DECLARATION OF JUDGE VERHOEVEN
The connection which counter-claims are required to have with the
principal claim in order for them to be admissible must, it seems to me,
be considered in the light of their purpose. That purpose is not always
entirely clear. Judged by reference to national practices, the importance
of counter-claims would appear to be twofold: on the one hand. they
enable the court to gain a more thorough and precise understanding of
the dispute of which it is seised and, on the other hand, they avoid the
risk of incompatible - or even downright contradictory - rulings.
These are the sole circumstances in which recourse to a counter-claim can
effectively enable additional proceedings to be dispensed with.
That is a reasonable explanation. Should it be otherwise in the case of
international courts? I see no reason why. That being the case, the cri-
teria of corinection emphasized to date by the Court for the purpose of
declaring counter-claims admissible (facts of the same nature, same over-
al1 fàct~ial situation, same legal objectives) must accordingly be under-
stood in light of the above-mentioned aims. However, it would seem to
me to be wrong to apply those criteria in a purely "mechanical" mannes,
losing sight of the reasons which essentially explain why a court should
entertain the respondent's claim without obliging it to institute new pro-
ceedings. Too rigid an application could result in an excessive reduction
in the number of claims that might effectively be subrnitted by way of
counter-claim; it could also be to disregard the hct, underlined by the
Court, that the principal claim and the counter-claim are independent of
one another, which necessarily implies that they need have neither the
saine subject-matter nos the same legal basis; finally, it cannot be pre-
cluded that other criteria may be judged relevant, under other circum-
stances, for the purpose of ruling on the admissibility of a counter-claim.
The important point is always that the Court should be in the "best"
position to pass judgment, and that the credibility of its judgments
should not be jeopardized by inconsistent rulings.
'That said, it is a pecific feature of the International Court of Justice
that its jurisdiction has to date been purely voluntary. That jurisdiction
exists only because and in so far as the parties have so desired. There is
thus a possibility that the Court. absent agreement, might not be able to
assume jurisdiction tomorrow in respect of a claim of which it is seised
today by way of coiinter-claim. Are we accordingly to conclude that the
Court should adopt a particularly "liberal" approach when ruling on the
admissibility of a counter-claim and. in particular, on the requirement
that the counter-claim be directly connected to the subject-matter of theprincipal claim? 1seriously doubt it. It is true that the peaceful settlement
of'disputes could be enhanced by such an approach. However. the risk is
that it would encourage States to avoid a court which springs too many
"siirprises" on theni, rather than submit to its jurisdiction. Further, the
interna1 logic of a system of voluntary jurisdiction undoubtedly requires
- irrespective of any considerations of jurisdictional policy - particular
rigour in regard to evaluation of the connection which the counter-claim
must have with the principal claim if it is not to be ruled inadmissible.
It is because the attack against Uganda's diplornatic mission in Kin-
shasa, as cited by the Respondent, does not appear to me to throw any
usefiil light for the Court on the armed aggression and unlawful occupa-
tion of part of its territory which the Democratic Republic of the Congo
clainis to have suffered - allegations central to the principal claim --
that 1 voted against the admissibility of the Respondent's second counter-
claim. In light of the foregoing observations, it seems to ine that the mere
fact that tliis attack is part of a multifaceted history of conflict is not
sufficient to justify the Respondent being authorized to seise the Court
of this claim by way of counter-claim.
(Signrd) Joe VERHOEVE~.
DECLARATION DE M. VERHOEVEN
C'est à la lumière des objectifs auxquels répond l'institution des de-
mandes reconventionnelles qu'il convient, me semble-t-il, d'apprécier le
lien de connexité que celles-ci doivent présenter avec la demande princi-
pale pour êtrerecevables. Ces objectifs ne sont pas toujours parfai-
tement clairs. Si l'on en juge par référenceaux pratiques nationales, une
double considération paraît déterminante: permettre au juge d'avoir
du litige dont il est saisi une connaissance plus conlplète et plus exacte,
d'une part, prévenir le risque de décisions difficilement compatibles.
voire franchement contradictoires, d'autre part. C'est à ces conditions
seulement que la demande reconventionnelle permet de faire utilement
l'économied'un procès supplémentaire.
L'explication est raisonnable. Doit-elleêtredifférente lorsque sont en
cause desjuridictions internationales?Je n'en voispas la raison. S'ilen va
bien ainsi. c'est à la lumièredes objectifs précitésqu'il y a dès lors lieu de
comprendre les critères de connexité qui ont été à ce jour mis en avant
par la Cour pour déclarer recevables des demandes reconventionnelles
(faits de mêmenature, même ensemblefactuel complexe, mêmesbuts
juridiques). Il me paraîtrait toutefois erronédelesappliquerd'une manière
purement «mécanique», en perdant de vue les raisons qui expliquent fon-
damentalement que lejuge se saisisse de la demande du défendeursans le
contraindre à une nouvelle instance. Une application trop rigide risque-
rait en effet de réduire d'une manièreexcessive les demandes qui puissent
effectivement êtreintroduites reconventionnellement; elle pourrait aussi
méconnaître l'autonomie respective de la demande principale et de la
demande reconventionnelle, soulignéepar la Cour, qui implique néces-
sairement qu'elles puissent ne pas avoir ni un objet ni un mêmefonde-
ment; il ne peut êtreexclu enfin que d'autres critères soient jugés perti-
nents, dans d'autres circonstances, pour déciderde la recevabilitéd'une
demande reconventionnelle. L'important est toujours que la Cour soit en
mesure de «mieux» juger et que la crédibilitéde la chose jugéesoit pré-
servéedes risques que lui feraient courir des prononcés incompatibles.
