Dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN

The ad hoc chamber system established in 1945by Article 26, para-
graph 2,ofthe Statute ofthe Court isavaluable one. 1make it clearatthe
outsetthat the burden ofthisdissentingopinion isconcernednot withthe
systemassoestablished,but onlywithcertainrelatedproceduralarrange-
ments adopted in 1972and first utilized in 1982.In my view,the Nicara-
guan Application arises from, and illustrates, the existence of certain
problems in these procedural arrangements. If these problems are
resolved, itwillbe possibleforthe ad hoc chamber systemto exercisethe
authority oftheCourt morecrediblyand more convincingly than itcan at
the moment, and so more effectivelyfulfil the expectations alike of the
founders of the system as of States which have recourse to it, including

Stateswishingto exercisetheirright under the Statuteto applyforpermis-
sion to intervenein casespendingbefore such a chamber. To what prob-
lemsam 1then referring?
Judged objectivelyand by universally acceptedjudicial standards,the
selection of its members having been substantiallydetermined or influ-
enced by the Parties under the procedural arrangementsreferred to, the
Chamber in this case cannot, in my respectful view, dischargethe func-
tions of the International Court of Justice, in its character as a court of
justice,inrelation to an application byanon-partyforpermission tointer-
vene in the casepending before it. Byitself disclaimingjurisdiction and
instead leavingtheApplicant withnorecourse excepttothe Chamber,the
Court effectivelydenies the Applicant its right to have its Application
under Article 62ofthe Statutejudicially determinedin the ordinary way.
If, as 1consider,this isthe reality,the legalityof the arrangements which
produce so seeminglyunacceptable a result would appearto be squarely
in issue, with important questions unavoidably arising as to thefunda-
mental nature of the Court itself and itsrelationship with its chambers. 1
have given carefulthought to the possibility of discovering some way of

reconciling my thinking on these matters with the position taken by the
Court in the Order made by ittoday. It is withmuch regret, courtesy and
respect that 1find that 1have the misfortune to conclude that the existing
procedural arrangementsfor forming ad hoc chambers are not valid, but
that, if they are, Nicaragua's Application for permission to intervene
should havebeenheard and determined bythe fullCourt. Myreasonsfor
soholdingare givenin Parts 1to VIasto the firstpoint, and in Part VI1as
to the second. TheCourt'sDilemma

Thefinding ofthe Courtthat it isforthe Chamber to deal with Nicara-
gua'sApplication isbased essentiallyontheground that the Chamber was
formed to deal with the particular case and must also deal with proceed-
ingsincidentalto it. In the normal case,1would agree. But,in the circum-
stancesofthis case,isthe decision aslogicalastheCourt suggests?Under
the Court's own Rules, as amended in 1972and revised in 1978,apart
from two of the five members of the Chamber being ad hocjudges
appointed as of right by the existing Parties, the remaining three were
elected by the full Court to the Chamber after the Court had taken into

account the views ofthe existing Parties as to the particular Members of
theCourt who shouldbeso elected.Whetheritisinfactso ornot - and it
is the Court which knows best - the Applicant is entitled to, and, as
appears from its Application and written arguments, clearly does, enter-
tain a reasonable apprehension that the three Members so elected were
electedin conformitywiththe expressedwishesofthe existingParties. In
substance,therefore,theApplicant isbeingtold bythe Court thatithas no
optionbut to submitto a Chamber al1of whosefivemembersitisreason-
ably entitled to feel have been practically hand-picked by the existing
Parties. Conceivably,Nicaragua mayneverthelessaccept that option and
goto the Chamber, and, if it does so,itsApplication may conceivablybe
granted bythe Chamber. However,this possibilitycannot affectthe legal
situation, as 1seeit.For it isnot difficult to seewhyNicaragua has not so
fargoneto the Chamber and whyithasinfact cometo thefullCourt - an

attitude whichisin itselfthe firstpracticalillustration ofhowfar an inter-
ested non-party State is likely to regard such a chamber as a legitimate
manifestation of the Court. When its presentation is fairlyread, Nicara-
gua obviously takes the viewthat the Chamber, as it stands, cannot dis-
chargethe functions ofthe International Court ofJustice,considered asa
court ofjustice, in relationto itself.That that isthe central issue,inescap-
ablypresented, seemsplain to me.Withoutfirstdealing with that issue,it
is,in myview,logicallyimpossibleto make an intelligentappreciation of
the problemsraised by Nicaragua's Application.

1have neverthelessasked myselfwhether it could persuasivelybe said
that thisisnot theappropriate momentto considerthe matter. However,if
it is not, have difficultyin seeing what moment will be appropriate so
long as the system continues to operate. On the other hand, should the

system cease to operate, it could hardly then bejudicially appropriateto
consider the matter: it would have become academic. Passivity at this
stage is not a guarantee against the occurrence of other and possibly
graverproblems yetto come,fortheimplications ofthe newsystemcut so
deep and run so wide as inevitably to surface one day or another as an
issuedemandingnot to be ignored. 1believethat dayhas come.To failtoconsider the matter now would be but sad proof ofthe common observa-
tion that an innovation,onceallowed,gathersmomentum which progres-
sively subdues any inclination to inquire, sometimes to the point of
producing misgiving that the very assertion of a right to do so might
be receivedwith surprise and disbelief. Often,indeed, it is the law which
reconciles itselfto reality. Still, casesmay arise in which that reconcilia-
tion cannot be made - cases, for example, in which the application by
the Court of a text taken at its received face value yields a result so
deeply offensiveto basal noms ofjustice asto make itimpossiblefor the
Court responsiblyto avert itsgazefromthe necessityto examinethe foun-
dations of the systemwhich leads to that result. It seemsto me that here
issuch a case.

In a highlyregardedstatementthe Court somethree decades agoenun-
ciated the reassuring and important principle that the "Court itself, and
not the parties, must be the guardian of the Court's judicial integrity"
(Northem Cameroons,Z.C.J.Reports1963,p. 29).If, as 1believe,this was

not merejudicial rhetoric, that duty rests throughout with the Court and
must be discharged by itwhetherornot invoked by aparty (LegalConse-
quencesfor States of the ContinuedPresenceof South Africain Namibia
(SouthWestAfrica)notwithstandingSecuritC youncilResolution 276(1970),
Z.C.J.Reports 1971,p. 323,per Judge Gros, dissenting). No doubt, the
Court is not required gratuitously to examine problems which are not
fairlyraised bythe circumstances of a case.But 1cannotthink that that is
the situation here.

The problem in this case is, of course, of an institutional character:
statemostdistinctly that ithasnothing whateverto dowiththe integrityof
the very distinguished members of the Chamber. However, it does have
everythingto do with fundamental concepts ofjustice. Theleading prin-
ciple, and its applicabilityto this Court, are not, 1think, in doubt. It was
citedbyJudge Lachsin an admirable reassessmentof his earlierstand on
the questionwhether an applicantforpermission tointerveneshould have
been heard evenifitsapplication was inadmissible.As he recalled, "It is,
after all,'offundamentalimportance thatjustice shouldnot onlybe done,

but should manifestlyand undoubtedlybe seentobe done'(Lord Hewart
in TheKingv. Sussex Justices,ex parte McCarthy,1K.B. [1924],pp. 256
and 259)" (Militaryand Paramilitary Activitiesin and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. UnitedStates ofAmerica)(Z.C.J.Reports1986,p. 171).That
principle goes tothe root of the claim of the Court to be considered as a
court ofjustice. Thisbeing so,the duty ofthe Court, asthe avowedguard-
ian of its own integrity, to consider the implications of that principle in
this case does not depend on whetherthe principle has been specifically
invoked by the Applicant: it depends on whether it is presented by the
facts themselves.1think it is.As it happens, however,the concern of the
Applicant on the point isapparent both fromitsApplication and from itswrittenarguments aspresented inthe lettertothe RegistrarfromitsAgent
of 1 February 1990 : the Applicant clearlyconsiders - and thisindeed is
the heart of itscontention - that the methods bywhichthe Chamber has
been formed do not allowitto function as a court ofjustice in relation to
the Applicant's case.

Thevice,then, in whichthe Court isheld isthis. Regardlessofultimate
results,the Applicant has aright under Article62ofthe Court's Statuteto
applyforpermission tointervene.However,whileclosingitsowndoorsto
the Applicant, the full Court is unable, in my view,to indicate anyjudi-
cially acceptable alternative forum to which the Applicant may turn. In
consequence,theApplicant iseffectivelydenieditsright to haveitsAppli-
cationforpermission to intervenejudicially considered.

If, as1think,this isthe dilemma in whichthe Court is caught, 1amnot
ableto seehow it couldbepossible to avoid examiningthe legalityofthe
arrangementsfrom which that dilemma Springs l.The line betweenjudi-
cial restraint and judicial abdication has to be observed if a judge'sjudi-
cialmissionisto befulfilled.For myself,1fear itwouldbeatransgression
ofthat lineto remain silent onthe point.Thejustice ofthe caseleavesme

no defensiblewayin which 1can avoid dealing with it. 1proceed accord-
ingly to consider it below. 1 am conscious of the length of that which
ensues and can only hope that the importance of the matter furnishes
somejustification.

Theissuehas been the subjectofindividuai statements,made mostlyoutofCourt,
bya numberofpast and presentMembersofthe Court, and from these1havebenefited
greatlyand gratefully.SeeJudges Oda, Morozovand El Khani in the case concerning
Delimitationof the MaritimeBoundaryin the Gulfof MaineAera, I.C.J. Reports 1982,
pp. 10,ll and 13respectively;Eduardo JiménezdeAréchaga,"TheArnendmentstothe
Rulesof Procedureofthe International Court of Justice",AmericanJournalofInterna-
tionalLaw, 1973,Vol. 67,p. 1;B. A.S.Petrén,"SomeThoughts on the Future of the
International Court ofJustice", NetherlandsYearbookofnternationalLaw,1975,Vol.6,
la Cour internationale de Justice", Société françapour le droit international, Col-
loaue de Lyon,Lajuridictioninternationaleoermanente.Paris, Pedone. 198DV. 73-78:
~Ôhammëd ~edjaoui,"Universalismeetrégionalismeauseindelacour internationale
deJustice:Laconstitutiondechambresad hoc".LiberAmicornm.ColeccibndeEstudios
JuridicosenHomenajealPro$Dr.D.JoséPérez~ontero, Universidadde Oviedo,1988,
p. 155;Stephen M.Schwebel,"AdHocChambersofthe InternationalCourt ofJustice",
Ârnerican journal ofinternationaLlaw. 1987.Vol. 81.o. 831: Stevhen M. Schwebel.
"Chambers of the international Courtof ~uitice~o&d for'~artkular Cases", in Y:
Dinstein(ed.1.InternationalLawata TimeofPemlexitv.1989. D.739:ShigeruOda."Fur-
therThoGgh&ontheChambers Procedurebfthé~ntérhationâc lourt of~ustice",'~mer-
icanJournal ofInternationalLaw,1988,Vol.82, p.556;T.O.Elias, ne UnitedNations
Charterandthe WorldCourt,Lagos,1989,pp. 16and203ff.;andHermann Mosler,"The
Experience",in Dinstein, op.cit.,p. 449.ofJustice :Evaluationafter FiveYearsof TheIssues

Theprincipal point concernsthe operation of Article 17,paragraph 2,
of the 1978Rules of Court, which requires the President of the Court to
ascertain and report to the Court the views ofthe parties regardingthe
composition ofan ad hocchamberbefore theCourt electsMembersofthe
Courtto bemembersofthe chamberto heartheparticular case.Itisnotin
questionthat, asNicaraguahaspointedlyrecalled, the intention wasthat,
in those views,the parties wereto be freeto indicate "exactlywhich indi-
vidual judges they desire on the Bench for that case" (Edvard Hambro,
"Willthe Revised Rules ofCourt Leadto Greater Willingnesson the Part
ofProspectiveClients?", in LeoGross(ed.), ne FutureoftheInternational
CourtofJustice,1976,Vol.1,p. 368,citedinthe letterto the Registrarfrom

the AgentforNicaragua of 1February 1990).Doesthisarrangement open
the doorto an invasionbytheparties oftheproperprovince ofthe Court?

The available material shows beyond doubt that the framing of Ar-
ticle 17,paragraph 2,of the Rules of Court 1978(in substanceArticle 26,
paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court as amended in 1972) wasmotivated
by a desire "to accord tothe parties", in the words of one of itsprincipal
architects, "a decisiveinfluence in the composition of ad hocChambers"
(Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, loc. cit., p. 2; and see ibid., p. 21).
Theinterestingmechanics employedinthe caseconcerningDelimitationof
theMaritime Boundaryin the Gulfof MaineArea,Constitutionof Chamber
(I.C.J.Reports1982,p. 3)onlyservedto highlightthe lengthsto whichthis
purpose could go. In that case,the parties made it unmistakablyclear to
the Courtthat thelitigationwouldnot proceed unlessthe selection,aswell

as the timing of the selection, of members of the chamber conformed in
every material detail to their expressedwishes.And the Court did exactly
as was required. It is scarcelyworthwhileto seekto put a glosson this as
being other than the practical result ofthe plainlypromulgated will ofthe
parties. 1sthis speculation? Here is the declarationmade by Judge Oda:

"While 1voted in favour of the Order, it should in my view have
beenmadeknown thatthe Court,forreasonsbest knownto itself,has ,
approved the composition of the Chamber entirely in accordance
with the latest wishes of the Parties as ascertained pursuant to Ar-
ticle 26,paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 17,paragraph 2, of
the Rules of Court." (Ibid.,p. 10.)

The choice of language employed in Article 26, paragraph 1, of the
RulesofCourt 1972mighthaveled,onthe onehand, to someobscuring of
the possibilityofthe newprovision beingpressedto the extentto whichit
was later pressedinthe GulfofMainecase,and might, on the other hand,
havebeenthoughtto leaveopen the possibilityofan answeringargument
that notification ofthe views ofthe partiestothe Court stillleftthe Courtwiththefinal Sayon selectionofpersonnel,asindeeditdid :the Court can
electjudges other than those proposed by the parties. But, to adopt the

words of Judge Gros, an approach of this kind may not unfairly be
regardedas restingonthe "supposition that words canbeusedto suppress
aproblemrather than dealwithit" (DelimitationoftheMaritimeBoundaty
in the GulfofMaineArea,I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 368).Delicacyin legisla-
tiveformulationcouldnot reallyconcealthe fact that one wayor another
the parties werebeing concededa substantial, ifnot indeed a "decisive",
Sayin the selection ofparticular judges, for it couldnot be supposed that
they were being accorded a right to express viewswhich the Court was
free entirelyto disregard.Judge Jiménezde Aréchaga'sstatements leave
no room for doubt on the point. Neither do those of Judge Petrén
(B. A. S.Petrén,loc.cit.,p. 64).
Leaving aside the question of effective dictation, the question which
arises - and it is desired to emphasize that this is the question - is

whether the new Rules could, consistently with the Statute of the Court
and the Charter of the United Nations, confer on the parties to a case a
right to influencethe election ofregular Membersofthe Courtto siton an
ad hoc chamber of the Court to hear and determine that particular case.
Foritispossibletograntthe goodfaith of,and evento commend - as1do
- theintention to promote the useofthe Court, whilerespectfullyasking
whether the stepstaken in pursuance ofthat intentionresulted in the cre-
ation ofabodydifferentfromanychamberauthorizedbythe Statute.True,
as was obsemed in 1972by the then President of the Court, "there is
nothing sacrosanct about the International Court of Justice itself in its
present form and structure" (President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan,
speaking on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the World Court,
I.C.J.Yearbook1971-1972p ,. 139).Ashenoted, withinthe Court's Statute
provisionalready existed,though not up to then utilized, forthe appoint-

ment ofad hocchambers.Clearly,however,ifsomethingwastobedoneto
encourageuse of that mechanism, it would be necessaryto bear in mind
that, whilethere mightbe nothing sacrosanctabout the Court itself in its
then form and structure,ifthat form and structure wereinconsequenceto
be changed,the prescribed procedure for effectingthe changeshouldbe
employed.

In addition to the foregoingquestion of constitutionality,asecond and
a third questionconsequentiallyarise.The secondquestionconcernsthe
validityoftheamended RulesofCourt insofarastheyseekto giveajudge
electedto an ad hocchamberatenure whichisgreaterthan that ofajudge
not so elected. The third question concerns the power of the Court to
reverseitsprevious decisionson the right ofparties to influencethe com-

position of ad hocchambers, and to discontinue the practice which those
decisionsinitiated.Thefirstquestion is examinedin Parts II and III. The
second and third questionsare examined in Parts IV and Vrespectively.
Part VI sets out the general conclusions as to the status of the existing
arrangementsrelating to ad hocchambers. Part VI1considersthe Nicara-guan Application on the assumption that the existingChamber isvalidly

constituted.

LimitsoftheCourt'sRule-Making Power

In a general sense, the matter turns on the limits of the rule-making

power of the Court, and this aspect may accordingly be taken up in this
PreliminaryPart. Article30,paragraph 1,ofthe Statutereads :"TheCourt
shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay
downrulesofprocedure." Changesmade in 1945intheEnglish textofthe
correspondingprovision ofthe Rulesof Court ofthe Permanent Court of
InternationalJustice wereonlyintended to bringit into harmony withthe
previous French version (see Manley O. Hudson, "The Twenty-Fourth
Year of the World Court", AmericanJournalof ZnternationalLaw, 1946,
Vol. 40,p.28;and P.C.Z.J.S , eriesD,ThirdAddendumtoNo.2,report bySir
Cecil Hurst, p. 758).Accordingly, recourse may be had to the learning
relatingto the earlierprovisionin elucidatingthe meaning ofthe existing
provision. Asamatter ofnecessity,the power conferred bytheearlierpro-
visionwas used to fil1certain lacunae in the Statute (Manley O. Hudson,
ThePermanentCourtof InternationalJustice1,920-1942,New York, 1943,
p. 275).It couldalso coverquestions of interna1organization ofthe Court
(ibid.,p. 270).And, no doubt, within anyapplicablelimitations,the Court
was freeto determinethe content of its Rules. It is not in issue, however,
that -

"[tlhe chief object with which rules of procedure are made is to
inform those whoare responsibleforthe conduct ofa casebeforethe
Court what stepshave to be taken, and when and how, for the pur-
pose of submittingthat caseto the decision ofthe Court" (report by
SirCecil Hurst, loc.cit.).

It seemssafe to assumethat, as regards ad hocchambers,the existing
Statuteleftno lacunae whichmightrequireremedial exercise,on grounds
of necessity,ofthe rule-makingpower of the Court. In this case,nothing
was being filled in: something was being changed. Previouslythe selec-
tion ofservingjudges tobe membersofan adhocchamber rested withthe

Courtto thestrict exclusionofthe parties.That wasundoubtedlythe legal
position. Anditwasaposition whichinvolvedno gapswaitingtobe filled
before the established mechanism could legallyfunction (see René-Jean
Dupuy, "La réformedu Règlementdela Courinternationale de Justice",
Annuairefrançais de droit international,1972,Vol. XVIII, p. 270).What
wasundertaken in 1972wasamodification ofthat mechanismwithaview
to making it more attractive to potential users. That did not involve the
filling in of any legal lacuna. Nor could it be said that the change made
couldbejustified as an exerciseofthe rule-makingpower ofthe Court inrelation to matters of its internal organization.That power, as generally
understood, doesnotcomprehend powerto conferrights on external enti-
ties overthe Court's internal organization.Theresidual question then is
whether the change could be justified as an exercise of the rule-making
power in relation to litigationprocedure.
Tothe question thus stated, the answer seemsplainly "No". Neverthe-
less,it isproposed to examinethe question,first,fromthepoint of view of
consistencyofthecharacter ofan adhocchamber, asmodified bythe new
Rules, with the substantive character of the Court as visualized by the
Charterand laid down bythe Statute, and, second and more specifically,
fromthepoint of viewofconsistencyofthenewRuleswiththecontrolling
provisions ofArticle 26 of the Statute. These two areas are dealt with in
Parts II and III respectively.

PART II. CONSISTENCY OF THECHARACTE OR AD HOCCHAMBERS
AS MODIFIE DYTHE NEWRULES WITH
THE CHARACTE OFRTHE COURT

The single most important question in this matter is to what extent, if
any,didthe constitution oftheCourt visualizethat parties to a casecould
haveanyinfluenceindetermining whichMembersoftheCourt should sit
in that case.understandable predisposition to assumea generalright
to exertsome such influence is observable in the case of an international
tribunal, as distinguished from a municipal court; and thatdisposi-
tion, in a measure, probably underlies attitudes favourable tonewe
arrangements. Butthe precise answerto the questionposed in the case of
thisparticular Court must turn,elieve,onthe exactjuridical character

ofthe Court and, by extension,ofitschambers. In thisrespect,eemsto
methat theessentialdistinction isthat alluded to byNicaraguainits refer-
ence to "the institutional conception of the Court as ajudicial -rgan
and not one of arbitrati..."(letterto the Registrar fromthe Agent for
Nicaragua, 1February 1990).1believethat distinction can bear retracing
and emphasis.

Thatthe Court isa court ofjustice isobvious.Yetit maybe that in that
very obviousnesslurksa danger that therima1considerations involved
maybe taken for granted.So it isproposed to revisitbriefly the historical
character ofthe Court, not only with theect ofregaininga feelfor the
real nature ofthe Court,but also with a viewto determiningwhetherthe
originalconceptstillhasvalidity,and, ifithas,what arethe limitsoftoler-

ablederogationsfromthe nom. It isparticularly importantto do thisfor
the reasonthat, althoughitwouldbe wrongto viewan international court
of justice as if it were abon copy of a municipal court of justice, it
would be equally misleading to suppose that there is a total absence of DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAISSO.P.SHAHABUDDEEN)
26

analogy in respect of the basic elements of the concept of a court of
justice.
The well-worn distinction between an arbitral tribunal and a court of
justice neednotberecited (see interaliaJames BrownScott, TheStatusof
the InternationalCourt ofJustice, 1916,p. 24). There was, indeed, some
earlyconcem withthe questionwhetherthe Permanent Court of Intema-
tional Justicecouldbe regardedas an arbitralbody ifit was competent to
adjudicate on purely political disputes as distinguished from legal dis-
putes involving political features (see Secretariat of the League of
Nations,"Memorandumonthe DifferentQuestions ArisinginConnection
with the Establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
Appendix", set out in PermanentCourt ofInternational JusticeA , dvisory

Committeeof Jurists,Documents Presentedto the CommitteeRelatingto
ExistingPlansfor theEstablishmentofa PermanentCourtofInternational
Justice,1920,p. 115).But that possibility does not appear to have been
seriouslypursued and neednot detain inquiry:the Court doesnot regard
itself as competent to decide questionsnot governed by legal principles
(see interaliaJudge Kellogg'sobservationsinthe caseofthe FreeZonesof
UpperSavoy andtheDistrictofGex,P.C.Z.J., SeriesA,No.24,pp. 29-34;the
CertainNorwegianLaanscase,I.C.J.Reports19.57p ,. 66,perJudge Lauter-
pacht; and the case concerning Borderand TransborderAnned Actions
(Nicaragua v. Honduras),I.C.J.Reports1988,p. 91,para. 52).The whole
evolution of thethinking leading to the creation of the Permanent Court
discloseda settledintention to create a court ofjustice in the sense gen-
erallyunderstood in municipal law.Aprincipal feature of the new body
was that itsjudicial personnel wereto be preordained :unlike an arbitral

body,particular judges werenottobeselectedbythe partiesforparticular
cases.

In one way or another this important point was repeatedlyhammered
home. Its essentials were to be found in the justly famous instructions
issued by Secretaryof StateElihuRootto the United Statesdelegation to
the 1907HagueConference (seeSecretaryof StateElihuRoot to Mr.J. H.
Choate and others,in James Brown Scott(ed.), Instructionsto theAmeri-
canDelegatesto theHaguePeaceConferencesand TheirOfficialReports,
1916,pp. 79-80.Theinstructions werequoted in part by Judge Kelloggin
the case of the FreeZonesof UpperSavoyand theDistrictof Gex,loc.cit.,
pp. 36-37).Theprinciple was affirmedinthe course ofthe proceedings of
the AdvisoryCommitteeofJurists, 1920.TheCommittee clearlyaccepted

the understanding of the League of Nations Secretariat that the new
Court, asvisualizedby Article 14of the Covenant,would "be a Court of
Justice in the technical and restrictedmeaning of theterm. Its character
would be similar ...tothat ofthe Courts ofJustice ofthe different coun-
tries" ("Note onthe Nature ofthe New Permanent Court of International
Justice", in Documents,op. cit.,p. 113;and see, ibid.,p. 7).The continu-
ance of the Permanent Court of Arbitration side by side with the newCourt - and indeed in the same building, as is still the case - was
regardedasconfirmatory of "the conclusion thatthe new Court willbe in
principle a Court ofJustice" (Documents,op.cit.,p. 115).The coexistence
ofthePermanent Court ofInternationalJustice withthe Permanent Court
of Arbitration and othertribunals of arbitration wasexpresslyrecognized
in Article 1ofthe Statute ofthe Court reading:

"This Court shallbe in addition to the Court ofArbitration organ-
ized by the Conventions of The Hague of 1899and 1907,and to the
specialTribunals of Arbitration to which Statesare alwaysatliberty
to submittheir disputesfor settlement."

Partiescould alwaysgoto arbitration. Now,on apotentially globalbasis,
theywerebeinggivenachoicebetweenthat and anewpieceofmachinery
- a court of justice (see also B. C. J. Loder, "The Permanent Court of
International Justice", in Report of the Twenty-NinthConferenceof the
International LawAssociation,London, 1920,p. 148).

