450
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC KREĆA
table of contents
Paragraphs
I. Legal Background 1-27
1. Constitutional concept of the Yugoslav State and of Croatia
as a federal unit 2-17
2. Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the SFRY 18-27
II. Jurisdictional Issues 28-83
1. Validity in time complex in casu 28-45
1.1.From which date is the Genocide Convention in force
as regards the Parties individually ? 29-33
1.2. From which date can the Genocide Convention be con -
sidered as applicable between the Parties? 34-35
1.3. Application of the principle in casu 36-43
1.4. By which date was the Genocide Convention in force
as regards the SFRY ? 44-45
2. Nature and effects of the second preliminary objection of the
Respondent 46-54
3. Treatment of preliminary objections to jurisdiction and
admissibility in casu 55-59.1
4. Succession to responsibility as a purported rule of general
international law 60-65.4
5. Rule in Article 10 (2) of the Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts as a purported rule
of general international law 66-67
6. Applicable substantive law in casu in the light of rules on
interpretation of treaties 68-79
7. The issue of the indispensable third party 80-83
III. Substantive Law Issues 84-138
1. Relationship between the ICJ and the ICTY in respect of
theadjudication of genocide 84-106
1.1. The need for a balanced and critical approach to
the jurisprudence of the ICTY 87
1.1.1.Factual findings of the ICTY 88-89
1.1.2. Legal findings of the ICTY 90-99
1.2. Compromising effects on the Court’s jurisprudence on
genocide 100-106
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2. Was genocide committed in Croatia ? 107-114
3. Issue of incitement to genocide 115
3.1. Issue of incitement to genocide as inchoate crime 116
3.2. Incitement in terms of ArticleIII (of the Convention 1 16-119
3.3. Ustasha ideology as a genocidal one 120-124
3.4. The establishment of the NDH — the Ustasha ideo-
logy becomes State policy 125-128
3.5. President Tudjman’s Croatia and the legacy of the
NDH 129-133
3.6. State symbols and other acts 134-138
3.7. Statements of Croatia’s officials in the light of the juris
prudence of the ICTR regarding incitement
*
Having great respect for the Court, it is for me a matter of regret to find
necessary to avail myself of the right to express a separate opinion bashed
on the considerations that follow.
I.Legal Background
1. The background part of the Judgment in the case at hand comprises
two parts : “A. The break -up of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and emergence of new States” ; and “B. The situation in
Croatia”.
It consists almost entirely of a statement of facts of a historical and h
political nature, neglecting at the same time the relevant legal facts whhich,
in my opinion, not only should constitute a part of the “background”h,
but without which the causes of the Yugoslav crisis and the civil war inh
Croatia can hardly be understood. The only relevant legal fact stated inh
the “background” part of the Judgment is the assertion of the Resphondent
that the “Croatian Serbs considered that the adoption of this new Conhsti -
tution [of Croatia on 22 December 1990] deprived them of certain basic
rights and removed their status as a constituent nation of Croatia” (hJudg -
ment, para. 64).
The relevant legal facts, together with other facts, can only be helpfulh
in the creation of a full picture of the background of the case.
1. Constitutional Concept of the Yugoslav State and
of Croatia as a Federal Unit
2. The legal facts relate to the domestic law of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and that of the Socialist Republic of
Croatia in force during the relevant period.
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In a case like the one at hand, domestic law is highly relevant.
3. The original international legal norm of self -determination of peo -
ples is both incomplete and imperfect, at least when it concerns subjecths
entitled to self -determination in multi -ethnic States and their exercise of
external self-determination infringing upon the territorial integrity of a
State. Given its incompleteness, the original norm of self -determination
of peoples is rendered inapplicable in its respective parts to certain phracti-
cal situations and constitutes a sort of decorative, empty normative strhuc -
ture. Interested entities often refer to it, but it can function only ouhtside the
legal domain, as a convenient cover for an eminently political strategy,h
based on opportuneness and the balance of power.
This implies a need to see the norm of the right to external self -deter-
mination in States composed of more than one people as a complex norm
consisting of two parts : on the one hand, original international legal
norms of the right of peoples to external self -determination, and, on
the other, relevant parts of the internal law of the given State. In this
context, the original international legal norm of the right of peoples
has the role of a general, permissive norm, which assumes an operative
character, the property of a norm which may become effective in the
event that the internal law of a multi -ethnic State has stipulated the right
to external self-determination if it defines the entitlement to it, as well as
the procedure for its exercise. In other words, the relevant provisions h
of internal law are ad casum an integral part of the norm of the right
of peoples to external self-determination. Only in this way does the origi -
nal international legal norm of the right to external self -determination
become applicable at the level of the fundamental premise of the rule ofh
law.
The necessity for such a relationship between international and internalh
laws is rightfully suggested by the following :
“If the rule of law is to be made effective in world affairs it must
cover a wide range of increasingly complex transactions which are
governed partly by international and partly by municipal law . . . It
is therefore important that international courts and tribunals should
be in a position, when adjudicating upon complex international trans-
actions, to apply simultaneously the relevant principles and rules of
international law and the provisions of any system of municipal law
which may be applicable to the particular transaction . . . One of the
essential functions of international law and international organization
is to promote the rule of law within as well as among nations, for only h
on the basis of the rule of law within nations can the rule of law amongh
nations develop and be made secure. International courts and tribu -
nals can contribute to this result more effectively if the extent to whichh
the interpretation and application of municipal law in the course
of their work is a normal and necessary incident of international
adjudication on complex transactions is more fully understood.”
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(C. Wilfred Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication, 1964,
p. 547.)
4. Thus, in the present case, this is not a matter of a conflict between ha
norm of international law and a norm of internal law, a type of case adju-
dicated by several international courts (Greco‑Bulgarian “Communities”,
Advisory Opinion, 1930, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 17, p. 32; Free Zones of
Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of 19 August 1929, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 22, p. 167 T;eatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons
of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932,
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 44, p. 24), but rather of the application of an
international norm of a complex structure, namely a norm that incorpo -
rates relevant norms of internal law relating to external self -determina-
tion. I am of the view that, in this case, the reasoning of the Court inh the
case concerning Brazilian Loans (1929) is relevant.
In that case, the Court pointed out, inter alia, that:
“Once the Court has arrived at the conclusion that it is necessary
to apply the municipal law of a particular country, there seems no
doubt that it must seek to apply it as it would be applied in that
country. It would not be applying the municipal law of a country if
it were to apply it in a manner different from that in which that law
would be applied in the country in which it is in force.
It follows that the Court must pay the utmost regard to the deci -
sions of the municipal courts of a country, for it is with the aid of
their jurisprudence that it will be enabled to decide what are the rulesh
which, in actual fact, are applied in the country the law of which is
recognized as applicable in a given case. If the Court were obliged to
disregard the decisions of municipal courts, the result would be that
it might in certain circumstance apply rules other than those actually
applied ; this would seem to be contrary to the whole theory on which
the application of municipal law is based.
Of course, the Court will endeavour to make a just appreciation of
the jurisprudence of municipal courts. If this is uncertain or divided, h
it will rest with the Court to select the interpretation which it considh-
ers most in conformity with the law. But to compel the Court to
disregard that jurisprudence would not be in conformity with its func-
tion when applying municipal law.” (Brazilian Loans, Judgment
No. 15, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 21, p. 124.)
5. Yugoslavia, both the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the federal Yugo -
slavia constituted after the Second World War, were multinational States
in the factual and constitutional sense.
6. The first constitution of the Yugoslav State — the Constitution of
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, promulgated on 28 June
1921, stipulated that the Kingdom “is a State of Serbs, Croats and Slho -
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venes, a constitutional, parliamentary and hereditary monarchy. The offih -
cial State name is : Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” Article 3 of
the Constitution provided that the “official language of the Kingdom will
be Serb-Croat-Slovenian”.
7. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia of 3 September
1931 did not indicate expressis verbis its constitutive peoples. They were
mentioned only indirectly, as, for example, in the provision of Article 3 of
the Constitution stipulating that the “official language of the Kinghdom
will be Serb-Croat-Slovenian”.
8. The resolution constituting Yugoslavia on the federal principle,
approved by the Second Conference of the Anti -Fascist Council of
National Liberation of Yugoslavia on 29 November 1943, said inter alia,
“By virtue of the right of each people to self -determination includ-
ing the right to separation or unification with other peoples . . . the
Anti‑Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia passes the
following :
RESOLUTION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) To effectuate the principle of sovereignty of the peoples of Yugosla
via, . . . Yugoslavia is being constructed and will be constructed on
the federal principle which will secure full equality to Serbs, Croats,
Slovenians, Macedonians and Montenegrins.” (Emphasis added.)
9. The Declaration on Basic Rights of Peoples and Citizens of the
Democratic Croatia, adopted at the Third Assembly of State Anti-Fascist
Council of National Liberation of Croatia on 9 May 1944 stipulated in
Article I that “Croatian and Serbian people in Croatia are completely
equal” (Decision on building up Yugoslavia on the federal principle,h Offi ‑
cial Gazette [of DFI], No. 1/1945).
At its last meeting ZAVNOH (The State Anti-Fascist Council of
National Liberation of Croatia) changed its name to the National Parliah-
ment of Croatia.
10. The first Constitution of the Federal Yugoslavia of 1946, in its
Article 1, defined the Federal Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia as
“a federal peoples’ State in the form of a Republic, a community of
peoples who have expressed their will, based on the right to self‑deter ‑
mination, including the right to separation to live together in a federal
State” (emphasis added).
11. In the second Constitution of 1963, the Federation was defined as
a : “Federal State freely unified and equal peoples and a Socialist Demo -
cratic community based on the rule of working people and self -govern-
ment.” (Emphasis added.)
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Article 1 of the Constitution of Croatia of 1963 qualified it as “a State
Socialist democratic community of peoples of Croatia, based on the rule
of working people and self-government” (emphasis added).
12. The Constitution of the SFRY of 1974 begins with Chapter I of the
Basic Principles, which was worded as follows :
“The peoples of Yugoslavia, starting from the right of each nation to
self‑determination, including the right to secession, on the grounds of
their will freely expressed in the joint struggle of all peoples and
nationalities in the national liberation war and socialist revolution. . .
have created a socialist federal community of working peoples — the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”
In Chapter VII of the “Basic Principles”, it is stated, inter alia that the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) upholds :
“— the right of each people freely to determine and build its social
and political order by ways of and means freely chosen ;
— the right of people to self -determination and national inde -
pendence and the right to wage a liberation war, in pursuit of
their causes;
— regard for generally accepted norms of international law.”
The Constitution of the SFRY in its operative part, defined it as a
“federal State, a state community of freely united peoples and their
socialist republics. . . based on the rule and self -management of the
working class and of all working people and the socialist sel-fmanaged
democratic community of working people and citizens and equal peo -
ples and nationalities” (Article 1 of the Constitution).
13. The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia laid
down, in Article 1, paragraph 2, that : “The Socialist Republic of Croatia
is the national State of the Croatian people, the State of 1he Serbian p▯eople
in Croatia and the State of all nationalities living in it.”
In the practice and legal terminology of the SFRY, the word “nation -
alities” denoted national minorities. The rationale of this terminolohgical
substitution led to the perception of the expression “national minorihties”
as a pejorative one.
14. It seems clear that a consistently undeniable fact underlies the
broad spectrum of changes that have affected the Yugoslav State since itsh
inception in 1918, functioning as a point of departure, explicit or implhicit,
1 Zemaljsko Antifascisticko vijece naroduoy slobodenja Hrvatske-Zboruk dokhumenala
1944 (Od 1. Sijcnja do. 9 Sorbuja), Zagreb, 1970, p. 666.
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of all constitutional solutions : that is that Yugoslavia has primarily been a
community of peoples since its birth.
The subject of changes was the number of constitutive peoples (in the
constitutional practice and the theory of constitutional law of federal h
Yugoslavia, the term “constituent nations” is the synonym of the therm
“peoples” equipped with the right to self -determination). At the moment
of its inception in 1918, Yugoslavia was a community of three constitu -
tive peoples (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). The Federal Constitution ofh
1946 recognized the status of constitutive peoples of Macedonians and
Montenegrins, who used to be regarded as parts of the Serbian national
corps. Finally, the Constitution of 1963 included Muslims in the rank of
constitutive peoples.
15. Federal Yugoslavia was formed under the resolution of the Second
Conference of the Anti -Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugo -
slavia in 1943, as a community of sovereign and equal peoples, while subse ‑
quent constitutional intervention created republics, as federal units. Thus,
like the rest of the republics, Croatia was formally brought into being hby
its Constitution of 1946, although temporary authorities had been createhd
by the ZAVNOH resolution in 1944.
16. In the light of constitutional solutions the qualification of Croatia as▯
a union of nations, personal sui generis, is the closest to the real state of
affairs. Such a qualification was justified by several facts of fundamentalh
importance.
Firstly, in the light of both norms and facts, Croatia was a community
of two peoples, Croats and Serbs, as well as a community of nationalities
(national minorities).
Secondly, the SFRY Constitution of 1974 and the Constitution of the
Socialist Republic of Croatia promulgated the same year, defined the
right to self -determination as a subjective, collective right of peoples.
Such a provision was consigned in earlier constitutions. It derives fromh
the very nature of the matter. The subject entitled to self-determination is,
by definition, a people. It is yet another question that as the right hto
self-determination is exercised on the given territory, the consequences of
the exercised right to self -determination are territorialized. Overlapping
of the right to self -determination and territorialization occurs, as a rule,
in single‑people communities, and it follows that formulations which recog ‑
nize the right to a territorial entity are colloquial formulations. However,
in multi-ethnic communities composed of two or more peoples provided
with equal rights, a territory is exclusively an area where equal rightsh of
self-determination are exercised.
Thirdly, in the light of the relevant constitution provisions, both
federal and that of Croatia, it seems clear that Croatia, as a federal
unit, was not equipped with a right to self -determination that would
include the right to secession. The Yugoslav federal units possessed no
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right to secession, for that right was absolutely reserved for constitutive
peoples.
Fourthly, the constitutional system of the Socialist Republic of Croatiah
designed the right to self -determination as a collective, subjective right of
Croatian and Serb people in Croatia, which is, by its nature, inalienable.
However, the Constitution of Croatia of 1990 deprived the Serbs in Croa -
tia of the status of a people equipped with the right to self -determination
and illegally transformed them into a national minority.
The proposal to resolve the controversies surrounding the exercise of
the right to external self -determination constitutione artis, namely via a
corresponding constitutional revision, was contained in the “Concept hfor
the Future Organization of the State Proposed by a Working Group
Comprising Representatives of All the Republics as a Basis for Further
Talks between the Republican President and the State Presidency”.
Starting from the basic premise that :
“The Yugoslav State community, seen as a Federal State of equal
citizens and equal peoples and their republics [footnote commentary :
Kasim Trnka from Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed that the repub -
lics be placed first] and as a democratic State, will be founded on
human and civil rights and liberties, the rule of law and social justiceh”,
the “Concept” contains a part entitled “Proposed Procedure for hDissocia -
tion from Yugoslavia” which reads :
“In connection with initiatives in certain republics for secession
from Yugoslavia, that is, the ‘disunion’ of the country, and in vihew
of the general demand for a peaceful, democratic and constitutional
resolution of the constitutional crisis, the question of procedure arisehs
with regard to the possible realization of these initiatives. The aim ofh
the initiatives is the withdrawal of certain republics from the Socialisht
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They are based on the permanent
and inalienable right of peoples to self -determination and should be
constitutionally regulated. The right of peoples to self-determination,
as one of the universal rights of modern law, is set out in the basic
principles of the SFRY Constitution. However, the realization of the
right of peoples to secession, which includes the possibility of certainh
republics’ withdrawal from the SFRY, is not regulated by the SFRY
Constitution. It is therefore necessary to amend the SFRY Constitu -
tion in order to create a basis for exercising this right. Revision of thhe
SFRY Constitution on these lines should be based on the democratic
nature of the entire process of statement of views, the equality of the h
Yugoslav people, the protection of fundamental human and civil
rights and freedoms, and the principle of the peaceful resolution of
all disputes. In keeping with the above, appropriate amendments
should be made to the SFRY Constitution which would in a general
manner regulate the procedure for the execution of the right of
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peoples to secession and thereby the withdrawal of certain republics
from the SFRY.
The amendments to the SFRY Constitution should express the fol-
lowing commitments :
1. The right to launch the initiative for a certain republic to withdraw
from the SFRY is vested in the Assembly of the respective repub-
lic, except if otherwise regulated by the republican constitution.
2. A decision on the initiative is taken at a referendum at which the
free, direct and secret voting of all citizens of the republic is
ensured.
3. During the preparations for the referendum, the public and voters
will be informed objectively and on time of the importance and
the consequences of the referendum.
4. The referendum will be monitored by representatives of the
Assembly of Yugoslavia and, possibly, representatives of other
republics and interested international institutions.
5. A decision will be deemed adopted if it receives more than one
half of the votes of all registered voters.
6. In republics populated by members of several Yugoslav nations,
the necessary majority will be established for each Yugoslav
nation separately. If one nation votes against, all settlements in
which this nation is predominant and which border on the remain -
ing territory of Yugoslavia and can constitute its territorial com -
pactness will remain part of the SFRY. [. . .]
8. The Assembly of the republic will inform the public and the
Assembly of Yugoslavia of the result of the referendum, and will
submit to the Assembly of Yugoslavia a proposal to adopt a con-
stitutional enactment on the withdrawal of the respective republic
from the SFRY, in accordance with the will of the people expressed
at the referendum.
9. The Assembly of Yugoslavia acknowledges the legality and legit-
imacy of the expressed will of the people and members of nations,
and instructs the Federal Government to carry out the necessary
preparations for the adoption of the enactment on withdrawal
from the SFRY.
In this context, the Federal Government is obligated to :
(a) prepare a proposal for the division of jointly created values and
the property of the federation (movable and immovable property)
in the country and abroad registered as the property of the fed -
eration; international obligations and claims ; assets of the
National Bank of Yugoslavia ; foreign currency, commodity and
monetary reserves of the federation, property of the Yugoslav
People’s Army, archives of Yugoslavia, certain infrastructure
facilities, licenses and other rights and obligations ensuing from
ratified international conventions. The Federal Government pro-
posal would also include issues relating to citizenship, pension
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and other rights of citizens and the like. This requires the estab -
lishment of common responsibility for the obligations and guar -
antees of the SFRY toward foreign countries ;
(b) propose to the Assembly of Yugoslavia the manner of the election
and authorization of a parity body or committee which will pre -
pare a proposal for the division of rights and obligations and
submit it to the Assembly of Yugoslavia ;
(c) prepare proposals for the territorial demarcation and the frontiers
of the future States and other issues of importance for formulat -
ing the enactment on withdrawal.
10. On the basis of the Federal Government proposals regarding
material and territorial issues, the Assembly of Yugoslavia will for -
mulate, with the consent of the republican assemblies, a constitutio -
nal enactment (constitutional law) on withdrawal from the SFRY
which, among other things, establishes :
— citizens’ right of choice (term and manner in which citizens will
state their choice in the event of territorial changes), and the
obligation to ensure just compensation for change of residence);
— the obligation to provide judicial protection of the rights of
citizens, legal entities and members of certain nations (compen-
sation for damages resulting directly from the execution of the
right to withdrawal, etc.) ;
— the obligation to harmonize certain laws and other enactments
with changes in the structure of the SFRY ;
— supervision and control of the enforcement of determined obli-
gations;
— other issues which must be resolved by the time of the definitive
disassociation (judiciary, environment protection, joint ven -
tures and the like) ;
— the transitional period and the moment of disassociation from
the SFRY. If the result of the referendum is negative, the same
initiative may be launched after the expiry of a period of five
years.” (Focus, Special Issue, January 1992, pp. 31-33.)
17. The proposal offered the peaceful change, the possibility of resolv -
ing the crisis constituzionertis, for the exercise of right to self-determina-
tion should be carried out according to the following pattern :
“Whether the federation dissolves into two or more States also
brings into focus the doctrine of self -determination in the form of
secession. Such a dissolution may be the result of an amicable and con ‑
stitutional agreement or may occur pursuant to a forceful exercise of
secession. In the latter case, international legal rules may be pleaded i▯ n
aid, but the position would seem to be that (apart from recognized colo‑▯
nial situations) there is no right of self‑determination applicable to inde‑
pendent States that would justify the resort to secession.” (M.N. Shaw,
International Law, 2008, p. 218 ; emphasis added.)
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2. Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the SFRY
18. The Constitutional Court of the SFRY was designed as the guard -
ian of constitutionality and legality in the legal system of the SFRY. Iht
consisted of a President and thirteen judges elected according to the fohl -
lowing formula: two from each Republic and one from each autonomous
province (Article 381 of the Constitution of the SFRY).
19. The Federal Executive Council (the Government of the SFRY),
headed by Croat Ante Markovic, instituted proceedings before the Con -
stitutional Court of Yugoslavia for the assessment of the constitutionalhity
of the Declaration on the Proclamation of Sovereign and Independent
Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine — Official Journal of the Republic
of Croatia, No. 31/91).
In the view of the Government of the SFRY,
“the Declaration on the Proclamation of Sovereign and Independent
Republic of Croatia, in particular its Parts III, IV and V are not [. . .]
in accordance with the Constitution of the SFRY and is contrary to
the federal laws regulating the fields of national defence, security, h
foreign affairs and public administration because the right to self -
determination, including the right to secession, can be realized only
under the conditions, via the procedure and in the manner determined
by agreement of all the Republics, in accordance with the Constitu -
tion of the SFRY”.
19.1. Part III of the Declaration on the Proclamation of Sovereign and
Independent Republic of Croatia stated inter alia:
“The Republic of Croatia guarantees to Serbs in Croatia and to all
national minorities living on its territory respect for all human and
civil rights, particularly freedom of speech and the cultivation of theihr
own languages and promotion of their cultures, and freedom to form
political organizations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Republic of Croatia in its capacity of the legal successor of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia guarantees to all
States and international organizations that it will fully and conscien -
tiously exercise all rights and perform all obligations in the part relah -t
ing to the Republic of Croatia.”
Part IV of the Declaration said :
“The Constitutions of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia
and of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia granted the
Republic of Croatia the right to self -determination and secession.
Being established as an independent and sovereign State, the Rep -
ublic of Croatia, which has up till now realized part of its sovereign
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rights together with the other constituent Republics and Autonomous
Provinces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is now
changing its status and its State-law relations with the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia, and agrees to take part in its individual institutionhs
and functions of common interest conducive to the disassociation
process.
In the course of the disassociation process it is necessary to establishh
the rights and obligations, i.e., the share of the Republic of Croatia
in the total movable and immovable property and in the rights of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
By proclaiming the Constitutional Decision on Independence, the
Republic of Croatia has started the process of disassociation from
other Republics of the SFRY, and wants to terminate this process as
soon as possible in a democratic and peaceful manner respecting the
interests of all Republics and Autonomous Provinces making up the
SFRY.
By the Constitutional Decision the present borders of the Republic
of Croatia have become State borders with other Republics and with
the countries adjoining the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Only laws which have been adopted by the Sabor of the Republic
of Croatia shall apply on the territory of the Republic of Croatia,
with the exception of the federal regulations which have not been
repealed pending the termination of the disassociation process
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal agencies may not operate on the territory of the Republic
of Croatia unless given specific and temporary authority by the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Croatia.
The Republic of Croatia shall withdraw its representatives from the
Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly, as its term expired and its
existence rendered unnecessary in the process of disassociation.”
In the Part V of the Declaration, it was stated inter alia:
“The Republic of Croatia recognizes full sovereignty and subjectiv-
ity under international law of the States which come into existence as
a result of the disassociation from the SFRY with the existing bound-
aries of the SFRY and within the boundaries among themselves, as
laid down in the present Constitution or as decided agreement among
them.”
20. The position of the Constitutional Court as regards disputed parts
of the declaration was as follows :
“The provisions of Articles1 and 2 of the Constitution of the SFRY
provide for that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a
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7 CIJ1077.indb 920 18/04/16 08:54 462 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Federal State, as the State community of voluntarily united nations
and their Republics, as well as of the Autonomous Provinces of
Vojvodina and Kosovo — which are constituent parts of Serbia —
which consists of: the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, the Socialist Republic of Slo -
venia, the Socialist Republic of Serbia, as well as the SAP Vojvodina
and Kosovo which are constituent parts of the Socialist Republic of
Serbia, the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Republic
of Montenegro.
The provisions of Article 5 of the Constitution of the SFRY pro -
vide for that the territory of the SFRY is a single united whole ; that
it consists of the territories of the socialist republics, and that the h
frontiers of the SFRY may not be altered without the consent of all
the Republics and Autonomous Provinces.
Alterations of the boundaries of the SFRY are decided upon by the
Federal Chamber of the Assembly of the SFRY in accordance with
the provisions of Article 283, paragraph 4, and Article 285, para -
graph 6.
The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the men-
tioned provisions of the Constitution of the SFRY, assessed that
Parts III, sections 2 and 4, IV, sections 2 to 10 and V of the Declara-
tion on the Proclamation of [a] Sovereign and Independent Republic
of Croatia — are not in conformity with the Constitution of the
SFRY.”
The Court devoted due regard to the right to self -determination. It
stated:
“Parts III, sections2 and 4, IV, sections 2 to 10 and Part V of the
disputed declaration are based on the understanding of the Assembly
of the Republic of Croatia as regards the right of the Croatian people
to self-determination, including the right to secession.
The rationale of the mentioned provisions of the Declaration on the
Proclamation of a Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia is
not, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, only in
the expression of the right of the Croatian people to self -determina -
tion, including the right to secession. The import of the disputed dec-
laration is the proclamation of the Republic of Croatia an independent
State which is not a constituent part of the SFRY, as a Federal State
and a State community of voluntarily united peoples and their repub-
lics, a proclamation of the State community of the Yugoslav nations
and theirrepublics a non-existent community, proclamation of federal
laws null and void on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, preven-
tion of the functioning of federal bodies on the territory of the Repu-
lic of Croatia within the jurisdiction of these bodies and ignorance of
certain federal institutions.
463
7 CIJ1077.indb 922 18/04/16 08:54 463 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The right of peoples of Yugoslavia to self -determination, including
the right to secession, established by the Constitution of the SFRY,
may not, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia,
be realized by unilateral acts of peoples and/or acts of the assemblies
of their Republics. This right can only be realized under the condi-
tions and in the manner to be determined, in accordance with the
Constitution of the SFRY, with the consent of each people and its
republic individually, and all of them together. Although the proce -
dure for the realization of the right to self -determination including
the right to secession, has not been defined by the Constitution of the
SFRY, this does not mean that this right may be realized on the
grounds of unilateral acts relating to the realization of that right.”h
21. At its meeting held on 13 November 1991, the Constitutional
Court, pursuant to the provision of Article 375, paragraph 1, subpara -
graph 4, of the Constitution of the SFRY, adopted the decision that :
“The provisions of Part III, sections 2 and 4, Part IV, sections 2 to
10 and Part V of the Declaration on the Proclamation of Sovereign
and Independent Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine (Official
Journal of the Republic of Croatia), No. 31/91) are abolished.”
(Decision II -U-No. 123/91 of 13 November 1991.)
22. The Federal Executive Council instituted also proceedings before
the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia for the assessment of the consti -
tutionality of the decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia ohn
the breakup of State -legal connection with the SFRY (Narodne novine
(Official Journal), No. 53/91).
The Council considered
“that the said decision is not in conformity with the Constitution ofh
the SFRY and that the breakup of the State -legal connections is pos -
sible only between independent and sovereign States having recog -
nized international legal personality, but not between a constituent
part of a sovereign State and that State”.
23. The decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia determined
that the Republic of Croatia, as of 8 October 1991, broke up its State-legal
connections on the basis of which, in common with other republics and
provinces, it had constituted the SFRY up to that date ; denied the legiti
macy and legality of all bodies of the Federation; recognized, on a recipro-
cal basis, the independence and sovereignty of the other republics of thhe
former SFRY ; guaranteed and ensured the basic rights of man and
national minorities, as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Humanh
Rights and other international documents; and expressed the readiness to
enter into inter-State associations with other States.
24. The Constitutional Court found that
“the decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia on the
breakup of its State -legal connection with the SFRY is not in con -
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7 CIJ1077.indb 924 18/04/16 08:54 464 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
formity with the Constitution of the SFRY. The Constitutional Court
of Yugoslavia based this decision on the fact that, according to the
Constitution of the SFRY, the Republic of Croatia is one of the con-
stituent Republics of the SFRY of which it consists as a State com -
munity. That is why it cannot, by any unilateral act of its own,
breakup State-legal connections with the federal State of which it is
a part nor can it, by such an act, change the status of the Republic
established by the Constitution of the SFRY, leave the State commu-
nity of the SFRY and change the boundaries of the SFRY.
The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia bases its assessment also
on the fact that the disputed decision, contrary to the Constitution of
the SFRY, denies the legitimacy and legality of the federal bodies, and
refuses to recognize all legal acts of the federal bodies. The Constitu -
tion of the SFRY determines which common interests are realized
within the Federation and which of these common interests the Fed -
eration realizes through the federal bodies; consequently, the relations
in the Federation cannot be altered by a unilateral act or denied its
rights and obligations determined by the Constitution of the SFRY
nor can the federal bodies be denied legitimacy and legality. Likewise,
it is not possible to deny recognition and validity of legal acts of theh
federal bodies because these acts are binding and valid on the whole
territory of the SFRY.” (Decision II -U-No. 194/91 of 25 December
1991 published in the Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 12/92.)
25. It should be emphasized that both decisions were adopted by the
Court in its full composition, as prescribed by the Constitution, with only
a judge from Slovenia not taking part in adopting the decisions.
* *
26. The set out legal facts provide a different picture of the so -called
“Greater Serbia” project, which, by the way, has never been a polihcy of
the FRY and Serbia. The so -called “Greater Serbia” project is rather a
myth or abuse in the circumstances of the Yugoslav crisis.
The term was adopted from the political programme of the Serbian
politician I.Garašanin who, in the mid -nineteenth century, wrote “Nac -
ertanije” (“Draft Plan”), which was a programme on the unifihcation of
Serbs on the basis of the principle of nationalities, a principle that sherved
as the legal ground for the constitution of European national States likhe
Germany and Italy. In both theory and practice, as a national ideology
and real policy, a similar notion of a national State existed in the pasht of
every nation in Europe.
27. During the Yugoslav crisis the substance of the “Greater Serbia”
concept, if accepted as relevant, amounted to a possibility of the expanh -
465
7 CIJ1077.indb 926 18/04/16 08:54 465 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
sion of the FRY/Serbia based on the outcome of the exercise by Serbs
living outside Serbia of their right to self -determination.
The primary political objective of the FRY and the Serbs in Croatia
was the safeguarding of Yugoslavia as a common home for Serbs. This
objective is fully understandable if one has in mind that more than a thhird
of Serbs lived outside the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviah.
The territorial expansion of the FRY/Serbia figured as a possibility whose
realization would depend on the outcome of self -determination of the
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The possibility as regards h
Croatia was not realized primarily because of the fact that :
“The achievement of independence by . . . Croatia . . . can be seen
as a revolutionary process that has taken place beyond the control of
existing body of laws . . . Self-determination has operated at the level
of political rhetoric, as a set of political principles legitimizing the
secession.” (A. Cassese, “Self -Determination of Peoples and the
Recent Break -up of USSR and Yugoslavia” in R. Macdonald (ed.),
Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, 1994, pp. 141-144.)
II. Jurisdictional Issuesh
1. Validity in Time Complex In Casu
28. The Court’s approach to the validity in time complex is highly
relaxed, in particular if one has in mind that the scope of its jurisdichtion
ratione temporis is a key jurisdictional issue in the present case. The ques -
tion which, in the circumstances surrounding the case, necessarily affecths
also the two primary forms of the jurisdiction of the Court — jurisdiction
ratione personae et ratione materiae (see paras. 50-54 below). The Court
did not decide from which date the Genocide Convention can be consid -
ered binding for the Applicant, and from which date the Genocide Con -
vention can be considered applicable between the Parties. It did not tachkle
at all the question of the date until which the Convention was in force hin
relation to the SFRY, although, inter alia, it dealt with the question as to
whether the acts on which Croatia relied are “attributable to the SFRhY at
the time of their commission” (Judgment, para. 114). Without these
parameters a proper treatment of the preliminary objection of Serbia
ratione temporis seems a difficult, if not an impossible task. It comes as
no surprise that the Court has not decided the Respondent’s other pre -
liminary objection in accordance with Article 79, paragraph 9, of the
Rules of the Court and its well established jurisprudence, but treated thhe
issue of jurisdiction ratione temporis and the related issue of admissibility
as accessory consequence of the decision as regards the principal claim h
and counter-claim (see paras. 56 and 59 below). The intrinsic meaning of
such an action of the Court is far -reaching — it ignores the fundamental
466
7 CIJ1077.indb 928 18/04/16 08:54 466 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
principle on which the Court’s jurisdiction is based, i.e., the principle of
consent.
1.1. From which date is the Genocide Convention in force as regards the
Parties individually?
29. Within the set of issues relating to the validity in time of the provi -
sions of the Genocide Convention, one issue, on which the Parties had
opposing opinions ab initio, was resolved by the Judgment of the Court in
the preliminary objections phase, i.e., the issue of since when the Resphon -
dent can be considered as bound by the provisions of the Convention. In h
its Judgment on the preliminary objections raised by Serbia the Court
found that, by combined effect of the declaration and Note of 27 April
1992 and the consistent conduct at the time of its making and through thhe
years 1992-2000, the FRY is considered as bound by the Genocide Con -
vention “from that date (27 April 1992) onwards” (Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2008 (hereinafter “2008 Judgment”), pp. 454-455, para. 117). In that part,
the Judgment of the Court possesses res iudicata effects.
30. However, the Judgment did not provide the answer to the question
as to when Croatia acquired the status of a party to the Convention. Theh
Court addressed the issue in a general way stating that “Croatia depohs -
ited a notification of succession with the Secretary -General of the United
Nations on 12 October 1992” (2008 Judgment, p. 445, para. 94). The
Judgment states further that “[Croatia] asserted that it had already hbeen
a party prior thereto as a successor State to the SFRY from the date it h
assumed responsibility for its international relations with respect to thhe
territory, namely from 8 October 1991” (ibid.). It is up to the Court to
determine precisely the date, one of the two mentioned, since when Croa -
tia can be considered a party to the Genocide Convention.
31. In its 2008 Judgment, the Court did not, in fact, tackle the claim
of Croatia, but simply presented, in its paragraph 94, the position of Cro -
atia.
In the light of the relevant circumstances, it appears that Croatia’s
claim is based on :
Primo , its notification on succession.
In a letter dated 27 July 1992, received by the Secretary -General on
4 August 1992 and accompanied by a list of multilateral treaties depos -
ited with the Secretary -General, the Government of the Republic of Cro -
atia notified that :
“[The Government of] . . . the Republic of Croatia has decided,
based on the Constitutional Decision on Sovereignty and Independ -
467
7 CIJ1077.indb 930 18/04/16 08:54 467 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
ence of the Republic of Croatia of 25 June 1991 and the Decision of
the Croatian Parliament in respect of the territory of the Republic of
Croatia, by virtue of succession of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia of 8 October 1991, to be considered a party to the con -
ventions that Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its prede-
cessor States (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Federal People’s Republic h
of Yugoslavia) were parties, according to the enclosed list.
In conformity with the international practice, [The Government of
the Republic of Croatia] would like to suggest that this take effect
from 8 October 1991, the date on which the Republic of Croatia
became independent.”
Secundo, the depositary records for the Genocide Convention draw a
distinction between the date of notification deposit and the date of ehffect.
The date of the deposit of notification of succession is, according toh the
depositary practice for the Genocide Convention, the date on which the
State deposited notification in reality, whereas the date of effect is hthe
expression of the consent of the State to be bound by the Convention
prior to that date, from the moment when it assumed responsibility for ihts
international relations with respect to its territory. In that sense, thhe
information in respect of the succession of the former federal units of hthe
SFRY to the Genocide Convention is coinciding, excepting Yugoslavia/
Serbia.
Action Date of Notification/ Date of Effect
Deposit
Bosnia and Herzegovina Succession 29 December 1992 6 March 1992
Croatia Succession 12 October 1992 8 October 1991
Montenegro Succession 23 October 2006 3 June 2006
Slovenia Succession 6 July 1992 25 June 1991
the former Yugoslav Succession 18 January 1994 17 November 1991
Republic of Macedonia
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Accession 12 March 2001 10 June 2001
(See https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280027hfac.)
Tertio, in its written pleadings Serbia “does not contest that Croatia
could become a contracting party to the Genocide Convention by submit-
ting a declaration of succession and that Croatia could thereby become ah
468
7 CIJ1077.indb 932 18/04/16 08:54 468 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
contracting party thereof, effective 8 October 1991” (Counter -Memorial
of Serbia, para. 370).
32. If the date of effect of a convention, as in the case at hand, is prior
to the date of the deposit of notification of succession, then undoubthedly
retroactivity is at work. For, notification of succession, as definehd by the
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978)h,
means “in relation to a multilateral treaty, any notification, howehver
framed or named, made by a successor State expressing its consent to be
considered as bound by the treaty” (Article 2 (g) of the Convention,
emphasis added). In this way the successor State expresses its consent hto
be considered as bound as from the date X which is later in relation to the
date Y as the “date of effect” being, in fact, the date of entry of the treaty
into force for that State. This appears to be a clear case of retroactivhe
effect. However, retroactivity in this case is of a sui generis nature, for it
relates to the successor State individually.
33. The basis of retroactive effect of the Genocide Convention in this
particular case is in the combined effect of Croatia’s notification of suc -
cession and the consent of third States. The conclusion relies on two
parts :
(i) theconnection that exists between the rules on succession with respect
to international treaties and the rules of treaty law ; and
(ii) the meaning of the instrument of “notification of succession”.
It is natural that the succession of States with respect to treaties hash the
closest links with the law of treaties itself and could be regarded as dheal -
ing with particular aspects of participation in treaties, the conclusionh of
treaties and the application of treaties.
Special Rapporteur Humphrey Waldock described these links as fol -
lows :
“the Commission could not do otherwise than examine the topic of
succession with respect to treaties within the general framework of
the law of treaties . . . the principles and rules of the law of treaties
seemed to provide a surer guide to the problems of succession with
respect to treaties than any general theories of succession” (Yearbook
of the International Law Commission (YILC), 1968, Vol. I, p. 131,
para. 52).
Or, as stated by O’Connell :
“The effect of a change of sovereignty on treaties is not a manifes -
tation of some general principle or rule of State succession, but ratherh
a matter of treaty law and interpretation.” (D. P. O’Connell, The Law
of State Succession, 1956, p. 15.)
469
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The determination of “notification of succession” given in Artichle 2 (g)
of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,h
as well as the practice of States in the matter, cast serious doubts as hto the
possibility of “notification of succession” as an instrument, pehr se, that
acts as a means of binding by treaty.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) stipulates in
Article 11 (means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty) : “The
consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signatureh,
exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.” (Emphasis
added.)
The formulation of Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties does not exclude the possibility of notification of succession being
understood as a means of expressing approval to be bound by a treaty.
The operationalization of this possibility implies, however, the agreemehnt
of the parties for, in the light of treaty law as expressed in Article 11 of
the Convention, “notification of succession” undoubtedly comes uhnder
“any other means” of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty, but is
conditioned by the phrase “if so agreed”. From this viewpoint, “notifica ‑
tion of succession” as a unilateral act of the State, constitutes a b▯asis for a
collateral agreement in simplified form between the new State and the in▯di ‑
vidual parties to its predecessor’s treaties. Thus “notification of succes -
sion” actually represents an abstract, generalized form of the new Sthate’s
consent to be bound by the treaties of the predecessor State — a form of
consent which is, in each particular case, realized in conformity with the
general rule of the law of treaties on expression of consent to be bound by
a treaty contained in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties and prescribed by provisions of the concrete treaty.
An exception to the general rule according to which consent of the suc -
cessor State to be bound by a treaty has to be expressed ad casum in
conformity with Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties could be envisaged in the event that, outside and independently of hthe
Convention, there exists a generally accepted rule according to which
“notification of succession” is considered a specific means of binding new
States by treaties. Grounds for such an interpretation are also providedh
by Article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : “The
provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question thaht
may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States . . .”
There is no credible evidence that such a rule exists. The Vienna Con -
vention on the Law of Treaties which is, by its nature, a combination of
codification and progressive development, does not make any mention inh
its Article 11 (means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty) of
“notification of succession” as such a means. This is particularhly conspic-
uous in view of the fact that Article 11 is built on the premise of defor-
malization of the means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty.
470
7 CIJ1077.indb 936 18/04/16 08:54 470 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Since succession per se is not and cannot be an independent method of
expressing consent to be bound by a treaty, it follows that “notifihcation of
succession” can only be a descriptive notion, a collective term for vharious
forms of expression of consent of a new State to be bound by a treaty. Ahs
pointed out by Professor Annie Gruber :
“Since it is a unilateral act, the legal effect of which cannot dependh
solely on the will of the author of the act, a unilateral declaration ofh
succession may be considered to contain a sort of personal proposi -
tion which third States may accept or reject.” (A. Gruber, Le droit
international de la succession d’Etats, 1986, p. 221.)
Finally, Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties clearly states :
“Obligation or rights under treaties in force in respect of a territohry
at the date of a succession of States do not become the obligations or
rights of the successor State or of other States parties to those treatihes
by reason only of the fact that the successor State has made a unilat -
eral declaration providing for the continuance in force of the treaties
in respect of its territory.”
That in particular terms means that Croatia’s notification of succehssion
constitute an offer which the parties to the Convention are free to accept
or reject. Only acceptance by the parties to the Convention could createh
treaty nexus between a State that make a notification and other States
parties to the Convention.
1.2. From which date can the Genocide Convention be considered as
applicable between the Parties ?
Scenario one
34. The determining of the date on which the Convention came into
force in relation to the FRY/Serbia and Croatia does not solve the issueh
of validity in time of the Convention in casu, but rather constitutes only
a part of that set of issues. The fact that the Genocide Convention is
binding on both Parties in casu is one thing, whereas its applicability in
terms of time between the Parties is quite another in the circumstances h
surrounding the case.
The status of Croatia and the FRY/Serbia as parties to the Convention
only determines the jurisdictional title in casu and does not solve the issue
of its temporal scope because the dates from which the parties are consihd -
ered as bound by the Convention do not coincide.
Croatia can be considered a contracting party to the Convention as
from 8 October 1991, while Serbia can be considered a contracting party
as from 27 April 1992.
471
7 CIJ1077.indb 938 18/04/16 08:54 471 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
35. The jurisdiction of the Court in casu is based on Article IX of the
Genocide Convention. In contrast to the substantive provisions of the
Convention which are, by their nature, integral (“Third Report on thhe
Law of Treaties” by G. Fitzmaurice, YILC , 1958, Vol. II; United
Nations doc. A/CN.4/115, Art. 18, p. 27, para. 2),collective obligations
towards the international community as a whole (Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3), Article IX of the Convention, as a
standard compromissory clause, is a bilateral obligation between the parh -
ties.
As regards the substantive obligation of the Convention, the will of theh
contracting parties, taken individually, is only a constitutive element hof
the will of the international community as a whole, as a basis of its
peremptory nature. As such, substantive obligations of the Genocide
Convention are binding on States “even without any conventional obliga -
tions” (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23).
Consequently, any new State is a priori subject to these rules since they
express the universal interest of the international community as a wholeh.
It might be concluded that, having in mind that nature of the principles
underlying the GenocideConvention, the then Secretary -General Dag Ham-
marskjöld warned the Congolese authorities during the United Nations’h
operations in that country that the principles of the Convention must beh
held to govern even a new State and to apply to subordinate political
authorities within the Congolese State ( Annual Report of the Secretary‑
General 1960‑1961 , General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supp. No. 1,
p. 11 ; H. Waldock, “General Course on Public International Law”,
Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye, 1962,
Vol. 106, p. 228).
In contrast to its substantive provisions, the provision of Article IX
of the Convention, being of a contractual nature, operates on the
inter partes level, within the reciprocity principle.
Accordingly, in relation to Article IX of the Convention, a multitude of
bilateral links is constituted between the parties to the Genocide Conven -
tion depending on the consent of the parties. In other words, the obliga -
tions of the parties to the Convention as regards Article IX are not
“self-existent, absolute and inherent” (G. Fitzmaurice, “Third Report on
the Law of Treaties”, YILC, 1958, Vol. II; United Nations doc. A/
CN.4/115, Art. 19, p. 28), but relative, extrinsic, depending on the con -
sent. The distinction is, in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility,
derived in explicit terms. In contrast to collective obligations embodiehd in
multilateral treaties,the International Law Commission notes that there
exist obligations in multilateral treaties where “performance in a gihven
situation involves a relationship of a bilateral character between two phar -
ties” (Commentary to Art. 42 (a)).
472
7 CIJ1077.indb 940 18/04/16 08:54 472 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
As far as the bilateral relationship, or bundles of bilateral relations,h
between the parties to a multilateral treaty, reciprocity and mutuality h
may be regarded as an essential principle of international law (a good h
example, in addition to the one which we are discussing, is the require -
ment of consent by other States to reservations to multilateral treatiesh).
1.3. Application of the principlein casu
36. The jurisdiction of the Court in the case at hand is based on Arti -
cle36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court which reads :
“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties h
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of theh
United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.” (Emphasis
added.)
When jurisdiction is based on paragraph 1 of Article 36 :
“the Court is empowered only to apply the specific treaty. Where ith
is based on paragraph 2, the Court’s jurisdiction may allow it and
even require it to have recourse to rules of customary international
law which resemble the rules of a treaty but which exist independently
of the treaty, if for any reason that treaty is excluded from the scope h
of the jurisdiction of the Court in that particular case.” (S. Rosenne,
The Law and Practice of the International Court : 1920‑2005 , 4th ed.,
Vol. II, 2006, pp. 648-649, referring in a footnote to Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 38,
para. 56.)
As the Genocide Convention is the only jurisdictional title in the case h
at hand, the date on which the Convention came into force as regards
Croatia and the FRY/Serbia is of paramount importance. For, proceed -
ings between these two parties may be validly instituted only during theh
currency of the title of jurisdiction (Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v.
United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963,
p. 29).
It appears that the Genocide Convention came into force as regards
Croatia and the FRY/Serbia on different dates — 8 October 1991 in rela -
tion to Croatia and 27 April 1992 in relation to the FRY/Serbia.
In the light of the principle of reciprocity and mutuality, it follows thhat
the Genocide Convention is applicable between Croatia and the FRY/
Serbia as from 27 April 1992 as the later date, limiting the jurisdiction of
the Court ratione temporis to acts and situations after that date.
The pattern of such legal reasoning was demonstrated by the Court in
the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) case. In
that case, the specific treaty was the Convention on Elimination of Rahcial
473
7 CIJ1077.indb 942 18/04/16 08:54 473 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Discrimination which provides, in its Article 22, that: “Any dispute between
two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or applicahtion
of this Convention . . . shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dis-
pute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision. . .”.
Since the Convention entered into force as regards Russia on 4 Febru-
ary 1969 and as regards Georgia on 2 July 1999, the Court concluded that
“CERD entered into force between the Parties on 2 July 1999” (Applica‑
tion of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objec‑
tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 81, para. 20).
Scenario two
37. This scenario is based on the principle that mutual recognition is
needed for establishment of treaty nexus between the contracting partiesh
to the Convention. The principle derives from the contractual nature of
the jurisdictional clauses operating on the inter partes level, within the
limits of the reciprocity. In that regard, international treaty law is ah sort
of vinculum iuris, a legal relationship between States which recognize each
other.
38. As stated by Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts :
“Generally, a situation which is denied recognition, and the conse -
quences directly flowing from it, will be treated by non -recognizing
States as without international legal effect.” ( Oppenheim’s Interna‑
tional Law, 9th edition, 1992, p. 199.);
and
“The non -recognized Government will not be regarded by non-rec-
ognizing States as competent to make its State a party to a multilat -
eral treaty, or to act on behalf of the State in legal proceedings.” h(Ibid.,
p. 198.)
Kelsen, although starting from the consideration that “the legal act hof
recognition is the establishment of a fact” (H. Kelsen, “Recognition in
International Law — Theoretical Observations”, in L. Gross (ed.), Inter‑
national Law in the Twentieth Century, 1969, p. 592) finds that :
“The new State starts its legal existence with its declaration of stah-te
hood but it exists only for itself, not in relation to other States. Thihs is
a typical border case. In order to become a subject of international lawh
in relation to other States, the new State has also to be recognized as
such by these other States, but the old State, too, in its relation to thhe
new State is a State, in the sense of international law, only if the newh
State recognizes it as such. Therefore mutual recognition is necessary.”h
(Ibid., p. 593.)
A similar opinion is represented by Hersch Lauterpacht. According to
the learned author and judge, recognition “marks the beginning of theh
474
7 CIJ1077.indb 944 18/04/16 08:54 474 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
international rights and duties of the recognized community” ( Oppen ‑
heim’s International Law : A Treatise, 8th ed., 1955, p. 128).
39. Such considerations are not unknown to the jurisprudence of the
Court. In the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, the
Permanent Court stated inter alia:
“Poland is not a contracting Party either to the Armistice Conven-
tion or to the Protocol of Spa. At the time of the conclusion of those
two Conventions, Poland was not recognized as a belligerent by Ger-
many ; it is, however, only on the basis of such recognition that an
armistice could have been concluded between those two Powers.
The Principal Allied Powers had, it is true, recognized the Polish
armed forces as an autonomous, allied and co -belligerent (or belli -
gerent) army. This army was placed under the supreme political
authority of the Polish National Committee with headquarters in
Paris. Without considering the question what was as this moment the
political importance of this Committee, the Court observes that these
facts cannot be relied on as against Germany, which had no share in
the transaction.” (Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,
Judgment No. 7, 1926, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7, pp. 27-28.)
Judge Skubiszewski, in his dissenting opinion in the East Timor case,
found that “[r]ecognition leads to the validation of factual control over
territory and to the establishment of corresponding rights” (East Timor
(Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, dissenting opin -
ion of Judge Skubiszewski, p. 265, para. 131; emphasis added).
In the Bosnian Genocide Case, the Court refrained from giving a clear
answer to the question with the explanation :
“For the purposes of determining its jurisdiction in this case, the
Court has no need to settle the question of what the effects of a situ -
ation of non -recognition may be on the contractual ties between par-
ties to a multilateral treaty. It need only note that, even if it were tho
be assumed that the Genocide Convention did not enter into force
between the Parties until the signature of the Dayton -Paris Agree -
ment, all the conditions are now fulfilled to found the jurisdiction ohf
the Court ratione personae [. . .]
In the present case, even if it were established that the Parties, each
of which was bound by the Convention when the Application was filed,
had only been bound as between themselves with effect from 14 Decem -
ber 1995, the Court could not set aside its jurisdiction on this basis .”
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.Yugoslavia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1996 (II), pp. 613-614, para. 26.)
475
7 CIJ1077.indb 946 18/04/16 08:54 475 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
It should be noted, however, that the pronouncement of the Court relatesh
to jurisdiction rationepersonae — not to jurisdiction rationetemporis.
40. Recent practice confirms that the recognition of a State determines
the critical date as regards the beginning of the international rights ahnd
duties of the recognized community vis -à-vis recognizing State by estab -
lishing a necessary treaty nexus between them. Exempli causa, Switzer-
land, having recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992,
declared that the treaties formerly concluded with Yugoslavia shall hench-e
forth be applicable to bilateral relations (Revue suisse de droit interna ‑
tional et européen, 1993, p. 709).
The same pattern of reasoning underlines the decision of the Supreme
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany of 18 December 1959:
“The Contracting Parties which are already bound by a multilateral
convention can be bound by the accession of another State entity only
to the extent that the latter is a subject of international law as far as
they themselves are concerned . . . Any entity which exists in fact
requires, in addition, the recognition of its existence in some form . . .
In relation to other States which do not recognize it as a subject of
international law, such an entity cannot be a party to a treaty, let
alone become a party merely by a unilateral declaration, as e.g., by
accession to a multilateral convention, thus conferring upon itself the
status of a subject of international law in relation to States which do h
not recognize it.” (International Law Reports, Vol. 28, 1959, pp.87-88 ;
emphasis in original.)
41. In the letter dated 5 April 1994 from the chargé d’affaires A.I. of
the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed
to the Secretary -General as the depositary of international conventions,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stated, inter alia, that :
“Croatia, no doubt, is a successor State and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia does not deny that. The term ‘successor State’, howeverh,
implies exclusively the change of sovereignty in a part of the territoryh of
the Yugoslav Federation in the sense of the transformation of that part
of the territory into an independent State. The very act of the change ohf
territorial sovereignty is not automatically linked to the transfer of thhe
rights and obligations of the Federation to the seceded part, since suchh
a transfer implies legality of the territorial change, i.e., that the tehrritorial
change has been carried out in conformity with the principles of positivhe
international law.” (UnitedN ations doc. S/1994/398, 5April 1994.)
The statement makes the distinction between succession taken in
terms of territorial change (de facto succession) and succession as the
transmission of rights and obligations from predecessor State(s) (de iure
succession) elaborated in the doctrine of international law (H. Kelsen,
476
7 CIJ1077.indb 948 18/04/16 08:54 476 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international , Vol. 42, p. 314 ;
D. P. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession, 1956, pp.3, 6 ; K.Zemanek,
“Die Wiener Konvention über die Staatennachfolge in Verträge”h, Ius
Humanitatis : Festschrift für Alfred Verdross , 1980, p. 719 ; M. Jones,
“State Succession in Matter of Treaties”, British Yearbook of Interna ‑
tional Law, Vol. 24, 1947, pp. 360-361) and embodied in Article 6 of the
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. Arti -
cle 6, entitled “Cases of Succession of States covered by the present Conh-
vention”, specifies that the Convention “applies only to the effehcts of a
succession of States occurring in conformity with the international law h
and, in particular, the principles of international law embodied in the h
Charter of the United Nations”.
42. The mutual recognition took place only on the day the Dayton
Agreement was signed, i.e., 14 December 1995 or, alternatively, on
23 August 1996, the date when the Agreement on Normalization of Rela -
tions between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia was signed (Narodne novine. Međunarodni ugovor br. 10/96).
Article 1 of the Agreement stipulates : “The Contracting Parties shall
respect each other as independent, sovereign and equal States within thehir
international borders.”
43. The fact that the Respondent asserted during the proceedings that
the Convention is applicable between the Parties as from 27 April 1992 is
not of decisive importance in the view of the fact that “the establishhment
or otherwise of jurisdiction is not a matter for the parties but for theh
Court itself” (Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 450, para. 37).
The Court must “always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction, and mhust
if necessary go into that matter proprio motu” (Appeal Relating to the
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 52, para. 13).
1.4. By which date was the Genocide Convention in force as regards the
SFRY?
44. It is hardly necessary to recall that two elements determine the
validity in time of a treaty or of a particular rule :
(i) the moment of its entering into force ; and
(ii) theoment of its termination in totoor of its particular rule, as Arti-
cleIX of the Convention.
The latter element is of special relevance as regards the SFRY as a
State party to the Genocide Convention in the circumstances surrounding h
the case. Sedes materiae of the dispute in the light of the Applicant’s claim
is determined by the Court in the following terms :
“(1) whether the acts relied on by Croatia took place ; and, if they did,
whether they were contrary to the Convention ;
477
7 CIJ1077.indb 950 18/04/16 08:54 477 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
(2) if so, whether those acts were attributable to the SFRY at the time
that they occurred and engaged its responsibility ; and
(3) if the responsibility of the SFRY had been engaged, whether the
FRY succeeded to that responsibility.
While there is no dispute that many (though not all) of the acts
relied upon by Croatia took place, the Parties disagree over whether
or not they constituted violations of the Genocide Convention. In
addition, Serbia rejects Croatia’s argument that Serbia has incurred
responsibility, on whatever basis, for those acts.” (Judgment,
para. 112.)
The only logical and legally founded conclusion is that the SFRY was
bound by the Convention until the moment when the process of its dis -
solution was complete.
That necessarily brings into focus the responsibility of the SFRY, for
the predominant number of acts which the Applicant considers as acts of h
genocide took place before 27 April 1992 when the Respondent was
established as a State.
The Court is right in stating that “the SFRY was bound by the Con -
vention at the time when it is alleged that the relevant acts occurred”h
(ibid., para. 113). However, this is only one aspect of the issue of the tem -
poral validity of the Genocide Convention as regards the SFRY. The
other aspect of the issue is the moment until which the SFRY was bound
by the provisions of the Genocide Convention.
The answer seems simple. As dissolution of a State means that it no
longer has legal personality (Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbi -
tration Commission, Opinion 8, point (2)), it appears that when the pro -
cess of dissolution of the SFRY was completed, its status as a State party
to treaties was terminated ipso facto.
45. The reasoning of the Court is designed in terms of retroactivity,
both of the substantive provisions of the Genocide Convention and of
Article IX, although this is denied by the Court (see, inter alia, Judgment,
paras. 95, 98, 99).
Pointing out that “the temporal scope of Article IX is necessarily linked
to the temporal scope of the other provisions of the Genocide Conven -
tion” (ibid., para. 93), which are not retroactive (ibid., para. 99), the Court
points, however, to its dictum in its 1996 and 2008 Judgments, which is
obviously based on the assumption of retroactivity.
In its 1996 Judgment, the Court determined :
“it remains for the Court to specify the scope of that jurisdiction
ratione temporis. In its sixth and seventh preliminary objections,
Yugoslavia, basing its contention on the principle of the non -retroac -
tivity of legal acts, has indeed asserted as a subsidiary argument that,h
even though the Court might have jurisdiction on the basis of the
Convention, it could only deal with events subsequent to the different
dates on which the Convention might have become applicable as
478
7 CIJ1077.indb 952 18/04/16 08:54 478 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
between the Parties. In this regard, the Court will confine itself to hthe
observation that the Genocide Convention — and in particular Arti-
cle IX — does not contain any clause the object or effect of which is
to limit in such manner the scope of its jurisdiction ratione temporis,
and nor did the Parties themselves make any reservation to that end,
either to the Convention or on the occasion of the signature of the
Dayton-Paris Agreement. The Court thus finds that it has jurisdiction
in this case to give effect to the Genocide Convention with regard to
the relevant facts which have occurred since the beginning of the con-
flict which took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This finding is,
moreover, in accordance with the object and purpose of the Conven -
tion as defined by the Court in 1951 and referred to above. As a resulht,
the Court considers that it must reject Yugoslavia’s sixth and seventh
preliminary objections.” (Application of the Convention on the Pre ‑
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze ‑
govinav.Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (II), p. 617, para. 34; reference omitted.)
It is perfectly true that the Genocide Convention does not contain
“express provision. . . limiting its jurisdiction rationetemporis” (2008Judg-
ment, para. 123). However, this is not the real issue at hand. The real issue
is whether the Convention contains a provision that excludes the applica-
tion of the general rule of international law regarding the non-retroactivity
of treaties, embodied in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.
The substantive reason concerns the very specific approach of the
Court to the temporal scope of the Genocide Convention in the Bosnian
Genocide case. The reasoning of the Court seems to be an inversion of the
logic incorporated in Article 28 of the Convention on the Law of Trea -
ties; it rests upon the presumption of retroactivity in contrast to Arti -
cle 28 which is based on presumption of non -retroactivity.
Therefore, “the presumption was reversed : absent some express reser -
vation, the temporal limitation did not apply” (R. Kolb, The International
Court of Justice, 2013, p. 423).
Thus, “[c]ompromissory clauses (and, perhaps, generally, jurisdictiohnal
clauses in treaties) are . . . aligned with the regime of the optional clause”
(ibid.). In the light of the jurisprudence of the Court, it may be under -
stood as retrospective effects of the title of jurisdiction (i.e., application of
a jurisdictional clause in view of the events and acts prior to its entrhy into
force) rather than retroactive effects of the jurisdictional clause at thhe
time when it was not yet in force.
The conclusion regarding the assumption of retroactivity in the
1996 Judgment becomes even more evident if the context is taken into
479
7 CIJ1077.indb 954 18/04/16 08:54 479 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
consideration. The dictum cited above is actually the response to the sixth
and seventh preliminary objection raised by Yugoslavia. Basing its con -
tention on the principle of non -retroactivity for legal acts, Yugoslavia
had indeed asserted, as a subsidiary argument, that, even if the Court
might have jurisdiction on the basis of the Convention, it could only dehal
with events subsequent to the different dates on which the Convention
might have become applicable as between the Parties.
45.1. In fact, the Court essentially accepted the Applicant’s interpreta -
tion that:
“Croatia responds that the Court has jurisdiction over the entirety
of its claim and that there is no bar to admissibility. For Croatia, theh
essential point is that the Genocide Convention was in force in the
territories concerned throughout the relevant period, because the
SFRY was a party to the Convention. According to Croatia, the FRY
emerged directly from the SFRY, with the organs of the new State
taking over the control of those of the old State during the course of
1991 when the SFRY was ‘in a process of dissolution’ (the phrase h
used by the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia
in Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, 92 International Law Reports
(ILR), p. 162). On 27April 1992, the FRY made a declaration which,
as the Court determined in 2008, had the effect of a notification of
succession to the Genocide Convention and other treaties to which
the SFRY had been party. Croatia maintains that there was, there -
fore, a continuous application of the Convention, that it would be
artificial and formalistic to confine jurisdiction to the period frohm
27 April 1992, and that a decision to limit jurisdiction to events occur-
ring on or after that date would create a ‘time gap’ in the protection
afforded by the Convention. Croatia points to the absence of any
temporal limitation in the terms of Article IX of the Genocide Con -
vention. At least by the early summer of 1991, according to Croatia,
the SFRY had ceased to be a functioning State and what became the
FRY was already a State in statu nascendi.” (Judgment, para. 81.)
In that sense, the Applicant is correct because, in the light of the Apphl-i
cant’s assertions, it is not a matter of retroactivity in the technichal sense,
but in the sense of the “continuous application of the Convention”h.
The Applicant’s assertion of the “continuous application of the Cohn -
vention” is based on :
(i) the rules on succession to responsibility ; and
(ii) the attribution of alleged acts of genocide to Serbia on the basis of
Article 10 (2) of the Rules on the Responsibility of States.
In order for the Court to act in the frame of the rule on non -retroactiv-
ity, it was necessary for it, before entering into the merits of the cashe, to
establish that the Applicant’s assertions relating to the rules on suhccession
480
7 CIJ1077.indb 956 18/04/16 08:54 480 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
to responsibility and attribution on the basis of Article 10 (2) were
well-founded, that is, that they constituted part of the applicable substan-
tive law in casu.
If established as part of the applicable substantive law, those rules
would produce retroactive effects independently of Article 28 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as a proper consequence of
effects of the rules themselves.
2. Nature and Effects of the Second Preliminary Objection
of the Respondent
46. In its Judgment on Preliminary Objections, the Court found, interalia,
that “the Respondent was bound by the Genocide Convention, including
Article IX thereof, at the date of the institution of the proceedings and
remained so bound at least until 1November 2000” (2008Judgment, p.455,
para. 118) and “if consequently the Applicant would have been at liberty,
had it so desired, to submit a fresh application identical in substance hto the
present Application, the conditions for the jurisdiction of the Court wohuld
be satisfied” (ibid.). It appears that the Court, by adopting this conclusion,
established its jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae.
47. The Court, however, did not pronounce itself as regards Serbia’s
preliminary objection ratione temporis, having found that this objection
“does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively phre -
liminary character” (ibid., p. 460, para. 130). The objection ratione tempo‑
ris in the circumstances surrounding the case triggers the issues of
jurisdiction and admissibility as two inseparable issues :
“In the view of the Court, the questions of jurisdiction and admissi-
bility raised by Serbia’s preliminary objection ratione temporis consti-
tute two inseparable issues in the present case. The first issue is thhat of
the Court’s jurisdiction to determine whether breaches of the Genocidhe
Convention were committed in the light of the facts that occurred prior
to the date on which the FRY came into existence as a separate State,
capable of being a party in its own right to the Convention ; this may
be regarded as a question of the applicability of the obligations under
the Genocide Convention to the FRY before 27 April 1992. The second
issue, that of admissibility of the claim in relation to those facts, anhd
involving questions of attribution, concerns the consequences to be
drawn with regard to the responsibility of the FRY for those same facts
under the general rules of State responsibility. In order to be in a poshi-
tion to make any findings on each of these issues, the Court will need
to have more elements before it.” (Ibid., p. 460, para. 129.)
48. The situation is one characterized by Judge Fitzmaurice as the dis -
tinction between jurisdiction and admissibility. Discussing the issue ofh
retroactivity, Judge Fitzmaurice said :
“But an unsuccessful jurisdictional plea leaves open the possibility h
that a finding on the ultimate merits may still be excluded through a h
481
7 CIJ1077.indb 958 18/04/16 08:54 481 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
decision given against the substantive admissibility of the claim.”
(G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, Vol. II, 1986, p. 439.)
Thus, “substantive admissibility may arise as an issue after jurisdiction
has been established”.
49. The temporal element of the jurisdiction of the Court in casu is to
be regarded as part of the issue of jurisdiction ratione personae primarily,
producing a corresponding effect on the jurisdiction of the Court ratione
materiae. It, in fact, determines the scope of jurisdiction, both ratione
personae et ratione materiae.
