SEPARATE OPINIOY BY JUDGE WINIARSKI
[Translation]
The advisory function of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, introduced by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, gave rise to serious doubts and grave concern on the part
of the Permanent Court at the beginning of its activities, as it had
on the part of jurists when the Covenant was being drafted and
later when the Statute of the Court was being prepared in 1920. At
the preliminary session of the Court in 1922 which uras devoted to
drawing up the first Rules of Court, Judge J. B. hloore began his
important report on the subject in the following terms :"No subject
connected with the organisation of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice has caused so much confusion and proved to be
so baffling as the question whether and under what conditions the
Court shall undertake to give 'advisory' opinions."
The important problem which the Court had to resolve was to
reconcile its advisory function and its character as a Court of
Justice, as an independent judicial organ of international law. On
the one hand there were the Opinions, without binding force, which
ought to impose themselves by virtue of the great authority
attaching to them ; otherwise, as Judge Moore pointed out in his
report, the prestige of the Court might be discredited. On the other
hand, Article 14 provided : "The Court may also give (in French :
donnera)an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred
to it by the Council or bythe Asse~nbly", which appeared to indicate
that there was a possibility of introducing the compulsory juris-
diction by the circuitous means of advisory opinions :by giving an
opinion on a legal question relating to an existing dispute between
States, the Court would in substance be adjudicating on the dispute
itself although the parties had not accepted its junsdiction for that
purpose.
The Permanent Court met this twofold danger in two ways.
First, it provided the exercise of its advisory function with judicial
forms and safeguards ;secondly, it recognized that it might decline
to give an opinion if there were compelling reasons against its
doing so, in accordance with the conclusion reached in the Moore
report to the effect that if an application for an advisory opinion
should be presented, "the Court should then deal with the applica-
tion according to what should be found to be the nature and the
merits of the case". In 1923, in the famous Opinion concerning the
Status of Eastern Carelia, the Court laid down the principles which
led it to decline to give the opinion requested by the Council ; these
principles were summarized in the following well-known sentence :
"The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving
31 Advisory Opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding it as a
Court." (Opinion No. 5, p. 29.) In 1935, President Anzilotti, recal-
ling the constant attitude of the Permanent Court, added the
following idea which has lost none of its force : "It is...difficult to
see how the Court's independence of tlie political organs of the
League of Nations could be safeguarded, if it were in the power of
the Assembly or the Council to oblige the Court to answer any
question which they might see fit to submit to it" (AIR 65, p. 61).
The attitude of the International Court of Justice does not differ
from that of the Permanent Court. In its Opinion of hfarch 3oth,
1950, after noting that the Court's Opinion in principle should not
be refused, the Court stated : "There are certain limits, however,
to the Court's duty to reply to a Request for an Opinion. It is not
merely an 'organ of the United Nations', it is essentially the 'prin-
cipal judicial organ' of the Organization (Art. 92 of the Charter and
Art. I of the Statute)." And further on :"Article 65 of the Statute
is permissive. It gives the Court the power to examine whether the
circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead it
to decline to answer the Request" (pp. 71-72). On another occasion,
recalling the principles thus stated, the Court said : "The permissive
provision of Article 65 of the Statute recognizes that the Court has
the power to decide whether the circumstances of a particular case
are such as to lead the Court to decline to reply to the request for
an Opinion" (Reports 1951, p. 19). The Court has not considered
that the circumstances of the case now before it are such as to lead
it to decline to give an answer and it is on this point that 1 regret
1 am unable to agree with the decision of the Court.
1pointed out above that from the beginning the Permanent Court
provided the exercise of its advisory function with judicial forms and
safeguards. In connexion with the first revision of the Rules (1926-
1927) the Committee appointed by the Permanent Court and com-
posed of Judges Loder, Moore and Anzilotti, made the following
statement iri its report : "The Court, in the exercise of this power,
deliberately and advisedly assimilated its advisory procedure to its
contentious procedure ; and the results have abundantly justified
its action. Such prestige as the Court to-day enjoys as a judicial
tribunal is largely due to the amount of its advisory business and
the judicial way in which it has dealt with such business. In reality,
where there are in fact contending parties, the difference between
contentious cases and advisory cases is only nominal." (Fourth
Annual Report, 1927-1928, p. 76.)
