Joint declaration of Judges Keith and Greenwood

Document Number
143-20100706-ORD-01-01-EN
Parent Document Number
143-20100706-ORD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

323

JOINT DECLARATION
OF JUDGES KEITH AND GREENWOOD

1. This case has its origins in atrocities and other inhumane acts com-

mitted by German armed forces and other parts of the Nazi Government
against Italian nationals, both civilian and military, between 3 September
1943, when Italy concluded an armistice with the Allied Powers, and the
unconditional surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945. The illegality of
those acts is beyond doubt and is not contested in these proceedings. The

only issue before the Court in the present phase of the proceedings is
whether the counter-claim which Italy seeks to bring is within the juris-
diction of the Court, as required by Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules
of Court. The only jurisdictional basis on which Italy might found its
case is the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,
1957, (“the European Convention”). Article 27 (a) of the European

Convention, however, excludes from the acceptance of the jurisdiction of
the Court (contained in Article 1) “disputes relating to facts and situa-
tions” prior to the entry into force of the Convention. In its Judgment in
Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany) the Court held that the test
is whether the source, or real cause, of the dispute, lies in facts or situa-
tions prior to the entry into force of the Convention (Preliminary Objec-

tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005 , p. 25, para. 44).

2. Since the European Convention entered into force between Ger-
many and Italy on 18 April 1961, the question is whether Italy has shown

that the counter-claim concerns a dispute whose source, or real cause, is
to be found in facts and situations arising after that date. The Court has
held that it has not. We agree with that conclusion and, in general, with
the reasons given by the Court. In this declaration we address two matters
which we consider strengthen that reasoning.

3. The first relates to the existence and definition of the dispute which
Italy wishes to submit in its counter-claim. According to Italy:

“[T]he source or real cause of the disputes submitted to the Court

in the present case is to be found in the reparation regime established
by the two 1961 Agreements between Germany and Italy. An addi-
tional source is constituted by events following the establishment in
2000 of the ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ Founda-
tion.” (Counter-Memorial, para. 7.4.)

17324 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE (JOINT DECL .)

Italy had earlier said this:

“To use the Court’s words in the Certain Property case, the con-
clusion of the 1961 Agreements created a ‘new situation’ between
Italy and Germany with regard to the issue of reparation. It is the

1961 Agreements — and more particularly the questions concerning
their scope, as well as the scope of the waiver clause therein con-
tained — which form the central point of the differences between
Italy and Germany on the issue of reparation. The 1961 Agreements,
and not the Peace Treaty, must therefore be regarded as constituting
the source or real cause of the disputes submitted to the Court.”

(Counter-Memorial, para. 3.18.)

4. Beyond those broad assertions, Italy does not identify what those
disputes are in terms of the jurisdiction of the Court under the European
Convention (see also para. 3.19). What are the disagreements between
Italy and Germany relating to “the interpretation” and application of the
1961 Agreements or relating to the 2000 Foundation and amounting to
“international legal disputes”? As we read in the Counter-Memorial, no

such legal disagreement or dispute is anywhere defined or demonstrated.
In Chapter II, entitled “The Facts”, Italy says that the 1961 Agreements:

“are first and foremost a confirmation that Germany recognizes it
is under an obligation to offer compensation to Italian victims of
serious violations of IHL. However, Italy considers that these
Agreements by their very provisions did not exhaust the range of
reparatory measures, but should have simply represented a first

step in a broader process of providing appropriate reparations to all
Italian victims of serious IHL violations.” (Para. 2.15.)

5. In the next section of “The Facts”, Italy contends that the 1953 and
2000 German legislation did not provide a mechanism for effective repa-
ration for a very large number of Italian victims (paras. 2.20-2.34). That
the Italian concern is with what it sees as the failure of the measures, so
far agreed with Germany and enacted by the German legislature, and of

the decisions of German Courts and authorities to provide compen-
sation for those Italian victims recurs at various points in the Counter-
Memorial (e.g., paras. 2.45, 5.58-5.65). Almost at the end of the chapter
on reparation it says this:

“The 1961 Agreements represent a ‘new situation’ whereby Ger-
many has (a) recognized the obligation towards Italian victims of
serious violations of IHL; (b) they contain some limited measures

of reparation (covering pending economic claims as well as claims by
victims of persecution on various specific grounds); but, at the same
time, (c) they left several other situations uncovered. In this respect,

18325 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE JOINT DECL .)

after a long period of uncertainty and several unfulfilled promises,
Italian victims were eventually excluded from the application of the

2000 law, on rather unconvincing arguments.” (Counter-Memorial,
para. 5.66.)

That passage immediately precedes this statement:

“The situation described above created the legal background that
prevented Italian judges from turning down reparation claims which
had been unfulfilled for too long and forced them to reject the plea
of immunity advanced by Germany.” (Para. 5.67.)

6. The failure of the Counter-Memorial to identify the international

legal disputes relating to the 1961 Agreements and subsequent German
actions is reflected by the absence from the Counter-Memorial of any
diplomatic correspondence from Italy to Germany identifying any such
disputes.
7. One further consideration remains to be mentioned in this regard.
Italy, in its Written Observations on the Preliminary Objections of Germany

regarding Italy’s counter-claim, contends that
“Germany has indeed explicitly recognized the existence of a dispute

between the Parties revolving around the meaning and the impact of
the 1961 Agreements. Germany ‘does not deny’ and on the contrary
explicitly affirms ‘that there exists in fact a certain divergence of
opinions regarding the legal connotations of the two 1961 Agree-
ments’.” (Para. 65.)

