Separate Opinion of Judge Mosler

Document Number
062-19760911-ORD-01-06-EN
Parent Document Number
062-19760911-ORD-01-00-EN
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Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MOSLER

1 concur in the opinion that the request to indicate interim measures

must be dismissed. Since this is the effect of the operative part of the
Order, 1 voted for it, although 1 do not share the reasons given by the
majority of my colleagues but base the same conclusion on different
grounds.
An Order made on the request of an applicant State to indicate interim
measures of protection pending judgment is given in incidental pro-
ceedings, normally at a very preliminary stage of the pendency of the
case before the Court. Furthermore, the definitive decision on jurisdic-
tion and admissibility is reserved tolater proceedings, if the parties, as
in the present case, disagree on this point. Matters belonging to the
substance of the case must not be touched at all. It follows from the
provisional character of these proceedings as well as from the need to
reach a decision urgently that the reasoning motivatingthe operative part
of the Order is kept brief. Accordingly an opinion differing from the
reasons givenin the Order is bound to confineitselfto similarrestrictions.
Subject to this understanding, my reasons are as follows:

1. In my view,the first question arising isthat of thejurisdiction of the
Court to indicate interim measures in the case submitted by the Greek
Application of 10August 1976instituting proceedings before the Court.
Article 41 of the Statute confers this power on the Court without being,
in my interpretation, an independent source of jurisdiction on the same
footingand ofthe samelegal quality asArticle 36.The various waysthere
indicated of founding the obligation to take part in proceedings before
the Court as a respondent party al1depend on the voluntary submission
of the State concerned. Article 41 is, however, in so far an autonomous

grant of jurisdiction that it permits that the grounds conferringjurisdic-
tion in conformity with the basic Article are to be examined only to the
extent that this can be done without endangeringthe urgency with which
a request for interim measures must be considered.
In view ofthe provisional character of the requestedOrder and bearing
in mind that it in no way prejudges the decisions to be taken in the
forthcoming proceedings, it is in my view sufficientthat the Court, when
it actuallyindicatesinterimmeasures,should have reached the provisional
conviction, based on a summary examination of the material before it
(including written observations of a party not represented) and subject
to any objections which may be raised in subsequent proceedings, that
it hasjurisdiction on the merits of the case.This amounts to an attempteddefinition of the criteria of a positive prima facie test. 1would add that
provisional affirmation ofjurisdiction is in my viewnot a "circumstance"
contributing to the necessity of provisional measures in the sense of

Article 41, but a precondition of the examination whether such circum-
stances exist.
If the Court however, as in the present Order, rejects the request
because the circumstances are not considered to require interim measures,
it examines the legal situation existing between the parties to the dispute
and thus, to that extent, also assumesjurisdiction. But in this hypothesis
the Court has only to satisfy itself that it does not manifestly lack
jurisdiction,sincethe Order does nothing to interferewiththe rights ofthe
respondent party.
2. In the present case the jurisdiction is open to doubt and certainly
not manifest. 1 must therefore examine whether it is, according to the
above-mentioned criteria, sufficientlyestablished to justify the indication
of interim measures, supposing that circumstances exist which require
such measures to be taken in order to preserve the respective rights of
either party. Greece asserts that the Court's jurisdiction with regard to the
merits of the dispute is founded on two separate grounds, each of them
furnishing a sufficientbasis: the General Act of Geneva of 26 September

1928and the Brussels communiquéof 31 May 1975.
(a) There may be reasonable grounds for maintaining that the General
Act of Geneva is still in force between those parties who have not
denounced it, but objections to that view are possible and may be
raised in the forthcoming proceedings on jurisdiction. Furthermore,
Greece's reservation made in 1931 in accordance with Article 39,
paragraph 2 (c), of the General Act (Annex IX to the Application),
excluding from her undertakings under the Act, interalia, "disputes
relating to the territorial status of Greece", gives rise to doubts

whether this status comprises the areas of the continental shelf
appertaining to the coastal State.
But neither of these problems can be solved, even in a summary
manner, in the present incidental proceedings, to the extent neces-
sary to meet the test indicated above and furnish the basis of the
Court's jurisdiction at the present stage of the proceedings.
(b) The same applies to the Brusselscommuniquéof 31 May 1975.1 am
not sufficiently convinced, after a summary examination, that it
constitutes an agreement to seisethe Court "as regards the continen-
tal shelf of the Aegean Sea", conferring on either party the right to
institute proceedings before the Court.