At the 1929 Conference for the revision of the Statute of the Per-
manent Court, the following explanation was given with regard to
Article 68which had been revised and was subsequently transmitted
to the Assembly : "It would be quite useless to give an advisory
opinion after hearing only one side. For the opinion to be useful,
both parties must be heard. It was therefore qiiite natural to laydown in the Statute of the Court that, in regard to advisory opinions,
the Court should proceed in al1respects in the same way as in con-
tentious cases."
The revised Statute of 1929 and the revised Rules of 1936 were
the last stages in the evolution which necessarily led to considerable
assimilation of the two procedures, an assimilation which was almost
complete in so far as "existing" disputes between two or more
States were concerned.
The position of the International Court of Justice with regard to
the advisory function has remained practically the same, and
although Article 65 of the Statute, in accordance with Article 96 of
the Charter, has abandoned the difference between "a question"
and "a dispute" in favour of a reference to "any legal question",
Article 68 of the Statute has remained unchanged and Article 82
(modified) of the Rules continues to provide : "...it [the Court] shall
above al1 consider whether the request for the advisory opinion
relates to a legal question actually pending between two or more
States" in order to be guided by the provisions of the Statute and
Rules which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it
recognizes them to be applicable.
In conductinç its advisory activity in this way, the Court respects
the principle of the independence of States by virtue of which dis-
putes between States mav not be settlecl without their consent, even
indirectly, by means of an advisory opinion ;the Court also respects
two fundamental principles of procedure from which, as a judicial
body, it cannot depart : audintzir et altera pars and the equality of
the parties before a Court. The strict observance of these principles
and the constant mil1 of the Court to be fully enlightened in its
study of the questions refcrred to it were to invest the Opinions of
the Court with the necessary authority.
The case now before the Court falls within neither of the two
categories of questions in respect of which the advisory function of
the Court has been provided : it is neither an abstract question nor
a "question actually pending between two or more States". The
Court, whose duty it is to ascertain the reality of the relations which
are at the basis of the question to be answered by it, has not failed
to noie that it is confronted by the final stage in the proceedings
between Vnesco and its former officiais. Having been regularly
seised bjr an Organization duly authorized to do so by the General
Assernbly, and having been seised of a legal question arising within
the field of the Organization's activities, the Court is competent to
give an answer to that question ; however, as is noted in the Opinion,
the procedure thus brought into being "appears as serving, in a way,
the object of a judicial appeal" against the four judgments of the
Administrative Tribunal, and this utilization of the advisory pro-
cedure was certainly not contemplated by the draftsmen of the
Charter and of the Statute of the Court. Of course what is involved is not a regular appeal. Such appeals
were contemplated by the delegation of Venezuela at the San
Francisco Conference and would have necessitated an appropriate
modification of Article 34 of the Statute which was formulated
by that delegation in the following terms : "As a Court of Appeal,
the Court will have jurisdiction to take cognizance over such
cases as are tried nnder original jurisdiction by international
administrative tribunals dependent upon the United Nations when
the appeal would be provided in the Statute of such tribunals."
This proposa1 was defeated. (Doc. 284, Iv/1/24.)
It is conceivable that a question relating to the validity of
a judgment of the Administrative Tribunal should be referred
to the Court in an isolated manner, within the framework of its
normal advisory activity and in accordance with the rules and
principles governing that activity ; but even in that case the
problem would present grave difficulties. In the case now before
the Court the character of a final settlement by means of appeal
against the four judgments follows from the fact that the Request
for an Advisory Opinion has been made in accordance with
Article XII of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal ; the
binding character of the Opinion does not in itself affect the
cornpetence of the Court but constitutes further proof that what
is involved is an appeal in the form of a Request for an Advisory
Opinion.
As regards the procedure, Unesco, in approaching the Court,
was guided by the special provisions laid down by the Council
of the League of Nations in the case of the former officials of
the Saar, which had moreover never been applied ; it was also
guided by the Resolution which was recently adopted by the
General Assembly with a view to amending the Statute of the
Administrati1.e Tribunal of the United Nations. The Director-
General, who was "anxious to ensure the fullest possible equality
of rights to those concerned", stated that he was prepared to
transmit their views to the Court (statement by the Legal Adviser,
read at the meeting of the Executive Board held on November 25th,
1955, Doc. 42 Ex/SR/I-27). This procedure, to which the Court
did not object, has led to a situation in which one of the parties
to the proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal can only
send its observations to the Court through the intermediary of
the other party.