M. Léon Bourgeois,the distinguished and learned delegate of the
Council ofthe LeagueofNations,alluded totheseideaswhen,addressing
the inaugural meeting of the Committee of Jurists on 16June 1920,he
said:

"The Court of Justice must be a true Permanent Court. It is not
simply a question of arbitrators chosen on a particular occasion, in
the case of conflict,by the interested parties; it is a smallnumber of
judges Sittingconstantly and receiving a mandate the duration of
whichwill enablethe establishment of arealjurisprudence, who will
administer justice. This permanence is a symbol. It will be a seat
raised inthe midst ofthe nations, wherejudges are alwayspresent,to
whom can alwaysbe brought the appeal of the weak and to whom
protests againstthe violation of right can be addressed. Chosen not

byreason ofthe Stateofwhichtheyare citizens,but byreason oftheir
persona1authority, oftheir past career, ofthe respect which attaches
to theirnames known overthe whole world, thesejudges willrepre-
sent a ti-ulyinternationalspirit whichisbyno means,as somepeople
pretend, a negation of the legitimate interests of each nation, but
which is,on the contrary,the safeguard of these interests,within the
very limits of their legitimacy." (Permanent Court of International
Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbauxof the Pro-
ceedingsofthe CommitteeJ ,une 16th-July24th1920,withAnnexes,The
Hague, 1920,pp. 7-8.)

The Report of the 1920Advisory Committee of Jurists in turn stated: "In the Court of Arbitration,it falls to the parties to choosetheir
judges, afterthe commencement of the dispute; whereas in the case
ofthe Permanent Court of International Justice,the contesting part-
iesnolongerhavethe choiceofthejudges." ("Report ofthe Advisory
Committee of Jurists", Annex No. 1to the Procès-Verbauxo , p. cit.,
p. 695.)

Then, after referring (p. 696) to M. Bourgeois's opening speech, the
Report added :
"In contradistinction to the Court of Arbitration,the Permanent
Court of International Justice will really deserve its name, as it will
consist ofjudges, who will continue to sitfrom one caseto another;

the parties will not have to choosethem for this purpose, and with
one exception, whichwillbedealt with laterin connection withsum-
maryprocedure,theparties maynotfixthenumberofjudges." (Zbid.,
p. 698.)
The exception seeminglyreferred to draft Article 26 of the Statute read-
ing :

"With a view to the speedy despatch of business the Court shall
form, annually, a chamber composed of three judges who, at the
request of the contestingparties, may hear and determine cases by
summaryprocedure." (Ibid.,p. 719.)

Theparties couldfixthe number ofjudges only inthe senseof optingfor
thischamber with itsprefixed membership ofthree.

How was al1of this understood when the new Court was eventually
established? Addressing the Court on 15February 1922on the occasion
of its officia1opening, the Dutch Foreign Minister, M. Van Karnebeek,
said :

"Your responsibility is the greater because the States, who will
have recourse to you for justice, will have renounced the right of
freelychoosingtheir judges, an outstandingfeature of the systemof
arbitration which exists side by side with you under this roof."
(P.C.I.J.,SeriesD,No. 2,p. 322.)

To which PresidentLoderagreeablyreplied :
"Thejurisdiction ofthis Court differsfromarbitration.The judges
arenolonger to benominated bytheparties. Theyformapermanent
Court.
The procedure has no longerto be framed; it is laid down in the

Statute and in the Rules of Procedure.
Thetwoinstitutions exist sideby side; eachfulfils itsspecialduty ;
eachpossessesitsownsphere ofaction;both livepeacefullytogether
in thissamebuilding, like an older and a younger sister. 1sthe younger organisation perfect ?Willits Statute never require
amendment? Nothing isperfect inthe hour ofitsbirth. Here alsothe
law of evolution will make itself felt." (P.C.I.J.Series D, No. 2,
pp. 329-330.)
Sothe structure ofthe institutioncouldbe changed and might need to be
changed. But, meanwhile, its character was that of a court ofjustice as
ordinarily understood. In the light of that character, it is not difficult to
imagine what might have been President Loder's reaction to a change
soughtto bebroughtabout byan amendment to the RulesofCourtfor the

purpose of giving the parties "a decisive influence" in the selection of
regular judges of the Court to sit on a chamber established under its
Statute, evenas recast forthe present Court in 1945.

This aspect may be summed up with these observations of Judge Kel-
loggin the case concerningthe FreeZones ofUpperSavoy andtheDistrict
of Gex:
"It is evident from a consideration of the circumstances which
called for the creation of this Court and the history of its organiza-
tion, as well as from a careful examination of the Court's Statute,
framed by aspecialcommittee ofjurists appointed bythe Council of
the League of Nations, that this tribunal is a Court ofjustice asthat

term is known and understood in the jurisprudence of civilized
nations." (P.C.I.J.,SerieA, No.24,p. 33.)
The idea that the Court was a court of justice in contradistinction to
being an arbitralbodyformedthe ground of opposition to two important
features, namely, that relating to chambers and that relating to ad hoc
judges. Although in both cases the desired provisions were made, the
material leaveslittleroomfor doubtthatthe basicjudicialcharacter ofthe
Court wasintended to prevailthroughout itsarrangements and function-
ing, Savein respect of variations clearly authorized by the Statute itself.

Asregards the idea of chambers,speaking in the Advisory Committee
ofJurists in 1920,Lord Phillimore framed his opposition this way:

"The idea of 1907to divide the Court into chambers,also is too
closelybound to the idea of arbitration,sincethese chambers would
be formed incasu.The Court must sit inplenoto be a real Court of
Justice... the number of judges was of secondary importance;the
essentialthing was that as far as possiblel1judges should sit at the
sametime." (Procès-Verbaux,op.cit.,1920,p. 175.)
Referring to the proceedings of the 1920Committee,Judge Hudson later
wrote:

"No basis for excludingsome members of the Court from Sitting
wasfound, and asthe debate progressed the 1920Committee ofJur-
istscametotheviewthat theunity ofthe Court required that itshould alwayssitinpleno;its proposa1tothis effectwasembodied inthe text
as adopted." (Hudson, ThePermanent CourtofInternationalJustice,
1943,pp. 173-174.)
The establishment of chambers was conceded as an exception to this

primary rule. Aswas noted by Lord Finlay,Article 25ofthe Statute .
"laid down that the full Court should sit except when expressly
provided otherwise. These exceptions were specially dealt with in
Articles 26 and 27 of the Statute" (P.C.I.J., SeriesD, No. 2, 11Feb-
ruary 1922,p. 28).

He accepted that the "Statute shouldbe interpreted broadly", but would
scarcelyhavethoughtthisasufficientwarrantfor theCourtto actthrough
chamberscomposed otherwisethan asexpresslyauthorized bythe Statute
itself.
Inthisconnection,apoint ofsome interestisthat, whereasArticle25of
the 1920Statute read, "The full Court shall sitexceptwhen it isexpressly
provided otherwise", Article 25 of the present Statute, while retaining

those words,prudentiallyadded thewords, "in thepresent Statute" (Doc-
uments of the UnitedNations Conferenceon International Organization,
San Francisco, 1945,Vol. XVII, p. 412, Sixth Meeting of the Advisory
Committee ofJurists, 12June 1945).The officia1records do not showthe
reasonforthe change,whichJudgeHudson wasprobablyrightin charac-
terizing as "merely stylistic" (Manley O. Hudson, "The Twenty-Fourth
Year of the World Court", AmericanJournal ofInternational Law, 1946,
Vol. 40, pp. 24-25).But, while no change of substance was involved, it
would seem clear that the stylistic change made was inspired by the
thought of bringing out and emphasizing an original principle of pre-
eminentimportance, namely, that exceptions to the general rule that the
full Court should alwayssit had to be authorized by express languagein
the Statute itself. Exceptionscouldnot be added by Rules of Court.

The question is :Can it be said that an ad hocchamber, as constituted
under the newRulesofCourt, fallswithinan exceptionwhichisexpressly
authorized bythe Statuteitselftothe dominant rulethat the Court should
sit inpleno?
Asregards ad hocjudges,heretoo, as iswellknown,the opposition was
mounted on the basis that the appointment of such judges was more
appropriate to arbitraltribunals than to courts ofjustice. The 1920Com-
mittee ofJurists was,ofcourse,aware ofpossible objections.Referring to
ahypothetical caseinwhichboth sideshad appointed an ad hocjudge, its
Report stated :

"In this particular, OurCourt more nearly resembles a Court of
Arbitration than a national Court of Justice. But this variation is
necessary.Though OurCourt is atrue Court, wemust not forgetthat
it is a Court between States. For the reasons already given, States
attach much importance to havingone oftheirsubjects onthe Bench when they appear before a Court of Justice." ("Report of the Advi-
soryCommittee of Jurists", 1920,loc.cit.,p. 722.)

The Report thus recognizedthe substance ofthepoint made by M.Loder
whenhe said: "If the rightto choosesuchjudges weregiventothe parties,
this would givethe proceedings a characteristic essentiallybelonging to
arbitration." (Procès-verbaux,op.cit.,p. 531.See also, ibid.,pp. 169-170;
and B. Schenkvon Stauffenberg, Statut et Règlementde la Courperrna-
nente de Justice internationale, Eléments d'interprétation, Berlin 1,934,
pp. 181-182.)
Thus, although it was agreedto allow ad hocjudges, it wasappreciated
that this arrangement evinced an arbitral aspect which was not quite in

harmony with the fundamentaljudicial character of the Court as a court
ofjustice. Thearrangement had to be foughtfor andjustified on very spe-
cial grounds (see "Report of the Advisory Committee of Jurists", 1920,
loc.cit.,p. 721;the remarks of Lord Phillimorein Procès-Verbauxo ,p.cit.,
p. 528,and of Mr. Adatci, ibid.,p. 529;the remarks ofJudge Altamira on
23June 1926,in P.C.I.J.,SeriesD,AddendumtoNo.2,p. 26; the "Report
Presented by the French Representative, M. Léon Bourgeois, and
Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations at Its Meeting at Bms-
sels on October 27th, 1920",in League of Nations, Permanent Court of
InternationalJustice,DocumentsconcerningtheActionTakenbytheCouncil
oftheLeagueofNations underArticle14oftheCovenantand theAdoption
bythe AssemblyoftheStatute ofthePermanentCourt,p. 48 ;and the Regis-
trar's statementin 1932in P.C.I.J.,SeriesD,ThirdAddendumtoNo.2,p. 18,

footnote). And these special grounds are no doubt still valid. But a fair
interpretation is that the idea of selection ofjudges by the parties, which
that arrangement involved, was not intended tobe extended to casesnot
clearly authorized by the Statute, whether by express language or by
necessaryimplication.

How alien to the concept of a court ofjustice - even an international
court ofjustice - isthe notion ofparties nominatingits members,maybe
gathered from the grounds on whichaproposa1wasmade and rejectedin
the 1920CommitteeofJurists formembers ofa chamber ofthe Permanent
Court of International Justice to be designated bythe parties (Procès-Ver-
baux,op. cit.,pp. 183-184,517,524).M.Ricci-Busatti'swritten proposa1to
that effect was expresslyprefaced with the statement that the "Court of

Justice should be connected as intimately as possible with the Court of
Arbitration, the functions ofwhich it merely develops"(ibid.,p. 183).The
summaryrecord of the related discussions not surprisingly showedthat,
in his presentation,

"M. Ricci-Busatti personally started from an entirely different
conception :he maintained his point of viewthat too much distinc-
tionshould notbedrawnbetween thenewCourtandthe old Court of32 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

Arbitration; that there wasno essentialdifference, especiallyininter-
national relations, between Arbitration and strict Justice" (Procès-
Verbaux,op.cit.,p. 177).
So his proposa1was frankly arbitral in character. M. Loder (with whom
M. de Lapradelleagreed) in consequence had littledifficulty in securing
its rejection onthe ground that, contraryto M.icci-Busatti'sconception,

the Court was indeed intended to be a court ofjustice (ibid.,p. 178;see
also, ibid.,p. 526; and James Brown Scott, TheProject ofa Permanent
CourtofInternationalJusticeandResolutionsof the Advisoy Committeeof
Jurists,Reportand Commentary,1920,pp. 27-28).Oncethe latter view of
the character ofthe Court was upheld, asit was,the proposa1wasbound
to fall. Using languageuncannily anticipatory of someused in reference
to the new Rules, M. Ricci-Busatti had urged that "it was desirable to
allowthe Parties,eitherdirectlyorthroughthe President, to haveacertain
influence on the composition of the section" (Procès-Verbauxo ,p. cit.,
p. 526).Theidea didnot find favour, M. Loder and BaronDescamps,the
President of the Committee, pointing out "that this method would too
much resemble that proper to arbitration" (ibid.).Can it be said that the
juridical character ofthepresent Court issosignallydifferentfrom that of
itspredecessoras tojustify acceptance now in place of rejection then?

Far fromthere being any difference, the present Court has repeatedly
affirmed,in relation to itself,the substance ofearlierpronouncements by
its predecessor about its status as a court ofjustice.pite someinitial

doubt as to the precise juridical relationship between the Permanent
Court, in its advisory role, and the Council of the League of Nations, as
early as 1923the Court had occasion to observethat the "Court, being a
Court ofJustice,cannot, eveningivingadvisoryopinions, depart fromthe
essentialrulesguidingtheir activityasaCourt" (StatusofEastem Carelia,
P.C.I.J.,eriesB,No.5,p. 29).That referenceto "the Court, beinga Court
of Justice", was repeated by the Permanent Court in the case of theFree
Zonesof UpperSavoy andtheDistrictofGex (loc.cit.,p. 15).The emphasis
hasbeen maintained bythe present Court in severalcases.See,for exam-
ple, the case of the Constitutionof theMaritimeSafety Committeeof the
Inter-GovernmentalMaritimeConsultative Organization wherethe Court
said:"The Court asajudicialbody is ...bound,inthe exerciseofitsadvi-
soryfunction, to remainfaithful to the requirements ofitsjudicial charac-
ter." (I.C.J. Reports 1960,p. 153.)The case of the Applicability ofthe
ObligationtoArbitrate underSection21oftheUnitedNations Headquarters
Agreementof 26June1947represents a recent reaffirmation bythe Court
of its status as a "Court ofjustice"I.C.J.Reports1988,p. 29,para. 40).
More particularly, using language which differences in context do not

render inapplicable to the situation being considered, in the Northem
Cameroons casethe Court said :
"There areinherentlimitations onthe exerciseofthejudicial func-
tion which the Court, as a court ofjustice, can never ignore. There33 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS). P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

may thus be an incompatibility between the desires of an applicant,
or,indeed, ofbothpartiestoa case,onthe onehand, andon theother
hand the duty of the Court to maintain its judicial character. The
Court itself,and not the parties, must bethe guardian ofthe Court's
judicial integrity.".C.J.Reports1963,p. 29.)

Atpage 30,the Court insightfully added
"That Ljudicial]function is circumscribed by inherent limitations
which are none the less imperative because they may be difficult to
catalogue,and maynotfrequentlypresent themselvesasaconclusive

barto adjudication in a concrete case."
Although certain specific rules were also involved, it seems clearthat
the refusa1ofthe Court inthe FreeZones ofUpperSavoy andtheDistrictof
Gexcaseto accedeto therequest ofthe partiesthatthe Court should com-
municate to themunofficiallythe resultsofitsdeliberationsillustratesthe
operation of an inherent limitation which the Court could not ignore

(P.C.I.J.,SeriesA, No.22,p. 12).That limitation flowed essentially from
the status of the Court as a court ofjustice. It is possible to see a similar
inherentlimitation,relating tothe audialterampartemprinciple, underly-
ingmuch ofthe thinking ofthe Court inthe StatusofEastern Careliacase
(P.C.I.J.,Series B, No.5).So too with the cases of the Judgments ofthe
Administrative Tribunalof theIL0 uponComplaintsMade against Unesco
(I.C.J.Reports 1956,p. 77),Applicationfor Review of Judgement No.158
of the UnitedNationsAdministrative Tribunal(I.C.J.Reports1973,p. 166)
and Applicationfor Review of Judgement No2 . 73 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal(I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 325). In the first of
these Judge Winiarskinoted that the

"important problem whichthe Courthadto resolvewasto reconcile
its advisory function and its character as a Court of Justice, as an
independentjudicial organ of international law" (p.104).

Alikeinherent limitation, it is submitted, prevents the Court fromllow-
ingitsdecision asto which of itsregular Membersshould sitin any parti-
cularcase to be in the least influenced by the contestingparties.
Thehistory of the creation of the Permanent Court makes it clear that
the concept of a court ofjustice to whichthe Court was intended to con-
form was that of a court ofjustice as generally understood in municipal
law.That being so, warnings about the danger of transposing municipal
law ideas to the international plane would not seem apt in this context.

Thefact that the Court wasto function onthe internationalplane wasnot
regarded as importing any substantialmodifications of the essential ele-
ments of that conceptin its application to the Court. This would seemto
put limitsto attemptstojustify the newsystembyreferenceto theinterna-
tionalnature ofthe Court. Itistrue, for example,that Stateswhichentrust34 DISPUTE(ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

a dispute to an international tribunal expectto have a its composi-
tion and functioning (see René-JeanDupuy, loc.cit.,p. 272). But if, as
seemsto be the case,the framers ofthe 1920Statute and itssuccessordid,
on that very ground (seethe "Report of the Advisory Committee of Jur-
ists", 1920,p.722,citedabove),addresstheirmindsto, and did specify,the
precise extent to which States were to be permitted to participate in the
composition and functioning of the Court, is it competent for the Court

itself,by an exerciseofitssubordinate and limitedrule-makingpower, to
enlargethe extent ofthat permissibleparticipation asdefined bythe gov-
erning instrument? The material makes itclearthatthe concept ofjudges
beingselectedbytheparties wasregardedasbeingacharacteristic ofarbi-
tral procedures; that, as such,that concept was essentiallyopposed to the
judicial character of the Court; that, on special grounds, it was, after
anxiousdebate,neverthelessalloweda limitedoperationwithinthe consti-
tution of the Court in relation to hocjudges; but that this limited
operation could not be extended consistently with the judicial character

of the Court without an appropriate enabling amendment of itsatute.

PART III. CONSISTEN CYTHE NEWRULES~WI THE STATUTE
OFTHE COURT

The conclusion reached above is supported by a consideration of the
relationship betweenArticle 17,paragraph 2,ofthe Rules of Court 1978,
and Article 26,paragraph 2, ofthetatute of the Court. The latter provi-
sion,introduced in 1945,reads

"The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a
particular case.The number ofjudges to constitutech a chamber
shall be determined by the Court with the approval of the parties."

Article 71, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court 1946 correspondingly
required the PresidentoftheCourtto "ascertain the viewsoftheparties as
to the number ofjudges to constitute the Chamber".

The judicial character of the Court, as sought to be demonstrated
above, would seemto support an argument a contrarioto the effect that
the specific reference in Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute to the
approval of the parties of the "number" ofjudges of anhocchamber
(repeated,asit was,inArticle71,paragraph 3,ofthe 1946Rules)excluded
an intention to givethem a Sayalso overthe selectionof suchjudges.

Nothing in the records of the Washington Committee of Jurists 1945
and of the subsequent proceedings at San Francisco suggests an under-

standing that parties could havearight to select,orto influencethe selec-
tionof,Members ofthe Courtto bemembersofa chamber (seeDocuments ofthe UnitedNationsConferenceonInternational Organization,SanFran-
cisco, 1945,Vol. XIV, pp. 200-202, 221-222, 271, 282, 317, 333-33a 4nd
834-835).The closest one gets to any discussion of the matter is through
JudgeHudson's much quoted statementin the WashingtonCommittee of
Jurists.The relevant part ofthe officia1records reads:

"The next question,the Chairman said, wasthe number ofjudges
on chambers. Sir Frederic Eggleston (Australia)asked whetherthe
chamber of summaryprocedure could sitatthe sametime asthe full
Court. Judge Hudson pointed out that there had been little use of

chambers and thatthequestion had neverarisen.Hepointed out that
under thepresent Statutethe Court electedmembersto chambersfor
a giventerm of years andthatthe parties did not decide the number
or the composition of the chambers. He thought the subcommittee
wasproposing a whollydifferent systemwhen it providedfor ad hoc
appointment of chambers with the approval of the parties." (Ibid.,
p. 199,16April 1945.)

Judge Hudson's statementthat under the previous Statute "the parties
did not decide the number or the composition of the chambers" was of
course accurate. The statement also shows that Judge Hudson appre-
ciatedthatthere was adistinction between "number" and "composition".
Thenewprovisionspoke onlyof "number", and the cleartendencyinthe
recorded discussions was to refer to it as being so confined. However
"wholly different" wasthe new system,it would require a powerful side-
windto extend the explicitreferenceto "number" to encompass "compo-
sition".Ashasbeen seen,the Court itself,through Article71,paragraph 3,
ofthe 1946RulesofCourt, reflectedno suchextension:itspokeexpressly
and deliberately of the Presidentascertaining"the viewsofthe parties as
to the number ofjudges to constitutethe Chamber". One may well sup-
pose that thejudges whomadethat Rulein 1946werecloseenough to the
making of the new Statute to grasp its meaning correctly on this point.
Had the intention ofthe Statutebeen to sanctionconsultation ofthe part-
ieson composition,it issurprisingthat itshouldhave takenthe Court over
a quarter ofa centuryto divinesoimportant a purpose andto incorporate
it in itsnew Rules.

Even if, which is doubtful, Judge Hudson understood matters differ-
ently,therecord doesnot suggestthat so strangeand strainedan interpre-
tation was shared by other members of the Washington Committee of
Jurists. Two of thelater speakers,Ambassador Cordova of Mexico and
the Chairman ofthe Committee, Mr.Hackworth,spoke onlyofthe "num-
ber". Ambassador Cordova inparticular "pointed out that the Court wasto be given the power to fix the number to sit in the chambers and the
parties given the opportunity to approve this arrangement" (ibid.).The
chairman of the drafting committeedid subsequently Saythat the draft
Article26"provided that whentheCourt setup chambersto decideparti-
cular cases the approval of the parties should be obtained. This was in

harmony withthe adviceofthreejudges ofthe Court" (ibid.,p. 221).Butit
would notberight to suppose that other memberscould have understood
this language as embracing a requirementfor obtaining the approval of
the parties for the selectionof particular judges.ferring to a statement
made by Mr. Fitzmaurice on 16April1945, the record reads :

"Mr. Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom) suggested that the Court
shouldnot be obligedto setup chambers in advance but ifthe Court
decided to establishstanding chambers the number should be fixed
by the Court. If chambers were established ad hoc,the number of
judges would be fixed by the Court with the consent of the parties.
Thequestionbeingput in thisform,there were21votesinfavor, and
none in opposition." (Zbid.,p. 202.)

Theformin whichthe question wasputand unanimouslyansweredcould
hardly have suggested to any of the participants that it concerned a
requirement to obtain "the consent oftheparties" forthe selectionofpar-
ticular servingjudges as members of an ad hocchamber.

Judge Delgado of the Philippine Commonwealth, who spoke in the
Committee of Jurists on 18April 1945,did speak of "the composition of
the chambers", but hedid soinamanner whichshowedhowutterly unac-
ceptable he would have consideredthe idea of the parties being given a
right to influence selection.Therecordreadsin part:

"Judge Delgado (Philippine Commonwealth) suggested that the
number ofjudges to composea chamber should be specifiedinpara-
graph 2[ofArticle26ofthe Statute]aswellasinparagraph 1...The
Chairman explained that in paragraph 2 it had been desired to leave
the matter to the discretion of the parties... Judge Delgado ...
thought paragraph 2 should be consistent with paragraph 1,and he
did not wishto havethe composition ofthe chambers determined by
political agencies." (Ibid.,p. 222.)

Judge Delgado was clearlyopposed to concedingcontrol, eveniflimited
to "number", lestthisshouldletin politicalinfluenceover"composition".

In al1the circumstances,it would require morethan an isolatedremark
of the kind made by Judge Hudson to evidence a credible intention to
effectbyindirection an amendment of manifestsubstance intheinherited
scheme of the Statute of the Permanent Court - an amendment of sub-stancebecause,asJudge Hudson himselfalmostcertainly knew(seeHud-
son, ThePermanent Court of International Justice, 1943,p. 179,footnote
49)and ashasbeenmentioned above,a 1920proposa1to permitparties to
nominate the members of a chamber had been rejected on the precise
ground that "thismethodwould too muchresemblethat proper to arbitra-
tion". That ground went of coursetotheheart ofthejudicial character of
the Court. To modify that character on the slender foundation of Judge
Hudson's remark would seem a somewhat daunting enterprise. In the
NorthSea ContinentalShelfcases(FederalRepublicofGermany/Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judge Ammoun made a
remark which comesto mind :"But if such had been the intention of the
authors oftheConvention,they wouldhaveexpressedit,instead ofallow-
ing it to be deduced in such a laborious fashion." (I.C.J. Reports 1969,
p. 115.)

Opposingarguments have largelyfounded themselves on a statement,
also much quoted, made by JudgeJessupin 1970when he said:

"It has been suggested elsewherethat if the difficulty of resort to
the International Court of Justice lies in a State'spreference for a
tribunal in whose composition it will have a Say,this result can be
achievedbythe useof 'a Chamber fordealingwith aparticular case',
as is authorized by Article 26 (2) ofthetatute. Under Article 31of
the Statute, the provisions about national judges are applicable to
such a Chamber sothat the Chamber couldbe composed of ajudge
ofthe nationality ofeachone oftheparties, withathirdjudge elected
by the Court very much as the President of the Court now often is
authorized to appoint presidingarbitrators." (Philip C. Jessup, "To

Form a More Perfect United Nations", Collected Coursesof the
HagueAcademy ofInternational Law, Vol. 129(1970-1) p,. 21.)

The procedure contemplated by Judge Jessup, as illustrated by himself,
(Philip C. Jessup, The Price of International Justice, 1971, pp. 62-64)
involved,first,an electionbytheCourt ofthree ofitsMemberstobe mem-
bers of the chamber; second, if necessary, the standing down, at the
request ofthe President,ofone ortwo of those electedto alloweachparty
to have its own judge on the chamber; and, third, the appointment of a

replacement judge or judges by each party, as may be necessary. That
procedure wouldnot involvethe parties inhaving aSayeither inthe elec-
tion by the Court of the originalthree members of the chamber or in the
decision ofthe Presidentasto whichofthemshould stand down. IfJudge
Jessup then intended that the parties should have such a Say,he did not
Saysointhe particular passage relied upon forimputing that viewto him.