3. The request must therefore be rejected for the sole reason that the
jurisdiction of the Court is Dot sufficiently established. It must be
determined in subsequent proceedings on the basis of Article 36, para-
graph 6, of the Statute.
Tt e Court bases its negative decision on the circumstances existing in
the present situation, which in its view do not require the indication ofinterim measuresin order to preservethe rights of either party. It draws
this conclusion from an examination first of the consequences of the

exploration by SismikI of part of the seabed the appurtenance of which
to either Greece or Turkey is at issue betweenthe parties and, secondly,
of the danger of an armed conflict involvedin militarymeasures taken by
Turkey to protect her researchvesseland by Greeceto monitor the move-
ment of it.
1sharethe Court's reasoningthat the continued exploration ofdisputed
areas of the continental shelf by Sismik I does not cause, of itself and
seen in isolation, irreparable prejudice to Greecejustifying the exercise
of the exceptional power granted to the, Court under Article 41, even
though, in the eventof a judgment favourableto Greece,it would consti-
tute an infringement of an exclusiveright of the coastal State. But 1
must expressdoubts regardingthe Court's separationof the infringement
of alleged Greek rights to exploration from the military measures, taken
by both sidesfor purposes of the protection or supervision of the vessel,
which involve a risk of armed conflict.1consider the military aspect not
asa distinctelementbut simplyasan aggravatingcircumstanceadditional
to the basic element of continued exploration. In my view the Court

should have considered that it was part of its overall responsibility to
consider the situation as a whole, quite apart from its assessment of the
Security Council'sresolution and the reactions thereto of Greece and
Turkey.

However,having taken the position 1haveindicated in section2 ofthis
opinion, 1find that the question whether one of these two circumstances,
or both in combination, require the indication of interim measures to
preserve the rights of either party, loses relevance. 1 must therefore
abstain from making further comments on these points.

(Signed) Hermann MOSLER.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MOSLER

1 concur in the opinion that the request to indicate interim measures

must be dismissed. Since this is the effect of the operative part of the
Order, 1 voted for it, although 1 do not share the reasons given by the
majority of my colleagues but base the same conclusion on different
grounds.
An Order made on the request of an applicant State to indicate interim
measures of protection pending judgment is given in incidental pro-
ceedings, normally at a very preliminary stage of the pendency of the
case before the Court. Furthermore, the definitive decision on jurisdic-
tion and admissibility is reserved tolater proceedings, if the parties, as
in the present case, disagree on this point. Matters belonging to the
substance of the case must not be touched at all. It follows from the
provisional character of these proceedings as well as from the need to
reach a decision urgently that the reasoning motivatingthe operative part
of the Order is kept brief. Accordingly an opinion differing from the
reasons givenin the Order is bound to confineitselfto similarrestrictions.
Subject to this understanding, my reasons are as follows:

1. In my view,the first question arising isthat of thejurisdiction of the
Court to indicate interim measures in the case submitted by the Greek
Application of 10August 1976instituting proceedings before the Court.
Article 41 of the Statute confers this power on the Court without being,
in my interpretation, an independent source of jurisdiction on the same
footingand ofthe samelegal quality asArticle 36.The various waysthere
indicated of founding the obligation to take part in proceedings before
the Court as a respondent party al1depend on the voluntary submission
of the State concerned. Article 41 is, however, in so far an autonomous

grant of jurisdiction that it permits that the grounds conferringjurisdic-
tion in conformity with the basic Article are to be examined only to the
extent that this can be done without endangeringthe urgency with which
a request for interim measures must be considered.
In view ofthe provisional character of the requestedOrder and bearing
in mind that it in no way prejudges the decisions to be taken in the
forthcoming proceedings, it is in my view sufficientthat the Court, when
it actuallyindicatesinterimmeasures,should have reached the provisional
conviction, based on a summary examination of the material before it
(including written observations of a party not represented) and subject
to any objections which may be raised in subsequent proceedings, that
it hasjurisdiction on the merits of the case.This amounts to an attempted OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. MOSLER

