Separate Opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh

Document Number
060-19730713-ORD-01-01-EN
Parent Document Number
060-19730713-ORD-01-00-EN
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Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE NAGENDRA SINGH

While voting with the majority for what in legaleffectnow constitutes a

clear withdrawal by the Applicant of its request for interim measures
sought under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, 1have al1along felt
that inthis case, irrespective of the competence of the Court in relation to
the Applicant (Pakistan) and the absent non-applicant (India), which
aspect will beexamined in the second phase, it ispatently obvious that the
Court has nojurisdiction in relation to Bangla-Desh.

It is well known that Bangla-Desh is a sovereign State recognized by
over 90 countries and now a regular member of the several specialized
agencies of the United Nations and a distinct member of the international
cornmunity. The fact remains, however, that without its consent there can
be no exerciseby the Court ofjurisdiction in relation to its rights.

Moreover, from the viewpoint of the Court's adjudication, whether ad
interio mr final, what is vital is the positive pleading of Pakistan that
Bangla-Desh and not India is contesting Pakistan's claim to exclusive
jurisdiction for the holding of trials of 195 prisoners of war. This is
manifest from paragraph 4 of Pakistan's Application, wherein it is stated

that "The Government of Pakistan cannot agree to the trial of its pris-
oners of war by 'Bangla Desh' since Pakistan has exclusivejurisdiction
over its nationals in respect of anyacts of genocideallegedlycommitted in
Pakistani territory".

It is indeed an elementary and basic principle of judicial propriety
which governs the exercise of the judicial function, particularly in inter-
State disputes, that no court of law can adjudicate on the rights and
responsibilities of a third State(a) without giving that State a hearing,
and (b) without obtaining its clear consent.
Furthermore, it appears to me that the Court has not been in proper
seisin of the case from the very beginning and lacks al1prima facie com-
petence. If that be so, it is regrettable to have instituted a further phase
by fixing time-limits for the Parties to plead on the question of jurisdic-
tion.
However, it is true that the Applicant, by its letter of 11 July 1973,
requested the Court to agree to postpone the entire case as the Parties
were about to enter into negotiations for an amicable settlement of the

dispute. As already stated, a request for postponement in relation to
interim measures can only have the legaleffectof withdrawal, which must
take priority over al1other considerations, particularly when India had333 PAKISTAXI PRISONLRS OE WAK (SEI'. 01'.\AGEi\IL)l<A SINGII)

declined to be present and has, therefore, no say in regard to tlie request
of Pakistan. Itis in these circun~stancesthat 1voted with the majority for

the decision of the Court. While doing so, however, 1 do hold that the
Court, when agreeing to postponement of further consideration of the
request for interim measures and finding that it is not therefore called
upon to pronounce thereon, should Iiave declined to deal anyfurther with
the case, as judicial propriety does iiot permit the Court to advance any

further therein.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE NAGENDRA SINGH

While voting with the majority for what in legaleffectnow constitutes a

clear withdrawal by the Applicant of its request for interim measures
sought under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, 1have al1along felt
that inthis case, irrespective of the competence of the Court in relation to
the Applicant (Pakistan) and the absent non-applicant (India), which
aspect will beexamined in the second phase, it ispatently obvious that the
Court has nojurisdiction in relation to Bangla-Desh.

It is well known that Bangla-Desh is a sovereign State recognized by
over 90 countries and now a regular member of the several specialized
agencies of the United Nations and a distinct member of the international
cornmunity. The fact remains, however, that without its consent there can
be no exerciseby the Court ofjurisdiction in relation to its rights.

Moreover, from the viewpoint of the Court's adjudication, whether ad
interio mr final, what is vital is the positive pleading of Pakistan that
Bangla-Desh and not India is contesting Pakistan's claim to exclusive
jurisdiction for the holding of trials of 195 prisoners of war. This is
manifest from paragraph 4 of Pakistan's Application, wherein it is stated

that "The Government of Pakistan cannot agree to the trial of its pris-
oners of war by 'Bangla Desh' since Pakistan has exclusivejurisdiction
over its nationals in respect of anyacts of genocideallegedlycommitted in
Pakistani territory".

