Dissenting Opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo

Document Number
055-19720817-ORD-01-02-EN
Parent Document Number
055-19720817-ORD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

DTSSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PADILLA NERVO

1an1 unable to concur in the Order of the Court and therefore 1 voted
against its adoption.
In my view, the Court should not have indicated measures of protec-
tion. Notwithstanding contrary opinion, the special features of this case
do not justify such measures against a State which denies the jurisdiction
of the Court, which is not a party to these proceedings and whose rights

as a sovereign State are thereby interfered with.
The claini of the Republic of Iceland to extend its fisheries jurisdiction
to a zone of 50 nautical miles around Iceland. has not been proved to be
contrary to international law.
The question regarding thejurisdiction of the Court has not been fully
explored. It relies mainly as a source of its jurisdiction on the Exchange

of Notes of II March 1961.an agreement which the Republic of lceland
contends has fully achieved its piirpose and object, and the provisions of
which it considers no longer to be applicable and. consequently. ter-
minated.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of lceland sent to the Registrar on
29 May 1972 a letter regarding the filing on 14 April 1972 of an Appli-

cation by the Government of the United Kingdom. instituting proceedings
against Iceland.
With that letter were sent several docun~ents dealing with the back-
ground and termination of the Agreement of 1I March 1961. and "with
the changed circumstances resulting from the ever-increasing exploita-
tion of the fishery resources in the seas surrounding Iceland".

The letter refers to the dispute with the United Kingdom who opposed
the 12-mile fishery limit established by the lcelandic Government in
1958,and to the 1961 Exchange of Notes.
Iceland States that "the 1961 Exchange of Notes look place under
extremely difficuli circumstances, Mhei~the British Royal Navy had been
using force to oppose the 12-mile fisherq liniit".

In paragraph 4 of the United Kingdoni Application instituting pro-
ceedings. it is said:

"The validity of this action was not accepted by the United King-
dom and fishing vessels from the United Kingdorn continued to
fish inside the 12-mileliniit. There then ensued a number of incidents
involving. on the one hand. lcelandic coastguard vessels and. on the21 FlSHERlES JURISDICTION (DISS. OP. PAUILLA NEKVO)

other hand, British fishing vessels and fisheries protection vessels
of the Royal Navy."
It appears from the above-quoted statements, that such circun~stances

were not the most appropriate to negotiate and conclude the 1961Agree-
ment.
The Foreign Minister of Iceland further indicates:

"The Agreement by which that dispute was settled, and conse-
quently the possibility of such recourse to the Court (to which the
Government of lceland was consistently opposed as far as concerns
disputes over the extent of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction, as
indeed the United Kingdom recognizes) was not of a permanent
nature. In particular, an undertaking for judicial settlement cannot

be considered to be of a permanent nature. There is nothing in that
situation, or in any general rule of contemporary international law,
to justify any other view .. .

. ..After the termination of the agreement recorded in the Exchange
of Notes of 1961, there was on 14 April 1972 no basis under the

Statute for the Courtto exercisejurisdiction in the case to which the
United Kingdom refers.
The Government of Iceland, considering that the vital interests of
the people of Iceland are involved, respectfully informs the Court
that it is not willing to confer jurisdiction on the Court in any case
involving the extent of the fishery limits of Iceland, and specifically

in the case sought to be instituted by the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern lreland on 14 April 1972."

In the Anglo-lranian Oil Co. case, Judges Winiarski and Badawi Pasha
gave the following reasons for their dissenting opinions which-in my
view-are applicable and valid in the present case:

"The question of interim measures of protection is linked, for the
Court, with the question of jurisdiction; the Court has power to
indicate such measures only if it holds, should it be only provi-
sionally, that it is competent to hear the case on its merits." (I.C.J.
Reports 1951, p. 96).
"In international law it is the consent of the parties which confers

jurisdiction on the Court; the Court has jurisdiction only in so far
asthat jurisdiction has been accepted by the parties. The power given
to the Court by Article 41 is not unconditional; it is given for the
purposes of the proceedings and is limited to those proceedings. If
there is no jurisdiction as to the merits, there can be no jurisdiction
to indicate interim measures of protection. Measures of this kind in
international law are exceptional in character to an even greater

extent than they are in mun~icipallaw; they may easily be considered a scarcely tolerable interference in the affairs of a sovereign State."
(Ibid., p. 97.)

"We find it difficult to accept the view that ifprinia facie the total
lack of jurisdiction of the Court is not patent, that is, if there is a
possibility, however remote, that the Court may be competent, then
it may indicate interim rneasures of protection. This approach, which
also involves an element of judgment, and which does not reserve
to any greater extent the right of the Court to give a final decision as

to its jurisdiction, appears however to be based on a presumption in
favour of the cornpetence of the Court which is not in consonance
with the principles of international law. In order to accord with these
principles, the position should be reversed: if there exist weighty
arguments in favour of the challenged jurisdiction. the Court may
indicate interim rneasures of protection: if there exist serious doubts
or weighty arguments against thisjurisdiction such measures cannot

be indicated." (Ibid., p. 97.)
In rny opinion such doubts do exist in the present case.

The Exchange of Notes on which the Application founds the jurisdic-
tion of the Court, dated 11March 1961,makes reference to the Resolution
of the Parliament of Iceland of 5 May 1959,which declared that a recog-
nition of the rights of lceland to fisheries lirnits extending to thc~n.ho1~
continental sheif"should be sought".
In the Note of 11 March 1961 itis stated that: "The Icelandic Govern-
ment will continue to work for the implrmentation of the Althing Reso-

lution of 5 May 1959, regarding the e.~tcnsion of fisheries jurisdiction
around Iceland .. ."
The claim of Iceland that its continental shelf must be considered to be
a part of the country itself, has support in the Convention on this subject,
done at Geneva on 29 April 1958.
This Court, in its Judgment of 20 February 1969,stated:

". . .the most fundamental of al1the rules of law relating to the conti-
nental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958Geneva Convention,
... namely that the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of

continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land
territory into and under the sea exist ipso,facto and ah initio, by
virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an
exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed
and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent
right. In order to exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone

through, nor have any special legal acts to be performed. Its existence
can be declared (and many States have done this) but does not need
to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does not depend on its
being exercised. To echo the language of the Geneva Convention, it
is 'exclusive' in the sense that if the coastal State does not choose to
explore or exploit the areas of'shelf appertaining to it. that is its own affair, but no one else may do so without its express consent."
(I.C.J.Reports 1969, p. 22, para. 19.)

The Government of Iceland in its information and documents sent

to the Court, has given well-founded reasons and explanations of its
sovereign right to extend its fisheriesjurisdiction to the entire continental
shelf area.
The coastal fisheries in Iceland have always been the foundation
of the country's economy.
The coastal fisheries are the conditio sine qua non for the Icelandic

economy; without them the country would not have been habitable.
lceland rests on a platform or continental shelf whose outlines
follow those of the countrv itself. In these shallow underwater terraces.
ideal conditions are found for spawning areas and nursery grounds upon
whose ~reservation and utilization the livelihood of the nation de~ends.
It is increasingly being recognized that coastal fisheries are based on the

special conditions prevailing in the coastal areas which provide the neces-
sary environment for the fishstocks. This environment is an integral part
of the natural resources of the coastal State.
The continental shelf is really the platform of the country and must
be considered to be a part of the country itself.
The vital interests of the Icelandic people are therefore at stake.
They must be protected.

