SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KLAESTAD
1 have arrived at the same final conclusion as the Court ; but as
my approach to the matter is entirely different, 1 consider it my
duty to state as briefly as possible the reasons upon which 1 base
my opinion.
1. In the Resolution by which the present Request for an Advi-
sory Opinion was adopted, the General Assembly of the United
Nations referred to a statement made by the Court in giving the
reasons on which its Advisory Opinion of July t th, 1950, was
based-a statement which, for the purpose of answering the Question
now put to the Court, calls for a brief comment. Afterhaving expres-
sed the view that South-West Africa was still to be considered as a
territory under the Mandate of December 17th, 1920, and that the
Union of South Africa was under an obligation to submit to the
supervision and control of the General Assembly, the Court stated :
"The degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assem-
bly should not therefore exceed that which applied under the Man-
dates System,and should conform as far as possibleto the procedure
followed in this respect by the Council of the League of Nations.
These observationsare particularly applicable to annual reports and
petitions."
This statement was made by the Court in connection with its
consideration of the international obligations which the Union of
South Africa had assumed under the Mandate and which the Union,
in the opinion of the Court, continued to have. The General Assem-
bly had, in its Request for an Opinion, asked :
"Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international
obligationsunder the Mandate forSouth-West Africaand, ifso,what
are those obligation?"
The above-mentioned statement is to be found in the part of the
Opinion in which the Court examined this Question relating to the
obligations under the Mandate, and when the Court said that the
"degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly"
should not exceed that which applied under the Mandates System,
it was dealing with and refemng to the international obligations
which the Union of South Africa continued to have, including the
obligation to submit to international supervision. As appears from
the context, the Court was thereby giving expression to the view
that the Union of South Africa should not, as a consequence of a
supervision exercised by the General Assembly, be subjected to
other or more onerous legal obligations than the Union had under
the supervision previously exercised by the League of Nations.
21 85 ADVIS. OPIN. OF 7 VI55 (SEP. OPIN. JUDGE KLAESTAD)
Having due regard to the discussions in the United Nations which
preceded the present Request for an Advisory Opinion, including
the view expressed by the Union of South Africa, 1 consider that
the task of the Court now is to determine whether decisions of the
General Assembly on questionsrelating to reports and petitions con-
ceming the Temtory of South-West Africa would, by the operation
of the voting procedure indicated in the Request, subject the Union
of South Africa to other or more onerous legal obligations than the
Union had previously under the supervision ofthe LeagueofNations.
On the solution of this qiiestion depends, in my opinion, the answer
to be given to the present Request.
The determination of this generalquestionnecessitates a previous
examination of two particular questions relating to
(a) the voting procedure in the competent organ of the League of
Nations and in the General Assembly of the United Nations ;
(b) the legal effect of decisions taken by the competent organ of
the League and by the General Assembly, when applying
their respective voting procedures.
II. In accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations, the supervision of mandated temtories was to be
exercised by the Council. The Permanent Mandates Commission
was to advise the Council on al1matters relating to the observance
of the mandates. The Assembly had, under Article 3, a general
competence to deal with any matter within the sphere of action
of the League.
The competence to take decisions with regard to reports and
petitions relating to mandated temtories was conferred upon the
Council. In accordance with Article 5 of the Covenant, these
decisions required the agreement of all the Members of the Concil
represented at the meeting, except in matters of procedure which
were decided by a majority. Article 4 prescnbed that a Member of
the League, not represented in the Council, should be invited to
send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the
Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the
interests of that Member. Each Member had one vote, including
the Member invited to send a representative. By virtue of these
des, the Union of South Africa was entitled to be represented
with voting power, when the Council considered matters relating
to the Mandated Temtory of South-West Africa, and it could, in
its capacity as a Member of the League, prevent the adoption
of a decision by voting against it.
It has been argued that the rule requiring the agreement of all
Members represented at the meeting was subject to an important
exception as a consequence of the view expressed by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in its Advisory Opinion of Novem-
ber ~zth, 1925, concerning the frontier between Iraq and Turkey.
It is said that, as a consequence of that Opinion, the vote of a Man-
22datory Power should not be taken into account in ascertaining
whether there was unanimity, when a question relating to the Man-
date of that Power was considered.
The principle enunciated in that Advisory Opinion, namely,
that "no one can be judge in his own suit", was found to be appli-
cable in view of the special competence which was conferred upon
the Council of the League by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923-
a competence of a judicial character to give a definitive and binding
decision in a particular dispute between two States with regard
to the final determination of a frontier. As far ashave been able
to ascertain, this principle wasnever extended by the Council to
comprise decisions taken by the Council in the course of its super-
vision of .the administration of mandated tenitories.1 am not
aware of a single instance in which a resolution concerning reports
or petitions was adopted by the Council against the vote of the
Mandatory Power.
Article5of the Covenant, which lays down the rule of unanimity,
makes-apart from matters of procedure-no other exceptions
than those "expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terrns
of the present Treaty". As no such exception was expressly made
for matters concerning Mandates, and as the practice of the Council
does not disclose any such exception showing that a decision on
reports or petitions was ever taken against the negative vote of
a Mandatory Power, it is difficult not to conclude that decisions
relating to reports and petitions were governed by the general
rule of Article5. It is not for the Court to coinsider whether the
Council would have been justified inmodifying the rule of absolute
unanimity in matters of Mandates in view of the Advisory Opinion
of 1925 or of considerations of reasonableness or general principles
of law.
