Separate Opinion of Judge Tarazi (translation)

Document Number
062-19760911-ORD-01-08-EN
Parent Document Number
062-19760911-ORD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE TARAZI

[Translation]

1voted in favour ofthe Order adopted bythe Court. 1think it necessary,
however, to express my separate opinion on two essential points which,
in my view, are particularly important:

(1) the Court's jurisdiction;
(2) the role of the Court as an organ of the United Nations and its place
in the process of peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Thejurisdiction which the International Court of Justice possesses in
contentious proceedings is not compulsory. It is necessary that States
shall have given their prior consent to its being seised. If the respondent
does not appear, the Court is under an obligation to ascertain, before any
consideration of the merits, whether it is competent to settle the dispute

referred to it by the applicant State, in accordancewith Article 53of the
Statute.
In the present instancethe Court had to consider a request for interim
measures of protection, submitted by the Government of Greece. This
request, in the eyes of that Government, was intended for the protection
of Greece'srights over the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea.The Court
was therefore urgently convened by its President, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 66 of its Rules.
Turkey, the respondent party in the case, has chosen not to respond to
the invitation made to it under paragraph 2 of Article 66 of the Rules of
Court. Neverthelessthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofTurkeyhas sent the
Registrar of the Court a written communication. That communication
raised an objection alleging lack ofjurisdiction and called for:

(a) the rejection of the Greek request for the indication of interim
measures of protection;
(b) the removal of the case from the Court's list.

There we have two quite separate requests. The first was based on a
contention that the interim measures of protection were not required by
the situation. The second denied the Court's right to pronounce upon the
Application of Greece or even to discuss it.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court had solelyto decide whetherthe interim measures should or should not be granted. Was it entitled to
grant them if it did not possessthepowerto decidethesubstantivedispute
or if, in other words, it lackedjurisdiction? It has been maintained that,
so far as concerns the application of the provisions of Article 41 of the
Statute of the Court, the text of which governs the question of interim
measures,the Court possessesa specialcompetencewhichis in someway
differentfrom its basic, specificjurisdiction as conferred by Article 36 of

that Statute.
This is a theory with which 1 am unable to agree. Without going into
the details of the argument, 1 feel impelled to declare that the Court is
competent onlyby virtue of Article 36of its Statute. The power conferred
upon it by Article 41 to indicate interim measures when appropriate is
merelya corollary of itsjurisdiction under Article 36,in accordance with
the old legal sawthat quimagispotest minuspotest.

That being so, the situation before the Court was such as to require it
to show vigilance intheappraisal of the various elementsin the Applica-
tion, in which Greece had claimed that two diplomatic instruments
conferredjurisdiction on the Court: Article 17of the General Act for the
PacificSettlement of International Disputes, 1928, and the joint com-
muniquéof Brusselsof 31May 1975.

The Court could not, on simple perusal of these two documents,
pronounce upon its jurisdiction at the present stage of the proceedings.
A more thoroughgoing examination was needed, on account of the
complexity and ambiguity of the problems confronting the Court,
problems which it could only resolveafter written and oral proceedings
had taken place in the normal way.
The request that the case be removed from the Court's list could not
be acceded to in the present circumstances. Accordingto the consistent
jurisprudence of the Court, suchremoval is decided onlyin the eventthat
the applicant State does not invoke in support of its Application any
legal instrument conferringjurisdiction on the Court but contents itself
with leavingthe respondent State the possibility of expressingits assent
to the proceedings. If, on the other hand, the respondent State responds
in the negative,by indicatingits refusa1to recognizethe Court'sjurisdic-

tion, the Court orders the case to be removed from its list. Such in my
view are the significanceand legal scope of the Orders of 12 July 1954
(TreatmentinHungaryof Aircraftand Crewof UnitedStates of America,
I.C.J. Reports 1954,pp. 99 and 103), 14 March 1956(AerialIncident of
10 March 1953,I.C.J. Reports 1956,p. 6)and of 16March 1956(Antarc-
tica, I.C.J. Reports 1956,pp. 12and 15).

It is clear that the situation is differentin respect of the present case.
That is why the Court has not decided to remove it from its list and has
reservedits position on the question of itsjurisdiction for later consider-
ation. 1think that the Court was welladvised to act as it has. 1feel however
that particular attention should have been paid to the fact that the pro-
ceedingsare attended by special circumstances.
At the sametime asit requestedtheCourt to indicateinterim measures,
Greeceturned to the Security Councilto request it to examinethe situa-
tion which it had already described in its Application. This was not an
example of the simultaneous use of two parallel remedies, inasmuch as
the Security Council, unlike the Court, is a political organ. The rule
electauna viadid not have to be applied.

