Separate opinion of Judge Oda

Document Number
112-19990602-ORD-01-04-EN
Parent Document Number
112-19990602-ORD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ODA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

II. THESTATU OF:THEFEDERAR LEPUBLIOF YUG~SLAV -IAA PRELI-
MINARY ISSI~E

III. LACKOF THF COURT'SJURISDICTIOUNNDER ARTICLE36, PARA-
GRAPH 2,OF THESTATUT END ARTICLE38, PARAGRAP 5,OF THE
RULES OF COURT

(1) No "legal dispute" within the meaning of Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute exists between the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the respondent State
(2)Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court

(3) Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court
(4) The optional clause
IV. LACKOF THE COURT'JSURISDICTIOUNDCR THE1930CONVENTION

BETWEEN BELGILIAND YUCOSLAV AAD THE1931TREATY BETWEEN
THE NETHERLAN DSDYUGOSLAVIA
V. LACK OF THECOURT'JSURISDICTIOIJDER THEGLNOCIDC EONVFN-

TlON
(1) Preliminary observations
(2) No disputes relating to the Genocide Convention exist

between the Parties
(3)General character of the Genocide Convention
(4) Concluding observations

VI.IN TIIPRESENC TIRCUMSTAN THESREQL.ESTFSR THEINDIC.ATION
OF PROVISIONM AEASURE ARk ~N~DM~SSIRL~~
VII. REMOVA LF THECASES FROM THLGENERAL LIST01. THCOURT

DUE TO THE LACK OFJURISDICTION 1. 1entirely support the decision of the Court in dismissing the requests
for the indication of provisional measures submitted on 29 April 1999

by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against ten respondent States -
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
While favouring subparagraph (2) of the operative paragraph in which
the Court ordered that the case be removed from the General List of the

Court in the cases of Spain and the United States, 1 voted against sub-
paragraph (2) of the operative paragraph in the other eight cases in which
the Court ordered that it "[rjeserve.~ the subsequent procedure for
further decision" because 1believe that those eight cases should also be

removed from the General List of the Court.
2. 1differ from the Court's reasoning on some aspects of the cases, not
only on matters concerning the dismissal of the requests but also on some
other matters relating to the Applications filed in the Registry of the
Court by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the same day, namely

29 April 1999. It is difficult, even impossible, for me to give a sufficient
explanation of my position in the extremely limited time - if 1may Say
so, an unreasonably short period of time, too short to do proper justice
to the cases - that has been made available to the judges for preparing

their opinions. 1very much regret that this lack of time has given me no
choice but to cover al1ten cases in a single opinion. Certain parts of this
opinion may thus not be relevant to a particular case.

II. THE STATIJSOF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

YUGOSLAV IA A PRELIMINAR ISSUE

3. 1consider that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a Member
of the United Nations and thus not a party to the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
Following the unrest in Yugoslavia in the early 1990sand the dissolu-
tion of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, some of its former

Republics achieved independence and then applied for membership of
the United Nations. On 22 May 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia
and Slovenia became Members of the United Nations, followed on
8 April 1993 by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However,

the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro) to continue automatically the membership in the United Nations
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not recog-
nized.
On 22 September 1992 the General Assembly, pursuant to Security

Council resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992and Security Council reso-
lution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992, adopted resolution 4711stating
that

"the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can- not continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations"

and decided that it "should applyfor membership in the United Nations".
The letter addressed to the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia dated 29 September 1992 from the Under-
Secretary-General, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, stated that

while the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution neither termi-
nated nor suspended Yugoslavia's membership in the Organization,
"the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automati-
cally continue the membership ofthe former Socialist Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations".

In fact, there seems to have been an understanding that this rather
exceptional situation would be resolved by the admission of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations as a new Member. How-
ever, no further developments have occurred and the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia has not been admitted to the United Nations, as a "peace-
loving State[s] which accept[s] the obligations contained in the [United
Nations] Charter" (United Nations Charter, Art. 4).
4. The Court is open to the States parties to its Statiite (Art. 35). Only
States parties to the Statute are allowed to bring cases before the Court.

It therefore follows, in my view, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
not being a Member of the United Nations and thus not a State party to
the Statute of the Court, has no standing before the Court as an appli-
cant State. The Applications presented by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia should therefore be declared inadmissible for this reason alone and
should be removed from the General List of the Court.

However, if 1 am not correct on this, and assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does in fact have
standing before the Court, 1shall now go on to discuss whether the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia can bring the present Applications on the
basis of certain provisions of the Statute and of the Rules of Court, of the

1930 and 1931 instruments in the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands,
and of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

III. LACK OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTIO UNNDER ARTICLE 36,
PARAGRAP2 , OF THE STATUT END ARTICLE 38, PARAGRAP 5.
OF THE RULES OF COURT

(1) No "Legul Dispute" ivitliin tlzc Meurzirzgof'Arti36,
Purugrup/~ 2, ~J'the Stutute Esi.~t.vhrtii'ren tlle Fculepubliof'

Yugo.slu~~iund the Respondent State

5. The Applications of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refer to the
acts of the ten respondent States by which the Federal Republic of Yugo-slavia alleges that they have violated certain obligations as listed in
the section of each Application entitled "Subject of the Dispute". The
acts which are listed in the section of each Application entitled "Claim"
may have occurred, but the fact alone that a State allegedly committed
these acts or actions as described in the section "Facts upon Which
the Claim is Based" cannot constitute the existence of a "legal dispute"
between two States within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute.
The question of whether certain acts of a State which may infringe

upon the rights and interests of another State should be considered as
justifiable under international law may well be a legitimate issue to be
raised, but not as a "legal dispute" in which both sides are to present
arguments concerning their respective rights and duties under interna-
tional law in their relations with each other. Certainly such a "legal dis-
pute" between Yugoslavia and the respondent States had not existed
when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed the Applications to insti-
tute the proceedings in these cases. What did exist on 29 April 1999was
simply the action of bombing or armed attacks conducted by the NATO
armed forces in which the military powers of each of the respondent
States were alleged to have participated. The issues - but not the "legal
disputes" - concerning the bombing and armed attacks should properly
be dealt with by the Security Council under Chapters V, VI, VI1and VI11
of the Charter or, in some cases, by the General Assembly under Chap-
ter IV. For this reason alone, the Application should, on the basis of

Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute be declared inadmissible.

However, for the sake of argument, 1shall proceed on the assumption
that there exists between the Parties a "legal dispute" within the meaning
of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

(2) Article 38, Paragraph 5, of'the
Rules of Court

6. In its Applications against France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the
United States,the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia invokesArticle 38,para-

graph 5, of the Rules of Court, in the hope that consent to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court might be given by those States. However, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain and the United States have given no such consent to
the Court's jurisdiction and it is clear from their arguments in the oral
hearings that they will not giveit.There is thus no room for the Court to
entertain these five Applications on the basis of Article 38, paragraph 5,
of the Rules of Court.The concept offorum prorogatum does not apply
in these five cases. (3) Article 36, Purugruph 2,of'tlze Stutute of'the Court

7. On 25 April 1999the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia registered with
the Secretariat of the United Nations its declaration recognizing the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute. The main point to be considered, even on the assumption that

the registration of the declaration by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on
25 April 1999was valid, is whether this declaration is valid in connection
with the Applications of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against six
respondent States (Belgium, Canada. the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
the United Kingdom) which have accepted the Court's compulsoryjurisdic-
tion in their respectivedeclarations under the same provision of the Statute.
8. The cases of Spain and the United Kingdom are different from the

other four cases. In its declaration of 29 October 1990, Spain expressly
excluded from the Court's jurisdiction "disputes in regard to which the
other party or parties have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court less than 12 months prior to the filing of the application bringing
the dispute before the Court" and the United Kingdom in its declaration
of 1January 1969 similarly excluded certain disputes from the Court's

jurisdiction :
"where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on

behalf of anyother Party to the dispute was deposited or ratified less
than twelve months prior to the filing of the application bringing the
dispute before the Court".

It is crystal clear that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to entertain
these two Applications, one against Spain and the other against the
United Kingdom, on the basis of Article 36. paragraph 2, of the Statute.

9. Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Portugal have accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in their respectivedeclarations, depos-

ited by Belgiumon 17June 1958,byCanada on 10 May 1994,by the Neth-
erlands on 1 August 1956and by Portugal on 19 December 1955.As no
reservation directly relevant to the present issues has been included in the
declarations of the four States mentioned above, it might be argued that the
exerciseof the Court's jurisdiction isjustified under Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute in the cases of the Applications addressed to those four

States. Literally interpreted, the declaration of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (assuming that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is indeed a
party to the Statute of the Court and that the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia's declaration was legitimately registered) may be claimed as being
valid in relation to otlier States which have made a similar declaration.
However, 1hold the viewthat acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia of the Court's jurisdiction only a matter of days before it filed its

Applications with the Court in these cases is not an act done ingoodfuitlz
and is contrary to the proper concept of acceptance of the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court under the "optional clause" in the Statute. (4) The Optional Clause

10. Provisions equivalent to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of
the lnternational Court of Justice were first introduced in 1920when the
Permanent Court of International Justice was being planned. In the view
of the Council of the League of Nations, which initiated the drafting of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920,the
time was not yet ripe for the international community to accept a general
obligation to be bound by the judicial settlement of disputes. In fact, the
consent of each State to accept such an obligation was deemed to be
absolutely necessary. The arguments surrounding that problem during

the preparation of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice clearly reflected thetill prevalent concept of national sovereignty
as dominant in the international community. It was in that context that
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute was drafted as one of the corner-
stones of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The International
Court of Justice, operating under the United Nations system, inherited it
as what is still Article 36, paragraph 2, now of the Statute of the present
Court.

11. By 1974, the year of the appeal by the United Nations General
Assembly for the revitalization of the Court (UnitedNations doc. AIRESI
3232 (XXIX)), 45 out of 141 States parties to the Statute had accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the "optional clause".
Sincethen, the number of accepting States has not increased significantly,
despite the increased number of States parties to the Statute. As of July
1998,the States parties to the Statute numbered 187. However, only 60
States out of that 187have declared their acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.The number of States accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction has never exceeded one-third of the total number of States

that might have at any one time accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court.

It is also a remarkable fact that, with the exception of the Uniteding-
dom, no permanent member of the Security Council has, at the present
time, accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In fact, in Octo-
ber 1985,on the occasion of the loss of its case against Nicaragua (at the
jurisdictional phase), the United States proceeded to withdraw the accept-
ance which it had maintained ever since the Court was set up in 1946.
Earlier, France had withdrawn its acceptance, just after being brought
before the Court by AustraliaINew Zealand in connection with its nuclear
tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacific in 1973.

12. The making of a declaration is a unilateral act, which, far from
being in the nature of a concession, is in fact to the State's advantage, in
that itconfers a right of action against States in a similar position. How-
ever, as the making of the declaration functions in the same way as anoffer to conclude an agreement and depends on reciprocity, the practical
effectiveness of the system depends on the number of States which are
willing to participate in it and on the relative breadth of the obligations

which they are prepared to accept thereunder. The acceptance is com-
monly hedged with reservations and exclusions.

The United Kingdom in its 1958declaration (revised in 1963and 1969)
excluded disputes

"where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on
behalf of any other Party to the dispute was deposited or ratified less

than twelve months prior to the filing of the application bringing the
dispute before the Court".
A similar 12-month exclusion clause is found in the following declara-

tions: Hungary (1992), India (1974), Malta (1966), Mauritius (1968).
New Zealand (1977), Philippines (1972), Poland (1996), Somalia (1963),
Spain (1990). Cyprus has a six-month exclusion clause in its declaration
(1988).
It is obvious thatthese States would, thanks to either a 12-month or a

six-month exclusion clause, be in a position to withdraw their acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court if faced with an application
that they considered lacking in bona fides.
The United Kingdom's 1958 declaration also had a clause excluding
"disputes in respect of which any other Party to the dispute has accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in

relation to or for the purpose of the dispute". A similar clause is also now
to be found in New Zealand's 1977declaration.

13. The "optional clause" in effect plays a double role: one positive, in
that it may on occasion enable a unilateral application to succeed, and

the other negative, in that it may sometimes result in a respondent being
brought to the Court against its will. Thus a State, by declaring its
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, may seek to
acquise locus stundi in a case in which the odds are in its favour, but on
the other hand it may, where it feels placed at a disadvantage, try to

release itself from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by the termi-
nation or amendment of its declaration.

It has always been the desire of States, when faced with an application
that in their view clearly lacks bona fides, to escape from their acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.The fact remains - and this

is what 1 want to stress -- that the judicial settlement of international
disputes still remains in the hands of those States that are genuinely
willing to defer to the International Court of Justice.
14. All of these facts indicate that some States accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court out of their good will but on the understanding
that other States have the same good intentions. If this good faith is lack-788 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OPODA)

ing, the system of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
cannot work in the manner in which the drafters of theatute intended.

Past practice reveals, in cases brought unilaterally in which preliminary

objections made by the respondent States were overcome, that there have
been only a fewcases in which thejudgments on the merits were properly
complied with. This indicates the reality of judicial settlement in the
world community. If States are brought to the Court against theirill,
then no real settlement of the dispute will follow. 1 feel that, even if a
12-month or similar exclusion clause is not included in a State'sra-
tion, al1States should have the right to refuse to be drawn into a case that
is obviously not brought bonafide.

15. Generally speaking1also believethat there should be some means
of excluding from the Court's jurisdiction applications which may not
have bona fide intentions or motives and that some provision should be
made for such exclusion in the basic concept of the declaration of accept-
ance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute. It should be noted that, as a basic concept of
international judiciary, the cornerstonof the granting by sovereign
States ofjurisdiction to the International Court of Justice in a dispute has
always been the consent ofthose States.