When the Court delivered its Advisory Opinion of 1950 t was
not unaware of the fact that the Charter of the United Nations
had rejected the principle of unanimity, and when the Court
expressed the view that the supervisory functions with regard
to the Temtory of South-West Africa, previously exercised by
the Council of the League, were henceforth to be exercised by the
General Assembly of the United Nations by virtue of Article 10
of the Charter, it was implicitly referring to that body with the
organization and functions conferred upon it by the provisions of
the Charter, including the provisions of Article 18.
In accordance with Article 18,decisions of the General Assembly
on "important questions" shall be made by a two-thirds majonty
of the members present and voting. Decisions on other questions
shali be made by a simple majonty of the members present and
voting.In virtue of the competence conferred uponit by Article18,
5 3,the General Assembly, by Resolution 844 (IX) of October co th,
1954, adopted a special rule on voting procedure, to the effect
2387 ADVIS. OPIN. OF 7 VI55 (SEP. OPIN. JUDGE KLAESTAD)
that decisions of the General Assembly on questions relating to
reports and petitions conceming the Temtory of South-West
Africa should be regarded as important questions within the mean-
ing of Article 18, $ 2,of the Charter.
It is this difference between the voting procedure in the Council
of the League of Nations andin the General Assembly of the United
Nations which has given rise to the question now before the Court,
namely, whether the Union of South Africa, by the operation of
this rule as to a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly,
would be subjected to other or more onerous legal obligations than
it had previously under the rule of unanimity of the Council of the
League. In order to answer this question it becomeç necessary to
consider .the legal effect of decisions taken by the Council of the
League and by the General Assembly with regard to reports and
petitions conceming the Temtory of South-West Afnca.
III. As mentioned above, the Council of the League of Nations
was governed. by the rule of unanimity when voting on matters
relating to Mandates. When the Union of South Africa, by a concur-
rent vote in the Council, gave an expression of its acceptance of a
Resolution concerning reports or petitions relating to the Temtory
ofiSouth-West Africa, the Union Government became, by reason
of that acceptance, legally bound to comply with the Resolution.
This view finds support in the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent
Court of International Justice of October 15th, 1931, concerning
railway traffic between Lithuania and Po1and:The Court expressed
the view that the Governments of Lithuania and Poland, bypartici-
pating in the adoption of a Resolution of the Council of the
League, became bound by their acceptance of the Resolution.
As to the legal significance of decisions taken by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on questions of reports and peti-
tions, the following considerations appear to be relevant :
In its Advisory Opinion of 1950the Court stated that the compe-
tence of the General Assembly to exercise supe~sory functions
with regard to a mandated temtory and to receive and examine
reports is derived from the provisions of ArticleIO of the Charter,
which authorizes the General Assembly to discuss any questions
within the scope of the Charter and to make recommendations on
these questions to the Members of the United Nations. Such recom-
mendations relating to reports and petitions conceming the Tem-
tory of South-West Africa shall, asalready mentioned, in accord-
ance with the General Assembly's Resolution 844 (IX) of October
rrth, 1954, be regarded as important questions within the meaning
of Article18, $ 2, of the Charter and therefore be made by a two-
thirds majority of the Members present and voting.
Article 18 does not make any distinction between "decisions"
and "recommendations". It refers to "decisions" as including
"recommendations". These decisions of the General Assembly on "important questions" are of different categories. Some are deci-
sions with a final and binding effect, such as, for instance, the
election of members of the various organs of the United Nations or
decisions approving the budget of the Organization by virtue of
Article 17.Some other decisions are recommendations in the ordi-
nary sense of that term, having no binding force. Recommendations
adopted by virtue of Article IO concerning reports and petitions
relating to the Territory of South-West Africa belong in my opinion
to the last-mentioned category. They are not legally binding on
the Cnion of South Afnca in its capacity as Mandatory Power.
Only if the Union Government by a concurrent vote has given its
consent to the recommendation can that Government become
legally bound to comply with it. In that respect the legal situation
is the same as it was under the supervision of the League. Only a
concurrent vote can create a binding legal obligation for the Union
of South Africa.
It is true that against a negative vote of the Union Government
no decision could be reached in the League, while a decision in the
Cnited Nations can be made by a two-thirds majority of the General
Assembly without the concurrent vote of that Government. But
such a decision (recommendâtion) adopted by the General Assembly
without the concurrent vote of the Union Government does not
create a binding legal obligation for that Government. Its effects
are, in my view, net of a legal nature in the usual sense, but rather
of a moral or political character. This does not, however, mean that
such a recommendation is without real significance and importance,
and that the Union Government can simply disregard it. As a
Member of the United Nations, the Union of South Africa is in duty
bound to consider in good faith a recommendation adopted by the
General Assembly under Article IO of the Charter andto inform the
General Assembly with regard to the attitude which it has decided
to take in respect of the matter referred to in the recommendation.
But a duty of such a nature, however real and serious it may be,
can hardly be considered as involving a true legal obligation, and it
does not in any case involve a binding legal obligation to comply
with the recommendation.
