Agreement that the presence of the Office in Alexandria is regarded as an
accomplished fact - which it merely confirms by implication - and its
establishmentas a matter of the past. It follows that the instrument had no
bearing upon that establishment.

This view is reinforced by the histoncal background, which shows how
the establishment of the EMRO at Alexandna originated in 1946with an
Egyptian Government invitation. This was pursued in various organs ofthe WHO, more particularly on the basis of a report by the Regional

Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean, and the process was accom-
plished when the Office eventually began operating on 1July 1949.In this
way, through a series of actsby the WHO and Egypt since 1946,the WHO
had inherited an existing office by its integration when it became part of a
regional organization in 1949.Given the self-sufficient legal consequences

of these acts on the part of competent authorities, there is no need to speak
of an inchoate agreement crying out for completion, or of a de facto
situation requiring legalization. One may thus regard the 195 1 Agreement
as a finishing touch from the standpoint of the operational facilities at the
disposal of the WHO in Egypt, without viewing it as an indispensable
element in the establishment of the Regional Office. However much it oils
the wheels, it is not a constitutive act upon which the operation of that

Office in Alexandria depends.

It is a corollary of the foregoing that the 115Agreement does not have
any bearing on the event of terminating the operations of the Alexandria
office, whether by transfer of the functions elsewhere or othenvise. As it is
thus inapplicable as a whole to such event, its separate parts, including

Section 37, are equally inapplicable to it. It must be said, however, that
Section 37 represents the Agreement's nearest approach to the problem of
termination, though the termination there contemplated in the word "de-
nounced" is not that of the operations of the Regional Office, but - in
practice - that of the special provisions for the privileges. immunities and
facilitiesenjoyed by the WHO in Egypt beyond what the 1947Convention

guarantees. One must accordingly suppose that the Court was invited,
by the request for advisory opinion, to ascertain whether the transfer
of the Regional Office would involve the constructive termination of
the 1951 Agreement and, if so, whether that would bring Section 37 into
play.
These are reasonable queries, quite irrespective of the question whether

the 195 1 Agreement govems the conditions of such transfer, for, as 1have
suggested, the termination of that Agreement would not be an inextricable
consequence of the cessation of the operations of the office in Alexandria.
Those few of its provisions that would then lack object are heavily out-
numbered by those that could still be applied.
It is perhaps due to the much-investigated compromise out of which the

formula of Section 37was born that its purport has given rise to differences
of view. Yet its analysis presents no serious difficulties. Its text is admit-
tedly elliptic in the way in which "consultation" about "modifications"
develops into "negotiations" in the next sentence. This change of termi-
nology suggests that the second sentence of Section 37, which is part of a
whole. contemplates harmonious discussions of ways and means whereas
the third provides for a second phase, overshadowed by the risk of failure

to reach an understanding, which it ispossible to conclude by denunciation
on two years' notice.
However, the question put to the Court relates only to the negotiationsand notice provisions, andit might therefore be inferred that the require-
ment of consultation is not at issue. But to detach this final sentence from
the first is toistort the whole Section, which isintended primanly with a
view to consultation about possible modifications of the Agreement,
implicitly coupled with the intention of maintaining it in force. It is
important, moreover, not to discard the "consultation" sentence, because
it specifies the "event" whch brings the Section into play. This "event" is

the circumstance of one or the other party requesting a revision of the
Agreement of 25 March 195 1. Even if the term "revision" - as suggested
by some - istobe givenavery widemeaning(bordering on "review" of the
Agreement)it ishere arnply quahfied by the reference to "modifications",
for this is a term which can only allude to alterations of particular pro-
visions.
In sum, the last sentence of Section 37is not severable and may not be
treated as embodying "negotiation and notice" provisions independent of
a request for revision by way of modification as opposed to a warning of
denunciation or an act of constructive termination. This seems an unde-
niable conclusion resulting from the ordinary meaning of the words, their
context and the text as a whole. To impose any other reading would be to
challenge grammar, logic and good sense.

1have dwelt on the interpretation of Section 37 because the Advisory

Opinion does not, in my view, lay sufficient emphasis on the elementary
point that, for any part of Section 37 to be applicable in the "event" of a
"wish" to transfer the EMRO from Egypt, it must be possible to equate (a)
the expression of such a desire with (b) a request for "revision" by way of
"modification" of the Agreement.
In myjudgment, as 1 hope my analysis has made clear, this possibility
does not exist, so that, had the first question been left in its original form,
my reply thereto would have been negative.
The Court, however, as 1said at the beginning, has chosen to turn away
from the 1951Agreement and al1its parts. It addresses itself to a wider
issue, concerning which 1wish to add certain observations.

