Separate Opinion of Judge Morozov

Document Number
062-19760911-ORD-01-04-EN
Parent Document Number
062-19760911-ORD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MOROZOV

1accepted the operative part of the Order of the Court but 1am unable
to sharethereasoning of the Order.
Reference is made in the Order to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute, as
wellas to Article 66of the Rules of Court, as arguments to prove that the
Court allegedly has a right to consider the request for the indication of
interim measures of protection before it has considered and settled the
question ofitsjurisdiction.
But these references in reality are based neither on the Statute of the
Court nor on its Rules of Procedure.
The key provisions relating to the competence of the Court are those
contained in Chapter II of its Statute, and particularly Article 36,

paragraph 1, thereof: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises al1cases
which the parties refer to it and al1matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventionsin force."
The sameprinciple isembodiedin Article 37of the Statute.
Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute are to be found in Chapter III of the
Statute under the title "Procedure". This means that provisions of that
Chapter cannot be regarded as something which may be separated from
Chapter II of the Statute, so asto have an independent significance,which
could cancel out the above-mentioned provisions of Chapter II concern-
ingthe competence of the Court.
As has been stated in the Order (para. 8) the Turkish Government
"suggested that the Greekrequest for interim measures be dismissedand,
in view of the lack of jurisdiction, asked the Court to remove the case
from the list. .."
After such a request had been made, it was the primary duty of the
Courtto consider the question ofitsjurisdiction.
It is not my intention to express a view now, pro or contra, on the
question of jurisdiction inasmuch as the question has not been con-
sidered or settled by the Court.

It ishowever important to stressthat the Courthas no right to consider
either the question of appointment of a judge ad hoc under Article 31,
paragraph 3,of the Statute, or the question of interim measures of protec-
tion,beforqit has satisfieditself thatit hasjurisdiction in accordance with
Articles36and 37ofthe Statute.
The reference in the Order to Article 48 adds nothing to the matter,
since that Article merely provides for the right of the Court to "make
orders for the conduct of the case .. .";it does not permit avoidance of
the keyprovisions of Articles36and 37of the Statute. The reference to Article 66 of the Rules of Court also cannot be used
as an argument to prove that the request for interim measures of protec-
tion allegedly has priority over the question of jurisdiction. Article 66

merely establishes that such a request "shall have priority over al1other
cases", but not over al1stages of the case concerned. The provision that
"the decisionthereon shall be treated as a matter of urgency" means only
that at the moment a request for interim measures is made consideration
of al1othercases should be interrupted.

Thus neitherthe Statute nor the Rules of Court contain any provisions
which provide that the request for interim measures of protection has any
priority over the question ofjurisdiction.
The precedents afforded by cases in which the Court has sometimes
made Orders on the question of interim measures of protection contrary
to itsStatute and Rules cannot be regarded as having any value in the
argument.
1should like to conclude by reference to paragraph 13of the Order, in
which we find: "and whereas the non-appearance of one of the States
concerned cannot by itself constitute an obstacle to the indication of
interim measures of protection ..."
This conclusion also is not in accordance with the Statute, for two

reasons. First: though, if the State concerned could be qualified as a
party (whichis not so in this case), anddoes not appear before the Court,
or fails to defend its case, the other party may in accordance with Article
53of the Statute cal1upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim, yet
paragraph 2 of the same Article lays down as a decisivecondition that the
Court in such a situation must satisfy itself that it hasjurisdiction.
Secondly,the filingby one side of an Applicationcannot of itselfcreate
a case, and therefore the State against which the Application is brought
could be regarded as a party within the meaning of the Statute only after
settlement of the question of the Court's jurisdiction.

