Declaration of Judge Koroma

Document Number
135-20070123-ORD-01-01-EN
Parent Document Number
135-20070123-ORD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

19

DECLARATION OF JUDGE KOROMA

Article 41 of the Statute — Requirements for the indication of provisional
measures — Prima facie jurisdiction established — Threat of imminent irrepa-
rable harm or prejudice to rights not demonstrated — Judicial role of the Court
in encouraging the peaceful and lawful settlement of disputes — Position
reached by the Court consistent with its judicial role.

1. Even though the Court, in the light of the circumstances of this
case, has decided not to grant Uruguay’s request for the indication of
provisional measures in its entirety, it has taken into consideration its
previous Order of 13 July 2006 and has reiterated its call to the Parties to
refrain from any actions which might render more difficult or prejudice
the resolution of the present dispute. I consider the Court’s position to be

judicious as well and consistent with Article 41 of the Statute. As is well
known, the purpose of provisional measures is to preserve the respective
rights of the parties. But before granting such a request the Court not
only must satisfy itself that it possesses prima facie jurisdiction, but
should take into account, among other things, the urgency of the situa-
tion or the imminence of the activity which, it is alleged, will result in the

harm.
2. In its request for the indication of provisional measures Uruguay
has maintained that by the blockades “Argentina has initiated a trend
that is intended to result in irreparable harm to the very substance of the
rights in dispute” and that, accordingly, “it is the blockades that present

the urgent threat, not . . . [the] impact they may eventually have on the
Botnia plant”.
3. Having considered the matter, the Court has come to the conclusion
that Uruguay’s request has sufficient connection with the merits of the
case and that the Court therefore possesses prima facie jurisdiction in the
current proceedings.

4. Its prima facie jurisdiction notwithstanding, the Court felt con-
strained not to grant the request in its entirety as it did not consider that
an imminent threat of irreparable harm or prejudice had been shown in
the proceedings, but reiterated its call to the Parties to refrain from any
actions which might render more difficult the resolution of the present

dispute. This reiteration, in my view, is not only related to the rights to be
preserved, as contemplated in Article 41 of the Statute, but, as I have said
elsewhere in a similar context, is consistent with the judicial function,
namely, to ensure that no step of any kind is taken which may be capable
of prejudicing the rights claimed or of aggravating or extending the dis-

2020 PULP MILLS DECL . KOROMA )

pute submitted to the Court, with a view to protecting or preserving the
status quo, and preventing it from deteriorating, until the merits of the

claim are finally adjudged.

5. I take the view that the judicial function is not limited to the settle-
ment of disputes and the development of the law but should encourage

parties in dispute to find a peaceful solution to their dispute on the basis
of law rather than otherwise. The Court’s present Order would do just
this: it properly takes consideration of its prima facie jurisdiction in light
of the parties’ submissions, makes an assessment of what is and is not
necessary for it to preserve the parties’ respective rights, and does not

foreclose the parties from making further requests of the Court for it to
indicate provisional measures should these rights be threatened in the
future.
6. The position reached by the Court is therefore within the purview of

Article 41, encourages the Parties to settle their dispute peacefully, and is
consistent with the judicial role of the Court.

(Signed) Abdul G. K OROMA .

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Bilingual Content

19

DECLARATION OF JUDGE KOROMA

Article 41 of the Statute — Requirements for the indication of provisional
measures — Prima facie jurisdiction established — Threat of imminent irrepa-
rable harm or prejudice to rights not demonstrated — Judicial role of the Court
in encouraging the peaceful and lawful settlement of disputes — Position
reached by the Court consistent with its judicial role.

1. Even though the Court, in the light of the circumstances of this
case, has decided not to grant Uruguay’s request for the indication of
provisional measures in its entirety, it has taken into consideration its
previous Order of 13 July 2006 and has reiterated its call to the Parties to
refrain from any actions which might render more difficult or prejudice
the resolution of the present dispute. I consider the Court’s position to be

judicious as well and consistent with Article 41 of the Statute. As is well
known, the purpose of provisional measures is to preserve the respective
rights of the parties. But before granting such a request the Court not
only must satisfy itself that it possesses prima facie jurisdiction, but
should take into account, among other things, the urgency of the situa-
tion or the imminence of the activity which, it is alleged, will result in the

harm.
2. In its request for the indication of provisional measures Uruguay
has maintained that by the blockades “Argentina has initiated a trend
that is intended to result in irreparable harm to the very substance of the
rights in dispute” and that, accordingly, “it is the blockades that present

the urgent threat, not . . . [the] impact they may eventually have on the
Botnia plant”.
3. Having considered the matter, the Court has come to the conclusion
that Uruguay’s request has sufficient connection with the merits of the
case and that the Court therefore possesses prima facie jurisdiction in the
current proceedings.

