Dissenting Opinion by Judge ad hoc de Cara (translation)

Document Number
129-20030617-ORD-01-02-EN
Parent Document Number
129-20030617-ORD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE CARA

Distinctivent>s.O~L'LIS~- Riglzts to hepreserved - Di iision (fjurisdiction-
Itnnmunity jrom jurisdiction - Inviolability-- Dignity oj Heud ifStore - Risk
oj'prcjudice -- lrreparubility - Urgency - Risk of ag::ravation of dispute -
Stuteruieritsby a pcrrtj,ut lzeuri~~g s Good,filitlz - Oh'igation tu i~zfoïtn,judi-
ciu/ uut/~ority,

The case before the Court concerns an African 'State.That gives it a
distinctive dimension. Not only does it concern a country marked by con-

stant upheavals and repeated crises since it gained independence in 1960,
it also pits that country against the former colonial power. It involves, in
particular, the Head of State and in Africa the Head of State embodies
the nation itself.
A "country without unity", the Republic of the Congo exhibits a geo-
graphical diversity matched by the heterogeneity c~fits people, brought

together, at a certain point in time, by the railway and by colonial inte-
gration into French Equatorial Africa, centred on Brazzaville'.
Decolonization was followed by a time of uphea\al when, withdrawing
into itself after a period of uncertainty starting with the "Trois Glo-
rieuses" uprising (1963), the country came under a Marxist military
régime, which failed oves a period of more than 20 years to put an end to

the instability and killings. In 1991, the country claimed back its name,
its flag, its national anthem and its symbols, as firs: adopted on indepen-
dence. The country was subsequently torn asundix- by economic crisis,
despite its mineral resources, and by civilwar. Having little experience of
democratic institutions, the Congo once again frac!ured along ethnic and
geographical lines: fierceclashes occurred between the Zoulou, Ninja and

Cobra militias and tlne army, whilst foreign naticnals fled the country,
especially after 1997. Thousands were massacred 3r disappeared during
the confrontations, in particular in 1999at the river port of Brazzaville.
The fighting has subsided as each week has brougk t surrenders by rnilitia
elements. but sustained rivalries and onuosi.i.n rernain and the conflict is
being pursued, through propaganda and covertly, at the political level.
These tragic circumstances, together with the instability of the country,

where peace is slowly being restored. explain why he Government of the
Rewublic of the Congo seiGed the Court in resDoIse to certain criminal
proceedings initiated in France.
The case is also distinctive in that this is the fiist time that the Court
has been seised of a case in which the respondl:nt has expressly con-

'Yves Lacoste. Dlctionnciire de g6opolitiyue. 1997. CERTAIN CRllLlINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P.DE CARA) 117

sented, under Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, to jurisdic-
tion in respect of an application (here, that of the C~ngo), and there has
been no need to consi'derthe prima facie jurisdictim of the Court. Its
distinctiveness also lies in the close relationship between the proceedings
on provisional measures and the proceedings on the merits. The Parties'

respective rights to be protected by the Court are, on the one hand, the
Congo's claim to territorial and persona1 jurisdicticm and the immunity
of the Congolese personalities involved - in particular, but not exclu-
sively, that of the Head of State - and, on the other, the claim to uni-
versa1jurisdiction based on international custom. 1 is thus necessary at
this stage to consider al1the consequences that may ;irisefrom the alleged
violation of the Congo's rights. The distinctive nzture of the case lies

lastly in the contrast between the relevant French law as it now stands
and the inappropriate measures taken or capable cf being taken by the
French prosecutors and judges.

The Application ori the merits is accompanied by a request for the
indication of a provisional measure whereby the Congo "seeks an order
for the immediate suspension of the proceedings being conducted by the

investigating judge of the Meaux Tribunal de grande irzsfance"'.
Under Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Court's Statute, the Court has
"the power to indicate, if it considers that circumsiances so require, any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either party".
Article 75 of the Rides of Court provides that:

"1. The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu
whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of pro-
visional measures which ought to be taken or eomplied with by any

or al1of the parties.
2. When a recluest for provisional measures has been made, the
Court may indicate measures that are in wholtt or in part other than
those requested, or that ought to be taken or complied with by the
party which has itself made the request."

These provisions show that the indication of provisional measures falls
within the Court's power of discretion, which it exercisesaccording to the
circurnstances of eaclhparticular case, and the Court may exercise this
discretion, which is basically unfettered3, pvopril, nzotu. The essential

point is that the Court must not prejudge the meriis of the case and must
leave "unaffected the right of the Respondent tc submit argumentsu4.

Application of the Republic of the Congo, p. 17.
' B. Ajibola, separate opinion appended to the Order of 10 January 1996in the case
concerning the Land unci Moritirne Bounduiy hetivren Cur,zeroon und Nigeria(Crinl-
erooAnglo-Irunirin Oil Cc,'.,ProvisiorzulMeusures, Orde.iJuly 1951.1.C.J. Reports
IYiI. p. 93.The objective is to preriervethe parties' rights as subjequently determined
by the decision of the Court and to do so in the intrrests of both parties
equally5. It is moreover necessary for "the alleged rights sought to be
made the subject of provisional measures" to be "tlie subject of the pro-

ceedings before the Court on the merits of the case"6.
However, jurisprudence has clarified the conditicms for the indication
of provisional measures, summed up by language now regularly inserted
into the Court's orders, as it is in paragraph 22 of the present Order7.

The Court has accordingly supplemented the text of the Statute, which
simply grants it discretion depending on the circuvv~stances! Well-estab-
lished case law thus cidls for a determination in each case as to whether
there is a serious risk of irreparable prejudice bein;: caused to the rights
of the parties and in particular of the applicant, in his case the Republic

of the Congo, and whether there is an urgent need for the indication of
provisional nleasures. The Court nevertheless enjoqs considerable leeway
in the exercise of its judicial function with respect to provisional meas-
ures: it may take the biewthat ordering such measures would be pointless

owing to the conduct or statements of the parties; on the other hand, it
may decide on measures other than those requeited or even indicate
measures proprio rzotu.
The Court did not !;eefit to uphold the Congo's -equest for the indica-
tion of a provisional measure and 1 regret that 1 was unable to vote in

favour of the decision because 1 consider the cru?: of the case - the
cornerstone of the proceeding in question, the riquisitoire (prosecutor's
application for judicial investigation) of 23 Januarj 2002 - to have been

Sir Gerald Fitz,mauric~:,The Luit:und Procedurofthe Int :rnational Court of'luslice,
Vol. II, p. 544.
fiCase conccrning the Arhitrul Abourtiof31 July 1989 iGuir~ou-Bissuuv. Senegal), Pro-
i>isionrl 4eusure.s,1.C.J. Reports 1990. p. 70.
.4rresr Wurrcznfof ll April 2000 iDrrnocrutic Rrprrhlic of'rhr Congov.Brlgiutn),
I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 201, para. 69; Arnled Activities on he Territory of the Congo
iDrnzocrrrtic Rc~pzrhlof the Cor~gov. C'guridu),1.C.J. Repcrts 2000, p. 127, para. 39:
Tiic,nrironic~ntiorron Con.su/crrRe1fition.riPcrruv.qL7nifetlSture~of.4mc,ricrrjC.J.
Rtports 1998. p. 257, para. 35.
Judge Oda summed up as follows the conditions defined b:ithe jurisprudence:
"the rights in question areose to be confronted at the inerits stage of the case, and
which coiistitute or are directly engaged by the subject of the application. The
urgency of the relevant action or inhibition is a prercquisite. The anticipated or
actual breach of the rights to be preserved ought to be cne that could not be erased
by the payment of reparation or compensation to be orccred in later judgment on
the merits. and thisirreparableprejudice must be imrniiieiit." (Esscrysiri HoO/ur
Sir Rohrrt Jennings, p. 551.)

Vn his dissenting opinion appended to the Order of 2 March 1990. Judge Hubert
Thierry even contends that "if the circumstances actually tequire such measures. they
[the provisional measures] 'o~cglzrt'o be taken (Art. 41)" (Arbitral A~r~urdof31 Jlrlj'
1989 (G~~ineir-Bisstu. !knegul), Pror.i.siol rusurrs, 1.C J. Reporrs 1990p. 79).disregarded. That prosecutorial act is the basis for and governs al1the
criminal proceedings pending in Franceyand it coiistitutes the Gordian
knot of the Parties' dispute before the Court. At the provisional measures
stage it represents the source of the risk of irreparable prejudice, given
that the rights to be protected will be the subject cbfthe proceedings on
the merits. 1am inclined to believe, however, with al1due respect, that the
Court's formal approach has led itto rely on the geieral terms of French
law and not on this key factor which needed to be considered at the pro-

visional measures stage. 1am thus unable, contrar!, though that may be
to my wishes, to support either the reasoning or the dispositd of the
present Order for the following reasons.

The rights which the Republic of the Congo sought to protect from the
risk of irreparable prejudice raised by the openirg of certain criminal
proceedings in France are apparent from its Application and oral argu-
ment.

During the oral pr~oceedings,frequent reference was made to the case
concerning the Arresl Wurrunt of II April2000 (L~enzocraticRepublic of
the Congo v. Belgiurn). However, the situation wai different in that case
because the dis~uted measure was an internationa arrest warrant issued
against the ~inister iforForeign Affairs, capable of causing prejudice ta
the person concerned not by virtue of its circulatio~ibut only upon poten-
tial execution by a third State. By contrast, the pre Gentcase concerns acts

initiating judicial proceedings: preliminary police cnquiry, judicial inves-
tigation on the application of the prosecutor, polize custody and exami-
nation as té~~'ui n(S.S~S(l;gally represented \vitness) of General Dabira,
and an application ILOquestion the Head of State as witness, without
regard for the judicial investigation opened by t le Trihunul de grande
insturzceof Brazzaville.
Some of those measures, which may appear preliminary, are in fact
acts of prosecution which - although this is not to prejudge the
merits - interfere both with the jurisdiction OFthe Republic of the

Congo and with the international standing of the Congolese authorities
involved.

(1) To begin with,the first right invoked by the Congo stems from the
principle of the "sovereign equality" of States, which, according to the

" "The investigating judge can only investigate by virtue of a réquisitoir~issued by the
Procureur(teItRépubli<ruc"(Art. 80 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure). CERTAIN CRIIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P.DE CARA) 120

Applicant, prohibits a State from "unilaterally attributing to itself uni-
versa1jurisdiction in criminal matters". It is apparent that the French
judicial measures are capable of contravening the division of jurisdiction
between criminal courts under international law.
First, while it istrue that French law recognizes i~niversaljurisdiction
under limited conditions that were recalled during the hearings 'O,the dis-

agreement between the Parties in the present case hinges on the réyuisi-
toire of 23 January 2002, which lets the French judgi: found his investiga-
tion on universal jurisdiction arising from intern.itiona1 custom. The
complaint of 5 December 2001, transmitted with tlre prosecutor's origi-
nating application, States that

"[dlomestic courts are therefore entitled to look to international cus-
tom as the source of their right to exercisejurisdiction to prosecute
the perpetrators of a crime against humanity alleged to have been
committed outsidie France where neither the perpetrator nor the
victim is a French national" ".

This is reiterated in th.ecomplaint of 7 December:

"Notwithstanding that the facts occurred on the territory of the
Republic of the Congo,the French courts have jurisdiction in respect
of crimes against humanity by virtue of international custom . . ."

By appending the cornplaints to his originating application of 23 Janu-
ary 2001, the Procureur de lu Ripubliyue at the Meaux Tribunal de
grande instunce adopted that basis ofjurisdiction. llowever, with respect
to acts of torture, it will be recalled that Article 5 of the United Nations
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, of 10 December 1984, implies that universal
jurisdiction is subsidiary to territorial jurisdiction and to jurisdiction

under the active nationality or passive personalitj principles. Article 5,
paragraph 1, of that Convention obliges States parties to establish their
territorial jurisdiction and their jurisdiction under the active nationality
principle, whilst also allowing them to establish ,lurisdiction under the
passive personality principle. Paragraph 2 requins each State party to
take such measures as may be necessary to estab1i:;hits jurisdiction over
the offences covered by the Convention where tlle alleged offender is

present in any territory under its jurisdiction anc it does not extradite

tion issubject to two conditions: "there must in principle be a treaty to which France is
a party that provides forthat universal jurisdiction and even ri:quires it to .. .xercised
the person suspected must be on French territory" (CR 2003'21,p. 9).
''Letter from the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues to the Procureur
de IUR~jP~tbliq~tet the Paris Trihunul de 'qrunrleitwrance, daied 5 December 2001, p. 25.

l2Document D1/2 of 7 December 2001, appended to the 1:tter from the International
Federation of Human Rights Leagues to the Procureur de la Républiqueat the Paris Tri-
bunal riegronde instance, p. 2. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P. DE CARA) 121

him. Universal jurisdiction here is thus simply an application of the
maxim aut dedere aut punire. This principle prevail:;afortiori in a situa-
tion of lis alibipeiîdeiîs: territorial or persona1jurisdiction takes priority
over universal jurisdiction.
Secondly, the record shows that proceedings viere already pending
in the Congo and that the intervention of the French courts is, according
to the Republic of the Congo, liable to violate th': principle non bis in
idetn.
Judicial investigation (instruction) proceedings were initiated in the

Congo in respect of the same events. Further to the originating applica-
tion of the Brazzaville prosecutor, dated 29 August 2000, supplemented
by an application for an extension of the investigation, dated 11 Novem-
ber 2002, the senior investigating judge of the Biazzaville Tribunal de
grande instance sent a commission rogatoire (letter of request for judicial
assistance) to the invizstigatingjudge of Kinshasa, concerning inter aliu
the enforced disappearance of more than 350 irdividuals and crimes
against humanity and torture, for which responsibility is attributed to
"the President of the IRepubIicof the Congo, the Minister of the Interior,
Mr. Norbert Dabira, Inspecter General of the Arrned Forces, and Gen-
eral Blaise Adoua, Commander of the Republican Guard" j3.

The principle non (Sisin idem is in fact susceptible of two interpreta-
tions. It can mean -- as the Agent of France pointed out - that no
further proceedings can be brought in respect of acts on which a final
judgment has already been rendered. This principl: is a manifestation of
the doctrine of res judicata, which operates not only to safeguard the
rights of the person tried but also to preserve th: authority of judicial
rulings. The doctrine is enshrined in the French Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure (Arts. 6, 368 and 692), in the United Nations Covenant and in
Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention for th{:Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It applies where the decision of a

trial court has become final and the subsequent action relates to the same
acts and is brought against the same party who was tried in the first pro-
ceedings.
Rut in international law the operation of the principle non bis in idem
can also indicate the existence of lis alibipendens, precluding the exercise
of jurisdiction by a court subsequently seised of the same matter. The
scope and nature of that rule in international law may well besubject to
debate, but the leasi. that can be said is that it would have been more
prudent for the French prosecutor to have refrained from prosecuting in
this case.

At the same time, as the Agent of the RepubIic of the Congo stated in
his introductory observations, there has been a violation of the indepen-

'3 Document Dl12 appended to the 5 December 2001 lette1from the International Fed-
eration of Human Rights Leagues to the P~.uczre la Ri~ztrbliqzieat the Paris Trihiozol
graride instancp.2. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P.DE CARA) 122

dence and s0vereignt.y of the Congolese State. The réquisitoire of
23 January 2002 constitutes per se an act of prosetution. In seising the
investigating judge of the offences alleged in the complaints and men-
tioned in the reports of the preliminary police enquiry, the réquisitoire
characterizes the facts, advances as its own the claixrs of the complainant
associations and allegesthe existence of crimes agair st humanity and tor-
ture. This constitutes interference by the French judiciary in the domestic
affairs of the Congo and encroaches upon the sovereignty of that

State.
(2) Further, the Court also observed that the Congo invoked "the
right to respect by France for the immunities conferred by international
law on, .. . in particular, the Congolese Head of State". The criminal
proceedings initiated iii France raise a challenge not only to the immunity
from jurisdiction of tht: personalities named but alsc to their inviolubility,
in so far as they may act or be present on the territory of France in their
capacities as representatives of the Republic of the Congo. This is par-
ticularly true for the Head of State, whose immuriity is invoked in the

Application.
"It is not dispiited that the Head of State kenefits from absolute
criminal immunity before the courts of a foreign State. The absolute
nature of the imniunity precludes the application of any exception to

that immunity, fix example based on the nature of the offence of
which he is accused." l4
Immunity has the efl'ectof rendering inadmissibb: any action brought

against the person who invokes it. President Sassoii Nguesso has admit-
tedly visited France on two occasions since the stait of the disputed pro-
ceedings, but the existence of the réquisitoireand the reference of the case
to the investigating judge maintain a constant threat in respect of his
travels to France or to other foreign countries. This is particularly sig-
nificant for a State whose constitution establishes a presidential régime,
entrusting the Head of State with most of the authority and responsibili-
ties for the functionirig of the Government.
(3) Lastly, and more generally, it is clear from the Application and the

Congo's statements at the hearings that the Frencli criminal proceedings
impugn the dignity of the State, a quality vested in sovereign States.
Anzilotti observed in his day that in relations betwcen States "the honour
and dignity of the State far outweigh material inti:restsn and that "non-
material damage takes on a far greater significsnce than in interna1
law" 15.The notion remains rather vague but it does entail certain specific

l4J. Verhoeven, Rapporà l'Institut de droit international "Les immunités dejuridic-
tion et d'exécutiondu cheftat et de gouvernement en droit international", Annuaire de
1'In.stiridroit internaiional, 2000-2001,Vol. 69, p. 516.
l5Cours de droit intert~ational,1929, Vol. 1,p. 523. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P. DE CARA) 123

legal consequences 16.In addition to norms and customs of protocol and
ceremonial, the dignity of diplornatic representatives finds protection in
treatiesl' and the 1973Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Interriationally Protected Person: acknowledges and
enshi-inesthe existence of an obligation under inte~national law to take
a11appropriate measures to prevent attacks on the tlignity of an interna-

tionally protected person (Art. 2, para. 3).

Furthermore, some traditional doctrine foundec the immunity from
jurisdiction enjoyed by the State and the Head of !;tate on the principle

of State dignity. The opinion delivered by Chief Justice Marshall in The
Schooner Exchunge v. McFucidon (1812) recalls the obligation of any
sovereign "not to degrade the dignity of his nation" by submitting to the
jurisdiction of another State; a Head of State or sovereign visiting
another State is not "to subject himself to a jurii,diction incompatible

with his dignity and the dignity of his nation" 18.T'lisjustification is still
invoked by some auttiors 19.

The dignity of the State, to which the Agent of the Congo referred2"
and to which relate the "reputation", "honour" and "international stand-
ing" of that country, and the dignity of the Hi:ad of State may be

irripugned whether or not the Head of State is presznt on the territory of
the State where the injurious acts have been comm tteda. Such acts may
be perpetrated through publications, press article;. insults. defamatory
or offensive statemerits, etc. They often emanate from private parties
and the authorities of the territory where such acts occur then have a

duty to punish or make good the violation and to present apologies;
such acts may also stem from inappropriate initiatives by local authori-

'Wir Arthur Watts obs,erves:

a convenient label. Some of the consequences former11 attributed to the need to is still
respect the dignity of Headsof States now survive, if they survive at all, in the realms
of protocol and State ceremonia...Some aspects of the respect due to the dignity of
Heads of States still, however, survive as a matter of inte mational law." ("The Legal
Position in International Law of Heads of States. Head:. of Governments and For-
eign Ministers", Recueil cie.~cours de 1'AcudC.miede droit inrernutional de Lu Huye,
1994.Vol. 247. p.41.)

Relations (Art. 40), and of 1969on Special Missions by a He:ad of State (Art. 29).r

'Yhe Scliooner E'tchtirigev. McFuddon (1812), 11 US If 7-138: in English case law:
Mi~hell v. The S~/ltnn($Johore [1894] 1 QB 149.
"'L. Cavaré.Le droit interntrtionulnuhlic positif, 1969.II,p.10: D. P. O'Connell,
Int~unut,onul Lu,). 2nd ed. 1970. Voi II, 842 See also J Verhoeven. op cit .p 507
"' CR 2003120, p 11
2lOppenheirn'~Intern~itionulLui.\,,9th ed., 1992.Vol. 1, p. 379.ties, in particular lower courts. The insult to dignit) is no less genuine in
such cases.

B. The Existence of Zrreparable Pr6judice

The purpose of prclvisional measures is to prevrnt the occurrence of

irreparable prejudice. If the prejudice has already corne into existence, it
is too late; on the other hand, the risk of irreparable prejudice is met by
the indication of provisional ineasures. The difficulty in the present case
lies in the fact that the risk for the Head of State c~fthe Republic of the
Congo has thus far appeared to be a potential or hypotlietical one and
was even described cluring the hearings as "chinierical", but the risk
raised by the rL;r/zrisifoiof 23 January is nonetkeless established and
the realization of that risk would indeed create irreparable prejudice.
Publicity surrounding acts of torture or enforced disappearance has
inevitably aroused suspicions already, given that the case involves the
Head of an African State on the morrow of a serie iof vicious civil wars,

whereas no credence would be attached to such allegations if they
concerned the leaders of older nations.

1. The risk of'prejudice

As illustrated by the jurisprudence, in assessing the risk of irreparable
prejudice, the Court inay be led to consider both trieprobability and the

potential consequences of the occurrence of a fact or event. A future
event does not have to be a certainty; it only neecisto be probable.
In some cases, the event capable of causing the prejudice may already
have occurred and the Court's work then consists simply in assessing
whether, in the light of the facts, a provisional n-easure is necessary to
prevent irreparable damage to the rights claimed. This is illustrated, for
example. by the Orders of 8 April and 13Septembcr 1993in the case con-
cerning the Application of tlzr Converrtio~ton the I'reverztionand Punish-
rnent of'tlze Crime of' Genocide (Bosnia and Her:.egoilina v. Yugoslavia
(Serhia and Moiztenl?gro)). The Applicant produced the same evidence

in support of its request for provisional measureç as for its Application
on the merits".
In other cases. the:reauest for the indication of ~rovisional measures
has arisen from events occurring subsequent to tl-e Application, such as
the incidents betweerithe armed forces of Burkina Faso and the Republic
of Mali in the border region between the two ccuntries in the Frontier
Dispute (Burkina FusolRc~publicof'Mali) case2'.
On other occasioils, the Court may have to assess the possibility or
likelihood of the prejudice. Thus, in the Orders c,oncerning the Nutleur

" 1.C.J. Rc~pori1993, p. 3 and p. 325.
'' Proi,i.sioti(d~\.lcu, rcleof10 Jciniiury 1981.C.J Rc,porrs1986. p.3.

26 CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P. DE CARA) 125

Tests cases, the Court stated that its power undm Article 41 of the
Statute

"presupposes thai. irreparable prejudice should not be caused to
rights which are the subject of dispute in judirial proceedings and

that the Court's judgment should not be anticipated by reason of
any initiative regarding the matters in issue belore the Court"24.

In those cases, the Court did not exclude the pos:.ibility of harm being
caused to Australia and New Zealand by the radicactive fall-out of the
nuclear tests in the atrnosphere.
A similar pronouncement appears in the FisherTesJuvisdiction cases
but the Court was more precise there because it added:

"the immediate inlplementation by Iceland of ils Regulations would,
by anticipating the Court's judgment, prejudire the rights claimed
. . .and affect the possibility of their full restoration in the event of

a judgment in its favour"".
More recently, in line with its decisions in the case concerning the

Vienna Convention on ConsulurRelations (Paraguuy v. United States of
America) 2h and in the LaGrand case (Gerrnany v. United States of
America), the Court held even more explicitly in the case concerning
Armed Activities on tJie Territory oj the Congo (D7rnocratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda 1:

"in the ~ircurnsta~izcetsh,e Court is of the opinion that persons, assets
and resources present on the territory of the Congo, particularly in
the area of conflict, remain extremely vulnerak)le,and that there is a
seriou5 risk that the rights ut issue in tlzis c~se, as noted in para-

graph 40 above [the Congo's rights to sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity. integrity of its assets and natural resources and its rights to
respect for the rides of international humanit irian law], in- sufjCL.r
irreprrrnbleprejudice"27.

In the present case, it appears to me that the prejudice already exists
and that a risk of further prejudice can be identifi:d in two respects.
First, the prejudice arises from the transmissior of the complaints by

the Paris prosecutor to the Meaux prosecutor, who had an obligation to

24Nuclear Tests jAusti*aliuv. France). Provisional Measu .es, Order of22 June 1973,
1.C.J. Reporr~ 1973, p. 103, and Nuclem Tests /Nr,,c. Zeallmd v. Fronce). Provisionrrl
Me~isure.~, rc/eof22 J~irre1973, C.J. Reports 1973. p. 133.
25 Fisheries Jurivdictiori (United Kingdom v. Icelund), Pro~~l rasures, Order of
17 August 1972, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 16, para. 22; Fisfieries Jurisdiction (Fedc,ral
Reports 1972. p. 34, para. 23.), Provi.sioMea.~ure.s,0rda.r-of 17 Auyuus 1972. ..C'J.
2h1.C.J. Rcporrs 1998, p. 257, paras. 35-37.
Orderof'1 Jub 2000, 1.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 128,para 43; emphasis added. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDJNGS (DISSO . PDE CARA) 126

declinejurisdiction for two reasons: the complaints implicate foreign per-
sonalities whose immunity from jurisdiction is established or foreseeable;
and there was no basiisunder French law for juriscliction of the French
judicial authorities. The only possibility open to tlie prosecutor was to
assert the territorial jurisdiction of French courts in respect of Gen-
eral Dabira, by virtue of a residential connection with French territory,
and to acknowledge that he otherwise lacked jurisdiction.

Failing to acknowledge the lack of jurisdiction cr to make any refer-
ence to such effect, and asserting the jurisdiction of French courts in
respect of acts committed abroad, the réquisitoireof 23 January 2002
flouts the international division of jurisdiction amolig courts and violates
the immunity of the Head of State and potentially that of other Congo-
lese personalities.
The rgquisitoire thus is clearly nul1 and void anll the Government of
the French Republic had an obligation towards the Republic of the
Congo to apply to the competent court for a fiiding to such effect,
without waiting for i.he investigating judge or tke prosecutor himself
to proceed with any other acts stemming from the réquisitoire that
would further violate international law.
Secondly, the Agent and counsel of France clainied that the summons

addressed to Presiderit Sassou Nguesso to give evidence was simply an
invitation under Article 656 of the Code of Crimirla1Procedure.