The priority position of the coastal State has then always been recog-
nized through the system of fishery limits. In the past these limits have to
a great extent not been established with any regard to the interests of the
coastal State. They owe their origin rather to the preponderant influence
of distant water fishery nations. who wished to fish as close as possible to
the shores of other nations, frequently destroying one area and then pro-

ceeding to another.

In a system of progressive development of international law the ques-
tion of fishery limits has to be reconsidered in terms of the protection and
utilization of coastal resources regardless of other considerations which
apply to the extent of the territorial sea. The international community
has increasingly recognized that the coastal fishery resources are to be

considered as a part of the natural resources of the coastal State. The
special situation of countries who are overwhelmingly dependent on
coastal fisheries, was generally recognized at both Geneva Conferences
in 1958and 1960.Since then this view has found frequent expression both
in the legislation of various countries and in important political state-
ments. The course of events is decidedly progressing in this direction.

Reiterating the considerations which lead the Government of Iceland
to issue new regulations relating to exclusive fisheries jurisdiction in the24 FISHEKIES JUKISDIC'TI~N(VISS.OP. PADILLA NERV~)

continental shelf area, it stated the following:

"ln the aide-nlr'moireof 31 August, 1971, it was intimated that 'in
order to strengthen the measures of protection essential to safeguard
the vital interests of the Icelandic people in theas surrounding its
coasts, the Government of Iceland now finds it essential to extend

further the zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction around its coasts
to include the areas of sea covering the continental shelf'. It was
further stated that in the opinion of the Icelandic Government, the
object and purpose of the provisions in the 1961Exchange of Notes
for recourse to judicial settlement in certain eventualities have been
fully achieved. The Government of Iceland, therefore, considers the

provisions of the Notes exchanged no longer to be applicable and
consequently terminated." (Government of Iceland's aide-mémoire
of 24 February 1972, Annex H to United Kingdom Application.)

". . . In the period of ten years which has elapsed, the United King-
dom Government enjoyed the benefit of the Icelandic Government's
policy to the effect that further extension of the limits of exclusive

fisheries jurisdictionwould be placed in abeyance .for a reason-
able and equitable period. Continuation of that policy by the Ice-
landic Government, in the light of intervening scientificandeconomic
evolution (including the ever greater threat of increased diversion
of highly developed fishing effort to the Icelandic area) has become
excessively onerous and unacceptable, and is harmful to the mainte-

nance of the resources of the sea on which the livelihood of the Ice-
landic people depends." (Government of Iceland's aide-mémoire of
31 August 1971,Annex C to United Kingdom Application.)

In the Request by the Government of the United Kingdom for the
indication of interim measures of protection the grounds of the request
are stated at length.
It is stated therein that Iceland's intention of extending the limits of its

fisheries jurisdiction, if carried into effect for any substantial period.
would result in immediate and irremediable damage to the United King-
dom fishing and associated industries, and that such damage could not be
made good by the payment of monetary compensation.

Another argument is, that it is not possible for the fishing effort to be

diverted from the Iceland area to other fishing grounds, at economic
levels. Distant-water trawlers displaced from Iceland could not profitahly
fish on near-water or middle-water grounds. Other factors would also
seriously impair fishing operations and theirjnanciul returns.

It is claimed that any additional effort by United Kingdom and other 25 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (DISS.OP. PADILLA NERVO)

vessels diverted frorn the lceland area would (among other things)
depress the projitsof the traditional near-water and middle-water sectors

of the United Kingdom fleet and in turn the current rerurnsof the United
Kingdom inshore fleet.

The request for interim measures States:

"In general, therefore, modern distant-water trawlers such as are
used bythe United Kingdorn fishing fleet in the Iceland area, equip-

ped with expensive and sophisticated technical gear and having
inflexibly high operating costs,could not, ifexcluded from the Iceland
area, hope to gain, let alone sustain, fish yields which would keep
them in business."

Not only Iceland but many coastal States in al1 regions of the world,
know by experience the harn~fuleffects of the ever greaterthreat of highly

developed fishing effort near their shores, by foreign fishing fleets equip-
ped-like the modern trawlers of the United Kingdom-with sophisti-
cated technical geur.
The arguments developed in the request for measures of protection
and in the oral hearing of 1 August 1972appear, in my view, to have as

their real object the protection of the interests, financial or economic,
of private fishing enterprises rather than the "rights" of the United King-
dom.
Furthermore, the existence of those rights cannot be taken forgranted.
This matter belongs to the merits of the case, to be decided when the Court

deals with thern.
The assertion that the indication of interirn rneasures of protection
in no wuy prejudges the rights which the Court may subsequently adjudge
to belong either to the Applicant or to the Respondent, is an assertion
contradicted by the obvious implication that questionable rights are
presumed to exist by the mere fact of indicating rneasures intended to

protect thern.
The measures indicated in the Order have thecharacter of a prelirninary
decision on the merits. The irnplementation of those measures will
amount to execution of such a prelirninary decision. This fact cannot be
denied sirnply by asserting that such rneasures in no way prejudge the

substance of the case.
The claim of imrnediate and irreparable darnage is based on the assump-
tion that the dispute on the merits or even the jurisdictional issue, will
not be settled by the Court for many years.
That is a wrong assumption and therefore the plea of adisruption ofthe

whole fishing industry will not have any force or weight if the Court, as
should be expected, does consider the matter of jurisdiction before the
end of this year. The Applicant has invoked Article 53 of the Statute and calls upon
the Courtto decide in favour of its claim.
According to paragraph 2 of that Article, the Court must,.first of all,
satisfy itseif that it hasjurisdiction.

Relevant to the issue of jurisdiction is the provision in Article 61,
paragraph 1,of the Rules: "A requesr for the indication of interim mea-
sures of protection may be filed at any time during the proceedings in
the case in connection with which it is made."
The objective requirement ratione temporis for the exercise of this juris-
diction is that the request is filed during the proceedings in the case.

"lf it is clear on the face of the document instituting proceedings

that the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the case on its merits re-
quires some step on the part of the respondent State for its perfection,
then, .. .there will be no 'proceedings',andconsequently no inherent
jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures, until that step has been
taken." (Rosenne, The Law and Practice of' the International Court,
Chap. XII, Incidental Jurisdiction, p. 424.)

The Governrnent of lceland, on 28 July 1972,acknowledged receipt

of a telegram from the Registrar of the Court concerning the United
Kingdom's request for interim measures filed 19 July 1972. The message
from the Government of Iceland, States in part:

". . . there is no basis for the request to which your telegram refers.
In any event the Application of 14 April1972 refers to the legalposition
of two Stales and not to the economic position of certain private
enterprises or otl~er interests in one oftlrose StareWithout prejudice
to any of its previous arguments the Government of lceland objects

specifically to the indication by the Court of provisional measures
under Article 41 of the Statute and Article 61 of the Rules of the
Court in the case to which the United Kingdom reièrs, where no
basis for jurisdiction is established." (Emphasisadded.)

Ln the Exchange of Notes of II March 1961, the agreement already
envisaged the prospect that the Republic of lceland would extend the
fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit.

Lfit is contrary to international law to envisage such extension, the
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany would not have
accepted the inclusion of such statement in the formal exchange of notes.