As regards the oral proceedings, Unesco has expressed its
intention of refraining from presenting an oral statement for the
same reasons. The afore-mentioned statement by the Legal Adviser,
however, added the following words : "It should, furthermore, be
noted that in order to fulfil its purpose-which is to ensure the
fullest possible equality of rights-abstentionfrom the presentation
of oral statements must be total and must apply not only to the
organization concerned, but also to the other international organi-zations and to Member States." In this way, since the officials
concerned were unable to appear before the Court, the States,
Organizations and even the Court had to dispense with the oral
argument which is the rule in advisory proceedings.
The fact that this unusual procediire has not given rise to any
objection on the part of those concerned and that it has been
consented to by counsel for the officials is irrelevant.ese officials
had no place in the normal advisory procedure. The important
thing is that the oral proceedings, which constitute the means
by which the Court usüally obtains clarification of the iss~ze
before it, have been dispcnsed with beforehand.
Unesco alone may apply to the Court to challenge the judgments
of the Administrative Tribunal. It was legally impossible to confer
the same right on the officials. They won their case before the
Tribunal ;had they lost it, no remedy would have been available
to them. This inequality in itself may not constitute a bar to
the Court's giving an Opinion in this case ; it does however add
to the situation in which the Court finds itself, a situation which
is not compatible with its judicial character. Furthermore, any
attempt to reduce, if not eliminate, these inequalities between
the Organization and the individuals further emphasizes the
contradictions between this hybrid procedure and the Statute
of the Court, for in the final analysis this procedure runs counter
to the fundamental provisioils of Article 34 to the effect that
"Only States may be parties in cases before the Court" and to
the provisions of Articles 65 and 66 by virtue of which only States
and international organizations may participate in advisory
proceedings.
For these reasons, it is my view that the Court would follow a
safer course by refraining from complying with the Request for
an Opinion. Since the Court has decided otherwise, 1 concur in
the answers given by the Court although 1 do not agree -4th al1
the reasoning of the Opinion.
(Signed) Bohdan ~VIKIARSKI.
OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. WINIARSKI
La fonction consultative de la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale, introduite par l'article 14 du Pacte de la Sociétédes
Nations, a étél'objet de doutes sérieuxet de préoccupations graves
pour la Cour permanente au début de son activité, comme elle
l'avait été pourles juristes lors de l'élaboration du Pacte et, plus
tard, lors de la préparation, en 1920, du Statut de la Cour. Pendant
la session préliminaire de 1922, consacrée à l'établissement du
premier Règlement, le juge J. B. Moore a pu commencer ainsi son
important rapport sur la matière : cAucune question relative à
l'organisation de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale n'a
provoqué autant de confusion et de perplexité que celle de savoir
si la Cour doit donner des avis consultatifs et dans quelles condi-
tions. »
Le grand problème à résoudre, pour la Cour, c'était de concilier
sa fonction consultative avec son caractère de Cour de justice,
organe judiciaire et indépendant du droit international. D'un côté
les avis, sans force obligatoire, devraient s'imposer par leur haute
autorité, autrement, comme l'a observé J. B. Moore dans son
rapport, il pourrait en résulter du discréditpour la Cour. D'un autre
côté,l'article 14stipulait : (Elle (la Cour) donnera aussi (en anglais :
may give) des avis consultatifs sur tout différend outout point dont
la saisira le Conseil ou l'Assemblée »,ce qui semblait indiquer la
possibilitéd'introduire la juridiction obligatoire par la voie détournée
des avis :en effet, en donnant un avis sur une question de droit
relative à un différend néentre Etats, la Cour se prononcerait en
substance sur le différend mêmepour lequel les parties n'avaient
pourtant pas admis sa juridiction.
A ce double danger, la Cour permanente a parépar deux moyens.
D'abord, elle a entouré l'exercice de sa fonction consultative des
formes et garanties judiciaires ; ensuite, elle a reconnu qu'elle peut
refuser de donner un avis au cas où d'importantes raisons s'opposent
à ce que l'avis soit donné, ceci en accord avec la conclusion du
rapport Moore : si la Cour reçoit une demande d'avis, ((elley donne
la suite qu'elle jugera opportune d'après la nature et les circons-
tances de chaque cas particulier ». Déjà en 1923, dans le cas
célèbrede la Carélieorientale, la Cour a formulé des principes qui
l'avaient déterminée àne pas donner l'avis demandépar le Conseil ;
elle les a résumésdans la phrase bien connue : (La Cour, étant une
cour de justice, ne peut pas se départir des règles essentielles qui
dirigent son activité de tribunal, même lorsqu'elledonne des avis SEPARATE OPINIOY BY JUDGE WINIARSKI
[Translation]
The advisory function of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, introduced by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, gave rise to serious doubts and grave concern on the part
of the Permanent Court at the beginning of its activities, as it had
on the part of jurists when the Covenant was being drafted and
later when the Statute of the Court was being prepared in 1920. At
the preliminary session of the Court in 1922 which uras devoted to
drawing up the first Rules of Court, Judge J. B. hloore began his
important report on the subject in the following terms :"No subject
connected with the organisation of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice has caused so much confusion and proved to be
so baffling as the question whether and under what conditions the
Court shall undertake to give 'advisory' opinions."