IV. As far as the binding force of a decision is concerned, there
is thus no difference between the rules on voting procedure in the
Council of the League and in the General Assembly of the United
Nations. In order to become legally bound to comply with a decinon,
the Union Government must, in the League as well as in the United
Nations, have consented to the decision by a concurrent vote. By
the operation of the rules on voting procedure in the General Assem-
bly, the Union Government cannot therefore become subjected,
against its will,to other or more onerous legal obligations than it
had under the supervision of the League.
25 This view-that a concurrent vote of the Union is necessary for
the extension of itsgbligations under the Mandate-is confirmed by
a consideratron of another nature, deduced from the Advisory
Opinion of 1950.In reply to the last Question putto it in the Request
for that Opinion, the Courf expressed the view :
"that the Union of South Afnca acting alone has not the compe-
tence to modify the international status of the Temtory of South-
West Afnca, and that the competenceto determine and modify the
international status of the Temtory rests with the Union of South
Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations".
In the reasons given in support of this answer, the Court stated :
"The international status of the Temtory results from the inter-
national rules regulating the rights, powersand obligationsrelating
to the administration of the Temtory and the supervision of that
administration, as embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant and in
the Mandate."
The international status of the Tenitory is thus determined, inter
alia, by the provisions of the Mandate which lay down, in Arti-
cles 3-6, the particular obligations of the Union of South Africa as
the Mandatory Power, such as obligations with regard to slave trade,
forcgd labour, traffic in arms and ammunition, intoxicating spirits
and beverages, military training and establishments, as well as
obligations relating to freedom of conscience and free exercise of
worship, including special obligations with regard to missionaries,
andthe obligation to make an annual report containing full inform-
ation with regard to the Temtory.
An extension of any of these obligations relating to the adminis-
tration of the Temtory and the supervision of that administration
would affect the international status of the Temtory and would
consequently, in accordance with the previous Advisory Opinion,
necessitate an agreement between the Union of South Africa and
the General Assembly. Such an extension would not be legally
binding upon the Union unless its consent has been given.
For these reasons 1am of opinion that an application of the de
on the voting procedure indicated in thè Request does not conflict
with the previous Advisory Opinion and may be considered as
corresponding to a correct interpretation of that Opinion.
(Signed) Helge KLAESTAD.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KLAESTAD
1 have arrived at the same final conclusion as the Court ; but as
my approach to the matter is entirely different, 1 consider it my
duty to state as briefly as possible the reasons upon which 1 base
my opinion.
1. In the Resolution by which the present Request for an Advi-
sory Opinion was adopted, the General Assembly of the United
Nations referred to a statement made by the Court in giving the
reasons on which its Advisory Opinion of July t th, 1950, was
based-a statement which, for the purpose of answering the Question
now put to the Court, calls for a brief comment. Afterhaving expres-
sed the view that South-West Africa was still to be considered as a
territory under the Mandate of December 17th, 1920, and that the
Union of South Africa was under an obligation to submit to the
supervision and control of the General Assembly, the Court stated :
"The degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assem-
bly should not therefore exceed that which applied under the Man-
dates System,and should conform as far as possibleto the procedure
followed in this respect by the Council of the League of Nations.
These observationsare particularly applicable to annual reports and
petitions."
This statement was made by the Court in connection with its
consideration of the international obligations which the Union of
South Africa had assumed under the Mandate and which the Union,
in the opinion of the Court, continued to have. The General Assem-
bly had, in its Request for an Opinion, asked :
"Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international
obligationsunder the Mandate forSouth-West Africaand, ifso,what
are those obligation?"
The above-mentioned statement is to be found in the part of the
Opinion in which the Court examined this Question relating to the
obligations under the Mandate, and when the Court said that the
"degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly"
should not exceed that which applied under the Mandates System,
it was dealing with and refemng to the international obligations
which the Union of South Africa continued to have, including the
obligation to submit to international supervision. As appears from
the context, the Court was thereby giving expression to the view
that the Union of South Africa should not, as a consequence of a
supervision exercised by the General Assembly, be subjected to
other or more onerous legal obligations than the Union had under
the supervision previously exercised by the League of Nations.
21 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. KLAESTAD
[Traduction]
Je suis arrivé aux mêmes conclusions finales que la Cour ; mais,
comme j'aborde la matière tout autrement, j'estime devoir exposer
aussi brièvement que possible les motifs sur lesquels je fonde mon
opinion.
1. Dans la résolution par laquelle elle a adopté la présente
demande d'avis, l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies s'est
référée à une phrase figurant dans les motifs de l'avis de la Cour
du II juillet 1950 ; pour répondre à la question dont la Cour est
actuellement saisie, il est nécessairede commenter brièvement cette
phrase. Après avoir exprimé l'opinion que le Sud-Ouest africain
doit toujours êtreconsidéré commeun territoire tenu en vertu du
Mandat du 17 décembre 1920 et que l'union sud-africaine se trouve
dans l'obligation de se prêter à la surveillance et au contrôle de
l'Assemblée générale,la Cour a déclaré :
«Le degréde surveillance à exercérpar l'Assembléegénéralene
saurait donc dépassercelui qui a étéappliquésous le Régimedes
mandats et devrait être conforme,autant que possible, à la procé-
dure suivie en la matière par le Conseilde la Sociétédes Nations.
Ces observations s'appliquent en particulier aux rapports annuels
et aux pétitions.))