In reality. this proves that the Head of State's iinmunity was violated
by the rkquisitoire of 23 January. Once President Sassou Nguesso had
been expressly accused in the complaints appended to the réquisitoireand
by a victim. or allegiid victim, examined during ihe preliminary police
enquiry, the deposition that the investigating jutlges expected to take
from him could only have concerned acts of whicli they were seised and
in respect of which he Aiasnamed, along with the other personalities
identified, as the prii~cipalperpetrator. Whilst any other person impli-
cated could only have been examined as a tirnoin ~*ssisté e,njoying guar-
antees of procedural due process, thejudges are he-eseeking a deposition
froin a foreign Head of State concerning accusations of which he does
not even know the exact tenor because he has not been granted access to

the case file.The investigating judges only considered themselves entitled
to proceed in such a manner because they had been seised by the réquisi-
toire of, inter uliu, offences attributed to the Con::olese Head of State.
Even assuming that Article 656 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
applies to Heads of State - wliich is debatable2*- , the President of the
Congo, by deferring to the judge's invitation, could find himself formally
placed under judicial examination on the basis of ti-ecomplaints appended
to the prosecutor's originating application of :!3 January. But what

" "-M. Gonnard, Jurrsckisseur de procécturepénule,fasc. No. 23would be the purpose of such a deposition? To question the Head of
State about events that occurred in his country? Tc induce him to make
accusations against any of his fellow citizens? Therr is certainly a serious
risk of prejudice here. The process would appex incongruous and,
admittedly, the French Minister for Foreign Affairj has not transmitted
the invitation to date, as the Court observed in the present Order. How-

ever, the failure to transmit that invitation to gnve evidence may be
explained by reasons of expediency or legality; thc French Minister for
Foreign Affairs may have considered the Article 616procedure inappli-
cable to a foreign Head of State. Most importantly, as the invitation has
not been followed up, there is nothing to prevent tne investigating judge
from taking any other measures in respect of Pres dent Sassou Nguesso
on the basis of the rr;qui,sitoire.It is therefore difjicult to see how "the
current proceedings .. .have not caused and canriot cause any damage

to the Congo by way of breach of the immunities of President Sas-
sou Nguesso".
The difficulty liesin the ongoing nature of the evt:ntcapable of creating
irreparable prejudice, stemming from the prosecutor's originating appli-
cation of which the consequences have not yet al occurred but remain
possible in the event of a decision by a less attent ve, less scrupulous or
more obstinate investigating judge. For as long as the defective pro-

cedural measure, the réquisitoire, remains in force",there will always be
a risk. That risk issaid to be "hypothetical" but "[a]risk is by definition a
matter of chance, and it is dangerous to rely for a ciecisionon the absence
of a risk or on its im~~robability"~~.

The notion of irre.parable prejudice has evolvec. In the narrow sense,
following from the Permanent Court's interpretati~m in the case concern-
ing Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1665 bet~)eenChina und
Belgiurn 'O, prejudice is irreparable if it cannot "br made good simply by
the payment of an iridemnity or by compensation or restitution in some
other material form"'.

Evidence of this narrow view was still to be fo~nd in the AegemzSea
Continental Shelf'case, in which the Court rejectcd Greece's request on
the ground that the right which it was seeking to protect (the right to
acquire information concerning the natural resoiirces of areas of conti-
nental shelf)was "ociethat might be capable of reparation by appropriate
means" 31.

'" Dissenting opinion of Judge Thierry appended to the Crder of 2 March 1Arbi-
tral Ailurdof 31 Juiy J98Y fGuinea-Bi.~.suuv. Senegui)'rovisionu/s feu sure1C.J.
Reports 1990, p. 82.
"'P.CIf.. SeriesA, Aio.8, p. 7.
'' 1C.J. Reports1976.p. 11.para. 33. Recent case law betokens a broader conception of irreparability.

This has not - it would appear - been discussed at length in cases in
which provisional me:asures have been indicated for obvious reasons,
such as the cases concerning the Applicution of tiie Convention on the
Prevention rrndPunishment of tlzeCritne qf'Genociue (Bosnia and Herse-
govinu v. Yilgosluvia ('Serbiaand Montenegro)), al-medincidents occur-

ring in the course of'the Fïontier Dispute (Burkina Fu.solRepuhlic of
Muli), Proi~isionulMmeusuresO , rder of 10 Jutzuary 1986, and Avenu und
Othcr Me.xicunN~liorlclls(iWc.xicov. Ut~itecS l tate; of'Arrîerica1.involv-
ing the impending execution of prisoners sentence<\to the deat'h'penalty
in the United States3;'.
On the other hand, some light is shed on this question in certain cases
in which the request for the indication of provisioiial measures has been
rejected.
In the case concerriing Questions of lnterpretation and Applicutiorzof

the 1971Montreal Cuniletzrionarisingfrom the Aeriul Incident ut Locker-
hie (Libyan Arab Jarrzahiriyuv. United Kingdom,, the irreparability of
the prejudice was n~otedand expounded primatily by the dissenting
judges. Had the Security Council not adopted a i.esolution altering the
circumstances, they evould have found the reques-.for the indication of
provisional measures to bejustified. If Libya were c ompelled to surrender
the suspects, it woulci as a result lose its right to try them itself under
the Montreal Convention; conversely, if the Colrt did not intervene,
there was a risk that Libya could find itself subji:ct to coercion on the

part of the respondent powers. The Respondents were disputing the
Applicant's right to exercise its jurisdiction in the matter. Judge Ranjeva
observed :

"with respect to both its scope and its nature, the Applicant's right
would have been under threat of disappear.~nce had the contrary
claim of the Respondent been acted upon. Here, on the contrary,
under the Montreal Convention, the Responcients possess the power
to prosecute the above-mentioned suspects. l'his collision of oppos-
ing rights, a clash centred upon a question of criminal responsibility,
is the cause not only of what nlclyive11be irr~parableprejudice, but
above al1of an aggravation of the dispute . . .[Tlhe Applicant has

used a remedy (opento every State wishing to request of the Court
the legitimate protection of its right to pass -udgment."33

'2 For example, most recently the Order of 5 February :!003, in the case concerning
Avenu und 0thc.r hifexicun Nationalr (Mexico v. United Stfitrs of'Amrricrr), Pro~isionul
Mt.ustires1.('J.report.2003, p. 91, para. 55.
33 I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 73, paras. 5 and 6; emphasis aclded. Finally, in other cases there was merely a difiuse risk of prej~dice'~.

Thus in the case coi~cerningDenunciution of tlzeTreaty ($2 Novern-
ber 1865 het,r.eenClzinaand Belgiunzin 1927,President Max Huber indi-

cated provisional measures, finding that :
"in the twnt of'un infruction . . . of certain of the rights, which
Belgium or her nationals would possess in China, if the Treaty

of November 2nd, 1865, were recognized as still operative, such
infraction could inot be made good simply by the payment of an
indemnity or by compensation or restitution ir some other material
form"

The Order says nothing expressly about irreparable prejudice and lays
down the principle thrit "the object of the provisional measures in ques-
tion can only be the protection of interests which, without such measures,
ivould he injeopardy cgbeing irrc~puuably conzpromised".
In the case concerning the Electricity Company 'ifSofia und Bulgrrrirr,
the Permanent Court indicated provisional meastres against Bulgaria,
not to prevent irreparable prejudice but because the parties to a case
must abstain from an:ymeasure capable of exercisi~ga prejudicial effect

in regard to the execiition of the decision to be given. In that case, the
Belgian Government claimed that prejudice had b:en caused by acts of
the State Administration of Mines putting into force a special artificially
calculated tariff, byji~dgments of the District Cou]t and of the Court of
Appeal of Sofia, and by the 1938judgment of the C'ourtof Cassation . . .
considering that the:y had occasioned grave przjudice to a Belgian
national 3h.

In the case concerriing Fisheries Jurisdiction ( D~litedKingdonzv. Ice-
land), the risk of economic prejudice was diffuse and required an assess-
ment of the consequiences of the Icelandic regulations on the fishing
industry in the United Kingdom (risk of unemplo;~ment,decommission-
ing of fishing vessels, etc.).
In the case concerning Nuclear Tests (Austruliu v. Franc(.), the Appli-
cants cited potential health effects of atomic radiation. Australia argued:

"as the result of the French tests which have already taken place,
[Australia] coulcl have 1 case of thyroid cancer per year due to the
isotope iodine-131 and 1to 4 other cancer cas1:s ... Due to the same

isotopes, Australia could have one mutation n every 10 years lead-

" Mathieu Bouah Bile, Les niesures conseri.utoire.sindiquees pur lu Cour.de Lu Huyr
de 1923 a nos jours, Dissertation, 1986, V1pp. 109 etsril.
35 P.C I.J., SeriA, No. 8. p. 7: emphasis added.
'6 P. C:/.J.. S(,AlB. No. 79, p. 199; P.C.I.J., Series.Vo.88, pp.55-56. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P. DE CARA)
130

ing to death or disability in the first generation, and up to 50-100
deaths or disabilities in al1subsequent generatii~ns."'~

Relying upon a scientific line of argument, the French Government
contended that "to dateno evidence has been adduc8:dthat such minimal
doses as those resulting from the fall-out from the French tests are likely
to have an effect . ..".Still, the Court held that the.e could be no doubt
as to the irreparability of the prejudice.

Consequently, in the light of this jurisprudence the threat of coercive

judicial measures raised by the véqzrisitoireof 23 Jsnuary in the present
case is such as to constitute a risk of irreparable pr:judice.

First, the threat of a measure of constraint can, under the jurispru-
dence of the Court, ccinstitute a risk of irreparable prejudice. In an old,
but nonetheless significant, case before the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, the German Government requested ..he Court to indicate
to the Polish Governnient, as an interim measure of protection pending
the delivery of judgnient on the Application, that it should abstain

from any measure of constraint in respect of che property of the
Prince von Pless, on ;account of income tax, beca Ise the carrying into
effect of the measures of constraint would irremcdiably prejudice the
right and interests forming the subject of the displte. Ultimately, after
the Court had converied, Poland transmitted dec1;~rationsstating that:
the summonses for payment had been sent to the Prince by oversight;the
higher authorities in Poland having learned that rreasures of constraint
had been taken in respect of the Prince, the Government had annulled
them and undertook to suspend measures of constiaint in respect of the

Prince's incometax for another period and to refrain from collecting the
disputed taxes until the Court had finally decided t le dispute then pend-
ing before it. Finally, after agreement between tlie parties, the Court
found in its Order of 11May 1933that, in consequence of the annulment,
on the ground that an administrative error had occiirred, of the measures
of constraint against the Prince von Pless, the grounds for the German
Government's request for the indication of provisional measures had
ceased to exi~t'~.

There is indeed a risk in the uresent case that coercive measures will be
taken against aliens, against Congolese nationals wliether or not enjoying
immunity from jurisdiction, in respect of acts corrmitted in the Congo,
such measures to be decided by French judicial autliorities on the basis of
a jurisdiction conjured up under international custom.
Further, in the case concerning the United State: Diplornutic and Con-
sular Stufj in Telzran, the Court responded favourably to the United

17 Reauest for the indication of urovisional measures of i~ustralia, I.C.J. Pleudinps,
~uc1ecrr'~esrs. ol1.p. 55.
IR P.C.I.J.Srrios AIBNo. 54.pp. 151-153 CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO. P.DE CARA) 131

States request, stating, after having noted that the power to indicate pro-
visional measures presupposes that irreparable pre,ludice should not be
caused to rights which are the subject of dispute, that
"there is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of rela-
tions between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and

embassies, . ..the obligations thus assumed, notably those for assur-
ing the persona1safety of diplomats and their frsedom from prosecu-
tion, are essential, unqualified, . .."39.

The same is true aj'hrtiori when State leaders ari: involved.

Finally, in the present proceedings, the Applicant stresses that account
should be taken of
"[the perturbation caused by the proceedings in question to] the
international relations of the Republic of the Congo as a result of
the publicity accc~rded . ..to the actions of the investigating judge,

which impugn thlr honour and reputation of the Head of State, of
the Minister of the Interior and of the Inspector-General of the
Armed Forces anNdi,n consequence, the international standing of the
Congo".
It is not only that Franco-Congolese relations will bedamaged because
proceedings concerning immunities are likely to afject relations between

two States. Allegations of crimes against humanity or other State crimes
can impair the international standing of a nation and the unprecedented
proceedings initiated in France would be such as to harm the standing
and even the honour of the Congo, owing to the publicity which will
inevitably be accordeti them.

In the international order the Head of State replesents the State in al1
aspects of its international intercourse and this gerieral authority, called
the jus repruesentationis omnimodue, follows froir international law as
much as, or even mori: than, from national constitutional law. Sir Arthur
Watts summarizes the position as follows: "It may be said generally that

nowadays Heads of States through their office manifest the spirit and
grandeur of their nations as a wh01e."~~
True, the international order traditionally provides means for making
good such an injury to the standing or honour of a State and a subse-
quent judgment by the Court would constitute adequate reparation for
the damage caused to the Congo in its relations nith other members of
the international community.
On the other hand, nothing could make good 'he loss of reputation
and honour suffered by a Head of State in the eqes of his people, who

" 1.C.J. Reports 1979p. 19para. 38
40Watts, op.c'ilp. 32. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS . P DE CARA) 132

remain sensitive to pri:ss reports and propaganda disseminated by oppo-
nents. It is important to keep in mind that the present case involves an
African Head of State. Owing to the civil wars ancl tragic events having
marked the continent in recent years, rumours anc accusations directed
at one or another leader are easily given some credcnce, even though like
accusations would raise a smile or be considered frivolous elsewhere. ln
Africa the Head of State occupies a very special position, for "the people
have a stronger sense of ethnic solidarity than of ~iational or State soli-
darity", as Raymond .Aronobserved; "lacking cohcsion as a result of the
multiplicity of tribes, African States are pre-national or sub-national, as
it were, in that the SiLatedoes not have before it ,r unified nation". He

added that this new type of State

"is territorial and national: territorial in that the sovereign is entitled
to do as he pleases within its boundaries; national in that the sov-
ereign seeshiniself not as the possessor of the land nor as the master
of those occupyiiig it but as the embodiment of a peoples4'.

Accordingly, the Head of State identifies the group, he incarnates the
national will, he performs a "rallying" function, he symbolizes the exis-
tence of the nation and any accusation against him or attempted harm to
his person is perceived as an attack on the Statc he represents in the
manifestation of a certain unanimism, even thou:h that unanimism is

fleeting. This has led one author to conclude:
"An African Head of State who has been a leader and the first
witness to the national ideal, to its sovereignty, who in tomorrow's
Africa will assuredly be a soldier, has as his 1)rimemission proving
the existence of lhe State."42

Now, foreign criminal proceedings initiated under murky circumstances
against political leaders who prevailed after years of civil war can con-
tribute to destabilizing the Government. A court v~hichlends itself, even
unintentionally, to manipulation by public opinio I in a foreign country
interferes in the interna1 affairs of that State. Th s prejudice is irrepar-
able, as it undermines the legitimacy and stability of the foreign govern-
mental authority. The Court did not wish to take account of this situa-

tion. It draws an abstract, categorical distinction b:tween the rights to be
protected and the prejudice arising from the violation of those rights,
taking the view that irreparable prejudice would not be caused to the
rights as such claimed by the Congo but might be regarded as such as to
affect irreparably the rights asserted in the Applicltion. First, it appears
to me that what is at issue is not the separateness or magnitude of the
injury; the crux is whether a causal nexus betvieen the injurious act
and the damage can be established: the violation of the right or the act

4'Paix et guerre entre les nulions, 1962, pp. 394-396.
4'Bernard Asso, LP chej'd'Elut ufiiccrin, 1976, p. 346.giving rise to responsibility must be the cause of tht. prejudice. Once this
nexus has been established, it sufficesto find that thvre is prejudice or, for
the indication of provisional measures, a risk of irreparable prejudice.
Secondly, in the political order it is not possible to stop at a mechanical
analysis isolating each injury or event with a viewto connecting it with its
<f$cient cause. In itsizlf, the violation of the rigl-ts which the Congo
seeks to protect creates prejudice, for example in the case of immunity;
it can, however, also create other irreparable preiudice which may be

observed in the future. That prejudice is difficult if not impossible to
prove before it is suffered but it may be infinitel;! more serious, as in
the case of the destalbilization of the countrv. A formalistic auuroach
confining itself to consideration of the assertid rights for whick protec-
tion is sought disregards the fact that violation of one right can give
rise to a series of injuries likely to affect other rights and, more gener-
ally, legaI interests worthy of preservation. In this regard, there is
nothing to prevent the Court, in assessing the "circumstunces" calling
for the indication of provisional measures, from taking account of the

legitimate interests of a Party. Further, the development of the law of
civil liability, notably in France, shows the courts desire that the right
to compensation for an injury caused to "a right' should be extended
to the prejudice impairing a "legitimate interest" of the victim4" The
desire to preserve the interna1 stability of the coLntry, under threat of
being undermined as a result of the allegations of criminal conduct
levelled at the country's leaders, is a legitimate legal interest of the
Congo. This attack on national independence is clearly irreparable and

once the Government has been shaken, a subsequent decision by the
Court upholding the Congo's Application could come too late.

II. THERE 1s URGENCY

Even if the Court has not always specifically s.iid so (see, inter ulia,
Anglo-Iraniun Oil Co., Provisional Measures, Order of 5 July 1951)44,its
orders leave no doubt that "such measures are oiily justified if there is
urgency"4s.

The case law reveals three types.
First, the urgency rnay be patent (risk of death, zrrmedaction, threat of
destruction of property, etc.) and the Court must then demonstrate

41Terré,Ph. Simler, Y. Lequette, Droit civil: les obligation.;,8th ed., 2002, Nos. 704 et
srq.. p. 684.
441.C.J. Reports 1951. p. 93.
" Case concerning the Land and Marititne Boundury befiieen Cumeruorrand Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), iDrovisionalMeusures, Order15f.Murch 1996,1C.J. Reports
1996 (I), pp. 21-22, para. 35. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P.DE CARA) 134

diligence". Situations where both parties seek provisional measures in

similar terms revealing that urgency lies at the heart of the proceedings
also fa11into this category4'.
Secondly, in some cases. the circumstances of the urgency have to be
assessed and this indicates that urgency is a contingent or relative notion.

The Court thus defined urgency in the case concerning Pussuge tlzrough
the Great Belt (Finlundv. Derzrnartk)as follows:

"provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute are indicated
'pending the final decision' of the Court on the merits of the case,
and are therefor~eonly justified if there is urgency in the sense thut
action prejudicial to the rights of the other paity is likely to he taken

before such final decision is gi~en"~~.

Thirdly, the distinction between likelihood and possibility is sometimes
subtle and urgency may result not only from an actual imminent risk but
even from a contingent one.
Thus in the case concerning Nuclear Tests (Au~truliu v. France), Pro-
visional Merrsures,Order ($22 June 1973, in whickithe Court's finding as

to the urgency of the request was merely implicit, the Court stated:
"these allegations give substance to the Australian Government's conten-
tion that there is an immediate passibility of .ifurther atmospheric
nuclear test being cairriedout by France in the Pa~ific"~~.The same view
is expressed in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases as to the possibility of the

immediate implementation of the new Icelandic Pegulation~~~.
In other cases, urgency has been assessed not b! application of the cri-
terion of likelihood but by reference to general ccbnsiderationsrelated to
the circumstances of the case.
In the case concerning Military und Parami1;tary Actiilities in and

aguinst Nicuragua jVic~lragurr v. United States 01 Atnerlca), Provisional
Mt.asure.5,Orùer of IO Mu!' 1984, the Applicant 'claims that the urgent
need for the requested measures is shown by the fact that 'the lives and
property of Nicaraguan citizens, the sovereignty of the State and the

" As in the cases concerning the TriuI of Pukistuni Pris(jnel:~of Wur, Provision01
Meusures, Ortler of13 July 1973, Applicurion of'rhe Convention on the Prc>venrionund
Puni.slzmentof'tlle CrinofGrnocide (Bosniu und Herregovi zuv. Yugosluviu (Serhiri und
,&fontenegroji. Lund and ikritime Bounrlurjl hr!~i.t~enCrimeroorl cmrl Nigeriu (CUIFI-
eroon v. .Vigerirr). Viennu Conven~ionon Consulur Relution~ (Paraguay v. United Stuies
qf Americuj, LuGrar~d(Germuriy v. DiziredSraies qf'Arrreriruj, Avenu und Otizer Mexi-
crinNuiioncils (Mexico.v.United Strites of'Americtr) and Arn~edActivifies on the Terri-
ter].of rhrCo~go /Bimor.rf~tjt~Rrprihlir [$ flie Corzgov. (i:trnduj.
47 7rontic.r Dispute iBurkinti FusolRepuhlic of jl.luli), Pr,~i,isioncllMcrr.rucfs.Order
10 Jnnuary 1986, 1.C J.Reports 1986, p.3.
j". C.J. Reports 1991, p. 17, para. 23; emphasis added.
1.C.J. Rr,j~orfsIY7:I. p. 104, para. 26: emphasis added.
'O Fis/~eriesJuri.sdictio (United Kirrgdv.Ice/und), Pr~visiontrl~Meusures,Or&r of'
17 Augu.~t1972, 1.C.J. Reports 1972, p.16; Fisheries Juri.,diciion (Federul Republic of
Gt~rmtrq~v. Icelu17rl).Provi~ionul Meusures, Order of 17 August 1972,1.C.J. Reports
1972, p. 34. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P. DE CARA) 135

health and progress of the economy are al1 immediately at ~take"'~'.
The risk that the Niiraraguan Government would be destabilized was

potential not actual, as the "covert" activities of the United States in
Nicaragua could havc ceased at any moment.
In the case concerning Passage through the Cvat Belt (Finland v.
Denmark), the Court based its assessment on the timetable for the dis-
puted project as seen in the light of the expected course of the proceed-
ings; the Court statecl:

"placing on record the assurances given by Dtmmark that no physi-
cal obstruction of the East Channel will occur before the end of
1994, and considering that the proceedings on the mmits in the
present case wo~ild,in the normal course, be ~ompleted before that
time, [the Court] finds that it has not been shown that the right
claimed will be infringed by construction wor <during the pendency
of the pr~ceedings"~'.

In short, Finland failed to obtain the provisional ineasures sought but it
did obtain a guarantee in the form of assurances given by Denmark in
response to Finland':; request.
In the present case, the urgency remains for as long as theréquisitoireis
maintained. That ac.t of procedure creates the possibility of additional
prejudice at any time because there are no guaran.ees for the individuals

named in the complaints appended to the réquisitoire.Having regard to
the complaints transrnitted to him, the Procureuroe lu Républiqueshould
have ascertained whether he had jurisdiction and whether criminal pro-
ceedings were admissible, given the involvement of a foreign Head of
State.Had he done slo,he would have understood hat he was not entitled
to seek the opening of a judicial investigation and that he should take no
further action on those complaints and should evel refrain from ordering
a preliminary police enquiry. As it was, the prosesutor's actions resulted
in a réquisitoirewhich was vitiated by a lack of jurisdiction, was ultra
vires and was therefore void. At the same time, he allowed the investi-

gating judge, at any time, to take any measures, including measures of
coercion, against the:personalities in question and even against the Head
of State. The appended complaints were drafted with care and are not
neutral documents; by virtue of the réquisitoirewhich relied on them,
they became the basis and framework for the exerciseof the investigating
judge's jurisdiction. The réquisitoireagainst person or persons unknown
allows the judge to act, as and when he chooses, igainst the named indi-
viduals, but also ag,ainst any other persons who may be connected with
the acts referred to the judge. Moreover, there s currently no right of
appeal against the réquisitoireof 23 January, exc:pt that which could be
exercised by civilcoimplainants,individuals formally placed under judicial

51I.C.J. Reports IYXil,p. 182, para. 32.
5'I.C.J. ReporflYY/,p. 18, para. 27; emphasis added.examination, the prosecutor if he receives such an order, or the investi-
gating judge under Article 170 of the Code of Criniinal Procedure. Indi-
viduals who have not been placed under judicial examination but who are
named in cornplaints remain powerless. Accordingly, only the French
Government, by instructions given to the Procurt ur général, would be
able to terminate the deleterious effect of the réqu sitoire of 23 January.
1sit really necessary for the President of the Rerublic of the Congo or

any other senior Congolese figures or citizens of th;~tState to be formally
placed under judicial examination, held in police custody, irnprisoned,
committed to the Assize Court for trial or convicte~i,before the preserva-
tion of the Congo's rights can be regarded as urgent?
It moreover appeai-spointless to consider that tlie Congo could subse-
quently seisethe Court of a new request for the indication of provisional
measures if a further threshold were to be crossed in the French criminal
proceedings. The prejudice already exists. It is urgent to forestall the

possibility of thatprejudice becoming irreparable.
More generally, urgency may also arise from the fact that it would
otherwise be necessary to wait until the Court rulf:d on the merits, since
any subsequent reparation of prejudice caused by 1he continuation of the
judicial proceedings against the personalities concerned would be quite
illusory.
As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht observed :

"from the point of view of the plaintiff State, an Order indicating
interim measures may be of such urgency that to postpone it until
the Court has finally decided, in proceedings which may take a long

time, upon the question of its jurisdiction cn the merits may well
render the remedy illusory as the result of the destruction of the
object of the dispute or for other reasonsf15'

This consideration takes on added significance given the refusal by the
Agent of the French Government to make any commitment, promise or
even arrangement, clespitethe express suggestion by one of the Congo's
counsel 54.

III. THEREIS A RISK OF.AGGRAVATIO ORNEXTENSIO OF THE DISPUTE

Byvirtue of Article 41, the Court has the power to indicate provisional
measures in order to prevent any aggravation or rxtension of the dispute
when it considers that the circumstances so requ~re~~.