What has been faced in the present proceedings is the desire of the
majonty of the States within a regional organization of the WHO to have
the seat of that organization's administrativeorgan transferred to another

country, and this is a matter on whch there is no further room for nego-
tiation, given the reasons advanced in favour of such an action. These are
obviously political and reflect a deep cleavage between the host State and
others of the region which has been stressed both in the councils of the
WHO and in the present proceedings. However, it must be made clear that
theCourt's opinion was not sought on the merits, legalor othenvise, of the
transfer proposal, nor on whether a transfer is possible or desirable ;at
most,itcould onlybewith itsconditions and modalities that the Court had
to deal. It wasin accordance with thisunderstanding that the Court, having
turned away from the 1951Agreement, defined its task thus : the exarn-ination of the legal principles and rules applicable in the case of such a

transfer. These the Court has sought to formulate on both a wider and a
more concrete basis, namely with reference to the relationship between the
WHO and Egypt in the past.
It is a truism that an inter-governmental organization, as a new subject
of international law created by States, acquires a special status vis-à-vis

those States. While it remains under their control, inasmuch as it both
represents and is subject to their collective will, its decisions may, and
frequently do, conflict with the will of its individual members. Since its
headquarters and other offices are usually located not on no-man's land
but on State territory, relationships are thereby created which arebound to
reflect mutual agreements or, sometimes, disagreements. When determin-

ing - eventually in consultation with potential hosts - the conditions
under which the headquarters or a regional office may be established in a
particular locality, or transferred from one country to another, and in
taking the corresponding decisions, the organization is simply implement-
ing the collective will of its members. It is then to be viewed as having to

act, not under any tutelage, but only in accordance with the law : where
there is an agreement establishing the seat, in compliance with that ; if
there is none applicable, in compliance with the principles of law whch
have evolved as the result of this new institution, the international orga-
nization, and its relationshp with States. A considerable number of agree-
ments now in force, though differing in detail, make it clear that an

organization is entitled to decide upon a change of seat (whether head-
quarters or regional office). Such seat is thus not immobilized, and of this
host States should be aware.

In the present case, the World Health Organization is faced with the
wish of 19members of the Eastern Mediterranean regional organization to
have the office of that organization transferred to another country. In the
event of this recommendation being accepted by theWorld Health Assem-
bly, the Organization should follow a reasonable path of action. In par-

ticular, any agreements concerning the separation of members of the staff
must be kept in view. The same applies to al1local agreements concern-
ing office accommodation, leases and similar arrangements. The World
Health Organization, whle retaining its full independence in the adoption
of the basic decision, should consult with Egypt on these modalities and
technical aspects of such a transfer. On the other hand, the host country

should facilitate the implementation of such a decision, since as a member
of the Organization it shares in the collective interest of minimizing any
disruption of services involved in the transfer once decided. Considering
that such a decision would represent the collective willof the Organization,
1doubt whether there is an obligation of, or even cal1for, negotiations with
the host State. To maintain the contrary is not in my view consonant with

the status of member States within an organization. What is actuallyrequisite in principle is a consultation with a view to the orderly termi-
nation of activities, so as to enable them tobe speedily resumed in the new
seat.

It is to be recalled that the request for an advisory opinion of the Court
wasmade whilethe matter wasunder consideration in severalorgans of the
WHO. On 12May 1979Sub-Committee A of the Mediterranean Region
was convened at Geneva to respond to a request made by a number of
governments on the subject ;the matter was already on the agendas of the
WHO Executive Board and of a working group set up by it to carry out a
study of al1aspects involved.The group'sreport wassubmitted to the latest
World Health Assembly, and the above-mentioned Sub-Committee A,
having reviewed theinformation provided therein, adopted a resolution to
transfer the Regional Office to Amman. It is to be noted that ths reso-
lution, submittëd to the Assembly, speaks of a transfer "as soon as pos-
sible", which obviously connotes its implementation under reasonable
conditions.
Thus it is clear that, a regional committee of the WHO having ex-
pressed the wish to transfer the seat of its administrative organ, the matter
is now to be considered and decided by the World Health Assembly in
accordance with the provisions of its Constitution and rules of procedure.

Should the Assembly decide upon the transfer, the executive organs of
the WHO should proceed to carry it out in an orderly manner, bringing
the operations at the Alexandria Office to an end within a reasonable
period, which, taking into account the time that has elapsed since the
proposa1 was first made, should to my way of thinking be a matter of
months.
It iswith this understanding that1 have felt able to concur in theCourt's
reply to the first question.do not propose todeal withthe second,whichis
redundant and has in my view resulted in the over-emphasis of certain
conclusions, more particularly of those contained in paragraph 49 of the
Advisory Opinion.
Finally a more general comment, related only indirectly to the case :
analysis confirms, as 1suggested at an early stage of my considerations,
that this new type of relationship between host States and international
organizations, dealt with by a new category of treaties known as head-
quarters agreements, includes veryheterogeneous elements.Scores of such
agreements havebeenconcluded, and they represent an important chapter
in the catalogue of contemporary treaties ;they show striking discrepan-
cies, some well founded on the peculiarities of the specific cases, others
evidently due to lack of adequate attention from the lawyer's eye.There

can be little doubt that this is not conducive to the proper operation of
international organizations and mayconstitute asourceofmisunderstand-
ing, misconstruction or even conflict, and not only in cases of proposed
transfer. Greater precision and comprehensiveness, closer attention to
legalformulations, and the introduction of uniformity wherever desirable,
will be in the interest of proper relationships between host States andinternational organizations, the proper functioning of the latter, and the
effectiveness of the law.