La Cour a employé cette phrase à propos de l'examen des obliga-
tions internationales que l'Union sud-africaine avait assumées en
vertu du Mandat, obligations qui, dans l'opinion de la Cour,
subsistent toujours. Dans sa demande d'avis, l'Assembléegénérale
posait la question :
cL'Union sud-africaine a-t-elle encore des obligations inter-
nationales en vertu du Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain et, si
c'est le cas, quelles sont-ell?))
La phrase précitéese trouve dans la partie de l'avis consacrée
par la Cour à l'examen de la question relative aux obligations
découlant du Mandat, et lorsque la Cour a dit que le ((degré de
surveillance à exercer par l'Assembléegénérale »ne saurait dépasser
celui qui était appliqué sous le Régime des Mandats, elle traitait
des obligations internationales qui continuent à incomber à l'Union
sud-africaine, y compris celle de se prêterà une surveillance inter-
nationale, et elle se référaità ces obligations internationales. Ainsi
qu'il ressort du contexte, la Cour exprimait par là l'opinion que
l'Union sud-africaine ne devait pas, par suite de la surveillance
exercée par l'Assemblée générale,être soumise à des obligations
juridiques autres ou plus lourdes que celles qu'elle avait sous la
surveiilance précédemment exercée par la Sociétédes Nations.
21 85 ADVIS. OPIN. OF 7 VI55 (SEP. OPIN. JUDGE KLAESTAD)
Having due regard to the discussions in the United Nations which
preceded the present Request for an Advisory Opinion, including
the view expressed by the Union of South Africa, 1 consider that
the task of the Court now is to determine whether decisions of the
General Assembly on questionsrelating to reports and petitions con-
ceming the Temtory of South-West Africa would, by the operation
of the voting procedure indicated in the Request, subject the Union
of South Africa to other or more onerous legal obligations than the
Union had previously under the supervision ofthe LeagueofNations.
On the solution of this qiiestion depends, in my opinion, the answer
to be given to the present Request.
The determination of this generalquestionnecessitates a previous
examination of two particular questions relating to
(a) the voting procedure in the competent organ of the League of
Nations and in the General Assembly of the United Nations ;
(b) the legal effect of decisions taken by the competent organ of
the League and by the General Assembly, when applying
their respective voting procedures.
II. In accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations, the supervision of mandated temtories was to be
exercised by the Council. The Permanent Mandates Commission
was to advise the Council on al1matters relating to the observance
of the mandates. The Assembly had, under Article 3, a general
competence to deal with any matter within the sphere of action
of the League.
The competence to take decisions with regard to reports and
petitions relating to mandated temtories was conferred upon the
Council. In accordance with Article 5 of the Covenant, these
decisions required the agreement of all the Members of the Concil
represented at the meeting, except in matters of procedure which
were decided by a majority. Article 4 prescnbed that a Member of
the League, not represented in the Council, should be invited to
send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the
Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the
interests of that Member. Each Member had one vote, including
the Member invited to send a representative. By virtue of these
des, the Union of South Africa was entitled to be represented
with voting power, when the Council considered matters relating
to the Mandated Temtory of South-West Africa, and it could, in
its capacity as a Member of the League, prevent the adoption
of a decision by voting against it.
It has been argued that the rule requiring the agreement of all
Members represented at the meeting was subject to an important
exception as a consequence of the view expressed by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in its Advisory Opinion of Novem-
ber ~zth, 1925, concerning the frontier between Iraq and Turkey.
It is said that, as a consequence of that Opinion, the vote of a Man-
22 Prenant dûment en considération les débats qui, aux Nations
Unies, ont précédéla présente demande d'avis,y compris l'opinion
expriméepar l'Union sud-africaine, j'estime que la tâche actuelle
de la Cour est de déterminer si,par le jeu de la procédurede vote
indiquéedans la requête,les décisionsde l'Assembléegénéralesur
les questions touchant les rapports et pétitions relatifsau Territoire
du Sud-Ouest africain soumettraient l'Union sud-africaineà des
obligations juridiques autres ou plus lourdes que celles qu'elle
avait précédemment sousla surveillance exercéepar la Société des
Nations. Selon moi, la réponse à donner à la présente demande
dépend de la solution de cette question.
Pour résoudre cette question générale,il faut au préalable
examiner deux points particuliers :
a) la procédurede vote de l'organe compétent de la Société des
Nations et de l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies ;
b) l'effet juridique des décisions prisespar l'organe compétent
de la Sociétdes Nations et par l'Assembléegénéralec ,onfor-
mément à leurs procédures de vote respectives.
II. En vertu de l'articl22 du Pacte de la Sociétédes Nations,
la surveillance destemtoires sous mandat devait êtreexercéepar
le Conseil. La Commissionpermanente des Mandats était chargée
l'exécution desmandats. Aux termes de l'articleons3,el'Assemblée
avait compétence générale pour connaître de toute question
rentrant dans la sphère d'activitéde la Sociétédes Nations.