" The DevelopmentouInternationul Law hy the Internatic nul Court, 1958,pp. 110-111.
j4CR 2003122,p. 13.
5'Frontier Dispute (Burkina FusolRepuhcfMali), Proi~isionulMeusures, Orcfr
10 Junuu,-1986,I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 9. para. 18. The Court can thuij seek to prevent incidents or even to maintain the
status quo.
In cases concerning an armed conflict or those tl-at have already led to
the loss of human life or material damage, the prctection of the parties'
rights includes the need to prevent any aggravation or extension of the
dispute. But this has also been observed in other cases, for example the
Anglo-Irunicrn Oil Co., Fi.sh~rie.sJurisdiction, Nucleur Tests and United
States Diplomatie anil Consulur Stuff in Tehran caiies,in connection with
the indication of specificprovisional measures.

In the Frontier Di.vputecase, the Court went q~ite far because it con-
sidered that :

"independently of the requests submitted by the Parties for the indi-
cation of provisional measures, the Court .. .possesses by virtue of
Article 41 of the Statute the power to indicatg:provisional measures
with a viewto preventing the aggravation or extension of the dispute
whenever it conisidersthat circumstances so req~ire"'~,

which indicated a certain evolution froiil the strict position previously
adopted in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelfcase, when it had refused to
settle that issues7.
In the case concerning Application of the Conveiztionon the Prevention
und Punishment of the Crime cf Genocide (Bosr,ia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslaviu (Serhiu ~zndMoritenegro)), in 1993,t'le Court ruled that the
two parties "should inottake any action and should ensure that no action
is taken which may aggravate or extend the exist ng disputens8.

More generally, it may be suggested that the objective of non-aggrava-
tion and non-extension of the dispute, or even the maintaining of the
status quo, is not only related to the protection o" the parties' rights, but
also constitutes a balsisfor the indication of provisional measures5'.
Accordingly, the Court seems inclined to take nto account al1the cir-
cumstances of the case and it would appear that minimal provisional
measures were appropriate here, with a view to maintaining the status
quo in the disputed proceedings initiated in Franre. In the case concern-
ing Questions of Ifilterpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal

Convention urising.from the Aerial Incident ut Lockerbie (Lihyun Arub
Jumahiriya v. United Kingdom). the dissenting judges singled out this
aspect of the Court's jurisprudence and considered that instead of
focusing on a reviervof each prerequisite to the iidication of provisional
measures, the Court may give preference to an overall analysis of the
circumstances of the case and "on that basis, [decide] to indicate [such]

sh 1C.J. Reports19815 ,. 9, para. ;8emphasis added
57 1.C.J. RL>PO~19S711,p. 13, para. 42.
'V.C J. Reports1993, p. 24, para. 52.
See S. Oda, opcil.measures in the general terms of an exhortation to al1the parties not to
aggravate or extend the dispute" or "[call] on th,: Parties to avoid al1
escalation" 60.
In the present case, one episode in the proceedings before the Court
should have led it to adopt such a solution. During the hearings, counsel
for the Congo suggested that the representatives O 'the French Republic
ask the Court "formally to place on record the sccpe which they ascribe

to the réqui~itoire"~'. That proposition fell short of the request for the
indication of provisional measures and would havi: been less demanding
than the requested suspension of the proceedings. The Agent of France,
however, rejected the offer and refused to make any promises, simply
referring to "the state of French law", even thougli the issue in this case
is not the state of French law in such matters or aiiy abstract guarantees
it may offer. but rather the existence and maintairiing of the réquisitoire
of 23 January 2002. The Court took note of the Agent's statements in its
Order, but without stipulating their scope, and tliose statements fail to
provide any guarantee capable of counterbalanci~ig the decision to dis-
miss the request for the indication of provisional :neasUres.The Court's

solution is somewhat ambiguous because the statements by the Agent of
France presented it viith two alternatives. Either tliey were statements of
law: French law prohibits the prosecution of a fxeign Head of State;
French law subjects the jurisdiction of French courts in respect of acts
committed abroad to certain conditions which preclude the exercise of a
universal jurisdiction purportedly founded on iniernational custom. In
the Nucleur Tests ca:se,the Court held that

"It is well recognized that declarations matle by way of unilateral
acts, concerning legal or factual situations, Inay have the effect of
creating legal obligations .. . When it is the intention of the State
making the declilration that it should become bound according to its
terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a
legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to fol-
low a course of conduct consistent with the tleclarati~n."~~

Under these circumstances, the Court was not only entitled to take note
of the statements but also to hold that the indication of provisional meas-
ures was pointless because it could not doubt th.it the French Govern-
ment would enforce its own law. The statements )y the French Govern-
ment's Agent thus had the effect of "creating le,:al obligations" and it
was incumbent upon the French authorities to assume any practical con-
sequences. Such a solution, capable of putting an end to the dispute, falls

perfectly within the Court's mission because it is established jurispru-
dence that the judicial settlement of international ,lisputes, with a view to

"'I.C.J. Reports 199.?, dissenting opinion of President Bedjaoui, p. 48, para. 32;
di6'CR 2003122,p. 13.utige Ranjeva, p. 76, para. 12.
621.C.J. Rq~orts 1974, p. 267, para. 43. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P DE CARA) 139

which the Court was established, is "simply an alternative to the direct

and friendly settlement of such disputes between tl-e partie^"^'.
Or the statements by the Agent of France were simply question-
begging and intended for dramatic effect, thus obliging the Court to take
the viewthat France had no "intention of becomingbound". But, if this was
not a unilateral promise64,the Court was entitled t3 consider the signifi-
cance of France's reluctance to make any promises and entitled to draw
the appropriate conclilsions. The Parties are in fact essentially agreed on

the general terms of French law on the subject but, with respect to the
crux of the dispute, stemming from the prosecutor s actions, the French
Government's refusal to make any commitment thus leaves a risk of
aggravation of the dispute for so long as the im~ugned riyuisitoire of
23 January 2002 remains in force. That reserve on the part of the French
Government's Agent inay perhaps be explained by ronstitutional consid-

erations relating to the separation of powers and to the independence of
the judiciary. However, in the international order, the Government rep-
resents the State in al1its aspects and is entitled to bind any authority,
including judicial bodlies,ufortiori when the initiztion of criminal pro-
ceedings is at issue. The International Law Comrrission thus observed:

"the conduct of any State organ acting in that capacity shall be con-
sidered an act of that state under internaticnal law, whether the
organ exerciseslegislative,executive,judicial, cr any other functions,
whatever position it holds in the organization of the StateWh5.

The Court has already had occasion to take note of the breach by a
Government which, irineglecting to enforce its owr laws, failed to ensure

compliance with international law. In the case concerning United States
Diplornutic und Consulur StajJ in Trhrun, it observed that the Iranian
Government had failed to take any measures to protect persons who
enjoyed diplornatic and consular immunities. It rccalled that a State is
under an obligation to take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on
the person, freedom or dignity of agents under threat. The Court con-
cluded that whilst the Iranian authorities were awa -eof their obligations,

they failed to use the means which were at their dijposal to comply with
those obligations; in particular, the Court consider-d it "necessary . ..to
stress that, if the interition to submit thehostages to any form of criminal
trial or investigation were to be put into effect, tkat would constitute a

Frre Zones of Iippcr Savoy and the L)i.stri(ifGex, grder of 19 Auguai lY2Y.
P.C.I.J.. S6,rie.cANo. 27,v. 13.
64J.-P. Jacqué,"A propos de la promesse unilatérale", M6k1ngrsofàPaul Reuter.
1981, p. 327.
"'Article 4 of ILC DraFt Articles on State Responsibility, I'ifty-second Session(2000),
AlCN.4lL.600: in the Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999concc:rningthe Differencr Relut-
;~igIo Inir>~uni/rom L~gul Pr«cess <i Jr'peciul Rupport ?ur of tlic, Curnt?zon.~ion
Hutilcin Rights the Court cited a similar text corresponding to an earlier draft of that
Articlc from the Yi,urhooliof tlic It~terrLairoCon~nziss;oti,1973, Vol. II. p. 193.grave breach by Iran of its obligations" 66.A jortior~, when a State claims

that its own law is in compliance with international law and when it con-
siders that there is no reason to "[suppose] that in the future [its]courts
would move away frorn respecting the law they are required to apply" 67,
the international forurn before which such statements are made need not
confine itself to taking note of them but may alsc, interpret them as a
commitment by that State. In the dispute concernir g Filleting ivithin the
Gulf' of Saint La~vrenc:e, among more innocuous comments concerning

cod fishing, the Arbitration Tribunal stated:
"Having regard to the circumstances in which it was made, the
Tribunal is boundlto consider that such a stateinent commits France

to use al1 the means in its power to ensure, in conjunction with
the Canadian authorities, that the commitment is re~pected."~~

In the present case, France should thus have been reminded of its duty

to ensure compliance with its own laws, inasmuch .is they enshrine rules
and principles of international law in its domestic xder; the assurances
given during the hearings as to the conformity of French law with inter-
national law would be vain unless accompanied by the appropriate
decisions because

"[olne of the basic principles governing the creation and perform-
ance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of
good faith. Trust and confidence are inhe -ent in international
cooperation . . ."6"

The jurisprudence shows that domestic statutes are not immune to the
effects of a judgment of the Court and that a State may be obliged to
strike down a domestic statute which is held to be in breach of its inter-
national obligations7". A fortiori,the execution of a decision of the Court

may require the Government of a State to tate an administrative
ineasure, such as, in the present case, issuing instrirctions to the judicial
authority. In its Adviijory Opinion concerning the .9@rence Reluting to
Imtnunity fionz Legul Process of u Special Rupportipurof'the Commis.sion
on Human Right.5, the Court held that the obligation to comply with the
requirements relating to the immunities granted to experts was "an obli-

h6 I C.J. Reports 1980, ]>p.13. 30. 33, 37.
" Statement of the Agent of France, CR2003/23. p. 7, cit:d in paragraph 33 of the
Order.
Arbitral Award of 17July 1986, Canada-France Arbitration Tribunal. Internutionul
Luiv Reports. Vol. 82, pp. 590 et seq., p. 637, para. 63 (2).
hy iYUcle(T<JSW /.41lstr0Y.uFrunc~). Jiirlgrnent,I.C.J. Rr,llorts 1974, p. 268, para. 46.
Certc~irlGermun Interests ipolis/^Upper Silrsiu, Juri:diction, Mrrits, Judgrnrnt
No. 7. 1926; Ft~ctoryut C/~oi.xhr,,Merits, Jud~mrnt No. 13, 1528; case concerning Righrs
of Ntrtionrrof tlte C'nitea'States of Anlerica in Morocco, JuiIgrnent of27 August 1952;
Fisheries JurisdictifnUniteriKingdom v.Icrland), Merits, .rud~nzeritof25 July 1974:
Fisherirs Jurisdiction iFe(ieral Republic of Gertnv.yIcel<rnd),iMerits, Judgmeat of
25 Jzrli:1974. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P DE CARA) 141

gation of result and not of means to be emploqed in achieving that
result". Malaysia conitended that it had complied vith its obligation by
enacting the necessary legislation and that Malaysi in courts had not yet
come to a final decisiisn concerning the right of the Special Rapporteur
concerned, Mr. Cumaraswamy, to enjoy immunity from legal process.
The Court rejected those arguments, concludin,; that governmental
authorities had an obligation to inform the nation; 1courts concerned of

the status of the officia1and in particular of his immunity from legal
process, since the proper application by those cou .ts of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United N~tions was dependent
on such information. Having failed to transmit that information to the
competent courts, Malaysia had not complied with its international obli-
gation''.
Similarly, at the current stage of the proceeding:,, the French Govern-
ment cannot simply a~bstainfrom acting. True, as the Permanent Court
of International Justice recalled, there is a

"principle universally accepted by internationid tribunals .. .to the
effect thatpartiersto a case must abstain from any measure capable
of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the
decision to be given and, in general, not allov any step of any kind

to be taken which might aggravate or extend the di~pute"'~.

However, that duty of abstention does not guarantee that the Congo's

rights will not continue to be violated during the ciiminal proceedings. It
would thus be incumbent upon the French Gover lment to give instruc-
tions to the Procureur géntral so that al1judicial measures be taken
with a view to annulling the impugned réquisitoir?, which threatens the
immunity of the Head of State and encroaches upon the jurisdiction
of Congolese courts, in order to "remedy any errcrs"".
In the absence of any specificconimitment by l'rance with respect to
the scope that it ascribes to that act of procedure, under the present cir-
cumstances, the suspension of the French procedural measures, which are

currently confined essentially to the réquisitoire of 23 January 2002,
would have been con'duciveto precluding any aggravation of the dispute,
by maintaining the si.atusquo without affecting tf e balance between the
Parties' respectiverights.

(Signed) Iean-Yves DE CARA

''DiJ-ferenceRelutin10Imt?~unityfrom Legal Pi.ocofs3SpeciczlRapporteur of'the
Commission on Human Ri~ht.7,I.C.J. Repurfs 1999 (I), pp. 36-88,paras. 57-65.
''Electriciv Company of'Sofia und Buigariu. Ordeof.;Decemher 1939, P.C.I.J.,
Series AIE, No. 79. p. 199.
73Mr. Abraham. Agent of France, CR 2003123,p. 14.

Bilingual Content

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. LE JUGE DE CARA

Singularitk de I'ajfaire- Droits Liprotkger - Répartition des compi'tences
j~tridictionnelles- Immunité de juridiction - Inviolabiliti- Dignitk du chef
de I'Etat - Risque de préjudice - Caruct6re irriparable -- Urgence - Risque
d'aggraiution du dtflérend - Déclarationsd'utzcPartie a I'audirnce -- Bonne

foi - Obligation d'informer I'uutoritéjudiciaire.

L'affaire dont la Cour est saisie affecte un Etat d'Afrique. Cela lui
donne une dimension particulière. Non seulement elle concerne un pays
marquépar des déchirementsconstants et des crises répétéed sepuis qu'il
a accédé à l'indépendanceen 1960,mais encore elle l'oppose à l'ancienne
puissance coloniale. Elle met en cause, notamment, le chef de 1'Etatqui,

sur ce continent, est l'incarnation de la nation.
«Pays sans unité»,la Républiquedu Congo présente une diversité géo-
graphique à laquelle correspond un ensemble humain composite réuni,
un moment, par le chemin de fer et l'intégrationcoloniale dans l'Afrique
équatoriale française autour de Brazzaville'.
Passéla décolonisation, s'est ouvert un temps de déchirements quand,

repliésur lui-même,le pays s'est doté, après une périoded'incertitudes
ouverte par l'insurrection des ((Trois Glorieuses)) (1963). d'un régime
militaire marxiste qui, en plus de vingt années,n'a mis un terme ni aux
flottements ni aux assassinats. En 1991, le pays retrouve son nom, son
drapeau, son hymne et ses symboles acquis lors de l'indépendance.La

crise économique,en dépitdes ressources minérales, et laguerre civileont
alors embrasé le pays. Peu familier des institutions démocratiques, le
Congo a retrouvé ses divisions ethniques et régionales: de farouches
affrontements ont opposé les milices, zoulou, ninja, cobra, et l'armée,
tandis que les étrangers fuyaient la contrée, singulièrement après 1997.
Au cours de ces violences, des milliers de personnes ont été déciméo eu

ont disparu, en particulier en 1999 au port fluvial de Brazzaville. Les
armes se taisent au gré desredditions hebdomadaires de bandes de mili-
ciens, mais de sourdes rivalités etoppositions demeurent, perpétuant la
lutte sur le terrain politique, par la propagande ou dans la clandestinité.
Ces circonstances tragiques et la fragilitédu pays où la paix civile se
rétablit lentement expliquent que le Gouvernement de la Républiquedu

Congo ait saisi la Cour à la suite de certaines procédures pénales déclen-
chées enFrance.
En outre, la singularitédu dossier tient au fait que pour la première
fois la Cour est saisie d'une affaire dans laquelle la compétence a été

'Yves Lacoste, Dictionnaire de géopoliticlue,1997.

18 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE CARA

Distinctivent>s.O~L'LIS~- Riglzts to hepreserved - Di iision (fjurisdiction-
Itnnmunity jrom jurisdiction - Inviolability-- Dignity oj Heud ifStore - Risk
oj'prcjudice -- lrreparubility - Urgency - Risk of ag::ravation of dispute -
Stuteruieritsby a pcrrtj,ut lzeuri~~g s Good,filitlz - Oh'igation tu i~zfoïtn,judi-
ciu/ uut/~ority,

The case before the Court concerns an African 'State.That gives it a
distinctive dimension. Not only does it concern a country marked by con-

stant upheavals and repeated crises since it gained independence in 1960,
it also pits that country against the former colonial power. It involves, in
particular, the Head of State and in Africa the Head of State embodies
the nation itself.
A "country without unity", the Republic of the Congo exhibits a geo-
graphical diversity matched by the heterogeneity c~fits people, brought

together, at a certain point in time, by the railway and by colonial inte-
gration into French Equatorial Africa, centred on Brazzaville'.
Decolonization was followed by a time of uphea\al when, withdrawing
into itself after a period of uncertainty starting with the "Trois Glo-
rieuses" uprising (1963), the country came under a Marxist military
régime, which failed oves a period of more than 20 years to put an end to

the instability and killings. In 1991, the country claimed back its name,
its flag, its national anthem and its symbols, as firs: adopted on indepen-
dence. The country was subsequently torn asundix- by economic crisis,
despite its mineral resources, and by civilwar. Having little experience of
democratic institutions, the Congo once again frac!ured along ethnic and
geographical lines: fierceclashes occurred between the Zoulou, Ninja and

Cobra militias and tlne army, whilst foreign naticnals fled the country,
especially after 1997. Thousands were massacred 3r disappeared during
the confrontations, in particular in 1999at the river port of Brazzaville.
The fighting has subsided as each week has brougk t surrenders by rnilitia
elements. but sustained rivalries and onuosi.i.n rernain and the conflict is
being pursued, through propaganda and covertly, at the political level.
These tragic circumstances, together with the instability of the country,

where peace is slowly being restored. explain why he Government of the
Rewublic of the Congo seiGed the Court in resDoIse to certain criminal
proceedings initiated in France.
The case is also distinctive in that this is the fiist time that the Court
has been seised of a case in which the respondl:nt has expressly con-

'Yves Lacoste. Dlctionnciire de g6opolitiyue. 1997.117 CERTAINES PROCEDURES PÉNALES (OP. DISS .E CARA)

acceptée expressémentpar la défenderesseaux fins de la demande du
Congo sur la base de l'article 38,paragraphe 5, du Règlementde la Cour
et il n'y a pas lieu de s'attarder sur la compétencerima jucir de la Cour.

Elle tient ensuite au lien intime entre la procédureen indication de me-
sures conservatoires et la procédure au fond. Les droits de chacune des
Parties que la Cour doit protéger consistent d'une part dans l'exercicede
la compétencejudiciaire territoriale et personnelle du Congo et l'immu-
nitédes personnalités congolaises mises en cause et en particulier, mais
pas seulement, celle du chef de 1'Etat; ils consistent d'autre part dans la
prétention a l'exercice d'une compétenceuniverselle fondéesur la cou-
tume internationale. Il est nécessaire aussi B ce stade de considérer
l'ensemble des conséquencesque la violation alléguée desdroits du
Congo peut entraîner. La singularitédu dossier tient enfin au contraste

entre l'étatdu droit français en la matière etlesactes intempestifs adoptés
ou les mesures susceptibles d'êtreprises par les procureurs et les juges
français.
La demande au fond est assortie d'une demande en indication de
mesure conservatoire qui «tend iifaire ordonner la suspension immédiate
de la procéduresuivie par lejuge d'instruction du tribunal de grande ins-
tance de Meaux)) *.
Aux termes de l'article 41, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour, celle-ci
<(ale pouvoir d'indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances l'exigent,
quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent êtresprises à

titre provisoire)).
L'article75 du Règlement de la Cour préciseque:
«1. La Cour peut a tout moment décider d'examiner d'office si les

circonstances de I'affaire exigent l'indication de mesures conserva-
toires que les parties ou l'une d'ellesdevraient prendre ou exécuter.
2. Lorsqu'une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
lui est présentée, laCour peut indiquer des mesures totalement ou
partiellement différentesde cellesqui sont sollicitées, ou des mesures
à prendre ou a exécuterpar la partie mêmedont émanela demande. »

Il ressort de ces textes que l'indication de mesures conservatoires relève
du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la Cour. Cette dernière l'exerceen fonction
des circonstances de chaque espèceet elle peut exercer d'officece pouvoir
qui en somme ne connaît pas de limites'. L'essentielest que la Cour ne
préjugepas du fond et «laisse intact le droit du défendeur de fairevaloir
ses moyens»4. L'objectif est de sauvegarder les droits des parties tels que

"equête de la République du Congo, p. 16.
B. Ajibola, opinion individuelle jointe a l'ordonnance du 10janvier 1996en l'affaire
de la Frontièreterrestre et niarifime entre le Cn~neroun et le Nigbria ('Cunierotrn
c. Nigéria), C.1.J. Recueil 1996 (l), p. 35.
Anglo-Iruniun Oil Co., n~rsures conservatoires. orclotznance du 5 juillet 1951,
C.LJ. Recueil 195p. 93. CERTAIN CRllLlINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P.DE CARA) 117

sented, under Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, to jurisdic-
tion in respect of an application (here, that of the C~ngo), and there has
been no need to consi'derthe prima facie jurisdictim of the Court. Its
distinctiveness also lies in the close relationship between the proceedings
on provisional measures and the proceedings on the merits. The Parties'

respective rights to be protected by the Court are, on the one hand, the
Congo's claim to territorial and persona1 jurisdicticm and the immunity
of the Congolese personalities involved - in particular, but not exclu-
sively, that of the Head of State - and, on the other, the claim to uni-
versa1jurisdiction based on international custom. 1 is thus necessary at
this stage to consider al1the consequences that may ;irisefrom the alleged
violation of the Congo's rights. The distinctive nzture of the case lies

lastly in the contrast between the relevant French law as it now stands
and the inappropriate measures taken or capable cf being taken by the
French prosecutors and judges.

The Application ori the merits is accompanied by a request for the
indication of a provisional measure whereby the Congo "seeks an order
for the immediate suspension of the proceedings being conducted by the

investigating judge of the Meaux Tribunal de grande irzsfance"'.
Under Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Court's Statute, the Court has
"the power to indicate, if it considers that circumsiances so require, any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either party".
Article 75 of the Rides of Court provides that:

"1. The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu
whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of pro-
visional measures which ought to be taken or eomplied with by any

or al1of the parties.
2. When a recluest for provisional measures has been made, the
Court may indicate measures that are in wholtt or in part other than
those requested, or that ought to be taken or complied with by the
party which has itself made the request."

These provisions show that the indication of provisional measures falls
within the Court's power of discretion, which it exercisesaccording to the
circurnstances of eaclhparticular case, and the Court may exercise this
discretion, which is basically unfettered3, pvopril, nzotu. The essential

point is that the Court must not prejudge the meriis of the case and must
leave "unaffected the right of the Respondent tc submit argumentsu4.

Application of the Republic of the Congo, p. 17.
' B. Ajibola, separate opinion appended to the Order of 10 January 1996in the case
concerning the Land unci Moritirne Bounduiy hetivren Cur,zeroon und Nigeria(Crinl-
erooAnglo-Irunirin Oil Cc,'.,ProvisiorzulMeusures, Orde.iJuly 1951.1.C.J. Reports
IYiI. p. 93.118 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES (OP.DISS. DE CARA)

les définira la décisionde la Cour et qu'elle le fera dans l'intérêé t gal des
deux parties5.Encore faut-il que «les droits allégués dont il est demandé

qu'ils fassent l'objet de mesuresconservatoires» soient ((l'objet de l'ins-
tance pendante devant la Cour sur le fond de l'affaire))6.

Toutefois, la jurisprudence a préciséles conditions d'indication de
mesures conservatoires, résuméespar une formule désormais insérée

régulièrementdans les ordonnances de la Cour, comme elle l'est ici au
paragraphe 22'.
La Cour a ainsi ajoutéau texte du Statut qui se limite à lui donner le
pouvoir d'apprécierselon les circonstances8. Unejurisprudence bien éta-
blie conduit donc dans chaque espèce a vérifier s'il existe un risque
sérieuxqu'un préjudiceirréparable soit porté auxdroits des parties et en

particulier de la partie demanderesse, en l'espècela Républiquedu Congo,
et s'ily a urgence à l'indication de mesures conservatoires. La Cour dis-
pose néanmoinsd'une grande latitude dans l'exercice de safonction judi-
ciaire en matière de mesures conservatoires et elle peut estimer qu'il n'est
pas utile de prendre de telles mesures en raison du comportement ou des

déclarations des parties ou, au contraire, elle peut déciderd'autres me-
sures que celles qui ont étésollicitéesou encore en indiquer d'office.