16. In my view,it would be extremely odd to have a situation where
the Court apparently has prima facie jurisdiction only forose States
(Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Portugal) that have simply failed
to include in their declarations an exclusion clause protecting their inter-
ests, while Spain and the United Kingdom are, because of their exclusion
clauses, released from the Court's jurisdiction in the present cases (which
in fact cover exactly theme subject). 1accordingly consider, in the light
my finding in paragraph 9 above as to Yugoslavia's lack of good faith,
that the Applications instituting proceedings againsthese four States

also (namely, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Portugal) should
likewise be found inadmissible.

IV. LACK OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTIO NNDER THE 1930 CONVENTION
BETWEEN BELGIUM AND YUGOSLAV AND THE 1931TREATY BETWEEN THE
NETHERLAND ASD YUGOSLAVIA

17. As late as the second round of oral hearings, which took place on
12 May 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supplemented its

Applications against Belgium and the Netherlands by invoking as addi-
tional grounds of jurisdiction of the Court, respectively, Article 4 of the
1930 Convention of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitrationbetween Yugoslavia and Belgium, and Article 4 of the 1931 Treaty of
Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation between Yugoslavia
and the Netherlands. Irrespective of the question of whether these instru-
ments still remain valid in the present-day relations between the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the two respondent States. and whether the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is entitled to invoke them as a basis of
jurisdiction at such a late stage, 1have to say that in my view the reliance
on these instruments by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is totally
unfounded.

18. These two instruments were among a number of treaties of a simi-

lar character concluded between a great number of States in the period
after the establishment of the League of Nations; they were intended to
bring together the various means of peaceful settlement of international
disputes, namely judicial settlement. arbitration. conciliation, and other
methods, into a systematized scheme of precedence among these various

procedures. However. these treaties did not impose any new obligations
on the States which became parties to them. Hence, the 1930 and 1931
instruments imposed no new obligations on the Contracting Parties in
connection with the judicial settlement of disputes, over and above resort
to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for in its Stat-
ute, to which the Contracting Parties of the 1930 and 1931 instruments,

respectively. were already signatories. (Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Yugoslavia had, in their respective declarations, already accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of that Court.)

The provisions of Article 4 of these two instruments have never been
interpreted as granting compulsory jurisdiction to the then existing Per-

manent Court of International Justice in addition to what had already
been provided for in its Statute. It is also to be noted that, in both of
these instruments, resort to any of the prescribed means of settlement of
disputes could be had only after a dispute had Failedto be settled through
the normal diplomatic channels (cf. Article 1 of the respective instru-

ments).

V. L,~cK OF THE COL~RTJ UKISDICTIO lNDEK TI1E
GENOC.IDC EONVENTION

19. The Court's Statiite provides in Article 36. paragraph1,that "[tlhe

jurisdiction of the Court comprises . . . al1 matters specially pi-ovided
for . . . in treaties and conventions in force". The 1948Genocide Conven-
tion is one of these "treaties and conventions in force'. and its Article IX
provides that

"[d]isputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre- tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention . . . shall
be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute".

In al1 ten of its Applications, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
referring to the alleged breach of the obligation contained in the Geno-
cide Convention, invoked Article IX of that Convention as a legal ground
for jurisdiction of the Court.

1will not deal here with the question of whether the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia is now a party to the Genocide Convention and whether a
State which is not a Stateparty to the Statute is entitled to locus .xtandiby
relying on Article 36, paragraph 1, as quoted at the beginning of this
paragraph.

1note that Portugal became a party to the Genocide Convention with
effect from 10 May 1999. 1 also note that Spain and the United States
have properly made their respective reservations in respect of Article IX
of theGenocideConvention. Thus the applications of the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia invoking that Convention should - from the outset -

be dismissed in the cases of Portugal, Spain and the United States.

(2) No Disputes reluting to the Genocide Convention Exist hetioeen
the Purties

20. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in spite of enumerating vari-
ous claims, did not establish any violation of the Genocide Convention
for which any one of the ten respondent States could be held responsible

as a party to that Convention and indicated no element of genocide as
defined in Article II of the Genocide Convention in the bombing or mili-
tary attacks in Yugoslavia by the NATO armed forces. The question in
general as to whether or not the bombing or the military attack in the
territory of Yugoslavia by the NATO armed forces does in fact constitute
a violation of international law may well be an issue but is irrelevant

when dealing with the Genocide Convention.

21. Even if acts of genocide for which the respondent States may be
deemed to be responsible under the Genocide Convention had taken

place in Yugoslavia, that would not mean that there were disputes
between the applicant State and the respondent States concerning the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention. The Appli-
cant did not indicate the existence of such a dispute which might be sub-
mitted obligatorily to the Court by application of the Genocide Conven-
tion.

1have previously stated my interpretation of the meaning of the words
"a dispute concerning the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the79 1 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP.OP.ODA)

Convention" in the declaration 1 appended to the Court's Judgment in
the Genocide case and 1repeat it here:

"If any dispute were to be unilaterally submitted to the Court by
one of the Contracting Parties to a treaty pursuant to the compro-
missory clause of that treaty, this would mean in essence that the
dispute had arisen because of (i) the allegedjuilure of another Con-

tracting Party to fuijïl the ohligutions imposed hy thut treaty - a
failure for which it is responsible - and (ii) the infringement of the
rights bestolved upor~tliejormer Stute hy thut treuty dueto that fail-
ure. The failure of the other State is itself a violation of the treaty

but such a violation alone cannot be interpreted as constituting a
dispute between the applicant State and the respondent State relat-
ing to that treaty unless it can be shown to have infringed such rights
of the former State as are protected thereby." (Application of the
Convention on the Prel~entionund Punishment of the Critne of'Grno-

cide, Prelimina~ Objections, Judgnzent, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
pp. 625-626.)

(3) Generul Charucter qf the Genooide Conventiorz

22. The GenocideConvention cannot be regarded as an orthodox type
of international treaty, as orthodox treaties provide for a right on the

part of one State and a corresponding obligation on the part of another
State. 1once described the unique character of the Genocide Convention.
It may be pertinent to quote my previous writing in this respect:

"4. The Genocide Convention is unique in having been adopted

by the General Assembly in 1948 at a time when - due to the suc-
cess of the Nuremburg Trials - the idea prevailed that an interna-
tional criminal tribunal should be established for the punishment of
criminal acts directed against human rights, including genocide; it is

essentially directed not to the rights and obligations of States hur to
the protection of rights of individuals and groups of persons which
have become recognized as universal.
To be sure, the Contracting Parties to the Convention defined
genocide as 'a crime under international law' (Art. 1).The Conven-

tion binds the Contracting Parties to punish persons responsible for
those acts, whoever they may be, and is thus directed to the punish-
ment of persons committing genocide and genocidal acts (Art. IV).
The Contracting Parties undertake 'to enact, in accordance with

their respective Constitutions. the necessary legislation to give effect
to the provisions of the present Convention' (Art. V).
As persons committing genocide or genocidal acts may possibly
be 'constitutionally responsible rulers [or] public officials' (Art. IV),the Convention contains a specific provision which allows '[alny
Contracting Party [to] cal1upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations
as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of
[those acts]' (Art. VIII) and contemplates the establishment of an

international penal tribunal (Art. VI).
Genocide is defined as 'a crime under international law which [the
Contracting Parties] undertake to prevent and punish' (Art. 1).Even
if this general clause (which was subjected to criticism at the Sixth
Committee in 1948when it was felt by some delegates that it should

have been placed in the preamble, but not in the main text) is to be
interpreted as meaning specifically that the Contracting Parties are
obliged 'to prevent and to punish' genocide and genocidal acts, these
legal obligations are borne in a general manner ergu omnes by the
Contracting Parties in their relations with al1the other Contracting

Parties to the Convention - or, even, with the international com-
munity as a whole - but are not obligations in relation to any spe-
cific and particular signatory Contracting Party.

The failure of any Contracting Party 'to prevent and to punish'
such a crime may only be rectified and remedied through (i) resort to

a competent organ of the United Nations (Art. VIII) or (ii) resort to
an international penal tribunal (Art. VI), but not by invoking the
responsibility of States in inter-State relations before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. This constitutes a unique character of the
Convention which was produced in the post-war period in parallel

with the emergence of the concept of the protection of human rights
and humanity.
5. In this regard, some explanation of the dispute settlement pro-
vision of the Convention (Art. IX) may be pertinent. It reads as fol-
lows:

'Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the inter-
pretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for geno-

cide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute'

and is unique as compared with the compromissory clauses found in
other multilateral treaties which provide for submission to the Inter-
national Court of Justice of such disputes between the Contracting
Parties as relate to the interpretation or upplicatior~of the treaties in

question.
The construction of Article IX of the GenocideConvention is very
uncertain as it incorporates specific references to '[dlisputes . . . relat-
ing to . . . fulfilment of the Convention' and to 'disputes relating to
the responsibility of a State for genocide or [genocidal acts]' - ref-erences which can hardly be understood in any meaningful sense as
a compromissory clause.

The original draft of the Genocide Convention was drawn up by
an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide in the ECOSOC in April-May

1948, and contained an orthodox type of compromissory clause
(Oj'ciul record.^of the Economic utzrlSociul Counc.iI,Tlzird Yeur.
Seventh Ses.sion, S~rpplementNo. 6), which read :

'Disputes between the High Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretution or upplication of this Convention shall be submitted
to the International Court of Justice, proilidcd tkut no dispute
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice involving
an issue which has been referred to and is pending before or has

been passed upon by a competent international criminal tribunal.'
(Emphasis added.)

When this draft was taken up by the Sixth Committee of the Gen-
eral Assemblv in its Third Session in October 1948. the addition of
the two aforimentioned references was proposed (OKfiriul Records
?/'the G~~neraA l .s.scmhl~~T.tzirrtSe.r.sion.Si.~ttrComrnitr, nnexes,
p. 28: AlC61258) without, in my view, the drafters having a clear
picture of the new type of convention to be adopted. While some
delegates understood that 'fulfilment' would not be different from

'application', aproposal to delete 'fulfilment'from the additions was
rejected by 27 votes to 10, with 8 abstentions. However, another
deletion of the words 'including [disputes] relating to the responsi-
bility of a State for genocide or [genocidal acts]' was also rejected
but only by 19 votes to 17, with 9 abstentions (O[ficiul record.^qf
tlrr Gcnrrul A.s,setnhly. Tlrird Session, Sixth Committre, SR. 104,

p. 447). The trrrvuuxpiépurcrtoircsof the Convention seem to con-
firm that there was some measlire of confusion among the drafters,
reflecting in particular the unique nature of their task in the prevail-
ing spirit of the times.

How can one then interpret this reference to the 'responsibility of
a State'? As far as 1know such a reference has never been employed
in any other treaty thereafter. It seems to be quite natural to assume
that that reference would not have had any meaningful sense or other-
wise would not have added anything to the clause providing for the
submission to the Court of disputes relating to the interpretution or
upplirution of the Convention, because, in general, any inter-State

dispute covered by a treaty per sr always relates to the responsibility
of a State and the singling-out of a reference to the responsibility of
a State does not have any sense with regard to a compromissory
clause." (Application of tlze Convention on the Prevention und794 LEGALITY OF LJSEOF FORCE (SEP. OP.ODA)

Punishment of'the Crime of'Cenocide, Preliminury Objections.
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), declaration of Judge Oda,

pp.626-628.)

23. In order to seise the Court of the present cases, excepting those
concerning Portugal, Spain and the United States as referred to in para-
graph 19 of tliis opinion, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would cer-
tainly have had to show that, applying the Genocide Convention to the
situation in the territory of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the respon-

dent States could indeed have been responsible for the failure of the ful-
filment of the Convention in relation to the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia. But. more particularly, the Federal Repubof Yugoslavia would
have to show that the respondent States have breached the rights of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a Contracting Party (which by defini-
tion is a State) entitled to protection under that Convention. This, how-

ever, has not been established in the Applications and in fact the Geno-
cide Convention is not intended to protect the rights of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia as a State.

Even if, as alleged. the respondent States are responsible for certain
results of the bombing or armed attacks by NATO armed forces in the

territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this factne does not
mean that there is a "dispute relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the Convention", as the respondent States did not violate
the rights conferred upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the
Convention. What is protected by the Convention is no, the particular

rights of any individual State (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in this
case)but the status of human beings with human rights and the universal
interest of the individual in general.

What the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did in its Applications was
to point to certaifuct.sallegedly tantamount to genocide or genocidal

acts and to submit cluitnalleged to have arisen out of these facts. This
cannot be taken to indicate the existence of an inter-State dispute relating
to the responsibility of a State which could have been made a basis for
the Court's jurisdiction.
1accordingly conclude that the Applications citing the Genocide Con-

vention as a basis of the Court's jurisdiction should be rejected.

VI. IN THE PKESENT CIRCIJMSTANC THSEREQ~JEST FSR THE
INDICATIO NF PROVISIONA M LEASURE SUE INADMISSIBLE

24. Having made observations on the Court's jurisdiction, 1would like
to make some comments on the institution of provisional measures. Provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respec-
tive rights of either party may be indicated by the Court"fit considers

that the circumstances so require" (Statute, Art. 41, emphasis added). It
thus falls within the discretion of the Court togrant provisional measures
upon the request of the applicant State.
The items concerning the subject-matter of the dispute, the claim and
the legal grounds on which the claim is based, are virtually identical
throughout the Applications filed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
against the ten respondent States. If provisional measures were to be
granted, but only in relation to certain of the ten respondent States, for
the reason that there existed a prima facie basis ofjurisdiction, while in
the case of other respondent States the requests were dismissed totally

because of the lack of the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the Applica-
tions, this would lead to an unreasonable result. For this reason alone,
the requests for the indication of provisional measures by the applicant
State are inadmissible throughout the ten cases.

