Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SCHWEBEL

1 have voted in favour of the Court's rejection of the United States
request to dismiss Nicaragua's case onjurisdictional grounds. 1have sup-
ported the Court's indication of three provisional measures, namely :

- the United States should not restrict access to and from Nicaraguan
ports, particularly by mine-laying ;
- the United States and Nicaragua should each ensure that no action
is taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the
Court ;
- the United States and Nicaragua should each ensure that no action is
taken which might prejudice the rights of the other in implementing
whatever decision the Court may render.

1 emphatically dissent, however, from a fourth provisional measure
which appears as operative paragraph B 2 of the Court's Order. That
paragraph provides that :

"The right to sovereignty and to political independence possessed
by the Republic of Nicaragua, like any other State of the region or of
the world, should be fully respected and should not in any way be
jeopardized by any military or paramilitary activities which are pro-
hbited by the pnnciples of international law ..."

In my view,that paragraph's emphasisupon the rights of Nicaragua - in a
case in whch Nicaragua itself is charged with violating the territorial
integrity and political independence of its neighbours - is unwarranted.

Worse than that, it isincompatible with thepnnciples of equality of States
and of collective secunty which are paramount in contemporary interna-
tional law and which the Court, as the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, is bound to uphold.

A. Considerationsof Fact
In its Application instituting proceedings, Nicaragua has made grave
charges against the United States, essentially that the United States : "is using militas. force against Nicaragua and intervening in Nica-
ragua's intemal affairs, in violation of Nicaragua's sovereignty, ter-
ritorialintegrity and political independence and of the most funda-
mental and universally accepted principles of international law".

In particular, Nicaragua charges that the United States has created,

trained, financed, supplied and directed an "army" of "mercenaries"
who are attacking human and economic targets inside Nicaragua.
The United States has met Nicaragua's Application and its accom-
panyingrequest for the indication of provisionalmeasures by challenging
thejurisdiction of the Court. Its Agent stated that in Mew ofthe absence
of jurisdiction, the United States would not debate the facts alleged by
Nicaragua,thoughheemphasizedthat theUnited States "has admitted no
factual allegationsof Nicaragua whatsoever".Nevertheless,in the courseof
the oral proceedings, and in exhibits submitted by the United States,
chargeswereadvancedby theUnited StatesagainstNicaragua of agravity
no lessprofound than the charges of Nicaragua against the United States.
Moreover, the United Statesplaced on record such chargesmade not only
by the United States,but by the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador
and Honduras. Furthermore, the extensive exhibits submitted by Nicara-
gua in support of its Application and request contain, at multiple points,

recitations of substantially the same charges against Nicaragua by the
United States and other sources.
A few illustrations from the exposition of United States counsel will
make the position clear. Quoting "one of the documents upon which
Nicaragua has relied in protesting its innocence", the United States Agent
read out the followingpassagefrom the Report of theUnited States House
of RepresentativesPermanent SelectCornmitteeon Intelligenceof 13May
1983which is found in Nicaraguan Exhibit X, tab 1 :
"[C]ontrary to the repeated denials of Nicaraguan officials, that
country is thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran insur-
gency ... It is not popular support that sustains the insurgents ...
[Tlhis insurgency depends for its life-blood - arms, ammunition,

financing, logisticsand command-and-control facilities - upon Nica-
ragua and Cuba. This Nicaraguan-Cuban contribution to the Salva-
doran insurgency is longstanding. ..It has provided - by land, sea
and air - thegreatbulk of thernilitaryequipmentand support received
by the insurgents."

United States counsel also maintained

"The new Government of Nicaragua. ..departed from its early
promise of rebuildingits own Societyon a pluralistic and democratic
basis. It turned instead to an increasingly authoritarian interna1pol-
icy.It initiated a massivebuild-up ofitsmilitaryforcesunprecedented
in the region. .. Nicaragua also became deeply involved in insurgenciesin neigh-
bouring countries, in furtherance of its 'active promotion for "revo-
lution without frontiers" throughout Central America'. This quota-
tion is found in Nicaragua's Exhibit V, tab 10,at pages 5 to 6.

The results have been a tragedy for al1of Central America ...

Although Nicaragua's greatest efforts have gone towards support-

ing Salvadoran guerrillas, it has also promoted guerrilla violence in
other Central American countries. Costa Rica, Honduras and Gua-
temala have al1been affected.
At the same time, Nicaragua's armed forces have conducted open
armed attacks across itsborders. Hondurashas repeatedly protested
armedincursions into itsterritory andwaters, whichhave resultedin a
loss of Honduran lives and destruction of property. Costa Rica has
protested Nicaraguan militaryincursions, shelling of its border posts
and seizures of fishing vessels within Costa Rican waters ...

As Nicaraguan support of such activities increased, Nicaragua's
neighbours turned to the United States for security assistance. At
the same time, the threat posed by Nicaragua to the other Central
American countries has also resulted in increased CO-operation
among those countries in collective self-defence measures.

Nicaragua itself has not been immunefrom the violence spreading
throughout the region. The failure to date of the Government of
Nicaragua to fulfil the early promises of pluralism, democracy and
justicehasled to thegrowth ofpoliticaloppositioninNicaragua. That
Government has been accused by its own former collaborators of
betraying the promises of the revolution ...

In responseto these policies, manyNicaraguans, includingleaders
of the 1979 revolution and former high-ranking members of the

SandinistaGovernmentitself, have since 1980gone into armedoppo-
sition to achieve the original goals of the revolution..

Nicaragua has accused other nations of instigating and supporting
the opposition movements within its own territory. But just as it
cannot be argued that violence in El Salvador or other neighbouring
countries is exclusively the result of Nicaraguan and Cuban aggres-
sion, Nicaragua's Government cannot pretend that its armed oppo-
sition is solely a creature of outside forces."