50. The temporal scope of jurisdiction ratione personae in the case at
hand is highly specific. Usually, jurisdictionratione personae means that the
parties to the case are parties to the Statute or have undertaken the obliga-
tions of a party to the Statute at the time of institution of proceedinghs. In
other words, “[i]t is necessary that the parties be under the obligathion to
accept the jurisdiction of the Court at the time at which the determinathion
of the existence of that obligation has to be made, normally the date ofh the
institution of the proceedings” (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the
International Court : 1920‑2005 , 4th ed., Vol. II, 2006, p. 562).
51. In casu, the question is whether or not FRY/Serbia was a State at
all before 29 April 1993, in the sense of a subject of international law,
suitable to be equipped with the capacities for the establishment of theh
jurisdiction of the Court ratione personae. That is the fundamental ques -
tion which precedes, both in terms of logic and law, the issue of jurisdhic-
tion, constituting a segment of ius standi in iudicio. For, the status of a
party to the Statute or non -party to the Statute, which has undertaken
the obligations as regards jurisdiction of the Court ratione personae is
absolutely reserved for States as legal persons in terms of international
law. If one or both parties to the case are not States as legal persons hin
terms of international law, the establishment of jurisdiction of the Couhrt
is an impossible mission, because a litigation before the Court implies h
ius standi before the Court as a pre-condition for the establishment of the
jurisdiction of the Court (see e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and
Montenegro v. Netherlands), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2004 (III), p. 1030, para. 45).
52. The temporal element in casu extends its relevance also to the juris-
diction of the Court ratione materiae, since the limitation of the Court’s
jurisdiction ratione personae produces corresponding effects on its juris -
diction ratione materiae. For, jurisdiction ratione materiae necessarily
implies that events which give rise to the reference to the Court occurrhed
during the space of time in respect to which jurisdiction ratione personae
exists.
53. The combined effects of temporal limitations of the jurisdiction of
the Court ratione personae and ratione materiae may have, as a conse -
quence, the disappearance of the dispute before the Court in part or intoto.
482
7 CIJ1077.indb 960 18/04/16 08:54 482 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The substance of the international dispute consists of the two cumula -
tive elements — personal and material. The generally accepted definition
of a dispute, which the Court gave in the Mavrommatis Palestine Conces‑
sions case represents, in fact, only the material element of the concept of
“international dispute”. In order to qualify “a disagreement ovher a point
of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests”, which is evident in
this specific case, as an “international dispute”, another, formhal, element
is indispensable, i.e., that the parties in the “disagreement or conflict” be
States in the sense of international public law.
Article IX of the Genocide Convention stipulates the competence of
the Court regarding “disputes between the Parties”. The term “Pharties”,
as it obviously results from Article XI of the Convention, means States,
either members or non-members of the United Nations. The term “State”
is not used either in abstracto in the Genocide Convention, or elsewhere ;
it means a concrete entity which combines in its personality the constithut -
ing elements of a State, determined by international law. The pretention
of an entity to represent a State, and even recognition by other States,h is
not, in the eyes of the law, sufficient, on its own, to make it a Stateh within
the meaning of international law.
54. The following statement of Judge Fitzmaurice seems to rest on
common sense and cogent legal consideration :
“since the . . . State did not exist as such at the date of these acts and
events, these could not have constituted, in relation to it, an interna -
tional wrong, nor have caused it an international injury. An act which
did not, in relation to the party complaining of it, constitute a wrong
at the time it took place, obviously cannot ex post facto become
one . . . [T]he . . . State was not then one [i.e., a Member of the United
Nations], nor even, over most of the relevant period, in existence as
a State and separate international persona.” (Northern Cameroons
(Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1963, separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, p. 129.)
Responsibility, as a legal notion, does not exist in se and per se. It is
necessarily linked with the rights and obligations of the State as a leghal
person in terms of international law. As the Court stated : “Responsibility
is the necessary corollary of a right.” (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 33, para. 36); and “Thus it is the existence or
absence of a right, belonging to [a State] and recognized as such by inther -
national law, which is decisive for the problem . . .” (ibid.).
483
7 CIJ1077.indb 962 18/04/16 08:54 483 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
3. Treatment of Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction
and Admissibility In Casu
55. The general approach of the majority of the Court to the issue of
the preliminary objection ratione temporis raised by Serbia, as well as to
the arguments of the Parties pro and contra in that regard or in connec -
tion with that issue, has been expressed succinctly in two conclusions :
Primo
“Having concluded in its 2008 Judgment that the present dispute
falls within Article IX of the Genocide Convention in so far as it
concerns acts said to have occurred after 27 April 1992, the Court
now finds that, to the extent that the dispute concerns acts said to
have occurred before that date, it also falls within the scope of Arti -
cle IX and that the Court therefore has jurisdiction to rule upon the
entirety of Croatia’s claim. In reaching that conclusion, it is not nhec-
essary to decide whether the FRY, and therefore Serbia, actually suc-
ceeded to any responsibility that might have been incurred by the
SFRY, any more than it is necessary to decide whether acts contrary
to the Genocide Convention took place before 27 April 1992 or, if
they did, to whom those acts were attributable.” (Judgment, para. 117.)
Secundo
“It follows from the foregoing that Croatia has failed to substan -
tiate its allegations that genocide was committed. Accordingly, no
issue of responsibility under the Convention for the commission of
genocide can arise in the present case. Nor can there be any question
of responsibility for a failure to prevent genocide, a failure to punishh
genocide, or complicity in genocide.
In view of the fact that dolus specialis has not been established by
Croatia, its claims of conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and pub-
lic incitement to commit genocide, and attempt to commit genocide
also necessarily fail.
Accordingly, Croatia’s claim must be dismissed in its entirety.”
(Ibid., para. 441.)
56. The applied methodology cannot be denied a certain judicial ele -
gance which served, in fact, to sweep under the carpet the complex issueh
of the admissibility of the claim in relation to the facts that occurredh prior
to the date on which the FRY came into existence as a separate State,
involving, in addition, questions of attribution, and to link it with thhe
issue as to whether the principal claim and counter-claim are founded inh
law and fact.
484
7 CIJ1077.indb 964 18/04/16 08:54 484 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Qualifying tacitly the issue of admissibility of the claim not as incidehn-
tal to, but rather as coincident with, the principal claim, the majorityh
reduced the fundamental issue of the jurisdiction of the Court to the lehvel
of a technical question, and the jurisdictional decision to some kind ofh
accessory consequence of the decision as regards the principal claim andh
counter-claim. In this way, the procedure as established by the law of thhe
Court has been turned on its head.
57. In the case at hand, such a reduction does not produce material
consequences for the outcome of the dispute. However, this fact does noth
amnesty or vindicate the action undertaken by the majority. Although
designed ad casum, its implications as regards future jurisprudence of the
Court cannot a priori be excluded.
58. The preliminary objection of Serbia ratione temporis has been qual-
ified by the Court as an objection which “does not possess, in the hcircum-
stances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character” (2008 Judgment,
para. 130).
What is the inherent meaning of this qualification ? Does it suggest that
an objection which does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, ahn
exclusively preliminary character loses its preliminary quality and givehs
the Court discretionary powers to act in accordance with the broadly
conceived and undefined formula “as good administration of justice h
requires”? The answer to this question, it appears, has to be negative.
58.1. The qualification that “the objection does not possess, in the cir -
cumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character” impliesh that
the objection in issue does “possess, at least in principle, an intrihnsic pre-
liminary character, which may only be partially affected by the circum -
stances of the case” (E. J. de Aréchaga, “The Amendments to the Rules
of Procedure of the International Court of Justice”, American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 67, 1973, p. 15). Ratio legis of the introduction of
objections having no exclusively preliminary character in the nomencla -
ture of the decisions of the Court as regards preliminary character in
Article 79 of the Rules of Court primarily concerns practical effects in a
case when the Court, on the basis of provision of Article 62 of the
1946 Rules of Court, used its power to join an objection to the merits
“whenever the interests of the good administration of justice requireh it”
(Panevezys‑Saldutiskis Railway, Order of 30 June 1938, P.C.I.J., Series
A/B, No. 75, p. 56 ; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 29, para. 39). When
“the character of the objections is not exclusively preliminary becauhse
they contain both preliminary aspects and other aspects relating to the
merits, they will have to be dealt with at the stage of merits. This
approach . . . tends to discourage the unnecessary prolongation of pro‑
ceedings at the jurisdictional stage.” (Military and Paramilitary Activi‑
ties in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. United States of America),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1986, p.31, para.41; emphasis added.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 966 18/04/16 08:54 485 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
58.2. The characterization of the particular objection does not deprive
the objection of its preliminary character. As observed by JudgeAréchaga,
who was one of the architects of the revision of the 1972Rules, the concrete
qualification means that “the objection that has been raised by a pharty as
preliminary is so intertwined with elements pertaining to the merits thaht a
hearing of those issues would siphon off into the preliminary stage the
whole of the case” (E.J. de Aréchaga, op.cit., p. 17) with the risk of “adju-
dicating on questions which appertain to the merits of the case or of
prejudging their solution” (Panevezys‑Saldutiskis Railway, Preliminary
Objections, Order of 30 June 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 75, p. 56).
In other words, the fact that the objection, in the circumstances of theh
case, does not possess an exclusively preliminary character, does not
deprive it of its material content in the sense of challenging the jurishdiction
of the Court, in whole or in part. Or, as Rosenne says, there is “a formal
distinction between the objection as a shell . . . and its material content”
(S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court : 1920‑2005 ,
4th ed., Vol. II, 2006, p. 894). As such, it must be pronounced by the
Court in the final judgment before pronouncement on the principal claihm.
The treatment of such an objection that was found to be not exclusively h
preliminary in nature at the merits phase does not mean that the objec -
tion has been incorporated in the meritum of the dispute, but simply that
the Court must bring decision on the objection within the merits phase ahs
a jurisdictional issue. The ratio of the transfer of the objection from hthe
preliminary objection phase to the merits phase is not the consequence ohf
the change in its jurisdictional nature, but of relation to cognition ofh the
facts, and law indispensable for a decision on an eminently jurisdictionhal
matter. The Court itself in the 2008 Judgment stated, inter alia, that:
“In order to be in a position to make any findings on each of theseh
issues, [the issue of its jurisdiction, as regards facts that occurred phrior
to 27 April 1992 and the issue of admissibility of the claim] the Court
will need to have more elements before it.” (2008 Judgment, p. 460,
para. 129 ; emphasis added.)
58.3. Such a solution is dictated, it appears, by the nature of the juris-
diction of the Court. The issue of jurisdiction is of fundamental impor -
tance for the judicial activity of the Court, being a questio iuris (Border
and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 76, para. 16) and a
matter of the international public order (intervention of Judge M. Yova-
novitch, Preliminary Session of the Court, Preparation of the Rules of
Court of 30 January ‑24 March 1922) P.C.I.J., Series D, No. 2, p. 59 ;
R. Monaco, “Observations sur la hiérarchie des sources du droit interh -
national”, Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit
Mensenrechte : Festschrift für H.Mosler , 1983, pp. 607-608).
The importance of the issue necessitates that “[t]he Court must . . .
always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction, and must if necessary goh into
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7 CIJ1077.indb 968 18/04/16 08:54 486 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
that matter proprio motu” (Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO
Council (India v.Pakistan), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1972, p.52, para.13).
Even the 2008 Judgment, which is res iudicata for the Court, stated in
the “Conclusion” that it “will consider the preliminary objectihon that it
has found to be not of an exclusively preliminary character when it reaches
the merits of the case” (2008 Judgment, p. 465, para. 145 ; emphasis
added).
58.4. The Court adjudicates on the issue of its jurisdiction through opera -
tion of the principle compétence de la compétence. The power of the Court to
determine whether it has jurisdiction in casu, emanating from the general
principle of compétence de la compétence, should be distinguished from the
corresponding power of the Court to determine the extent of its jurisdichtion.
The extent of jurisdiction of the Court is not a matter to be decided onh
the basis of the principle of compétence de la compétence solely as a func -
tional norm, but on the basis of substantive norms of the Statute defihning
the scope of the exercise of the judicial function of the Court. In thath
regard, the basic norm of the consensual nature of the Court’s jurisdhic -
tion — some sort of a constitutional norm of the law of the Court, anhd of
international tribunals as well — is of relevance.
Already in its Judgment No. 2, the Permanent Court of International
Justice clearly established the limits of its jurisdiction by stating thhat “the
Court, bearing in mind the fact that its jurisdiction is limited, that iht is
invariably based on . . . consent . . . and only exists in so far as this co-
sent has been given” (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment
No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, p. 16).
59. By deciding that, in view of the absence of genocide in terms of
Article II of the Convention, there is no need for the Court to enter into
consideration of the objection, the majority linked the issue of jurisdihc -
tion with the principal claim and thus made a Copernican turnaround,
paradoxical in the light of the relevant rules of the law of the Court, run -
ning counter to the general rule that, without established jurisdiction,h the
Court not only cannot determine the case, but cannot even hear it.
The adoption of a decision on the jurisdictional issue in the merits
phase is an act, indeed a condition for the determination of the principhal
claim.
59.1. A proper pattern of treatment of a preliminary objection not
having, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary char -
acter, is demonstrated in the Land and Maritime Boundary case. The
Court, following the well -established jurisprudence on the issue, stated,
inter alia:
“The Court would first observe that its finding in its Judgment of
11 June 1998 on the eight preliminary objection of Nigeria that that
preliminary objection did ‘not have, in the circumstances of the caseh,
an exclusively preliminary character” (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 326,
para. 118 (2)) requires it to deal now with the preliminary objection
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7 CIJ1077.indb 970 18/04/16 08:54 487 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
before proceeding further on the merits. That this is so follows from
the provision on preliminary objections adopted by the Court in its
Rules in 1972 and retained in 1978, which provide that the Court is
to give a decision
‘by which it shall either uphold the objection, reject it, or declareh
that the objection does not possess in the circumstances of the
case, an exclusively preliminary character. If the Court rejects the
objection or declares that it does not possess an exclusively pre-
liminary character, it shall fix time -limits for the further proceed -
ings.’ (Rules of Court, Art. 79, para. 7.)
(See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J.Reports 1998,pp. 27-28, paras.49-50 Que;tions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyv a. United States of Amer‑
ica), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1998,pp.132-134,
paras. 48-49; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicar‑a
gua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1986,p. 30, para. 40.) Since Nigeria maintains its objec-
tion, the Court must now rule on it.” (Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroonv. Nigeria Equatorial Guinea
intervening), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 2002,p. 420, para. 237.)
4. Succession to Responsibility as a Purported Rule
of General International Law
60. The impression is that the Court qualified succession to responsi -
bility as a rule of general international law with amazing ease. It founhd
that “the rules on succession . . . come into play in the present case fall
into the same category as those on treaty interpretation and responsibil▯ity
of States referred to” in the Judgment of the Court in the Bosnia and Her ‑
zegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro case (Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Her ‑
zegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I),
hereinafter “2007 Judgment”) (Judgment, para. 115 ; emphasis added).
61. The Court gives no indication of any source of international law
that would vindicate the qualification that the rules of succession ofh States
to responsibility pertain to the corpus of rules of general international law.
Noting the arguments of the Parties concerning succession to responsi -
bility as status controversiae, the Court only points to the reliance of the
Applicant on
“the award of the arbitration tribunal in the Lighthouses Arbitration
between France and Greece, Claims Nos. 11 and 4, 24July 1956 (United
488
7 CIJ1077.indb 972 18/04/16 08:54 488 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XII,
p. 155 ; International Law Reports (ILR), Vol. 23, 1956, p. 81), which
stated that the responsibility of a State might be transferred to a suc -
cessor if the facts were such as to make it appropriate to hold the
latter responsible for the former’s wrongdoing” (Judgment, para. 107).
It appears, in the light of the relevant facts, that the Court, by takinhg
such a position, is heading precisely in the direction opposite to that h
contained in its own dictum in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case : “the Court,
as a court of law, cannot render judgment sub specie legis ferendae, or
anticipate the law before legislator has laid it down” (Fisheries Jurisdic ‑
tion (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974,
pp. 23-24, para. 53 F;sheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 192, para. 45).
62. Arbitral jurisprudence as regards succession to responsibility offers
only a few isolated decisions. Seemingly they stand on diametrically
opposed positions.
The paradigm of succession to responsibility represents, in essence, theh
French claim in the Agios Nikolaos case within the Lighthouses Arbitra ‑
tion (Claim No. 11, United Nations, RIAA, Vol. XII, pp. 161 et seq.
p. 190 ; ILR, Vol. 23, 1956, pp. 81 et seq., pp. 88-90) in which the claim
relating to the construction of lighthouses at Spada and Elaphonissi was
dismissed.
The position of the arbitration was expressed in clear terms :
“In view of this division between the three parties concerned of the h
responsibility for the events of 1903 to 1908, the Tribunal sees no realh
reason to saddle, after the event, Greece, who had absolutely nothing
to do with the dealings between those parties, with this responsibility,h
in whole or in part. Not even the part of the general responsibility for
the events of 1903 to 1908 to be imputed to the autonomous State of
Crete can be regarded as having devolved upon Greece. Such a trans -
mission of responsibility is not justified in the present case either hfrom
the particular point of view of the final succession of Greece to the
rights and obligations of the concession in 1923/1924 — if only for
the reason that the said events took place outside the scope of the
concession — or from the more general point of view of its succession
in 1913 to the territorial sovereignty over Crete.” (Ibid., p. 89.)
The paradigm of non -succession to responsibility is expressed also in
the Brown case in which the United States claim against Great Britain,
based on succession to responsibility, was disallowed by the Anglo -
489
7 CIJ1077.indb 974 18/04/16 08:54 489 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
American Claims Commission in November 1923 (United Nations,
RIAA, Vol. VI, p. 120).
63. The sedes materiae of the decision in the Agios Nikolaos case seems
clear. The Award stated, inter alia:
“In the present case, we are concerned with the violation of a term
of a contract by the legislative power of an autonomous island State
the population of which had for decades passionately aspired to be
united, by force of arms if necessary, with Greece, which was regarded
as the mother country — a violation which was recognized by the
State itself as constituting a breach of the concession contract, which h
was effected in favour of a shipping company belonging to the same
mother -country, which was endorsed by the latter as if it had been a
regular transaction and which was eventually continued by her, even
after the acquisition of territorial sovereignty over the island in quesh
tion. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can only come to the con -
clusion that Greece, having adopted the illegal conduct of Crete in its h
recent past as autonomous State, is bound, as successor State, to take
upon its charge the financial consequences of the breach of the con -
cession contract.” (ILR, Vol. 23, 1956, p. 92.)
The Court further stated that “the Greek Government with good rea -
son commenced by recognizing its own responsibility” (ibid.).
64. In the light of the facts of the case, it appears that the qualification
of the decision as the expression of the acceptance of succession to res -
ponsibility is exaggerated. For, the last fact tends to speak in favour hof
the perception of the responsibility of Greece as a “direct responsibhility
for tort of her own” (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical
Perspective, Part VII, 1974, p. 223). The position of the arbitral tribunal
appears to be an obiter dictum rather than a precedent stricto sensu.
Besides the intrinsic reasons which make relative the scope of the deci-
sion taken in the Agios Nikolaos case, also relevant in the case at hand are
some extrinsic reasons.
Primo , the Lighthouse Arbitration considered disputes between natural
and legal persons, on the one hand, and a territorial State, on the othehr,
disputes which, in particular in the continental legal tradition, apperthain
to international private law, rather than international public law. The h
legal basis in a dispute is provided, as a rule, by concessionary contrahcts.
As the Court stated in the Anglo‑Iranian Oil Co. case, the concessionary
contract signed between the Government of a State and of a foreign oil
company:
“has a single purpose: the purpose of regulating the relations between
that Government and the Company in regard to the concession. It
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7 CIJ1077.indb 976 18/04/16 08:54 490 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
does not regulate in any way the relations between the two Governments
[the Government and the Company’s national State] . . . The fact that
the concessionary contract was reported to the Council . . . does not
convert its terms into the terms of a treaty by which [a Government]
is bound vis‑à‑vis [another Government]” (Anglo ‑Iranian Oil Co.
(United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 112 ; emphasis added).
Secundo, jurisdiction of arbitration courts and mixed commissions is,
as a rule, based on arbitral compromises. That fact, per se, imposes cer-
tain limits on the scope of adopted decisions. In the Barcelona Traction
case, the Court clearly determined its position in respect of jurisprudehnce
of arbitration courts and mixed claims commissions as regards their
impact on general international law. The Court stated :
“However, in most cases the decisions cited rested upon the terms
of instruments establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal or claims
commission and determining what rights might enjoy protection; they
cannot therefore give rise to generalization going beyond the special
circumstances of each case. Other decisions, allowing or disallowing
claims by way of exception, are not, in view of the particular facts
concerned, directly relevant in the present case.” (arcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application : 1962)(Bel ‑
gium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 40,
para. 63.)
Tertio, the jurisprudence of the Court, as a rule, does not recognize the
quality of juridical precedent to decisions of arbitral tribunals.
It is pointed out that “[s]pecific references in the decisions of thhe Court
to the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals have in the past been extremehly
rare”, and “in fact partake more of the nature of a reference to State
practice than that of recourse to a judicial precedent” (H. Thirlway, The
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice : Fifty Years of
Jurisprudence , Vol. I, 2013, p. 248).
65. In addition to cases from arbitral practice, the issue of succession
to responsibility is the subject of doctrinal opinions and, in the form hof an
exception to the general rule, of Article 10 (2) of the International Law
Commission Articles on State Responsibility.
65.1. In the light of the status versiae et controversiae in the case at
hand — whether the FRY succeeded to alleged responsibility of the
SFRY for acts and omissions contrary to the Genocide Convention —
these would hardly seem applicable. The opinions expressed in that regarhd
are a doctrinal plea for the formulation of a comprehensive doctrine of
succession to responsibility rather than an all-embracing and comprehen -
sive doctrine per se.
Namely, the focus of the theory of succession to responsibility is on thhe
responsibility for delictual debts, as a rule in the relations between thhe
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7 CIJ1077.indb 978 18/04/16 08:54 491 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
State and physical or legal personalities which possess specific charahcter-
istics. It is based on the doctrine of acquired rights (droits acquis), under-
stood as the rights held by private citizens at the time of succession tho
sovereignty (see German Settlers in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923,
P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 6, p. 36).
Besides the doctrine of acquired rights, the appropriate support is the h
passage of rights and obligations principle and the principle of internah -
tional servitudes (M. J. Volkovitsch, “Righting Wrongs : Towards a New
Theory of State Succession to Responsibility for International Delicts”h,
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 92, 1992, pp. 2162-2214). In addition to the
principles of international law, support for succession to responsibilithy
can also be found in borrowing from internal law in the form of the prinh -
ciple of unjust enrichment (ibid., p. 2210; P. Dumberry, State Succession
to International Responsibility, 2007, p. 263).
65.2. The said principles are, by their nature, unsuitable to uphold the
idea of responsibility in personam , such as responsibility for violation of
the Genocide Convention, although they carry certain weight as regards
responsibility in rem.
Responsibility in personam is too much linked with the legal identity
and continuity of the State which makes it difficult to ascertain it inh terms
of ipso iure succession to responsibility without prejudice to the funda -
mental principles of equality and independence of States.
The legal identity and continuity of a State appears to be the powerful h
argument in favour of the general principle of action personalis mori‑
tur cum persona.
65.3. It is no coincidence that the perception of the notion of legal
identity and continuity on the part of the supporters of succession to
responsibility well exceeds the generally accepted meaning of that notiohn.
It is said,exempli causa that : “‘successor States’ are those nations which
take over the international identity of ‘Predecessor States’” (M. J. Volko -
vitsch, op. cit., p. 2164, fn. ; emphasis added), although the notions “suc -
cessor State(s)” and “predecessor State” are mutually exclusihve. Or, in the
elaborated concept of “shared identity”, which is, in fact, the negation of
legal identity and continuity as usually understood, the crucial role ish
given to the notion of “organic substitution”, according to which,h even in
the case where succession took place, “organic forces” or “conshtitutive
elements” of the predecessor State (its territory and its population) sur -
vive its disintegration, being only affected, but not extinguished (P. Dum-
berry, State Succession to International Responsibility , 2007, pp. 49-50).
The concept implies that the successor State is equipped with an identithy
similar to that held by the predecessor State. Precisely “shared idenhtity”
justifies the transfer of any responsibility that existed at the time hof the
succession.
65.4. It appears that the concept of “organic substitution” fails to takhe
into account the element of legal identity and continuity as the very suhb -
stance of international personality in the frame of territorial changes.h It
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7 CIJ1077.indb 980 18/04/16 08:54 492 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
reduces the State to its physical attributes (territory, population), hwhich
are also possessed by territorial non -State entities devoid of the quality of
subjects in terms of international law.
“Shared identity” as the product of the concept of “organic substitu -
tion” portrays new States as a specific mix of the successor State hand the
continuator State expressed in percentage share, because each of them
possesses a part of the territory and population of the predecessor Stathe.
It contains an element of legal absurdity, which is, perhaps, best illush -
trated in the case when, after separation of any part(s) of its territhory, the
predecessor State continues to exist, both States, the predecessor Stateh
and the newly emerged successor State possess identity — the successor
State with its predecessor State, whereas the predecessor State, retainsh its
own.
To sum up, it seems clear that, in the present phase of development,
succession to responsibility in personam is not a part of the corpus of gen -
eral international law. Insurmountable legal obstacles lie, to use the Inter-
national Law Commission explanation, in the fact that entitlement “toh
invoke State responsibility (exists) when an obligation owed to that Shtate
individually was breached” (Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Adopted by the Commission on First Reading, 1996, Report of the Inter -
national Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty -Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996, General Assembly Official Records, United Nations
doc. A/51/10, in relation to Article 42 (a); emphasis in original). In the
present context, individually means the State as an individual legal per -
sonality, equipped with its own rights and obligations.
Succession to responsibility in personam is not stricto sensu legally pos-
sible. As regards this kind of responsibility, it could be said that apphlica-
ble is the parallel with “an incoming tenant [who] is bound by the
obligations of his predecessor who has been evicted, or a son by the obli -
gations of his parent” (T. Baty, “The Obligations of Extinct States”, Yale
Law Journal, Vol. 35, 1925-1926, p. 434), at least when speaking about
violations of the rules of international criminal law based on the princhiple
of subjective responsibility. Even if responsibility of a State for actsh or
omissions of another State is established on the basis of consented sucches -
sion to responsibility, it is not stricto sensu a matter of succession to
responsibility as subjective, of the intuitu personae category, but of assum-
ing the consequences of responsibility in a proper form.
5. Rule in Article 10 (2) of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts as a Purported
Rule of General International Law
66. In the commentary to Article 10 (2) of the Articles on State
Responsibility it is stated, inter alia, that “[a]rbitral decisions, together
493
7 CIJ1077.indb 982 18/04/16 08:54 493 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
with State practice and the literature, indicate a general acceptance of the
two positive attribution rules in Article 10” (J. Crawford, The Interna ‑
tional Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility — Introduction,
Text and Commentaries, 2002, p. 119, para. 12).
The two positive attribution rules to which this refers are attribution of
the “conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new
Government of a State” (para. 1 of Art. 10) and attribution of the “con -
duct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishh-
ing a new State” (para. 2 of Art. 10).
66.1. Consequently, it is a matter of two distinct rules (Counsel of Cro-
atia said that there is “very good reason to cover both situations”h) (Reply
of Croatia, para. 7.54) by the practice relating to Article 10 as a whole.
This position is, however, questionable in view of the differences which h
exist between these situations.
In case of revolutionary change of Government, the State remains the
identical subject of international law, responsible on the basis of the fact
that “it represented ab initio a changing national will, crystallizing in the
fully successful result” (Bolivar Railway Company,United Nations, RIAA,
1903, Vol. IX, p. 445). Basically, its responsibility derives from the gene -
ral principle underlying the rule provided by Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates that “[a] party mhay
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for itsh failure
to perform a treaty”. Consequently, in the case of change of Governmehnt,
responsibility of the State is genuine, does not imply any transfer of rhes -
ponsibility because in question is the same and identical State in termsh of
legal personality, a personality with unimpaired rights and obligations.h In
a colloquial sense, as opposed to the legal one, it is possible to speakh only
of a transfer of responsibility from one Government to another Govern -
ment.
As regards “a movement, insurrectional or other which succeeds in esth -a
blishing a new State”, the situation is entirely different. A new Stathe is a new
legal person in terms of international law, whose corpus of rights and ohb-li
gations does not coincide with the rights and obligations of its parent hState,
but is determined on the basis of the rules of succession of States. Frohm a
legal point of view, responsibility of the new State is essentially an ihssue of
the law of succession rather than an issue of State responsibility. Or, ha co -m
bination of both. It is logical to presume that this is the reason why it is
pointed out that “Article 10 concerns the special case of responsibility. . .”
(J. Crawford, op. cit., p.93, para. 8).
66.2. An additional reason against the treatment of paragraphs 1 and
2 of Article 10 as a whole is of a formal nature and concerns the postu -
lates of legal logic. Basically, such a treatment would imply analogy orh
extensive interpretation of paragraph 1.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 984 18/04/16 08:54 494 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Analogy and extensive interpretation, as legal vehicles, are used in cashe
of the existence of lacunae which are thus filled in by a rule which hhas not
originally been created for the concrete situation/or relation, or by inhter-
pretation of the existing rule as if it were created for that specifich situa -
tion.
In the concrete case there are no lacunae — the conduct of “insurrec -
tional movement which [become] a new Government” and movements
“insurrectional or other, which [succeed] in establishing a new Stateh” are
regulated by two distinct rules expressed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Arti -
cle 10; hence, a rational and legal basis for the application of analogy or
extensive interpretation of paragraph 1 is non-existent.
It appears, however, that the arbitral awards referred to in the Commen -
tary to Article 10 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility relate to
different objects (the general principle of non -responsibility for rebellions
(J. Crawford, op. cit., p.116); the principle that liability could be estab -
lished in the case of a lack of good faith or negligence in suppressing han
insurrection (ibid.) ; and, the responsibility for successful revolutionary/
insurrectional movements (ibid., p. 113)).
The only cases which relate to the concrete issue are stated in para -
graph 14 of the Commentary (ibid., p. 120), including the explanation
that “more recent decisions and practice do not, on the whole, give ahny
reason to doubt the propositions contained in Article 10”. It appears,
however, that such a characterization is, in terms of law, wishful thinkhing
rather than a respectable argument.
The decision in Minister of Defence, Namibia v. Mwandinghi 1992 (2)
seems to involve the liability of the newly independent State for actionhs of
the predecessor State. But, it is based on a constitutional provision, Ahrti-
cle 140 (3) of the Republic of Namibia, which states that the said Repub -
lic inherited liability for “anything done” by the predecessor Stahte (see
ILR , Vol. 91, 1991, p. 341).
Although based on municipal and constitutional law, the decision dis -
cussed some elements of international law. However, the position of the h
court at the first instance appears to be contrary to the rule containhed in
paragraph 2 of Article 10. The court found that “in international law a
new State is not liable for the delicts committed by its predecessor”h (ibid.,
p. 353).
On appeal, the reasoning of the court was founded on constitutional
interpretation exclusively (ibid., p. 361).
The decision in Ontario Ltd. v. Crispus Kiyonga and Others is also of
little, if any relevance, to the issue at hand. The case considered whethher
a contract concluded with a rebel movement seeking to overthrow the
Government could be enforceable against the Government when that
movement subsequently seized power. The applicant claims that the con -
495
7 CIJ1077.indb 986 18/04/16 08:54 495 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
tract was not illegal and that once the revolution succeeded, the actionhs of
the revolutionary movement were validated. The Government argued
that the revolutionary movement did not have any legal personality untilh
they achieved power and thus they could not have entered into the con -
tract and could not, at that time, have signed a contract binding on theh
Government of Uganda. The Judgment is based entirely on municipal
contract law and does not refer to international law. It upholds the above
claims of the Ugandan Government. The essential finding is that :
“It is true that for a contract to be binding it must be between
persons existing at the time the contract is made : Kelner v. Baxter
(1866) LR 2 CP 174. The case is also authority for the legal proposi -
tion that a person or persons cannot act as an agent of a non -existent
principal because an act which cannot be done by a principal cannot
be done by him through an agent. Again at common law there are
contracts which are illegal in the sense that they are entered into to
commit crimes, and they are enforceable.” (44123 Ontario Ltd. v.
Crispus Kiyonga and Others (1992) 11 Kampala LR 14, pp. 20-21;
ILR , Vol. 103, p. 259, p. 266 (High Court, Uganda).)
67. In the Commentary of the International Law Commission, together
with State practice and arbitral decisions, literature is also cited as han
indicator of general acceptance of the rules contained in Article 100
(J. Crawford, op. cit., p. 119, para. 12).
The Commentary, however, mentions only one Article which concerns
insurrectional movements which succeed in establishing a new State
(H. Atlam, “International Liberation Movement and International Respon -
sibility”, in B.Simma and M. Spinedi (eds.), United Nations Codification
of State Responsibility, 1987, p. 35).
The Arbitral Tribunal in the Lighthouse Arbitration stressed the unsatis -
factory nature of the theoretical analysis of the issue, speaking, moreohver,
of the “chaotic state of authoritative writings” ( Lighthouses Arbitration
between France and Greece, Claims Nos. 11 and 4, 24 July 1956 (United
Nations, RIAA, Vol. XII, p. 155; 23 ILR 81, p. 91). Dumberry, the author
of a unique systematic work on the issue of succession to international
responsibility (P. Dumberry, State Succession to International Responsibil ‑
ity, 2007), in concluding a comprehensive research into the responsibilityh
of an insurrectional movement that succeeds in establishing a new State
says:
“The work of the International Law Commission and doctrine has
long considered as well-established principle of international law the fact
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7 CIJ1077.indb 988 18/04/16 08:54 496 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
that whenever an insurrectional movement succeeds in creating a new
State, the new State should be held responsible for obligations arising
from internationally wrongful acts committed by the insurrectional
movement against third States during the armed struggle for independ -
ence. The new State should remain responsible for acts which took place
before its independence because there is a ‘structural’ and ‘orhganic’ -con
tinuity of the legal personality of what was then a rebel movement and
what has since successfully become a new independent State.
The somehow surprising result of the research outlined here is the
limited State practice which can be found in support of this principle. h
Thus, State practice ultimately consists of one obiter dictum by an
internal United States compensation commission and one sentence
taken from a legal opinion discussing the likely consequences arising
from uncertain future events. Even the several French municipal court
decisions, which held that the new State of Algeria was (in principle)h
responsible for the internationally wrongful acts committed by the
FLN before 1960, had limited concrete implications since Algeria was
in fact not a party to any of these proceedings.” (P. Dumberry, “New
State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts by an Insur -
rectional Movement”, European Journal of International Law, Vol.17,
2006, p. 620.)
In assessing the legal force of the Articles on State Responsibility, ith
should be born in mind that the International Law Commission recom -
mended to the General Assembly simply to ‘‘take note” of these Articles,
with the caveat that at a later stage the General Assembly should considher
the adoption of a Convention (Report of the International Law Commis -
sion 2001, United Nations doc. A/56/10, paras. 67, 72, 73). The General
Assembly followed this suggestion “without prejudice to the question hof
their future adoption or other appropriate action”. It took this decihsion
without a vote, in the Sixth Committee, as well as in the Plenary.
Consequently, the Articles on the Responsibility of States are, by their
nature, closest to the doctrinary codification by a prestigious body ohf
international lawyers such as the International Law Commission. They
have no binding force by themselves, but they can possess it indirectly ▯via
customary law to the extent to which they express it.
General Assembly resolution 59/35 (2004) entrusted the United Nations
Secretariat with the task of producing a compilation of express referenches
to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongfulh
Acts and their commentaries in international judicial practice (see
General Assembly resolution 56/83 (2001) and General Assembly resolu -
tion 59/35 (2004)). It is an extremely important task which should
demonstrate the reaction of international courts and tribunals in terms hof
its perception of the Articles as expressing positive law or not.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 990 18/04/16 08:54 497 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Even more useful in this respect is perhaps the study prepared by the
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, which is consid -
erably more extensive in its scope ratione materiae. It comprises not only
international judicial practice, but
“it includes references to the Articles made in the separate or dissent-
ing opinions of judges of both the International Court of Justice and
other bodies . . . it aims to provide a greater amount of context to
instances of express reference . . .it aims to provide some comment
upon, and where appropriate, criticism of, the way in which the Arti-
cles have been applied in specific instances . . . it includes the most
important instances of reliance on the Articles by domestic courts.” h
(Simon Olleson, The Impact of ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Preliminary Draft, British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2003, p. iv.)
Moreover, the study “aims to provide a survey not only of express ref -
erence to the Articles, but also to the most important judicial pronounche-
ments (in particular those of the International Court of Justice), whihch,
although made without express reference to the Articles, are relevant to
matters falling within their subject-matter and which are therefore releh -
vant to an assessment of the impact of the Articles since the adoption”h
(ibid.). (See also “Responsibility of States ; Compilation of Decisions
of International Courts, Tribunals and other Bodies”, Report of the
Secretary ‑General, United Nations doc. A/62/62 and Add. 1 ; D. Caron,
“The ILC Articles on State Responsibility : The Paradoxical Relation -
ship between Form and Authority”, American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 96, 2002, pp. 857, 863-866, 857).
The conclusion of the study is that, contrary to the largest number of
the Articles on which the jurisprudence of courts, international and
national’ and the practice of States, strongly relies, in respect of hArti -
cles 10 as a whole “[t]here appears to have been no international judicialh
reference to Article 10” (ibid., p. 95) nor any other instances referring to
Article 10 (ibid.)
6. Applicable Substantive Law In Casu in the Light of Rules
on Interpretation of Treaties
68. Even if, arguendo, succession to responsibility is supposed to be a
part of general international law, this would not automatically mean thaht
it is a part of the applicable law in casu.
In order to be considered as such, rules on succession to responsibilityh
must be, pursuant to Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, “relevant rules of international law applicable in thhe
relations between the parties”.
69. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is a special treaty -oriented
compromissory clause producing a “presumption of confinement”
498
7 CIJ1077.indb 992 18/04/16 08:54 498 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
(W. M. Reisman, “The Other Shoe Falls : The Future of Article 36 (1)
Jurisdiction in the Light of Nicaragua”, American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 81, 1987, p. 170) in the sense that, as a jurisdictional title, it
determines substantive law to be applied (positive aspect) and excludehs, in
principle, as applicable substantive law, other than that determined by hit
(negative aspect).
It can be said that this type of clause determines the principal or pri ‑
mary rules of the treaty to which the compromissory clause is attached
(L. Bartels, “Jurisdiction and Applicable Law Clauses : Where Does a
Tribunal Find the Principal Norms Applicable to the Case before It ?” in
Y. Shany and T. Broude (eds.), Multi‑Sourced Equivalent Norms in Inter ‑
national Law, 2011, pp. 117-120; M. Papadaki, “Compromissory Clauses
as the Gatekeepers of the Law to Be ‘Used’ in the ICJ and PCIJ”h, Journal
of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 5, 2014, pp. 573 et passim) which
the Court applies ad casum. Its effects naturally derive from the consen -
sual and limited jurisdiction of the Court.
70. The consensual and limited jurisdiction of the Court cannot but
reflect upon the substantive law which the Court applies. This fact
expresses the essential difference between international courts and domesh -
tic courts, the latter which, representing the State imperium in the judicial
sphere, apply the formal sources of law ex lege, independently of the will
of the parties. The power of the parties to limit applicable substantiveh
rules, being a part of the Statute of the Court, possesses the constituthional
character in the law governing the Court’s judicial activity. The strong
form of the exercise of this power is the provision of Article 38, para -
graph 2, of the Statute of the Court, on the basis of which the parties can,
on the basis of agreement, give the power to the Court to decide a case h
ex aequo et bono. Narrower by scope and, implicitly, by form, are juris -
dictional titles granted in instruments such as compromissory clauses or
special agreements.
71. The special treaty-oriented compromissory clauses do not exclude
per se the application of the legal rules contained in sources mentioned in
Article 38 of the Statute of the Court. Such exclusion would be incompat -
ible with the judicial function of the Court as a court of law which adohpts
decisions in accordance with international law. Moreover, such effects are
logically and legally impossible, having in mind that the Court, by applhy-
ing the law referred to in a compromissory clause, acts, in fact, in acchor-
dance with the provision of paragraph 1 (a) of Article 38 of the Statute.
The effects of treaty-oriented compromissory clauses are not designed
in terms of exclusion/inclusion dichotomy, but in terms of determining
priority of the rules from various sources which concern or may concern h
the subject-matter of the dispute and of the function of the rules of inhter -
national law other than the rules embodied in the treaty to which a com -
promissory clause is attached.
In this sense, in contrast to the principal or primary rules representinhg
applicable substantive law in casu, there are incidental norms (L. Bartels,
499
7 CIJ1077.indb 994 18/04/16 08:54 499 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
op. cit., p. 117) which comprise metanorms, constructive and conflicting
norms (M. Papadaki, op. cit., pp. 580-592). Metanorms imply “rules that
govern the validity and interpretation of the rules of the treaty”, whhereas
constructive norms constitute “the logical presuppositions and the nehces-
sary logical consequences” of the principal or primary rules (D. Anzilotti,
Cours de droit international, trans. G. C. Gidel, 1929, pp. 106 -107, as trans-
lated into English by M. Papadaki, op. cit.). Conflicting norms, for their
part, concern “conflicting norm extraneous to the compromissory clahuse–
containing treaty” whose application is a “result of the applicatihon of the
metanorms of conflict resolution” like lex specialis or lex posterior whose
function is, generally speaking, to determine “the interpretation, vahlidity
and applicability of any given principal norms” (L. Bartels, op.cit., p. 119).
Consequently, whereas the principal norms of substantive law are
linked with the subject -matter of the dispute, possessing specific norma -
tive content relevant to the adjudicative process, incidental norms haveh
structural-functional significance which enables a proper interpretation
and application of the principal norms.
72. The dichotomy of the principal/incidental norms reconciles two,
prima facie, opposing premises — consensual and limited jurisdiction of
the Court and the nature of the judicial function of the Court as an orghan
of international law. In the optic of this dichotomy, it seems clear thaht the
substantive law referred to by the compromissory clause is not a self -con -
tained regime, but a relevant part of international law as a whole operaht-
ing, together with other relevant parts of international law, on the bashis
of a proper distribution of functions. Moreover, the normative integrityh
and consistency of international law is safeguarded precisely by the opehr-
ation of metanorms relating to the validity of legal acts.
73. The part of jurisprudence of the Court based on special, treaty-
oriented compromissory clauses, generally follows the theoretical divisihon
of primary and incidental norms, and their role in the process of determhi-
nation.
A good illustration is the 2007 Judgment in the Bosnian Genocide case
which, in respect of this particular matter, is virtually identical to thhe case
at hand.
As regards applicable substantive law, the position of the Court is
clear. The Court, inter alia, stated :
“The jurisdiction of the Court in this case is based solely on Arti -
cle IX of the Convention. All the other grounds of jurisdiction invoked
by the Applicant were rejected in the 1996 Judgment on jurisdiction
(I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 617-621, paras. 35-41). It follows that
the Court may rule only on the disputes between the Parties to which
that provision refers. The Parties disagree on whether the Court
finally decided the scope and meaning of that provision in its
1996 Judgment and, if it did not, on the matters over which the Court
500
7 CIJ1077.indb 996 18/04/16 08:54 500 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
has jurisdiction under that provision. The Court rules on those two
matters in following sections of this Judgment. It has no power to rule h
on alleged breaches of other obligations under international law, not
amounting to genocide, particularly those protecting human rights in
armed conflict. That is so even if the alleged breaches are of obliga -
tions under peremptory norms, or of obligations which protect essen-
tial humanitarian values, and which may be owed erga omnes.”
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Monte‑
negro) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 104, para. 147.)
In other words, the Court diagnosed applicable substantive law or the
principal norms in the Genocide Convention as indicated by Article IX of
the Convention, pointing out “the fundamental distinction between theh
existence and binding force of obligations arising under international law
and the existence of a court or tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve disputes
about compliance with those obligations” (ibid., para. 148 ; emphasis
added).
The Court, then, continues to consider applicable law lato sensu finding
out that:
“The jurisdiction of the Court is founded on Article IX of the Con -
vention, and the disputes subject to that jurisdiction are those ‘relhat-
ing to the interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convenhtion,
but it does not follow that the Convention stands alone.” (Ibid., p. 105,
para. 149 ; emphasis added.)
and concludes:
“In order to determine whether the Respondent breached its obli -
gation under the Convention, as claimed by the Applicant, and, if a
breach was committed, to determine its legal consequences, the Court
willhave recourse not only to the Convention itself, but also to the
rules of general international law on treaty interpretation and on resp‑n
sibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.” (Ibid. emphasis
added.)
74. It seems clear that “the rules of general international law on treatyh
interpretation and on responsibility of States for internationally wronghful
acts”, as the rules which “stand” alongside the Genocide Convenhtion,
fully correspond with metanorms and constructive norms, respectively, ash
the forms of incidental or auxiliary norms (see paras. 69 and 71 above).
75. It appears clear that succession to responsibility is not a part of
primary substantive law contained in the Genocide Convention. Respon -
sibility of a State for the committed crime is a constructive norm in thhe
501
7 CIJ1077.indb 998 18/04/16 08:54 501 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
sense of “logical presuppositions and necessary logical consequences of
norms established” (D. Anzilotti and G. C. Gidel, Cours de droit interna‑
tional, 1929, pp. 106-107, as translated into English by M. Papadaki,
op. cit.) by a treaty, in the case at hand the Convention on Genocide. Or,
more precisely, as a constructive norm, the rules of State responsibilithy
are “the logical presuppositions not of the primary rules per se, but of
their effectiveness” (M. Papadaki, op. cit., p. 586). The special position of
constructive norms is well -established in the jurisprudence of the Court.
It is expressed in a general way in the dictum of the Court in the Chorzow
Factory case “:eparation . . .s the indispensable complement of a fail -
ure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be statehd in
the Convention itself.” (Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow, Juris‑
diction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 13.)
Moreover, in the Genocide Convention “responsibility” is included hin
the compromissory clause, which, due to the fact that responsibility is,
ex natura, the constructive norm, possesses thus only a declaratory effect.
76. Responsibility of a State is one thing and succession to responsibil-
ity is another. Suffice it to say that, whereas the rules on responsibihlity are
secondary rules, the rules on successionare a part of the corpus ofprimary
norms whose violation entails activation of the rules on responsibility.h
77. As such, supposed rules of succession to responsibility are not “rel-
evant rules” of international law applicable in casu. “Relevant rules” in
terms of Article 31, paragraph 3 (c), of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties “can be taken as an indication that analogy to rules hof
international law other than directly applicable to the subject‑matter of the
case were to be excluded” (H. J. Uibopuu, “Interpretation of Treaties in
the Light of International Law : Art. 31, para. 3 (c) of the Vienna Con -
vention on the Law of Treaties”, Yearbook of the Association of Attenders
and Alumni : Hague Academy of International Law , Vol. 40, 1970, p. 4 ;
emphasis added). “Relevant” means that the rules “concerns the
subject‑matter of the treaty term at issue ” (M. E. Villiger, Commentary on
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2009, p. 433; empha-
sis added ; see also Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 219,
para. 113).
78. In the circumstances surrounding the case, two relevant conclu -
sions can be drawn :
(i) that the alleged rules on succession to responsibility are not primary
substantive rules in the sense of the Genocide Convention ; and
(ii) that, having in mind that they are not a part of secondary rules, they
do not form a legal union with the rules on responsibility so that
in casu they do not constitute constructive norms.
502
7 CIJ1077.indb 1000 18/04/16 08:54 502 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
79. The only possible form of succession to responsibility in the cir -
cumstances surrounding the case, could be succession to the responsibil -
ity of SFRY ex consensu.
On 29 June 2001, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia,
the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Slovenia and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, concluded in Vienna, under the auspices of the
International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, an Agreement on
succession issues.
The Parties have concluded the Agreement, as stated in the Preamble,
“being in sovereign equality the five successor States to the formehr Social -
ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.
Article 1 of Annex F of the Agreement provides that “[a]ll rights and
interests which belonged to the SFRY and which are not otherwise cov -
ered by the Agreement . . . shall be shared among the successor States. . .”
The Article is interpreted as a provision “in favour of the transfer hof the
right to reparation from the predecessor State to the successor States”.
(P. Dumberry, op. cit., p. 121, fn. 293; emphasis in original).
Article 2 of Annex F stipulates :
“All claims against the SFRY which are not otherwise covered by
this agreement shall be considered by the Standing Joint Committee
established under Article 4 of this agreement. The successor States
shall inform one another of all such claims against the SFRY.”
Sir Arthur Watts, special negotiator for succession issues, whose pro -
posal is actually incorporated into the text of the Agreement on succes-
sion issues, indicates that
“it was understood by all concerned (at least, if it wasn’t, it shhould
have been !) that Articles 1 and 2 of Annex F included within their
scope such items of international responsibility as might exists [sic],
whether involving outstanding claims by the SFRY against other
States (Art. 1) or outstanding claims by other States against the SFRY
(Art. 2)” (P. Dumberry, op. cit., p. 121, fn. 294, referring to a letter
from Sir Arthur Watts on file with the author).
7. The Issue of the Indispensable Third Party
80. Even if, arguendo qua non, there exists a rule of general interna -
tional law and ipso iure succession to responsibility, it seems inapplicable
in the circumstances surrounding the case.
Succession to responsibility is not a simple movement of responsibility h
from the predecessor State towards the successor State, an automatic
transfer of responsibility from old to new State(s).
It presupposes two relevant legal facts established in a proper judicialh
action of the Court.
503
7 CIJ1077.indb 1002 18/04/16 08:54 503 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Primo, that the alleged genocidal acts have been committed on the ter -
ritory of the Applicant ; and
Secundo, that such acts can be attributed to the SFRY according to
“criteria, standards and principles, including, in addition to commonh
sense, national and international rules” (YILC, 1989, Vol. II, pp. 51-52).
Only upon establishing these legal facts can the “succession issue”h be
brought in focus in terms of the transfer of established responsibility of
the SFRY for alleged genocidal acts to the FRY/Serbia. The issue of res -
ponsibility of the SFRY is, consequently, of the preliminary, antecedenth
nature in relation to the alleged responsibility of the FRY/Serbia.
81. Therefore, the alleged responsibility of the SFRY represents the
very subject-matter of the decision of the Court in the dispute between
Croatia and the FRY/Serbia. In that part, it appears that the Court doesh
not have jurisdiction because, as stated by the Court in Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute, expressing the well -established, fundamental
rule as regards its jurisdiction, “continuance of proceedings in the habsence
of a State whose [interests] would be ‘the very subject -matter of the deci-
sion’” is not allowed (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal‑
vador/Honduras), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1990, pp. 115 -116, para. 55, referring to the case of Mon‑
etary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France ; United Kingdom
and United States of America), Preliminary Question, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32).
The Court thus confirmed the so-called Monetary Gold principle which
rests on the difference between the “legal interest” in a dispute ahnd the
“subject -matter” of a dispute or its part. The dictum of the Court is as
follows:
“To adjudicate upon [this objection] without. . . consent would run
counter to a well -established principle of international law embodied
in the Court’s Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise juris -
diction over a State with its consent.” (Ibid.)
The fact that in the present case, a third State’s legal interests would not
only be affected by a decision, but would form “the very subject-matter of
the decision”, does not make it possible for the Court to be authorizhed by
Article 62 of the Statute to continue the proceedings even in the absence
of the third State concerned.
Nor can Article 59 of the Statute be invoked since
“the decision of the Court in a given case only binds the parties to hit
and in respect of that particular case. This rule. . . rests on the assump-
tion that the Court is at least able to render a binding decision.
Where . . . the vital issue to be settled concerns the international
responsibility of a third State, the Court cannot, without the consent
504
7 CIJ1077.indb 1004 18/04/16 08:54 504 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
of that third State, give a decision on that issue binding upon any Stathe,
either the third State, or any of the parties before it” (I.C.J. Reports
1954, p. 33).
82. Considering that the “indispensable third party” principle derives
from the fundamental principle of consent, the application of the princih-
ple in casu could be objected to by recalling the argument that the SFRY
has given its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court by ratifying the hCon -
vention in 1948 without expressing reservation regarding Article IX of the
Convention.
Such an objection would, however, be deprived of sense. The SFRY
became extinct as a State in 1992 and, with the extinction of a State, ahll
its rights and obligations cease as its own rights and obligations.
83. Moreover, the indispensable third-party rule would relate to the
Republic of Macedonia up until 1 December 1991, the date of the procla-
mation of Macedonia as an independent State, and to Bosnia and
Herzegovina up until 29 February and 1 March 1992 — the dates of
the proclamation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent State,
because they were parts of the SFRY prior to these dates.
III. Substantive Law Issues
1. Relationship between the ICJ and the ICTY in respect
of the Adjudication of Genocide
84. Following the filing of the Application against the FRY in the Bos‑
nian Genocide case, on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Conven -
tion, the Court found itself on terra incognita. It had three possibilities at
its disposal at the time :
(i) to pronounce itself incompetent, which was, perhaps, a solution clos -
est to the letter of the Convention, although it contained a negative
connotation in terms of the Court’s judicial policy, implying that thhe
World Court renounces making its contribution to the settlement of
the disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the Con -
vention constituting a part of corpus juris cogentis;
(ii) to pronounce itself competent to entertain the case, acting as a crimi -
nal court, some kind of a judicial counterpart to the French adminis -
trative court in a dispute of full jurisdiction (le contentieux de pleine
juridiction). Legal obstacles for the Court to act in such a way do not
exist. As a court of general jurisdiction it was in a position, like theh
courts in the continental judicial system which does not know the
strict division into criminal and civil courts, to treat the issue of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for genocide as a preliminary part of
the issue of the responsibility of a State for genocide. This possibilithy
is additionally strengthened, representing even, in the light of logic
and legal considerations, the most appropriate solution, in the frame
505
7 CIJ1077.indb 1006 18/04/16 08:54 505 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
of the dictum of the Court that a State, too, can commit genocide
(2007 Judgment, pp. 113-114, paras. 166-167) ; or,
(iii) to opt for a middle-of-the-road position, limiting itself to the issue of
State responsibility, without entering, at least not directly, into the
area of individual criminal responsibility. Such position is essentiallyh
based on the dichotomy of individual criminal responsibility for the
committed act of genocide/State responsibility, in terms of the gen -
eral rules of responsibility of a State for wrongful acts. The logic of h
dichotomy in concreto implies, or may imply, the establishment of a
jurisprudential connection with the ICTY judgments. Judge Tomka,
in his separate opinion to the 2007 Judgment, outlined the rationale
of this connection in [these] terms:
“The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over the
individual perpetrators of those serious atrocities. Article IX of
the Genocide Convention confers on the Court jurisdiction to
determine whether the Respondent complied with its obligations
under the Genocide Convention. In making this determination in
the present case, the Court was entitled to draw legal conse -
quences from the judgments of the ICTY, particularly those which
dealt with charges of genocide or any of the other acts proscribed
in Article III. Only if the acts of the persons involved in the com-
mission of such crimes were attributable to the Respondent could
its responsibility have been entailed.
The activity of the Court has thus complemented the judicial
activity of the ICTY in fulfilling the Court’s role in the field hof
State responsibility for genocide, over which the ICTY has no
jurisdiction. Hopefully, the activities of these two judicial institu
tions of the United Nations, the Court remaining the principal
judicial organ of the Organization, contribute in their respective
fields to their common objective — the achievement of internatio -
nal justice— however imperfect it may be perceived.” (Ibid., sepa-
rate opinion of Judge Tomka, p. 351, para. 73.)
85. It appears that the Court opted for this third possibility and applied
it both in the Bosnian Genocide case and in the case at hand.
It seems that the reasons underlying the choice of the Court for the
third option are dual — positive and negative.
The main positive reasons could be the following :
— primo, the crime of genocide, due to its specific collective nature,
entails cumulatively the responsibility of individuals and that of the
State;
— secundo, it respects both the competence of the ICTY and the limita -
tions on the judicial activity of the Court, which is, true, relatively h
limited to dealing with international responsibility for genocide ;
506
7 CIJ1077.indb 1008 18/04/16 08:54 506 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
— tertio , enabling interconnecting international jurisdictions relating to
genocide for the purpose of “[u]nity of substantive law as a remedy
for jurisdictional fragmentation” (E. Cannizzaro, “Interconnecting
International Jurisdictions : A Contribution from the Genocide Deci -
sion of the ICJ”, European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 1, 2007);
— quarto, opening space for “integrating the mandate and methodolo-
gies of international courts” (D. Groome, “Adjudicating Genocide: Is
the International Court of Justice Capable of Judging State Criminal
Responsibility ?”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2008,
p. 976).
The negative reasons relate to the capability of the Court, in practicalh
terms, to act as a criminal court and the avoidance of competing jurisdic -
tion with the fellow court — the ICTY.
Although the Court “can and does have much to say on matters of
criminal justice” (K. J. Keith, “The International Court of Justice and
Criminal Justice”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 59,
2010, p. 895), its proper judicial activity in genocide cases calls for institu
tional and methodological accommodation, in particular as regards evi -
dential matters. It appears that the Court considered competing
jurisdiction with the ICTY undesirable, not only because of the problems
of principle regarding competing jurisdiction in the legal environment ohf
the international community which does not know the judicial system
stricto sensu, but also because of the fact that the ICTY was established
by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations.
86. In principle, “interconnection” with a specialized tribunal such ahs
the ICTY can be desirable and productive for the International Court of h
Justice. However, it must not ignore the substantial differences between h
the two bodies and the proper effects deriving from these differences.
The differences are many and range from those of a judicial nature and
concerning the adjudicative function to judicial reasoning.
86.1. The International Court of Justice is a “World Court”, estab -
lished in accordance with a general multilateral treaty as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations.
Although a principal organ of the United Nations, co-existing with the
other principal organs of the world organization on the basis of Articleh 7,
paragraph 1, of the Charter, the International Court of Justice is primarily
the “principal judicial organ” (UN Charter, Art. 92), and “[t]he formula
‘principal judicial organ’ stresses the independent status of the Court in
the sense that it is not subordinate or accountable to any external author -
ity in the exercise of its judicial functions” (S.Rosenne, The Law and Prac‑
tice of the International Court: 1920‑2005, 2006, 4th ed., Vol. I, p. 141).
507
7 CIJ1077.indb 1010 18/04/16 08:54 507 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The ICTY, for its part, is a specialized, criminal tribunal established hby
resolution 827 of the Security Council, whose competence is limited in all
relevant aspects — ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione loci —
representing, basically, an “ad hoc measure” aiming to “contribute to the
restoration and maintenance of peace” (UN Security Council resolu -
tion 827, doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, Preamble) or, promoting the idea
of selective justice versus universal justice as inherent in the very essence
of law and the judiciary. In the light of that fact, the ICTY has, actuahlly,
been established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, which ish
also reflected, inter alia, in its function according to Security Council res -
olution 827 (see para. 86.2 below). It raises the question of its legitimacy,
to which no proper legal answer has been provided to this day. The ICTY h
itself, in the Tadić case, reacting to the argument of the defence that the
tribunal was “not established by law”, as required, inter alia, by the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pointed out that, in
terms of the principle of competence de la competence, it had the inherent
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction (Tadić, IT -94-1, Appeals
Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, paras. 18-19).
The position taken by the Appeals Chamber can hardly be considered
satisfactory, for at least two reasons.
Primo , the principle of competence de la competence is not an omni -
potent principle capable of transforming illegitimacy into legitimacy, ille
gality into legality or vice versa. It is simply a basic functional and h
structural principle inherent in any adjudicatory body, whether a regulahr
court or any other body possessing adjudicatory powers. The principle is,
as pointed out by United States Commissioner Gore in the Betsey case,
“indispensably necessary to the discharge of any . . . duties” for any adju -
dicatory body (J. B. Moore (ed.), International Adjudications, Ancient and
Modern, History and Documents, Modern Series, Vol. IV, p. 183).
As such, the principle of competence de la competence, operating within
the particular judicial structure, is neutral as regards the legitimacy hor
illegitimacy of the adjudicating body.
Secundo , even, if arguendo, the principle of competence de la compe ‑
tence is capable of serving as a basis of legitimacy of the ICTY, the find -
ing of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case does not appear sufficient
in that regard in the light of the fundamental principle — nemo iudex in
causa sua. The proper forum for a proper assessment of legitimacy of the
ICTY is the ICJ which, however, avoided explicit pronouncement in that
regard (some other models of judicial review and of UN constitutional
interpretation are also possible, see J. Alvarez, “Nuremberg Revisited :
The Tadić Case”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, 1996,
p. 250).
86.2. The differences as regards adjudicatory functions between the
ICJ and the ICTY are particularly evident in relation to international
peace and security.
508
7 CIJ1077.indb 1012 18/04/16 08:54 508 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The activity of the ICTY is strongly linked with international peace
and security.
Security Council resolution 827, establishing the ICTY, proceeded
from the qualification that the situation in the territory of the formher
Yugoslavia “constitute[d] a threat to international peace and securithy”
and that the establishment of the Tribunal “would contribute to the rhes-
toration and maintenance of peace” (UN Security Council resolution 827,
doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, Preamble). The Appeals Chamber, in the
Tadić case, concluded that “the establishment of the International Tribu -
nal falls squarely within the powers of the Security Council under Arti ‑
cle 41” (Tadić, IT -94-1, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995,
para. 36 ; emphasis added) (as an aside, such a conclusion could be con -
troversial in light of the provision of Article 41 of the Charter, which
a limine enumerates the powers of the Security Council proving that mea -
sures “may include complete or partial interruption of economic relathions
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of cohm -
munication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”). The conclushion
in Tadić has been substantiated in the Milošević case in which the Trial
Chamber found that the establishment of the International Tribunal “ihs,
in the context of the conflict in the country at that time, pre‑eminently a
measure to restore international peace and security” (Milošević, IT -02-54,
Trial Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motions of 8 November 2001,
para. 7; emphasis added).
The instrumental nature of the ICTY is not a subjective perception of
the Tribunal itself, but derives from the act by which it has been estabh -
lished. Resolution 827 provides, inter alia, that the establishment of the
Tribunal, “in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia”h, as
“an ad hoc measure by the Council” (UN Security Council resolution 827,
doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, Preamble). Such perception of the nature
of the Tribunal is also reflected in the timing of the establishment ohf the
Tribunal by the Security Council. May 1993 was the apex of the conflicht
in the former Yugoslavia, so that the establishment of the Tribunal was ha
part of international peace operations backed by the authority and
enforcement power of the Security Council. Therefore, it can be said thaht
“the overall purpose of the tribunals [ICTY and ICTR] coincides with h
other forms of humanitarian intervention with respect to humanitar -
ian concern for victims in conflict-ridden areas. The ICTY’s relation-
ship with peacekeeping forces in Bosnia -Herzegovina during the
Bosnian war indicates a critical juncture of judicial organs with mili -
tary forces.” (H. Shinoda, “Peace-Building by the Rule of Law : An
Examination of Intervention in the Form of International Tribunals”, h
International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 7, 2002.)
509
7 CIJ1077.indb 1014 18/04/16 08:54 509 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
As such, the ICTY essentially represents a “non -military form of inter -
vention by the international community” (International Journal of Peace
Studies , Vol. 7, 2002, p. 15).
Although there exists an indisputable nexus between law and peace, the
instrumental role of the adjudicatory body in the establishment of peace
hardly represents an inherent feature of judicial activity of the court hof
law. At least of the International Court of Justice.
Restoration of peace is pre -eminently a political matter achieved by
way of measures which are stricto sensu non -legal or extra -legal. The
notions of “peace” and “justice” do not necessarily coincideh. More often
than not, peace is achieved by means of unjust solutions. Moreover, law h
can even be an obstacle to the attainment of peace, as is shown by peaceh
treaties. If the rules of the law of treaties were to be respected as rehgards
peace treaties, the peace achieved through peace treaties could not be
legally established because, as a rule, it is based on superiority on thhe
battle -fiel; which is, in terms of the law of treaties, the essential lack of
consent (vice de consentement) .
The international practice
“has developed two principal methods for settling international affairs
and for dealing with international disputes. One is purely political.
The other is legal. There are degrees of shading off between them, and
various processes for the introduction of different types of third-party
settlement. Because of this fundamental difference between the two
approaches of settling international disputes, analogies from one to
the other are false.” (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the Inter ‑
national Court: 1920‑2005, 2006, 4th ed., pp. 4-5.)
The role of the Court is manifested in its “bolstering of the structuhre of
peace . . . through its advisory opinions, [as well as through judgments]
through the confidence which it inspired, and through the encouragemenht
which it gave to the extension of the law of pacific settlement, rathehr than
through its disposition of particular disputes” (M. Hudson, International
Tribunals : Past and Future , 1944, p. 239).
86.3. It seems understandable that such a position of the Tribunal is
also reflected in its judicial reasoning. In the interpretation of relhevant
legal rules, the Tribunal strongly, even decisively, relies on the respehctive
interpretation of the Security Council and that of the chief administrathive
officer of the world Organization — the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. By reasoning in this way, the Tribunal in fact conducts itself
loyally towards its founder. There can be no objection to that in the lihght
of the circumstances surrounding the establishment and adjudicatory
function of the ICTY, but the question posed is whether such an approachh
fits within the standards of judicial reasoning of the Court.