4. Its prima facie jurisdiction notwithstanding, the Court felt con-
strained not to grant the request in its entirety as it did not consider that
an imminent threat of irreparable harm or prejudice had been shown in
the proceedings, but reiterated its call to the Parties to refrain from any
actions which might render more difficult the resolution of the present

dispute. This reiteration, in my view, is not only related to the rights to be
preserved, as contemplated in Article 41 of the Statute, but, as I have said
elsewhere in a similar context, is consistent with the judicial function,
namely, to ensure that no step of any kind is taken which may be capable
of prejudicing the rights claimed or of aggravating or extending the dis-

20 19

DÉCLARATION DE M. LE JUGE KOROMA

[Traduction]

Article 41 du Statut — Conditions pour l’indication de mesures conserva-
toires — Compétence prima facie établie — Risque imminent de dommage ou de
préjudice irréparable menaçant les droits de l’Uruguay non démontré — Encou-
rager le règlement pacifique des différends, en conformité avec le droit, fait par-
tie de la fonction judiciaire de la Cour — La position adoptée par la Cour

s’inscrit dans le cadre de cette fonction.

1. Même si la Cour a décidé, compte tenu des circonstances de l’espèce,
de ne pas accueillir la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
de l’Uruguay dans son ensemble, elle a pris en considération l’ordon-
nance qu’elle avait rendue le 13 juillet 2006 et réitéré l’appel qu’elle y
adressait aux Parties de s’abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait compromettre
le règlement du présent différend ou le rendre plus difficile. La position

adoptée par la Cour est, selon moi, judicieuse et conforme à l’article 41
du Statut. L’objectif des mesures conservatoires, on le sait, est de préser-
ver les droits de chacune des parties. Avant d’indiquer de telles mesures,
toutefois, la Cour doit non seulement s’assurer qu’elle a compétence
prima facie, mais aussi apprécier, notamment, l’urgence de la situation ou
l’imminence des actes dont il est allégué qu’ils causeront le préjudice.

2. Dans sa demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, l’Uru-
guay soutient que, avec les barrages routiers, «[l]’Argentine s’est engagée
dans un processus destiné à porter atteinte de manière irréparable à la
nature même des droits en litige» et que, dès lors, «ce sont les barrages

qui constituent la menace imminente, et non les conséquences ... qu’ils
pourraient avoir à terme sur l’usine Botnia».
3. Ayant examiné la question, la Cour est parvenue à la conclusion
que la demande de l’Uruguay a un lien suffisant avec le fond de l’affaire
et que, par conséquent, la Cour a compétence prima facie en la présente
instance.

4. Nonobstant sa compétence prima facie, la Cour ne s’est pas jugée en
mesure d’accueillir la demande dans son ensemble, estimant que l’exis-
tence d’un risque imminent de dommage ou de préjudice irréparable
n’avait pas été démontrée au cours de la procédure, mais elle a répété
l’appel qu’elle avait adressé aux Parties de s’abstenir de tout acte qui ris-

querait de rendre plus difficile le règlement du différend. A mon avis, la
répétition de cet appel non seulement est en rapport avec les droits à sau-
vegarder, comme le prévoit l’article 41 du Statut, mais, comme je l’ai dit
ailleurs dans un contexte similaire, elle s’inscrit dans le cadre de la fonc-
tion judiciaire, puisqu’elle vise à garantir qu’il ne sera pris aucune mesure

2020 PULP MILLS DECL . KOROMA )

pute submitted to the Court, with a view to protecting or preserving the
status quo, and preventing it from deteriorating, until the merits of the

claim are finally adjudged.

5. I take the view that the judicial function is not limited to the settle-
ment of disputes and the development of the law but should encourage

parties in dispute to find a peaceful solution to their dispute on the basis
of law rather than otherwise. The Court’s present Order would do just
this: it properly takes consideration of its prima facie jurisdiction in light
of the parties’ submissions, makes an assessment of what is and is not
necessary for it to preserve the parties’ respective rights, and does not

foreclose the parties from making further requests of the Court for it to
indicate provisional measures should these rights be threatened in the
future.
6. The position reached by the Court is therefore within the purview of

Article 41, encourages the Parties to settle their dispute peacefully, and is
consistent with the judicial role of the Court.

(Signed) Abdul G. K OROMA .

21 USINES DE PÂTE À PAPIER (DÉCL .KOROMA ) 20

d’aucune sorte susceptible de porter préjudice aux droits invoqués, ou
d’aggraver ou étendre le différend soumis à la Cour, le but étant de pro-

téger et de préserver le statu quo et d’empêcher que la situation ne se dété-
riore jusqu’à ce que l’affaire soit définitivement tranchée au fond.
5. Selon moi, la fonction judiciaire ne se limite pas au règlement des
différends et au développement du droit, elle devrait aussi consister à

encourager les parties dans la recherche d’une solution pacifique à leur
différend, sur la base du droit. C’est précisément ce que fait la Cour dans
la présente ordonnance: après avoir dûment examiné sa compétence
prima facie compte tenu des arguments des deux Parties, elle apprécie ce
qui est ou non nécessaire pour préserver les droits de l’une et de l’autre, et

sa décision ne fait pas obstacle à la présentation de nouvelles demandes
en indication de mesures conservatoires si ces droits devaient à l’avenir
être menacés.
6. La position adoptée par la Cour est par conséquent conforme aux

dispositions de l’article 41, elle encourage les Parties à régler leur diffé-
rend de manière pacifique et elle s’inscrit dans le cadre de la fonction
judiciaire de la Cour.

(Signé) Abdul G. K OROMA .

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Document Long Title

Declaration of Judge Koroma

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