Apparently by way of pre-empting such accusations,counsel for Nica-
ragua filed an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to by Miguel d'EscotoBrockmann, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Nicaragua, which was
expounded in Court in some detail. It declares:

"1 am aware of the allegations made by the Government of the
United States that my Govemment is sending arms, ammunition,
communicationsequipment and medical supplies to rebels conduct-
ing a civil war against the Govemment of El Salvador. Such allega-
tions arefalse.and constitute nothingwmore than aDretextfor the U.S.
to continue its unlawful military and paramilitary activities against
Nicaragua intended to overthrow my Government. In truth, my
Goveniment is not engaged, and has not been engaged, in the pro-
vision ofarms or other supplies to either of thefactions engagedin the
civil war in El Salvador."

The affidavitfurther submits that, in respect of "the falseaccusationsthat
the Government of the United States has made against Nicaragua" in
respect of unlawful arms trafficking in Central America :

"It is interesting that only the Govemment of the United States
makes these allegations, and not the Govemment of El Salvador,
which is the supposed victim of the alleged arms trafficking. Full
diplomaticrelations existbetweenNicaragua and ElSalvador.Yet, El
Salvadorhas never - not once - lodged a protest with my Govern-
ment accusing it of complicityin or responsibility for any traffic in
arms or other military supplies to rebel groups in that country."

The accuracy of the Foreign Minister's affidavit of 21 April 1984may be
measured against a statement made on 10November 1983in the General
Assembly of the United Nations by the representative of El Salvador :

"We know that Central America is now a region in turmoil, and
hencewehaveacted with themost scrupulous respectfor theprinciple
ofnon-interventionin theaffairs of Ourneighbours.Nicaragua, on the
contrary, has followed an interventionist policy, and the accumula-
tion of evidence singles out the Government of Nicaragua as the
primary factor in the instability of Central America.

Thus my country has been the victim, among other warlike and
hostileacts, of a continuing trafficin weapons, with Nicaragua asthe
lastlink in the chain. From there orders are sent to armed groups of
the extreme left operating in El Salvador. These groups have their
headquarters in Nicaragua and logisticsupport ischannelled through
them." (A/38/PV.49, p. 17.)194 MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (DISSO. P.SCHWEBEL)

B. Considerationsof Law

In thecurrent phase of theproceedings,which areconcerned solelywith
the indication of provisionalmeasures to preservethe respectiverights of
eitherParty,theCourtis innoposition to weighorresolvetheseconflicting
factual allegations. Yet what conclusion does the Court draw for its indi-
cation ofprovisionalmeasures ? In its operativeparagraph B2, it callsfor
full respect of the right to sovereignty and political independence of
Nicaragua, a right which, "like any other State of the region or of the
world", Nicaragua possesses. Thus the Court, to its credit, does not over-
lookentirelytherights of Statesother than Nicaragua. Nevertheless,it can
hardly be said to givethe expressemphasis to the rights of Costa Rica, El
Salvador and Honduras which it gives to those of Nicaragua, and
designedly so.
It rnaybe assumedthat theCourt doesnot mean to denytheundeniable,

namely,that thepreservation of the livesand property of inhabitants of El
Salvador,Honduras and CostaRica isjust asurgent andjust aspreciousas
thepreservation of the livesand property of the inhabitants of Nicaragua.
It rnay equally be presumed that the Court places on the same plane the
lives of United States citizens who rnaybe present in El Salvador, Hon-
duras and Costa Rica on mission in pursuance of the support of the
Government of the United Statesfor the Governments of those countries
as the livesof citizensof Cubaor the SovietUnion whornay be present in
Nicaragua on mission in pursuance of support which those two States
extend to the Nicaraguan Govemment.
Rather, the unwillingnessof the Court to apply the principles of inter-
national law whichoperativeparagraph B 2 of its Order recalls against as
wellas in favour of Nicaragua, its unwillingnessto apply those principles
equallyand expresslyin favour of El Salvador,Honduras and Costa Rica,
must stemfrom the fact that those three States are not parties to the case
beforethe Court. Presumably,the Court doesnot apply theseprinciplesin

favouroftheUnited States,whichisaPartyto thecase, becauseitisnot the
object of military and paramilitary activities of Nicaragua - a presump-
tion, however,which rnay not wholly accord with the facts, in so far as it
rnay be true that allegedNicaraguan support of subversion of its neigh-
bours affects United States advisers on mission in those neighbouring
countries.
It is preciselythispreoccupation of the Court on suchgrounds with the
rights ofNicaragua alonewhichissoobjectionable,asa matter oflaw,asa
matter of equity, and as a matter of the place of the Court as theprincipal
judicial organ of the United Nations.
It should initially be recalled that it is indisputable that the Courtis
empowered to issue measures of interim protection which apply to an
applicant no lessthan a respondent State. This is true evenwhere - as in
this case therespondent State doesnot requestthat provisional measures
be directed towards the applicant. Thus Article 41 of the Statute of the
Court provides that the Court shall have the power to indicate, if itconsiders that circumstancesso require, any provisional measures which
ought to be taken "to preservethe respectiverightsofeitherparty". Article
75, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court provides that :
"When a request for provisional measures has been made, the
Court may indicate measures that are in whole or in part other than
those requested, or that ought to be taken or complied with by the
party whch has itself made the request."

The Court exercisedprecisely such a power in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
case, issuing a balanced Order directed to both Iran and the United
Kingdom. It justified its so doing in these terms :

"Whereas the objectofinterim measuresofprotectionprovided for
in theStatute istopreservetherespectiverightsof thePartiespending
the decision of the Court, and whereas from the general terms of
Article 41 of the Statute and from the power recognized by ... the
Rules of Court, to indicate interim measures of protection proprio
motu, it followsthat theCourt must be concernedto preserveby such
measurestherightswhichmaybesubsequentlyadjudged by theCourt
to belong either to the Applicant or to the Respondent." (I.C.J.
Reports 1951,p. 93.)

The Court exercised a like even-handed authority in its indication of
provisional measuresin the FisheriesJurisdictioncase (UnitedKingdom v.
Iceland) (I.C.J. Reports 1972, pp. 12, 16, 17-18),and in the companion
FisheriesJurisdictioncase (FederalRepublicof Germanyv. Iceland) (ibid.,
pp. 30,34-36). In al1three cases,the Court took care to preserve the rights
of the defendant State, even though, in al1three cases, the defendant was
not evenrepresented at theCourt's hearingson therequestsfor indication
of provisional measures.