What Germany said in full was this:

“Germany does not deny that there exists in fact a certain diver-
gence of opinions regarding the legal connotation of the two 1961
Agreements. While Germany is of the view that these two instru-

ments are to be seen as a voluntary complement to the regime
ushered in by the 1947 Peace Treaty, Italy contends that the two
Agreements opened up again the issue of reparations. But the core
of the Counter-Claim is epitomized by the contention that Germany
has a continuing obligation to provide reparation for the violations of
the IHL committed by the authorities of the Nazi regime during the

time of the military occupation of Italy. Hence the real cause of the
dispute is the occurrences of 1943 to 1945. The two Settlement Treaties
as such are not in issue. Both sides agree that the conclusion of these
Treaties was a positive step forward for the improvement of the
mutual relationship between the two countries. As far as Italy’s

claims are concerned, the 1961 Agreements provide no basis, neither
factually nor legally. There is simply no dispute about the relevance
of the Treaties with regard to the Counter-Claim.” (Written Obser-

19326 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE (JOINT DECL .)

vations on the Preliminary Objections of Germany regarding Italy’s
Counter-Claim, para. 35.)

8. We do not see Germany’s statement as recognition that a dispute —

in the well-established legal sense of the term — existed regarding the
1961 Agreements. In any event, we consider these pleadings as irrelevant
to the Court’s power to “entertain a counter-claim” under Article 80 of
the Rules of the Court. They are subsequent to it; further, Germany has
not had the opportunity to respond to this latest Italian argument, since

it was set out only in the Italian response to Germany’s objections to the
counter-claim and there have been neither further written proceedings
nor oral hearings subsequent to the filing of that response.

9. We consider, therefore, that Italy has failed to establish the exist-
ence of a dispute between itself and Germany arising after 18 April 1961.
10. The second matter to which we wish to draw attention is that, even
if (contrary to what we have just stated), Italy had satisfied us that there
was a dispute between the Parties relating to the 1961 Agreements or the
German reparations legislation, we are convinced that the source or real

cause of that dispute lay in facts prior to 18 April 1961, with the result
that the jurisdiction of the Court would be excluded by the limitation in
Article 27 (a) of the European Convention.

11. As the Order records, the issue of claims by Italy and Italian
nationals arising out of the events of the Second World War was one of
the many subjects addressed by the Peace Treaty concluded in 1947
between the Allied Powers and Italy. Of particular relevance is Article 77,
paragraph 4, by which Italy agreed, on its own behalf and on behalf of all

Italian nationals to waive

“all claims against Germany and German nationals outstanding
on May 8, 1945, except those arising out of contracts and other obli-
gations entered into, and rights acquired, before September 1, 1939”.

The precise scope and effect of this clause, and, in particular, whether it

covered claims for violations of humanitarian law has been the subject of
different views and is a matter on which we do not express an opinion.
We note, however, that the issue of whether Germany should pay repa-
rations in respect of violations of international humanitarian law com-
mitted in Italy and elsewhere during the Second World War was the

subject of discussion long before 1961. It was, for example, considered in
the context of the conclusion of the London Agreement on German
External Debts, 1953.

20327 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE JOINT DECL .)

12. The two 1961 Agreements have to be seen in that context. In those
Agreements, Germany undertook to make certain payments to Italy in

respect of events which occurred during the Second World War. Article
2, paragraph 1, of the first 1961 Agreement, namely, the Treaty between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic on the Settle-
ment of Certain Property-Related, Economic and Financial Questions,
provided that

“The Italian Government declares all outstanding claims on the
part of the Italian Republic or Italian natural or legal persons

against the Federal Republic of Germany or German natural or
legal persons to be settled to the extent that they are based on rights
and circumstances which arose during the period from 1 Septem-
ber 1939 to 8 May 1945.”

Article 3 of the second 1961 Agreement, namely, the Treaty between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic concerning Com-
pensation for Italian Nationals Subjected to National-Socialist Measures

of Persecution, provided that
“[w]ithout prejudice to any rights of Italian nationals based on Ger-

man compensation legislation, the payment provided for in Article 1
shall constitute final settlement between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Italian Republic of all questions governed by the
present Treaty”.

13. Again, there is room for more than one view about the precise
scope and effect of these provisions. For present purposes, however, the
important point is that neither of the 1961 Agreements, in and of itself, is

capable of being interpreted as creating any obligation for Germany to
pay compensation to Italy or Italian nationals for violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed during the Second World War over
and above the sums expressly provided for in the two Agreements. Italy
has not suggested that Germany has not paid these sums. Instead, Italy

relies upon the two Agreements as constituting recognition on the part of
Germany that it could no longer rely upon the waiver in Article 77, para-
graph 4, of the Peace Treaty. To the extent that there may be said to be
a dispute between the Parties regarding that question, however, it is
inseparable from the régime established by the 1947 Peace Treaty and the
dealings between the two Governments which followed the adoption of

that Treaty. In particular, it is inextricably linked to an appreciation
of the scope and effect of the waiver contained in Article 77, paragraph 4,
of the 1947 Peace Treaty and the different views of the Parties thereon.

