Judge WINIARSK Ihile voting in favour of the Opinion of the
Court, makes the following declaration :
1 regret that 1 am unable to accept the whole of the reasoning
on which the Court has based its reply. In particular 1think that
as the Opinion of 1950 was not based on the idea of the United
Nations as a successor in title of the League of Nations, the question
of a devolution of the powers of the Council of the League of
Nations to the General Assembly does not arise.1am in agreement
with the minonty opinion in considering that the whole structure
of the Opinion of 1950 was founded on the objective elements of
the situation which arose as a result of the disappearance of the
League of Nations, and that that Opinion found in the General
Assembly the organ qualified to exercise those functions which
could not be allowed to go by default.
1 also believe that the maintenance of the previously existing
situation constitutesthe dominant theme of the Opinion and that
the decisive testis to be found in what was formerly done, and 1
therefore think that any enquiry as to the extent of the powers of
the Council and of the General Assembly respectively is pointless.
The pGwers of the supervisory organ, which are determined by the
continuing obligations of the mandatory Power, are at the same
time duties, and it is quite natural that, conscious of its responsibili-
ties, the General Assembly should have put to the Court the ques-
tion relating thereto.
1 agree with the Court in considering that, though drafted in
absolute terms, the question is to be understood as relating to the
actual situation existing and 1 hesitate to reply to it as though
this situation were normal, that is to Say, as if the Mandatory
were discharging its undertakings as it did under the regime of the
League of Nations ; the raison d'êtreof the question cannot be
ignored. If then, in these circumstances, the General Assembly, in
order to secure further information, grants a hearing to a petitioner,
its decision cannot be held to be irregular. If, on the same basis, it
shoiild authonze the Committee, which is its organ, to grant a
hearing in a particular case in its stead,hould be unable to regard
such a decision, which is one for the Assembly, as conflicting with
the Opinion of 1950 ;if, in the same circumstances, it deemed it
necessary to authorize the Committee to undertake sach hearings,
that, while not in accordance with the former practice, would be
justified if warranted by imperative considerations and if kept
within reasonable limits and govemed by the rule of good faith.
Judge KOJEVNIKOV w,hile voting in favour of the Opinion of the
Court, makes the following declaration :
While accepting the operative clause of the Advisory Opinion,
1 am unable to concur in certain respects with the reasoning, in
14particular with that part which would attribute to the Opinion a
limited and conditional character, fLram of opinion that petitions
may be in writing or oral, or both in writing and oral, that heanngs
granted to petitioners by the Committee on South West Afnica are
consistent with the Advisory Opinion of the Court of July ~mth,
1950, and that the presentation even of oral petitions is one of the
indefeasible rights of the population of the Territory of South West
Africa, rights which accrue from the Covenant of the League oà
Nations, and still more from the Charter of the United Nations, in
conformity with which this Territory shoulà be includecl in the
Trusteeship System of the United Nations.
Judge Sir Hersch LAUTERPACHT a,ailing himself of theright
conferred on him by Articles57 and 68 of the Stalute, appnds to
the Opinion of the Court a staternent of his separate Opinion.
Vice-President BADAWIand Judges BASDEVANT ,Isw MO,
ARMAND-UGOaN nd MORENO QUINTANA a,vailing themselves of the
right conferred on them by Articles 57 and 68 of the Statuée,
append to the Opinion of the Court the joint sta-ternentoLtheir
dissenting Opinion, to which iç attached a declarationby Vice-
President Badawi;
Judge WINIARSK Ihile voting in favour of the Opinion of the
Court, makes the following declaration :
1 regret that 1 am unable to accept the whole of the reasoning
on which the Court has based its reply. In particular 1think that
as the Opinion of 1950 was not based on the idea of the United
Nations as a successor in title of the League of Nations, the question
of a devolution of the powers of the Council of the League of
Nations to the General Assembly does not arise.1am in agreement
with the minonty opinion in considering that the whole structure
of the Opinion of 1950 was founded on the objective elements of
the situation which arose as a result of the disappearance of the
League of Nations, and that that Opinion found in the General
Assembly the organ qualified to exercise those functions which
could not be allowed to go by default.
1 also believe that the maintenance of the previously existing
situation constitutesthe dominant theme of the Opinion and that
the decisive testis to be found in what was formerly done, and 1
therefore think that any enquiry as to the extent of the powers of
the Council and of the General Assembly respectively is pointless.
The pGwers of the supervisory organ, which are determined by the
continuing obligations of the mandatory Power, are at the same
time duties, and it is quite natural that, conscious of its responsibili-
ties, the General Assembly should have put to the Court the ques-
tion relating thereto.
1 agree with the Court in considering that, though drafted in
absolute terms, the question is to be understood as relating to the
actual situation existing and 1 hesitate to reply to it as though
this situation were normal, that is to Say, as if the Mandatory
were discharging its undertakings as it did under the regime of the
League of Nations ; the raison d'êtreof the question cannot be
ignored. If then, in these circumstances, the General Assembly, in
order to secure further information, grants a hearing to a petitioner,
its decision cannot be held to be irregular. If, on the same basis, it
shoiild authonze the Committee, which is its organ, to grant a
hearing in a particular case in its stead,hould be unable to regard
such a decision, which is one for the Assembly, as conflicting with
the Opinion of 1950 ;if, in the same circumstances, it deemed it
necessary to authorize the Committee to undertake sach hearings,
that, while not in accordance with the former practice, would be
justified if warranted by imperative considerations and if kept
within reasonable limits and govemed by the rule of good faith.