JudgeJessup's proposa1for givingthe parties a Sayin the composition
ofa chamber worked itselfoutthroughthe appointment ofparty-selected
judges to a smallthree-member chamber, with one or two electedjudgesyielding up their places if necessary. There seems to be nothing in his
published mode1whichsuggeststhat hethen considered that the Rulesof
Court couldbeamended consistentlywiththe Statuteto givethe parties a
Sayin that part ofthe procedure by whichthe Court electsservingjudges
to be members of an ad hocchamber andthe President decideswhich of
them should then stand down. Similar observationsapply to the earlier
ideas of Mr.James N. Hyde on the subject (James N. Hyde, "ASpecial
Chamberof the International Court of Justice - an AlternativetoAd Hoc
Arbitration", AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,1968,Vol.62,p.439).
Bothwriterswould have had goodreasonfornot going so far.The word-
ing of Article 31, paragraph 4, of the Statute strongly suggeststhat the
systemregulatingthe Sittingof party-selectedjudges on an ad hoccham-
ber assumed that the parties had no influenceon, and no advance know-
ledge of, the results of the electionmade by the.Court of servingjudges
to be membersof the chamber. Thus, in the case of litigating Stateswith
nationalsalready on the Bench,it was only in the after-light ofthe results
ofthe electionthat a determinationcouldbemade bythe President ofthe

extentto which it mightbe necessaryto activatethe procedure relating to
national judges. Nor was it a foregone conclusion that litigating States
with no nationals on the Bench would always wish to appoint ad hoc
judges to a chamber; followingon an election they might conceivablybe
so satisfied with the resultingcomposition of thechamber as to abstain
from exercisingtheir entitlement toappoint adhocjudges, in likemanner
as some Stateshave abstained from doingsoin relation to the fullCourt.
This system,with itsassociatedassumptionsas to lack ofinfluence on, or
advanceknowledgeof, the resultsofanelection,wasbaseddirectly onthe
Statute itself.And the Statute continuesin full force.

Althoughconsidering that the names ofmembersofan adhocchamber
who were to be requested by the President to "step down" in favour of
judges chosen by the parties could also be the subject of consultation
betweenthe President and theparties,Judge JiménezdeAréchaga clearly
recognized that what 1would for convenience cal1the "standing-down

procedure", aslaiddown byArticle31,paragraph 4,ofthe Statute,would
continue to apply to such a chamber even after the 1972amendments
(Eduardo Jiménezde Aréchaga,loc.cit.,p. 3). A neglect in the Rules to
reflectthat fact was rightlycured by an appropriate changemadein 1978
inArticle 17,paragraph 2,ofthe Rules. As 1soughtto point outmore fully
in theseparate opinion which 1appended to the Order made in this case
on 13December 1989 (I.C.J.Reports 1989,pp. 165-167),the prescribed
procedure was correctly observed in the case of the Delimitationof the
Maritime Boundav in the Gulfof Maine Area, Constitution of Chamber
(I.C.J.Reports1982,pp. 4,8 and 9).It wasnot appliedinthe caseconcem-
ing Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI), Constitution of Chamber (I.C.J.
Reports 1987,pp. 3-4) for the reason that (however it came about) the39 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

electedjudges includedtwo servingnational judges. It wasnot applied in
the caseconcerningthe FrontierDispute(BurkinaFaso/RepublicofMali),
ConstitutionofChamber(I.C.J.Reports1985,pp. 6-7)nor in the casecon-
cerningthe Land, IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute(ElSalvador/Hon-
duras), ConstitutionofChamber(1.C.J.Reports1987,p. 10).TheOrders of
Court in these two cases simplyshowthe election of three servingjudges
and the addition of two named ad hocjudges. The Court did not, as it
ought to have done under the prescribed procedure, elect five serving
judges subjectto twobeingasked to stand downinfavour of adhocjudges
to be laterchosen bythe parties. Contrary to the laid downsequence,the
two ad hocjudges were chosen by the parties beforethe election by the
Court of any servingjudges. The observance of the standing-down pro-
cedureprescribed byArticle31,paragraph 4,ofthe Statutemadeno prac-

tical sense in a situation in which the Court was in fact electing serving
judges who had been previously designated by the parties (see Shabtai
Rosenne, ProcedureintheInternational CourtA, Commentalyonthe1978
RulesoftheInternational Courtof Justice,1983,p. 43).The logicof allow-
ing the parties a right to exercise "decisive influence" over selection
would naturally lead to dispensation with that procedure. The question
remainswhether it was competentforthe Courtto confer such a right on
them by Rules of Court.

Anegativeanswertothat question issuggestedbythe inescapablefact
that the standing-downprocedure continues to apply to ad hocchambers
by virtue of the express provisions of Article31,paragraph 4, of the Sta-
tute itself. Neither the Rules of Court nor any practice adopted by the

Court can Varythe schemeaslaid downin those overriding provisions of
the master law. Indeed, as has been noticed, the applicability of that
schemeto ad hocchambers was expresslyand correctlyrecognizedby an
amendmentmadeinArticle 17,paragraph 2, ofthe RulesofCourt in 1978.
It applies to other chambers by virtue of Article 91,paragraph 2, of the
Rules. What does therefore emerge is that the very decision to dispense
with the standing-downprocedure in relation to ad hocchambers is an
indication oftheextenttowhichpracticalcontrol overselectionofserving
judges asmembersofsuchchambershasbeenconceded totheparties; for
it isonlyon this basisthat the observance ofaprocedure stilllegallycom-
manded both bythe Statute and bythe Ruleswould becomethe pointless
ritual which presumably led to the decision to ignore its continuing
existencein law.

It isnot a persuasive answerto Saythat the application ofthe standing-
down procedure of Article 31, paragraph 4, of the Statute to chambers
dated back to 1936before the establishment of ad hoc chambers was
visualized.Article31,paragraph 4,was in factmodified in 1945to reflectother changes made in the new Statute in relation to chambers, in conse-

quence of which an earlier reference in that provision to Article 27 had
to be deleted. In sofaras concernedthe applicability of Article 31, para-
graph4,tothe newArticle26,paragraph 2,relatingto ad hocchambers,the
records of the Washington Committee of Jurists for 18April 1945read:

"Article31. Mr. Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom) raised the ques-
tion whether paragraph 4 of Article 31was not already covered by
paragraph 2 of Article26.It was decided to leaveparagraph 4 of Ar-
ticle 3as it stood, andJudge Hudson noted that under paragraph 2

of Article 26 the Court could not appoint ad hocjudges. Professor
Basdevant(France)noteda mistakeinthe Frenchtext ofparagraph 4
of Article 31."(Documentsofthe UnitedNations ConferenceonInter-
national Organization,San Francisco, 1945,Vol.XIV,p. 224.)

So the relationship between Article 31, paragraph 4, and the new Arti-
cle26,paragraph 2,relatingto ad hocchambersdid receiveconsideration.
It isreasonable to assumethat ifArticle31,paragraph 4,wasleftinaform

which made it applicable "as it stood to the new provisionsrelating to
ad hocchambers,this was because this result was deliberatelyintended.
Anditwasdeliberatelyintended becausethe Statutewasnotbased on any
idea ofparties havinganyinfluence overthe selectionofservingjudges to
be membersof sucha chamber. It isonlyifadifferentviewistaken onthis
pivota1 point that the application of the standing-down procedure of
Article 31, paragraph 4, to ad hoc chambers can appear aberrant (cf.
GenevièveGuyomar, "La constitution au sein de la Cour internationale
de Justice d'une chambre chargéede régler ledifférend de frontières
maritimes entre les Etats-Unis et le Canada", Annuairefrançais de droit
internationa2,1981,Vol. XXVII, p. 220). Far from appearing aberrant
to Judge Jessup, that procedure constituted an essentialbuilding block
of his 1970model.

With respect to the argument that the express reference to "number"
excludes "composition", it has been said :"This objection isnot of a very
important character since nothing in the Statute would forbid the Presi-

dent to consult." (Edvard Hambro, loc.cit.,p. 369.)It is submitted that
there isindeed somethinginthe Statute whichforbids the President from
doing so, and that the objectionbased on it cannot be brushed aside as
being"not of averyimportant character". The wholenature ofthe Court,
as a court of justice, constitutes a prohibition, no less clear for being
implied,against givingthepartiesany Sayintheselectionofjudgesto hear
a case,whetherthrough the Rules of Court or otherwise,and whetherin
whole or in part, exceptin the case of ad hocjudges. Sofundamental was
that prohibition tothecharacter ofthe Court asacourt ofjustice, asdistin-
guished from an arbitral body, that it wasno more necessaryto express itin its Statute than it would have been to do so in the constitution of any
other "court ofjustice" within the normal acceptation of the meaning of
this expression.
Thisimpliedprohibition is not neutralized by approaching the matter
from the point of view ofthe doctrine of implied powers. True, the fact
that specific powers are conferred on a body does not necessarily imply
the non-existence of others. Butthe latter do not float around at large. In
the last analysis,al1the powers of a body mustbe conferred by itsconsti-
tuent instrument,whether expresslyorimpliedly. Speakingofthe powers
ofthe United Nations, the Court said:

"It must be acknowledged that its Members,by entrustingcertain
functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have
clothed it with the competence requiredto enable those functions to
be effectively discharged." (Reparationfor InjuriesSufferedin the
Serviceof the United Nations, I.C.JR . eports 1949,p. 179;emphasis
supplied.)

Atpage 182,the Court added :

"Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to
have thosepowerswhich,thoughnot expresslyprovided intheChar-
ter, are conferredupon it by necessaryimplication as being essential
to the performance of its duties." (Ibid.;emphasissupplied.)

Puttinggreater emphasis on the extent to which such additional powers
must be sorequired,Judge Hackworth,dissenting, stated :

"Powers not expressedcannot freelybe implied. Implied powers
flowfrom a grant of expressed powers, and are limited to those that
are 'necessary'to the exercise of powers expressly granted." (Ibid.,
p. 198.Seealso,byhim,EffectofAwardsofCompensation Madebythe
United Nations Administrative TribunaIl.,C.J. Reports 1954,p. 80.)

Theneedfor somelimitation wasalsorecognizedbyJudgeFitzmauricein
CertainExpensesof theUnitedNations(I.C.J.Reports1962,pp. 208,213).
(Seealso,by him, "Hersch Lauterpacht - TheScholar asJudge" - Part
III,BritishYearBookofInternationalLaw,1963,Vol. 39,p. 154,footnote,
and his separate opinion in the Goldercase, European Court of Human
Rights,judgment of 21February 1975,Series A, Vol. 18,p. 32.)

However elastic may be the test to be applied in determiningthe exis-
tence and extent of implied powers - and undue rigidity is surely to be
avoided - itseemsinanyeventclearthat aconstituentinstrumentcannot
beread as implyingthe existenceofpowerswhich contradictthe essential43 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAISSO.P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

be aprofitless, ifnot dangerous,affectationto appeal tothe international
status of the International Court of Justice to suggest that occupies a
materially different position in respect of matters normally regarded as
inconsistent with the basic concept of a court ofjusticeder municipal
law.

The Ceylon case involved the municipal law concept of separation of
powers,andthis,ithasbeenheld, is"not applicabletotherelationsamong
international institutions for the settlement of disputes"Military and
ParamilitaryActivitiesinand againstNicaragua (Nicaraguva. UnitedStates
ofAmerica), Jurisdictioand Admissibility,I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 433).But
this dictum has no application to the question whether the Court itself
may allow suchjudicial power as has in factbeen vested in it to be exer-
cisedbypersons other than itself.True, also,the Ceylon caseinvolvedan
outrightdesignation ofjudges by an agencyexternaltothe court, whereas
the systemunder reviewonly givesto the parties a Sayin the designation,
which remains ultimately with the Court itself, with the right tocide
differentlyifitwishes. Butthere isdifficultyin conceding that thisshould
make any legal difference. A proper concern for the preservation of the

juridical wholeness of the Court does not suggestthat this is an area in
which fascination with forms can be suffered to prevail over regard for
substance. As mentionedearlier,Judge Jiménezde Aréchaga, a principal
architectofthe newsystem,had saidthat the "main changeintroduced ...
[was]to accord to the parties a decisiveinfluence in the composition of
ad hoc Chambers" (Eduardo Jiménezde Aréchaga,loc. cit., p. 2). No
reason appears for thinking that this authoritative statement of purpose
differed from actual practice up to the time when the Chamber in this
casewasestablished.Evenifnot "decisive",theinfluenceaccorded iscer-
tainly substantial, for, as earlier obsewed, it could not be supposed
that the Court was being required to ascertain the views ofthe parties
as to the composition of a chamber while being entirely free to ignore
them. Whether "decisive" or "substantial", the influence so given to the
parties was,in myrespectfulopinion, an illicitconveyanceof an essential
part ofthe Court's patrimony.

It istrue that the secrecyrequirementin electionsofjudges asmembers

of an ad hocchamber continuesto apply. But so also does a connected
requirement, no less compelling for being assumed, that such elections
must alsobefree.Argumentsinoppositiontothe newsystem assertthat it
leads to an infringement of the secrecyrequirementin the sensethat the
result is known in advance. Perhaps, in that sense, there is an infringe-
ment, eventhough the forma1procedures do remain secret.Butastronger
argumentwould seemto bethat the newsystem violatesacertainfreedom
of choice which the secrecy provision was intended to insulate againstpressure and extraneousinfluences l.In an electionofservingjudges tobe
members of a chamber, the votingjudge is electing fellow members of a

court ofjustice to hear and determinea caseat am's lengthbetween con-
testingparties.That is a purely domesticexerciseof the Court, in relation
to which the viewsofthe parties are at best irrelevant, at worst injurious.
The effective result of the system under review being to accord them a
"decisiveinfluence", it isneithercrediblenor acceptable to averthat elec-
tionsmade onthat basiscan realisticallyclaimto representafree exercise
ofthe will ofthe Court.
This, in turn, is why it serves little purpose to seek to down-playthe

status of the requirement for holding elections on the ground that the
requirement existsonly under the Rules of Court and not under the Sta-
tute. Trueenough. Butwhat does existunder the Statuteis an assumption
that the selection, however made by the Court, of those of its Members
who are to serve as members of a chamber would represent a free and
genuine exercise of the will ofthe Court. It was perfectly proper forthe
Rulesto seekto ensure this important result by envelopingthe procedure
within the protectiveframework of an electionby secretballot.

In the case of the ConstitutionoftheMaritime Safety Committeeof the
Inter-GovemmentalMaritime ConsultativeOrganization, construing the
word "elected as it appeared in Article 28 (a)of the Conventionfor the
Establishment ofthe Inter-GovernmentalMaritimeConsultativeOrgani-
sation,the Court said :

"The meaning ofthe word 'elected'inthe Articlecannotbe deter-
mined in isolation by recourse to itsusual or commonmeaning and
attaching that meaning to the word where used in the Article. The
word obtains itsmeaningfrom the context in whichit isused. If the
contextrequiresa meaning which connotesa widechoice,it mustbe
construed accordingly, just asit mustbegivenarestrictivemeaningif
the context in which it is used so requires." (I.C.J. Reports 1960,
p. 158.)

The context of that case favoured a restrictive meaning. In this case,the
Rules of Court are to be construed in the light of the Statute, and both
must of coursebe viewedin the light ofthe Charter, of which the Statute
indeedformspart. It isinthis waythatthe context isto be ascertained for

the word "election", asit appears in Article 17,paragraph 3,ofthe Rules
of Court, and more particularly as it is linked with the words "by secret
ballot" appearing in Article 18,paragraph 1,of the Rules. Thus consid-
ered, there is nothing in the context which can so validly constrain the
freedomnormallyassociated withthe concept ofan electionbysecretbal-
lot as to afford the parties any influence over the result, whether "deci-

l Forthe generaltheoryunderlyinganelectoral secreprovision,seetheMapleVal-
leyCase (1926) 1D.L.R.808,atpp. 814-815;29 CorpusJurisSecundum,para. 201 (l),
pp. 557-558;and Withersv.Boardof CommissionersofHarnett County (1929) 146S.E.
225,atp.226.45 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU( RDISS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

sive"ornot. Onthe contrary, everythinginthe contextprohibits the intro-
duction of any such influence into the process. With that prohibition,
fixed asit isbythe verynature ofthe Court asestablished bythe Charter
and the Statute,it isvainto seekto interferebyan exerciseofthe subordi-
nate and limited rule-makingpower of the Court. The regular judges of
the Court, it must be remembered,are elected by the General Assembly
and the SecurityCouncil,the possible involvement of the Court in that
process being merely contingent under Article 12,paragraph 3, of the
Statute.
Article 2 of the Statute requires judges of the Court to be "indepen-
dent". The importance of that quality for the Court as a whole has been
rightlystressed in the literature (seeditionsofAdmissionofa State to
Membershipinthe UnitedNations (Article 4 of theCharter),I.C.J.Reports

1947-1948,p. 95,perJudge ZoriEiE;and Judgments oftheAdministrative
Tribunalof the IL0 uponComplaintsMade against Unesco,I.C.J.Reports
1956,p. 104,perJudge Winiarski).It isnot easyto think of anyconcept of
judicial independence which is consonant with particular judges being
named to sit in a particular case practically at the behest of the parties.
Referring to the term "court" in Article 5,paragraph 4, of the European
Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights
observed that

"[tlhisterm implies onlythat the authority called upon to dec...
must possess ajudicial character,that is to Saybe independent both
of the executiveand oftheparties to thecase"(see European Court
of Human Rights, the Neumeistercase,judgment of 27 June 1968,
SeriesA,p. 44,para. 24; emphasisadded).

1cannot think of any reason excluding the substance of this view in the
case of an international court.
Do the new arrangementsplacethe independence ofthe Court at risk?
To take one example, in selecting judges as members of a chamber it
would, 1 think, be extraneous and legally impermissible for the Court
itself(bywhich asa wholethe selectionisultimatelymade when forming
the chamber under Article26,paragraph 2, ofthe Statute)tobeguided by
acriterion astothe extenttowhichitsjurisdictionisaccepted bycountries
from which particular judges come. No such test is visualized by the
Statute, which does not regard a judge as representing his country or his
nationalityasrelevant to hisindependence (seeCertainNonvegianLaans,
I.C.J.Reports1957,p. 45,perJudge Lauterpacht, and MilitaryandPara-
militaryActivitiesinand againstNicaragua(Nicaraguav. UnitedStates of
America),I.C.J.Reports1986,pp. 158-160,perJudgeLachs,and p. 528,per

Judge Jennings). Yet it would seemthat the new systemis structuredin a
way which enables litigatingparties, ifthey wish,to excludejudges from
an adhocchamber onthe basis of preciselythat criterion or criteria simi-
lartoit (seeJudgePetrén,loc.cit.,pp. 61-62;and Mr.John R.Stevenson,in
American Societyof Intemational Law, Proceedingsof the 80th Annual 46 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DISS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

Meeting,1986,p. 202).If, asthink,the Court itselfcannottake such con-
siderationsintoaccount when electingjudges to be membersof an ad hoc
chamber, can it,by Rules,authorizeaprocedure which enablessuch con-
siderations to be indirectly taken by it into account through reception of
the views ofthe parties? That the Court may not in fact be aware of the
motivation of the partiesoes not diminishthe risk: on the contrary, it
makesthe risk evenmorepalpable.

Similarobservationsapplyin relation to Mr. Edvard Hambro's arrest-
ingobservation to the effectthatthe new consultationprocedure

"means also in fact although not in law that the rules concerning
imcompatibilitiesofjudges havebeenchanged sinceitmaysafelybe
assumedthat the parties willscrutinizethebackground ofthejudges
very carefully and exclude any person who may be considered as
'unfriendly'on account ofpreviousdealings withthe sameor similar
problems, even though such dealings would not be considered by
himself,the President or the Court to be ofuch a characterthat he
wouldbeexcludedfrom Sittinginthe case"(EdvardHambro, loc.cit.,

p. 368).

Thegrounds ofincompatibilityareprescribed byArticles 16and 17ofthe
Statute itself. Can an amendment to the Rules of Court effectively
empower the parties to add to those grounds in the exerciseof a practi-
callyunreviewable discretion? 1cannot think so. And yet that, indeed, is
whatthe new Rules would enable the parties to do.

Arguments in favour of the new systemplace somereliance onthe in-
applicabilityto chambers of Article9 of the Statut- a provision which
relates to the globally representative composition of the Court, in the
sensethat itwasvisualizedthat inthe Court "asawholetherepresentation
of the main forms ofcivilizationand ofthe principal legalsystemsofthe
world should be assured. Under Articles 26 and 27 of the 1920Statute,
judges of the labour chamber and of the transit and communications
chamber were to be "selected so far as possible with due regard to the
provisions of Article9". The fact that those chambers consisted of five
memberseach,whereasthe Chamber ofSummaryProcedureconsisted of
only three members until this was increased to five in 1936,probably
accounts, at least in part (accessibility to The Hague might have been
anotherfactor),forthe origins ofthe omissionofareferenceto Article9 in
Article 29 of the 1920Statute relating to the Chamber of Summary Pro-

cedure, it being obviousthat a three-memberchamber could not possibly
hopeto achieveanythingreasonablyapproximating to global representa-
tiveness. Possibly it was an extension of this reasoning which ultimately
ledin 1945to the complete omissionfromthe chambers provisions ofthepresent Statute of any reference to Article 9. But,whatever the reason, it
would not appear that this omission could in any way support an argu-
ment in favour of the legalityof the new system(cf. Eduardo Jiménezde
Aréchaga, loc.cit.,pp. 2-3).What is in issue is freedom of choice by the
Court in relation to the will of the parties, not the question whether the
exerciseof that choiceshould or should not conform to Article9.

If in fact that freedom of choice is materiallyimpaired under the new
system,aquestion whichwillariseisthis :grantedthat achamberneed not
be representative of the global distribution of civilizationsand legals-
tems, must it not at anyrate representthe result of a tmly free exerciseof
the will ofthe Court itselfin order to beabletopassasacredible manifes-
tation of the Court in its capacityas "the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations" within the meaning of Article 92 of the Charter? Can a
chamber, whosemembers have eachbeenpracticallyhand-picked bythe
litigants themselves, pass as the "principal judicial organ of the United
Nations" ?Wasthiswhatthe framersofthe Charter intended whentheyso
characterizedthe Court? Moreparticularly, wasthat the kind ofchamber
they had in mind when they accepted in Article 27 of the Statute that a

"judgment givenbyanyofthe chambersprovidedforin Articles26and 29
shallbe consideredasrendered bythe Court" and should accordingly be
enforceable by recourseto the SecurityCouncil under Article 94 of the
Charter? One maybe permitted to doubt it.

1appreciatethe argumentthat, in viewofthe existenceofthe Chamber
of SummaryProcedure,therecould havebeenlittlepoint inprovidingfor
ad hocchambers in 1945unless it was intended that the parties should
have some Sayin their composition. My difficulty is that, if this was the
intention,it isnot to befound inthetext oftheStatute,and the fundamen-
ta1character ofthe Court does not suggestthat it can beimplied.Further,
the assumption of unnecessary duplication in the absence of such an
intention may not be wellgrounded, for it does not seemsafeto suppose
that it was contemplated that an ad hocchamber would alwaysbe of the
same sizeasthe Chamber of SummaryProcedure, orthat it would neces-
sarily be dealing with the same type of cases which might have been
thought appropriate for determination by the Chamber of Summary
Procedure. Someof the caseswhichhave gone to ad hocchambers could
hardly have lent themselvesto treatment by a chamber of summary pro-

cedure which was intended for "the speedy dispatch of business" as
expresslyvisualizedby Article 29of the Statute.
To sum up, the field of operation of the rule-making power of the
Court, as defined by Article 30of the Statute, is wide but not unlimited.
The Court, it may be said, has a certain autonomy in the exercise of its
rule-making competence; but autonomy is not omnipotence, and that
competenceisnotunbounded. RulesofCourt could onlybemade inexer-
ciseofpowers grantedbythe Statute,whether expresslyorimpliedly.The
Statute did not expresslygrant power to the Court to confer by Rules aright onthe parties to have their viewstaken into account in the selection
of servingjudges tobe members of an ad hocchamber. Nor was any such
power granted by the Statute impliedly: however generous may be the
principleregulatingtheascertainment ofthe extentoftheCourt's implied
powers, such powers encounter an ultimate limit when they collide with
the intrinsicnature ofthe Court itself.Forthereasons given,theselection,
whenever necessary, of servingjudges to sit in any particular case is an
integralpart ofthe inalienablejudicialpowerconfided tothe Court bythe
world community.TheCourt cannot, directly or indirectly, conveyaway
that power in whole or in part, or share it with others,withoutdestroying
itsessentialcharacterasacourt ofjustice. A RuleofCourt whichpurports
to do soiscontrary to the Statute. In the words ofJudge Fitzmaurice, dis-

senting:

"The Court has no power to make Rules that conflict with its Sta-
tute: hence any rule that did so conflict would bepro tantoinvalid,
and the Statute would prevail." (LegalConsequencef sor Statesof the
Continued Presenceof SouthAfrica in Namibia (SouthWestAfrica)
notwithstandingSecurityCouncilResolution276(1970),I.C.J.Reports

1971,p. 310.)
Judge Mbaye spoke to similareffectin the caseconcerningthe Continen-
tal Shelf (LibyanArab Jamahiriya/Malta), Applicationfor Permissionto
Zntervene(Z.C.J.Reports1984,p. 44). And a Rule of Court which is ultra
viresthe Statute is also ultraviresthe Charter, first, because Article 92 of
the Charter expresslydeclares that the Statute "forms an integral part of
thepresentCharter", and, second, becausethe sameArticleoftheCharter
expresslyrequiresthe Court to "functionin accordance withthe annexed
Statute". In the result,asJudge Lauterpacht said inhisdissentingopinion

in theInterhandelcase :

"the Court, as shown by itspractice and as indicated by compelling
legal principle, cannot act othenvise than in accordance with its
Statute, of which it is the guardian" (Z.C.J.Reports1959,p. 104.See,
also by him, inCertainNorwegianLoans,Z.C.J.Reports1957,p. 45.)