14. Nor does the adoption by Germany of legislation concerning repa-

ration for certain categories of victims of violations of humanitarian law
committed during the Second World War or the fact that, under this legis-
lation, certain Italian victims were denied compensation, constitute facts

21328 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE (JOINT DECL .)

which can be separated from the régime created by the 1947 Peace Treaty.
The German national legislation and its application by the German
courts and authorities does not in itself give rise to an obligation
under international law to compensate any categories of claimants

excluded from the scope of the legislation. Once again, its relevance is
said to lie in its effect upon the ability of Germany to rely upon the pro-
visions of the 1947 Peace Treaty and it is, therefore, inextricably bound
up with that Treaty.

15. We are therefore driven to the conclusion that the source or real
cause of any dispute which Italy seeks to bring before the Court by way
of a counter-claim is to be found in facts and situations which came into
existence long before 18 April 1961. Italy’s formulation of the counter-
claim in its Counter-Memorial effectively admits as much. In the first and

second substantive sentences of the chapter setting out the counter-claim,
Italy states:

“As permitted by Article 80 of the Court’s Rules, Italy hereby
submits a counter-claim with respect to the question of the repara-
tion owed to Italian victims of grave violations of international
humanitarian law committed by forces of the German Reich . . .

The present Chapter sets forth Italy’s counter-claim in this case.
Italy asks the Court to find that Germany has violated its obligation
of reparation owed to Italian victims of the crimes committed by
Nazi Germany during the Second World War and that, accordingly,

Germany must cease its wrongful conduct and offer effective and
appropriate reparation to these victims.” (Paras. 7.1-7.2.)

The matter could not be stated with greater clarity.

(Signed) Kenneth K EITH.

(Signed) Christopher G REENWOOD .

22

Bilingual Content

323

JOINT DECLARATION
OF JUDGES KEITH AND GREENWOOD

1. This case has its origins in atrocities and other inhumane acts com-

mitted by German armed forces and other parts of the Nazi Government
against Italian nationals, both civilian and military, between 3 September
1943, when Italy concluded an armistice with the Allied Powers, and the
unconditional surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945. The illegality of
those acts is beyond doubt and is not contested in these proceedings. The

only issue before the Court in the present phase of the proceedings is
whether the counter-claim which Italy seeks to bring is within the juris-
diction of the Court, as required by Article 80, paragraph 1, of the Rules
of Court. The only jurisdictional basis on which Italy might found its
case is the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes,
1957, (“the European Convention”). Article 27 (a) of the European

Convention, however, excludes from the acceptance of the jurisdiction of
the Court (contained in Article 1) “disputes relating to facts and situa-
tions” prior to the entry into force of the Convention. In its Judgment in
Certain Property (Liechtenstein v. Germany) the Court held that the test
is whether the source, or real cause, of the dispute, lies in facts or situa-
tions prior to the entry into force of the Convention (Preliminary Objec-

tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005 , p. 25, para. 44).

2. Since the European Convention entered into force between Ger-
many and Italy on 18 April 1961, the question is whether Italy has shown

that the counter-claim concerns a dispute whose source, or real cause, is
to be found in facts and situations arising after that date. The Court has
held that it has not. We agree with that conclusion and, in general, with
the reasons given by the Court. In this declaration we address two matters
which we consider strengthen that reasoning.

3. The first relates to the existence and definition of the dispute which
Italy wishes to submit in its counter-claim. According to Italy:

“[T]he source or real cause of the disputes submitted to the Court

in the present case is to be found in the reparation regime established
by the two 1961 Agreements between Germany and Italy. An addi-
tional source is constituted by events following the establishment in
2000 of the ‘Remembrance, Responsibility and Future’ Founda-
tion.” (Counter-Memorial, para. 7.4.)

17 323

DÉCLARATION COMMUNE
DE MM. LES JUGES KEITH ET GREENWOOD

[Traduction]

1. La présente affaire trouve son origine dans les atrocités et autres

actes inhumains perpétrés par les forces allemandes et d’autres services
du gouvernement nazi à l’encontre de ressortissants italiens, civils et mili-
taires, entre le 3 septembre 1943, date à laquelle l’Italie a signé un armis-
tice avec les puissances alliées, et le 8 mai 1945, date de la capitulation
inconditionnelle de l’Allemagne. Le caractère illicite de ces actes est indé-

niable et n’est pas contesté en l’espèce. La seule question qui se pose
devant la Cour au stade actuel de la procédure est de savoir si la demande
reconventionnelle présentée par l’Italie relève de sa compétence, comme
l’exige le paragraphe 1 de l’article 80 de son Règlement. Le seul titre
de compétence sur lequel l’Italie puisse fonder sa demande est la conven-
tion européenne de 1957 pour le règlement pacifique des différends (ci-

après la «convention européenne»). Or, l’alinéa a) de l’article 27 de
celle-ci exclut de la compétence de la Cour (prévue à l’article premier)
les «différends concernant des faits ou situations» antérieurs à son
entrée en vigueur. Dans son arrêt relatif à Certains biens (Liechten-
stein c. Allemagne), la Cour a jugé que le critère tenait à la question
de savoir si les faits ou situations générateurs du différend, ceux qui