(Signed) Manfred LACHS.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE LACHS

The Court, having analysed the different views on the subject, turns
away from the Agreement between the World Health Organization and
Egypt of 25 March 1951 and the applicability of a specific provision
(Section 37),or rather part ofit,in theevent of the WHO or Egypt wishing
to have the Regional Office now situated at Alexandria transferred from

E~YP~.
In my view, this Agreement is, as its title indicates, an "Agreement for
the purpose of determining the privileges, immunities and facilities to be
granted in Egypt by the Govemment to the Organization, to the repre-
sentatives of its members and to its experts and officials'' and, as the
preamble adds, "in particular with regard to its arrangements in the
Eastern Mediterranean Region", which include a Regional Officein Alex-
andria. It belongs to the family of those instruments which have grownin
number in recent years with the birth and development of international
organizations, concluded between them and States on whose territories
their offices are located. But even a cursory perusal of these many agree-
ments leads to theconclusion that they areaveryheterogeneous collection.
Whatever analogies maybedrawn, therefore, they shouldnot be allowedto
obscure the fact that the 1951Agreement does not enshrine any decision
concerning the establishment of the office at Alexandria. It differs from
many other instruments which proclaim the establishment and location of

theseat as their purpose, e.g.,theAgreement between the United States of
America and the United Nations concluded "to establish the seat of the
United Nations in the City of New York and to regulate questions arising
as a result thereof" (Preamble, and cf. Art. 2). More thorough analysis
discloses that very many of its provisions are identical with those of the
1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized
Agencies, whch Egypt was not to ratify until 1954.Moreover, it is clear
from the merely matter-of-factmention of the Regional Officein the 1951
Agreement that the presence of the Office in Alexandria is regarded as an
accomplished fact - which it merely confirms by implication - and its
establishmentas a matter of the past. It follows that the instrument had no
bearing upon that establishment.

This view is reinforced by the histoncal background, which shows how
the establishment of the EMRO at Alexandna originated in 1946with an
Egyptian Government invitation. This was pursued in various organs of OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LACHS

[Traduction]

Après avoiranalysk lesdifférentesthèses en présence,la Cour laisse de
côtél'accord conclu entrel'organisation mondiale de la Santéet 1'Egypte

le 25 mars 1951, ainsi que l'applicabilité d'une de ses dispositions (la
section 37),ou plutôt d'une partie de celle-ci,au cas où l'OMSou 1'Egypte
souhaite que le Bureau régional, actuellement situé à Alexandrie, soit
transféré hors d'Egypte.
Ainsi que l'indique son titre, l'accord dont il s'agit estuaccord entre
l'organisation mondiale de la Santéet le Gouvernement de I'Egyptepour
déterminerles privilèges,immunitéset facilitésaccordésen Egypte par le
Gouvernement à l'organisation, aux représentants de ses Membres, à ses
experts et àses fonctionnaires ))et, comme le précise lepréambule, <no-
tamment en ce qui concerne les arrangements pour la régionde la Médi-

terranée orientale r)formule qui désignele Bureau régional à Alexandrie.
Ledit accord appartient à cette catégoried'instruments qui se sont mul-
tipliés, cesdernières années,avec la naissance et le développement des
organisations intemaltionales, et qui ont éconclusentre cesorganisations
et lesEtats sur le territoire desquels se trouvent leursbureaux. Mais même
en nejetant qu'un regard rapide sur cesnombreux accords, on parvient àla
conclusion qu'ils constituent un ensemble des plus hétérogènes.En con-
séquence,quelles que soient les analogies qu'on puisse établir entre ces
accords, ellesne changent rien au fait que celuide 195neconsacreaucune
décisionportant établissement du Bureau à Alexandrie. L'accord se dis-

tingue de beaucoup d'autres instruments dont le but proclaméest I'éta-
blissement et l'emplacement d'un siège,comme l'accord conclu entre
l'organisation des Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis d'Amériqueen vue
d'assurer l'exécutiondela décisiond'établir <le siègedel'organisation des
Nations Unies dans la ville de New York, et de régler les questions
soulevéespar cette dlécision>>(préambule ; voir aussi art. 2). Il ressort
d'une analyse plus pousséequ'un trèsgrand nombre des dispositions de
l'accord de 195 1sont identiques à celles dela convention de 1947sur les
privilègeset immunitks des institutions spécialisées,ue 1'Egyptenedevait
ratifier qu'en 1954. Il'autre part, si le Bureau régional n'estmentionné
qu'incidemment dans l'accord de 1951,c'estbien parce que la présencede

ce Bureau àAlexandrie y est considéréecommeun fait accompli - ce que
l'accord ne fait que confirmer implicitement - et que I'établissementpro-
prement dit appartient au passé. Il s'ensuit que cet instrument ne concer-
nait en rien I'établissementdu Bureau.
Cetteopinion est confirméepar le déroulementdes faits, dont il ressort
que l'établissementdu Bureau régional à Alexandrie a pour origine une
invitationfaiteen 1946par le ~oüvernement égyptien. Divers organes dethe WHO, more particularly on the basis of a report by the Regional

Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean, and the process was accom-
plished when the Office eventually began operating on 1July 1949.In this
way, through a series of actsby the WHO and Egypt since 1946,the WHO
had inherited an existing office by its integration when it became part of a
regional organization in 1949.Given the self-sufficient legal consequences

of these acts on the part of competent authorities, there is no need to speak
of an inchoate agreement crying out for completion, or of a de facto
situation requiring legalization. One may thus regard the 195 1 Agreement
as a finishing touch from the standpoint of the operational facilities at the
disposal of the WHO in Egypt, without viewing it as an indispensable
element in the establishment of the Regional Office. However much it oils
the wheels, it is not a constitutive act upon which the operation of that

Office in Alexandria depends.

It is a corollary of the foregoing that the 115Agreement does not have
any bearing on the event of terminating the operations of the Alexandria
office, whether by transfer of the functions elsewhere or othenvise. As it is
thus inapplicable as a whole to such event, its separate parts, including

Section 37, are equally inapplicable to it. It must be said, however, that
Section 37 represents the Agreement's nearest approach to the problem of
termination, though the termination there contemplated in the word "de-
nounced" is not that of the operations of the Regional Office, but - in
practice - that of the special provisions for the privileges. immunities and
facilitiesenjoyed by the WHO in Egypt beyond what the 1947Convention

guarantees. One must accordingly suppose that the Court was invited,
by the request for advisory opinion, to ascertain whether the transfer
of the Regional Office would involve the constructive termination of
the 1951 Agreement and, if so, whether that would bring Section 37 into
play.
These are reasonable queries, quite irrespective of the question whether

the 195 1 Agreement govems the conditions of such transfer, for, as 1have
suggested, the termination of that Agreement would not be an inextricable
consequence of the cessation of the operations of the office in Alexandria.
Those few of its provisions that would then lack object are heavily out-
numbered by those that could still be applied.
It is perhaps due to the much-investigated compromise out of which the

formula of Section 37was born that its purport has given rise to differences
of view. Yet its analysis presents no serious difficulties. Its text is admit-
tedly elliptic in the way in which "consultation" about "modifications"
develops into "negotiations" in the next sentence. This change of termi-
nology suggests that the second sentence of Section 37, which is part of a
whole. contemplates harmonious discussions of ways and means whereas
the third provides for a second phase, overshadowed by the risk of failure

to reach an understanding, which it ispossible to conclude by denunciation
on two years' notice.
However, the question put to the Court relates only to the negotiationsI'OMS y ont donné suite en se fondant en particulier sur un rapport du
Comitérégionalde la Méditerranée orientale ; et ce processus étaitachevé

lorsque le Bureau a commencé finalement à fonctionner le 1erjuillet 1949.
Ainsi donc, àlasuited'une séried'actesde l'OMSet de l'Egypte, accomplis
depuis 1946.I'OMS a héritéun bureau préexistant, par voie d'intégration,
au moment où ce bureau est devenu partie intégrante d'une organisation
régionale, en 1949. Compte tenu des conséquencesjuridiques nécessaires
de ces actes des autorités compétentes, pris en eux-mêmes,il est vain de

parler d'un accord imparfait comportant des lacunes criantes ou d'une
situation de fait à régulariser. On peut donc considérer l'accord de 1951
comme apportant la dernière touche, du point de vue des facilités dont
I'OMS devait disposer en Egypte, sans le considérer comme un élément
indispensable de l'établissementdu Bureau régional.Cet accord peut avoir

facilité les choses. Ce n'était pas un acte constitutif dont dépendait le
fonctionnement du Elureau d'Alexandrie.
Lecorollaire de ce quiprécèdeest que l'accord de 195 1nejoue pas s'ilest
mis fin à l'activitédu Bureau d'Alexandrie, que ce soit par transfert de ses
fonctionsou autrement. De mêmeque cet accord n'est pas applicable dans
son ensemble en pareil cas, ses différentesparties, y compris sa section 37,

ne le sontpas davantage. Il est ànoter pourtant que, dans l'accord, c'estla
section 37 qui cerne de plus près le problème de l'extinction, encore que
celle que vise le mot dénoncé n'est pas la fin des fonctions du Bureau
régional mais,en fait, l'expiration des dispositions spéciales relatives aux
privilèges, immunités;et facilitésdont l'OMS jouit en Egypte, en plus de

ceux de la convention de 1947. Il faut donc supposer que la Cour a été
invitée,par la requêtepour avis consultatif, à rechercher si le transfert du
Bureau régionalobligerait a mettre effectivement fin al'accord de 1951et,
dans l'affirmative, si la section 37 entrerait en jeu.