The important problem which the Court had to resolve was to
reconcile its advisory function and its character as a Court of
Justice, as an independent judicial organ of international law. On
the one hand there were the Opinions, without binding force, which
ought to impose themselves by virtue of the great authority
attaching to them ; otherwise, as Judge Moore pointed out in his
report, the prestige of the Court might be discredited. On the other
hand, Article 14 provided : "The Court may also give (in French :
donnera)an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred
to it by the Council or bythe Asse~nbly", which appeared to indicate
that there was a possibility of introducing the compulsory juris-
diction by the circuitous means of advisory opinions :by giving an
opinion on a legal question relating to an existing dispute between
States, the Court would in substance be adjudicating on the dispute
itself although the parties had not accepted its junsdiction for that
purpose.
The Permanent Court met this twofold danger in two ways.
First, it provided the exercise of its advisory function with judicial
forms and safeguards ;secondly, it recognized that it might decline
to give an opinion if there were compelling reasons against its
doing so, in accordance with the conclusion reached in the Moore
report to the effect that if an application for an advisory opinion
should be presented, "the Court should then deal with the applica-
tion according to what should be found to be the nature and the
merits of the case". In 1923, in the famous Opinion concerning the
Status of Eastern Carelia, the Court laid down the principles which
led it to decline to give the opinion requested by the Council ; these
principles were summarized in the following well-known sentence :
"The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving
31 IO5 OPIN. INDIV. DE M. WINIARSKI (AVIS 23 x 56)
consultatifs. » (Avis no j,p. 29.) En 1935, le Président Anzilotti, en
rappelant l'attitude constante de la Cour permanente, ajouta cette
idée qui garde toute sa valeur : ccIl est difficile de voir de quelle
manière pourrait être sauvegardée l'indépendance de la Cour
vis-à-vis des organes politiques de la Sociétédes Nations, s'il était
dans le pouvoir de l'Assembléeet du Conseil de l'obliger à répondre
à n'importe quelle question qu'ils jugeraient opportun de lui
soumettre » (A/B no 6j, p. 61).
L'attitude de la Cour internationale de Justice ne diffèrepas de
celle de la Cour permanente. Dans son avis du 30 mars 1950, après
avoir constaté que la réponse, en principe, ne devrait pas être
refusée, la Cour déclare :ccL'obligation de la Cour de répondre à
une demande d'avis comporte toutefois certaines limites. La Cour
n'est pas seulement corgane des Nations Unies », elle est aussi
essentiellement leur ccorgane judiciaire principal » (art. 92 de la
Charte et art. I du Statut). 1Et plus loin :cL'article 65 du Statut est
permissif. 11donne à la Cour le pouvoir d'apprécier si les circons-
tances de l'espècesont telles qu'elles doivent la déterminer à ne pas
répondre à une demande d'avis » (pp. 71-72). A une autre occasion,
en rappelant les principes ainsi énoncés,la Cour a déclaré : ccLa
disposition permissive de l'article 65 du Statut reconnaît à la Cour
le pouvoir d'apprécier si les circonstances de l'espèce sont telles
qu'elles doivent la déterminer à ne pas répondre à la demande
d'avis » (Rec. 1951, p. 19). Dans les circonstances du cas qui lui
est actuellement soumis, la Cour n'a pas cru trouver des éléments
qui la détermineraient à s'abstenir de répondre, et c'est ici que, à
mon regret, je ne puis êtred'accord avec sa décision.