Nevertheless, Article 41 provides for provisional measures to preserve
the rights of "either party".Does that debar provisional measures in this
casewhich are directednot against Nicaragua'sallegedactsprejudicialto
the rights of the United States but to the rights of third parties, namely,
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras ? A reasonable construction of
Article 41 appears to exclude the rights of third States which have not
intervenedasparties to the case. However, such a conclusion,on thefacts
of the case now before the Court, would be quite beside the point.
For the point is that the rights of the United States are at issue in this

case - not simply the rights of the United States as defendant, but the
rights it may affirmativelyassert against Nicaragua.And those rights are
by no means limitedto suchassaults on the persons or property of citizens
of the United States as alleged Nicaraguan activities may directly or
indirectlyentail. Rather,therights oftheUnited States whicharecentral to
this case are the rights ofl1States which are central to modern interna-
tional law and life:those that spring from "the most fundamental anduniversally acceptedprinciples of international law" invoked by Nicara-
guain itsApplication. Thesefundamental rights of a State to livein peace,
free of the threat or use of force against its territorial integrity or political
independence, are rights of every State, ergaomnes.They do not depend
upon narrow considerations of privity to a dispute before the Court. They
depend upon the broad considerations of collective security.

At theoutset of theoralargument,the Agent ofNicaraguamade whathe
describedasanother "evident observation", namelythat the United States

claim that the indication of interim measurescould irreparably prejudice
the interests of a number of States put in issue "the right of the United
States to speak on behalf of other countries". "What right", he asked,
"does the United States have to act as guardian of these countries before
the Court ?"
That question evidencesaprofound misunderstanding of the veryprin-
ciplesofinternational lawwhichNicaragua hasinvoked.For iftheconcept
ofcollectivesecurityhas any meaning,if theessentialsof theCharter of the
United Nations are tobe sustained, then everyState isindeedtheguardian
of the security of everyother State. The Charter speaks of the Peoples of
theUnited Nations unitingtheirstrength "to maintain international peace
and security" and of ensuring, "by the acceptance of principles and the
institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, Savein the
cornmon interest". The Charter's pnmary purpose is :

"To maintain international peace and security,and to that end :to
take effective collectivemeasures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggres-
sion .. ."

Under Article 2, paragraph 4, al1Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or politicalindependence "of any State". Under Article 51,"the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" ispreserved. These
bedrockprinciples ofmodern international lawarenot particular,bilateral
rules running between two States, in whose observance and realization
third States have no legal interest. On the contrary, they are general,
universalnorms which,whenprejudiced,impairthesecurity of third States
aswell.Not only doeseveryState have a legalinterest in the observance of
the principles of collective security;it is one of the most important legal

interests which any State can have.

In itsJudgment of 18July 1966in the SouthWestAfricacases,theCourt
- by the President's casting vote, the votes being equally divided -
declined to allow "the equivalentof an 'actiopopularis',orright residentin any member
of a community to take legal action in vindication of a public inter-
est. .. a right of this kind... is not known to international law as it
stands at present .. ."(South West Africa, Second Phase,Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1966,p. 47).

But that holding was rapidly and decisivelydisplaced by the Court's
Judgment in Barcelona Traction,where the Court - with only one dis-
senting vote - held :

"33. When a State admits into its territory foreigninvestments or
foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to
extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations
concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations,
however,areneither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essen-
tial distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis-à-visanother State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their
very nature the former are the concern of al1States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved,al1Statescan beheld tohavealegal
interest in their protection ;they are obligations erga omnes.

34. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary inter-
national law,from theoutlawingof actsof aggression ..." (Barcelona
Traction,LightandPowerCompany,Limited,Judgment, I.C.J.Reports
1970, p. 32.)

In acommentary ofcharacteristiccogencyon thislandmark holding,the
then Profesor Roberto Ago wrote :

"it seems unquestionable that, by making such affirmations, the
Court sought to draw a fundamental distinction with regard to inter-
national obligations ...it implicitly recognized that that distinction
shouldinfluencethedetermination ofsubjectsentitled toinvokeState
responsibility. In the Court's view,there are in fact a number, albeit
limited, of international obligations which,by reason of their impor-
tance to the international cornrnunity as a whole, are - unlike the
others - obligationsin respectofwhichal1Stateshavea legalinterest.
It follows, the Court held, that the responsibility flowing from the
breach of thoseobligationsisentailednotonly withregard to theState
that has been the direct victim of the breach (e.g.,a State which has
suffered an act of aggression in its territory);it is also entailed with
regard to al1the other members of the international cornrnunity.
EveryState, evenif it isnot immediately and directlyaffected by the

breach, should therefore be considered justified in invoking the
responsibility of the State comrnitting the internationally wrongful
act." (Fifth report on State responsibility,by Mr. Roberto Ago, Spe- cialRapporteur, Yearbookof theInternationalLawCommission1976,
Vol. II, Part One, p. 29.)

ProfessorAgothen proceeded to setout an impressivebody of doctrine, of
State practice, and of the literature of international law, in support of the
Court's holding in Barcelona Tractionand of his analysis of the thrust of
that holding (ibid.,pp. 28-54).He tightly ties the Court's holding to the
principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly those found in
Article 2, paragraph 3, Article 2, paragraph 4, and in Chapter VII.

It followsfrom the Court's holding in Barcelona Tractionthat the basic
tenets of modern international lawwhichit articulates govern - or should
govern - the Court's Order in this case. The United States has, in the
specific term of Barcelona Traction,"a legal interest" in the performance
by Nicaragua of its fundamental international obligations ; to use Ago's
words, "evenifit isnot irnrnediatelyand directlyaffected" by thebreaches
of international law which it attributes to Nicaragua, the United States

"should therefore beconsideredjustified in invokingtheresponsibility7'of
Nicaragua as the State which, the United States maintains, is at root
responsiblefor the internationally wrongful acts which are at issue in this
case. The United States should be consideredjustified in doing so before
this Court not because it can speak for Costa Rica, Honduras and El
Salvadorbut because the allegedviolation byNicaragua of theirsecurity is
a violation of the secunty of the United States.