Judge KOJEVNIKOV w,hile voting in favour of the Opinion of the
Court, makes the following declaration :
While accepting the operative clause of the Advisory Opinion,
1 am unable to concur in certain respects with the reasoning, in
14 M. WINIARSK u,ge, après avoir voté pour l'avis, fait la décla-
ration suivante :
Je regrette de ne pouvoir accepter dans leur ensemble les motifs
sur lesquels la Cour a fondé sa réponse. En particulier, je pense
que l'wis de 1950 n'ayant pas étébasésur l'idéede la succession
des Nations Unies à la Sociétédes Nations, la question du transfert
des pouvoirs du Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations à l'Assemblée
généralene se pose pas. Avec l'opinion de la minorité, je considère
que l'avis de 1950 a basésa construction sur les éléments objectifs
de la situation telle qu'elle s'est produite à la suite de la disparition
de la Société des Nations, et que dans l'Assembléegénérale ila
trouvé l'organe habilité à exercer les fonctions qui ne pouvaient
pas êtreabandonnées.
Je trouve aussi que le maintien de la situation antérieurement
existante constitue la thèse maîtresse cie l'avis et que c'est la
pratique qui est décisive, ce qui rend inutile la recherche de la
définition des pouvoirs du Conseil et de l'Assemblée générale
respectivement. Les pouvoirs de l'organe de surveillance, déter-
minds par les obligations continues de la Puissance mandataire
sont en mêmetemps des devoirs, et il est naturel que, consciente
de ses responsabilités, l'Assembléegénéraleait posé à la Cour la
question y relative.
D'accord avec la Cour je comprends cette question, bien que
rédigéeen termes absolus, comme s'attachant à la situation con-
crète, et j'hésitey répondrecomme sicette situation étaitnormale,
c'est-à-dire comme si le Mandataire s'acquittait de ses engagements
comme il le faisait sous le régime de la Sociétédes Nations ; la
raison d'êtrede la question ne peut êtreignorée.Or, si dans ces
conditions, aux fins d'obtenir un complément d'information,
l'Assembléegénérale accorde une audience A un pétitionnaire, sa
décision ne saurait êtretenue pour irrégulière.Si, dans le même
ordre d'idées, elleautorisait le Comité, son organe, à procéder à
sa place à une telle audience dans un cas déterminé,je ne poilmais
considérercette décision,qui est du ressort de l'Assemblée,comme
contraire à l'avis de 1950; si, toujours dans les mêmesconditions,
elle jugeait nécessaire d'autoriser le Comitéà procéder à de telles
auditions, le fait, encore que n'étant pas conforme à la pratique,
serait justifiés'ilétait déterminépar desconsidérations impérieuses,
s'il était maintenu dans des limites raisonnables et dominé par la
règle de la bonne foi.
M. KOJEVNIKO jVge, après avoir votépour l'avis, fait la décla-
ration suivante :
En acceptant le dispositif final de l'avis consultatif, je ne puis
pourtant me rallier à certains points des motifs, en particulier
14particular with that part which would attribute to the Opinion a
limited and conditional character, fLram of opinion that petitions
may be in writing or oral, or both in writing and oral, that heanngs
granted to petitioners by the Committee on South West Afnica are
consistent with the Advisory Opinion of the Court of July ~mth,
1950, and that the presentation even of oral petitions is one of the
indefeasible rights of the population of the Territory of South West
Africa, rights which accrue from the Covenant of the League oà
Nations, and still more from the Charter of the United Nations, in
conformity with which this Territory shoulà be includecl in the
Trusteeship System of the United Nations.
Judge Sir Hersch LAUTERPACHT a,ailing himself of theright
conferred on him by Articles57 and 68 of the Stalute, appnds to
the Opinion of the Court a staternent of his separate Opinion.
Vice-President BADAWIand Judges BASDEVANT ,Isw MO,
ARMAND-UGOaN nd MORENO QUINTANA a,vailing themselves of the
right conferred on them by Articles 57 and 68 of the Statuée,
append to the Opinion of the Court the joint sta-ternentoLtheir
dissenting Opinion, to which iç attached a declarationby Vice-
President Badawi;à ceux qui attribuent à cet avis un caractère restreint et condi-
tionnel, car je suis d'avis que les pétitions peuvent être écrites
ou orales ou encore écrites et orales en mêmetemps, que l'octroi
d'audiencesà des pétitionnaires par le Comitédu Sud-Ouestafricain
est conforme à l'avis consultatif de la Cour II juillet 1950 er
que la présentation mêmedespétitions orales appartient au nombre
des droits imprescriptibles de la population du temtoire du Sud-
Ouest africain, droits qui ressortent du Pacte de la Sociétédes
Nations et encore plus de la Charte des Nations Unies, confor-
mément à laquelle ce temtoire doit êtreinclus dans le système
de tutelle del'organisation des Nations Unies.
Sir Hersch LAUTERPACHT ju,ge, se prévalant du droit que lui
confèrent les article57 et 68 du Statut, jointà l'avis l'exposé
de son opinion individuelle.
MM. BADAWIV , ice-Président, BASDEVANT H,SU MO, ARMAND-
UGON et MORENO QUINTANA , ges, se prévalant du droit que leur
confèrent les articles 57 et 68 du Statut, joigàl'avis l'exposé
commun de leur opiniondissidente, auquel est annexéeune déclara-
tion deM. Badawi, Vice-Président.
(Paraphé) G. H. H.
(Paraphé) J. L. O.
Declaration by Judge Kojevnikov (as appended immediately after the advisory opinion)