[Traduction]

Je m'associe à l'opinion selon laquelle la demande en indication de
mesures conservatoiresdoit êtrerejetée.Tel étantl'effetdu dispositif de
l'ordonnance, j'ai votépour ce dispositif bien que je ne partage pas les
motifs retenus par la majorité de mes collègues, mais arriveà la même
conclusion sur des bases différentes.
Une ordonnance rendue àla demande d'un Etat requérant quisollicite
l'indication de mesures conservatoiresen attendant l'arrêt intervientau
cours d'une procédure incidente, normalement à un stade très prélimi-
naire du déroulement du procès devant la Cour. De plus, la décision
définitivesur la compétenceet la recevabilitéest renvoyée à plus tard si

les parties, comme c'est lecas en l'espèce,ne sont pas d'accordce sujet.
Les questions qui relèvent du fond de l'affaire doivent êtrelaisséesen-
tièrement de côté.Vu le caractère provisoire d'une telle procédure et la
nécessitéde se prononcer d'urgence, l'énoncé dem s otifs conduisant au
dispositif de l'ordonnance reste bref. en découleque les mêmesrestric-
tions s'imposentdans une opinionqui s'écarte des motifsde l'ordonnance.
Souscette réserve,mesmotifs sont lessuivants:

1.A mon avis, la première question qui se pose est celle de la compé-
tence de la Cour pour indiquer des mesures conservatoires en l'affaire
dont elle a étésaisie par la Grècedans sa requête introductive d'instance
du 10août 1976.L'article 41 du Statut donne ce pouvoir àla Cour sans
constituer, selon mon interprétation, une source de compétence auto-
nome, de mêmerang et se situant sur le mêmeplan juridique que l'ar-
ticle36.Lesdifférentsfondementsdonnéspar celui-ci àl'obligationdeparti-
ciperàuneinstancedevant la Cour comme partie défenderessed 'épendent
tous de l'acce~tation volontaire de 1'Etatintéress. 'article 41 constitue
néanmoins une source autonome de compétence dans la mesure où il
permet de n'examiner les motifs dejuridiction prévuspar l'article de base
quepour autant qu'il est possiblede le faire sansretarder l'examenurgent
dela demandeenindicationdemesuresconservatoires.

L'ordonnance sollicitéeayant un caractère provisoire et ne préjugeant
en rien lesdécisionsprendre dans la suitede la procédure,il suffitd'après
moi que, si elleindique effectivementdes mesures conservatoires,la Cour
se soit d'abord assuréeprovisoirement, par un examen sommaire du dos-
sier(y compris les observations écrites d'une partie non représentée)et
sous réservedesexceptionsquipourraient êtresoulevéespar la suite,de sa
compétencepour statuer sur le fond de l'affaire. Cela pourrait êtreun
essai de définitiondu critère appliquer aux fins d'une épreuve positivedefinition of the criteria of a positive prima facie test. 1would add that
provisional affirmation ofjurisdiction is in my viewnot a "circumstance"
contributing to the necessity of provisional measures in the sense of

Article 41, but a precondition of the examination whether such circum-
stances exist.
If the Court however, as in the present Order, rejects the request
because the circumstances are not considered to require interim measures,
it examines the legal situation existing between the parties to the dispute
and thus, to that extent, also assumesjurisdiction. But in this hypothesis
the Court has only to satisfy itself that it does not manifestly lack
jurisdiction,sincethe Order does nothing to interferewiththe rights ofthe
respondent party.
2. In the present case the jurisdiction is open to doubt and certainly
not manifest. 1 must therefore examine whether it is, according to the
above-mentioned criteria, sufficientlyestablished to justify the indication
of interim measures, supposing that circumstances exist which require
such measures to be taken in order to preserve the respective rights of
either party. Greece asserts that the Court's jurisdiction with regard to the
merits of the dispute is founded on two separate grounds, each of them
furnishing a sufficientbasis: the General Act of Geneva of 26 September