Theforegoingconsiderations suggestthat therequirementin Article 17,
paragraph 2,ofthe Rules of Court 1978for the President to ascertain the
views of the parties regarding the "composition" of an ad hocchamber
should be construed harmoniously with the Statute, and that, when so
construed,it isrestricted to ascertainment ofthe views ofthe parties asto
the "number" of members of the chamber. Failing that construction - a
construction which does not correspond either with the general under-
standing of the provision or with the actual practice under i- it would

seemthat Article 17,paragraph 2, of the Rules ispro tantoultra viresthe
Statute. For, as wasobservedbyJudge Hackworthin his dissentingopin-49 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAISSO.P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

ioninthe caseofthe EffectofAwardsofCompensationMade bythe United
NationsAdministrativeTribunal:

"The duty of a court when faced with apparent incompatibility
between a legislativeenactment and the constitution(theCharter)is
to try to reconcile the two. If this cannot bene the constitution
must prevail." (I.C.J.Reports 1954,p. 83.)

PART IV. JUDICIAT LENURE

The far-reachingimplications of the new system now bring me to the
question ofjudicialtenure,a matter alluded to inthe letterfromthe Agent
forNicaragua to the Registrarof 1February 1990.Thequestionconcerns
an associatedamendment as a result of which Article 17,paragraph 4,of
the Rules of Court reads:

"Members of aChamber formed under thisArticle whohavebeen
replaced, in accordance with Article 13of theStatute followingthe
expiration oftheirterms ofoffice,shallcontinue to sitin1phases of
the case,whateverthe stageit has then reached."

Thisapplies eventhough no pleadings havebeen filed; it is enoughthat a
bare application originating the proceedingshas been. Afortiori, it is not
necessary that the oral proceedings or any collegiate study of the case
should have commenced.So,ashappened inthe GulfofMainecase (I.C.J.
Reports1982,p. 3),ajudge maybe electedto a chamberjust weeksbefore
he isdue to be replaced, with the resultthat it isthe timing ofthe election
andnotthestate ofworkthat really dictatesthe need for an extension.By
contrast, Article 13,paragraph 3, of thetatute, referred to in that rule,
itself provides that Members of the Court replaced at an election "shall
finishany caseswhichtheymayhavebegun". Advertingto this, Article33
ofthe Rulesstipulatesthat, Saveasprovidedin Article 17above,Members
ofthe Court who havebeenreplacedin accordance withArticle 13,para-

graph 3, of the Statute shall continue to sit "until the completion of any
phase of a case in respect of which the Court convenes for the oral pro-
ceedingsprior to the date ofsuch replacement". Leavingaside arguments
relating to the restrictivereference to "any phase", under this provision
there can be no extension unless the oral proceedings had commenced
beforethe normal date of retirement.

It is thus obvious that an outgoing judge elected as a member of an
ad hocchamber beforethe expiryofhisnormalterm can continue to sitin
circumstances in which an outgoing judge not so elected cannot. Can a
Rule of Court competentlycreate such a discrepancy?50 DISPUTE (EL SALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS).P. SHAHABUDDEEN)

It seems elementary that the right to continue to sit notwithstanding
replacement is a substantive matter concerning the constitution of the
Court and is accordingly controlled by the Statute itself. The Statute
visualized only one case of extension and that was where, as provided
in Article 13,paragraph 3,the judge had "begun" a case. Ajudge is not
normally regarded as having "begun" a caseuntil he has commencedthe
oral proceedingsl. In the case of the International Court of Justice,
a possibly widerformula has.been givenby Rosenne,as follows :

"the point oftimeto whichthe verb 'begin'or its derivativesrefersin
provisionssuchasArticle 13,paragraph 3,ofthe Statuteand Articles
13,paragraph 2,and 27,paragraph 5, ofthe [1972]Rules of Court is
the moment when the Court commencesits collectivedeliberations,
technicallycalled the 'hearing'. Even when grammaticallythe verb
describesaction byanindividualjudge,juridicallyitsimplicationisa
general and collectivestudy ofthe casebythejudges togetherin per-

son, and not the persona1study ofthe file by ajudge individually, to
al1of whom, of course, the dossieris formally transmitted by the
Registrarunder Article48ofthe Rules." (S.Rosenne, "The Compo-
sitionofthe Court", inLeoGross(ed.), TheFutureofthe Znternational
CourtofJustice, 1976,Vol. 1,pp. 397-398.)

Differentjudges do, ofcourse,beginto studya casefileat differenttimes.

Hence, asRosenneexplains, eventhe wider viewproposed byhim would
be restricted to a collegiateexercise.Bycontrast,Article 17,paragraph 4,
ofthe existing Rules extends the right to sitwhether or not any collegiate
exercisehas commenced.

Theattempt made to Varythe position aslaid down by the Statute was
not surprisinglybased onthe parallelattemptmade to grant to theparties
practical control overthe selection of Members of the Court to bemem-
bers of an ad hocchamber. Judge Jiménezde Aréchagaput it this way:

"The consideration that dictated a different solution forad hoc
Chambers isthat in thistype of Chamber continuedparticipation in
the case should not depend on remaining a Member of the Court
itselfOthenvise, a Chamber setup atthe requestof, and taking into
account the wishes of the parties might lose some of its members

' Consider,forexample,thegeneralunderstandigeflectedin the statementsmade
byM.Raested, inLeagueof Nations,CommitteeofJuristsontheStatuteofthePenna-
nentCourtof ZnternationaJlustice, MioftheSession Heldat Geneva,March11th-
2Q.B,5.91,andSookoov.Attorney GeneralofTrinidadaTobago(1985)33W.I.R.338,7]
atp.360j, and,onappeal,[1986]1A.C.63,P.C. merely by the passage of time." (Jiménezde Aréchaga, loc. cit.,

P. 4.1
In effect,sothe argument seemedto run, sinceajudge owed hismember-
ship ofsucha chamberto the wishesoftheparties, those wishesoughtnot
to be frustrated by the expiry of his regularterm. With much respect, this
does not seemto be a safemode of proceeding. Even ifthere is room for
argumentas to what is meant by the reference to "cases which they may

havebegun" inthe governingprovisions ofArticle 13,paragraph 3,ofthe
Statute,itisnotadmissibleto assigntothatphraseonemeaninginrelation
to casesheard beforethefull Courtandanother in relation to casesheard
before a chamber. The form assumed by the Court in hearing a case has
nothing to do with the question whether a case has been "begun" by a
judge or not. The Court being in legaltheorythe same whethersitting en
bancor in chamber,the questionwhether ajudge has "begun" a casemust
be answeredinthe samewayregardlessofwhetherit isbeingheardbefore
the oneorthe other.Whatevermaybethe meaningoftheword "begun" as
it appears in the Court's constituenttext, that meaning can only be one

and singularin relation to al1judges. Differentmeanings maybe givento
the sameword appearing in differentplaces ofan instrument orindeedin
differentplacesinthe sameprovision of an instrument,but hardlyto one
and the same word appearing in a particular place in a particular provi-
sion,and certainlynot where the meanings would be contradictory, as in
this casel.

The resulting situation has an important bearing on the question

whether an ad hoc chamber formed under the new arrangements may be
regarded asa legitimatemanifestation ofthe Court.Theproblem ofwhat
to do withjudicial business remaining unfinished at a prescribed retire-
ment date arises in manyjurisdictions. There are severalways ofdealing
with it, other than to order a rehearing. As it has been aptly put in one
jurisdiction where the question arose and had to be answered,two solu-
tions aretheoreticallypossible :

"One ofthese[is]to allowthetermination to take effectand merely
permit the holder of the office, now a formerjudge, to sitas ajudge

differentinterpretationosfthemeexpressionbydifferentcourt systems,andonesv.
Booth (1778)2W.BI.1226,involvingadifferencebetweenpenal andnon-penalapplica-
tionofagivenexpression.BothwerementionedinMaxwellon theIntepretationofSta-
tutes,6thed.,pp.558-560,buthavedisappearedfrommorerecenteditions.Thecaseofa
single generic expressioncomprehendingseveralspecies isof coursea differentone.52 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DISS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

forthepurpose ofcompletingtheincompletematters ...Theother[is]

to postpone the vacatingof the office of thejudge for a period to be
determinedasnecessaryforthe completionofthe pending court mat-
ters and permit ajudge to continueto hold his officewith his powers
undiminished." (Sookoov. AttorneyGeneral ofTrinidadand Tobago
(1985)33W.I.R.338,Trinidad and TobagoCourt ofAppeal,atp. 361,
perWarner J.A.,and,on appeal, [1986]1A.C.63,P.C., at p. 71 .)
It seemsclearthat it wasthe first ofthesetwo theoreticalsolutions which
wasemployedinArticle 13,paragraph 3,ofthe Statute,withtheresultthat
ajudge who, "though replaced", isfunctioningbyvirtue ofthisprovision,

exercisesthe functionsbut does not holdthe office of ajudge. He cannot
hold the office any longerbecause he has been "replaced as one of the
fifteenjudges ofthe Court byanother person whohasbeen dulyadmitted
to fil1the sameoffice.Now,ifthe Rulesunder considerationare valid,the
entireoral proceedings of a casebefore an adhocchamber maytakeplace
before persons none of whom held the office of a Member of the Court
at any timeduring that hearing. So,once again, isthis the kind of cham-
ber that the framers of the Statute had in mind when they accepted in
Article 27that a "judgment givenby any ofthe chambers provided for in
Articles26and 29shallbe consideredasrendered by the Court"?

1come now to the questionwhether, if the foregoingis right, what, if
anything, can be done to correcttheposition. In the caseconcerning Deli-
mitationof theMaritime BoundaryintheGulfofMaineArea, Constitution
of Chamber,the Order ofCourt recitedthat theparties had been dulycon-
sulted "as to the composition of the proposed Chamber of the Court in
accordance with Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 17,
paragraph 2,ofthe Rules of Court" (I.C.J.Reports1982,p. 4).With occa-
sional variations, similar affirmations were later made in the case con-
cerningthe FrontierDispute(BurkinaFaso/RepublicofMali), Constitution
of Chamber(I.C.J.Reports 1985,p. 7); the case concerning Elettronica
Sicula S.P.A.(ELSI),Constitution ofChamber(I.C.J.Reports 1987,p. 4);
the case concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI), Composition of

Chamber(I.C.J.Reports 1988,pp. 158-159);and the case concerningthe
Lund,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute(El Salvador/Honduras)(I.C.J.
Reports 1987, p. 12). The Court has therefore taken a position, even
though not reasoned, on the question whether the existing practice is in
accordance withthe Statute. Butdoesthispreclude the matter frombeing
re-opened?

Beforea practice isheld to be inconsistent witha controlling provision
ofthe Statuteor ofthe Rules ofCourt, to whichitmust yieldifinconflict,53 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

the meaning ofthe provision must firstbe established.What isevidenced
bythe casesreferredto isnota simpleaccidentallydevelopedpractice,but
a practice resting on decisions ofthe Court whichfest itsinterpreta-
tion of the applicable provisions of those instruments. To what extent
would it be proper forthe Court at this stageto reverseits previous deci-
sionsasto themeaning ofthose provision?Thisseemsto bethe question

here,as1believeitsimilarlywasinthe caseconcerningthe AerialIncident
of3July 1988(ZslamicRepublicofIran v. UnitedStates ofAmerica)(Z.C.J.
Reports1989,p. 145).Theanswer may, 1think,be derived from the posi-
tion putfonvard by Sir HerschLauterpacht as follows:

"Subject to the overriding principle of resjudicata, the Court is
freeatany timeto reconsiderthesubstance ofthe lawasembodied in
a previous decision...it will not do so lightly and without good
reason. But it may do so, and it hasne so." (Sir Hersch Lauter-
pacht, The Developmentof International Law by the International
Court,1958,p. 19.Seealso ibid.,p. 20.)

That theCourt shouldnot act lightlyand withoutgoodreason suggeststo
mymind that the mere factthat the Court in a later casemaybe disposed
to seethe lawdifferentlyfromthe wayin whichit sawit in an earlier case
maynot always sufficetowarrant a reversa1ofitspreviousholding onthe
samepoint. But1do notthink theCourt willbe actinglightlyand without
good reason if it were to reverse a previoussion on the law on the
ground that it was clearlyerroneousas wellasproductive of graveconse-
quencesforthejudicial integrity ofthe Court of whichthe Court itselfis
the avowedguardian. In this case,expectationsbased onthe continuance
of the system sanctioned by the previous decisions of the Court cannot
outweighthe gravityofthe consequences ofhose decisionsforthe essen-

tialnature and structure ofthe Court. 1believethat the applicable criteria
are satisfied in this caseto the point of unmistakablyrequiringthe Court
to reverse its previous decisions and to redirect the law along its proper
course. Reasonable development of the law, even if sometimes bold, is
natural and legitimate; mere expansivenessis another matter.

PART VI. CONCLUSIO ANTO THE VALIDIT OFTHE EXISTING
ARRANGEMEN RTELATINGTO ADHOCCHAMBERS

Theissue,summarized,isthis Thefundamentalcharacter ofthe Court
remains what it was conceived to be by the founders of the Permanent
Court. That character was deliberatelyjudicial and was not materially
alteredbytheintroduction in 1945oftheinstitution ofthe adhocchamber.
Upto 1972,the determination ofwhichparticular Members ofthe Court
shouldsit on ahamber was exclusivelya matter forthe Court itself.Was
it legallycompetent for the Court, by an exercise of its subordinate andlimitedrule-making power, to bargain awaya substantial, if not decisive,
part ofthis facultyof choiceto potential litigantsinexchangeforthe pros-
pect of greater use of ad hoc chambers? Was the fundamental judicial
character of the Court consistent with givingthe parties a share in the
exercise of ifsppoqerto select its regular personnel to sit in a particular
case? Even in casesa negative selection by exclusionfor cause, though
somethingin the nature of a right of recusation in fact exists,the Statute
cautiouslyrefrainedfrom explicitlyconferring such aright on the parties
(see Procès-Verbaux,1920,op. cit.,p. 472,per Lord Phillimore; P.C.Z.J.,
SeriesD,No.2,p.72,perLord Finlay;Stauffenberg, op.cit.,p.76;Hudson,
ThePermanentCourtofInternationalJustice,1943,pp. 173and 370;Louis
Favoreu,"RécusationetadministrationdelapreuvedevantlaCourinter-
nationale de Justice", Annuaire français de droit international, 1965,
Vol.XI,pp. 236ff. ;and GenevièveGuyomar, CommentaireduRèglement
de la CourinternationaledeJustice: Interprétationetpratique, Paris, 1983,
pp. 195-197).Did it authorizethe Court by Rules of Courtto givethem a
right ofpositive selection? 1do not think so.

Thequestion then iswhich shall prevail - the practical utility of a pri-
vately selected chamber claiming to be a legitimate manifestation of the
Court,or the grand original designof the Court asa court ofjustice serv-
ing an integrated world and seen by that world to be servingit as such a
court? While it cannot be inadmissibletoday to recall the great vision
which animated yesterday'screators of ajudicial edifice of whose integ-
ritythe Court istheproud guardian,defenders ofthe newsystemmaywell
cal1in aid Judge Lauterpacht's statementreading :

"Aproper interpretation of a constitutionalinstrument must take
intoaccountnot onlythe forma1letter ofthe originalinstrument, but
also its operation inactual practice and in the light of the revealed
tendencies in the life of the Organization." (VotingProcedure on
QuestionsrelatingtoReportsand PetitionsconcerningtheTerritoryof
South WestAfrica,Z.C.J.Reports1955,p. 106.)

Evensoattractivelydesigned aninvitationto constitutional creativitymay

not however settle doubts as to whether the law-making powers of the
Court can everproperly extend to enable it by an act oflevitationto shift
the ground on which it has been standing. It wasJudge Lauterpacht him-
selfwho noted "the principle that an organ cannot act exceptin accord-
ance with its constituent instrument" (Certain Nonvegian bans, I.C.J.
Reports1957,p. 45).Ifthisprinciplehasindeedbeenbreached inthiscase,
to sustain the new arrangementsrelating to ad hocchambers would not
only violate the Court's own declaration that its duty is "to interpre.. .,
not to revise" (ZnterpretationofPeace TreatieswithBulgaria,Hungaryand
Romania, Second Phase,Z.C.J.Reports1950,p. 229); it would gobeyond
that to bring into play the more ominous words used by the Permanent55 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

Court of International Justice when it took the position that to uphold
a certain interpretation "would be, not to construe but to destroy
(Serbian Loans, P.C.Z.J.,SerieA, No. 20/21, p. 32). It seems to me
that what would be destroyed here would be a concept of fundamental
importance to the institutionalintegrity ofthe Court as it was conceived
to be.Thisistheproblem lyingattheroot ofthiswholecase,asbrought to
a head by the presentprocedural difficulties.

In sum then, 1agreewith Nicaraguathat to

"consider that a challenge to the formation of theamber ...
should be aired before the same Chamber would certainly be a
complete surrender of the sovereign will of the intemening party
to the will ofthe originalparties as reflected in the formation of the
Chamber" (letter to the Registrar from the Agent for Nicaragua of
1February 1990).

But what are therue implications of the extent to which "the will ofthe
original parties [is]reflected in the formation of the Chamber"? In my
opinion, reached with reluctance but with conviction,the methods by
whichthe members of the Chamber have been selected do not satisfythe
criteria required to enable itto dischargethejudicial mission ofthe Inter-
national Court ofJustice,consideredasacourtofjustice,inrelationtothe
Applicant;and the fundamental reason for this is that the Chamber has
been constituted not in accordance with theatute, but in accordance
with an unauthorized arrangement under which the Court has been
essayingto transform itself into the Permanent Court oftration, or
something akin to it. This represents a major flaw which the Court, as

the avowed guardian of its ownjudicial integrity,cannot correctly over-
look. The existing practice may well continue unabated. My views may
make no difference. It was nevertheless myduty to state

PART VII. THENICARAGUA PLIC CATIO CONNSIDERE O N THE
ASSUMPTIO ON THELEGALIT OF THEEXISTINA GRRANGEMENTS

Assumingthat 1amwronginthe foregoing,howshouldtheNicaraguan
Applicationbe determined? It seemsto me that, evenifthe originalcon-
stitution of the Chamber was valid in relation to the existing Parties,the
capacity ofthehamber to actjudicially, asitstands, in relation to Nicar-
aguawould stillbe seriously in issue.

In its Application, as pointed out in the Order made by the Court,

Nicaraguaemphasized that its"request forpermissionto interve.isa
matter exclusivelywithinthe procedural mandate ofthe full Court". The
word "exclusively" seems reasonably to conveythat Nicaragua does notwishitsApplication to beconsidered bythe Chamber. Developingthis,in
his letter to the Registrar of 1 Febmary 1990,the Agent for Nicaragua
statedthe following :

"One of the main changesintroduced in the 1972Rules of Court
was in relation to the composition of ad hocChambers. As former
Registrar Hambro said, the changes in the Rules

'meansthat the parties arefree to makeknown exactlywhichindi-
vidualjudges theydesireonthe Benchforthat case''.

In effect,Article26,paragraph 1,ofthese Rules indicatesthat the
President ofthe Court 'shallconsultthe agents ofthe parties regard-
ingthe composition of the Chamber'.
Therole ofthe parties in organizingthe adhocChamber isfurther
emphasized bythe fact ofthe continuation of a member of an adhoc
Chamber beyond his term of office.
To consider that a challenge to the formation of the Chamber,
made because of the extent of the competence rationemateriaewith
which it was anointed, should be aired before the same Chamber,

would certainlybe a complete surrender of the sovereignwill ofthe
intemening Party,to the will ofthe originalparties as reflected inthe
formation ofthe Chamber.
.............................
Thisprinciple [ofthe equality of States]whichdemandsrespect of
the sovereignequality of Nicaragua wouldbe inevitablyaffectedif it
were decided that the only intervention possible was before the
ad hocChamber. Hence, Nicaragua can only appear beforethe full
Court ifthisprinciple istobe respected.

l Edvard Hambro',Willthe RevisedRulesof CourtLeadto GreaterWilling-
InternationalCourtofJustic1976,p.368.", in Leo Gross(eTheFutureof the

Clearly, Nicaragua's primary concern is with the extent to which the
formation ofthe Chamber reflectedthe will ofthe existingParties.It does
not wish to go to the Chamber as it stands, whether for the purpose of
seekingpermission to intemene or for the purpose of seeking a reforma-
tion ofthe Chamber. Thesituationsopresented maybe considered,first,
atthe levelofgeneralprinciples, and then atthe levelofparticular proced-
ural rules.

Viewingthe matter at the level of general principles, 1think it is first
necessaryto considertherelationship betweenthe full Courtand a cham-
ber of anykind. No doubt,unlessa chamber isindicated bythe context,a
reference inthe Statuteto the "Court" isa referenceto the full Court, and
evidentlytherearedifferences betweenthesetwobodies,but these differ-ences are those between related and not mutually alien entities. In prin-
ciple, the same Court is acting whether it acts through the full Court
orthroughadulyestablished chamber.Thefirstchamberjudgment, given
in 1924,began with the carefully chosen words, "The Court, Sitting
as a Chamber of Summary Procedure ...",and ended with a'dispositif
beginning significantly with the words, "For these reasons the Court
decides ..."(TreatyofNeuilly,P.C.Z. SeJiesA, No.3,pp. 4 and 9respec-
tively).ByArticle 1ofthe relevantSpecial Agreement,the casehad been
correspondingly submitted by the parties "to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, in its Chamber for summary procedure .. ."
(P.C.Z .eres,C,No.6, p. 9).In effect,the functions of a chamber are as

much the functions of the "Court" as are those of the full body. Thus,
however desirable it may be for a chamber to be left to discharge its
actualfunctionsasautonomouslyas possible,the relationship between it
and the full Court is not one between strangers. Nicaragua has drawn
attention to significant instances of actionken by the full Court in
relation to a chamber even after the latter has been established.The full
Court, having set up a chamber, cannot interfere in its actual work; but
1think it retains a continuing responsibility to ensure that the composi-
tion of thechamber is such as to enable it to function with a sufficient
degreeofprocedural rectitude inorder to qualifyit as a convincingmani-
festation ofthe Court asa court ofjustice.1mistake not, something of
this viewis implicit in the reference in the Court's to its "power to
form a chamber to deal with a particular case, and consequently to
regulatemattersconcerning its composition".

Under the systemasithassofarworked,an adhocchamber,beingcom-
posed ofjudges whose selection has been substantiallyinfluenced, if not
determined, by the originalparties (a proposition which cannot credibly
be controverted), cannot function as a normal court of justice either in
relation to an application forpermissionto interveneor, ifthe application
is granted, in relation to the applicant as an interveningparty to the case
on the merits. A request for permission to intervene cannot but be
coupled, as in this case, with a request for an appropriate reformation
of thechamber. Exhypothesi,the latter is beyond the competence of the
chamber, which is thus incapable of dealing with either branch of the
application.
It maywellbethat the originalparties and the applicant (ifsuccessful)
may never agree on matters essential to the reformation of the chamber,
suchasthe number ofmembers.Inthat event,theproceedingsare halted;
but, unfortunateas thismaybe,itis,inmyopinion,a lesserthingthan that
the proceedings should be conducted at variance with fundamental
noms applicable to a court ofjustice, as distinguishedfrom an arbitral
tribunal.
1accept as elementary that in principle it is the tribunal with compe- 58 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DISS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

tenceoverthe meritswhichshouldalsodetermineincidentalproceedings,
including applications for permission to intemene. But another elemen-
tary rule isthat in applyinga rule- especiallyan elementaryrule - itis
important to takeaccount oftheparticular circumstances.Subjectto this,
1think 1can agreewith the submission of Honduras that -

"the correctprinciple is...that any Court or Tribunal, with compe-
tence overthe merits ofthe case,must(withinthe limitsofitsStatute)
be free to decide upon the procedures appropriate to the case, and
such decision has to be taken in the light of the actual issues of sub-
stance raised in the case, not as an abstract matter" (letter to the
Registrarfromthe Agentfor Honduras of 15January 1990).

That,nodoubt,represents the nom. However,thepresent caserepresents
anythingbutthe nom. Havingregardtothe methods bywhichthe Cham-
ber was formed, it is difficult to appreciate how the Applicant can with
any show ofjustice be left with no option but to goto that body. 1seeno
convincinganswer to Nicaragua's submissionthat to requireit to submit
to such a forum would involve "a completesurrender" of its will "to the
will of the originalparties as reflected in the formation oftheamber"
and aresultingbreach oftheprinciple ofequalityofStates.Inthisrespect,
the positionhere seemsmaterially and qualitativelydifferentfrom that in
the caseofthe ContinentalShelf(Tunisia/LibyanArabJamahiriya),Appli-

cationtoIntewene,Judgment(1.C.J.Reports1981,p.6)inwhichitwasheld
that a Stateapplying to the full Court for permission to intemene had no
right to appoint an ad hocjudge to that Court for thepurpose of hearing
the application, eventhoughthe Court included ad hocjudgesappointed
bythe existingparties inthe ordinary way.In myopinion, such isthe dis-
tance betweenthecircumstancesofthat caseand those ofthepresent case
(in whichthe selectionof al1the membersof a five-memberchamber was
substantially, if not decisively,influenced or determined by the existing
Parties)as to leavenojuridically defensiblealternative to the Application
in this casehaving of necessitytobe heard by the full Court.

The Court has cited the Haya de la Torreprinciple to the effect that
"every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case" (I.C.J.

Reports1951,p. 76).Inthat case(decided under Article63ofthe Statute),
the questionwaswhetherthe purported intervention "actually relate[d]to
the subject-matter of the pending proceedings" (ibid.).That is not the
question here. While 1accept that the principle would ordinarily mean
that an applicationforpermission to intemene under Article62ofthe Sta-
tute shouldbe made to the tribunal dealing with the merits ofthe matter,
this presupposesthat the tribunal is one which can actjudicially in rela-
tion to the application. That case was not concerned with the kind of
issues arising here as to what should be done to give real effect to the59 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

applicant's rightto apply wherethetribunal, whichshouldordinarilyact,
does not satisfythe generally recognized criteria applicable to a court of
justice insofar astheapplicant atanyrate isconcerned.In particular, that
casedidnot involvetheconcomitantapplication ofthe principle ofequal-
ity of States which would ineluctably be breached if Nicaragua's only
remedy was to go before a chamber composed of members selected as
mentioned above. It is difficult to justify this course by reference to the
ContinentalShelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)case, without a
considerable and unpersuasiveextension ofthe latter.