VII. REMOVAL OF THE CASES FROM THE GENERAL LIST OF THE COURT
DUE TO THE LACK OF JURISDICTION

25. The Court has reached its decision to dismiss the requests for the
indication of provisional measures inal1ten cases on the sole ground that
it lacks a prima facie basis of jurisdiction inse cases. If, at the provi-
sional measures stage, the Court finds that it has prima faciejurisdiction,
then it remains free, irrespective of whether or not it grants provisional
measures, to proceed to the next phase.
26. In the past the Court, even after having affirmed that there could
exist a prima facie basis of jurisdiction,till dismissed the requests for
provisional measures in some cases for various reasons. In theInterhun-
del case, thePassage through the Great Beltcase and the case concerning
Questions of Interpretution und Applicutiotî of the 1971 Montreul Con-

vention arising from the Aeriul Incident ut Lockerbie,the Court consid-
ered that the circumstances of these cases were not such as to require the
exercise of its power to indicate provisional measures. In tAegcun Seu
ContinetztulSl7elf'case,the Court did not find such a risk of irreparable
prejudice to rights in issue before it as might require the exercise of its
power to indicate provisional measures. In the 1990case concerning the
Arbitral Alvurd of 31 July 1989, the Court dismissed the request of the
Republic of Guinea-Bissau on the ground that the alleged rights sought
to be made the subject of provisional measures were not the subject of the
proceedings before the Court on the merits of the case.

Where the Court finds that there is a prima facie basis of jurisdiction,
thisdoes not, of course, necessarily lead it to determine that it eventually
has jurisdiction in the case. In theAnglo-Iraniun Oil Co. case and theInterhandel case, the Court, after granting provisional measures, ulti-
mately found that it had no jurisdiction to be seised of these cases.

27. In its past jurisprudence the Court has always found, as in those
cases mentioned above and in spite of its ultimately negative response to
the request for provisional measures, that there existed a prima facie
basis ofjurisdiction. There has been no previous case in which the Court
did not recognize evena prima facie basis ofjurisdiction, and the present
cases concerning Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal and the United Kingdom are the first in the Court's juris-

prudence in which the Court has dismissed a request for the indication of
provisional measures due to the lack of prima faciejurisdiction.

The Court's findings at this stage of the present cases that there is not
even a prima facie basis ofjurisdiction in al1eight of the cases mentioned
above should be interpreted as a ruling that it has no jurisdiction what-
soever to entertain the Applications, without leaving any room to retain
these cases and to deal with the issue of jurisdiction in the future.

28. In its Orders in the cases of Spain and the United States, the Court
finds that the cases against them should be removed from the General
List, as the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction to entertain these two
Applications. The Court concludes, however, that it should remain seised
of the other eight cases on the ground that its finding that it lacks juris-
diction prima facie to entertain the respective Applications instituting
proceedings against Belgium,Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom in no way prejudges the ques-
tion of jurisdiction in those eight cases.
Itis my firm beliefthat, for al1the reasons given above concerning the

Court's lack ofjurisdiction under (i) Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Stat-
ute, (ii) the provisions of the instruments of 1930 and 1931 between
Yugoslavia and Belgium and the Netherlands, respectively, and (iii) the
provisions of the Genocide Convention. and due to my interpretation of
theCourt's finding concerning the lack of prima Faciebasis ofjurisdiction
in the eight cases, as stated in the last sentence of paragraph 27 of this
opinion, the Applications in not only the two cases but in al1ten cases
should be removed from the General List.

It would be contrary tojudicial propriety to make a distinction between
two groups of States, in what isessentially one casedealing with the same
subject throughout, solely because of the difference in attitudes taken by
the States towards the relevant documents which givethe Court jurisdic-
tion.
29. In conclusion 1 would like to express my sincere hope that the
present situation in the territory of Yugoslavia, in the settlement of which
the International Court of Justice as the principal judiciul organ of theUnited Nations has no role to play, will be resolved peacefully and in a
way that satisfies al1humanitarian aspects raised by this case.

(Signed) Shigeru ODA.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE ODA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

II. THESTATU OF:THEFEDERAR LEPUBLIOF YUG~SLAV -IAA PRELI-
MINARY ISSI~E

III. LACKOF THF COURT'SJURISDICTIOUNNDER ARTICLE36, PARA-
GRAPH 2,OF THESTATUT END ARTICLE38, PARAGRAP 5,OF THE
RULES OF COURT

(1) No "legal dispute" within the meaning of Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute exists between the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and the respondent State
(2)Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court

(3) Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court
(4) The optional clause
IV. LACKOF THE COURT'JSURISDICTIOUNDCR THE1930CONVENTION

BETWEEN BELGILIAND YUCOSLAV AAD THE1931TREATY BETWEEN
THE NETHERLAN DSDYUGOSLAVIA
V. LACK OF THECOURT'JSURISDICTIOIJDER THEGLNOCIDC EONVFN-

TlON
(1) Preliminary observations
(2) No disputes relating to the Genocide Convention exist

between the Parties
(3)General character of the Genocide Convention
(4) Concluding observations

VI.IN TIIPRESENC TIRCUMSTAN THESREQL.ESTFSR THEINDIC.ATION
OF PROVISIONM AEASURE ARk ~N~DM~SSIRL~~
VII. REMOVA LF THECASES FROM THLGENERAL LIST01. THCOURT

DUE TO THE LACK OFJURISDICTION OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. ODA

[Traduction]

TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Pur

11. UNE QUESTIONPR~LIM~NAIR LESTATUT DE LA REPUBLIQU FÉDÉ-
RALE DE YOUGOSLAVIE

III. LA COUR N'A PAS COMPETENC EN V~:RTL'~t-L'ARTICLE36, PARA-
GRAPHE 2,DE SONSTATLI NI DE L'ARTICL38,PARAGRAPHF 5, SON

RÈGLEMEUT
1) 11n'existe pas entre la République fédéralede Yougoslavie et

1'Etatdéfendeur «de différendd'ordre juridique)) au sens de
l'article 36,paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour
2) Article 38. paragraphe 5, du Règlement de la Cour
3) Article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la Cour
4) La clause facultative

IV. LACOUR N'A PAS (.OMPFTENC.EN V~RT~IDE LA CONVENTION D1930
ENTRE L.ABELGIQL ET LAYOUGOSLAV IEEN VERTU DU TRAITEDE

1931 E~TRE LESPAYS-BA ST LA YOUGOSLAVIF:
V. LACOUR N'A PAS COMPETENCE ENVERTI 'E 1.4 CONVENTIONSUR LL
GGNOCIDE

1) Observations préliminaires
2) 11n'existe pas entre les Parties de différend relatif a la

convention sur le génocide
3) Caractère généralde la convention sur le génocide
4) Coi~clusions

VI. DANSL~.S CIRCONSTANCES DEL'ESP~CLF,I-I>LMANUES EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES SON1 IRRECEVABLES

VII. LE MANQUE DE COIWPET~.N IMPO~E DE RAYER LES AFFAIRES DROLE
ut,LACOUR 1. 1entirely support the decision of the Court in dismissing the requests
for the indication of provisional measures submitted on 29 April 1999

by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against ten respondent States -
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
While favouring subparagraph (2) of the operative paragraph in which
the Court ordered that the case be removed from the General List of the

Court in the cases of Spain and the United States, 1 voted against sub-
paragraph (2) of the operative paragraph in the other eight cases in which
the Court ordered that it "[rjeserve.~ the subsequent procedure for
further decision" because 1believe that those eight cases should also be

removed from the General List of the Court.
2. 1differ from the Court's reasoning on some aspects of the cases, not
only on matters concerning the dismissal of the requests but also on some
other matters relating to the Applications filed in the Registry of the
Court by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the same day, namely

29 April 1999. It is difficult, even impossible, for me to give a sufficient
explanation of my position in the extremely limited time - if 1may Say
so, an unreasonably short period of time, too short to do proper justice
to the cases - that has been made available to the judges for preparing

their opinions. 1very much regret that this lack of time has given me no
choice but to cover al1ten cases in a single opinion. Certain parts of this
opinion may thus not be relevant to a particular case.

II. THE STATIJSOF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

YUGOSLAV IA A PRELIMINAR ISSUE

3. 1consider that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a Member
of the United Nations and thus not a party to the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
Following the unrest in Yugoslavia in the early 1990sand the dissolu-
tion of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, some of its former

Republics achieved independence and then applied for membership of
the United Nations. On 22 May 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia
and Slovenia became Members of the United Nations, followed on
8 April 1993 by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However,

the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro) to continue automatically the membership in the United Nations
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not recog-
nized.
On 22 September 1992 the General Assembly, pursuant to Security

Council resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992and Security Council reso-
lution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992, adopted resolution 4711stating
that

"the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) can- 1. Je souscris sans réservesà la décisionde la Cour auand celle-ci
rejette la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentéele
29 avril 1999par la Flépubliquefédéralede Yougoslavie contre dix Etats
défendeurs quisont les suivants: Belgique, Canada, France, Allemagne,
Italie, Pays-Bas,Portugal, Espagne, Royaume-Uni et Etats-Unis.
J'ai voté pour le paragraphe 2 du dispositif dans lequel la Cour
ordonne que l'affaire soit rayéedu rôle quand il s'agit de l'Espagne etdes
Etats-Unis, mais j'ai voté contre ce paragraphe dans les huit autres
affaires,dans lesquelles la Cour «[~.]t.sevvela suite de la procédure)),
parce qu'à mon avis, elle aurait dû également rayerces huit affaires du
rôle.

2. Je m'écarte aussidu raisonnement suivi par la Cour sur certains
aspects des affaires, non pas seulement sur des questions ayant trait au
rejet des demandes mais égalementsur certaines autres questions concer-
nant les requêtes déposéeasu Greffe de la Cour par la Républiquefédé-
rale de Yougoslavie le même jour, à savoir le 29 avril 1999. Il m'est
difficile,voire impossible, d'exposer comme il convient ma position dans
le délai extrêmementlimitéqui nous a étéimparti pour préparer nos
opinions, et je me permettrai de dire que ce délaifut déraisonnablement
bref, trop bref pour traiter ces affaires comme il aurait fallu. Je regrette
beaucoup que ce m.anque de temps m'ait contraint de traiter les dix
affaires dans une seule et même opinion. Il est donc possible que cer-
tains passages ne se rapportent pasà telle ou telle autre affaire.

II. UNE QUESTION PRÉLIMINAIRE :
LE STATUT DE. LA RÉPUBLIQU FEDÉRALE DE YOUGOSLAVIE

3. J'estime que la République fédéralede Yougoslavie n'est pas
membre des Nations Unies et n'est donc pas partie au Statut de la Cour
internationale de Justice.
A la suitedes troubles qui ont eu lieu enYougoslavieau débutdes années
quatre-vingt-dixet de la dissolutionde la Républiquefédérative socialeetd

Yougoslavie, certaine:de ses anciennes républiquesont accédéà l'indépen-
dance et ont présenté ensuite uneemande d'admissionaux Nations Unies.
Le 22mai 1992,la Bosnie-Herzégovinel,a Croatie et la Slovéniesont ainsi
devenuesMembres desNations Unies,suivies,le 8avril 1993,par l'ancienne
Républiqueyougoslave de Macédoine. La République fédérativede You-
goslavie (Serbie et Monténégro) ademandé à prendre automatiquement la
succession,aux Nations Unies, de l'ancienne Républiquefédérative socia-
liste de Yougoslavie,nais cette demande n'a pas étéreconnue commetelle.
Le 22 septembre 1992, l'Assembléegénérale,a la suite des résolu-
tions 757(1992)et 777(1992)adoptéespar le Conseil de sécurité le 30mai
1992 et le 19septembre 1992respectivement, a adoptéla résolution 4711
dans laquelle elle dit que

«La République fédérativede Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monté- not continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations"

and decided that it "should applyfor membership in the United Nations".
The letter addressed to the Permanent Representatives of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia dated 29 September 1992 from the Under-
Secretary-General, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, stated that

while the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution neither termi-
nated nor suspended Yugoslavia's membership in the Organization,
"the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot automati-
cally continue the membership ofthe former Socialist Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations".

In fact, there seems to have been an understanding that this rather
exceptional situation would be resolved by the admission of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations as a new Member. How-
ever, no further developments have occurred and the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia has not been admitted to the United Nations, as a "peace-
loving State[s] which accept[s] the obligations contained in the [United
Nations] Charter" (United Nations Charter, Art. 4).
4. The Court is open to the States parties to its Statiite (Art. 35). Only
States parties to the Statute are allowed to bring cases before the Court.

It therefore follows, in my view, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
not being a Member of the United Nations and thus not a State party to
the Statute of the Court, has no standing before the Court as an appli-
cant State. The Applications presented by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia should therefore be declared inadmissible for this reason alone and
should be removed from the General List of the Court.

However, if 1 am not correct on this, and assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does in fact have
standing before the Court, 1shall now go on to discuss whether the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia can bring the present Applications on the
basis of certain provisions of the Statute and of the Rules of Court, of the

1930 and 1931 instruments in the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands,
and of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

III. LACK OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTIO UNNDER ARTICLE 36,
PARAGRAP2 , OF THE STATUT END ARTICLE 38, PARAGRAP 5.
OF THE RULES OF COURT

(1) No "Legul Dispute" ivitliin tlzc Meurzirzgof'Arti36,
Purugrup/~ 2, ~J'the Stutute Esi.~t.vhrtii'ren tlle Fculepubliof'

Yugo.slu~~iund the Respondent State

5. The Applications of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refer to the
acts of the ten respondent States by which the Federal Republic of Yugo- LICÉITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP.IND. ODA) 783

négro)ne peut pas assumer automatiquement la qualitéde Membre
de l'organisatiori des Nations Unies»

et a décidéqu'elle devrait ({présenterune demande d'admission à I'Orga-
nisation)). Dans une lettre adressée le 29 septembre 1992 aux représen-
tants permanents de Bosnie-Herzégovineet de Croatie, le conseiller juri-
dique des Nations Unies dit que la résolution ci-dessus de l'Assemblée

généralene mettait pas fin à l'appartenance de la Yougoslavie à I'Orga-
nisation et ne la suspendait pas non plus, mais que
«l'Assembléegéi~érale a déclarésans équivoque que la République

fédérativede Yougoslavie (Serbie et Monténégro)ne peut pas assu-
mer automatiqw-ment la qualité de Membre de l'organisation des
Nations Unies à la place de l'ancienne République fédérativesocia-
liste de Yougosliivie».