La compétencepour prendre des décisionsrelatives aux rapports
et pétitions concernant les temtoires sous mandat était conférée
au Conseil.Aux termes del'article 5du Pacte, cesdécisionsdevaient
êtreprises à l'unanimitédes membres du Conseil représentés àla
réunion,sauf pour les questions de procédurequi étaient régléesà
la majorité. L'article4 stipulait que tout Membre de la Sociéqui
n'était pas représentéau Conseil devait êtreinvité à y envoyer
siégerun représentant lorsqu'une question qui l'intéressait parti-
culièrement était portée devant le Conseil. Chaque Membre, y
compris celui qui était invitA envoyer un représentant, disposait
d'unevoix. En vertu de cesdispositions,lorsquele Conseilexaminait
des questions se rapportant au Temtoire sous Mandat du Sud-
Ouest africain, l'Union sud-africaine était fondéà se faire repré-
senter avec droit de vote et, en sa qualité deMembrede la Société.
elle pouvait, par un vote négatif, empêcherl'adoption d'une
décision.
Il a étéallégué qu'en conséquencede l'opinion expriméepar
la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans son avis du
12 novembre 1925,au sujet de la frontièreentre l'Irak et la Turquie,
la règle exigeant l'accord de tous les membres représentés à la
réunioncomportait une exception importante. L'on a dit que, par
suite de cet avis, le vote d'une Puissance mandataire ne devait pasdatory Power should not be taken into account in ascertaining
whether there was unanimity, when a question relating to the Man-
date of that Power was considered.
The principle enunciated in that Advisory Opinion, namely,
that "no one can be judge in his own suit", was found to be appli-
cable in view of the special competence which was conferred upon
the Council of the League by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923-
a competence of a judicial character to give a definitive and binding
decision in a particular dispute between two States with regard
to the final determination of a frontier. As far ashave been able
to ascertain, this principle wasnever extended by the Council to
comprise decisions taken by the Council in the course of its super-
vision of .the administration of mandated tenitories.1 am not
aware of a single instance in which a resolution concerning reports
or petitions was adopted by the Council against the vote of the
Mandatory Power.
Article5of the Covenant, which lays down the rule of unanimity,
makes-apart from matters of procedure-no other exceptions
than those "expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terrns
of the present Treaty". As no such exception was expressly made
for matters concerning Mandates, and as the practice of the Council
does not disclose any such exception showing that a decision on
reports or petitions was ever taken against the negative vote of
a Mandatory Power, it is difficult not to conclude that decisions
relating to reports and petitions were governed by the general
rule of Article5. It is not for the Court to coinsider whether the
Council would have been justified inmodifying the rule of absolute
unanimity in matters of Mandates in view of the Advisory Opinion
of 1925 or of considerations of reasonableness or general principles
of law.
When the Court delivered its Advisory Opinion of 1950 t was
not unaware of the fact that the Charter of the United Nations
had rejected the principle of unanimity, and when the Court
expressed the view that the supervisory functions with regard
to the Temtory of South-West Africa, previously exercised by
the Council of the League, were henceforth to be exercised by the
General Assembly of the United Nations by virtue of Article 10
of the Charter, it was implicitly referring to that body with the
organization and functions conferred upon it by the provisions of
the Charter, including the provisions of Article 18.
In accordance with Article 18,decisions of the General Assembly
on "important questions" shall be made by a two-thirds majonty
of the members present and voting. Decisions on other questions
shali be made by a simple majonty of the members present and
voting.In virtue of the competence conferred uponit by Article18,
5 3,the General Assembly, by Resolution 844 (IX) of October co th,
1954, adopted a special rule on voting procedure, to the effect
23êtrecompté dans le calcul de l'unanimité lors de l'examen d'une
question relative au Mandat de cette Puissance.
Le principe énoncédans ledit avis, à savoir que «nul ne peut
êtrejuge en sa propre cause n,a étéjugé applicable eu égard à la
compétence spéciale conférée au Conseil de la Sociétépar le.traité
de Lausanne de 1923 - compétence d'ordre judiciaire aux fins de
prendre, dans un certain différend entre deux États, une décision
définitive et obligatoire concernant la détermination finale d'une
frontière. Pour autant que j'aie pu m'en assurer, le ConseiI n'a
jamais étendu ce principe aux décisions prises par lui en exerçant
sa surveillance sur l'administration des territoires sous mandat.
Je ne connais pas un seul cas où, contre le vote de la Puissance
mandataire, le Conseil aurait adopté une résolution concernant
des rapports ou pétitions.
L'article 5 du Pacte, qui énonce la règle de l'unanimité, ne
prévoit - abstraction faite des questions de procédure - aucune
exception, sauf pour ce qui est de toute « disposition expressément
contraire du présent Pacte ou des clauses du présent traité ».
Comme aucune exception n'a étéexpressément prévue au sujet
des questions relatives aux Mandats et comme la pratique du
Conseil ne révèleaucune exception indiquant qu'une décision sur
les rapports ou pétitions ait jamais étéprise nonobstant le vote
négatif de la Puissance mandataire, il est difficile de ne pas en
conclure que les décisions sur les rapports et pétitions étaient
régies par la règle générale énoncée à l'article 5. Il n'appartient
pas à la Cour d'examiner si le Conseil aurait étéfondé à modifier
la règle de l'unanimité absolue en matière de Mandats, eu égard
soit à l'avis consultatif de 1925, soità des considérations tirées de
ce qui serait raisonnable, soit aux principes généraux du droit.