Il est raisonnable de se poser ces questions, que l'accord de 1951régisse
ou non les conditions d'un tel transfert ; en effet, comme je l'ai dit, la
cessation des activités du Bureau d'Alexandrie n'entraînerait pas inéluc-
tablement l'extinction de l'accord. Les rares dispositions de celui-ci qui
deviendraient alors sans objet seraient largement compensées en nombre

par celles qui pourraient encore s'appliquer.
C'est peut-êtreparce que la formulation de la section 37 est le résultat
d'un compromis 1ong;uementrecherché que le sens de cette disposition a
suscitédes divergences de vues. Son analyse ne soulève pourtant pas de
graves difficultés.Certes, lelibelléestelliptique :d'une phrase àl'autre, on

passe des <consultations u sur les <modifications )>aux ((négociations )).
Cette terminologie changeante fait penser que la deuxième phrase de la
section 37, qui en est un élément constitutif, vise des discussions harmo-
nieuses relatives à d'es modalités, tandis que la troisième envisage une
seconde phase, sur laquelle plane un risque d'échec, à laquelle on peut
mettre un point final moyennant préavis de deux ans.

Orla question posée a la Cour ne portequesur lesclauses de négociationand notice provisions, andit might therefore be inferred that the require-
ment of consultation is not at issue. But to detach this final sentence from
the first is toistort the whole Section, which isintended primanly with a
view to consultation about possible modifications of the Agreement,
implicitly coupled with the intention of maintaining it in force. It is
important, moreover, not to discard the "consultation" sentence, because
it specifies the "event" whch brings the Section into play. This "event" is

the circumstance of one or the other party requesting a revision of the
Agreement of 25 March 195 1. Even if the term "revision" - as suggested
by some - istobe givenavery widemeaning(bordering on "review" of the
Agreement)it ishere arnply quahfied by the reference to "modifications",
for this is a term which can only allude to alterations of particular pro-
visions.
In sum, the last sentence of Section 37is not severable and may not be
treated as embodying "negotiation and notice" provisions independent of
a request for revision by way of modification as opposed to a warning of
denunciation or an act of constructive termination. This seems an unde-
niable conclusion resulting from the ordinary meaning of the words, their
context and the text as a whole. To impose any other reading would be to
challenge grammar, logic and good sense.

1have dwelt on the interpretation of Section 37 because the Advisory

Opinion does not, in my view, lay sufficient emphasis on the elementary
point that, for any part of Section 37 to be applicable in the "event" of a
"wish" to transfer the EMRO from Egypt, it must be possible to equate (a)
the expression of such a desire with (b) a request for "revision" by way of
"modification" of the Agreement.
In myjudgment, as 1 hope my analysis has made clear, this possibility
does not exist, so that, had the first question been left in its original form,
my reply thereto would have been negative.
The Court, however, as 1said at the beginning, has chosen to turn away
from the 1951Agreement and al1its parts. It addresses itself to a wider
issue, concerning which 1wish to add certain observations.

What has been faced in the present proceedings is the desire of the
majonty of the States within a regional organization of the WHO to have
the seat of that organization's administrativeorgan transferred to another

country, and this is a matter on whch there is no further room for nego-
tiation, given the reasons advanced in favour of such an action. These are
obviously political and reflect a deep cleavage between the host State and
others of the region which has been stressed both in the councils of the
WHO and in the present proceedings. However, it must be made clear that
theCourt's opinion was not sought on the merits, legalor othenvise, of the
transfer proposal, nor on whether a transfer is possible or desirable ;at
most,itcould onlybewith itsconditions and modalities that the Court had
to deal. It wasin accordance with thisunderstanding that the Court, having
turned away from the 1951Agreement, defined its task thus : the exarn- INTERPRÉTATION DE L'ACCORD (OP. IND. LACHS) 110

et de préavis.On peut donc en déduire que la condition de consultation
n'entre pas enjeu. Mais en détachantla dernièrephrase de la premièreon
fausse l'ensemble de la section, laquelle vise surtoutdes consultations sur
d'éventuellesmodifications de l'accord, étant sous-entendu que celui-ci
reste en vigueur. Il importe au surplus de ne pas négligerla phrase relative