La Cour n'a pas cru pouvoir faire droit a la demande en indication de
mesure conservatoire présentéepar le Congo et je regrette de ne pouvoir

m'associer à sa décisioncar il me semble que l'élément essentied lu dos-
sier a éténSgligé:la piècemaîtresse du procès estle réquisitoiredu 23jan-
vier 2002. Cet acte de poursuite fonde et cornmande l'ensemble despro-

Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. The Laiv und Proceclurï oltlie Internutional Coirrtof Justice.
vol. II, p. 544.
" Affaire relatiàela Sentence urbitrule (lu31 iui1lt.t1989 iGuini.e-Bissau c",SPni.aulJ.
inesiires conservc~toires1J. Recueil 1990, p. 70.
' Munda/ d'urrêt(lu II avril ZOO0[Ri.pziblique clétnocrcrt~r/uCongo c. Belgique).
C.I.J. Recueil 2000, p. 201, par. 69; Activites uriizles sur le territcliredu Congo (RPpu-
hliqlredi2mocrutiyuedu Congo(,.Ougandu), C.I.J. Rec1~c~i1200p.. 127,par. 39; Conven-
tion de Vienne sur les relutions consicluires (Pnruguci.~ c. Etuts- L'tzi.~d'.Anzi>rique),
C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 257, par. 35.
Le juge Oda a résuméles conditions qui se dégagent dela jurisprudenc:
«ces droits sont ceux sur lesquels il doit êtrestatuéau stade de l'examen au fond et
qui font l'objet de la requêteou sont directement mis en cause par celle-ci.ac-
tère d'urgencede l'action ou de son interdiction constitue une condition préalable. La
violation potentielle ou effective des droitsauvegarder doit être de celles aux-
quelles il ne peut êtreremédiépar le versement d'une indemnité ou l'octroi'iine
réparation qui seraient ultérieurement fixéspar un arrêtrendu sur le fond, et ce préju-
dice irréparable doit être imminent. (E.s.soj3sin Honozrof Sir Robert Jentzings,
p. 551.) [Trczduction du Grtgfi..]
Dans son opinion dissidente jointà l'ordonnance du 2 mars 1990, le juge Hubert
Thierry soutient mêmeque, «dès lors que les circonstances exigent de telles mesures. elles
[les mesures conservatoires]oivent êtreprises (art. 41))) (Seizteizcerrrbitrrrledu 31 juil-
let 1989 (Girin<'e-Bissu~ci. Si.négci1).i~~rsurcscon.ser.r.utoircs.C'1.J. Rrcur~il1990, p. 79).The objective is to preriervethe parties' rights as subjequently determined
by the decision of the Court and to do so in the intrrests of both parties
equally5. It is moreover necessary for "the alleged rights sought to be
made the subject of provisional measures" to be "tlie subject of the pro-

ceedings before the Court on the merits of the case"6.
However, jurisprudence has clarified the conditicms for the indication
of provisional measures, summed up by language now regularly inserted
into the Court's orders, as it is in paragraph 22 of the present Order7.

The Court has accordingly supplemented the text of the Statute, which
simply grants it discretion depending on the circuvv~stances! Well-estab-
lished case law thus cidls for a determination in each case as to whether
there is a serious risk of irreparable prejudice bein;: caused to the rights
of the parties and in particular of the applicant, in his case the Republic

of the Congo, and whether there is an urgent need for the indication of
provisional nleasures. The Court nevertheless enjoqs considerable leeway
in the exercise of its judicial function with respect to provisional meas-
ures: it may take the biewthat ordering such measures would be pointless

owing to the conduct or statements of the parties; on the other hand, it
may decide on measures other than those requeited or even indicate
measures proprio rzotu.
The Court did not !;eefit to uphold the Congo's -equest for the indica-
tion of a provisional measure and 1 regret that 1 was unable to vote in

favour of the decision because 1 consider the cru?: of the case - the
cornerstone of the proceeding in question, the riquisitoire (prosecutor's
application for judicial investigation) of 23 Januarj 2002 - to have been

Sir Gerald Fitz,mauric~:,The Luit:und Procedurofthe Int :rnational Court of'luslice,
Vol. II, p. 544.
fiCase conccrning the Arhitrul Abourtiof31 July 1989 iGuir~ou-Bissuuv. Senegal), Pro-
i>isionrl 4eusure.s,1.C.J. Reports 1990. p. 70.
.4rresr Wurrcznfof ll April 2000 iDrrnocrutic Rrprrhlic of'rhr Congov.Brlgiutn),
I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 201, para. 69; Arnled Activities on he Territory of the Congo
iDrnzocrrrtic Rc~pzrhlof the Cor~gov. C'guridu),1.C.J. Repcrts 2000, p. 127, para. 39:
Tiic,nrironic~ntiorron Con.su/crrRe1fition.riPcrruv.qL7nifetlSture~of.4mc,ricrrjC.J.
Rtports 1998. p. 257, para. 35.
Judge Oda summed up as follows the conditions defined b:ithe jurisprudence:
"the rights in question areose to be confronted at the inerits stage of the case, and
which coiistitute or are directly engaged by the subject of the application. The
urgency of the relevant action or inhibition is a prercquisite. The anticipated or
actual breach of the rights to be preserved ought to be cne that could not be erased
by the payment of reparation or compensation to be orccred in later judgment on
the merits. and thisirreparableprejudice must be imrniiieiit." (Esscrysiri HoO/ur
Sir Rohrrt Jennings, p. 551.)

Vn his dissenting opinion appended to the Order of 2 March 1990. Judge Hubert
Thierry even contends that "if the circumstances actually tequire such measures. they
[the provisional measures] 'o~cglzrt'o be taken (Art. 41)" (Arbitral A~r~urdof31 Jlrlj'
1989 (G~~ineir-Bisstu. !knegul), Pror.i.siol rusurrs, 1.C J. Reporrs 1990p. 79).cédurespénales enFrance9 et il constitue le nŒud gordien du différend
qui oppose les Parties devant la Cour. Au stade des mesures conserva-
toires, il est la source du risque de préjudiceirréparable, étant entendu
que les droitsà protéger feront l'objet de la discussion au fond. Or, j'in-
cline à penser, respectueusement, que l'approche formelle de la Cour l'a

conduite à s'attacher aux termes générauxdu droit français et non à cet
élémentdont l'examen s'imposait au stade des mesures conservatoires. Je
ne peux donc, quel que soit mon souhait, souscrire au raisonnement ni
au dispositif de la présenteordonnance pour les raisons suivantes.

De la requêteet des plaidoiries se dégagentles droits dont la Répu-
blique du Congo cherche à assurer la protection en raison du risque de
préjudice irréparable que l'ouverture de certaines procédures pénales
en France laisse peser sur eux.

A. Les droits riprottger
Au cours de la procédure orale,il a étésouvent fait référence àl'affaire
relative au Mrrndzltd'arrêdt u II avril2000 (Rkpublique dktér?zocrutiq due

Congo c. Belgique) ; toutefois, la situation étaitdifférentecar la mesure
en cause étaitun mandat d'arrêtinternational émiscontre le ministre des
affaires étrangères,susceptible de porter préjudiceàl'intéressénon par sa
diffusion, mais seulement au moment où il y eût étérépondupar un Etat
tiers quiy eût donné suite. Inversement, dans la présente affaire,il s'agit
d'actes d'ouverture d'une procédure judiciaire: enquêtepréliminaire,
information judiciaire sur réquisitoiredu procureur, garde à vue et audi-
tion comme témoin assistédu généralDabira, demande d'audition du
chef de 1'Etat comme témoin, sans considération pour l'information
ouverte par le tribunal de grande instance de Brazzaville.

Or, certaines de ces mesures qui peuvent apparaître préparatoires sont
en réalité des actesde poursuite qui affectent, sans que cette appréciation
préjugedu fond, aussi bien la compétencejuridictionnelle de la Répu-
blique du Congo que le statut international des autorités congolaises

mises en cause.

1) Tout d'abord, le premier droit invoqué par le Congo résulte du
principe de l'«égalitésouveraine)) des Etats qui, selon lui, interdià un

la République)) (art. 80 du code de procédure pénalefrançais).quisitoiredu procureur de

21disregarded. That prosecutorial act is the basis for and governs al1the
criminal proceedings pending in Franceyand it coiistitutes the Gordian
knot of the Parties' dispute before the Court. At the provisional measures
stage it represents the source of the risk of irreparable prejudice, given
that the rights to be protected will be the subject cbfthe proceedings on
the merits. 1am inclined to believe, however, with al1due respect, that the
Court's formal approach has led itto rely on the geieral terms of French
law and not on this key factor which needed to be considered at the pro-

visional measures stage. 1am thus unable, contrar!, though that may be
to my wishes, to support either the reasoning or the dispositd of the
present Order for the following reasons.

The rights which the Republic of the Congo sought to protect from the
risk of irreparable prejudice raised by the openirg of certain criminal
proceedings in France are apparent from its Application and oral argu-
ment.

During the oral pr~oceedings,frequent reference was made to the case
concerning the Arresl Wurrunt of II April2000 (L~enzocraticRepublic of
the Congo v. Belgiurn). However, the situation wai different in that case
because the dis~uted measure was an internationa arrest warrant issued
against the ~inister iforForeign Affairs, capable of causing prejudice ta
the person concerned not by virtue of its circulatio~ibut only upon poten-
tial execution by a third State. By contrast, the pre Gentcase concerns acts

initiating judicial proceedings: preliminary police cnquiry, judicial inves-
tigation on the application of the prosecutor, polize custody and exami-
nation as té~~'ui n(S.S~S(l;gally represented \vitness) of General Dabira,
and an application ILOquestion the Head of State as witness, without
regard for the judicial investigation opened by t le Trihunul de grande
insturzceof Brazzaville.
Some of those measures, which may appear preliminary, are in fact
acts of prosecution which - although this is not to prejudge the
merits - interfere both with the jurisdiction OFthe Republic of the

Congo and with the international standing of the Congolese authorities
involved.

(1) To begin with,the first right invoked by the Congo stems from the
principle of the "sovereign equality" of States, which, according to the

" "The investigating judge can only investigate by virtue of a réquisitoir~issued by the
Procureur(teItRépubli<ruc"(Art. 80 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure). 120 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PENALES (OP. DISS. DE CARA)

Etat de s'attribuer ((unilatéralement une compétence universelle en
matière pénale)). Il apparaît en effet que lesmesuresjudiciaires françaises
sont susceptibles de porter atteinte a la répartition des compétences des
juridictions pénales endroit international.
En premier lieu, il est établique le droit français retient la compétence
universelle dans des conditions limitées qui ont été rappelées à
I'audien~e'~,mais en l'espèce,le point de désaccord entre les Parties

résidedans le réquisitoiredu 23janvier 2002 qui permet au juge français
de fonder la procédure d'information sur une compétence universelle
résultant de la coutume internationale. La plainte du 5 décembre2001,
transmise par le réquisitoire introductif, expose que

«le juge interne est fondéa puiser dans la coutume internationale la
source de son droit d'exercer sa compétence pour poursuivre les
auteurs d'un crime contre I'humanité qui n'aurait pasété commisen
France et dont ni l'auteur ni la victime n'auraient la nationalité fran-
çaise))".

Cela est répété dans la plainte du 7 décembre:

«Bien que les faits se soient déroulés surle territoire de la Répu-
blique du Congo, le juge français est compétent pour statuer sur le
crime contre l'humanitéen vertu de la coutume internationale ..))12

En annexant ses plaintes au réquisitoireintroductif du 23janvier 2001, le
procureur de la Républiqueprèsle tribunal de grande instance de Meaux
fait sienne cette base de compétence.En revanche, en ce qui concerne les
actes de torture, il suffit de rappeler que l'article 5 de la convention des

Nations Unies contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels,
inhumains ou dégradants, du 10 décembre1984implique la subsidiarité
de la compétence universelle par rapport à la compétence territoriale,
personnelle active et personnelle passive. En effet, le paragraphe 1 de
l'article5 oblige les Etats parties à établir leur compétence territoriale
ainsi que leur compétence personnelle active, et il leur permet d'établir
leur compétencepersonnelle passive. Le paragraphe 2 impose a tout Etat

partie de prendre les mesures nécessairesaux fins de connaître des infrac-
tions viséespar la convention dans le cas où l'auteur présumé de ces
infractions se trouve sous sa juridiction et où il ne l'extrade pas. La com-
pétence universelle n'estdonc ici qu'une application de l'adage aut dedere

'O L'agent du Gouvernement français a rappelé que la compétence universelle est su-
bordonnée en Franceà deux conditions: «il faut en principe qu'un traité auquella France
est partie prévoie et mêmeimpose une telle compétence universellel faut que les per-
sonnes suspectéesse trouvent sur le territoire français))3121,p. 9).
''Lettre de la Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme adàessée
Monsieur le procureur de la République près le tribunal de grande instance de Paris le
5 décembre2001, p. 25.
ligues des droits de l'homme adresàéMonsieur le procureur de la République préslee des
tribunal de grande instance de Paris, p. 2. CERTAIN CRIIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P.DE CARA) 120

Applicant, prohibits a State from "unilaterally attributing to itself uni-
versa1jurisdiction in criminal matters". It is apparent that the French
judicial measures are capable of contravening the division of jurisdiction
between criminal courts under international law.
First, while it istrue that French law recognizes i~niversaljurisdiction
under limited conditions that were recalled during the hearings 'O,the dis-

agreement between the Parties in the present case hinges on the réyuisi-
toire of 23 January 2002, which lets the French judgi: found his investiga-
tion on universal jurisdiction arising from intern.itiona1 custom. The
complaint of 5 December 2001, transmitted with tlre prosecutor's origi-
nating application, States that

"[dlomestic courts are therefore entitled to look to international cus-
tom as the source of their right to exercisejurisdiction to prosecute
the perpetrators of a crime against humanity alleged to have been
committed outsidie France where neither the perpetrator nor the
victim is a French national" ".

This is reiterated in th.ecomplaint of 7 December:

"Notwithstanding that the facts occurred on the territory of the
Republic of the Congo,the French courts have jurisdiction in respect
of crimes against humanity by virtue of international custom . . ."

By appending the cornplaints to his originating application of 23 Janu-
ary 2001, the Procureur de lu Ripubliyue at the Meaux Tribunal de
grande instunce adopted that basis ofjurisdiction. llowever, with respect
to acts of torture, it will be recalled that Article 5 of the United Nations
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, of 10 December 1984, implies that universal
jurisdiction is subsidiary to territorial jurisdiction and to jurisdiction

under the active nationality or passive personalitj principles. Article 5,
paragraph 1, of that Convention obliges States parties to establish their
territorial jurisdiction and their jurisdiction under the active nationality
principle, whilst also allowing them to establish ,lurisdiction under the
passive personality principle. Paragraph 2 requins each State party to
take such measures as may be necessary to estab1i:;hits jurisdiction over
the offences covered by the Convention where tlle alleged offender is

present in any territory under its jurisdiction anc it does not extradite

tion issubject to two conditions: "there must in principle be a treaty to which France is
a party that provides forthat universal jurisdiction and even ri:quires it to .. .xercised
the person suspected must be on French territory" (CR 2003'21,p. 9).
''Letter from the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues to the Procureur
de IUR~jP~tbliq~tet the Paris Trihunul de 'qrunrleitwrance, daied 5 December 2001, p. 25.

l2Document D1/2 of 7 December 2001, appended to the 1:tter from the International
Federation of Human Rights Leagues to the Procureur de la Républiqueat the Paris Tri-
bunal riegronde instance, p. 2.121 CERTAINES PROCÉDUKES PENALES (OP. DISS. DE CARA)

aut punire. Cela s'impose êplus forte raison lorsqu'il y a une situation de
litispendance: la compétence territoriale ou personnelle a priorité sur la
compétenceuniverselle.

En second lieu, il ressort du dossier qu'une procédure étaiten cours au
Congo et que l'intervention desjuridictions françaises est de nature, selon
la République du Congo, à violer le principe non bis in idem.

En effet, une procédure d'instruction aétéouverte au Congo pour les
mêmesfaits ;suite au réquisitoireaux finsd'informer du parquet de Braz-
zaville du 29 août 2000, complétépar un réquisitoire supplétif du
11novembre 2002, le doyen desjuges d'instruction du tribunal de grande
instance de Brazzaville a adressé une commissionrogatoire au juge d'ins-
truction de Kinshasa qui vise, notamment, les disparitions forcéesde plus
de trois cent cinquante personnes, les crimes contre l'humanitéet de tor-
tures dont la responsabilité estimputée «à Monsieur le présidentde la
Républiquedu Congo, à Monsieur le ministre de l'intérieur,à Monsieur

Norbert Dabira, inspecteur général des armées, àMonsieur BlaiseAdoua,
général,commandant de la garde républicaine)) ".

Or, le principe non bisin idem est susceptible d'avoir deux interpréta-
tions.11signifie- comme l'a rappelél'agent de la France - que des faits
définitivementjugés ne puissentpas faire l'objet d'une nouvelle poursuite.
C'est l'autorité dela chosejugéequi s'exprime à travers ce principe et qui
s'impose pour protégerles garanties desjusticiables mais aussi pour pro-

tégerl'autorité des décisionsde justice. Elle est consacréedans le code
français de procédurepénale(art. 6, 368 et 692) par le Pacte des Nations
Unies, le protocole no 4 de la convention européenne des droits de
l'homme et des libertésfondamentales. Cela en effet concerne les déci-
sions des juridictions de jugement lorsqu'elles sont devenues définitives,
lorsque l'action porte sur les mêmesfaits et qu'elle est dirigéecontre la
personne qui a été l'objetde la premièrepoursuite.

Mais non bis in idem peut signifieraussi dans l'ordre international qu'il

y a litispendance faisant obstacleà l'exercicede sa compétencepar lejuge
saisien second lieu. Sans doute, la portéeet la nature de cette règledans
l'ordre international peuvent êtrediscutées,mais il aurait été,pour le
moins, prudent que le procureur français s'abstînt de poursuivre.

Du mêmecoup, comme l'a indiqué l'agent dela Républiquedu Congo
dans ses propos liminaires, ily a violation de l'indépendance de1'Etatdu

l3Document Dl12 annexé à la lettre de la Fédération internationale des ligues des
droits de l'homme adressàMonsieur le procureur de la République prèsle tribunal de
grande instance de Paris le 5 décembre2p.2. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P. DE CARA) 121

him. Universal jurisdiction here is thus simply an application of the
maxim aut dedere aut punire. This principle prevail:;afortiori in a situa-
tion of lis alibipeiîdeiîs: territorial or persona1jurisdiction takes priority
over universal jurisdiction.
Secondly, the record shows that proceedings viere already pending
in the Congo and that the intervention of the French courts is, according
to the Republic of the Congo, liable to violate th': principle non bis in
idetn.
Judicial investigation (instruction) proceedings were initiated in the

Congo in respect of the same events. Further to the originating applica-
tion of the Brazzaville prosecutor, dated 29 August 2000, supplemented
by an application for an extension of the investigation, dated 11 Novem-
ber 2002, the senior investigating judge of the Biazzaville Tribunal de
grande instance sent a commission rogatoire (letter of request for judicial
assistance) to the invizstigatingjudge of Kinshasa, concerning inter aliu
the enforced disappearance of more than 350 irdividuals and crimes
against humanity and torture, for which responsibility is attributed to
"the President of the IRepubIicof the Congo, the Minister of the Interior,
Mr. Norbert Dabira, Inspecter General of the Arrned Forces, and Gen-
eral Blaise Adoua, Commander of the Republican Guard" j3.

The principle non (Sisin idem is in fact susceptible of two interpreta-
tions. It can mean -- as the Agent of France pointed out - that no
further proceedings can be brought in respect of acts on which a final
judgment has already been rendered. This principl: is a manifestation of
the doctrine of res judicata, which operates not only to safeguard the
rights of the person tried but also to preserve th: authority of judicial
rulings. The doctrine is enshrined in the French Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure (Arts. 6, 368 and 692), in the United Nations Covenant and in
Protocol No. 4 of the European Convention for th{:Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It applies where the decision of a

trial court has become final and the subsequent action relates to the same
acts and is brought against the same party who was tried in the first pro-
ceedings.
Rut in international law the operation of the principle non bis in idem
can also indicate the existence of lis alibipendens, precluding the exercise
of jurisdiction by a court subsequently seised of the same matter. The
scope and nature of that rule in international law may well besubject to
debate, but the leasi. that can be said is that it would have been more
prudent for the French prosecutor to have refrained from prosecuting in
this case.

At the same time, as the Agent of the RepubIic of the Congo stated in
his introductory observations, there has been a violation of the indepen-

'3 Document Dl12 appended to the 5 December 2001 lette1from the International Fed-
eration of Human Rights Leagues to the P~.uczre la Ri~ztrbliqzieat the Paris Trihiozol
graride instancp.2.122 CERTAlNES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES (OP.DISS. DE CARA)

Congo, de sa souveraineté.En effet, le réquisitoiredu 23 janvier 2002

constitue en soi un acte de poursuite. En saisissant le juge d'instruction
des faits dénoncésdans les plaintes et mentionnés dans les procès-
verbaux de l'enquête préliminaire , réquisitoire qualifieles faits, adopte
les prétentions des associations plaignantes, avance les qualifications de
crimes contre l'humanitéet de tortures. Cela constitue une immixtion
du juge français dans les affaires intérieuresdu Congo et un empiétement
sur sa souveraineté.

2) Ensuite, la Cour a aussi relevéque le Congo invoque «le droit au

respect par la France des immunitésconféréespar le droit international,
en particulier au chef de1'Etatcongolais)).Lesprocédurespénales déclen-
chées enFrance mettent en cause non pas seulement l'immunitéde juri-
diction des personnalités citéesmais leur inviolabilité,alors qu'ils agi-
raient ou seraient présentssur le territoire français en qualité derepré-
sentants de la Républiquedu Congo. Cela vaut particulièrement pour le
chef de 1'Etatdont la requête invoque l'immunitéO . r,

«il n'est pas contesté quele chef de 1'Etatbénéficie d'une immunité
pénale absolue devant lesjuridictions d'un Etat étranger.Le carac-
tèreabsolu de l'immunité exclut qu'il puisse lui êtreapportéaucune
exception, tenant par exemple à la nature de l'infraction qui lui est

reprochée. »l4
L'immunitéa pour effet de rendre irrecevable toute action introduite
contre celui qui s'en prévaut. Sans doute le président Sassou Nguesso
s'est rendu à deux reprises en France depuis le déclenchement des procé-

dures incriminées, mais l'existencedu réquisitoire, la saisinedujuge d'ins-
truction font planer à tout instant une menace sur sesdéplacementsdans
ce pays ou à l'étranger.Cela est particulièrementimportant dans un Etat
dont la Constitution établitun régime présidentielqui confie l'essentiel
du pouvoir et des responsabilitésdans le fonctionnement des pouvoirs
publics au chef de 1'Etat.
3) Enfin, plus généralement,il ressort de la demande et des observa-
tions présentéespar le Congo à l'audience que les procédures pénales

françaises portent atteinte à la dignitéde l'Etat, qualité inhérente aux
Etats souverains. Anzilotti observait déjàque dans les rapports entre les
Etats ((l'honneur et la dignitéde 1'Etatl'emportent de beaucoup sur les
intérêts matérielse ))t que «le dommage moral prend une importance de
trèsloin supérieure à celle qu'il a dans le droit nati~nal))'~.Il s'agit sans

"V. Verhoeven, Rapportàl'Institut de droit international, «Les immunitésde juridic-
tion et d'exécutiondu cheftat et de gouvernement en droit interna»,Annuuire
de l'Institut de droit intrrnufionul, 2000-2001, vol. 69, p. 516.
'(Cours de droit international, 1921,p. 523. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P.DE CARA) 122

dence and s0vereignt.y of the Congolese State. The réquisitoire of
23 January 2002 constitutes per se an act of prosetution. In seising the
investigating judge of the offences alleged in the complaints and men-
tioned in the reports of the preliminary police enquiry, the réquisitoire
characterizes the facts, advances as its own the claixrs of the complainant
associations and allegesthe existence of crimes agair st humanity and tor-
ture. This constitutes interference by the French judiciary in the domestic
affairs of the Congo and encroaches upon the sovereignty of that

State.
(2) Further, the Court also observed that the Congo invoked "the
right to respect by France for the immunities conferred by international
law on, .. . in particular, the Congolese Head of State". The criminal
proceedings initiated iii France raise a challenge not only to the immunity
from jurisdiction of tht: personalities named but alsc to their inviolubility,
in so far as they may act or be present on the territory of France in their
capacities as representatives of the Republic of the Congo. This is par-
ticularly true for the Head of State, whose immuriity is invoked in the

Application.
"It is not dispiited that the Head of State kenefits from absolute
criminal immunity before the courts of a foreign State. The absolute
nature of the imniunity precludes the application of any exception to

that immunity, fix example based on the nature of the offence of
which he is accused." l4
Immunity has the efl'ectof rendering inadmissibb: any action brought

against the person who invokes it. President Sassoii Nguesso has admit-
tedly visited France on two occasions since the stait of the disputed pro-
ceedings, but the existence of the réquisitoireand the reference of the case
to the investigating judge maintain a constant threat in respect of his
travels to France or to other foreign countries. This is particularly sig-
nificant for a State whose constitution establishes a presidential régime,
entrusting the Head of State with most of the authority and responsibili-
ties for the functionirig of the Government.
(3) Lastly, and more generally, it is clear from the Application and the

Congo's statements at the hearings that the Frencli criminal proceedings
impugn the dignity of the State, a quality vested in sovereign States.
Anzilotti observed in his day that in relations betwcen States "the honour
and dignity of the State far outweigh material inti:restsn and that "non-
material damage takes on a far greater significsnce than in interna1
law" 15.The notion remains rather vague but it does entail certain specific

l4J. Verhoeven, Rapporà l'Institut de droit international "Les immunités dejuridic-
tion et d'exécutiondu cheftat et de gouvernement en droit international", Annuaire de
1'In.stiridroit internaiional, 2000-2001,Vol. 69, p. 516.
l5Cours de droit intert~ational,1929, Vol. 1,p. 523. 123 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES (OP. DISS. DE CARA)

doute d'une notion assez floue mais qui emporte quelques conséquences
juridiques précises16.Par-delà les règleset les usages du protocole et le
cérémonial,la dignité desreprésentants diplomatiques est conventionnel-
lement protégée ''et la convention de 1973sur la prévention et la répres-

sion des infractions contre les Dersonnes iouissant d'une ~rotection inter-
nationale reconnaît et consacre l'existence d'une obligation en droit
international de prendre toutes mesures appropriées pour prévenir les
attaques contre la dignité des personnes internationalement protégées
(art. 2, par. 3).
En outre, une partie de la doctrine classique fondait l'immunitédejuri-

diction de 1'Etatet du chef d'Etat sur la dignitéde I'Etat; l'arrêtdu Chief
Justice Marshall dans l'affaireThe SchoonerExchangev. McFaddon(1812)
rappelle l'obligation de tout Etat souverain de ne pas attenter à la dignité
de sa nation («net to degrade the dgnitj of his nation))) en se soumet-
tant à la juridiction d'un autre Etat; un chef d'Etat ou un souverain en
visite dans un autre Etat n'a pas à se soumettre à une juridiction étran-

gérequi serait incompatible avec la dignitéde I'Etat («to subject l~imself
to a jurisdictiorz incompatible ~vithhis dignity and the dignity of his na-
tion») lx.Cette justification est encore invoquée chez certains auteurs ''.
Or, cette dignité de1'Etatévoquéepar l'agent du Congo20et à laquelle
se rattachent la «réputation», la «considération» ou le ((crédit interna-
tional» de ce pays, ainsi que celle du chef de 1'Etatpeuvent être atteintes

que ce dernier soit présentou non sur le territoire de 1'Etatoù les actes
portant préjudiceont étécommis2'. Ces actes peuvent êtreaccomplis par
l'intermédiaire de publications, d'articles depresse, d'insultes, de déclara-
tions diffamatoires ou offensantes ...Souvent ilsémanentde personnes pri-
vées,alors la puissance sur le territoire de laquelle ces actes interviennent
se doit de punir ou de corriger le manquement et de formuler des

excuses; ils peuvent résulterd'initiatives inopportunes d'autoritéslocales

'"ir Arthur Watts observe
((La dignité,que ce soit la dignitédes Etats ou de leur chef, est une notion difficile
àsaisir, quoiqu'elle présente encoreun intérêt certain d'unpoint de vue classifica-
toire. II est des conséquencesauparavant attachéàsla nécessitéde respecter la di-
gnitédes chefs d'Etat qui aujourd'hui perdurent, tout au plus, dans le protocole et
l'étiquet...Certains aspects du respect àûla dignitédeschefs d'Etat se sont néan-
moins conservés endroit international. » («The Legal Position in International Law
of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers)), Recueil descours
de l'Acudi.n?ticclroitinternutionul de La Haye, 1994.vol. 247, p. 41.) [Truduction
du Greffe./
I7Conventions de Vienne de 1961sur les relations diplomatiques (art. 29), de 1963sur
les relations consulaires (art. 40), et de 1969sur les missions spécialesconduites par un
chef d'Etat (art. 29).
The Scliooner Exchunge v. McFaddon (1812) :11 US 137-138 :dans la jurisprudence
anglaise: Mighell v. The Sultan ofJohore [1894] 1 QB 149.
IyL. Cavaré,Le droit internationalpzrblicposit~; 1969,vol. II, p. 10; D. P. O'Connell,
International Luit., 2" éd., 1970, vol. Il, p. 842. Voir aussi J. Verhoeven. op. ci!., p. 507.
"0 Oppenheini'sInternational Luii., 9' éd.,1992, volp.379. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P. DE CARA) 123

legal consequences 16.In addition to norms and customs of protocol and
ceremonial, the dignity of diplornatic representatives finds protection in
treatiesl' and the 1973Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Interriationally Protected Person: acknowledges and
enshi-inesthe existence of an obligation under inte~national law to take
a11appropriate measures to prevent attacks on the tlignity of an interna-

tionally protected person (Art. 2, para. 3).