It is indeed an elementary and basic principle of judicial propriety
which governs the exercise of the judicial function, particularly in inter-
State disputes, that no court of law can adjudicate on the rights and
responsibilities of a third State(a) without giving that State a hearing,
and (b) without obtaining its clear consent.
Furthermore, it appears to me that the Court has not been in proper
seisin of the case from the very beginning and lacks al1prima facie com-
petence. If that be so, it is regrettable to have instituted a further phase
by fixing time-limits for the Parties to plead on the question of jurisdic-
tion.
However, it is true that the Applicant, by its letter of 11 July 1973,
requested the Court to agree to postpone the entire case as the Parties
were about to enter into negotiations for an amicable settlement of the

dispute. As already stated, a request for postponement in relation to
interim measures can only have the legaleffectof withdrawal, which must
take priority over al1other considerations, particularly when India had OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. NAGENDRA SINGH

[Traduction]

Tout en votant avec la majorité pour ce qui constitue manifestement
en droit un retrait par le demandeur de la demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires déposéeen vertu de l'article 41 du Statut de la
Cour, je n'ai pas cesséde penser qu'en l'espèce,indépendamment de la

question de la compétence de la Cour à l'égarddu demandeur (le Pa-
kistan) et dela Partie adverse absente (l'Inde), qui sera examinée lors de
la deuxièmephase, il est tout àfait patent que la Cour n'a aucune compé-
tence à l'égarddu Bangladesh.
Chacun sait que le Bangladesh est un Etat souverain reconnu par plus
de quatre-vingt-dix pays, qu'il a étérégulièrement admisdans plusieurs
institutions spécialisées desNations Unies et que c'est un membre indé-
pendant de la commi~nautéinternationale. Il reste cependant quela Cour
ne peut, sans son consentement, exercer de compétence à l'égardde ses
droits.
De plus, du point de vue de la décision de la Cour, provisoire ou

définitive,tout à fait essentielle est la thèse positive avancéepar le Pa-
kistan selon laquelle c'est le Bangladesh et non pasl'Inde qui conteste la
prétention pakistanaise à la juridiction exclusive en ce qui concerne le
jugement de 195 prisonniers de guerre. Cela ressort clairement du para-
graphe 4 dela requêtepakistanaise où il est di((Le Gouvernement pakis-
tanais ne saurait accepter que ses prisonniers de guerre soient jugéspar le
((Bangladesh)), attendu que le Pakistan a une juridiction exclusive sur ses
ressortissants pourtous lesactes de génocide enterritoire pakistanais dont
ils peuvent êtreaccusés.))
C'està vrai dire un principe élémentaireet fondamental touchant à la
fonction judiciaire et régissantson exercice, pour ce qui est en particulier

des différends entre Etats, qu'aucun tribunal ne puisse statuer sur les
droits et responsabilités d'un Etat tiers) sans avoir entendu cet Etat et
b) sans avoir obtenu son consentement non équivoque.
En outre, il me semble que, dès le début, la Cour n'a pas étésaisie
valablement de l'affaire et qu'elle est prima facie dépourvue de toute
conipétence.S'ilen est ainsi, il est regrettable queon ait prévuune autre
phase en fixant aux Parties des délaispour traiter de la question de com-
pétence.
Il est vrai que, daris sa lettre du 11juillet 1973,le demandeur a prié la
Cour de bien vouloir différer l'examende l'affaire dans son ensemble, les
Parties étant sur le point d'entamer des négociations en vue d'un règle-

ment amiable du diflérend.Comme je l'ai dit, une demande tendant àce
que l'indication de mesures conservatoires soit différéene peut avoir
qu'un effet juridique, celui d'un retrait, qui doit l'emporter sur toute333 PAKISTAXI PRISONLRS OE WAK (SEI'. 01'.\AGEi\IL)l<A SINGII)

declined to be present and has, therefore, no say in regard to tlie request
of Pakistan. Itis in these circun~stancesthat 1voted with the majority for

the decision of the Court. While doing so, however, 1 do hold that the
Court, when agreeing to postponement of further consideration of the
request for interim measures and finding that it is not therefore called
upon to pronounce thereon, should Iiave declined to deal anyfurther with
the case, as judicial propriety does iiot permit the Court to advance any

further therein. , ; I I , I I
..iii-:~1!,iii: i !ii~li>aictll'ir.i!t,\C j7t.&cilteret ii'a
ilo~icricri :I (11i.c,il! ILLilci~i;iiicic(111 1';ikist:in. C'cst daris ces conditions
q~iei'ai ~olti ;i\.ec Ikiincjorit6 pour la dicision de la Cour. Ce faisant, je
ii't:restilne pas iiioii-isqiie litC'our.tout en acceptant de diffGrerla suite de

l'i-~..ii~icriilc 1;i di.:ii;iiiilc eii iiitiic:itiori dc ineîures corlïcr\:itoires et en
ion\(;it;irit cj~i'clli. ir'e\! i!oiic piik.:ippcli.e ii se proiionccr ;i leur si~jct,
'iiirliit dii i.cl'ri~;c<.cIN)~II-!.LIrc I'iitlii~r~. iiril !lecoi~vi~iitpas ;LUcaractère

jiidiciaire de s;i foiiciiioti d'aller p1i.i~loin.

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Document Long Title

Separate Opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh

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