Declaration of Judge Shi

Document Number
112-19990602-ORD-01-01-EN
Parent Document Number
112-19990602-ORD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

DECLARATION OF JUDGE SHI

1am in agreement with the majority of the Court that, in the present
case, no basis of prima facie jurisdiction can be found for the indication

of provisional measures requested by the Applicant.
Nevertheless 1 am of the opinion that, being confronted with the
urgent situation of a human tragedy involving loss of life and suffering
which arises from the use of force in and against Yugoslavia, the Court
ought to have contributed to the maintenance of international peace and
security in so far as its judicial functions permit.
The Court would have been fully justified in point of law if, immedi-

ately upon receipt of the request by the Applicant for the indication of
provisional measures, and regardless of what might be its conclusion on
prima facie jurisdiction pending the final decision, it had issued a general
statement appealing to the Parties to act in compliance with their obliga-
tions under the Charter of the United Nations and al1other rules of inter-
national law relevant to the situation, including international humanitar-

ian law, and at least not to aggravate or extend their dispute. In my view,
nothing in the Statute or the Rules of Court prohibits the Court from so
acting. According to the Charter, the Court is after al1the principal judi-
cial organ of the United Nations, with its Statute as an integral part of
the Charter; and by virtue of the purposes and principles of the charter,
including Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), the Court has been

assigned a role within the general framework of the United Nations for
the maintenance of international peace and security. There is no doubt
that to issue such a general statement of appeal is within the implied
powers of the Court in the exercise of itsjudicial functions. Now that the
Court has made its final decision on the request by the Applicant, it has
failed to take an opportunity to make its due contribution to the main-
tenance of international peace and security when that is most needed.

Moreover, in his letter addressed to the President and the Members of
the Court, the Agent of Yugoslavia stated:

"Considering the power conferred upon the Court by Article 75,
paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court and having in mind the greatest
urgency caused by the circumstances described in the Requests for
provisional measure of protection 1 kindly ask the Court to decide

on the submitted Requestsproprio motu orto fix a date for a hearing
at earliest possible time."In the recent LaGrand case, the Court, at the request of the applicant
State and despite the objection of the respondent State, decided to make
use of itsabove-mentioned power under Article 75, paragraph 1, of the
Rules of Court without hearing the respondent State in either written or
oral form (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Order of
3 March 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, pp. 13and 14,paras. 12and 21). By
contrast, in the present case the Court failed to take any positive action
in response to the similar request made by the Agent of Yugoslavia in a
situation far more urgent even than that in the former case.
It is for these reasons th1tfelt compelled to vote against the operative
paragraph 40 (1) of the present Order.

(Signed) SHIJiuyong.

Bilingual Content

DECLARATION OF JUDGE SHI

1am in agreement with the majority of the Court that, in the present
case, no basis of prima facie jurisdiction can be found for the indication

of provisional measures requested by the Applicant.
Nevertheless 1 am of the opinion that, being confronted with the
urgent situation of a human tragedy involving loss of life and suffering
which arises from the use of force in and against Yugoslavia, the Court
ought to have contributed to the maintenance of international peace and
security in so far as its judicial functions permit.
The Court would have been fully justified in point of law if, immedi-

ately upon receipt of the request by the Applicant for the indication of
provisional measures, and regardless of what might be its conclusion on
prima facie jurisdiction pending the final decision, it had issued a general
statement appealing to the Parties to act in compliance with their obliga-
tions under the Charter of the United Nations and al1other rules of inter-
national law relevant to the situation, including international humanitar-

ian law, and at least not to aggravate or extend their dispute. In my view,
nothing in the Statute or the Rules of Court prohibits the Court from so
acting. According to the Charter, the Court is after al1the principal judi-
cial organ of the United Nations, with its Statute as an integral part of
the Charter; and by virtue of the purposes and principles of the charter,
including Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), the Court has been

assigned a role within the general framework of the United Nations for
the maintenance of international peace and security. There is no doubt
that to issue such a general statement of appeal is within the implied
powers of the Court in the exercise of itsjudicial functions. Now that the
Court has made its final decision on the request by the Applicant, it has
failed to take an opportunity to make its due contribution to the main-
tenance of international peace and security when that is most needed.

