Declaration of Judge Vereshchetin

Document Number
112-19990602-ORD-01-03-EN
Parent Document Number
112-19990602-ORD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

DECLARATION OF JUDGE VERESHCHETlN

The extraordinary circumstances in which Yugoslavia made its request
for interim measures of protection imposed a need to react immediately.
TheCourt should have promptly expressed its profound concern over the
unfolding human misery, loss of life and serious violations of interna-
tional law which by the time of the request were already a matter of pub-

lic knowledge. It is unbecoming for the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, whose very raison d'êtreis the peaceful resolution of
international disputes, to maintain silence in such a situation. Even if
ultimately the Court may come to the conclusion that, due to constraints
in its Statute, it cannot indicate fully fledged provisional measures in
accordance with Article 41 of the Statute in relation to one or another of
the respondent States, the Court is inherently empowered, at the very

least, immediately to cal1 upon the Parties neither to aggravate nor to
extend the conflict and to act in accordance with their obligations under
the Charter of the United Nations. This power flows from its responsi-
bility for the safeguarding of internationallaw and from major consid-
erations of public order. Suçh an authoritative appeal by the "World
Court", which would also be consistent with Article 41 of its Statute and

Article 74.paragraph 4, and Article 75, paragraph 1, of its Rules, could
have a sobering effect on the Parties involved in the military conflict, un-
precedented in European history since the end of the Second World War.

The Court was urged to uphold the rule of law in the context of large-
scale gross violations of international law, including of the Charter of the
United Nations. Instead of acting expeditiously and, if necessary, proprio
mofu, in its capacity as "the principal guardian of international law", the
majority of the Court, more than one month after the requests were
made, rejected them in a sweeping way in relation to al1the cases brought
before the Court, including those where, in my view, the prima faciejuris-

diction of the Court could have been clearly established. Moreover, this
decision has been taken in a situation in which deliberate intensification
of bombardment of the most heavily populated areas is causing unabated
loss of life amongst non-combatants and physical and mental harm to the
population in al1parts of Yugoslavia.

For the foregoing reasons, 1 cannot concur with the inaction of the
Court in this matter, although 1concede that in some of the cases insti-tutedby the Applicant the basis of the Court's jurisdiction, at this stage
of the proceedings, is open to doubt, and in relation to Spain and the
United States is non-existent.

(Signed ) ladlen S. VERESHCHETIN.

Bilingual Content

DECLARATION OF JUDGE VERESHCHETlN

The extraordinary circumstances in which Yugoslavia made its request
for interim measures of protection imposed a need to react immediately.
TheCourt should have promptly expressed its profound concern over the
unfolding human misery, loss of life and serious violations of interna-
tional law which by the time of the request were already a matter of pub-

lic knowledge. It is unbecoming for the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, whose very raison d'êtreis the peaceful resolution of
international disputes, to maintain silence in such a situation. Even if
ultimately the Court may come to the conclusion that, due to constraints
in its Statute, it cannot indicate fully fledged provisional measures in
accordance with Article 41 of the Statute in relation to one or another of
the respondent States, the Court is inherently empowered, at the very

least, immediately to cal1 upon the Parties neither to aggravate nor to
extend the conflict and to act in accordance with their obligations under
the Charter of the United Nations. This power flows from its responsi-
bility for the safeguarding of internationallaw and from major consid-
erations of public order. Suçh an authoritative appeal by the "World
Court", which would also be consistent with Article 41 of its Statute and

Article 74.paragraph 4, and Article 75, paragraph 1, of its Rules, could
have a sobering effect on the Parties involved in the military conflict, un-
precedented in European history since the end of the Second World War.