Now, whilethe oral proceedingswere taking place beforethe Court, the
Security Council adopted "by consensus" the resolution of 25 August
1976 bywhichit, in the main, recommendedthe parties to continue their

negotiations and address themselves,if appropriate, to the Court. There
can be no doubt that this was a situation which created a new element
requiriag to betaken into consideration in the formulation ofthe Court's
Order.
For ifit is trueand certain that the Court isan independent andjudicial
organ, and that neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council
are able, without the consent of the interestedparties, to withdraw from
it anycasewhichhasbeenreferredto it,itisno lesstruethatit isan integral
part ofthe United Nations, inasmuch asArticle 7of the Charter provides
that it is one of the "principal organs of the United Nations7' while
Article 92indicates that itsStatute is annexed to and "forms an integral
part of" the Charter. Suchwas not the casewith the Court's predecessor.
The Covenant of the League of Nations did not provide that the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice should be one of its organs. The
Court itselfhad beensetup independentlyofthe elaboration and adoption
of the Covenant.
That being so, the present Court, whilemaintaining its independence,
should not fail to take into consideration this basic truth, namely that it

is an integral part of the United Nations. The Charter, whose genesis
marked a new stage in the course of history, features some essential
differences in comparison with the provisions of its predecessor, the
Covenant ofthe LeagueofNations. Thosedifferencesweredueto the new
situation which States and peoples had to face on account of the conse-
quencesofthe SecondWorldWar and ofthedevelopmentswhichpreceded
or triggered its outbreak.
There is no necessityhere to consider these differencesin detail. One
may content oneselfwith the affirmation that, by virtue of the Charter,
the Security Council bearsan essential responsibilityfor the maintenance
of peace and security. The Court, if the circumstances so require, ought
to collaborate in the accomplishment of this fundamental mission.
It must be recognized that the Court has indeed applied itself to thistask. Several of the paragraphs in the reasoning of the Order recall the
Security Councilresolution. Nevertheless, 1would have thought it neces-
sary to mention this resolution in the operative part.

(Signed) Salah El Dine TARAZI.

Bilingual Content

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. TARAZI

J'ai voté en faveurde l'ordonnance adoptéepar la Cour. Je croistoute-
fois devoir exposer mon opinion individuelle sur deux points essentiels
qui ont,àmon avis,une importanceparticulière, àsavoir:

1) la compétencedela Cour;
2) le rôle de la Cour en tant qu'organe des Nations Unies et la place qui
lui revient dans le processus de règlement pacifique des différends
internationaux.

La compétenceque possèdela Cour internationale de Justice en ma-

tière contentieuse n'est pas obligatoire.aut que les Etats l'aient accep-
téepréalablement àla saisine. Si le défendeurfait défaut,il incomàla
Cour de rechercher, avant tout examen du fond, si elle est habilitéeà
trancher le différendquilui a été soumpar 1'Etatdemandeur, conformé-
ment àl'article 53du Statut.

Dans le cas présent, la Cour avait examiner une demande en indica-
tion de mesures conservatoires introduite par le Gouvernement grec.
Cette demande devait, aux yeux du Gouvernement hellénique,protéger
lesdroits de la Grècesurle plateau continental de la mer Egée.La Cour a
donc été convoquéed'urgence par son Président, conformémentauxdis-
positions du paragraphe3del'article66de son Règlement.
La Turquie,partie défenderesseà l'instance, a choisi de ne pas répondre
à la convocation qui lui a étéfaite en application du paragraphe 2 de
l'article6du Règlement.Toutefois le ministère des affairesétrangèresde

Turquie a fait parvenir au Greffierde la Cour une communication écrite.
Cette communication soulevait l'exception d'incompétenceet réclamait:
a) le rejet de la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires sollici-
téepar la Grèce;

b) la radiation del'affairedu rôledela Cour.
Ces deuxdemandesétaient donc bien distinctes. La premièreconsistait

à dire que lesmesures conservatoiresn'étaient pas nécessitsar la situa-
tion. La seconde déniait la Cour le droit de statuer sur la requêteintro-
ductive d'instance de la Grèceetmêmed'endébattre.
A cette étape de la procédure,la Cour n'avait qu'à déciderde l'octroi SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE TARAZI

[Translation]

1voted in favour ofthe Order adopted bythe Court. 1think it necessary,
however, to express my separate opinion on two essential points which,
in my view, are particularly important:

(1) the Court's jurisdiction;
(2) the role of the Court as an organ of the United Nations and its place
in the process of peaceful settlement of international disputes.