If,forthereasons givenbyme,the Chamber cannotentertaintheAppli-
cation, and if, for the reasons given by the Court, the Court cannot, it
would follow that there is no effective right to apply for permission to
intervene in a matter pending before an ad hocchamber. But 1see little

justification for holding that the right conferred by Article 62of the-
tute to make such an application can be denied by simplybringinga case
before such a chamber rather than before the full Court. A systemwhich
turns awaya Stateasa stranger at the gate evenifit can prove that "it has
an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the
case" has little claim in modern times to speak in the name of a court of
justice, whatever other styleit may affect and whatever might have been
the earlierposition in international adjudication. However, if there is a
right to applyforpermission to intervene,it mustbe arealrightcapable of
being asserted and vindicated by normaljudicial process.

Itistrue that under Article 59ofthe Statutethe decision ofthe chamber
is not binding on a non-party. That, however, does not diminish the
import of the fact that Article 62,paragraph 1,of thesame Statute gives

a non-party a right in law to request permission to intervene if "it has
an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision
in the case", whether the requested permission is ultimately granted or
not being another matter (see Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law andPro-
cedure of the International Court ofJustice, 1986, Vol.2, p. 552; and
Shigeru Oda, "Intervention in the International Court of Justice", in
Festschriftfür Hermann Mosler,1983,pp. 645-647).A State does not
have to exercisethat right; but, if it elects to do so, it is entitled to have
its application determined judicially by a court of justice. fail to see
how this can happen where the selection of the members of the deciding
tribunal was influenced, if not in substance determined, by the existing
parties.
Viewingthe matter now at the levelof the procedural rules, it is to be
observedthat, in the absence of any provision in thetatute or the Rules
dealing specifically with applications for permission to intemene in a

chamber case,and leavingaside generalprinciples, the argumentagainst
Nicaraguaisbased largelyonthe circumstancethat Article90ofthe Rules
of Court applies in relation to chambers the provisions of Articles81,83,
84and 85ofthe Rules(seethe secondrecital ofthe Order ofCourt). Theseprovisions lay down rules of procedure for carrying out the functions of
the Court under Article 62, paragraph 1, ofthe Statute concerning the
right to applyforpermission to intervene.

Although the rule-making provisions of Article 30,paragraph 1,of the
Statutespeak onlyofthe "Court" framing "rules for carryingoutits func-
tions", itbeingthe casethat thefunctions ofa chamberarethefunctions of
the Court, itwasfullycompetent forthe Court acting under that provision
to makemles ofprocedurerelating to chambers also. 1willassume,with-
out deciding, that the combined effectof Articles 81,83,84,85 and 90of
the Rules of Court isto regulateproceedingsrelating to applications for
permissionto intervenein chamber mattersonthebasisthat suchapplica-

tions are tobe made tothe chamber concerned. But,inthus providingfor
such applications to be made to the chamber concerned,the Rules con-
templated a chamber so constituted as to be capable of functioningas a
court of justice in relation to the applicant. For the reasons given, the
Chamber inthis casecannotbe consideredasanormal court ofjustice in
relation to the Applicant. In my opinion, the Rules do not and cannot
require such an applicant to submit to such a chamber.

Towhatforumshould the Applicant then turn? Onthe safeassumption
that Article 62of the Statute givesthe Applicanta real right to apply for
permission to intervene,the common senseviewwould bethat the Appli-
cant must of necessity apply to the full Court. This common sense view
accords with the legal situation.Ashas been noticed, the Rules of Court
are made under Article 30,paragraph 1,of the Statute which authorizes
the Courtto "frame rules for carryingoutits functions". It isthe function
of the International Court of Justice to administerjustice, not injustice;
and, correspondingly,judges whomake RulesofCourt areto be credited
withtheintention ofenablingthe Courtto dojustice, notinjustice. Hence,

a Rule ofCourt shouldnotbe construed or applied as being legallyeffec-
tua1to createinjustice, such asthat which 1fearwould be created by con-
struingthe existing Rules as requiring Nicaragua to submit its Applica-
tiontothe existingChamber notwithstandingthemethods bywhichitwas
constituted.

Since,in myview,the Rules do not effectivelyprovide forthe case,the
competence to deal with an application for permission to intervene in
such a casefallstobeconsideredas remainingwiththe fullCourt in keep-
ing with the wording of Article 62 of the Statute. Under paragraph 1 of
this,the requestforpermission to interveneisto be made to the "Court".
Under paragraph 2,the decision is made by the "Court". Article 3 ofthe
Statute makes it clear that references to the "Court" are referencesto the
full Court. The Court may of course act through a chamber in proper
instances. But where, as here, the Court cannot properly act through a
chamber, the Court must of necessity act by itself. The jurisdictionbelongsprimarily to the Court and isretained byitto the extentthat ithas
not, for anyreason, become effectuallyexercisableby the chamber.
1appreciatethat, byreason ofthe SpecialAgreement,itmaybesaidthat
the caseispendingbefore the Chamber and notbeforetheCourt. Butif,as
1consider, the right to apply for permission to intervene is applicable in
relation to a casependingbefore such a chamber,this must be sobecause
"the case" isin legaltheory pendingbeforethe "Court" withinthe mean-
ing of Article 62ofthe Statute.
It remainsfor me toreferto the followingstatementmade inthe Order
of Court :

"Whereas furthermore a State which has submitted a request for
permissionto intemene on which a decision has not yet been taken
'has yet to establish any status in relation to the case'(Continental
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),Application to Zntervene,
Judgment,Z.C.J.Reports 1981,p. 6, para. 8), and therefore a State
requesting such permission must, for the purposes of the decision
whetherthat requestshouldbegranted,taketheproceduralsituation
inthe case as it finds it".

In myopinion,the questionraisedinthe case referred to by the Court, as
to whether an applicant tothe fullCourt for permissionto intervenehasa
right to appoint an ad hocjudge tothat Court before it hearsthe applica-
tion,was,assubmitted above,not ofthe sameorder asthe question raised
in this case asto whether such an application may competentlybe heard
by a chamber the selectionofal1ofwhosememberswasinfluenced, ifnot
practically determined, by the existing parties. The issue arising in this
case concernsthe capacity of the Chamber to actjudicially in relation to
the hearing and determination of the Application, having regard to the
methods by which the Chamber was constituted and to universally
acceptedjudicial standards. The issue so raised is too vital, too weighty,
and too substantial for me to bring myselfto accept that it may be dis-
posed of asa mere "procedural situation" withinthe Court's dictumthat
an applicant for permission to intemene "must ...take the procedural

situationin the caseas it finds it". It is onthisfundamental issue,and the
properjudicial approachto it,that 1havethe misfortune to disagreewith
the Court.

In sum, but with respect, 1consider that the Court has misconceived
Nicaragua's case.The essence of that case, as 1understand it, is that the
methodsbywhichthe Chamber hasbeenformedentitleNicaraguatotake
the view that the Chamber cannot exercisethe judicial functions of the
International Court of Justice in so far as Nicaragua is concerned.The
Order of Court nowhere addresses this problem. The Haya de la Torre
principle relied upon by the Court does not by itself suffice to provide a
solution to that problem. A solution, if there is one, must, in the circum-
stances ofthisparticular case,takeaccount ofthe principle ofequality of
States, and there is no possibility of satisfying this principle withoutappropriate action taken by the full Court within the framework of the
veryspecialrelationship existingbetween itselfandthe Chamber.
Forthese reasons, 1would uphold the contention of Nicaragua thatthe
full Court hasjurisdiction to entertain its Application. It is possible that
the conclusion soreached isnot altogetherneat. Butit oftenhappens that
the law has to balance the operation of one principle against that of
another, and sometimesinpeculiar circumstances.Ifthe resultofthispro-
cess of mutual accommodation does not giveperfect satisfactionin this
case,the difficulty lies not in the conclusionbut in the premise, namely,
that the existingarrangements relatingto ad hocchambersare valid.Inmy
opinion,theyare not;and 1fearthat theproblemsinhering intheopposite
viewarenot concluded with today's Order.

1end,as 1began, by affirming myviewthat the ad hocchamber system
provided for by Article 26,paragraph 2, of the Statute is a valuable one.
Thoughdelays have not been unknown,the systemshould be capable of
affording the benefit of simplicitywithoutthe risk of fractionalizingthe
functioning ofthe Court. In thislatter respect, it seemsto me that there is
something of lastingworth in the stress which the Informa1Inter-Allied
Committeelaid upon

"the unity and cohesion of the Court as an institution, its central
direction and the uniformity and continuity of itsjurisprudence -
everything,infact,that isimpliedinthe conception ofa singlePerm-
anent Court ofInternational Justice" ("Report ofthe Informa1 Inter-
Allied Committee on the Future ofthe Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, Febmary 10,1944",AmericanJournal ofInternational
Law,Supplement,1945,Vol. 39,p. 33).

1amnot convinced that in the longterm(forit isthis which mustprovide
the true institutional perspective)any risk to these values is necessarily
negated by experience of the working of the new arrangementssofar. In
principle,some oftheproblems whichexercisedthe mind ofthe Informa1
Inter-Allied Committee when consideringthe subject of regional cham-
bers are inherent in the methods by which an ad hoc chamber is formed
under the existing arrangements. But for those methods, 1should have
hadno difficultysupporting the Ordermadebythe Court today. Itmaybe
that those methods can be usefully reviewed.At the moment, however, 1
feel obliged respectfullyto dissent.

(Signed) Mohamed SHAHABUDDEEN.

Bilingual Content

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SHAHABUDDEEN

The ad hoc chamber system established in 1945by Article 26, para-
graph 2,ofthe Statute ofthe Court isavaluable one. 1make it clearatthe
outsetthat the burden ofthisdissentingopinion isconcernednot withthe
systemassoestablished,but onlywithcertainrelatedproceduralarrange-
ments adopted in 1972and first utilized in 1982.In my view,the Nicara-
guan Application arises from, and illustrates, the existence of certain
problems in these procedural arrangements. If these problems are
resolved, itwillbe possibleforthe ad hoc chamber systemto exercisethe
authority oftheCourt morecrediblyand more convincingly than itcan at
the moment, and so more effectivelyfulfil the expectations alike of the
founders of the system as of States which have recourse to it, including

Stateswishingto exercisetheirright under the Statuteto applyforpermis-
sion to intervenein casespendingbefore such a chamber. To what prob-
lemsam 1then referring?
Judged objectivelyand by universally acceptedjudicial standards,the
selection of its members having been substantiallydetermined or influ-
enced by the Parties under the procedural arrangementsreferred to, the
Chamber in this case cannot, in my respectful view, dischargethe func-
tions of the International Court of Justice, in its character as a court of
justice,inrelation to an application byanon-partyforpermission tointer-
vene in the casepending before it. Byitself disclaimingjurisdiction and
instead leavingtheApplicant withnorecourse excepttothe Chamber,the
Court effectivelydenies the Applicant its right to have its Application
under Article 62ofthe Statutejudicially determinedin the ordinary way.
If, as 1consider,this isthe reality,the legalityof the arrangements which
produce so seeminglyunacceptable a result would appearto be squarely
in issue, with important questions unavoidably arising as to thefunda-
mental nature of the Court itself and itsrelationship with its chambers. 1
have given carefulthought to the possibility of discovering some way of

reconciling my thinking on these matters with the position taken by the
Court in the Order made by ittoday. It is withmuch regret, courtesy and
respect that 1find that 1have the misfortune to conclude that the existing
procedural arrangementsfor forming ad hoc chambers are not valid, but
that, if they are, Nicaragua's Application for permission to intervene
should havebeenheard and determined bythe fullCourt. Myreasonsfor
soholdingare givenin Parts 1to VIasto the firstpoint, and in Part VI1as
to the second. OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. SHAHABUDDEEN

[Traduction1.

Le systèmedeschambres ad hocinstituéen 1945par l'article26,para-
graphe 2, du Statut de la Cour est un systèmeutile.Je précise d'emblée
que, pour l'essentiel,la présente opinion dissidenteconcernenon le sys-
tème ainsi créé, maisuniquement certaines dispositions procédurales
connexesadoptées en 1972et utiliséespour la première fois en 1982.A
mon avis, la requêtedu Nicaragua découle, et estune illustration, de
l'existencedecertainsproblèmesencequi concerne cesdispositions pro-
cédurales.Sicesproblèmessontrésolus,le systèmedes chambres ad hoc
pourra exercer l'autorité dela Cour de manière plus crédible et plus
convaincante qu'ilnelepeut encemoment,etainsirépondre pluseffecti-

vement à l'attente tant de ceux qui l'ont créé que des Etats qui y ont
recours,ycompris lesEtatsdésireuxd'exercer ledroit que leurconfèrele
Statut d'intervenir dans des affaires pendantes devant une chambre.
Quels sont donc cesproblèmes?
Considéréeobjectivement et selondes normesjudiciaires universelle-
ment acceptées, lechoix de ses membres ayant été substantiellement
déterminéou influencé par lesparties envertu desdispositions procédu-
rales susviséesl,a Chambrenepeut en l'espèce,je ledisavecrespect, s'ac-
quitter desfonctions de la Cour internationale de Justiceen sa qualité de
cour de justice, pour ce qui est d'une requêtàfin d'intervention dans
l'affairedont elle est saisie.En déclinantelle-mêmesa compétenceet en
ne laissant au requérantd'autre recours que devant la Chambre, la Cour
prive effectivement ce dernier du droit qui est le sien de voir la requête
qu'ilaprésentéeenvertu del'article62du Statuttranchéejudiciairement

de la manière ordinaire. Si, comme c'estmon avis,telle est la réalité, il
sembleraitque soit directementen cause la légalitdes dispositions qui
produisent un résultat qui semble inacceptable, des questions impor-
tantesseposantinévitablementquant à lanaturefondamentalede laCour
elle-mêmeet àsesrelations avecseschambres.J'ai soigneusementréfléchi
à lapossibilitédeconciliermonopinionsur cesquestionsaveclaposition
adoptéepar la Cour dans l'ordonnance qu'elle a rendue aujourd'hui.
C'est avecbeaucoup de regret, de courtoisie et de respect que j'en arrive
malheureusement àconclure que les dispositionsprocédurales régissant
laconstitution deschambres ad hocnesontpas valides,maisque,siellesle
sont,c'estlaCourplénièrequiaurait dû statuersur larequêteàfind'inter-
vention du Nicaragua. J'expose lesraisonsdemonopinion delapremière
àlasixièmepartiequant aupremierpoint, etdans laseptièmepartiequant
au second. TheCourt'sDilemma

Thefinding ofthe Courtthat it isforthe Chamber to deal with Nicara-
gua'sApplication isbased essentiallyontheground that the Chamber was
formed to deal with the particular case and must also deal with proceed-
ingsincidentalto it. In the normal case,1would agree. But,in the circum-
stancesofthis case,isthe decision aslogicalastheCourt suggests?Under
the Court's own Rules, as amended in 1972and revised in 1978,apart
from two of the five members of the Chamber being ad hocjudges
appointed as of right by the existing Parties, the remaining three were
elected by the full Court to the Chamber after the Court had taken into

account the views ofthe existing Parties as to the particular Members of
theCourt who shouldbeso elected.Whetheritisinfactso ornot - and it
is the Court which knows best - the Applicant is entitled to, and, as
appears from its Application and written arguments, clearly does, enter-
tain a reasonable apprehension that the three Members so elected were
electedin conformitywiththe expressedwishesofthe existingParties. In
substance,therefore,theApplicant isbeingtold bythe Court thatithas no
optionbut to submitto a Chamber al1of whosefivemembersitisreason-
ably entitled to feel have been practically hand-picked by the existing
Parties. Conceivably,Nicaragua mayneverthelessaccept that option and
goto the Chamber, and, if it does so,itsApplication may conceivablybe
granted bythe Chamber. However,this possibilitycannot affectthe legal
situation, as 1seeit.For it isnot difficult to seewhyNicaragua has not so
fargoneto the Chamber and whyithasinfact cometo thefullCourt - an

attitude whichisin itselfthe firstpracticalillustration ofhowfar an inter-
ested non-party State is likely to regard such a chamber as a legitimate
manifestation of the Court. When its presentation is fairlyread, Nicara-
gua obviously takes the viewthat the Chamber, as it stands, cannot dis-
chargethe functions ofthe International Court ofJustice,considered asa
court ofjustice, in relationto itself.That that isthe central issue,inescap-
ablypresented, seemsplain to me.Withoutfirstdealing with that issue,it
is,in myview,logicallyimpossibleto make an intelligentappreciation of
the problemsraised by Nicaragua's Application.

1have neverthelessasked myselfwhether it could persuasivelybe said
that thisisnot theappropriate momentto considerthe matter. However,if
it is not, have difficultyin seeing what moment will be appropriate so
long as the system continues to operate. On the other hand, should the

system cease to operate, it could hardly then bejudicially appropriateto
consider the matter: it would have become academic. Passivity at this
stage is not a guarantee against the occurrence of other and possibly
graverproblems yetto come,fortheimplications ofthe newsystemcut so
deep and run so wide as inevitably to surface one day or another as an
issuedemandingnot to be ignored. 1believethat dayhas come.To failto LedilemmedelaCour

C'est essentiellement au motif que la Chambre a été constituée pour
connaître de l'affaire en question et doit aussi connaître des procédures
incidentesquelaCouraconcluque c'estàla Chambre qu'ilappartient de
connaître de la requêtedu Nicaragua. Normalement, je seraisd'accord.
Mais, dans lescirconstancesde l'espèce,cettedécisionest-elleaussi logi-
que quela Cour lesuggère?Envertu dupropre Règlementde laCour,tel
qu'ilaétémodifiéen 1972etreviséen 1978,outrequedeuxdescinq mem-
bres delaChambre sontdes juges ad hocdésignés de droit par les Parties
initiales, les trois autres membres ont été élusa Chambre par la Cour
plénière après quecelle-cieut tenu compte des vues des Parties quant à

ceux de sesmembres qui devaientêtreélus.Que cela soiten fait ainsi ou
non - et la Cour estla mieux placéepourle savoir - lerequérant a rai-
sonnablementledroit de craindre - et ilressortclairement de sarequête
et de ses écritures que telest le ca- que les trois membres ainsi élus
l'aient été conformémena tux vŒux expriméspar les Parties initiales.
Donc,ensubstance,laCourditaurequérantqu'iln'a d'autrechoixquede
placerson sort entre lesmainsd'une chambredont ilestraisonnablement
fondé à penserque lescinqmembresonttousétépratiquementchoisispar
les Partiesinitiales.On peut concevoirque le Nicaragua aillenéanmoins
devantlaChambreet, s'illefait, on peut concevoir que celle-cifassedroit
à sa requête. Unetelle possibilité ne peut toutefois affecter la situation

juridique tellequeje la conçois.Car,iln'estpas difficile devoirpourquoi
jusqu'ici leNicaragua n'estpas allédevantla Chambre etpourquoi il est
enfaitvenu devantla Courplénière - une attitude quiensoiillustrepour
lapremièrefoiscombienilestpeuprobablequ'un Etatnon partie intéres-
séeconsidère une telle chambre comme une incarnation légitimede la
Cour. Lues en toute équité,ses écritures montrent à l'évidenceque le
Nicaragua considèreque la Chambre, telle qu'elleestcomposée,ne peut
exercer àson égardles attributions de la Cour internationale de Justice.
Que celasoitla questioncentrale, qu'onnepeut éluder,me semblemani-
feste. Faute d'envisagerd'abord cette question, il eston avislogique-
ment impossible d'apprécierintelligemment les problèmes que pose la

requête du Nicaragua.
Jemesuisnéanmoinsdemandésil'onpouvaitdire demanièreconvain-
cantequele momentn'estpas appropriépourexaminerlaquestion.Mais,
si le moment n'estpas approprié,je vois mal quand il le sera aussilong-
temps que le systèmecontinue de fonctionner.D'autre part, sile système
cessaitdefonctionner, ilneseraitguèreapproprié,d'unpoint devuejudi-
ciaire,d'examiner la question: elle serait alors académique.La passivité
negarantitpas àcestadequed'autres problèmes,peut-êtreplusgraves,ne
surviendrontpas àl'avenir,carlesconséquencesdu nouveau systèmesont
siradicales etsivastesqu'ellesnemanquerontpasd'apparaître unjour ou
l'autrecommeune questionexigeantqu'on s'yarrêteJ .epenseque cejourconsider the matter now would be but sad proof ofthe common observa-
tion that an innovation,onceallowed,gathersmomentum which progres-
sively subdues any inclination to inquire, sometimes to the point of
producing misgiving that the very assertion of a right to do so might
be receivedwith surprise and disbelief. Often,indeed, it is the law which
reconciles itselfto reality. Still, casesmay arise in which that reconcilia-
tion cannot be made - cases, for example, in which the application by
the Court of a text taken at its received face value yields a result so
deeply offensiveto basal noms ofjustice asto make itimpossiblefor the
Court responsiblyto avert itsgazefromthe necessityto examinethe foun-
dations of the systemwhich leads to that result. It seemsto me that here
issuch a case.

In a highlyregardedstatementthe Court somethree decades agoenun-
ciated the reassuring and important principle that the "Court itself, and
not the parties, must be the guardian of the Court's judicial integrity"
(Northem Cameroons,Z.C.J.Reports1963,p. 29).If, as 1believe,this was

not merejudicial rhetoric, that duty rests throughout with the Court and
must be discharged by itwhetherornot invoked by aparty (LegalConse-
quencesfor States of the ContinuedPresenceof South Africain Namibia
(SouthWestAfrica)notwithstandingSecuritC youncilResolution 276(1970),
Z.C.J.Reports 1971,p. 323,per Judge Gros, dissenting). No doubt, the
Court is not required gratuitously to examine problems which are not
fairlyraised bythe circumstances of a case.But 1cannotthink that that is
the situation here.

The problem in this case is, of course, of an institutional character:
statemostdistinctly that ithasnothing whateverto dowiththe integrityof
the very distinguished members of the Chamber. However, it does have
everythingto do with fundamental concepts ofjustice. Theleading prin-
ciple, and its applicabilityto this Court, are not, 1think, in doubt. It was
citedbyJudge Lachsin an admirable reassessmentof his earlierstand on
the questionwhether an applicantforpermission tointerveneshould have
been heard evenifitsapplication was inadmissible.As he recalled, "It is,
after all,'offundamentalimportance thatjustice shouldnot onlybe done,

but should manifestlyand undoubtedlybe seentobe done'(Lord Hewart
in TheKingv. Sussex Justices,ex parte McCarthy,1K.B. [1924],pp. 256
and 259)" (Militaryand Paramilitary Activitiesin and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. UnitedStates ofAmerica)(Z.C.J.Reports1986,p. 171).That
principle goes tothe root of the claim of the Court to be considered as a
court ofjustice. Thisbeing so,the duty ofthe Court, asthe avowedguard-
ian of its own integrity, to consider the implications of that principle in
this case does not depend on whetherthe principle has been specifically
invoked by the Applicant: it depends on whether it is presented by the
facts themselves.1think it is.As it happens, however,the concern of the
Applicant on the point isapparent both fromitsApplication and from itsest venu. Ne pas examiner la question maintenant tendrait malheureuse-
ment àprouver l'exactitude de l'observationcourante selonlaquelle, une
foisqu'elleaétépermiset,oute innovationacquiert une forced'inertiequi
étouffe progresssivementtoute inclination à demander des explications,
parfois aupoint de susciterla crainte quel'affirmation même d'undroit à
le fairepuisse êtreaccueillieavecsurpriseetincrédulité.Souventd ,e fait,
c'estledroit quiseréconcilieaveclaréalitéP . ourtant, cetteréconciliation

peut dans certains casn'êtrepas possible - par exemplelorsque l'appli-
cation littérale d'un textepar la Cour aboutità un résultat quibafoue si
ouvertement les normes fondamentales de lajustice qu'il est impossible
pour laCour de détournerentoute responsabilitésonregardde la néces-
sitéd'examiner lesfondementsdu systèmequi aboutit à cerésultat.Il me
semblequetel est lecas en l'occurrence.
Il y a environtrente ans laCour avait,par une déclaration quilui avait
valu la plus haute considération, énoncé le principe rassurant et impor-
tant selon lequel c'està«la Cour elle-même et non pas aux parties qu'il
appartient deveilleràl'intégritédelafonctionjudiciaire »(Camerounsep-
tentrional, C.I.J.Recueil1963,p. 29).Si,commeje le pense, cen'étaitpas
là seulement de la rhétorique judiciaire, cette obligation s'impose à la
Courtout au longdelaprocédureetla Courdoit s'enacquitter,qu'une des
parties l'aitou non invoquée(Conséquencejs uridiquespour lesEtats de la
présence continuede l'Afriquedu Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouestafricain)

nonobstant la résolution276 (1970)du Conseilde sécuritéC , .Z.J.Recueil
1971,opinion dissidente de M. Gros, p. 323).Bien sûr, la Cour n'estpas
tenue d'examiner gratuitement desproblèmesqui entoute équité ne sont
pas soulevéspar les circonstances d'une affaire. Maisje ne peux penser
que tel est lecas en l'espèce.
Le problème en l'espèce estbien sûr d'ordre institutionnel :j'affirme
avecforce qu'il ne s'agiten rien de l'intégrité des membrestrès éminents
de la Chambre. Mais il s'agitau premier chef de certaines notions fonda-
mentalesdejustice. Iln'yaaucun doute,je pense,quantauprincipe direc-
teur et à son applicabilitéà la Cour. Il a été invoqué par M. Lachs à
l'occasion d'une réévaluation admirable de la position qu'il avait anté-
rieurement défenduesurla question de savoirsi l'auteur d'une requête à
fin d'intervention aurait dû être entendu mêmsei sa requête était irrece-
vable.Commeill'a rappelé :«endéfinitive,il estd'une((importance fon-

damentale non seulement que justice soit faite mais qu'il apparaisse
manifestement et indubitablement que justice a été faite » (lord Hewart
dans TheKing v.SussexJustices, exparte McCarthy,1K.B.[1924],p. 256
et 259)»(Activitéms ilitairesetparamilitairesau Nicaraguaetcontrecelui-ci
(Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique)C , .Z.J.Recueil1986,p. 171).C'est
essentiellementpar l'effetdeceprincipe quelaCour peut prétendre àêtre
considéréecomme une cour dejustice. Celaétant,ledevoirdela Cour, en
tantque gardiennedéclarée desapropre intégrité,d'envisagelreseffetsde
ceprincipe dans laprésente affairenedépendpas du faitquelerequérant
l'aitou non expressémentinvoqué :ce devoir dépend dufait que le prin-
cipe est mis en lumièrepar les circonstances elles-mêmesJ .e pense qu'ilwrittenarguments aspresented inthe lettertothe RegistrarfromitsAgent
of 1 February 1990 : the Applicant clearlyconsiders - and thisindeed is
the heart of itscontention - that the methods bywhichthe Chamber has
been formed do not allowitto function as a court ofjustice in relation to
the Applicant's case.