86.3.1. In the Blaškić case, the Tribunal found the decisive argument
relating to “existing international humanitarian law” in the asserhtions of
510
7 CIJ1077.indb 1016 18/04/16 08:54 510 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
the Security Council and the Secretary -General of the United Nations.
The Tribunal stated inter alia :
“It would therefore be wholly unfounded for the Tribunal to now
declare unconstitutional and invalid part of its jurisdiction which the h
Security Council, with the Secretary-General’s assent, has asserted to
be part of existing international humanitarian law.” (Blaškić,
IT-95-14, Trial Chamber, Decision on the defence motion to strike
portions of the amended indictment alleging “failure to punish” lihability
of 4 April 1997, para. 8.)
86.3.2. The Tribunal found that in cases where there is no manifest
contradiction between the Statute of the ICTY and the Report of the Sec ‑
retary‑General “the Secretary-General’s Report ought to be taken to pro -
vide an authoritative interpretation of the Statute” (Tadić, IT -94-1,
Appeal Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 295).
86.3.3. The Tribunal is inclined to attach decisive weight to interpreta -
tive declarations made by Security Council members :
“In addressing Article 3 the Appeals Chamber noted that where
interpretative declarations are made by Security Council members
and are not contested by other delegations ‘they can be regarded as
providing an authoritative interpretation’ of the relevant provisions
of the Statute. Importantly, several permanent members of the Secu -
rity Council commented that they interpret ‘when committed in
armed conflict’ in Article 5 of the Statute to mean ‘during a period of
armed conflict’. These statements were not challenged and can thus,h
in line with the Appeals Chamber Decision, be considered authorita -
tive interpretations of this portion of Article5.” (Tadić, IT-94-1, Trial
Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 631.)
1.1. The need for a balanced and critical approach to the jurisprudence of
the ICTY
87. The presented reasons require a balanced and critical approach to
the jurisprudence of the ICTY as regards genocide. Balanced in the senseh
of a clear distinction between factual and legal findings of the Tribuhnal.
1.1.1. Factual findings of the ICTY
88. The factual findings of the Tribunal are a proper point for the
establishment of interconnection between two international jurisdictionsh
which relate to genocide.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1018 18/04/16 08:54 511 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The methodology and techniques of a specialized, criminal judicial
body constitute the basis of the high quality of factual findings of thhe
Tribunal. The Court took cognizance of this, having found in the Bosnian
Genocide case that it “should in principle accept as highly persuasive rel -
evant findings of fact made by the Tribunal at trial” (2007 Judgment,
p. 134, para. 223). The heavy reliance on factual findings of the Tribunal
is, moreover, based on a formal, and not a substantive, criterion. This h
clearly derives from the pronouncement that “the Court cannot treat thhe
findings and determinations of the Trial Chamber as being on an equal h
footing with those of the Appeals Chamber. In cases of disagreement, it h
is bound to accord greater weight to what the Appeals Chamber Judg -
ment says” (Judgment, para. 471). In this sense, the position of the Tribu-
nal as regards claims made by the Prosecutor can also be mentioned. The h
Court stated in a robust way that “as a general proposition the incluhsion
of charges in an indictment cannot be given weight” (2007 Judgment,
p. 132, para. 217). The proposition has been mitigated in the present
Judgment by the qualification that “the fact that the ICTY Prosecuthor
has never included a count of genocide in the indictments in cases relating
to Operation Storm does not automatically mean that Serbia’s counter-h
claim must be dismissed” (Judgment, para. 461).
89. Reliance on ICTY factual findings must have precise limits. It can -
not be considered as a formal verification of factual findings of thhe Tribu-
nal nor as a simple rejection based on formal criteria.
Instead of a formal criterion, a substantive one must be applied with a
view to the proper assessment of the factual finding of the Tribunal ihn
accordance with the standards of judicial reasoning of the Court.
In addition to the general reasons which necessitate such an approach
in the case at hand, of relevance could also be an additional reason whihch
relates to the alleged connection between the institution of proceedings
before the Court by Croatia and the treatment of Croatian citizens before
the Tribunal, as claimed by Professor Zimmermann (CR 2014/14, p. 11).
This claim was ultimately left unanswered by Croatia, nor has it been
answered by the ICTY itself, despite it having been made publicly in theh
Court’s Great Hall of Justice.
1.1.2.Legal findings of the ICTY
90. In contrast to factual findings of the ICTY, the treatment of its
legal findings which relate to genocide needs to be essentially differehnt.
The Court should not allow itself to get into the position of a mere verhi -
fier of legal findings of the Tribunal. For, it would thus seriouslyh jeopar-
dize its judicial integrity and, even, the legality of its actions in thhe disputes
regarding the application of the Genocide Convention.
512
7 CIJ1077.indb 1020 18/04/16 08:54 512 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
A number of cogent considerations necessitate a critical approach to
the legal findings of the Tribunal.
90.1. In dealing with the disputes relating to genocide on the basis of
Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the Court is bound to apply only
the provisions of the Convention as the relevant substantive law. In thaht
regard, the Judgment states expressis verbis :
“since Article IX provides for jurisdiction only with regard to ‘the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, includ -
ing . . . the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the
other acts enumerated in Article III’, the jurisdiction of the Court does
not extend to allegations of violations of the customary international
law on genocide. It is, of course, well established that the Convention
enshrines principles that also form part of customary international
law. Article I provides that ‘[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a
crime under international law’. The Court has also repeatedly stated h
that the Convention embodies principles that are part of customary
international law. That was emphasized by the Court in its 1951 Advi -
sory Opinion . . .
That statement was reaffirmed by the Court in Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp.110-111, para.161).” (Judgment, para.87 ;
emphasis added.)
The position of the ICTY as regards applicable substantive law seems
different.
In its judgment in the Krstić case, which served as the basis for the
Court’s conclusion that genocide was committed in Srebrenica, the Trihal
Chamber stated that it “must interpret Article 4 of the Statute taking into
account the state of customary international law at the time the events in
Srebrenica took place” (Krstić, IT -98-33, Trial Chamber, Judgment,
2 August 2001, para. 541 ; emphasis added).
The Trial Chamber referred to a variety of sources in order to arrive ath
the definition of genocide that it applied :
“The Trial Chamber first referred to the codification work under -
taken by international bodies. The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide . . . whose provisions Article 4
adopts verbatim, constitutes the main reference source in this respect.
Although the Convention was adopted during the same period that
the term ‘genocide’ itself was coined, the Convention has been viehwed
as codifying a norm of international law long recognized and which
case law would soon elevate to the level of a peremptory norm of
general international law (jus cogens). The Trial Chamber has inter -
preted the Convention pursuant to the general rules of interpretation
of treaties laid down in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
513
7 CIJ1077.indb 1022 18/04/16 08:54 513 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
on the Law of Treaties. As a result, the Chamber took into account
the object and purpose of the Convention in addition to the ordinary
meaning of the terms in its provisions. As a supplementary means of
interpretation, the Trial Chamber also consulted the preparatory
work and the circumstances which gave rise to the Convention. Fur -
thermore, the Trial Chamber considered the international case law on
the crime of genocide, in particular, that developed by the ICTR. The
Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Draft
Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind received par-
ticular attention. Although the report was completed in 1996, it is the h
product of several years of reflection by the Commission whose pur -
pose was to codify international law, notably on genocide: it therefore
constitutes a particularly relevant source for interpretation of Arti -
cle 4. The work of other international committees, especially the
reports of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities of the UN Commission on Human Rights,
was also reviewed. Furthermore, the Chamber gave consideration to
the work done in producing the Rome Statute on the establishment
of an international criminal court, specifically, the finalized drafht text
of the elements of crimes completed by the Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court in July 2000. Although that doc-
ument post -dates the acts involved here, it has proved helpful in
assessing the state of customary international law which the Chamber
itself derived from other sources. In this regard, it should be noted
that all the States attending the conference, whether signatories of theh
Rome Statute or not, were eligible to be represented on the Prepara -
tory Commission. From this perspective, the document is a useful key
to theopinio juris of the States. Finally, the Trial Chamber also looked
for guidance in the legislation and practice of States, especially their
judicial interpretations and decisions.” (Krstić, IT-98-33, Trial Cham-
ber, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 541; footnotes omitted.)
90.2. It appears that the fact that Article 4 of the ICTY Statute ad ver‑
batim reproduces Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention does not
automatically mean that the law of genocide as contemplated by the
ICTY Statute is equivalent to the law of genocide established by the Conh -
vention. Article 4 of the Statute is but a provision of the Statute, which is
itself a unilateral act of one of the political organs of the United Nathions.
As such, the provision cannot change its nature simply by reproducing
the text of ArticlesII and III of the Convention, without any renvoi to the
Genocide Convention. Consequently, interpretation of Article 4 of the
Statute on the basis inter alia of the travaux preparatoires of the Conven -
tion, on which the ICTY amply draws, is essentially misleading. It reflhects
the difference in judicial reasoning between the ICJ and the ICTY (see, h
para. 86.3 above).
514
7 CIJ1077.indb 1024 18/04/16 08:54 514 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
90.2.1. The interpretation of relevant provisions of the Convention
can, however, be one thing and the application of these provisions quiteh
another. Thus, the interpretation provided in paragraphs 87 and 88 of the
Judgment appears to be in discrepancy with the positions of the Court inh
the Bosnian Genocide case, which, as the first case alleging acts of geno -
cide dealt with by the International Court of Justice, represents some short
of a judicial parameter in genocide cases before the Court.
In the Bosnian Genocide case, conclusio of the Court that genocide was
committed in Srebrenica was based on the ICTY judgment in the Krstić
case, (2007 Judgment, pp. 163-166, paras. 292-297) which was decided by
the ICTY on the basis of “customary international law at the time theh
events in Srebrenica took place” (Krstić, IT -98-33, Trial Chamber, Judg -
ment, 2 August 2001, para. 541).
91. In connection with “customary law of genocide”, two legal ques -
tions are posed which, due to their specific weight, transcend the quehstion
of customary law of genocide, affecting the very understanding of cus -
tom, as one of the main sources of international law, and the relationshhip
between the Genocide Convention and customary law emerging, or which
could merge, following the adoption of the Convention.
91.1. The ICTY perception of custom as a source of international law
is highly innovative, going well beyond the understanding of custom in
the jurisprudence of the ICJ.
According to the well settled jurisprudence of the ICJ, which follows
the provision of its Statute referring to “international custom, as ehvidence
of a general practice accepted as law” (Art. 38, para. 1 (b)), custom is
designed as a source based on two elements : general practice and opinio
iuri sive necessitatis. As it pointed out in the Nicaragua case : “[b]ound as
it is by Article 38 of its Statute . . . the Court may not disregard the essen‑
tial role played by general practice” (Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 97-98, para. 184; emphasis added).
The jurisprudence of the ICTY generally moves precisely in the oppo-
site direction, giving the predominant role to opinio juris in the determina-
tion of custom (G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc
Tribunals, 2005, p. 13, fn. 4) and, thus, showing a strong inclination
towards the single element conception of custom !
In doing so, it considers opinio juris in a manner far removed from its
determination by the Court. For, in order “to constitute the opinio
juris . . . two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried hout
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendehred
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it” (North Sea Conti ‑
nental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark ; Federal Republic of
515
7 CIJ1077.indb 1026 18/04/16 08:54 515 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 44, para. 77).
Opinio juris cannot be divorced from practice because “[t]he Court must
satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opiniojuris of States is
confirmed by practice” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 98, para. 184).
The ICTY has often satisfied itself with “extremely limited case law”
and State practice (A. Nollkaemper, “The Legitimacy of International
Law in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for -
mer Yugoslavia” in : T. A. J. A. Vandamme and J. H. Reestman (eds.),
Ambiguity in the Rule of Law : The Interface between National and Inter ‑
national Legal Systems, 2001, p. 17).
A large part of law qualified by the ICTY as customary law is based onh
decisions of municipal courts (A. Nollkaemper, “Decisions of National
Courts as Sources of International Law : An Analysis of the Practice of
the ICTY” in G. Boas and W. A. Schabas (eds.), International Criminal
Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY, 2003, p. 282) which are
of a limited scope in the jurisprudence of the Court (H. Thirlway, The
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice : Fifty Years of
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 2013, p. 248). In the case concerning Certain Ger ‑
man Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court stated that
national judicial acts represent “facts which express the will and cohnsti -
tute the activities of States” (Merits, Judgment No. 7, 1926, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 7, p. 19).
91.2. Hidden under the surface of the general characteristic of the
ICTY’s approach to customary law, which is dubious per se, is incoher-
ence and subjectivism. It has been well noted that differently -composed
Chambers of the ICTY have utilized different methods for identifying
and interpreting customary law, even in the same case, including simply h
referring to previous ICTY decisions themselves as evidence of a custom -
ary rule (N. Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International
Law : Methods of Interpreting the Concept of Custom in International
Criminal Tribunals, 2014, p. 117). In addition, the ICTY has failed to con-
sistently and rigorously address the concepts of State practice and
opinio juris by, inter alia, failing to refer to evidence of either, referring
merely to the bulk existence of national legislation as evidencing custohm
without addressing opinio juris or framing policy or “humanity” related
rationales as opinio juris (ibid., p. 118).
92. The establishment of customary law in the ICTY resembles in
many aspects a quasi-customary law exercise based on deductive reason -
ing driven by meta -legal and extra -legal principles. As can be perceived
“many a Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals have been too ready to brand
norms as customary, without giving any reason or citing any authority
for that conclusion” (G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc
Tribunals, 2005, p. 15). This has resulted in judicial law -making through
purposive, adventurous interpretation (M. Swart, “Judicial Law-Making
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1028 18/04/16 08:54 516 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
at the Ad Hoc Tribunals : The Creative Use of Sources of International
Law and ‘Adventurous Interpretation’”, Heidelberg Journal of Interna ‑
tional Law, Vol. 70, 2010, pp. 463-468, 475-478), although, according to
the Secretary-General, on the establishment of the ICTY, the judges of the
Tribunal could apply only those laws that were beyond doubt part of cus-
tomary international law (UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary ‑
General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council resolution 808 (1993),
United Nations doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 34).Being in substantial
conflict with custom, as perceived by the ICJ, the ICTY perception of h
custom, applied in its jurisprudence, opens the way to a fragmentation ohf
international criminal law and, even, general international law (see
G. Mettraux, op. cit., p. 15 citing Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem ‑
ocratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002,
p. 3).
93. It is customary law to which is usually attributed the dynamic
capacity in the development of treaty law, both as regards the scope of h
the established obligation and as regards its content. The question of
modification of the substantive rules of the Convention in the form ofh
custom is, as a rule, a neglected question although it seems to be of
far-reaching importance.
Is custom capable of modifying a rule which belongs to corpus juris
cogentis?
Given the inherent characteristics of customary law, on the one hand,
and legal force of the rules of corpus juris cogentis, on the other, the
answer to this question is necessarily negative.
The other side of the flexibility of custom, as a positive characterishtic
from the aspect of the creation of peremptory norms, is the fact that cuhs -
tomary rules, as a rule, come into existence slowly and painstakingly.
This fact, besides the vagueness and imprecision of custom, is a big hanhd -
icap in relation to an international treaty, in particular at a time of hrapid
and all -embracing changes in the overall set of relations regulated by
international law. In the words of Friedmann, “custom is too clumsy ahnd
slow moving a criterion to accommodate the evolution of international
law in our time” (W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International
Law, 1964, p. 122).
Precisely because of this, the advantages of custom as a source of existh-
ing peremptory norms of general international law represent, at the sameh
time, and in certain cases, also a difficulty, if not an obstacle, to thhe for -
mulation of new peremptory norms or the modification of those already h
in existence.
94. Namely, the very mechanism of the creation of an international
customary rule by way of permanent, continual repetition of certain
behaviour, coupled with the opinio juris, is certainly not in full harmony
with the status enjoyed by the peremptory norm of general international h
law; in particular in relation to consequences inherent in such a norm in
relation to contrary acts undertaken by a State or a group of States. Thhe
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1030 18/04/16 08:54 517 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
customary rule implies certain regularity as a characteristic of particular
forms of behaviour which constitute the being of the material element ofh
custom ; a regularity on the basis of which the subjects of international
law perceive this practice as an expression of the obligatory rule of con -
duct. On the other hand, such regularity should have overall scope, that
is, it must be included, directly or indirectly, in the practice of the hover -
whelming majority of member countries of the international community.
In view of the fact that the custom came into being diffusely, general
practice is achieved through the accumulation of varied individual and
common behaviours and acts (see Special Rapporteur M. Wood, “Second
report on identification of customary international law”, International
Law Commission, doc. A/CN.4/672, 22 May 2014).
However, it follows from the character of a norm of jus cogens that all
acts which are contrary to it are null and void ab initio. In other words,
such practice does not possess legal validity ; therefore it cannot represent
a regular form of the coming into existence of a norm of jus cogens super‑
veniens in the matter which is already covered by the cogent régime.
95. The inherent incapability of custom to modify the existing rule of
jus cogens has been diagnosed in a subtle way by the International Law
Commission. In the commentary to Draft Article 50 (Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), the Commission, having foundh
that “it would be clearly wrong to regard even rules of juscogens as immu -
table and incapable of modification. . .”, concludes that “a modification of
a rule ofjus cogens would today most probably be effected through a general
multilateral treaty. . .(United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
“Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Adopted by hthe
International Law Commission at Its Eighteenth Session”, First and Sehcond
Sessions, Vienna, 26 March-24 May 1968 and 9April-22 May 1969, Official
Records, Documents of the Conference, p.68, para. 4; emphasis added).
Only “instant custom” would possess the proper capacity for modifica -
tion of an existing jus cogens rule, a conception of custom that has not
become part of positive law.
96. The perception of customary law developed by the ICTY is highly
destructive as regards the normative integrity of international law. Beihng
essentially a subjective perception of customary law divorced from its dheeply
rooted structure which derives from the Statute of the Court as part of the
internationalordre public , actually a judicial claim of custom contradictory
not only per se but also in se, it generates diversity in the determination of
customary law, including the rules of juscogens of a customary nature.
97. It can be qualified as the most serious challenge to the construction h
of customary law in the recent history of international law. Reducing
“general practice” to isolated judgments of national courts or, evhen, to
statements in the United Nations Security Council and derivingopinio juris
from these acts, or, going even further, simply asserting that a certainh rule
is of a customary nature, not only contradicts the positive -legal concep -
tion of custom reflected in the jurisprudence of the Court, but also thrivia-l
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1032 18/04/16 08:54 518 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
izes the will of the international community as a whole as the basis of h
obligations in international law, in particular obligations of a customahry
nature. In sum, the ICTY’s perception of customary law as a demonstrah-
tion of judicial fundamentalism would seem to incarnate Lauterpacht’sh
metaphor of custom as a metaphysical joke (H. Lauterpacht, “Sover -
eignty over Submarine Areas”, British Yearbook of International Law,
Vol. 27, 1950, p. 394).
The dangers of the ICTY’s perception of customary law can hardly be
overestimated. The effects of such a perception are not limited to the juhd-i
cial activity of the ICTY and other ad hoc bodies. For a number of rea-
sons, including, inter alia, the inclination to deductive reasoning based on
meta -legal and, even, extra -legal considerations, not even the Court is
immune to such perception.
98. Furthermore, the pronouncement of the Court that a customary
law of genocide existed before the adoption of the Genocide Convention ihs
unclear (see Judgment, paras. 87 and 88). The arguments on which relies
the conclusio of the Court are not excessively persuasive. The arguments of
the Court are basically : (i) that it is “well established that the Convention
enshrines principles that also form part of customary international law”h;
and (ii) that Article I provides that “the Contracting Parties confirm that
genocide . . . is a crime under international law” (Judgment, para. 87).
98.1. As far as the first argument is concerned, it is, in fact, a strong
assertion which lacks precision and proper evidence. In its 1951 Advisory
Opinion, the Court rightly found “denial of the right of existence ofh entire
human groups”, which is genus proximum of genocide, contrary “to moral
law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations” (Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23; emphasis added). It appears
that, in the opinion of the Court, “the principles underlying the Conhven -
tion are principles which are recognized by civilized nations . . .”, in
essence, “most elementary principles of morality” (ibid.).
Apart from the question as to whether there is equivalency between
legal principles stricto sensu and “moral law” or the “most elementary
principles of morality”, it appears that the latter are the guiding phrinciples
for the creation of legal rules on genocide, rather than legal rules perh se.
The term “customary law on genocide” necessarily implies only rulehs or
rules and principles. Principles, no matter how fundamental they can be,h
cannot per se constitute any law whatsoever, including in respect of the
law on genocide. Or, at least, not operational law or law in force.
98.2. The second argument is based on the meaning of the word “con -
firm”. As it is only possible to confirm something that exists, thhe Geno -
cide Convention would express the already constituted law of genocide
or, in a technical sense, it would represent codification of customaryh law
of genocide.
519
7 CIJ1077.indb 1034 18/04/16 08:54 519 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
However, there may be a different interpretation. For, it seems that the h
subject of “confirmation” is something else and not customary law of
genocide.
On 11 December 1946, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
resolution 96 (I) on the Crime of Genocide which, inter alia:
“Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the
civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals
and accomplices — whether private individuals, public officials or
statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial,
political or any other grounds — are punishable” (emphasis added).
The Preamble of the Genocide Convention states, inter alia, that “the
Contracting Parties, having considered the declaration made by the Gen -
eral Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated
11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law”
(emphasis added).
It could be said that the relation between resolution 96 (I) and the
Genocide Convention is the embryo of the two -phase legislative activity
which tractu temporis turned into a model for the creation of general mul -
tilateral treaty regimes in United Nations practice (exempli causa, Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, 13 December 1963 ; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon h
and Other Celestial Bodies 1967 ; General Assembly resolution 217 (III),
A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 ; Interna -
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 ; International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966). In this model,
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted unani -
mously or by the overwhelming majority, declare the general principles
relating to the particular subject, these principles become part of intehrna-
tional public policy, and are finally transformed into binding legal rhules in
the form of general international treaty, thus constituting what has beehn
referred to by Judge Alvarez as “international legislation” (Reservations
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, dissenting opinion
of Judge Alvarez, p. 49).
99. If, arguendo, customary law of genocide existed before the adoption
of the Genocide Convention, it is unclear on what practice, in particulahr
general practice, it was based? The Court did not indicate any evidence of
the corresponding practice before the adoption of the Convention.
Moreover, the question may be posed why the corresponding practice,
if it was constituted, was not respected by the Nuremberg and the Tokyo h
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1036 18/04/16 08:54 520 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Tribunals which were established precisely at the time when that practiche
must have been constituted ?
Does the thesis that customary law of genocide existed before the adop-
tion of the Convention suggest that the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribu-
nals were unaware of/it or did they, perhaps, intentionally ignore it ?
1.2. Compromising effects on the Court’s jurisprudence on genocide
100. Uncritical acceptance of the legal findings of the ICTY, essentially
its verification, could result in compromising the determination of the
relevant rules of the Genocide Convention by the Court.
There exists a reason of an objective nature which produces, or may
produce, a difference between the law of genocide embodied in the Geno -
cide Convention and the law of genocide applied by the ad hoc tribunals.
The law applied by the ICTY as regards the crime of genocide cannot
be considered equivalent to the law of genocide established by the Con -
vention. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the ICTY can be said to beh a
progressive development of the law of genocide enshrined in the Conven -
tion, rather than its actual application. Article 4 of the ICTY Statute is
but a provision of the Statute as a unilateral act of one of the main polit -
ical organs of the fact that it does not contain any renvoi to the Genocide
Convention, the provision cannot change its nature simply by reproduc -
ing the text of Article II of the Convention.
101. It is not surprising therefore that in the jurisprudence of the Court
as regards the law on genocide there exist a discrepancy between the
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention expressing as
a rule the letter of the Convention, and its application based on in toto
acceptance of the ICTY’s decision, that goes in the other direction.
I shall give two examples that concern the crucial provisions of the
Convention.
102. The first example relates to the nature of the destruction of the
protected group.
The Court notes that, in the light of the travaux préparatoires, the
scope of the Convention is limited to the physical and biological destruc -
tion of the group (Judgment, para. 136). The finding is consistently imple-
mented in the Judgment as a whole.
Exempli causa the Court considers that,
“in the context of Article II, and in particular of its chapeau and in
light of the Convention’s object and purpose, the ordinary meaning
of ‘serious’ is that the bodily or mental harm referred to in subphara-
graph (b) of that Article must be such as to contribute to the physi -
cal or biological destruction of the group . . .” (ibid., para. 157, see
also paras. 160, 163).
521
7 CIJ1077.indb 1038 18/04/16 08:54 521 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
103. However, “destruction” as applied by ICTY in the Krstić and
Blagojević cases, is a destruction in social terms rather than in physical
and biological terms.
In the Krstić case the Trial Chamber found, inter alia, that the destruc-
tion of a sizeable number of military aged men “would inevitably resuhlt in
the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebren-
ica” (Krstić, IT -98-33, Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 595), since
“their spouses are unable to remarry and, consequently, to have new chhi-l
dren” (ibid., Appeal Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 28). Such a conclu -
sion, reflects rather the idea of a social destruction, rather than a hphysical
or biological one.
The perception of destruction in social terms is even more emphasized
in the Blagojević case. The Trial Chamber applied “[a] broader notion of
the term ‘destroy’, encompassing also ‘acts which may fall shorht of caus -
ing death’” (Blagojević and Jokić, IT -02-60, Trial Judgment, 17 January
2005, para. 662), an interpretation which does not fit with the under -
standing of destruction in terms of the Genocide Convention. In that
sense, the Trial Chamber finds support in the judgment of the Federal h
Constitutional Court of Germany, which held expressis verbis that
“the statutory definition of genocide defends a supra -individual object
of legal protection, i.e., the social existence of the group [and that] the
intent to destroy the group . . . extends beyond physical and biolog -
ical extermination . . . The text of the law does not therefore compel
the interpretation that the culprit’s intent must be to exterminate
physically at least a substantial number of members of the group.”
(Ibid., para. 664; emphasis and ellipses in original.)
Thus perceived, “the term ‘destruction’, in the genocide defihnition can
encompass the forcible transfer of population” ( ibid., para. 665).
104. The finding contradicts the dictum of the Court that “deportation
or displacement of the members of a group, even effected by force, is noth
necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruch -
tion an automatic consequence of the displacement” (2007 Judgment,
para. 190).
Those findings of the ICTY served as a basis for the conclusio of the
Court that genocide was committed in Srebrenica (ibid., paras. 296-297).
In addition, fortunately, the subjective character of destruction in a
sociological sense is clearly shown precisely by the case of Srebrenica.h
One of the key arguments of the Tribunal in the Krstić case and the
Blagojević case was that “destruction of a sizeable number of military
aged men would inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1040 18/04/16 08:54 522 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica” ( Krstić, IT-98-33, Trial Judg -
ment, 2 August 2001, para. 595).
Life, however, proved the Tribunal’s prediction wrong. Following the
conclusion of the Dayton Agreement, the Muslim community in Srebren -
ica was reconstituted, so that today the number of the members of the
two communities — the Muslim and the Serbian — is equalized. This is
also evidenced by the fact that a representative of the Muslim communityh
was elected Mayor at the last elections.
105. The other example relates to the relevance of customary law on
genocide in disputes before the Court based on Article IX of the Geno -
cide Convention.
In the present Judgment, the Court devoted considerable attention to
the customary law on genocide and made proper conclusions in clear and
unequivocal terms.
The Court stated in strong words that
“[t]hefact that the jurisdiction of the Court in the present proceedings
can be founded only upon Article IX has important implications for
the scope of that jurisdiction. That Article provides for jurisdiction
only with regard to disputes relating to the interpretation, applicationh
or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention, including disputes relating
to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other achts
enumerated in Article III of the Convention.” (Judgment, para. 85.)
The statement is supported by the following reasoning :
“any jurisdiction which the Court possesses is derived from ArticleIX
of the Genocide Convention and is therefore confined to obligations
arising under the Convention itself. Where a treaty states an obligationh
which also exists under customary international law, the treaty obli -
gation and the customary law obligation remain separate and distinct
(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nica ‑
ragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 96, para. 179). Accordingly, unless a treaty discloses a differ-
ent intention, the fact that the treaty embodies a rule of customary
international law will not mean that the compromissory clause of the
treaty enables disputes regarding the customary law obligation to be
brought before the Court. In the case of Article IX of the Genocide
Convention no such intention is discernible. On the contrary, the text
is quite clear that the jurisdiction for which it provides is confined to
disputes regarding the interpretation, application or fulfilment of thhe
Convention, including disputes relating to the responsibility of a Stateh
for genocide or other acts prohibited by the Convention. Article IX
does not afford a basis on which the Court can exercise jurisdiction
over a dispute concerning alleged violation of the customary interna -
tional law obligations regarding genocide.” (Judgment, para. 88.)
523
7 CIJ1077.indb 1042 18/04/16 08:54 523 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
It should be noted that the position of the Court in that regard was
couched in a similar, although more general, way, in the Bosnian Geno‑
cide case.
The Court stated that : “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court in this case is
based solely on Article IX of the Convention” (2007 Judgment, p. 104,
para. 147).
True, the Court continued :
“The jurisdiction of the Court is founded on Article IX of the Con -
vention, and the disputes subject to that jurisdiction are those ‘relhat-
ing to the interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convenhtion,
but it does not follow that the Convention stands alone. In order to
determine whether the Respondent breached its obligation under the
Convention, as claimed by the Applicant, and, if a breach was com -
mitted, to determine its legal consequences, the Court will have
recourse not only to the Convention itself, but also to the rules of
general international law on treaty interpretation and on responsibil-
ity of States for internationally wrongful acts.” (Ibid., p. 105,
para. 149.)
However, it seems clear that the rules of general international law on
treaty interpretation, for its object in concreto, can have only the Geno -
cide Convention itself. These rules, as rules of interpretation of the Con-
vention, cannot introduce through the back door customary law on
genocide as applicable substantive law. As far as the rules on the respohn-
sibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, things seem to be h
equally clear. For, being essentially the secondary rules, the rules on hthe
responsibility of States are “incapable” of modifying the substanche of the
primary rules contained within the Genocide Convention.
106. However, the ICTY’s Judgment in the Krstić case was based, as
the Tribunal stated expressis verbis, on “customary international law at
the time the events in Srebrenica took place” (Krstić, IT -98-33, Trial
Chamber, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 541).
It appears that the Court, having found that it “sees no reason to dihs -
agree with the concordant findings of the Trial Chamber and the Appealhs
Chamber” (2007 Judgment, p. 166, para. 296) in the Krstić and the
Blagojević cases, has, in light of its pronouncement in paragraphs 87 and
88 of the Judgment, exceeded its jurisdiction, since Article IX confers
jurisdiction only with respect to the “interpretation, application or fulfil -
ment of the Convention . . . [and] the jurisdiction of the Court does not
extend to allegations of violation of the customary international law on
genocide” (Judgment, para. 87 ; emphasis added) so that “Article IX does
not afford a basis on which the Court can exercise jurisdiction over a dis ‑
pute concerning alleged violation of the customary international law obl▯iga ‑
tions regarding genocide” (ibid., para. 88; emphasis added).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1044 18/04/16 08:54 524 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
2. Was Genocide Committed in Croatia ?
107. The essence of the crime of genocide lies in destruction, in whole
or in part, of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.
108. A genocidal act can exist only under conditions defined by the
body of law established by the Convention. Acts enumerated in Article II,
in subparagraphs (a) to (e), are not genocidal acts in themselves, but
only the physical or material expression of specific, genocidal intenth. In
the absence of a direct nexus with genocidal intent, acts enumerated in
Article II of the Convention are simply punishable acts falling within the
purview of other crimes, exempli causa war crimes or crimes against
humanity.
109. Genocide as a distinct crime is characterized by the subjective ele -
ment — intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial and religious group
as such — an element which represents the differentia specifica distin -
guishing genocide from other international crimes with which it shares
substantially the same objective element 41. In the absence of that intent,
whatever the degree of atrocity of an act and however similar it might bhe
to the acts referred to in the Convention, that act can still not be calhled
genocide. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I,
Sixth Committee, 69th meeting.)
110. It appears that four elements are distinguishable within genocidal
intent: (a) the degree of the intent ; (b) destruction ; (c) a national, eth-
nical, racial or religious group ; (d) in whole or in part. Although sepa -
rate, the four elements make up a legal whole characterizing in their
cumulative effect, genocidal intent as the subjective element of the crimhe
of genocide. The absence of any of them disqualifies the intent from bheing
genocidal in nature. As a legal unity, these elements, taken in corpore,
demonstrate that genocidal intent is not merely something added to phys -
ical acts capable of destroying a group of people. It is an integral, pehrme-
ating quality of these acts taken individually, a quality that transforms
them from simple punishable acts into genocidal acts. In other words,
such intent is a qualitative feature of genocide distinguishing it from hall
other crimes, indeed its constituent element stricto sensu.
The ICTR followed the same pattern of reasoning as that described
above.
In the Kanyarukiga case, the Trial Chamber stated, inter alia, that
“[t]o support a conviction for genocide, the bodily or mental harm
inflicted on members of a protected group must be of such a serious
nature as to threaten the destruction of the group in whole or in part”h
(Kanyarukiga, ICTR-02-78-T, Trial Judgment, 1 November 2010,
p. 158, para. 637 ; see also Ndahimana, ICTR-01-68-T, Trial Judg -
ment, 30 December 2011, p. 173, para. 805).
525
7 CIJ1077.indb 1046 18/04/16 08:55 525 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
111. In the case at hand, so called quantitative criteria in terms of the
sheer size of the group and its homogenous numerical composition seems
applicable, since no Party adduced evidence suggesting application of thhe
qualitative criteria contemplating the destruction of the elite of the lhead-r
ship of the group.
As a rule, the quantitative criteria is presented in the form of a “shub -
stantial” part which means “a large majority of the group in questhion”
(Jelisić, IT-95-10, Trial Judgment, 14 December 1999, p. 26, para. 82).
The ICTY emphasizes that :
“The numeric size of the targeted part of the group is the necessary h
and important starting-point. The number of individuals targeted
should be evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation
to the overall size of the entire group.” (Krstić, IT-98-33-A, Appeal
Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 12 ; see also,Brđanin, IT-99-36-T,
Trial Judgment, 1 September 2004, para. 702 Tolomir, IT-05-88/2-T,
Trial Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 749 Blagojević and Jokić,
IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 668.)
112. Croatia claims that there were over 12,500 victims killed
(CR 2014/6, p. 45, para. 13). It should be noted that evidence concerning
ethnic structure of victims as well as numbers of victims killed in the
capacity of members of military units in military operations is lacking.
Having in mind the object of destruction that characterizes the crime ofh
genocide, its specific collective character, such evidence would be ofh cru-
cial importance. The genocide is directed against a number of individuals
as a group or at them in their collective capacity not ad personam as such.
The International Law Commission stated that :
“The prohibited (genocidal) act must be committed against an indi-
vidual because of his membership in a particular group and as an
incremental step in the overall objective of destroying the group . . .
the intention must be to destroy the group ‘as such’, meaning as ah
separate and distinct entity, and not merely some individuals because
of their membership in a particular group.” (Official Records of the
General Assembly, Fifty -First Session, Supplement No. 10, United
Nations doc. A/51/10/1556, p. 88.)
112.1. Even if, arguendo qua non, all the victims concerned were killed
because of the membership in the Croat national or ethnic group, the
number of 12,500 victims could hardly represent a “substantial part” of
the Croat national and ethnic group. In the relevant period, according tho
the data from the census in Croatia in 1991, there 3,736,356 persons of
Croatian nationality (http://bs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popis_stanovni%C5%
A1tva_u_Hrvatskoj_1991).
112.2. Of relevance as regards the element of dolus specialis is the fact
that the Chief of Staff of the First Military Region, operating in Vukovahr
526
7 CIJ1077.indb 1048 18/04/16 08:55 526 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
and, generally, Eastern Slavonia, was General Andrije Silić, a Croat (later
appointed as the Inspector-General of the armed forces, JNA) (http://
www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/79367 -popis-generala-jna-iz-hrvatske-
samo -sedam-ih-se-pridruzilo-hv-u.html).
112.3. General Anton Tus, Croat, was Head of the Yugoslavian air
force during the battle for Vukovar. As The Croatian Weekly for Culture,
Science and Social Issues wrote he “just twenty days before the fall of
Vukovar has changed the way” and was promoted to the First Chief of
the General Staff of the Croatian armed forces (http://www.hrvatsk-ifokus.
hr/index.php/hrvatska/3812 -anton-tus-sada-popuje -a-samo-20-dana-
prije-pada-vukovara-odabrao-je-stranu).
It should be born in mind that in the Croatian armed formations were
between ten and twenty thousand Serbs (http://www.jutarnji.hr/davor -
butkovic --i-srbi-su-branili-hrvatsku/901195/).
113. Serbia, for its part, claims that :
(i) the overall number of Serbs victims is 6,381 (Counter -Memorial,
Anns., Vol. V, Ann. 66, List of Serbs victims on the territory of Cro -
atia 1990 -1998; Statement of witness -expert Savo Strbac (4.2.2.);
Updated list of Serb victims, publicly available on the website of
D.I.C. Veritas (http://www.veritas.org.rs/srpske -zrtve-rata-i-poraca-
na -podrucju-hrvatske-i-bivse-rsk-1990-1998-godine/spisak-nestalih/);
(ii) victims killed during and after “Operation Storm”: 1,719 (CR2014/13,
p. 15, para. 16, (Obradović) referring to the Veritas publicly available
list of the victims of Operation Storm (http://www.veritas.org.rs/
wp -content/uploads/2014/02/Oluja-direktne-zrtve-rev2014.pdf).
According to the data from the census in Croatia in 1991, on its terri -
tory there lived 581,663 persons of the Serbian national and ethnic group.
It appears that the number of individuals killed in relation to the actuhal
size of the Serbian national and ethnic group in Croatia, does not satishfy
the “substantial part” standard.
As regards “Operation Storm” it seems to be rather “ethnic cleansing”
than genocide in terms of the Genocide Convention.
As stated by the Court in the Bosnian Genocide case:
“Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area ‘ethhn-i
cally homogenous’, nor the operations that may be carried out
to implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide :
the intent that characterizes genocide is ‘to destroy, in whole or
in part’ a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the
members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily
equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruction
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1050 18/04/16 08:55 527 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
an automatic consequence of the displacement.” (2007 Judgment,
p. 123, para. 190.)
114. In conclusion, it seems indisputable that terrible atrocities and
crimes were committed by both sides in the tragic civil war in Croatia, h
but, in the light of the relevant rules of the Genocide Convention, theyh
cannot be characterized as the crime of genocide. They rather fall withihn
the purview of war crimes or crimes against humanity as evidenced,
interalia, by the jurisprudence of the ICTY.
3. Issue of Incitement to Genocide
115. The matter on which I respectfully disagree concerns incitement
to genocide. In my opinion, the relationship of the regime of President h
Tudjman to the Ustasha ideology and the legacy of the Nezavisna Državha
Hrvatska (NDH), followed by numerous acts and omissions, justifies
finding that direct and implicit incitement to genocide was committed h
(Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 557).
3.1. Issue of incitement to genocide as inchoate crime
3.2. Incitement in terms of Article III (c) of the Convention
116. Under the Convention, direct and public incitement is defined as
a specific punishable act by Article III (c). With respect to such punish -
able act, three elements are of relevance : incitement, direct and public.
117. In common law systems, incitement is defined as encouraging or
persuading another to commit an offence (A. Ashworth, Principles of
Criminal Law, 1995, p. 462). Threats and other forms of pressure also
constitute a form of incitement (ibid.). Civil law systems regard public
and direct incitement in the following terms :
“Anyone, who whether through speeches, shouting or threats uttered
in public places or at public gatherings or through the sale or dissemi-
nation, offer for sale or display of written material, printed matter,
drawings, sketches, paintings, emblems, images or any other written or
spoken medium or image in public places or at public gatherings, or
through the public display of placards or posters, or through any other
means of audio -visual communication, having directly provoked the
perpetrators(s) to commit a crime or misdemeanour, shall be punished
as an accomplice to such a crime or misdemeanour.” (French Penal
Code, Law No. 72-546 of 1 July 1972 and Law No. 85-1317 of
13 December 1985 (unofficial translation) cited in Akayesu, ICTR-96-
4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 555, fn. 124.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1052 18/04/16 08:55 528 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
118. In the draft Genocide Convention formulated by the Ad hoc
Committee, public incitement is defined as incitement in the shape of
“‘public speeches or . . . the press . . . the radio, the cinema or other
ways of reaching the public’ while incitement was considered private h
when ‘conducted through conversations, private meetings or mes -
sages’” (Commentary on Articles Adopted by the Committee, United h
Nations doc. E/AC 25W.I, 27 April 1948, p. 2).
The International Law Commission characterized incitement as public
where it is directed at “a number of individuals in a public place or to
members of the general public at large by such means as the mass media, h
for example radio or television” (ibid.).
Only public incitement has been interpreted by the international courts h
as being an inchoate offence. Public incitement is dangerous because it
“leads to the creation of an atmosphere of hatred and xenophobia and h
entails the exertion of influence on people’s minds” (W. K. Timmermann,
“Incitement in International Criminal Law”, International Review of the
Red Cross, Vol. 88, December 2006, p. 825).
In the jurisprudence of the ICTR, reference has repeatedly been made
to the creation of the particular state of mind in the audience that wouhld
induce its members to commit genocidal acts.
119. Direct incitement seems to have been defined in the Akayesu case.
The tribunal noted that direct implies : “that the incitement assume a
direct form and specifically provoke another to engage in a criminal ahct,
and that more than mere vague and indirect suggestion goes to constituteh
direct incitement” (Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 September
1998, para. 557). And, further that
“the direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of iths
cultural and linguistic content . . . The Chamber further recalls that
incitement may be direct, and nonetheless implicit. Thus, at the time
the Convention on Genocide was being drafted, the Polish delegate
observed that it was sufficient to play skilfully on mob psychology by h
casting suspicion on certain groups, by insinuating that they were
responsible for economic or other difficulties in order to create an
atmosphere favourable to the perpetration of the crime.” (Ibid.)
In determining whether certain statements are likely to incite genocide,h
the context is extremely important. The ICTR stated, inter alia, that
“the meaning of a message can be intrinsically linked to the context h
in which it [sic] is formulated. In the opinion of the Appeals Cham -
ber, the Trial Chamber was correct in concluding that it was appro -
priate to consider the potential impact in context — notably, how the
message would be understood by its intended audience — in deter -
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1054 18/04/16 08:55 529 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
mining whether it constituted direct and public incitement to commit
genocide.” (Nahimana et al., ICTR -99-52-A, Appeal Judgment,
28 November 2007, para. 711.)
The principal consideration is the meaning of the word use in the spe -
cific context:
“It does not matter that the message may appear ambiguous to
another audience or in another context. On the other hand, if the
discourse is still ambiguous even when considered in its context, it
cannot be found beyond reasonable doubt to constitute direct and
public incitement to commit genocide.” ( Ibid., para. 701.)
There is, of course, a difference where such statements are made by
official: “these will be more likely in actual fact to promote genocide
than similar statements made by individuals who do not command the
same degree of authority . . . Furthermore, such statements may provide
evidence of an actual desire to promote genocide.” (T. Mendel, Study on
International Standards relating to Incitement to Genocide or Racial
Hatred, for the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide, April 2006, pp. 64-65.)
3.3. Ustasha ideology as a genocidal one
120. Two special features characterize the Ustasha ideology in this
particular context. Primo, the teaching about the ethnic descent of the
Croats and, secundo, the perception of Croatia as a State. In the ideology
of the Ustasha movement these two features are organically, inseparably
linked.
121. In contrast to the teaching about the Slavic origin of the Croats,
advocated by progressive Croatian intellectuals and politicians at the
beginning of the nineteenth century (see e.g., A. Trumbić, Hrvatska
seljačka stranka (Croatian Peasant Party)), the proponents of the Ustasha
ideology maintained that the Croats were of Aryan descent.
As observed by the well -known Croatian historian Nevenko Bartulin,
Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Split, in his doctoral dissertha -
tion entitled “The ideology of nation and race : the Croatian Ustasha
regime and its policies toward minorities in the Independent State of Crho -
atia, 1941-1945”, defended at the University of New South Wales (2006),
the Ustasha teaching about the Croatian ethnicity was decisively influh -
enced by I. von Suedland (1874-1933) and by Professor Milan Sufflay
(1879-1931).
Suedland, which is, in fact, the assumed name of the Croatian historian h
and sociologist Ivo Pilar, taught that
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1056 18/04/16 08:55 530 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
“the Croats had preserved the ‘Nordic-Aryan’ heritage of their Slavic
ancestors far more than the Serbs, who had interbred, to a large
degree, with the Balkan-Romanic Vlachs. . . The Serbs. . . had appar -
ently inherited their predominant physical features of black hair, dark h
eyes and dark skin from the Vlachs and Pilar thought that these traits
were, in turn, probably the result of Vlach admixture with Gypsies.” h
(N. Bartulin, op. cit., pp. 176-177.)
Physiognomic differences between the Croats and the Serbs are accom -
panied, according to Pilar, by the essential differences in the social rohle of
these two peoples. He considers
“the Vlachs, as the core of the Serbian people, to be detriment to the
social harmony and progress of States in which they lived. They were
a race of destructive pastoral nomads and bandits . . . that the Serbs
were accomplished traders . . . In contrast, the Croats were charac -
terized by the values and virtues of their nobility, which was the only h
hereditary aristocracy in the Balkans . . .” (Ibid., pp. 177-178; empha-
sis added.)
Such a qualification is further extended to the present -day Greeks
whom he sees as “the descendants of Slavs and Albanians” and, as shuch,
“worthless people of mixed bloods ‘who didn’t have the materialh and
moral strength’ — to inherit the mantle of successor to the Roman
Empire” (ibid., p. 178).
It seems that Sufflay was primarily concerned with vindicating chauvin -
ism, which necessarily derives from the teaching about the Croats as a
superior Aryan race. Croatian nationalism, according to him, is abso -
lutely positive because it possesses “higher ethical motives, namely,
defence of Western civilization” (M. Sufflay, Characteristics of the Croa ‑
tian Nation and Croatia in the Light of World History and Politics : Twelve
Essays, reprint, Nova hrvatska povjesnica, Zagreb, 1999, pp. 40-41). As
such, it is not a local nationalism, but rather a “loyal service to thhe White
West” (ibid.).
122. The teaching about the Aryan descent of Croats, their racial super-
iority, necessarily bore upon the Ustasha concept of the Croatian State.
The leader of the Ustasha movement, Ante Pavelić, in the document enti -
tled “The Principles of the Ustasha Movement”, published in 1933, hmen-
tioned 17 principles which “became the dogma for Ustasha members . . .
and form the core around which the legal -constitutional system (if one
could call it that) of the Independent State of Croatia would be based”h
(N. Bartulin, op. cit., p. 164).
A certain number of these principles are of special relevance. The firhst
principle is that “the Croatian nation is a self -contained ethnic unit, it is
a nation in its own right and from an ethnic perspective is not identicahl
with any other nation nor is it a part of, or a tribe of, any other natihon”.
The seventh principle states that the Croats maintained their State
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1058 18/04/16 08:55 531 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
throughout the centuries up until the end of the First World War and
that they therefore have the right to “restore their own Croatian Stahte on
their whole ethnic and historic territory” with the right to use all hmethods
(principle 8).
Principle 11 says that “no one who is not by descent and blood a mem -
ber of the Croatian nation can decide on Croatian State and national
matters”. Principle 14, on the other hand, provides that an individual has
no specific rights as he/she only counts as a part of the whole, meanihng
“nation and State” (see VictorNovak, Magnum crimen, 2011, pp.723-724).
The Croatian State, according to Pavelić, ought to be based on the
theory of historic statehood, while denying the right of peoples to
self-determination. At the meeting of the HSP youth of September 1928
held in Zagreb, Pavelić explicitly pointed out that the Croats do noth need
President Wilson’s right to self-determination because “we have our his -
toric State right and according to that right we seek that Croatia becomhes
free” (Jareb, Political Recollections and Work of Dr. Branimir Jelić, Cleve-
land, Mirko Samija, 1982, p. 251; N. Bartulin, op. cit., pp. 165-166). The
theory of the historic State right, as the basis of independent Croatia,h
gave rise to Ustasha-oriented lawyers viewing the State as a notion which
consists of “the territory, the nation and State right” (for examhple, Pro -
fessor Fran Milobar, Jareb, op. cit., p. 253; N. Bartulin, op. cit., p. 156).
The meaning of the historical right title is that the Croats “had exchlu -
sive rights to the territory that encompassed the NDH, despite the size-
able number of non -Croats on this territory” (ibid., p. 275).
123. As far as internal organization is concerned, independent Croatia,
in the Ustasha ideological vision, ought to be founded on the “Fühh -
rerprinzip”, because “all authorities in the NDH were answerable tho the
‘Poglavnik’, while he answered only to ‘history and his own conscience’”
(ibid., p. 279; Slaven Pavlić, “Tko je tko in NDH” (“Who’s Who in the
Independent State of Croatia”), Hrvatska 1941‑1945, Zagreb, Minerva,
1997, p. 477). The reception of the model of government of Nazi Ger -
many was explained as being due to the deficiencies of the democratic h
principle which “almost ruined the world by abolishing the distinctiohn
between good and evil, in other words, democracy was held responsible
for moral relativization” (D. Zanko, “Etička osnova ustaštva” (“The eth-
nic basis of the Ustasha ideology”), Ustaški godišnjak 1943 (Ustasha
Yearbook 1943) , p. 187).
124. It seems clear that the Croatian State, based on the Ustasha ideo-
logy, rested on the logic of genocide. It was a copied Nazi ideology
ratione loci limited to parts of the then Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
Only on the basis of a genocidal paradigm was it possible for the Usta -
sha ideology to create an ethnically clean State of superior Aryan peoplhe,
with the Serbs and the Jews who lived in the same space being regarded
as socially destructive and a “detriment to the social harmony and prog -
532
7 CIJ1077.indb 1060 18/04/16 08:55 532 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
ress of States in which they lived”. Without that paradigm, the creathion of
an Ustasha Croatian State was simply not possible :
“The Ustasha genocide was underlined by two principal aims. One
was to establish a Croatian nation -State for the first time in modern
history, and secondly, to simultaneously ‘remove the ethnic, racial
and religious minorities that the Ustashe considered both alien and a
threat to the organic unity of the Croatian nation’.” (N. Bartulin,
op. cit., p. 11.)
These two aims are not only organically linked, but, moreover, the reali -
zation of the first aim necessarily implies the removal of national grhoups
which do not fit in the matrix of the Aryan Croatian nation. If the
non-Croatian ethnic and religious groups are “both alien and a threat to h
the organic unity of the Croatian nation” why should they at all be phre -
served? (in other words, the obliteration of such groups can be inferred
from the very essence of the Ustasha ideology). As far as the Serbs areh
concerned, genocidal logic was explained. As academician Viktor Novak,
a leading Croatian historian after the Second World War noted, the main h
Ustasha ideologist and No. 2 of the Independent State of Croatia,
Mile Budak, set out, at the big assembly in Gospić, the genocidal formula h
in the following words : “We will kill one part of the Serbs, will dislocate
the other part and will convert the rest into Catholic religion and thush
have them assimilated into the Croats” (quoted by Viktor Novak,
Magnum Crimen, Gambit, Jagodina, 2011, pp. 786-787).
The Ustasha ideology is, in its substance, a genocidal plan to destroy
the Serb national group in Croatia and parts of the territory of the Kinhg-
dom of Yugoslavia, which, in the Ustasha perception, constitute parts of
Greater Croatia.
3.4. The establishment of the NDH — the Ustasha ideology becomes State
policy
125. The Ustasha State, the so -called Independent State of Croatia,
was formally proclaimed in Zagreb on 10 April 1941 in Pavelićs name
and by the “will of our ally” (i.e., Germany) comprised territorhies of his-
toric Croatia with Međumurje, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herze -
govina and the big part of Vojvodina (Fikreta Jelić -Butić, Ustaše i
Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941‑1945 (Ustasha and the Independent State
of Croatia), Sveučilišna naklada Liber, Zagreb, 1977, p. 67).
126. Following the proclamation of the NDH a number of measures
were taken with a view to the realization of the Ustasha ideology in rela -
tion to Serbs, Jews and Roma. These measures can be divided into two
groups. One group of measures comprised legislative measures, whereas
the other group were institutional measures, meaning the creation of
structures for their implementation. These two kinds of interrelated meah-
sures were supposed to create a “clean Croatian State space” that hwas to
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1062 18/04/16 08:55 533 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
enable the existence of a “clean Croatian nation”. The vital condihtion for
achieving thisaim was the “extermination” primarily of Serbs and Jews
who were declared “the greatest enemies of the Croatian people”, chonse-
quently “there is no place for them in Croatia” (Fikreta Jelić -Butić,
op. cit., p. 158).
127. The establishment of concentration camps took place in two
phases.
In the first phase the so-called “reception camps” were established, i.e.,
places of temporary stay of the arrested, mainly Serbs, from which they h
were deported to concentration camps (ibid., p. 185). The arrested per -
sons, as formulated in the “Legal provision on the sending of objectihon -
able and dangerous persons to forcible stay in reception camps and
forced-labour camps”, were “objectionable persons who were a threat to
the public order and security or persons which could endanger peace and h
calm of the Croatian people or the achievements of the liberation struggle
of the Croatian Ustasha Movement” (Narodne novine, 26 November
1941).
The second phase was the setting up of concentration camps or death
camps. There were a considerable number of death camps in Ustasha
Croatia (Mirko Veršen, Ustasha Camps, Zagreb, 1966, pp. 29-36). The
establishment of these camps took place soon after the proclamation of
the NDH and, in fact, they were the first concentration camps in Europhe,
set up before the concentration camps in Nazi Germany.
128. The accurate number of killed persons in these camps has not been
established. The reason for this was by and large the lack of will on thhe part
of the authorities after the end of the Second World War to establish prhecisely
and to make known the number of perished people and thus avoid triggering
inter-ethnic differences and frictions. The slogan “Brotherhood and Unity”h
of “Yugoslav” peoples proclaimed and strictly adhered to by JB.. Tito, who
saw it as the condition of the survival of Yugoslavia — quite rightly as it
turned out — was not to be impaired in any way whatsoever.
However, it seems indisputable that several hundred thousands of peo -
ple were killed in Jasenovac. According to the data of the Croatian
Regional Commission for the establishment of crimes committed by the
occupiers and their helpers, it is reckoned that the number of victims
ranges between 500,000 -600,000 (Fikreta Jelić-Butić, op. cit., p. 187).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, in the article entitled “Fascism”, statehs that the
Croatian fascists in the German puppet state of Croatia, “in a campaign
of genocide, killed about 250,000 Serbs in Croatia and 40,000 Jews”
(http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/202210/fascism/219386/
Sexism -and-misogyny).
A number of sources assert that 600,000 people, including Serbs (the
overwhelming majority), Jews and Roma were murdered at Jasenovac
(http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/othercamps/jasenovac.html ;
Jasenovac : Proceedings of the First International Conference and Exhibit
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1064 18/04/16 08:55 534 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
on the Jasenovac Concentration Camps , 29-31 October 1997, Kingsbor -
ough Community College of the City University of New York, Dallas
Publishing, p. 20 ; Robert Rozett and Shmuel Spector, Encyclopedia of
the Holocaust, p. 280; http://www.museumoffamilyhistory.com/ce/cc/
nf-camps-jasenovac-01.htm ; Padraic Kenney, The Burdens of Freedom:
Eastern Europe since 1989, p. 94; http://www.balkanstudies.org/blog/
holocaust-deniers-us-state-department; David Birnbaum, Jews, Church
and Civilization, Vol. VI; https://books.google.rs/books?id=SDW5owdrH
bIC&pg=PA165&lpg=PA165&dq=Jasenovac+600+000+murdered&sour
ce=bl&ots=3vliR5EeiO&sig=Bco48GL6ePjbfwpmFSn7k6eZb9g&hl=en
&sa=X&ei=Mo3VZbMLajhywOh5oGAAQ&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAjgU#v
=onepage&q=Jasenovac%20600%20000%20murdered&f=fal;sehttp://www .
ag-friedensforschung.de/regionen/jugoslawien/jasenovac.html ; http:// www.
holocaustchronicle.org/staticpages/414.html).
On the occasion of the International Day of Holocaust Remembrance,
the Croatian Parliament held a meeting which included a programme
suited to the occasion on 27 January 2014. In addition, to a good number
of officials and public figures, the commemoration was also attended hby
representatives of religious communities, as well as by the Croatian Prehs-
dent Ivo Josipović and Prime Minister Zoran Milanović who, in addition
to the Speaker of Parliament, Josip Leko, also delivered a speech :
“In his speech, Prime Minister Zoran Milanović observed that this h
should be an opportunity for political speeches rather than commem-
orative ones ‘in a low sense of the word’, because what happened
70 years ago is an everlasting story about the fight between good and
evil, between a moral individual and an immoral society. He reminded
those present of the fact that antiSemitism did not appear overnight ;
that everything that was said about the Jews before the Holocaust
could be considered as hatred speech.
He also recalled the fact that horrible things had happened in
Croatia in 1941, not only to the Jews but also to the Serbs before
them.
Until April 1941 there were no mass executions in Europe on
account of different religious belief or racial origins. This situation
changed in April of that year following the establishment of the Inde-
pendent State of Croatia in which, within a few weeks, mass killings
of people of different religions and nationalities began. The mass exe-
cutions of Serbs started first and were soon followed by the killings
of Jews. It was only at the end of June 1941 that mass executions
started in East Europe, primarily the executions of Jews. That was
not yet the time of concentration camps. That was a time of mass
killings with firearms which, as it soon turned out, could not satisfyh
the high technological standards of the executioners. We all know what
followed soon after.”
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1066 18/04/16 08:55 535 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
In his speech, the Speaker of the Parliament of Croatia, Josip Leko,
pointed out that :
“One could say that Nazi brutalities began already in the first dayhs
of Hitler’s dictatorship and continued twelve full years ; however, the
real proportions of that unprecedented, planned in detail, and system-
atically carried out policy of annihilation became visible only at the
end of the SecondWorld War following the access of the Allied troops
to the ‘death factories’, the largest of which was the concentratihon
camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau. One of these frightening pages of the
past, the darkest, most inhumane pages of the past, is the death camp
of Jasenovac created on the model of the notorious Nazi concentra -
tion camps.”
3.5. President Tudjman’s Croatia and the legacy of the NDH
129. In the construction of Croatia, the legacy of the NDH could not
be left aside because that legacy, as was repeatedly pointed out in unishon
and almost ritually, is a part of the “thousand -year-old national indepen-
dence and the existence of the State of the Croatian people”. Moreovehr,
although by its emergence and nature, it was a puppet State, Pavelić’s
NDH was in effect the first Croatian State since the year 1102, when the
medieval Croatian State came under the rule of Hungary.
It appears that strong elements of the legacy of the NDH were not
alien to the Croatian State in the period 1990 -1995.
130. President Tudjman clearly determined his perception of the Croa -
tian State. His statements are of special importance because he was the h
unquestionable political authority during his lifetime. He was regarded has
“the Messiah of the Croatian people”. Misha Glenny notes that Tudj -
man, at his inauguration as the President, was introduced with these
words: “On this day (Palm Sunday) Christ triumphant came to Jerusa -
lem. He was greeted as a messiah. Today our capital is the new Jerusalemh.
Franjo Tudjman has come to his people.” (M. Glenny, The Fall of Yugo‑
slavia, 1992.)
For Tudjman, the Croatian State implies an ethnic State based on his -
torical right. In that regard, even genocide in history had some positivhe
consequences, such as
“[bringing] about ethnic homogenization of some peoples, leading to
more harmony in the national composition of the population and
State borders of individual countries, thus also having possible posi -
tive impact on developments in the future, in the sense of fewer rea -
sons of fresh violence and pretexts for the outbreak of new conflicts
and international friction” (F. Tudjman, Wastelands in Historical
Reality, Nakladni Zavod Matiće Hrvatska, Zagreb, p. 163).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1068 18/04/16 08:55 536 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Hence, even Ustasha Croatia was “not only a quisling organization
and a fascist crime, but was also an expression of the Croatian nation’hs
historic desire for an independent homeland” (Z. Silber and A. Little,
Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation , 1997, pp. 82-87). The last American
Ambassador to the SFRY, Warren Zimmermann, portrayed Presi -
dent Tudjman’s relations with Serbs in the following way :
“Mike Einik and I raised with him or his aides every piece of infor-
mation that came to us about abuses of the civil rights of Serbs, in
hopes that his Government would crack down on the offences and
bring the offenders to book. With a few individual exceptions, he was
unresponsive. I urged him to visit Jasenovac, the notorious
World War II Croatian concentration camp where tens of thousands
of Serbs and other [victims] had perished, as Willy Brandt had gone
to Yad Vashem in Israel in an act of contrition for the Holocaust. He
refused . . .
But toward Croatia’s Serbian population he rejected any gesture
that smacked of reconciliation, co-operation, or healing . . .
Tudjman always seemed to me on the brink of becoming a slightly
ridiculous operetta figure. But this impression was contradicted by
the ruthlessness with which he pursued Croatian interests as he saw
them.” (W. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe : Yugoslavia and
Its Destroyers — America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened
and Why , 1996, pp. 76-77.)
130.1. The meaning of President Tudjman’s policy did not go unno -
ticed. The American expert in geopolitics, Samuel Huntington, also
warned that the Ustasha acts of violence were the key factor which
prompted the reaction of the Serbian minority and thus predetermined
the course of events during the disintegration of the SFRY. “The conflhicts
between Serbs and Croats, for example, cannot be attributed to demogra -
phy, but only partly to history, because these nations lived relatively h
peacefully, one beside the other, until the Croatian Ustasha killed Serbhs
in the Second World War”, says Huntington. The relationship character -
ized by a lack of tolerance towards Serbs enjoyed at that time the suppohrt
of an important ally of the Ustasha NDH — Nazi Germany. During the
meeting between Ante Pavelić and Adolf Hitler, in connection with the
“Serbian question”, Hitler pronounced a sentence which was probablhy
prepared in advance and, hence, particularly stressed : “If the Croatian
State desires to be really strong, it will have to pursue nationally intholer
ant policy for 50 years, because excessive tolerance in these questions
causes only damage.” (S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 1996,
p. 261.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1070 18/04/16 08:55 537 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
130.2. The attention was brought to all these facts in 2009 by the Slo -
vene State Council, the other Chamber of the Slovene Parliament, which
even adopted a separate statement in connection with the cherishing of
the attainments of the NDH in the neighbouring country, which pro -
voked numerous strong reactions. Namely, in the course of the debate
concerning the ratification of the accession of Croatia to the NATO Alhli-
ance, the Slovene State Council adopted, at its 13th meeting, a statement
to the effect that Croatia should be aware of responsibility for the resphect
for the basic values expected of NATO membership. As an aggravating
circumstance for the accession to NATO membership, the neighbouring
country was reproached for “the attitude of Croatia towards NDH tradih -
tion”, in view of the fact that “the NDH is to this day a constituhtive part
of the Croatian national conscience” (“Hrvaška : Gre za škandalozno
obtozbo”, 24ur, 24 January 2009, dostupno preko : http://www.24ur.com/
novice/svet/hrvaska -gre-za-skandalozno-obtozbo.html).
130.3. The mayor of Split, the largest city in Dalmatia, reacted in con -
nection with the meeting organized in Split on 11 January 2014 by the
second-largest political party in Croatia, the HDZ (Croatian Democratic
Union), founded by President Tudjman, on the occasion of the celebra -
tion of its 24th anniversary.
Mayor Baldasar, inter alia, says:
“The messages uttered in Split take us, as a society, several steps
back and do not contribute in any way whatsoever to constructive
solutions aimed at a better present and a better future of citizens who h
are preoccupied with quite concrete problems ; problems for which
not a single solution has been offered by Mr. Karamarko and others.
The Ustasha greetings at public gatherings, hatred speech and manip -
ulation of historical facts do not reflect patriotism nor care for theh
well-being of Croatia and its citizens. Therefore, I wish that the
Split HDZ, as well as the HDZ as a whole, celebrate the next anni -
versary in a more dignified and more decent way befitting to a polith-
ical party calling itself democratic.” (http://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/
hrvatska/111419 -baldasar -porucio -hadezeovcima -iduci -put-k,
12 January 2014.)
131. Special value in that regard possesses statements of high officials
and leading politicians in Croatia as regards President Tudjman’s polhicy
(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara ‑
gua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986,
p. 41, paras. 64-65, p. 43, para. 70, and p. 47, para. 78 Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 206-207, para. 78).
131.1. Ivica Račan, former leader of the SDP (Party of Democratic
Reform), now the ruling party of Croatia, and Prime Minister of Croatiah
from 2000 -2003, characterized Tudjman’s Party, HDZ (Croatian Demo -
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1072 18/04/16 08:55 538 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
cratic Union), as the “party of dangerous intentions” because it h“invokes
the ghost of the NDH”. Račan’s endeavour to draw attention to the
unacceptability of resurrection of the achievements of the NDH did not
fall on fertile ground the majority of the Croatian public, at least judging
by the great support enjoyed by the HDZ for many years, did not reject
Tudjman’s pronouncements nor did it recognize anything negative in hihs
ideology (http://www.hvatski -fokus.hr/index-php?option=com-content&
view=article&id=1556:prije -dvadeset -godina -ivica -raan -hdz -je-
stranka-opasnih-namjera-10&catid=22:feljtoni&itemd=46).