Thejurisdiction which the International Court of Justice possesses in
contentious proceedings is not compulsory. It is necessary that States
shall have given their prior consent to its being seised. If the respondent
does not appear, the Court is under an obligation to ascertain, before any
consideration of the merits, whether it is competent to settle the dispute

referred to it by the applicant State, in accordancewith Article 53of the
Statute.
In the present instancethe Court had to consider a request for interim
measures of protection, submitted by the Government of Greece. This
request, in the eyes of that Government, was intended for the protection
of Greece'srights over the continental shelf of the Aegean Sea.The Court
was therefore urgently convened by its President, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 66 of its Rules.
Turkey, the respondent party in the case, has chosen not to respond to
the invitation made to it under paragraph 2 of Article 66 of the Rules of
Court. Neverthelessthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofTurkeyhas sent the
Registrar of the Court a written communication. That communication
raised an objection alleging lack ofjurisdiction and called for:

(a) the rejection of the Greek request for the indication of interim
measures of protection;
(b) the removal of the case from the Court's list.

There we have two quite separate requests. The first was based on a
contention that the interim measures of protection were not required by
the situation. The second denied the Court's right to pronounce upon the
Application of Greece or even to discuss it.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court had solelyto decide whetherou non des mesures conservatoires. Pouvait-elle le faire si elle ne possé-

dait pas le pouvoir de trancher le différendau fond, si,en d'autres termes,
elle était incompétente?On a soutenu la thèseque, s'agissantde l'applica-
tion des dispositions de l'article 41 du Statut de la Cour qui régit les
mesures conservatoires, la Cour possédait une compétencespécialequi
diffère,en quelquesorte, de sa compétence originelleet spécifiqueprévue
à l'article 36du mêmeStatut.

C'est là une prise de position à laquelle je ne saurais souscrire. Sans
entrer dans les détails de l'argumentation, je me dois de déclarer que la
Cour n'est compétentequ'en vertu de l'article 36 de son Statut. Le pou-
voir qui lui est octroyépar l'article 41 de statuer, le cas échéant, surles
mesures conservatoires n'est que le corollaire de la compétence qu'elle

détientenvertu del'article 36du Statut conformément à l'adagejuridique
«qui peut lepluspeut lemoins».
Cela étant, la situation telle qu'elle se présentaià la Cour exigeait
d'elle qu'ellese montrât vigilante dans l'appréciationdes divers éléments
contenus dans la requête introductive d'instance de la Grèce. En effet,
celle-ci avait prétendu que deux instruments diplomatiques accordaient
compétence à la Cour: l'article 17 de l'Acte généralde 1928 pour le
règlement pacifique des différendsinternationaux et le communiquécon-
joint de Bruxelles endate du 31mai 1975.
La Cour ne pouvait, au vu des deux documents précités,se prononcer,
au stade actuel de la procédure, sur sa compétence.Celle-cinécessitaitun
plus ample examen du fait de la complexitéet de l'ambiguïtédes pro-

blèmesqui étaientposéset àla solution desquels on ne pouvait parvenir
qu'aprèsun déroulementnormal desprocéduresécriteet orale.

La demande tendant à ce que I'affairesoit rayéedu rôle de la Cour ne
pouvait, dans les circonstances présentes,être admise.Selon une juris-
prudence constante de la Cour, la radiation n'est décidéeue dans le seul
cas où 1'Etatdemandeur n'invoque, à l'appui de sa requête, aucun instru-
ment juridique qui attribue compétence à la Cour, mais se contente de
laisserà 1'Etatdéfendeurla possibilitéd'exprimer son acquiescement au
déroulement de la procédure. Cependant, à partir du moment où l'Etat
défendeurse prononçait négativementen signifiant son refus de recon-
naître la compétence de la Cour, celle-ci ordonnait la radiation de