en sont réellement la cause, étaient antérieurs à l’entrée en vigueur de
la convention ( exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2005 ,
p. 25, par. 44).
2. La convention européenne étant entrée en vigueur le 18 avril 1961
entre l’Allemagne et l’Italie, la question qui se pose est de savoir si l’Italie

a établi que la demande reconventionnelle concerne un différend dont la
source ou la cause réelle réside dans des faits et situations postérieurs à
cette date. La Cour a jugé que tel n’était pas le cas. Nous souscrivons à
cette conclusion et, d’une manière générale, au raisonnement de la Cour.
Dans la présente déclaration, nous allons examiner deux questions qui, à
notre avis, viennent à l’appui de ce raisonnement.

3. La première concerne l’existence et la définition du différend que
l’Italie entend soumettre dans sa demande reconventionnelle. D’après
l’Italie:

«C’est ... le régime de réparation institué par les deux accords

conclus entre l’Allemagne et l’Italie en 1961 qui est la source ou la
cause réelle des différends portés devant la Cour en la présente
espèce. S’y ajoutent les événements ayant suivi la création, en 2000,
de la Fondation «Mémoire, responsabilité et avenir ».» (Contre-
mémoire, par. 7.4.)

17324 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE (JOINT DECL .)

Italy had earlier said this:

“To use the Court’s words in the Certain Property case, the con-
clusion of the 1961 Agreements created a ‘new situation’ between
Italy and Germany with regard to the issue of reparation. It is the

1961 Agreements — and more particularly the questions concerning
their scope, as well as the scope of the waiver clause therein con-
tained — which form the central point of the differences between
Italy and Germany on the issue of reparation. The 1961 Agreements,
and not the Peace Treaty, must therefore be regarded as constituting
the source or real cause of the disputes submitted to the Court.”

(Counter-Memorial, para. 3.18.)

4. Beyond those broad assertions, Italy does not identify what those
disputes are in terms of the jurisdiction of the Court under the European
Convention (see also para. 3.19). What are the disagreements between
Italy and Germany relating to “the interpretation” and application of the
1961 Agreements or relating to the 2000 Foundation and amounting to
“international legal disputes”? As we read in the Counter-Memorial, no

such legal disagreement or dispute is anywhere defined or demonstrated.
In Chapter II, entitled “The Facts”, Italy says that the 1961 Agreements:

“are first and foremost a confirmation that Germany recognizes it
is under an obligation to offer compensation to Italian victims of
serious violations of IHL. However, Italy considers that these
Agreements by their very provisions did not exhaust the range of
reparatory measures, but should have simply represented a first

step in a broader process of providing appropriate reparations to all
Italian victims of serious IHL violations.” (Para. 2.15.)

5. In the next section of “The Facts”, Italy contends that the 1953 and
2000 German legislation did not provide a mechanism for effective repa-
ration for a very large number of Italian victims (paras. 2.20-2.34). That
the Italian concern is with what it sees as the failure of the measures, so
far agreed with Germany and enacted by the German legislature, and of

the decisions of German Courts and authorities to provide compen-
sation for those Italian victims recurs at various points in the Counter-
Memorial (e.g., paras. 2.45, 5.58-5.65). Almost at the end of the chapter
on reparation it says this:

“The 1961 Agreements represent a ‘new situation’ whereby Ger-
many has (a) recognized the obligation towards Italian victims of
serious violations of IHL; (b) they contain some limited measures

of reparation (covering pending economic claims as well as claims by
victims of persecution on various specific grounds); but, at the same
time, (c) they left several other situations uncovered. In this respect,

18 IMMUNITÉS JURIDICTIONNELLES DE L ÉTAT (DÉCL .COMMUNE ) 324

L’Italie avait écrit auparavant:

«Pour reprendre les propos de la Cour dans l’affaire concernant
Certains biens, la conclusion des accords de 1961 avait créé une

«situation nouvelle» entre l’Italie et l’Allemagne au sujet de la ques-
tion de la réparation. Ce sont les accords de 1961 et, plus particuliè-
rement, les questions concernant leur portée, ainsi que la portée de la
clause de renonciation figurant dans ces accords, qui se trouvent au
centre des divergences entre l’Italie et l’Allemagne sur la question de

la réparation. Ce sont donc les accords de 1961, et non pas le traité
de paix, qui doivent être considérés comme étant l’origine ou la
cause réelle des différends portés devant la Cour.» (Contre-mémoire,
par. 3.18.)