132. The distinguished Croatian journalist and publisher Slavko Gold-
stein, a founder of the Croatian Social Liberal Party and the party’sh first
leader, said that “the Ustasha regime was an abortive semblance of a h
legal State, a poorly organized combination of legality and wild chaos”h.
He further said that “[f]or understandable reasons, in the historicalh mem-
ory of the Serbian people, the Ustasha NDH has never been and will
never be anything but a fascist crime, slaughterhouse of the Serbs in Crho-
atia and Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Slavko Goldstein, 1941 : Godina koja
se vraća (1941 : The Year that Keeps Returning) , book review available
at: www.nybooks.com/books/imprints/collections/194-1 the-year-that-keeps-
returning).
133. The first Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, and
one of the closest associated to President Tudjman, Josip Boljkovac,
claims “the Ustasha ideology is still alive in Croatia”. He claimsh that this
“must be a serious warning” and that it is “tragic that the Ustasha ideol -
ogy is coming back to Croatia ; that members of the SKOJ (Union of
Communist Youth of Yugoslavia), organizers of the 1941 uprising againsth
fascism, are being tried” (“Boljkovac : Ustastvo I dalje zivu u Hrvatskoj”,
Glas Istre, 6 January 2014, dostupno preko : http://www.glasistre.hr/
vijesti/hrvatska/boljkovac-ustasvo-i-dalje-zivu-u-hrvatskoj-436319).
The realization of the idea of an ethnically clean Croatia does not toleh-r
ate restrictions of any kind, tacitly according to the then President
of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić. What is essential is to achieve the aim. In ah
speech to Croatian expatriates in Australia, delivered in the early 1990hs,
he says:
“You see, in the Second World War, the Croats won twice and we
have no reason to apologize to anyone. What they ask of the Croats
the whole time, ‘Go kneel in Jasenovac, kneel here. . .’ We don’t have
to kneel in front of anyone for anything ! We won twice and all the
others only once. We won on 10 April when the Axis Powers recog -
nized Croatia as a State and we won because we sat after the war,
again with the winners, at the winning table.” (“Croatian leader’hs
speech glorifying World War Two pro -Nazi State widely condemned”,
Text of Report in English by Croatian news agency HINA, BBC Mon-
itoring Europe, 10 December 2006, a video of the speech in the orig -
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1074 18/04/16 08:55 539 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
inal Serbo -Croatian can be viewed at http://emperor.vwh.net/croatia/
MesicVideo.wmv) 2.
3.6. State symbols and other acts
134. Every State autonomously determines its symbols, i.e., signs by
which it is recognized. The choice of State symbols is a matter of optiohn,
a strictly internal domain of the State.
Under the December 1990 amendments to the Constitution, as a new
State symbol was adopted the HDZ party flag with šahovnica, a red and
white chequerboard pattern “[that] was . . . employed by the Ustasha
regime and which the Croatian Serbs considered as ‘footprint of the
Ustashe’” (Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, 1997,
p. 223). To “many Jews, Serbs and others, it is a symbol almost as hatehful
as the swastika” (S. Kinzer, “Pro-Nazi Rulers’ Legacy Still Lingers for
Croatia”, The New York Times, 31 October 1993). Tudjman’s régime
“also renamed the police into ‘redarstvo’ which had Ustasha conhnota -
tions, renamed streets and public places after World War II generals”h
(C. Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse : Causes, Course and Conse ‑
quences, 1995, p. 141).
Furthermore, at President Tudjman’s proposal, the Croatian parlia-
ment adopted a
“new currency and call[ed] it kuna, which was the name of the national
currency of the Ustasha period. A prominent Croatian Jew,
Slavko Goldstein, wrote in a newspaper’s commentary that the deci -
sion ‘will awaken very deep feelings of antagonism in a not -small
2 As far as the reaction to this statement of President Mesić, Jared IsEncy‑, in
clopedia of the Holocaust states:
“Despite the political significance of this video, both in terms ofh understanding
the Serbian-Croatian conflict over the past sixteen years and judging the sincerithy of
Croatian President Mesić’s current claim to abhor Ustasha politics, and despite the
fact that three leading Croatian TV newspeople were suspended for broadchasting
the video and subsequently reinstated, following an uproar in Croatia, dhespite these
highly newsworthy events, and despite the fact that some of the main inthernational
news agencies — including Associated Press, Agence France Presse, ANSA and BBC
Monitoring — all covered this story, nevertheless, out of the thousands of Englihsh,
French, German, Italian, Spanish and Dutch newspapers and TV news statiohns
archived by the Lexis -Nexis media search engine, we could find only — the
Dutch newspaper, Dagblad van het Noorden — that even mentioned the scandal.”
(http://de-construct.net/e-zine/?p=361)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1076 18/04/16 08:55 540 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
portion of the population for whom these associations are extremely
painful’.” (C.Bennett, op. cit.)
The names of streets and institutions were changed, i.e., instead of the
names from the period of Yugoslavia, newly-given names are associated
with Ustasha Croatia. Immediately after Tudjman’s coming to power, anh
elementary school in Zagreb was renamed after Mile Budak, Minister of
Justice under the Ustasha State, the main Ustasha ideologist and author
of the formula for the solution of the Serb question. Budak fled from h
Zagreb on 6 May 1945, but was handed over to Tito’s Yugoslavia by the
English authorities on 18 May 1945. As a war criminal Budak was sen -
tenced to death. As can be seen from the decision of the Croatian Minis -
ter of Public Administration, Arsen Banko, about the removal of the
“names of streets given in honour of a senior Ustasha official”, hthere still
remain streets named after Mile Budak in ten cities and local districts
(Danas, Croatian edition, 3 January 2014). The decision met with opposi -
tion, so that the final decision will be made by the competent municiphal
court. It is interesting to note that the Association for the Promotion hof
Local Government and Self-Rule requested already in April 2011 that the
street in Slavonski Brod named after Dr. Mile Budak be renamed ; the
City Council, however, refused with the explanation that the change
would entail considerable financial costs.
135. Upon Tudjman’s rise to power, a plaque in memory of Mile Budak
was raised in Sveti Rok, whereas another plaque in memory of
Juraj Francetić, Commander of the notorious Black Legion and Ustasha
Commissioner for Bosnia and Herzegovina responsible for the massacre
of Bosnian Serbs and Jews was put up in Slunj. Both memorials were
removed in 2004 by the decision of the Croatian Government with the
explanation that the fixing of the plaques was “contrary to the orihginal
basic principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and thath it
harms the reputation and interests of the Republic of Croatia” (Hrvatska
riječ, 10March 2013). However, in January 2005, another memorial to
J. Francetić and Mile Budak was built in the outskirts of Split (E. Pond,
Endgame in the Balkans : Régime Change, European Style , 2006,
pp. 135-136). The 13th and the 14th battalions of the Croatian Defence
Forces were also named after Francetić, as well as a military unit ofh the
Croatian Defence Council which was active in central Bosnia and Herze -
govina in 1993 (C. Shrader, The Muslim‑Croat Civil War in Central Bos ‑
nia: A Military History, 1992‑1994, 2003). The “Victims of Fascism
Square” in Zagreb was renamed the “Square of Croatian Giants”.
Ambassador Zimmermann noted that :
“By changing street names that had previously honoured victims
of fascism and reviving the traditional Croatian flag and coat of armsh
last used during the 1941-1945 Ustaše dictatorship, the Croatian Gov-
ernment contributed to the resurrection of this grotesque period in
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1078 18/04/16 08:55 541 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
the minds of Serbs.” (W. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe :
Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers — America’s Last Ambassador Tells
What Happened and Why , 1996, p. 75.)
136. The glorification of the Ustasha ideology (Ustaštvo) and its
prominent members was accompanied by the destruction of the symbols
of the anti-fascist struggle.
In the period from 1990 -2000, most of the symbols of the anti -fascist
struggle were devastated in Croatia. Over 3,000 of them were demolished,h
damaged or removed (http://www.slobodnaevropa.org./content/article/
703313.html).
Croatian anti -fascist Juraj Hrženjak, participant in the People’s Libera-
tion War, is one of the authors of the monograph entitled “The Destruc -
tion of the Anti -Fascist Monuments in Croatia 1990 -2000”. Hrženjak
notes, inter ali, that 2,904 destroyed or desecrated memorials, busts and
mass graves have been listed. He says that one should add to this numberh
“about 500 memorials which could not be recorded due to the fact that
the extremist Right was in power in these areas ; that due to this fact our
veterans who wanted to put them on the list were exposed to threats,
sometimes even threats with death” (http://www.dw.de/sramna -epizoda-
hrvatske-istorije-16044052).
137. The requests by the Association of Anti -Fascists for the “safe -
guarding of memorials as heritage usually come up against a wall of
silence” (ibid.).
A very small number of devastated anti -fascist memorials have been
repaired. Among those that have been restored is the monument to the
leader of the Anti-Fascist Movement, Josip Broz Tito, in his native place
of Kumrovec and the memorial plaque in the Ustasha concentration
camp Jadovno. According to the words of Croatian PresidentI. Josipović,
who attended the commemoration in Jadovno, “between 30,000 and
40,000 persons were killed there during the war” (Jutarnji list hr., 26 June
2010). The restoration of the anti -fascist memorials seems, however, to
meet with numerous obstacles.
138. The Croatian daily newspaper with the highest circulation,
Jutarnji list published a text entitle: “We spend 350 million kunas annu -
ally for the military of the NDH.” The text says, inter alia, that the Par -
liament of the Republic of Croatia adopted amendments to the Law on
Pension and Disability Insurance in 1993
“which provide for that each year of service that the members of the h
NDH armed forces, called in that law the ‘homeland army’, spent inh
the NDH armed formations counts as two years of service. The same
criterion is applicable to the years which the members of these forces
spent in captivity as POWs after 16 May 1945. The amendments to
the legislation bear the signature of the then Speaker of the House of
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1080 18/04/16 08:55 542 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Deputies, Stjepan Mesić.” (http://www.jutarnji.hr/za -vojnike-ndh-
godisnje-placamo-350-milijuna-kuna/1134285/)
On the basis of the said law “more than 13,000 members of the Ustashah
units, Poglavnik’s (i.e., Pavelićs) Life Guard(s), World War Two Domo-
brans (home guardsmen) and paramilitary policemen, as well as members h
of their family entitled to pension after the death thereof, are on the hfiles
of the Social Security Bureau” at present (ibid.). The amount of 350 mil-
lion kunas (about 45 million euros) is allocated annually for the members
of the armed forces (ibid.).
In contrast, Croatia has never investigated where and/or in whose
hands ended up gold and other valuable objects plundered during the
persecutions and pogroms of Serbs and Jews. The fate of the property of h
persecuted Serbs and Jews has not been established, nor has anyone suc -
ceeded in getting the Croatian authorities after 1991 to include this ques -
tion on the agenda. And it was precisely in these years that the Croatiahn
President, Franjo Tudjman intensively worked on the project of revital -
ization, toleration and glorification of the Ustasha ideology in todayh’s
Croatia. Susan Woodward, in her book entitled Balkan Tragedy thus
came to the conclusion that the
“revisionist history of the Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman relating
to the genocide committed against Serbs, Jews and Roma during the
existence of the Independent State of Croatia in the period from
1941-1945, became politically dangerous at the moment when the
election of Tudjman as President was financially supported mostly by
the rightist émigrés from that period, who brought with them the State
symbols, as well as when special taxes were imposed on Serbs who
had summer houses in Croatia (but not on other persons from some
other republics)” (S. L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy : Chaos and Dis ‑
solution after the Cold War, 1995, p. 229).
3.7. Statements of Croatia’s officials in the light of the jurisprudence o▯f the
ICTR regarding incitement
Dr. Franjo Tudjman, Pre - The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi
sident of the Republic of Croatia,
during the first election campaign “[T]he Chamber recalls that :
in 1989:
(1) Witness FBX testified that Muvu -
nyi told them that even if people
“Thank God my wife is refused to hand over the Tutsis in hid-
neither a Serb nor a Jew.” ing, they had to do so because when a
(Counter -Memorial, Ann. 51; snake wraps itself around a calabash,
emphasis added.) you have to kill the snake and break
the calabash ; (2) Witness AMJ testi -
Dubravko Horvatić Croatian fied that Muvunyi said that babies
academic and writer, in his arti - born to Tutsi girls married to Hutu
cle Matoš o Srbiji published in men after 6 April had to be killed like
543
7 CIJ1077.indb 1082 18/04/16 08:55 543 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
the daily newspaper Večernj list, snakes are killed ; (3) Witness CCP
Zagreb, 17 June 1992: testified that Muvunyi said that Tutsis
were comparable to snakes and had
to be killed; and (4) Witness CCP tes -
“Matoš [Croatian poet] taught tified that Muvunyi used a Rwandan
both his contemporaries and gen- proverb to the effect that the Tutsi
erations to come what Serbia is girls that had been ‘married’ to Hutu
and what it is like. On reading men should die in a forest in a faraway
him today, we discover that the place.
experience tells us how much
Matoš was right in saying that Accordingly, the Chamber notes
Serbia is the winner of the ‘world that all four witnesses testified that
championship of killing and seri - Muvunyi used Kinyarwanda proverbs
ous crimes’. . . However, by strip- to urge the audience to kill Tutsis, and
ping the mask off Serbia he has
that three Prosecution witnesses
enormously helped us to learn the recalled that Muvunyi used proverbs
lesson that is particularly relevant comparing Tutsis to snakes to urge the
today: in order for Croats and crowd to kill Tutsis.
other nations to be able to survive,
Serbia must be totally and utterly
The Chamber also notes the evi -
defeated.” (Counter -Memorial, dence of Evariste Ntakirutimana, a
Ann. 51 ; emphasis added.) sociolinguist who was accepted as an
expert witness for the Prosecution.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dr. Franjo Tudjman :
Ntakirutimana’s evidence is that a
proverb is a sentence, which may sum ‑
“And there can be no return to marize an entire context ; it is an
the past, to the times when they
the Serbs were spreading cancer in attempt to say the most possible
the heart of Croatia, cancer which through the least possible words. Pro ‑
was destroying the Croatian verbs are universally accepted truths,
so they are employed in an attempt to
national being and which did not summarize a message into a universally
allow the Croatian people to be the
master in its own house and did accepted fact that everyone should be
not allow Croatia to lead an inde - aware of or admit to.
pendent and sovereign life under . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
this wide, blue sky and within the
world community of sovereign [T]he use of a proverb makes it easier
nations.” (Croatian President for such an audience to understand the
Franjo Tudjman’s Speech on meaning of what is being conveyed ; it
“Freedom Train” Journey after reduces the distance between the per ‑
Driving 250,000 Serbian civilians son who is speaking and the target of
from the Krajina Section of the message. Ntakirutimana also
Yugoslavia, BBC Summary of stated that speakers during the Rwan-
World Broadcasts, 28 August dan war avoided calling the adver -
1995 ; emphasis added.) sary, the Tutsi, by its real name to
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1084 18/04/16 08:55 544 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Metaphor used by Croatian avoid interference or intervention by
Minister of Foreign Affairs, foreigners.
Hrvoje Sarinić in his conversa -
tion with the US Ambassador For example, the term ‘snake’ is uti‑
Mr. Peter Galbraith, when they, lized to show that there should be no
after Operation Storm, discussed pity when dealing with the Tutsi. Nta-
the opportunities for Serbs to kirutimana testified that a calabash is
come back to their homes in a container of great value, in which
Krajina. milk is stored. Consequently, the pro ‑
verb ‘when a snake twirls around a
calabash, the calabash must be broken
According to Galbraith, who in order to destroy the snake’ conveys
testified in Gotovina, Sarinić saidthe meaning that if you have a precious
the following : “We cannot object that comes under threat, you
accept them to come back. They may have to sacrifice the object rather
are cancer in the stomach of than sacrifice yourself.
Croatia.” (Gotovina et al., testi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
mony of witness Peter Gal-
braith, 23June2008, Transcripts, In giving such a speech, the Cham -
p. 4939.)
ber finds that there is no reasonable
doubt that Muvunyi intended to incite
the audience to commit acts of geno ‑
National, Ethnic and Religious cide. The Chamber further finds that
Hatred — context in which the Prosecution has proven beyond all
Operation Storm was conducted reasonable doubt that Muvunyi pos ‑
sessed the requisite intent to destroy
the Tutsi group as such.” (Muvunyi,
Croatian philosopher Zarko ICTR-00-55A-T, Trial Judgment,
Puhovski, described this context 11 February 2010, paras. 120 -128;
clearly in his statement recorded emphasis added.)
in the documentary “Storm over
Krajina”. He said :
The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema
The Effects of Extremist Ideology
“We are talking here about a Disseminated Through the Mass
large number of incidents which Media
were influenced by motions. But
these incidents, these motions “Military and civilian official [sic]
had been prepared for years perpetuated ethnic tensions prior to
through propaganda, from televi ‑ 1994. Kangura newspaper, established
sion to the president of the coun ‑after the 1990 RPF invasion, Radio
try and all public factors. In Television Mille Colline (RTLM) and
Croatia, which convinced the Cro‑ other print and electronic media took
atian population and especially an active part in the incitement of the
the soldiers that the Serbs are Hutu population against the Tutsis.
guilty as such and they should be Kangura had published the ‘Ten
punished as such.” (Gotovina et Commandments’ for the Hutus in
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1086 18/04/16 08:55 545 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
1991, al. Transcripts, 13 Febru - 1991, which stated that the Tutsis
ary 2009, p. 15901; emphasis were the enemy. In addition, accord -
added.) ing to witnesses, in 1991 ten military
commanders produced a full report
that answered the question how to
Miro Bajramovic: defeat the enemy in the military, media
and political domains. These witnesses
also testified that inSeptember 1992
“My name is MiroBajramovic the military issued a memorandum,
and I am directly responsible for based on the 1991 report, which also
the death of 86people . . . I killeddefined ‘the enemy’ as the Tutsi popu-
72 people with my own hands, lation, thereby transferring the hostile
among them nine were women. intentions of the RPF to all Tutsis.
We made no distinction, asked no According to one report, prior to
questions, they were ‘Chetniks’
6 April, the public authorities did not
[Serbs], and our enemies.” (Inter- openly engage in inciting the Hutus to
view with Miro Bajramovic, perpetrate massacres. On 19 April
Feral Tribune , Split, Croatia, however, the President of the Interim
1 September 1997; emphasis Government, told the people of
added.)
Butare to ‘get to work’ in the Rwan -
dan sense of the term by using their
machetes and axes.
Miro Bajramovic : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“We did not separate Serb The dissemination and acceptance
of such ideas was confirmed by a
civilians and soldiers from each Hutu policeman to Prosecution wit -
other. If we found a rifle hidden ness Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, a jour-
in his/her house, we considered nalist reporting for the French
him/her a Chetnik. Serbs at the
time could not survive, because newspaper Le Figaro. De Saint -Exu-
there is a saying : wherever we pery remarked that the policeman had
told him how they killed Tutsis
trod, the grass does not grow ‘because they were the accomplices of
again.” (Ibid.) the RFF’ and that no Tutsis should be
“When I recall all that
torturing, I wonder how they left alive.
managed to think of all those . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
methods . For example, the most
painful is to stick little pins In summary, the Trial Chamber
under the nails and to connect it finds that the massacres of the Tutsi
to the three -phase current ; population indeed were ‘meticulously
nothing remains of a man, but planned and systematically co ‑ordi‑
ashes.” nated’ by top‑level Hutu extremists in
“After all, we knew that they the former Rwandan government at the
would all be killed, so it did not time in question. The widespread
matter if we hurt him more nature of the attacks and the sheer
today or tomorrow.” (Ibid.) number of those who perished within
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1088 18/04/16 08:55 546 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Sime Djodan, Special Envoy just three months is compelling evi -
of the Croatian President dence of this fact. This plan could not
Franjo Tudjman, in his speech have been implemented without the
at a traditional competition in participation of militias and the Hutu
Sinj held in August 1991 : “The population who had been convinced by
Serbs had pointed heads and these extremists that the Tutsi popula ‑
probably also small brains.” tion, in fact was the enemy and respon-
(Counter-Memorial, Ann. 51.) sible for the downing of President
Habyarimana’s airplane.
Krešimir Dolenčić, Director The cruelty with which the attackers
of Gavella Theatre in Zagreb, killed, wounded and disfigured their vic‑
12 November 1991 : tims indicates that the propaganda
unleashed on Rwanda had the desired
effect, namely the destruction of the
“Beasts from the East stand no Tutsi population. The involvement of
chance. A monkey smashes every - the peasant population in the massa -
thing around the house and it is cres was facilitated also by their mis -
all the house and it is all the same placed belief and confidence in their
to the animal whether it smashed leadership, and an understanding that
a glass or a Chinese vase, because the encouragement of the authorities to
it is unable to tell the difference. guaranteed [sic] them impunity to kill
There is no way that the monkey the Tutsis and loot their property.
has any chance in the fight against
the human. There will always be a Final reports produced estimated
way to put it to sleep and place it the number of the victims of the geno-
in a cage where it belongs . . . The cide at approximately 800,000 to
distinction between us and them one million, nearly one -seventh of
is like between computers of the Rwanda’s total population. These
first and the fifth generation. facts combined prove the special intent
They should either be held in cap ‑ requirement element of genocide.
tivity or destroyed, because noth ‑ Moreover, there is ample evidence to
ing better could be expected of find that the overwhelming majority of
them. There could not be much the victims of this tragedy were Tutsi
talk or negotiations with them. civilians which leaves this Chamber
I am convinced that their culture satisfied that the targets of the massa‑
is below the primitive level, cres were ‘members of a group’, in this
since primitive cultures can be case an ethnic group. In light of this
interesting and rich spiritually.” evidence, the Trial Chamber finds a
(Counter -Memorial, Ann. 51 ; plan of genocide existed and perpetra -
emphasis added.) tors executed this plan in Rwanda
between April and June 1994.”
Miro Bajramovic: Kayishema’s Utterances
“We worked in two groups, “Kayishema’s utterances, as well as
one was in charge of taking utterances by other individuals under
547
7 CIJ1077.indb 1090 18/04/16 08:55 547 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
them to Velesajam, and the his direction before, during and after
other of taking them further. I the massacres, also demonstrate the
mostly attended arrests, because existence of his specific intent. Tutsis
I am a rhetoric and I tried to be were called ‘Inkotanyi’ meaning an
civil on such occasions. I always RPF fighter or an enemy of Rwanda.
told prisoners that I was only Inyenzi meaning cockroach. They also
doing my job.” (Interview with were referred to as filth or dirt. Wit -
Miro Bajramovic, Feral Tribune, ness WW testified how she heard the
Split, Croatia, 1 September Tutsi were being referred to as ‘dirt’
1997.) when Kayishema told Bourgmestre
Bagilishema that ‘all the dirt has to be
removed’ referring to the Tutsis who
Franjo Tudjman : had sought shelter in the communal
office. During the attacks at the Sta -
dium, Kayishema called the Tutsis :
“And, particularly, gentle - ‘Tutsi dogs’ and ‘Tutsis sons of bitches’
men, please remember how many when instigating the attackers to kill
Croatian villages and towns have the Tutsis gathered there.
been destroyed, but that’s still
not the situation in Knin
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
today . . .” (Minutes of the
Meeting held by the President of
the Republic of Croatia, Several witnesses who survived the
Dr. Franjo Tudjman, with massacres at the Complex heard Kay-
Military Officials, on 31 July ishema say ‘go to work’ or ‘get down
1995, Brioni, Counter-Memorial, to work’ which, as many witnesses
Ann. 2, p. 11 ; emphasis added.) affirmed, meant to begin killing the
Tutsis. Other witnesses testified to
having heard the attackers, including
Croatian Defence Minister, members of the Interahamwe, who
Spegelj, stated in 1991 : were de facto under Kayishema’s con -
trol, sing songs about exterminating
the Tutsi.
“Listen to the Commander.
First, your entire Command will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
be defeated, no one will survive,
we will spare no one. Give up all
illusion of raising alarm.” In sum, for all the reasons stated
(Memorial, Ann. 148 ; emphasis above the Chamber finds beyond a
added.) reasonable doubt that Kayishema had
the intent to destroy the Tutsi group in
Witness John William Hill whole or in part and, in pursuit of that
further added that he talked to intent, carried out the acts detailed
some Croatian soldiers in front below.” (Kayishema et al.,
of the United Nations camp ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgment,
who told him that “they were 21 May 1999, paras.279, 281, 289-291,
going to kill all the Serbs” (see 538-540 ; emphasis added.)
548
7 CIJ1077.indb 1092 18/04/16 08:55 548 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
ICTY, Gotovina et al., IT-060-90, The Prosecutor v. J. Kajelijeli
testimony of witness John Wil-
liam Hill, 27 May 2008, Tran - “The Chamber found that at a
script, p. 3751; emphasis added). meeting on the evening of 6April 1994
following the death of the President
of the Republic of Rwanda, at the
Witness Božo Suša stated that canteen next to the Nkuli Commune
he had seen and heard a Croa - Office, the Accused addressed those
tian army officer who on
persons present — who were all of
5 August, entering Knin on the Hutu ethnic origin — saying to them
main road, had ordered his sol - ‘you very well know that it was the
diers to “shoot them all at ran ‑ Tutsi that killed — that brought down
dom”. The execution of Serb the Presidential plane. What are you
refugees, on two tractors was
conducted immediately after. waiting for to eliminate the enemy ?’
The Chamber found that by ‘the
enemy’ the Accused meant the Tutsi
ethnic group.
The evidence is corroborated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
by a statement of one Croatian
war veteran who was interviewed
The Chamber found that a woman
by Croatian daily “Jutarnji list” who was thought to be Tutsi and her
in 1998. He stated : son were singled out at a roadblock in
front of Witness GDQ’s house on
“The plan was to clean every - 8 April 1994, and subsequently killed
thing up as soon as possible. by an lnterahamwe named Musafiri.
Kanoti, a Hutu man who was also
Some will get out, and we’ll waste present, and accompanying these vic -
the others . . . there were no civil‑
ians for us ; they were simply all tims, was not killed. The Accused was
enemies . . . It was an unwritten present at the roadblock during this
order that there were no prison - event and was heard saying, ‘No Tutsi
should survive at Mukingo’.
ers of war to be taken but, for
the sake of saving our face
before world public opinion, a The Chamber found that, on
very small number of prisoners 8 April 1994, the Accused and the
of war were nonetheless left lnterahamwe were inspecting bodies
alive.” (Rejoinder of Serbia, and searching for survivors. Witness
GBH pleaded with the Accused to
para. 720 ; emphasis added.)
stop the killings, however, in the
words of GBH, the Accused
“As a result of these wide- responded by saying ‘that it was nec ‑
spread and systematic unlawful essary to continue, look for those or
acts during the Croatian mili - hunt for those who had survived’.
tary operation, the Medak
Pocket became uninhabitable. On the basis of the established
The villages of the Pocket were facts, the Chamber finds that the kill -
destroyed, thereby depriving the ings upon which the Chamber heard
549
7 CIJ1077.indb 1094 18/04/16 08:55 549 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Serbian civilian population of evidence as occurring in Mukingo,
their home and livelihood.” Nkuli and Kigombe Communes,
(ICTY, Ademi and Norac, were, at all relevant times pleaded in
IT-01-46 and IT-04-76, Consoli- the Indictment, systematically directed
dated Indictment, para. 50; against Tutsi civilians. The words and
emphasis added.) deeds of the Accused show clearly
that he directed and participated in
those killings with the specific intent
“In the whole Krajina region to destroy the Tutsi ethnical group.”
houses were burning and even (Kajelijeli, ICTR -98-44A-T, Trial
today, more than five weeks Judgment, 1 December 2003,
after the last battles, they are paras. 819, 826 -828; emphasis
still burning. Destroying big added.)
complex[es] of non -Croat prop -
erties can lead to the conclusion The Prosecutor v. Callixte Kaliman ‑
that this was not done only by zira
mobs and that the whole affair
was tolerated by the Croatian “The Chamber recalls that a call to
Government . . . [The] result defend oneself against the enemy is not
will be an efficient impediment of intrinsically illegitimate, particularly
the Serb return to their houses when the ‘enemy’ is clearly restricted
and it will also create more diffi to the RPF to the exclusion of Tutsi
culties for people to settle down civilians. In this case, however, the
again in this region . .” (Empha- Chamber finds that when exhorting
sis added.) those manning the Kajyanama road -
block to carry arms in order to
‘defend’ themselves against ‘the
Marjan Jurić, Deputy in the enemy’ who might pass through,
Croatian Parliament, at a ses - Kalimanzira was understood to be
sion held on 1-3 August 1991: calling for the killing of the Tutsis,
and that he intended to be understood
as such. The slapping and abduction of
“But I am asking these same the unarmed man emphasized Kaliman ‑
Serbs whether it will dawn on zira’s exhortation and effect on his
them when they — and I am just audience . The incitement was dissemi -
wondering — and I’m not mak - nated in a public place — the road -
ing a statement [sic!] — whether block — to an indeterminate group of
they would come to their senses if people — those present to man it and
ten civilians were executed for anyone else watching or listening.
one killed policeman or if a hun ‑ Kalimanzira exhibited here, and else ‑
dred civilians were killed for one where, an intent to destroy the Tutsi
soldier! group . As such, the Chamber finds
This is something that my Kalimanzira guilty beyond reasonable
Christian, Catholic faith would doubt for committing Direct and
not allow me, because Father Public Incitement to Commit Geno -
Stanko Bogeljic has taught me cide at the Kajyanama roadblock in
that there is one commandment late April 1994.
550
7 CIJ1077.indb 1096 18/04/16 08:55 550 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
in those ten commandments : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
‘thou shall not kill’, and it does
not allow me to say that this is The Chamber therefore finds that
right, but it would be right for
in late May or early June 1994, Kali-
me if ten Serb intellectuals manzira attended a public meeting at
would get the sack in Zagreb, the Nyabisagara football field where
Rijeka, Split or Osijek for every he thanked the audience for their
policeman killed. For, intellectu- efforts at getting rid of the enemy but
als cannot go to the woods.
warned them not to grow complacent,
They are not like those ignorant to remain armed at all times, and
Banija peasants who could go to exhorted the crowd to keep searching
bed without washing their feet for enemies hidden in the bush or in
for a month ! Intellectuals must other persons homes, which they did.
be sacked, because Chetnik ring- He also instructed them to destroy
leaders live in the big cities and
the homes of dead Tutsis and plant
we must prevent it . . . Our trees in their place, which they did. In
Almighty God has created at the the context of these particular instruc-
same time both good people and a tions, which have little to do with
lot of vermin. One such vermin is military combat, and BCZ’s under -
the moth which, when let into the
standing of Kalimanzira’s words, the
closet, in fact when it comes into Chamber finds that ‘the enemy’ meant
it, eats at the shirt, then it turns any Tutsi.
to the pullover ;it eats and eats
until it has eaten everything The Chamber finds that Kaliman -
away. The same is true of those zira’s call for further elimination of
who came to us as our guest‑ Tutsis in hiding was direct, leading
workers.” (Deputy Jurić ended clearly to immediate and commensu -
his speech with a raised hand rate action. It was disseminated in a
in a fasciststyle salute, Counter- public place to a large public audi -
Memorial, Ann. 51 ; emphasis ence. By instructing the people present
added.) to kill any surviving Tutsis, demolish
their homes, and wipe out any traces of
their existence, there is no reasonable
Zvonimir Sekulin, Editor-in- doubt that Kalimanzira intended to
Chief of Hrvatski Vijesnik, in his incite the audience present to commit
interview published in the maga- acts of genocide. Kalimanzira exhib -
zine Globus, Zagreb, on 9 Sep- ited here, and elsewhere, an intent to
tember 1994: destroy the Tutsi group. The Cham -
ber therefore finds Kalimanzira
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
“Considering that the committing direct and public incite -
Hrvatski Vijesnik really runs a ment to commit genocide at the
column entitled ‘hard -core Serb Nyabisagara football field in late
pornographic pages’, I also May or early June 1994.” (Kaliman ‑
admit that this newspaper is in zira, ICTR -05-88-T, Trial Judgment,
part pornographic as the Serbs 22 June 2009, paras. 589, 613 -614 ;
themselves are pornography. emphasis added.)
551
7 CIJ1077.indb 1098 18/04/16 08:55 551 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Photograph of Patriarch Pavle The Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi
(Head of the Serbian Orthodox
Church), published on these “When heading towards Kayove,
pages, is more pornographic Bikindi used the public address sys -
that the photos of the biggest tem to state that the majority popula ‑
whores . . . [name] wrote that I tion, the Hutu, should rise up to
said that some people were ver ‑ exterminate the minority, the Tutsi.
min. But I say that only On his way back, Bikindi used the
the so‑called Serbian people are same system to ask if people had been
vermin.” (Counter -Memorial, killing Tutsi who were referred to as
Ann. 51; emphasis added.) snakes.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Franjo Tudjman:
The Chamber finds that both state -
ments, broadcast over loudspeaker,
were made publicly. The Chamber
“We have to inflict such blows also finds that Bikindi’s call on ‘the
that the Serbs will, to all practi
cal purposes disappear, that is to majority’ to ‘rise up and look every ‑
say, the areas we do not take at where possible’ and not to ‘spare any ‑
body’ immediately referring to Tutsis
once must capitulate within a as the minority unequivocally consti ‑
few days.” (Minutes of the tutes a direct call to destroy the Tutsis
Meeting held by the President
of the Republic of Croatia, ethnic group. Similarly, the Chamber
Dr. Franjo Tudjman, with mili- considers that Bikindi’s address to the
tary officials, on 31 July 1995, population on his way back from
Kayove, asking ‘Have you killed the
Brioni, p. 2, Counter-Memorial, Tutsis here ?’ and whether they had
Ann. 52; emphasis added.)
killed the ‘snakes’ is a direct call to kill
Tutsis, pejoratively referred as ‘snakes’.
The Logbook notes “our artil‑ In the Chamber’s view, it is inconceiv-
lery was hitting the column pull - able that, in the context of widespread
killings of the Tutsi population that
ing from Petrovac to Grahovo,
the score is excellent, the Chet‑ prevailed in June 1994 in Rwanda, the
niks have many dead and audience to whom the message was
wounded . . .” (ICTY, Gotovina directed, namely those standing on the
et al., IT -060-90, Reyn - road, could not have immediately
aud Theunes, Expert Report : understood its meaning and implica ‑
Croatian Armed Forces and tion. The Chamber therefore finds
Operation Storm, Part II, that Bikindi’s statements through
p. 189 ; emphasis added.) loudspeakers on the main road
between Kivumu and Kayove consti -
tute direct and public incitement to
commit genocide.
Based on the words he proffered
and the manner he disseminated his
552
7 CIJ1077.indb 1100 18/04/16 08:55 552 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Miro Bajramovic: message, the Chamber finds that
Bikindi deliberately, directly and pub ‑
licly incited the commission of genocide
“T. Mercep was commander with the specific intent to destroy the
of Poljane . . . He knew about Tutsi ethnic group. ” (Bikindi,
each execution, because he was a ICTR-01-72-T, Trial Judgment,
commander and was a very 2 December 2008, paras.281, 423-424 ;
charismatic person. He told us emphasis added.)
several times: ‘Tonight you have
to clean all these shits.’ The Prosecutor v. Jean‑Paul Akayesu
This meant that all prisoners
should be executed. The order for
Gospic was to perform ‘ethnic “The Chamber further recalls that
incitement can be direct, and nonethe -
cleansing’ so we killed directors less, implicit.” (Para. 557.)
of post offices and hospitals, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a restaurant owner and many
other Serbs. Executions
were performed by shooting “(iii) It has been established that
Akayesu then clearly urged the popu -
at point blank range since we
did not have much time. I lation to unite in order to eliminate
repeat, orders from the head - what he termed the sole enemy : the
quarters were to reduce the accomplices of the Inkotanyi.
percentage of Serbs in Gospic.”
(Interview with Miro
(iv) On the basis of consistent testi-
Bajramovic, Feral Tribune, Split, monies heard throughout the pro -
Croatia, 1 September 1997 ; ceedings and the evidence of
emphasis added.) Dr. Ruzindana, appearing as expert
witness on linguistic matters, the
Chamber is satisfied beyond a reason -
Franjo Tudjman: able doubt that the population under ‑
stood Akayesu’s call as one to kill the
Tutsi. Akayesu himself was fully
“[I]n view if the situation cre- aware of the impact of his speech on
ated by the liberation of occu- the crowd and of the fact that his call
pied territories affecting the to fight against the accomplices of the
demographic picture, there is a
lnkotanyi would be construed as a
need to make military units one call to kill the Tutsi in general.
of the most effective elements, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
which can happen if we properly
solve one of the most effective
postulates of State politics (vii) The Chamber is of the opin -
in dealing with our essential ion that there is a causal relationship
between Akayesu’s speeches at the
problem of today, namely,
[the] demographic situation gathering of 19 April 1994 and the
in Croatia. That was why I ensuing widespread massacres of
invited to this meeting the Tutsi in Taba.
553
7 CIJ1077.indb 1102 18/04/16 08:55 553 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Vice-Premier and the Minister From the foregoing, the Chamber
responsible for reconstruction is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
and development, Dr. Radić, to that, by the above‑mentioned speeches
present, at the opening of this made in public and in a public place,
debate, the present demographic Akayesu had the intent to directly cre ‑
situation because of the ate a particular state of mind in his
deployment of military com - audience necessary to lead to the
mands, military districts, destruction of the Tutsi group, as such.
brigade stationing, military Accordingly, the Chamber finds that
training institutions, etc. It the said acts constitute the crime of
may be effective and useful to direct and public incitement to commit
resolve that situation where we genocide, as defined above.” (Akayesu,
have reinforced or at least ICTR -96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 Sep -
should reinforce Croatian tember 1998, paras. 557, 673-674;
dom, like in Istria, and in emphasis added.)
other places the more so
because it is not so much
about changing the composition
today as to populate some places The Prosecutor v. Aloys Simba
and areas. Minister Radić
“Simba was physically present at
explained how they should pro -
ceed : two massacre sites. He provided tradi-
tional weapons, guns, and grenades to
attackers poised to kill thousands of
Tutsi. Simba was aware of the target -
ing of Tutsi throughout his country,
and as a former military commander,
he knew what would follow when he
‘I conclude, therefore, that urge the armed assailants ‘to get rid of
red and blue areas should the filth’. The only reasonable conclu -
promptly, and as a matter of sion, even accepting his submissions
priority, be populated by Croats, as true, is that at that moment, he
as far as possible. These areas acted with genocidal intent .” (Simba,
are marked, including Zrinska ICTR-2001-76-T, Trial Judgment,
Gora, which I skipped for the 13 December 2005, para. 418 ; empha -
time being, and areas such as sis added.)
Lapac and Knin, namely the
hinterland and the Herzegovina The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema
region, which should be given
secondary priority, and this “According to the witness, Musema
empty area in Lika as much as addressed those who had convened in
possible . . .’” (Minutes of the Kinyarwanda, telling them to rise
Meeting held by the President of together and fight their enemy the
the Republic of Croatia, Tutsis and deliver their country from
Dr. Franjo Tudjman, with the enemy. Questions were put to him
Military Officials, 23 August by the crowd, asking what would be
1995, Zagreb, pp. 01325991 ; their rewards considering that they
554
7 CIJ1077.indb 1104 18/04/16 08:55 554 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
01325993 -01325997; Counter- might lose their lives in this war.
Memorial, Ann. 53, pp. 4-7 ; Musema answered that there would
emphasis added.) be no problem in finding rewards,
that the unemployed would take jobs of
those killed, and that they would appro‑
priate the lands and properties of the
Tutsis.” (Musema, ICTR -96-13-T,
Trial Judgment, 27 January 2000,
para. 373; emphasis added.)
(Signed) Milenko Kreća.
555
7 CIJ1077.indb 1106 18/04/16 08:55
450
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC KREĆA
table of contents
Paragraphs
I. Legal Background 1-27
1. Constitutional concept of the Yugoslav State and of Croatia
as a federal unit 2-17
2. Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the SFRY 18-27
II. Jurisdictional Issues 28-83
1. Validity in time complex in casu 28-45
1.1.From which date is the Genocide Convention in force
as regards the Parties individually ? 29-33
1.2. From which date can the Genocide Convention be con -
sidered as applicable between the Parties? 34-35
1.3. Application of the principle in casu 36-43
1.4. By which date was the Genocide Convention in force
as regards the SFRY ? 44-45
2. Nature and effects of the second preliminary objection of the
Respondent 46-54
3. Treatment of preliminary objections to jurisdiction and
admissibility in casu 55-59.1
4. Succession to responsibility as a purported rule of general
international law 60-65.4
5. Rule in Article 10 (2) of the Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts as a purported rule
of general international law 66-67
6. Applicable substantive law in casu in the light of rules on
interpretation of treaties 68-79
7. The issue of the indispensable third party 80-83
III. Substantive Law Issues 84-138
1. Relationship between the ICJ and the ICTY in respect of
theadjudication of genocide 84-106
1.1. The need for a balanced and critical approach to
the jurisprudence of the ICTY 87
1.1.1.Factual findings of the ICTY 88-89
1.1.2. Legal findings of the ICTY 90-99
1.2. Compromising effects on the Court’s jurisprudence on
genocide 100-106
451
7 CIJ1077.indb 898 18/04/16 08:54 450
OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE AD HOC KREĆA
table des matières
Paragraphes
I. Contexte juridique 1-27
1. Conception constitutionnelle de l’Etat yougoslave et de la
Croatie en tant qu’unité fédérale 2-17
2. Arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle de la RSFY 18-27
II. Questions de compétenhce 28-83
1. Questions relatives aux dates de validité en l’affaire 28-45
1.1. A quelle date la Convention est-elle entrée en vigueur à
l’égard de chacune des Parties ? 29-33
1.2. A partir de quelle date la Convention peut -elle être
considérée comme applicable entre les Parties ? 34-35
1.3. L’application du principe en l’espèce 36-43
1.4. A quelle date la Convention est -elle entrée en vigueur à
l’égard de la RFSY ? 44-45
2. Nature et effets de la deuxième exception préliminaire du
défendeur 46-54
3. Traitement des exceptions préliminaires à la compétence et àh
la recevabilité en l’espèce 55-59.1
4. La succession à la responsabilité comme prétendue règle du
droit international général 60-65.4
5. La règle figurant au paragraphe 2 de l’articl10 des Articles
sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement
illicite comme prétendue règle du droit international générahl 66-67
6. Droit matériel applicable en l’espèce à la lumière des règles
d’interprétation des traités 68-79
7. La question de la tierce partie indispensable 80-83
III. Questions de droit mathériel 84-138
1. Rapport entre la Cour internationale de Justice et le Tribunal
pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie pour ce qui est du
traitement judiciaire du génocide 84-106
1.1. Nécessité d’une approche équilibrée et critique de
la jurisprudence du TPIY 87
1.1.1. Conclusions de fait du TPIY 88-89
1.1.2. Conclusions de droit du TPIY 90-99
1.2. Des effets compromettants sur la jurisprudence de la
Cour en matière de génocide 100-106
451
7 CIJ1077.indb 899 18/04/16 08:54 451 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
2. Was genocide committed in Croatia ? 107-114
3. Issue of incitement to genocide 115
3.1. Issue of incitement to genocide as inchoate crime 116
3.2. Incitement in terms of ArticleIII (of the Convention 1 16-119
3.3. Ustasha ideology as a genocidal one 120-124
3.4. The establishment of the NDH — the Ustasha ideo-
logy becomes State policy 125-128
3.5. President Tudjman’s Croatia and the legacy of the
NDH 129-133
3.6. State symbols and other acts 134-138
3.7. Statements of Croatia’s officials in the light of the juris
prudence of the ICTR regarding incitement
*
Having great respect for the Court, it is for me a matter of regret to find
necessary to avail myself of the right to express a separate opinion bashed
on the considerations that follow.
I.Legal Background
1. The background part of the Judgment in the case at hand comprises
two parts : “A. The break -up of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and emergence of new States” ; and “B. The situation in
Croatia”.
It consists almost entirely of a statement of facts of a historical and h
political nature, neglecting at the same time the relevant legal facts whhich,
in my opinion, not only should constitute a part of the “background”h,
but without which the causes of the Yugoslav crisis and the civil war inh
Croatia can hardly be understood. The only relevant legal fact stated inh
the “background” part of the Judgment is the assertion of the Resphondent
that the “Croatian Serbs considered that the adoption of this new Conhsti -
tution [of Croatia on 22 December 1990] deprived them of certain basic
rights and removed their status as a constituent nation of Croatia” (hJudg -
ment, para. 64).
The relevant legal facts, together with other facts, can only be helpfulh
in the creation of a full picture of the background of the case.
1. Constitutional Concept of the Yugoslav State and
of Croatia as a Federal Unit
2. The legal facts relate to the domestic law of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and that of the Socialist Republic of
Croatia in force during the relevant period.
452
7 CIJ1077.indb 900 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 451
2. Un génocide a-t-il été commis en Croatie ? 107-114
3. Question de l’incitation à commettre le génocide 115
3.1. Question de l’incitation à commettre le génocide en
tant que crime inchoatif 116
3.2. L’incitation au sens du litt. c) de l’articleII de la
Convention 116-119
3.3. L’idéologie oustachie en tant qu’idéologie génocidaire 120-124
3.4. Proclamation de l’« Etat indépendant de Croatie »
(NDH) : l’idéologie oustachie devient politique d’Etat 125-128
3.5. La Croatie de Tudjman et l’héritage du NDH 129-133
3.6. Emblèmes d’Etat et autres mesures 134-138
3.7. Déclarations de personnalités croates rapprochées de la
jurisprudence du Tribunal
*
Le grand respect dans lequel je tiens la Cour me fait d’autant plus rhegret-
ter de devoir me prévaloir de mon droit d’exposer une opinion indihvi -
duelle fondée sur les considérations qui suivent.
I. Contexte juridique
1. La partie de l’arrêt consacrée au contexte de l’affaire comprhend deux
parties: « A. La dissolution de la République fédérative socialiste de
Yougoslavie et l’émergence de nouveaux Etats »; et « B. La situation en
Croatie».
Elle consiste presque entièrement en une énumération de faits dh’ordre
historique et politique, omettant par là même des faits juridiquesh perti -
nents qui, à mon avis, non seulement devraient faire partie intégrhante de
ce «contexte», mais encore sans lesquels on ne peut guère comprendre les
causes de la crise yougoslave et de la guerre civile en Croatie. L’unhique
fait juridique pertinent mentionné dans cette partie de l’arrêth est la décla-
ration du défendeur, selon laquelle « les Serbes de Croatie considérèrent
que l’adoption de cette Constitution [de Croatie le 22 décembre 19h90] les
privait de certains droits fondamentaux et leur enlevait le statut de nahtion
constitutive de la Croatie » (arrêt, par. 64).
Les faits juridiques pertinents, joints aux autres faits, permettront deh
dresser un tableau plus complet du contexte de la présente affaire.
1. Conception constitutionnelle de l’Etat yougoslave
et de la Croatie en tant qu’unité fédérale
2. Les faits juridiques en question concernent le droit interne de la
République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie (RFSY) et celhui de la
République socialiste de Croatie pendant la période en cause.
452
7 CIJ1077.indb 901 18/04/16 08:54 452 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
In a case like the one at hand, domestic law is highly relevant.
3. The original international legal norm of self -determination of peo -
ples is both incomplete and imperfect, at least when it concerns subjecths
entitled to self -determination in multi -ethnic States and their exercise of
external self-determination infringing upon the territorial integrity of a
State. Given its incompleteness, the original norm of self -determination
of peoples is rendered inapplicable in its respective parts to certain phracti-
cal situations and constitutes a sort of decorative, empty normative strhuc -
ture. Interested entities often refer to it, but it can function only ouhtside the
legal domain, as a convenient cover for an eminently political strategy,h
based on opportuneness and the balance of power.
This implies a need to see the norm of the right to external self -deter-
mination in States composed of more than one people as a complex norm
consisting of two parts : on the one hand, original international legal
norms of the right of peoples to external self -determination, and, on
the other, relevant parts of the internal law of the given State. In this
context, the original international legal norm of the right of peoples
has the role of a general, permissive norm, which assumes an operative
character, the property of a norm which may become effective in the
event that the internal law of a multi -ethnic State has stipulated the right
to external self-determination if it defines the entitlement to it, as well as
the procedure for its exercise. In other words, the relevant provisions h
of internal law are ad casum an integral part of the norm of the right
of peoples to external self-determination. Only in this way does the origi -
nal international legal norm of the right to external self -determination
become applicable at the level of the fundamental premise of the rule ofh
law.
The necessity for such a relationship between international and internalh
laws is rightfully suggested by the following :
“If the rule of law is to be made effective in world affairs it must
cover a wide range of increasingly complex transactions which are
governed partly by international and partly by municipal law . . . It
is therefore important that international courts and tribunals should
be in a position, when adjudicating upon complex international trans-
actions, to apply simultaneously the relevant principles and rules of
international law and the provisions of any system of municipal law
which may be applicable to the particular transaction . . . One of the
essential functions of international law and international organization
is to promote the rule of law within as well as among nations, for only h
on the basis of the rule of law within nations can the rule of law amongh
nations develop and be made secure. International courts and tribu -
nals can contribute to this result more effectively if the extent to whichh
the interpretation and application of municipal law in the course
of their work is a normal and necessary incident of international
adjudication on complex transactions is more fully understood.”
453
7 CIJ1077.indb 902 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 452
Dans une affaire comme celle -ci, le droit interne est très pertinent.
3. La norme juridique internationale originelle qu’est le droit des
peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes est à la fois incomplète et imparfaite, au
moins en ce qui concerne les sujets ayant droit à l’autodétermihnation dans
les Etats multiethniques et l’exercice par ceux -ci de ce droit à l’autodéter -
mination externe lorsque cet exercice porte atteinte à l’intégrhité territo -
riale d’un Etat. Etant incomplète, cette norme est à certains éhgards
inapplicable à certaines situations concrètes et constitue une sorhte de
structure normative décorative et vide. Les entités intéressées l’invoquent
souvent, mais elle ne peut opérer que hors de la sphère juridique, en tant
que façade commode d’une stratégie éminemment politique, rephosant sur
l’opportunité et l’équilibre des puissances.
Cela étant, il faut considérer le droit à l’autodéterminahtion externe
dans les Etats composés de plus d’un peuple comme une norme complehxe
comprenant deux parties : d’une part, la norme juridique internationale
originelle du droit des peuples à l’autodétermination externe eht, de l’autre,
les éléments pertinents du droit interne de l’Etat en cause. Dahns ce
contexte, la norme juridique internationale originelle joue le rôle dh’une
norme générale et permissive, qui assume un caractère opérathionnel et
peut devenir opérante au cas où le droit interne d’un Etat multhiethnique
a prévu le droit à l’autodétermination externe, s’il habihlite à l’exercer et
définit les modalités de son exercice. En d’autres termes, lehs dispositions
pertinentes du droit interne sont dans chaque cas partie intégrante dhe la
norme du droit des peuples à l’autodétermination externe. Ce n’hest que de
cette manière que la norme juridique internationale originelle du drohit à
l’autodétermination externe devient applicable au niveau du postulat fon-
damental de la primauté du droit.
La nécessité d’une telle relation entre droit international et hdroit interne
est à juste titre soulignée par ce qui suit:
« Pour que la primauté du droit régisse la vie internationale, elle
doit englober une vaste gamme d’opérations de plus en plus com -
plexes qui sont régies en partie par le droit international et en parhtie
par le droit interne… Il est donc important que les juridictions et lhes
tribunaux internationaux soient à même, lorsqu’ils statuent surh des
opérations internationales complexes, d’appliquer simultanémenth les
principes et règles pertinents du droit international et les dispositions
du système de droit interne qui peuvent être applicables à l’hopération
en cause… L’une des fonctions essentielles du droit international het
de l’organisation internationale est de promouvoir l’état de drhoit à
l’intérieur des nations et entre elles, car ce n’est que sur lah base de
l’état de droit à l’intérieur des nations que l’étaht de droit entre les
nations peut se développer et être garanti. Les juridictions et lehs tri -
bunaux internationaux peuvent contribuer à ce résultat plus efficace-
ment si la mesure dans laquelle l’interprétation et l’applicatihon du
droit interne dans le cadre de leurs activités sont un corollaire norh -
453
7 CIJ1077.indb 903 18/04/16 08:54 453 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
(C. Wilfred Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication, 1964,
p. 547.)
4. Thus, in the present case, this is not a matter of a conflict between ha
norm of international law and a norm of internal law, a type of case adju-
dicated by several international courts (Greco‑Bulgarian “Communities”,
Advisory Opinion, 1930, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 17, p. 32; Free Zones of
Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of 19 August 1929, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 22, p. 167 T;eatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons
of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932,
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 44, p. 24), but rather of the application of an
international norm of a complex structure, namely a norm that incorpo -
rates relevant norms of internal law relating to external self -determina-
tion. I am of the view that, in this case, the reasoning of the Court inh the
case concerning Brazilian Loans (1929) is relevant.
In that case, the Court pointed out, inter alia, that:
“Once the Court has arrived at the conclusion that it is necessary
to apply the municipal law of a particular country, there seems no
doubt that it must seek to apply it as it would be applied in that
country. It would not be applying the municipal law of a country if
it were to apply it in a manner different from that in which that law
would be applied in the country in which it is in force.
It follows that the Court must pay the utmost regard to the deci -
sions of the municipal courts of a country, for it is with the aid of
their jurisprudence that it will be enabled to decide what are the rulesh
which, in actual fact, are applied in the country the law of which is
recognized as applicable in a given case. If the Court were obliged to
disregard the decisions of municipal courts, the result would be that
it might in certain circumstance apply rules other than those actually
applied ; this would seem to be contrary to the whole theory on which
the application of municipal law is based.
Of course, the Court will endeavour to make a just appreciation of
the jurisprudence of municipal courts. If this is uncertain or divided, h
it will rest with the Court to select the interpretation which it considh-
ers most in conformity with the law. But to compel the Court to
disregard that jurisprudence would not be in conformity with its func-
tion when applying municipal law.” (Brazilian Loans, Judgment
No. 15, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 21, p. 124.)
5. Yugoslavia, both the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the federal Yugo -
slavia constituted after the Second World War, were multinational States
in the factual and constitutional sense.
6. The first constitution of the Yugoslav State — the Constitution of
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, promulgated on 28 June
1921, stipulated that the Kingdom “is a State of Serbs, Croats and Slho -
454
7 CIJ1077.indb 904 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 453
mal et nécessaire du règlement judiciaire international d’opérations
complexes est mieux comprise. » (C. Wilfred Jenks, The Prospects of
International Adjudication, 1964, p. 547.)
4. Ainsi, en la présente affaire, il s’agit non pas d’un conflit hentre une
norme du droit international et une norme du droit interne, un type d’haf -
faire dont ont eu à connaître plusieurs tribunaux internationaux (h« Com‑
munautés » gréco‑bulgares, avis consultatif, 1930, C.P.J.I. série B n o 17,
p. 32 ; Zones franches de la Haute‑Savoie et du Pays de Gex, ordonnance
o
du 19 août 1929, C.P.J.I. série A n 22, p. 167; Traitement des nationaux
polonais et des autres personnes d’origine ou de langue polonaise dan▯s le
territoire de Dantzig, avis consultatif, 1932, C.P.J.I. série A/B n o 44, p. 24),
mais de l’application d’une norme internationale de structure complexe, à
savoir une norme qui englobe des normes de droit interne relatives à h
l’autodétermination externe. J’estime que, en la présente affhaire, le raison -
nement de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale dans l’affaire h
relative aux Emprunts brésiliens (1929) est pertinent.
Dans cette affaire, la Cour a notamment fait observer ce qui suit :
«La Cour étant arrivée à la conclusion qu’il y a lieu d’aphpliquer le
droit interne d’un pays déterminé, il ne semble guère douteux qu’elle
doit s’efforcer de l’appliquer comme on l’appliquerait dans ledit
pays. Ce ne serait pas appliquer un droit interne que de l’appliquer
d’une manière différente de celle dont il serait appliqué danhs le pays
où il est en vigueur.
Il s’ensuit que la Cour doit tenir le plus grand compte de la juris -
prudence nationale, car c’est à l’aide de cette jurisprudence qhu’elle
pourra déterminer quelles sont vraiment les règles qui, en fait, shont
appliquées dans le pays dont le droit est reconnu applicable en l’hes -
pèce. Si la Cour était mise dans la nécessité de faire abstrhaction de la
jurisprudence, le résultat en serait qu’elle pourrait éventuellhement
appliquer d’autres règles que celles effectivement appliquées ; cela
semblerait aller à l’encontre de l’idée même qui est àh la base de l’ap -
plication du droit interne.
Sans doute, la Cour appréciera librement la jurisprudence natio -
nale. Si celle-ci est incertaine ou partagée, il appartiendra à la Cour
de choisir l’interprétation qu’elle croit être la plus confohrme à la loi.
Mais il ne serait pas conforme à la fonction qu’exerce la Cour lors -
qu’elle applique une loi nationale que de l’obliger à faire abshtraction
o
de la jurisprudence. » ( Emprunts brésiliens, arrêt n 15, 1929,
C.P.J.I. série A n o 21, p. 124.)
5. La Yougoslavie, c’est -à-dire tant le Royaume de Yougoslavie que la
Yougoslavie fédérale créée après la seconde guerre mondiahle, était consti -
tuée d’Etats multinationaux au sens propre et au sens constitutionhnel.
6. La première Constitution de l’Etat yougoslave, la Constitution du h
Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, promulguée le 28 juin 1921,
définissait le Royaume comme « un Etat de Serbes, Croates et Slovènes,
454
7 CIJ1077.indb 905 18/04/16 08:54 454 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
venes, a constitutional, parliamentary and hereditary monarchy. The offih -
cial State name is : Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” Article 3 of
the Constitution provided that the “official language of the Kingdom will
be Serb-Croat-Slovenian”.
7. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia of 3 September
1931 did not indicate expressis verbis its constitutive peoples. They were
mentioned only indirectly, as, for example, in the provision of Article 3 of
the Constitution stipulating that the “official language of the Kinghdom
will be Serb-Croat-Slovenian”.
8. The resolution constituting Yugoslavia on the federal principle,
approved by the Second Conference of the Anti -Fascist Council of
National Liberation of Yugoslavia on 29 November 1943, said inter alia,
“By virtue of the right of each people to self -determination includ-
ing the right to separation or unification with other peoples . . . the
Anti‑Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia passes the
following :
RESOLUTION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(2) To effectuate the principle of sovereignty of the peoples of Yugosla
via, . . . Yugoslavia is being constructed and will be constructed on
the federal principle which will secure full equality to Serbs, Croats,
Slovenians, Macedonians and Montenegrins.” (Emphasis added.)
9. The Declaration on Basic Rights of Peoples and Citizens of the
Democratic Croatia, adopted at the Third Assembly of State Anti-Fascist
Council of National Liberation of Croatia on 9 May 1944 stipulated in
Article I that “Croatian and Serbian people in Croatia are completely
equal” (Decision on building up Yugoslavia on the federal principle,h Offi ‑
cial Gazette [of DFI], No. 1/1945).
At its last meeting ZAVNOH (The State Anti-Fascist Council of
National Liberation of Croatia) changed its name to the National Parliah-
ment of Croatia.
10. The first Constitution of the Federal Yugoslavia of 1946, in its
Article 1, defined the Federal Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia as
“a federal peoples’ State in the form of a Republic, a community of
peoples who have expressed their will, based on the right to self‑deter ‑
mination, including the right to separation to live together in a federal
State” (emphasis added).
11. In the second Constitution of 1963, the Federation was defined as
a : “Federal State freely unified and equal peoples and a Socialist Demo -
cratic community based on the rule of working people and self -govern-
ment.” (Emphasis added.)
455
7 CIJ1077.indb 906 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 454
monarchie héréditaire, constitutionnelle et parlementaire. Son nom offi -
ciel est: Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes. » Selon l’article 3 de la
Constitution, « la langue officielle du Royaume est le serbe -croate-
slovène».
7. La Constitution du Royaume de Yougoslavie du 3 septembre 1931
n’en indiquait pas nommément les peuples constitutifs. Il n’éhtait question
de ceux-ci que de manière indirecte, par exemple à l’article 3, qui dispo -
sait que « la langue officielle du Royaume [est] le serbe -croate-slovène».
8. La résolution organisant la Yougoslavie selon le principe fédérhal,
approuvée le 29 novembre 1943 à la deuxième conférence du conseil anti -
fasciste de libération nationale de la Yougoslavie, contenait notammehnt
cette disposition:
«En vertu du droit qu’a chaque peuple de disposer de lui -même, y
compris le droit de se séparer d’autres peuples ou de s’unir avhec
eux … le conseil antifasciste de libération nationale de la Yougoslavie
adopte la présente
RÉSOLUTION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2) Pour donner effet au principe de la souveraineté des peuples de
Yougoslavie, … la Yougoslavie est et sera édifiée selon le principe
fédératif qui garantit la pleine égalité des Serbes, Croatesh, Slovènes,
Macédoniens et Monténégrins.» (Les italiques sont de moi.)
9. La déclaration des droits fondamentaux des peuples et citoyens de la h
Croatie démocratique, adoptée le 9 mai 1944 par la troisième assemblée
du conseil d’Etat antifasciste de libération nationale de la Croatie, procla -
mait en son article premier que « le peuple croate et le peuple serbe sont
pleinement égaux en Croatie » (résolution portant constitution de la You-
goslavie selon le principe fédératif, Journal officiel de la Fédération you ‑
goslave, no 1/1945).
A sa dernière réunion, le conseil d’Etat antifasciste de libéhration natio-
nale de la Croatie (ZAVNOH) a pris le nom de Parlement national de
Croatie.
10. La première Constitution de la Yougoslavie fédérative, celle
de 1946, définissait en son article premier la République populaireh fédéra -
tive de Yougoslavie comme
«un Etat fédéral populaire à forme républicaine, une communau▯té de
peuples égaux qui, en vertu du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux‑mêmes,
y compris celui de sécession, ont exprimé leur volonté de vivreh
ensemble dans un Etat fédéral » (les italiques sont de moi).
11. Dans la seconde Constitution, celle de 1963, la Fédération était
définie comme un « Etat fédéral constitué de peuples égaux librement unis,
[une] communauté démocratique socialiste fondée sur le pouvoir hdes tra-
vailleurs et l’autonomie politique » (les italiques sont de moi).
455
7 CIJ1077.indb 907 18/04/16 08:54 455 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Article 1 of the Constitution of Croatia of 1963 qualified it as “a State
Socialist democratic community of peoples of Croatia, based on the rule
of working people and self-government” (emphasis added).
12. The Constitution of the SFRY of 1974 begins with Chapter I of the
Basic Principles, which was worded as follows :
“The peoples of Yugoslavia, starting from the right of each nation to
self‑determination, including the right to secession, on the grounds of
their will freely expressed in the joint struggle of all peoples and
nationalities in the national liberation war and socialist revolution. . .
have created a socialist federal community of working peoples — the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”
In Chapter VII of the “Basic Principles”, it is stated, inter alia that the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) upholds :
“— the right of each people freely to determine and build its social
and political order by ways of and means freely chosen ;
— the right of people to self -determination and national inde -
pendence and the right to wage a liberation war, in pursuit of
their causes;
— regard for generally accepted norms of international law.”
The Constitution of the SFRY in its operative part, defined it as a
“federal State, a state community of freely united peoples and their
socialist republics. . . based on the rule and self -management of the
working class and of all working people and the socialist sel-fmanaged
democratic community of working people and citizens and equal peo -
ples and nationalities” (Article 1 of the Constitution).
13. The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia laid
down, in Article 1, paragraph 2, that : “The Socialist Republic of Croatia
is the national State of the Croatian people, the State of 1he Serbian p▯eople
in Croatia and the State of all nationalities living in it.”
In the practice and legal terminology of the SFRY, the word “nation -
alities” denoted national minorities. The rationale of this terminolohgical
substitution led to the perception of the expression “national minorihties”
as a pejorative one.
14. It seems clear that a consistently undeniable fact underlies the
broad spectrum of changes that have affected the Yugoslav State since itsh
inception in 1918, functioning as a point of departure, explicit or implhicit,
1 Zemaljsko Antifascisticko vijece naroduoy slobodenja Hrvatske-Zboruk dokhumenala
1944 (Od 1. Sijcnja do. 9 Sorbuja), Zagreb, 1970, p. 666.
456
7 CIJ1077.indb 908 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 455
L’article premier de la Constitution de la Croatie de 1963 qualifiait
celle-ci de «communauté socialiste démocratique constituée d’un Etat des
peuples de Croatie, fondée sur le pouvoir des travailleurs et l’autonomieh
politique » (les italiques sont de moi).
