INDIVIDUAL OPIXION BI' JCDGE B. WISIAKSKI
[Translation]
The Advisory Opinion indicates that the question submitted to
the Court concerns only awards made by the Administrative
Tribunal within the limits of its competence and that it contem-
plates awards made by the Tribunal when properly constituted.
"It is true", it is said in the Opinion, "that by this Question the
Court is requested to Say whether the General Assembly has the
right to refuse to give effect to an award 'on any grounds'. But it
is difficult to hold that the General Assembly, by inserting these
words, intended to modify the meaning which naturally follows
from the other terms of the Question and from the ...considerations
contained in its Resolution." The Court accordingly formulates
as follows the way in which it understands the Question which
the Advisory Opinion must answer : "the Court is requested to
consider the general and abstract question whether the General
Assembly is legally entitled to refuse to give effect to an award of
compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal, properly
constituted and acting within the limits of its statutory compe-
tence"; farther on in the Opinion it is added that "the previous
observations of the Court are based upon that ground".
To this formula it would, in my opinion, be necessary to add
a third element to complete it correctly : the Tribunal, properly
constituted, acting within the limits of its statutory competence and
in accordance with the rules of its procedure. The Opinion states
that "in none of these reports or relevant records is to be found any
suggestion indicating that the Tribunal, when rendering its awards
in those eleven cases, was not legally constituted", but it might
with equal reason be added :or that it disregarded any essential rule
of its procedure. In any event, 1understand the Opinion as contem-
plating awards which are not nullities, and 1 was accordingly able
to vote with the majority, for, like the majority, 1 consider that
the General Assembly has not the right to refuse to give effect
to an award where the ground on which it relies is merely an
incorrect application of the law or a mistaken finding or appraisal
of the facts.
Having thus construed the question to which the answer is given
in its operative part, the Advisory Opinion then refers to the
following hypothesis which, in my view, goes beyond the ground
upon which the obsenrations of the Court are based : "If, however,
the General Assembly, by inserting the words 'on any grounds',
intended also to refer to awards made in excess of the Tribunal's
competence or to any other defect which might vitiate an award, U.K. ADM. TRIB. (INDIV. OP. BY JUDGE WINIARSKI) 65
there would arise a problem which calls for some general obser-
vations."
1regret to be unable to associate myself with these observations :
and as they make it necessary for me to clarify my vote, 1 am com-
pelled to append to the Advisory Opinion certain considerations
which briefly summarize my point of view.
It is said in the Opinion that the problem envisaged by this
hypothesis would not raise the question of the nullity of arbitral
awards made in the ordinary course of arbitration between States,
for the present case concerns judgments pronounced by a permanent
judicial tribunal established by the General Assembly, functioning
under a special statute adopted by the General Assembly and within
the organizedlegal system of the United Nations. If this passagerefers
to a judgment vitiated by such defects asto be a nullity, 1 can see
no difference between the nullity of an arbitral award and that
of an award made by the Administrative Tribunal. An arbitral
award, which is always final and without appeal, may be vitiated
by defects which make it void ;in this event, a party to the arbitra-
tion will be justified in refusing to give effect to it. This is not by
virtue of any rule peculiar to ordinary arbitration between States ;
it is a natural and inevitable application of a general principle
existing in al1 law: not only a judgment, but any act is incapable
of producing legal effects if it is legally nul1 and void. The Adminis-
trative Tribunal, organized as it is, for important practical reasons,
is a permanent tribunal made available by the United Nations
and accepted by staff members under a contract freely entered into.
It does not and cannot constitute an exception to the general
rule. Its judgments are final and without appeal ;but this provision
of the Statute says what it says, and the Opinion quotes the State-
ment of the rapporteur of the Fifth Committee of the General
Assemblÿ when the draft Statute of the Administrative Tribunal
was under discussion. Indicating that there would be no appeal
from the decisions of the Tribunal, the rapporteur, at the meeting
on November 15th, 1946, referred to delay in "the final decision
in a case ....if there should be "appeal beyond the Administrative
Tribunal". There can be no appellate procedure in the absence
of a; express provision which must in the first place establish an
appellate tribunal. But appeal is one thing, and refusa1 to give
efiect to a judgment which is a nullity is another. The view that
it is only possible for a party to rely on the rule relating to nullities
where some procedure for this purpose is established, finds no
support in international law. Such a procedure may be established
ad hocbetween States,as it was in the Orinoco Steamship Company
case ; it was established in the case of the Administrative Tribunal
of the International Labour Organisation ; but the absence of an
organized procedure does not do away with nullities, and there is
no warrant for the idea that there can be no nullity if there is no
appropriate court to take cognizance of it. Nor is it necessary that i
the principle, in accordance with which a party is entitled to refuse
to give effect to a judgment which legally is a nullity, should be
enunciated in any express provision.