1928and the Brussels communiquéof 31 May 1975.
(a) There may be reasonable grounds for maintaining that the General
Act of Geneva is still in force between those parties who have not
denounced it, but objections to that view are possible and may be
raised in the forthcoming proceedings on jurisdiction. Furthermore,
Greece's reservation made in 1931 in accordance with Article 39,
paragraph 2 (c), of the General Act (Annex IX to the Application),
excluding from her undertakings under the Act, interalia, "disputes
relating to the territorial status of Greece", gives rise to doubts

whether this status comprises the areas of the continental shelf
appertaining to the coastal State.
But neither of these problems can be solved, even in a summary
manner, in the present incidental proceedings, to the extent neces-
sary to meet the test indicated above and furnish the basis of the
Court's jurisdiction at the present stage of the proceedings.
(b) The same applies to the Brusselscommuniquéof 31 May 1975.1 am
not sufficiently convinced, after a summary examination, that it
constitutes an agreement to seisethe Court "as regards the continen-
tal shelf of the Aegean Sea", conferring on either party the right to
institute proceedings before the Court.

3. The request must therefore be rejected for the sole reason that the
jurisdiction of the Court is Dot sufficiently established. It must be
determined in subsequent proceedings on the basis of Article 36, para-
graph 6, of the Statute.
Tt e Court bases its negative decision on the circumstances existing in
the present situation, which in its view do not require the indication ofprima facie. J'ajouterai quel'affirmationprovisoire de la compétencene
constitue pas, à mon avis, l'une des «circonstances» qui contribuent à
rendre nécessairesdes mesuresconservatoiresau sensde l'article41, mais
une conditionpréalablepour recherchersidetellescirconstancesexistent.

Cependant si la Cour, comme ellele fait dans la présente ordonnance,
rejette la demande au motif que les circonstances ne lui paraissent pas
exiger de mesures conservatoires, elle examine la situation juridique

existant entre les parties au différendet, dans cette mesure, elle exerce
effectivementune compétence.Mais dans cette hypothèse, il lui suffitde
s'assurer qu'elle n'est pasmanifestement dépourvue de juridiction, I'or-
donnance n'affectantenrien lesdroits delapartie défenderesse.
2. En l'espèce,la compétenceest discutable et elle n'estcertainement
pas manifeste. Je dois donc rechercher si, selon les critères indiquésci-
dessus, elleest suffisammentétabliepour justifier l'indication demesures
conservatoires,à supposer que les circonstancesexigentde telles mesures
pour sauvegarderle droit de chacun. La Grèceaffirmeque lacompétence
de la Cour pour connaître du fond du différendrepose sur deux bases
distinctes, dont chacune est suffisante: l'Acte généralde Genève du
26 septembre 1928et lecommuniquéde Bruxellesdu 31mai 1975 :

a) Des motifs raisonnablespermettraient de soutenir que l'Actegénéral
de Genèveest toujours en vigueur entre cellesdes parties qui neont
pas dénoncém , ais il existe aussi des arguments en senscontraire qui
pourraient être invoqués dansla procédure sur la compétence.En
outre la réservede la Grèce,faiteen931conformément à l'article39,
paragraphe 2 c), del'Actegénéra( lann. IX de la requête), quiexclut
notamment des engagements pris en vertu de l'Acte «les différends
ayanttrait au statut territorial de la Grèce»amèneedemander sice
statut englobe les zones du plateau continental relevant de IyEtat
riverain. Cependant aucun de ces problèmesne saurait êtrerasolu,

même de façon sommaire, au cours de la procédure incidenteactuelle,
autant qu'il serait nécessairepour satisfaire au critère indiqué plus
haut et pour fournir le fondement de la compétencede la Cour à ce
stade.
b) Il en va de mêmepour le communiqué deBruxellesdu 31 mai 1975.
Aprèsun examen sommaire,je ne suispas persuadé quece communi-
qué constitueun accord en vue de soumettre à la Cour les problèmes
aconcernant le plateau continental de la mer Egée»qui permettrait
àl'uneou l'autre partied'introduireuneinstancedevantla Cour.