En fait, il semblait entendu que cette situation assez exceptionnelle serait
régléepar l'admission aux Nations Unies de la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie en qualiitéde nouvel Etat Membre. Mais aucun autre élé-
ment nouveau n'a étéenregistréet la République fédéralede Yougoslavie

n'a pas été admiseaulxNations Unies en qualité «d'[Etat] [pacifique] qui
[accepte] les obligations de la Charte» (Charte des Nations Unies, art. 4).

4. La Cour est ouverteaux Etats oarties à son Statut (art. 351.Seuls les
Etats parties auStatut ont qualité pour saisir la Cour. Il découlede cette
situation, à mon avis, que la République fédéralede Yougoslavie, n'étant

pas membre des Nations Unies et n'étant par conséquent pas partie au
Statut de la Cour, n'a pas qualitépour se présenterdevant la Cour Atitre
d'Etat demandeur. Les requêtesprésentéespar la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie devraient par conséquent, ne serait-ce que pour ce seul
motif, êtrecléclaréesirrecevables et êtrerayéesdu rôle de la Cour.

Toutefois, si je n'ai pas raison sur ce point, etsupposer, pour ne pas
en rester là, que la Ripublique fédéralede Yougoslavie a en fait qualité
pour saisir la Cour. je vais a présent voir si la République fédéralede
Yougoslavie peut prtJsenter ces requêtesen se fondant sur certaines dis-
positions du Statut et du Règlement de la Cour, sur des instruments de

1930 et de 1931 daris les cas de la Belgique et des Pays-Bas, et de la
convention sur le génocidede 1948.

III.LACOUR N'A PAS COMPETENCE EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 36,
PARAGRAPHE 2, DE SON STATUT NI DE L'ARTICLE 38,PARAGRAPHE 5,
DE SON REGLEMENT

1) II ri'existe pus entre lu R&puhliqucJZdkrule de Yougosluvie
et I'Etut d(/'i.ndeilr«de difrirrnd d'ordrejuridique)) (ruseru (le I'urticlc36,
puragruplze 2,(lu Stutirticlu Cour

5. Dans ses requêtes,la République fédéralede Yougoslavie fait état

d'actes commis par les dix Etats défendeurs par lesquels elle soutient queslavia alleges that they have violated certain obligations as listed in
the section of each Application entitled "Subject of the Dispute". The
acts which are listed in the section of each Application entitled "Claim"
may have occurred, but the fact alone that a State allegedly committed
these acts or actions as described in the section "Facts upon Which
the Claim is Based" cannot constitute the existence of a "legal dispute"
between two States within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the
Statute.
The question of whether certain acts of a State which may infringe

upon the rights and interests of another State should be considered as
justifiable under international law may well be a legitimate issue to be
raised, but not as a "legal dispute" in which both sides are to present
arguments concerning their respective rights and duties under interna-
tional law in their relations with each other. Certainly such a "legal dis-
pute" between Yugoslavia and the respondent States had not existed
when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed the Applications to insti-
tute the proceedings in these cases. What did exist on 29 April 1999was
simply the action of bombing or armed attacks conducted by the NATO
armed forces in which the military powers of each of the respondent
States were alleged to have participated. The issues - but not the "legal
disputes" - concerning the bombing and armed attacks should properly
be dealt with by the Security Council under Chapters V, VI, VI1and VI11
of the Charter or, in some cases, by the General Assembly under Chap-
ter IV. For this reason alone, the Application should, on the basis of

Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute be declared inadmissible.

However, for the sake of argument, 1shall proceed on the assumption
that there exists between the Parties a "legal dispute" within the meaning
of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.

(2) Article 38, Paragraph 5, of'the
Rules of Court

6. In its Applications against France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the
United States,the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia invokesArticle 38,para-

graph 5, of the Rules of Court, in the hope that consent to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court might be given by those States. However, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain and the United States have given no such consent to
the Court's jurisdiction and it is clear from their arguments in the oral
hearings that they will not giveit.There is thus no room for the Court to
entertain these five Applications on the basis of Article 38, paragraph 5,
of the Rules of Court.The concept offorum prorogatum does not apply
in these five cases.ces Etats ont violé certaines obligations énuméréesdans chacune des
requêtessous l'intitulé ((Objet du différend)). Les actes ainsi énumérés
dans chacune des requêtessous l'intitulé((Demandes)) ont peut-être été

commis, mais le seul fait qu'un Etat aurait commis lesdits actes ou
actions décritssous l'iintitulé((Faits sur lesquels la requêteest fondée))ne
peut pas établir l'existence d'un ((différendd'ordre juridique))entre deux
Etats au sens de l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut.

11peut être parfaitement justifié de demander si les actes par les-
quels un Etat commet peut-être des infractions au droit et aux intérêts
d'un Etat tiers doivent être considéréscomme légitimesen droit inter-
national, mais il ne faut pas présenter le problème comme un ((différend
d'ordre juridique)) dans le cadre duquel les deux parties devront dire

comment elles conçoivent leurs droits et leurs obligations en vertu du
droit international dans leurs rapports l'une avec l'autre. Incontes-
tablement, il n'existait pas de ((différendd'ordre juridique))entre la You-
goslavie et les Etats dlifendeurs au moment où. dans les présentes affaires,
la République fédéralede Yougoslavie a déposéses requêtesintroduc-
tives d'instance. Ce qui existait le 29 avril 1999, c'étaient purement et

simplement des bombardements ou des attaques armées menéespar les
forces armées de l'OTAN. auxauels l'arméede chacun des Etats défen-
deurs aurait participé. Quant aux questions qui se posent au sujet de
ces bombardements et des ces attaques armées - mais ilne s'agit pas de
((différendd'ordre juridique)) - c'est au Conseil de sécuritéqu'il appar-

tient de s'en saisir ail titre des chapitres V, VI, VII, VI11 de la Charte,
ou bien, dans certains cas, c'est à l'Assemblée générale,en vertu du
chapitre IV. Ne serait-ce que pour ce seul motif, les requêtes devraient,
sur la base de I'article 36,paragraphe 2,du Statut, êtredéclarées irrece-
vables.

Toutefois, pour ne pas en rester là, je fais à présentcomme s'il existait
bel et bien entre les IJarties un ((différendd'ordre juridique)) au sens de
I'article 36,paragraphe 2, du Statut.

2) Article 38, puragraphe 5. du Règlement
de lu Cour

6. Dans les requêtesqu'elle déposecontre l'Allemagne, l'Espagne, les
Etats-Unis, la France et l'Italie, la République fédéralede Yougoslavie
invoque I'article 38,paragraphe 5, du Règlement de la Cour, dans l'espoir
que lesdits Etats accepteront la compétencede la Cour. Toutefois, 1'Alle-

magne, l'Espagne, les Etats-Unis, la France et l'Italie n'ont pas donnéce
consentement et 1eur.splaidoiries, au cours de la procédure orale, indi-
quent clairement qu'ils ne le donneront pas. La Cour ne peut donc pas
connaître de ces cinq requêtesen se fondant sur I'article 38.paragraphe 5,
de son Règlement. La doctrine du,forum prorogutum n'est pas applicable
à ces cinq affaires. (3) Article 36, Purugruph 2,of'tlze Stutute of'the Court

7. On 25 April 1999the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia registered with
the Secretariat of the United Nations its declaration recognizing the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute. The main point to be considered, even on the assumption that

the registration of the declaration by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on
25 April 1999was valid, is whether this declaration is valid in connection
with the Applications of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against six
respondent States (Belgium, Canada. the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
the United Kingdom) which have accepted the Court's compulsoryjurisdic-
tion in their respectivedeclarations under the same provision of the Statute.
8. The cases of Spain and the United Kingdom are different from the

other four cases. In its declaration of 29 October 1990, Spain expressly
excluded from the Court's jurisdiction "disputes in regard to which the
other party or parties have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court less than 12 months prior to the filing of the application bringing
the dispute before the Court" and the United Kingdom in its declaration
of 1January 1969 similarly excluded certain disputes from the Court's

jurisdiction :
"where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on

behalf of anyother Party to the dispute was deposited or ratified less
than twelve months prior to the filing of the application bringing the
dispute before the Court".

It is crystal clear that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to entertain
these two Applications, one against Spain and the other against the
United Kingdom, on the basis of Article 36. paragraph 2, of the Statute.

9. Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Portugal have accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in their respectivedeclarations, depos-

ited by Belgiumon 17June 1958,byCanada on 10 May 1994,by the Neth-
erlands on 1 August 1956and by Portugal on 19 December 1955.As no
reservation directly relevant to the present issues has been included in the
declarations of the four States mentioned above, it might be argued that the
exerciseof the Court's jurisdiction isjustified under Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Statute in the cases of the Applications addressed to those four

States. Literally interpreted, the declaration of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (assuming that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is indeed a
party to the Statute of the Court and that the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia's declaration was legitimately registered) may be claimed as being
valid in relation to otlier States which have made a similar declaration.
However, 1hold the viewthat acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia of the Court's jurisdiction only a matter of days before it filed its

Applications with the Court in these cases is not an act done ingoodfuitlz
and is contrary to the proper concept of acceptance of the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court under the "optional clause" in the Statute. 1-ICÉITEDI: L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. ODA) 785

31 Article 36, paragraphe 2. du Statut de lu Cour

7. Le 25 avril 1999,la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie a déposéau
Secrétariat desNations Unies une déclarationdans laquelle elle reconnaît la

juridiction obligatoire de la Cour conformémentà l'article 36, paragraph2,
du Statut. A supposer mêmeque l'enregistrement de la déclaration de la
Républiquefédéralede:Yougoslavie, le 25 avril 1999,soit valable, le point
essentiel à examiner est de savoir si cette déclaration est valable pour les
requêtes présentée psar la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie à l'encontre
de six Etats défendeur:;(Belgique, Canada, Espagne, Pays-Bas, Portugal et

Royaume-Uni) qui ont acceptéla juridiction obligatoire de la Cour dans la
déclarationqu'ils ont faite au titre de la mêmedisposition du Statut.
8. Le cas de l'Espagne et celui du Royaume-Uni diffèrent des quatre
autres cas. Dans sa déclaration du 29 octobre 1990, l'Espagne a exclu
expressément de la juridiction de la Cour «les différends dans lesquels
l'autre partie ou les autres parties en cause ont acceptéla juridiction obli-

gatoire de la Cour moins de douze mois avant la date de présentation de
la requêteécriteintroduisant l'instance devant la Cour)) et, de même,le
Royaume-Uni, dans sa déclaration du premierjanvier 1969.a exclu de la
juridiction de la Cour certains différends:

«lorsque l'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour au
nom d'une autre partie au différend aété déposéo eu ratifiéemoins
de douze mois avant la date du dépôt de la requêtepar laquelle la
Cour est saisie du différend)).

Il est clair, sans l'ombre d'un moindre doute, que la Cour ne peut pas être
compétente sur la base de l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut, pour

connaître des deux requêtesdéposées.l'une contre l'Espagne et l'autre,
contre le Royaume-Uni.
9. La Belgique, le Canada, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal ont acceptéla
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour dans les déclarations qu'ils ont faites
respectivement, la Belgique le 17juin 1958, leCanada le 10mai 1994, les
Pavs-Bas le 1"-août 1956et le Portugal le 19décembre 1955.Comme ces
"
quatre Etats n'ont foirmulédans leur déclaration aucune réservequi soit
directement pertinent(; pour les questions à résoudre ici, on pourrait pen-
ser que la Cour est fondéeà exercer sa juridiction au titre de l'article 36,
paragraphe 2,de son Statut, dans les affaires introduites par les requêtes
dirigéescontre ces quatre Etats. A l'interpréter littéralement, on pourrait

soutenir que la déclaration de la République fédéralede Yougoslavie
(toujours à supposer que celle-ci soit bien partie au Statut de la Cour et
que sa déclaration ait étédûment enregistrée) est valable à l'égarddes
Etats tiers qui ont faii une déclaration analogue. Toutefois. j'estime qu'en
acceptant la juridiction de la Cour quelques jours à peine seulement
avant de la saisir de ses requêtesdans les présentes affaires, la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie n'agit pas de bbonncfOi et qu'elle agit contraire-

ment au principe même d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la
Cour au titre de la ((clause facultative)) du Statut. (4) The Optional Clause

10. Provisions equivalent to Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of
the lnternational Court of Justice were first introduced in 1920when the
Permanent Court of International Justice was being planned. In the view
of the Council of the League of Nations, which initiated the drafting of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920,the
time was not yet ripe for the international community to accept a general
obligation to be bound by the judicial settlement of disputes. In fact, the
consent of each State to accept such an obligation was deemed to be
absolutely necessary. The arguments surrounding that problem during

the preparation of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice clearly reflected thetill prevalent concept of national sovereignty
as dominant in the international community. It was in that context that
Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute was drafted as one of the corner-
stones of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The International
Court of Justice, operating under the United Nations system, inherited it
as what is still Article 36, paragraph 2, now of the Statute of the present
Court.

11. By 1974, the year of the appeal by the United Nations General
Assembly for the revitalization of the Court (UnitedNations doc. AIRESI
3232 (XXIX)), 45 out of 141 States parties to the Statute had accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the "optional clause".
Sincethen, the number of accepting States has not increased significantly,
despite the increased number of States parties to the Statute. As of July
1998,the States parties to the Statute numbered 187. However, only 60
States out of that 187have declared their acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.The number of States accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction has never exceeded one-third of the total number of States

that might have at any one time accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court.