Furthermore, some traditional doctrine foundec the immunity from
jurisdiction enjoyed by the State and the Head of !;tate on the principle

of State dignity. The opinion delivered by Chief Justice Marshall in The
Schooner Exchunge v. McFucidon (1812) recalls the obligation of any
sovereign "not to degrade the dignity of his nation" by submitting to the
jurisdiction of another State; a Head of State or sovereign visiting
another State is not "to subject himself to a jurii,diction incompatible

with his dignity and the dignity of his nation" 18.T'lisjustification is still
invoked by some auttiors 19.

The dignity of the State, to which the Agent of the Congo referred2"
and to which relate the "reputation", "honour" and "international stand-
ing" of that country, and the dignity of the Hi:ad of State may be

irripugned whether or not the Head of State is presznt on the territory of
the State where the injurious acts have been comm tteda. Such acts may
be perpetrated through publications, press article;. insults. defamatory
or offensive statemerits, etc. They often emanate from private parties
and the authorities of the territory where such acts occur then have a

duty to punish or make good the violation and to present apologies;
such acts may also stem from inappropriate initiatives by local authori-

'Wir Arthur Watts obs,erves:

a convenient label. Some of the consequences former11 attributed to the need to is still
respect the dignity of Headsof States now survive, if they survive at all, in the realms
of protocol and State ceremonia...Some aspects of the respect due to the dignity of
Heads of States still, however, survive as a matter of inte mational law." ("The Legal
Position in International Law of Heads of States. Head:. of Governments and For-
eign Ministers", Recueil cie.~cours de 1'AcudC.miede droit inrernutional de Lu Huye,
1994.Vol. 247. p.41.)

Relations (Art. 40), and of 1969on Special Missions by a He:ad of State (Art. 29).r

'Yhe Scliooner E'tchtirigev. McFuddon (1812), 11 US If 7-138: in English case law:
Mi~hell v. The S~/ltnn($Johore [1894] 1 QB 149.
"'L. Cavaré.Le droit interntrtionulnuhlic positif, 1969.II,p.10: D. P. O'Connell,
Int~unut,onul Lu,). 2nd ed. 1970. Voi II, 842 See also J Verhoeven. op cit .p 507
"' CR 2003120, p 11
2lOppenheirn'~Intern~itionulLui.\,,9th ed., 1992.Vol. 1, p. 379.124 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES (OP.DISS .E CARA)

et notamment dejuridictions de second rang. L'atteinteàla dignité n'en
est pas moins réelle.

B. L'existence d'unpréjudiceirrépuruble

Les mesures conservatoires ont pour objet de prévenir la réalisation
d'un préjudiceirréparable. Si le préjudice existe,il est déjàtrop tard; en
revanche, l'indication de mesures conservatoires répond au risque desur-
venance du préjudiceirréparable. La difficulté en l'espèce tientau fait
que, jusqu'à présent,le risque qui pèsesur le chef de 1'Etatde la Répu-
blique du Congo est apparu potentiel, hypothétique et il aêmeétéqua-
lifiéde «chimérique» à l'audience, mais le risque dont est porteur le
réquisitoire du 23 janvier n'en est pas moins constant et sa réalisation
constituerait précisément un préjudice irrémédiable. D'oreset déjà,la
publicitéqui entoure des faits de torture ou de disparitions forcées suscite

inévitablementle soupçon dèslors qu'est mis en causeun chef d7Etatafri-
cain au sortir d'une série de guerrescivilescruelles, tandis qu'aucun crédit
ne serait accordé àde telles allégationssi elles visaient les dirigeants des
vieillesnations.

1. Le risque depréjudice

La jurisprudence révéleque l'appréciationdu risque de préjudice irré-
parable peut conduire la Cour à considérerà la fois la probabilité d'un
fait ou d'un événement etles conséquences qu'ilpeut avoir. Cet événe-

ment futur n'a pas à être certain,il suffit qu'il soit probable.
Dans certains cas, l'événement susceptiblede provoquer le préjudice
s'est déjà produit et, dans ces conditions, le travail de la Cour consiste
simplement à apprécier à la lumière des faits existants si une mesure
conservatoire est nécessairepour prévenir le dommage irréparable aux
droits en cause. Ce fut illustré, par exemple, par les ordonnances du
8 avril et 13 septembre 1993 dans l'affaire relativà l'Application de lu
conventzonpour lapréventionet lu répressionIL crime de génocide(Bos-
ni(.-Herzégovinec. Yougoslavie (Serbce et Monténégro)). Les preuves
avancéespar la demanderesseétaient les mêmesau soutien de la demande
en mesures conservatoires et au soutien de la demande principale2'.
Dans d'autres cas, la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
est résultée d'événemenp ostérieurs à la requêteau principal comme les
incidents qui ont opposé les forces armées du Burkina Faso et de la
République du Mali dans la région frontière entre les deux pays dans

l'affaire du DgTérendfrontalier (Burkina FasolRépubliquedu Mali)".
Parfois encore, la Cour est amenéea apprécier la possibilitéou la pro-
babilitédu préjudice. Ainsi,dans les ordonnances concernant les affairesties, in particular lower courts. The insult to dignit) is no less genuine in
such cases.

B. The Existence of Zrreparable Pr6judice

The purpose of prclvisional measures is to prevrnt the occurrence of

irreparable prejudice. If the prejudice has already corne into existence, it
is too late; on the other hand, the risk of irreparable prejudice is met by
the indication of provisional ineasures. The difficulty in the present case
lies in the fact that the risk for the Head of State c~fthe Republic of the
Congo has thus far appeared to be a potential or hypotlietical one and
was even described cluring the hearings as "chinierical", but the risk
raised by the rL;r/zrisifoiof 23 January is nonetkeless established and
the realization of that risk would indeed create irreparable prejudice.
Publicity surrounding acts of torture or enforced disappearance has
inevitably aroused suspicions already, given that the case involves the
Head of an African State on the morrow of a serie iof vicious civil wars,

whereas no credence would be attached to such allegations if they
concerned the leaders of older nations.

1. The risk of'prejudice

As illustrated by the jurisprudence, in assessing the risk of irreparable
prejudice, the Court inay be led to consider both trieprobability and the

potential consequences of the occurrence of a fact or event. A future
event does not have to be a certainty; it only neecisto be probable.
In some cases, the event capable of causing the prejudice may already
have occurred and the Court's work then consists simply in assessing
whether, in the light of the facts, a provisional n-easure is necessary to
prevent irreparable damage to the rights claimed. This is illustrated, for
example. by the Orders of 8 April and 13Septembcr 1993in the case con-
cerning the Application of tlzr Converrtio~ton the I'reverztionand Punish-
rnent of'tlze Crime of' Genocide (Bosnia and Her:.egoilina v. Yugoslavia
(Serhia and Moiztenl?gro)). The Applicant produced the same evidence

in support of its request for provisional measureç as for its Application
on the merits".
In other cases. the:reauest for the indication of ~rovisional measures
has arisen from events occurring subsequent to tl-e Application, such as
the incidents betweerithe armed forces of Burkina Faso and the Republic
of Mali in the border region between the two ccuntries in the Frontier
Dispute (Burkina FusolRc~publicof'Mali) case2'.
On other occasioils, the Court may have to assess the possibility or
likelihood of the prejudice. Thus, in the Orders c,oncerning the Nutleur

" 1.C.J. Rc~pori1993, p. 3 and p. 325.
'' Proi,i.sioti(d~\.lcu, rcleof10 Jciniiury 1981.C.J Rc,porrs1986. p.3.

26 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES (OP. DISS. DE CARA)
125

des Essais nucléctiresl,a Cour a dit que le pouvoir reconnu par l'article41
du Statut

((présupposequ'un préjudiceirréparable ne doit pas êtrecauséaux
droits en litige devant le juge et qu'aucune initiative concernant les
questions litigieuses ne doit anticiper sur l'arrêt dela

En l'espèce, la Cour n'exclut pas la possibilité que des dommages
puissent êtrecausés à l'Australie et à la Nouvelle-Zélandepar des retom-
béesradioactives des essais nucléairesdans l'atmosphère.
Une formule similaire apparaît dans l'affaire de la Compétence en

matiérede pêcheries, mais la Cour est plus précisecar elle ajoute que:
«la mise en application immédiatede son règlementpar l'Islande, en

anticipant sur l'arrêt dela Cour, porterait préjudiceaux droits invo-
qués ...et nuirait à la possibilitéde leur rétablissementintégral au
cas où la Cour se prononcerait en sa

Plus récemment, comme elle l'avait fait dans l'affaire relative à la
Convention de Vienne sur 1e.yrelations consulaires (Paraguay c. Etuts-
Unisd'Amérique) ou dans l'affaire LuGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis
d'Amérique), mais de façon plus explicite encore la Cour a jugé dans
l'affaire des Activités arméessur le territoire du Congo (République

démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda) :
«qu'au vu des circonstances,la Cour est d'avis que les personnes, les
biens et les ressources se trouvant sur le territoire du Congo, en par-

ticulier dans la zone de conflit, demeurent gravement exposés, et
qu'il existe un risque sérieuxque lesdroits en litige dans laprésente
espéce, tels que décritsau paragraphe 40 ci-dessus [droit a la souve-
rainetéet à l'intégritéterritoriale, à l'intégrité de ses biens et de ses
ressources naturelles, ainsi que ses droits au respect des règles du
droit international humanitaire], subisserzt un préjudice irrépu-

rable»".
Dans la présenteaffaire, il m'apparaît que le préjudice existedéjàet
qu'un risque de nouveau préjudicepeut êtrerelevé à deux égards.

Premièrement, le préjudiceest néde la transmission des plaintes par le
procureur de Paris au procureur de Meaux. Celui-ciavait l'obligationde se

24Essais nucléaires (Australie c. Frunce), mesures conservcitoires, orclonnunce du
22 juin1973, C.I.J. Recueil 1973,p. 103,et E.ssuisnucléaires(Nouvelle Zélanc/ec. Frunc,e),
mesures con.servcitoir, r~lonnuncedu 22juin 1973, CJ.Reciceil1973,p.139.
" Compétenceen niuiièr-e(lepêcherieslRoj~uume-Uni c. Islande), tnesures conservu-
toires, ordonncrncedu 17 août 1972, CJ.Recueil 1972,p. 16, par. 22; ConzpPtetzceen
rnciti2rede pêcheries(République fi.dc;rale d'Allemrigne c. Islande), rnesures conservci-
to"'C.I.J. Recueil 1998p.257, par. 35-37.cueil 1972p. 34,par. 23.
" Ordonnunce du 1" juillet 2000, CI. J. Recueilp.0128.par. 43; les italiques sont
de moi. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P. DE CARA) 125

Tests cases, the Court stated that its power undm Article 41 of the
Statute

"presupposes thai. irreparable prejudice should not be caused to
rights which are the subject of dispute in judirial proceedings and

that the Court's judgment should not be anticipated by reason of
any initiative regarding the matters in issue belore the Court"24.

In those cases, the Court did not exclude the pos:.ibility of harm being
caused to Australia and New Zealand by the radicactive fall-out of the
nuclear tests in the atrnosphere.
A similar pronouncement appears in the FisherTesJuvisdiction cases
but the Court was more precise there because it added:

"the immediate inlplementation by Iceland of ils Regulations would,
by anticipating the Court's judgment, prejudire the rights claimed
. . .and affect the possibility of their full restoration in the event of

a judgment in its favour"".
More recently, in line with its decisions in the case concerning the

Vienna Convention on ConsulurRelations (Paraguuy v. United States of
America) 2h and in the LaGrand case (Gerrnany v. United States of
America), the Court held even more explicitly in the case concerning
Armed Activities on tJie Territory oj the Congo (D7rnocratic Republic of
the Congo v. Uganda 1:

"in the ~ircurnsta~izcetsh,e Court is of the opinion that persons, assets
and resources present on the territory of the Congo, particularly in
the area of conflict, remain extremely vulnerak)le,and that there is a
seriou5 risk that the rights ut issue in tlzis c~se, as noted in para-

graph 40 above [the Congo's rights to sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity. integrity of its assets and natural resources and its rights to
respect for the rides of international humanit irian law], in- sufjCL.r
irreprrrnbleprejudice"27.

In the present case, it appears to me that the prejudice already exists
and that a risk of further prejudice can be identifi:d in two respects.
First, the prejudice arises from the transmissior of the complaints by

the Paris prosecutor to the Meaux prosecutor, who had an obligation to

24Nuclear Tests jAusti*aliuv. France). Provisional Measu .es, Order of22 June 1973,
1.C.J. Reporr~ 1973, p. 103, and Nuclem Tests /Nr,,c. Zeallmd v. Fronce). Provisionrrl
Me~isure.~, rc/eof22 J~irre1973, C.J. Reports 1973. p. 133.
25 Fisheries Jurivdictiori (United Kingdom v. Icelund), Pro~~l rasures, Order of
17 August 1972, I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 16, para. 22; Fisfieries Jurisdiction (Fedc,ral
Reports 1972. p. 34, para. 23.), Provi.sioMea.~ure.s,0rda.r-of 17 Auyuus 1972. ..C'J.
2h1.C.J. Rcporrs 1998, p. 257, paras. 35-37.
Orderof'1 Jub 2000, 1.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 128,para 43; emphasis added.déclarerincompétentpour deux raisons. D'une part, les plaintes mettent
en cause des personnalités étrangèresdont I'immunitéde juridiction est
établieou envisageable; d'autre part, il n'existait dans le droit français
aucun fondement àla compétencedes autoritésjudiciaires françaises. La
seule possibilitéqui s'offrait au procureur étaitd'affirmer la compétence
territoriale des juridictions françaisesl'égarddu généralDabira, en rai-

son de son lien de résidence avecle territoire français et de relever pour le
reste son incompétence.
A défautd'une telle déclarationd'incom~étenceet de la moindre men-
tion à cet égard, en affirmant la compétencedes juridictions françaises
pour des faits commis à l'étrangerle réquisitoiredu 23janvier 2002 bou-
leverse la répartition internationale des compétences judiciaires etil met
en cause l'immunitédu chef de I'Etat et éventuellementd'autres person-
nalités congolaises.
Ce réquisitoireapparaît donc entaché denullitéet le Gouvernement de
la Républiquefrançaise avait l'obligation envers laRépubliquedu Congo
de fdire constater cette nullitépar lajuridiction compétente, sansattendre
que le juge d'instruction ou le procureur de la République lui-même
accomplisse d'autres actes aussi contraires au droit international se rat-
tachant au réquisitoire.

Deuxièmement, l'agent et les conseils de la République française ont
fait valoir que la convocation du présidentSassou Nguesso pour recueillir
sa déposition n'était qu'une invitation surle fondement de l'article 656du
code de procédure pénale.
En réalité,cela constitue la preuve de la violation de l'immunitédu
chef de 1'Etat par le réquisitoire du 23 janvier. En effet, dèslors que le
président Sassou Nguesso étaitexpressément misen cause par lesplaintes
visées auréquisitoireet par une victime, ou victime alléguéee,ntendue au
cours de l'enquête préliminairel,a déposition que lesjuges d'instruction
attendaient de lui ne pouvait porter que sur les faits dont ils étaientsaisis
et pour lesquels il était désigné, avecles autres personnalités citées,
comme le coupable principal. Alors que toute autre personne ainsi mise
en cause n'aurait pu êtreentendue qu'en qualitéde témoin assisté, avec
les garanties de la défense,lesjuges prétendent ainsi demander à un chef

d'Etat étrangerune dépositionrelative à des accusatioris dont il n'a même
pas une connaissance exacte puisqu'il n'a pasaccèsau dossier. Or, les
juges d'instruction ne se sont cru autorisés à le faire que parce que le
réquisitoireles saisissait, notamment, de faits qui sont imputésau chef de
1'Etatcongolais.
En admettant mêmeque l'article 656 du code de procédure pénale soit
une disposition applicable aux chefs d'Etat - ce qui est conte~table~-,
le président du Congo, en se rendant à l'invitation du juge, pourrait
s'exposer à une mise en examen sur le fondement des plaintes annexées
au réquisitoire introductif du 23 janvier. Mais quel pourrait êtrel'objet

J.-M. Gonnard, Jurisclrr.re procérliirepi.ntrlc,fasc. no23.

28 CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDJNGS (DISSO . PDE CARA) 126

declinejurisdiction for two reasons: the complaints implicate foreign per-
sonalities whose immunity from jurisdiction is established or foreseeable;
and there was no basiisunder French law for juriscliction of the French
judicial authorities. The only possibility open to tlie prosecutor was to
assert the territorial jurisdiction of French courts in respect of Gen-
eral Dabira, by virtue of a residential connection with French territory,
and to acknowledge that he otherwise lacked jurisdiction.

Failing to acknowledge the lack of jurisdiction cr to make any refer-
ence to such effect, and asserting the jurisdiction of French courts in
respect of acts committed abroad, the réquisitoireof 23 January 2002
flouts the international division of jurisdiction amolig courts and violates
the immunity of the Head of State and potentially that of other Congo-
lese personalities.
The rgquisitoire thus is clearly nul1 and void anll the Government of
the French Republic had an obligation towards the Republic of the
Congo to apply to the competent court for a fiiding to such effect,
without waiting for i.he investigating judge or tke prosecutor himself
to proceed with any other acts stemming from the réquisitoire that
would further violate international law.
Secondly, the Agent and counsel of France clainied that the summons

addressed to Presiderit Sassou Nguesso to give evidence was simply an
invitation under Article 656 of the Code of Crimirla1Procedure.

In reality. this proves that the Head of State's iinmunity was violated
by the rkquisitoire of 23 January. Once President Sassou Nguesso had
been expressly accused in the complaints appended to the réquisitoireand
by a victim. or allegiid victim, examined during ihe preliminary police
enquiry, the deposition that the investigating jutlges expected to take
from him could only have concerned acts of whicli they were seised and
in respect of which he Aiasnamed, along with the other personalities
identified, as the prii~cipalperpetrator. Whilst any other person impli-
cated could only have been examined as a tirnoin ~*ssisté e,njoying guar-
antees of procedural due process, thejudges are he-eseeking a deposition
froin a foreign Head of State concerning accusations of which he does
not even know the exact tenor because he has not been granted access to

the case file.The investigating judges only considered themselves entitled
to proceed in such a manner because they had been seised by the réquisi-
toire of, inter uliu, offences attributed to the Con::olese Head of State.
Even assuming that Article 656 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
applies to Heads of State - wliich is debatable2*- , the President of the
Congo, by deferring to the judge's invitation, could find himself formally
placed under judicial examination on the basis of ti-ecomplaints appended
to the prosecutor's originating application of :!3 January. But what

" "-M. Gonnard, Jurrsckisseur de procécturepénule,fasc. No. 23 127 CERTAINES PROCEDURES PÉNALES (OP. DISS. DECARA)

d'une telle audition? Interroger le chef de 1'Etatsur des événementsinter-
venus dans son pays? Le conduire à porter des accusations contre tel ou
tel de ses concitoyens? Il y a bien la un risque sérieuxde préjudice. Le
procédéapparaît incongru et, il est vrai, le ministèrefrançais des affaires
étrangèresn'a pasjusqu'a présenttransmis l'invitation, ainsi que la Cour
le constate dans la présenteordonnance. To~itefois,l'absence de trans-
mission de l'invitation à témoignerpeut être due à des raisons d'oppor-

tunitéou de légalitél,e ministèrefrançais des affaires étrangères ayantpu
considérer que la procédure de l'article 656 n'était pas applicable à un
chef d'Etat étranger. Surtout, cette invitation n'ayant pas abouti, rien
n'empêchelejuge d'instruction de prendre toutes autres mesures à l'égard
du président Sassou Nguesso, sur la base du réquisitoire. II ne paraît
donc pas possible d'affirmer que «les procéduresen cours n'ont changéet
ne sauraient causer aucun dommage au Congo du fait de violations des
immunitésdu président Sassou Nguesso)).

La difficulté tienta ce que l'événement susceptible de créer un préju-
dice irréparableest en voie de formation, a travers le réquisitoireaux fins
d'information dont les conséquencesne sont pas encore toutes réalisées
mais demeurent réalisables a la faveur de la décisiond'un juge d'instruc-
tion moins attentif,moins scrupuleux ou plus obstiné.Tant que l'acte de
procédure défectueux,le réquisitoire, subsiste,le risque existe. C'est un

risque que l'on dit «hypothétique>>,mais «un risque est par définition
aléatoire et il est dangereux de fonder une décisionsur l'absence d'un
risque ou sur son caractère improbable^^^.

2. Le caractère ivrgparabledu préjudice

La notion de caractère irréparable du préjudice a évolué.Au sens
étroit, qui résultede l'interprétationdonnéepar la Cour permanente dans
l'affaire de laDénonciationdu traitésino-belge30,est irréparable le pré-
judice qui ne ((saurait être réparé moyennanlte versement d'une simple
indemnitéou par une autre prestation matérielle)).

De cette conception étroite, on trouve encore trace dans l'affaire du
Pluteau continental de la mer Egéeoù la Cour rejette la demande de la
Grèce au motif que le droit dont elle cherchait a assurer la protection
(droit de recueillir des renseignements sur les ressources naturelles de
zones du plateau continental) ((pourrait ... donner lieu à une réparation
appropriée »" .

2yOpinion dissidente du juge Hubert Thierry joànl'ordonnance du 2 mars 1990,
Sentence arbitrale du 31jui1989 (Guinée-Birsciirc. S(.nigcil), rneszrrrsconserilut»ires,
C.I.J. Recuei1990,p. 82.
30C.P.J.I. sérieA n8,p. 7.
" C.I.J. Recuei1976, p11,par. 33.would be the purpose of such a deposition? To question the Head of
State about events that occurred in his country? Tc induce him to make
accusations against any of his fellow citizens? Therr is certainly a serious
risk of prejudice here. The process would appex incongruous and,
admittedly, the French Minister for Foreign Affairj has not transmitted
the invitation to date, as the Court observed in the present Order. How-

ever, the failure to transmit that invitation to gnve evidence may be
explained by reasons of expediency or legality; thc French Minister for
Foreign Affairs may have considered the Article 616procedure inappli-
cable to a foreign Head of State. Most importantly, as the invitation has
not been followed up, there is nothing to prevent tne investigating judge
from taking any other measures in respect of Pres dent Sassou Nguesso
on the basis of the rr;qui,sitoire.It is therefore difjicult to see how "the
current proceedings .. .have not caused and canriot cause any damage

to the Congo by way of breach of the immunities of President Sas-
sou Nguesso".
The difficulty liesin the ongoing nature of the evt:ntcapable of creating
irreparable prejudice, stemming from the prosecutor's originating appli-
cation of which the consequences have not yet al occurred but remain
possible in the event of a decision by a less attent ve, less scrupulous or
more obstinate investigating judge. For as long as the defective pro-

cedural measure, the réquisitoire, remains in force",there will always be
a risk. That risk issaid to be "hypothetical" but "[a]risk is by definition a
matter of chance, and it is dangerous to rely for a ciecisionon the absence
of a risk or on its im~~robability"~~.

The notion of irre.parable prejudice has evolvec. In the narrow sense,
following from the Permanent Court's interpretati~m in the case concern-
ing Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1665 bet~)eenChina und
Belgiurn 'O, prejudice is irreparable if it cannot "br made good simply by
the payment of an iridemnity or by compensation or restitution in some
other material form"'.