There is in such excliange of notes an implicit recognition of the right
of lceland to extend its fisheriesjurisdiction.

The United Kingdom, in view of its recognition of the exceptional
dependence of the lcelandic nation upon coastal fisheries for their liveli-hood and economic development, accepted the proposais put forward by
the Government of Iczland, among them, the proposal contained in the
penultimate paragraph, which states that "the Government of Iceland
would continue to work for the implementation of the Althing Resolution

of 5 May 1959 regarding the extension of fisheries jurisdiction around
Iceland", which declares that a recognition of its rights to the whole
continental shelf should be sought, as provided in the Law concerning the
Scientific Conservation of the Continental Shelf Fisheries of 1948.

The United Kingdom did not object to the existence of such rights, it
accepted the proposal which contained as counterpart or consideration
the obligation of lceland to give six months' notice of any such extension.

If a dispute did arise in respect of such extension, it would not affect

the previous implicit recognition of Iceland's right to extend its fisheries
jurisdiction.
The most essential asset of coastal States is to be found in the living
resources of the sea covering their continental shelf and in the fishing zone
contiguous to their territorial sea.
The progressive development of international law entails the recogni-

tion of the concept of the patrimonial sea, which extends from the territo-
rial waters to a distance fixed by the coastal State concerned, in exercise
of its sovereign rights, for theurpose of protecting the resources on which
its economic development and the livelihood of its people depends.

This concept is not a new one. It has found expression in declarations
by many governments proclaiming as their international maritime policy,
their sovereignty and exclusive fisheries jurisdiction over the sea conti-
guous to their shores.

There are nine States which have adopted a distance of 200 nautical
miles from their shores as their exclusive fisheries jurisdiction. Some of
them have enacted and enforced regulations to that effect since 20 years
ago, when the "Santiago Declaration" was signed by the Governments of
Chile, Ecuador and Peru in August 1952.

\My last observation is the following. The claim of irremediable
damages to the Applicant has not, in my opinion, been proved. They are
only allegations that the fishing enterprises would suffer financial losses
and also allegations that the eating habits of people in the countries con-
cerned will be disturbed. Such an argument cannot, in my opinion, be
opposed to the sovereign rights of lceland over its exclusive jurisdiction

and the protection of the living resources of the sea covering its continen-
tal shelf. The Order does not strike, in my view, a fair balance between the
two sides as required by the relevantarticle ofthe Statute. The restrictions
indicated in the Order are obviously against Iceland, interfering with its
indisputable rights to legislate over its own territory as it considers essen-

tial (cf. para. 1, sub-para. (d), of the operative clause of the Court's28 FISHERIESJURlSDlCTlON (DISS. OP. PADILLA NERVO)

Order). In the nieasures indicated in that Order the only substantial
restriction to the Applicant consists in limiting the amount of its annual

catch to 170,000metric tons instead of its claim to 185,000 metric tons,
15,000metric tons less than the Applicant had asked for in its request for
measures of protection.All the other measures of protection requested
in the Application the Court has accepted. On this aspect also 1am not
able to agree with the indication of measures in the Order of the Court.

(Signed) Luis PADILL A ERVO.

Bilingual Content

DTSSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PADILLA NERVO

1an1 unable to concur in the Order of the Court and therefore 1 voted
against its adoption.
In my view, the Court should not have indicated measures of protec-
tion. Notwithstanding contrary opinion, the special features of this case
do not justify such measures against a State which denies the jurisdiction
of the Court, which is not a party to these proceedings and whose rights

as a sovereign State are thereby interfered with.
The claini of the Republic of Iceland to extend its fisheries jurisdiction
to a zone of 50 nautical miles around Iceland. has not been proved to be
contrary to international law.
The question regarding thejurisdiction of the Court has not been fully
explored. It relies mainly as a source of its jurisdiction on the Exchange

of Notes of II March 1961.an agreement which the Republic of lceland
contends has fully achieved its piirpose and object, and the provisions of
which it considers no longer to be applicable and. consequently. ter-
minated.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of lceland sent to the Registrar on
29 May 1972 a letter regarding the filing on 14 April 1972 of an Appli-

cation by the Government of the United Kingdom. instituting proceedings
against Iceland.
With that letter were sent several docun~ents dealing with the back-
ground and termination of the Agreement of 1I March 1961. and "with
the changed circumstances resulting from the ever-increasing exploita-
tion of the fishery resources in the seas surrounding Iceland".

The letter refers to the dispute with the United Kingdom who opposed
the 12-mile fishery limit established by the lcelandic Government in
1958,and to the 1961 Exchange of Notes.
Iceland States that "the 1961 Exchange of Notes look place under
extremely difficuli circumstances, Mhei~the British Royal Navy had been
using force to oppose the 12-mile fisherq liniit".

In paragraph 4 of the United Kingdoni Application instituting pro-
ceedings. it is said:

"The validity of this action was not accepted by the United King-
dom and fishing vessels from the United Kingdorn continued to
fish inside the 12-mileliniit. There then ensued a number of incidents
involving. on the one hand. lcelandic coastguard vessels and. on the OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. PADILLA NERVO

Je ne suis pas en mesure de souscrire à l'ordonnance de la Cour et

j'ai donc votécontre son adoption.
A mon avis, la Cour n'aurait pas dû indiquer de mesures conservatoires.
Malgré l'opinion contraire, les traits particuliers de la présente affaire
n'autorisent pas de telles mesures contre un Etat qui nie la compétence de

la Cour, qui n'est pas partie à l'instance et dont les droits d'Etat souve-
rain subissent ainsi une atteinte.
IIn'est pas établiqut la prétention de la Républiqued'lslande à étendre
sa compétence en matière de pêcheriesjusqu'à 50 milles marins autourde
ses côtes soit contraire au droit international.

La question de la compétence de la Cour n'a pas étéconiplètement
examinée. La Cour invoque surtout pour fonder sa compétencel'échange
de notes du Il mars 1961, accord qui. d'après la République d'lslande.
a entièrement atteint son but et son objet, dont elle considère que les
dispositions ne sont plus applicables et sont donc devenues caduques.

Le ministre des AfTairesétrangèresd'Islande a envoyé au Greffier, le
29 mai 1972,une lettre au sujet du dépôt,intervenu le 14avril 1972,d'une
requête par laquelle le Gouverrlement du Royaume-Uni introduisait
une instance contre I'lslande.