It is also a remarkable fact that, with the exception of the Uniteding-
dom, no permanent member of the Security Council has, at the present
time, accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In fact, in Octo-
ber 1985,on the occasion of the loss of its case against Nicaragua (at the
jurisdictional phase), the United States proceeded to withdraw the accept-
ance which it had maintained ever since the Court was set up in 1946.
Earlier, France had withdrawn its acceptance, just after being brought
before the Court by AustraliaINew Zealand in connection with its nuclear
tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacific in 1973.

12. The making of a declaration is a unilateral act, which, far from
being in the nature of a concession, is in fact to the State's advantage, in
that itconfers a right of action against States in a similar position. How-
ever, as the making of the declaration functions in the same way as an LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOIDE LA FORCE (OP. IND. ODA) 786

4) La clausf eacultative

10. L'idéed'adopter une disposition équivalant à l'article 36, para-
graphe 2, du Statut de:la Cour internationale de Justice, apparaît pour la
première foisen 1920, à l'époqueoù on envisage de créer laCour perma-
nente de Justice internationale. Quand le Conseil de la SociétéNations
met en train. en 1920, le travail de rédaction du Statut de la Cour per-

manente, la communalutéinternationale n'étaitpas encore prête à accep-
ter l'obligation généralede se soumettre au règlement judiciaire des dif-
férends.En fait, on estimait absolument indispensable que chaque Etat
consente expressément a êtreliépar ce type d'obligation. Les débats que
le problème a suscitéspendant l'élaborationdu Statut de la Cour perma-
nente montrent clairement que le principe de la souveraineté nationale
régnait encore sans partage au sein de la communauté internationale.
C'est dans ce contexte que fut mis au point l'article 36,paragraphe 2, du
Statut, l'une des pierres angulaires de la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale. La Cour internationale de Justice, qui fait partie, quant
elle, du système des Nations Unies, a héritécette disposition sous la
forme de ce qui est toujours l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut de la
Cour actuelle.
11. En 1974. l'annéeoù l'Assemblée générale deN s ations Unies a

lancé sonappel en faveur de la revitalisation de la Cour (Nations Unies,
doc. AlRed3232 (XXiX)), sur cent quarante et un Etats parties au Statut,
quarante-cinq avaient accepté la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour au
titre de la «clause facultative)). Depuis, le nombre'Etats acceptant de
manifester ainsi leur consentement n'a pas sensiblement augmenté,bien
que le nombre d'Etats parties au Statut ait, quant à lui, augmenté.
En juillet 1998, on dénombrait cent quatre-vingt-sept Etats parties au
Statut.Or, soixante d'entre eux seulement ont déclaré accepterlajuridic-
tion obligatoire de la Cour. Le nombre d'Etats qui font cette déclaration
d'acceptation n'a janiais étésupérieur au tiers du nombre total d'Etats
qui ont à un momerit quelconque ou à un autre accepté lajuridiction
obligatoire.
Il y a égalementlieu de relever, car il est extraordinaire, le fait qu'à
l'exception du Royaume-Uni, aucun membre permanent du Conseil de
sécuritén'a actuellement acceptélajuridiction obligatoire de la Cour. En

fait, en octobre1985,ayant perdu contre le Nicaragua (lors de la phase
relativeà la compétence), les Etats-Unis ont retiré l'acceptation qu'ils
avaient régulièremenirtenouveléedepuis la création de la Cour en 1946.
Précédemment,la France avait retiréson acceptation, peu de temps après
avoir étécitéeàcomparaître devant la Cour par l'Australie et la Nouvelle-
Zélande en raison des essais nucléairesauxquels elle procédait dans le
Pacifique Sud, en 19'73.
12. Faire une déclaration d'acceptation est un acte unilatéral, lequel,
loin de s'apparenter à une concession, sert en réalité l'intérdet 1'Etat
auteur de la déclaration puisqu'il lui confère le droit de poursuivre des
Etats se trouvantdaris une situation similaire. Toutefois, comme le dépôtoffer to conclude an agreement and depends on reciprocity, the practical
effectiveness of the system depends on the number of States which are
willing to participate in it and on the relative breadth of the obligations

which they are prepared to accept thereunder. The acceptance is com-
monly hedged with reservations and exclusions.

The United Kingdom in its 1958declaration (revised in 1963and 1969)
excluded disputes

"where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on
behalf of any other Party to the dispute was deposited or ratified less

than twelve months prior to the filing of the application bringing the
dispute before the Court".
A similar 12-month exclusion clause is found in the following declara-

tions: Hungary (1992), India (1974), Malta (1966), Mauritius (1968).
New Zealand (1977), Philippines (1972), Poland (1996), Somalia (1963),
Spain (1990). Cyprus has a six-month exclusion clause in its declaration
(1988).
It is obvious thatthese States would, thanks to either a 12-month or a

six-month exclusion clause, be in a position to withdraw their acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court if faced with an application
that they considered lacking in bona fides.
The United Kingdom's 1958 declaration also had a clause excluding
"disputes in respect of which any other Party to the dispute has accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in

relation to or for the purpose of the dispute". A similar clause is also now
to be found in New Zealand's 1977declaration.

13. The "optional clause" in effect plays a double role: one positive, in
that it may on occasion enable a unilateral application to succeed, and

the other negative, in that it may sometimes result in a respondent being
brought to the Court against its will. Thus a State, by declaring its
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, may seek to
acquise locus stundi in a case in which the odds are in its favour, but on
the other hand it may, where it feels placed at a disadvantage, try to

release itself from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by the termi-
nation or amendment of its declaration.

It has always been the desire of States, when faced with an application
that in their view clearly lacks bona fides, to escape from their acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.The fact remains - and this

is what 1 want to stress -- that the judicial settlement of international
disputes still remains in the hands of those States that are genuinely
willing to defer to the International Court of Justice.
14. All of these facts indicate that some States accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court out of their good will but on the understanding
that other States have the same good intentions. If this good faith is lack- L.ICÉITÉ DE: L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. [ND. ODA) 787

d'une déclaration a le imême effet qu'une offre d'accord et qu'il est tribu-
taire de la réciprocité,l'efficacitédu systèmedans la pratique est fonction
du nombre d'Etats souhaitant entrer dans le systèmeet de l'étenduerela-

tive des obligations qu'ils sont disposésà accepter en vertu de ce système.
Les Etats entourent frkquemment leur acceptation de réserveset d'exclu-
sions.
C'est ainsi que, dans sa déclaration de 1958 (révisée en1963 et en
1969), le Royaume-Ucii a exclu les différends

«lorsque l'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour au
nom d'une autre partie au différend a été déposéoeu ratifiéemoins
de douze mois avant la date du dépôt de la requêtepar laquelle la

Cour est saisie du différend)).
On trouve une clause voisine d'exclusion de douze mois dans les décla-

rations de l'Espagne (1990), de la Hongrie (1992), de l'Inde (1974), de
Malte (1966), de Maurice (1968). de la Nouvelle-Zélande (l977), des Phi-
lippines (1972),de la Pologne (1996),de la Somalie (1963). Chypre (1988)
formule dans sa déclaration une clause d'exclusion de six mois.
IIest clair que lesdits Etats seraient, grâce à cette clause d'exclusion de

douze mois ou de six mois. en mesure de retirer leur acceptation de la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour dès lors qu'ils seraient face à une
requêteà laquelle. à leur avis, la bonne foi ferait défaut.
Le Royaume-Uni, cians sa déclaration de 1958, formulait aussi une
clause excluant «les différends à l'égarddesquels toute autre partie en

cause a accepté lajuridiction obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Jus-
tice uniquement en ce (quiconcerne lesdits différendsou aux fins de ceux-
ci». On trouve actuellement une clause analogue dans la déclaration de la
Nouvelle-Zélande de 1977.
13. La c(clause fac~iltative)) aboutit à jouer un rôle double: l'un est

positif, en ce sens qu'elle permet parfois qu'une requête unilatéraleabou-
tisse et le second rôle est négatif,en ce sens que la déclaration risque par-
fois de faire comparaitre devant la Cour un Etat défendeur contre sa
volonté. C'est-à-dire qu'un Etat peut, en déclarant accepter la juridiction
obligatoire de la Couir, chercher à avoir qualité pour porter devant la
Cour une cause qu'il a des chances de gagner, mais, par ailleurs, quand il

estime risquer de perdre. le mêmeEtat peut essayer de se délierde la juri-
diction obligatoire de la Cour en mettant fin à la validitéde sa déclara-
tion ou en amendant celle-ci.
Face à une requêteà laquelle, à leur avis, la bonne foi fait manifeste-
ment défaut, les Etats ont toujours éprouvé l'envie de revenir sur leur

acceptation de lajuridiction obligatoire de la Cour. Le fait demeure - et
c'est ceque je veux souligner - que le règlement judiciaire des différends
internationaux est toujours aux mains des Etats qui sont véritablement
disposésà s'en remettre à la Cour internationale de Justice.
14. Ces faits indiqul-nt tous que certains Etats acceptent la juridiction

obligatoire de la Cour sous l'effet de leur bonne volonté. étant entendu
toutefois que les autres Etats doivent êtreanimés des mêmesbonnes788 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP. OPODA)

ing, the system of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
cannot work in the manner in which the drafters of theatute intended.

Past practice reveals, in cases brought unilaterally in which preliminary

objections made by the respondent States were overcome, that there have
been only a fewcases in which thejudgments on the merits were properly
complied with. This indicates the reality of judicial settlement in the
world community. If States are brought to the Court against theirill,
then no real settlement of the dispute will follow. 1 feel that, even if a
12-month or similar exclusion clause is not included in a State'sra-
tion, al1States should have the right to refuse to be drawn into a case that
is obviously not brought bonafide.

15. Generally speaking1also believethat there should be some means
of excluding from the Court's jurisdiction applications which may not
have bona fide intentions or motives and that some provision should be
made for such exclusion in the basic concept of the declaration of accept-
ance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, para-
graph 2, of the Statute. It should be noted that, as a basic concept of
international judiciary, the cornerstonof the granting by sovereign
States ofjurisdiction to the International Court of Justice in a dispute has
always been the consent ofthose States.

16. In my view,it would be extremely odd to have a situation where
the Court apparently has prima facie jurisdiction only forose States
(Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Portugal) that have simply failed
to include in their declarations an exclusion clause protecting their inter-
ests, while Spain and the United Kingdom are, because of their exclusion
clauses, released from the Court's jurisdiction in the present cases (which
in fact cover exactly theme subject). 1accordingly consider, in the light
my finding in paragraph 9 above as to Yugoslavia's lack of good faith,
that the Applications instituting proceedings againsthese four States

also (namely, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands and Portugal) should
likewise be found inadmissible.

IV. LACK OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTIO NNDER THE 1930 CONVENTION
BETWEEN BELGIUM AND YUGOSLAV AND THE 1931TREATY BETWEEN THE
NETHERLAND ASD YUGOSLAVIA

17. As late as the second round of oral hearings, which took place on
12 May 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supplemented its

Applications against Belgium and the Netherlands by invoking as addi-
tional grounds of jurisdiction of the Court, respectively, Article 4 of the
1930 Convention of Conciliation, Judicial Settlement and Arbitration L.ICÉITÉ DE<L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE(OP. [ND. ODA)
788

intentions. Quand cette bonne foi fait défaut,ce systèmed'acceptation de
la juridiction obligatoiire de la Cour ne peut pas fonctionner comme le
voulaient les auteurs du Statut.
Dans les affaires introduites par voie unilatérale dans lesquelles les

exceptions préliminairi:~soulevéespar 1'Etatdéfendeurn'ont pas étérete-
nues. la pratique révèleque l'arrêtprononcé sur le fond est rarement exé-
cuté comme ilconvierit. On voit par là ce que représente réellement le
règlement judiciaire pour la communauté mondiale. Si les Etats doivent
se présenter devant la Cour contre leur volonté,ilne faut pas s'attendre

à un véritable règlement du différend. A mon sens, même si 1'Etat
n'incorpore pas à sa déclaration de clause d'exclusion de douze mois ou
de clause voisine, les Etats devraient avoir tous le droit de refuser de com-
paraître quand la demande n'est manifestement pas présentéede bonne
foi.

15. D'ailleurs, j'esti:me également qu'en règle générale,il devrait être
possible d'exclure de la juridiction de la Cour les requêtesdont l'intention
ou la motivation ne paraît pas empreinte de bonne foi et qu'il faudrait
envisager une exclusioinde ce type dans la conception mêmede la décla-
ration d'acceptation di: la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour en vertu de

l'article 36, paragraphe2,du Statut. IIne faut pas oublier que, dans les
principes mêmesde la justice internationale, la pierre angulaire par
laquelle les Etats souverains donnent compétence à la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice pour connaître d'un différend a toujours étéle consente-
ment de ces mêmesEtats.

16. A mon sens, il serait extrêmement bizarre que la Cour ait appa-
remment compétence ,arimu,fuc.ien ce qui concerne les seuls Etats (la
Belgique, le Canada, les Pays-Bas et le Portugal) qui ont tout simplement
omis de faire figurer dans leur déclaration une clause d'exclusion pro-
tégeant leurs intérêts,tandis que l'Espagne et le Royaume-Uni, parce
qu'ils ont prévu cette clause d'exclusion, n'ont pas à se soumettre à la

juridiction de la Cour en l'espèce(alors que la cause porte exactement
sur le même objet). Comme je constate au paragraphe 9 ci-dessus un
défaut de bonne foi chez la Yougoslavie, j'estime par conséquent que les
requêtes introductives d'instance à l'encontre de ces quatre Etats (la
Belgique, le Canada, les Pays Bas et le Portugal) doivent. elles aussi, être

déclarées irrecevables.