J'ai indiquétout à l'heure que la Cour permanente a dèsle début
entourél'exercice de sa fonction consultative desformes et garanties
judiciaires. A l'occasion de la première revision du Règlement
(1926-1927), le comité nommépar la Cour permanente et composé
des juges Loder, Moore et Anzilotti, a dit dans son rapport :
ccLa Cour dans l'exercice de ses pouvoirs a délibérémentet inten-
tionnellement assimilé la procédure consultative à la procédure
contentieuse, et les résultats obtenus ont abondamment justifié
cette attitude. Le prestige dont peut jouir la Cour actuellement,
en tant que tribunal judiciaire, est dans une large mesure dû à
l'importance de son activité consultative et à la façon judiciaire
dont elle a réglécette activité. En réalité,lorsqu'en fait il se trouve
des parties en présence, il n'y a qu'une différencepurement nomi-
nale entre les affaires contentieuses et les affaires consultatives. ))
(qmeRapport annuel, 1927-1928, p. 72.)
A la conférence de 1929 pour la revision du Statut de la Cour
permanente, on a donné de l'article 68 revisé I'explicatioi~suivante,
qui fut transmise plus tard à l'Assemblée : «Il serait parfaitement
inutile et vain de donner un avis consultatif après avoir entendu
seulement une seule voix. Pour que l'avis soit utile, il faut entendre
les deux parties. C'est pourquoi il est tout naturel de prévoir dans
32 Advisory Opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding it as a
Court." (Opinion No. 5, p. 29.) In 1935, President Anzilotti, recal-
ling the constant attitude of the Permanent Court, added the
following idea which has lost none of its force : "It is...difficult to
see how the Court's independence of tlie political organs of the
League of Nations could be safeguarded, if it were in the power of
the Assembly or the Council to oblige the Court to answer any
question which they might see fit to submit to it" (AIR 65, p. 61).
The attitude of the International Court of Justice does not differ
from that of the Permanent Court. In its Opinion of hfarch 3oth,
1950, after noting that the Court's Opinion in principle should not
be refused, the Court stated : "There are certain limits, however,
to the Court's duty to reply to a Request for an Opinion. It is not
merely an 'organ of the United Nations', it is essentially the 'prin-
cipal judicial organ' of the Organization (Art. 92 of the Charter and
Art. I of the Statute)." And further on :"Article 65 of the Statute
is permissive. It gives the Court the power to examine whether the
circumstances of the case are of such a character as should lead it
to decline to answer the Request" (pp. 71-72). On another occasion,
recalling the principles thus stated, the Court said : "The permissive
provision of Article 65 of the Statute recognizes that the Court has
the power to decide whether the circumstances of a particular case
are such as to lead the Court to decline to reply to the request for
an Opinion" (Reports 1951, p. 19). The Court has not considered
that the circumstances of the case now before it are such as to lead
it to decline to give an answer and it is on this point that 1 regret
1 am unable to agree with the decision of the Court.
1pointed out above that from the beginning the Permanent Court
provided the exercise of its advisory function with judicial forms and
safeguards. In connexion with the first revision of the Rules (1926-
1927) the Committee appointed by the Permanent Court and com-
posed of Judges Loder, Moore and Anzilotti, made the following
statement iri its report : "The Court, in the exercise of this power,
deliberately and advisedly assimilated its advisory procedure to its
contentious procedure ; and the results have abundantly justified
its action. Such prestige as the Court to-day enjoys as a judicial
tribunal is largely due to the amount of its advisory business and
the judicial way in which it has dealt with such business. In reality,
where there are in fact contending parties, the difference between
contentious cases and advisory cases is only nominal." (Fourth
Annual Report, 1927-1928, p. 76.)
At the 1929 Conference for the revision of the Statute of the Per-
manent Court, the following explanation was given with regard to
Article 68which had been revised and was subsequently transmitted
to the Assembly : "It would be quite useless to give an advisory
opinion after hearing only one side. For the opinion to be useful,
both parties must be heard. It was therefore qiiite natural to layle Statut de la Cour qu'en matière d'avis consultatif la Cour procède
à tous égards comme en matière contentieuse. ))
Le Statut revisé de 1929 et le Règlement reviséen 1936 ont été
les dernières étapesde l'évolutionqui a dû conduire à l'assimilation
considérable des deux procédures, assimilation presque complète
en ce qui concerne te cas des différends actuellement nés 1)entre
deux ou plusieurs Etats.
La position de la Cour internationale de Justice en ce qui concerne
la fonction consultative est restée pratiquement la même,et si
l'article65 du Statut, en conformité avec l'article 96 de la Charte,
a abandonné la différenceentre ((un point » et ((un différend » et
parle de «toute question juridique ))l'article68 du Statut est resté
sans changement et l'article 82 (modifié) du Règlement statue
toujours : (La Cour recherche avant tout si la demande d'avis a
trait ou non à une question iuridique actuellement vendante entre
deux ou plusieurs ~tats D, ceci po;r s'inspirer des hispositions du
Statut et du Règlement relatives à la procédure contentieuse, dans
la mesure où elle les reconnaît applicables.