3. La demande doit donc êtrerejetéepour le simplemotif que la com-
pétencede la Cour n'est pas suffisammentétablie.Elle devra être déter-
minéedans la suite de la procédure sur la base de l'article 36, para-
graphe 6,du Statut.
La Cour fonde sa décision négativseur lescirconstancesde la situation
actuelle, qui neluiparaissentpas nécessiterl'indicationdemesuresconser-

26interim measuresin order to preservethe rights of either party. It draws
this conclusion from an examination first of the consequences of the

exploration by SismikI of part of the seabed the appurtenance of which
to either Greece or Turkey is at issue betweenthe parties and, secondly,
of the danger of an armed conflict involvedin militarymeasures taken by
Turkey to protect her researchvesseland by Greeceto monitor the move-
ment of it.
1sharethe Court's reasoningthat the continued exploration ofdisputed
areas of the continental shelf by Sismik I does not cause, of itself and
seen in isolation, irreparable prejudice to Greecejustifying the exercise
of the exceptional power granted to the, Court under Article 41, even
though, in the eventof a judgment favourableto Greece,it would consti-
tute an infringement of an exclusiveright of the coastal State. But 1
must expressdoubts regardingthe Court's separationof the infringement
of alleged Greek rights to exploration from the military measures, taken
by both sidesfor purposes of the protection or supervision of the vessel,
which involve a risk of armed conflict.1consider the military aspect not
asa distinctelementbut simplyasan aggravatingcircumstanceadditional
to the basic element of continued exploration. In my view the Court

should have considered that it was part of its overall responsibility to
consider the situation as a whole, quite apart from its assessment of the
Security Council'sresolution and the reactions thereto of Greece and
Turkey.

However,having taken the position 1haveindicated in section2 ofthis
opinion, 1find that the question whether one of these two circumstances,
or both in combination, require the indication of interim measures to
preserve the rights of either party, loses relevance. 1 must therefore
abstain from making further comments on these points.

(Signed) Hermann MOSLER.vatoires pour sauvegarder les droits de chacune des parties. Elle par-
vient àcette conclusion après avoir envisagé,premièrement, les consé-
quencesde l'exploration effectuéepar leA Sismik Id'une partie du lit
de la mer dont le rattachementà la Grèceou à la Turquie est en litige

entre cesEtats et, deuxièmement,le risqued'un conflitarmàla suite des
mesures militaires prises par la Turquie pour protéger son navire de
rechercheet par la Grècepour enrepérerlesmouvements.
Je souscris au raisonnement de la Cour suivant lequel l'exploration
continue de zones contestéesdu plateau continental par le Sismi k
ne cause pas, en elle-mêmeet considérée isolémentu ,n préjudice irré-
parable à la Grèce, justifiant l'exercice du pouvoir exceptionnel que
l'article1 confèreà la Cour, quand bien même,dans l'hypothèsed'un
arrêtfavorable à la Grèce,il y aurait de ce fait violation d'un droit ex-
clusif de'Etatriverain.
Je dois cependantexprimer des doutes au sujet de la distinction établie
par la Cour entre la violation des droits d'exploration qui appartien-
draientà la Grèceet les mesures militaires prisesde part et d'autre pour
protéger ou surveiller le navire, et qui comportent un risque de conflit
armé. Pour moi, l'aspect militaire n'est pas un élémentdistinct mais

simplement une circonstanceaggravante qui s'ajouteà l'élémendte base
qu'est l'exploration continue. mon sens la Cour aurait dû considérer
qu'il entrait dans ses attributions générd'envisagerla situation dans
son ensemble, indépendamment de son appréciation de la résolutiondu
Conseil de sécuritet des réactionsqu'ellea inspirées la Grèce età la
Turquie.
Toutefois, ayant adopté le point de vue que j'ai indiqué dansla sec-
tion2 delaprésenteopinion,j'estimequelaquestiondesavoirsil'unedeces
deux circonstances, ou les deux prises ensemble, exigentl'indication de
mesuresconservatoirespour sauvegarder lesdroits de chacune desparties
n'estplus pertinente. Je doisdoncm'abstenir detoute autre observatàon
ce sujet.

(Signé)Hermann MOSLER.

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Separate Opinion of Judge Mosler

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