IV. LACOUR N'A PAS COMPÉTENCE EN VERTU DE LA CONVENTION DE 1930
ENTRE LA BELGIQU ET LA YOUGOSLAV NE EN VERTU DU TRAITÉ DE 1931

ENTRE LES PAYS-BAS ET LA YOUGOSLAVIE

17. Fort tardivement, lors du second tour de plaidoiries, le 12 mai
1999, la République lëdérale de Yougoslavie a complété les requêtes
qu'elle présentait contre la Belgique et les Pays-Bas en invoquant un nou-
veau chef de compétence de la Cour, respectivement l'article 4 de la

convention de conciliation, de règlement judiciaire et d'arbitrage concluebetween Yugoslavia and Belgium, and Article 4 of the 1931 Treaty of
Judicial Settlement, Arbitration and Conciliation between Yugoslavia
and the Netherlands. Irrespective of the question of whether these instru-
ments still remain valid in the present-day relations between the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the two respondent States. and whether the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is entitled to invoke them as a basis of
jurisdiction at such a late stage, 1have to say that in my view the reliance
on these instruments by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is totally
unfounded.

18. These two instruments were among a number of treaties of a simi-

lar character concluded between a great number of States in the period
after the establishment of the League of Nations; they were intended to
bring together the various means of peaceful settlement of international
disputes, namely judicial settlement. arbitration. conciliation, and other
methods, into a systematized scheme of precedence among these various

procedures. However. these treaties did not impose any new obligations
on the States which became parties to them. Hence, the 1930 and 1931
instruments imposed no new obligations on the Contracting Parties in
connection with the judicial settlement of disputes, over and above resort
to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for in its Stat-
ute, to which the Contracting Parties of the 1930 and 1931 instruments,

respectively. were already signatories. (Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Yugoslavia had, in their respective declarations, already accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of that Court.)

The provisions of Article 4 of these two instruments have never been
interpreted as granting compulsory jurisdiction to the then existing Per-

manent Court of International Justice in addition to what had already
been provided for in its Statute. It is also to be noted that, in both of
these instruments, resort to any of the prescribed means of settlement of
disputes could be had only after a dispute had Failedto be settled through
the normal diplomatic channels (cf. Article 1 of the respective instru-

ments).

V. L,~cK OF THE COL~RTJ UKISDICTIO lNDEK TI1E
GENOC.IDC EONVENTION

19. The Court's Statiite provides in Article 36. paragraph1,that "[tlhe

jurisdiction of the Court comprises . . . al1 matters specially pi-ovided
for . . . in treaties and conventions in force". The 1948Genocide Conven-
tion is one of these "treaties and conventions in force'. and its Article IX
provides that

"[d]isputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre- LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. ODA) 789

en 1930 entre la Yougoslavie et la Belgique, et l'article 4 du traité de
règlement judiciaire, cl'arbitrage et de conciliation conclu en 113entre la
Yougoslavie et les Pays-Bas. Indépendamment de la question de savoir si
ces instruments sont toujours en vigueur dans le cadre des relations
actuelles entre la République fédéralede Yougoslavie et les deux Etats
défendeurs, et indépendamment aussi du point de savoir si la République

fédéralede Yougoslavie a le droit. à un stade aussi tardif de la procédure,
de faire de ces deux ]instruments une base de compétence, je dirai qu'à
mon sens la République fédéralede Yougoslavie n'est strictement pas
fondée à s'appuyer sur ces instruments.
18. Ces deux instru.ments. en effet, font partie d'un certain nombre de
traités analogues coriclus entre un grand nombre d'Etats pendant la

période qui a suivi la création de la Sociétédes Nations; ces traités
visaient à regrouper les divers moyens de règlement pacifique des diffé-
rends internationaux, c'est-à-dire le règlement judiciaire, l'arbitrage, la
conciliation entre autres méthodes. et à systématiser un certain ordre de
préséanceentre ces diverses procédures. Mais les traités en question
n'imposaient aucune obligation nouvelle aux Etats qui y adhéraient. Par

conséquent. ces traités de 1930 et de 1931 n'imposaient aux parties
contractantes aucune obligation nouvelle liéeau règlement judiciaire des
différendsen sus de la saisine de la Cour permanente de Justice interna-
tionale prévue dans le Statut de cette dernière, auquel les parties contrac-
tantes des instruments de 1930 et 1931 étaient d'ores et déjà respective-
ment signataires. (La Belgique, les Pays-Bas et la Yougoslavie avaient.
dans leur déclaration, d'ores et déjàacceptéla juridiction obligatoire de

la Cour permanente.)
Les dispositions de l'articl4 des deux instruments en question n'ont
jamais étéinterprétée:;comme conférantjuridiction obligatoire à la Cour
permanente de Justice internationale de l'époqueen sus de ce que pré-
voyait d'ores et déjà le Statut de ladite Cour. Ilconvient également de
noter que, dans les deux instruments en question, le recours à l'une quel-

conque des méthodes prescrites de règlement des différendsn'est envisagé
que s'ila étéimpossible de réglerle litige par les voies diplomatiques nor-
males (cf. l'articl1 de chacun des instruments).

19. Le Statut de la Cour dispose à l'article36. paragraphe 1.que (<[l]a
compétence de la Coius s'étend ... à tous les cas spécialement prévus ...
dans les traités et conventions en vigueur)^.La convention sur le génocide
de 1948 fait partie de ces ((traitéset conventions en vigueur)) et disposi
I'articlc 1X que

(([Ilesdifférends entre les Parties contractantes relatifs à l'interpre- tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention . . . shall
be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute".

In al1 ten of its Applications, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
referring to the alleged breach of the obligation contained in the Geno-
cide Convention, invoked Article IX of that Convention as a legal ground
for jurisdiction of the Court.

1will not deal here with the question of whether the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia is now a party to the Genocide Convention and whether a
State which is not a Stateparty to the Statute is entitled to locus .xtandiby
relying on Article 36, paragraph 1, as quoted at the beginning of this
paragraph.

1note that Portugal became a party to the Genocide Convention with
effect from 10 May 1999. 1 also note that Spain and the United States
have properly made their respective reservations in respect of Article IX
of theGenocideConvention. Thus the applications of the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia invoking that Convention should - from the outset -

be dismissed in the cases of Portugal, Spain and the United States.

(2) No Disputes reluting to the Genocide Convention Exist hetioeen
the Purties

20. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in spite of enumerating vari-
ous claims, did not establish any violation of the Genocide Convention
for which any one of the ten respondent States could be held responsible

as a party to that Convention and indicated no element of genocide as
defined in Article II of the Genocide Convention in the bombing or mili-
tary attacks in Yugoslavia by the NATO armed forces. The question in
general as to whether or not the bombing or the military attack in the
territory of Yugoslavia by the NATO armed forces does in fact constitute
a violation of international law may well be an issue but is irrelevant

when dealing with the Genocide Convention.

21. Even if acts of genocide for which the respondent States may be
deemed to be responsible under the Genocide Convention had taken

place in Yugoslavia, that would not mean that there were disputes
between the applicant State and the respondent States concerning the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention. The Appli-
cant did not indicate the existence of such a dispute which might be sub-
mitted obligatorily to the Court by application of the Genocide Conven-
tion.

1have previously stated my interpretation of the meaning of the words
"a dispute concerning the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the tation, l'application ou l'exécution de la présente convention ...
seront soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice, a la requêted'une
partie au différend».
Dans la totalité de ses dix requêtes introductives d'instance, la Répu-

blique fédéralede Yougoslavie, faisant état de la violation alléguéede
l'obligation ainsiénoncéedans la convention sur le génocide, a invoqué
l'articleIX de ladite convention dont elle fait une base juridique de la
compétencede la Cour.
Je ne m'arrêterai pas ici sur la question de savoir si la Républiquefédé-
rale de Yougoslavie eijt actuellement partià la convention sur le géno-
cide ni sur le point de;avoirsi un Etat non partie au Statut a bien qualité
pour agir s'il s'appuie sur son article 36, paragraphe 1, que je cite au
débutdu présentparagraphe.
Je constate que le ]Portugal est devenu partie a la convention sur le
génocide a compter du 10mai 1999.Je constate égalementque deux pays,
l'Espagne et les Etats-Unis, ont dûment formuléchacun leurs réserves en
ce qui concerne l'article1Xde la convention sur le génocide.Par consé-
quent, les demandes de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie par les-
quelles celle-cinvoque la convention doivent êtrerejetées d'emblée pour
le Portugal, l'Espagne et les Etats-Unis.

2) II n'existe pas entre les Parties de dffirend relatif à la convention
.surle génocide

20. Bien qu'elle énumèredivers griefs, la Républiquefédéralede You-
goslavien'a pas établiIl'existenced'une violation quelconque de la conven-
tion sur le génocidedont l'un quelconque des dix Etats défendeurspour-
rait êtretenu pour responsable en qualité departie ladite convention et
ellen'a pas montréno-nplus que les bombardements ou les attaques mili-

taires menéesen Yougoslavie par les forces arméesde I'OTAN partici-
pent d'un génocidetel qu'il est définiàl'article II de la convention sur le
génocide. La question1de caractère généralde savoir si les bombarde-
ments ou les attaques militaires menéessur le territoire de la Yougoslavie
par les forces arméesdleI'OTAN constituent bien en fait ou non une vio-
lation du droit international peut trèsbien seposer, mais elle est sans per-
tinence quand on a affaire A la convention sur le génocide.
21. Mêmesi des actes de génocidedont les Etats demandeurs pour-
raient êtredéclarés responsables en vertude la convention sur le génocide
avaient bien été commis enYougoslavie, cela ne voudrait pas dire qu'il y
aurait un dffirend entre 1'Etatdemandeur et les Etats défendeursrelatif
a l'interprétation, l'application ou l'exécutionde ladite convention. Le
demandeur n'a pas signalé l'existenced'un différend qu'ilfaudrait peut-
êtresoumettre ainsi obligatoirement 2 la Cour par application de la
convention sur le génocide.
J'ai déjàdit comment j'interprétais le sensà attribuer aux termes «dif-
férendsrelatifsà l'interprétation,l'application oul'exécutionde la conven-79 1 LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (SEP.OP.ODA)

Convention" in the declaration 1 appended to the Court's Judgment in
the Genocide case and 1repeat it here:

"If any dispute were to be unilaterally submitted to the Court by
one of the Contracting Parties to a treaty pursuant to the compro-
missory clause of that treaty, this would mean in essence that the
dispute had arisen because of (i) the allegedjuilure of another Con-

tracting Party to fuijïl the ohligutions imposed hy thut treaty - a
failure for which it is responsible - and (ii) the infringement of the
rights bestolved upor~tliejormer Stute hy thut treuty dueto that fail-
ure. The failure of the other State is itself a violation of the treaty

but such a violation alone cannot be interpreted as constituting a
dispute between the applicant State and the respondent State relat-
ing to that treaty unless it can be shown to have infringed such rights
of the former State as are protected thereby." (Application of the
Convention on the Prel~entionund Punishment of the Critne of'Grno-

cide, Prelimina~ Objections, Judgnzent, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II),
pp. 625-626.)

(3) Generul Charucter qf the Genooide Conventiorz

22. The GenocideConvention cannot be regarded as an orthodox type
of international treaty, as orthodox treaties provide for a right on the

part of one State and a corresponding obligation on the part of another
State. 1once described the unique character of the Genocide Convention.
It may be pertinent to quote my previous writing in this respect:

"4. The Genocide Convention is unique in having been adopted

by the General Assembly in 1948 at a time when - due to the suc-
cess of the Nuremburg Trials - the idea prevailed that an interna-
tional criminal tribunal should be established for the punishment of
criminal acts directed against human rights, including genocide; it is

essentially directed not to the rights and obligations of States hur to
the protection of rights of individuals and groups of persons which
have become recognized as universal.
To be sure, the Contracting Parties to the Convention defined
genocide as 'a crime under international law' (Art. 1).The Conven-

tion binds the Contracting Parties to punish persons responsible for
those acts, whoever they may be, and is thus directed to the punish-
ment of persons committing genocide and genocidal acts (Art. IV).
The Contracting Parties undertake 'to enact, in accordance with

their respective Constitutions. the necessary legislation to give effect
to the provisions of the present Convention' (Art. V).
As persons committing genocide or genocidal acts may possibly
be 'constitutionally responsible rulers [or] public officials' (Art. IV), LICEITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. ODA) 791

tien» dans la déclaration que j'ai jointe à l'arrêtrendu par la Cour dans
l'affaire relative à la Convention sur le génocideet je rappelle ci-dessous

cette interprétation :

«Si un différend devait êtresoumis unilatéralement à la Cour par
l'une des parties contractantes à un traité en application de la clause
compromissoire y figurant, cela signifierait essentiellement que le
différend est né: i) parce qu'une autre partie contractante n'aurait

pus e- écut téles obligutions mises à .FU cliurge pur ce truiti - un
manquement engageant sa responsabilité - etii)parce qu'il uuruit
étéporté atteinte aux droits conférésau premier Etut pur ce truite
du fait de ce mariquement. Ce manquement est lui-même uneviola-

tion du traitémais cette violation ne peut à elle seule êtreinterprétée
comme constituant un différend entre I'Etat requérant et 1'Etat
défendeur relativement à ce traité s'il n'estpas établique ce dernier
Etat a porté atteinte aux droits du premier Etat protégéspar le
traitéen questiori. » (Applicution de lu convention pour lu préventiori

et lu rlpression du crime de génocide, exceptions préliminaire.~,
urrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 625-626.)