Considerations of equity reinforce these conclusions of law. As Judge
Hudson wrote of the equitable principles of international law in his indi-
vidual opinion in the case of Diversion of Water from the River Meuse
(P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 70,p. 77) :

"It would seem tobe an important principle of equity that where
two parties have assumed an identical or reciprocal obligation, one
party which is engaged in a continuing non-performance of that
obligation should not be permitted to take advantage of a similar
non-performance of that obligation by the other party. . .'He who
seeks equity must do equity.' "

He who seeks equity must come to Court - as it is laid down in the
goveming maxim of equityin the comrnon law - with clean hands. Can it
be said, evenon the most provisionalevaluation of the facts, that it isclear
that Nicaragua's hands are so clean that the injunctions of operative
paragraph B2 of the Court's Order should not be directed to it as

well?
Nowit may beasked,if 1take thispositionas to operativeparagraph B2
of theCourt's Order, whydo 1not take it in respect of operativeparagraphB1, which concerns port access and mine-laying and is directed to the
United States alone ?
The essential reason is that the United States has placed before the
Courtno allegationsthat Nicaraguahaslaidminesin thewaters orports of
other States. It has drawn to the Court's attention a diplomaticest by
the Government of the Republic of Honduras of attacks by Nicaraguan
patrol boats on unarmed, civilian-operated fishing boats. (See the note
from the Foreign Minister of Honduras to the Foreign Minister of Nica-
raguaof 15April1983 whichisreproduced at United StatesExhibitIV,tab
B.)It has drawn to the Court'sattention adiplomatic protest by Honduras
of the mining of roads in Honduras "by the Sandinistaforces..with the
perverse intent to cause this type of indiscriminate bloody act in open
violation of the territorial integrity of Honduras"n act which caused
the death of United Statesournalists Dia1Torgerson and Richard Ernest

Cross,and injuries to a Honduran citizen,Francisco EdasRodriguez. (See
thenote from theForeignMinister of Hondurasto theForeignMinister of
Nicaragua of 30June 1983whichis reproduced at United States Exhibit
IV, tab C. See,also, the protest dated 8 July 1983allegingfurther acts of
mining of Honduran roads and other "hostile acts of the Government of
Nicaragua", ibid.)It has charged that Nicaragua has seizedfishingvessels
withinCostaRicanwaters (seethequotation abovefromtheoralargument
of United States counsel to the Court). But the United States has not
submitted to the Court chargesthat Nicaragua has mined the waters and
ports of neighbouring States.

It should, however, be observed that Nicaragua has introduced into
evidencea newspaper account of an address by the United States Perma-
nent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Jeane J. Kirk-

patrick, to the American Societyof International Law of 12April 1984
(Nicaraguan Exhibit IV,No. 2).Whilethat newspaper sumrnarydoesnot
advert to the point, the text of Ambassador Kirkpatrick's address States
that, on 23 March 1984,a member of the ruling Nicaraguan directorate
warned the President of Costa Rica "that other Central American ports
might be mined by insurgentgroups actingin solidarity with Nicaragua".
Butin the circumstancein which no such allegationhas been made before
the Court,1do not feelentitled to weighit in appraising provisions of the
Court'sOrder.

II. THEJURISDICTIO NF THE COURT TO INDICATE PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

The United States concentrated on advancing a battery of arguments
designed to demonstrate that the Court lacksjurisdiction in this case, on

the merits and in respect of the indication of provisionalmeasures. While
theCourt hasreservedto thenextphase oftheproceedingsthequestions ofthejurisdiction of the Court to entertain the dispute and the admissibility
ofNicaragua'sApplication,and whileno definitive viewscan be expressed

on jurisdictional questions at this stage, 1 think it right to give some
indication of why 1havejoined the Court in voting to reject the United
States request to remove the case from the Court's list.

Among the arguments made by the United States, two weremost stre-
nuously and ablyadvanced. The firstturned on thefailure of Nicaragua to
ratify the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. The second turned on the terrns of the United States
adherence of26August 1946to theCourt's compulsoryjurisdiction, under
the Optional Clause, which the United States purports to have altered on
6 April1984, and to the termsof theNicaraguan acceptance of theCourt's
compulsory jurisdiction should that acceptance be deemed to be in
force.

A. Nicaragua'sFailure to Ratify the Statute of the Permanent Courtof
International Justice

Nicaragua's Application instituting proceedings in this case bases the
jurisdiction of theCourt on thecontentions of asinglesentence :"Both the
United States and Nicaraguahaveacceptedthecompulsoryjurisdiction of
the Court under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court." Nicaragua has
never made a declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the present
Court's Statute. In theoralproceedings,Nicaraguainvokedsubmissions to
the Court'sjurisdiction on the part of the United States under Article 36,
paragraph 2, and on the part of Nicaragua under Article 36,paragraph 5.
That latter provision specifies :
"Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Perma-

nent Court of International Justice and which arestillinforceshall be
deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be accep-
tances of the compulsoryjurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice for theperiod which they still have to run and in accordance
with their terms."
Nicaraguamaintains that it deposited such a declaration under Article 36
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1929
which is "still in force".
However, the United Statesmaintains that the Nicaraguan declaration
of 1929 never came into force, for the reason that it could do so only if
Nicaragua's adherence to the Statute of the Permanent Court had come
into force,eitherbefore or after the deposit of the Nicaraguan declaration
of 1929.The United States contends that, while Nicaragua signed the
Protocol of Signatureof the Statute, itfailed toratify it byfailingtodeposit

with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations its instrument of
ratification. The details of these conflicting contentions should be reserved to the
nextphase of theproceedings. Sufficeitto saythat it appears tobe beyond
doubt that Nicaragua did not completeratification of the P.C.I.J. Statute
and that, in consequence,it wasofficiallytreated by the Permanent Court
and by the League of Nations as never having made a declaration which
came into force submitting to that Court's compulsoryjurisdiction. So
treating Nicaragua asnot havingmade a declaration in force wasand isin
accordance with the law of treaties.