aux consultations, puisque c'est cette phrase qui précise dans quelle
éventualité la sectionjoue. Cette <éventualité ))est celle où l'une ou
l'autre partiedemande une revision de l'accord du 25mars 1951.Mêmes'il
faut donner au terme revision un sens très large, proche de l'acte par
lequel on <revoit im accord - comme d'aucuns le prétendent - la
portéeen est ici sensiblement restreinte par l'emploi du mot <(modifica-
tions )); en effet, ce dernier terme ne peut viser que des changements
apportés à des dispositions particulières.
En définitive,la dernière phrasede la section 37ne peut pas êtreisolée,

ni considérée commerenfermant desdispositionssur les «négociations et
le préavis u applicables en dehors de toute demande de revision par
modification, par opposition à un préavisde dénonciation ou à un acte
visant à mettre fin en pratique à l'accord. Telle sembleêtrela conclusion
incontestable découlant du sensordinaire àattribuer aux mots, considérés
dans tout leur contexte. Imposer une autre interprétation de ces termes
serait défier la grammaire, la logique et le bon sens.
Je me suis appesanti sur l'interprétation de la section 37 parce que,
d'après moi, l'avis consultatif ne metpas suffisamment l'accent sur le fait
élémentaireque, pour qu'une partie quelconque de la section 37 soit

applicable au cas ou l'on souhaite transférerle Bureau régionalhors
d'Egypte, il faut que l'expression d'un tel souhait puisse êtreassimilée à
une demande de «revision par «modification )>de l'accord.
A mon avis, etj'espère que l'analyse qui précède l'a bienmontré, cette
possibilité n'existe pas,sibien que, sila premièrequestion avaitétélaissée
sous sa forme originale, j'y aurais répondu négativement.
La Cour, commeje l'ai dit au début, a toutefois choisi de laisser de côté
l'accord de 1951et toutes ses dispositions pour examinerun problème de
portée plus générale,sur lequel je voudrais ajouter quelques observa-

tions.
Enl'espèce,on setrouve devant ledésirdela majoritédesEtats membres
d'une organisation régionale de l'OMS de voif le siègede cet organe
administratif de llOrg,anisation transférédans un autre pays. Or, ce trans-
fert n'est plus négociablecompte tenu des motifs invoqués àson appui. Il
s'agit de toute évidencede motifs politiques qui traduisent un profond
désaccordentre 1'Etathôte et d'autres Etats de la région, désaccordsou-
ligné tant au cours des réunions tenues par l'OMS qu'au cours de la
présenteprocédure.Ilfaut toutefois rappeler que laCour n'apas été invitée
à donner son avis sur la valeur, juridique ou autre, de la proposition de

transfert, ni sur laquestion de savoir si ce transfert est possible ou sou-
haitable ; la Cour n'a tout au plus à connaître que de ses conditions et
modalités.Celaétantentendu, ellealaissédecôtél'accordde 1951et défini
sa tâchecommeconsistant en un examen des principeset règlesjuridiquesination of the legal principles and rules applicable in the case of such a

transfer. These the Court has sought to formulate on both a wider and a
more concrete basis, namely with reference to the relationship between the
WHO and Egypt in the past.
It is a truism that an inter-governmental organization, as a new subject
of international law created by States, acquires a special status vis-à-vis

those States. While it remains under their control, inasmuch as it both
represents and is subject to their collective will, its decisions may, and
frequently do, conflict with the will of its individual members. Since its
headquarters and other offices are usually located not on no-man's land
but on State territory, relationships are thereby created which arebound to
reflect mutual agreements or, sometimes, disagreements. When determin-

ing - eventually in consultation with potential hosts - the conditions
under which the headquarters or a regional office may be established in a
particular locality, or transferred from one country to another, and in
taking the corresponding decisions, the organization is simply implement-
ing the collective will of its members. It is then to be viewed as having to

act, not under any tutelage, but only in accordance with the law : where
there is an agreement establishing the seat, in compliance with that ; if
there is none applicable, in compliance with the principles of law whch
have evolved as the result of this new institution, the international orga-
nization, and its relationshp with States. A considerable number of agree-
ments now in force, though differing in detail, make it clear that an

organization is entitled to decide upon a change of seat (whether head-
quarters or regional office). Such seat is thus not immobilized, and of this
host States should be aware.

In the present case, the World Health Organization is faced with the
wish of 19members of the Eastern Mediterranean regional organization to
have the office of that organization transferred to another country. In the
event of this recommendation being accepted by theWorld Health Assem-
bly, the Organization should follow a reasonable path of action. In par-

ticular, any agreements concerning the separation of members of the staff
must be kept in view. The same applies to al1local agreements concern-
ing office accommodation, leases and similar arrangements. The World
Health Organization, whle retaining its full independence in the adoption
of the basic decision, should consult with Egypt on these modalities and
technical aspects of such a transfer. On the other hand, the host country

should facilitate the implementation of such a decision, since as a member
of the Organization it shares in the collective interest of minimizing any
disruption of services involved in the transfer once decided. Considering
that such a decision would represent the collective willof the Organization,
1doubt whether there is an obligation of, or even cal1for, negotiations with
the host State. To maintain the contrary is not in my view consonant with

the status of member States within an organization. What is actuallyapplicables en cas de transfert. La Cour acherchéàformuler ces principes
et règles sur une barje à la fois plus large et plus concrète, à savoir en
fonction de la relation existant par le passéentre l'OMS et 1'Egypte.