I'affaire. Tellessont,mon avis, la signification et la portéejuridique des
ordonnances du 12 juillet 1954 (Traitement en Hongrie d'un avion des
Etats-Unis d'Amériqueet de son équipage,C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 99 et
103), du 14 mars 1956 (Incident aériendu IO mars 1953, C.I.J. Recueil
1956,p. 6), du 16mars 1956(Affaire del'Antarctique, C.I.J. Recueil 1956,
p. 12et 15).
Il est clair que I'affaire actuelle se présente différemment.Voilà pour-
quoi la Cour n'a pas décidé de la rayer du rôle et a réservélus tard sa
position surla questionde sacompétence.the interim measures should or should not be granted. Was it entitled to
grant them if it did not possessthepowerto decidethesubstantivedispute
or if, in other words, it lackedjurisdiction? It has been maintained that,
so far as concerns the application of the provisions of Article 41 of the
Statute of the Court, the text of which governs the question of interim
measures,the Court possessesa specialcompetencewhichis in someway
differentfrom its basic, specificjurisdiction as conferred by Article 36 of

that Statute.
This is a theory with which 1 am unable to agree. Without going into
the details of the argument, 1 feel impelled to declare that the Court is
competent onlyby virtue of Article 36of its Statute. The power conferred
upon it by Article 41 to indicate interim measures when appropriate is
merelya corollary of itsjurisdiction under Article 36,in accordance with
the old legal sawthat quimagispotest minuspotest.

That being so, the situation before the Court was such as to require it
to show vigilance intheappraisal of the various elementsin the Applica-
tion, in which Greece had claimed that two diplomatic instruments
conferredjurisdiction on the Court: Article 17of the General Act for the
PacificSettlement of International Disputes, 1928, and the joint com-
muniquéof Brusselsof 31May 1975.

The Court could not, on simple perusal of these two documents,
pronounce upon its jurisdiction at the present stage of the proceedings.
A more thoroughgoing examination was needed, on account of the
complexity and ambiguity of the problems confronting the Court,
problems which it could only resolveafter written and oral proceedings
had taken place in the normal way.
The request that the case be removed from the Court's list could not
be acceded to in the present circumstances. Accordingto the consistent
jurisprudence of the Court, suchremoval is decided onlyin the eventthat
the applicant State does not invoke in support of its Application any
legal instrument conferringjurisdiction on the Court but contents itself
with leavingthe respondent State the possibility of expressingits assent
to the proceedings. If, on the other hand, the respondent State responds
in the negative,by indicatingits refusa1to recognizethe Court'sjurisdic-

tion, the Court orders the case to be removed from its list. Such in my
view are the significanceand legal scope of the Orders of 12 July 1954
(TreatmentinHungaryof Aircraftand Crewof UnitedStates of America,
I.C.J. Reports 1954,pp. 99 and 103), 14 March 1956(AerialIncident of
10 March 1953,I.C.J. Reports 1956,p. 6)and of 16March 1956(Antarc-
tica, I.C.J. Reports 1956,pp. 12and 15).

It is clear that the situation is differentin respect of the present case.
That is why the Court has not decided to remove it from its list and has
reservedits position on the question of itsjurisdiction for later consider-
ation. POUVOIR ETRÔLEDE LA COUR
DANS LESYSTÈMEDES NATIONU SNIES

Je pense quela Cour étaitbien inspiréed'agircomme ellel'a fait. Il me
semble cependant qu'une attention spécialeaurait dû êtreaccordéeau
fait que descirconstancesparticulières ont entouré la procédure.
En mêmetemps qu'elle sollicitait de la Cour l'indication de mesures
conservatoires, la Grèce s'adressait au Conseil de sécuritépour lui de-
mander d'examiner la situation qu'elle avait déjà décrite danssa requête
introductive d'instance.Il ne s'agissait pas, en l'espèce, de l'exercice
simultané dedeux recours parallèlesétantdonné quele Conseil de sécu-
rité, la différencede la Cour, est un organepolitique. La règleelecta una
vian'avait pasàêtreappliquée.

Or, tandis quela procédure orale sepoursuivait la Cour, le Conseil de
sécuritéadopta, «par consensus)), sa résolution du 25 août 1976 par
laquelle il recommandait principalement aux parties de poursuivre leurs
négociationset de s'adresser, lecas échéant,la Cour. C'était là,coup
sûr, une situation qui créaitun élémentnouveaudevantentrer enlignede
comptedans laformulation del'ordonnance de la Cour.