That being the case,the United Statesrequest to strike the Nicaraguan
Application from the list would appear to bejustified - wereit not for the
followingfacts which did not comesufficientlyto lightin the courseof the
oral proceedings.
The first Yearbookof the International Court of Justice, that for 1946-

1947,contains, at pages 110-112,a table entitled :"Members of the United
Nations, otherStatesparties to the Statute and States to whichthe Courtis
open.(An asterisk denotes a State bound by the compulsoryjurisdiction
clause.)" (At p. 110 ; footnotes omitted.) A caption of the table reads :

"Deposit of declaration accepting
compulsoryjurisdiction.

State. Date. Conditions."
Nicaragua is listed thereunder, as follows :

"Nicaragua 24 IX 1929l Unconditional"

Footnote 1reads: "Declaration made under Article 36of the Statute of the
Permanent Court and deemedtobe stillin force(Article 36,5, ofStatute of
the present Court)." (Ibid., p. 111.)

Moreover,that Yearbookcontains a sectionentitled: "Communications
and declarations of States which are still bound by their adherence to the
Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice" (ibid.,p. 207; footnote omitted). Among the declarations of such
States which are then set out in full is that of Nicaragua :

"Nicaragua '.
Au nom de la Républiquede Nicaragua, je déclare reconnaître
commeobligatoireet sans condition lajuridiction de la Cour perma-
nente de Justice internationale.

Genève,le 24 septembre 1929
(Signed) T. F. MEDINA .

Footnote 1reads :
"Accordingtoa telegramdated November 29th, 1939,addressed to the League of Nations, Nicaragua had ratified the Protocol of Sig-
nature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(December 16th, 1920), and the instrument of ratification was to
follow.Notification concerningthedeposit of the saidinstrument hzs
not, however, been received in the Registry."

Furthermore, on page 221 of the same Yearbook, there appears still
another compendium of the texts of adherences to the compulsory juris-
diction, entitled :"List of States which have recognized the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or which are still bound
by theiracceptance of the Optional Clauseof the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (Article 36 of the Statute of the Interna-
tionalCourt ofJustice)." Nicaragua isamongthe States whicharelistedas
unconditionally bound. The date of signature of "24 IX 29" is the date
givenfor signature of the Optional Clause ;the column entitled "Date of
deposit of ratification" is left blank. That column appears to relate to the

date ofdeposit ofratification of thedeclarations and not of the Protocol of
Signature of the Statute.
Finally, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has published
annually since 1949a volume initially entitled : Signatures, Ratifications,
Acceptances, Accessions,etc., concerning theMultilateral Conventionsand
Agreements in respect of whichthe Secretary-Generalacts as Depositary.
That compendium for 1949contains, at page 18, a list entitled, "States
Whose Declarations Were Made Under Article 36 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and Deemed to Be Still in
Force". Among the States so listed is Nicaragua. The data is stated to be
derived from the Yearbookof the Court for 1947-1948.

The facts which flow from the foregoing may be summarized in this
way :(a) the Registry of the Permanent Court and the Secretariat of the
Leagueof Nations did not, as long as those institutions werein existence,
treat Nicaragua as party to the Statute, with the officia1consequence that

its declaration accepting the Court's compulsoryjurisdiction never came
into force ;(b) the Registry of the International Court of Justice and the
Secretariat of the United Nations from the outset of the life of the Court
and the Organization did treat Nicaragua, which became automatically
party to theStatute asan originalMember oftheUnited Nations, asaState
bound to this Court's compulsoryjurisdiction by reason of its 1929decla-
ration being deemed to be still in force.

How is it that such opposite conclusions could have been reached,
back-to-back as it were ?
A definitive conclusion of law on the foregoing facts must await the
judgment of the Court in the next phase of the proceedings. But it would
appear that the Registryof this Court and the Secretary-General maywell
have taken theposition that thedeclaration ofNicaragua of 1929accepting
the Permanent Court's compulsory jurisdiction, while never perfected,remainedin animperfect but not invalid state ;it couldhavebeenbrought
into force at any time during the life of the Permanent Court by trans-
mission to the Secretary-General of the League of the instrument of
ratification;but it wasnot brought into forceuntil Nicaragua ratified the
Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of this Court which is an
integralpart ofthat Charter.OnceNicaraguatook that step,itsdeclaration
made under Article 36of the Statute of the Permanent Courtand which -
bythe termsof that declaration alone - is"stillinforceshallbe deemed . ..
to be" an acceptance "of the compulsoryjurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice for the period" which it still has to run (Article 36,
paragraph 5, of the Statute).

It may be objected that what never came into force cannot be still in

force and that, accordingly,Nicaragua's ratification of the Charter could
not have givenlifetoa declaration whichhad neverbeenbrought into force
under the League.But the contrary position may find somesupport in the
French text of Article 36, paragraph 5 :

"Lesdéclarationsfaitesenapplication del'article36du Statut de la
Courpermanente de Justiceinternationalepour uneduréequin'estpas
encoreexpiréeseront considéréesd ,ans les rapports entre parties au
présentStatut, commecomportant acceptation de lajuridiction obli-

gatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice pour la durée restant à
courir d'après ces déclarations et conformémenta leurs termes."
(Emphasis supplied.)
It will be observed that the French text does not speak of declarations
"whichare stillin force" but declarations "for a duration whichhasnot yet
expired". This position arguably also finds support in the essential rea-
soning of thejoint dissenting opinion of Judges Sir Hersch Lauterpacht,
Wellington Koo and Sir Percy Spender in the case concerning the Aerial
Incidentof 27July 1955 (Israelv.Bulgaria),Judgment(I.C.J. Reports 1959,
p. 156).Furthermore, that distinguishedscrutinizer of the activitiesof the

Permanent Court and this Court, Judge Hudson, appeared to treat Nica-
ragua's declaration of 1929 as in force for the purposes of Article 35,
paragraph 5, of the Court's Statute. He accordinglywrote :

"The newparagraph 5wasinserted with the purpose of preserving
some of thejurisdiction of the Permanent Court for the new Court.
For the States whichhad depositedratifications on October 24, 1945,
the date on which the Statute entered into force, the provision must
operate as of that date. At that time, declarations made by the fol-
lowing States under Article 36 were in force, and 'as between the
parties tothe Statute'theprovision appliesto them: Argentina, Brazil,

Denmark, Dominican Republic, Great Britain, Haiti, Iran, Luxem-
bourg, NewZealand, Nicaragua, and El Salvador."(Manley O. Hud- son, "The Twenty-Fourth Year of the World Court", American Jour-
nalofInternationalLaw,Vol.40(1946),p. 34.Seealso M. O.Hudson,
"The Twenty-Fifth Year of the World Court", ibid., Vol. 41 (1947),
p. 10.)