Lorsque la Cour a émis sonavis de 1950, elle n'ignorait pas que
la Charte des Nations Unies avait rejetéle principe de l'unanimité ;
et, lorsqu'elie a exprimé l'opinion que les fonctions de surveillance
à l'égarddu Temtoire du Sud-Ouest africain, précédemment exer-
céespar le Conseil de la Société,devaient désormais êtreexercées
par I'Asemblée généraledes Nations Unies en vertu de l'article IO
de la Charte, elle visait implicitement cet organe avec l'organisation
et lesfonctions dont l'avait dotéla Charte et, entre autres, I'arti-
cle 18.
Aux termes de l'article 18, les décisionsde l'Assemblée générale
sur les «questions importantes » sont prises à la majorité des deux
tiers des membres présents et votant. Les décisions sur d'autres
questions sont prises à la majorité simple des membres présents et
votant. En vertu des pouvoirs que lui confère l'article 18, para-
graphe 3, l'Assemblée générala e adopté, par sa résolution 844 (IX)
du II octobre 199, un article spécialconcernant la procédure de
2387 ADVIS. OPIN. OF 7 VI55 (SEP. OPIN. JUDGE KLAESTAD)
that decisions of the General Assembly on questions relating to
reports and petitions conceming the Temtory of South-West
Africa should be regarded as important questions within the mean-
ing of Article 18, $ 2,of the Charter.
It is this difference between the voting procedure in the Council
of the League of Nations andin the General Assembly of the United
Nations which has given rise to the question now before the Court,
namely, whether the Union of South Africa, by the operation of
this rule as to a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly,
would be subjected to other or more onerous legal obligations than
it had previously under the rule of unanimity of the Council of the
League. In order to answer this question it becomeç necessary to
consider .the legal effect of decisions taken by the Council of the
League and by the General Assembly with regard to reports and
petitions conceming the Temtory of South-West Afnca.
III. As mentioned above, the Council of the League of Nations
was governed. by the rule of unanimity when voting on matters
relating to Mandates. When the Union of South Africa, by a concur-
rent vote in the Council, gave an expression of its acceptance of a
Resolution concerning reports or petitions relating to the Temtory
ofiSouth-West Africa, the Union Government became, by reason
of that acceptance, legally bound to comply with the Resolution.
This view finds support in the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent
Court of International Justice of October 15th, 1931, concerning
railway traffic between Lithuania and Po1and:The Court expressed
the view that the Governments of Lithuania and Poland, bypartici-
pating in the adoption of a Resolution of the Council of the
League, became bound by their acceptance of the Resolution.
As to the legal significance of decisions taken by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on questions of reports and peti-
tions, the following considerations appear to be relevant :
In its Advisory Opinion of 1950the Court stated that the compe-
tence of the General Assembly to exercise supe~sory functions
with regard to a mandated temtory and to receive and examine
reports is derived from the provisions of ArticleIO of the Charter,
which authorizes the General Assembly to discuss any questions
within the scope of the Charter and to make recommendations on
these questions to the Members of the United Nations. Such recom-
mendations relating to reports and petitions conceming the Tem-
tory of South-West Africa shall, asalready mentioned, in accord-
ance with the General Assembly's Resolution 844 (IX) of October
rrth, 1954, be regarded as important questions within the meaning
of Article18, $ 2, of the Charter and therefore be made by a two-
thirds majority of the Members present and voting.
Article 18 does not make any distinction between "decisions"
and "recommendations". It refers to "decisions" as including
"recommendations". These decisions of the General Assembly onvote, aflicle selon lequel les décisionsde l'Assembléegénéralesur
les questions touchant les rapports et pétitions relatifsau Territoire
du Sud-Ouest africain sont considéréescomme questions impor-
tantes au sens de l'article 18, paragraphe 2, de la Charte.
C'estcette différenceentre la procédure devote au Conseilde la
SociétC des Nations et à l'Assembléegénérale des Nations Unies qui
a fait surgir la question dont la Courest actuellement saisieà savoir
si, par le jeu de cette règlede la majoritédes deux tiers de 1'Assem-
bléegénérale,l'Union sud-africaineserait soumise à desobligations
juridiques autres ou plus lourdes que celles qu'elle avait précédem-
ment, sous la règle de l'unanimité du Conseil de la Sociétédes
Nations. Pour répondre à cette question, il faut examiner l'effet
juridique des décisionsprises,d'unepart, par le Conseilde la Société
et, d'autre part, par l'Assembléegénéraletouchant les rapports et
pétitions relatifs au Territoire du Sud-Ouest africain.
III. Commeon l'a dit plus haut, lorsque le Conseilde la Société
des Nations votait en matière de Mandats, il étaitrégipar la règle
de l'unanimité. Quandl'Union sud-africaine, par son vote positif
au sein du Conseil, acceptait une résolution touchant lesrapports
et pétitions relatifs au Territoire du Sud-Ouest africain, elle
étaitjuridiquement tenue de se conformer à la résolution,en raison
de cette acceptation. Cette manikre de voir trouve appui dans l'avis
émispar la Courpermanente de Justice internationale le 15 octobre
1931,enl'affairedu traficferroviaireentre la Lithuanie etla Pologne ;
la Cour'yénonceque les Gouvernementsde Lithuanie et dePologne,
ayant participé à l'adoption dela résolutiondu Conseilde la Société,
se trouvaient liéspar leur acceptation.
En ce qui concerne la portée juridique de décisions prisespar
l'Assembléegénérale des NationsUnies sur des questions touchant
des rapports et pétitions, les considérations ci-après semblent
pertinentes.