Evidence of this narrow view was still to be fo~nd in the AegemzSea
Continental Shelf'case, in which the Court rejectcd Greece's request on
the ground that the right which it was seeking to protect (the right to
acquire information concerning the natural resoiirces of areas of conti-
nental shelf)was "ociethat might be capable of reparation by appropriate
means" 31.

'" Dissenting opinion of Judge Thierry appended to the Crder of 2 March 1Arbi-
tral Ailurdof 31 Juiy J98Y fGuinea-Bi.~.suuv. Senegui)'rovisionu/s feu sure1C.J.
Reports 1990, p. 82.
"'P.CIf.. SeriesA, Aio.8, p. 7.
'' 1C.J. Reports1976.p. 11.para. 33. 128 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES (OP. DISS. DE CARA)

La jurisprudence récentedénote une conception plus large du caractère

irréparable.
Ceci n'a pas été - semble-t-il - longuement discutédans des affaires
où des mesures conservatoires ont été indiquées pour des raisons évi-
dentes dans les affaires relatives a l'Application dela conventionpour la
préventionet la répressiondu crirîzede génocide(Bosnie-Herzégovinec.
Yougo.slavie(Serbie et Monténégro)),aux incidents armésau cours du
Diffrend frontalier (Burkina FasolRépubliquedu Mali), mesures conser-
i,atoires, ordonnunce du IOjanvier 1986, ou lorsque était attendue l'exé-

cution des condamnés a la peine capitale aux Etats-Unis dans l'affaire
Avenu et autres ressortissant.mexicuins (Mexique c. Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique) '?.
En revanche, dans certaines affaires où la demande en indication de
mesures a été rejetéeq,uelques éléments de réponse peuvenê t trerelevés.

Dans l'affaire relativea des Questions d'interprétation etd'application
de lu convention de Montréal de 1971 résultantde I'incidetztaériende

Lockerbie (Jumahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaunîe-Uni), le caractère
irréparable du préjudicea surtout étéévoquéet développépar lesjuges
dissidents. Ceux-ci, si le Conseil de sécuritén'avait adoptéune résolution
qui a changé les circonstances, auraient considéréque la demande en
indication de mesures conservatoires était bien fondée. En effet, si la
Libye était contrainte ii remettre les personnes suspectes, elle aurait de
ce fait perdu son droit de les juger elle-mêmeau titre de la convention
de Montréal; inversement, il y avait un risque, si la Cour n'intervenait
pas, de voir la Libye soumise aux pressions coercitives des puissances

défenderesses. Ces dernières contestaient alors le droit du demandeur
d'exercer sa compétence judiciaire en la matière. Le juge Ranjeva
observait :
<<ledroit du demandeur, tant dans sa nature que dans son étendue,

étaitmenacéde disparition au cas où la demande contraire de la par-
tie défenderesse serait mise à exécution. En effet, a l'opposé, les
défendeurs tiennent du droit conventionnel de Montréal le pouvoir
de juger les mêmespersonnes suspectes. Cette collision de droits
contraires,heurt dont le centre de gravitéest constituépar une ques-
tion de responsabilité pénale,est la cause non seulement d'un préju-
dice qui risque d'êtreirréparablemais surtout d'une aggravation du
différend ...le demandeur a eu recours à une voie de droit ouverte à

tout Etat qui veut requérir de la Cour la protection légitimede
l'exercicede son droit de juger. »"

" Par exemple, en dernier lieu l'ordonnance du 5 février2003. dans l'affaire Avenu et
autres ressurri.rsantsrnexicuin.~(Mexique c. Etcj,smesurc~.rconservatoires, C.1.J.
Rec~reil2003. p. 91, par. 55.
22C.I.J. Recuei1992,p. 73, par. 5 6;les italiques sont de moi. Recent case law betokens a broader conception of irreparability.

This has not - it would appear - been discussed at length in cases in
which provisional me:asures have been indicated for obvious reasons,
such as the cases concerning the Applicution of tiie Convention on the
Prevention rrndPunishment of tlzeCritne qf'Genociue (Bosnia and Herse-
govinu v. Yilgosluvia ('Serbiaand Montenegro)), al-medincidents occur-

ring in the course of'the Fïontier Dispute (Burkina Fu.solRepuhlic of
Muli), Proi~isionulMmeusuresO , rder of 10 Jutzuary 1986, and Avenu und
Othcr Me.xicunN~liorlclls(iWc.xicov. Ut~itecS l tate; of'Arrîerica1.involv-
ing the impending execution of prisoners sentence<\to the deat'h'penalty
in the United States3;'.
On the other hand, some light is shed on this question in certain cases
in which the request for the indication of provisioiial measures has been
rejected.
In the case concerriing Questions of lnterpretation and Applicutiorzof

the 1971Montreal Cuniletzrionarisingfrom the Aeriul Incident ut Locker-
hie (Libyan Arab Jarrzahiriyuv. United Kingdom,, the irreparability of
the prejudice was n~otedand expounded primatily by the dissenting
judges. Had the Security Council not adopted a i.esolution altering the
circumstances, they evould have found the reques-.for the indication of
provisional measures to bejustified. If Libya were c ompelled to surrender
the suspects, it woulci as a result lose its right to try them itself under
the Montreal Convention; conversely, if the Colrt did not intervene,
there was a risk that Libya could find itself subji:ct to coercion on the

part of the respondent powers. The Respondents were disputing the
Applicant's right to exercise its jurisdiction in the matter. Judge Ranjeva
observed :

"with respect to both its scope and its nature, the Applicant's right
would have been under threat of disappear.~nce had the contrary
claim of the Respondent been acted upon. Here, on the contrary,
under the Montreal Convention, the Responcients possess the power
to prosecute the above-mentioned suspects. l'his collision of oppos-
ing rights, a clash centred upon a question of criminal responsibility,
is the cause not only of what nlclyive11be irr~parableprejudice, but
above al1of an aggravation of the dispute . . .[Tlhe Applicant has

used a remedy (opento every State wishing to request of the Court
the legitimate protection of its right to pass -udgment."33

'2 For example, most recently the Order of 5 February :!003, in the case concerning
Avenu und 0thc.r hifexicun Nationalr (Mexico v. United Stfitrs of'Amrricrr), Pro~isionul
Mt.ustires1.('J.report.2003, p. 91, para. 55.
33 I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 73, paras. 5 and 6; emphasis aclded. Enfin, dans d'autres affaires, il n'existait mêmequ'un risque de préju-
dice diffU,~~~.
Ainsi, dans l'affaire de la Dénonciationdu truitésino-belge en 1927, le
présidentMax Huber indique des mesures conservatoires en considérant
que :

«la violation éventuelle... de certains droits que posséderaient en
Chine, la Belgique ou ses ressortissants si le Traité du 2 novembre
1865 étaitreconnu comme continuant à produire ses effets, ne sau-

rait être réparée moyennanlte versement d'une simple indemnitéou
par une autre prestation matérielle»'j.

L'ordonnance ne dit rien expressémentdu préjudiceirréparableet pose
en principe que «les mesures conservatoires dont il s'agit ne peuvent
avoir pour objet que la protection d'intérêtq sui, sans elles, courruient le
risque d'êtreirrémidiublementcompromis)).
Dans I'affaire de la Compagnie d'électricité de Sofia et de Bulgarie, la
Cour permanente indiqua des mesures conservatoires à l'encontre de la

Bulgarie, non pour prévenirun préjudiceirréparable, mais parce que les
parties en cause doivent s'abstenir de toute mesure susceptible d'avoir
une répercussion préjudiciable à l'exécutionde la décision à intervenir.
En l'espèce,le Gouvernement belge avait mentionné au titre du préjudice
les actes de l'administration des mines de 1'Etat mettant en vigueur un
tarif spécialfactice, les jugements et arrêts dutribunal régional etde la
cour d'appel de Sofia, l'arrêt dela Cour de cassation de 1938...en consi-

dérantqu'ilsavaient causéun préjudicegrave a une ressortissante belge36.

Dans I'affaire dela Compétenceen rnutièredepêclreries (Royaume- Uni
c. Islande), le risque de préjudicede nature économique étaitdiffus et
consistait dans l'appréciationdesconséquencesde la réglementationislan-
daise sur l'industrie de la pêcheau Royaume-Uni (risque de chômage,

désarmementdes navires de pêche.. .).
Dans l'affaire desEssuk nuc1éaire.s (Australie c. Frunce), les deman-
deresses évoquaientles effets des rayonnements ionisants sur la santé en
termes potestatifs. L'Australie avait précisé:

«les essais français qui ont déjàlieu pourraient êtrela cause d'un
cancer de la thyroïde par an dû au radio-isotope iode 131,et d'un à
quatre autres cas de cancer ...les mêmes isotopespourraient provo-
quer en Australie une mutation tous les dix ans, entraînant la mort

24Mathieu Bouah Bile, Les nzeslirescorzservutoiresindiqu2e.rpur likCLu Hrrq.~
de 1923 rnosjours, thèse, 1986,vol.p.,109et suiv.
3sC.P.J.I. s2rie A no8, p. 7: les italiques sont de moi.
?YCIP.J.1.si.riAIB n" 79, p. 1;9C.P.J1.strie. C n" 8p.55-56. Finally, in other cases there was merely a difiuse risk of prej~dice'~.

Thus in the case coi~cerningDenunciution of tlzeTreaty ($2 Novern-
ber 1865 het,r.eenClzinaand Belgiunzin 1927,President Max Huber indi-

cated provisional measures, finding that :
"in the twnt of'un infruction . . . of certain of the rights, which
Belgium or her nationals would possess in China, if the Treaty

of November 2nd, 1865, were recognized as still operative, such
infraction could inot be made good simply by the payment of an
indemnity or by compensation or restitution ir some other material
form"

The Order says nothing expressly about irreparable prejudice and lays
down the principle thrit "the object of the provisional measures in ques-
tion can only be the protection of interests which, without such measures,
ivould he injeopardy cgbeing irrc~puuably conzpromised".
In the case concerning the Electricity Company 'ifSofia und Bulgrrrirr,
the Permanent Court indicated provisional meastres against Bulgaria,
not to prevent irreparable prejudice but because the parties to a case
must abstain from an:ymeasure capable of exercisi~ga prejudicial effect

in regard to the execiition of the decision to be given. In that case, the
Belgian Government claimed that prejudice had b:en caused by acts of
the State Administration of Mines putting into force a special artificially
calculated tariff, byji~dgments of the District Cou]t and of the Court of
Appeal of Sofia, and by the 1938judgment of the C'ourtof Cassation . . .
considering that the:y had occasioned grave przjudice to a Belgian
national 3h.

In the case concerriing Fisheries Jurisdiction ( D~litedKingdonzv. Ice-
land), the risk of economic prejudice was diffuse and required an assess-
ment of the consequiences of the Icelandic regulations on the fishing
industry in the United Kingdom (risk of unemplo;~ment,decommission-
ing of fishing vessels, etc.).
In the case concerning Nuclear Tests (Austruliu v. Franc(.), the Appli-
cants cited potential health effects of atomic radiation. Australia argued:

"as the result of the French tests which have already taken place,
[Australia] coulcl have 1 case of thyroid cancer per year due to the
isotope iodine-131 and 1to 4 other cancer cas1:s ... Due to the same

isotopes, Australia could have one mutation n every 10 years lead-

" Mathieu Bouah Bile, Les niesures conseri.utoire.sindiquees pur lu Cour.de Lu Huyr
de 1923 a nos jours, Dissertation, 1986, V1pp. 109 etsril.
35 P.C I.J., SeriA, No. 8. p. 7: emphasis added.
'6 P. C:/.J.. S(,AlB. No. 79, p. 199; P.C.I.J., Series.Vo.88, pp.55-56. CERTAINES PROCEDURES PÉNALES (OP. DISS. DE CARA)

ou une incapacitédans la premièregénérationet de cinquante acent
morts ou incapacitéspour l'ensemble des générations suivante^))^'.

Le Gouvernement français déclarait en s'appuyant sur une démonstra-
tion de caractère scientifique ((qu'aucune preuve n'a pu êtreapportée
jusqu'à présent que des doses aussi minimes que celles qui proviennent
des retombées françaises sont susceptibles de produire des effets ..n.
Mais la Cour a jugéque le caractkre irréparable du préjudicene faisait
aucun doute.
Par conséquent, a la lumière de cette jurisprudence, dans la présente

affaire, la menace de mesures judiciaires coercitives que représente le
réquisitoiredu 23janvier est de nature a constituer un risque de préjudice
irréparable.
Tout d'abord, une menace de mesure coercitive peut constituer, selon
la jurisprudence de la Cour, un risque de préjudiceirréparable.Dans une
affaire ancienne - certes - mais significative devant la Cour perma-
nente deJusticeinternationale, le Gouvernement allemand avait demandé
à la Cour d'indiquer au Gouvernement polonais, en attendant qu'il soit
statué surla requête, commemesure conservatoire, de s'abstenir àl'égard

des biens du prince von Pless de toute mesure de coercition du chef de
l'impôt sur le revenu, car la réalisation des mesures de coercitionappor-
terait aux droits et intérêtqui font l'objet du litige un préjudice irrémé-
diable. En définitive,après convocation de la Cour, la Pologne fit parve-
nir des déclarations selon lesquelles les sommations adresséesau prince
l'avaient étépar mégarde et les autorités polonaises supérieures ayant
appris que des mesures coercitives avaient été prisescontre le prince, le
gouvernement les avait annulées etil s'engageait à surseoir aux mesures

coercitives relatives à l'impôt sur le revenu du prince pour une autre
période, et à n'encaisser les impôts litigieux qu'au moment où la Cour
aurait résolu définitivementle différendpendant devant elle. En somme,
après accord entre les parties, dans son ordonnance du 11 mai 1933,la
Cour constate que, par suite de l'annulation, pour cause d'erreur admi-
nistrative, des mesures coercitives prises contre le prince von Pless, les
motifs sur lesquels était fondéela demande du Gouvernement allemand
en indication de mesures conservatoires ont disparu 38.

Il y a bien dans la présente affaire un risque de mesures coercitives a
l'encontre de ressortissants étrangers, des nationaux congolais bénéficiant
ou non d'une immunité dejuridiction, pour des faits commis au Congo,
décidées par l'autoritéjudiciaire française sur le fondement d'une compé-
tence inventéedans la coutume internationale.
Ensuite, dans l'affaire du Personnel diplomatique et consulaire ries
Etats-Unis à TéhSran,la Cour a répondu favorablement à la demande

37Demande en indication de mesures conservatodeel'Australie, C.I.J. Mémoires,
Essuis nucléuires,v1,p. 55.
3RC.P.J.I. sérieAIBn054, p. 151-153. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P. DE CARA)
130

ing to death or disability in the first generation, and up to 50-100
deaths or disabilities in al1subsequent generatii~ns."'~

Relying upon a scientific line of argument, the French Government
contended that "to dateno evidence has been adduc8:dthat such minimal
doses as those resulting from the fall-out from the French tests are likely
to have an effect . ..".Still, the Court held that the.e could be no doubt
as to the irreparability of the prejudice.

Consequently, in the light of this jurisprudence the threat of coercive

judicial measures raised by the véqzrisitoireof 23 Jsnuary in the present
case is such as to constitute a risk of irreparable pr:judice.

First, the threat of a measure of constraint can, under the jurispru-
dence of the Court, ccinstitute a risk of irreparable prejudice. In an old,
but nonetheless significant, case before the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, the German Government requested ..he Court to indicate
to the Polish Governnient, as an interim measure of protection pending
the delivery of judgnient on the Application, that it should abstain

from any measure of constraint in respect of che property of the
Prince von Pless, on ;account of income tax, beca Ise the carrying into
effect of the measures of constraint would irremcdiably prejudice the
right and interests forming the subject of the displte. Ultimately, after
the Court had converied, Poland transmitted dec1;~rationsstating that:
the summonses for payment had been sent to the Prince by oversight;the
higher authorities in Poland having learned that rreasures of constraint
had been taken in respect of the Prince, the Government had annulled
them and undertook to suspend measures of constiaint in respect of the

Prince's incometax for another period and to refrain from collecting the
disputed taxes until the Court had finally decided t le dispute then pend-
ing before it. Finally, after agreement between tlie parties, the Court
found in its Order of 11May 1933that, in consequence of the annulment,
on the ground that an administrative error had occiirred, of the measures
of constraint against the Prince von Pless, the grounds for the German
Government's request for the indication of provisional measures had
ceased to exi~t'~.

There is indeed a risk in the uresent case that coercive measures will be
taken against aliens, against Congolese nationals wliether or not enjoying
immunity from jurisdiction, in respect of acts corrmitted in the Congo,
such measures to be decided by French judicial autliorities on the basis of
a jurisdiction conjured up under international custom.
Further, in the case concerning the United State: Diplornutic and Con-
sular Stufj in Telzran, the Court responded favourably to the United

17 Reauest for the indication of urovisional measures of i~ustralia, I.C.J. Pleudinps,
~uc1ecrr'~esrs. ol1.p. 55.
IR P.C.I.J.Srrios AIBNo. 54.pp. 151-153131 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES (OP. DISS . E CARA)

américaineen disant, après avoir rappelé que le pouvoir d'indiquer des

mesures conservatoires présuppose qu'un préjudiceirréparable ne doit
pas êtrecauséaux droits en litige, que
«dans la conduite des relations entre Etats, il n'est pas d'exigence
plus fondamentale que celle de l'inviolabilité desdiplomates et
des ambassades ...les obligations ainsi assuméespour garantir en
particulier la sécurité personnelle desdiplomates et leur exemp-

tion de toute poursuite sont essentielles, ne comportent aucune
restriction...)".
Il en est a plus forte raison de mêmelorsque sont en cause les gouver-
nants des Etats.
Enfin, dans la présente instance,la demanderesse insiste pour que soit
pris en considération

«le trouble causépar l'information en cause aux relations interna-
tionales de la Républiquedu Congo par la publicitéque reçoivent ...
les actes accomplis par le magistrat instructeur, lesquels portent
atteinte a l'honneur et à la considération du chef de l'Etat, du mi-
nistre de l'intérieuret de l'inspecteur généradle l'arméeet, par la, au
créditinternational du Congo)).

Il serait difficilede se borneà affirmer que les relations franco-congo-
laises vont êtrealtéréescar toute procédurerelative aux immunités estde
nature à affecter lesrelations entre deux Etats. IIest possible que des allé-
gations de crimes contre l'humanitéou autres crimes d'Etat affectent le

créditinternational d'une nation, alors lesprocédures inattendues déclen-
chées en France seraient de nature a porter atteinte au crédit et même à
l'honneur du Congo, en raison de la publicitéqui leur est inévitablement
donnée.
Dans l'ordre international, le chef de 1'Etatreprésente1'Etatdans tous
les aspects de sa vie internationale et cette capacité généraledésignée
comme le jus repraesentationis omnimodae résultedu droit international
au moins autant et même plusque du droit constitutionnel national. Sir
Arthur Watts résume ainsi lasituation: «De manière générale,on peut
dire que, de nos jours, les chefs d'Etat, par leur fonction, expriment

l'esprit et la grandeur de toute leur nation.»40
Il existe sans doute des modes classiques de réparation d'une telle
atteinte au créditou à l'honneur d'un Etat dans l'ordre international et
un arrêt ultérieur de la Cour constituerait une réparation adéquate
du manquement à l'égarddu Congo dans ses relations avec les autres
membres de la sociétéinternationale.
En revanche, rien ne saurait réparer l'atteinte àla réputation et I'hon-
neur perdu d'un chef d'Etat aux yeux de son peuple, sensible a la publi-

j9C.I,J. Recueil 1979,19,par. 38.
40Watts,op. cit.p. 32. [Traduction du Gr<ff'e./ CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO. P.DE CARA) 131

States request, stating, after having noted that the power to indicate pro-
visional measures presupposes that irreparable pre,ludice should not be
caused to rights which are the subject of dispute, that
"there is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of rela-
tions between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and

embassies, . ..the obligations thus assumed, notably those for assur-
ing the persona1safety of diplomats and their frsedom from prosecu-
tion, are essential, unqualified, . .."39.

The same is true aj'hrtiori when State leaders ari: involved.

Finally, in the present proceedings, the Applicant stresses that account
should be taken of
"[the perturbation caused by the proceedings in question to] the
international relations of the Republic of the Congo as a result of
the publicity accc~rded . ..to the actions of the investigating judge,

which impugn thlr honour and reputation of the Head of State, of
the Minister of the Interior and of the Inspector-General of the
Armed Forces anNdi,n consequence, the international standing of the
Congo".
It is not only that Franco-Congolese relations will bedamaged because
proceedings concerning immunities are likely to afject relations between

two States. Allegations of crimes against humanity or other State crimes
can impair the international standing of a nation and the unprecedented
proceedings initiated in France would be such as to harm the standing
and even the honour of the Congo, owing to the publicity which will
inevitably be accordeti them.

In the international order the Head of State replesents the State in al1
aspects of its international intercourse and this gerieral authority, called
the jus repruesentationis omnimodue, follows froir international law as
much as, or even mori: than, from national constitutional law. Sir Arthur
Watts summarizes the position as follows: "It may be said generally that

nowadays Heads of States through their office manifest the spirit and
grandeur of their nations as a wh01e."~~
True, the international order traditionally provides means for making
good such an injury to the standing or honour of a State and a subse-
quent judgment by the Court would constitute adequate reparation for
the damage caused to the Congo in its relations nith other members of
the international community.
On the other hand, nothing could make good 'he loss of reputation
and honour suffered by a Head of State in the eqes of his people, who

" 1.C.J. Reports 1979p. 19para. 38
40Watts, op.c'ilp. 32.citéentretenue par la presse, ou a la propagande d'opposants. Il importe
de garder à l'esprit que, dans la présente affaire, esten cause un chef
d'Etat africain. En raison des guerres civileset des événementstragiques
qui ont marqué ce continent ces dernières années,un certain crédit est
facilement accordé aux rumeurs ou aux accusations qui désignenttel ou
tel leader, alors que de semblables accusations feraient sourire ou ne
seraient pas considéréescomme sérieusesend'autres régions. EnAfrique,
le chef de 1'Etat occupe une position trèsparticulière car «la population
a une conscience plus forte de la solidarité ethnique que de la solidarité
nationale ou étatique)),observait Raymond Aron; ((sans cohésionpar le

fait de la multiplicité tribale, les Etats d'Afrique sont prénationaux ou
subnationaux, si l'on peut dire, en ce sens que I'Etat n'a pasen face de lui
une nation unifiée));il ajoutait que ce type d'Etat nouveau
«est territorial et national: territorial en ce sens qu'à l'intérieurde
ses frontières, le souverain a le droit de faire ce qu'il veut, national
en ce sens que le souverain se veut non le possesseur du sol, non le

maître de ceux qui l'occupent mais l'expressiond'un peuple^^'.
Dans ces conditions, le chef de 17Etatidentifie le groupe, il incarne la
volonté nationale, il exerce une fonction «solidarisante», il symbolise
l'existencede la nation et toute accusation contre lui ou tentative d'atteinte
à sa personne est perçue comme une atteinte à 1'Etatqu'il représente avec

un certain unanimisme, mêmesi cet unanimisme est momentané. Cela a
conduit un auteur à conclure que
((Le chef d'Etat africain qui a étéun leader et qui fut le premier
témoin de l'idée nationale, de sa souveraineté,qui sera assurément,
dans l'Afrique de demain, un soldat, a pour mission première de
prouver I'Etat»42

Or, des procédures pénales engagées à l'étrangerdans des circonstances
mal éclairciescontre des dirigeants politiques qui se sont imposésau
terme d'années de guerrecivile peuvent contribuer à déstabiliserle gou-
vernement. Le juge qui mêmeinvolontairement se prête à des manipula-
tions de l'opinion populaire d'un pays étranger commet une ingérence
dans les affaires internes de cet Etat.n tel préjudice estirréparablecar

il affecte la légitimitéet la stabilité del'autoritégouvernementale étran-
gère.La Cour n'a pas voulu tenir compte de cette situation. Elle procède
à une distinction abstraite et catégoriqueentre les droitsà protégeret le
préjudicequi est la conséquencede la violation de ces droits, en retenant
l'éventualitéd'un préjudiceirréparable qui ne serait pas causéaux droits
dont se prévautle Congo en tant que tels, mais qui pourrait êtretel qu'il
affecterait de manière irréparable les droits énoncésdans la requête.
D'une part, il me semble que ce qui est en cause, ce n'est pas le caractère
distinct ou l'importance du préjudice;l'essentielest de pouvoir établirun

41Paix et guerre enksenations, 1962,p. 394-396.
4'Bernard Asso, Le clwf d'Etut ufricairi, 1976,p. 346

34 CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS . P DE CARA) 132

remain sensitive to pri:ss reports and propaganda disseminated by oppo-
nents. It is important to keep in mind that the present case involves an
African Head of State. Owing to the civil wars ancl tragic events having
marked the continent in recent years, rumours anc accusations directed
at one or another leader are easily given some credcnce, even though like
accusations would raise a smile or be considered frivolous elsewhere. ln
Africa the Head of State occupies a very special position, for "the people
have a stronger sense of ethnic solidarity than of ~iational or State soli-
darity", as Raymond .Aronobserved; "lacking cohcsion as a result of the
multiplicity of tribes, African States are pre-national or sub-national, as
it were, in that the SiLatedoes not have before it ,r unified nation". He

added that this new type of State

"is territorial and national: territorial in that the sovereign is entitled
to do as he pleases within its boundaries; national in that the sov-
ereign seeshiniself not as the possessor of the land nor as the master
of those occupyiiig it but as the embodiment of a peoples4'.