As the argument of the United States in this case makes clear, Judge
Hudson was fully aware of the fact of Nicaragua's failure to ratify the
Statute of the Permanent Court, and of the legal conclusions which
authorizedorgans of the LeagueofNations and thePermanentCourt drew
from that failure.
The record is confused, because the footnote setting out the fact that
notification of the deposit of Nicaragua's instrument of ratification had
not been received, which is found at page 210 of the Court's Yearbook
1946-1947, and which has been quoted above, is not found in subsequent
Yearbooks until the Yearbook 1955-1956, where the following footnote
appears, at page 195 :

"According toa telegram dated November 29th, 1939,addressed to
the League of Nations, Nicaragua had ratified the Protocol of Sig-
nature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
(December 16th, 1920), and the instrument of ratification was to
follow.It doesnot appear, however,that theinstrument of ratification
was ever received by the League of Nations."
That footnote appears in al1subsequent Yearbooks to this day. Why the
footnote reappeared, and what the effect of its reappearance is or may be,
is not clear.
Nevertheless, at thisjuncture, the question is not whether the line of

reasoning which Judge Hudson apparently followed, and to which the
publications of the United Nations and the Court lend a substantial, but
not unambiguous, support, is correct, or whether the contrary view so
forcefullyexpounded by the United States Agent in the oral hearings is
correct.What isimportant isthat thefactsdescribed above are sufficient at
this stage to provide the Court with a basis, in respect of Nicaragua's
apparent adherence or alleged adherence to the Court's jurisdiction, on
whichthejurisdiction of theCourt in thiscase might be founded. In viewof
these facts, and of the precedents of the Court in finding a sufficient
jurisdictional basis on whch to indicate provisional measures, 1did not
find itpossible to vote to strike theNicaraguanApplication and request for
provisionalmeasuresfromthelist, despite the cogencyof theUnited States
argument.

B. Modification or Termination of the Declarationsof the
United States and Nicaragua

Among several other jurisdictional arguments advanced by United
States counsel, two stand out and ment provisional observations.

On 6 April 1984,the United Statessent to the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations a note with respect to the United States declaration of
1946accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the Op-
tional Clause. The note in part read :
"the aforesaiddeclarationshallnot apply to disputeswithanyCentral
American State or arising out of or related to events in Central
America,any of whichdisputesshall be settledin suchmanner as the

parties to them may agree.

Notwithstanding the terms of the aforesaid declaration, this pro-
vis0 shall take effect imrnediately and shall remain in force for two
years, so as to foster the continuingregional dispute settlement pro-
cess which seeksa negotiated solution to the interrelated political,
economic and security problems of Central America."

The United Statesobservesthat Nicaragua's Application of 9April 1984
falls squarely within the terms of the 6 April 1984note, since it poses a

dispute with a Central American State and arises out of or is related to
events in Central America.
Nicaragua maintains that the note is ineffective to modify or suspend
provisions of the United States 1946declaration, since the declaration,
whilenot reservingaright to Varyor suspendits terms,doesprovide that it
"shall remain in force for a period of five years and thereafter until the
expiration of six months after notice may be given to terminate this
declaration". Nicaragua contends that, sincetheUnited Statesdeclaration
may be terminated only on sixmonths' notice,it may not be modified or
suspended on lessnotice. It arguesthat the law of treaties is applicable to
theUnited Statesdeclaration,that that lawpermits termination of atreaty
in accordance with theterms of that treaty, and that the onlytermin point
is the provision for termination on six months' notice.

TheUnited Statescountered that the United Statesnote of 6April 1984
is not, and does not purport to be, a termination of its 1946declaration.
Rather, it is a modification "narrowly limited in time and geography".
Nicaragua's argumentationcameto the clairnthat, sincethe United States
did not reserve a right to modify or suspend operation of its 1946 decla-

ration,it couldnot doso.TheUnited Statescontended that "this argument
is simplyinconsistent with the practice of States and this Court". Citing
cases of this Court and various leading authorities, the United States
maintained that a bilateral agreement between States both of which have
filed declarationsunder the Optional Clausearises only on the filingof a
casebetweenthem;before that, thereisno consensualbond and "henceno
obligation of the respondent to the applicant to continue the terms of its
declaration". The United States relied on State practice, particularly
modifications of adherences to the compulsoryjurisdiction of the Perma-nent Court by Great Bntain, the Commonwealthcountries and Franceon
the outbreak of the Second World War expressly to exclude disputes
arisingout of the war, even though thedurations of those declarations had
not expired.

"If those States were entitled to determine unilaterally that a
change of circumstances had occurred and to revoke their declara-
tionscontrary to the timelimits specifiedin those declarations,surely
the United States may act similarly here."
A second argument advanced by the United States is that, under the

govemingprinciple of reciprocity,theUnited Statescould be bound by its
six-month notice proviso in relation to Nicaragua if Nicaragua had a
similar or greater notice period in its declaration. Nicaragua - on the
assumption that its declaration is valid at al1 - in 1929 accepted the
jurisdiction of the Permanent Court unconditionally. But surely, the Uni-
ted Statesargued, "such an unconditional acceptance wasnot intended to
bind a State in perpetuo".State practice - and the United States cited
examples of termination or modification of unconditional acceptances by
Paraguay and El Salvador - confirms that conclusion,as do the opinions
of leading authorities. Thus purportedly "unconditional" acceptances
such as Nicaragua's in 1929 "are, in fact, denounceable". Since, in this
case, Nicaragua's purported declaration was and is immediately termin-
able,the United Statesequally wasentitled to introduce a temporal quali-
fication into its declaration with immediate effect, in accordance with the
principle of reciprocity.