Thevice,then, in whichthe Court isheld isthis. Regardlessofultimate
results,the Applicant has aright under Article62ofthe Court's Statuteto
applyforpermission tointervene.However,whileclosingitsowndoorsto
the Applicant, the full Court is unable, in my view,to indicate anyjudi-
cially acceptable alternative forum to which the Applicant may turn. In
consequence,theApplicant iseffectivelydenieditsright to haveitsAppli-
cationforpermission to intervenejudicially considered.

If, as1think,this isthe dilemma in whichthe Court is caught, 1amnot
ableto seehow it couldbepossible to avoid examiningthe legalityofthe
arrangementsfrom which that dilemma Springs l.The line betweenjudi-
cial restraint and judicial abdication has to be observed if a judge'sjudi-
cialmissionisto befulfilled.For myself,1fear itwouldbeatransgression
ofthat lineto remain silent onthe point.Thejustice ofthe caseleavesme

no defensiblewayin which 1can avoid dealing with it. 1proceed accord-
ingly to consider it below. 1 am conscious of the length of that which
ensues and can only hope that the importance of the matter furnishes
somejustification.

Theissuehas been the subjectofindividuai statements,made mostlyoutofCourt,
bya numberofpast and presentMembersofthe Court, and from these1havebenefited
greatlyand gratefully.SeeJudges Oda, Morozovand El Khani in the case concerning
Delimitationof the MaritimeBoundaryin the Gulfof MaineAera, I.C.J. Reports 1982,
pp. 10,ll and 13respectively;Eduardo JiménezdeAréchaga,"TheArnendmentstothe
Rulesof Procedureofthe International Court of Justice",AmericanJournalofInterna-
tionalLaw, 1973,Vol. 67,p. 1;B. A.S.Petrén,"SomeThoughts on the Future of the
International Court ofJustice", NetherlandsYearbookofnternationalLaw,1975,Vol.6,
la Cour internationale de Justice", Société françapour le droit international, Col-
loaue de Lyon,Lajuridictioninternationaleoermanente.Paris, Pedone. 198DV. 73-78:
~Ôhammëd ~edjaoui,"Universalismeetrégionalismeauseindelacour internationale
deJustice:Laconstitutiondechambresad hoc".LiberAmicornm.ColeccibndeEstudios
JuridicosenHomenajealPro$Dr.D.JoséPérez~ontero, Universidadde Oviedo,1988,
p. 155;Stephen M.Schwebel,"AdHocChambersofthe InternationalCourt ofJustice",
Ârnerican journal ofinternationaLlaw. 1987.Vol. 81.o. 831: Stevhen M. Schwebel.
"Chambers of the international Courtof ~uitice~o&d for'~artkular Cases", in Y:
Dinstein(ed.1.InternationalLawata TimeofPemlexitv.1989. D.739:ShigeruOda."Fur-
therThoGgh&ontheChambers Procedurebfthé~ntérhationâc lourt of~ustice",'~mer-
icanJournal ofInternationalLaw,1988,Vol.82, p.556;T.O.Elias, ne UnitedNations
Charterandthe WorldCourt,Lagos,1989,pp. 16and203ff.;andHermann Mosler,"The
Experience",in Dinstein, op.cit.,p. 449.ofJustice :Evaluationafter FiveYearsofl'est.Le fait est néanmoins quele requérantsemble manifesterune cer-
taine inquiétude surce pointtant dans sarequêtequedans lesarguments
qu'ila présentés par écritdansla lettreque son agenta adresséeau Gref-

fier lele'février1990 :il est clairque le requérant considère - et de fait,
ceciestau cŒurde sonargumentation - que lesméthodesutiliséespour
constituer la Chambrenepermettentpas à celle-cide fonctionner comme
une courdejustice en ce qui le concerne.
La Cour se trouve ainsi devant un dilemme. Quel que soit le résultat

final,lerequéranta,envertu del'article62du StatutdelaCour,ledroit de
présenterunerequête àfin d'intervention.Cependant, tout enfermant ses
portes au requérant, laCour plénière ne peut à mon avis lui indiquer
aucune autre instancejudiciaire acceptable vers laquelle se tourner. En
conséquence,le requérant setrouveen fait privéde son droit à ce que sa
requête àfin d'intervention soitexaminéejudiciairement.

Si, comme je le pense, tel est le dilemme devant lequel est placée la
Cour,je nevoispascomment ellepourrait éviterd'examinerlalégalité des
dispositions qui sont à l'origine de ce dilemme1.Un juge doit éviterde
franchir la ligne qui séparela réservejudiciaire de l'abdication s'ilveut
s'acquitter de sa mission. Je craindrais quant à moi de la franchir si en

l'occurrenceje demeuraismuet sur cettequestion. Lajustice ne melaisse
aucun moyen défendabled'éluderla question.Jevaisdonc l'examiner ci-
après.Je suisconscientdela longueur des développementsquisuiventet
ne peux qu'espérerque l'importance de la question lajustifie, dans une
certaine mesure.

l Un certain nombre de membresde la Cour ont à titre individuel abordéce sujet
dansdes déclarations faitespour laplupart horsdelaCour,dontj'aipris connaissance
avecgrandprofit etreconnaissance.VoirMM.Oda,MorozovetEl Khanidansl'affaire
dela DélimitationmaritimedanlsarégiondugolfeduMaine(C.1.J.Recueil1982, p. 10,ll
et 13respectivement);EduardoJiménez deAréchaga« , TheAmendmentstothe Rulesof
Law,e1973,vol.67,p. 2; BA.S.Petrén, SomeThoughtson the Futureofthe Internatio-
nal Court of Justice)Netherlands Yearbookof InternationaLaw,1975,vol. 6,p. 59;
Mohammed Bedjaoui, «Remarques sur la créationde chambres ad hoc au sein de la
Cour internationale deJustice.Sociétéfrançaisueour ledroit international, colloque
de Lyon, La juridiction internationalepe&meite, Paris, Pedone, 1987,-p. 73-78;
Mohammed Bediaoui. Universalismeet régionalismeau sein de la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice:.,constitution de chambres ad hoc)),LiberAmicorum,Coleccibnde
EstudiosJuridicosen Homenajeal Pro$ Dr. D. José PéreM z ontero,Universidad de
Oviedo, 1988,p. 155;Stephen M. Schwebel, «Ad Hoc Chambers of the International
Court of Justice))AmericanJournalof International Law,1987,vol. 81,p. 831; Ste-
phen M.Schwebel,((Chambersofthe International Court ofJustice Formedfor Parti-
cular Cases)), dansInternationalLaw at a Time of Perplexitysous la direction de
Y.Dinstein, 1989,p.739;ShigeruOda, « Further ThoughtsontheChambersProcedure
of the International Court of JusticeAmericanJournal ofInternational Law,1988,
vol. 82,p. 556; O.Elias,TheUnitedNationsCharterandthe WorldCourt, Lagos,1989,
p. 16,203et suiv.; et Hermann Mosler,«The Ad Hoc Chambers of the International
Court of JusticeEvaluation after Five Yearsof Experience))dans Dinstein,op. cit.,
p. 449. TheIssues

Theprincipal point concernsthe operation of Article 17,paragraph 2,
of the 1978Rules of Court, which requires the President of the Court to
ascertain and report to the Court the views ofthe parties regardingthe
composition ofan ad hocchamberbefore theCourt electsMembersofthe
Courtto bemembersofthe chamberto heartheparticular case.Itisnotin
questionthat, asNicaraguahaspointedlyrecalled, the intention wasthat,
in those views,the parties wereto be freeto indicate "exactlywhich indi-
vidual judges they desire on the Bench for that case" (Edvard Hambro,
"Willthe Revised Rules ofCourt Leadto Greater Willingnesson the Part
ofProspectiveClients?", in LeoGross(ed.), ne FutureoftheInternational
CourtofJustice,1976,Vol.1,p. 368,citedinthe letterto the Registrarfrom

the AgentforNicaragua of 1February 1990).Doesthisarrangement open
the doorto an invasionbytheparties oftheproperprovince ofthe Court?

The available material shows beyond doubt that the framing of Ar-
ticle 17,paragraph 2,of the Rules of Court 1978(in substanceArticle 26,
paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court as amended in 1972) wasmotivated
by a desire "to accord tothe parties", in the words of one of itsprincipal
architects, "a decisiveinfluence in the composition of ad hocChambers"
(Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, loc. cit., p. 2; and see ibid., p. 21).
Theinterestingmechanics employedinthe caseconcerningDelimitationof
theMaritime Boundaryin the Gulfof MaineArea,Constitutionof Chamber
(I.C.J.Reports1982,p. 3)onlyservedto highlightthe lengthsto whichthis
purpose could go. In that case,the parties made it unmistakablyclear to
the Courtthat thelitigationwouldnot proceed unlessthe selection,aswell

as the timing of the selection, of members of the chamber conformed in
every material detail to their expressedwishes.And the Court did exactly
as was required. It is scarcelyworthwhileto seekto put a glosson this as
being other than the practical result ofthe plainlypromulgated will ofthe
parties. 1sthis speculation? Here is the declarationmade by Judge Oda:

"While 1voted in favour of the Order, it should in my view have
beenmadeknown thatthe Court,forreasonsbest knownto itself,has ,
approved the composition of the Chamber entirely in accordance
with the latest wishes of the Parties as ascertained pursuant to Ar-
ticle 26,paragraph 2, of the Statute and Article 17,paragraph 2, of
the Rules of Court." (Ibid.,p. 10.)

The choice of language employed in Article 26, paragraph 1, of the
RulesofCourt 1972mighthaveled,onthe onehand, to someobscuring of
the possibilityofthe newprovision beingpressedto the extentto whichit
was later pressedinthe GulfofMainecase,and might, on the other hand,
havebeenthoughtto leaveopen the possibilityofan answeringargument
that notification ofthe views ofthe partiestothe Court stillleftthe Court Lesquestions

Lepoint principal concernel'application de l'article 17,paragraphe 2,
du Règlementde la Cour tel qu'il a été modifié en 1978,qui prescrit au
Présidentde s'informerdesvuesdesparties au sujet de la composition de
la chambre ad hocetde rendre compte àlaCour avantque celle-cin'élise
lesmembresde lachambrequiconnaîtrade l'affaire en cause. Iln'estpas
contestéque, ainsiquel'ajustement rappeléle Nicaragua, dans cesvues
lesparties devraientêtrelibresd'indiquer ((précisémentqueljsuges par-
ticuliers elles souhaitent voir siégerdans l'affaire» en cause (Edvard
Hambro, «Willthe Revised Rules of Court Lead to Greater Willingness
on the Part of ProspectiveClients?»,dans TheFutureof theInternational
CourtofJustice,sousladirectiondeLeoGross,1976,vol.1,p. 368,citédans
lalettredu le'février1990adresséeauGreffierpar l'agentdu Nicaragua).

Ce systèmeouvre-t-il la porte à un empiétement illicite desparties sur
lesprérogativesdela Cour?
Lesdocumentsdisponiblesdémontrentdemanièrecertaineque l'élabo-
rationde l'article 17,paragraphe 2,delaversionde 1978du Règlementde
la Cour (en substancel'article26,paragraphe 1,du Règlementdela Cour
tel qu'ila été amendé en 1972)étaitmotivée parle désir,pour reprendre
les termes d'un desprincipaux auteurs de cette disposition,d'«accorder
aux parties une influence décisivedans la composition des chambres ad
hoc»(Eduardo JiménezdeAréchaga,loc.cit.,p.2; etvoir ibid.,p. 21).L'in-
téressant mécanismeutilisé dans l'affairede la Délimitationdelafrontière
maritime dans la régiondu golfe du Maine, constitution de chambre
(C.Z.J.Recueil1982,p. 3)n'a fait que mettre en lumièrejusqu'où pouvait
allercedésir.Danscetteaffaire,lespartiesontindiquésansambiguïté à la
Cour queleprocèsne pourrait sepoursuivreque silechoixdes membres
de la Chambre, et le moment où ce choix devait intervenir, étaient
conformes dans leurs moindres détails aux souhaits qu'elles avaient
exprimés.Etla Cour a fait exactement ce qui lui était demandé.Il serait

vaindevouloirnierque cecin'estriend'autre quelerésultatpratiquedela
volonté ouvertement proclamée des parties. Est-ce pure spéculation?
Voicila déclaration faitepar M. Oda:
((Quoique ayant votépour l'ordonnance,j'estime qu'ileût fallu y
indiquer que la Cour, pour les raisons qui lui sont propres, approu-
vait une composition de la chambrecorrespondant entièrement aux

vues les plus récentesdes Parties, telles qu'elles leur avaient été
demandéesconformémentàl'article26,paragraphe 2,du Statutet à
l'article 17,paragraphe 2,du Règlement.»(Zbid.,p. 10.)
Les termes employésdans l'article 26,paragraphe 1,de la version de
1972du Règlementde la Cour auraientpu, d'une part, entraîner une cer-
taine occultation de lapossibilitéd'exploiterlanouvelledispositiondans

la mesure où elle l'aétdans l'affairedu Golfedu Maine,et, d'autre part,
être considéré csomme laissant subsisterla possibilitéd'un argumenten
réponse, à savoirquelanotification desvuesdesparties àla Courlaissaitwiththefinal Sayon selectionofpersonnel,asindeeditdid :the Court can
electjudges other than those proposed by the parties. But, to adopt the

words of Judge Gros, an approach of this kind may not unfairly be
regardedas restingonthe "supposition that words canbeusedto suppress
aproblemrather than dealwithit" (DelimitationoftheMaritimeBoundaty
in the GulfofMaineArea,I.C.J.Reports1984,p. 368).Delicacyin legisla-
tiveformulationcouldnot reallyconcealthe fact that one wayor another
the parties werebeing concededa substantial, ifnot indeed a "decisive",
Sayin the selection ofparticular judges, for it couldnot be supposed that
they were being accorded a right to express viewswhich the Court was
free entirelyto disregard.Judge Jiménezde Aréchaga'sstatements leave
no room for doubt on the point. Neither do those of Judge Petrén
(B. A. S.Petrén,loc.cit.,p. 64).
Leaving aside the question of effective dictation, the question which
arises - and it is desired to emphasize that this is the question - is

whether the new Rules could, consistently with the Statute of the Court
and the Charter of the United Nations, confer on the parties to a case a
right to influencethe election ofregular Membersofthe Courtto siton an
ad hoc chamber of the Court to hear and determine that particular case.
Foritispossibletograntthe goodfaith of,and evento commend - as1do
- theintention to promote the useofthe Court, whilerespectfullyasking
whether the stepstaken in pursuance ofthat intentionresulted in the cre-
ation ofabodydifferentfromanychamberauthorizedbythe Statute.True,
as was obsemed in 1972by the then President of the Court, "there is
nothing sacrosanct about the International Court of Justice itself in its
present form and structure" (President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan,
speaking on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the World Court,
I.C.J.Yearbook1971-1972p ,. 139).Ashenoted, withinthe Court's Statute
provisionalready existed,though not up to then utilized, forthe appoint-

ment ofad hocchambers.Clearly,however,ifsomethingwastobedoneto
encourageuse of that mechanism, it would be necessaryto bear in mind
that, whilethere mightbe nothing sacrosanctabout the Court itself in its
then form and structure,ifthat form and structure wereinconsequenceto
be changed,the prescribed procedure for effectingthe changeshouldbe
employed.

In addition to the foregoingquestion of constitutionality,asecond and
a third questionconsequentiallyarise.The secondquestionconcernsthe
validityoftheamended RulesofCourt insofarastheyseekto giveajudge
electedto an ad hocchamberatenure whichisgreaterthan that ofajudge
not so elected. The third question concerns the power of the Court to
reverseitsprevious decisionson the right ofparties to influencethe com-

position of ad hocchambers, and to discontinue the practice which those
decisionsinitiated.Thefirstquestion is examinedin Parts II and III. The
second and third questionsare examined in Parts IV and Vrespectively.
Part VI sets out the general conclusions as to the status of the existing
arrangementsrelating to ad hocchambers. Part VI1considersthe Nicara-à celle-ci, comme c'étaitde fait le cas, le dernier mot dans le choix des
juges :la Cour peut élired'autresjuges que ceuxproposéspar lesparties.
Mais il ne serait pas injuste de considérerun tel raisonnement comme
revenant àadmettre que, pour citer M. Gros, «sous le voile des mots, on
efface leproblème plutôt qu'on nele traite » (Délimitationde lafrontière

maritimedanslarégiondugolfedu Maine,arrêtC , .Z.J.Recueil1984,p.368).
La délicatessede formulation législative nepouvait pas vraiment cacher
que d'une manièreou d'uneautre l'onconcédaitauxpartiesun rôlesubs-
tantiel, sinon ({décisifdans le choixde certainsjuges, car on nepouvait
supposer que l'on accordaitauxpartiesun droit d'exprimerdesvuesdont
la Cour était librede ne tenir aucun compte. Pas plus les déclarationsde
M. Jiménezde Aréchagaque cellesde M. Petrén(B.A. S.Petrén,loc.cit.,
p. 64)ne laissent dedoute à cet égard.
Sion laisse de côtéla question de la dictéeeffective,la question qui se
pose - et l'ontient àsouligner que telle est la questio- est de savoir
si lesnouvellesdispositions du Règlementpourraient, tout enétantcom-
patibles avec le Statut de la Cour et la Charte des Nations Unies, don-
ner aux parties àune affaire le droit d'influencer l'électionde membres
titulaires de la Cour à une chambre ad hoc de la Cour constituée pour

connaître de ladite affaire. Car il est possible d'admettre que c'est de
bonne foi qu'on a souhaité promouvoirle recours àla Cour et même -
comme moi - s'en louer, tout en demandant respectueusement si les
mesures prises à cet effet ont abouti à créerun organe différent des
diverses chambres autoriséespar le Statut. Il est exact, comme l'a ob-
servéen 1972celui qui était alors le Présidentde la Cour, qu'«il n'y a
rien d'immuable dans la constitution et la structure actuelles de la
Cour internationale de Justice» (sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, dis-
cours prononcé à l'occasion du cinquantenaire de la Cour mondiale,
C.Z.J.Annuaire1971-1972,p. 142).CommelePrésidentd'alorslenotait,le
Statut de la Cour contenait déjà desdispositionspermettantde constituer
deschambresspéciales,même sicesdispositionsn'avaientpas encoreété
utilisées.l est clairtoutefois que s'ilfallait faire quelque chose pour pro-
mouvoirl'utilisationdecemécanisme,l'onaurait dû avoir à l'espritque si

la constitution etlastructured'alors delaCour n'avaient rien d'immuable
et devaient par voie de conséquenceêtremodifiéeisl,fallait pour cefaire
utiliserla procédureprescrite.
Outre cette question de constitutionnalité,une deuxièmeet une troi-
sièmequestion seposent par voiedeconséquence.Ladeuxièmeconcerne
la validité des dispositionsreviséesdu Règlementde la Cour dans la
mesure où ellesvisent àdonner àun juge élu à une chambre ad hocune
périodedefonctionspluslongue quecelled'unjuge quin'estpas ainsiélu.
La troisième question concerne le pouvoir de la Cour de revenir sur ses
décisionsantérieures relativesau droit desparties d'influencer la compo-
sitiondeschambres ad hoc,etdemettre fin àlapratique que cesdécisions
ont crééeL. a première question est examinéedans les deuxièmeet troi-
sièmeparties. Les deuxième et troisième questionssont examinéesdans

les quatrième et cinquième parties respectivement. La sixièmepartieguan Application on the assumption that the existingChamber isvalidly

constituted.

LimitsoftheCourt'sRule-Making Power

In a general sense, the matter turns on the limits of the rule-making

power of the Court, and this aspect may accordingly be taken up in this
PreliminaryPart. Article30,paragraph 1,ofthe Statutereads :"TheCourt
shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay
downrulesofprocedure." Changesmade in 1945intheEnglish textofthe
correspondingprovision ofthe Rulesof Court ofthe Permanent Court of
InternationalJustice wereonlyintended to bringit into harmony withthe
previous French version (see Manley O. Hudson, "The Twenty-Fourth
Year of the World Court", AmericanJournalof ZnternationalLaw, 1946,
Vol. 40,p.28;and P.C.Z.J.S , eriesD,ThirdAddendumtoNo.2,report bySir
Cecil Hurst, p. 758).Accordingly, recourse may be had to the learning
relatingto the earlierprovisionin elucidatingthe meaning ofthe existing
provision. Asamatter ofnecessity,the power conferred bytheearlierpro-
visionwas used to fil1certain lacunae in the Statute (Manley O. Hudson,
ThePermanentCourtof InternationalJustice1,920-1942,New York, 1943,
p. 275).It couldalso coverquestions of interna1organization ofthe Court
(ibid.,p. 270).And, no doubt, within anyapplicablelimitations,the Court
was freeto determinethe content of its Rules. It is not in issue, however,
that -

"[tlhe chief object with which rules of procedure are made is to
inform those whoare responsibleforthe conduct ofa casebeforethe
Court what stepshave to be taken, and when and how, for the pur-
pose of submittingthat caseto the decision ofthe Court" (report by
SirCecil Hurst, loc.cit.).

It seemssafe to assumethat, as regards ad hocchambers,the existing
Statuteleftno lacunae whichmightrequireremedial exercise,on grounds
of necessity,ofthe rule-makingpower of the Court. In this case,nothing
was being filled in: something was being changed. Previouslythe selec-
tion ofservingjudges tobe membersofan adhocchamber rested withthe

Courtto thestrict exclusionofthe parties.That wasundoubtedlythe legal
position. Anditwasaposition whichinvolvedno gapswaitingtobe filled
before the established mechanism could legallyfunction (see René-Jean
Dupuy, "La réformedu Règlementdela Courinternationale de Justice",
Annuairefrançais de droit international,1972,Vol. XVIII, p. 270).What
wasundertaken in 1972wasamodification ofthat mechanismwithaview
to making it more attractive to potential users. That did not involve the
filling in of any legal lacuna. Nor could it be said that the change made
couldbejustified as an exerciseofthe rule-makingpower ofthe Court incontientdes conclusionsgénéralesquant au statut du systèmeactuel des
chambres ad hoc.La septièmepartie examine la requête du Nicaragua
dans l'hypothèseoù la Chambre estvalidementconstituée.

Limitesdupouvoirréglementaire dela Cour

Entermesgénéraux,laquestionest celledupouvoirréglementairedela
Cour, et cetaspectpeut enconséquenceêtreabordé dansla présentepar-
tiepréliminaire.L'article30,paragraphe 1,du Statut estainsilibellé«La
Cour déterminepar un règlement lemode suivantlequel elle exerce ses
attributions. Elle règle notamment la procédure.)) Les modifications

apportées en 1945au texte anglais de la disposition correspondante du
Règlementde la Cour permanente de Justice internationale ne visaient
qu'à harmoniser ce texte avec la version françaiseantérieure(voir Man-
ley O. Hudson, «The Twenty-Fourth Year of the World Court »,Ameri-
can Journal of International Law, 1946,vol. 40, p. 28; et C.P.J.I.sérieD,
troisièmeaddendumau no2,rapport de sirCecilHurst, p. 758).En consé-
quence, on peut à bon droit recourir aux écrits doctrinaux relatifs à la
dispositionantérieurepour éluciderle sensde la disposition actuelle.Par
nécessitél,aCour permanente a utilisé lepouvoirque luiconféraitla dis-
position antérieurepour comblercertaines lacunes de son Statut (Man-
ley O. Hudson, ThePermanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942,
New York, 1943,p. 275),et aussi pour servir àréglerdes questionstou-
chant son organisationinterne (ibid.,p. 270).Et il n'estpas douteux que,
dans les limites applicables, il étaitloisiblela Cour de déterminerle
contenude son Règlement.Toutefois,il n'estpas contestableque

«le principal objet du Règlement est d'informer ceux qui ont la
charge de conduire la procédure d'une affaire devant la Cour des
mesuresquidoiventêtreprises,ainsiquedumomentet delamanière
dont ellesdoiventl'être,fin de soumettreladiteaffaireà la décision

de la Cour»(rapport de sir Cecil Hurst, loc.cit.).
Onpeutsansrisquesupposer qu'encequiconcerneleschambres adhoc

le Statut ne comportait pas de lacunes qu'il aurait éténécessaireque la
Cour comblât en exerçantsonpouvoir réglementaire.En l'espèce,on n'a
combléaucunelacune :on a changéquelquechose.Auparavant,lechoix
desjuges appelés à siégerdans une chambre ad hocrelevait de la Cour, à
l'exclusiontotale desparties. Telleétaitindubitablementla situationjuri-
dique. Et il n'existait,dans cettesituation,aucune lacune qu'ilaurait été
nécessairedecomblerpour quelemécanismeétablipuisse, endroit,fonc-
tionner (voir René-Jean Dupuy, «La réformedu Règlementde la Cour
internationale de Justice,Annuairefrançais dedroit international, 1972,
vol.XVIII,p. 270).Sion a, en 1972,modifiécemécanismepour lerendre
plus attrayant pour les utilisateurs potentiels, il ne s'agissaiten aucune
manièrede comblerune lacunejuridique. On ne peut non plusjustifier
cette réformeen disant que la Cour a exercéson pouvoir réglementairerelation to matters of its internal organization.That power, as generally
understood, doesnotcomprehend powerto conferrights on external enti-
ties overthe Court's internal organization.Theresidual question then is
whether the change could be justified as an exercise of the rule-making
power in relation to litigationprocedure.
Tothe question thus stated, the answer seemsplainly "No". Neverthe-
less,it isproposed to examinethe question,first,fromthepoint of view of
consistencyofthecharacter ofan adhocchamber, asmodified bythe new
Rules, with the substantive character of the Court as visualized by the
Charterand laid down bythe Statute, and, second and more specifically,
fromthepoint of viewofconsistencyofthenewRuleswiththecontrolling
provisions ofArticle 26 of the Statute. These two areas are dealt with in
Parts II and III respectively.