Accordingly, the Head of State identifies the group, he incarnates the
national will, he performs a "rallying" function, he symbolizes the exis-
tence of the nation and any accusation against him or attempted harm to
his person is perceived as an attack on the Statc he represents in the
manifestation of a certain unanimism, even thou:h that unanimism is

fleeting. This has led one author to conclude:
"An African Head of State who has been a leader and the first
witness to the national ideal, to its sovereignty, who in tomorrow's
Africa will assuredly be a soldier, has as his 1)rimemission proving
the existence of lhe State."42

Now, foreign criminal proceedings initiated under murky circumstances
against political leaders who prevailed after years of civil war can con-
tribute to destabilizing the Government. A court v~hichlends itself, even
unintentionally, to manipulation by public opinio I in a foreign country
interferes in the interna1 affairs of that State. Th s prejudice is irrepar-
able, as it undermines the legitimacy and stability of the foreign govern-
mental authority. The Court did not wish to take account of this situa-

tion. It draws an abstract, categorical distinction b:tween the rights to be
protected and the prejudice arising from the violation of those rights,
taking the view that irreparable prejudice would not be caused to the
rights as such claimed by the Congo but might be regarded as such as to
affect irreparably the rights asserted in the Applicltion. First, it appears
to me that what is at issue is not the separateness or magnitude of the
injury; the crux is whether a causal nexus betvieen the injurious act
and the damage can be established: the violation of the right or the act

4'Paix et guerre entre les nulions, 1962, pp. 394-396.
4'Bernard Asso, LP chej'd'Elut ufiiccrin, 1976, p. 346.lien de causalité entre le fait préjudiciable etle dommage: il faut que la
violation du droit ou le fait générateur deresponsabilité soit la causedu
préjudice. En revanche, dèslors que ce lien est établi,il suffit de constater
qu'il existeun préjudiceou, pour l'indication de mesuresconservatoires,
un risque de préjudiceirréparable. D'autre part, dans l'ordre politique, il
n'est pas possible de se limiter à une analyse mécaniste qui isolerait
chaque préjudice ou événemenptour le rattacher à sa cause efJiciente.La

violation des droits dont le Congo réclamela protection créepar elle-
même un préjudicep .ar exemple dans le cas de l'immunité, maisellepeut
créerd'autres préjudicesirréparables susceptibles d'êtreconstatés dans
l'avenir, difficiles voire impossibles prouver avant qu'ils ne soient réa-
lisés,mais qui peuvent êtreinfiniment plus graves, telle la déstabilisation
du pays. L'approche formelle qui se limite à la prise en considération des
droits à protéger énoncélsaisse de côtéle fait qu'ilpeut résulter dela vio-

lation d'un droit une sériede préjudices susceptibles d'affecterd'autres
droits et, plus généralement,des intérêtsjuridiqueslégitimesdignesd'être
sauvegardés. A cet égard, dans l'appréciation des «circonstunces» qui
exigent l'indication de mesures conservatoires rien ne s'oppose à ce que la
Cour puisse tenir compte des intérêtslégitimesd'une partie. D'ailleurs,
l'évolutiondu droit de la responsabilité civile, notamment en France,
dénotele souci du juge d'étendrele droit àréparation du dommage causé
a ((un droit)) au préjudice qui atteint un «intérêtlégitime))de la vic-

time4'. Le souci de voir préserver lastabilité interne du pays, qui risque
d'être troublée sousl'effet des allégations de comportements criminels
dont font l'objet ses dirigeants, constitue un intérêtjuridiquelégitimedu
Congo. Une telle atteinte à l'indépendance nationaleapparaît irréparable
et, une fois le gouvernement ébranlé, unedécision ultérieure de laCour
faisant droit à la demande du Congo pourrait être tardive.

II. IL EXISTE UNE URGENCE

Mêmesi la Cour ne l'a pas toujours mentionné defaçon spécifique(en
particulier dans l'ordonnance du 5 juillet 1951 dans l'affaire Arzglo-

Irunian Oil Co., mesures conservatoires, ordonnancedu 5juillet 1951)44,
les ordonnances ne laissent aucun doute, «de telles mesures ne sont justi-
fiéesque s'ily a urgence»45.
De la jurisprudence, trois tendances se dégagent.
Tantôt, il y a urgence manifeste (risque de mort, actions armées,
menace de destruction d'un bien ...et la Cour est conduite à faire preuve

43Terré, Ph. Simler, Y. Lequette, Droit civil: les obli~ations. 8' éd.,2002, no' 704 et
suiv., p. 684.
44C.I.J. Recueil 195p.93.
45Affaire relatiàla FronfiSre terrestre et maritime entre le Carnc~rounet le NiXiria
(Cameroun c. Nigériu}, mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 15 mars 1996,
C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (Il, p.21-22,35..giving rise to responsibility must be the cause of tht. prejudice. Once this
nexus has been established, it sufficesto find that thvre is prejudice or, for
the indication of provisional measures, a risk of irreparable prejudice.
Secondly, in the political order it is not possible to stop at a mechanical
analysis isolating each injury or event with a viewto connecting it with its
<f$cient cause. In itsizlf, the violation of the rigl-ts which the Congo
seeks to protect creates prejudice, for example in the case of immunity;
it can, however, also create other irreparable preiudice which may be

observed in the future. That prejudice is difficult if not impossible to
prove before it is suffered but it may be infinitel;! more serious, as in
the case of the destalbilization of the countrv. A formalistic auuroach
confining itself to consideration of the assertid rights for whick protec-
tion is sought disregards the fact that violation of one right can give
rise to a series of injuries likely to affect other rights and, more gener-
ally, legaI interests worthy of preservation. In this regard, there is
nothing to prevent the Court, in assessing the "circumstunces" calling
for the indication of provisional measures, from taking account of the

legitimate interests of a Party. Further, the development of the law of
civil liability, notably in France, shows the courts desire that the right
to compensation for an injury caused to "a right' should be extended
to the prejudice impairing a "legitimate interest" of the victim4" The
desire to preserve the interna1 stability of the coLntry, under threat of
being undermined as a result of the allegations of criminal conduct
levelled at the country's leaders, is a legitimate legal interest of the
Congo. This attack on national independence is clearly irreparable and

once the Government has been shaken, a subsequent decision by the
Court upholding the Congo's Application could come too late.

II. THERE 1s URGENCY

Even if the Court has not always specifically s.iid so (see, inter ulia,
Anglo-Iraniun Oil Co., Provisional Measures, Order of 5 July 1951)44,its
orders leave no doubt that "such measures are oiily justified if there is
urgency"4s.

The case law reveals three types.
First, the urgency rnay be patent (risk of death, zrrmedaction, threat of
destruction of property, etc.) and the Court must then demonstrate

41Terré,Ph. Simler, Y. Lequette, Droit civil: les obligation.;,8th ed., 2002, Nos. 704 et
srq.. p. 684.
441.C.J. Reports 1951. p. 93.
" Case concerning the Land and Marititne Boundury befiieen Cumeruorrand Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), iDrovisionalMeusures, Order15f.Murch 1996,1C.J. Reports
1996 (I), pp. 21-22, para. 35.de diligence46.De cela, on rapprochera la situation dans laquelle les deux
parties sollicitent lesmesures conservatoires en des termes similaires révé-
lant que I'urgence estau cŒur de la procédure4'.

Tantôt, les circonstances de l'urgence doivent êtreappréciéeset cela
révèleque I'urgence estune notion contingente, relative. La Cour avait
défini l'urgencedans l'affaire du Passage pur le Grand-Belt (Finlande
c. Danemark), en disant :

«les mesures conservatoires visées à l'article41 du Statut sont indi-
quées «en attendant l'arrêt définitif)d)e la Cour au fond et ne sont

par conséquentjustifiéesque s'ily a urgence, c'est-ci-dires'il estpro-
bable qu'une action préjudiciableaux droits de l'une ou de l'autre
Partie sera commise avant qu'un tel arrêtdéfinitifne soit rendu»48.

Tantôt, la distinction entre probabilité et possibilité est délicateet
l'urgence résultenon pas seulement d'un risque imminent, actuel, mais
mêmed'un risque éventuel.
Ainsi dans l'affaire des Essais nucl6uires(Austrulie c. Frunce), mesures

conservutoires, ordonnance du 22juin 1973, ou la Cour a seulement rele-
véde façon implicite l'urgence dela demande: «ces allégations viennent
étayer la thèse du Gouvernement australien selon laquelle 11 se peut
que la France procède immédiatement à un nouvel essai nucléaireatmo-
sphériquedans le Pacifiq~e))~~L .a même vue est expriméedans les affaires
relatives à la Compétenceen nzatiéredepe^cheriesquant à la possibilité de

la mise cn vigueur immbdiatc de la nouvellc réglementation islandaises0.
Parfois aussi l'urgence a été appréciéneon a la faveur du critèrede la
probabilité mais par référence à des considérations généralestenant aux
circonstances de l'affaire.
Dans l'affaire des Activitis militaires et purunîilituires uu Nicaragua et
contre celui-ci (Nicaruguu c Etats- Unisd'Amérique),mesures conserva-

toires, or~fonnuncedu IO nzui 1984, le demandeur «affirme que l'urgente
nécessité des mesures demandéesest attestéepar le fait que «la vie et les
biens des citoyens nicaraguayens, la souverainetéde l'Etat, la soliditéetle

4h Ainsi dans les affaires du Prnc6s rle prisonr2ier.sde guerre paki.stanuis, mesures
conseri~utoire.~o,rdont~unceclu 13 juillet 1973, de I'App/icution tle /u coni.ention pour la
pr6vention et lu répressiondu crime ckegénocirlt,(Bosrzie-Hrr~6~yovinte,. Yolrgos/uvie(Ser-
hie et Montérzégro)),de la Frontiéreterrestre et r?~aretre le Cutneroutlet le Nigiricl
(Ccimerouizc. Nigirinj, de la Convention de Vienne sur les relutions consriluires (Paru-
guq e. Etuts- Unis d'Amérique), LrrGrcin/Aller?iagnec. Etrits-Unis d'Ar?lérique),Avenu
et trutres ressortissattts rrre>ticain.isc. Etcits-Unid'Amérique), ou des Activiti.~
arniles sur le territoire cl21Congo iRépuhlique &nr»crtrtiyur (lu Coi~goc. Ougandtr).
47 D$ft5rendfrontulier (Burkinti FcrsolRépuhlic/uerlu Mirli), rneszrre.yconsrroutoires,
ordotlnunee du 10junoierlY86, C.I.J. Recueil 1986p.3.
48 C.I.J. Recueil 1991p.17. par. 23; les italiques sont de moi.
"' Conzpétenceen mutiércrlt~pêcheries(Royuurr~e-Urzic. I.slande), tnesures conserva-
toirrs, ordonnunce du 17ao6t 1Y72, C.I.J. Recueil 19p.,16;Cot?zpPtenceen ~ncitière(le
pêcheries(Rkpublirlue ,fldérule d'Allrn?u,c.Islaniic~),niesuriJscon.servutoires. ordon-
nonce (/il 17 uoiît 1972, C.I.J. Recueil p.734. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISSO . P.DE CARA) 134

diligence". Situations where both parties seek provisional measures in

similar terms revealing that urgency lies at the heart of the proceedings
also fa11into this category4'.
Secondly, in some cases. the circumstances of the urgency have to be
assessed and this indicates that urgency is a contingent or relative notion.

The Court thus defined urgency in the case concerning Pussuge tlzrough
the Great Belt (Finlundv. Derzrnartk)as follows:

"provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute are indicated
'pending the final decision' of the Court on the merits of the case,
and are therefor~eonly justified if there is urgency in the sense thut
action prejudicial to the rights of the other paity is likely to he taken

before such final decision is gi~en"~~.

Thirdly, the distinction between likelihood and possibility is sometimes
subtle and urgency may result not only from an actual imminent risk but
even from a contingent one.
Thus in the case concerning Nuclear Tests (Au~truliu v. France), Pro-
visional Merrsures,Order ($22 June 1973, in whickithe Court's finding as

to the urgency of the request was merely implicit, the Court stated:
"these allegations give substance to the Australian Government's conten-
tion that there is an immediate passibility of .ifurther atmospheric
nuclear test being cairriedout by France in the Pa~ific"~~.The same view
is expressed in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases as to the possibility of the

immediate implementation of the new Icelandic Pegulation~~~.
In other cases, urgency has been assessed not b! application of the cri-
terion of likelihood but by reference to general ccbnsiderationsrelated to
the circumstances of the case.
In the case concerning Military und Parami1;tary Actiilities in and

aguinst Nicuragua jVic~lragurr v. United States 01 Atnerlca), Provisional
Mt.asure.5,Orùer of IO Mu!' 1984, the Applicant 'claims that the urgent
need for the requested measures is shown by the fact that 'the lives and
property of Nicaraguan citizens, the sovereignty of the State and the

" As in the cases concerning the TriuI of Pukistuni Pris(jnel:~of Wur, Provision01
Meusures, Ortler of13 July 1973, Applicurion of'rhe Convention on the Prc>venrionund
Puni.slzmentof'tlle CrinofGrnocide (Bosniu und Herregovi zuv. Yugosluviu (Serhiri und
,&fontenegroji. Lund and ikritime Bounrlurjl hr!~i.t~enCrimeroorl cmrl Nigeriu (CUIFI-
eroon v. .Vigerirr). Viennu Conven~ionon Consulur Relution~ (Paraguay v. United Stuies
qf Americuj, LuGrar~d(Germuriy v. DiziredSraies qf'Arrreriruj, Avenu und Otizer Mexi-
crinNuiioncils (Mexico.v.United Strites of'Americtr) and Arn~edActivifies on the Terri-
ter].of rhrCo~go /Bimor.rf~tjt~Rrprihlir [$ flie Corzgov. (i:trnduj.
47 7rontic.r Dispute iBurkinti FusolRepuhlic of jl.luli), Pr,~i,isioncllMcrr.rucfs.Order
10 Jnnuary 1986, 1.C J.Reports 1986, p.3.
j". C.J. Reports 1991, p. 17, para. 23; emphasis added.
1.C.J. Rr,j~orfsIY7:I. p. 104, para. 26: emphasis added.
'O Fis/~eriesJuri.sdictio (United Kirrgdv.Ice/und), Pr~visiontrl~Meusures,Or&r of'
17 Augu.~t1972, 1.C.J. Reports 1972, p.16; Fisheries Juri.,diciion (Federul Republic of
Gt~rmtrq~v. Icelu17rl).Provi~ionul Meusures, Order of 17 August 1972,1.C.J. Reports
1972, p. 34.135 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PENALES (OP. DISS .E CARA)

progrès del'activitééconomiquesont tous directement en jeu» ...D~'Le
risque de déstabilisationdu Gouvernement de Managua étaitéventuelet
non actuel, les activités«secrètes» des Etats-Unis au Nicaragua pou-
vaient à tout moment cesser.

Dans l'affaire du Passagepur le GranhBelt (Finlande c.Danemark),
la Cour a fondé son appréciationsur le calendrier des travaux litigieux
combinéavec le déroulement de l'instance devant elle; deplus,

«prenant acte des assurances donnéespur le Dane~nurk selon les-
quelles aucune obstruction matérielledu chenal Est ne se produira
avant la finde l'année1994,et tenant compte du fait que la procédure
sur le fond dans la présente affaire devrait normalement êtreenéea
son terme auparavant, [la Cour] est d'avis qu'il n'apas été établiue
les travaux de construction porteront atteinte pendente lite au droit
revendiqué))52.

En somme, sans avoir obtenu les mesures conservatoires sollicitées, la
Finlande a obtenu une garantie qui tient dans les assurances danoises
suiteà sa demande.
Dans la présente affaire,il y a urgence tant que subsiste le réquisitoire.
Cet acte de procédure ouvreune possibilitéde préjudicesupplémentaire à
tout moment car il n'existe aucune garantie pour les personnes citées
dans les plaintes annexéesau réquisitoire. Au vu des plaintes portées

entre ses mains, le procureur de la Républiqueaurait dû vérifiersa com-
pétence et la recevabilitde l'action publique eu égardà la mise en cause
d'un chef d'Etat étranger.Un tel examen l'aurait convaincu qu'il ne pou-
vait en aucune façon requérir l'ouvertured'une information, qu'il devait
classer ces plaintes sans suite et s'abstenir mêmed'ordonner une enquête
préliminaire.En procédantcomme il l'a fait, il a entaché sonréquisitoire
d'incompétence,d'excèsde pouvoir et, par suite, de nullité. En même
temps, il permet au juge d'instruction de prendre à tout moment toute
mesure, y compris coercitive, contre les personnalitésen cause, et même
contre le chef de 1'Etat.Les plaintes annexées, rédigées avec soin,e sont

pas des piècesindifférentes,elles sont devenues par le réquisitoirequi y
renvoie la baseet lecadre de l'exercicede sa compétencepar lejuge d'ins-
truction. Le réquisitoirecontre X permet au juge d'agir au moment de
son choix contre les personnes dénommées mais ausstioutes autres per-
sonnes ayant un lien avec les faits dont le juge est saisi. Or, il n'existe
actuellement aucun recours possible contre le réquisitoiredu 23janvier,
sauf pour les parties civiles,les personnes mises en examen,le procureur
s'ilen a l'ordre, lejuge d'instruction sur la base de l'article code de
procédurepénale.Les personnes non mises en examen mais citéesdans
les plaintes sont impuissantes. De sorte que seul le Gouvernement fran-

C.1J. Recueil 1984, p. 182, par. 32.
52C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 18, par. 27; les italiques sont de moi. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P. DE CARA) 135

health and progress of the economy are al1 immediately at ~take"'~'.
The risk that the Niiraraguan Government would be destabilized was

potential not actual, as the "covert" activities of the United States in
Nicaragua could havc ceased at any moment.
In the case concerning Passage through the Cvat Belt (Finland v.
Denmark), the Court based its assessment on the timetable for the dis-
puted project as seen in the light of the expected course of the proceed-
ings; the Court statecl:

"placing on record the assurances given by Dtmmark that no physi-
cal obstruction of the East Channel will occur before the end of
1994, and considering that the proceedings on the mmits in the
present case wo~ild,in the normal course, be ~ompleted before that
time, [the Court] finds that it has not been shown that the right
claimed will be infringed by construction wor <during the pendency
of the pr~ceedings"~'.

In short, Finland failed to obtain the provisional ineasures sought but it
did obtain a guarantee in the form of assurances given by Denmark in
response to Finland':; request.
In the present case, the urgency remains for as long as theréquisitoireis
maintained. That ac.t of procedure creates the possibility of additional
prejudice at any time because there are no guaran.ees for the individuals

named in the complaints appended to the réquisitoire.Having regard to
the complaints transrnitted to him, the Procureuroe lu Républiqueshould
have ascertained whether he had jurisdiction and whether criminal pro-
ceedings were admissible, given the involvement of a foreign Head of
State.Had he done slo,he would have understood hat he was not entitled
to seek the opening of a judicial investigation and that he should take no
further action on those complaints and should evel refrain from ordering
a preliminary police enquiry. As it was, the prosesutor's actions resulted
in a réquisitoirewhich was vitiated by a lack of jurisdiction, was ultra
vires and was therefore void. At the same time, he allowed the investi-

gating judge, at any time, to take any measures, including measures of
coercion, against the:personalities in question and even against the Head
of State. The appended complaints were drafted with care and are not
neutral documents; by virtue of the réquisitoirewhich relied on them,
they became the basis and framework for the exerciseof the investigating
judge's jurisdiction. The réquisitoireagainst person or persons unknown
allows the judge to act, as and when he chooses, igainst the named indi-
viduals, but also ag,ainst any other persons who may be connected with
the acts referred to the judge. Moreover, there s currently no right of
appeal against the réquisitoireof 23 January, exc:pt that which could be
exercised by civilcoimplainants,individuals formally placed under judicial

51I.C.J. Reports IYXil,p. 182, para. 32.
5'I.C.J. ReporflYY/,p. 18, para. 27; emphasis added.136 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES (OP.DISS. DE CARA)

çais, par instructions données au procureur général,pourrait interrompre
l'effet pernicieux du réquisitoiredu 23janvier.

Faut-il attendre que le présidentde la Républiquedu Congo, une autre

personnalité congolaise ou un ressortissant de cet Etat soit mis en exa-
men, placé en garde à vue, incarcéré, défér éune cour d'assises ou
condamnépour considérerqu'il y a urgence à sauvegarder les droits du
Congo?
Il semble d'ailleurs vain de considérer que le Congo pourrait saisir la
Cour ultérieurement d'une nouvelle demande en indication de mesures

conservatoires si une autre étape était franchiedans la procédurepénale
française. Le préjudice existe déji. 11est urgent d'éviterque se réalisele
risque qu'il devienneirréparable.
Plus généralement,le fait d'attendre que la Cour ait statué au fond
peut constituer une cause d'urgence dans la mesure où la réparation d'un
préjudicecausépar la poursuite des procéduresjudiciaires contre les per-
sonnalitésen cause serait bien illusoire.

Déjà sir HerschLauterpacht notait:

((du point de vue de 1'Etat demandeur, une ordonnance indiquant
des mesures conservatoires peut revêtir uncaractère d'urgence tel
qu'attendre que la Cour, à l'issued'une procédurequi peut êtretrès
longue, finisse par statuer sur la question de sa compétenceau fond
risque fort de rendre illusoire la réparation ordonnée,soit que l'objet
du différend n'existe plus,soit qu'ily ait A cela d'autres raisons~~'
(traduction du Greffe].

Cette considération pèsed'autant plus lourdement que l'agent du Gou-

vernement français a refusétout engagement, toute promesse ou même
tout arrangement qu'avait pourtant expressément suggéré un des conseils
du Congo54.

III. ILEXISTE UN RISQUE D'AGGRAVATION OU D'EXTENSION DU DIFFÉREND

La Cour dispose du pouvoir d'indiquer, en vertu de l'article 41, des
mesures conservatoires en vue d'empêcherl'aggravation ou l'extension

du différendquand elle estime que les circonstances l'exigent 55.

53The Deoelonnzent of Internatloizul Lait, bi. the Internationul Court. 1958.o. 110-111.
'5Difjrirend frontalier (Burkina F~~solRip~ibliquedu Mali), mesures conservatoires,
ordonnancedu 10janvier 1986, C.I.J. Recueil p.9, par. 18.examination, the prosecutor if he receives such an order, or the investi-
gating judge under Article 170 of the Code of Criniinal Procedure. Indi-
viduals who have not been placed under judicial examination but who are
named in cornplaints remain powerless. Accordingly, only the French
Government, by instructions given to the Procurt ur général, would be
able to terminate the deleterious effect of the réqu sitoire of 23 January.
1sit really necessary for the President of the Rerublic of the Congo or

any other senior Congolese figures or citizens of th;~tState to be formally
placed under judicial examination, held in police custody, irnprisoned,
committed to the Assize Court for trial or convicte~i,before the preserva-
tion of the Congo's rights can be regarded as urgent?
It moreover appeai-spointless to consider that tlie Congo could subse-
quently seisethe Court of a new request for the indication of provisional
measures if a further threshold were to be crossed in the French criminal
proceedings. The prejudice already exists. It is urgent to forestall the

possibility of thatprejudice becoming irreparable.
More generally, urgency may also arise from the fact that it would
otherwise be necessary to wait until the Court rulf:d on the merits, since
any subsequent reparation of prejudice caused by 1he continuation of the
judicial proceedings against the personalities concerned would be quite
illusory.
As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht observed :

"from the point of view of the plaintiff State, an Order indicating
interim measures may be of such urgency that to postpone it until
the Court has finally decided, in proceedings which may take a long

time, upon the question of its jurisdiction cn the merits may well
render the remedy illusory as the result of the destruction of the
object of the dispute or for other reasonsf15'

This consideration takes on added significance given the refusal by the
Agent of the French Government to make any commitment, promise or
even arrangement, clespitethe express suggestion by one of the Congo's
counsel 54.

III. THEREIS A RISK OF.AGGRAVATIO ORNEXTENSIO OF THE DISPUTE

Byvirtue of Article 41, the Court has the power to indicate provisional
measures in order to prevent any aggravation or rxtension of the dispute
when it considers that the circumstances so requ~re~~.

" The DevelopmentouInternationul Law hy the Internatic nul Court, 1958,pp. 110-111.
j4CR 2003122,p. 13.
5'Frontier Dispute (Burkina FusolRepuhcfMali), Proi~isionulMeusures, Orcfr
10 Junuu,-1986,I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 9. para. 18.137 CERTAINES PROCEDURES PÉNALES (OP.DISS. DE CARA)

La Cour peut ainsi chercher à éviterles incidents ou mêmemaintenir

un statu quo.
Dans les affaires qui portent sur un conflit armé ouqui ont entraînéla
perte de vies humaines ou des dommages matériels, laprotection des
droits des parties comprend la nécessité d'évitetroute aggravation ou
extension du différend.Mais cela a étéaussi relevédans d'autres cas, par
exemple dans I'affaire de I'Anglo-Zranian Oil Co., dans I'affaire de la
Compétenceen matière de pêcheries,dans l'affaire des Essais nucléaires,
dans I'affaire du Persontzeldiplomatique et consulaire américain à Téhé-

ran, en liaison avec I'indication de mesures conservatoires spécifiques.
Dans I'affaire du Différendfrontulier, la Cour est allée assez loin
puisqu'elle a considéréque :

((indépendamment des demandes présentéespar les Parties en indi-
cation de mesures conservatoires, la Cour ...dispose en vertu de
l'article 41 du Statut du pouvoir d'indiquer des mesures conserva-
toires en vue d'empêcherl'aggravation ou l'extension du différend
quand elle estime que les circonstances

ce qui dénotait une évolution par rapport à la position stricte adoptée
dans I'affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Egéeou elle avait refusé
de trancher cette auestion ".
Dans I'affaire relativeà l'Application de la converztionpourlapréven-
tion et la répressiondu crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégosine c. You-
goslavie (Serbie et Monténégro)) en 1993,la Cour a enjoint aux deux

Parties de (<neprendre aucune mesure et veiller a ce qu'il n'en soit prise
aucune, qui soit de nature à aggraver ou étendrele différend»5x.
Plus généralement,il est permis de se demander si l'objectif de non-
aggravation et de non-extension du différend ou mêmele maintien du
statu quo est non seulement lié à la protection des droits des parties mais
aussi constitue la base de I'indication des mesures conservatoires5'.
Dans ces conditions, il semble que la Cour s'attache à l'ensemble des

circonstances du dossier et il apparaît qu'il y avait place pour l'indication
de mesures conservatoires minimales tendant au maintien du statu quo
dans les procédureslitigieuses engagées enFrance. Dans I'affaire relative
à des Questionsd'interprétutiotz~td'applicationde la convention deMont-
réal de 1971 résultant de l'incident akrietz de Lockerbie (Junzahiriya
arabe libyenne c. Royaume-Uni), lesjuges dissidents ont mis en exergue
cet aspect de la jurisprudence de la Cour en considérant que, au lieu de
s'attacher à l'examen de chaque condition mise à I'indication de mesures

conservatoires, la Cour peut privilégierune analyse globale des circons-
tances de I'affaire et,«sur cette base, décided'indiquer ces mesures en

jhC.LJ. Recueil 1986, p. 9, par. 18; les italiques sont de moi.
" C.I.J. Recuei1976, p13, par. 42.
5XC.IJ. Recueil 1993, p. 24, par. 52.
5yVoir S. Oda,op.cit. The Court can thuij seek to prevent incidents or even to maintain the
status quo.
In cases concerning an armed conflict or those tl-at have already led to
the loss of human life or material damage, the prctection of the parties'
rights includes the need to prevent any aggravation or extension of the
dispute. But this has also been observed in other cases, for example the
Anglo-Irunicrn Oil Co., Fi.sh~rie.sJurisdiction, Nucleur Tests and United
States Diplomatie anil Consulur Stuff in Tehran caiies,in connection with
the indication of specificprovisional measures.