The response of Nicaraguan counsel to the foregoing contentions was
that,if a declaration is made unconditionally and there is no reference to
termination, the presumption is that it cannot be denounced except in
accordance with the principles of the law of treaties.
In myprovisional view,and subject to thepleadings of the Partiesin the
next phase of the proceedings, both of the jurisdictional arguments
advanced by theUnited States whichhavebeen summarizedin this section
of this opinion are so substantial as to require the most searchinganalysis
of the Court.
Nevertheless, 1 have not found it possible to conclude that, on either
ground or on the basis of the severalotherjurisdictional arguments of the
United States,thejurisdictional provisionsinvoked by Nicaragua do not,
prima facie, afford a basison which thejurisdiction of the Court might be
founded.
It is beyond dispute that the Court may not indicate provisional mea-
sures under its Statute where it has no jurisdiction over the merits of the

case. Equally, however, considerations of urgency do not or may not
permit the Court to establish itsjurisdiction definitivelybefore it issuesan
order of interim protection. Thus the Court has built a body of precedent
which affords it the authority to indicate provisional measures if the207 MILITARY AND PUILITARY ACTIVITIES (DISSO. P.SCHWEBEL)

jurisdiction whichhasbeenpleaded appears,prima facie,to afford abasis
on which the Court'sjurisdiction might be founded. Whether "might"
means "possiblymight" or "might well"or "might probably" isaquestion
of some controversy. The nub of the matter appears to be that, whilein
deciding whether it has jurisdiction on the merits, the Court gives the
defendant the benefit of the doubt, in decidingwhether it hasjurisdiction

toindicate provisional measures,theCourt givesthe applicant the benefit
of the doubt. In the present case, the Court, in my view, has given the
applicant the benefitof a great many doubts.
The resultis that Stateswhichhave,by one route or another, submitted
to the Court's compulsoryjurisdiction in advance of a particular dispute,
run theriskof beingthe objectof an order indicating provisional measures
even though (as in the Anglo-IranianOil Co.case) the Court may even-
tuallyconcludethatjurisdiction on the ments is laclung.Thus the tactical
disadvantage which the minority of States which has adhered to the
Optional Clause generally suffers, as compared with that majority which
has not submitted declarations under the Optional Clause at all, may be
markedly greater than was conceived at the time declarations were sub-
mitted or has been perceived since.

A readysolutionto thisproblem whichcomports with the maintenance
of the Court'sjurisdiction is not obvious. But one step which the Court
itselfan take is to ensure that the parties, at the stage of argument on
provisional measures, are afforded the time required to prepare to argue
issues ofjurisdiction in depth.A second step is to ensure that the Court
itself is afforded the requisite time to deliberate issues ofjurisdiction in
depth and to formulate its order in accordance with its interna1judicial
practice.

(Signed)Stephen M. SCHWEBEL.

Bilingual Content

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SCHWEBEL

1 have voted in favour of the Court's rejection of the United States
request to dismiss Nicaragua's case onjurisdictional grounds. 1have sup-
ported the Court's indication of three provisional measures, namely :

- the United States should not restrict access to and from Nicaraguan
ports, particularly by mine-laying ;
- the United States and Nicaragua should each ensure that no action
is taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the
Court ;
- the United States and Nicaragua should each ensure that no action is
taken which might prejudice the rights of the other in implementing
whatever decision the Court may render.

1 emphatically dissent, however, from a fourth provisional measure
which appears as operative paragraph B 2 of the Court's Order. That
paragraph provides that :

"The right to sovereignty and to political independence possessed
by the Republic of Nicaragua, like any other State of the region or of
the world, should be fully respected and should not in any way be
jeopardized by any military or paramilitary activities which are pro-
hbited by the pnnciples of international law ..."

In my view,that paragraph's emphasisupon the rights of Nicaragua - in a
case in whch Nicaragua itself is charged with violating the territorial
integrity and political independence of its neighbours - is unwarranted.

Worse than that, it isincompatible with thepnnciples of equality of States
and of collective secunty which are paramount in contemporary interna-
tional law and which the Court, as the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, is bound to uphold.

A. Considerationsof Fact
In its Application instituting proceedings, Nicaragua has made grave
charges against the United States, essentially that the United States : OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. SCHWEBEL

[Traduction]

J'ai votéen faveur du rejet, par la Cour, de la demande des Etats-Unis
tendant à débouterle Nicaragua pour des motifs ayant trait à la compé-
tence.J'ai appuyél'indicationpar la Cour de trois mesuresconservatoires,

celles qui prévoient:
- que les Etats-Unis ne limitent pas l'accèsaux ports nicaraguayens, en
particulier en posant des mines ;

- que les Etats-Unis et le Nicaragua veillent tous deux à ce qu'aucune
mesurene soitprisequipuisse aggraverou étendreledifférendsoumis à
la Cour ;
- quelesEtats-UnisetleNicaragua veillentchacun àcequ'aucunemesure
ne soit prise quipuisseporter atteinte au droit del'autre touchant toute
décisionque la Cour pourrait rendre.

En revanche, je suis en total désaccord avec une quatrième mesure
conservatoire,faisant l'objet du paragraphe B 2 du dispositif de l'ordon-
nance, qui dispose :

<Que le droit àla souverainetéet à l'indépendance politiqueque
possèdela République du Nicaragua, comme tout autre Etat de la

régionet du monde, soit pleinement respecté et ne soit compromis
d'aucunemanièrepar desactivitésmilitairesetparamilitairesquisont
interdites par les principes du droit international..))

Selonmoi,l'insistancemisedans ceparagraphe sur lesdroits du Nicaragua
- alors que le Nicaragua lui-mêmeest accuséde violer l'intégrité territo-
rialeet l'indépendancepolitiquede sesvoisins - ne sejustifie pas. Pis,elle
est contraire auxprincipes del'égalitédeE s tats et dela sécuritcollective,
principes suprêmesdu droit international contemporain, que la Cour,

organejudiciaire principal des Nations Unies, a l'obligationde maintenir.