12. La Constitution de 1974 de la RFSY commence par un exposé de
« Principes fondamentaux», dont le chapitre I se lit comme suit:
«Les peuples de Yougoslavie, partant du droit de chaque nation à
l’autodétermination, y compris le droit à la sécession, en vertu de leur
volonté librement exprimée dans la lutte commune de tous les peuplhes
et de toutes les nationalités au cours de la guerre de libération hnatio-
nale et de la révolution socialiste … ont créé une communauté fédé -
rale socialiste de travailleurs, la République fédérative socialiste de
Yougoslavie. »
Le chapitre VII de ces « Principes fondamentaux » déclare notamment
que la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie reconnaîht
«— le droit qu’a chaque peuple de décider et d’édifier libremhent et
par les moyens de son choix son ordre social et politique ;
— le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes et à accéder à l’in -
dépendance nationale, et leur droit de mener une guerre de
libération pour réaliser ces fins ;
— le devoir de respecter les règles de droit international générahle -
ment reconnues ».
Dans le corps de ses dispositions, la Constitution définit la RFSY de la
manière suivante:
« un Etat fédéral — communauté étatique de peuples librement unis et
de leurs républiques socialistes … fondée sur le pouvoir et l’autoges -
tion de la classe ouvrière et de tous les travailleurs, et communautéh
démocratique autogestionnaire socialiste de travailleurs et de
citoyens, de peuples et de nationalités égaux en droits » (articlepre-
mier de la Constitution).
13. La Constitution de 1974 de la République socialiste de Croatie dis-
pose, au paragraphe 2 de son article premier, que « [l]a République socia-
liste de Croatie est l’Etat national du peuple croate, l’Etat 1u peuple ser▯be
en Croatie et l’Etat de toutes les nationalités qui y vivent.
Dans la pratique et la terminologie juridiques de la RFSY, le mot
« nationalités» désignait les minorités nationales. Le raisonnement
sous-tendant cette substitution terminologique explique que l’expression
«minorités nationales» ait pu passer pour péjorative.
14. Il est un fait, depuis toujours indéniable, que l’on retrouve soush
tous les changements, fort variés, qu’a connus 1’Etat yougoslavhe depuis
sa création en 1918 et qui a été, implicitement ou explicitement, à la base
1 Zemaljsko Antifascisticko vijece naroduoy slobodenja Hrvatske-Zboruk dokhumenala
1944 (Od 1. Sijcnja do. 9 Sorbuja), Zagreb, 1970, p. 666.
456
7 CIJ1077.indb 909 18/04/16 08:54 456 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
of all constitutional solutions : that is that Yugoslavia has primarily been a
community of peoples since its birth.
The subject of changes was the number of constitutive peoples (in the
constitutional practice and the theory of constitutional law of federal h
Yugoslavia, the term “constituent nations” is the synonym of the therm
“peoples” equipped with the right to self -determination). At the moment
of its inception in 1918, Yugoslavia was a community of three constitu -
tive peoples (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes). The Federal Constitution ofh
1946 recognized the status of constitutive peoples of Macedonians and
Montenegrins, who used to be regarded as parts of the Serbian national
corps. Finally, the Constitution of 1963 included Muslims in the rank of
constitutive peoples.
15. Federal Yugoslavia was formed under the resolution of the Second
Conference of the Anti -Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugo -
slavia in 1943, as a community of sovereign and equal peoples, while subse ‑
quent constitutional intervention created republics, as federal units. Thus,
like the rest of the republics, Croatia was formally brought into being hby
its Constitution of 1946, although temporary authorities had been createhd
by the ZAVNOH resolution in 1944.
16. In the light of constitutional solutions the qualification of Croatia as▯
a union of nations, personal sui generis, is the closest to the real state of
affairs. Such a qualification was justified by several facts of fundamentalh
importance.
Firstly, in the light of both norms and facts, Croatia was a community
of two peoples, Croats and Serbs, as well as a community of nationalities
(national minorities).
Secondly, the SFRY Constitution of 1974 and the Constitution of the
Socialist Republic of Croatia promulgated the same year, defined the
right to self -determination as a subjective, collective right of peoples.
Such a provision was consigned in earlier constitutions. It derives fromh
the very nature of the matter. The subject entitled to self-determination is,
by definition, a people. It is yet another question that as the right hto
self-determination is exercised on the given territory, the consequences of
the exercised right to self -determination are territorialized. Overlapping
of the right to self -determination and territorialization occurs, as a rule,
in single‑people communities, and it follows that formulations which recog ‑
nize the right to a territorial entity are colloquial formulations. However,
in multi-ethnic communities composed of two or more peoples provided
with equal rights, a territory is exclusively an area where equal rightsh of
self-determination are exercised.
Thirdly, in the light of the relevant constitution provisions, both
federal and that of Croatia, it seems clear that Croatia, as a federal
unit, was not equipped with a right to self -determination that would
include the right to secession. The Yugoslav federal units possessed no
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7 CIJ1077.indb 910 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 456
de toutes les configurations constitutionnelles de cet Etat, à savoir que la
Yougoslavie a toujours été essentiellement, depuis sa naissance, u▯ne commu‑
nauté de peuples.
Ce qui a changé, c’est le nombre de peuples constitutifs (dans l’usage
constitutionnel en vigueur en Yougoslavie fédérative, aussi bien que dans
la théorie du droit applicable, l’expression « nation constitutive » était
synonyme de peuple doté du droit à l’autodétermination). Auh moment de
sa création, en 1918, la Yougoslavie était une communauté de trois
peuples: les Serbes, les Croates et les Slovènes. La Constitution fédéhrale
de 1946 a reconnu la qualité de peuple constitutif aux Macédoniens eth aux
Monténégro, considérés jusque -là comme faisant partie de l’ensemble
national serbe. Enfin, la Constitution de 1963 a fait figurer les Musul -
mans parmi les peuples constitutifs.
15. La Yougoslavie fédérative s’est formée, aux termes de la réhsolution
adoptée en 1943 par la deuxième conférence du conseil antifasciste de
libération nationale de la Yougoslavie, en tant que communauté de peuples
souverains et égaux, et ce sont des initiatives constitutionnelles ul▯térieures
qui ont institué les républiques, en tant qu’entités fédé▯rales. Ainsi donc,
comme les autres républiques, la Croatie est officiellement née de la
Constitution de 1946 — bien que des autorités provisoires eussent été
mises en place par la résolution de 1944 du ZAVNOH.
16. A considérer ces solutions constitutionnelles, qualifier la Croatie
d’union de nations, de fédération personnelle sui generis, est ce qui se rap ‑
proche le plus du véritable état de choses. Une telle qualification est justi -
fiée par plusieurs éléments factuels d’importance fondamenhtale.
En premier lieu, du point de vue du droit comme du point de vue des
faits, la Croatie était une communauté de deux peuples, les Croatehs et
les Serbes, ainsi qu’une communauté de nationalités (minorités nationales).
En deuxième lieu, la Constitution de 1974 de la RFSY et la Constitu -
tion de la République socialiste de Croatie promulguée la même hannée
définissaient le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux -mêmes comme un droit
des peuples subjectif et collectif. Cette disposition était reprise des hConst-i
tutions antérieures. Elle répond à la nature même de la situhation. Le sujet
investi du droit à disposer de lui -même est, par définition, un peuple.
Cependant, lorsque le droit à disposer de soi -même est exercé sur un
territoire donné, les conséquences de l’exercice de ce droit sohnt « territo -
rialisées». En règle générale, le droit à l’autodétermination et la « territo-
rialisation» coïncident dans le cas de communautés composées d’un seul
peuple, et il s’ensuit que les formulations qui reconnaissent le droi▯t à une
entité territoriale ne sont qu’une commodité de langage. Mais, dans le cas
de communautés multiethniques, composées de deux ou plusieurs peuphles
dotés de droits égaux, le territoire n’est que le champ matéhriel de l’exer -
cice de droits égaux à l’autodétermination.
En troisième lieu, compte tenu des dispositions pertinentes de la Conhs-ti
tution fédérale et de la Constitution de la Croatie, il apparaît clairement
que la Croatie, en tant qu’unité fédérale, n’avait pas le bénéfice d’un droit
à l’autodétermination qui inclurait le droit de faire sécession. Les unités
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7 CIJ1077.indb 911 18/04/16 08:54 457 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
right to secession, for that right was absolutely reserved for constitutive
peoples.
Fourthly, the constitutional system of the Socialist Republic of Croatiah
designed the right to self -determination as a collective, subjective right of
Croatian and Serb people in Croatia, which is, by its nature, inalienable.
However, the Constitution of Croatia of 1990 deprived the Serbs in Croa -
tia of the status of a people equipped with the right to self -determination
and illegally transformed them into a national minority.
The proposal to resolve the controversies surrounding the exercise of
the right to external self -determination constitutione artis, namely via a
corresponding constitutional revision, was contained in the “Concept hfor
the Future Organization of the State Proposed by a Working Group
Comprising Representatives of All the Republics as a Basis for Further
Talks between the Republican President and the State Presidency”.
Starting from the basic premise that :
“The Yugoslav State community, seen as a Federal State of equal
citizens and equal peoples and their republics [footnote commentary :
Kasim Trnka from Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed that the repub -
lics be placed first] and as a democratic State, will be founded on
human and civil rights and liberties, the rule of law and social justiceh”,
the “Concept” contains a part entitled “Proposed Procedure for hDissocia -
tion from Yugoslavia” which reads :
“In connection with initiatives in certain republics for secession
from Yugoslavia, that is, the ‘disunion’ of the country, and in vihew
of the general demand for a peaceful, democratic and constitutional
resolution of the constitutional crisis, the question of procedure arisehs
with regard to the possible realization of these initiatives. The aim ofh
the initiatives is the withdrawal of certain republics from the Socialisht
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They are based on the permanent
and inalienable right of peoples to self -determination and should be
constitutionally regulated. The right of peoples to self-determination,
as one of the universal rights of modern law, is set out in the basic
principles of the SFRY Constitution. However, the realization of the
right of peoples to secession, which includes the possibility of certainh
republics’ withdrawal from the SFRY, is not regulated by the SFRY
Constitution. It is therefore necessary to amend the SFRY Constitu -
tion in order to create a basis for exercising this right. Revision of thhe
SFRY Constitution on these lines should be based on the democratic
nature of the entire process of statement of views, the equality of the h
Yugoslav people, the protection of fundamental human and civil
rights and freedoms, and the principle of the peaceful resolution of
all disputes. In keeping with the above, appropriate amendments
should be made to the SFRY Constitution which would in a general
manner regulate the procedure for the execution of the right of
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7 CIJ1077.indb 912 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 457
fédérales yougoslaves n’avaient nullement le droit de sécesshion, ce droit
étant absolument réservé aux peuples constitutifs.
En quatrième lieu, le régime constitutionnel de la République shocialiste
de Croatie concevait le droit à l’autodétermination comme un drhoit col -
lectif et subjectif des peuples croate et serbe de Croatie, droit qui, dhe par
sa nature même, était inaliénable. Or, la Constitution croate dhe 1990 a
privé les Serbes de Croatie de leur statut de peuple doté du droith à l’auto -
détermination, pour les transformer illégalement en minorité nahtionale.
Une proposition tendant à résoudre la controverse que soulevait l’hexe-r
cice du droit à l’autodétermination externe constitutione artis, c’est-à-dire
par voie de revision constitutionnelle, figurait dans les « Principes d’orga-
nisation de 1’Etat futur proposés par le groupe de travail des rephrésen -
tants de toutes les républiques pour servir de base aux pourparlers àh venir
entre le président de la République et la présidence de l’Ethat ».
Ce texte, qui part du postulat que
«[l]a communauté d’Etat yougoslave, considérée comme un Etat h
fédéral de citoyens égaux et de peuples égaux et de leurs réhpubliques
[en note: Kasim Trnka, Bosnie -Herzégovine, propose de nommer les
républiques en premier] et comme un Etat démocratique, sera fondéhe
sur les droits civils et les libertés fondamentales, l’empire du dhroit et
la justice sociale,
comprend une partie intitulée « Projet de procédure de dissociation de la
Yougoslavie», qui se lit comme suit :
« Les initiatives prises par certaines républiques pour faire séces -
sion de la Yougoslavie, c’est -à-dire pour se «dissocier» du pays, et la
pressante volonté générale d’apporter une solution pacifiqhue, démo-
cratique et constitutionnelle à la crise constitutionnelle soulèvent la
question des procédures selon lesquelles ces initiatives pourraient she
concrétiser. Ces initiatives ont pour objet le retrait de certaines répu -
bliques de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie. hElles
s’appuient sur le droit imprescriptible et permanent des peuples àh di-s
poser d’eux -mêmes et devraient être régies par la Constitution. Le
droit des peuples à disposer d’eux -mêmes, qui fait partie des droits
universels en droit moderne, figure parmi les principes fondamentaux
de la Constitution de la RFSY. Pourtant, l’exercice du droit des
peuples de faire sécession, qui comporte le droit pour certaines répu -
bliques de se dissocier de la RFSY, n’est pas réglementé par lah
Constitution de celle -ci. Il faut donc amender cette Constitution afin
d’y créer les fondements de l’exercice de ce droit. La revisionh en ce
sens de la Constitution de la RFSY devrait être fondée sur le proches -
sus démocratique d’expression des idées, l’égalité des nations yougo -
slaves, la protection des libertés fondamentales et des droits civilsh et
de l’homme, et le principe du règlement pacifique des différenhds.
Conformément à ce qui précède, il conviendrait d’apporterh à la
Constitution de la RFSY tels amendements qui fixeraient d’une
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7 CIJ1077.indb 913 18/04/16 08:54 458 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
peoples to secession and thereby the withdrawal of certain republics
from the SFRY.
The amendments to the SFRY Constitution should express the fol-
lowing commitments :
1. The right to launch the initiative for a certain republic to withdraw
from the SFRY is vested in the Assembly of the respective repub-
lic, except if otherwise regulated by the republican constitution.
2. A decision on the initiative is taken at a referendum at which the
free, direct and secret voting of all citizens of the republic is
ensured.
3. During the preparations for the referendum, the public and voters
will be informed objectively and on time of the importance and
the consequences of the referendum.
4. The referendum will be monitored by representatives of the
Assembly of Yugoslavia and, possibly, representatives of other
republics and interested international institutions.
5. A decision will be deemed adopted if it receives more than one
half of the votes of all registered voters.
6. In republics populated by members of several Yugoslav nations,
the necessary majority will be established for each Yugoslav
nation separately. If one nation votes against, all settlements in
which this nation is predominant and which border on the remain -
ing territory of Yugoslavia and can constitute its territorial com -
pactness will remain part of the SFRY. [. . .]
8. The Assembly of the republic will inform the public and the
Assembly of Yugoslavia of the result of the referendum, and will
submit to the Assembly of Yugoslavia a proposal to adopt a con-
stitutional enactment on the withdrawal of the respective republic
from the SFRY, in accordance with the will of the people expressed
at the referendum.
9. The Assembly of Yugoslavia acknowledges the legality and legit-
imacy of the expressed will of the people and members of nations,
and instructs the Federal Government to carry out the necessary
preparations for the adoption of the enactment on withdrawal
from the SFRY.
In this context, the Federal Government is obligated to :
(a) prepare a proposal for the division of jointly created values and
the property of the federation (movable and immovable property)
in the country and abroad registered as the property of the fed -
eration; international obligations and claims ; assets of the
National Bank of Yugoslavia ; foreign currency, commodity and
monetary reserves of the federation, property of the Yugoslav
People’s Army, archives of Yugoslavia, certain infrastructure
facilities, licenses and other rights and obligations ensuing from
ratified international conventions. The Federal Government pro-
posal would also include issues relating to citizenship, pension
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7 CIJ1077.indb 914 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 458
manière générale la procédure d’exercice du droit des peuhples de faire
sécession et, ainsi, du retrait de certaines républiques de la RFShY.
Les amendements à la Constitution de la RFSY devraient fixer les
dispositions suivantes:
1. Le droit d’une république de prendre l’initiative de se retirerh de la
RFSY est dévolu à l’assemblée de la république considéhrée, sauf
si la Constitution de cette république en dispose autrement.
2. Le sort de cette initiative est réglé par référendum, avec gharantie
de participation libre, directe et secrète de tous les citoyens de lah
république.
3. Au cours des préparatifs du référendum, les populations et l’hélec-
torat seront informés objectivement et en temps utile de l’impor -
tance et des conséquences du référendum.
4. Le référendum sera contrôlé par des représentants de l’hAssemblée
yougoslave et, si possible, par des représentants des autres répu -
bliques et des institutions internationales compétentes.
5. Une décision est réputée prise si plus de la moitié des éhlecteurs
inscrits votent en sa faveur.
6. Dans les républiques où résident des membres de plusieurs natiohns
yougoslaves, la majorité est calculée séparément pour chacunhe des
nations. Si une nation vote contre, toutes les localités où cette h
nation est prépondérante et qui sont limitrophes du reste du ter -
ritoire yougoslave et peuvent s’intégrer dans sa masse territorialhe
continuent de faire partie de la RFSY. […]
8. L’assemblée de la république informera les populations et l’hAs -
semblée yougoslave des résultats du référendum et présenthera à
l’Assemblée yougoslave une proposition d’acte constitutionnel dhe
retraitde la république considérée de la RFSY, conformément à
la volonté exprimée par le peuple à l’occasion du réféhrendum.
9. L’Assemblée yougoslave reconnaît la légalité et la léghitimité de la
volonté exprimée par le peuple et les membres des nations, et
donne pour instructions au gouvernement fédéral de préparer le h
retrait formel de la république considérée de la RFSY.
A cette fin, le gouvernement fédéral a l’obligation de :
a) rédiger un projet de répartition des intérêts et des biens chommuns
de la Fédération (meubles et immeubles) situés dans le pays eht à
l’étranger, et officiellement réputés propriété de lah Fédération; des
obligations et des créances internationales ; des biens de labanque
nationale de Yougoslavie ; des devises étrangères, des marchan -
dises et des réserves monétaires de la Fédération ; des biens de
l’armée populaire yougoslave ; des archives de la Yougoslavie ; de
certains ouvrages d’infrastructure, des droits de licence et autres, h
et des obligations découlant des conventions internationales rati -
fiées. Dans ce projet, le gouvernement règle aussi les questionsh de
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7 CIJ1077.indb 915 18/04/16 08:54 459 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
and other rights of citizens and the like. This requires the estab -
lishment of common responsibility for the obligations and guar -
antees of the SFRY toward foreign countries ;
(b) propose to the Assembly of Yugoslavia the manner of the election
and authorization of a parity body or committee which will pre -
pare a proposal for the division of rights and obligations and
submit it to the Assembly of Yugoslavia ;
(c) prepare proposals for the territorial demarcation and the frontiers
of the future States and other issues of importance for formulat -
ing the enactment on withdrawal.
10. On the basis of the Federal Government proposals regarding
material and territorial issues, the Assembly of Yugoslavia will for -
mulate, with the consent of the republican assemblies, a constitutio -
nal enactment (constitutional law) on withdrawal from the SFRY
which, among other things, establishes :
— citizens’ right of choice (term and manner in which citizens will
state their choice in the event of territorial changes), and the
obligation to ensure just compensation for change of residence);
— the obligation to provide judicial protection of the rights of
citizens, legal entities and members of certain nations (compen-
sation for damages resulting directly from the execution of the
right to withdrawal, etc.) ;
— the obligation to harmonize certain laws and other enactments
with changes in the structure of the SFRY ;
— supervision and control of the enforcement of determined obli-
gations;
— other issues which must be resolved by the time of the definitive
disassociation (judiciary, environment protection, joint ven -
tures and the like) ;
— the transitional period and the moment of disassociation from
the SFRY. If the result of the referendum is negative, the same
initiative may be launched after the expiry of a period of five
years.” (Focus, Special Issue, January 1992, pp. 31-33.)
17. The proposal offered the peaceful change, the possibility of resolv -
ing the crisis constituzionertis, for the exercise of right to self-determina-
tion should be carried out according to the following pattern :
“Whether the federation dissolves into two or more States also
brings into focus the doctrine of self -determination in the form of
secession. Such a dissolution may be the result of an amicable and con ‑
stitutional agreement or may occur pursuant to a forceful exercise of
secession. In the latter case, international legal rules may be pleaded i▯ n
aid, but the position would seem to be that (apart from recognized colo‑▯
nial situations) there is no right of self‑determination applicable to inde‑
pendent States that would justify the resort to secession.” (M.N. Shaw,
International Law, 2008, p. 218 ; emphasis added.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 916 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 459
citoyenneté, de pensions de retraite, de droits civils et autres, d’hoù
la reconnaissance d’une responsabilité commune dans les obliga -
tions par lesquelles la RFSY est liée à des pays étrangers;
b) proposer à l’Assemblée yougoslave les modalités d’élection et le
mandat de l’organe ou comité paritaire qui sera chargé de réhdiger
un projet de répartition des droits et des obligations, et de le préh-
senter à l’Assemblée yougoslave ;
c) proposer la délimitation des territoires et la démarcation des froh-n
tières des futurs Etats et la solution des autres grands problèmesh
soulevés par l’acte formel de retrait.
10. Au vu des propositions du gouvernement fédéral concernant
lesproblèmes matériels et territoriaux, l’Assemblée yougoslave éla -
bore, avec l’assentiment des assemblées républicaines, un amendhe -
ment constitutionnel (loi constitutionnelle) portant acte de sécesshion
de la RFSY ; cet amendement règle, entre autres questions :
— le droit des citoyens de choisir (conditions et modalités du
choix en cas de changement territorial) et l’obligation d’accor -
der une juste réparation en cas de changement de résidence ;
— l’obligation de garantir la protection de la justice aux citoyens,
personnes morales et membres de certaines nations (répara -
tion des préjudices qui résultent directement de l’exercice du h
droit de sécession, etc.) ;
— l’obligation de mettre certaines lois et actes publics en confor -
mité avec la structure de la RSFY telle que modifiée ;
— la surveillance et le contrôle de l’accomplissement d’obliga -
tions déterminées;
— les autres questions qui doivent être résolues avant la dissocia -
tion définitive (concernant notamment l’appareil judiciaire, lah
protection de l’environnement, les coentreprises, etc.) ;
— la période de transition et le moment exact de la dissociation
de la RFSY. Si le résultat du référendum est négatif, la mêhme
initiative peut être reprise à l’expiration d’un délai deh cinq
(Focus, numéro spécial, janvier 1992, p. 31-33.)
17. Cette proposition offrait des perspectives de changement pacifique
et une possibilité de résoudre la crise constitutione artis, car l’exercice du
droit des peuples à disposer d’eux -mêmes doit suivre le schéma suivant :
«La dissolution de la fédération en deux Etats ou davantage fait
aussi passer au premier plan le problème théorique de l’autodéhtermi -
nation sous forme de sécession. Cette dissolution peut être le résultat
d’un accord amiable constitutionnel, ou le résultat d’un ac▯ sécession
par la force. Dans ce dernier cas, les règles du droit international
peuvent être invoquées, mais, hormis les situations coloniales▯ nnues,
il semble qu’il n’y ait pas de droit à l’autodétermi▯ applicable à des
Etats indépendants qui justifie le recours à la sécess» (M. N. Shaw,
International Law, 2008, p.218 ; les italiques sont de moi.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 917 18/04/16 08:54 460 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
2. Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the SFRY
18. The Constitutional Court of the SFRY was designed as the guard -
ian of constitutionality and legality in the legal system of the SFRY. Iht
consisted of a President and thirteen judges elected according to the fohl -
lowing formula: two from each Republic and one from each autonomous
province (Article 381 of the Constitution of the SFRY).
19. The Federal Executive Council (the Government of the SFRY),
headed by Croat Ante Markovic, instituted proceedings before the Con -
stitutional Court of Yugoslavia for the assessment of the constitutionalhity
of the Declaration on the Proclamation of Sovereign and Independent
Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine — Official Journal of the Republic
of Croatia, No. 31/91).
In the view of the Government of the SFRY,
“the Declaration on the Proclamation of Sovereign and Independent
Republic of Croatia, in particular its Parts III, IV and V are not [. . .]
in accordance with the Constitution of the SFRY and is contrary to
the federal laws regulating the fields of national defence, security, h
foreign affairs and public administration because the right to self -
determination, including the right to secession, can be realized only
under the conditions, via the procedure and in the manner determined
by agreement of all the Republics, in accordance with the Constitu -
tion of the SFRY”.
19.1. Part III of the Declaration on the Proclamation of Sovereign and
Independent Republic of Croatia stated inter alia:
“The Republic of Croatia guarantees to Serbs in Croatia and to all
national minorities living on its territory respect for all human and
civil rights, particularly freedom of speech and the cultivation of theihr
own languages and promotion of their cultures, and freedom to form
political organizations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Republic of Croatia in its capacity of the legal successor of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia guarantees to all
States and international organizations that it will fully and conscien -
tiously exercise all rights and perform all obligations in the part relah -t
ing to the Republic of Croatia.”
Part IV of the Declaration said :
“The Constitutions of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia
and of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia granted the
Republic of Croatia the right to self -determination and secession.
Being established as an independent and sovereign State, the Rep -
ublic of Croatia, which has up till now realized part of its sovereign
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7 CIJ1077.indb 918 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 460
2. Arrêts de la Cour constitutionnelle de la RSFY
18. Dans l’ordre juridique yougoslave, la Cour constitutionnelle de la
RSFY était le garant de la constitutionnalité et de la légalitéh. Elle était
composée d’un président et de treize juges élus selon la formule suivante :
deux juges par république et un par province autonome (article 381 de la
Constitution de la RSFY).
19. Le conseil exécutif fédéral (à savoir le gouvernement de lah RFSY),
présidé par le Croate Ante Markovic, a attaqué devant la Cour constitu -
tionnelle yougoslave la constitutionnalité de la déclaration relathive à la
proclamation de la souveraineté et de l’indépendance de la République de
Croatie (Narodne novine (Journal officiel), n 31/91).
De l’avis du gouvernement de la RFSY,
«la déclaration relative à la proclamation de la souveraineté eth de
l’indépendance de la République de Croatie, en particulier ses h
titres III, IV et V, n’est pas conforme à la Constitution de la RFSY
et est contraire aux lois fédérales relatives à la défense nhationale et à
la sécurité nationale, aux affaires étrangères et à l’admihnistration
publique, étant donné que le droit à l’autodétermination,h y compris
le droit de faire sécession, ne peut être exercé que sous les chonditions
et suivant la procédure et les modalités convenues entre toutes lehs
républiques, comme le prévoit la Constitution de la RFSY ».
19.1. Le titreIII de la déclaration relative à la proclamation de la sou -
veraineté et de l’indépendance de la République de Croatie dhisposait
notamment que
«[l]a République de Croatie garantit aux Serbes de Croatie et à l’hen-
semble des minorités nationales vivant sur son territoire le respect de
tous les droits civils et humains, en particulier la liberté d’exphression,
la pratique de leurs propres langues et le renforcement de leurs
cultures, ainsi que la liberté de constituer des organisations politihques
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
La République de Croatie, en sa qualité de successeur légal de hl’an -
cienne République fédérale socialiste de Yougoslavie, assure àh l’en -
semble des Etats et des organisations internationales qu’elle en exerhcera
pleinement et en toute conscience tous les droits et en remplira toutes
les obligations pour autant que ceux-ci relèvent de la Croatie.»
Le titre IV de la déclaration affirmait ce qui suit :
« Les Constitutions de la République fédérative populaire de You -
goslavie et de la République fédérale socialiste de Yougoslavieh ont
accordé à la République de Croatie le droit à l’autodéhtermination et
à la sécession.
Etablie en tant qu’Etat souverain et indépendant, la République
de Croatie, qui, jusqu’à présent, a exercé une partie de sesh droits sou -
461
7 CIJ1077.indb 919 18/04/16 08:54 461 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
rights together with the other constituent Republics and Autonomous
Provinces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is now
changing its status and its State-law relations with the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia, and agrees to take part in its individual institutionhs
and functions of common interest conducive to the disassociation
process.
In the course of the disassociation process it is necessary to establishh
the rights and obligations, i.e., the share of the Republic of Croatia
in the total movable and immovable property and in the rights of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
By proclaiming the Constitutional Decision on Independence, the
Republic of Croatia has started the process of disassociation from
other Republics of the SFRY, and wants to terminate this process as
soon as possible in a democratic and peaceful manner respecting the
interests of all Republics and Autonomous Provinces making up the
SFRY.
By the Constitutional Decision the present borders of the Republic
of Croatia have become State borders with other Republics and with
the countries adjoining the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Only laws which have been adopted by the Sabor of the Republic
of Croatia shall apply on the territory of the Republic of Croatia,
with the exception of the federal regulations which have not been
repealed pending the termination of the disassociation process
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal agencies may not operate on the territory of the Republic
of Croatia unless given specific and temporary authority by the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Croatia.
The Republic of Croatia shall withdraw its representatives from the
Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly, as its term expired and its
existence rendered unnecessary in the process of disassociation.”
In the Part V of the Declaration, it was stated inter alia:
“The Republic of Croatia recognizes full sovereignty and subjectiv-
ity under international law of the States which come into existence as
a result of the disassociation from the SFRY with the existing bound-
aries of the SFRY and within the boundaries among themselves, as
laid down in the present Constitution or as decided agreement among
them.”
20. The position of the Constitutional Court as regards disputed parts
of the declaration was as follows :
“The provisions of Articles1 and 2 of the Constitution of the SFRY
provide for that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a
462
7 CIJ1077.indb 920 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 461
verains de concert avec les autres républiques constitutives et pro -
vinces autonomes de la République fédérale socialiste de Yougoshlavie,
s’emploie actuellement à modifier son statut et ses relations inhter -
étatiques avec la République fédérale de Yougoslavie. Elle ahccepte de
prendre part à ses institutions et fonctions d’intérêt commuhn facili -
tant le processus de dissociation.
Dans le cadre dudit processus de dissociation, il convient de déter -
miner les droits et les obligations, c’est -à-dire la part de ceux -ci qui
revient à la République de Croatie par rapport au total des biens
meubles et immeubles et des droits de l’ancienne République fédhérale
socialiste de Yougoslavie.
En publiant sa décision constitutionnelle relative à l’indéphendance,
la République de Croatie a déclenché le processus de dissociatihon des
autres républiques de la RFSY. Elle souhaite achever ce processus
aussi rapidement que possible, de manière démocratique et pacifihque,
en respectant les intérêts de toutes les républiques et provinces auto -
nomes qui constituent la RFSY.
Par sa décision constitutionnelle relative à l’indépendance, les fron-
tières actuelles de la République de Croatie sont devenues des frohntières
d’Etat qui la séparent des autres républiques et des pays limithrophes de
l’ancienne République fédérale socialiste de Yougoslavie
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D’ici la fin du processus de dissociation, seules les lois qui ont été
adoptées par le Sabor de la République de Croatie s’appliqueronht sur
le territoire de la République de Croatie, à l’exception des réhglemen-
tations fédérales qui n’auront pas été abrogées
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Les agences fédérales ne peuvent pas exercer d’activités surh le terr-i
toire de la République de Croatie, à moins d’avoir reçu une hautorisation
spéciale et temporaire du gouvernement de la République de Croatieh.
La République de Croatie retirera ses représentants de la Chambre h
fédérale de l’Assemblée de la RFSY, puisque son mandat est expiré
et qu’elle n’a pas de raison d’être dans le processus de dishsociation.»
Dans le titre V de la déclaration, il est notamment dit que
«[l]a République de Croatie reconnaît la pleine souveraineté et la
personnalité juridique internationale des Etats nés de leur dissocia -
tion d’avec la RFSY dans ses frontières actuelles, et les uns d’havec les
autres à l’intérieur de leurs frontières respectives, ainsi hqu’il est indi-
qué dans la présente Constitution ou comme il en a été déhmocrati -
quement convenu entre eux. »
20. La position de la Cour constitutionnelle sur les passages contestés
de la déclaration était la suivante :
« Les articles premier et 2 de la Constitution de la RFSY disposent
que la République fédérale socialiste de Yougoslavie est un Etaht
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7 CIJ1077.indb 921 18/04/16 08:54 462 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Federal State, as the State community of voluntarily united nations
and their Republics, as well as of the Autonomous Provinces of
Vojvodina and Kosovo — which are constituent parts of Serbia —
which consists of: the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, the Socialist Republic of Slo -
venia, the Socialist Republic of Serbia, as well as the SAP Vojvodina
and Kosovo which are constituent parts of the Socialist Republic of
Serbia, the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Republic
of Montenegro.
The provisions of Article 5 of the Constitution of the SFRY pro -
vide for that the territory of the SFRY is a single united whole ; that
it consists of the territories of the socialist republics, and that the h
frontiers of the SFRY may not be altered without the consent of all
the Republics and Autonomous Provinces.
Alterations of the boundaries of the SFRY are decided upon by the
Federal Chamber of the Assembly of the SFRY in accordance with
the provisions of Article 283, paragraph 4, and Article 285, para -
graph 6.
The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the men-
tioned provisions of the Constitution of the SFRY, assessed that
Parts III, sections 2 and 4, IV, sections 2 to 10 and V of the Declara-
tion on the Proclamation of [a] Sovereign and Independent Republic
of Croatia — are not in conformity with the Constitution of the
SFRY.”
The Court devoted due regard to the right to self -determination. It
stated:
“Parts III, sections2 and 4, IV, sections 2 to 10 and Part V of the
disputed declaration are based on the understanding of the Assembly
of the Republic of Croatia as regards the right of the Croatian people
to self-determination, including the right to secession.
The rationale of the mentioned provisions of the Declaration on the
Proclamation of a Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia is
not, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, only in
the expression of the right of the Croatian people to self -determina -
tion, including the right to secession. The import of the disputed dec-
laration is the proclamation of the Republic of Croatia an independent
State which is not a constituent part of the SFRY, as a Federal State
and a State community of voluntarily united peoples and their repub-
lics, a proclamation of the State community of the Yugoslav nations
and theirrepublics a non-existent community, proclamation of federal
laws null and void on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, preven-
tion of the functioning of federal bodies on the territory of the Repu-
lic of Croatia within the jurisdiction of these bodies and ignorance of
certain federal institutions.
463
7 CIJ1077.indb 922 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 462
fédéral revêtant la forme d’une communauté étatique cohnstituée par
des nations librement unies et leurs républiques, ainsi que les pro -
vinces autonomes de Voïvodine et du Kosovo qui font partie de
la République socialiste de Serbie, et qui comprend : la République
socialiste de Bosnie -Herzégovine, la République socialiste de
Macédoine, la République socialiste de Slovénie, la Républiqhue
socialiste de Serbie, ainsi que les PAS de Voïvodine et du Kosovo
qui font partie intégrante de la République socialiste de Serbie, la
République socialiste de Croatie et la République socialiste du Mohn -
ténégro.
L’article5 de la Constitution de la RFSY dispose que le territoire
de la RFSY forme un tout unifié ; qu’il se compose des territoires des
républiques socialistes ; et que les frontières de la RFSY ne peuvent
être modifiées qu’avec le consentement de toutes les répubhliques et
des provinces autonomes.
En vertu des dispositions du paragraphe 4 de l’article 283 et du
paragraphe 6 de l’article 285 [de la Constitution], les modifications
de frontières de la RFSY sont décidées par la Chambre fédéhrale de
l’Assemblée de la RFSY.
La Cour constitutionnelle yougoslave, se fondant sur les disposi -
tions précitées de la Constitution de la RFSY, a jugé que les shec -
tions 2 et 4 du titre III, les sections 2 à 10 du titre IV, et le titre V de
la déclaration relative à la proclamation de la souveraineté eth de l’in-
dépendance de la République de Croatie ne sont pas conformes à hla
Constitution de la RFSY. »
La Cour a examiné comme il se devait la question du droit des peuplesh
à disposer d’eux-mêmes. Elle a formulé les observations suivantes :
«Les sections 2 et 4 du titre III, les sections 2 à 10 du titre IV, et le
titre V de la déclaration contestée se fondent sur l’interprétatiohn que
fait l’Assemblée de la République de Croatie du droit du peuple
croate à disposer de lui-même, y compris le droit de sécession.
La portée des dispositions susmentionnées de la déclaration relha -
tive à la proclamation de la souveraineté et de l’indépendanhce de la
République de Croatie ne se limite pas, de l’avis de la Cour consthitu-
tionnelle yougoslave, à l’expression du droit du peuple croate àh dis-
poser de lui -même, y compris le droit de sécession. L’essentiel de la
déclaration contestée est la proclamation par la République de hCro- a
tie d’un Etat indépendant qui ne fait pas partie intégrante de hla
RFSY en tant qu’Etat fédéral et communauté étatique de pehuples
librement unis et de leurs républiques ; la proclamation que la com -
munauté étatique des nations yougoslaves et de leurs républiquehs a
cessé d’exister ; la proclamation que les lois fédérales sont nulles et
non avenues sur le territoire de la République de Croatie ; l’interdic-
tion faite aux organes fédéraux d’exercer leur activité sur le territoire
de la République de Croatie dans les matières relevant de leur comh-
pétence ; et la récusation de certaines institutions fédérales.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 923 18/04/16 08:54 463 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The right of peoples of Yugoslavia to self -determination, including
the right to secession, established by the Constitution of the SFRY,
may not, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia,
be realized by unilateral acts of peoples and/or acts of the assemblies
of their Republics. This right can only be realized under the condi-
tions and in the manner to be determined, in accordance with the
Constitution of the SFRY, with the consent of each people and its
republic individually, and all of them together. Although the proce -
dure for the realization of the right to self -determination including
the right to secession, has not been defined by the Constitution of the
SFRY, this does not mean that this right may be realized on the
grounds of unilateral acts relating to the realization of that right.”h
21. At its meeting held on 13 November 1991, the Constitutional
Court, pursuant to the provision of Article 375, paragraph 1, subpara -
graph 4, of the Constitution of the SFRY, adopted the decision that :
“The provisions of Part III, sections 2 and 4, Part IV, sections 2 to
10 and Part V of the Declaration on the Proclamation of Sovereign
and Independent Republic of Croatia (Narodne novine (Official
Journal of the Republic of Croatia), No. 31/91) are abolished.”
(Decision II -U-No. 123/91 of 13 November 1991.)
22. The Federal Executive Council instituted also proceedings before
the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia for the assessment of the consti -
tutionality of the decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia ohn
the breakup of State -legal connection with the SFRY (Narodne novine
(Official Journal), No. 53/91).
The Council considered
“that the said decision is not in conformity with the Constitution ofh
the SFRY and that the breakup of the State -legal connections is pos -
sible only between independent and sovereign States having recog -
nized international legal personality, but not between a constituent
part of a sovereign State and that State”.
23. The decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia determined
that the Republic of Croatia, as of 8 October 1991, broke up its State-legal
connections on the basis of which, in common with other republics and
provinces, it had constituted the SFRY up to that date ; denied the legiti
macy and legality of all bodies of the Federation; recognized, on a recipro-
cal basis, the independence and sovereignty of the other republics of thhe
former SFRY ; guaranteed and ensured the basic rights of man and
national minorities, as guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Humanh
Rights and other international documents; and expressed the readiness to
enter into inter-State associations with other States.
24. The Constitutional Court found that
“the decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia on the
breakup of its State -legal connection with the SFRY is not in con -
464
7 CIJ1077.indb 924 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 463
De l’avis de la Cour constitutionnelle, les nations de Yougoslavie
ne peuvent pas exercer le droit à l’autodétermination, y compris le
droit de faire sécession, que leur confère la Constitution de la RhFSY
par la voie d’actes unilatéraux ou de décision des assemblées de leurs
républiques respectives. Elles ne peuvent exercer ce droit que sous
des conditions et selon des modalités qui doivent être définihes,
conformément à la Constitution de la RFSY, avec le consentement
individuel de chacune des nations et républiques aussi bien que leur h
consentement collectif. Le fait que la procédure d’exercice du drohit à
l’autodétermination, y compris le droit de faire sécession, ne hfigure
pas dans la Constitution de la RFSY ne signifie pas que ce droit
puisse être exercé par la voie d’actes unilatéraux. »
21. A sa séance du 13 novembre 1991, la Cour constitutionnelle, agis -
sant en application de l’alinéa 4 du paragraphe 1 de l’article 375 de la
Constitution de la RFSY, a adopté un arrêt aux termes duquel
« [l]esdispositions des sections 2 et 4 du titre III,des sections 2 à 10
du titre IV, et du titre V de la déclaration relative à la proclamation
de la souveraineté et de l’indépendance de la République de Croatie
(Narodne novine (Journal officiel), n o 31/91) sont abrogées. »
(Arrêt II-U n o 123/91 du 13 novembre 1991.)
22. Le conseil exécutif fédéral a également attaqué devant lah Cour
constitutionnelle la constitutionnalité de la décision de l’Asshemblée de la
République de Croatie relative à la rupture deoses liens juridiquehs avec la
RFSY (Narodne novine (Journal officiel), n 53/91).
Le conseil exécutif fédéral considérait en effet
« que ladite décision n’est pas conforme à la Constitution de la h
RFSY, et que la rupture des liens juridiques entre Etats n’est possibhle
que si les Etats considérés sont reconnus comme ayant une personna-
lité juridique internationale ; elle n’est pas possible entre une unité
constitutive d’un Etat et ledit Etat ».
23. La décision de l’Assemblée de la République de Croatie proclhamait
que ladite République avait rompu, à compter du 8 octobre 1991, les liens
juridiques dans le cadre desquels, comme les autres républiques et prho -
vinces, elle avait constitué jusqu’alors la RFSY ; contestait la légitimité et
la légalité de tous les organes de la Fédération ; reconnaissait, sur une
base de réciprocité, l’indépendance et la souveraineté dehs autres répu -
bliques de l’ancienne RFSY ; garantissait les droits fondamentaux de
l’homme et des minorités reconnus par la déclaration universellhe des
droits de l’homme et autres instruments internationaux ; et déclarait que
la République de Croatie était disposée à s’associer àh d’autres Etats.
24. La Cour constitutionnelle a statué que
«[l]a décision de l’Assemblée de la République de Croatie relhative à
la rupture des liens juridiques entre celle -ci et la RFSY n’est pas
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7 CIJ1077.indb 925 18/04/16 08:54 464 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
formity with the Constitution of the SFRY. The Constitutional Court
of Yugoslavia based this decision on the fact that, according to the
Constitution of the SFRY, the Republic of Croatia is one of the con-
stituent Republics of the SFRY of which it consists as a State com -
munity. That is why it cannot, by any unilateral act of its own,
breakup State-legal connections with the federal State of which it is
a part nor can it, by such an act, change the status of the Republic
established by the Constitution of the SFRY, leave the State commu-
nity of the SFRY and change the boundaries of the SFRY.
The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia bases its assessment also
on the fact that the disputed decision, contrary to the Constitution of
the SFRY, denies the legitimacy and legality of the federal bodies, and
refuses to recognize all legal acts of the federal bodies. The Constitu -
tion of the SFRY determines which common interests are realized
within the Federation and which of these common interests the Fed -
eration realizes through the federal bodies; consequently, the relations
in the Federation cannot be altered by a unilateral act or denied its
rights and obligations determined by the Constitution of the SFRY
nor can the federal bodies be denied legitimacy and legality. Likewise,
it is not possible to deny recognition and validity of legal acts of theh
federal bodies because these acts are binding and valid on the whole
territory of the SFRY.” (Decision II -U-No. 194/91 of 25 December
1991 published in the Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 12/92.)
25. It should be emphasized that both decisions were adopted by the
Court in its full composition, as prescribed by the Constitution, with only
a judge from Slovenia not taking part in adopting the decisions.
* *
26. The set out legal facts provide a different picture of the so -called
“Greater Serbia” project, which, by the way, has never been a polihcy of
the FRY and Serbia. The so -called “Greater Serbia” project is rather a
myth or abuse in the circumstances of the Yugoslav crisis.
The term was adopted from the political programme of the Serbian
politician I.Garašanin who, in the mid -nineteenth century, wrote “Nac -
ertanije” (“Draft Plan”), which was a programme on the unifihcation of
Serbs on the basis of the principle of nationalities, a principle that sherved
as the legal ground for the constitution of European national States likhe
Germany and Italy. In both theory and practice, as a national ideology
and real policy, a similar notion of a national State existed in the pasht of
every nation in Europe.
27. During the Yugoslav crisis the substance of the “Greater Serbia”
concept, if accepted as relevant, amounted to a possibility of the expanh -
465
7 CIJ1077.indb 926 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 464
conforme à la Constitution de la RFSY. La Cour constitutionnelle
de Yougoslavie fonde ses conclusions sur le fait que, selon la Cons -
titution de la RFSY, la République de Croatie est l’une des réphu -
bliques constitutives de la RFSY conçue comme communauté
étatique. C’est pourquoi elle ne peut, par une décision unilatéhrale,
rompre les liens juridiques qui la lient à l’Etat fédéral dohnt elle fait
partie, pas plus qu’elle ne saurait, par une telle décision, modifiher son
statut de république établi par la Constitution de la RFSY, sortir de
la communauté étatique de la RFSY et modifier les frontières hde la
RFSY.
La Cour constitutionnelle de Yougoslavie fonde également ses
conclusions sur le fait que la décision contestée, en violation deh la
Constitution de la RFSY, rejette la légitimité et la légalitéh des organes
fédéraux et refuse de reconnaître les actes juridiques émanahnt d’eux.
Or la Constitution de la RFSY définit les intérêts communs dont la
réalisation relève directement de la Fédération et ceux donth la Fédé-
ration délègue la réalisation aux organes fédéraux ; il s’ensuit qu’un
acte unilatéral ne saurait ni modifier les relations à l’intérieur de la
Fédération, ni contester les droits et obligations établis par la Consti-
tution de la RFSY, ni rejeter la légitimité et la légalité dhes organes
fédéraux. De même, il n’est pas possible de refuser de reconhnaître la
validité des actes juridiques des organes fédéraux parce que cehs actes
sont obligatoires et valides sur l’ensemble du territoire de la RFSY.h
(Arrêt II-U no 194/91 du 25 décembre 1991, publié au Journal officiel
o
de la RFSY, n 12/92.)
25. On rappellera que ces deux arrêts ont été rendus par la Cour consti-
tutionnelle siégeant en formation plénière, comme le prescrit lha Constitu-
tion, seul un juge slovène n’ayant pas pris part à la décisihon.
* *
26. Les faits juridiques ainsi décrits offrent une image différente de
celle du prétendu projet de « Grande Serbie », qui, d’ailleurs, n’a jamais
constitué une politique de la RFY ou de la Serbie. Ce prétendu projet de
«Grande Serbie»est plutôt un mythe ou une déformation dans le contexte
de la crise yougoslave.
L’expression est empruntée au programme d’un homme politique sehrbe
nommé I. Garašanin, qui, vers le milieu du XIX esiècle, a rédigé un projet
— le « Nacertanije» — d’unification des Serbes sur la base du même prin-
cipe des nationalités qui avait servi de fondement juridique à la hcréation
d’Etats nationaux comme l’Allemagne et l’Italie en Europe. Tant en théo-
rie qu’en pratique, aussi bien comme idéologie nationale que comme poli-
tique réelle, une notion de ce genre a existé dans l’histoire dhe toutes les
nations d’Europe.
27. Pendant toute la crise yougoslave, cette notion de «rande Serbie»,
pour autant qu’on admette sa pertinence, consistait en la possibilitéh d’une
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7 CIJ1077.indb 927 18/04/16 08:54 465 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
sion of the FRY/Serbia based on the outcome of the exercise by Serbs
living outside Serbia of their right to self -determination.
The primary political objective of the FRY and the Serbs in Croatia
was the safeguarding of Yugoslavia as a common home for Serbs. This
objective is fully understandable if one has in mind that more than a thhird
of Serbs lived outside the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviah.
The territorial expansion of the FRY/Serbia figured as a possibility whose
realization would depend on the outcome of self -determination of the
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The possibility as regards h
Croatia was not realized primarily because of the fact that :
“The achievement of independence by . . . Croatia . . . can be seen
as a revolutionary process that has taken place beyond the control of
existing body of laws . . . Self-determination has operated at the level
of political rhetoric, as a set of political principles legitimizing the
secession.” (A. Cassese, “Self -Determination of Peoples and the
Recent Break -up of USSR and Yugoslavia” in R. Macdonald (ed.),
Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, 1994, pp. 141-144.)
II. Jurisdictional Issuesh
1. Validity in Time Complex In Casu
28. The Court’s approach to the validity in time complex is highly
relaxed, in particular if one has in mind that the scope of its jurisdichtion
ratione temporis is a key jurisdictional issue in the present case. The ques -
tion which, in the circumstances surrounding the case, necessarily affecths
also the two primary forms of the jurisdiction of the Court — jurisdiction
ratione personae et ratione materiae (see paras. 50-54 below). The Court
did not decide from which date the Genocide Convention can be consid -
ered binding for the Applicant, and from which date the Genocide Con -
vention can be considered applicable between the Parties. It did not tachkle
at all the question of the date until which the Convention was in force hin
relation to the SFRY, although, inter alia, it dealt with the question as to
whether the acts on which Croatia relied are “attributable to the SFRhY at
the time of their commission” (Judgment, para. 114). Without these
parameters a proper treatment of the preliminary objection of Serbia
ratione temporis seems a difficult, if not an impossible task. It comes as
no surprise that the Court has not decided the Respondent’s other pre -
liminary objection in accordance with Article 79, paragraph 9, of the
Rules of the Court and its well established jurisprudence, but treated thhe
issue of jurisdiction ratione temporis and the related issue of admissibility
as accessory consequence of the decision as regards the principal claim h
and counter-claim (see paras. 56 and 59 below). The intrinsic meaning of
such an action of the Court is far -reaching — it ignores the fundamental
466
7 CIJ1077.indb 928 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 465
expansion de la RFY/Serbie fondée sur l’aboutissement de l’exerhcice par
les Serbes vivant hors de Serbie de leur droit à l’autodéterminhation.
Le principal objectif politique visé par la RFY et les Serbes de Croatie
était la préservation de la Yougoslavie comme maison commune des
Serbes. Cet objectif se comprend parfaitement si l’on se rappelle que plus
du tiers des Serbes habitaient alors à l’extérieur des frontièhres de la Répu -
blique fédérale de Serbie. L’expansion territoriale de la RFY/Serbie
n’était donc qu’une possibilité dont la réalisation déhpendait de l’aboutis-
sement de l’autodétermination des Serbes de Croatie et de Bosnie -
Herzégovine. En ce qui concerne la Croatie, cette possibilité ne sh’est pas
réalisée principalement en raison du fait suivant :
«L’accession de la … Croatie à l’indépendance … peut être consi-
dérée comme l’aboutissement d’un processus révolutionnairhe qui
s’est déroulé en dehors du cadre législatif existant… L’hautodétermi-
nation a fonctionné comme rhétorique politique, comme un ensemble h
de principes politiques tendant à légitimer la sécession. » (A. Cassese,
« Self-Determination of Peoples and the Recent Break -up of USSR
and Yugoslavia », dans R. Macdonald (dir. publ.), Essays in Honour
of Wang Tieya, 1994, p. 141-144.)
II. Questions de compétenhce
1. Questions relatives aux dates de validité en l’affaire
28. La façon dont la Cour a examiné la problématique des dates de
validité des dispositions de la convention sur le génocide à l’égard des par -
ties est plutôt cavalière, en particulier si l’on se rappelle qhue la question de
l’étendue de sa compétence ratione temporis présente une importance
considérable en l’espèce. C’est une question qui, dans les chirconstances de
l’espèce, concerne également et nécessairement les deux principaux types
de compétence de la Cour, à savoir sa compétence ratione personae et sa
compétence ratione materiae (voir par. 50 et 54 ci-après). La Cour n’a
tranché ni la question de la date à partir de laquelle le demandeuhr pouvait
être considéré comme lié par la convention sur le génocidhe, ni celle de la
date à partir de laquelle la Convention pouvait être considérée comme
applicable entre les Parties. Elle a ignoré la question de la date juhsqu’à
laquelle la Convention est restée en vigueur à l’égard de lah RFSY alors
que, entre autres contradictions, elle a examiné la question de savoihr si les
actes allégués par la Croatie « étaient, au moment de leur commission,
attribuables à la RFSY » (arrêt, par. 114). En l’absence de ces paramètres,
il semble difficile, sinon impossible, de répondre correctement àh l’exception
préliminaire ratione temporis de la Serbie. Rien d’étonnant, donc, à ce que
la Cour se soit abstenue de statuer sur l’autre exception préliminhaire du
défendeur comme le voulaient les dispositions du paragraphe 9 de l’ar-
ticle 79 de son Règlement et sa jurisprudence constante, et qu’elle ait hpré-
féré traiter la question de sa compétence ratione temporis et la question
466
7 CIJ1077.indb 929 18/04/16 08:54 466 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
principle on which the Court’s jurisdiction is based, i.e., the principle of
consent.
1.1. From which date is the Genocide Convention in force as regards the
Parties individually?
29. Within the set of issues relating to the validity in time of the provi -
sions of the Genocide Convention, one issue, on which the Parties had
opposing opinions ab initio, was resolved by the Judgment of the Court in
the preliminary objections phase, i.e., the issue of since when the Resphon -
dent can be considered as bound by the provisions of the Convention. In h
its Judgment on the preliminary objections raised by Serbia the Court
found that, by combined effect of the declaration and Note of 27 April
1992 and the consistent conduct at the time of its making and through thhe
years 1992-2000, the FRY is considered as bound by the Genocide Con -
vention “from that date (27 April 1992) onwards” (Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2008 (hereinafter “2008 Judgment”), pp. 454-455, para. 117). In that part,
the Judgment of the Court possesses res iudicata effects.
30. However, the Judgment did not provide the answer to the question
as to when Croatia acquired the status of a party to the Convention. Theh
Court addressed the issue in a general way stating that “Croatia depohs -
ited a notification of succession with the Secretary -General of the United
Nations on 12 October 1992” (2008 Judgment, p. 445, para. 94). The
Judgment states further that “[Croatia] asserted that it had already hbeen
a party prior thereto as a successor State to the SFRY from the date it h
assumed responsibility for its international relations with respect to thhe
territory, namely from 8 October 1991” (ibid.). It is up to the Court to
determine precisely the date, one of the two mentioned, since when Croa -
tia can be considered a party to the Genocide Convention.
31. In its 2008 Judgment, the Court did not, in fact, tackle the claim
of Croatia, but simply presented, in its paragraph 94, the position of Cro -
atia.
In the light of the relevant circumstances, it appears that Croatia’s
claim is based on :
Primo , its notification on succession.
In a letter dated 27 July 1992, received by the Secretary -General on
4 August 1992 and accompanied by a list of multilateral treaties depos -
ited with the Secretary -General, the Government of the Republic of Cro -
atia notified that :
“[The Government of] . . . the Republic of Croatia has decided,
based on the Constitutional Decision on Sovereignty and Independ -
467
7 CIJ1077.indb 930 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 466
connexe de recevabilité comme des conséquences accessoires de sa dhécision
à venir sur les demandes principale et reconventionnelle (voir par. 56 et 59
ci-après). Le sens profond de cette décision de la Cour va très lhoin: elle fait
fi du principe fondamental sur lequel est fondée la compétence de la Cour,
qui est le principe du consentement.
1.1. A quelle date la Convention est‑elle entrée en vigueur à l’é▯gard de
chacune des Parties ?
29. Parmi l’ensemble des questions relatives aux dates de validité àh l’égard
des Parties des dispositions de la convention sur le génocide, celle hde savoir
à compter de quelle date le défendeur peut être considéréh comme lié par la
Convention, question sur laquelle les Parties avaient au départ des phositions
divergentes, a été réglée par la Cour dans son arrêt relahtif aux exceptions
préliminaires soulevées par la Serbie. Dans cet arrêt, la Cour ha conclu qu’il
convenait, compte tenu de la teneur de la déclaration et de la note dhu
27 avril 1992 ainsi que du comportement concordant de la RFY tant au
moment de leur rédaction que tout au long des années 1992 à2000, de consi -
dérer que la RFY était liée par la convention sur le génocidhe « à compter de
cette date» (27 avril 1992) (Application de la convention pour la prévention et
la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie cSerbie), exceptions préliminaires,
arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil 2008 (ci-après «l’arrêt de 2008»), p. 454-455, par. 117).
Cette partie de l’arrêt de la Cour est revêtue de l’autoritéh de la chose jugée.
30. Toutefois, la Cour n’a pas répondu à la question de savoir quand
la Croatie avait acquis la qualité de partie à la Convention. Elleh s’est bor -
née à relever que « la Croatie a[vait] déposé une notification de succession,
le 12 octobre 1992, auprès du Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des h
Nations Unies » (arrêt de 2008, p. 445, par. 94). La Cour a aussi noté que
la Croatie « affirm[ait] qu’avant cette date elle était déjà devenue parhtie à
ladite Convention en qualité d’Etat successeur de la RFSY à comhpter du
moment où elle avait assumé la responsabilité des relations inthernatio -
nales pour son territoire, c’est-à-dire à partir du 8 octobre 1991» (ibid.).
Il appartenait à la Cour de déterminer à laquelle de ces deux dates la
Croatie est devenue partie à la Convention.
31. En fait, dans son arrêt de 2008, la Cour ne s’est pas prononcée sur
la prétention de la Croatie, mais a simplement présenté (au pahragraphe94
dudit arrêt) la position de la Croatie.
Au vu des circonstances pertinentes, il semble que la prétention de lha
Croatie se fonde sur les éléments suivants :
Premièrement, la notification de succession déposée par la Crhoatie.
Dans une lettre datée du 27 juillet 1992, adressée au Secrétaire général
des Nations Unies par le Gouvernement de la République de Croatie et h
parvenue à son destinataire le 4 août 1992, lettre à laquelle était jointe une
liste d’instruments multilatéraux déposés auprès du Secréhtaire général,
figurait la notification suivante :
« Compte tenu de la Déclaration constitutionnelle relative à la sou -
veraineté et à l’indépendance de la République de Croatieh, en date du
467
7 CIJ1077.indb 931 18/04/16 08:54 467 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
ence of the Republic of Croatia of 25 June 1991 and the Decision of
the Croatian Parliament in respect of the territory of the Republic of
Croatia, by virtue of succession of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia of 8 October 1991, to be considered a party to the con -
ventions that Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its prede-
cessor States (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Federal People’s Republic h
of Yugoslavia) were parties, according to the enclosed list.
In conformity with the international practice, [The Government of
the Republic of Croatia] would like to suggest that this take effect
from 8 October 1991, the date on which the Republic of Croatia
became independent.”
Secundo, the depositary records for the Genocide Convention draw a
distinction between the date of notification deposit and the date of ehffect.
The date of the deposit of notification of succession is, according toh the
depositary practice for the Genocide Convention, the date on which the
State deposited notification in reality, whereas the date of effect is hthe
expression of the consent of the State to be bound by the Convention
prior to that date, from the moment when it assumed responsibility for ihts
international relations with respect to its territory. In that sense, thhe
information in respect of the succession of the former federal units of hthe
SFRY to the Genocide Convention is coinciding, excepting Yugoslavia/
Serbia.
Action Date of Notification/ Date of Effect
Deposit
Bosnia and Herzegovina Succession 29 December 1992 6 March 1992
Croatia Succession 12 October 1992 8 October 1991
Montenegro Succession 23 October 2006 3 June 2006
Slovenia Succession 6 July 1992 25 June 1991
the former Yugoslav Succession 18 January 1994 17 November 1991
Republic of Macedonia
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Accession 12 March 2001 10 June 2001
(See https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280027hfac.)
Tertio, in its written pleadings Serbia “does not contest that Croatia
could become a contracting party to the Genocide Convention by submit-
ting a declaration of succession and that Croatia could thereby become ah
468
7 CIJ1077.indb 932 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 467
25 juin 1991, et de la déclaration du Parlement croate concernant le
territoire de la République de Croatie, [le Gouvernement de] … la
République de Croatie a décidé que, en vertu de la succession dhe la
République socialiste fédérative de Yougoslavie du 8 octobre 1991, il
se considérait lié par les conventions auxquelles la Républiqueh socia -
liste fédérative de Yougoslavie et les Etats qui l’ont précéhdée (le
Royaume de Yougoslavie et la République populaire fédérative de
Yougoslavie) étaient Parties, selon la liste ci -jointe.
Conformément à la pratique internationale, [le Gouvernement de la
République de Croatie] suggère que la présente déclaration phrenne
effet le 8 octobre 1991, date à laquelle la République de Croatie est
devenue indépendante. »
Deuxièmement, les états tenus par le dépositaire, qui font une hdistinc -
tion entre la date de dépôt d’une notification de succession et la date de
prise d’effet. Selon la pratique du dépositaire, la date de dépôht d’une not-i
fication de succession pour la convention sur le génocide est celleh à
laquelle la notification a été effectivement déposée, alorsh que sa date de
prise d’effet est celle — antérieure au dépôt de ladite nohtification — à
laquelle l’Etat considéré a exprimé son consentement à êhtre lié par la
Convention, c’est-à-dire la date à laquelle il a assumé la responsabilité des
relations internationales pour son territoire. Il ressort des renseignemhents
relatifs à la succession de la RFSY à l’égard de la convention sur le géno -
cide que la prise d’effet de la notification de succession a étéh antérieure à
la date de dépôt de celle -ci pour toutes les anciennes unités fédérales de la
RFSY, sauf la Yougoslavie/Serbie.
Instrument Date de dépôt Date de prise
d’effet
Bosnie-Herzégovine Notification 29 décembre 1992 6 mars 1992
de succession
Croatie Notification 12 octobre 1992 8 octobre 1991
de succession
Monténégro Notification 23 octobre 2006 3 juin 2006
de succession
Slovénie Notification 6 juillet 1992 25 juin 1991
de succession
Ex-République yougoslave Notification 18 janvier 1994 17 novembre 1991
de Macédoine de succession
Yougoslavie (Serbie) Notification 12 mars 2001 10 juin 2001
d’adhésion
(Voir https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028002h7fac.)
Troisièmement, dans ses écritures, la Serbie a indiqué qu’elhle
« ne contest[ait] pas que la Croatie ait pu devenir partie à la conventionh
sur le génocide par voie de déclaration de succession, et qu’elle ait hpu par
468
7 CIJ1077.indb 933 18/04/16 08:54 468 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
contracting party thereof, effective 8 October 1991” (Counter -Memorial
of Serbia, para. 370).
32. If the date of effect of a convention, as in the case at hand, is prior
to the date of the deposit of notification of succession, then undoubthedly
retroactivity is at work. For, notification of succession, as definehd by the
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978)h,
means “in relation to a multilateral treaty, any notification, howehver
framed or named, made by a successor State expressing its consent to be
considered as bound by the treaty” (Article 2 (g) of the Convention,
emphasis added). In this way the successor State expresses its consent hto
be considered as bound as from the date X which is later in relation to the
date Y as the “date of effect” being, in fact, the date of entry of the treaty
into force for that State. This appears to be a clear case of retroactivhe
effect. However, retroactivity in this case is of a sui generis nature, for it
relates to the successor State individually.
33. The basis of retroactive effect of the Genocide Convention in this
particular case is in the combined effect of Croatia’s notification of suc -
cession and the consent of third States. The conclusion relies on two
parts :
(i) theconnection that exists between the rules on succession with respect
to international treaties and the rules of treaty law ; and
(ii) the meaning of the instrument of “notification of succession”.
It is natural that the succession of States with respect to treaties hash the
closest links with the law of treaties itself and could be regarded as dheal -
ing with particular aspects of participation in treaties, the conclusionh of
treaties and the application of treaties.
Special Rapporteur Humphrey Waldock described these links as fol -
lows :
“the Commission could not do otherwise than examine the topic of
succession with respect to treaties within the general framework of
the law of treaties . . . the principles and rules of the law of treaties
seemed to provide a surer guide to the problems of succession with
respect to treaties than any general theories of succession” (Yearbook
of the International Law Commission (YILC), 1968, Vol. I, p. 131,
para. 52).
Or, as stated by O’Connell :
“The effect of a change of sovereignty on treaties is not a manifes -
tation of some general principle or rule of State succession, but ratherh
a matter of treaty law and interpretation.” (D. P. O’Connell, The Law
of State Succession, 1956, p. 15.)
469
7 CIJ1077.indb 934 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 468
conséquent devenir partie à ladite Convention à compter du 8 octobre
1991 » (contre -mémoire de la Serbie, par. 370).
32. Lorsque, comme dans le cas de la Croatie, la prise d’effet de la
succession à une convention est antérieure à la date de dépôht de la notifi-
cation de succession, il y a indubitablement rétroactivité. En effeht, aux
termes de la convention de Vienne de 1978 sur la succession d’Etats en
matière de traités, « [l’]expression «notification de succession » s’entend,
par rapport à un traité multilatéral, d’une notification, hquel que soit son
libellé ou sa désignation, faite par un Etat successeur, exprimant le consen ‑
tement de cet Etat à être considéré comme étant lié par le traité » (conven-
tion de Vienne sur la succession d’Etats en matière de traités, art. 2,
alinéa g); les italiques sont de moi). L’Etat successeur exprime ainsi à lha
date X postérieure à la date Y de «prise d’effet» de la succession, laquelle
est en fait la date d’entrée en vigueur du traité à son éhgard, son consente-
ment à être considéré comme lié par celui -ci. Il semble donc clair que la
rétroactivité joue. Cependant, elle présente dans ce cas un carhactère
sui generis, car elle joue différemment pour chacun des Etats successeurs.