En dirigeant ainsi son activité consqltative, la Cour obéitd'abord
au principe de l'indépendance des Etats qui s'oppose à ce que
leurs différends soient tranchés sans leur consentement par voie
d'avis, mêmeindirectement, et ensyite aux deux principes fonda-
mentaux de procédure dont, tribunal judiciaire, elle ne saurait se
départir :audiatur et altera 9ars et l'égalité desparties devant le
juge. L'observation religieuse de ces principes, la volontéconstante
de la Cour d'êtrecomplètement éclairéedans l'étudedes questions
qui luisont soumises devaient assurer àses avisl'autorité nécessaire.
Le cas actuellement soumis à la Cour ne rentre dans aucune des
deux catégoriesde questions pour lesquelles la fonction consultative
de la Cour a été prévue :ce n'est ni une question abstraite, ni une
((question actuellement pendante entre deux ou plusieurs États ».
La Cour, qui a le devoir de dégagerla réalitédes rapports se trou-
vant à la base de la question à laquelle elle doit répondre, n'a pas
manqué de constater qu'elle se trouve devant le stade final d'un
procès entre l'Unesco et ses anciens fonctionnaires. Régulièrement
saisie par une Organisation autorisée à cet effet par l'Assemblée
générale,saisie d'une question de droit qui rentre dans le cadre de
l'activité de cette .Organisation, la Cour est compétente pour y
répondre ; cependant, comme l'avis le constate, la procédure ainsi
engagée cse présente comme faisant, dans une certaine mesure,
fonction de recours judiciaire )) contre les quatre jugements du
Tribunal administratif, et cette utilisation de la voie consultative
n'a certainement pas étéenvisagée par les auteurs de la Charte
et du Statut de la Cour.
33down in the Statute of the Court that, in regard to advisory opinions,
the Court should proceed in al1respects in the same way as in con-
tentious cases."
The revised Statute of 1929 and the revised Rules of 1936 were
the last stages in the evolution which necessarily led to considerable
assimilation of the two procedures, an assimilation which was almost
complete in so far as "existing" disputes between two or more
States were concerned.
The position of the International Court of Justice with regard to
the advisory function has remained practically the same, and
although Article 65 of the Statute, in accordance with Article 96 of
the Charter, has abandoned the difference between "a question"
and "a dispute" in favour of a reference to "any legal question",
Article 68 of the Statute has remained unchanged and Article 82
(modified) of the Rules continues to provide : "...it [the Court] shall
above al1 consider whether the request for the advisory opinion
relates to a legal question actually pending between two or more
States" in order to be guided by the provisions of the Statute and
Rules which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it
recognizes them to be applicable.
In conductinç its advisory activity in this way, the Court respects
the principle of the independence of States by virtue of which dis-
putes between States mav not be settlecl without their consent, even
indirectly, by means of an advisory opinion ;the Court also respects
two fundamental principles of procedure from which, as a judicial
body, it cannot depart : audintzir et altera pars and the equality of
the parties before a Court. The strict observance of these principles
and the constant mil1 of the Court to be fully enlightened in its
study of the questions refcrred to it were to invest the Opinions of
the Court with the necessary authority.
The case now before the Court falls within neither of the two
categories of questions in respect of which the advisory function of
the Court has been provided : it is neither an abstract question nor
a "question actually pending between two or more States". The
Court, whose duty it is to ascertain the reality of the relations which
are at the basis of the question to be answered by it, has not failed
to noie that it is confronted by the final stage in the proceedings
between Vnesco and its former officiais. Having been regularly
seised bjr an Organization duly authorized to do so by the General
Assernbly, and having been seised of a legal question arising within
the field of the Organization's activities, the Court is competent to
give an answer to that question ; however, as is noted in the Opinion,
the procedure thus brought into being "appears as serving, in a way,
the object of a judicial appeal" against the four judgments of the
Administrative Tribunal, and this utilization of the advisory pro-
cedure was certainly not contemplated by the draftsmen of the
Charter and of the Statute of the Court. OPIN. INDIV. DE M. WINIARSKI (AVIS 23 X 56)
IO7
Certes, ce n'est pas un recours régulier en appel. De tels appels
avaient étéenvisagéspar la délégationdu Venezuela àla Conférence
de San Francisco, ce qui aurait nécessitéune modification appro-
priée de l'article 34 du Statut, modification que cette délégation
a formulée comme suit :((Siégeanten degré d'appel la Cour prend
connaissance des litiges jugés en première instance par des tribu-
naux administratifs des Nations Unies, dont le Statut contiendra
une disposition à cet effet.))Cette proposition a étérejetée (Doc.