1. L'ORDONNANC NE COMPORTE AUCUNE INJONCTION RELATIVE
AUX VIOLATIONS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL QUI SERAIENT COMMISES

PAR LE NICARAGUA

A. Considérations defait

Dans sa requêteintroductive d'instance, leNicaragua aportéde graves
accusationscontre les Etats-Unis, en soutenant essentiellement que ceux-
ci : "is using militas. force against Nicaragua and intervening in Nica-
ragua's intemal affairs, in violation of Nicaragua's sovereignty, ter-
ritorialintegrity and political independence and of the most funda-
mental and universally accepted principles of international law".

In particular, Nicaragua charges that the United States has created,

trained, financed, supplied and directed an "army" of "mercenaries"
who are attacking human and economic targets inside Nicaragua.
The United States has met Nicaragua's Application and its accom-
panyingrequest for the indication of provisionalmeasures by challenging
thejurisdiction of the Court. Its Agent stated that in Mew ofthe absence
of jurisdiction, the United States would not debate the facts alleged by
Nicaragua,thoughheemphasizedthat theUnited States "has admitted no
factual allegationsof Nicaragua whatsoever".Nevertheless,in the courseof
the oral proceedings, and in exhibits submitted by the United States,
chargeswereadvancedby theUnited StatesagainstNicaragua of agravity
no lessprofound than the charges of Nicaragua against the United States.
Moreover, the United Statesplaced on record such chargesmade not only
by the United States,but by the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador
and Honduras. Furthermore, the extensive exhibits submitted by Nicara-
gua in support of its Application and request contain, at multiple points,

recitations of substantially the same charges against Nicaragua by the
United States and other sources.
A few illustrations from the exposition of United States counsel will
make the position clear. Quoting "one of the documents upon which
Nicaragua has relied in protesting its innocence", the United States Agent
read out the followingpassagefrom the Report of theUnited States House
of RepresentativesPermanent SelectCornmitteeon Intelligenceof 13May
1983which is found in Nicaraguan Exhibit X, tab 1 :
"[C]ontrary to the repeated denials of Nicaraguan officials, that
country is thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran insur-
gency ... It is not popular support that sustains the insurgents ...
[Tlhis insurgency depends for its life-blood - arms, ammunition,

financing, logisticsand command-and-control facilities - upon Nica-
ragua and Cuba. This Nicaraguan-Cuban contribution to the Salva-
doran insurgency is longstanding. ..It has provided - by land, sea
and air - thegreatbulk of thernilitaryequipmentand support received
by the insurgents."

United States counsel also maintained

"The new Government of Nicaragua. ..departed from its early
promise of rebuildingits own Societyon a pluralistic and democratic
basis. It turned instead to an increasingly authoritarian interna1pol-
icy.It initiated a massivebuild-up ofitsmilitaryforcesunprecedented
in the region. .. <<font usagede laforcemilitaire contre leNicaragua et interviennent
dans ses affaires intérieuresen violation de sa souveraineté,de son
intégrité territoriale etde son indépendance politique ainsi que des

principes lesplusfondamentaux et lesplus universellement reconnus
du droit international o.
Le Nicaragua accuse notamment les Etats-Unis d'avoir créé,formé,
financé, approvisionné et dirigé une (<armée ))de <mercenaires )>qui
attaque des objectifs humains et économiques à l'intérieurdu Nicaragua.
En réponse à la requêtedu Nicaragua et à la demande en indication de

mesures conservatoires qui l'accompagnait, les Etats-Unis ont contestéla
compétencedela Cour. L'agent desEtats-Unis a déclaréquev , u l'absence
dejuridiction, lesEtats-Unisn'entendaient pas entrerdans un débatsurles
faits alléguépsar leNicaragua, mais, a-t-il souligné, ((lesEtats-Unis n'ont
admis aucun [desdits]faits )).Néanmoins,durant la procédure orale, et
dans des pièces qu'ilsont soumises, les Etats-Unis ont formulé contre le
Nicaragua des accusations qui ne sont pas moins graves que celles du
Nicaragua contre les Etats-Unis. Ils ont d'autre part fait étatdes accusa-
tions semblablesprésentées non seulementpar les Etats-Unis, mais aussi

par les Gouvernements du Costa Rica, d'El Salvador et du Honduras. En
outre, toutes lespiècesproduites par leNicaragualui-même àl'appuide sa
requêteet de sa demande reprennent en substance, et sur bien despoints,
les mêmes allégationscontreleNicaragua émanantdesourcesaméricaines
et d'autres sources.
Quelques illustrations tiréesdes exposésdes conseils des Etats-Unis
permettront de mieux comprendre la situation. Citant <<l'un des docu-
ments dont le Nicaragua s'est servi pour protester de son innocence )),
l'agent des Etats-Unis a donnélecture du passage suivant du rapport du
13mai 1983du Permanent Select Comrnitteeon Intelligencedela chambre

des représentants des Etats-Unis (pièce X du Nicaragua, onglet 1) :
([Clontrairement aux dénégations répétées des représentants du
Nicaragua, ce pays s'estengagé à fond dans une aide à l'insurrection
salvadorienne ...Ce n'est pas un appui populaire qui soutient les
insurgés ...cette insurrection dépend pour son existence même -
armes,munitions,financement, moyenslogistiqueset installations de
commandement et de contrôle - du Nicaragua et de Cuba. Cette

contribution cubano-nicaraguayenne à l'insurrection salvadorienne
dure depuislongtemps ..Elleafourni - par terre,par airet par mer -
la grande masse du matériel militaire et de l'appui reçus par les
insurgés.
Un conseil des Etats-Unis a égalementdéclaré :

((Le nouveau Gouvernement du Nicaragua ...a rapidement dévié
de son engagement initial de reconstruire la société de son pays sur
une base pluraliste et démocratique. Au contraire, il a adopté une
politique intérieurede plus en plus autoritaire. 11a immédiatement
entrepris un renforcement massif de sesforcesmilitaires,sansprécé-
dent dans la région ... Nicaragua also became deeply involved in insurgenciesin neigh-
bouring countries, in furtherance of its 'active promotion for "revo-
lution without frontiers" throughout Central America'. This quota-
tion is found in Nicaragua's Exhibit V, tab 10,at pages 5 to 6.