En effet,s'ilest vrai et certain que la Cour est un organejudiciaire indé-
pendant, que nil'Assembléegénéralen , i le Conseil de sécurne sont en
mesure sans le consentement des parties intéressées dela dessaisir d'une
affaireà elle soumise, il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'elle fait partie inté-
grante des Nations Unies puisque l'article de la Charte prévoit qu'elle
est un des«organes principaux de l'Organisation» et que l'article 92 dis-

pose que son statut est annexéla Charte «dont il fait partie intégrante».
Il n'en était pasainsi de la Cour qui a précelle-ci.Le Pactede la SdN
n'avait pas prévu quela Cour permanente de Justice internationale était
un de ses organes. La Cour, elle-même,avait été instituée indépendam-
mentdel'élaborationet del'adoption du pacte.

Cela étant, la présente Cour, tout en maintenant son indépendance
ne doit pas négligerde prendre en considération cette véritépremière,
à savoir qu'ellefaitpartie intégrante del'ONU. La Charte dont la genèse
historique marque une étape nouvelle dans l'histoire offre des différences
essentielles par rapport aux dispositions de son devancier, le Pacte de la
SdN. Ces différencesétaientdues à une situation nouvelleà laquelle ont

fait face les Etats et les peuples en raison des suites de la seconde guerre
mondiale et des développementsqui l'ont précédée ou en ont précipité
ledéclenchement.
Il n'est pas nécessaireici de passer en revue ces différences.Onpour-
rait pourtant se contenter d'affirmer qu'en vertude la Charte le Conseil
de sécuritéassume une responsabilitéessentielleen vue du maintien de la
paix et de la sécurité.La Cour devrait collaborer, si les circonstances
l'exigent, cette Œuvrefondamentale.
Il faut reconnaître que la Cour n'a pas manquéàcette tâche. Plusieurs 1think that the Court was welladvised to act as it has. 1feel however
that particular attention should have been paid to the fact that the pro-
ceedingsare attended by special circumstances.
At the sametime asit requestedtheCourt to indicateinterim measures,
Greeceturned to the Security Councilto request it to examinethe situa-
tion which it had already described in its Application. This was not an
example of the simultaneous use of two parallel remedies, inasmuch as
the Security Council, unlike the Court, is a political organ. The rule
electauna viadid not have to be applied.

Now, whilethe oral proceedingswere taking place beforethe Court, the
Security Council adopted "by consensus" the resolution of 25 August
1976 bywhichit, in the main, recommendedthe parties to continue their

negotiations and address themselves,if appropriate, to the Court. There
can be no doubt that this was a situation which created a new element
requiriag to betaken into consideration in the formulation ofthe Court's
Order.
For ifit is trueand certain that the Court isan independent andjudicial
organ, and that neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council
are able, without the consent of the interestedparties, to withdraw from
it anycasewhichhasbeenreferredto it,itisno lesstruethatit isan integral
part ofthe United Nations, inasmuch asArticle 7of the Charter provides
that it is one of the "principal organs of the United Nations7' while
Article 92indicates that itsStatute is annexed to and "forms an integral
part of" the Charter. Suchwas not the casewith the Court's predecessor.
The Covenant of the League of Nations did not provide that the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice should be one of its organs. The
Court itselfhad beensetup independentlyofthe elaboration and adoption
of the Covenant.
That being so, the present Court, whilemaintaining its independence,
should not fail to take into consideration this basic truth, namely that it

is an integral part of the United Nations. The Charter, whose genesis
marked a new stage in the course of history, features some essential
differences in comparison with the provisions of its predecessor, the
Covenant ofthe LeagueofNations. Thosedifferencesweredueto the new
situation which States and peoples had to face on account of the conse-
quencesofthe SecondWorldWar and ofthedevelopmentswhichpreceded
or triggered its outbreak.
There is no necessityhere to consider these differencesin detail. One
may content oneselfwith the affirmation that, by virtue of the Charter,
the Security Council bearsan essential responsibilityfor the maintenance
of peace and security. The Court, if the circumstances so require, ought
to collaborate in the accomplishment of this fundamental mission.
It must be recognized that the Court has indeed applied itself to thisdes considérants de l'ordonnance rappellentla résolution duConseil de
sécurité.l m'aurait paru néanmoinsnécessaireque cette résolution soit
mentionnéedansledispositif.

(Signé Salah El Dine TARAZI.task. Several of the paragraphs in the reasoning of the Order recall the
Security Councilresolution. Nevertheless, 1would have thought it neces-
sary to mention this resolution in the operative part.

(Signed) Salah El Dine TARAZI.

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Document Long Title

Separate Opinion of Judge Tarazi (translation)

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