In the Frontier Di.vputecase, the Court went q~ite far because it con-
sidered that :

"independently of the requests submitted by the Parties for the indi-
cation of provisional measures, the Court .. .possesses by virtue of
Article 41 of the Statute the power to indicatg:provisional measures
with a viewto preventing the aggravation or extension of the dispute
whenever it conisidersthat circumstances so req~ire"'~,

which indicated a certain evolution froiil the strict position previously
adopted in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelfcase, when it had refused to
settle that issues7.
In the case concerning Application of the Conveiztionon the Prevention
und Punishment of the Crime cf Genocide (Bosr,ia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslaviu (Serhiu ~zndMoritenegro)), in 1993,t'le Court ruled that the
two parties "should inottake any action and should ensure that no action
is taken which may aggravate or extend the exist ng disputens8.

More generally, it may be suggested that the objective of non-aggrava-
tion and non-extension of the dispute, or even the maintaining of the
status quo, is not only related to the protection o" the parties' rights, but
also constitutes a balsisfor the indication of provisional measures5'.
Accordingly, the Court seems inclined to take nto account al1the cir-
cumstances of the case and it would appear that minimal provisional
measures were appropriate here, with a view to maintaining the status
quo in the disputed proceedings initiated in Franre. In the case concern-
ing Questions of Ifilterpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal

Convention urising.from the Aerial Incident ut Lockerbie (Lihyun Arub
Jumahiriya v. United Kingdom). the dissenting judges singled out this
aspect of the Court's jurisprudence and considered that instead of
focusing on a reviervof each prerequisite to the iidication of provisional
measures, the Court may give preference to an overall analysis of the
circumstances of the case and "on that basis, [decide] to indicate [such]

sh 1C.J. Reports19815 ,. 9, para. ;8emphasis added
57 1.C.J. RL>PO~19S711,p. 13, para. 42.
'V.C J. Reports1993, p. 24, para. 52.
See S. Oda, opcil.138 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PENALES (OP. DISS. DE CARA)

termes générauxd'exhortation faite à toutes les parties de ne pas aggra-
ver ou étendre le différend))ou (([d'appeler] les parties à évitertoute
escalade »60.
Or, dans la présenteaffaire, un épisodede la procédure devantla Cour
incitaità adopter cette solution. A l'audience, un des conseils du Congo

a suggéréque les représentants de la Républiquefrançaise demandent a
la Cour de leur ((donner acte de la portée qu'ils attribuent au réquisi-
t~ire»~'.Cette proposition se situait en deçà de la demande en indication
de mesures conservatoires et constituait une moindre mesure que la sus-
pension des procéduressollicitée.Rejetant l'offre, l'agentde la France a
refuséde formuler toute promesse et il s'estborné à constater ((l'étatdu
droit français)) bien que soient en cause dans cette affaire non pas l'état
du droit français en la matière et les garanties abstraites qu'il présente
mais plutôt l'existence et le maintien du réquisitoiredu 23 janvier 2002.
La Cour a pris note de ces déclarationsdans son ordonnance sans préci-
ser leur portée et sans que ces déclarations apportent une quelconque
garantie de nature à compenser le rejet de la demande en indication de

mesures conservatoires. Cette solution n'est pas dénuée d'ambiguïté car
les déclarations de l'agent du Gouvernement français plaçaient le juge
devant une alternative. Soit elles sont un constat d'ordre juridique: le
droit français interdit de poursuivre un chef'Etat étranger,le droit fran-
çais subordonne la compétence des tribunaux français pour des faits
commis à l'étrangerà certaines conditions qui excluent l'affirmation
d'une compétenceuniverselle fondée surune prétenduecoutume interna-
tionale. Dans l'affaire desEssais nucléaires,la Cour a jugéque

«Il est reconnu que des déclarationsrevêtantla forme d'actes uni-
latéraux et concernant des situations de droit ou de fait peuvent
avoir pour effet de créer desobligations juridiques ...Quand 1'Etat
auteur de la déclaration entend êtreliéconformément a ses termes.
cette intention confèreA sa prise de position le caractère d'un enga-
gement juridique, 1'Etat intéresséétant désormais tenu en droit de
suivre une ligne de conduite conforme à sa déclaration.» h2

Dans ces conditions, la Cour pouvait non seulement en prendre note
mais aussi juger que l'indication de mesures conservatoires étaitinutile
car elle ne saurait douter que le Gouvernement français fasse respecter
ses propres lois. Les déclarations de l'agent du Gouvernement français
avaient donc pour effet «de créer desobligationsjuridiques)) et il incom-
bait aux autorités françaises d'en tirer toutes les conséquencespratiques.
Une telle solution de nature A mettre un terme au différend s'inscritpar-
faitement dans la mission de la Cour car il est dejurisprudence constante

que le règlement judiciaire des conflits internationaux, en vue duquel la

C.I.J. Recue1992,opinion dissidente du président Bedjaoui,p. 48, par. 32; opinion
dissidente du juge Ranjeva, p. 76, par. 12.
CR 2003122,p. 13.
hZC.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 267. par. 43.measures in the general terms of an exhortation to al1the parties not to
aggravate or extend the dispute" or "[call] on th,: Parties to avoid al1
escalation" 60.
In the present case, one episode in the proceedings before the Court
should have led it to adopt such a solution. During the hearings, counsel
for the Congo suggested that the representatives O 'the French Republic
ask the Court "formally to place on record the sccpe which they ascribe

to the réqui~itoire"~'. That proposition fell short of the request for the
indication of provisional measures and would havi: been less demanding
than the requested suspension of the proceedings. The Agent of France,
however, rejected the offer and refused to make any promises, simply
referring to "the state of French law", even thougli the issue in this case
is not the state of French law in such matters or aiiy abstract guarantees
it may offer. but rather the existence and maintairiing of the réquisitoire
of 23 January 2002. The Court took note of the Agent's statements in its
Order, but without stipulating their scope, and tliose statements fail to
provide any guarantee capable of counterbalanci~ig the decision to dis-
miss the request for the indication of provisional :neasUres.The Court's

solution is somewhat ambiguous because the statements by the Agent of
France presented it viith two alternatives. Either tliey were statements of
law: French law prohibits the prosecution of a fxeign Head of State;
French law subjects the jurisdiction of French courts in respect of acts
committed abroad to certain conditions which preclude the exercise of a
universal jurisdiction purportedly founded on iniernational custom. In
the Nucleur Tests ca:se,the Court held that

"It is well recognized that declarations matle by way of unilateral
acts, concerning legal or factual situations, Inay have the effect of
creating legal obligations .. . When it is the intention of the State
making the declilration that it should become bound according to its
terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a
legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to fol-
low a course of conduct consistent with the tleclarati~n."~~

Under these circumstances, the Court was not only entitled to take note
of the statements but also to hold that the indication of provisional meas-
ures was pointless because it could not doubt th.it the French Govern-
ment would enforce its own law. The statements )y the French Govern-
ment's Agent thus had the effect of "creating le,:al obligations" and it
was incumbent upon the French authorities to assume any practical con-
sequences. Such a solution, capable of putting an end to the dispute, falls

perfectly within the Court's mission because it is established jurispru-
dence that the judicial settlement of international ,lisputes, with a view to

"'I.C.J. Reports 199.?, dissenting opinion of President Bedjaoui, p. 48, para. 32;
di6'CR 2003122,p. 13.utige Ranjeva, p. 76, para. 12.
621.C.J. Rq~orts 1974, p. 267, para. 43.139 CERTAINES PROCÉDURES PÉNALES (OP. DISS. DE CARA)

Cour est instituée,n'est ((qu'un succédanéau règlement direct etamiable
de ces conflits entre les partie^))^'.
Soit les déclarations de l'agent de la France constituent une simple
pétition deprincipe, un effet d'audience et la Cour ne pouvait que consi-
dérer quela France n'avait pas ((l'intention de se lier)).Mais s'ilne s'agis-

sait pas d'une promesse nil latérale^^,la Cour pouvait apprécierla portée
de la réticence française à formuler toute promesse et en tirer les consé-
quences. Les parties àl'instance se sont en effet entendues pour l'essentiel
sur les termes générauxdu droit français en la matière mais, sur ce qui
constitue le nŒuddu différend etqui résulte des initiativesdu parquet, le
refus du Gouvernement français de s'engagerentretient un risque d'aggra-
vation du différendtant que subsiste le réquisitoirelitigieux du 23janvier

2002. Sans doute pourrait-on expliquer la réserve de l'agentdu Gouver-
nement français par des considérationsd'ordre constitutionnel tenant à la
séparationdes pouvoirs et a l'indépendance de l'autoritéjudiciaire. Mais
dans l'ordre international, le gouvernement représente 1'Etatdans sa plé-
nitude et il a la facultéd'engager toute autorité, y compris judiciaire, à
plus forte raison alors qu'est en cause le déclenchement de l'actionpu-
blique. Ainsi que la Commission du droit international l'a constaté,

«est considéré commeun fait de 1'Etatd'aprèsle droit international
le comportement de tout organe de cet Etat agissant en cette qualité,
que cet organe exerce des fonctions législatives, exécutives, judi-
ciaires ou autres, quelle que soit la position qu'il occupe dans I'orga-
nisation de I'Etat »h5.

La Cour a pu déjàconstater la carence d'un gouvernement qui ne faisait
pas respecter le droit international en n'appliquant pas ses propres lois.
Dans l'affaire du Personnel diplomutiquc et consulairedes Etuts-Unis ù

Téhkrarz ,lle a relevéque le Gouvernement de l'Iran n'avait pris aucune
mesure de protection des personnes qui bénéficiaientdes immunitéd siplo-
matiques et consulaires. Elle a rappelé que 1'Etat a l'obligation de
prendre toutes mesures appropriées pour empêchertoute atteinte a la
personne, la libertéet la dignité des agents menacés. La Cour a été amenée
à conclure que les autorités iraniennes étaientégalementconscientesde leur
obligation mais qu'elles ont manqué à utiliser les moyens dont elles dis-
posaient pour s'acquitter de leurs obligations; en particulier, elle a jugé

((nécessairedesouligner que, si l'intention de soumettre les otages à toute
espècede procès criminel ou d'enquêtedevait se traduire dans les faits,

" Zoncsfrunches de lu Haute-Suvoie et du Puys de Gex, ordonnance du IY1929,t
C.P.J.I. sérieAIB n" 2p. 13.
1981.p. 327.cqué,<<probesde la promesse unilatéralen. Mi1unge.soùrPaul Reuter,
"5Article 4 du projet d'articles reàala responsabilité des Etats, RGDIP, 2000,
p. 117;dans l'avisconsultatif du 29 avril 1999concernant le Dlfi'rend relatifù l'immunité
de juridiction d'un rapporteur spi.ciu1de lu Cornmission des droits de l'homme. la Cour a
citéun texte similaire qui a prla rédaction decet article, Annuuire dc.la Comnzission
du droit internarionul, 1973, vol. II, p. 197. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P DE CARA) 139

which the Court was established, is "simply an alternative to the direct

and friendly settlement of such disputes between tl-e partie^"^'.
Or the statements by the Agent of France were simply question-
begging and intended for dramatic effect, thus obliging the Court to take
the viewthat France had no "intention of becomingbound". But, if this was
not a unilateral promise64,the Court was entitled t3 consider the signifi-
cance of France's reluctance to make any promises and entitled to draw
the appropriate conclilsions. The Parties are in fact essentially agreed on

the general terms of French law on the subject but, with respect to the
crux of the dispute, stemming from the prosecutor s actions, the French
Government's refusal to make any commitment thus leaves a risk of
aggravation of the dispute for so long as the im~ugned riyuisitoire of
23 January 2002 remains in force. That reserve on the part of the French
Government's Agent inay perhaps be explained by ronstitutional consid-

erations relating to the separation of powers and to the independence of
the judiciary. However, in the international order, the Government rep-
resents the State in al1its aspects and is entitled to bind any authority,
including judicial bodlies,ufortiori when the initiztion of criminal pro-
ceedings is at issue. The International Law Comrrission thus observed:

"the conduct of any State organ acting in that capacity shall be con-
sidered an act of that state under internaticnal law, whether the
organ exerciseslegislative,executive,judicial, cr any other functions,
whatever position it holds in the organization of the StateWh5.

The Court has already had occasion to take note of the breach by a
Government which, irineglecting to enforce its owr laws, failed to ensure

compliance with international law. In the case concerning United States
Diplornutic und Consulur StajJ in Trhrun, it observed that the Iranian
Government had failed to take any measures to protect persons who
enjoyed diplornatic and consular immunities. It rccalled that a State is
under an obligation to take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on
the person, freedom or dignity of agents under threat. The Court con-
cluded that whilst the Iranian authorities were awa -eof their obligations,

they failed to use the means which were at their dijposal to comply with
those obligations; in particular, the Court consider-d it "necessary . ..to
stress that, if the interition to submit thehostages to any form of criminal
trial or investigation were to be put into effect, tkat would constitute a

Frre Zones of Iippcr Savoy and the L)i.stri(ifGex, grder of 19 Auguai lY2Y.
P.C.I.J.. S6,rie.cANo. 27,v. 13.
64J.-P. Jacqué,"A propos de la promesse unilatérale", M6k1ngrsofàPaul Reuter.
1981, p. 327.
"'Article 4 of ILC DraFt Articles on State Responsibility, I'ifty-second Session(2000),
AlCN.4lL.600: in the Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999concc:rningthe Differencr Relut-
;~igIo Inir>~uni/rom L~gul Pr«cess <i Jr'peciul Rupport ?ur of tlic, Curnt?zon.~ion
Hutilcin Rights the Court cited a similar text corresponding to an earlier draft of that
Articlc from the Yi,urhooliof tlic It~terrLairoCon~nziss;oti,1973, Vol. II. p. 193.cela constituerait une violation grave des obligations incombant à
A plus forte raison, lorsqu'un Etat prétend queses propres lois
sont conformes au droit international et qu'il considèrequ'il n'ya aucune
raison de ((supposerqu'à l'avenir lesjuges vont s'écarterdu droit qu'ils

sont chargésd'appliquer >)67l,a juridiction internationale devant laquelle
de telles déclarations sont faites n'a pas a se borner a en prendre note;
elle peut y voir un engagement dudit Etat. Dans le différendconcernant
le$filetageriIJintt.rieurdu golfe du Saint-Laurent, en présencede propos
plus anodins relatifs à la capture de morue, le Tribunal arbitral a dit:

«Eu égard aux circonstances dans lesquelleselle a été faite,le Tri-
bunal doit considérerpareille déclaration commeengageantla France
a user de tous les moyens dont elle dispose pour veiller, conjointe-
ment avec les autorités canadiennes, au respect de cette déclara-
tion.»68

11convenait donc dans la présente affaire de rappeler a la France son
devoir de faire respecter ses propres lois dans la mesure où elles ex-
priment dans l'ordre interne des règleset des principes du droit interna-
tional; les assurances données à l'audience quant à la conformité du

droit français au droit international seraient vaines si elles ne s'accom-
pagnaient pas de l'adoption de décisionsappropriéescar
«[l']un des principes de base qui président A la création et à I'exé-
cution d'obligations juridiques, quelle qu'en soit la source, est celui

de la bonne foi. La confiance réciproqueest une condition inhérente
de la coopération internationale ..))69
Il ressort d'ailleurs de lajurisprudence que les lois internes ne sont pas
à l'abri d'un arrêtde la Cour et qu'un Etat peut être conduit à priver

d'effetune loi interne contraire à ses obligations internationales7('.A plus
forte raison, l'exécutiond'une décisionde la Cour peut imposer au gou-
vernement d'un Etat une mesure administrative telle qu'ici une instruc-
tion adresséeau pouvoir judiciaire. Dans son avis consultatif concernant
le Différendrelatij 6 l'imnzunitédejz4ridictiond'un rupporteur spéci~rd le
la Convnission des droits de I'horîzrvzel,a Cour a dit que l'obligation
d'assurer les exigences relatives aux immunités des experts était «une

obligation de résultat et non une obligation quant aux moyens a utiliser

hhC.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 13, 30, 33, 37.
"'Selon les termes de l'agent du Gouvernement français, CR2003123, p. 7, citésau
pahXTribunal arbitral FrancelCanada, sentence du 17juillet 1986,RGDIP, 1986,p. 713et
suiv.. par. 63.p. 756.
6'Essais nucliaires (Austrac.France), arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 268, par. 46.
Certains intc5rêtasllemands en Haute>-Silêsipeolonaise, fond, arrêtti" 7, 1926; Usine
de Cliorzbiv, ,fi>nd arrêrn" 13, 1928; affaire relative aux Droits des ressortissunts dc,s
Etats-Unis d'Amêriqzreau Maroc, urrc't (lu 27 août 1952; affaires reàala Com-
pltence en mutière de pêcheries(Roj~ciumei. Islande), fond, arràla Con~pitence
en mcitièreciepdcheries (Rc;puhliquefi.di.rale d'Alc.mIslande), coinpetence de lu
Cour, arrêtdu 25 juillet 1974.grave breach by Iran of its obligations" 66.A jortior~, when a State claims

that its own law is in compliance with international law and when it con-
siders that there is no reason to "[suppose] that in the future [its]courts
would move away frorn respecting the law they are required to apply" 67,
the international forurn before which such statements are made need not
confine itself to taking note of them but may alsc, interpret them as a
commitment by that State. In the dispute concernir g Filleting ivithin the
Gulf' of Saint La~vrenc:e, among more innocuous comments concerning

cod fishing, the Arbitration Tribunal stated:
"Having regard to the circumstances in which it was made, the
Tribunal is boundlto consider that such a stateinent commits France

to use al1 the means in its power to ensure, in conjunction with
the Canadian authorities, that the commitment is re~pected."~~

In the present case, France should thus have been reminded of its duty

to ensure compliance with its own laws, inasmuch .is they enshrine rules
and principles of international law in its domestic xder; the assurances
given during the hearings as to the conformity of French law with inter-
national law would be vain unless accompanied by the appropriate
decisions because

"[olne of the basic principles governing the creation and perform-
ance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of
good faith. Trust and confidence are inhe -ent in international
cooperation . . ."6"

The jurisprudence shows that domestic statutes are not immune to the
effects of a judgment of the Court and that a State may be obliged to
strike down a domestic statute which is held to be in breach of its inter-
national obligations7". A fortiori,the execution of a decision of the Court

may require the Government of a State to tate an administrative
ineasure, such as, in the present case, issuing instrirctions to the judicial
authority. In its Adviijory Opinion concerning the .9@rence Reluting to
Imtnunity fionz Legul Process of u Special Rupportipurof'the Commis.sion
on Human Right.5, the Court held that the obligation to comply with the
requirements relating to the immunities granted to experts was "an obli-

h6 I C.J. Reports 1980, ]>p.13. 30. 33, 37.
" Statement of the Agent of France, CR2003/23. p. 7, cit:d in paragraph 33 of the
Order.
Arbitral Award of 17July 1986, Canada-France Arbitration Tribunal. Internutionul
Luiv Reports. Vol. 82, pp. 590 et seq., p. 637, para. 63 (2).
hy iYUcle(T<JSW /.41lstr0Y.uFrunc~). Jiirlgrnent,I.C.J. Rr,llorts 1974, p. 268, para. 46.
Certc~irlGermun Interests ipolis/^Upper Silrsiu, Juri:diction, Mrrits, Judgrnrnt
No. 7. 1926; Ft~ctoryut C/~oi.xhr,,Merits, Jud~mrnt No. 13, 1528; case concerning Righrs
of Ntrtionrrof tlte C'nitea'States of Anlerica in Morocco, JuiIgrnent of27 August 1952;
Fisheries JurisdictifnUniteriKingdom v.Icrland), Merits, .rud~nzeritof25 July 1974:
Fisherirs Jurisdiction iFe(ieral Republic of Gertnv.yIcel<rnd),iMerits, Judgmeat of
25 Jzrli:1974.pour parvenir à ce résultat)).La Malaisie exposait qu'elle s'étaitacquittée
de son obligation en promulguant les textes législatifs nécessaires etque

les tribunaux malaisiens n'étaient pasencore parvenus à une décision
finaleen cequiconcerne ledroit durapporteur spécialencause, M. Cuma-
raswamy, àbénéficied re l'immunitédejuridiction. La Cour a rejetécette
argumentation en concluant que les autorités gouvernementales étaient
tenues de communiquer les informations relatives au statut de l'agent et
en particulier a son immunité de juridiction aux tribunaux nationaux
concernéscar l'application correcte de la convention sur les privilèges et
immunités desNations Unies par ces derniers en dépend. N'ayant pas
transmis cette information aux tribunaux compétents,la Malaisie ne s'est
pas acquittée de son obligation internationale71.

De même,au stade actuel de la procédure, le Gouvernement français
ne peut se borner à s'abstenir. Sans doute, ainsi que la Cour permanente
l'a rappelé,il est un
((principe universellement admis devant les juridictions internatio-
nales ...d'apréslequel lesparties en cause doivent s'abstenir de toute

mesure susceptible d'avoir une répercussion préjudiciable à I'exécu-
tion de la décision à intervenir et, en général, ne laisser procéde r
aucun acte, de quelque nature qu'il soit, susceptible d'aggraver ou
d'étendrele différend »72.
Toutefois, ce devoir d'abstention ne garantit pas que la violation des
droits du Congo ne se perpétuedurant le procès. Il reviendrait donc au

Gouvernement français de donner instruction au procureur généralpour
que soient prises toutes mesures judiciaires destinées à priver d'effet le
réquisitoirelitigieux qui menace l'immunitédu chef de 1'Etatet empiète
sur la compétence des juridictions du Congo, afin de ((redresser les
erreurs commises »".
A défaut d'engagementspécifiquede la France sur la portée accordée à
cet acte de poursuite, dans les circonstances présentes,la suspension des
mesures procéduralesfrançaises qui actuellement se limitent pour I'essen-
tiel au réquisitoiredu 23 janvier 2002 eût été denature à éviterI'aggra-
vation du différend enmaintenant le statu quo sans altérerl'équilibre des
droits respectifs des parties.

(Signé) Jean-Yves DE CARA.

''B~flërend rrlatifù l'inii~uniri.dejuridiction d'un rappo(/e/a Commission
des(fruits del'homnze, C.I.J. Recueil(1)p. 86-88, par. 57-65.
C.P.J.I.irie AIBn" 79, p. 199.e Sqfiu et de B~iigurie.ordonnance (lu 5 dicrn7hrc. 1939.
''M. Abraham, agent du Gouvernement français, CR2003123. p. 14. CERTAIN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (DISS .P DE CARA) 141

gation of result and not of means to be emploqed in achieving that
result". Malaysia conitended that it had complied vith its obligation by
enacting the necessary legislation and that Malaysi in courts had not yet
come to a final decisiisn concerning the right of the Special Rapporteur
concerned, Mr. Cumaraswamy, to enjoy immunity from legal process.
The Court rejected those arguments, concludin,; that governmental
authorities had an obligation to inform the nation; 1courts concerned of

the status of the officia1and in particular of his immunity from legal
process, since the proper application by those cou .ts of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United N~tions was dependent
on such information. Having failed to transmit that information to the
competent courts, Malaysia had not complied with its international obli-
gation''.
Similarly, at the current stage of the proceeding:,, the French Govern-
ment cannot simply a~bstainfrom acting. True, as the Permanent Court
of International Justice recalled, there is a

"principle universally accepted by internationid tribunals .. .to the
effect thatpartiersto a case must abstain from any measure capable
of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the
decision to be given and, in general, not allov any step of any kind

to be taken which might aggravate or extend the di~pute"'~.

However, that duty of abstention does not guarantee that the Congo's

rights will not continue to be violated during the ciiminal proceedings. It
would thus be incumbent upon the French Gover lment to give instruc-
tions to the Procureur géntral so that al1judicial measures be taken
with a view to annulling the impugned réquisitoir?, which threatens the
immunity of the Head of State and encroaches upon the jurisdiction
of Congolese courts, in order to "remedy any errcrs"".
In the absence of any specificconimitment by l'rance with respect to
the scope that it ascribes to that act of procedure, under the present cir-
cumstances, the suspension of the French procedural measures, which are

currently confined essentially to the réquisitoire of 23 January 2002,
would have been con'duciveto precluding any aggravation of the dispute,
by maintaining the si.atusquo without affecting tf e balance between the
Parties' respectiverights.

(Signed) Iean-Yves DE CARA

''DiJ-ferenceRelutin10Imt?~unityfrom Legal Pi.ocofs3SpeciczlRapporteur of'the
Commission on Human Ri~ht.7,I.C.J. Repurfs 1999 (I), pp. 36-88,paras. 57-65.
''Electriciv Company of'Sofia und Buigariu. Ordeof.;Decemher 1939, P.C.I.J.,
Series AIE, No. 79. p. 199.
73Mr. Abraham. Agent of France, CR 2003123,p. 14.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Dissenting Opinion by Judge ad hoc de Cara (translation)

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