The Court was urged to uphold the rule of law in the context of large-
scale gross violations of international law, including of the Charter of the
United Nations. Instead of acting expeditiously and, if necessary, proprio
mofu, in its capacity as "the principal guardian of international law", the
majority of the Court, more than one month after the requests were
made, rejected them in a sweeping way in relation to al1the cases brought
before the Court, including those where, in my view, the prima faciejuris-

diction of the Court could have been clearly established. Moreover, this
decision has been taken in a situation in which deliberate intensification
of bombardment of the most heavily populated areas is causing unabated
loss of life amongst non-combatants and physical and mental harm to the
population in al1parts of Yugoslavia.

For the foregoing reasons, 1 cannot concur with the inaction of the
Court in this matter, although 1concede that in some of the cases insti- Les circonstances extraordinaires dans lesquelles la Yougoslavie a
déposésa requêteen indication de mesures conservatoires imposaient de
réagir immédiatement, La Cour aurait dû aussitôt exprimer son inquié-

tude profonde face aux multiples drames humains, aux pertes en vies
humaines et aux violations graves du droit international qui, au moment
du dépôt de la requite, étaient d'ores et déjà du domaine public. Il est
inélégantde la part de l'organe judiciaire principal de l'organisation des
Nations Unies, dont la raison d'être même est de présider au règlement
pacifique des différends internationaux, de garder le silence en pareille

situation. Même si finalement, la Cour aboutit à la conclusion que, sous
l'effet de contraintes figurant dans son Statut, elle ne peut pas indiquer de
mesures conservatoires au sens plein, conformément à l'article 41 de ce
Statut, à l'égardde l'un ou l'autre des Etats défendeurs, la Cour est dotée
à tout le moins. par définition, du pouvoir d'en appeler immédiatement
aux parties pour qu'elles s'abstiennent d'aggraver ou d'étendre le conflit

et qu'elles respecteni: les obligations qui leur incombent en vertu de la
Charte des Nations Unies. Ce pouvoir découle de la responsabilité qui lui
a étéimpartie de pr'iserver le droit international et aussi de considéra-
tions primordiales d'ordre public. Cet appel. fort de l'autorité qui émane
de la «Cour mondiale)),compatible de surcroît avec l'article 41 de son
Statut et avec l'article 74,paragraphe 4 et l'article 75, paragraphe1, de

son Règlement, pourrait donner à réfléchiraux Parties à ce conflit mili-
taire, lequel est sans précédentdans l'histoire de l'Europe depuis la fin de
la seconde guerre mondiale.
La Cour a étépriéede défendre l'étatde droit face à des violations
flagrantes du droit international qui sont d'une portée considérablecar
elles atteignent aussi la Charte des Nations Unies. Au lieu d'agir avec
diligence et au besoin de sa propre initiative, en sa qualité de ((gardien

principal du droit international)), la majorité des membres de la Cour,
plus d'un moisaprès le dépôtdes requêtes,les a rejetéessans nuance pour
la totalité des affaire:; qui lui étaientsoumises. y compris celles où, à mon
avis. la compétence prinlu juciP de la Cour aurait pu êtretrès clairement
établie. En outre. cette décision a étéprise dans une situation dans
laquelle une intensification délibérée des bombardements des zones les

plus peuplées cause des pertes en vies humaines toujours aussi lourdes
chez les non-combaitants et cause également, physiquement et menta-
lement. des dommages à la population de toutes les régionsde Yougo-
slavie.
Pour les motifs ci-dessus, je ne peux pas m'associer à l'inaction de la
Cour en l'occurrence, mêmesi j'admets que. dans certaines des affairestutedby the Applicant the basis of the Court's jurisdiction, at this stage
of the proceedings, is open to doubt, and in relation to Spain and the
United States is non-existent.

(Signed ) ladlen S. VERESHCHETIN.introduites par le demandeurAce stade-ci de la procédure, la Cour n'est
peut-êtrepas compétente, et qu'elle ne l'est pas du tout dans le cas de
l'Espagne ni dans celui des Etats-Unis.

(Sign~;) VladlenS. VERESHCHETIN.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Declaration of Judge Vereshchetin

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