A cette lettre, étaient joints plusieurs documents concernant l'origine
et l'extinction de l'accord du 1I mars 1961, ainsi que le changement
de circonstances résultant de l'exploitation toujours croissante des
ressources de la pèche dans les mers entourant I'lslande )).
La lettre mentionne le différendavec le Royaume-Uni, qui s'opposait

ù la limite de pêchede 12milles établiepar le Gouvernement islandais en
1958,et se réfèreà l'échangede notes de 1961.
L'Islande déclareque 1,l'échangede notes de 1961 est intervenu dans
des circonstances extrêmement ditficiles, à un moment où la flotte
britannique employait la force pour s'opposer à l'application de la limite

de pêchede 12 niilles 11.
Au paragraphe 4 de la requète introductive d'instance di1 Royaume-
Uni. il est dit:

La validité de cette mesure n'ayant pas été reconnue par le
Royaunie-Uni. des navires de pêche de ce pays continuèrent à
pêcheren deçà de la limite de douze milles. II s'ensuivit un certain
nombre d'incidents où furerit impliqués, d'une part, des navires

garde-chtes islandais ei. de l'autre, des navires de pêchebritanniq~ies21 FlSHERlES JURISDICTION (DISS. OP. PAUILLA NEKVO)

other hand, British fishing vessels and fisheries protection vessels
of the Royal Navy."
It appears from the above-quoted statements, that such circun~stances

were not the most appropriate to negotiate and conclude the 1961Agree-
ment.
The Foreign Minister of Iceland further indicates:

"The Agreement by which that dispute was settled, and conse-
quently the possibility of such recourse to the Court (to which the
Government of lceland was consistently opposed as far as concerns
disputes over the extent of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction, as
indeed the United Kingdom recognizes) was not of a permanent
nature. In particular, an undertaking for judicial settlement cannot

be considered to be of a permanent nature. There is nothing in that
situation, or in any general rule of contemporary international law,
to justify any other view .. .

. ..After the termination of the agreement recorded in the Exchange
of Notes of 1961, there was on 14 April 1972 no basis under the

Statute for the Courtto exercisejurisdiction in the case to which the
United Kingdom refers.
The Government of Iceland, considering that the vital interests of
the people of Iceland are involved, respectfully informs the Court
that it is not willing to confer jurisdiction on the Court in any case
involving the extent of the fishery limits of Iceland, and specifically

in the case sought to be instituted by the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern lreland on 14 April 1972."

In the Anglo-lranian Oil Co. case, Judges Winiarski and Badawi Pasha
gave the following reasons for their dissenting opinions which-in my
view-are applicable and valid in the present case:

"The question of interim measures of protection is linked, for the
Court, with the question of jurisdiction; the Court has power to
indicate such measures only if it holds, should it be only provi-
sionally, that it is competent to hear the case on its merits." (I.C.J.
Reports 1951, p. 96).
"In international law it is the consent of the parties which confers

jurisdiction on the Court; the Court has jurisdiction only in so far
asthat jurisdiction has been accepted by the parties. The power given
to the Court by Article 41 is not unconditional; it is given for the
purposes of the proceedings and is limited to those proceedings. If
there is no jurisdiction as to the merits, there can be no jurisdiction
to indicate interim measures of protection. Measures of this kind in
international law are exceptional in character to an even greater

extent than they are in mun~icipallaw; they may easily be considered et des bâtiments de la marine royale chargés de la protection des
pêcheries. »

IIressort des déclarations ci-dessus que de telles circonstances n'étaient
pas des plus favorables pour négocieret conclure l'accord de 1961.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangèresd'Islande indique en outre:

(L'accord réglant le différend dont il s'agissait et par conséquent
la possibilitéd'une instance devant la Cour (à laquelle le Gouverne-
ment islandais s'est constamment opposé pour les différends con-
cernant l'étendue desa compétenceexclusive en matière de pêcheries,

ainsi que le reconnaît d'ailleurs le Royaume-Uni) n'avaient pas un
caractère permanent. En particulier on ne saurait considérer comme
permanent un engagement de se soumettre au règlement judiciaire.
Rien dans cette situation ni dans toute règle généraledu droit
international contemporain ne justifierait une autre manière de

voir ...
L'accord enregistré dans l'échange de notes de 1961 ayant pris
fin, la Cour ne pouvait trouver dans son Statut le 14 avril 1972
aucun fondement pour l'exercice de sa compétence dans l'affaire
viséepar le Royaume-Uni.

Considérant que les intérêtsvitaux du peuple islandais sont enjeu,
le Gouvernement islandais porte respectueusement à la connaissance
de la Cour qu'il n'est pas disposé à luiattribuer compétence dans
une affaire qui concernerait l'étendue des pêcheries islandaises,en
particulier dans l'instance que le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de

Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord a voulu introduire le 14avril
1972. »

Dans I'affaire de 1'Anglo-lranian Oil Co., M. Winiarski et Badawi
Pacha ont justifié leur opinion dissidente par les motifs suivants, que je
crois applicables et valables en l'espèce:

11Le problème des mesures conservatoires est liLpour la Cour à
celui de sa compétence; elle ne peut les indiquer que si elle admet, ne
fût-ce que provisoirement, sa compétence pour connaître du fond
de l'affaire1)(C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 96.)

11En droit international, c'est le consentement des parties qui
confère juridiction à la Cour; la Cour n'a compétence que dans la
mesure où sa juridiction a étéacceptée par les parties. Le pouvoir
donné a la Cour par l'article 41 n'est pas inconditionnel; il lui est

donné aux fins du procès, dans les limites du procès. Pas de compé-
tente au fond, pas de compétence pour indiquer des mesures con-
servatoires. Ces mesures en droit international ont un caractère
exceptionnel à un plus haut degré encore qu'en droit interne; elles a scarcely tolerable interference in the affairs of a sovereign State."
(Ibid., p. 97.)

"We find it difficult to accept the view that ifprinia facie the total
lack of jurisdiction of the Court is not patent, that is, if there is a
possibility, however remote, that the Court may be competent, then
it may indicate interim rneasures of protection. This approach, which
also involves an element of judgment, and which does not reserve
to any greater extent the right of the Court to give a final decision as

to its jurisdiction, appears however to be based on a presumption in
favour of the cornpetence of the Court which is not in consonance
with the principles of international law. In order to accord with these
principles, the position should be reversed: if there exist weighty
arguments in favour of the challenged jurisdiction. the Court may
indicate interim rneasures of protection: if there exist serious doubts
or weighty arguments against thisjurisdiction such measures cannot

be indicated." (Ibid., p. 97.)
In rny opinion such doubts do exist in the present case.

The Exchange of Notes on which the Application founds the jurisdic-
tion of the Court, dated 11March 1961,makes reference to the Resolution
of the Parliament of Iceland of 5 May 1959,which declared that a recog-
nition of the rights of lceland to fisheries lirnits extending to thc~n.ho1~
continental sheif"should be sought".
In the Note of 11 March 1961 itis stated that: "The Icelandic Govern-
ment will continue to work for the implrmentation of the Althing Reso-

lution of 5 May 1959, regarding the e.~tcnsion of fisheries jurisdiction
around Iceland .. ."
The claim of Iceland that its continental shelf must be considered to be
a part of the country itself, has support in the Convention on this subject,
done at Geneva on 29 April 1958.
This Court, in its Judgment of 20 February 1969,stated:

". . .the most fundamental of al1the rules of law relating to the conti-
nental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958Geneva Convention,
... namely that the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of

continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land
territory into and under the sea exist ipso,facto and ah initio, by
virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an
exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed
and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent
right. In order to exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone

through, nor have any special legal acts to be performed. Its existence
can be declared (and many States have done this) but does not need
to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does not depend on its
being exercised. To echo the language of the Geneva Convention, it
is 'exclusive' in the sense that if the coastal State does not choose to
explore or exploit the areas of'shelf appertaining to it. that is its sont facilement considérées comme une ingérence à peine tolérable
dans les affaires d'un Etat souverain. ))(Ibid.,p. 97.)