3) Cururrt.re générulde lu convention sur le génocide

22. Il n'est pas po:ssible de considérer la convention sur le génocide
comme un traité interi~ational de type orthodoxe, car les traitésde ce type
confèrent un droit qu'un Etat exercera et une obligation correspondante

dont devra s'acquitter un autre Etat. J'ai eu l'occasion de montrer le
caractère exceptionnel de la convention sur le génocideet il est peut-être
pertinent de reprendre ici ce texte:

((4. La convenition sur le génocide est unique en ce qu'elle a été

adoptée par 1'Asr.emblée générale en1948à une époqueoù - en rai-
son du succès des procésde Nuremberg -- l'idéeprospérait qu'il fal-
lait créer untribunal pénalinternational pour réprimer les actes cri-
minels dirigés contre les droits de l'homme, dont le génocide; elle

vise essentiel1emi:nt non les droits et obligations des Etats mais la
protection de droits aujourd'hui universellement reconnus à l'indi-
vidu et aux grou.pes de population.
Certes, les parties contractantes à la convention définissent le
génocidecomme un ((crime du droit des gens» (article premier). La

convention oblige les parties contractantes à punir les personnes
ayant commis un génocide ou des actes de génocide (art. IV). Les
parties contractantes s'engagent a prendre ((conformément à leurs
constitutions respectives, les mesures législatives nécessaires pour
assurer l'application des dispositions de la présente convention))

(art. V).
Comme les personnes commettant un génocide ou des actes de
génocide peuvent être«des gouvernants [ou] des fonctionnaires))the Convention contains a specific provision which allows '[alny
Contracting Party [to] cal1upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations
as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of
[those acts]' (Art. VIII) and contemplates the establishment of an

international penal tribunal (Art. VI).
Genocide is defined as 'a crime under international law which [the
Contracting Parties] undertake to prevent and punish' (Art. 1).Even
if this general clause (which was subjected to criticism at the Sixth
Committee in 1948when it was felt by some delegates that it should

have been placed in the preamble, but not in the main text) is to be
interpreted as meaning specifically that the Contracting Parties are
obliged 'to prevent and to punish' genocide and genocidal acts, these
legal obligations are borne in a general manner ergu omnes by the
Contracting Parties in their relations with al1the other Contracting

Parties to the Convention - or, even, with the international com-
munity as a whole - but are not obligations in relation to any spe-
cific and particular signatory Contracting Party.

The failure of any Contracting Party 'to prevent and to punish'
such a crime may only be rectified and remedied through (i) resort to

a competent organ of the United Nations (Art. VIII) or (ii) resort to
an international penal tribunal (Art. VI), but not by invoking the
responsibility of States in inter-State relations before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. This constitutes a unique character of the
Convention which was produced in the post-war period in parallel

with the emergence of the concept of the protection of human rights
and humanity.
5. In this regard, some explanation of the dispute settlement pro-
vision of the Convention (Art. IX) may be pertinent. It reads as fol-
lows:

'Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the inter-
pretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for geno-

cide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute'

and is unique as compared with the compromissory clauses found in
other multilateral treaties which provide for submission to the Inter-
national Court of Justice of such disputes between the Contracting
Parties as relate to the interpretation or upplicatior~of the treaties in

question.
The construction of Article IX of the GenocideConvention is very
uncertain as it incorporates specific references to '[dlisputes . . . relat-
ing to . . . fulfilment of the Convention' and to 'disputes relating to
the responsibility of a State for genocide or [genocidal acts]' - ref-(art. IV), la coi~vention permet expressément a «[t]oute partie

contractante [de] saisir les organes compétents de l'organisation des
Nations Unies afiinque ceux-ci prennent, conformément à la Charte
des Nations Unies, les mesures qu'ils jugent appropriées pour la pré-
vention et la répressionde [cesactes])) (art. VIII) et envisage la créa-
tion d'une cour criminelle internationale (art. VI).

Le génocideest définicomme <<uncrime du droit des gens [que les
parties contractantes] s'engagent à prévenir et à punir)) (article pre-
mier). Mêmesi l'on doit interpréter cette disposition générale (qui a
été critiquée à la Sixième Commission en 1948, certains représen-
tants estimant qu'elle aurait dû êtreplacéedans le préambule et non

dans le texte mênie)comme signifiant spécifiquement que les parties
contractantes sont tenues «de préveniret de punir)) le génocideet les
actes de génocide:, cesobligations juridiques sont supportées d'une
manière générale erglron~n~s par les parties contractantes dans leurs
relations avec toiites les autres parties à la convention - ou même

avec l'ensemble di: la communauté internationale - mais ne sotztpus
des obligations à l'égardd'une partie contractante signataire parti-
culière ou définie.
Au cas où une partie contractante manquerait à ((prévenir et
punir)) un tel crirne, il peut êtreremédiéà ce manquement unique-

ment: i) en saisissant un organe compétent de l'organisation des
Nations Unies (a.rt. VIII) ou ii) en saisissant une cour criminelle
internationale (art. VI),mais non en invoquant la responsabilité des
Etats dans les reli-itionsinterétatiaues devant la Cour internationale
de Justice. Il s'agit là d'une caractéristique unique de la convention,

élaboréeà une époque - l'après-guerre - -ou la notion de protec-
tion des droits de:l'homme et de l'humanité faisait son apparition.
5. A cet égard, il peut êtrepertinent d'expliquer la disposition de
la convention relative au règlement des différends (art. IX). Elle est
ainsi libellée:

«Les différends entre les parties contractantes relatifs à l'inter-
prétation. l'application ou l'exécutionde la présente convention. y

compris ceux r8elatifsà la responsabilité d'un Etat en matière de
génocideou de l'un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à I'ar-
ticleIII, seront soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice, à la
requêted'une partie au différend)):

et elle est unique si on la compare aux clauses compromissoires
d'autres traités multilatéraux qui prévoient la soumission à la Cour
internationale de Justice des différends entre les parties contrac-

tantes ayant trait à leur interpr<;tutiorou upp/ic.ution.

La constructiori de l'articleIX de la convention sur le génocide est
très incertaine en ce qu'elle contient des références expressesaux

((différends ... rel;itifs à ... l'exécutionde la présenteconvention)) et
aux ((différendsrelatifs a la responsabilité d'un Etat en matière deerences which can hardly be understood in any meaningful sense as
a compromissory clause.

The original draft of the Genocide Convention was drawn up by
an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide in the ECOSOC in April-May

1948, and contained an orthodox type of compromissory clause
(Oj'ciul record.^of the Economic utzrlSociul Counc.iI,Tlzird Yeur.
Seventh Ses.sion, S~rpplementNo. 6), which read :

'Disputes between the High Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretution or upplication of this Convention shall be submitted
to the International Court of Justice, proilidcd tkut no dispute
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice involving
an issue which has been referred to and is pending before or has

been passed upon by a competent international criminal tribunal.'
(Emphasis added.)

When this draft was taken up by the Sixth Committee of the Gen-
eral Assemblv in its Third Session in October 1948. the addition of
the two aforimentioned references was proposed (OKfiriul Records
?/'the G~~neraA l .s.scmhl~~T.tzirrtSe.r.sion.Si.~ttrComrnitr, nnexes,
p. 28: AlC61258) without, in my view, the drafters having a clear
picture of the new type of convention to be adopted. While some
delegates understood that 'fulfilment' would not be different from

'application', aproposal to delete 'fulfilment'from the additions was
rejected by 27 votes to 10, with 8 abstentions. However, another
deletion of the words 'including [disputes] relating to the responsi-
bility of a State for genocide or [genocidal acts]' was also rejected
but only by 19 votes to 17, with 9 abstentions (O[ficiul record.^qf
tlrr Gcnrrul A.s,setnhly. Tlrird Session, Sixth Committre, SR. 104,

p. 447). The trrrvuuxpiépurcrtoircsof the Convention seem to con-
firm that there was some measlire of confusion among the drafters,
reflecting in particular the unique nature of their task in the prevail-
ing spirit of the times.

How can one then interpret this reference to the 'responsibility of
a State'? As far as 1know such a reference has never been employed
in any other treaty thereafter. It seems to be quite natural to assume
that that reference would not have had any meaningful sense or other-
wise would not have added anything to the clause providing for the
submission to the Court of disputes relating to the interpretution or
upplirution of the Convention, because, in general, any inter-State

dispute covered by a treaty per sr always relates to the responsibility
of a State and the singling-out of a reference to the responsibility of
a State does not have any sense with regard to a compromissory
clause." (Application of tlze Convention on the Prevention und LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. ODA) 793

génocideou [d'actes de génocide] ))- des référencesqu'il est difficile
de comprendre utilement comme constituant une clause compromis-
soire.

Le projet originaire de la convention sur le génocidea étéélaboré
par un comité spécialdu génocidedu Conseil économique et social
en avril-mai 1948, et contenait une clause compromissoire plus
orthodoxe (Documents ojjïciels du Conseil éc,onomiqueet social,
troisiPrrie annir. septi&nîesession. .supplérnrnno 6), qui était ainsi
libellé:

«Les différends qui s'élèveraient entre les Hautes Parties
contractantes concernant l'interprétation ou I'applicalion de la

présente convention seront soumis à la Cour internationale de
Justice, sous reserve qu'aucun différend ne sera soumis à la Cour
internationale de Justice s'ilimplique une question qui a étédéférée
à un tribunal international compétent, est pendante devant ce tri-
bunal, ou a déjà été jugée par lui.» (Les italiques sont de moi.)

Lorsque ce projet a été examinépar la Sixième Commission de
l'Assembléegénérale A sa troisième session, en octobre 1948, l'ajout
des deux référencessusmentionnées a étéproposé document. ^ffi-
ciels de l'A~se~nhlétg~én&rale,troisikn~r srssion, Si-t-ièm Co~~znzi.s-

.sion, annexes, p. 28 (AlC61258)) sans qu'à mon avis les rédacteurs
aient une idéebien claire de la nouveauté du type de convention qui
allait êtreadopté. Certains représentants ne voyaient pas de diffé-
rence entre ((exécution» et ((application », mais une proposition ten-
dant à la suppression du mot «exécution)>a étérejetéepar 27 voix
contre IO, avec 8 abstentions. Toutefois, une autre proposition, ten-

dant à la suppression des mots «y compris [les différends] relatifs A
la responsabilité d'un Etat en matière de génocide ou [d'actes de
génocide])) a. elle aussi, étérejetée, mais seulement par 19 voix
contre 17. avec 9 abstentions (Documents c~J'cie1.sde 1'As.semhlée
g6nc;rale, trui.siérrzrsc~.s.n,ixiOn?cCot~~rni.s.vioS,R.104, p. 447).
Les travaux préparatoires de la convention semblent confirmer qu'il

régnait une certaine confusion parmi ceux qui l'ont rédigéet,enant
en particulier au caractère unique de leur tache étant donné l'esprit
qui régnait à l'époque.
Comment peut-on alors interpréter cette référenceà la ((responsa-
bilité d'un Etat))? A ma connaissance, elle n'a plus jamais été

employée dans aucun autre traité. Ilsemble tout à fait naturel de
supposer que cette référence n'avaitpas un sens bien défini ou
n'aurait rien ajoutéà la clause prévoyant la soumission à la Cour des
différends relatifs à l'interprétation ou à l'application de la conven-
tion parce que, en général, tout différend interétatiquevisédans un
traité a toujours en soi trait à la responsabilité d'un Etat et que la
mise en valeur d'une référence à la responsabilité d'un Etat n'a

aucun sens pour ce qui est d'une clause compromissoire. » (Déclara-
tion de M. Oda dans l'affaire relative à I'Applicrrtiondo la convention794 LEGALITY OF LJSEOF FORCE (SEP. OP.ODA)

Punishment of'the Crime of'Cenocide, Preliminury Objections.
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), declaration of Judge Oda,

pp.626-628.)

23. In order to seise the Court of the present cases, excepting those
concerning Portugal, Spain and the United States as referred to in para-
graph 19 of tliis opinion, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would cer-
tainly have had to show that, applying the Genocide Convention to the
situation in the territory of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the respon-

dent States could indeed have been responsible for the failure of the ful-
filment of the Convention in relation to the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia. But. more particularly, the Federal Repubof Yugoslavia would
have to show that the respondent States have breached the rights of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a Contracting Party (which by defini-
tion is a State) entitled to protection under that Convention. This, how-

ever, has not been established in the Applications and in fact the Geno-
cide Convention is not intended to protect the rights of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia as a State.

Even if, as alleged. the respondent States are responsible for certain
results of the bombing or armed attacks by NATO armed forces in the

territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this factne does not
mean that there is a "dispute relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfilment of the Convention", as the respondent States did not violate
the rights conferred upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the
Convention. What is protected by the Convention is no, the particular

rights of any individual State (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in this
case)but the status of human beings with human rights and the universal
interest of the individual in general.

What the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did in its Applications was
to point to certaifuct.sallegedly tantamount to genocide or genocidal

acts and to submit cluitnalleged to have arisen out of these facts. This
cannot be taken to indicate the existence of an inter-State dispute relating
to the responsibility of a State which could have been made a basis for
the Court's jurisdiction.
1accordingly conclude that the Applications citing the Genocide Con-

vention as a basis of the Court's jurisdiction should be rejected.

VI. IN THE PKESENT CIRCIJMSTANC THSEREQ~JEST FSR THE
INDICATIO NF PROVISIONA M LEASURE SUE INADMISSIBLE

24. Having made observations on the Court's jurisdiction, 1would like
to make some comments on the institution of provisional measures. pour la prévenlionet la répressiondu crime de génocide,exceptions
prélimil?uire.r,rrgt, C1.J. Recueil 1996 (Il), p. 626-628.)