Dire qu'une organisation intergouvernementale, en tant que nouveau
sujet de droit international créépar des Etats, acquiert de ce fait un statut

spécialpar rapport à ces Etats, c'est énoncer une évidence.Alors qu'elle
demeure sous leur dépendance, dans la mesure où elle représente leur
volontécollective et est soumise à cette volonté, ses décisions risquent de
s'opposer, et de fait s'opposent souvent, à la volonté de certains de ses
membres. Son siège et sesautresbureaux étant en généralsitués non dans
un no manS land mai:;sur le territoire d'un Etat, cela crée desrelations qui

ne peuvent qu'êtrele reflet des accords ou, parfois, desdésaccords mutuels.
Lorsque l'organisation détermine, éventuellement en consultation avecdes
pays hôtes possibles, lesconditions dans lesquelles son siègeou un bureau
régional pourrait s'établirdans une localitédonnée, ou les conditions de
transfert d'un pays dans un autre, et lorsqu'elle prend les décisions cor-
respondantes, cette organisation donne simplement suite à la volonté

collective de ses membres. Il faut donc la considérer comme devant agir
non sous une quelconque tutelle, mais uniquement selon des règles
de droit : lorsqu'il existe un accord établissant le siège,conformément à
cet accord ; en l'absence d'accord applicable, conformément aux prin-
cipes de droit découlant de cette nouvelle institution, l'organisation inter-
nationale, et de ses rapports avec certains Etats. Un nombre considé-

rable d'accords actuellement en vigueur, bien que différents dans leurs
details, précisent que l'organisation a le droit de décider de transférer
un siège (qu'il s'agisse de son siège ou de celui d'un bureau régional).
Ce siège n'est donc pas immobilisé et les Etats hôtes doivent en être
conscients.
En l'espèce,I'OrgarÙsationmondiale dela Santése trouve confrontée au

souhait de dix-neuf m.embres de l'organisation régionalede la Méditerra-
néeorientale qui demandent le transfert du Bureau de cette organisation
dans un autre pays. Siil'Assembléemondiale de la Santé approuve cette
recommandation, l'organisation devra suivre une ligne de conduite rai-
sonnable. En particulier, il ne faudra pas perdre de vue tous les accords
relatifs à la cessation des services d'un certain nombre de fonctionnaires,

tous les accords locaux relatifs aux bâtiments, les baux et autres arrange-
ments du mêmeordre. Tout en conservant son entière indépendance pour
ce qui est de l'adoption de la décisionde base, l'Organisation mondiale de
laSantédevra consult~rr1'Egyptesur les modalitéset les aspectstechniques
du transfert. Le pays hôte, pour sa part, devra faciliter la mise en Œuvre
d'une telle décision,attendu qu'en tant que membre de l'organisation ilest

dans sonintérêt,élémentde l'intérêt collectifd ,e réduireàun minimum les
perturbations des senlices en cause, une fois le transfert décidé. Considé-
rant qu'une telle décisiontraduit la volontécollective de l'organisation, je
doute qu'il y ait une obligation ou mêmeune nécessitéde négocier avec
1'Etathôte. Affirmer le contraire est selon moi inconciliable avec le statutrequisite in principle is a consultation with a view to the orderly termi-
nation of activities, so as to enable them tobe speedily resumed in the new
seat.

It is to be recalled that the request for an advisory opinion of the Court
wasmade whilethe matter wasunder consideration in severalorgans of the
WHO. On 12May 1979Sub-Committee A of the Mediterranean Region
was convened at Geneva to respond to a request made by a number of
governments on the subject ;the matter was already on the agendas of the
WHO Executive Board and of a working group set up by it to carry out a
study of al1aspects involved.The group'sreport wassubmitted to the latest
World Health Assembly, and the above-mentioned Sub-Committee A,
having reviewed theinformation provided therein, adopted a resolution to
transfer the Regional Office to Amman. It is to be noted that ths reso-
lution, submittëd to the Assembly, speaks of a transfer "as soon as pos-
sible", which obviously connotes its implementation under reasonable
conditions.
Thus it is clear that, a regional committee of the WHO having ex-
pressed the wish to transfer the seat of its administrative organ, the matter
is now to be considered and decided by the World Health Assembly in
accordance with the provisions of its Constitution and rules of procedure.