284, IV11/24).
Il est concevable qu'une question relative à la validité d'un
jugement du Tribunal administratif puisse êtresoumise à la Cour
isolément, dans le cadre de son activité consultative normale et
conformément aux règleset principes qui président à cette activité ;
mais mêmedans un tel cas le problème présenterait des difficultés
graves. Dans le cas actuellement devant la Cour, le caractère de
règlement final au moyen de recours organisé contre les quatre
jugements ressort du fait que la demande d'avis a étéprésentée
Conformément à l'article XII du Statut du Tribunal ; l'effet obliga-
toire de l'avis n'affecte pas par lui-mêmela compétence de la Cour,
mais il constitue une nouvelle preuve qu'il s'agit d'un recours sous
forme de demande d'avis consultatif.
Pour ce qui est de la procédure, I'Gnesco, en s'adressant à la
Cour, s'est inspirée des dispositions spécialesarrêtéespar le Conseil
de la Société desNations dans le cas des anciens fonctionnaires de
la Sarre - dispositions qui, d'ailleurs, n'avaient jamais étéappli-
quées - ainsi que de la résolution récemmentvotéepar l'Assemblée
généraleen vue d'amender le Statut du Tribunal administratif
des Nations Unies. Le Directeur général,dans ((le souci d'assurer
dans toute la mesure du possible l'égalitédes droits aux intéressés D,
s'est déclaré disposé à transmettre à la Cour leurs exposés(déclara-
tion du Conseiller juridique lue à la séancedu Conseil exécutif le
25 novembre 1955, Doc. 42 Ex/SR/I-27). Ce procédéauquel la
Cour ne s'est pas opposée a abouti à une situation dans laquelle
une des parties au procès devant le Tribunal administratif ne peut
adresser ses observations à la Cour que par l'intermédiaire de la
partie adverse.
Pour ce qui est de la procédure orale, l'Unesco a, pour les mêmes
raisons, expriméson intention de s'abstenir de présenter un exposé
oral. La déclaration du Conseiller juridique ci-dessus mentionnée
ajoute cependant :((Il convient par ailleurs d'observer que pour
atteindre son but - qui est d'assurer, dans la mesure du possible,
une égalitédes droits - l'abstention de présentation des exposés
oraux doit être complète et viser non seulement l'organisation
intéressée, maisaussi bien les autres organisations internationales
34 Of course what is involved is not a regular appeal. Such appeals
were contemplated by the delegation of Venezuela at the San
Francisco Conference and would have necessitated an appropriate
modification of Article 34 of the Statute which was formulated
by that delegation in the following terms : "As a Court of Appeal,
the Court will have jurisdiction to take cognizance over such
cases as are tried nnder original jurisdiction by international
administrative tribunals dependent upon the United Nations when
the appeal would be provided in the Statute of such tribunals."
This proposa1 was defeated. (Doc. 284, Iv/1/24.)
It is conceivable that a question relating to the validity of
a judgment of the Administrative Tribunal should be referred
to the Court in an isolated manner, within the framework of its
normal advisory activity and in accordance with the rules and
principles governing that activity ; but even in that case the
problem would present grave difficulties. In the case now before
the Court the character of a final settlement by means of appeal
against the four judgments follows from the fact that the Request
for an Advisory Opinion has been made in accordance with
Article XII of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal ; the
binding character of the Opinion does not in itself affect the
cornpetence of the Court but constitutes further proof that what
is involved is an appeal in the form of a Request for an Advisory
Opinion.
As regards the procedure, Unesco, in approaching the Court,
was guided by the special provisions laid down by the Council
of the League of Nations in the case of the former officials of
the Saar, which had moreover never been applied ; it was also
guided by the Resolution which was recently adopted by the
General Assembly with a view to amending the Statute of the
Administrati1.e Tribunal of the United Nations. The Director-
General, who was "anxious to ensure the fullest possible equality
of rights to those concerned", stated that he was prepared to
transmit their views to the Court (statement by the Legal Adviser,
read at the meeting of the Executive Board held on November 25th,
1955, Doc. 42 Ex/SR/I-27). This procedure, to which the Court
did not object, has led to a situation in which one of the parties
to the proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal can only
send its observations to the Court through the intermediary of
the other party.