11IInous est difficile d'admettre le point de vue d'après lequel si
prima facie l'incompétence totale n'est pas évidente.donc s'il existe

une possibilité, si faible soit-elle, de compétence pour la Cour, elle
peut indiquer des mesures conservatoires. Cette méthode qui com-
porte, elle aussi, un élémentd'appréciation et qui ne réservepas dans
une plus grande mesure la liberté de la Cour de statuer définitive-

ment sur sa compétence, paraît cependant partir de la présomption
en faveur de la compétence de la Cour, ce qui ne s'acwrde pas avec
les principes du droit international. Pour êtreen accord avec le droit
international, il faut renverser les positions: s'il existe de fortes

raisons en faveur de la compétence contestée, la Cour peut indiquer
des mesures conservatoires; s'il existe des doutes sérieux ou de
fortes raisons contre cette compétence, elle ne peut pas les accorder. ))

(Ibid.)
A mon avis, ces doutes existent dans la présente affaire.

L'échange de notes du II mars 1961 sur lequel la requête fonde la
compétence de la Cour mentionne la résolution du Parlement islandais
du 5 mai 1959,aux termes de laquelle (iil convient de s'efforcer d'obtenir ))
la reconnaissance des droits de pêche de l'Islande sur l'ensemble du

plateau continental.
Dans la note du 11 mars 1961, il est dit que: (Le Gouvernement
islandais continuera de s'employer à mettre en Ipurre la résolution de
1'Althing en date du 5 mai 1959relative à l'élargissement de la juridiction

sur les pêcheriesautour de l'Islande... »
Quand l'Islande affirme que son plateau continental doit être considéré
comme une partie du pays lui-même,elle peut s'appuyer sur la convention

relative à cette question, signée a Genève le 29 avril 1958.
Dans son arrêt du20 février 1969, la Cour a énoncé:

11la plus fondanientale de toutes les règles de droit relatives au
plateau continental et qui est consacrée par l'article 2 de la Con-
vention de Genève de 1958 ... :les droits de I'Etat riverain concer-
nant la zone de plateau continental qui constitue un prolongement

naturel de son territoire sous la mer existent ipso ,facto et ab
initio en vertu de la souveraineté de I'Etat sur ce territoire et par
une extension de cette souveraineté sous la forme de l'exercice de

droits souverains aux fins de l'exploration du lit de la mer et de
l'exploitation de ses ressources naturelles. Il y a là un droit inhérent.
Point n'est besoin pour l'exercer de suivre un processus juridique
particulier ni d'accomplir des actesjuridiques spéciaux. Son existence

peut être constatée,comme cela a été faitpar de nombreux Etats,
niais elle ne suppose aucun acte constitutif. Qui plus est, ce droit est
indépendant de son exercice effectif. Pour reprendre le terme de la
Convention de Genève, il est Iexclusif ))en ce sens que, si un Etat own affair, but no one else may do so without its express consent."
(I.C.J.Reports 1969, p. 22, para. 19.)

The Government of Iceland in its information and documents sent

to the Court, has given well-founded reasons and explanations of its
sovereign right to extend its fisheriesjurisdiction to the entire continental
shelf area.
The coastal fisheries in Iceland have always been the foundation
of the country's economy.
The coastal fisheries are the conditio sine qua non for the Icelandic

economy; without them the country would not have been habitable.
lceland rests on a platform or continental shelf whose outlines
follow those of the countrv itself. In these shallow underwater terraces.
ideal conditions are found for spawning areas and nursery grounds upon
whose ~reservation and utilization the livelihood of the nation de~ends.
It is increasingly being recognized that coastal fisheries are based on the

special conditions prevailing in the coastal areas which provide the neces-
sary environment for the fishstocks. This environment is an integral part
of the natural resources of the coastal State.
The continental shelf is really the platform of the country and must
be considered to be a part of the country itself.
The vital interests of the Icelandic people are therefore at stake.
They must be protected.

The priority position of the coastal State has then always been recog-
nized through the system of fishery limits. In the past these limits have to
a great extent not been established with any regard to the interests of the
coastal State. They owe their origin rather to the preponderant influence
of distant water fishery nations. who wished to fish as close as possible to
the shores of other nations, frequently destroying one area and then pro-

ceeding to another.

In a system of progressive development of international law the ques-
tion of fishery limits has to be reconsidered in terms of the protection and
utilization of coastal resources regardless of other considerations which
apply to the extent of the territorial sea. The international community
has increasingly recognized that the coastal fishery resources are to be

considered as a part of the natural resources of the coastal State. The
special situation of countries who are overwhelmingly dependent on
coastal fisheries, was generally recognized at both Geneva Conferences
in 1958and 1960.Since then this view has found frequent expression both
in the legislation of various countries and in important political state-
ments. The course of events is decidedly progressing in this direction.

Reiterating the considerations which lead the Government of Iceland
to issue new regulations relating to exclusive fisheries jurisdiction in the riverain choisit de ne pas explorer ou de ne pas exploiter les zones
de plateau continental lui revenant, cela ne concerne que lui et nul
ne peut le faire sans son consentement exprès. ))(C.I.J.Recueil 1969,
p. 22, par. 19.)

Le Gouvernement islandais, dans les renseignements et les documents
envoyés à la Cour, donne des raisons et des explications bien motivées
de son droit souverain d'étendre sa compétence en matière de pêcheries

à la totalité de la zone du plateau continental.
Depuis toujours les pêcheries côtières de l'Islande constituent le
fondement mêmede I'économiedu pays.
Les pêcheries côtières sont indispensables à l'économie islandaise;
sans elles, le pays n'aurait pas étéhabitable.

L'Islande est située sur une plate-forme ou plateau continental, dont
les contours sont concentriques à ceux du pays lui-même.Ces terrasses
sous-marines peu profondes présentent des conditions idéales pour
les zones de frai et d'alevinage dont la préservation et l'utilisation sont
indispensables à la vie du pays. II est de plus en plus généralement
admis que les pêcheries côtièresdépendent des conditions particulières

existant dans les zones littorales, lesquelles fournissent l'environnement
nécessaire aux réserves de poisson. Cet environnement fait partie inté-
grante des ressources naturelles du pays riverain.
Le plateau continental est en réalité l'assisesur laquelle le pays repose
et ildoit êtreconsidéré commeune partie du pays lui-même.

Les intérêtsvitaux du peuple islandais sont donc en jeu. Ils doivent
être protégés.
La position prioritaire de 1'Etatcôtier a toujours été reconnuegrâce au
système des linlites de pêche.Dans le passé, ces limites ont été souvent
établies sans que l'on tienne aucun compte des intérêts de1'Etat riverain.
Elles doivent plutôt leur origine à l'influence prépondérante des nations

pratiquant la pêche lointaine, qui souhaitaient pêcher aussi prèsque
possible des côtes des autres nations et, souvent, ravageaient une zone
avant de passer à une autre.
Dans un système de développement progressif du droit international,
la question de la limite de pêche exclusivedoit êtreréexaminée dupoint

de vue de la protection et de l'utilisation des ressources côtières, indépen-
damment d'autres considérations qui portent sur l'étendue de la mer
territoriale. La communauté internationale reconnaît de plus en plus que
les ressources de la pêche côtièredoivent être considéréescomme un
élément des ressources naturelles de I'Etat riverain. La situation particu-
lière des pays qui sont tributaires avant tout des pêcheries côtièresa été

admise, d'une manière générale,lors des deux conférences de Genève
de 1958 et 1960. Depuis lors cette idéea été maintes foisexprimée,quece
soit dans la législation de divers pays ou dans d'importantes déclara-
tions politiques. L'évolution se fait résolument dans cette direction.
Rappelant les raisons qui l'avaient amené à adopter une nouvelle
réglementation sur l'exclusivitéde sa conipétence en matière de pêcheries24 FISHEKIES JUKISDIC'TI~N(VISS.OP. PADILLA NERV~)

continental shelf area, it stated the following:

"ln the aide-nlr'moireof 31 August, 1971, it was intimated that 'in
order to strengthen the measures of protection essential to safeguard
the vital interests of the Icelandic people in theas surrounding its
coasts, the Government of Iceland now finds it essential to extend

further the zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction around its coasts
to include the areas of sea covering the continental shelf'. It was
further stated that in the opinion of the Icelandic Government, the
object and purpose of the provisions in the 1961Exchange of Notes
for recourse to judicial settlement in certain eventualities have been
fully achieved. The Government of Iceland, therefore, considers the

provisions of the Notes exchanged no longer to be applicable and
consequently terminated." (Government of Iceland's aide-mémoire
of 24 February 1972, Annex H to United Kingdom Application.)

". . . In the period of ten years which has elapsed, the United King-
dom Government enjoyed the benefit of the Icelandic Government's
policy to the effect that further extension of the limits of exclusive

fisheries jurisdictionwould be placed in abeyance .for a reason-
able and equitable period. Continuation of that policy by the Ice-
landic Government, in the light of intervening scientificandeconomic
evolution (including the ever greater threat of increased diversion
of highly developed fishing effort to the Icelandic area) has become
excessively onerous and unacceptable, and is harmful to the mainte-

nance of the resources of the sea on which the livelihood of the Ice-
landic people depends." (Government of Iceland's aide-mémoire of
31 August 1971,Annex C to United Kingdom Application.)

In the Request by the Government of the United Kingdom for the
indication of interim measures of protection the grounds of the request
are stated at length.
It is stated therein that Iceland's intention of extending the limits of its

fisheries jurisdiction, if carried into effect for any substantial period.
would result in immediate and irremediable damage to the United King-
dom fishing and associated industries, and that such damage could not be
made good by the payment of monetary compensation.

Another argument is, that it is not possible for the fishing effort to be

diverted from the Iceland area to other fishing grounds, at economic
levels. Distant-water trawlers displaced from Iceland could not profitahly
fish on near-water or middle-water grounds. Other factors would also
seriously impair fishing operations and theirjnanciul returns.

It is claimed that any additional effort by United Kingdom and otherdans la zone du plateau continental, le Gouvernenlent islandais a déclaré
ce qui suit:

IDans l'aide-mémoire du 31 août 1971, il était indiqué: 1en vue
de renforcer les mesures de protection essentielles pour la préser-

vation des intérêtsvitaux du peuple islandais dans les mers qui en-
tourent ses côtes, le Gouvernement islandais considèrecomme essen-
tiel d'étendresa zone de compétence exclusive sur lespêcheriesautour
des côtes de manière à inclure les espaces marins situés au-dessus

du plateau continental ». Il était ajoutéque, de l'avis du Gouverne-
ment islandais, l'objet et le but des dispositions de l'échange de
notes de 1961visant le recours au règlement judiciaire dans certains
cas avaient été entièrement atteints. En conséquence, le Gouverne-

ment islandais considère que les dispositions des notes échangéesne
sont plus applicables et sont donc devenues caduques. » (Aide-
mémoire du Gouvernement islandais en date du 24 février 1972,

annexe H à la requêtedu Royaume-Uni.)
1Au cours des dix annéesécoulées,le Gouvernement du Royaume-

Uni a bénéficié de la politique du Gouvernement islandais tendant à
suspendre pour une durée raisonnableet équitabletout nouvel élargis-
sement des limites de la juridiction exclusive sur les zones de pêche.

Etant donné l'évolution scientifique et économique qui s'est pro-
duite (et notaniment la menace toujours plus grande d'une orien-
tation des activités de pêche intensives vers la zone islandaise) la
poursuite de cette politique du Gouvernement islandais a des

conséquences excessivement lourdes et inacceptables et elle porte
préjudice à la conservation des ressources de la mer dont dépend la
subsistance de la population islandaise. 1)(Aide-mémoire du Gouver-
nement islandaisen date du 3 1 août 1971, annexe C à la requêtedu

Royaume-Uni.)

La demande en indication de mesures conservatoires présentéepar
le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni est longuement niotivée.

II est indiqué parmi les motifs que, si l'intention de l'Islande d'étendre

les limites de sa compétence sur les pêcheries était mise à exécution
pendant une période d'une certaine durée, il en résulterait un dommage
immédiat et irrémédiablepour 1'1industrie ))de la pêche di:Royaume-
Uni et les industries connexes. Ce dommage ne saurait être réparépar

le versement d'une indemnité en espèces.
Autre motif: il n'est pas possible de transférer dans des conditions
((rentables ))l'effort de pêchede la zone islandaise à d'autres lieux de
pêche. Les chalutiers de pêchelointaine qui n'iraient plus en Islande

ne trouveraient de pêcheries l(rentables 1ni à proximité ni a des distances
moyennes. D'autres facteurs nuiraient gravement aussi aux opérations
de pêcheet à leur 11rentabilité financière 1).

On prétend en outre que tout effort supplémentaire de la part de navires 25 FISHERIES JURISDICTION (DISS.OP. PADILLA NERVO)

vessels diverted frorn the lceland area would (among other things)
depress the projitsof the traditional near-water and middle-water sectors

of the United Kingdom fleet and in turn the current rerurnsof the United
Kingdom inshore fleet.

The request for interim measures States:

"In general, therefore, modern distant-water trawlers such as are
used bythe United Kingdorn fishing fleet in the Iceland area, equip-

ped with expensive and sophisticated technical gear and having
inflexibly high operating costs,could not, ifexcluded from the Iceland
area, hope to gain, let alone sustain, fish yields which would keep
them in business."

Not only Iceland but many coastal States in al1 regions of the world,
know by experience the harn~fuleffects of the ever greaterthreat of highly

developed fishing effort near their shores, by foreign fishing fleets equip-
ped-like the modern trawlers of the United Kingdom-with sophisti-
cated technical geur.
The arguments developed in the request for measures of protection
and in the oral hearing of 1 August 1972appear, in my view, to have as

their real object the protection of the interests, financial or economic,
of private fishing enterprises rather than the "rights" of the United King-
dom.
Furthermore, the existence of those rights cannot be taken forgranted.
This matter belongs to the merits of the case, to be decided when the Court

deals with thern.
The assertion that the indication of interirn rneasures of protection
in no wuy prejudges the rights which the Court may subsequently adjudge
to belong either to the Applicant or to the Respondent, is an assertion
contradicted by the obvious implication that questionable rights are
presumed to exist by the mere fact of indicating rneasures intended to

protect thern.
The measures indicated in the Order have thecharacter of a prelirninary
decision on the merits. The irnplementation of those measures will
amount to execution of such a prelirninary decision. This fact cannot be
denied sirnply by asserting that such rneasures in no way prejudge the

substance of the case.
The claim of imrnediate and irreparable darnage is based on the assump-
tion that the dispute on the merits or even the jurisdictional issue, will
not be settled by the Court for many years.
That is a wrong assumption and therefore the plea of adisruption ofthe

whole fishing industry will not have any force or weight if the Court, as
should be expected, does consider the matter of jurisdiction before the
end of this year.britanniques ou autres qui sîraient transférés de la zone islandaise se

solderait notamment par une (1diminution des profits )des secteurs tra-
ditionnels fréquentés par les chalutiers britanniques à courte ou a
moyenne distance et, en conséquence, par une diminution des ((profits
actuels 1)de la pêche côtière auRoyaume-Uni.