(Signed) Platon Mo~ozov.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MOROZOV

1accepted the operative part of the Order of the Court but 1am unable
to sharethereasoning of the Order.
Reference is made in the Order to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute, as
wellas to Article 66of the Rules of Court, as arguments to prove that the
Court allegedly has a right to consider the request for the indication of
interim measures of protection before it has considered and settled the
question ofitsjurisdiction.
But these references in reality are based neither on the Statute of the
Court nor on its Rules of Procedure.
The key provisions relating to the competence of the Court are those
contained in Chapter II of its Statute, and particularly Article 36,

paragraph 1, thereof: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises al1cases
which the parties refer to it and al1matters specially provided for in the
Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventionsin force."
The sameprinciple isembodiedin Article 37of the Statute.
Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute are to be found in Chapter III of the
Statute under the title "Procedure". This means that provisions of that
Chapter cannot be regarded as something which may be separated from
Chapter II of the Statute, so asto have an independent significance,which
could cancel out the above-mentioned provisions of Chapter II concern-
ingthe competence of the Court.
As has been stated in the Order (para. 8) the Turkish Government
"suggested that the Greekrequest for interim measures be dismissedand,
in view of the lack of jurisdiction, asked the Court to remove the case
from the list. .."
After such a request had been made, it was the primary duty of the
Courtto consider the question ofitsjurisdiction.
It is not my intention to express a view now, pro or contra, on the
question of jurisdiction inasmuch as the question has not been con-
sidered or settled by the Court.

It ishowever important to stressthat the Courthas no right to consider
either the question of appointment of a judge ad hoc under Article 31,
paragraph 3,of the Statute, or the question of interim measures of protec-
tion,beforqit has satisfieditself thatit hasjurisdiction in accordance with
Articles36and 37ofthe Statute.
The reference in the Order to Article 48 adds nothing to the matter,
since that Article merely provides for the right of the Court to "make
orders for the conduct of the case .. .";it does not permit avoidance of
the keyprovisions of Articles36and 37of the Statute. OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. MOROZOV

[Traduction]

J'ai acceptéle dispositifde l'ordonnance rendue par la Cour maisje ne
suispas en mesure d'adhérer àsesmotifs.
Il est fait référencedans l'ordonnance aux articles 41 et 48 du Statut
ainsi qu'à l'article 66 du Règlement commepreuves de ce que la Cour
aurait le droit de prendre en considération la demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires avant d'avoir examinéet régléla question de sa
compétence.
Or ces référencesne sefondent en réaliténi sur le Statut de la Cour ni
sur son Règlement.
Les dispositions cléstouchant la compétencedela Cour sont cellesdu

chapitre II du Statut et en particulier l'article 36, paragraphe1: «La
compétencede la Cour s'étend à toutes les affaires que les parties lui
soumettront, ainsi qu'à tous les cas spécialementprévus dansla Charte
desNations Unies ou dans les traités et conventions en vigueur. » L'ar-
ticle 37du Statut consacre le mêmeprincipe.
Les articles 41 et 48 du Statut figurent dans le chapitre III intitulé
«Procédure ».Cela signifieque les dispositionsde ce chapitre ne sauraient
êtredissociéesdu chapitre II du Statut pour acquérir une portée indépen-
dante, contraire à celle des dispositions susmentionnées du chapitre II
concernant la compétencedela Cour.

Ainsi que le rappelle l'ordonnance (par. 8), le Gouvernement turc a
suggéré «de rejeter la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
dela Cour et,faute de compétence,derayerl'affairedu rôle ».

Devant une telle requête, la Cour avait pour première obligation
d'examinersielleétait compétente.
11n'entre pasdans mes intentions de prendre àprésentpositionpour ou
contre la compétence, cette question n'ayant pas encore étéexaminée ni
régléepar la Cour.
11importe cependant de souligner que la Cour n'a ledroit d'examiner
ni la question de la désignation d'unjugead hoc en vertu de l'article 31,
paragraphe 3, du Statut ni celledes mesures conservatoires avant de s'être
assuréedesajuridiction conformémentauxarticles 36et 37du Statut.