It is, however, possible that when it considered the hypothesis
which has given rise to this Individual Opinion, the Advisory
Opinion was contemplating simply an established system of review,
review in the sense of a further consideration of the case, and this
seems to be so in view of the last lines of the paragraph referred
to : "the Court is of opinion that the General Assembly itself ....
could hardly act as a judicial organ-considering the arguments of
the parties, appraising the evidence produced by them, establishing
the facts and declaring the law applicable to them". Here, the
Opinion seems to be contemplating a consideration on appeal and
perhaps in proceedings to have a decision quashed, but this is
outside the scope of the question referred to the Court by the
General Assembly, which is nui concerned with a review of this
sort but merely with a refusal to give effect to an award.
Having indicated my agreement with the opinion of the Court
on the ground defined by it, 1 can confine myself to these bnef
observations designed to indicate my disagreement with what 1
believe to be the purport of the "general observations". As they
appear to me to be outside the scope of the factors which determined
the attitude of the Court, 1 shall refrain from going into any
detailed argument on this point.
(Signed) B. WINIARSKI.
OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. B. WINIARSKI
L'avis constate que la question soumise à la Cour se réfère
seulement à des jugements rendus par le tribunal administratif
dans les limites de sa compétence et qu'elle a en vue des jugements
rendus par le tribunal régulièrement constitué. cc11 est vrai, dit
l'avis, que cette question invite la Cour à dire si l'Assemblée
générale a le droit de refuser d'exécuter un jugement pour une
raison quelconque. Mais il serait difficile de considérer que l'As-
semblée générale, eninsérant ces mots, ait voulu modifier le sens
qui découle naturellement des autres termes de la question ainsi
que des considérations contenues dans sa résolution. ))En consé-
quence, la Cour formule ainsi la question telle qu'elle l'entend
et à laquelle l'avis doit répondre :((la Cour est invitée à examiner
la question générale et abstraite de savoir si l'Assemblée générale
est fondée en droit à refuser d'exécuter un jugement accordant
indemnité, rendu par le tribunal administratif régulièrement
constitué et agissant dans les limites de sa compétence statu-
taire »; plus loin, l'avis ajoute que ccles considérations énoncées
ci-dessus par la Cour reposent sur cette base 1).
A cette formule il faudrait, à mon avis, ajouter un troisième
élément qui la compléterait utilement : tribunal régulièrement
constitué; agissant dans les limites de sa compétence et en confor-
mité avec les règles de sa procédure. Si l'avis constate que (dans
aucun de ces rapports oÜ textes pertinents on ne t;ouve de
suggestion qui donnerait à penser que le tribunal, lorsqu'il a
rendu ses jugements dans les onze affaires, n'était pas légalement
constitué )),on pourrait ajouter avec autant de raison : ou qu'il
a méconnu une règle essentielle de sa procédure. De toute façon
je comprends l'avis comme ayant en vue des jugements qui ne
sont pas entachés de nullité et par conséquent j'ai pu voter avec
la majorité, car je considère avec elle que l'Assemblée générale
n'a pas le droit de refuser d'exécuter un jugement si la raison
qu'elle invoque se réduit à une mauvaise application du droit
ou à une constatation ou appréciation erronée des faits.
Après avoir ainsi interprété la question à laquelle il donne sa
réponse dans le dispositif, l'avis formule l'hypothèse suivante
qui, à mon sens, est en dehors de la base sur laquelle reposent
les considérations de la Cour : cSi, cependant, en insérant les
mots cpour une raison quelconque » l'Assemblée générale avait
entendu se référer aussi à des jugements dépassant la c'ompétence
du tribunal ou à quelque autre vice pouvant affecter un jugement, INDIVIDUAL OPIXION BI' JCDGE B. WISIAKSKI
[Translation]
The Advisory Opinion indicates that the question submitted to
the Court concerns only awards made by the Administrative
Tribunal within the limits of its competence and that it contem-
plates awards made by the Tribunal when properly constituted.
"It is true", it is said in the Opinion, "that by this Question the
Court is requested to Say whether the General Assembly has the
right to refuse to give effect to an award 'on any grounds'. But it
is difficult to hold that the General Assembly, by inserting these
words, intended to modify the meaning which naturally follows
from the other terms of the Question and from the ...considerations
contained in its Resolution." The Court accordingly formulates
as follows the way in which it understands the Question which
the Advisory Opinion must answer : "the Court is requested to
consider the general and abstract question whether the General
Assembly is legally entitled to refuse to give effect to an award of
compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal, properly
constituted and acting within the limits of its statutory compe-
tence"; farther on in the Opinion it is added that "the previous
observations of the Court are based upon that ground".