33. Dans le cas de la Croatie, la rétroactivité de l’applicabilitéh de la
convention sur le génocide procède à la fois de sa notificatihon de succes -
sion et du consentement des Etats tiers. Cette conclusion repose sur deuhx
éléments:
i) les liens entre les règles de succession en matière de traités het les règles
du droit des traités ;
ii) la signification attribuée à l’instrument de « notification de succes -
sion ».
Il est évident que les règles de la succession d’Etats en matièhre de traités
sont étroitement liées à celles du droit des traités, et qu’helles peuvent être
considérées comme régissant certains aspects particuliers de lah participa -
tion aux traités, de la conclusion des traités et de leur applicathion.
Humphrey Waldock, rapporteur spécial de la Commission du droit
international, a déclaré ce qui suit au sujet de ces liens :
«[L]a Commission ne peut faire autrement qu’examiner la ques -
tion de la succession d’Etats en matière de traités dans le cadre géné -
ral du droit des traités … [vu] que la solution la plus sûre des
problèmes de succession en matière de traités doit, semble -t-il, être
recherchée dans le cadre des principes et des règles du droit des htrai-
tés plutôt que dans celui d’une théorie générale de lah succession. »
(Annuaire de la Commission du droit international, 1968, vol. I, p. 135,
par. 52.)
O’Connell s’est exprimé sur ce sujet dans les termes suivants :
« L’effet qu’un changement de souveraineté a sur l’applicabilithé
d’un traité ne procède pas d’un principe ou d’une règlhe générale de la
succession d’Etats ; il relève plutôt des règles du droit des traités et
comporte un élément d’interprétation. » (D. P. O’Connell, The Law
of State Succession, 1956, p. 15.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 935 18/04/16 08:54 469 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The determination of “notification of succession” given in Artichle 2 (g)
of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties,h
as well as the practice of States in the matter, cast serious doubts as hto the
possibility of “notification of succession” as an instrument, pehr se, that
acts as a means of binding by treaty.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) stipulates in
Article 11 (means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty) : “The
consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signatureh,
exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.” (Emphasis
added.)
The formulation of Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties does not exclude the possibility of notification of succession being
understood as a means of expressing approval to be bound by a treaty.
The operationalization of this possibility implies, however, the agreemehnt
of the parties for, in the light of treaty law as expressed in Article 11 of
the Convention, “notification of succession” undoubtedly comes uhnder
“any other means” of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty, but is
conditioned by the phrase “if so agreed”. From this viewpoint, “notifica ‑
tion of succession” as a unilateral act of the State, constitutes a b▯asis for a
collateral agreement in simplified form between the new State and the in▯di ‑
vidual parties to its predecessor’s treaties. Thus “notification of succes -
sion” actually represents an abstract, generalized form of the new Sthate’s
consent to be bound by the treaties of the predecessor State — a form of
consent which is, in each particular case, realized in conformity with the
general rule of the law of treaties on expression of consent to be bound by
a treaty contained in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties and prescribed by provisions of the concrete treaty.
An exception to the general rule according to which consent of the suc -
cessor State to be bound by a treaty has to be expressed ad casum in
conformity with Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties could be envisaged in the event that, outside and independently of hthe
Convention, there exists a generally accepted rule according to which
“notification of succession” is considered a specific means of binding new
States by treaties. Grounds for such an interpretation are also providedh
by Article 73 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties : “The
provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question thaht
may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States . . .”
There is no credible evidence that such a rule exists. The Vienna Con -
vention on the Law of Treaties which is, by its nature, a combination of
codification and progressive development, does not make any mention inh
its Article 11 (means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty) of
“notification of succession” as such a means. This is particularhly conspic-
uous in view of the fact that Article 11 is built on the premise of defor-
malization of the means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty.
470
7 CIJ1077.indb 936 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 469
La définition de l’expression « notification de succession » qui figure à
l’alinéag) de l’article 2 de la convention de Vienne sur la succession
d’Etats en matière de traités ainsi que la pratique des Etats ehn la matière
laissent planer un sérieux doute sur la possibilité de considérher une « noti-
fication de succession » comme un instrument qui, en soi, établit que
l’Etat successeur consent à être lié par tel ou tel traitéh.
La convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités, en son
article 11 intitulé Modes d’expression du consentement à être lié par un
traité», stipule ce qui suit: « Le consentement d’un Etat à être lié par un
traité peut être exprimé par la signature, l’échange d’hinstruments consti -
tuant un traité, la ratification, l’acceptation, l’approbatiohn ou l’adhésion,
ou par tout autre moyen convenu. » (Les italiques sont de moi.)
Ce libellé n’exclut pas la possibilité qu’une notification de succession
soit considérée comme l’expression du consentement à êtreh lié par un
traité, pareille notification relevant indubitablement des autres mhodes
d’expression envisagés par le droit des traités. Toutefois, cethte possibilité
ne peut se réaliser qu’à la condition, exprimée par l’emphloi dans la dispo -
sition précitée de l’adjectif «onvenu», que les parties au traité concerné
l’admettent. Ainsi considérée, la « notification de succession », en tant
qu’acte unilatéral de l’Etat, constitue la base d’accords co▯llatéraux simpli ‑
fiés entre le nouvel Etat et les autres Etats parties aux traités ▯auxquels avait
souscrit l’Etat prédécesseur . La « notification de succession » exprime en
termes généraux et abstraits le consentement de l’Etat successehur à être lié
par les traités auxquels l’Etat prédécesseur était partieh, consentement qui,
dans chaque cas, se concrétise conformément à la règle géhnérale du droit
des traités relative aux modes d’expression du consentement à être lié
figurant à l’article11 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités,
ainsi qu’aux dispositions du traité considéré.
Une dérogation à la règle générale selon laquelle l’Ethat successeur doit
exprimer ad casum son consentement à être lié conformément à l’article 11
de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités pourrait être envisagée
si, en dehors et indépendamment de ce que prévoit la Convention, ihl exis-
tait une règle généralement admise selon laquelle la « notification de suc-
cession» est considérée comme un moyen particulier dont disposent les h
nouveaux Etats pour exprimer leur consentement à être liés par hdes trai-
tés. Cette interprétation pourrait s’appuyer sur l’article 73 de la conven -
tion de Vienne sur le droit des traités, qui prévoit ce qui suit : « Les
dispositions de la présente Convention ne préjugent aucune questiohn qui
pourrait se poser à propos d’un traité du fait d’une successhion d’Etats…»
Or, rien n’indique de façon convaincante qu’il existe une telleh règle. La
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, qui, de par sa nature hmême,
procède à la fois de la codification du droit et de son dévelhoppement pro -
gressif, ne dit aucunement en son article 11, intitulé «Modes d’expression
du consentement à être lié par un traité », qu’une « notification de succes-
sion» constitue l’un de ces modes d’expression. Ce silence est d’hautant
plus remarquable que l’article 11 a été conçu dans le but de conférer un
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7 CIJ1077.indb 937 18/04/16 08:54 470 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Since succession per se is not and cannot be an independent method of
expressing consent to be bound by a treaty, it follows that “notifihcation of
succession” can only be a descriptive notion, a collective term for vharious
forms of expression of consent of a new State to be bound by a treaty. Ahs
pointed out by Professor Annie Gruber :
“Since it is a unilateral act, the legal effect of which cannot dependh
solely on the will of the author of the act, a unilateral declaration ofh
succession may be considered to contain a sort of personal proposi -
tion which third States may accept or reject.” (A. Gruber, Le droit
international de la succession d’Etats, 1986, p. 221.)
Finally, Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties clearly states :
“Obligation or rights under treaties in force in respect of a territohry
at the date of a succession of States do not become the obligations or
rights of the successor State or of other States parties to those treatihes
by reason only of the fact that the successor State has made a unilat -
eral declaration providing for the continuance in force of the treaties
in respect of its territory.”
That in particular terms means that Croatia’s notification of succehssion
constitute an offer which the parties to the Convention are free to accept
or reject. Only acceptance by the parties to the Convention could createh
treaty nexus between a State that make a notification and other States
parties to the Convention.
1.2. From which date can the Genocide Convention be considered as
applicable between the Parties ?
Scenario one
34. The determining of the date on which the Convention came into
force in relation to the FRY/Serbia and Croatia does not solve the issueh
of validity in time of the Convention in casu, but rather constitutes only
a part of that set of issues. The fact that the Genocide Convention is
binding on both Parties in casu is one thing, whereas its applicability in
terms of time between the Parties is quite another in the circumstances h
surrounding the case.
The status of Croatia and the FRY/Serbia as parties to the Convention
only determines the jurisdictional title in casu and does not solve the issue
of its temporal scope because the dates from which the parties are consihd -
ered as bound by the Convention do not coincide.
Croatia can be considered a contracting party to the Convention as
from 8 October 1991, while Serbia can be considered a contracting party
as from 27 April 1992.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 938 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 470
caractère moins formel aux modes d’expression du consentement àh être lié
par un traité. Dès lors que la succession en soi ne constitue pas het ne sau-
rait constituer un mode indépendant d’expression du consentement àh être
lié par un traité, l’expression « notification de succession » ne peut être
qu’un terme descriptif désignant collectivement différents modesh d’expre-s
sion du consentement d’un nouvel Etat à être lié par un traihté. Je cite à cet
égard Annie Gruber:
«S’agissant d’un acte unilatéral dont les effets juridiques ne pehuvent
dépendre de la seule volonté de son auteur, on peut considérer hque la
déclaration unilatérale de succession renferme une sorte de proposhition
personnelle que les Etats tiers peuvent accepter ou refuser. » (A. Gru -
ber, Le droit international de la succession d’Etat, 1986, p. 221.)
Enfin, l’article 9 de la convention de Vienne sur la succession d’Etats en
matière de traités stipule ce qui suit :
« Les obligations ou les droits découlant de traités en vigueur à
l’égard d’un territoire à la date d’une succession d’Ehtats ne deviennent
pas les obligations ou les droits de l’Etat successeur ni d’autresh Etats
parties à ces traités du seul fait d’une déclaration unilatérale de l’hEtat
successeur prévoyant le maintien en vigueur des traités à l’égard de
son territoire.»
Cette disposition signifie que la notification de succession de la Chroatie
constitue à l’égard des parties à la convention sur le génocide une offre
que ceux -ci sont libres d’accepter ou de rejeter. L’Etat qui émet une nohti -
fication de succession ne peut être lié par la convention sur leh génocide à
l’égard des autres Etats parties que si ceux -ci l’admettent.
1.2. A partir de quelle date la Convention peut‑elle être considérée▯ comme
applicable entre les Parties ?
Premier scénario
34. La détermination de la date à laquelle la convention sur le génhocide
est entrée en vigueur à l’égard de la RFY/Serbie et de la Crhoatie ne règle
pas la question de la date d’applicabilité de la Convention en l’hespèce et
ne touche qu’à un aspect de la question des dates. Le fait que lesh Parties
à la présente affaire sont l’une et l’autre liées par la Chonvention est une
chose, mais la question de savoir à quelle date celle -ci est devenue appli -
cable entre elles en est une autre dans les circonstances de l’espèhce.
Le fait que la Croatie et la RFY/Serbie soient toutes deux parties à hla
Convention permet seulement d’établir le titre de compétence enh l’espèce,
mais laisse entière la question de savoir à quelle date la Conventhion est
devenue applicable entre elles, parce que les dates à compter desquelhles elles
peuvent être considérées comme liées par cet instrument ne choïncident pas.
La Croatie peut être considérée comme partie contractante à hla conven -
tion sur le génocide depuis le 8 octobre 1991, et la Serbie à compter du
27 avril 1992.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 939 18/04/16 08:54 471 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
35. The jurisdiction of the Court in casu is based on Article IX of the
Genocide Convention. In contrast to the substantive provisions of the
Convention which are, by their nature, integral (“Third Report on thhe
Law of Treaties” by G. Fitzmaurice, YILC , 1958, Vol. II; United
Nations doc. A/CN.4/115, Art. 18, p. 27, para. 2),collective obligations
towards the international community as a whole (Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3), Article IX of the Convention, as a
standard compromissory clause, is a bilateral obligation between the parh -
ties.
As regards the substantive obligation of the Convention, the will of theh
contracting parties, taken individually, is only a constitutive element hof
the will of the international community as a whole, as a basis of its
peremptory nature. As such, substantive obligations of the Genocide
Convention are binding on States “even without any conventional obliga -
tions” (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23).
Consequently, any new State is a priori subject to these rules since they
express the universal interest of the international community as a wholeh.
It might be concluded that, having in mind that nature of the principles
underlying the GenocideConvention, the then Secretary -General Dag Ham-
marskjöld warned the Congolese authorities during the United Nations’h
operations in that country that the principles of the Convention must beh
held to govern even a new State and to apply to subordinate political
authorities within the Congolese State ( Annual Report of the Secretary‑
General 1960‑1961 , General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supp. No. 1,
p. 11 ; H. Waldock, “General Course on Public International Law”,
Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye, 1962,
Vol. 106, p. 228).
In contrast to its substantive provisions, the provision of Article IX
of the Convention, being of a contractual nature, operates on the
inter partes level, within the reciprocity principle.
Accordingly, in relation to Article IX of the Convention, a multitude of
bilateral links is constituted between the parties to the Genocide Conven -
tion depending on the consent of the parties. In other words, the obliga -
tions of the parties to the Convention as regards Article IX are not
“self-existent, absolute and inherent” (G. Fitzmaurice, “Third Report on
the Law of Treaties”, YILC, 1958, Vol. II; United Nations doc. A/
CN.4/115, Art. 19, p. 28), but relative, extrinsic, depending on the con -
sent. The distinction is, in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility,
derived in explicit terms. In contrast to collective obligations embodiehd in
multilateral treaties,the International Law Commission notes that there
exist obligations in multilateral treaties where “performance in a gihven
situation involves a relationship of a bilateral character between two phar -
ties” (Commentary to Art. 42 (a)).
472
7 CIJ1077.indb 940 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 471
35. La juridiction de la Cour en l’espèce est fondée sur l’artichle IX de
la convention sur le génocide. A la différence de ses dispositions hde fond,
qui par nature sont « de type intégral » (voir G. Fitzmaurice, « Troisième
rapport sur le droit des traités »ACDI, 1958, vol. II ; Nations Unies, doc.
A/CN.4/115, art. 18, p. 27, par. 2) et établissent des obligations collectives
qui s’imposent à la communauté internationale tout entière (hvoir Barce ‑
lona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgique c. Espagne),
deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970, p. 3), l’article IX de la Conven-
tion, qui est une clause compromissoire type, établit une obligation hbila-
térale entre les parties.
A l’égard des obligations de fond établies par la Convention, lha volonté
de chacune des parties à celle -ci n’est qu’une composante de la volonté
collective de la communauté internationale, qui fonde celle-ci à établir des
normes impératives. C’est pourquoi les obligations de fond prévhues par la
Convention s’imposent aux Etats « même en dehors de tout lien conven -
tionnel » (Réserves à la convention pour la prévention et la répression▯ du
crime de génocide, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 23). En consé -
quence, tout nouvel Etat est a priori soumis à ces règles, puisqu’elles sont
l’expression de l’intérêt de la communauté internationaleh tout entière.
C’est en ayant à l’esprit le caractère impératif des prinhcipes dont pro -
cède la convention sur le génocide que Dag Hammarskjöld, alors Secré-
taire général des Nations Unies, a averti les autorités du Congho, au cours
des opérations menées dans ce pays par les Nations Unies, que les prin-
cipes énoncés dans cette Convention devaient être considéréhs comme
applicables même à un nouvel Etat comme le Congo et à ses subdivisions
politiques (voir le Rapport du Secrétaire général sur l’activité de l’Orga▯ni‑
sation, 1960‑1961, Documents officiels de l’Assemblée générale, sei -
zième session, supplément n 1, p. 11; H. Waldock, « General Course on
Public International Law», Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit inter ‑
national de La Haye, 1962, vol. 106, p. 228).
A la différence des dispositions de fond de la Convention, son articleIhX,
de par son caractère contractuel, joue inter partes selon le principe de
réciprocité.
Aussi l’application de l’article IX de la Convention a -t-elle abouti à la
création entre les parties d’une multiplicité de liens bilatéhraux. Autrement
dit, les obligations assumées par les parties en application de l’harticleIX
n’ont pas une force « autonome, absolue et intrinsèque pour chaque
partie» (G. Fitzmaurice, « Troisième rapport sur le droit des traités »,
ACDI , 1958, vol. II; Nations Unies, doc. A/CN.4/115, art. 19, p. 28),
mais sont relatives, extrinsèques et subordonnées au consentement.h Cette
distinction est explicitée dans le projet d’articles de la CDI sur la respon -
sabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite. La CDI rhelève que
les traités multilatéraux peuvent établir non seulement des oblhigations
s’imposant à tous les Etats parties, mais aussi des obligations dohnt
« [l’]exécution, dans une situation donnée, suppose une relation hà carac -
tère bilatéral entre deux parties » (commentaire de l’alinéa a) du projet
d’article 42).
472
7 CIJ1077.indb 941 18/04/16 08:54 472 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
As far as the bilateral relationship, or bundles of bilateral relations,h
between the parties to a multilateral treaty, reciprocity and mutuality h
may be regarded as an essential principle of international law (a good h
example, in addition to the one which we are discussing, is the require -
ment of consent by other States to reservations to multilateral treatiesh).
1.3. Application of the principlein casu
36. The jurisdiction of the Court in the case at hand is based on Arti -
cle36, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court which reads :
“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties h
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of theh
United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.” (Emphasis
added.)
When jurisdiction is based on paragraph 1 of Article 36 :
“the Court is empowered only to apply the specific treaty. Where ith
is based on paragraph 2, the Court’s jurisdiction may allow it and
even require it to have recourse to rules of customary international
law which resemble the rules of a treaty but which exist independently
of the treaty, if for any reason that treaty is excluded from the scope h
of the jurisdiction of the Court in that particular case.” (S. Rosenne,
The Law and Practice of the International Court : 1920‑2005 , 4th ed.,
Vol. II, 2006, pp. 648-649, referring in a footnote to Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 38,
para. 56.)
As the Genocide Convention is the only jurisdictional title in the case h
at hand, the date on which the Convention came into force as regards
Croatia and the FRY/Serbia is of paramount importance. For, proceed -
ings between these two parties may be validly instituted only during theh
currency of the title of jurisdiction (Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v.
United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1963,
p. 29).
It appears that the Genocide Convention came into force as regards
Croatia and the FRY/Serbia on different dates — 8 October 1991 in rela -
tion to Croatia and 27 April 1992 in relation to the FRY/Serbia.
In the light of the principle of reciprocity and mutuality, it follows thhat
the Genocide Convention is applicable between Croatia and the FRY/
Serbia as from 27 April 1992 as the later date, limiting the jurisdiction of
the Court ratione temporis to acts and situations after that date.
The pattern of such legal reasoning was demonstrated by the Court in
the Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) case. In
that case, the specific treaty was the Convention on Elimination of Rahcial
473
7 CIJ1077.indb 942 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 472
Dans le cadre d’une relation bilatérale ou des faisceaux de relations bila-
térales entre les parties à un traité, le principe de réciprhocité peut être co-si
déré comme un principe essentiel de droit international. (Outre lhe cas dont il
s’agitici, la condition qui subordonne les réserves aux traités multilatéraux
au consentement des autres Etats parties fournit à cet égard un bohn exemple.)
1.3. L’application du principe en l’espèce
36. La compétence de la Cour en la présente espèce est fondée suhr le
paragraphe 1 de l’article 36 de son Statut, ainsi libellé:
« La compétence de la Cour s’étend à toutes les affaires que lehs
parties lui soumettront, ainsi qu’à tous les cas spécialement phrévus
dans la Charte des Nations Unies ou dans les traités et conventions en
vigueur.» (Les italiques sont de moi.)
Lorsque sa compétence est fondée sur le paragraphe 1 de l’article 36 du
Statut,
«la Cour n’a que le pouvoir d’appliquer le traité considéréh. Lorsque
sa compétence est fondée sur le paragraphe 2, la Cour, dans une
affaire qui met en jeu un traité échappant pour une raison quel -
conque à sa compétence, peut, voire doit, invoquer des règles du
droit international coutumier qui ressemblent aux dispositions du
traité, mais en sont indépendantes. » (S. Rosenne, The Law and Prac ‑
tice of the International Court : 1920‑2005, 4 éd., vol. II, 2006, p. 648-
649. Le passage cité est tiré d’une note de bas de page qui se hrapporte
à l’affaire relative aux Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicara ‑
gua et contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), fond,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 38, par. 56.)
La convention sur le génocide étant en la présente espèce leh seul titre de
compétence de la Cour, les dates auxquelles elle est entrée en vighueur à
l’égard de la Croatie et à l’égard de la RFY/Serbie revêtent une impor -
tance capitale. En effet, un différend opposant les deux Etats ne pouvahit
être porté devant la Cour qu’à un moment où ce titre de chompétence était
valide (Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun c. Royaume‑Uni), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963, p. 29).
Il appert que la convention sur le génocide est entrée en vigueur hà des
dates différentes à l’égard de la Croatie et à l’égahrd de la RFY/Serbie, soit
le 8 octobre 1991 pour la première et le 27 avril 1992 pour la seconde.
En vertu du principe de réciprocité, la convention sur le génochide est donc
devenue applicable entre la Croatie et la RFY/Serbie à compter de la hplus
récente de ces dates, c’es-à-dire du 27avril1992, ce qui limite la compétence
ratione temporis de la Cour aux actes et situations postérieurs à ladite date.
C’est un raisonnement juridique de cet ordre que la Cour a suivi en
l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimi ‑
nation de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération
de Russie). L’article 22 de ladite convention est ainsi libellé : «Tout diffé-
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7 CIJ1077.indb 943 18/04/16 08:54 473 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Discrimination which provides, in its Article 22, that: “Any dispute between
two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or applicahtion
of this Convention . . . shall, at the request of any of the parties to the dis-
pute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision. . .”.
Since the Convention entered into force as regards Russia on 4 Febru-
ary 1969 and as regards Georgia on 2 July 1999, the Court concluded that
“CERD entered into force between the Parties on 2 July 1999” (Applica‑
tion of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objec‑
tions, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I), p. 81, para. 20).
Scenario two
37. This scenario is based on the principle that mutual recognition is
needed for establishment of treaty nexus between the contracting partiesh
to the Convention. The principle derives from the contractual nature of
the jurisdictional clauses operating on the inter partes level, within the
limits of the reciprocity. In that regard, international treaty law is ah sort
of vinculum iuris, a legal relationship between States which recognize each
other.
38. As stated by Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts :
“Generally, a situation which is denied recognition, and the conse -
quences directly flowing from it, will be treated by non -recognizing
States as without international legal effect.” ( Oppenheim’s Interna‑
tional Law, 9th edition, 1992, p. 199.);
and
“The non -recognized Government will not be regarded by non-rec-
ognizing States as competent to make its State a party to a multilat -
eral treaty, or to act on behalf of the State in legal proceedings.” h(Ibid.,
p. 198.)
Kelsen, although starting from the consideration that “the legal act hof
recognition is the establishment of a fact” (H. Kelsen, “Recognition in
International Law — Theoretical Observations”, in L. Gross (ed.), Inter‑
national Law in the Twentieth Century, 1969, p. 592) finds that :
“The new State starts its legal existence with its declaration of stah-te
hood but it exists only for itself, not in relation to other States. Thihs is
a typical border case. In order to become a subject of international lawh
in relation to other States, the new State has also to be recognized as
such by these other States, but the old State, too, in its relation to thhe
new State is a State, in the sense of international law, only if the newh
State recognizes it as such. Therefore mutual recognition is necessary.”h
(Ibid., p. 593.)
A similar opinion is represented by Hersch Lauterpacht. According to
the learned author and judge, recognition “marks the beginning of theh
474
7 CIJ1077.indb 944 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 473
rend entre deux ou plusieurs Etats parties touchant l’interprétatihon ou
l’application de la présente Convention … sera porté, à la requête de
toute partie au différend, devant la Cour internationale de Justice pohur
qu’elle statue à son sujet… »
La convention en cause étant entrée en vigueur à l’égard de la Russie le
4 février 1969 et à l’égard de la Géorgie le 2 juillet 1999, la Cour a conclu
que « [l]a CIEDR [était] entrée en vigueur entre les Parties le 2 juillet
1999» (Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de
toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Rus ‑
sie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), p. 81, par. 20).
Deuxième scénario
37. Le deuxième scénario repose sur le principe selon lequel la recon -
naissance mutuelle est une condition de l’établissement de liens chonven -
tionnels entre les Etats parties à la convention sur le génocide. hCe principe
tient au caractère contractuel des clauses de juridiction applicablesh
interpartes sous condition de réciprocité. Le droit international des trai -
tés établit à cet égard une sorte de vinculum juris, un lien juridique entre
les Etats qui se reconnaissent mutuellement.
38. Je cite sur ce sujet sir Robert Jennings et sir Arthur Watts :
« Généralement, les Etats qui ne reconnaissent pas telle ou telle
situation et les conséquences qui en découlent directement considèrent
celleci comme dépourvue d’effet juridique sur le plan internatio -
nal…» (Oppenheim’s International Law, 9 édition, 1992, p. 198-199);
et
« La non -reconnaissance d’un gouvernement emporte de la part
des Etats qui ne le reconnaissent pas le refus d’admettre qu’il a qua -
lité pour obtenir que l’Etat qu’il prétend diriger devienne hpartie à un
traité multilatéral ou pour agir au nom de cet Etat dans une instahnce
judiciaire… » (Ibid., p. 198.)
Kelsen, bien qu’il parte de l’idée que « l’acte juridique de reconnais -
sance consiste à établir un fait » (H. Kelsen, « Recognition in Internatio-
nal Law — Theoretical Observations », dans L. Gross (dir. publ.),
International Law in the Twentieth Century, 1969, p. 592), considère que
«[l|e nouvel Etat acquiert son existence juridique lorsqu’il se proclahme
tel, mais il n’existe alors que pour lui -même, et n’existe pas aux yeux
des autres Etats. C’est là un bon exemple de situation limite. Pour
acquérir vis-à-vis des autres Etats la qualité de sujet de droit internatio
nal, le nouvel Etat doit être reconnu par eux comme tel; en droit inter-
national, l’Etat prédécesseur, quant à lui, n’existe en thant qu’Etat par
rapport au nouvel Etat que si ce dernier l’a reconnu comme tel. La
reconnaissance mutuelle est donc indispensable. Ib» (, p. 593.)
Hersch Lauterpacht, juriste et juge éminent, exprime sur ce sujet une
opinion semblable. Selon lui, la reconnaissance « marque la prise d’effet
474
7 CIJ1077.indb 945 18/04/16 08:54 474 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
international rights and duties of the recognized community” ( Oppen ‑
heim’s International Law : A Treatise, 8th ed., 1955, p. 128).
39. Such considerations are not unknown to the jurisprudence of the
Court. In the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case, the
Permanent Court stated inter alia:
“Poland is not a contracting Party either to the Armistice Conven-
tion or to the Protocol of Spa. At the time of the conclusion of those
two Conventions, Poland was not recognized as a belligerent by Ger-
many ; it is, however, only on the basis of such recognition that an
armistice could have been concluded between those two Powers.
The Principal Allied Powers had, it is true, recognized the Polish
armed forces as an autonomous, allied and co -belligerent (or belli -
gerent) army. This army was placed under the supreme political
authority of the Polish National Committee with headquarters in
Paris. Without considering the question what was as this moment the
political importance of this Committee, the Court observes that these
facts cannot be relied on as against Germany, which had no share in
the transaction.” (Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia,
Judgment No. 7, 1926, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7, pp. 27-28.)
Judge Skubiszewski, in his dissenting opinion in the East Timor case,
found that “[r]ecognition leads to the validation of factual control over
territory and to the establishment of corresponding rights” (East Timor
(Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, dissenting opin -
ion of Judge Skubiszewski, p. 265, para. 131; emphasis added).
In the Bosnian Genocide Case, the Court refrained from giving a clear
answer to the question with the explanation :
“For the purposes of determining its jurisdiction in this case, the
Court has no need to settle the question of what the effects of a situ -
ation of non -recognition may be on the contractual ties between par-
ties to a multilateral treaty. It need only note that, even if it were tho
be assumed that the Genocide Convention did not enter into force
between the Parties until the signature of the Dayton -Paris Agree -
ment, all the conditions are now fulfilled to found the jurisdiction ohf
the Court ratione personae [. . .]
In the present case, even if it were established that the Parties, each
of which was bound by the Convention when the Application was filed,
had only been bound as between themselves with effect from 14 Decem -
ber 1995, the Court could not set aside its jurisdiction on this basis .”
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.Yugoslavia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1996 (II), pp. 613-614, para. 26.)
475
7 CIJ1077.indb 946 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 474
des droits et obligations de l’entité reconnue » ( Oppenheim’s International
Law : A Treatise , 8 éd., 1955, p. 128).
39. On relève des considérations du même genre dans la jurisprudenche
de la Cour. Par exemple, dans son arrêt en l’affaire relative à Certains
intérêts allemands en Haute‑Silésie polonaise, la Cour permanente de Jus -
tice internationale a dit ce qui suit:
«La Pologne n’est Partie contractante ni à la Convention d’armis -
tice, ni au Protocole de Spa. Au moment de la conclusion de ces deux
accords, la Pologne n’était pas reconnue comme belligérante
par l’Allemagne; mais c’est seulement sur la base de pareille recon -
naissance qu’un armistice aurait pu être conclu entre ces deux Puihs-
sances.
Les Principales Puissances alliées avaient, il est vrai, reconnu les h
forces armées polonaises comme une armée autonome, alliée et
co -belligérante (ou : belligérante). Cette armée était placée sous l’au -
torité politique suprême du Comité national polonais dont le sihège
était à Paris. Sans entrer dans l’examen de la question de savohir
quelle était, à cette époque, l’importance politique de ce Chomité, la
Cour constate que ces faits ne sont pas opposables à l’Allemagne, hqui
n’y a eu aucune part. »o(Certains intérêts allemandsoen Haute‑Silésie
polonaise, fond, arrêt n 7, 1926, C.P.J.I. série A n 7, p. 27-28.)
Dans son opinion dissidente sur l’arrêt rendu par la Cour en l’haffaire
relative au Timor oriental, le juge Skubiszewski a affirmé que « [l]a recon -
naissance conduit à la validation du contrôle de fait sur un territoire et à
l’établissement de droits correspondants » (Timor oriental (Portugal c. Aus‑
tralie), arrêt, C.I.J.ecueil 1995, opinion dissidente du jugeSkubiszewski,
p. 265, par. 131; les italiques sont de moi).
Dans son arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires en l’affaire Bosnie‑
Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro, la Cour s’est abstenue de répondre
clairement à la question, se bornant à expliquer ce qui suit :
«Aux fins de se prononcer sur sa compétence en l’espèce, la Cohur
n’a pas à trancher la question de savoir quels peuvent être lesh effets
d’une situation de non-reconnaissance sur les liens contractuels entre
parties à un traité multilatéral. Il lui suffira de constater hque, à sup-
poser même que la convention sur le génocide ne soit entrée en h
vigueur entre les Parties qu’à la signature des accords de Dayton -Pa-
ris, toutes les conditions sont à présent réunies pour fonder lha com -
pétence de la Cour ratione personae…
En l’occurrence, quand bien même il serait établi que les Partihes,
qui étaient liées chacune par la convention au moment du dépôht de
la requête, ne l’auraient été entre elles qu’à compter du 14 décembre
1995, la Cour ne saurait écarter sa compétence sur cette base… »
(Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 613-614, par. 26.)
475
7 CIJ1077.indb 947 18/04/16 08:54 475 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
It should be noted, however, that the pronouncement of the Court relatesh
to jurisdiction rationepersonae — not to jurisdiction rationetemporis.
40. Recent practice confirms that the recognition of a State determines
the critical date as regards the beginning of the international rights ahnd
duties of the recognized community vis -à-vis recognizing State by estab -
lishing a necessary treaty nexus between them. Exempli causa, Switzer-
land, having recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992,
declared that the treaties formerly concluded with Yugoslavia shall hench-e
forth be applicable to bilateral relations (Revue suisse de droit interna ‑
tional et européen, 1993, p. 709).
The same pattern of reasoning underlines the decision of the Supreme
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany of 18 December 1959:
“The Contracting Parties which are already bound by a multilateral
convention can be bound by the accession of another State entity only
to the extent that the latter is a subject of international law as far as
they themselves are concerned . . . Any entity which exists in fact
requires, in addition, the recognition of its existence in some form . . .
In relation to other States which do not recognize it as a subject of
international law, such an entity cannot be a party to a treaty, let
alone become a party merely by a unilateral declaration, as e.g., by
accession to a multilateral convention, thus conferring upon itself the
status of a subject of international law in relation to States which do h
not recognize it.” (International Law Reports, Vol. 28, 1959, pp.87-88 ;
emphasis in original.)
41. In the letter dated 5 April 1994 from the chargé d’affaires A.I. of
the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed
to the Secretary -General as the depositary of international conventions,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stated, inter alia, that :
“Croatia, no doubt, is a successor State and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia does not deny that. The term ‘successor State’, howeverh,
implies exclusively the change of sovereignty in a part of the territoryh of
the Yugoslav Federation in the sense of the transformation of that part
of the territory into an independent State. The very act of the change ohf
territorial sovereignty is not automatically linked to the transfer of thhe
rights and obligations of the Federation to the seceded part, since suchh
a transfer implies legality of the territorial change, i.e., that the tehrritorial
change has been carried out in conformity with the principles of positivhe
international law.” (UnitedN ations doc. S/1994/398, 5April 1994.)
The statement makes the distinction between succession taken in
terms of territorial change (de facto succession) and succession as the
transmission of rights and obligations from predecessor State(s) (de iure
succession) elaborated in the doctrine of international law (H. Kelsen,
476
7 CIJ1077.indb 948 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 475
Il est à noter cependant que cette opinion de la Cour se rapporte àh sa
compétence ratione personae, et non ratione temporis.
40. La pratique récente confirme que la reconnaissance d’un Etat
détermine la date à compter de laquelle ses droits et obligations hprennent
effet vis-à-vis des Etats qui l’ont reconnu, en établissant avec eux les liensh
conventionnels nécessaires. Par exemple, la Suisse, ayant reconnu la hSlo-
vénie et la Croatie le 15 janvier 1992, a déclaré que les traités qu’elle avait
conclus avec la Yougoslavie seraient applicables à compter de cette dhate
dans ses relations bilatérales avec lesdits Etats (Revue suisse de droit inter‑
national et européen, 1993, p. 709).
La décision de la Cour suprême de la République fédérale hd’Allemagne
en date du 18 décembre 1959, citée ci -après, procède du même type de
raisonnement:
«Les parties contractantes déjà liées par une convention multilahté -
rale ne le deviennent à l’égard d’une autre entité étahtique qui adhère
à cette convention que si ladite entité a pour elles la qualité de sujet
de droit international… Une entité qui existe de facto doit de surcroît
être reconnue d’une manière ou d’une autre comme ayant une exis -
tence juridique… Par rapport aux autres Etats qui ne l’ont pas recon-
nue en tant que sujet de droit international, pareille entité ne saurhait
être partie à un traité, et encore moins y devenir partie par lhe seul
effet d’une déclaration unilatérale, telle qu’une déclarathion
d’adhésion à une convention multilatérale par laquelle elle préten -
drait se conférer elle -même la qualité de sujet de droit international
vis-à-vis d’Etats qui ne la reconnaissent pas. » (International Law
Reports, vol. 28, 1959, p. 87-88; les italiques sont dans l’original.)
41. Dans la lettre datée du 5 avril 1994 qu’il a adressée au Secrétaire
général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en sa qualité de dépositaire
de conventions internationales, le chargé d’affaires par intérimh de la mis -
sion permanente de la Yougoslavie auprès de l’Organisation a notamh-
ment déclaré ce qui suit :
«Il ne fait pas de doute que la Croatie est l’un des Etats successeursh,
et la République fédérative [sic] de Yougoslavie ne le nie pas. Toute-
fois, les termes «Etat successeur» impliquent uniquement le transfert
de souveraineté dans une partie du territoire de la Fédération hyougo -
slave, cette partie devenant un Etat indépendant. L’acte de transfhert de
la souveraineté territoriale n’est pas automatiquement lié au thransfert
des droits et obligations de la Fédération touchant à la partieh sécession
niste, car un tel transfert implique une modification territoriale licite,
c’est-à-dire réalisée en conformité avec les principes du droit internah-tio
nal positif. (Nations Unies, doc. S/1994/398, 5avril 1994.)
Cette déclaration opère une distinction entre la succession comme
modification territoriale (succession de facto) et la succession comme
transfert des droits et obligations de l’Etat ou des Etats prédéhcesseur(s)
(succession de jure), distinction retenue dans la doctrine du droit interna -
476
7 CIJ1077.indb 949 18/04/16 08:54 476 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international , Vol. 42, p. 314 ;
D. P. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession, 1956, pp.3, 6 ; K.Zemanek,
“Die Wiener Konvention über die Staatennachfolge in Verträge”h, Ius
Humanitatis : Festschrift für Alfred Verdross , 1980, p. 719 ; M. Jones,
“State Succession in Matter of Treaties”, British Yearbook of Interna ‑
tional Law, Vol. 24, 1947, pp. 360-361) and embodied in Article 6 of the
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. Arti -
cle 6, entitled “Cases of Succession of States covered by the present Conh-
vention”, specifies that the Convention “applies only to the effehcts of a
succession of States occurring in conformity with the international law h
and, in particular, the principles of international law embodied in the h
Charter of the United Nations”.
42. The mutual recognition took place only on the day the Dayton
Agreement was signed, i.e., 14 December 1995 or, alternatively, on
23 August 1996, the date when the Agreement on Normalization of Rela -
tions between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia was signed (Narodne novine. Međunarodni ugovor br. 10/96).
Article 1 of the Agreement stipulates : “The Contracting Parties shall
respect each other as independent, sovereign and equal States within thehir
international borders.”
43. The fact that the Respondent asserted during the proceedings that
the Convention is applicable between the Parties as from 27 April 1992 is
not of decisive importance in the view of the fact that “the establishhment
or otherwise of jurisdiction is not a matter for the parties but for theh
Court itself” (Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the
Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 450, para. 37).
The Court must “always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction, and mhust
if necessary go into that matter proprio motu” (Appeal Relating to the
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1972, p. 52, para. 13).
1.4. By which date was the Genocide Convention in force as regards the
SFRY?
44. It is hardly necessary to recall that two elements determine the
validity in time of a treaty or of a particular rule :
(i) the moment of its entering into force ; and
(ii) theoment of its termination in totoor of its particular rule, as Arti-
cleIX of the Convention.
The latter element is of special relevance as regards the SFRY as a
State party to the Genocide Convention in the circumstances surrounding h
the case. Sedes materiae of the dispute in the light of the Applicant’s claim
is determined by the Court in the following terms :
“(1) whether the acts relied on by Croatia took place ; and, if they did,
whether they were contrary to the Convention ;
477
7 CIJ1077.indb 950 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 476
tional (H. Kelsen, Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international,
vol. 42, p. 314 ; D.P. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession, 1956, p. 3
et 6; K. Zemanek, « Die Wiener Konvention über die Staatennachfolge in
Verträge », Ius Humanitatis : Festschrift für Alfred Verdross, 1980, p. 719 ;
M. Jones, « State Succession in Matter of Treaties », British Yearbook of
International Law, vol. 24, 1947, p. 360-361). L’article 6 de la convention
de Vienne sur la succession d’Etats en matière de traités, intihtulé «Cas de
succession d’Etats visés par la présente convention », reflète cette distinc -
tion. Il dispose en effet que la convention « s’applique uniquement aux
effets d’une succession d’Etats se produisant conformément au drhoit
international, et plus particulièrement aux principes du droit internhatio -
nal invoqués par la Charte des Nations Unies».
42. La Croatie et la République fédérale de Yougoslavie ne se sont h
mutuellement reconnues que le 14 décembre 1995, date de signature de
l’accord de Dayton, voire même plus tard, lorsqu’elles ont signhé le
23 août 1996 l’accord sur la normalisation de leurs relations (Naro ‑
dne novine. Međunarodni ugovor br. 10/96).
L’article premier de cet accord est ainsi libellé: «Chaque Partie contrac-
tante respecte l’autre en sa qualité d’Etat indépendant, souhverain et égal à
elle à l’intérieur de ses frontières internationales.
43. Le fait que le défendeur ait soutenu au cours de la procédure que h
la convention sur le génocide était applicable entre les Parties dhepuis le
27 avril 1992 ne revêt pas une importance décisive, étant donné que «h éta-
blir ou ne pas établir sa compétence n’est pas une question quih relève des
parties ;elle est du ressort de la Cour elle -même »Compétence en matière
de pêcheries (Espagne c. Canada), compétence de la Cour, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1998, p. 450, par. 37).
La Cour doit « toujours s’assurer de sa compétence et …, s’il y a lieu,
l’examiner d’office » (ppel concernant la compétence du Conseil de l’OACI
(Inde c. Pakistan), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1972, p. 52, par. 13).
1.4. A quelle date la Convention est‑elle entrée en vigueur à l’é▯gard de la
RFSY?
44. On se rappellera que deux éléments déterminent la validité dans le
temps d’un traité donné ou d’une disposition particulièrehdudit traité :
i) la date à laquelle ce traité ou cette règle sont entrés en vhigueur; et
ii) la date à laquelle le traité in toto ou la règle particulière considérée,
comme l’article IX de la Convention, cesse d’être en vigueur.
Dans les circonstances de l’espèce, ce dernier élément préhsente une
importance particulière en ce qui concerne la RFSY en tant qu’Etath partie
à la convention sur le génocide. Le sedes materiae du différend au regard
des prétentions du demandeur est défini comme suit par la Cour, à savoir :
«1) si les actes allégués par la Croatie ont été commis et, le chas
échéant, s’ils contrevenaient à la Convention ;
477
7 CIJ1077.indb 951 18/04/16 08:54 477 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
(2) if so, whether those acts were attributable to the SFRY at the time
that they occurred and engaged its responsibility ; and
(3) if the responsibility of the SFRY had been engaged, whether the
FRY succeeded to that responsibility.
While there is no dispute that many (though not all) of the acts
relied upon by Croatia took place, the Parties disagree over whether
or not they constituted violations of the Genocide Convention. In
addition, Serbia rejects Croatia’s argument that Serbia has incurred
responsibility, on whatever basis, for those acts.” (Judgment,
para. 112.)
The only logical and legally founded conclusion is that the SFRY was
bound by the Convention until the moment when the process of its dis -
solution was complete.
That necessarily brings into focus the responsibility of the SFRY, for
the predominant number of acts which the Applicant considers as acts of h
genocide took place before 27 April 1992 when the Respondent was
established as a State.
The Court is right in stating that “the SFRY was bound by the Con -
vention at the time when it is alleged that the relevant acts occurred”h
(ibid., para. 113). However, this is only one aspect of the issue of the tem -
poral validity of the Genocide Convention as regards the SFRY. The
other aspect of the issue is the moment until which the SFRY was bound
by the provisions of the Genocide Convention.
The answer seems simple. As dissolution of a State means that it no
longer has legal personality (Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, Arbi -
tration Commission, Opinion 8, point (2)), it appears that when the pro -
cess of dissolution of the SFRY was completed, its status as a State party
to treaties was terminated ipso facto.
45. The reasoning of the Court is designed in terms of retroactivity,
both of the substantive provisions of the Genocide Convention and of
Article IX, although this is denied by the Court (see, inter alia, Judgment,
paras. 95, 98, 99).
Pointing out that “the temporal scope of Article IX is necessarily linked
to the temporal scope of the other provisions of the Genocide Conven -
tion” (ibid., para. 93), which are not retroactive (ibid., para. 99), the Court
points, however, to its dictum in its 1996 and 2008 Judgments, which is
obviously based on the assumption of retroactivity.
In its 1996 Judgment, the Court determined :
“it remains for the Court to specify the scope of that jurisdiction
ratione temporis. In its sixth and seventh preliminary objections,
Yugoslavia, basing its contention on the principle of the non -retroac -
tivity of legal acts, has indeed asserted as a subsidiary argument that,h
even though the Court might have jurisdiction on the basis of the
Convention, it could only deal with events subsequent to the different
dates on which the Convention might have become applicable as
478
7 CIJ1077.indb 952 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 477
2) dans l’affirmative, si ces actes étaient attribuables à la RFShY au
moment où ils ont été commis et ont engagé la responsabilitéh de
cette dernière ; et
3) à supposer que la responsabilité de la RFSY ait été engagéhe, si la
RFY a succédé à cette responsabilité.
S’il est admis de part et d’autre que bon nombre des actes alléhgués
par la Croatie (mais pas tous) ont effectivement eu lieu, les Parties ne
s’accordent pas sur le point de savoir s’ils contrevenaient à la
Convention. En outre, la Serbie rejette l’argument de la Croatie selohn
lequel sa responsabilité serait engagée pour ces actes, à un tihtre ou à
un autre. » (Arrêt, par. 112.)
La seule conclusion logique et fondée en droit est que la RFSY étahit
liée par la Convention jusqu’à la date d’achèvement de sohn processus de
dissolution.
Cette conclusion ramène nécessairement à la question de la resphonsabi -
lité de la RFSY, puisque la plus grande partie des actes que le demanhdeur
considère comme des actes de génocide a été commise avant leh
27 avril 1992, date à laquelle le défendeur a été constitué en Etaht.
La Cour a raison de dire que « la RFSY était liée par la Convention à
l’époque où les actes pertinents sont censés avoir étéh commis » ( ibid.,
par. 113). Il ne s’agit cependant là que d’un aspect de la questionh de la
validité temporelle de la convention sur le génocide à l’éhgard de la RFSY.
L’autre aspect de la question concerne la date jusqu’à laquelleh la RFSY a
été liée par les dispositions de cette Convention.
La réponse semble simple. Du fait que « la dissolution d’un Etat
entraîne la fin de sa personnalité juridique » (conférence pour la paix en
Yougoslavie, commission d’arbitrage, avis n o 8, point 2), il appert que,
lorsque le processus de dissolution de la RFSY est arrivé à son tehrme, sa
qualité d’Etat partie à des traités a pris fin ipso facto.
45. Le raisonnement de la Cour s’énonce en termes de rétroactivité,
tant des dispositions de fond de la convention sur le génocide que deh son
articleIX, bien que la Cour le nie (voir, entre autres, les paragraphes 95,
98, 99 de l’arrêt).
Faisant observer que « [l]a portée temporelle [de l’article IX] est forcé -
ment liée à celle des autres dispositions de la Convention » (ibid., par. 93),
qui ne sont pas rétroactives (ibid., par. 99), la Cour renvoie cependant
au dictum de ses arrêts de 1996 et 2008, qui est manifestement basé sur
l’hypothèse de la rétroactivité.
Dans son arrêt de 1996, la Cour a conclu :
«il incombe encore à la Cour de préciser l’étendue de cette chompé -
tence ratione temporis. Dans ses sixième et septième exceptions pré -
liminaires, la Yougoslavie, se fondant sur le principe de la
non-rétroactivité des actes juridiques, a en effet fait valoir à titre sub-
sidiaire que, quand bien même la Cour serait compétente sur la bashe
de la convention, elle ne pourrait connaître que des faits postériheurs
aux différentes dates auxquelles la convention aurait pu devenir
478
7 CIJ1077.indb 953 18/04/16 08:54 478 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
between the Parties. In this regard, the Court will confine itself to hthe
observation that the Genocide Convention — and in particular Arti-
cle IX — does not contain any clause the object or effect of which is
to limit in such manner the scope of its jurisdiction ratione temporis,
and nor did the Parties themselves make any reservation to that end,
either to the Convention or on the occasion of the signature of the
Dayton-Paris Agreement. The Court thus finds that it has jurisdiction
in this case to give effect to the Genocide Convention with regard to
the relevant facts which have occurred since the beginning of the con-
flict which took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This finding is,
moreover, in accordance with the object and purpose of the Conven -
tion as defined by the Court in 1951 and referred to above. As a resulht,
the Court considers that it must reject Yugoslavia’s sixth and seventh
preliminary objections.” (Application of the Convention on the Pre ‑
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herze ‑
govinav.Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1996 (II), p. 617, para. 34; reference omitted.)
It is perfectly true that the Genocide Convention does not contain
“express provision. . . limiting its jurisdiction rationetemporis” (2008Judg-
ment, para. 123). However, this is not the real issue at hand. The real issue
is whether the Convention contains a provision that excludes the applica-
tion of the general rule of international law regarding the non-retroactivity
of treaties, embodied in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.
The substantive reason concerns the very specific approach of the
Court to the temporal scope of the Genocide Convention in the Bosnian
Genocide case. The reasoning of the Court seems to be an inversion of the
logic incorporated in Article 28 of the Convention on the Law of Trea -
ties; it rests upon the presumption of retroactivity in contrast to Arti -
cle 28 which is based on presumption of non -retroactivity.
Therefore, “the presumption was reversed : absent some express reser -
vation, the temporal limitation did not apply” (R. Kolb, The International
Court of Justice, 2013, p. 423).
Thus, “[c]ompromissory clauses (and, perhaps, generally, jurisdictiohnal
clauses in treaties) are . . . aligned with the regime of the optional clause”
(ibid.). In the light of the jurisprudence of the Court, it may be under -
stood as retrospective effects of the title of jurisdiction (i.e., application of
a jurisdictional clause in view of the events and acts prior to its entrhy into
force) rather than retroactive effects of the jurisdictional clause at thhe
time when it was not yet in force.
The conclusion regarding the assumption of retroactivity in the
1996 Judgment becomes even more evident if the context is taken into
479
7 CIJ1077.indb 954 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 478
applicable entre les Parties. A cet égard, la Cour se bornera à obhser-
ver que la convention sur le génocide — et en particulier son
article IX — ne comporte aucune clause qui aurait pour objet ou
pour conséquence de limiter de la sorte l’étendue de sa compéhtence
ratione temporis et que les Parties elles -mêmes n’ont formulé aucune
réserve à cet effet, ni à la convention, ni à l’occasion dhe la signature
des accords de Dayton -Paris. La Cour constate ainsi qu’elle a com -
pétence en l’espèce pour assurer l’application de la conventhion sur le
génocide aux faits pertinents qui se sont déroulés depuis le déhbut du
conflit dont la Bosnie -Herzégovine a été le théâtre. Cette constata -
tion est d’ailleurs conforme à l’objet et au but de la conventihon tels
que définis par la Cour en 1951 et rappelés ci-dessus. La Cour estime
par suite devoir rejeter les sixième et septième exceptions préhlimi -
naires de la Yougoslavie. » (Application de la convention pour la pré ‑
vention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie‑Herzégov▯ine
c. Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1996▯ (II),
p. 617, par. 34 ; référence omise.)
Il est parfaitement exact que la convention sur le génocide « ne contient
aucune disposition expresse limitant [l]a compétence ratione temporis [de
la Cour] » (arrêt de 2008, par. 123). Mais là n’est pas la vraie question. La
vraie question est de savoir si la convention sur le génocide contienht une
disposition excluant l’application de la règle générale de droit internatio -
nal relative à la non -rétroactivité des traités qui figure à l’article 28 de la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités.
Quant à la raison de fond, elle tient à la manière très parthiculière dont
la Cour a traité la question de la portée temporelle de la conventhion sur le
génocide en l’affaire opposant la Bosnie-Herzégovine à la Yougoslavie au
sujet de cette Convention. Il semble en effet que la Cour ait alors suivih un
raisonnement dont la logique est à l’opposé de celle dont procèhde l’ar -
ticle 28 de la convention sur le droit des traités ; ce raisonnement repose
sur une présomption de rétroactivité, alors que l’article 28 est fondé sur
une présomption de non -rétroactivité.
Ainsi, « les présomptions ont été inversées : en l’absence d’une réserve
expresse, il n’y a pas de limitation temporelle» (R. Kolb, The International
Court of Justice, 2013, p. 423).
Cet auteur poursuit en ces termes : «les clauses compromissoires (voire,
plus généralement, les clauses de compétence que contiennent lehs traités)
se trouvent … alignées sur le régime applicable aux clauses facultatives »
(ibid.). A la lumière de la jurisprudence de la Cour, on peut entendre
cette inversion comme conférant rétrospectivement effet au titre deh com-
pétence (application d’une clause de compétence en fonction d’hévéne -
ments ou actes qui ont précédé son entrée en vigueur) plutôht que comme
conférant à la clause de compétence des effets rétroactifs, ch’est-à-dire des
effets à l’égard de faits antérieurs à son entrée en vihgueur.
La conclusion relative à la présomption de rétroactivité quih figure dans
l’arrêt de 1996 devient encore plus manifeste si l’on prend en compte son
479
7 CIJ1077.indb 955 18/04/16 08:54 479 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
consideration. The dictum cited above is actually the response to the sixth
and seventh preliminary objection raised by Yugoslavia. Basing its con -
tention on the principle of non -retroactivity for legal acts, Yugoslavia
had indeed asserted, as a subsidiary argument, that, even if the Court
might have jurisdiction on the basis of the Convention, it could only dehal
with events subsequent to the different dates on which the Convention
might have become applicable as between the Parties.
45.1. In fact, the Court essentially accepted the Applicant’s interpreta -
tion that:
“Croatia responds that the Court has jurisdiction over the entirety
of its claim and that there is no bar to admissibility. For Croatia, theh
essential point is that the Genocide Convention was in force in the
territories concerned throughout the relevant period, because the
SFRY was a party to the Convention. According to Croatia, the FRY
emerged directly from the SFRY, with the organs of the new State
taking over the control of those of the old State during the course of
1991 when the SFRY was ‘in a process of dissolution’ (the phrase h
used by the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia
in Opinion No. 1, 29 November 1991, 92 International Law Reports
(ILR), p. 162). On 27April 1992, the FRY made a declaration which,
as the Court determined in 2008, had the effect of a notification of
succession to the Genocide Convention and other treaties to which
the SFRY had been party. Croatia maintains that there was, there -
fore, a continuous application of the Convention, that it would be
artificial and formalistic to confine jurisdiction to the period frohm
27 April 1992, and that a decision to limit jurisdiction to events occur-
ring on or after that date would create a ‘time gap’ in the protection
afforded by the Convention. Croatia points to the absence of any
temporal limitation in the terms of Article IX of the Genocide Con -
vention. At least by the early summer of 1991, according to Croatia,
the SFRY had ceased to be a functioning State and what became the
FRY was already a State in statu nascendi.” (Judgment, para. 81.)
In that sense, the Applicant is correct because, in the light of the Apphl-i
cant’s assertions, it is not a matter of retroactivity in the technichal sense,
but in the sense of the “continuous application of the Convention”h.
The Applicant’s assertion of the “continuous application of the Cohn -
vention” is based on :
(i) the rules on succession to responsibility ; and
(ii) the attribution of alleged acts of genocide to Serbia on the basis of
Article 10 (2) of the Rules on the Responsibility of States.
In order for the Court to act in the frame of the rule on non -retroactiv-
ity, it was necessary for it, before entering into the merits of the cashe, to
establish that the Applicant’s assertions relating to the rules on suhccession
480
7 CIJ1077.indb 956 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 479
contexte. Le dictum cité plus haut constitue en effet la réponse aux sixième
et septième exceptions préliminaires soulevées par la Yougoslavie. Appuyant
sa thèse sur le principe de la non-rétroactivité des actes juridiques, la You-
goslavie a en effet fait valoir à titre subsidiaire que, quand bien mêhme la
Cour serait compétente sur la base de la convention sur le génocidhe, elle ne
pourrait connaître que de faits postérieurs aux différentes datehs auxquelles
la Convention aurait pu devenir applicable entre les Parties.
45.1. En réalité, la Cour a pour l’essentiel accepté l’inhterprétation du
demandeur ainsi résumée :
« La Croatie répond que la Cour a compétence à l’égard de lh’en -
semble de sa demande et qu’aucune fin de non-recevoir ne peut lui être
opposée. De son point de vue, l’essentiel est que la convention suhr le
génocide était en vigueur dans les territoires en cause tout au lohng de la
période en litige, puisque la RFSY y était partie. Selon elle, la hRFY est
née directement de la RFSY, les organes du nouvel Etat prenant en
charge ceux de l’Etat prédécesseur au cours de l’année1991, alors que
la RFSY se trouvait engagée dans un « processus de dissolution »
(expression utilisée par la commission d’arbitrage de la conféhrence sur
la Yougoslavie dans son avisn o 1, 29novembre1991, Revue générale de
droit international public(RGDIP), t.96, 1992, p.264). Le 27avril1992,
la RFY a fait une déclaration qui, ainsi que la Cour l’a dit en 2008, a
eu l’effet d’une notification de successio… à la convention sur le géno -
cide et à d’autres traités auxquels la RFSY avait été parhtie. La Croatie
soutient que, en conséquence, il n’y a pas eu de rupture dans l’happli- ca
tion de la Convention, qu’il serait artificiel et formaliste de limiter la
compétence de la Cour à la période commençant le 27 avril 1992 et
qu’une décision en ce sens introduirait une «interruption» dans la pro-
tection assurée par la Convention. Elle souligne l’absence de touthe li-mi
tation temporelle dans le libellé de l’articleIX de la Convention. Au
moins à partir du début de l’été1991, la RFSY avait, selon la Croatie,
cessé de fonctionner en tant qu’Etat et ce qui allait devenir la RhFY était
déjà un Etat in statu nascendi.» (Arrêt, par. 81.)
Dans ce sens, le demandeur a raison, parce que, dans l’optique de sesh
assertions, la question n’en est pas une de rétroactivité au sehns technique,
mais au sens de l’absence de « rupture dans l’application de la Convention ».
L’assertion du demandeur selon laquelle il n’y aurait pas eu de «h rup -
ture dans l’application de la Convention » se fonde sur :
i) les règles régissant la succession à la responsabilité ; et
ii) l’attribution à la Serbie des actes de génocide allégués hsur le fonde -
ment du paragraphe 2 de l’article 10 des Articles de la Commission du
droit international sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait intehrnatio-
nalement illicite.
Pour inscrire son raisonnement dans le cadre de la règle de la non -
rétroactivité, la Cour devait, avant d’examiner l’affaire au hfond, s’assurer
que les assertions du demandeur concernant les règles relatives à hla suc -
480
7 CIJ1077.indb 957 18/04/16 08:54 480 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
to responsibility and attribution on the basis of Article 10 (2) were
well-founded, that is, that they constituted part of the applicable substan-
tive law in casu.
If established as part of the applicable substantive law, those rules
would produce retroactive effects independently of Article 28 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as a proper consequence of
effects of the rules themselves.
2. Nature and Effects of the Second Preliminary Objection
of the Respondent
46. In its Judgment on Preliminary Objections, the Court found, interalia,
that “the Respondent was bound by the Genocide Convention, including
Article IX thereof, at the date of the institution of the proceedings and
remained so bound at least until 1November 2000” (2008Judgment, p.455,
para. 118) and “if consequently the Applicant would have been at liberty,
had it so desired, to submit a fresh application identical in substance hto the
present Application, the conditions for the jurisdiction of the Court wohuld
be satisfied” (ibid.). It appears that the Court, by adopting this conclusion,
established its jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae.
47. The Court, however, did not pronounce itself as regards Serbia’s
preliminary objection ratione temporis, having found that this objection
“does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively phre -
liminary character” (ibid., p. 460, para. 130). The objection ratione tempo‑
ris in the circumstances surrounding the case triggers the issues of
jurisdiction and admissibility as two inseparable issues :
“In the view of the Court, the questions of jurisdiction and admissi-
bility raised by Serbia’s preliminary objection ratione temporis consti-
tute two inseparable issues in the present case. The first issue is thhat of
the Court’s jurisdiction to determine whether breaches of the Genocidhe
Convention were committed in the light of the facts that occurred prior
to the date on which the FRY came into existence as a separate State,
capable of being a party in its own right to the Convention ; this may
be regarded as a question of the applicability of the obligations under
the Genocide Convention to the FRY before 27 April 1992. The second
issue, that of admissibility of the claim in relation to those facts, anhd
involving questions of attribution, concerns the consequences to be
drawn with regard to the responsibility of the FRY for those same facts
under the general rules of State responsibility. In order to be in a poshi-
tion to make any findings on each of these issues, the Court will need
to have more elements before it.” (Ibid., p. 460, para. 129.)
48. The situation is one characterized by Judge Fitzmaurice as the dis -
tinction between jurisdiction and admissibility. Discussing the issue ofh
retroactivity, Judge Fitzmaurice said :
“But an unsuccessful jurisdictional plea leaves open the possibility h
that a finding on the ultimate merits may still be excluded through a h
481
7 CIJ1077.indb 958 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 480
cession à la responsabilité et à l’attribution de responsabihlité sur le fonde-
ment du paragraphe 2 de l’article 10 étaient fondées, c’est -à-dire qu’elles
faisaient partie intégrante du droit matériel applicable à l’hespèce.
S’il était établi que ces règles font partie intégrante dhu droit matériel
applicable, elles produiraient des effets rétroactifs qui seraient uneh consé-
quence logique de leurs dispositions, nonobstant l’article 28 de la conven-
tion de Vienne sur le droit des traités.
2. Nature et effets de la deuxième exception préliminaire
du défendeur
46. Dans son arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires, la Cour a notam -
ment établi que « le défendeur était lié par la convention sur le génocide,
y compris son article IX, à la date de l’introduction de l’instance, et qu’il
l’[était] demeuré au moins jusqu’au 1 er novembre 2000» (arrêt de 2008,
p. 455, par. 118) et que, s’il avait «été loisible au demandeur d’introduire
— s’il l’avait souhaité — une nouvelle requête identique en substance à la
présente, les conditions de sa compétence se trouveraient rempliesh »
(ibid.). La Cour semble avoir ainsi établi sa compétence ratione personae
et ratione materiae.
47. La Cour ne s’est cependant pas prononcée sur l’exception prélimi -
naire ratione temporis de la Serbie, ayant considéré que cette exception
« n’a[vait] pas, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, un caractèhre exclusive -
ment préliminaire» (ibid., p. 460, par. 130). Or, dans le contexte de la pré-
sente affaire, ladite exception soulève indissociablement la question hde la
compétence et celle de la recevabilité :
«De l’avis de la Cour, les questions de compétence et de recevabilité
soulevées par l’exception préliminaire ratione temporis de la Serbie
constituent, en la présente affaire, deux questions indissociables. Lah
première est celle de savoir si la Cour a compétence pour déterminer si
des violations de la convention sur le génocide ont été commisehs, à la
lumière des faits antérieurs à la date à laquelle la RFY a chommencé à
exister en tant qu’Etat distinct, ayant à ce titre la capacité hd’être partie
à cet instrument cela revient à se demander si les obligations en vertu
de la Convention étaient opposables à la RFY antérieurement au
27 avril 1992. La seconde question, qui porte sur la recevabilité de la
demande concernant ces faits, et qui a trait à l’attribution, est hcelle des
conséquences à tirer quant à la responsabilité de la RFY à raison des-
dits faits en vertu des règles générales de la responsabilitéh de l’Etat.
Pour que la Cour puisse se prononcer sur chacune de ces questions,
elle devra disposer de davantage d’éléments. » (Ibid., p. 460, par. 129.)
48. Ce cas de figure est précisément celui que le juge Fitzmaurice a
considéré comme marquant la différence entre compétence et rehcevabilité.
Sur la question de la rétroactivité, il a pu dire :
«Même si les exceptions d’incompétence sont rejetées, une déhci -
sion concluant à l’irrecevabilité de la demande au fond peut enhcore
481
7 CIJ1077.indb 959 18/04/16 08:54 481 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
decision given against the substantive admissibility of the claim.”
(G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, Vol. II, 1986, p. 439.)
Thus, “substantive admissibility may arise as an issue after jurisdiction
has been established”.
49. The temporal element of the jurisdiction of the Court in casu is to
be regarded as part of the issue of jurisdiction ratione personae primarily,
producing a corresponding effect on the jurisdiction of the Court ratione
materiae. It, in fact, determines the scope of jurisdiction, both ratione
personae et ratione materiae.
50. The temporal scope of jurisdiction ratione personae in the case at
hand is highly specific. Usually, jurisdictionratione personae means that the
parties to the case are parties to the Statute or have undertaken the obliga-
tions of a party to the Statute at the time of institution of proceedinghs. In
other words, “[i]t is necessary that the parties be under the obligathion to
accept the jurisdiction of the Court at the time at which the determinathion
of the existence of that obligation has to be made, normally the date ofh the
institution of the proceedings” (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the
International Court : 1920‑2005 , 4th ed., Vol. II, 2006, p. 562).
51. In casu, the question is whether or not FRY/Serbia was a State at
all before 29 April 1993, in the sense of a subject of international law,
suitable to be equipped with the capacities for the establishment of theh
jurisdiction of the Court ratione personae. That is the fundamental ques -
tion which precedes, both in terms of logic and law, the issue of jurisdhic-
tion, constituting a segment of ius standi in iudicio. For, the status of a
party to the Statute or non -party to the Statute, which has undertaken
the obligations as regards jurisdiction of the Court ratione personae is
absolutely reserved for States as legal persons in terms of international
law. If one or both parties to the case are not States as legal persons hin
terms of international law, the establishment of jurisdiction of the Couhrt
is an impossible mission, because a litigation before the Court implies h
ius standi before the Court as a pre-condition for the establishment of the
jurisdiction of the Court (see e.g., Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and
Montenegro v. Netherlands), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2004 (III), p. 1030, para. 45).