La demande en indication de mesures conservatoires contient le
passage suivant :

1En général, donc, les chalutiers modernes de pêche lointaine
comme en utilisent les pêcheursbritanniques dans la zone islandaise,
dont l'équipement technique est coûteux et complexe et dont les

frais d'exploitation élevéssont donc incompressibles n'auraient,
si on les excluait de la zone islandaise, aucun espoir d'atteindre et
encore moins de maintenir un rendement en poissons suffisant pour
faire leurs affaires.»

Non seulement l'Islande mais encore bien d'autres pays riverains
connaissent par expérience les effets néfastes de la nienace toujours plus

grande d'une intensification de la pêcheprès de leur littoral que font peser
des flottilles étrangères de bateaux de pêche munis, comme les chalutiers
modernes du Royaume-Uni, d'un (équipement technique ...complexe )).
L'argumentation développéedans la demande en indication de mesures

conservatoires et dans la plaidoirie du 1" août 1972 nie parait avoir
pour but véritable la protection des intérêtsfinanciers ou économiques
d'entreprises de pêche privées et non la protection des ((droits ))du
Royaume-Uni.

En outre on ne peut tenir pour acquise l'existence de ces droits. Le
problème relève du fond de l'affaire et c'est à ce stade que la Cour doit
le trancher.
Dire que l'indication de mesures conservatoires ((ne préjuge en rien »

les droits que la Cour pourra estimer appartenir au demandeur ou au
défendeur, c'est une affirmation qui est contredite par cette constatation
évidente que le simple fait d'indiquer des mesures destinées à protéger
des droits révèleune présomption quant à l'existence des droits contro-

versés.
L'indication des mesures contenues dans l'ordonnance a le caractère
d'une décision préliniinaire sur le fond et la mise en Œuvrede ces mesures
équivaudra à l'application de cette décision. On ne saurait nier cela

simplement en affirmant que de telles mesures ne préjugent en rien le
fond de l'affaire.
Quand on prétend qu'un préjudice immédiat et irréparable sera causé,
on part de 17h.vporhèsqeue le différendsur le fond ou mêmesur la question

de compétence ne sera pas réglépar la Cour avant de nombreuses années.
C'est là une hypothèse erronée et c'est pourquoi l'argument tiré du
bouleversenient de l'ensemble de l'industrie de la pêche perdtoute force
et toute valeur si la Cour, comme on doit l'escompter, examine le pro-

blème de la compétence avant la fin de l'année. The Applicant has invoked Article 53 of the Statute and calls upon
the Courtto decide in favour of its claim.
According to paragraph 2 of that Article, the Court must,.first of all,
satisfy itseif that it hasjurisdiction.

Relevant to the issue of jurisdiction is the provision in Article 61,
paragraph 1,of the Rules: "A requesr for the indication of interim mea-
sures of protection may be filed at any time during the proceedings in
the case in connection with which it is made."
The objective requirement ratione temporis for the exercise of this juris-
diction is that the request is filed during the proceedings in the case.

"lf it is clear on the face of the document instituting proceedings

that the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the case on its merits re-
quires some step on the part of the respondent State for its perfection,
then, .. .there will be no 'proceedings',andconsequently no inherent
jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures, until that step has been
taken." (Rosenne, The Law and Practice of' the International Court,
Chap. XII, Incidental Jurisdiction, p. 424.)

The Governrnent of lceland, on 28 July 1972,acknowledged receipt

of a telegram from the Registrar of the Court concerning the United
Kingdom's request for interim measures filed 19 July 1972. The message
from the Government of Iceland, States in part:

". . . there is no basis for the request to which your telegram refers.
In any event the Application of 14 April1972 refers to the legalposition
of two Stales and not to the economic position of certain private
enterprises or otl~er interests in one oftlrose StareWithout prejudice
to any of its previous arguments the Government of lceland objects

specifically to the indication by the Court of provisional measures
under Article 41 of the Statute and Article 61 of the Rules of the
Court in the case to which the United Kingdom reièrs, where no
basis for jurisdiction is established." (Emphasisadded.)

Ln the Exchange of Notes of II March 1961, the agreement already
envisaged the prospect that the Republic of lceland would extend the
fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit.

Lfit is contrary to international law to envisage such extension, the
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany would not have
accepted the inclusion of such statement in the formal exchange of notes.

There is in such excliange of notes an implicit recognition of the right
of lceland to extend its fisheriesjurisdiction.

The United Kingdom, in view of its recognition of the exceptional
dependence of the lcelandic nation upon coastal fisheries for their liveli- COMPÉTENCEPÊCHER~ES (OP. DISS. PADILLA NERVO) 26

Ayant invoqué I'article 53 du Statut. le demandeur prie la Cour de lui

adjuger ses conclusions.
D'après le paragraphe 2 de cet article, la Cour doit d'abord s'assurer
qu'elle a compétence.
La disposition figurant à I'article 61, paragraphe 1, du Règlement

intéresse la question de la compétence: a Une demande en indication de
mesures conservatoires peut êtreprésentéeà tout moment au cours de la
procédure relative à l'affaire au sujet de laquelle elle est introduite )).
La condition objective ratione temporis mise à l'exercice de cette

compétence est que la demande soit présentéeau cours de la procédure
relative à l'affaire.

IS'il résulte clairement de la pièce introductive d'instance que la
Cour ne peut avoir pleine compétence pour statuer sur l'affaire au
fond que si un autre acte est accompli par I'Etat défendeur et si
celui-ci refuse de l'accomplir ...il n'y a pas d'instance et par con-

séquent pas de compétence intrinsèque qui permette d'indiquer des
mesures conservatoires, jusqu'à ce que l'on ait parfait la compétence
sur le fond. » (Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International
Court, chap. XII, 11Incidental Jurisdiction ))p. 424.)

Le Gouvernement islandais a accusé réceptionle 28juillet 1972 d'un
télégrammeémanant du Greffier de la Cour et relatif à la demande du

Royaume-Uni en indication de mesures conservatoires déposée le
19juillet 1972. Le télégrammedu Gouvernement islandais dit en par-
ticulier:

lla demande à laquelle votre télégrammese réfèreestsansfondement.
De toute manière, la requêtedu 14 avril 1972 concerne la situation
juridique des deux Etuts et non la situation économiquede certaines

entreprises privées ou d'autres intérêts del'un de ces Etats '.Sans
préjudice d'aucun des arguments qu'il a antérieurement formulés
le Gouvernement islandais s'oppose tout particulièrement à I'indi-
cation par la Cour de mesures conservatoires en vertu de l'article 41

du Statut et de l'article 61 du Règlement en l'affaire viséepar le
Royaume-Uni et dans laquelle aucun fondement de compétence
n'est établi.))(Les italiques sont de nous.)