4. En dehors de ces affirmations générales, l’Italie n’indique pas quels
sont les différends relevant ainsi de la compétence de la Cour en vertu de
la convention européenne (voir également par. 3.19). Quelles sont les
divergences opposant l’Italie et l’Allemagne au sujet de «l’interprétation»

et de l’application des accords de 1961 ou de la Fondation de 2000 qui
constitueraient des «différends juridiques internationaux»? Nulle part
dans le contre-mémoire une telle divergence ou un tel différend juridique
n’est défini ou démontré. Au chapitre II, intitulé «Les faits», l’Italie
déclare que les accords de 1961:

«constituent en premier lieu une confirmation du fait que l’Alle-
magne reconnaît être tenue de l’obligation d’offrir une indemnisation

aux victimes italiennes de violations graves du DIH. Néanmoins,
l’Italie estime qu’il ressort de leurs dispositions mêmes que ces
accords n’ont pas épuisé les mesures d’indemnisation possibles, mais
ont simplement représenté une première étape d’un processus plus
large visant à offrir une réparation appropriée à toutes les victimes

italiennes de violations graves du DIH.» (Par. 2.15.)
5. Dans la section suivante du chapitre consacré aux faits, l’Italie sou-
tient que les lois allemandes de 1953 et de 2000 n’ont pas institué de

mécanisme assurant une réparation effective à un très grand nombre de
victimes italiennes (par. 2.20 à 2.34). Il ressort de plusieurs passages
du contre-mémoire (par exemple, par. 2.45 et 5.58 à 5.65) que l’Italie
s’inquiète de ce que les mesures convenues jusqu’à présent avec l’Alle-
magne et mises en Œuvre par le législateur allemand, ainsi que les décisions

des juridictions et des autorités allemandes, n’ont pas réparé le préjudice
subi par ces victimes italiennes. Vers la fin du chapitre concernant la
réparation, elle déclare:

«Les accords de 1961 constituent une «situation nouvelle» en
vertu de laquelle a) l’Allemagne a reconnu son obligation envers les
victimes italiennes de violations graves du DIH; b) les accords pré-
voient certaines mesures de réparation limitées (concernant les récla-

mations pendantes de nature économique ainsi que les réclamations
émanant des victimes de la persécution pour plusieurs causes parti-

18325 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE JOINT DECL .)

after a long period of uncertainty and several unfulfilled promises,
Italian victims were eventually excluded from the application of the

2000 law, on rather unconvincing arguments.” (Counter-Memorial,
para. 5.66.)

That passage immediately precedes this statement:

“The situation described above created the legal background that
prevented Italian judges from turning down reparation claims which
had been unfulfilled for too long and forced them to reject the plea
of immunity advanced by Germany.” (Para. 5.67.)

6. The failure of the Counter-Memorial to identify the international

legal disputes relating to the 1961 Agreements and subsequent German
actions is reflected by the absence from the Counter-Memorial of any
diplomatic correspondence from Italy to Germany identifying any such
disputes.
7. One further consideration remains to be mentioned in this regard.
Italy, in its Written Observations on the Preliminary Objections of Germany

regarding Italy’s counter-claim, contends that
“Germany has indeed explicitly recognized the existence of a dispute

between the Parties revolving around the meaning and the impact of
the 1961 Agreements. Germany ‘does not deny’ and on the contrary
explicitly affirms ‘that there exists in fact a certain divergence of
opinions regarding the legal connotations of the two 1961 Agree-
ments’.” (Para. 65.)

What Germany said in full was this:

“Germany does not deny that there exists in fact a certain diver-
gence of opinions regarding the legal connotation of the two 1961
Agreements. While Germany is of the view that these two instru-

ments are to be seen as a voluntary complement to the regime
ushered in by the 1947 Peace Treaty, Italy contends that the two
Agreements opened up again the issue of reparations. But the core
of the Counter-Claim is epitomized by the contention that Germany
has a continuing obligation to provide reparation for the violations of
the IHL committed by the authorities of the Nazi regime during the

time of the military occupation of Italy. Hence the real cause of the
dispute is the occurrences of 1943 to 1945. The two Settlement Treaties
as such are not in issue. Both sides agree that the conclusion of these
Treaties was a positive step forward for the improvement of the
mutual relationship between the two countries. As far as Italy’s

claims are concerned, the 1961 Agreements provide no basis, neither
factually nor legally. There is simply no dispute about the relevance
of the Treaties with regard to the Counter-Claim.” (Written Obser-

19 IMMUNITÉS JURIDICTIONNELLES DE L ÉTAT (DÉCL .COMMUNE ) 325

culières), mais, dans le même temps, c) ces accords n’ont pas réglé

plusieurs autres situations. A cet égard, au bout d’une longue période
marquée par l’incertitude et de nombreuses promesses non remplies,
les victimes italiennes furent finalement exclues du champ d’applica-
tion de la loi de 2000, et ce en vertu d’arguments plutôt non convain-
cants.» (Contre-mémoire, par. 5.66.)

Ce passage est immédiatement suivi de l’affirmation suivante:

«La situation ci-dessus exposée constitue le contexte juridique qui
a empêché les juges italiens de rejeter des demandes de réparation
n’ayant pas été honorées pendant trop longtemps, et qui les a

contraints à rejeter l’argument de l’Allemagne tiré de l’immunité.»
(Par. 5.67.)

6. Mais le contre-mémoire ne précise pas quels sont les différends juri-
diques internationaux relatifs aux accords de 1961 et aux actes ultérieurs
de l’Allemagne, pas plus qu’il ne fait référence à une correspondance
diplomatique dans le cadre de laquelle l’Italie aurait informé l’Allemagne

de l’existence de tels différends.
7. Une autre considération s’impose à cet égard. Dans ses observations
écrites sur les observations écrites de l’Allemagne relatives à la demande
reconventionnelle, l’Italie soutient que:

«l’Allemagne a en effet expressément reconnu l’existence d’une
contestation entre les Parties quant au sens et à la portée des accords
de 1961. Non seulement l’Allemagne «ne conteste pas qu’il existe

effectivement une certaine divergence de vues quant à la signification
juridique des deux accords de 1961», mais elle l’affirme au contraire
de manière explicite.» (Par. 65.)