Dans son avis de 1950, la Cour a déclaré quela compétencede
l'Assembléegénérale pour exercer les fonctionsde surveillance à
l'égardd'un territoire sous mandat et pour recevoir et examiner des
rapports se déduitdes termes généraux de l'article IO de la Charte,
qui autorise l'Assembléegénérale à discuter toute question rentrant
dans le cadre de la Charte et à formuler sur ces questions des
recommandations aux Membresdes Nations U~ies.Ainsiqu'il adéjà
étédit, les recommandations touchant lesrapports et pétitions rela-
tifs au temtoire du Sud-Oirest africain sont, conformément à la
résolution 844 (IX) de l'Assembléegénérale du II octobre 1954,
considéréescomme questions importantes au sens de l'article 18,
paragraphe 2, de la Charte, et doivent dès lors êtreadoptées à la
majorité des deux tiers des Membres présents et votant.
L'article 18 ne fait aucune distinction entre ((décisions » et
(recommandations n. Il se rCfèreaux (décisions 1comme compre-
nant les (recommandations ».Les décisionsde l'Assembléegénérale
24 "important questions" are of different categories. Some are deci-
sions with a final and binding effect, such as, for instance, the
election of members of the various organs of the United Nations or
decisions approving the budget of the Organization by virtue of
Article 17.Some other decisions are recommendations in the ordi-
nary sense of that term, having no binding force. Recommendations
adopted by virtue of Article IO concerning reports and petitions
relating to the Territory of South-West Africa belong in my opinion
to the last-mentioned category. They are not legally binding on
the Cnion of South Afnca in its capacity as Mandatory Power.
Only if the Union Government by a concurrent vote has given its
consent to the recommendation can that Government become
legally bound to comply with it. In that respect the legal situation
is the same as it was under the supervision of the League. Only a
concurrent vote can create a binding legal obligation for the Union
of South Africa.
It is true that against a negative vote of the Union Government
no decision could be reached in the League, while a decision in the
Cnited Nations can be made by a two-thirds majority of the General
Assembly without the concurrent vote of that Government. But
such a decision (recommendâtion) adopted by the General Assembly
without the concurrent vote of the Union Government does not
create a binding legal obligation for that Government. Its effects
are, in my view, net of a legal nature in the usual sense, but rather
of a moral or political character. This does not, however, mean that
such a recommendation is without real significance and importance,
and that the Union Government can simply disregard it. As a
Member of the United Nations, the Union of South Africa is in duty
bound to consider in good faith a recommendation adopted by the
General Assembly under Article IO of the Charter andto inform the
General Assembly with regard to the attitude which it has decided
to take in respect of the matter referred to in the recommendation.
But a duty of such a nature, however real and serious it may be,
can hardly be considered as involving a true legal obligation, and it
does not in any case involve a binding legal obligation to comply
with the recommendation.
IV. As far as the binding force of a decision is concerned, there
is thus no difference between the rules on voting procedure in the
Council of the League and in the General Assembly of the United
Nations. In order to become legally bound to comply with a decinon,
the Union Government must, in the League as well as in the United
Nations, have consented to the decision by a concurrent vote. By
the operation of the rules on voting procedure in the General Assem-
bly, the Union Government cannot therefore become subjected,
against its will,to other or more onerous legal obligations than it
had under the supervision of the League.
25 sur des ((questions importantes » sont de diverses catégories.
Certaines sont définitives et obligatoires, comme, par exemple,
l'élection des membres des divers organes des Nations Unies, ainsi
que les décisions approuvant le budget de l'organisation aux
termes de l'article 17.D'autres sont des recommandations au sens
ordinaire du terme et n'ont aucune force obligatoire. A mon avis,
les recommandations adoptées en vertu de l'article IO, touchant
les rapports et les pétitions relatifs au Territoire du Sud-Ouest
africain, appartiennent à cette dernière catégorie. Elles ne sont
pas juridiquement obligatoires pour l'Union sud-africaine en tant
que Puissance mandataire. Le Gouvernement de l'Union ne peut
être juridiquement tenu de se conformer à une recommandation
que s'il l'a acceptée par un vote positif. A cet égard, la situation
juridique est la mêmeque lorsque la surveillance était exercée par
la Sociétédes Nations. Seul un vote positif peut donner naissance
à une obligation juridique liant l'Union sud-africaine.
11eit vrai que,contre un vote négatifdu Gouvernement de l'union,
la Sociétédes Nations ne pouvait aboutir à une décision, tandis
qu'aux Nations Unies, l'Assemblée générale peut prendre une
décision à lamajorité des deux tiers sans le vote positif de ce
Gouvernement. Mais une décision (recommandation) adoptée par
l'Assemblée généralesans le vote positif du Gouvernement de
l'Union ne peut donner naissance à une obligation juridique liant
ce Gouvernement. A mon avis, ses effets sont non d'ordre juridique,
au sens habituel du terme, mais plutôt d'ordre moral ou politique.
Cela ne sienifie ce~endailt Das au'une telle recommandation soit
dépourvueude signhcation Ou d'importance réelles et que le Gou-
vernement de l'Union puisse simplement d'en pas tenir compte.