Cela dit, il est propre au juge international de ne disposer à cejour que
d'une juridiction purement volontaire. Celle-ci n'existe que parce que et
dans la mesure où les parties l'ont voulue. II est dès lors possible que le
juge ne puisse plus. faute d'un accord, connaître demain de la demande
qui lui est aujourd'hui présentée reconventionnellement. Faut-il en
déduire que la Cour devrait faire preuve d'un «libéralisme» particulier
lorsqu'elle statue sur la recevabilitéd'une demande reconventionnelle, et
en particulier sur l'exigence de connexitéà laquelle celle-ci est subordon-
née? J'endoute fort. II est vrai que le règlement pacifique des différends DECLARATION OF JUDGE VERHOEVEN
The connection which counter-claims are required to have with the
principal claim in order for them to be admissible must, it seems to me,
be considered in the light of their purpose. That purpose is not always
entirely clear. Judged by reference to national practices, the importance
of counter-claims would appear to be twofold: on the one hand. they
enable the court to gain a more thorough and precise understanding of
the dispute of which it is seised and, on the other hand, they avoid the
risk of incompatible - or even downright contradictory - rulings.
These are the sole circumstances in which recourse to a counter-claim can
effectively enable additional proceedings to be dispensed with.
That is a reasonable explanation. Should it be otherwise in the case of
international courts? I see no reason why. That being the case, the cri-
teria of corinection emphasized to date by the Court for the purpose of
declaring counter-claims admissible (facts of the same nature, same over-
al1 fàct~ial situation, same legal objectives) must accordingly be under-
stood in light of the above-mentioned aims. However, it would seem to
me to be wrong to apply those criteria in a purely "mechanical" mannes,
losing sight of the reasons which essentially explain why a court should
entertain the respondent's claim without obliging it to institute new pro-
ceedings. Too rigid an application could result in an excessive reduction
in the number of claims that might effectively be subrnitted by way of
counter-claim; it could also be to disregard the hct, underlined by the
Court, that the principal claim and the counter-claim are independent of
one another, which necessarily implies that they need have neither the
saine subject-matter nos the same legal basis; finally, it cannot be pre-
cluded that other criteria may be judged relevant, under other circum-
stances, for the purpose of ruling on the admissibility of a counter-claim.
The important point is always that the Court should be in the "best"
position to pass judgment, and that the credibility of its judgments
should not be jeopardized by inconsistent rulings.
'That said, it is a pecific feature of the International Court of Justice
that its jurisdiction has to date been purely voluntary. That jurisdiction
exists only because and in so far as the parties have so desired. There is
thus a possibility that the Court. absent agreement, might not be able to
assume jurisdiction tomorrow in respect of a claim of which it is seised
today by way of coiinter-claim. Are we accordingly to conclude that the
Court should adopt a particularly "liberal" approach when ruling on the
admissibility of a counter-claim and. in particular, on the requirement
that the counter-claim be directly connected to the subject-matter of thepourrait s'en trouver renforcé. Le risque est toutefois que cela incite les
Etats a se détourner d'un juge qui lui réservetrop de «surprises>) plutôt
qu'à s'ysoumettre. En outre, la logique interne d'un système de juridic-
tion volontaire commande sans doute, toute politique juridictionnelle
mise à part, une rigueur particulière dans l'appréciation du lien que, sous
peine d'irrecevabilité, la demande reconventionnelle doit présenter avec
la demande principale.
C'est parce que l'attaque contre la mission diplomatique de l'Ouganda
à Kinshasa, dont fait étatle défendeur,ne me paraît pas de nature àéclai-
rer utilement la Cour sur l'agression armée et sur l'occupation illégale
d'une partie de son territoire dont se prétend victime la République
démocratique du Congo, qui sont au cŒurde la demande principale, que
j'ai votécontre la recevabilitéde la deuxièmedemande reconventionnelle
du défendeur. Compte tenu des observations qui précédent. ilme semble
que la seule circonstance que cette attaque s'inscrive dans une histoire
conflictuelle dont les facettes sont multiples ne suffit pas àjustifier que le
défendeur soit autorisé à en saisir reconbentionnellement la Cour.
fSignc;) Joe VERHOEVEN.principal claim? 1seriously doubt it. It is true that the peaceful settlement
of'disputes could be enhanced by such an approach. However. the risk is
that it would encourage States to avoid a court which springs too many
"siirprises" on theni, rather than submit to its jurisdiction. Further, the
interna1 logic of a system of voluntary jurisdiction undoubtedly requires
- irrespective of any considerations of jurisdictional policy - particular
rigour in regard to evaluation of the connection which the counter-claim
must have with the principal claim if it is not to be ruled inadmissible.
It is because the attack against Uganda's diplornatic mission in Kin-
shasa, as cited by the Respondent, does not appear to me to throw any
usefiil light for the Court on the armed aggression and unlawful occupa-
tion of part of its territory which the Democratic Republic of the Congo
clainis to have suffered - allegations central to the principal claim --
that 1 voted against the admissibility of the Respondent's second counter-
claim. In light of the foregoing observations, it seems to ine that the mere
fact that tliis attack is part of a multifaceted history of conflict is not
sufficient to justify the Respondent being authorized to seise the Court
of this claim by way of counter-claim.
(Signrd) Joe VERHOEVE~.
Declaration by Judge ad hoc Verhoeven (translation)