L’Allemagne avait affirmé textuellement ce qui suit:

«L’Allemagne ne conteste pas qu’il existe effectivement une cer-
taine divergence de vues quant à la signification juridique des
deux accords de 1961. Alors qu’elle est d’avis que ces instruments
doivent être considérés comme un ajout volontaire au régime ins-
tauré par le traité de paix de 1947, l’Italie soutient qu’ils ont rouvert

la question des réparations. L’élément central de la demande recon-
ventionnelle réside cependant dans l’argument selon lequel une
obligation de réparer les violations du droit international humani-
taire commises par les autorités nazies pendant la période de
l’occupation militaire de l’Italie continue d’incomber à l’Allemagne.

Ce sont donc les événements qui se sont produits entre 1943 et
1945 qui constituent la cause réelle du différend. Les deux traités
de règlement en tant que tels ne sont pas en cause. Les deux
Parties conviennent que leur conclusion a fait progresser les
relations entre les deux pays. Ces accords ne permettent donc

nullement de fonder les demandes de l’Italie, que ce soit sur le
plan factuel ou sur le plan juridique.» (Observations écrites

19326 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE (JOINT DECL .)

vations on the Preliminary Objections of Germany regarding Italy’s
Counter-Claim, para. 35.)

8. We do not see Germany’s statement as recognition that a dispute —

in the well-established legal sense of the term — existed regarding the
1961 Agreements. In any event, we consider these pleadings as irrelevant
to the Court’s power to “entertain a counter-claim” under Article 80 of
the Rules of the Court. They are subsequent to it; further, Germany has
not had the opportunity to respond to this latest Italian argument, since

it was set out only in the Italian response to Germany’s objections to the
counter-claim and there have been neither further written proceedings
nor oral hearings subsequent to the filing of that response.

9. We consider, therefore, that Italy has failed to establish the exist-
ence of a dispute between itself and Germany arising after 18 April 1961.
10. The second matter to which we wish to draw attention is that, even
if (contrary to what we have just stated), Italy had satisfied us that there
was a dispute between the Parties relating to the 1961 Agreements or the
German reparations legislation, we are convinced that the source or real

cause of that dispute lay in facts prior to 18 April 1961, with the result
that the jurisdiction of the Court would be excluded by the limitation in
Article 27 (a) of the European Convention.

11. As the Order records, the issue of claims by Italy and Italian
nationals arising out of the events of the Second World War was one of
the many subjects addressed by the Peace Treaty concluded in 1947
between the Allied Powers and Italy. Of particular relevance is Article 77,
paragraph 4, by which Italy agreed, on its own behalf and on behalf of all

Italian nationals to waive

“all claims against Germany and German nationals outstanding
on May 8, 1945, except those arising out of contracts and other obli-
gations entered into, and rights acquired, before September 1, 1939”.

The precise scope and effect of this clause, and, in particular, whether it

covered claims for violations of humanitarian law has been the subject of
different views and is a matter on which we do not express an opinion.
We note, however, that the issue of whether Germany should pay repa-
rations in respect of violations of international humanitarian law com-
mitted in Italy and elsewhere during the Second World War was the

subject of discussion long before 1961. It was, for example, considered in
the context of the conclusion of the London Agreement on German
External Debts, 1953.

20 IMMUNITÉS JURIDICTIONNELLES DE L ’ÉTAT DÉCL . COMMUNE ) 326

de l’Allemagne relatives à la demande reconventionnelle de l’Italie,
par. 35.)

8. Nous ne voyons pas dans la déclaration de l’Allemagne une recon-
naissance de l’existence d’un différend — au sens bien établi que ce terme
a en droit — au sujet des accords de 1961. Quoi qu’il en soit, nous esti-

mons que ces arguments ne sont pas pertinents lorsqu’il s’agit de déter-
miner si la Cour a le pouvoir de «connaître d’une demande reconvention-
nelle» en vertu de l’article 80 de son Règlement. Ils ne le sont qu’une fois
cette question tranchée. En outre, l’Allemagne n’a pas été en mesure de
répondre à ce dernier argument de l’Italie, puisque celle-ci ne l’a avancé

que dans sa réponse aux observations écrites de l’Allemagne relatives à la
demande reconventionnelle, et que le dépôt de cette réponse n’a été suivi
ni d’une procédure écrite ni d’une procédure orale.
9. Nous estimons donc que l’Italie n’a pas établi l’existence d’un dif-
férend avec l’Allemagne survenu postérieurement au 18 avril 1961.

10. Le second point sur lequel nous souhaitons attirer l’attention est le
fait que, quand bien même (contrairement à ce que nous venons de décla-
rer) l’Italie nous aurait convaincus de l’existence d’un différend entre les
Parties au sujet des accords de 1961 ou de la législation allemande en

matière de réparation, nous sommes persuadés que la source ou la cause
réelle de ce différend réside dans des faits antérieurs au 18 avril 1961,
d’où il résulte que la compétence de la Cour est exclue en vertu de la limi-
tation apportée par l’alinéa a) de l’article 27 de la convention euro-
péenne.