Moreover, in his letter addressed to the President and the Members of
the Court, the Agent of Yugoslavia stated:

"Considering the power conferred upon the Court by Article 75,
paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court and having in mind the greatest
urgency caused by the circumstances described in the Requests for
provisional measure of protection 1 kindly ask the Court to decide

on the submitted Requestsproprio motu orto fix a date for a hearing
at earliest possible time." IIÉCLARATION DE M. SHI

[Traduction]

Je me range aux côtésde la majorité de la Cour quand celle-ci estime
ne pas pouvoir trouver en l'espècede base de compétence prirnu,facie
pour indiquer les mesures conservatoires sollicitéespar le demandeur.
Je suis pourtant d'avis que, face à la situation d'urgence crééepar le

drame humain qu'expriment les pertes en vies humaines et les souffrances
causéespar l'emploi de la force en Yougoslavie et contre celle-ci, la Cour
aurait dû favoriser le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales
dans la mesure où ses fonctions judiciaires l'y autorisent.
L'action de la Cour aurait étépleinement justifiée en droit si, dès
qu'elle a étésaisie de la part du demandeur de sa requêteen indication de
mesures conservatoires, et indépendamment de son éventuelleconclusion

quant à sa compétenoi prin~ufucie dans l'attente de sa décision définitive,
elle avait lancé un appel de caractère généralaux Parties pour leur
demander d'agir conformément aux obligations leur incombant en vertu
de la Charte des Nai.ions Unies et de toutes les autres règles du droit
international intéressant la situation, y compris le droit international
humanitaire, et leur demander à tout le moins de s'abstenir d'aggraver ou
étendre leur différend. A mon sens. il n'y a rien dans le Statut ni dans le

Règlement de la Cour qui interdise à celle-ci d'agir de cette façon. Aux
termes de la Charte, la Cour est après tout le principal organe judiciaire
de l'organisation des Nations Unies. son Statut faisant partie intégrante
de la Charte; et, sous l'effet des buts et des principes de ladite Charte, y
compris son chapitre VI (relatif au règlement pacifique des différends), il
a étéattribué un rôle à la Cour dans le cadre généralde l'organisation
des Nations Unies aux fins du maintien de la paix et de la sécuritéinter-

nationales. Il ne fait aucun doute que l'appel de caractère généraldont je
parle relèveimplicitement des pouvoirs impartis à la Courdans l'exercice
de ses fonctions judiciaires. Ayant aujourd'hui statué définitivement sur
la requêtedu demandeur, la Cour n'a pas saisi l'occasion qui lui était
donnée d'apporter le (concoursqu'elle aurait dû au maintien de la paix et
de la sécuritéinternai.ionales au moment où ce concours est on ne peut

plus indispensable.
En outre, dans la lettre qu'il a adresséeau présidentet aux membres de
la Cour. l'agent de la Yougoslavie a dit ceci:
((Considérant le pouvoir conféréà la Cour aux termes du para-

graphe 1de l'articl5 de son Règlement, et compte tenu de l'extrême
urgence de la situation néedes circonstances décrites dans les de-
mandes en indicaiion de mesures conservatoires, je prie la Cour de bien
vouloir se prononcer d'office sur les demandes présentéesou de fixer
une date pour la tenue d'une audience dans les meilleurs délais.))In the recent LaGrand case, the Court, at the request of the applicant
State and despite the objection of the respondent State, decided to make
use of itsabove-mentioned power under Article 75, paragraph 1, of the
Rules of Court without hearing the respondent State in either written or
oral form (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Order of
3 March 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, pp. 13and 14,paras. 12and 21). By
contrast, in the present case the Court failed to take any positive action
in response to the similar request made by the Agent of Yugoslavia in a
situation far more urgent even than that in the former case.
It is for these reasons th1tfelt compelled to vote against the operative
paragraph 40 (1) of the present Order.

(Signed) SHIJiuyong. LICÉITÉ DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE (DÉCL. SHI) 776

Dans une affaire très récente, l'affaiL~iGrand, la Cour, sur la requête

de 1'Etat demandeur et en dépit des objections de I'Etat défendeur, a
décidé d'exercerle pouvoir qui lui est ainsi conférépar le paragrap1ede
l'articl75 de son Règlement sans entendre 1'Etat défendeur, ni par écrit
ni oralement (orrlonri'uncrdu 3mm 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 13,
par. 12, et p. 14,pair. 21). Par opposition, en l'espèce. laCour n'a eu
aucun geste positifà la suite de la requêtesimilaire formuléepar l'agent

de la Yougoslavie dans une situation dont le caractère d'urgence était
mêmebeaucoup plus prononcé que dans l'exemple que je cite.
Ce sont ces motifs qui m'ont obligéà voter contre le paragraphe 1du
dispositif de la présente ordonnance.

(Signé) SHI Jiuyong.

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Document Long Title

Declaration of Judge Shi

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