La mention de l'article 48 qui figure dans l'ordonnance ne change rien
à cettesituation, cet article ne faisant quereconnaîàla Cour le droit de
rendre «des ordonnances pour la direction du procès»; il n'autorise paà
éluderlesdispositions clésdesarticles 36et 37du Statut. The reference to Article 66 of the Rules of Court also cannot be used
as an argument to prove that the request for interim measures of protec-
tion allegedly has priority over the question of jurisdiction. Article 66

merely establishes that such a request "shall have priority over al1other
cases", but not over al1stages of the case concerned. The provision that
"the decisionthereon shall be treated as a matter of urgency" means only
that at the moment a request for interim measures is made consideration
of al1othercases should be interrupted.

Thus neitherthe Statute nor the Rules of Court contain any provisions
which provide that the request for interim measures of protection has any
priority over the question ofjurisdiction.
The precedents afforded by cases in which the Court has sometimes
made Orders on the question of interim measures of protection contrary
to itsStatute and Rules cannot be regarded as having any value in the
argument.
1should like to conclude by reference to paragraph 13of the Order, in
which we find: "and whereas the non-appearance of one of the States
concerned cannot by itself constitute an obstacle to the indication of
interim measures of protection ..."
This conclusion also is not in accordance with the Statute, for two

reasons. First: though, if the State concerned could be qualified as a
party (whichis not so in this case), anddoes not appear before the Court,
or fails to defend its case, the other party may in accordance with Article
53of the Statute cal1upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim, yet
paragraph 2 of the same Article lays down as a decisivecondition that the
Court in such a situation must satisfy itself that it hasjurisdiction.
Secondly,the filingby one side of an Applicationcannot of itselfcreate
a case, and therefore the State against which the Application is brought
could be regarded as a party within the meaning of the Statute only after
settlement of the question of the Court's jurisdiction.

(Signed) Platon Mo~ozov. On ne peut pas non plus tirer argument de l'article 66 du Règlement
pour démontrerqu'unedemande en indication de mesuresconservatoires
aurait la priorité surl'examende la compétence.L'article 66 se bornà
établirqu'une telledemande «a la priorité sur toutes autres affaires»,
mais non pas sur toutes les étapes del'affaireaquelle elle se rapporte.
La dispositionsuivant laquelle«ileststatué d'urgenceàson sujet»signifie
seulement qu'au moment où une demande en indication de mesures
conservatoiresest présentée l'examenetoutes lesutresaffairesdoit être
interrompu.
Ainsi, ni le Statuti le Règlementne prévoient que la demande en
indication de mesures conservatoires a la priorité sur l'examen de la

compétence.
Les précédents tirédses affairesdans lesquellesil est arràla Cour
d'ordonner des mesures conservatoires contrairement à son Statut eta
son Règlementne sauraientêtreconsidéréscommp eertinents.

Je voudrais, pour finir, renvoyer au paragraphe 13 de l'ordonnance,
où l'on trouve les mots: «et considérant que la non-comparution de l'un
desEtats en causene saurait en soiconstituerun obstacàel'indicationde
mesuresconservatoires».
Cette conclusion est égalementcontraire au Statut, et cela pour deux
raisons. Tout d'abord,àsupposerque 1'Etatconcernépuisse êtrequalifié
de partie (cequi n'estpas le cas en l'espèce),s'ilrefuse de seprésenter ou
de faire valoir ses moyens, l'autre partie peut certes, conformément
l'article53du Statut, demanderà la Cour de lui adjuger sesconclusions,

maisleparagraphe 2du même articleposeà celala condition décisiveque,
dans unetellesituation,la Cour doit s'assurerqu'ellea compétence.
En second lieu,ledépôt d'une requêtpear un seul Etat ne saurait en soi
donner naissance àune affaire,de sorte que 1'Etatcontre lequella requête
est introduite ne pourrait êtreconsidéré commepartie au sens du Statut
qu'une foistranchéela questionde la compétencedela Cour.

(Signé Platon Mo~ozov.

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Separate Opinion of Judge Morozov

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