PART II. CONSISTENCY OF THECHARACTE OR AD HOCCHAMBERS
AS MODIFIE DYTHE NEWRULES WITH
THE CHARACTE OFRTHE COURT

The single most important question in this matter is to what extent, if
any,didthe constitution oftheCourt visualizethat parties to a casecould
haveanyinfluenceindetermining whichMembersoftheCourt should sit
in that case.understandable predisposition to assumea generalright
to exertsome such influence is observable in the case of an international
tribunal, as distinguished from a municipal court; and thatdisposi-
tion, in a measure, probably underlies attitudes favourable tonewe
arrangements. Butthe precise answerto the questionposed in the case of
thisparticular Court must turn,elieve,onthe exactjuridical character

ofthe Court and, by extension,ofitschambers. In thisrespect,eemsto
methat theessentialdistinction isthat alluded to byNicaraguainits refer-
ence to "the institutional conception of the Court as ajudicial -rgan
and not one of arbitrati..."(letterto the Registrar fromthe Agent for
Nicaragua, 1February 1990).1believethat distinction can bear retracing
and emphasis.

Thatthe Court isa court ofjustice isobvious.Yetit maybe that in that
very obviousnesslurksa danger that therima1considerations involved
maybe taken for granted.So it isproposed to revisitbriefly the historical
character ofthe Court, not only with theect ofregaininga feelfor the
real nature ofthe Court,but also with a viewto determiningwhetherthe
originalconceptstillhasvalidity,and, ifithas,what arethe limitsoftoler-

ablederogationsfromthe nom. It isparticularly importantto do thisfor
the reasonthat, althoughitwouldbe wrongto viewan international court
of justice as if it were abon copy of a municipal court of justice, it
would be equally misleading to suppose that there is a total absence ofpour réglerdesquestionsd'organisation interne. Telqu'on l'entend géné-
ralement, ce pouvoir n'autorise pas la Courconférerdes droits sur son
organisation interne à des entitésqui lui sont extérieures.Reste donc à

savoirsicettemodification du Règlementsejustifiait en tant qu'exercice
du pouvoir réglementaireen matièredeprocédure.
A la question ainsi posée, il semble que la réponse soit simplement
non ».Toutefois,nousallonsexaminer cettequestion,premièrementdu
point de vue de la compatibilitéde la nature d'une chambred hoc,telle
que modifiéepar les nouvellesdispositionsdu Règlement,avecla nature
profonde delaCour,telleque celle-cia étenvisagéeparla Charte etdéfi-
niepar leStatut,et,deuxièmenentetplusspécialement,du point devuede
la compatibilitédesnouvellesdispositionsdu Règlementaveclesdisposi-

tions d'une forcesupérieurede l'article26du Statut.Cesdeux questions
sont examinéesdans lesdeuxièmeettroisièmepartiesrespectivement.

DEUXIÈM PARTIE. COMPATIBIL IT~CARACTÈRE DES CHAMBRES AD HOC
TEL QU'IL AÉTÉMODIFIÉPARLESNOUVELLESDISPOSITIONSDU RÈGLEMENT
AVECCELUI DE LA COUR

La question la plus importante en l'occurrence est de savoirsi,et dans
quelle mesure, l'acteconstitutif de la Cour envisageque lespartàune

instancepuissentinfluersurladéterminationdes membresdelaCourqui
siégeronten cetteinstance.Onpeut observer une prédispositioncompré-
hensible à considérerqu'il existeun droit général à exercer une telle
influencedans lecasd'untribunal international par oppositionnejuri-
diction interne; et il est probable que la faveur que connaît le nouveau
systèmeprocèdedans une certaine mesure de cetteprédisposition. Mais
laréponsepréciseàla question qui sepose dans lecasde laCour interna-
tionale doità mon avis être fonctiondu caractèrejuridique exact de la
Cour et, par extension, de ses chambres.1me semble à cet égardque la

distinction essentielle est cellelaquelle le Nicaragua fait allusion
lorsqu'il évoque «la conception institutionnelle de la Cour en tant
qu'organejudiciaire - et non pas en tant qu'organe d'arbitrage»(lettre
du le'février1990adresséeau Greffier par l'agent de la République du
Nicaragua). Je crois qu'iln'estpas inutile de reveniret d'insistersur cette
distinction.
Il estévidentquelaCour estune cour dejustice. Néanmoins,enraison
de cette évidencemêmel,'onrisque de tenir pour acquises les considéra-
tionsprimordialesquisonten jeu. Nousnousproposons donc derappeler
brièvementlecaractèrehistorique delaCour non seulement pour retrou-

ver le sens de la nature réellede la Cour, mais aussi pour déterminersila
conception originelledemeure valide et, si tel est le cas, quellessont les
limites des dérogations tolérablesà la norme. Il est particulièrement
important delefairecar,bienqu'ilseraiterronédeconsidérerqu'une cour
de justice internationale est une copie conforme d'une cour de justice
interne,ilneleseraitpas moinsdesupposerqu'aucune analogie n'estpos- DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAISSO.P.SHAHABUDDEEN)
26

analogy in respect of the basic elements of the concept of a court of
justice.
The well-worn distinction between an arbitral tribunal and a court of
justice neednotberecited (see interaliaJames BrownScott, TheStatusof
the InternationalCourt ofJustice, 1916,p. 24). There was, indeed, some
earlyconcem withthe questionwhetherthe Permanent Court of Intema-
tional Justicecouldbe regardedas an arbitralbody ifit was competent to
adjudicate on purely political disputes as distinguished from legal dis-
putes involving political features (see Secretariat of the League of
Nations,"Memorandumonthe DifferentQuestions ArisinginConnection
with the Establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
Appendix", set out in PermanentCourt ofInternational JusticeA , dvisory

Committeeof Jurists,Documents Presentedto the CommitteeRelatingto
ExistingPlansfor theEstablishmentofa PermanentCourtofInternational
Justice,1920,p. 115).But that possibility does not appear to have been
seriouslypursued and neednot detain inquiry:the Court doesnot regard
itself as competent to decide questionsnot governed by legal principles
(see interaliaJudge Kellogg'sobservationsinthe caseofthe FreeZonesof
UpperSavoy andtheDistrictofGex,P.C.Z.J., SeriesA,No.24,pp. 29-34;the
CertainNorwegianLaanscase,I.C.J.Reports19.57p ,. 66,perJudge Lauter-
pacht; and the case concerning Borderand TransborderAnned Actions
(Nicaragua v. Honduras),I.C.J.Reports1988,p. 91,para. 52).The whole
evolution of thethinking leading to the creation of the Permanent Court
discloseda settledintention to create a court ofjustice in the sense gen-
erallyunderstood in municipal law.Aprincipal feature of the new body
was that itsjudicial personnel wereto be preordained :unlike an arbitral

body,particular judges werenottobeselectedbythe partiesforparticular
cases.

In one way or another this important point was repeatedlyhammered
home. Its essentials were to be found in the justly famous instructions
issued by Secretaryof StateElihuRootto the United Statesdelegation to
the 1907HagueConference (seeSecretaryof StateElihuRoot to Mr.J. H.
Choate and others,in James Brown Scott(ed.), Instructionsto theAmeri-
canDelegatesto theHaguePeaceConferencesand TheirOfficialReports,
1916,pp. 79-80.Theinstructions werequoted in part by Judge Kelloggin
the case of the FreeZonesof UpperSavoyand theDistrictof Gex,loc.cit.,
pp. 36-37).Theprinciple was affirmedinthe course ofthe proceedings of
the AdvisoryCommitteeofJurists, 1920.TheCommittee clearlyaccepted

the understanding of the League of Nations Secretariat that the new
Court, asvisualizedby Article 14of the Covenant,would "be a Court of
Justice in the technical and restrictedmeaning of theterm. Its character
would be similar ...tothat ofthe Courts ofJustice ofthe different coun-
tries" ("Note onthe Nature ofthe New Permanent Court of International
Justice", in Documents,op. cit.,p. 113;and see, ibid.,p. 7).The continu-
ance of the Permanent Court of Arbitration side by side with the newsibleen ce qui concerne lesélémentsfondamentauxde la notion de cour
dejustice.
Je nerappelleraipas ladistinction éculéeentretribunal arbitral etcour
dejustice (voirentreautresJames Brown Scott, TheStatusoftheInterna-
tionalCourt ofJustice,1916,p.24).Enfait,ons'estdanslespremierstemps
demandési la Cour permanente de Justice internationale pouvait être
considérée commeun organearbitral dansla mesure ou elleétaitcompé-

tentepour statuersur desdifférendspurementpolitiquespar opposition a
desdifférendsjuridiques ayantdes aspectspolitiques (voirSecrétariatde
la Société desNations, ((Mémorandum sur les différentes questions
concernant l'établissementde la Cour permanente de Justice internatio-
nale, appendice D,dans CourpermanentedeJusticeinternationale,comité
consultatifdejuristes,Documentsprésenté asucomitéetrelatifsdesprojets
déjàexistantspourl'établissemend t'uneCourpermanentede Justice inter-
nationale, 1920,p. 115).Mais cette possibiliténe semble pas avoir été
sérieusementenvisagée etnous n'avons pas besoin de nous y arrêter: la
Cour neseconsidèrepascommecompétentepour trancher desquestions
qui ne sont pas régiespar des principesjuridiques (voir entre autres les
observationsde M. Kelloggdans l'affaire des Zonesfranchesdela Haute-
Savoie etduPaysde Gex,C.P.J.I.sérieA no24,p. 29-34;l'affairerelativea
Certains empruntsnorvégiensC , .I.J.Recueil1957,opinion de sir Hersch

Lauterpacht, p. 66; et l'affaire relativeauxActions armées frontalières
et transfrontalières(Nicaragua c. Honduras),C.I.J.Recueil 1988,p. 91,
par. 52).Toute l'évolutionde la réflexionqui a amené la créationde la
Cour permanente révélaitune intention bien établie de créer une cour
dejustice ausensqu'a généralementcetteexpressionendroitinterne.Une
des caractéristiquesprincipalesdu nouvel organeétaitque sonpersonnel
judiciairedevraitêtretitulaire:lesparties nepourraient, commecelaestle
casdevantun organearbitral,désignercertainsjuges pour siégerdans des
affairesdonnées.
D'une manièreou d'une autre,on a àdenombreusesreprisesfortement
insisté surce point important, dont les aspects essentiels sont exposés
dans lesinstructionsjustement célèbres du secrétairedYEtatElihu Root à
la délégation des Etats-Unis à la conférencede La Haye de 1907(voir
a Secretaryof StateElihu Root to Mr.J. H. Choate and others»,dans In-

structionsto theAmerican Delegatesto theHaguePeace Conferencea snd
Their OfficialReports, sous la direction de James Brown Scott, 1916,
p. 79-80; ces instructions sont citéespar M. Kellogg dans l'affaire des
Zonesfranchesde laHaute-Savoieet duPaysde Gex,loc.cit.,p. 36-37). Le
principeaétéproclamé durant lesdébatsdu comitéconsultatifdejuristes
en 1920.Al'évidence,le comitéa fait sienne la conceptiondu Secrétariat
de la Société desNations, àsavoirque la nouvelle Cour, telle que l'envi-
sageaitl'article 14du Pacte, seraitune Cour de Justice dans l'acception
restreinte et technique du terme. Elle serait une Cour dont le caractère
serait au présent égard analogue a celui des Cours de Justice des divers
pays.»(((Notice sur le caractèrede la nouvelle Cour permanente deJus-
ticeinternationale»,dans Documents,op.cit.,p. 113;voiraussi,ibid.,p. 7).Court - and indeed in the same building, as is still the case - was
regardedasconfirmatory of "the conclusion thatthe new Court willbe in
principle a Court ofJustice" (Documents,op.cit.,p. 115).The coexistence
ofthePermanent Court ofInternationalJustice withthe Permanent Court
of Arbitration and othertribunals of arbitration wasexpresslyrecognized
in Article 1ofthe Statute ofthe Court reading:

"This Court shallbe in addition to the Court ofArbitration organ-
ized by the Conventions of The Hague of 1899and 1907,and to the
specialTribunals of Arbitration to which Statesare alwaysatliberty
to submittheir disputesfor settlement."

Partiescould alwaysgoto arbitration. Now,on apotentially globalbasis,
theywerebeinggivenachoicebetweenthat and anewpieceofmachinery
- a court of justice (see also B. C. J. Loder, "The Permanent Court of
International Justice", in Report of the Twenty-NinthConferenceof the
International LawAssociation,London, 1920,p. 148).

M. Léon Bourgeois,the distinguished and learned delegate of the
Council ofthe LeagueofNations,alluded totheseideaswhen,addressing
the inaugural meeting of the Committee of Jurists on 16June 1920,he
said:

"The Court of Justice must be a true Permanent Court. It is not
simply a question of arbitrators chosen on a particular occasion, in
the case of conflict,by the interested parties; it is a smallnumber of
judges Sittingconstantly and receiving a mandate the duration of
whichwill enablethe establishment of arealjurisprudence, who will
administer justice. This permanence is a symbol. It will be a seat
raised inthe midst ofthe nations, wherejudges are alwayspresent,to
whom can alwaysbe brought the appeal of the weak and to whom
protests againstthe violation of right can be addressed. Chosen not

byreason ofthe Stateofwhichtheyare citizens,but byreason oftheir
persona1authority, oftheir past career, ofthe respect which attaches
to theirnames known overthe whole world, thesejudges willrepre-
sent a ti-ulyinternationalspirit whichisbyno means,as somepeople
pretend, a negation of the legitimate interests of each nation, but
which is,on the contrary,the safeguard of these interests,within the
very limits of their legitimacy." (Permanent Court of International
Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbauxof the Pro-
ceedingsofthe CommitteeJ ,une 16th-July24th1920,withAnnexes,The
Hague, 1920,pp. 7-8.)

The Report of the 1920Advisory Committee of Jurists in turn stated:Le maintien de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage aux côtésde la nouvelle
Cour - et de fait dans le mêmebâtiment, comme c'est encore le cas
aujourd'hui - étaitvucommeune confirmation de «la conclusion quela
nouvelleCour aura enprincipe lecaractèred'une courdejustice »(Docu-

ments,op.cit.,p. 115).La coexistence de la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale avecla Cour permanente d'arbitrage etd'autrestribunaux
arbitraux a été expressémentreconnue à l'article 1du Statut de la Cour,
ainsilibellé:
((Indépendamment de la Cour d'arbitrage, organiséepar les

conventions de La Haye de 1899et 1907,et des tribunaux spéciaux
d'arbitres, auxquelslesEtats demeurenttoujours libres de confier la
solution de leurs différends,il est institué, conformément à l'ar-
ticle 14du Pacte de la Sociétédes Nations,une Cour permanente de
Justiceinternationale. »

Lesparties ont toujours eu la possibilitéde recourir àl'arbitrage. On leur
donnait désormais,surune base potentiellementmondiale,le choixentre
l'arbitrage et un nouveau mécanisme - une cour de justice (voir aussi
B.C. J. Loder, The Permanent Court of International Justice», Report
of the Twenty-NinthConference of the Intemational Law Association,
Londres, 1920,p. 148).
M. Léon Bourgeois,représentant éminene ttdistinguédu Conseil de la
Société des Nations, a évoquécesidéeslorsque,prenant la parole lors de
la séanceinauguraledu comitédejuristes le 16juin 1920,il déclara:

La Cour de Justice doit êtreune véritableCour permanente. Ce
n'estpas simplement à des arbitres choisiséventuellementen casde
conflit par les parties intéressée, 'estàun petit nombre de juges
siégeantconstamment,recevantun mandat dontla durée permettra
l'établissement d'une véritablejurisprudenceq , u'ilappartiendra de
dire le droit. Cette permanence est un symbole. C'estun siègeélevé
au milieu des nations, où toujours sont présentslesjuges, versqui

puissetoujours seporter l'appel des faibleset se dresserla protesta-
tion du droit violé.Choisisnon en considérationde 1'Etatauquel ils
appartiennent mais à raison de leur autoritépersonnelle, de leur
passé,du respectquis'attache àleurnomconnu du monde entier,ces
juges représenterontlevéritable esprit international, quin'estnulle-
ment, comme on l'a prétendu,la négation deslégitimesintérêtd se
chaque nation, mais qui est, au contraire, la sauvegarde de ces inté-
rêts,dans la limite mêmede leur légitimité.» (Cour permanente de
Justice internationale, comité consultatifdejuristes, Procès-verbaux
desséancesdu comité,16juin-24juillet 1920,avec annexes, LaHaye,
1920,p. 7-8.)

Le rapport du comitéconsultatifdejuristes de 1920indiquait quant à
lui: "In the Court of Arbitration,it falls to the parties to choosetheir
judges, afterthe commencement of the dispute; whereas in the case
ofthe Permanent Court of International Justice,the contesting part-
iesnolongerhavethe choiceofthejudges." ("Report ofthe Advisory
Committee of Jurists", Annex No. 1to the Procès-Verbauxo , p. cit.,
p. 695.)

Then, after referring (p. 696) to M. Bourgeois's opening speech, the
Report added :
"In contradistinction to the Court of Arbitration,the Permanent
Court of International Justice will really deserve its name, as it will
consist ofjudges, who will continue to sitfrom one caseto another;

the parties will not have to choosethem for this purpose, and with
one exception, whichwillbedealt with laterin connection withsum-
maryprocedure,theparties maynotfixthenumberofjudges." (Zbid.,
p. 698.)
The exception seeminglyreferred to draft Article 26 of the Statute read-
ing :

"With a view to the speedy despatch of business the Court shall
form, annually, a chamber composed of three judges who, at the
request of the contestingparties, may hear and determine cases by
summaryprocedure." (Ibid.,p. 719.)

Theparties couldfixthe number ofjudges only inthe senseof optingfor
thischamber with itsprefixed membership ofthree.

How was al1of this understood when the new Court was eventually
established? Addressing the Court on 15February 1922on the occasion
of its officia1opening, the Dutch Foreign Minister, M. Van Karnebeek,
said :

"Your responsibility is the greater because the States, who will
have recourse to you for justice, will have renounced the right of
freelychoosingtheir judges, an outstandingfeature of the systemof
arbitration which exists side by side with you under this roof."
(P.C.I.J.,SeriesD,No. 2,p. 322.)

To which PresidentLoderagreeablyreplied :
"Thejurisdiction ofthis Court differsfromarbitration.The judges
arenolonger to benominated bytheparties. Theyformapermanent
Court.
The procedure has no longerto be framed; it is laid down in the

Statute and in the Rules of Procedure.
Thetwoinstitutions exist sideby side; eachfulfils itsspecialduty ;
eachpossessesitsownsphere ofaction;both livepeacefullytogether
in thissamebuilding, like an older and a younger sister. «Avec la Cour d'arbitrage, cesont lesparties qui choisissentleurs
juges, après que lelitige est né;avecla Cour permanente de Justice
internationale, lesplaideurs ne doivent plus avoirle choix dujuge.»
(«Rapport du comitéconsultatif de juristes)), annexe no 1 aux

Procès-verbauxo, p.cit.,p. 695.)

Puis,aprèsavoir(p. 696)évoqué lediscoursinaugural de M. Bourgeois,le
rapport ajoutait:

«Paropposition à laCour d'arbitrage,laCour permanente deJus-
tice internationale méritera vraiment son nom parce qu'elle sera
composéedejuges qui siégerontd'affaireenaffaire,sansque lespar-
tiesaient àlesdésignerpour cerôleet,saufune exceptiondont ilsera
parléplusloinenmatièredeprocéduresommaire,sansqu'ilsoitper-
mis aux parties de déterminerle nombre des juges. » (Ibid.,p. 698.)

L'exception visait apparemment le projet d'article 26 du Statut ainsi
libellé

«En vue de la prompte expéditiondesaffaires, la Cour compose
annuellementune chambredetrois juges, appelée àstatuerenprocé-
dure sommaire,lorsque lesparties le demandent. »(Zbid.,p. 719.)

Lespartiespouvaientfixer lenombredesjuges seulementdanslamesure
où elleschoisissaientcettechambre dont lenombrede membresétaitfixé

à trois.
Commenttout cela a-t-il étécompris quand la nouvelle Cour a finale-
mentétécréée?S'adressant àlaCour le 15février1922àl'occasiondeson
inauguration officielle, le ministre néerlandais des affaires étrangères,
M.Van Karnebeek,déclara:
«Votre responsabilitéest d'autant plus grande que les Etats qui
s'adresserontàvous pour obtenir la justice auront renoncé au libre

choix desjuges, qui caractérisel'arbitrage établios côtéssous le
même toit.»(C.P.J.I.sérieDno2,p. 322.)

Le PrésidentLoderen convint lorsqu'ilrépondit :

«[L]ajuridiction [de la Cour]diffère de l'arbitrage. Lesjuges ne
sont plus ànommer par les parties. Ils sont là en Cour permanente.

La procéduren'estplus àfaire, elle est réglédans le Statut et les
Règlements.
Lesdeuxinstitutions existent l'uneàcôtéde l'autre,chacune rem-
plissant sa destination spéciale,chacune ayant sa sphère naturelle,
les deux vivant paisiblement ensemble dans cette mêmedemeure,
comme deux sŒursd'un âge différent. 1sthe younger organisation perfect ?Willits Statute never require
amendment? Nothing isperfect inthe hour ofitsbirth. Here alsothe
law of evolution will make itself felt." (P.C.I.J.Series D, No. 2,
pp. 329-330.)
Sothe structure ofthe institutioncouldbe changed and might need to be
changed. But, meanwhile, its character was that of a court ofjustice as
ordinarily understood. In the light of that character, it is not difficult to
imagine what might have been President Loder's reaction to a change
soughtto bebroughtabout byan amendment to the RulesofCourtfor the

purpose of giving the parties "a decisive influence" in the selection of
regular judges of the Court to sit on a chamber established under its
Statute, evenas recast forthe present Court in 1945.

This aspect may be summed up with these observations of Judge Kel-
loggin the case concerningthe FreeZones ofUpperSavoy andtheDistrict
of Gex:
"It is evident from a consideration of the circumstances which
called for the creation of this Court and the history of its organiza-
tion, as well as from a careful examination of the Court's Statute,
framed by aspecialcommittee ofjurists appointed bythe Council of
the League of Nations, that this tribunal is a Court ofjustice asthat

term is known and understood in the jurisprudence of civilized
nations." (P.C.I.J.,SerieA, No.24,p. 33.)
The idea that the Court was a court of justice in contradistinction to
being an arbitralbodyformedthe ground of opposition to two important
features, namely, that relating to chambers and that relating to ad hoc
judges. Although in both cases the desired provisions were made, the
material leaveslittleroomfor doubtthatthe basicjudicialcharacter ofthe
Court wasintended to prevailthroughout itsarrangements and function-
ing, Savein respect of variations clearly authorized by the Statute itself.

Asregards the idea of chambers,speaking in the Advisory Committee
ofJurists in 1920,Lord Phillimore framed his opposition this way:

"The idea of 1907to divide the Court into chambers,also is too
closelybound to the idea of arbitration,sincethese chambers would
be formed incasu.The Court must sit inplenoto be a real Court of
Justice... the number of judges was of secondary importance;the
essentialthing was that as far as possiblel1judges should sit at the
sametime." (Procès-Verbaux,op.cit.,1920,p. 175.)
Referring to the proceedings of the 1920Committee,Judge Hudson later
wrote:

"No basis for excludingsome members of the Court from Sitting
wasfound, and asthe debate progressed the 1920Committee ofJur-
istscametotheviewthat theunity ofthe Court required that itshould Laplusjeune est-elleparfaite,sonStatut nesera-t-iljamaisà modi-
fier? Rienn'estparfait àl'heuredela naissance. C'estaussipour elle
que la loi de l'évolutionse fera valoir.» (C.P.J.I. sérieD no 2,
p. 329-330.)

Ainsi, la structure de l'institution pouvait être modifiée eitl serait peut-
êtrenécessairede la modifier; mais, pour lors, son caractère étaitcelui
d'unecourdejustice ausensordinairedel'expression.Celaétant,onima-
gineaisémentcommentlePrésidentLoder aurait réagiàune tentative d'y
apporter une modification par le biais d'un amendement du Règlement
de la Cour visantà donner aux parties «une influence décisive»dans le
choix desjuges titulaires de la Cour devant siégeràune chambreconsti-
tuée envertudu Statut, mêmetel que celui-cia étéremanié pour la Cour
actuelleen 1945.