4) Conclusions

23. Pour saisir la Cour des présentes espèces,exceptécellesqui concer-
nent le Portugal, l'Espagne et les Etats-Unis, comme je l'ai dit au para-
graphe 19de la présenteopinion, la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie
aurait incontestablement dû montrer que, la convention sur le génocide
étantappliquée àla situation sur le territoire de la Républiquefédéralede

Yougoslavie, les Etats défendeurs pouvaient effectivement être tenus
pour responsables d'un manquement aux obligations découlant de la
convention à l'égardde la République fédéralede Yougoslavie. Mais,
plus particulièrement encore, la ~e~ubli~ue fédéralede Yougoslavie
aurait dû montrer que les Etats défendeurs avaient violéles droits de la
République fédéralede Yougoslavie en tant que partie contractante
(c'est-à-dire, par définition,un Etat) devanttreprotégéau titre de ladite
convention. Mais le fait n'a pasétéétablidans les requêtes et en réalila
convention sur le génociden'est pascensée protégerlesdroits de la Répu-
blique fédéralede Yougoslavie en tant qu'Etat.
Même si,comme il est allégué,les Etats défendeurssont responsables
de certains résultats des bombardements ou des attaques armées menées

par les forces armées de l'OTAN sur le territoire de la République fédé-
rale de Yougoslavie, ce faità lui seul ne signifie pas qu'il existeun «dif-
férend relatià l'interprétation, l'applicationou l'exécutionde la conven-
tion», car les Etats défendeurs n'ont pas violéles droits conférés à la
Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie par la convention. Ce que la conven-
tion protège,ce ne sontpus lesdroits particuliers d'un Etat, quel qu'il soit
(la République fédérale de Yougoslavieen l'espèce) mais la condition
d'êtres humainsdotésde droits à ce titre, les droits de l'homme, et les
intérêtsuniversels de l'individu en général.
Dans ses requêtes,la Républiquefédéralede Yougoslavie, en réalité,a
mis en évidence certuinsfuit.r qui seraient assimilablàsun génocideou
à des actes de génocide eta présentédes dernande.~qui découleraient de

ces faits. On ne peut pas y voir l'indication qu'il existeraitun différend
interétatique relatif la responsabilitéd'un Etat, différendqui aurait pu
fonder la compétencede la Cour.
J'en déduisqu'il faut rejeter les requêtesqui font delaconvention sur
le génocide une basede compétencepour la Cour.

VI. DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES DE L'ESPÈCE LES DEMANDES EN INDICATION
DE MESURES CONSERVATOIRES SONT IRRECEVABLES

24. Après avoir parlé de la compétence de la Cour, j'aimerais for-
muler quelques observations sur l'institution même des mesuresconser-
vatoires. Provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respec-
tive rights of either party may be indicated by the Court"fit considers

that the circumstances so require" (Statute, Art. 41, emphasis added). It
thus falls within the discretion of the Court togrant provisional measures
upon the request of the applicant State.
The items concerning the subject-matter of the dispute, the claim and
the legal grounds on which the claim is based, are virtually identical
throughout the Applications filed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
against the ten respondent States. If provisional measures were to be
granted, but only in relation to certain of the ten respondent States, for
the reason that there existed a prima facie basis ofjurisdiction, while in
the case of other respondent States the requests were dismissed totally

because of the lack of the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the Applica-
tions, this would lead to an unreasonable result. For this reason alone,
the requests for the indication of provisional measures by the applicant
State are inadmissible throughout the ten cases.

VII. REMOVAL OF THE CASES FROM THE GENERAL LIST OF THE COURT
DUE TO THE LACK OF JURISDICTION

25. The Court has reached its decision to dismiss the requests for the
indication of provisional measures inal1ten cases on the sole ground that
it lacks a prima facie basis of jurisdiction inse cases. If, at the provi-
sional measures stage, the Court finds that it has prima faciejurisdiction,
then it remains free, irrespective of whether or not it grants provisional
measures, to proceed to the next phase.
26. In the past the Court, even after having affirmed that there could
exist a prima facie basis of jurisdiction,till dismissed the requests for
provisional measures in some cases for various reasons. In theInterhun-
del case, thePassage through the Great Beltcase and the case concerning
Questions of Interpretution und Applicutiotî of the 1971 Montreul Con-

vention arising from the Aeriul Incident ut Lockerbie,the Court consid-
ered that the circumstances of these cases were not such as to require the
exercise of its power to indicate provisional measures. In tAegcun Seu
ContinetztulSl7elf'case,the Court did not find such a risk of irreparable
prejudice to rights in issue before it as might require the exercise of its
power to indicate provisional measures. In the 1990case concerning the
Arbitral Alvurd of 31 July 1989, the Court dismissed the request of the
Republic of Guinea-Bissau on the ground that the alleged rights sought
to be made the subject of provisional measures were not the subject of the
proceedings before the Court on the merits of the case.

Where the Court finds that there is a prima facie basis of jurisdiction,
thisdoes not, of course, necessarily lead it to determine that it eventually
has jurisdiction in the case. In theAnglo-Iraniun Oil Co. case and the La Cour est habilitée à indiquer quelles mesures conservatoires du
droit de chacun il convient de prendre à titre provisoire «si elle estime
que les circonstances l'exigent))(Statut, art. 4:les italiques sont de moi).
C'est donc la Cour qui peut décider de prendre, à la demande de 1'Etat

requérant, des mesures conservatoires.
Les élémentsrelatifs à l'objet du différend,la demande elle-mêmeet les
fondements juridiques sur lesquels elle repose sont pratiquement identi-
ques de la première ala dernière des requêtes déposées par la République
fédéralede Yougoslavie à l'encontre des dix Etats défendeurs. S'il devait
êtrepris des mesures conservatoires uniquement en ce qui concerne cer-

tains des dix Etats défendeurs au motif qu'il existe dans ces cas-là une
base de compétence prima facie alors que, s'agissant des autres Etats
défendeurs, les demandes seraient intégralement rejetées parce que la
Cour n'aurait pas compétence pour connaître des requêtes, cette issue
serait déraisonnable. Ne serait-ce que pour cette seule raison, les requêtes
en indication de mesures conservatoires présentéespar I'Etat demandeur
sont irrecevables dans les dix affaires.

VII. LE MANQUE DE COMPETENCE IMPOSE DE RAYER LES AFFAIRES
DU ROLE DE LA COUR

25. Pour décider de rejeter les demandes en indication de mesures

conservatoires dans les dix affaires. la Cour retient Dour seul motif
l'absence de toute base de compétenceprima fucie. Quand, au stade des
mesures conservatoires, elle estime avoir compétenceprinzujucie, la Cour
conserve, indépendamment du point de savoir si elle accorde ou non des
mesures conservatoires, toute latitude pour passer à la phase suivante.
26. Dans le passé,mêmeaprèsavoir affirméqu'il pouvait exister prin~u
fucie une base de compétence, la Cour n'en a pas moins rejeté les de-

mandes en indication de mesures conservatoires dans certaines affaires,
pour diverses raisons. Dans l'affaire de I'Inter/~undel,dans celledu Pa.rsage
par le Grand-Belt et dans l'affaire relativA des Qur.vtionsd'interprétation
et d'application ui./uconvention de Montréal de 1971 résultantde 1'i~fc.i-
dent uéric~dne Lock~rhie. la Cour a estiméque les circonstances de l'espèce
n'étaient pas de nature à lui imposer d'exercer le pouvoir dont elle est

dot& d'indiquer des mesures conservatoires. Dans l'affaire du Plateau
continental de lu mer Egke. la Cour n'a pas estiméque le risque d'atteinte
irréparable aux droits en litige devant elle fût tel qu'elle se devait d'exer-
cer ce pouvoir. En 1990, dans l'affaire relativea la Sentence urhirrule c/zr
31 juiller 1989, la Cour a rejetéla demande de la République de Guinée-
Bissau au motif que les droits alléguésdont le demandeur voulait faire
l'objet des mesures conservatoires n'étaient pas l'objet de la procédure

sur le fond se déroulant devant la Cour.
Quand elle constate qu'il existe une base de compétence prima ,fucie,
cela ne conduit certes pas nécessairement la Cour à conclure que, finale-
ment, elle a compétence pour connaître de l'affaire. Dans l'affaire deInterhandel case, the Court, after granting provisional measures, ulti-
mately found that it had no jurisdiction to be seised of these cases.

27. In its past jurisprudence the Court has always found, as in those
cases mentioned above and in spite of its ultimately negative response to
the request for provisional measures, that there existed a prima facie
basis ofjurisdiction. There has been no previous case in which the Court
did not recognize evena prima facie basis ofjurisdiction, and the present
cases concerning Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal and the United Kingdom are the first in the Court's juris-

prudence in which the Court has dismissed a request for the indication of
provisional measures due to the lack of prima faciejurisdiction.

The Court's findings at this stage of the present cases that there is not
even a prima facie basis ofjurisdiction in al1eight of the cases mentioned
above should be interpreted as a ruling that it has no jurisdiction what-
soever to entertain the Applications, without leaving any room to retain
these cases and to deal with the issue of jurisdiction in the future.

28. In its Orders in the cases of Spain and the United States, the Court
finds that the cases against them should be removed from the General
List, as the Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction to entertain these two
Applications. The Court concludes, however, that it should remain seised
of the other eight cases on the ground that its finding that it lacks juris-
diction prima facie to entertain the respective Applications instituting
proceedings against Belgium,Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom in no way prejudges the ques-
tion of jurisdiction in those eight cases.
Itis my firm beliefthat, for al1the reasons given above concerning the

Court's lack ofjurisdiction under (i) Article 36,paragraph 2, of the Stat-
ute, (ii) the provisions of the instruments of 1930 and 1931 between
Yugoslavia and Belgium and the Netherlands, respectively, and (iii) the
provisions of the Genocide Convention. and due to my interpretation of
theCourt's finding concerning the lack of prima Faciebasis ofjurisdiction
in the eight cases, as stated in the last sentence of paragraph 27 of this
opinion, the Applications in not only the two cases but in al1ten cases
should be removed from the General List.

It would be contrary tojudicial propriety to make a distinction between
two groups of States, in what isessentially one casedealing with the same
subject throughout, solely because of the difference in attitudes taken by
the States towards the relevant documents which givethe Court jurisdic-
tion.
29. In conclusion 1 would like to express my sincere hope that the
present situation in the territory of Yugoslavia, in the settlement of which
the International Court of Justice as the principal judiciul organ of the LICEITEDE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. ODA) 796

I'Anglo-Irunian Oil CO., et dans celle de l'lntrrhandrl, la Cour, après
avoir accordé les mesures conservatoires demandées, a finalement conclu
qu'elle n'était pascompétente pour connaître de ces affaires.

27. Sa jurisprudence montre que la Cour a toujours estimé,comme ce
fut le cas dans les affaires rappelées ci-dessus et mêmequand elle répon-
dait finalement par la négative A la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires, qu'il existait pr.imu,fac.irune base de compétenceIln'y a
jamais eu de précédentdans lequel la Cour n'a pas mêmeadmis l'exis-
tence d'une base de compétence priinu ,/UC~Le Jt, les présentes affaires
concernant l'Allemagne, la Belgique, le Canada, la France, l'Italie, les

Pays-Bas. le Portugal et le Royaume-Uni sont les premières de sa juris-
prudence dans lesquelles la Cour aura rejetéune demande en indication
de mesures conservatoires faute de compétence prirnu ,fucir.
Cette conclusion de la Cour à ce stade-ci des présentesaffaires, suivant
laquelle il n'existe pas mêmeune base de compétence prima fucie dans les
huit affaires viséesci-dessus, doit être interprécomme revenant Adéci-

der qu'elle n'a aucune compétence pour connaître des requêtes,sans lui
laisser la moindre possibilitéde se pencher sur ces affaires et d'examiner
ultérieurement la question de sa compétence.
28. Dans les ordonnances qu'elle rend concernant l'Espagne et les
Etats-Unis, la Cour décideque les deux affaires doivent êtrerayéesdu
rôle, parce qu'elle n'a manifestement pas compétence pour en connaître.

La Cour n'en conclut pas moins qu'elle doit demeurer saisie des huit
autres affaires au motif que, en considérant qu'elle n'a pas compétence
prin~ufucie pour connaître des requêtes introductives d'instance contre
l'Allemagne, la Belgique. le Canada, la France, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas, le
Portugal et le Royaume-Uni, elle ne préjuge en rien la question de sa
compétence dans ces huit affaires.
Je suis pour ma part convaincu que, pour les motifs exposés ci-dessus,

indiquant que la Cour n'est pas compétente i) au titre de l'article 36,para-
graphe 2, du Statut, ni ii)au titre des dispositions des instruments de
1930 et de 1931 passésentre la Yougoslavie, d'une part et, de l'autre, la
Belgique et les Pays-Bas, ni iii) au titre des dispositions de la convention
sur le génocide, et compte tenu de l'interprétation que je donne de la
conclusion de la Cour concernant l'absence de juridiction prima ,fucie

dans les huit affaires en question, telle que je l'indique dans la dernière
phrase du paragraphe 27 ci-dessus de la présente opinion, ce n'est pas
seulement pour les deux affaires citéesmais pour la totalité d'entre elles,
les dix espèces,qu'il faudrait rayer l'affaire du rôle.
II serait contraire à la rigueur judiciaire de faire une distinction entre
deux groupes d'Etats alors qu'il s'agit essentiellement d'une seule affaire

portant chaque fois sur le mêmeobjet. uniquement parce que lesdits
Etats n'ont pas adopté la mêmeattitude en établissant les instrumentsqui
donnent compéten& à la Cour.
29. Pour conclure, je tiens à dire que j'espère sincèrementvoir la situa-
tion actuelle sur le territoire de la Yougoslavie, au règlement de laquelle
la Cour internationale de Justice en sa qualité d'organe judiciuire princi-United Nations has no role to play, will be resolved peacefully and in a
way that satisfies al1humanitarian aspects raised by this case.

(Signed) Shigeru ODA. LICÉITE DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (OP. IND. ODA) 797

pal des Nations Unies n'a aucun rôle à jouer, connaître une solution
pacifique, sous une forme qui réponde de façon satisfaisante toutes les
questions d'ordre humanitaire que la présenteaffaire soulève.

(Signé) Shigeru ODA

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Document Long Title

Separate opinion of Judge Oda

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