Should the Assembly decide upon the transfer, the executive organs of
the WHO should proceed to carry it out in an orderly manner, bringing
the operations at the Alexandria Office to an end within a reasonable
period, which, taking into account the time that has elapsed since the
proposa1 was first made, should to my way of thinking be a matter of
months.
It iswith this understanding that1 have felt able to concur in theCourt's
reply to the first question.do not propose todeal withthe second,whichis
redundant and has in my view resulted in the over-emphasis of certain
conclusions, more particularly of those contained in paragraph 49 of the
Advisory Opinion.
Finally a more general comment, related only indirectly to the case :
analysis confirms, as 1suggested at an early stage of my considerations,
that this new type of relationship between host States and international
organizations, dealt with by a new category of treaties known as head-
quarters agreements, includes veryheterogeneous elements.Scores of such
agreements havebeenconcluded, and they represent an important chapter
in the catalogue of contemporary treaties ;they show striking discrepan-
cies, some well founded on the peculiarities of the specific cases, others
evidently due to lack of adequate attention from the lawyer's eye.There

can be little doubt that this is not conducive to the proper operation of
international organizations and mayconstitute asourceofmisunderstand-
ing, misconstruction or even conflict, and not only in cases of proposed
transfer. Greater precision and comprehensiveness, closer attention to
legalformulations, and the introduction of uniformity wherever desirable,
will be in the interest of proper relationships between host States and INTERPRIÉTATION DE L'ACCORD (OP. IND. LACHS) 112

des Etats membres aüisein d'une organisation. Parcontre, ilest en principe

réellement nécessairede procéder à des consultationsen vue de mettre fin
dans l'ordre aux tâches accomplies et, partant, d'en permettre la reprise
rapide au nouveau siège.
Il faut rappeler que la requêtepour avis consultatif a étésoumise à la
Cour alorsque la question étaitexaminéepar plusieurs organes de l'OMS.

Le 12 mai 1979, le sous-comité A de la Méditerranée orientale était
convoquéàGenèveàla demanded'un certain nombre de gouvernements ;
laquestionétaitdéjà inscrite àl'ordre dujour du Conseil exécutifde I'OMS
et d'un groupe de travail chargéd'étudier touslesaspects de la question. Le

rapport du groupe de travaila étésoumis àla dernière Assembléemondiale
de la Santé et le souis-comitéA susmentionné, après avoir examiné les
renseignements contenus dans ce rapport, a adoptéune résolution deman-
dant le transfert du Eiureau régionalà Amman. A noter que cette résolu-
tion, soumise àl'Assemblée,parle d'un transfert (<le plus tôt possible))ce
qui donnede toute évidenceàentendre que la décisiondoit êtreappliquée

dans des conditions raisonnables.
Ilest donc clair que, un comité régional de I'OMS ayant exprimé le
souhait de transférer le siège de son organe administratif, l'Assemblée
mondiale de la Santé doit maintenant étudier la question et prendre une
décision conformément aux dispositions de sa Constitution et de son

règlement. Si l'Assemblée décide le transfert, les organes exécutifs de
I'OMS devront l'effectuer de manière ordonnée, en mettant fin aux acti-
vitésdu Bureau d'Alexandrie dans un délai raisonnable, lequel devrait être
selon moi une question de mois, compte tenu du temps qui s'est écoulé
depuis que la proposition a été faitepour la première fois.

C'est en interprétant ainsi la situationque j'ai pu me rallier à la réponse
de la Cour à la première question. Je ne me propose pas d'examiner la
réponseà la deuxième qui, à mon avis,est redondante et a eu pour effet de
donner trop d'importance à certaines conclusions, notamment celles du

paragraphe 49 de l'avis consultatif.
Je terminerai par une remarque d'ordre plus général, ayant un rapport
indirect avec la présenteespèce. L'analyse confirme,commeje l'ai suggéré
au débutde mes considérations, que ce nouveau type de relations entre des
Etats hôtes et des organisations internationales, entérinées par une nou-

velle catégorie de traités dénommés accordsde siège,comprend des élé-
ments très hétérogènes.Un grand nombre d'accords de ce type ont été
conclus et représentent un chapitre important du catalogue des traités
contemporains ; ils contiennent des contradictions frappantes, certaines
étantfondées,compte tenu desparticularités de l'espèce,d'autres étantde

toute évidencedues à un défaut de vigilance des juristes. Il ne fait pas de
doute que cela peut nuire au bon fonctionnement des organisations inter-
nationales etpeut conistituer une source de malentendus, d'interprétations
erronées, voire de conflits et pas seulement en cas de proposition de
transfert. Une plus grande précision et une meilleure compréhension, un

plus grand soin apporté aux formulesjuridiques et l'introduction d'uneinternational organizations, the proper functioning of the latter, and the
effectiveness of the law.

(Signed) Manfred LACHS.certaine uniformité chaque fois que cela est souhaitable seraient favo-
rables à l'établissement de relations satisfaentre Etats hôtes et
organisations internationales, au bon fonctionnement de ces dernières et à
l'efficacitédes règles de droit.

(Signé )anfred LACHS.

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Document Long Title

Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs

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