As regards the oral proceedings, Unesco has expressed its
intention of refraining from presenting an oral statement for the
same reasons. The afore-mentioned statement by the Legal Adviser,
however, added the following words : "It should, furthermore, be
noted that in order to fulfil its purpose-which is to ensure the
fullest possible equality of rights-abstentionfrom the presentation
of oral statements must be total and must apply not only to the
organization concerned, but also to the other international organi-108 OPIN. INDIV. DE RI. WINIARSKI (AVIS 23 x 56)
et les États Membres. » C'est ainsi que, les fonctioqnaires intéressés
ne pouvant pas se présenter devant la Cour, les Etats, les organi-
sations et la Cour mêmeont dû renoncer aux débatsoraux q~iisont
de règle dans la procédure consultative.
Le fait que cette procédure inusitéen'a pas soulevé d'objection
de la part des intéresséset qu'elle a mêmereçu l'assentiment du
conseil des fonctionnaires est sans pertinence. Ces fonctionnaires
n'ont pas de place dans la procédure consultative normale. L'impor-
tant est que la procédure orale, moyen habituel pour la Cour de
s'éclairer sur la question qui lui est soumise, a étésupprimée à
l'avance.
L'Unesco seule a pu s'adresser à la Cour pour contester les juge-
ments du Tribunal administratif. Il était juridiquement impossible
d'accorder le mêmedroit aux fonctionnaires. Ils ont gagné leur
procès devant le Tribunal ; s'ils l'avaient perdu, aucun recours ne
leur était ouvert. Cette inégalité,prise en elle-même,peut ne pas
constitiier un empêchement à ce que la Cour donne son avis en
l'espèce ;mais elle ajoute à la situation où la Cour se trouve et qui
ne s'accorde pas avec son caractère judiciaire. D'autre part, toute
tentative de diminuer, sinon d'éliminer, ces inégalitésentre l'Orga-
nisation et les individus conduit à mettre davantage en évidence
les contradictions entre cette procédure hybride et le Statut de la
Cour, car en définitive elle se heurte d'une part à la d-position
fondamentale de l'article 34, d'aprPs lequel ((seuls les Etats ont
qualité pour se présenter devant la Cour ))et d'autre part,aux
dispositions des articles 65 et 66 en vertu desquels seuls les Etats
et les Organisations internationales ont place dans la procédure
consultative.
Pour ces raisons, je suis d'avis que la Cour suivrait une voie plus
sûre en s'abstenant de donner l'avis qui lui est demandé. Comme
la Cour a décidéautrement, je rne rallie aux réponses qu'elle a
données,sans partager par ailleurs tous les motifs de son avis.
(Signé) Bohdan \VIXIARSKI.zations and to Member States." In this way, since the officials
concerned were unable to appear before the Court, the States,
Organizations and even the Court had to dispense with the oral
argument which is the rule in advisory proceedings.
The fact that this unusual procediire has not given rise to any
objection on the part of those concerned and that it has been
consented to by counsel for the officials is irrelevant.ese officials
had no place in the normal advisory procedure. The important
thing is that the oral proceedings, which constitute the means
by which the Court usüally obtains clarification of the iss~ze
before it, have been dispcnsed with beforehand.
Unesco alone may apply to the Court to challenge the judgments
of the Administrative Tribunal. It was legally impossible to confer
the same right on the officials. They won their case before the
Tribunal ;had they lost it, no remedy would have been available
to them. This inequality in itself may not constitute a bar to
the Court's giving an Opinion in this case ; it does however add
to the situation in which the Court finds itself, a situation which
is not compatible with its judicial character. Furthermore, any
attempt to reduce, if not eliminate, these inequalities between
the Organization and the individuals further emphasizes the
contradictions between this hybrid procedure and the Statute
of the Court, for in the final analysis this procedure runs counter
to the fundamental provisioils of Article 34 to the effect that
"Only States may be parties in cases before the Court" and to
the provisions of Articles 65 and 66 by virtue of which only States
and international organizations may participate in advisory
proceedings.
For these reasons, it is my view that the Court would follow a
safer course by refraining from complying with the Request for
an Opinion. Since the Court has decided otherwise, 1 concur in
the answers given by the Court although 1 do not agree -4th al1
the reasoning of the Opinion.
(Signed) Bohdan ~VIKIARSKI.
Separate Opinion of Judge Winiarski (translation)