En tant que Membre des Nations Unies, l'Union sud-africaine a
le devoir d'examiner de bonne foi une recommandation adoptée
par l'Assemblée générale envertu de l'article IO de la Charte et
d'informer l'Assemblée généralede l'attitude qu'elle a decidé
d'adopter àl'égardde la question envisagéedans la recommandation.
Mais on ne saurait guère considérer qu'un devoir de cette nature,
quelque réelet sérieux qu'il soit, implique une véritable.obligation
juridique, et, en tout cas, il n'implique pas une l'obligation juri-
dique de se conformer à la recommandation.
IV. Pour ce qui est de la force obligatoire d'une décision, il n'y
a donc aucune différence entre les règles de procédure de vote du
Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations et de l'Assemblée généraledes
Nations Unies. A la Sociétédes Nations, comme aux Nations Unies,
le Gouvernement de l'Union doit, pour êtrejuridiquement tenu
d'appliquer une décision, y avoir consenti par un vote positif. Donc,
par le jeu des règles relatives la procédure de vote à l'Assemblée
générale,le Gouvernement de l'Union ne peut être soumis, contre
son gré, à des obligations juridiques autres ou plus lourdes que
celles qu'elle avait sous la surveillance de la Sociétédes Nations. This view-that a concurrent vote of the Union is necessary for
the extension of itsgbligations under the Mandate-is confirmed by
a consideratron of another nature, deduced from the Advisory
Opinion of 1950.In reply to the last Question putto it in the Request
for that Opinion, the Courf expressed the view :
"that the Union of South Afnca acting alone has not the compe-
tence to modify the international status of the Temtory of South-
West Afnca, and that the competenceto determine and modify the
international status of the Temtory rests with the Union of South
Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations".
In the reasons given in support of this answer, the Court stated :
"The international status of the Temtory results from the inter-
national rules regulating the rights, powersand obligationsrelating
to the administration of the Temtory and the supervision of that
administration, as embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant and in
the Mandate."
The international status of the Tenitory is thus determined, inter
alia, by the provisions of the Mandate which lay down, in Arti-
cles 3-6, the particular obligations of the Union of South Africa as
the Mandatory Power, such as obligations with regard to slave trade,
forcgd labour, traffic in arms and ammunition, intoxicating spirits
and beverages, military training and establishments, as well as
obligations relating to freedom of conscience and free exercise of
worship, including special obligations with regard to missionaries,
andthe obligation to make an annual report containing full inform-
ation with regard to the Temtory.
An extension of any of these obligations relating to the adminis-
tration of the Temtory and the supervision of that administration
would affect the international status of the Temtory and would
consequently, in accordance with the previous Advisory Opinion,
necessitate an agreement between the Union of South Africa and
the General Assembly. Such an extension would not be legally
binding upon the Union unless its consent has been given.
For these reasons 1am of opinion that an application of the de
on the voting procedure indicated in thè Request does not conflict
with the previous Advisory Opinion and may be considered as
corresponding to a correct interpretation of that Opinion.
(Signed) Helge KLAESTAD. AVIS CONS. DU 7VI 55 (OP. INDIV. M. KLAESTAD) 89
Cette opinion - à savoir qu'un vote positif de l'union est
nécessaire pour que soient étendues ses obligations en vertu du
Mandat - est confirméepar une considération d'une autre nature,
déduite de l'avis de 1950. Dans sa réponse à la dernière question
énoncéedans la demande d'avis, la Cour a dit :
pour modifier le statut international du Territoire du Sud-Ouest
africain, et que la compétencepourdétermineret modifiesce statut
international appartient à l'Union sud-africaine agissant avec le
consentement des Nations Unies ».
Dans l'exposé des motifs, la Cour a déclaré :
«Le statut international du Temtoire résulte des règlesinter-
nationales régissant lesdroits, pouvoirs et obligations concernant
l'administration du Temtoire et la surveillance de cette adminis-
tration, telles que ces règles sont énoncéesdans l'aiticlr22 du
Pacte et dans le Mandat. »
La statut international du Temtoire est donc déterminé,inter
alia, par les dispositions du Mandat, dont les articles 3 à 6 énoncent
les obligations particulièresde l'Union sud-africaine en tant que
Puissance mandataire, telles que ses obligations relatives à la
traite des esclaves, au travail forcé,au trafic des armements et des
munitions, des spiritueux et des boissonsalcooliques, àl'instruction
et aux établissements militaires ainsi que celles relatives à la
liberté de conscience et au libre exercice des cultes,y compris des
obligations spécialesà l'égard des missionnaires et, enfin, l'obliga-
tion de présenter un rapport annuel contenant toute information
concernant le Territoire.
Étendre l'une quelconque de ces obligations relatives à l'admi-
nistration du Temtoire ou à la surveillance de cette administration
affecterait lestatut international du Temtoire et, en conséquence,
aux termes de l'avis antérieur, exigerait un accord entre l'union
sud-africaine et l'Assemblée générale. Pareille extetision ne serait
donc pas juridiquement obligatoire pour l'Union, si elle n'y avait
donné son consentement.
Par ces motifs, je suis d'avis que l'application de la règle concer-
nant la procédure de vote, telle qu'elle est énoncéedans la requête,
n'est pas en conflit avecil'avis antérieur et qu'elle peut êtrecon-
sidérée commecorrespondant à une interprétation exacte dudit avis.
(Signé )elge KLAESTAD.
Separate Opinion of Judge Klaestad