52. The temporal element in casu extends its relevance also to the juris-
diction of the Court ratione materiae, since the limitation of the Court’s
jurisdiction ratione personae produces corresponding effects on its juris -
diction ratione materiae. For, jurisdiction ratione materiae necessarily
implies that events which give rise to the reference to the Court occurrhed
during the space of time in respect to which jurisdiction ratione personae
exists.
53. The combined effects of temporal limitations of the jurisdiction of
the Court ratione personae and ratione materiae may have, as a conse -
quence, the disappearance of the dispute before the Court in part or intoto.
482
7 CIJ1077.indb 960 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 481
empêcher qu’il soit statué sur le fond de l’affaire. » (G. Fitzmaurice,
The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, vol. II,
1986, p. 439.)
Autrement dit, « la question de la recevabilité au fond peut se poser après
que la compétence a été établie ».
49. L’élément temporel de la compétence de la Cour en la préshente
espèce doit être considéré avant tout comme un aspect de la hquestion de la
compétence ratione personae, et produit un effet correspondant sur la com-
pétence ratione materiae de la Cour. De fait, c’est cet élément qui détermine
l’étendue de la compétence, tant ratione personae que ratione materiae.
50. La portée temporelle de la compétence ratione personae en l’espèce
est très particulière. D’ordinaire, la compétence ratione personae signifie
que les parties à une affaire sont parties au Statut ou se sont acquithtées
des obligations incombant à une partie au Statut au moment de l’inhtro -
duction de l’instance. Autrement dit, « il faut que les parties soient dans
l’obligation d’accepter la juridiction de la Cour à la date àh laquelle l’exis-
tence de cette obligation doit être établie, c’est -à-dire, normalement, à la
date de l’introduction de l’instance » (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice
of the International Court : 1920‑2005 , 4eéd., vol. II, p. 562).
51. En la présente espèce, la question est de savoir si la RFY/Serbie,h
avant le 29 avril 1993, était simplement un Etat, au sens d’un sujet de droit
international, doté des qualités voulues pour que la compétenceh ratiop ner‑
sonae de la Cour puisse être établie. Telle est la question fondamentalhe, qui
précède même, tant d’un point de vue logique que juridique, celle de la
compétence, qui est un aspect du jus standi in judicio. C’est qu’en effet la
qualité de partie au Statut, ou de non -partie à celui-ci s’étant acquittée des
obligations relatives à la juridiction de la Cour ratione personae, est abso -
lument réservée aux Etats en tant que personnes juridiques en droiht inter-
national. Si l’une ou l’autre des deux parties à une affaire — ou les
deux — ne sont pas des Etats, c’est -à-dire des personnes juridiques du
point de vue du droit international, l’établissement de la compéhtence de la
Cour est impossible, étant donné que toute procédure devant celhle -ci a
pour condition préalable à l’établissement de la compétenhce de la Cour le
jus standi devant celle-ci (voir, par exemple, l’affaire relative à la Licéité de
l’emploi de la force (Serbie‑et‑Monténégro c. Pays‑Bas), exceptions préli‑
minaires, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil 2004 (III), p. 1030, par. 45).
52. L’élément temporel en la présente espèce est égalementh pertinent en
ce qui concerne la compétence ratione materiae de la Cour, puisque la
limitation de la compétence ratione personae de celle -ci produit des effets
correspondants sur cet autre aspect de sa compétence. La compétenche
ratione materiae implique en effet nécessairement que les événements qui
ont donné lieu à la saisine de la Cour se soient déroulés pehndant la période
à l’égard de laquelle celle-ci avait compétence ratione personae.
53. L’effet conjugué des limites temporelles des compétences ratione
personae et ratione materiae de la Cour peut entraîner la disparition de
tout ou partie du différend dont celle -ci est saisie.
482
7 CIJ1077.indb 961 18/04/16 08:54 482 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The substance of the international dispute consists of the two cumula -
tive elements — personal and material. The generally accepted definition
of a dispute, which the Court gave in the Mavrommatis Palestine Conces‑
sions case represents, in fact, only the material element of the concept of
“international dispute”. In order to qualify “a disagreement ovher a point
of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests”, which is evident in
this specific case, as an “international dispute”, another, formhal, element
is indispensable, i.e., that the parties in the “disagreement or conflict” be
States in the sense of international public law.
Article IX of the Genocide Convention stipulates the competence of
the Court regarding “disputes between the Parties”. The term “Pharties”,
as it obviously results from Article XI of the Convention, means States,
either members or non-members of the United Nations. The term “State”
is not used either in abstracto in the Genocide Convention, or elsewhere ;
it means a concrete entity which combines in its personality the constithut -
ing elements of a State, determined by international law. The pretention
of an entity to represent a State, and even recognition by other States,h is
not, in the eyes of the law, sufficient, on its own, to make it a Stateh within
the meaning of international law.
54. The following statement of Judge Fitzmaurice seems to rest on
common sense and cogent legal consideration :
“since the . . . State did not exist as such at the date of these acts and
events, these could not have constituted, in relation to it, an interna -
tional wrong, nor have caused it an international injury. An act which
did not, in relation to the party complaining of it, constitute a wrong
at the time it took place, obviously cannot ex post facto become
one . . . [T]he . . . State was not then one [i.e., a Member of the United
Nations], nor even, over most of the relevant period, in existence as
a State and separate international persona.” (Northern Cameroons
(Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1963, separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, p. 129.)
Responsibility, as a legal notion, does not exist in se and per se. It is
necessarily linked with the rights and obligations of the State as a leghal
person in terms of international law. As the Court stated : “Responsibility
is the necessary corollary of a right.” (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 33, para. 36); and “Thus it is the existence or
absence of a right, belonging to [a State] and recognized as such by inther -
national law, which is decisive for the problem . . .” (ibid.).
483
7 CIJ1077.indb 962 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 482
Un différend international consiste en deux éléments cumulés : un
élément personnel et un élément matériel. La définition généralement
acceptée du terme « différend» que la Cour a donnée dans l’affaire des
Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine ne représente en fait que l’élément
matériel de la notion de « différend international ». Pour pouvoir quali -
fier «un désaccord sur un point de droit ou de fait, une contradiction,
une opposition de thèses juridiques ou d’intérêts », lesquels sont évi -
dents en l’espèce, de « différend international », un autre élément, formel
celui-là, est indispensable, à savoir que les parties au « désaccord» ou
en «opposition» doivent être des Etats au sens du droit international
public.
L’article IX de la convention sur le génocide dispose que la Cour
est compétente pour connaître des « différends entre les parties ».
Le terme « parties», ainsi qu’il ressort à l’évidence de l’article XI
de la Convention, désigne les Etats, qu’ils soient ou non membres de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies. Le terme « Etat» n’est pas non plus
utilisé in abstracto dans la convention sur le génocide ni ailleurs ; il
désigne une entité concrète qui réunit dans sa personnalité les éhléments
constitutifs de l’Etat tels que ceux -ci sont définis par le droit internatio-
nal. La prétention d’une entité à la qualité d’Etat eth même sa reconnais -
sance par d’autres Etats ne sont pas, au regard du droit, suffisantehs
en elles-mêmes pour faire de cette entité un Etat au sens du droit inter -
national.
54. La déclaration suivante du juge Fitzmaurice semble tout à la fois
frappée au coin du bon sens et juridiquement convaincante :
«étant donné que l’Etat demandeur n’existait pas comme tel àh la
date de ces actes ou événements, ceux -ci n’ont pu lui faire subir un
préjudice international ni lui causer un dommage international.
Un acte qui, au moment où il s’est produit, ne constituait pas un
préjudice à l’égard de la partie qui s’en plaint ne saurahit évidem -
ment devenir préjudiciable a posteriori … [et] l’Etat demandeur n’en
était pas un alors et …, pendant la plus grande partie de la période
pertinente, il n’existait même pas comme Etat et comme per -
sonne internationale distincte.» (Cameroun septentrional (Cameroun
c. Royaume‑Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1963,
opinion individuelle du juge Fitzmaurice, p. 129.)
La responsabilité, en tant que notion juridique, n’existe pas in se
et per se. Elle est nécessairement liée aux droits et obligations de
l’Etat en tant que personne juridique au regard du droit international.
Ainsi que la Cour a eu l’occasion de le préciser : «[l]a responsabilité est le
corollaire nécessaire du droit » (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgique c. Espagne), deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1970, p. 33, par. 36) ; et « [c]’est donc l’existence ou l’inexistence
d’un droit appartenant à [un Etat] et reconnu comme tel par le droit inter -
national qui est décisive en ce qui concerne le problème de la quahlité… »
(ibid.).
483
7 CIJ1077.indb 963 18/04/16 08:54 483 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
3. Treatment of Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction
and Admissibility In Casu
55. The general approach of the majority of the Court to the issue of
the preliminary objection ratione temporis raised by Serbia, as well as to
the arguments of the Parties pro and contra in that regard or in connec -
tion with that issue, has been expressed succinctly in two conclusions :
Primo
“Having concluded in its 2008 Judgment that the present dispute
falls within Article IX of the Genocide Convention in so far as it
concerns acts said to have occurred after 27 April 1992, the Court
now finds that, to the extent that the dispute concerns acts said to
have occurred before that date, it also falls within the scope of Arti -
cle IX and that the Court therefore has jurisdiction to rule upon the
entirety of Croatia’s claim. In reaching that conclusion, it is not nhec-
essary to decide whether the FRY, and therefore Serbia, actually suc-
ceeded to any responsibility that might have been incurred by the
SFRY, any more than it is necessary to decide whether acts contrary
to the Genocide Convention took place before 27 April 1992 or, if
they did, to whom those acts were attributable.” (Judgment, para. 117.)
Secundo
“It follows from the foregoing that Croatia has failed to substan -
tiate its allegations that genocide was committed. Accordingly, no
issue of responsibility under the Convention for the commission of
genocide can arise in the present case. Nor can there be any question
of responsibility for a failure to prevent genocide, a failure to punishh
genocide, or complicity in genocide.
In view of the fact that dolus specialis has not been established by
Croatia, its claims of conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and pub-
lic incitement to commit genocide, and attempt to commit genocide
also necessarily fail.
Accordingly, Croatia’s claim must be dismissed in its entirety.”
(Ibid., para. 441.)
56. The applied methodology cannot be denied a certain judicial ele -
gance which served, in fact, to sweep under the carpet the complex issueh
of the admissibility of the claim in relation to the facts that occurredh prior
to the date on which the FRY came into existence as a separate State,
involving, in addition, questions of attribution, and to link it with thhe
issue as to whether the principal claim and counter-claim are founded inh
law and fact.
484
7 CIJ1077.indb 964 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 483
3. Traitement des exceptions préliminaires à la compétence
et à la recevabilité en l’espèce
55. L’approche générale retenue par la majorité de la Cour sur lha que-s
tion de l’exception préliminaire ratione temporis soulevée par la Serbie,
ainsi que les arguments pro et contra des Parties sur la question, sont
résumés dans les deux conclusions suivantes:
Primo
«Ayant conclu dans son arrêt de 2008 que le présent différend rele-
vait de l’articleIX de la convention sur le génocide dans la mesure où
il se rapporte à des actes supposés avoir été commis aprèhs le
27 avril 1992, la Cour en vient à présent à la conclusion que le difféh-
rend entre également dans le champ dudit article dans la mesure où
il se rapporte à des actes qui seraient antérieurs à cette dateh, et qu’elle
a compétence pour connaître de la demande de la Croatie dans son
ensemble. Point n’est besoin, pour parvenir à cette conclusion, deh
trancher la question de savoir si la RFY et, partant, la Serbie ont
effectivement succédé à la responsabilité qu’aurait pu enchourir la
RFSY, ni de se prononcer sur celle de savoir si des actes contreve -
nant à la convention sur le génocide ont été commis avant leh
27 avril 1992 ou, dans l’affirmative, à qui ils étaient imputables. Cesh
questions relèvent du fond et seront examinées, en tant que de beshoin,
dans les sections suivantes du présent arrêt. » (Arrêt, par. 117.)
Secundo
«Il résulte de ce qui précède que la Croatie n’a pas démonhtré son
allégation selon laquelle un génocide a été commis. Dès lhors, aucune
question de responsabilité pour commission du génocide au titre deh
la Convention ne se pose en la présente affaire. Il ne saurait davan -
tage être question d’une responsabilité pour manquement à l’hobliga-
tion de prévenir le génocide, à l’obligation de punir le géhnocide ou
pour complicité dans le génocide.
Le dolus specialis n’ayant pas été établi par la Croatie, ses alléga -
tions relatives à l’entente en vue de commettre le génocide, l’hincita -
tion directe et publique à commettre le génocide, et la tentative hde
génocide doivent aussi nécessairement être écartées.
En conséquence, la demande de la Croatie doit être rejetée dansh sa
totalité.» (Ibid., par. 441.)
56. On ne saurait refuser à la méthode ainsi appliquée une certaineh
élégance judiciaire qui avait pour objet, en réalité, de balhayer sous le tapis
la complexe question de la recevabilité de la demande en ce qu’ellhe concer -
nait des faits survenus avant la date à laquelle la RFY a commencéh à
exister en tant qu’Etat distinct, question qui soulevait en outre desh pro -
blèmes d’attribution, et de la subordonner à la question de savoir si les
demandes principale et reconventionnelle étaient fondées en droit het en
fait.
484
7 CIJ1077.indb 965 18/04/16 08:54 484 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Qualifying tacitly the issue of admissibility of the claim not as incidehn-
tal to, but rather as coincident with, the principal claim, the majorityh
reduced the fundamental issue of the jurisdiction of the Court to the lehvel
of a technical question, and the jurisdictional decision to some kind ofh
accessory consequence of the decision as regards the principal claim andh
counter-claim. In this way, the procedure as established by the law of thhe
Court has been turned on its head.
57. In the case at hand, such a reduction does not produce material
consequences for the outcome of the dispute. However, this fact does noth
amnesty or vindicate the action undertaken by the majority. Although
designed ad casum, its implications as regards future jurisprudence of the
Court cannot a priori be excluded.
58. The preliminary objection of Serbia ratione temporis has been qual-
ified by the Court as an objection which “does not possess, in the hcircum-
stances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character” (2008 Judgment,
para. 130).
What is the inherent meaning of this qualification ? Does it suggest that
an objection which does not possess, in the circumstances of the case, ahn
exclusively preliminary character loses its preliminary quality and givehs
the Court discretionary powers to act in accordance with the broadly
conceived and undefined formula “as good administration of justice h
requires”? The answer to this question, it appears, has to be negative.
58.1. The qualification that “the objection does not possess, in the cir -
cumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary character” impliesh that
the objection in issue does “possess, at least in principle, an intrihnsic pre-
liminary character, which may only be partially affected by the circum -
stances of the case” (E. J. de Aréchaga, “The Amendments to the Rules
of Procedure of the International Court of Justice”, American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 67, 1973, p. 15). Ratio legis of the introduction of
objections having no exclusively preliminary character in the nomencla -
ture of the decisions of the Court as regards preliminary character in
Article 79 of the Rules of Court primarily concerns practical effects in a
case when the Court, on the basis of provision of Article 62 of the
1946 Rules of Court, used its power to join an objection to the merits
“whenever the interests of the good administration of justice requireh it”
(Panevezys‑Saldutiskis Railway, Order of 30 June 1938, P.C.I.J., Series
A/B, No. 75, p. 56 ; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judg ‑
ment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 29, para. 39). When
“the character of the objections is not exclusively preliminary becauhse
they contain both preliminary aspects and other aspects relating to the
merits, they will have to be dealt with at the stage of merits. This
approach . . . tends to discourage the unnecessary prolongation of pro‑
ceedings at the jurisdictional stage.” (Military and Paramilitary Activi‑
ties in and against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav. United States of America),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1986, p.31, para.41; emphasis added.)
485
7 CIJ1077.indb 966 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 484
En faisant tacitement de la question de la recevabilité de la demande
une question non pas incidente, mais « coïncidente», de la demande prin -
cipale, la majorité a réduit la question fondamentale de la compéhtence de
la Cour à une simple question technique, et la décision de la Courh sur sa
compétence à une sorte de conséquence accessoire de sa décishion sur les
demandes principale et reconventionnelle. C’était procéder de façon exac-
tement inverse de la procédure établie par le droit de la Cour.
57. En l’espèce, cette approche réductrice ne produit pas d’effeth sen -
sible sur le règlement du différend. Ce fait, cependant, n’excushe ni ne jus-
tifie la décision de la majorité. Bien qu’elle ait été hconçue casum, il n’est
pas exclu a priori qu’elle puisse avoir des conséquences pour la jurispru -
dence future de la Cour.
58. La Cour a qualifié l’exception préliminaire ratione temporis de la
Serbie d’exception qui « n’a pas, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, un
caractère exclusivement préliminaire » (arrêt de 2008, par. 130).
Quel est le sens profond de cette qualification ? Veut-elle dire qu’une
exception qui n’a pas, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, un caractère
exclusivement préliminaire perd de ce fait sa qualité de prélimhinaire et
donne à la Cour toute latitude pour agir, comme dit une formule trop h
générale et trop vague, « selon les exigences d’une bonne administration
de la justice »? La réponse à cette question ne peut être que négative.
58.1. L’idée que «l’exception … n’a pas, dans les circonstances de l’es -
pèce, un caractère exclusivement préliminaire » implique qu’« elle a, au
moins en principe, un caractère préliminaire intrinsèque, qui pheut n’être que
partiellement modifié par les circonstances de l’espèce» (E. J. de Aréchaga,
«The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the International Court of
Justice», American Journal of International Law, vol. 67, 1973, p. 15). La
ratio legis de l’insertion des exceptions n’ayant pas un caractère exclusihve-
ment préliminaire dans la nomenclature des décisions de la Cour suhr le
caractère préliminaire des exceptions qui figure à l’artichle79 de son Règle-
ment répond principalement à des considérations d’ordre prathique dans une
affaire où la Cour, sur le fondement de l’articl62 de son Règlement de1946,
a usé de sa faculté d’ordonner la jonction des exceptions au fond « lorsque
les intérêts de la bonne administration de la justice lui en font hun devoir»
(Chemin de fer Panevezys‑Saldutiskis, ordonnance du 30 juin 1938, C.P.J.I.
o
série A/B n 75, p. 56; Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et
contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 29, par. 39). Lorsque
« ce caractère [préliminaire] n’est pas exclusif puisqu[e lesexceptions]
comportent à la fois des aspects préliminaires et des aspects de fhond,
elles devront être réglées au stade du fond. Ce procédé thend … à
décourager toute prolongation inutile de la procédure au stade de ▯la
compétence.» (Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et
contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 31, par. 41; les italiques sont de moi.)
485
7 CIJ1077.indb 967 18/04/16 08:54 485 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
58.2. The characterization of the particular objection does not deprive
the objection of its preliminary character. As observed by JudgeAréchaga,
who was one of the architects of the revision of the 1972Rules, the concrete
qualification means that “the objection that has been raised by a pharty as
preliminary is so intertwined with elements pertaining to the merits thaht a
hearing of those issues would siphon off into the preliminary stage the
whole of the case” (E.J. de Aréchaga, op.cit., p. 17) with the risk of “adju-
dicating on questions which appertain to the merits of the case or of
prejudging their solution” (Panevezys‑Saldutiskis Railway, Preliminary
Objections, Order of 30 June 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 75, p. 56).
In other words, the fact that the objection, in the circumstances of theh
case, does not possess an exclusively preliminary character, does not
deprive it of its material content in the sense of challenging the jurishdiction
of the Court, in whole or in part. Or, as Rosenne says, there is “a formal
distinction between the objection as a shell . . . and its material content”
(S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court : 1920‑2005 ,
4th ed., Vol. II, 2006, p. 894). As such, it must be pronounced by the
Court in the final judgment before pronouncement on the principal claihm.
The treatment of such an objection that was found to be not exclusively h
preliminary in nature at the merits phase does not mean that the objec -
tion has been incorporated in the meritum of the dispute, but simply that
the Court must bring decision on the objection within the merits phase ahs
a jurisdictional issue. The ratio of the transfer of the objection from hthe
preliminary objection phase to the merits phase is not the consequence ohf
the change in its jurisdictional nature, but of relation to cognition ofh the
facts, and law indispensable for a decision on an eminently jurisdictionhal
matter. The Court itself in the 2008 Judgment stated, inter alia, that:
“In order to be in a position to make any findings on each of theseh
issues, [the issue of its jurisdiction, as regards facts that occurred phrior
to 27 April 1992 and the issue of admissibility of the claim] the Court
will need to have more elements before it.” (2008 Judgment, p. 460,
para. 129 ; emphasis added.)
58.3. Such a solution is dictated, it appears, by the nature of the juris-
diction of the Court. The issue of jurisdiction is of fundamental impor -
tance for the judicial activity of the Court, being a questio iuris (Border
and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 76, para. 16) and a
matter of the international public order (intervention of Judge M. Yova-
novitch, Preliminary Session of the Court, Preparation of the Rules of
Court of 30 January ‑24 March 1922) P.C.I.J., Series D, No. 2, p. 59 ;
R. Monaco, “Observations sur la hiérarchie des sources du droit interh -
national”, Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit
Mensenrechte : Festschrift für H.Mosler , 1983, pp. 607-608).
The importance of the issue necessitates that “[t]he Court must . . .
always be satisfied that it has jurisdiction, and must if necessary goh into
486
7 CIJ1077.indb 968 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 485
58.2. Qualifier une exception donnée ne prive pas cette exception de son
caractère préliminaire. Comme le faisait observer le juge Aréchaga, qui fut
l’un des architectes de la revision du Règlement de1972, la qualification en
question veut dire que « l’exception qui a été soulevée par une partie est si
étroitement mêlée d’éléments relevant du fond que l’examen de ces ques -
tions en audience reviendrait à transférer l’ensemble de l’ahffaire au stade
préliminaire » (E. J. de Aréchaga, op. cit., p. 17), avec le risque «soit de
trancher des questions qui appartiennent au fond de l’affaire, soit d’hen
préjuger la solution » (hemin de for Panevezys‑Saldutiskis, ordonnance du
30 juin 1938, C.P.J.I. série A/B n 75, p. 56).
Autrement dit, le fait que l’exception n’ait pas, dans les circonstances
de l’espèce, un caractère exclusivement préliminaire ne la phrive pas de sa
teneur matérielle, qui est de contester tout ou partie de la compétence de
la Cour. Comme l’écrit Rosenne, il existe « une distinction formelle entre
l’exception comme enveloppe … et sa teneur » (S. Rosenne, The Law and
Practice of the International Court : 1920‑2005 , 4 e éd., vol. II, 2006,
p. 894). A ce titre, la Cour doit statuer sur l’exception dans son arrêht final
avant de statuer sur la demande principale.
Le fait de reporter à la phase du fond l’examen d’une exception dont il
a été conclu qu’elle n’avait pas un caractère exclusivemehnt préliminaire ne
signifie pas que cette exception ait été incorporée au meritum du différend,
mais simplement que la Cour doit statuer sur elle en tant que question dhe
compétence lors de la phase du fond. La raison pour laquelle l’excheption
a été transportée de la phase des exceptions préliminaires àh celle du fond
n’est pas la conséquence d’une modification de son caractère propre, mais
répond à la nécessité d’avoir une meilleure connaissance hde points de fait
et de droit pour statuer sur une question de compétence importante. La
Cour elle -même, dans son arrêt de 2008, a notamment déclaré :
«Pour que la Cour puisse se prononcer sur chacune de ces ques -
tions [la question de sa compétence à l’égard de faits antéhrieurs au
27 avril 1992 et celle de la recevabilité de la demande concernant ces
faits], elle devra disposer de davantage d’éléments. » (Arrêt de 2008,
p. 460, par. 129; les italiques sont de moi.)
58.3. Une telle opinion semble dictée par la nature de la compétence de h
la Cour. La question de la compétence présente une importance fondha -
mentale pour l’activité judiciaire de la Cour, puisqu’elle est hà la fois une
questio juris (Actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières (Nicaragua
c. Honduras), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1988, p. 76,
par. 16) et une question d’ordre public international (intervention du jhuge
M. Yovanovitch, session préliminaire de la Cour, Préparation du Règle ‑
ment de la Cour (30 janvier‑24 mars 1922), C.P.J.I. série D n 2, p. 59;
R. Monaco, « Observations sur la hiérarchie des sources du droit inter -
national », Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit
Mensenrechte: Festschrift für H. Mosler, 1983, p. 607-608).
L’importance de la question est telle que « [l]aCour … doit … toujours
s’assurer de sa compétence et elle doit, s’il y a lieu, l’exhaminer d’office »
486
7 CIJ1077.indb 969 18/04/16 08:54 486 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
that matter proprio motu” (Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO
Council (India v.Pakistan), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1972, p.52, para.13).
Even the 2008 Judgment, which is res iudicata for the Court, stated in
the “Conclusion” that it “will consider the preliminary objectihon that it
has found to be not of an exclusively preliminary character when it reaches
the merits of the case” (2008 Judgment, p. 465, para. 145 ; emphasis
added).
58.4. The Court adjudicates on the issue of its jurisdiction through opera -
tion of the principle compétence de la compétence. The power of the Court to
determine whether it has jurisdiction in casu, emanating from the general
principle of compétence de la compétence, should be distinguished from the
corresponding power of the Court to determine the extent of its jurisdichtion.
The extent of jurisdiction of the Court is not a matter to be decided onh
the basis of the principle of compétence de la compétence solely as a func -
tional norm, but on the basis of substantive norms of the Statute defihning
the scope of the exercise of the judicial function of the Court. In thath
regard, the basic norm of the consensual nature of the Court’s jurisdhic -
tion — some sort of a constitutional norm of the law of the Court, anhd of
international tribunals as well — is of relevance.
Already in its Judgment No. 2, the Permanent Court of International
Justice clearly established the limits of its jurisdiction by stating thhat “the
Court, bearing in mind the fact that its jurisdiction is limited, that iht is
invariably based on . . . consent . . . and only exists in so far as this co-
sent has been given” (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment
No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, p. 16).
59. By deciding that, in view of the absence of genocide in terms of
Article II of the Convention, there is no need for the Court to enter into
consideration of the objection, the majority linked the issue of jurisdihc -
tion with the principal claim and thus made a Copernican turnaround,
paradoxical in the light of the relevant rules of the law of the Court, run -
ning counter to the general rule that, without established jurisdiction,h the
Court not only cannot determine the case, but cannot even hear it.
The adoption of a decision on the jurisdictional issue in the merits
phase is an act, indeed a condition for the determination of the principhal
claim.
59.1. A proper pattern of treatment of a preliminary objection not
having, in the circumstances of the case, an exclusively preliminary char -
acter, is demonstrated in the Land and Maritime Boundary case. The
Court, following the well -established jurisprudence on the issue, stated,
inter alia:
“The Court would first observe that its finding in its Judgment of
11 June 1998 on the eight preliminary objection of Nigeria that that
preliminary objection did ‘not have, in the circumstances of the caseh,
an exclusively preliminary character” (I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 326,
para. 118 (2)) requires it to deal now with the preliminary objection
487
7 CIJ1077.indb 970 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 486
(Appel concernant la compétence du Conseil de l’OACI (Inde c. Pakistan),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1972, p. 52, par. 13).
Même dans son arrêt de 2008, qui a force de chose jugée, la Couhr a
déclaré dans sa « Conclusion» qu’elle « examinera[it] l’exception prélimi -
naire dont elle a[vait] conclu qu’elle n’avait pas un caractèreh exclusive -
ment préliminaire lors de la phase du fond» (arrêt de 2008, p.465, par. 145;
les italiques sont de moi).
58.4. La Cour statue sur la question de sa compétence par application
du principe de la compétence de la compétence. Or il convient de distinguer
entre la faculté qu’a la Cour de décider si elle a compétence en l’espèce, qui
émane du principe général de la compétence de la compétenhce, et la faculté
correspondante qu’elle a de décider de l’étendue de sa compéhtence.
L’étendue de la compétence de la Cour est une question à trahncher non
pas sur le fondement du principe de compétence de la compétence exhclu-
sivement conçu comme norme fonctionnelle, mais sur le fondement des
normes matérielles du Statut qui définissent le champ d’applihcation de
l’exercice par la Cour de sa fonction judiciaire. A cet égard, la hnorme
fondamentale du consentement à la juridiction de la Cour — qui esth une
sorte de norme constitutionnelle du droit de la Cour ainsi que des tribu -
naux internationaux — est pertinente.
Dès son arrêt n 2, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale avait
clairement établi les limites de sa juridiction dans cette formule: «la Cour,
en considération du fait que sa juridiction est limitée, qu’elle se fonde
toujours sur le consentement … et ne saurait subsister en dehors des
limites dans lesquelles ce consentement a été donné » (Concessions
Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrêt n 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. série A, p. 16).
59. En décidant que, en l’absence de génocide au sens de l’artichle II de
la Convention, il n’était nul besoin pour la Cour d’examiner l’hexception,
la majorité a lié la question de la compétence à la demande hprincipale et
produit ainsi un renversement copernicien, paradoxal au regard des règles
pertinentes du droit de la Cour, et qui va à l’encontre de la rèhgle générale
qui veut que, si sa compétence n’est pas établie, la Cour non sheulement ne
peut pas statuer en l’affaire, mais encore ne peut pas en connaîtreh.
L’adoption d’une décision sur la question de la compétence lhors de la
phase du fond est un acte essentiel, voire une condition à remplir, phour
statuer sur la demande principale.
59.1. L’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime offre un bon exemple
de la méthode à suivre pour examiner une exception préliminaireh qui,
dans les circonstances de l’espèce, n’a pas un caractère exchlusivement pré-
liminaire. Suivant en cela sa jurisprudence constante en la matière, hla
Cour a notamment déclaré :
« La Cour souhaite tout d’abord faire observer que la conclusion
qu’elle a formulée dans son arrêt du 11 juin 1998 sur la huitième
exception préliminaire du Nigéria, selon laquelle celle -ci «n’a[vait]
pas, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, un caractère exclusivement
préliminaire» (C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 326, par. 118 2)), l’oblige à
487
7 CIJ1077.indb 971 18/04/16 08:54 487 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
before proceeding further on the merits. That this is so follows from
the provision on preliminary objections adopted by the Court in its
Rules in 1972 and retained in 1978, which provide that the Court is
to give a decision
‘by which it shall either uphold the objection, reject it, or declareh
that the objection does not possess in the circumstances of the
case, an exclusively preliminary character. If the Court rejects the
objection or declares that it does not possess an exclusively pre-
liminary character, it shall fix time -limits for the further proceed -
ings.’ (Rules of Court, Art. 79, para. 7.)
(See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal
Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J.Reports 1998,pp. 27-28, paras.49-50 Que;tions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyv a. United States of Amer‑
ica), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1998,pp.132-134,
paras. 48-49; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicar‑a
gua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1986,p. 30, para. 40.) Since Nigeria maintains its objec-
tion, the Court must now rule on it.” (Land and Maritime Boundary
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroonv. Nigeria Equatorial Guinea
intervening), Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 2002,p. 420, para. 237.)
4. Succession to Responsibility as a Purported Rule
of General International Law
60. The impression is that the Court qualified succession to responsi -
bility as a rule of general international law with amazing ease. It founhd
that “the rules on succession . . . come into play in the present case fall
into the same category as those on treaty interpretation and responsibil▯ity
of States referred to” in the Judgment of the Court in the Bosnia and Her ‑
zegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro case (Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Her ‑
zegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I),
hereinafter “2007 Judgment”) (Judgment, para. 115 ; emphasis added).
61. The Court gives no indication of any source of international law
that would vindicate the qualification that the rules of succession ofh States
to responsibility pertain to the corpus of rules of general international law.
Noting the arguments of the Parties concerning succession to responsi -
bility as status controversiae, the Court only points to the reliance of the
Applicant on
“the award of the arbitration tribunal in the Lighthouses Arbitration
between France and Greece, Claims Nos. 11 and 4, 24July 1956 (United
488
7 CIJ1077.indb 972 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 487
considérer maintenant cette exception préliminaire avant de pour -
suivre l’examen au fond, ainsi qu’il découle des dispositions dhu
Règlement de la Cour relatives aux exceptions préliminaires, tellehs
qu’elles ont été adoptées en 1972 et conservées en 1978. Aux termes
de ces dispositions, la Cour est appelée à statuer dans un arrêht
«par lequel elle retient l’exception, la rejette ou déclare que cethte
exception n’a pas dans les circonstances de l’espèce un caractèhre
exclusivement préliminaire. Si la Cour rejette l’exception ou
déclare qu’elle n’a pas un caractère exclusivement prélimhinaire,
elle fixe les délais pour la suite de la procédure.» (Règlement de la
Cour, art. 79, par. 7.)
(Voir Questions d’interprétation et d’application de la convention de▯
Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya
arabe libyenne c. Royaume‑Uni), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1998, p. 27-28, par. 49-50 Questions d’interprétation et d’appli ‑
cation de la convention de Montréal de1971 résultant de l’incident aérien
de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 132-134,
par. 48-49; Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre
celui‑ci (Nicaragua c.Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.JR . ecueil
1986, p. 30, par. 40.) Puisque le Nigéria maintient son exception, la
Cour doit à présent statuer sur celle-ci» (Frontière terrestre et maritime
entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria ; Guinée équato ‑
riale (intervenant)), arrêt, C.I.J.ecueil 2002, p. 420, par. 237.)
4. La succession à la responsabilité comme prétendue règle
du droit international général
60. La Cour donne l’impression d’avoir agi avec une surprenante léghè-
reté en qualifiant la succession à la responsabilité de rèhgle du droit inter-
national général. Elle a conclu en effet que « les règles de succession
susceptibles d’entrer en jeu en l’espèce sont du même ordre que celles qui
régissent l’interprétation des traités et la responsabilité▯ de l’Etat et dont il
est question dans » son arrêt en l’affaire Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑
et‑Monténégro (Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répres ‑
sion du crime de génocide (Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro),
arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil 2007 (I), ci-après dénommé « l’arrêt de2007 ») (arrêt,
par. 115; les italiques sont de moi).
61. La Cour ne donne aucune indication sur les sources de droit interna -
tional susceptibles d’étayer cette assertion voulant que les rèhgles de la suc-ces
sion d’Etats appartiennent au corpus des règles du droit international général.
Notant les arguments des Parties sur la succession à la responsabilité
pour faire le point de leur controverse, la Cour mentionne seulement queh
le demandeur
«se fonde sur la sentence arbitrale rendue en l’ Affaire relative à la
concession des phares de l’Empire ottoman (Grèce/France), réc▯lama ‑
488
7 CIJ1077.indb 973 18/04/16 08:54 488 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XII,
p. 155 ; International Law Reports (ILR), Vol. 23, 1956, p. 81), which
stated that the responsibility of a State might be transferred to a suc -
cessor if the facts were such as to make it appropriate to hold the
latter responsible for the former’s wrongdoing” (Judgment, para. 107).
It appears, in the light of the relevant facts, that the Court, by takinhg
such a position, is heading precisely in the direction opposite to that h
contained in its own dictum in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case : “the Court,
as a court of law, cannot render judgment sub specie legis ferendae, or
anticipate the law before legislator has laid it down” (Fisheries Jurisdic ‑
tion (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974,
pp. 23-24, para. 53 F;sheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 192, para. 45).
62. Arbitral jurisprudence as regards succession to responsibility offers
only a few isolated decisions. Seemingly they stand on diametrically
opposed positions.
The paradigm of succession to responsibility represents, in essence, theh
French claim in the Agios Nikolaos case within the Lighthouses Arbitra ‑
tion (Claim No. 11, United Nations, RIAA, Vol. XII, pp. 161 et seq.
p. 190 ; ILR, Vol. 23, 1956, pp. 81 et seq., pp. 88-90) in which the claim
relating to the construction of lighthouses at Spada and Elaphonissi was
dismissed.
The position of the arbitration was expressed in clear terms :
“In view of this division between the three parties concerned of the h
responsibility for the events of 1903 to 1908, the Tribunal sees no realh
reason to saddle, after the event, Greece, who had absolutely nothing
to do with the dealings between those parties, with this responsibility,h
in whole or in part. Not even the part of the general responsibility for
the events of 1903 to 1908 to be imputed to the autonomous State of
Crete can be regarded as having devolved upon Greece. Such a trans -
mission of responsibility is not justified in the present case either hfrom
the particular point of view of the final succession of Greece to the
rights and obligations of the concession in 1923/1924 — if only for
the reason that the said events took place outside the scope of the
concession — or from the more general point of view of its succession
in 1913 to the territorial sovereignty over Crete.” (Ibid., p. 89.)
The paradigm of non -succession to responsibility is expressed also in
the Brown case in which the United States claim against Great Britain,
based on succession to responsibility, was disallowed by the Anglo -
489
7 CIJ1077.indb 974 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 488
tions nos 11 et 4, 24 juillet 1956 (Nations Unies, Recueil des sentences
arbitrales (RSA), vol. XII, p. 155; International Law Reports (ILR),
vol. 23, 1956, p. 81), qui a affirmé que la responsabilité de l’Etat pou-
vait être dévolue au successeur lorsque les faits étaient tels hqu’il
paraissait opportun de rendre ce dernier responsable des agissements
reprochés au premier » (arrêt, par. 107).
Il semble, à la lumière des faits pertinents, qu’en adoptant cehtte posi -
tion la Cour aille dans un sens exactement opposé à celui qu’indiquait son
propre dictum dans l’affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries : «la
Cour, en tant que tribunal, ne saurait rendre de décision sub specie legis
ferendae, ni énoncer le droit avant que le législateur l’ait édictéh» (Compé‑
tence en matière de pêcheries (Royaume‑Uni c. Islande), fond, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 23-24, par. 53 Compétence en matière de pêcheries
(République fédérale d’Allemagne c. Islande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
1974, p. 192, par. 45).
62. La jurisprudence arbitrale relative à la question de la succession àh la
responsabilité n’offre que quelques décisions isolées, qui sehmblent occuper
des positions diamétralement opposées les unes par rapport aux authres.
Le modèle de la succession à la responsabilité est illustré,h pour l’essen-
tiel, par la réclamation française au sujet du navire Aghios Nicolaos dans
l’affaire relative à la Concession des phares de l’Empire ottoman (réclama -
o
tion n 11, Nations Unies, RSA, vol. XII, p. 161 et suiv., en particulier
p. 190 ; ILR, vol. 23, 1956, p. 81 et suiv., en particulier p. 88-90), réclama-
tion qui a été admise, alors que dans la même affaire la réclhamation fran-
çaise n o 11 relative à la construction de feux nouveaux à Spada et
Elaphonissi était rejetée, constituant ainsi un modèle de non -succcession
à la responsabilité.
La position des arbitres motivant leur décision de rejet de la réchlama -
tion n 11 était exprimée avec clarté :
«Partant de cette répartition de la responsabilité pour les évéhnements
de 1903 à 1908 entre les trois parties intéressées d’alors, le Tribunal nhe
voit aucun motif raisonnable pour charger après coup de cette respon -
sabilité, entière ou même partielle, la Grèce, qui n’avaiht absolument
rien à voir avec les agissements desdites parties. Pas même la parht de la
responsabilité collective à impartir à l’Etat autonome de Crhète pour les
événements de 1903 à 1908 ne saurait être considérée comme étant
dévolue à la Grèce. Une telle transmission de responsabilitéh ne se ju-sti
fie dans l’espèce ni au point de vue spécial de la successionh finale de la
Grèce aux droits et charges de la concession en 1923/1924, ne fût -ce que
pour le motif que lesdits événements se sont déroulés en dehhors du jeu
de la concession, ni au point de vue plus général de sa successionh à la
souveraineté territoriale sur la Crète en 1913. Ibid., p. 89)
Ce modèle de non -succession à la responsabilité se retrouve aussi dans
l’affaire Brown, dans laquelle la réclamation des Etats -Unis contre la
Grande -Bretagne sur le fondement de la succession à la responsabilité a été
489
7 CIJ1077.indb 975 18/04/16 08:54 489 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
American Claims Commission in November 1923 (United Nations,
RIAA, Vol. VI, p. 120).
63. The sedes materiae of the decision in the Agios Nikolaos case seems
clear. The Award stated, inter alia:
“In the present case, we are concerned with the violation of a term
of a contract by the legislative power of an autonomous island State
the population of which had for decades passionately aspired to be
united, by force of arms if necessary, with Greece, which was regarded
as the mother country — a violation which was recognized by the
State itself as constituting a breach of the concession contract, which h
was effected in favour of a shipping company belonging to the same
mother -country, which was endorsed by the latter as if it had been a
regular transaction and which was eventually continued by her, even
after the acquisition of territorial sovereignty over the island in quesh
tion. In these circumstances, the Tribunal can only come to the con -
clusion that Greece, having adopted the illegal conduct of Crete in its h
recent past as autonomous State, is bound, as successor State, to take
upon its charge the financial consequences of the breach of the con -
cession contract.” (ILR, Vol. 23, 1956, p. 92.)
The Court further stated that “the Greek Government with good rea -
son commenced by recognizing its own responsibility” (ibid.).
64. In the light of the facts of the case, it appears that the qualification
of the decision as the expression of the acceptance of succession to res -
ponsibility is exaggerated. For, the last fact tends to speak in favour hof
the perception of the responsibility of Greece as a “direct responsibhility
for tort of her own” (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical
Perspective, Part VII, 1974, p. 223). The position of the arbitral tribunal
appears to be an obiter dictum rather than a precedent stricto sensu.
Besides the intrinsic reasons which make relative the scope of the deci-
sion taken in the Agios Nikolaos case, also relevant in the case at hand are
some extrinsic reasons.
Primo , the Lighthouse Arbitration considered disputes between natural
and legal persons, on the one hand, and a territorial State, on the othehr,
disputes which, in particular in the continental legal tradition, apperthain
to international private law, rather than international public law. The h
legal basis in a dispute is provided, as a rule, by concessionary contrahcts.
As the Court stated in the Anglo‑Iranian Oil Co. case, the concessionary
contract signed between the Government of a State and of a foreign oil
company:
“has a single purpose: the purpose of regulating the relations between
that Government and the Company in regard to the concession. It
490
7 CIJ1077.indb 976 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 489
rejetée par la Commission anglo -américaine des réclamations en novembre
1923 (Nations Unies, RSA, vol. VI, p. 120).
63. Le sedes materiae de la décision dans la réclamation n o 4 au sujet
du navire Aghios Nicolaos semble clair. La sentence arbitrale faisait
notamment observer:
«Dans le cas d’espèce, il s’agit de la violation d’une clauseh contrac
tuelle par le pouvoir législatif d’un Etat insulaire autonome donth la
population avait durant des dizaines d’années passionnément asphiré,
même par la force des armes, à s’unir à la Grèce, considéhrée comme
mère patrie, violation reconnue par ledit Etat lui -même comme
constituant une infraction au contrat de concession, réalisée en fhaveur
d’une compagnie de navigation ressortissant à ladite mère patrihe,
endossée par cette dernière comme si cette infraction était régulière et
finalement maintenue par elle, même après l’acquisition de lah souve -
raineté territoriale sur l’île en question. Dans de telles condhitions, le
Tribunal ne peut arriver qu’à la conclusion que la Grèce, ayant fait
sienne la conduite illégale de la Crète dans son passé récenht d’Etat
autonome, est tenue, en qualité d’Etat successeur, de prendre àh sa
charge les conséquences financières de l’infraction au contraht de
concession. » (ILR, vol.23, 1956, p. 92.)
Le Tribunal d’arbitrage a également fait observer que « le Gouverne -
ment hellénique a à bon droit commencé par reconnaître lui -même sa res-
ponsabilité » (ibid.).
64. Compte tenu des faits de la réclamation n o 4 en cause, il semble
exagéré de prétendre que cette sentence exprimerait l’acceptation de la
succession à la responsabilité. L’observation précitée duh Tribunal tend
plutôt à accréditer l’idée d’une responsabilité de la Grèce qui serait
« une responsabilité directe à raison d’un préjudice causé par helle »
(J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. VII,
1974, p. 223). La position du Tribunal arbitral semble être un obiter dic‑
tum plutôt qu’un précédent stricto sensu.
Au-delà des raisons intrinsèques qui relativisent la portée de la décision
prise dans la réclamation n o4 au sujet du navire AghiosNicolaos, un certain
nombre de raisons extrinsèques sont pertinentes dans cette réclamahtion.
Primo, l’affaire relative à la Concession des phares de l’Empire ottoman
se rapporte à des différends opposant des personnes physiques ou mohrales
à un Etat territorial ; de tels différends, eu égard en particulier à la tradi
tion juridique du continent considéré, relèvent du droit internhational
privé plutôt que du droit international public. En général, hles différends
dont il s’agit ont pour fondement juridique un contrat de concession.h Au
sujet de ce type de contrat, la Cour, dans son arrêt en l’affaire dhe l’nglo‑
Iranian Oil Co., a dit qu’un contrat de concession entre un gouvernement
et une société privée étrangère
«ne vise qu’une seule fin : régler les rapports entre ce gouvernement
et la compagnie en ce qui est de la concession. Il ne règle en aucune
490
7 CIJ1077.indb 977 18/04/16 08:54 490 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
does not regulate in any way the relations between the two Governments
[the Government and the Company’s national State] . . . The fact that
the concessionary contract was reported to the Council . . . does not
convert its terms into the terms of a treaty by which [a Government]
is bound vis‑à‑vis [another Government]” (Anglo ‑Iranian Oil Co.
(United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 112 ; emphasis added).
Secundo, jurisdiction of arbitration courts and mixed commissions is,
as a rule, based on arbitral compromises. That fact, per se, imposes cer-
tain limits on the scope of adopted decisions. In the Barcelona Traction
case, the Court clearly determined its position in respect of jurisprudehnce
of arbitration courts and mixed claims commissions as regards their
impact on general international law. The Court stated :
“However, in most cases the decisions cited rested upon the terms
of instruments establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal or claims
commission and determining what rights might enjoy protection; they
cannot therefore give rise to generalization going beyond the special
circumstances of each case. Other decisions, allowing or disallowing
claims by way of exception, are not, in view of the particular facts
concerned, directly relevant in the present case.” (arcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application : 1962)(Bel ‑
gium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 40,
para. 63.)
Tertio, the jurisprudence of the Court, as a rule, does not recognize the
quality of juridical precedent to decisions of arbitral tribunals.
It is pointed out that “[s]pecific references in the decisions of thhe Court
to the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals have in the past been extremehly
rare”, and “in fact partake more of the nature of a reference to State
practice than that of recourse to a judicial precedent” (H. Thirlway, The
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice : Fifty Years of
Jurisprudence , Vol. I, 2013, p. 248).
65. In addition to cases from arbitral practice, the issue of succession
to responsibility is the subject of doctrinal opinions and, in the form hof an
exception to the general rule, of Article 10 (2) of the International Law
Commission Articles on State Responsibility.
65.1. In the light of the status versiae et controversiae in the case at
hand — whether the FRY succeeded to alleged responsibility of the
SFRY for acts and omissions contrary to the Genocide Convention —
these would hardly seem applicable. The opinions expressed in that regarhd
are a doctrinal plea for the formulation of a comprehensive doctrine of
succession to responsibility rather than an all-embracing and comprehen -
sive doctrine per se.
Namely, the focus of the theory of succession to responsibility is on thhe
responsibility for delictual debts, as a rule in the relations between thhe
491
7 CIJ1077.indb 978 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 490
façon les rapports entre les deux gouvernements… Le fait que le
contrat de concession fit l’objet d’un rapport au Conseil [de lah Société
des Nations] … n’en transforme pas les termes en ceux d’un traité
liant le Gouvernement de l’Iran envers le Gouvernement du
Royaume-Uni.» (Anglo‑Iranian Oil Co. (Royaume‑Uni c. Iran),
exception préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1952, p. 112 ; les italiques
sont de moi.)
Secundo, dans les affaires citées, la compétence des tribunaux arbitraux ohu
des commissions mixtes est généralement fondée sur des clauses hcomprom - is
soires prévoyant l’arbitrage. Ce fait impose en soi certaines limihtes à la p-or
tée des décisions arbitrales. En l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction, la Cour a
clairement défini sa position au sujet de l’incidence de la jurihsprudence des
tribunaux arbitraux et des commissions mixtes sur le droit international
général. Dans son arrêt, elle a notamment dit ce qui suit:
«Mais dans la majorité des cas les décisions citées se fondent shur les
instruments qui établissent la juridiction du tribunal ou de la commis-
sion des réclamations et déterminent les droits pouvant bénéhficier
d’une protection, de sorte qu’elles ne sauraient faire l’objet hde génér-a
lisations dépassant les circonstances particulières de l’espèhce. D’autres
décisions en vertu desquelles des réclamations ont été accuehillies ou
rejetées à titre d’exceptions, vu les faits de la cause, ne sonht pas dir-c
tement pertinentes en la présente affaire. » (Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Limited (nouvelle requête : 1962) (Belgique
c. Espagne), deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil 1970, p. 40, par. 63.)
Tertio, la jurisprudence de la Cour ne reconnaît généralement pas la qu- a
lité de précédent juridique aux sentences des tribunaux arbitrahux.
On a ainsi pu écrire que « lesréférences expresses à la jurisprudence des
tribunaux arbitraux ont été jusqu’à présent extrêmemenht rares dans les
arrêts rendus par la Cour» et «s’apparentent à une référence à la pratique
des Etats plutôt qu’à un renvoi à un précédent judiciahire » (H. Thirlway,
The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice : Fifty Years
of Jurisprudence , vol. I, 2013, p. 248).
65. Outre les affaires relevant de la pratique arbitrale, la question de la
succession à la responsabilité a fait l’objet de divers avis deh doctrine et,
sous forme d’exception à la règle générale, du paragrapheh2 de l’article 10
des articles de la Commission du droit international sur la responsabilihté
de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite.
65.1. A la lumière du status versiae et controversiae de l’espèce — à
savoir si la RFY a succédé à la prétendue responsabilité hde la RSFY pour
des actes et des omissions contraires à la convention sur le génochide —,
ces avis ne semblent guère applicables. Les opinions exprimées surh le sujet
constituent un appel doctrinal à la formulation d’une doctrine géhnérale de
la succession à la responsabilité plutôt qu’une doctrine unihverselle et
générale en soi.
Plus précisément, au cœur de la théorie de la succession à la responsa -
bilité se trouve la responsabilité pour dettes délictuelles, en tant que règle
491
7 CIJ1077.indb 979 18/04/16 08:54 491 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
State and physical or legal personalities which possess specific charahcter-
istics. It is based on the doctrine of acquired rights (droits acquis), under-
stood as the rights held by private citizens at the time of succession tho
sovereignty (see German Settlers in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1923,
P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 6, p. 36).
Besides the doctrine of acquired rights, the appropriate support is the h
passage of rights and obligations principle and the principle of internah -
tional servitudes (M. J. Volkovitsch, “Righting Wrongs : Towards a New
Theory of State Succession to Responsibility for International Delicts”h,
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 92, 1992, pp. 2162-2214). In addition to the
principles of international law, support for succession to responsibilithy
can also be found in borrowing from internal law in the form of the prinh -
ciple of unjust enrichment (ibid., p. 2210; P. Dumberry, State Succession
to International Responsibility, 2007, p. 263).
65.2. The said principles are, by their nature, unsuitable to uphold the
idea of responsibility in personam , such as responsibility for violation of
the Genocide Convention, although they carry certain weight as regards
responsibility in rem.
Responsibility in personam is too much linked with the legal identity
and continuity of the State which makes it difficult to ascertain it inh terms
of ipso iure succession to responsibility without prejudice to the funda -
mental principles of equality and independence of States.
The legal identity and continuity of a State appears to be the powerful h
argument in favour of the general principle of action personalis mori‑
tur cum persona.
65.3. It is no coincidence that the perception of the notion of legal
identity and continuity on the part of the supporters of succession to
responsibility well exceeds the generally accepted meaning of that notiohn.
It is said,exempli causa that : “‘successor States’ are those nations which
take over the international identity of ‘Predecessor States’” (M. J. Volko -
vitsch, op. cit., p. 2164, fn. ; emphasis added), although the notions “suc -
cessor State(s)” and “predecessor State” are mutually exclusihve. Or, in the
elaborated concept of “shared identity”, which is, in fact, the negation of
legal identity and continuity as usually understood, the crucial role ish
given to the notion of “organic substitution”, according to which,h even in
the case where succession took place, “organic forces” or “conshtitutive
elements” of the predecessor State (its territory and its population) sur -
vive its disintegration, being only affected, but not extinguished (P. Dum-
berry, State Succession to International Responsibility , 2007, pp. 49-50).
The concept implies that the successor State is equipped with an identithy
similar to that held by the predecessor State. Precisely “shared idenhtity”
justifies the transfer of any responsibility that existed at the time hof the
succession.
65.4. It appears that the concept of “organic substitution” fails to takhe
into account the element of legal identity and continuity as the very suhb -
stance of international personality in the frame of territorial changes.h It
492
7 CIJ1077.indb 980 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 491
applicable aux relations entre un Etat et des personnes physiques ou
morales présentant des caractéristiques particulières. Ladite thhéorie se
fonde sur la doctrine des droits acquis, entendus comme les droits déhtenus
par des particuliers à la date de succession à la souveraineté h(voir Colons
allemands en Pologne, avis consultatif, 1923, C.P.J.I. série B n 6, p. 36).
A cette doctrine des droits acquis s’ajoutent, en faveur de la succession
à la responsabilité, le principe de la transmission des droits et hobligations
et le principe des servitudes internationales (M. J. Volkovitsch, «Righting
Wrongs : Towards a New Theory of State Succession to Responsibility for
International Delicts», Columbia Law Review, vol.92, 1992, p. 2162-2214).
Au -delà encore des principes du droit international, on pourra emprunterh
au droit interne, sous la forme du principe d’enrichissement indu, deh quoi
conforter la succession à la responsabilité (ibid., p. 2210 ; P.Dumberry,
State Succession to International Responsibility, 2007, p. 263).
65.2. Les principes susmentionnés sont, de par leur nature même,
impropres à accréditer l’idée d’une responsabilité in personam, comme le
serait la responsabilité d’une violation de la convention sur le ghénocide,
bien qu’ils conservent une certaine importance pour ce qui est de la hres -
ponsabilité in rem.
Du fait que la responsabilité in personam est trop étroitement liée à
l’identité et à la continuité juridiques de l’Etat, il esht difficile de l’établir en
termes de succession ipso jure à la responsabilité sans porter atteinte aux
principes fondamentaux d’égalité et d’indépendance des Ethats.
L’identité et la continuité juridiques de l’Etat semblent constituer un
puissant argument en faveur du principe général selon lequel actio perso ‑
nalis moritur cum persona.
65.3. Ce n’est pas un hasard si l’idée que les partisans de la succeshsion à
la responsabilité se font des notions d’identité et de continuihté juridiques
dépasse largement le sens généralement admis desdites notions. On a pu
écrire, par exemple, que : « Les « Etats successeurs» sont les nations qui
reprennent l’identité internationale d’«Etats prédécesseurs»» (M. J. Volko-
vitsch,op. cit., p.2164, note 1; les italiques sont de moi), alors même que les
notions d’« Etat(s) successeur(s) » et d’« Etat prédécesseur » s’excluent
mutuellement. Ou bien encore, dans le concept controuvé d’« identité parta
gée », qui est en réalité la négation de l’identité et de hla continuité juridiques
telles qu’elles sont généralement entendues, un rôle crucial est attribué à la
notion de «substitution organique», selon laquelle, même dans les cas où la
succession a eu lieu, des «forces organiques »u des « éléments constitutifs»
de l’Etat prédécesseur (son territoire et sa population) survhivraient à la
désintégration de celui-ci et ne seraient que touchés, mais non pas éteints
(P. Dumberry, State Succession to International Responsibility, 2007,
p. 49-50). Ce concept suppose que l’Etat successeur soit doté d’une hidentité
semblable à celle de l’Etat prédécesseur. Ainsi, l’«identité partagée» justifie
la dévolution de toute responsabilité existant au moment de la suchcession.
65.4. Or cette notion de « substitution organique » est impuissante à
rendre compte de l’élément d’identité et de continuité juridiques qui se
trouve au cœur de la personnalité internationale dans le cadre desh chan -
492
7 CIJ1077.indb 981 18/04/16 08:54 492 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
reduces the State to its physical attributes (territory, population), hwhich
are also possessed by territorial non -State entities devoid of the quality of
subjects in terms of international law.
“Shared identity” as the product of the concept of “organic substitu -
tion” portrays new States as a specific mix of the successor State hand the
continuator State expressed in percentage share, because each of them
possesses a part of the territory and population of the predecessor Stathe.
It contains an element of legal absurdity, which is, perhaps, best illush -
trated in the case when, after separation of any part(s) of its territhory, the
predecessor State continues to exist, both States, the predecessor Stateh
and the newly emerged successor State possess identity — the successor
State with its predecessor State, whereas the predecessor State, retainsh its
own.
To sum up, it seems clear that, in the present phase of development,
succession to responsibility in personam is not a part of the corpus of gen -
eral international law. Insurmountable legal obstacles lie, to use the Inter-
national Law Commission explanation, in the fact that entitlement “toh
invoke State responsibility (exists) when an obligation owed to that Shtate
individually was breached” (Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Adopted by the Commission on First Reading, 1996, Report of the Inter -
national Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty -Eighth Session,
6 May-26 July 1996, General Assembly Official Records, United Nations
doc. A/51/10, in relation to Article 42 (a); emphasis in original). In the
present context, individually means the State as an individual legal per -
sonality, equipped with its own rights and obligations.
Succession to responsibility in personam is not stricto sensu legally pos-
sible. As regards this kind of responsibility, it could be said that apphlica-
ble is the parallel with “an incoming tenant [who] is bound by the
obligations of his predecessor who has been evicted, or a son by the obli -
gations of his parent” (T. Baty, “The Obligations of Extinct States”, Yale
Law Journal, Vol. 35, 1925-1926, p. 434), at least when speaking about
violations of the rules of international criminal law based on the princhiple
of subjective responsibility. Even if responsibility of a State for actsh or
omissions of another State is established on the basis of consented sucches -
sion to responsibility, it is not stricto sensu a matter of succession to
responsibility as subjective, of the intuitu personae category, but of assum-
ing the consequences of responsibility in a proper form.
5. Rule in Article 10 (2) of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts as a Purported
Rule of General International Law
66. In the commentary to Article 10 (2) of the Articles on State
Responsibility it is stated, inter alia, that “[a]rbitral decisions, together
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7 CIJ1077.indb 982 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 492
gements territoriaux. Elle réduit l’Etat à des attributs physiqhues (terri -
toire, population) que possèdent aussi certaines entités territoriales non
étatiques dépourvues de la qualité de sujet de droit internatiohnal.
L’« identité partagée» en tant que dérivé de la notion de « substitution
organique» fait des nouveaux Etats un mélange particulier d’Etat successheur
et d’Etat continuateur (ou assurant la continuité de l’Etat prhédécesseur),
exprimé en pourcentage parce que chacun d’eux possède une partihe du terri -
toire et de la population de l’Etat prédécesseur. Il y a là hun élément d’abs -ur
dité juridique que rien n’illustre mieux, peut -être, que le cas où, après la
sécession d’une ou plusieurs parties de son territoire, l’Etat hprédécesseur
continue d’exister : les deux Etats — à savoir l’Etat prédécesseur et l’Etat
successeur nouvellement créé— possèdent une identité, avec son Etat prédé -
cesseur pour l’Etat successeur, avec lui-même pour l’Etat prédécesseur.
Pour résumer, il semble clair que, en l’état actuel du dévelhoppement du
droit, la succession à la responsabilité in personam ne fait pas partie du
corpus du droit international général. Pour reprendre l’explicahtion don -
née par la Commission du droit international, il se trouve des obstachles
juridiques insurmontables dans le fait que le droit qu’a un Etat lésé « d’in-
voquer la responsabilité d’un autre Etat » n’existe que « si l’obligation
violée est due à cet Etat individuellement » (Projet d’articles sur la
responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite, 19h96, Rap -
port de la Commission du droit international sur les travaux de sa qua -
rante-huitième session, 6 mai-26 juillet 1996, Nations Unies, doc. A/51/10,
à propos de l’article 42 a) ; les italiques sont de moi). Dans le contexte qui
nous occupe, individuellement désigne l’Etat au sens de personnalité juri -
dique individuelle, doté de ses propres droits et obligations.
La succession à la responsabilité in personam au sens strict est juridi -
quement impossible. On pourrait illustrer ce type de responsabilité en
dressant un parallèle « avec un nouveau locataire [qui] serait tenu par les
obligations de son prédécesseur frappé d’une mesure d’exphulsion, ou avec
un fils qui serait tenu par les obligations contractées par un parent »
(T. Baty, « The Obligations of Extinct States », Yale Law Journal, vol. 35,
1925 -1926, p. 434), au moins en ce qui concerne les violations des règles
du droit pénal international fondées sur le principe de la responshabilité
subjective. Et lorsque la responsabilité d’un Etat pour des actes hou des
omissions d’un autre Etat est établie sur le fondement du consentehment à
la succession à la responsabilité, il ne s’agit plus à strichtement parler de
faire jouer une succession à la responsabilité de type subjectif, de la caté -
gorie de l’intuitu personae, mais d’assumer en bonne et due forme les
conséquences de la responsabilité.
5. La règle figurant au paragraphe 2 de l’article 10 des articles
sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illic▯ite
comme prétendue règle du droit international général
66. Selon le commentaire du paragraphe 2 de l’article 10 du projet
d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat, « [l]es décisions arbitrales, ainsi
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7 CIJ1077.indb 983 18/04/16 08:54 493 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
with State practice and the literature, indicate a general acceptance of the
two positive attribution rules in Article 10” (J. Crawford, The Interna ‑
tional Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility — Introduction,
Text and Commentaries, 2002, p. 119, para. 12).
The two positive attribution rules to which this refers are attribution of
the “conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new
Government of a State” (para. 1 of Art. 10) and attribution of the “con -
duct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishh-
ing a new State” (para. 2 of Art. 10).
66.1. Consequently, it is a matter of two distinct rules (Counsel of Cro-
atia said that there is “very good reason to cover both situations”h) (Reply
of Croatia, para. 7.54) by the practice relating to Article 10 as a whole.
This position is, however, questionable in view of the differences which h
exist between these situations.
In case of revolutionary change of Government, the State remains the
identical subject of international law, responsible on the basis of the fact
that “it represented ab initio a changing national will, crystallizing in the
fully successful result” (Bolivar Railway Company,United Nations, RIAA,
1903, Vol. IX, p. 445). Basically, its responsibility derives from the gene -
ral principle underlying the rule provided by Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which stipulates that “[a] party mhay
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for itsh failure
to perform a treaty”. Consequently, in the case of change of Governmehnt,
responsibility of the State is genuine, does not imply any transfer of rhes -
ponsibility because in question is the same and identical State in termsh of
legal personality, a personality with unimpaired rights and obligations.h In
a colloquial sense, as opposed to the legal one, it is possible to speakh only
of a transfer of responsibility from one Government to another Govern -
ment.
As regards “a movement, insurrectional or other which succeeds in esth -a
blishing a new State”, the situation is entirely different. A new Stathe is a new
legal person in terms of international law, whose corpus of rights and ohb-li
gations does not coincide with the rights and obligations of its parent hState,
but is determined on the basis of the rules of succession of States. Frohm a
legal point of view, responsibility of the new State is essentially an ihssue of
the law of succession rather than an issue of State responsibility. Or, ha co -m
bination of both. It is logical to presume that this is the reason why it is
pointed out that “Article 10 concerns the special case of responsibility. . .”
(J. Crawford, op. cit., p.93, para. 8).
66.2. An additional reason against the treatment of paragraphs 1 and
2 of Article 10 as a whole is of a formal nature and concerns the postu -
lates of legal logic. Basically, such a treatment would imply analogy orh
extensive interpretation of paragraph 1.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 984 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 493
que la pratique des Etats et la doctrine indiquent que les deux règles d’at -
tribution positive à l’article10 sont généralement acceptées» (J. Crawford,
The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility —▯
Introduction, Text and Commentaries, 2002, p. 119, par. 12).
Ces deux règles d’attribution positive concernent l’attributionh du
« comportement d’un mouvement insurrectionnel qui devient le nouveau
gouvernement de l’Etat » (art.10, par. 1) et du «comportement d’un mou -
vement insurrectionnel ou autre qui parvient à créer un nouvel Etaht »
(ibid., par. 2).
66.1. Il est donc question de deux règles distinctes (le conseil de la
Croatie a soutenu que, au vu de la pratique concernant l’ensemble de h
l’article10, « ily avait de bonnes raisons » de considérer que ces règles
étaient censées «couvrir les deux situations ») (réplique de la Croatie, par.
7.54). Cette assertion est cependant contestable eu égard aux difféhrences
qui existent entre les deux situations.