To this formula it would, in my opinion, be necessary to add
a third element to complete it correctly : the Tribunal, properly
constituted, acting within the limits of its statutory competence and
in accordance with the rules of its procedure. The Opinion states
that "in none of these reports or relevant records is to be found any
suggestion indicating that the Tribunal, when rendering its awards
in those eleven cases, was not legally constituted", but it might
with equal reason be added :or that it disregarded any essential rule
of its procedure. In any event, 1understand the Opinion as contem-
plating awards which are not nullities, and 1 was accordingly able
to vote with the majority, for, like the majority, 1 consider that
the General Assembly has not the right to refuse to give effect
to an award where the ground on which it relies is merely an
incorrect application of the law or a mistaken finding or appraisal
of the facts.
Having thus construed the question to which the answer is given
in its operative part, the Advisory Opinion then refers to the
following hypothesis which, in my view, goes beyond the ground
upon which the obsenrations of the Court are based : "If, however,
the General Assembly, by inserting the words 'on any grounds',
intended also to refer to awards made in excess of the Tribunal's
competence or to any other defect which might vitiate an award,65 TRIE. .4DM. DES N. U. (OP. INDIV. DE M. WINIARSKI)
un problème se poserait qui appelle quelques observations géné-
rales. 1)
Je regrette de ne pas pouvoir m'associer à ces observations ;
et comme elles m'obligent à préciser mon vote, je me vois amené
à joindre à l'avis quelques considérations qui résument brièvement
mon point de vue.
L'avis dit que le problème envisagé dans cette hypothèse ne
poserait pas la question de la nullité d'une sentence arbitrale
rendue au cours d'un arbitrage U ordinaire entre Etats. car dans
le cas présent il s'agit des jugements prononcés par un tribunal
permanent établi par l'Assemblée générale,fonctionnant en vertu
d'un statut spécial adopté par l'Assemblée générale et dans le
cadre du système juridique organisé des Nations Unies. Si ce
passage vise un jugement entaché de nullité, je ne vois aucune
différence entre la nullité d'une sentence arbitrale et celle d'un
jugement rendu par le tribunal administratif. Une sentence
arbitrale, qui est toujours définitive et sans appel, peut être
entachée de nullité ; dans ce cas la partie à l'arbitrage est justifiée
dans son refus de l'exécuter. ,Ceci n'est pas une règle propre au
seul arbitrage ordinaire entre Etats ; c'est une application naturelle
et inévitable du principe général de tout droit : non seulement
un arrêt, mais aucun acte ne peut produire d'effets légaux s'il
est juridiquement nul. Le tribunal administratif, organisé comme
il l'est, pour d'importantes raisons pratiques, est un tribunal
permanent offert par les Nations Lnies et accepté par le fonction-
naire dans un contrat librement consenti. Il ne constitue pas et
ne peut pas constituer une exception à la règle générale. Ses
jugements sont définitifs et sans appel ; mais cette disposition
du statut dit ce qu'elle dit, et l'avis cite la déclaration du rap-
porteur de la Vme Commission de l'Assemblée générale lors de la
discussion du projet de statut du tribunal administratif. En
indiquant, à la séance du 15 novembre 1946, que les décisions
du tribunal seraient sans appel, le rapporteur a continué :((appeler
à une compétence supérieure des jugements du tribunal administra-
tif, ce serait retarder le règlement définitif des affaires ...». Cne
procédure d'appel n'est pas possible sans une disposition expresse
organisant avant tout une instance d'appel. Mais l'appel est une
chose, le refus d'exécuter un jugement entaché de nullité en est
une autre. L'opinion d'après laquelle il serait possible pour une
partie d'invoquer la règle de la nullité seulement dans le cas où
une procédure à cet effet serait organisée, ne trouve pas d'appui
dans le droit international. Une telle procédure peut êtreorganisée
ad hoc entre États comme dans l'affaire de l'orinoco Steamship
Company, elle a étéorganisée en ce qui concerne le tribunal
administratif de l'organisation internationale du Travail ; mais
l'absence de procédure organisée ne supprime pas la nullité; la
thèse : pas de nullité sans instance, n'est pas fondée. Il n'est
pas besoin non plus que le principe d'après lequel la partie est U.K. ADM. TRIB. (INDIV. OP. BY JUDGE WINIARSKI) 65
there would arise a problem which calls for some general obser-
vations."
1regret to be unable to associate myself with these observations :
and as they make it necessary for me to clarify my vote, 1 am com-
pelled to append to the Advisory Opinion certain considerations
which briefly summarize my point of view.