Cet aspect de la question peut êtrerésumépar ces observations de
M.Kelloggdans l'affairedesZonesfranchesdelaHaute-SavoieetduPays
de Gex:
«Ilestévident - celaressortdescirconstances quiontconduit àla
créationde laCour etdu développementhistoriquede sonorganisa-
tion,ainsiqued'un examenattentifdu Statut delaCour rédigé par un
comitéspécialde juristes désignépar le Conseil de la Société des
Nations - que la Cour est une cour de justice dans le sens où ce
terme est connu et entendu selonlajurisprudence desnations civili-

sées.»(C.P.J.I.sérieA no24,p. 33.)
L'idée que la Cour était une cour dejustice et non un organe arbitral
étaità la base de l'opposition qui s'estmanifestéeà l'encontre de deux
institutionsimportantes,à savoirleschambresetlesjuges adhoc.Bienque
dans les deux cas les dispositions souhaitéesaient été élaborées,nil'est
guère douteux, au vu des travaux préparatoires, que le caractèrefonda-
mentalementjudiciaire de laCour devaitprévaloirdans toutes lesmoda-
litésde son organisation et de son fonctionnement, sauf dérogations

clairementautoriséespar le Statut lui-même.
En ce qui concerne l'idée deschambres, lord Phillimore, dans une
déclaration faite devant le comité consultatif de juristes de 1920, a
expriméson opposition de la manièresuivante :
«L'idéede1907dediviserla Courenchambres estégalementtrop
liéeà celle de l'arbitrage,puisque les chambresseraient composées
in casu. Pour être une courde justice, il faut que la Cour siège
inpleno..lenombredejuges n'aqu'une importancesecondaire; l'es-
sentielc'estque, dansla mesure du possible,tous lesjuges siègenten

même temps. »(Procès-verbaux,opc.it., 1920,p. 174-175.)
Evoquant les débatsdu comitéde 1920,M. Hudson devaitécrire:

Onn'atrouvéaucuneraisonpour exclurecertains membresdela
Courlorsque celle-cisiégeait,etaufuret àmesure queledébatavan-

çaitle comitédejuristes de 1920enestvenu àconclurequel'unité de alwayssitinpleno;its proposa1tothis effectwasembodied inthe text
as adopted." (Hudson, ThePermanent CourtofInternationalJustice,
1943,pp. 173-174.)
The establishment of chambers was conceded as an exception to this

primary rule. Aswas noted by Lord Finlay,Article 25ofthe Statute .
"laid down that the full Court should sit except when expressly
provided otherwise. These exceptions were specially dealt with in
Articles 26 and 27 of the Statute" (P.C.I.J., SeriesD, No. 2, 11Feb-
ruary 1922,p. 28).

He accepted that the "Statute shouldbe interpreted broadly", but would
scarcelyhavethoughtthisasufficientwarrantfor theCourtto actthrough
chamberscomposed otherwisethan asexpresslyauthorized bythe Statute
itself.
Inthisconnection,apoint ofsome interestisthat, whereasArticle25of
the 1920Statute read, "The full Court shall sitexceptwhen it isexpressly
provided otherwise", Article 25 of the present Statute, while retaining

those words,prudentiallyadded thewords, "in thepresent Statute" (Doc-
uments of the UnitedNations Conferenceon International Organization,
San Francisco, 1945,Vol. XVII, p. 412, Sixth Meeting of the Advisory
Committee ofJurists, 12June 1945).The officia1records do not showthe
reasonforthe change,whichJudgeHudson wasprobablyrightin charac-
terizing as "merely stylistic" (Manley O. Hudson, "The Twenty-Fourth
Year of the World Court", AmericanJournal ofInternational Law, 1946,
Vol. 40, pp. 24-25).But, while no change of substance was involved, it
would seem clear that the stylistic change made was inspired by the
thought of bringing out and emphasizing an original principle of pre-
eminentimportance, namely, that exceptions to the general rule that the
full Court should alwayssit had to be authorized by express languagein
the Statute itself. Exceptionscouldnot be added by Rules of Court.

The question is :Can it be said that an ad hocchamber, as constituted
under the newRulesofCourt, fallswithinan exceptionwhichisexpressly
authorized bythe Statuteitselftothe dominant rulethat the Court should
sit inpleno?
Asregards ad hocjudges,heretoo, as iswellknown,the opposition was
mounted on the basis that the appointment of such judges was more
appropriate to arbitraltribunals than to courts ofjustice. The 1920Com-
mittee ofJurists was,ofcourse,aware ofpossible objections.Referring to
ahypothetical caseinwhichboth sideshad appointed an ad hocjudge, its
Report stated :

"In this particular, OurCourt more nearly resembles a Court of
Arbitration than a national Court of Justice. But this variation is
necessary.Though OurCourt is atrue Court, wemust not forgetthat
it is a Court between States. For the reasons already given, States
attach much importance to havingone oftheirsubjects onthe Bench la Cour exigeait qu'ellesiègetoujours inpleno; sa propositioà cet
effet a étéconsacrédeans letexte adopté.»(Hudson, ThePermanent
CourtofInternationalJustice,1943,p. 173-174.)

La création de chambresa été admise en tant qu'exception à cette règle
primaire. Commel'anoté lordFinlay, l'article25du Statut

«stipule que la Cour exerce ses attributions en séance plénière,
sauf exceptionsexpressémentprévues.Les exceptions en question
sont spécialement envisagées aux article 26 et 27 du Statut»
(C.P.J.I.sérieDno2, 11février1922,p. 28).
Il concédaitqu'il fallait ((appliquer le Statut d'une fa~on large», mais
n'auraitjamais imaginéqu'on puisse penser que cela habilitait la Courà
exercer sesattributions par letruchement de chambres composéesautre-

ment que ne l'autorisait expressémentle Statut lui-même.
A cetégard,iln'estpas inintéressantdenoterquetandis quel'article 25
du Statut de 1920stipulait«saufexceptionexpressémentprévue,laCour
exercesesattributions en séanceplénière »,l'article25du présent Statut,
tout en reprenant cestermes, a prudemment ajoutéles mots «par le pré-
sent Statut)) après le mot «prévue» (Documents de la conférencedes
Nations Unies sur l'Organisation internationale, San Francisco, 1945,
vol.XVII,p. 412,sixièmeséanceducomitéconsultatifdejuristes, 12juin
1945).Les actes officielsn'indiquent pas la raison de cettemodification,
que M.Hudson avaitprobablementraison de qualifier de ((purementsty-
listique» (Manley O. Hudson, «The Twenty-Fourth Year of the World
Court »,AmericanJournal of International Law, 1946,vol. 40, p. 24-25).
Mais, si ellene changerien quant au fond, il sembleque cette modifica-
tion stylistiqueait viséàfaireressortiràtsoulignerun principe originel
d'une importance prééminente, à savoirque toute dérogation àla règle
générale selon laquelle laCour doit toujours siéger enséance plénière
devaitêtre expressémentautorisép ear le Statut lui-même. e Règlement

de la Cour ne pouvait ajouter de nouvelles dérogationssupplémentaires.
Laquestion estlasuivante :peut-on direqu'une chambre ad hocconsti-
tuéeenapplicationdunouveauRèglementdelaCour constitueune déro-
gationexpressémentautoriséepar leStatutlui-même àlarègledominante
selonlaquellela Cour doit siégerinpleno?
Pour cequi estdesjuges ad hoc,làaussi,commechacun sait,une oppo-
sition s'estmanifestée aumotif que la désignationde tels juges était le
propre destribunaux arbitrauxplutôt que des cours dejustice. Lecomité
dejuristes de 1920étaitbien sûr conscient des objections possibles. Evo-
quant l'hypothèseoù les deux parties désigneraientun juge ad hoc,le
comitédéclarait :

«Souscerapport, notre Cours'écartedu type de lacour dejustice
interne pour serapprocher de la cour d'arbitrage. Mais cet écart est
nécessaire.Sinotre Cour estune cour, ilne faut pas oublierque c'est
une cour entre Etats. Et les Etats tiennent àfaire monter, quand ils
viennentdevantla justice, pour lesraisonsdéjàdonnées,un desleurs when they appear before a Court of Justice." ("Report of the Advi-
soryCommittee of Jurists", 1920,loc.cit.,p. 722.)

The Report thus recognizedthe substance ofthepoint made by M.Loder
whenhe said: "If the rightto choosesuchjudges weregiventothe parties,
this would givethe proceedings a characteristic essentiallybelonging to
arbitration." (Procès-verbaux,op.cit.,p. 531.See also, ibid.,pp. 169-170;
and B. Schenkvon Stauffenberg, Statut et Règlementde la Courperrna-
nente de Justice internationale, Eléments d'interprétation, Berlin 1,934,
pp. 181-182.)
Thus, although it was agreedto allow ad hocjudges, it wasappreciated
that this arrangement evinced an arbitral aspect which was not quite in

harmony with the fundamentaljudicial character of the Court as a court
ofjustice. Thearrangement had to be foughtfor andjustified on very spe-
cial grounds (see "Report of the Advisory Committee of Jurists", 1920,
loc.cit.,p. 721;the remarks of Lord Phillimorein Procès-Verbauxo ,p.cit.,
p. 528,and of Mr. Adatci, ibid.,p. 529;the remarks ofJudge Altamira on
23June 1926,in P.C.I.J.,SeriesD,AddendumtoNo.2,p. 26; the "Report
Presented by the French Representative, M. Léon Bourgeois, and
Adopted by the Council of the League of Nations at Its Meeting at Bms-
sels on October 27th, 1920",in League of Nations, Permanent Court of
InternationalJustice,DocumentsconcerningtheActionTakenbytheCouncil
oftheLeagueofNations underArticle14oftheCovenantand theAdoption
bythe AssemblyoftheStatute ofthePermanentCourt,p. 48 ;and the Regis-
trar's statementin 1932in P.C.I.J.,SeriesD,ThirdAddendumtoNo.2,p. 18,

footnote). And these special grounds are no doubt still valid. But a fair
interpretation is that the idea of selection ofjudges by the parties, which
that arrangement involved, was not intended tobe extended to casesnot
clearly authorized by the Statute, whether by express language or by
necessaryimplication.

How alien to the concept of a court ofjustice - even an international
court ofjustice - isthe notion ofparties nominatingits members,maybe
gathered from the grounds on whichaproposa1wasmade and rejectedin
the 1920CommitteeofJurists formembers ofa chamber ofthe Permanent
Court of International Justice to be designated bythe parties (Procès-Ver-
baux,op. cit.,pp. 183-184,517,524).M.Ricci-Busatti'swritten proposa1to
that effect was expresslyprefaced with the statement that the "Court of

Justice should be connected as intimately as possible with the Court of
Arbitration, the functions ofwhich it merely develops"(ibid.,p. 183).The
summaryrecord of the related discussions not surprisingly showedthat,
in his presentation,

"M. Ricci-Busatti personally started from an entirely different
conception :he maintained his point of viewthat too much distinc-
tionshould notbedrawnbetween thenewCourtandthe old Court of sur le siège.» («Rapport du comité consultatifde juristes », 1920,
loc.cit.,p. 722.)

Lerapport admettait ainsi la validitéde l'argument avancépar M. Loder

lorsqu'il déclarait«si l'ondonne auxparties ledroitde choisircejuge,on
setrouve enpleineprocédure d'arbitrage »(Procès-verbauxo ,p.cit.,p. 53;
voiraussi,ibid.,p. 169-170;etB.Schenkvon Stauffenberg, Statut etRègle-
mentdela CourpermanentedeJusticeinternationale,Elémentsd'interpréta-
tion,Berlin, 1934,p. 181-182).

Ainsi, bien qu'ayant décidéqu'il serait permis de désigner des
juges ad hoc,on avait conscienceque cet arrangement donnait àla Cour
une connotation arbitrale qui n'étaitpastout àfait en harmonie avec son
caractère fondamentalement judiciaire en tant que cour de justice. Les
promoteurs decesystèmeontdû sebattre pour lefaireaccepter, etlejusti-
fier par des motifstrès particuliers (voir ((Rapport du comitéconsultatif
dejuristes », 1920,loc.cit.,p. 72;lesobservationsdelord Phillimoredans
Procès-verbaux,op. cit., p. 528, et celles deM. Adatci, ibid.,p. 529; les

observations de M. Altamirale 23juin 1926,dans C.P.J.I.sérieD, adden-
dumau no2,p. 26; le«Rapport présenté par lereprésentantde la France,
M. Léon Bourgeois, etadopté parle Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations
réuni à Bruxellesle27octobre 1920»,dans Société desNations,Courper-
manentedeJusticeinternationale,Documentsrelatifsauxmesuresprisespar
le Conseilde la SociétédeN s ationsaux termesde l'article 14du Pacteet à
l'adoptionpar l'Assembléd eu Statut de la Courpermanente, p. 48; et la
déclarationdu Greffier en 1932dans C.P.J.Z.série D,troisièmeaddendum
au no2,p. 18,note de bas de page). Et ces motifs particuliers demeurent
sans aucun doute valides. Mais l'on doit admettre qu'iln'étaitpas prévu
d'étendrece système - et l'idéedu choix des juges par les parties qu'il
concrétise - auxcasdans lesquelsleStatutnel'autorisait pas clairement,
expressémentoupar implication nécessaire.
Lesmotifspour lesquelsune proposition tendant àce que lesmembres

d'une chambre de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale soient
désignés par lesparties a été faite et rejetéeu comitédejuristes en 1920
permettent de comprendre combien le principe d'une telle désignation
était étrangerà la notion de cour de justice - mêmede cour de justice
internationale (Procès-verbaux,op. cit, p. 183-184,517, 524). M. Ricci-
Busatti déclarait expressément, dans l'introductionde la proposition
écritequ'il aprésentée àcet effet: «Il convient que la Cour de Justice se
rattache autant que possible à la Cour d'arbitrage, dont elle ne fait que
développer les fonctions.» (Zbid.,p. 183.)Le compte rendu des débats
relatifàcetteproposition montre - celan'estpassurprenant - que dans
saprésentation :

«M.Ricci-Busatti[partait]personnellementd'une conceptiondif-
férente:il maintient son point de vue, àsavoir qu'ilne faut pas trop

distinguer entre la nouvelle cour et l'ancienne cour d'arbitrage, et32 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

Arbitration; that there wasno essentialdifference, especiallyininter-
national relations, between Arbitration and strict Justice" (Procès-
Verbaux,op.cit.,p. 177).
So his proposa1was frankly arbitral in character. M. Loder (with whom
M. de Lapradelleagreed) in consequence had littledifficulty in securing
its rejection onthe ground that, contraryto M.icci-Busatti'sconception,

the Court was indeed intended to be a court ofjustice (ibid.,p. 178;see
also, ibid.,p. 526; and James Brown Scott, TheProject ofa Permanent
CourtofInternationalJusticeandResolutionsof the Advisoy Committeeof
Jurists,Reportand Commentary,1920,pp. 27-28).Oncethe latter view of
the character ofthe Court was upheld, asit was,the proposa1wasbound
to fall. Using languageuncannily anticipatory of someused in reference
to the new Rules, M. Ricci-Busatti had urged that "it was desirable to
allowthe Parties,eitherdirectlyorthroughthe President, to haveacertain
influence on the composition of the section" (Procès-Verbauxo ,p. cit.,
p. 526).Theidea didnot find favour, M. Loder and BaronDescamps,the
President of the Committee, pointing out "that this method would too
much resemble that proper to arbitration" (ibid.).Can it be said that the
juridical character ofthepresent Court issosignallydifferentfrom that of
itspredecessoras tojustify acceptance now in place of rejection then?

Far fromthere being any difference, the present Court has repeatedly
affirmed,in relation to itself,the substance ofearlierpronouncements by
its predecessor about its status as a court ofjustice.pite someinitial

doubt as to the precise juridical relationship between the Permanent
Court, in its advisory role, and the Council of the League of Nations, as
early as 1923the Court had occasion to observethat the "Court, being a
Court ofJustice,cannot, eveningivingadvisoryopinions, depart fromthe
essentialrulesguidingtheir activityasaCourt" (StatusofEastem Carelia,
P.C.I.J.,eriesB,No.5,p. 29).That referenceto "the Court, beinga Court
of Justice", was repeated by the Permanent Court in the case of theFree
Zonesof UpperSavoy andtheDistrictofGex (loc.cit.,p. 15).The emphasis
hasbeen maintained bythe present Court in severalcases.See,for exam-
ple, the case of the Constitutionof theMaritimeSafety Committeeof the
Inter-GovernmentalMaritimeConsultative Organization wherethe Court
said:"The Court asajudicialbody is ...bound,inthe exerciseofitsadvi-
soryfunction, to remainfaithful to the requirements ofitsjudicial charac-
ter." (I.C.J. Reports 1960,p. 153.)The case of the Applicability ofthe
ObligationtoArbitrate underSection21oftheUnitedNations Headquarters
Agreementof 26June1947represents a recent reaffirmation bythe Court
of its status as a "Court ofjustice"I.C.J.Reports1988,p. 29,para. 40).
More particularly, using language which differences in context do not

render inapplicable to the situation being considered, in the Northem
Cameroons casethe Court said :
"There areinherentlimitations onthe exerciseofthejudicial func-
tion which the Court, as a court ofjustice, can never ignore. There qu'iln'yapas de différenceessentielle,surtoutdans le domaine des
rapports internationaux, entre la fonction arbitrale et la fonction
judiciaire»(Procès-verbauxo , p. cit.,p. 177).

Ainsi, sa proposition était de nature franchement arbitrale. M. Loder
(approuvésur cepointpar M. de Lapradelle) n'a donc guèreeu de diffi-
culté à en obtenir le rejet, au motif que, contrairemenà ce que pensait
M. Ricci-Busatti,laCour devaitbien être une courdejustice (ibid.,p. 178;
voir aussi, ibid.,p. 526;et James BrownScott, fie Projectofa Permanent
CourtofInternationalJusticeand ResolutionsoftheAdvisoryCommitteeof
Jurists, Reportand Commentaty,1920,p. 27-28). A partir du moment où
cetteconceptiondu caractèredelaCourétaitainsiconfirmée,laproposi-
tion ne pouvait qu'être rejetéeE.n des termes qui anticipentétrangement
ce qu'on a ditau sujet du nouveau Règlement,M. Ricci-Busattiavaitfait
valoir qu'ilétait«désirable delaisseraux parties directement,ou par l'in-
termédiairedu Président,une certaineinfluencesur la composition de la

section» (Procès-verbaux,op. cit, p. 526). L'idée ne fut pas retenue,
M. Loder et le baron Descamps,président du comité,faisant valoir que
((cetteméthode rappelleraittrop cellepropre àl'arbitrage» (ibid.).Peut-
on direque lecaractèrejudiciairedel'actuelleCour estsinettementdiffé-
rent de celui de la Cour qui l'a précédée qu'il soit justifié d'accepter
aujourd'hui cequ'alorson avaitrejeté?
Bienau contraire :la Cour a maintesfoisrepris, en substance, les vues
expriméespar la Cour permanente de Justice internationale au sujet de
son statut en tant que cour de justice. Malgréun doute initial quant àla
relation juridique précise entre la Cour permamente, dans son rôle
consultatif,etle Conseil de la SociétédesNations, dès 1923la Cour a eu
l'occasionde déclarerque «la Cour, étant une cour dejustice, ne peut se
départirdesrèglesessentiellesquidirigentson activitédetribunal, même
lorsqu'elle donne des avis consultatifs» (Statut de la Carélieorientale,
C.P.J.I.sérieBno5,p. 29).Cette affirmation, «la Cour, étant une courde
justice)), a été reprisepar la Cour permanente dans l'affaire des Zones
franchesde Haute-SavoieetduPaysde Gex(1oc.cit,p. 15).L'actuelleCour

a fait de mêmedans plusieurs affaires. Par exemple, dans l'affaire de la
Compositiondu Comitéde la sécuritémaritime de l'Organisation intergou-
vernementale consultativede la navigation maritime,la Cour a déclaré:
«En tant que corpsjudiciaire, la Cour doit dans l'exercicede sa fonction
consultative rester fidèle aux exigences de son caractère judiciaire.))
(C.I.J. Recueil1960,p. 153.)Plus récemment, à l'occasion de l'affaire de
1'Applicabilitéel'obligationd'arbitrageen vertudela section21del'accord
du26juin 194 7relatifau siègedel'OrganisationdesNations Unies,la Cour
a une nouvelle fois réaffirméqu'elle avaitle caractère d'une «cour de
justice»(C.I.J. Recueil1988,p. 29,par. 40).Plusparticulièrement,en des
termesque la différencede contextene rend pas inapplicables à la situa-
tion àl'examen,laCoura déclaré dansl'affaire duCamerounseptentrional:

«Il y a des limitationsinhérentes àl'exercicede la fonctionjudi-
ciairedontlaCour,en tant quetribunal, doittoujourstenir compte. Il33 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS). P.SHAHABUDDEEN)

may thus be an incompatibility between the desires of an applicant,
or,indeed, ofbothpartiestoa case,onthe onehand, andon theother
hand the duty of the Court to maintain its judicial character. The
Court itself,and not the parties, must bethe guardian ofthe Court's
judicial integrity.".C.J.Reports1963,p. 29.)

Atpage 30,the Court insightfully added
"That Ljudicial]function is circumscribed by inherent limitations
which are none the less imperative because they may be difficult to
catalogue,and maynotfrequentlypresent themselvesasaconclusive

barto adjudication in a concrete case."
Although certain specific rules were also involved, it seems clearthat
the refusa1ofthe Court inthe FreeZones ofUpperSavoy andtheDistrictof
Gexcaseto accedeto therequest ofthe partiesthatthe Court should com-
municate to themunofficiallythe resultsofitsdeliberationsillustratesthe
operation of an inherent limitation which the Court could not ignore

(P.C.I.J.,SeriesA, No.22,p. 12).That limitation flowed essentially from
the status of the Court as a court ofjustice. It is possible to see a similar
inherentlimitation,relating tothe audialterampartemprinciple, underly-
ingmuch ofthe thinking ofthe Court inthe StatusofEastern Careliacase
(P.C.I.J.,Series B, No.5).So too with the cases of the Judgments ofthe
Administrative Tribunalof theIL0 uponComplaintsMade against Unesco
(I.C.J.Reports 1956,p. 77),Applicationfor Review of Judgement No.158
of the UnitedNationsAdministrative Tribunal(I.C.J.Reports1973,p. 166)
and Applicationfor Review of Judgement No2 . 73 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal(I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 325). In the first of
these Judge Winiarskinoted that the

"important problem whichthe Courthadto resolvewasto reconcile
its advisory function and its character as a Court of Justice, as an
independentjudicial organ of international law" (p.104).

Alikeinherent limitation, it is submitted, prevents the Court fromllow-
ingitsdecision asto which of itsregular Membersshould sitin any parti-
cularcase to be in the least influenced by the contestingparties.
Thehistory of the creation of the Permanent Court makes it clear that
the concept of a court ofjustice to whichthe Court was intended to con-
form was that of a court ofjustice as generally understood in municipal
law.That being so, warnings about the danger of transposing municipal
law ideas to the international plane would not seem apt in this context.

Thefact that the Court wasto function onthe internationalplane wasnot
regarded as importing any substantialmodifications of the essential ele-
ments of that conceptin its application to the Court. This would seemto
put limitsto attemptstojustify the newsystembyreferenceto theinterna-
tionalnature ofthe Court. Itistrue, for example,that Stateswhichentrust peut ainsi y avoir incompatibilité entre, d'un côté, les désirsd'un
demandeur ou mêmedesdeuxparties àune instance et,de l'autre,le
devoir de la Cour de conserver son caractèrejudiciaire. C'est à la
Cour elle-mêmeet non pas aux parties qu'il appartient de veiller à
l'intégritde la fonctionjudiciaire de la Cour.»(C.I.J. Recueil1963,

P.29)
La Cour ajoutait de manièrepénétrante :

«Cette fonction Ljudiciaire]est soumise à des limitations inhé-
rentes qui, pour n'être ni facilesasser,ni fréquentesen pratique,
n'en sont pas moins impérieuses en tant qu'obstacles décisifsau
règlementjudiciaire. »(Ibid., p.30.)

Bienque desrèglesspécifiquesfussentaussiencausedans l'affairedes
Zonesfranches deHaute-SavoieetduPaysdeGex,ilsembleclairque, dans
le refus de la Cour d'accéderàla demandetendant àcequelaCour com-
muniqueofficieusement aux parties, commecelles-cileluidemandaient,
les résultatsde ses délibérations,on puisse voir l'effet d'une limitation
inhérente que la Cour ne pouvait ignorer (C.P.J.I. sérieA no22,p. 12).
Cettelimitationdécoulaitessentiellementdu statutdela Cour entant que
courdejustice. Onpeut voir l'effetd'une limitationinhérentesemblable,
liéecettefoisauprincipeaudialterampartem, à labased'unebonne partie
du raisonnement de la Courdans l'affairedu Statut dela Carélieorientale
(C.P.J.I. sérieB no5),ainsi que dans l'affaire des Jugements du Tribunal

administratif de l'OITsur requêtes contrel'Unesco(C.I.J. Recueil1956,
p. 77)et dans cellesde la Demandede réformationdujugement no158du
TribunaladministratifdesNations Unies(C.I.J.RecueilI973,p. 166)etdela
Demandede réformationdujugement no273du Tribunaladministratifdes
Nations Unies (C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 325). Dans la première de ces
affaires,M. Winiarskinotait :

«le grand problèmeàrésoudre,pour la Cour, c'étaitde conciliersa
fonction consultative avec son caractèrede Cour dejustice, organe
judiciaire etindépendant du droit internationa8 (p.104).

Une limitation inhérente similaireinterdità mon avis àla Cour de per-
mettre aux partiesà un litiged'influencer en quoi que ce soit sa décision
quant à ceux de ses membres qui doivent siégerdans l'affaire en cause.
L'histoire de la créationde la Cour permanente montre que c'est la
notion de cour dejustice telle que cettenotion s'entend généralementen
droit interne que la Cour devait incarner. Ceci étant,les mises en garde
contre ledanger detransposer desconcepts de droitinterneau plan inter-
national ne semblentpas justifiées dans le présent contexte.On n'a pas
considéréquelavocationinternationale delaCourmodifiesubstantielle-
ment les éléments essentielsde cette notion dans son application à la
Cour. L'argumenttendant à justifier le nouveau systèmepar la vocation
internationale de laCoursembleainsid'une pertinence limitée. Il estvrai
par exemplequelesEtatsquisoumettentun litige àun tribunal internatio-34 DISPUTE(ELSALVADOR/HONDU(R DAIS).P.SHAHABUDDEEN)