L'accord que constitue l'échangede notes du 11 mars 1961envisageait
déjàque la République d'Islande étendrait la limite de sa compétence
sur les pêcheriesau-delà de 12 milles.

S'il avait étécontraire au droit international d'envisager une telle
extension, le Royaume-Uni et la République fédérale d'Allemagne
n'auraient pas accepté l'insertion d'une déclaration de ce genre dans
I'échangede notes officiel.

Cet échange de notes contient la reconnaissance implicite du droit de
l'Islande d'étendre sa compétence en matière de pêcheries.
Ayant reconnu que la nation islandaise est exceptionnellement tribu-
taire de ses pêcheries côtièrespour sa subsistance et son développementhood and economic development, accepted the proposais put forward by
the Government of Iczland, among them, the proposal contained in the
penultimate paragraph, which states that "the Government of Iceland
would continue to work for the implementation of the Althing Resolution

of 5 May 1959 regarding the extension of fisheries jurisdiction around
Iceland", which declares that a recognition of its rights to the whole
continental shelf should be sought, as provided in the Law concerning the
Scientific Conservation of the Continental Shelf Fisheries of 1948.

The United Kingdom did not object to the existence of such rights, it
accepted the proposal which contained as counterpart or consideration
the obligation of lceland to give six months' notice of any such extension.

If a dispute did arise in respect of such extension, it would not affect

the previous implicit recognition of Iceland's right to extend its fisheries
jurisdiction.
The most essential asset of coastal States is to be found in the living
resources of the sea covering their continental shelf and in the fishing zone
contiguous to their territorial sea.
The progressive development of international law entails the recogni-

tion of the concept of the patrimonial sea, which extends from the territo-
rial waters to a distance fixed by the coastal State concerned, in exercise
of its sovereign rights, for theurpose of protecting the resources on which
its economic development and the livelihood of its people depends.

This concept is not a new one. It has found expression in declarations
by many governments proclaiming as their international maritime policy,
their sovereignty and exclusive fisheries jurisdiction over the sea conti-
guous to their shores.

There are nine States which have adopted a distance of 200 nautical
miles from their shores as their exclusive fisheries jurisdiction. Some of
them have enacted and enforced regulations to that effect since 20 years
ago, when the "Santiago Declaration" was signed by the Governments of
Chile, Ecuador and Peru in August 1952.

\My last observation is the following. The claim of irremediable
damages to the Applicant has not, in my opinion, been proved. They are
only allegations that the fishing enterprises would suffer financial losses
and also allegations that the eating habits of people in the countries con-
cerned will be disturbed. Such an argument cannot, in my opinion, be
opposed to the sovereign rights of lceland over its exclusive jurisdiction

and the protection of the living resources of the sea covering its continen-
tal shelf. The Order does not strike, in my view, a fair balance between the
two sides as required by the relevantarticle ofthe Statute. The restrictions
indicated in the Order are obviously against Iceland, interfering with its
indisputable rights to legislate over its own territory as it considers essen-

tial (cf. para. 1, sub-para. (d), of the operative clause of the Court's économique, le Royaume-Uni a acceptéles propositions formulées par
le Gouvernement islandais et notamment celle qui figure à I'avant-
dernier alinéa où il est dit: 1Le Gouvernement islandais continuera de
s'employer à mettre eneusre la résolution de 1'Althing en date du 5 mai

1959 relative à l'élargissement de la juridiction sur les pêcheriesautour
de l'Islande ));d'après cette résolution, l'Islande doit s'efforcer d'obtenir
la reconnaissance de ses droits sur toute l'étenduedu plateau continental,
conformément à la loi de 1948concernant la conservation scientifique des
pêcheriesdu plateau continental.

Le Royaume-Uni n'a pas objecté que ces droits n'existaient pas; il a
accepté la proposition dont la contrepartie était l'obligation pour
l'Islande de notifier six mois à l'avance toute mesure tendant à étendre
sa juridiction sur les pêcheries.

A supposer qu'un différend survienne en la matière, cela ne concerne-
rait pas la reconnaissance déjà admise implicitement du droit de l'Islande
à étendre sa compétence en matière de pêcheries.
Pour les Etats riverains, les ressources biologiques de la mer au-dessus
de leur plateau continental et dans la zone de pêchecontiguë à leur mer

territoriale sont une richesse essentielle.
Le développement progressif du droit international suppose la recon-
naissance de la notion de ((mer patrinloniale ))qui s'étend depuis les
eaux territoriales jusqu'à une certaine distance, fixéepar I'Etat riverain

intéressédans l'exercice de ses droits souverains, en vue de protéger les
ressources dont dépendent son développement écononlique et la subsis-
tance de sa population.
Cette notion n'est pas nouvelle. Elle a trouvé expression dans nombre
de déclarations par lesquelles les gouvernements ont proclamé, comme

des élémentsde leur politique maritime internationale, leur souveraineté
et leur compétence exclusiveen matière depêcheriessur leseaux adjacentes
à leurs côtes.
Neuf Etats ont fixéà 200 milles marins à partir de leur littoral la zone
de leur compétence exclusive sur les pêcheries. Il ya vingt ans que cer-

tains appliquent une réglementation en ce sens, depuis que la ((déclara-
tion de Santiago ))a étésignéepar les Gouvernements du Chili, de I'Equa-
teur et du Pérou en août 1952.
Ma dernière remarque est la suivante. IIn'a pas étéprouvé, à mon

avis, que le préjudice infligéau demandeur serait irréparable. On a sim-
plement alléguéque les entreprises de pêchesubiraient des pertes finan-
cières et les habitudes alimentaires de la population dans les pays inté-
ressés seraient troublées. J'estime que l'on ne saurait opposer un tel
argument aux droits souverains de l'Islande relatifs à sa compétence

exclusive et à la protection des ressources biologiques de la mer au-dessus
de son plateau continental. L'ordonnance n'établit pas, me semble-t-il,
un juste équilibre entre les deux Parties, comme l'exige l'article applicable
du Statut. Les restrictions indiquées dans l'ordonnance visent naturelle-

ment l'Islande et portent atteinte a son droit incontestable de légiférer
sur son propre territoire de la manière qui lui parait indispensable (voir

1928 FISHERIESJURlSDlCTlON (DISS. OP. PADILLA NERVO)

Order). In the nieasures indicated in that Order the only substantial
restriction to the Applicant consists in limiting the amount of its annual

catch to 170,000metric tons instead of its claim to 185,000 metric tons,
15,000metric tons less than the Applicant had asked for in its request for
measures of protection.All the other measures of protection requested
in the Application the Court has accepted. On this aspect also 1am not
able to agree with the indication of measures in the Order of the Court.

(Signed) Luis PADILL A ERVO.par. 1,d) du dispositif). Dans les mesures indiquées par l'ordonnance,

la seule restriction importante imposée au demandeur consiste à limiter
le montant de ses prises annuelles à 170000 tonnes métriques au lieu des
185 000 tonnes métriques qu'il réclamait, soi15000 tonnes métriques
de moins que le chiffre figurant dans sa demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires. Toutes les autres mesures conservatoires demandées ont
étéacceptéespar la Cour. Sur ce point non plus je ne saurais souscrire
à l'indication de mesures dans l'ordonnance.

(Signé )uis PADILL.ANERVO.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Padilla Nervo

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