11. Comme il est rappelé dans l’ordonnance, la question des réclama-
tions de l’Italie et de ses ressortissants pour des faits survenus pendant la
seconde guerre mondiale était l’un des nombreux sujets sur lesquels por-
tait le traité de paix conclu en 1947 entre les Puissances alliées et l’Italie.

Le paragraphe 4 de l’article 77 présente une importance particulière. En
vertu de cette disposition, l’Italie acceptait, en son nom et au nom de tous
les ressortissants italiens, de renoncer

«à toutes réclamations contre l’Allemagne et les ressortissants alle-
mands, qui n’[avaient] pas [été] réglées au 8 mai 1945, à l’exception
de celles qui [résultaient] de contrats et d’autres obligations qui

éerient en vigueur ainsi que de droits qui [avaient été] acquis avant le
1 septembre 1939».

La portée et l’effet exacts de cette clause, et en particulier la question de
savoir si elle visait aussi les réclamations relatives à des violations du
droit humanitaire, ont suscité des analyses différentes et nous n’exprime-

rons pas ici d’avis sur ce sujet. Nous relèverons néanmoins que la ques-
tion de savoir si l’Allemagne devait verser des réparations pour des vio-
lations du droit international humanitaire commises en Italie et ailleurs
au cours de la seconde guerre mondiale avait été discutée bien avant
1961. Elle avait par exemple été abordée dans le contexte de la conclusion

de l’accord de Londres de 1953 sur les dettes extérieures allemandes.

20327 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE JOINT DECL .)

12. The two 1961 Agreements have to be seen in that context. In those
Agreements, Germany undertook to make certain payments to Italy in

respect of events which occurred during the Second World War. Article
2, paragraph 1, of the first 1961 Agreement, namely, the Treaty between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic on the Settle-
ment of Certain Property-Related, Economic and Financial Questions,
provided that

“The Italian Government declares all outstanding claims on the
part of the Italian Republic or Italian natural or legal persons

against the Federal Republic of Germany or German natural or
legal persons to be settled to the extent that they are based on rights
and circumstances which arose during the period from 1 Septem-
ber 1939 to 8 May 1945.”

Article 3 of the second 1961 Agreement, namely, the Treaty between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic concerning Com-
pensation for Italian Nationals Subjected to National-Socialist Measures

of Persecution, provided that
“[w]ithout prejudice to any rights of Italian nationals based on Ger-

man compensation legislation, the payment provided for in Article 1
shall constitute final settlement between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Italian Republic of all questions governed by the
present Treaty”.

13. Again, there is room for more than one view about the precise
scope and effect of these provisions. For present purposes, however, the
important point is that neither of the 1961 Agreements, in and of itself, is

capable of being interpreted as creating any obligation for Germany to
pay compensation to Italy or Italian nationals for violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed during the Second World War over
and above the sums expressly provided for in the two Agreements. Italy
has not suggested that Germany has not paid these sums. Instead, Italy

relies upon the two Agreements as constituting recognition on the part of
Germany that it could no longer rely upon the waiver in Article 77, para-
graph 4, of the Peace Treaty. To the extent that there may be said to be
a dispute between the Parties regarding that question, however, it is
inseparable from the régime established by the 1947 Peace Treaty and the
dealings between the two Governments which followed the adoption of

that Treaty. In particular, it is inextricably linked to an appreciation
of the scope and effect of the waiver contained in Article 77, paragraph 4,
of the 1947 Peace Treaty and the different views of the Parties thereon.

14. Nor does the adoption by Germany of legislation concerning repa-

ration for certain categories of victims of violations of humanitarian law
committed during the Second World War or the fact that, under this legis-
lation, certain Italian victims were denied compensation, constitute facts

21 IMMUNITÉS JURIDICTIONNELLES DE L ’ÉTAT (DÉCL . COMMUNE ) 327

12. Les deux accords de 1961 doivent être examinés dans ce contexte.
En vertu de ces accords, l’Allemagne s’est engagée à effectuer certains
versements à l’Italie en relation avec des faits survenus pendant la seconde
guerre mondiale. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article 2 du premier accord de

1961, à savoir le traité entre la République fédérale d’Allemagne et la
République italienne portant règlement de certaines questions d’ordre
patrimonial, économique et financier, disposait ce qui suit:

«Le Gouvernement italien déclare que toutes les réclamations et
créances pendantes de la République italienne ou de personnes phy-
siques ou morales italiennes contre la République fédérale d’Alle-
magne ou des personnes physiques ou morales allemandes sont réglées,

pour autant qu’elles soient fondées sur der droits et situations de fait
nés au cours de la période allant du 1 septembre 1939 au 8 mai
1945.»

L’article 3 du deuxième accord de 1961, à savoir le traité entre la Répu-
blique fédérale d’Allemagne et la République italienne relatif à l’indem-
nisation des ressortissants italiens ayant fait l’objet de mesures de persé-

cution sous le régime national-socialiste, prévoyait que
«[l]e paiement prévu à l’article premier portera[it] règlement définitif

entre la République fédérale d’Allemagne et la République italienne
de toutes les questions faisant l’objet du présent accord, sans préju-
dice des droits éventuels de ressortissants italiens fondés sur la légis-
lation allemande en matière d’indemnisation».