It is said in the Opinion that the problem envisaged by this
hypothesis would not raise the question of the nullity of arbitral
awards made in the ordinary course of arbitration between States,
for the present case concerns judgments pronounced by a permanent
judicial tribunal established by the General Assembly, functioning
under a special statute adopted by the General Assembly and within
the organizedlegal system of the United Nations. If this passagerefers
to a judgment vitiated by such defects asto be a nullity, 1 can see
no difference between the nullity of an arbitral award and that
of an award made by the Administrative Tribunal. An arbitral
award, which is always final and without appeal, may be vitiated
by defects which make it void ;in this event, a party to the arbitra-
tion will be justified in refusing to give effect to it. This is not by
virtue of any rule peculiar to ordinary arbitration between States ;
it is a natural and inevitable application of a general principle
existing in al1 law: not only a judgment, but any act is incapable
of producing legal effects if it is legally nul1 and void. The Adminis-
trative Tribunal, organized as it is, for important practical reasons,
is a permanent tribunal made available by the United Nations
and accepted by staff members under a contract freely entered into.
It does not and cannot constitute an exception to the general
rule. Its judgments are final and without appeal ;but this provision
of the Statute says what it says, and the Opinion quotes the State-
ment of the rapporteur of the Fifth Committee of the General
Assemblÿ when the draft Statute of the Administrative Tribunal
was under discussion. Indicating that there would be no appeal
from the decisions of the Tribunal, the rapporteur, at the meeting
on November 15th, 1946, referred to delay in "the final decision
in a case ....if there should be "appeal beyond the Administrative
Tribunal". There can be no appellate procedure in the absence
of a; express provision which must in the first place establish an
appellate tribunal. But appeal is one thing, and refusa1 to give
efiect to a judgment which is a nullity is another. The view that
it is only possible for a party to rely on the rule relating to nullities
where some procedure for this purpose is established, finds no
support in international law. Such a procedure may be established
ad hocbetween States,as it was in the Orinoco Steamship Company
case ; it was established in the case of the Administrative Tribunal
of the International Labour Organisation ; but the absence of an
organized procedure does not do away with nullities, and there is
no warrant for the idea that there can be no nullity if there is no
appropriate court to take cognizance of it. Nor is it necessary that66 TRIB. ADM. DES N. U. (OP. INDIV. DE M. TYISIARSKI)
fondée à refuser d'exécuter un jugement juridiquement nul soit
consacré par une disposition expresse.
Il' se peut cependant que l'avis, lorsqu'il examine l'hypothèse
qui a donné lieu à la présente opinion individuelle, n'ait en vue
qu'une revision organisée,revision dans le sens d'un nouvel examen
de l'affaire ainsi qu'il parait résulter des lignes finales de l'alinéa
visé dans ces observations : c(la Cour estime que l'Assemblée
généraleelle-même .... ne pourrait guère agir comme un' organe
judiciaire examinant les arguments des parties, appréciant les
preuves produites par elles, établissant les faits et disant le droit
qui s'y applique ». Ici l'avis paraît avoir en vue un examen en
appel, peut-être aussi en annulation, mais ceci est en dehors de
la question posée par l'Assemblée généraleet qui a pour objet
non pas une pareille revision mais simplement un refus d'exécuter.
Ayant accepté l'avis sur la base définie par la Cour, je peux
me limiter à ces brèves remarques pour constater un désaccord
avec ce que je crois être le sens des cobservations générales n.
Comme elles me paraissent sortir du cadre de ce qui a déterminé
l'attitude de la Cour, je m'abstiens de présenter des développe-
ments iétaillés à ce sujet.
(Signé) B. \YINIARSKI. i
the principle, in accordance with which a party is entitled to refuse
to give effect to a judgment which legally is a nullity, should be
enunciated in any express provision.
It is, however, possible that when it considered the hypothesis
which has given rise to this Individual Opinion, the Advisory
Opinion was contemplating simply an established system of review,
review in the sense of a further consideration of the case, and this
seems to be so in view of the last lines of the paragraph referred
to : "the Court is of opinion that the General Assembly itself ....
could hardly act as a judicial organ-considering the arguments of
the parties, appraising the evidence produced by them, establishing
the facts and declaring the law applicable to them". Here, the
Opinion seems to be contemplating a consideration on appeal and
perhaps in proceedings to have a decision quashed, but this is
outside the scope of the question referred to the Court by the
General Assembly, which is nui concerned with a review of this
sort but merely with a refusal to give effect to an award.
Having indicated my agreement with the opinion of the Court
on the ground defined by it, 1 can confine myself to these bnef
observations designed to indicate my disagreement with what 1
believe to be the purport of the "general observations". As they
appear to me to be outside the scope of the factors which determined
the attitude of the Court, 1 shall refrain from going into any
detailed argument on this point.
(Signed) B. WINIARSKI.
Individual Opinion by Judge B. Winiarski (translation)