13. Là encore, la portée et l’effet exacts de ces dispositions peuvent
donner matière à discussion. Ce qui importe ici cependant, c’est qu’aucun
des deux accords de 1961 ne saurait en soi être interprété comme mettant

à la charge de l’Allemagne l’obligation de verser à l’Italie ou à des res-
sortissants italiens, pour des violations du droit international humani-
taire commises pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, d’autres indemnités
que les montants prévus expressément dans les deux accords. L’Italie n’a

jamais dit que l’Allemagne n’avait pas versé ces montants. Elle soutient
par contre que les deux accords constituaient de la part de l’Allemagne la
reconnaissance du fait qu’elle ne pouvait plus se prévaloir de la renoncia-
tion contenue au paragraphe 4 de l’article 77 du traité de paix. Or, dans
la mesure où l’on pourrait considérer qu’il existe un différend entre les

Parties sur cette question, celui-ci est indissociable du régime institué par
le traité de 1947 et des échanges ultérieurs qui ont eu lieu entre les deux
gouvernements après la conclusion de ce traité. Il est en particulier inex-
tricablement lié à l’appréciation de la portée et de l’effet de la clause de

renonciation contenue au paragraphe 4 de l’article 77 du traité de paix de
1947 et aux divergences de vues entre les Parties à ce sujet.
14. De même, ni l’adoption par l’Allemagne d’une législation pré-
voyant des réparations en faveur de certaines catégories de victimes de
violations du droit humanitaire commises au cours de la seconde guerre

mondiale, ni le fait que, en vertu de cette législation, certaines victimes

21328 JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE (JOINT DECL .)

which can be separated from the régime created by the 1947 Peace Treaty.
The German national legislation and its application by the German
courts and authorities does not in itself give rise to an obligation
under international law to compensate any categories of claimants

excluded from the scope of the legislation. Once again, its relevance is
said to lie in its effect upon the ability of Germany to rely upon the pro-
visions of the 1947 Peace Treaty and it is, therefore, inextricably bound
up with that Treaty.

15. We are therefore driven to the conclusion that the source or real
cause of any dispute which Italy seeks to bring before the Court by way
of a counter-claim is to be found in facts and situations which came into
existence long before 18 April 1961. Italy’s formulation of the counter-
claim in its Counter-Memorial effectively admits as much. In the first and

second substantive sentences of the chapter setting out the counter-claim,
Italy states:

“As permitted by Article 80 of the Court’s Rules, Italy hereby
submits a counter-claim with respect to the question of the repara-
tion owed to Italian victims of grave violations of international
humanitarian law committed by forces of the German Reich . . .

The present Chapter sets forth Italy’s counter-claim in this case.
Italy asks the Court to find that Germany has violated its obligation
of reparation owed to Italian victims of the crimes committed by
Nazi Germany during the Second World War and that, accordingly,

Germany must cease its wrongful conduct and offer effective and
appropriate reparation to these victims.” (Paras. 7.1-7.2.)

The matter could not be stated with greater clarity.

(Signed) Kenneth K EITH.

(Signed) Christopher G REENWOOD .

22 IMMUNITÉS JURIDICTIONNELLES DE L ÉTAT (DÉCL .COMMUNE ) 328

italiennes se sont vu refuser une réparation, ne constituent des faits déta-
chables du régime institué par le traité de paix de 1947. La législation
nationale allemande et son application par les juridictions et les autorités

allemandes ne donnent pas à elles seules naissance à une obligation en
vertu du droit international d’indemniser des catégories de demandeurs
qui ont été exclues du champ d’application de la législation. Là encore, sa
pertinence tiendrait à son incidence sur la possibilité pour l’Allemagne de
se fonder sur les dispositions du traité de paix de 1947. Elle est dès lors

inextricablement liée à ce traité.
15. Nous devons donc nécessairement conclure que la source ou la
cause réelle de tout différend que l’Italie cherche à porter devant la Cour
par voie de demande reconventionnelle réside dans des faits et situations

survenus bien avant le 18 avril 1961. Cela ressort effectivement de la
manière dont l’Italie formule sa demande reconventionnelle dans son
contre-mémoire. Dans les deux phrases du chapitre sur la demande
reconventionnelle exposant le contenu de cette demande, l’Italie déclare:

«Comme l’y autorise l’article 80 du Règlement de la Cour, l’Italie
présente une demande reconventionnelle portant sur la question des

réparations dues aux victimes italiennes des graves violations du
droit international humanitaire commises par les forces du Reich
allemand...
Le présent chapitre expose la demande reconventionnelle de l’Ita-

lie en l’affaire. L’Italie prie la Cour de déclarer que l’Allemagne a
violé l’obligation de réparation qui est la sienne à l’égard des victi-
mes italiennes des crimes commis par l’Allemagne nazie pendant la
seconde guerre mondiale et qu’elle doit, par conséquent, mettre fin à
son comportement illicite et accorder aux victimes une réparation

effective et appropriée.» (Par. 7.1-7.2.)
On ne saurait être plus clair.

(Signé) Kenneth K EITH .

(Signé) Christopher G REENWOOD .

22

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Joint declaration of Judges Keith and Greenwood

Links