Lorsqu’une révolution aboutit à un changement de gouvernement, h
l’Etat concerné reste le sujet de droit international qu’il éhtait antérieure -
ment, et sa responsabilité repose sur le fait que le nouveau gouvernehment
« représente ab initio la nouvelle volonté de la nation, qui s’est cristallisée
dans le succès final [du mouvement révolutionnaire] » ( Bolivar Railway
Company, Nations Unies, RSA, 1903, vol. IX, p. 445). Essentiellement, sa
responsabilité découle du principe général dont procède la règle énoncée
à l’article 27 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, qui
dispose qu’« une partie ne peut invoquer les dispositions de son droit
interne comme justifiant la non -exécution d’un traité ». En conséquence,
en cas de changement de gouvernement, la responsabilité de l’Etat hn’est
pas mise en question, étant donné qu’il n’y a pas eu transfehrt de respon -
sabilité et que l’Etat considéré a conservé sa personnalihté juridique et
continue de jouir de tous les droits et d’assumer toutes les obligatihons qui
en découlent. En langage courant plutôt qu’en langage juridique, on peut
dire qu’il y a simplement passation de pouvoirs d’un gouvernement hà un
autre.
Dans le cas d’un « mouvement insurrectionnel ou autre qui parvient à
créer un nouvel Etat », la situation est tout autre. Un nouvel Etat est un
nouveau sujet de droit international, dont les droits et les obligations ne
sont pas les mêmes que ceux de l’Etat dont il est issu et sont déhterminés
conformément aux règles régissant la succession d’Etats. Jurhidiquement,
la question de la responsabilité du nouvel Etat relève davantage dhu droit
de la succession d’Etats que du droit de la responsabilité de l’Etat. Ou, du
moins, conjugue les deux. On peut logiquement considérer que telle esht la
raison pour laquelle il a été dit que « l’article 10 vise [un] cas spécial de
responsabilité… » (J.Crawford, op. cit., p. 93, par. 8).
66.2. Il existe une autre raison de ne pas traiter les paragraphes 1 et 2
de l’article 10 comme constituant un tout, une raison qui a trait à la forme
et renvoie aux postulats de la logique juridique. Considérer ces deuxh para -
graphes comme un tout reviendrait en effet à interpréter le paragrahphe 1
par analogie ou par extension.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 985 18/04/16 08:54 494 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Analogy and extensive interpretation, as legal vehicles, are used in cashe
of the existence of lacunae which are thus filled in by a rule which hhas not
originally been created for the concrete situation/or relation, or by inhter-
pretation of the existing rule as if it were created for that specifich situa -
tion.
In the concrete case there are no lacunae — the conduct of “insurrec -
tional movement which [become] a new Government” and movements
“insurrectional or other, which [succeed] in establishing a new Stateh” are
regulated by two distinct rules expressed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Arti -
cle 10; hence, a rational and legal basis for the application of analogy or
extensive interpretation of paragraph 1 is non-existent.
It appears, however, that the arbitral awards referred to in the Commen -
tary to Article 10 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility relate to
different objects (the general principle of non -responsibility for rebellions
(J. Crawford, op. cit., p.116); the principle that liability could be estab -
lished in the case of a lack of good faith or negligence in suppressing han
insurrection (ibid.) ; and, the responsibility for successful revolutionary/
insurrectional movements (ibid., p. 113)).
The only cases which relate to the concrete issue are stated in para -
graph 14 of the Commentary (ibid., p. 120), including the explanation
that “more recent decisions and practice do not, on the whole, give ahny
reason to doubt the propositions contained in Article 10”. It appears,
however, that such a characterization is, in terms of law, wishful thinkhing
rather than a respectable argument.
The decision in Minister of Defence, Namibia v. Mwandinghi 1992 (2)
seems to involve the liability of the newly independent State for actionhs of
the predecessor State. But, it is based on a constitutional provision, Ahrti-
cle 140 (3) of the Republic of Namibia, which states that the said Repub -
lic inherited liability for “anything done” by the predecessor Stahte (see
ILR , Vol. 91, 1991, p. 341).
Although based on municipal and constitutional law, the decision dis -
cussed some elements of international law. However, the position of the h
court at the first instance appears to be contrary to the rule containhed in
paragraph 2 of Article 10. The court found that “in international law a
new State is not liable for the delicts committed by its predecessor”h (ibid.,
p. 353).
On appeal, the reasoning of the court was founded on constitutional
interpretation exclusively (ibid., p. 361).
The decision in Ontario Ltd. v. Crispus Kiyonga and Others is also of
little, if any relevance, to the issue at hand. The case considered whethher
a contract concluded with a rebel movement seeking to overthrow the
Government could be enforceable against the Government when that
movement subsequently seized power. The applicant claims that the con -
495
7 CIJ1077.indb 986 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 494
L’interprétation d’un texte juridique par analogie ou extension est une
méthode employée lorsqu’il existe des lacunes qu’il faut comhbler en fai -
sant intervenir une règle dont il n’était pas prévu au déhpart qu’elle couvre
la situation ou le rapport considéré, ou en interprétant une rèhgle existante
comme si elle avait été instituée pour ladite situation.
Dans le cas qui nous intéresse ici, il n’existe pas de telles lacuhnes ; le
comportement d’un « mouvement qui devient le nouveau gouvernement
de l’Etat » et celui d’un « mouvement insurrectionnel ou autre qui par -
vient à créer un nouvel Etat » sont régis par deux règles distinctes, expri -
mées respectivement aux paragraphes 1 et 2 de l’article10; en conséquence,
rien ne justifie, logiquement ou juridiquement, que le paragraphe 1 soit
interprété par analogie ou par extension.
Or les décisions arbitrales mentionnées dans le commentaire de l’har -
ticle10 du projet d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat semblenht bien
avoir eu des objets différents : le principe général de non-responsabilité du
comportement des mouvements de rébellion (J.Crawford, op. cit., p. 116);
le principe selon lequel la responsabilité de l’Etat peut être hétablie s’il a fait
preuve de mauvaise foi ou de négligence lors de la répression d’une insur -
rection(ibid.); et la responsabilité du comportement de mouvements insur-
rectionnels ou révolutionnaires qui parviennent à leurs fins (ibid., p. 113).
Les seules affaires se rapportant aux aspects concrets de la question sonht
mentionnées au paragraphe 14 du commentaire, où il est expliqué ceci :
«Globalement, les décisions de la pratique plus récente ne fournisshent
aucune raison de mettre en doute la proposition énoncée à l’harticle 10 »
(ibid., p.20). Toutefois, cette assertion ne semble guère solide, pour autanth
qu’elle revient, juridiquement, à prendre ses désirs pour des rhéalités.
La décision rendue en l’affaire Minister of Defence, Namibia c.Mwandin ‑
ghi en 1992 (2) semble conclure à l’attribution à l’Etat nouvellement hind-é
pendant de la responsabilité des actes de l’Etat prédécesseuhr. Toutefois,
cette décision se fonde sur le paragraphe 3 de l’article 140 de la Constitu-
tion de la République de Namibie, qui dispose que cette républiqueh a hérité
de la responsabilité de l’Etat prédécesseur pour « tous les actes accomplis
par lui» (voir ILR, vol. 91, 1991, p. 341).
Bien que reposant essentiellement sur des dispositions de droit interne h
et de droit constitutionnel, cette décision renvoie aussi à certaihnes règles
de droit international. Néanmoins, la décision du tribunal ayant ehu à
connaître de l’affaire en première instance semble contredire lah règle
énoncée au paragraphe 2 de l’article 10. Ce tribunal a en effet conclu que,
«en droit international, un nouvel Etat n’[était] pas responsable dhes actes
illicites de son prédécesseur » (ibid., p. 353).
La cour d’appel, quant à elle, a fondé sa décision uniquemenht sur l’in -
terprétation de la Constitution (ibid., p. 361).
La décision rendue en l’affaire Ontario Ltd. c. Crispus Kiyonga and
Others est elle aussi presque entièrement dépourvue de pertinence pour
l’examen de la question ici traitée. Cette affaire portait sur le phoint de
savoir si un contrat conclu avec un mouvement rebelle qui avait finaleh -
ment réussi à renverser le gouvernement était opposable au gouvernement
495
7 CIJ1077.indb 987 18/04/16 08:54 495 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
tract was not illegal and that once the revolution succeeded, the actionhs of
the revolutionary movement were validated. The Government argued
that the revolutionary movement did not have any legal personality untilh
they achieved power and thus they could not have entered into the con -
tract and could not, at that time, have signed a contract binding on theh
Government of Uganda. The Judgment is based entirely on municipal
contract law and does not refer to international law. It upholds the above
claims of the Ugandan Government. The essential finding is that :
“It is true that for a contract to be binding it must be between
persons existing at the time the contract is made : Kelner v. Baxter
(1866) LR 2 CP 174. The case is also authority for the legal proposi -
tion that a person or persons cannot act as an agent of a non -existent
principal because an act which cannot be done by a principal cannot
be done by him through an agent. Again at common law there are
contracts which are illegal in the sense that they are entered into to
commit crimes, and they are enforceable.” (44123 Ontario Ltd. v.
Crispus Kiyonga and Others (1992) 11 Kampala LR 14, pp. 20-21;
ILR , Vol. 103, p. 259, p. 266 (High Court, Uganda).)
67. In the Commentary of the International Law Commission, together
with State practice and arbitral decisions, literature is also cited as han
indicator of general acceptance of the rules contained in Article 100
(J. Crawford, op. cit., p. 119, para. 12).
The Commentary, however, mentions only one Article which concerns
insurrectional movements which succeed in establishing a new State
(H. Atlam, “International Liberation Movement and International Respon -
sibility”, in B.Simma and M. Spinedi (eds.), United Nations Codification
of State Responsibility, 1987, p. 35).
The Arbitral Tribunal in the Lighthouse Arbitration stressed the unsatis -
factory nature of the theoretical analysis of the issue, speaking, moreohver,
of the “chaotic state of authoritative writings” ( Lighthouses Arbitration
between France and Greece, Claims Nos. 11 and 4, 24 July 1956 (United
Nations, RIAA, Vol. XII, p. 155; 23 ILR 81, p. 91). Dumberry, the author
of a unique systematic work on the issue of succession to international
responsibility (P. Dumberry, State Succession to International Responsibil ‑
ity, 2007), in concluding a comprehensive research into the responsibilityh
of an insurrectional movement that succeeds in establishing a new State
says:
“The work of the International Law Commission and doctrine has
long considered as well-established principle of international law the fact
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7 CIJ1077.indb 988 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 495
successeur. Le demandeur prétendait que le contrat n’était pas illicite et
que le succès du mouvement révolutionnaire validait les actes des hmembres
de ce mouvement. Le Gouvernement ougandais affirmait quant à lui queh
le mouvement révolutionnaire n’avait acquis la personnalité juridique
qu’au moment où il avait pris le pouvoir, qu’auparavant il n’havait pas
qualité pour conclure un contrat, et que, par conséquent, il ne pohuvait
pas à l’époque signer un contrat opposable au gouvernement. La sentence
arbitrale rendue en cette affaire repose exclusivement sur des règles hdu
droit contractuel interne et ne fait aucune référence au droit inthernational.
Elle retient la position sus -indiquée du Gouvernement ougandais. En
voici les principales conclusions :
«Il est vrai qu’un contrat ne saurait être opposé à une persohnne qui
n’existait pas à sa conclusion :elner c. Baxter (1866) LR 2 CP 174.
La décision rendue en cette affaire fait également autorité pour cohnfir
mer la proposition juridique selon laquelle une ou plusieurs personnes
ne peuvent pas jouer le rôle d’agent d’un mandant qui n’existe pas, parce
qu’un acte qui ne peut être accompli par un mandant ne saurait êhtre
accompli par une personne prétendant agir en son nom. Il y a lieu de
rappeler que, en common law, il est des contrats qui sont illégaux en ce
sens qu’ils sont conclus dans le but de commettre des infractions, mahis
qui n’en sont pas moins opposables. » (44123 Ontario Ltd. c. Crispus
Kiyonga and Others (1992) 11 Kampala LR 14, p.20-21 ILR, v;l.103,
p. 259 et 266 (Cour supérieure, Ouganda).)
67. Dans son commentaire, la Commission du droit international cite
non seulement la pratique des Etats et les sentences arbitrales, mais auhssi
la doctrine, pour accréditer l’idée que les règles énoncéhes à l’article 10
sont généralement acceptées (J. Crawford, op. cit., p. 119, par. 12).
Cependant, le commentaire ne mentionne qu’un seul article traitant deh
mouvements insurrectionnels qui parviennent à créer un nouvel Etath
(H. Atlam, « International Liberation Movement and International Res -
ponsibility », dans B. Simma et M. Spinedi (dir. publ.), United Nations
Codification of State Responsibility, 1987, p. 35).
Dans l’affaire des Phares de l’Empire ottoman, le tribunal arbitral a
souligné les insuffisances de l’analyse doctrinale de la question, allant
jusqu’à évoquer « l’état chaotique de la doctrine » (Affaire relative à la
coosession des phares de l’Empire ottoman (Grèce/France), réclamations
n 11 et 4, 24 juillet 1956 (Nations Unies, RSA, vol. XII, p. 198; ILR,
vol. 23, 1956, p. 81, en particulier p. 91). Dumberry, auteur d’un ouvrage
consacré à un examen systématique de la question de la successihon à la
responsabilité internationale (P. Dumberry , State Succession to Interna ‑
tional Responsibility, 2007), à l’issue d’un travail exhaustif de recherche
sur la responsabilité des mouvements insurrectionnels qui parviennent à
créer un nouvel Etat, écrit ce qui suit :
«La Commission du droit international, comme les auteurs, voit
depuis longtemps comme relevant d’un principe bien établi de droith
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7 CIJ1077.indb 989 18/04/16 08:54 496 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
that whenever an insurrectional movement succeeds in creating a new
State, the new State should be held responsible for obligations arising
from internationally wrongful acts committed by the insurrectional
movement against third States during the armed struggle for independ -
ence. The new State should remain responsible for acts which took place
before its independence because there is a ‘structural’ and ‘orhganic’ -con
tinuity of the legal personality of what was then a rebel movement and
what has since successfully become a new independent State.
The somehow surprising result of the research outlined here is the
limited State practice which can be found in support of this principle. h
Thus, State practice ultimately consists of one obiter dictum by an
internal United States compensation commission and one sentence
taken from a legal opinion discussing the likely consequences arising
from uncertain future events. Even the several French municipal court
decisions, which held that the new State of Algeria was (in principle)h
responsible for the internationally wrongful acts committed by the
FLN before 1960, had limited concrete implications since Algeria was
in fact not a party to any of these proceedings.” (P. Dumberry, “New
State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts by an Insur -
rectional Movement”, European Journal of International Law, Vol.17,
2006, p. 620.)
In assessing the legal force of the Articles on State Responsibility, ith
should be born in mind that the International Law Commission recom -
mended to the General Assembly simply to ‘‘take note” of these Articles,
with the caveat that at a later stage the General Assembly should considher
the adoption of a Convention (Report of the International Law Commis -
sion 2001, United Nations doc. A/56/10, paras. 67, 72, 73). The General
Assembly followed this suggestion “without prejudice to the question hof
their future adoption or other appropriate action”. It took this decihsion
without a vote, in the Sixth Committee, as well as in the Plenary.
Consequently, the Articles on the Responsibility of States are, by their
nature, closest to the doctrinary codification by a prestigious body ohf
international lawyers such as the International Law Commission. They
have no binding force by themselves, but they can possess it indirectly ▯via
customary law to the extent to which they express it.
General Assembly resolution 59/35 (2004) entrusted the United Nations
Secretariat with the task of producing a compilation of express referenches
to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongfulh
Acts and their commentaries in international judicial practice (see
General Assembly resolution 56/83 (2001) and General Assembly resolu -
tion 59/35 (2004)). It is an extremely important task which should
demonstrate the reaction of international courts and tribunals in terms hof
its perception of the Articles as expressing positive law or not.
497
7 CIJ1077.indb 990 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 496
international l’attribution à un mouvement insurrectionnel qui parh-
vient à créer un nouvel Etat de la responsabilité des actes inthernatio-
nalement illicites commis par ce mouvement à l’égard d’Etatsh tiers
durant sa lutte armée pour l’indépendance. Ainsi, un nouvel Etaht
serait responsable d’actes antérieurs à l’accession à l’hindépendance
parce que, « structurellement» et « organiquement», il incarnerait la
continuité de la personnalité juridique d’un mouvement rebelle hpar-
venu à créer un nouvel Etat indépendant.
Le caractère quelque peu surprenant des résultats des travaux de
recherche dont il est question ici est que la pratique des Etats qui
peut être invoquée à l’appui de l’existence de ce principhe est fort
mince. En effet, cette pratique se résume à un seul obiter dictum, émis
par une commission d’indemnisation régie par le droit interne des h
Etats -Unis, et à une phrase tirée d’un avis juridique sur les conséh -
quences probables d’événements futurs incertains. Et même lehs déci-
sions des tribunaux français, selon lesquelles le nouvel Etat algéhrien
était (en principe) responsable des actes internationalement illicihtes
commis par le FLN avant 1960, n’ont dans la pratique eu qu’un effeth
limité, l’Algérie n’ayant été partie à aucune des ihnstances introduites
devant eux. » (P. Dumberry, « New State Responsibility for Interna -
tionally Wrongful Acts by an Insurrectional Movement », European
Journal of International Law, vol. 17, 2006, p. 620.)
Pour apprécier la valeur juridique des articles sur la responsabilitéh de
l’Etat, il convient de se rappeler que la CDI a simplement recommandéh à
l’Assemblée générale de « prendre acte » desdits articles et d’envisager la
possibilité, à un stade ultérieur, de conclure une convention shur le sujet
(Rapport de la Commission du droit international 2001, Nations Unies,
doc. A/56/10, par. 67, 72 et 73). L’Assemblée générale a suivi cette recom-
mandation «sans préjudice de leur adoption éventuelle ou de toute autre
mesure appropriée ». Elle a adopté cette résolution sans la mettre aux
voix, aussi bien à la Sixième Commission qu’en séance pléhnière.
Il s’ensuit que les articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat ont pour l’es -
sentiel le caractère d’une codification doctrinale réaliséhe par un corps
prestigieux de juristes internationaux, en l’occurrence la Commission du
droit international. Ils n’ont aucune force exécutoire en eux‑mêmes, mais
ils peuvent l’avoir indirectement par l’intermédiaire du droit ▯coutumier, dans
la mesure où ils expriment celui‑ci.
Par sa résolution 59/35 de 2004, l’Assemblée générale des NationsUnies
a chargé le Secrétariat d’établir une compilation des réfhérences expresses
aux articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationhalement
illicite et aux commentaires dans la pratique judiciaire internationale h(voir
les résolutions 56/83 (2001) et 59/35 (2004) de l’Assembléeh générale). Il
s’agit là d’une tâche extrêmement importante qui devrait mieux faire
connaître la réception des articles par les cours et tribunaux inthernatio -
naux et si ces derniers considèrent que les articles expriment le drohit posi-
tif ou non.
497
7 CIJ1077.indb 991 18/04/16 08:54 497 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Even more useful in this respect is perhaps the study prepared by the
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, which is consid -
erably more extensive in its scope ratione materiae. It comprises not only
international judicial practice, but
“it includes references to the Articles made in the separate or dissent-
ing opinions of judges of both the International Court of Justice and
other bodies . . . it aims to provide a greater amount of context to
instances of express reference . . .it aims to provide some comment
upon, and where appropriate, criticism of, the way in which the Arti-
cles have been applied in specific instances . . . it includes the most
important instances of reliance on the Articles by domestic courts.” h
(Simon Olleson, The Impact of ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Preliminary Draft, British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2003, p. iv.)
Moreover, the study “aims to provide a survey not only of express ref -
erence to the Articles, but also to the most important judicial pronounche-
ments (in particular those of the International Court of Justice), whihch,
although made without express reference to the Articles, are relevant to
matters falling within their subject-matter and which are therefore releh -
vant to an assessment of the impact of the Articles since the adoption”h
(ibid.). (See also “Responsibility of States ; Compilation of Decisions
of International Courts, Tribunals and other Bodies”, Report of the
Secretary ‑General, United Nations doc. A/62/62 and Add. 1 ; D. Caron,
“The ILC Articles on State Responsibility : The Paradoxical Relation -
ship between Form and Authority”, American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 96, 2002, pp. 857, 863-866, 857).
The conclusion of the study is that, contrary to the largest number of
the Articles on which the jurisprudence of courts, international and
national’ and the practice of States, strongly relies, in respect of hArti -
cles 10 as a whole “[t]here appears to have been no international judicialh
reference to Article 10” (ibid., p. 95) nor any other instances referring to
Article 10 (ibid.)
6. Applicable Substantive Law In Casu in the Light of Rules
on Interpretation of Treaties
68. Even if, arguendo, succession to responsibility is supposed to be a
part of general international law, this would not automatically mean thaht
it is a part of the applicable law in casu.
In order to be considered as such, rules on succession to responsibilityh
must be, pursuant to Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, “relevant rules of international law applicable in thhe
relations between the parties”.
69. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is a special treaty -oriented
compromissory clause producing a “presumption of confinement”
498
7 CIJ1077.indb 992 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 497
Peut -être encore plus utile à cet égard est l’étude du Britishh Institute of
International and Comparative Law, dont le champ d’investigation
ratione materiae est beaucoup plus large. Cette étude s’intéresse en effet
non seulement à la pratique judiciaire internationale, mais encore
«aux renvois aux articles que l’on trouve dans les opinions individuelhles
ou dissidentes des juges de la Cour internationale de Justice et d’auhtres
organes… Elle entend présenter de façon plus approfondie le contexte
des références expresses… Elle entend aussi commenter, voire, lhe cas
échéant, critiquer la façon dont les articles ont été apphliqués dans cer-
taines affaires… Elle comprend enfin les cas les plus importants de hc-ita
tion des articles par les tribunaux nationaux. » (Simon Olleson, The
Impact of ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for International▯ ly
Wrongful Acts, Preliminary Draft, British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, 2003, p.iv.)
De plus, cette étude « vise à recenser non seulement les références
expresses aux articles, mais encore les prononcés judiciaires les pluhs impor -
tants (en particulier ceux de la Cour internationale de Justice), qui,h même
s’ils ne renvoient pas expressément aux articles, concernent les mhatières sur
lesquelles portent ceux-ci et sont par là même utiles pour apprécier l’effet
produit par les articles depuis leur adoption » (ibid.). (Voir aussi Respon ‑
sabilité de l’Etat pour fait internationalement illicite, Compilation de déci -
sions de juridictions internationales et d’autres organes internationhaux,
Rapport du Secrétaire général , Nations Unies, doc. A/62/62 et Add.1 ;
D. Caron, «The ILC Articles on State Responsibility : The Paradoxical
Relationship between Form and Authority », American Journal of Interna
‑
tional Law, vol. 96, 2002, p. 857, 863-866, en particulier p. 857.)
La conclusion à laquelle est parvenue cette étude est que, contraihre -
ment au grand nombre d’articles sur lesquels s’appuient vigoureusehment
la jurisprudence des cours et tribunaux internationaux et nationaux et lha
pratique des Etats, « il ne semble y avoir aucune référence judiciaire inter-
nationale à l’article 10 (ibid., p. 95) ni aucune référence audit article de la
part d’autres instances (ibid.).
6. Droit matériel applicable en l’espèce à la lumière
des règles d’interprétation des traités
68. Même si, pour les besoins de l’argumentation, on devait supposer
que la succession à la responsabilité fasse partie du droit international
général, cela ne voudrait pas dire qu’elle fasse automatiquemenht partie du
droit applicable en l’espèce.
Pour cela, en effet, les règles de la succession à la responsabilithé doivent,
selon l’alinéa c) du paragraphe 3 de l’article 31 de la convention de
Vienne sur le droit des traités, être des « règles[s] pertinente[s] de droit
international applicable[s] dans les relations entre les parties ».
69. L’article IX de la convention sur le génocide est une clause com -
promissoire entraînant une « présomption de limitation » (W. M. Reis-
498
7 CIJ1077.indb 993 18/04/16 08:54 498 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
(W. M. Reisman, “The Other Shoe Falls : The Future of Article 36 (1)
Jurisdiction in the Light of Nicaragua”, American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 81, 1987, p. 170) in the sense that, as a jurisdictional title, it
determines substantive law to be applied (positive aspect) and excludehs, in
principle, as applicable substantive law, other than that determined by hit
(negative aspect).
It can be said that this type of clause determines the principal or pri ‑
mary rules of the treaty to which the compromissory clause is attached
(L. Bartels, “Jurisdiction and Applicable Law Clauses : Where Does a
Tribunal Find the Principal Norms Applicable to the Case before It ?” in
Y. Shany and T. Broude (eds.), Multi‑Sourced Equivalent Norms in Inter ‑
national Law, 2011, pp. 117-120; M. Papadaki, “Compromissory Clauses
as the Gatekeepers of the Law to Be ‘Used’ in the ICJ and PCIJ”h, Journal
of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 5, 2014, pp. 573 et passim) which
the Court applies ad casum. Its effects naturally derive from the consen -
sual and limited jurisdiction of the Court.
70. The consensual and limited jurisdiction of the Court cannot but
reflect upon the substantive law which the Court applies. This fact
expresses the essential difference between international courts and domesh -
tic courts, the latter which, representing the State imperium in the judicial
sphere, apply the formal sources of law ex lege, independently of the will
of the parties. The power of the parties to limit applicable substantiveh
rules, being a part of the Statute of the Court, possesses the constituthional
character in the law governing the Court’s judicial activity. The strong
form of the exercise of this power is the provision of Article 38, para -
graph 2, of the Statute of the Court, on the basis of which the parties can,
on the basis of agreement, give the power to the Court to decide a case h
ex aequo et bono. Narrower by scope and, implicitly, by form, are juris -
dictional titles granted in instruments such as compromissory clauses or
special agreements.
71. The special treaty-oriented compromissory clauses do not exclude
per se the application of the legal rules contained in sources mentioned in
Article 38 of the Statute of the Court. Such exclusion would be incompat -
ible with the judicial function of the Court as a court of law which adohpts
decisions in accordance with international law. Moreover, such effects are
logically and legally impossible, having in mind that the Court, by applhy-
ing the law referred to in a compromissory clause, acts, in fact, in acchor-
dance with the provision of paragraph 1 (a) of Article 38 of the Statute.
The effects of treaty-oriented compromissory clauses are not designed
in terms of exclusion/inclusion dichotomy, but in terms of determining
priority of the rules from various sources which concern or may concern h
the subject-matter of the dispute and of the function of the rules of inhter -
national law other than the rules embodied in the treaty to which a com -
promissory clause is attached.
In this sense, in contrast to the principal or primary rules representinhg
applicable substantive law in casu, there are incidental norms (L. Bartels,
499
7 CIJ1077.indb 994 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 498
man, «The Other Shoe Falls : The Future of Article 36 (1) Jurisdiction in
the Light of Nicaragua », American Journal of International Law, vol. 81,
1987, p. 170), en ce sens que, en tant que titre de compétence, il définhit le
droit matériel applicable (aspect positif), et exclut en principe dhu champ
de ce droit matériel applicable tout ce qu’il n’a pas défihni comme lui
appartenant (aspect négatif).
On peut dire que ce type de stipulation définit les règles principales ou
primaires du traité auxquelles la clause compromissoire est attachée
(L. Bartels, «Jurisdiction and Applicable Law Clauses: Where Does a Tri -
bunal Find the Principal Norms Applicable to the Case before It ?», dans
Y. Shany et T. Broude (dir. publ.), Multi‑Sourced Equivalent Norms in
International Law, 2011, p. 117-120 ; M. Papadaki, « Compromissory
Clauses as the Gatekeepers of the Law to Be « Used» in the ICJ and
PCIJ», Journal of International Dispute Settlement, vol. 5, 2014, p. 573 et
passim) et que la Cour appliquera à l’espèce considérée. Ses ehffets
découlent naturellement du caractère consensuel et limité de lah compé -
tence de la Cour.
70. Ce caractère consensuel et limité de la compétence de la Cour nhe
peut pas ne pas influencer le droit matériel qu’elle applique. Ihl y a là une
différence essentielle entre les cours internationales et les tribunauhx
internes, puisque ceux-ci, représentant l’imperium de l’Etat dans la sphère
judiciaire, appliquent le droit ex lege, indépendamment de la volonté des
parties. A l’inverse, la prérogative que le Statut de la Cour recohnnaît aux
parties de limiter les règles matérielles applicables présente hun caractère
quasi constitutionnel dans le droit qui régit l’activité judicihaire de la Cour.
Le paragraphe 2 de l’article 38 du Statut, qui rappelle la faculté qu’a la
Cour, si les parties en sont d’accord, de statuer ex aequo et bono, constitue
une forme éminente de l’exercice de cette prérogative. Quant auhx titres de
compétence découlant d’instruments tels que les clauses compromhissoires
et les conventions spéciales, ils sont de portée et, implicitementh, de nature
plus limitée.
71. Les clauses compromissoires spéciales des traités n’excluent pahs en
soi l’application des règles de droit émanées des sources mehntionnées à
l’article38 du Statut, car ce serait incompatible avec la fonction judiciaire
de la Cour en sa qualité d’organe judiciaire dont les décisionsh doivent se
conformer au droit international. De plus, un tel effet serait logiquemenht
et juridiquement impossible, puisque, en appliquant le droit stipulé hdans
la clause compromissoire, la Cour se conforme de fait aux dispositions dhe
l’alinéa a) du paragraphe 1 de l’article 38 de son Statut.
Les effets produits par les clauses compromissoires des traités ne s’hins -
crivent pas dans une dichotomie exclusion/inclusion, mais visent à hihérar -
chiser les règles émanées des différentes sources pertinentesh ou susceptibles
d’être pertinentes pour l’objet du litige et à définir hle rôle d’autres règles
de droit international que celles qui sont déjà inscrites dans le htraité
auquel appartient la clause compromissoire.
En ce sens, et par contraste avec les règles principales ou primairesh qui
constituent le droit matériel applicable en l’espèce, il existeh des normes inci
499
7 CIJ1077.indb 995 18/04/16 08:54 499 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
op. cit., p. 117) which comprise metanorms, constructive and conflicting
norms (M. Papadaki, op. cit., pp. 580-592). Metanorms imply “rules that
govern the validity and interpretation of the rules of the treaty”, whhereas
constructive norms constitute “the logical presuppositions and the nehces-
sary logical consequences” of the principal or primary rules (D. Anzilotti,
Cours de droit international, trans. G. C. Gidel, 1929, pp. 106 -107, as trans-
lated into English by M. Papadaki, op. cit.). Conflicting norms, for their
part, concern “conflicting norm extraneous to the compromissory clahuse–
containing treaty” whose application is a “result of the applicatihon of the
metanorms of conflict resolution” like lex specialis or lex posterior whose
function is, generally speaking, to determine “the interpretation, vahlidity
and applicability of any given principal norms” (L. Bartels, op.cit., p. 119).
Consequently, whereas the principal norms of substantive law are
linked with the subject -matter of the dispute, possessing specific norma -
tive content relevant to the adjudicative process, incidental norms haveh
structural-functional significance which enables a proper interpretation
and application of the principal norms.
72. The dichotomy of the principal/incidental norms reconciles two,
prima facie, opposing premises — consensual and limited jurisdiction of
the Court and the nature of the judicial function of the Court as an orghan
of international law. In the optic of this dichotomy, it seems clear thaht the
substantive law referred to by the compromissory clause is not a self -con -
tained regime, but a relevant part of international law as a whole operaht-
ing, together with other relevant parts of international law, on the bashis
of a proper distribution of functions. Moreover, the normative integrityh
and consistency of international law is safeguarded precisely by the opehr-
ation of metanorms relating to the validity of legal acts.
73. The part of jurisprudence of the Court based on special, treaty-
oriented compromissory clauses, generally follows the theoretical divisihon
of primary and incidental norms, and their role in the process of determhi-
nation.
A good illustration is the 2007 Judgment in the Bosnian Genocide case
which, in respect of this particular matter, is virtually identical to thhe case
at hand.
As regards applicable substantive law, the position of the Court is
clear. The Court, inter alia, stated :
“The jurisdiction of the Court in this case is based solely on Arti -
cle IX of the Convention. All the other grounds of jurisdiction invoked
by the Applicant were rejected in the 1996 Judgment on jurisdiction
(I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 617-621, paras. 35-41). It follows that
the Court may rule only on the disputes between the Parties to which
that provision refers. The Parties disagree on whether the Court
finally decided the scope and meaning of that provision in its
1996 Judgment and, if it did not, on the matters over which the Court
500
7 CIJ1077.indb 996 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 499
dentes (L. Bartels, op. cit., p. 117) qui comprennent les métanormes, les
normes constructives et les normes conflictuelles (M. Papadaki, op. cit.,
p.580 -592). Les métanormes sont « les règles qui gouvernent la validité et
l’interprétation des règles du traité», tandis que les normes constructives
constituent les présupposés théoriques et les conséquences lhogiques néces -
saires des règles principales ou primaires (D. Anzilotti, Cours de droit inter‑
national, trad. G. C. Gidel, 1929, p. 106-107). De leur côté, les normes
conflictuelles désignent «des normes étrangères au traité contenant la clause
compromissoire», dont l’application «résulte de l’application de métanormes
du règlement des conflits » telles qu’unelex specialis ou une lexposterior qui
ont généralement pour fonction de déterminer «l’interprétation, la validité
et l’applicabilité de normes principales données » (L.Bartels, op.cit., p.119).
Par conséquent, alors que les normes principales du droit matérielh sont
liées à l’objet du différend et que leurs dispositions normathives présentent
une pertinence spécifique pour l’administration de la justice, lhes normes
incidentes ont un caractère structurel et fonctionnel qui facilite l’hinterpré-
tation et l’application des normes principales.
72. La dichotomie normes principales/normes incidentes opère une
conciliation entre deux postulats à première vue contradictoires, hà savoir
d’une part, le fait que la compétence de la Cour est limitée eth repose sur le
consentement et, d’autre part, la nature de la fonction judiciaire deh la Cour
en tant qu’organe de droit international. Dans la perspective de cetthe
dichotomie, il semble clair que le droit matériel évoqué par lah clause com -
promissoire constitue non pas un régime autonome, mais une partie perht-i
nente du droit international considéré comme un tout et agissant, hen même
temps que d’autres parties pertinentes du droit international, sur la base
d’une distribution appropriée des fonctions. De plus, c’est préhcisément le
fonctionnement des métanormes relatives à la validité des actesh juridiques
qui assure l’intégrité et la cohérence normatives du droit ihnternational.
73. La partie de la jurisprudence de la Cour qui est basée sur des
clauses compromissoires de traités suit généralement la répartition théo -
rique des normes entre normes principales et normes incidentes, et leursh
rôles respectifs dans l’adoption de la décision.
On en trouve un bon exemple dans l’arrêt de 2007 dans l’affaire h Bosnie‑
Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro qui, sur ce point particulier, est
presque identique à l’espèce.
En ce qui concerne le droit matériel applicable, la position de la Cohur
est claire. La Cour a notamment déclaré :
« La compétence de la Cour en l’espèce n’est fondée que surh l’ar -
ticle IX de la Convention. Tous les autres fondements de compétence
invoqués par le demandeur ont été rejetés dans l’arrêth de 1996 conce -r
nant la compétence (C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), p. 617-621, par. 35-41).
Il s’ensuit que la Cour ne peut trancher que les différends entre lhes
parties contractantes visées par cette disposition. Les Parties s’hop -
posent sur la question de savoir si la Cour s’est définitivementh prono -n
cée, dans son arrêt de 1996, sur la portée et le sens de cette hdispositi;n
500
7 CIJ1077.indb 997 18/04/16 08:54 500 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
has jurisdiction under that provision. The Court rules on those two
matters in following sections of this Judgment. It has no power to rule h
on alleged breaches of other obligations under international law, not
amounting to genocide, particularly those protecting human rights in
armed conflict. That is so even if the alleged breaches are of obliga -
tions under peremptory norms, or of obligations which protect essen-
tial humanitarian values, and which may be owed erga omnes.”
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Monte‑
negro) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 104, para. 147.)
In other words, the Court diagnosed applicable substantive law or the
principal norms in the Genocide Convention as indicated by Article IX of
the Convention, pointing out “the fundamental distinction between theh
existence and binding force of obligations arising under international law
and the existence of a court or tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve disputes
about compliance with those obligations” (ibid., para. 148 ; emphasis
added).
The Court, then, continues to consider applicable law lato sensu finding
out that:
“The jurisdiction of the Court is founded on Article IX of the Con -
vention, and the disputes subject to that jurisdiction are those ‘relhat-
ing to the interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convenhtion,
but it does not follow that the Convention stands alone.” (Ibid., p. 105,
para. 149 ; emphasis added.)
and concludes:
“In order to determine whether the Respondent breached its obli -
gation under the Convention, as claimed by the Applicant, and, if a
breach was committed, to determine its legal consequences, the Court
willhave recourse not only to the Convention itself, but also to the
rules of general international law on treaty interpretation and on resp‑n
sibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.” (Ibid. emphasis
added.)
74. It seems clear that “the rules of general international law on treatyh
interpretation and on responsibility of States for internationally wronghful
acts”, as the rules which “stand” alongside the Genocide Convenhtion,
fully correspond with metanorms and constructive norms, respectively, ash
the forms of incidental or auxiliary norms (see paras. 69 and 71 above).
75. It appears clear that succession to responsibility is not a part of
primary substantive law contained in the Genocide Convention. Respon -
sibility of a State for the committed crime is a constructive norm in thhe
501
7 CIJ1077.indb 998 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 500
dans la négative, elles sont en désaccord sur les questions à l’éhgard des-
quelles la Cour a compétence en vertu de celle -ci. La Cour se pronon-
cera sur ces deux questions plus loin dans le présent arrêt. Elle hn’est pas
habilitée à se prononcer sur des violations alléguées d’ahutres obligations
que les Parties tiendraient du droit international, violations qui ne
peuvent être assimilées à un génocide, en particulier s’ahgissant d’obl-iga
tions visant à protéger les droits de l’homme dans un conflith armé. Il en
est ainsi même si les violations alléguées concernent des oblighations
relevant de normes impératives ou des obligations relatives à la phrot-ec
tion des valeurs humanitaires essentielles et que ces obligations peuvenht
s’imposererga omnes.» (Application de la convention pour la prévention
et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie ‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑
Monténégro), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I) , p. 104, par. 147.)
Autrement dit, la Cour a trouvé dans la convention sur le génocideh le
droit matériel ou les normes principales applicables conformément hà l’ar-
ticleIX de la Convention, en rappelant «la différence fondamentale entre,
d’une part, l’existence et la force contraignante d’obligationsh résultant du
droit international et, d’autre part, l’existence d’une cour ou d’un tribunal
compétent pour résoudre des différends relatifs au respect de c▯es obliga ‑
tions» (ibid., par. 148; les italiques sont de moi).
Poursuivant son examen du droit applicable lato sensu, la Cour fait la
constatation suivante :
« Que la Cour tire sa compétence de l’article IX de la Convention et
que les différends qui relèvent de cette compétence portent sur « l’inter-
prétation, l’application ou l’exécution » de la Conventionn’a pas néces‑
sairement pour conséquence que seule doive entrer en ligne de compte
cette Convention .» (Ibid., p.105, par. 149; les italiques sont de moi.)
etconclut:
«Afin de déterminer si, comme le soutient le demandeur, le défen -
deur a violé l’obligation qu’il tient de la Convention et, s’hil y a eu
violation, d’en déterminer les conséquences juridiques, la Courh fera
appel non seulement à la Convention proprement dite, mais aussi
aux règles du droit international général qui régissent l’▯interprétation
des traités et la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fait internatio▯nalement
illicite (Ibid.; les italiques sont de moi.)
74. Il semble clair que les « règles du droit international général qui
régissent l’interprétation des traités et la responsabilitéh de l’Etat pour fait
internationalement illicite » qui « entrent en ligne de compte » en complé -
ment de la Convention correspondent pleinement aux métanormes et aux
normes constructives, respectivement, sous la forme de normes incidentesh
ou auxiliaires (voir supra, par. 69 et 71).
75. Il est manifeste que la succession à la responsabilité ne fait pash partie
du droit matériel principal issu de la convention sur le génocide.h La resp-on
sabilité de l’Etat à raison d’une infraction est une norme constructive au sens
501
7 CIJ1077.indb 999 18/04/16 08:54 501 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
sense of “logical presuppositions and necessary logical consequences of
norms established” (D. Anzilotti and G. C. Gidel, Cours de droit interna‑
tional, 1929, pp. 106-107, as translated into English by M. Papadaki,
op. cit.) by a treaty, in the case at hand the Convention on Genocide. Or,
more precisely, as a constructive norm, the rules of State responsibilithy
are “the logical presuppositions not of the primary rules per se, but of
their effectiveness” (M. Papadaki, op. cit., p. 586). The special position of
constructive norms is well -established in the jurisprudence of the Court.
It is expressed in a general way in the dictum of the Court in the Chorzow
Factory case “:eparation . . .s the indispensable complement of a fail -
ure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be statehd in
the Convention itself.” (Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow, Juris‑
diction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 13.)
Moreover, in the Genocide Convention “responsibility” is included hin
the compromissory clause, which, due to the fact that responsibility is,
ex natura, the constructive norm, possesses thus only a declaratory effect.
76. Responsibility of a State is one thing and succession to responsibil-
ity is another. Suffice it to say that, whereas the rules on responsibihlity are
secondary rules, the rules on successionare a part of the corpus ofprimary
norms whose violation entails activation of the rules on responsibility.h
77. As such, supposed rules of succession to responsibility are not “rel-
evant rules” of international law applicable in casu. “Relevant rules” in
terms of Article 31, paragraph 3 (c), of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties “can be taken as an indication that analogy to rules hof
international law other than directly applicable to the subject‑matter of the
case were to be excluded” (H. J. Uibopuu, “Interpretation of Treaties in
the Light of International Law : Art. 31, para. 3 (c) of the Vienna Con -
vention on the Law of Treaties”, Yearbook of the Association of Attenders
and Alumni : Hague Academy of International Law , Vol. 40, 1970, p. 4 ;
emphasis added). “Relevant” means that the rules “concerns the
subject‑matter of the treaty term at issue ” (M. E. Villiger, Commentary on
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2009, p. 433; empha-
sis added ; see also Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 219,
para. 113).
78. In the circumstances surrounding the case, two relevant conclu -
sions can be drawn :
(i) that the alleged rules on succession to responsibility are not primary
substantive rules in the sense of the Genocide Convention ; and
(ii) that, having in mind that they are not a part of secondary rules, they
do not form a legal union with the rules on responsibility so that
in casu they do not constitute constructive norms.
502
7 CIJ1077.indb 1000 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 501
des présupposés théoriques et des conséquences logiques néhcessaires des
normes établies par un traité, lequel est en l’occurrence la cohnvention sur le
génocide (D.Anzilotti, Cours de droit international, trad. G. C.Gidel, 1929,
p. 106-107). Ou encore, plus précisément, les règles relatives àh la responsab-
lité de l’Etat en tant que normes constructives sont « les présupposés théo-
riques non des règles primaires en elles -mêmes, mais de leur efficacité »
(M. Papadaki, op.cit., p.586). La position particulière des normes constru-c
tives est bien établie dans la jurisprudence de la Cour. La CPJI l’ha exprimée
de façon générale dans un dictum de son arrêt en l’affaire relative à l’Usine
de Chorzow: «La réparation est … le complément indispensable d’un man-
quement à l’application d’une convention, sans qu’il soit néhcessaire que cela
soitinscrit dans la Convention même. (A»faire relative à l’usine de Chorzow,
o
compétence, arrêt nº8, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A n 9, p. 21.)
De plus, dans la convention sur le génocide, la « responsabilité» est
incluse dans la clause compromissoire qui, du fait que la responsabilitéh est
par nature une norme constructive, ne possède qu’un effet déclarhatoire.
76. La responsabilité de l’Etat est une chose et la succession à lah respon -
sabilité en est une autre. Je me contenterai de rappeler que, si les hrègles
relatives à la responsabilité sont des règles secondaires, les hrègles relatives à
la succession font partie intégrante de ce corpus de normes primaires dont
la violation déclenche l’application des règles relatives à hla responsabilité.
77. Les prétendues règles de la succession à la responsabilité nhe sont
pas en tant que telles des «règles pertinentes» de droit international appli-
cables en l’espèce. Dans la référence à « toute règle pertinente » qui est
faite à l’alinéa c) du paragraphe 3 de l’article 31 de la convention de
Vienne sur le droit des traités, on peut voir « une indication que toute
analogie avec des règles de droit international qui ne seraient pas directe‑
ment applicables à l’objet de l’espèce est à exclure » (H. J. Uibopuu,
«Interpretation of Treaties in the Light of International Law : Art. 31,
para. 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties », Annuaire
de l’Association des auditeurs et anciens auditeurs de l’Académ▯ie de droit
international de La Haye, vol. 40, 1970, p. 4 ; les italiques sont de moi).
Par « pertinente», on entend que la règle « concerne l’objet de la stipul‑
tion en cause du traité » (M. E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2009, p. 433; les italiques sont de moi ;
voir aussi Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matière
pénale (Djibouti c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 219, par. 113).
78. Dans les circonstances de l’espèce, on peut en tirer deux conclu -
sions:
i) que les prétendues règles relatives à la succession à la reshponsabilité ne
sont pas des règles matérielles primaires au sens de la conventionh sur
le génocide; et
ii) que, sachant qu’elles ne font pas partie des règles secondaires, ihl
n’existe pas de lien juridique entre elles et les règles relativesh à la res -
ponsabilité, si bien qu’en l’espèce elles ne constituent pash des normes
constructives.
502
7 CIJ1077.indb 1001 18/04/16 08:54 502 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
79. The only possible form of succession to responsibility in the cir -
cumstances surrounding the case, could be succession to the responsibil -
ity of SFRY ex consensu.
On 29 June 2001, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia,
the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Slovenia and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, concluded in Vienna, under the auspices of the
International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, an Agreement on
succession issues.
The Parties have concluded the Agreement, as stated in the Preamble,
“being in sovereign equality the five successor States to the formehr Social -
ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.
Article 1 of Annex F of the Agreement provides that “[a]ll rights and
interests which belonged to the SFRY and which are not otherwise cov -
ered by the Agreement . . . shall be shared among the successor States. . .”
The Article is interpreted as a provision “in favour of the transfer hof the
right to reparation from the predecessor State to the successor States”.
(P. Dumberry, op. cit., p. 121, fn. 293; emphasis in original).
Article 2 of Annex F stipulates :
“All claims against the SFRY which are not otherwise covered by
this agreement shall be considered by the Standing Joint Committee
established under Article 4 of this agreement. The successor States
shall inform one another of all such claims against the SFRY.”
Sir Arthur Watts, special negotiator for succession issues, whose pro -
posal is actually incorporated into the text of the Agreement on succes-
sion issues, indicates that
“it was understood by all concerned (at least, if it wasn’t, it shhould
have been !) that Articles 1 and 2 of Annex F included within their
scope such items of international responsibility as might exists [sic],
whether involving outstanding claims by the SFRY against other
States (Art. 1) or outstanding claims by other States against the SFRY
(Art. 2)” (P. Dumberry, op. cit., p. 121, fn. 294, referring to a letter
from Sir Arthur Watts on file with the author).
7. The Issue of the Indispensable Third Party
80. Even if, arguendo qua non, there exists a rule of general interna -
tional law and ipso iure succession to responsibility, it seems inapplicable
in the circumstances surrounding the case.
Succession to responsibility is not a simple movement of responsibility h
from the predecessor State towards the successor State, an automatic
transfer of responsibility from old to new State(s).
It presupposes two relevant legal facts established in a proper judicialh
action of the Court.
503
7 CIJ1077.indb 1002 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 502
79. La seule forme de succession à la responsabilité de la RFSY pos -
sible dans les circonstances de l’espèce serait la succession ex consensu.
Le 29 juin 2001, la Bosnie -Herzégovine, la République de Croatie, la
République de Macédoine, la République de Slovénie et la République
fédérale de Yougoslavie ont conclu à Vienne, sous les auspices hde la
Conférence internationale sur l’ex -Yougoslavie, un « accord portant sur
des questions de succession ».
Dans son préambule, les parties signataires de l’accord ont déchlaré
« être en souveraine égalité les cinq Etats successeurs de l’ehx -République
fédérale socialiste de Yougoslavie ».
L’article premier de l’annexe F de l’accord stipule que « [t]ous les droits
et intérêts de la RFSY dont l’accord ne prévoit pas expresséhment la dis -
position … sont répartis entre les Etats successeurs…». Cet article s’inter-
prète comme une stipulation « en faveur du transfert du droit à réparation
de l’Etat prédécesseur aux Etats successeurs » (P. Dumberry, op. cit.,
p. 121, note 293 ; les italiques sont de l’auteur).
L’article2 de l’annexe F prévoit que
« [t]outesles réclamations contre la RFSY qui ne sont pas prévues au
présent accord seront examinées par le Comité permanent conjoinht
créé par l’article4 dudit accord. Les Etats successeurs s’informeront
les uns les autres de leurs réclamations contre la RFSY. »
Le négociateur spécial pour les questions de succession, sirArthurWatts,
dont la proposition a été incorporée au texte de l’accord pohrtant sur des
questions de succession, observe que
« toutes les parties concernées savaient (ou du moins, si elles ne le h
savaient pas, auraient dû savoir!) que les articles premier et 2 de l’an-
nexe F s’appliquaient à tous les éléments éventuels de la responsabi-
lité internationale, qu’il s’agisse de réclamations pendantehs de la
RFSY contre les autres Etats (art. premier) ou de réclamations pen -
dantes des autres Etats contre la RFSY (art. 2)» (P. Dumberry,
op. cit., p. 121, note 294, citant une lettre de sir Arthur Watts en pos-
session de l’auteur).
7. La question de la tierce partie indispensable
80. A supposer même qu’il existe une règle de droit international ghéné -
ral et une succession ipso jure à la responsabilité, ce qui n’est pas le cas,
elle semble inapplicable dans les circonstances de l’espèce.
La succession à la responsabilité n’est pas un simple mouvementh par
lequel la responsabilité passerait de l’Etat prédécesseur àh l’Etat succes -
seur, un transfert automatique de la responsabilité de l’ancien Ethat au(x)
nouveau(x) Etats.
Elle suppose que deux faits juridiques pertinents aient été étahblis dans
le cadre d’une instance judiciaire devant la Cour, à savoir :
503
7 CIJ1077.indb 1003 18/04/16 08:54 503 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Primo, that the alleged genocidal acts have been committed on the ter -
ritory of the Applicant ; and
Secundo, that such acts can be attributed to the SFRY according to
“criteria, standards and principles, including, in addition to commonh
sense, national and international rules” (YILC, 1989, Vol. II, pp. 51-52).
Only upon establishing these legal facts can the “succession issue”h be
brought in focus in terms of the transfer of established responsibility of
the SFRY for alleged genocidal acts to the FRY/Serbia. The issue of res -
ponsibility of the SFRY is, consequently, of the preliminary, antecedenth
nature in relation to the alleged responsibility of the FRY/Serbia.
81. Therefore, the alleged responsibility of the SFRY represents the
very subject-matter of the decision of the Court in the dispute between
Croatia and the FRY/Serbia. In that part, it appears that the Court doesh
not have jurisdiction because, as stated by the Court in Land, Island and
Maritime Frontier Dispute, expressing the well -established, fundamental
rule as regards its jurisdiction, “continuance of proceedings in the habsence
of a State whose [interests] would be ‘the very subject -matter of the deci-
sion’” is not allowed (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal‑
vador/Honduras), Application for Permission to Intervene, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1990, pp. 115 -116, para. 55, referring to the case of Mon‑
etary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France ; United Kingdom
and United States of America), Preliminary Question, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1954, p. 32).
The Court thus confirmed the so-called Monetary Gold principle which
rests on the difference between the “legal interest” in a dispute ahnd the
“subject -matter” of a dispute or its part. The dictum of the Court is as
follows:
“To adjudicate upon [this objection] without. . . consent would run
counter to a well -established principle of international law embodied
in the Court’s Statute, namely, that the Court can only exercise juris -
diction over a State with its consent.” (Ibid.)
The fact that in the present case, a third State’s legal interests would not
only be affected by a decision, but would form “the very subject-matter of
the decision”, does not make it possible for the Court to be authorizhed by
Article 62 of the Statute to continue the proceedings even in the absence
of the third State concerned.
Nor can Article 59 of the Statute be invoked since
“the decision of the Court in a given case only binds the parties to hit
and in respect of that particular case. This rule. . . rests on the assump-
tion that the Court is at least able to render a binding decision.
Where . . . the vital issue to be settled concerns the international
responsibility of a third State, the Court cannot, without the consent
504
7 CIJ1077.indb 1004 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 503
Primo, que les actes de génocides allégués ont été commis sur hle terri -
toire du demandeur ; et
Secundo, que ces actes peuvent être attribués à la RFSY en recourant
«à des critères, des normes et des principes, c’est -à-dire aussi, avec discer-
nement, à des règles nationales et internationales » (ACDI, 1989, vol. II,
p. 56).
Ce n’est qu’une fois ces faits juridiques établis que l’on phourra aborder
la « question de la succession » du point de vue du transfert à la RFY/
Serbie de la responsabilité dûment établie de la RFSY pour les hactes de
génocide allégués. La question de la responsabilité de la RFhSY a donc un
caractère préliminaire et préalable à la prétendue responhsabilité de la
RFY/Serbie.
81. Il s’ensuit que la prétendue responsabilité de la RFSY constitue
l’objet même de la décision de la Cour dans le différend entrhe la Croatie
et la RFY/Serbie. Sur ce point, il semble que la Cour ne soit pas compéh -
tente parce que, comme elle l’a déclaré dans l’affaire du Différend fronta ‑
lier terrestre, insulaire et maritime, rappelant la règle fondamentale et bien
établie qui gouverne sa juridiction, « la continuation de la procédure … en
l’absence d’un Etat dont la responsabilité internationale consthituerait
«l’objet même de la … décision »» n’est pas permise ( Différend frontalier
terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête du▯ Nicara ‑
gua à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 115-116, par. 55,
avec renvoi à l’affaire de l’Or monétaire pris à Rome en 1943 (Italie
c.France ; Royaume ‑Uni et Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), question préliminaire,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 32).
La Cour a ainsi confirmé le principe dit de « l’or monétaire» qui repose
sur la différence entre l’« intérêt d’ordre juridique » qui peut être en cause
dans un différend et l’« objet» de ce différend ou d’un aspect dudit diffé -
rend. Le dictum de la Cour s’énonce comme suit :
« Statuer sur la responsabilité internationale de l’Albanie sans sonh
consentement serait agir à l’encontre d’un principe de droit inhterna -
tional bien établi et incorporé dans le Statut, à savoir que lah Cour ne
peut exercer sa juridiction à l’égard d’un Etat si ce n’ehst avec le
consentement de ce dernier. » (Ibid.)
Du fait qu’en la présente espèce les intérêts juridiques hd’un Etat tiers non
seulement seraient touchés par la décision, mais encore constituenht «l’ob -
jet même de ladite décision », l’article 62 du Statut ne saurait être invoqué
pour permettre à la Cour de continuer la procédure même en l’habsence de
l’Etat tiers considéré.
L’article 59 ne peut pas non plus être invoqué puisque
«la décision de la Cour n’est obligatoire que pour les parties en lhitige
et dans le cas qui a été décidé… [C]ette règle supposeh que la Cour est
pour le moins en mesure de rendre une décision qui lie les parties. Ehn
revanche, là où … la question essentielle à trancher a traith à la respon-
sabilité internationale d’un Etat tiers, la Cour ne peut, sans le consen-
504
7 CIJ1077.indb 1005 18/04/16 08:54 504 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
of that third State, give a decision on that issue binding upon any Stathe,
either the third State, or any of the parties before it” (I.C.J. Reports
1954, p. 33).
82. Considering that the “indispensable third party” principle derives
from the fundamental principle of consent, the application of the princih-
ple in casu could be objected to by recalling the argument that the SFRY
has given its consent to the jurisdiction of the Court by ratifying the hCon -
vention in 1948 without expressing reservation regarding Article IX of the
Convention.
Such an objection would, however, be deprived of sense. The SFRY
became extinct as a State in 1992 and, with the extinction of a State, ahll
its rights and obligations cease as its own rights and obligations.
83. Moreover, the indispensable third-party rule would relate to the
Republic of Macedonia up until 1 December 1991, the date of the procla-
mation of Macedonia as an independent State, and to Bosnia and
Herzegovina up until 29 February and 1 March 1992 — the dates of
the proclamation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent State,
because they were parts of the SFRY prior to these dates.
III. Substantive Law Issues
1. Relationship between the ICJ and the ICTY in respect
of the Adjudication of Genocide
84. Following the filing of the Application against the FRY in the Bos‑
nian Genocide case, on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Conven -
tion, the Court found itself on terra incognita. It had three possibilities at
its disposal at the time :
(i) to pronounce itself incompetent, which was, perhaps, a solution clos -
est to the letter of the Convention, although it contained a negative
connotation in terms of the Court’s judicial policy, implying that thhe
World Court renounces making its contribution to the settlement of
the disputes relating to the interpretation and application of the Con -
vention constituting a part of corpus juris cogentis;
(ii) to pronounce itself competent to entertain the case, acting as a crimi -
nal court, some kind of a judicial counterpart to the French adminis -
trative court in a dispute of full jurisdiction (le contentieux de pleine
juridiction). Legal obstacles for the Court to act in such a way do not
exist. As a court of general jurisdiction it was in a position, like theh
courts in the continental judicial system which does not know the
strict division into criminal and civil courts, to treat the issue of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for genocide as a preliminary part of
the issue of the responsibility of a State for genocide. This possibilithy
is additionally strengthened, representing even, in the light of logic
and legal considerations, the most appropriate solution, in the frame
505
7 CIJ1077.indb 1006 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 504
tement de ce dernier, rendre sur cette question une décision qui soith
obligatoire pour aucun Etat, ni pour l’Etat tiers, ni pour aucune authre
des parties qui sont devant elle. » (C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 33.)
82. Etant donné que le principe de la « tierce partie indispensable »
découle du principe fondamental du consentement, son application en
l’espèce pourrait être contestée en rappelant que la RFSY a hdonné son
consentement à la juridiction de la Cour en ratifiant la Convention en
1948 sans exprimer aucune réserve à l’égard de son article IX.
Une telle contestation n’aurait cependant pas de sens. La RFSY a dis -
paru en tant qu’Etat en 1992 et, lorsqu’un Etat disparaît, toush ses droits
et toutes ses obligations cessent d’exister en tant que ses droits eth obliga-
tions propres.
83. De surcroît, la règle de la tierce partie indispensable s’applihquerait
à la République de Macédoine jusqu’au 1 er décembre 1991, date de la
proclamation de la Macédoine en tant qu’Etat indépendant, et à la
er
Bosnie -Herzégovine jusqu’au 29 février et au 1 mars 1992, dates de la
proclamation de la Bosnie -Herzégovine en tant qu’Etat indépendant,
parce qu’elles faisaient partie de la RFSY avant ces dates.
III. Questions de droit mathériel
1. Rapport entre la CIJ et le TPIY pour ce qui est du traitement
judiciaire du génocide
84. Avec l’introduction d’une instance contre la RFY dans l’affaire
Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro, sur le fondement de l’ar -
ticleIX de cette Convention, la Cour s’est trouvée en terra incognita. Elle
avait à l’époque le choix entre trois solutions :
i) se déclarer incompétente, ce qui était peut -être la solution la plus
proche de la lettre de la Convention mais avait l’inconvénient, duh
point de vue de la politique judiciaire de la Cour, de laisser croire quhe
celle-ci renonçait à contribuer au règlement des différends relatifs à
l’interprétation et à l’application d’une convention faishant partie inté -
grante du corpus juris cogentis;
ii) se déclarer compétente pour connaître de l’affaire, sur le modèle d’une
cour pénale ou comme une sorte d’homologue des tribunaux adminis -
tratifs français dans un contentieux de pleine juridiction. Il n’ehxiste
pas d’obstacles juridiques à ce que la Cour procède ainsi. Juridiction
de droit commun, elle était habilitée, comme les tribunaux du systhème
judiciaire continental qui ne connaissent pas la stricte séparation ehntre
juridiction pénale et juridiction civile, à examiner la question dhe la
responsabilité pénale individuelle pour génocide comme un aspecht pré -
liminaire de la question de la responsabilité de l’Etat pour géhnocide.
Cette possibilité qu’a la Cour est renforcée, au point de repréhsenter la
solution la plus appropriée du point de vue logique et juridique, parh
505
7 CIJ1077.indb 1007 18/04/16 08:54 505 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
of the dictum of the Court that a State, too, can commit genocide
(2007 Judgment, pp. 113-114, paras. 166-167) ; or,
(iii) to opt for a middle-of-the-road position, limiting itself to the issue of
State responsibility, without entering, at least not directly, into the
area of individual criminal responsibility. Such position is essentiallyh
based on the dichotomy of individual criminal responsibility for the
committed act of genocide/State responsibility, in terms of the gen -
eral rules of responsibility of a State for wrongful acts. The logic of h
dichotomy in concreto implies, or may imply, the establishment of a
jurisprudential connection with the ICTY judgments. Judge Tomka,
in his separate opinion to the 2007 Judgment, outlined the rationale
of this connection in [these] terms:
“The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over the
individual perpetrators of those serious atrocities. Article IX of
the Genocide Convention confers on the Court jurisdiction to
determine whether the Respondent complied with its obligations
under the Genocide Convention. In making this determination in
the present case, the Court was entitled to draw legal conse -
quences from the judgments of the ICTY, particularly those which
dealt with charges of genocide or any of the other acts proscribed
in Article III. Only if the acts of the persons involved in the com-
mission of such crimes were attributable to the Respondent could
its responsibility have been entailed.
The activity of the Court has thus complemented the judicial
activity of the ICTY in fulfilling the Court’s role in the field hof
State responsibility for genocide, over which the ICTY has no
jurisdiction. Hopefully, the activities of these two judicial institu
tions of the United Nations, the Court remaining the principal
judicial organ of the Organization, contribute in their respective
fields to their common objective — the achievement of internatio -
nal justice— however imperfect it may be perceived.” (Ibid., sepa-
rate opinion of Judge Tomka, p. 351, para. 73.)
85. It appears that the Court opted for this third possibility and applied
it both in the Bosnian Genocide case and in the case at hand.
It seems that the reasons underlying the choice of the Court for the
third option are dual — positive and negative.
The main positive reasons could be the following :
— primo, the crime of genocide, due to its specific collective nature,
entails cumulatively the responsibility of individuals and that of the
State;
— secundo, it respects both the competence of the ICTY and the limita -
tions on the judicial activity of the Court, which is, true, relatively h
limited to dealing with international responsibility for genocide ;
506
7 CIJ1077.indb 1008 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 505
son dictum qui veut qu’un Etat puisse lui aussi commettre un génocide
(arrêt de 2007, p. 113-114, par. 166-167) ; ou
iii) opter pour une position médiane en se limitant à la question de lah
responsabilité de l’Etat, sans s’engager, au moins directement,h dans le
domaine de la responsabilité pénale individuelle. Une telle positihon
s’appuie essentiellement sur la dichotomie entre la responsabilitéh
pénale individuelle pour fait de génocide et la responsabilité hde l’Etat
pour fait illicite, telle qu’elle ressort des règles généralhes en ce domaine.
La logique de cette dichotomie implique concrètement, ou pourrait
impliquer, l’établissement d’un lien jurisprudentiel avec les dhécisions
du TPIY. Dans l’opinion individuelle qu’il a annexée à l’harrêt de 2007,
le juge Tomka a justifié un tel lien en ces termes :
«La Cour internationale de Justice, quant à elle, n’a pas com -
pétence à l’égard des personnes ayant commis ces atrocitéhs. L’ar-
ticleIX de la convention sur le génocide lui confère compétence
pour déterminer si le défendeur s’est conformé aux obligatiohns lui
incombant en vertu de cette convention. En se prononçant sur ce
point en la présente affaire, la Cour était fondée à tirer dehs consé-
quences juridiques des décisions du TPIY, en particulier de celles
relatives aux accusations de génocide ou de tout autre acte prohibéh
par l’articleIII. Ce n’était que si les actes des personnes ayant par-
ticipé à la commission de tels crimes étaient attribuables au dhéfen -
deur que sa responsabilité pouvait être engagée.
Le travail de la Cour, laquelle s’est acquittée de sa mission dansh
le domaine de la responsabilité des Etats en matière de génocide,
domaine dans lequel le TPIY n’a pas compétence, est donc venu
compléter l’activité judiciaire de ce dernier. Il est à espéhrer que, si
imparfaits qu’ils puissent paraître, les travaux de ces deux instihtu-
tions judiciaires de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, la Cour
demeurant son organe judiciaire principal, contribueront, dans
leurs domaines respectifs, à leur objectif commun : l’administra -
tion de la justice internationale. » (Ibid., opinion individuelle du
juge Tomka, p. 351, par. 73.)
85. La Cour semble avoir choisi la troisième solution et l’avoir applih -
quée aussi bien en l’affaire Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro
qu’en la présente espèce.
Il semble que les raisons qui sous-tendent ce choix de la troisième solu-
tion soient doubles, à savoir positives et négatives.
Les principales raisons positives seraient celles-ci
— primo , en raison de son caractère collectif spécifique, le crime de
génocide met en cause de façon cumulative la responsabilité desh
individus et celle de l’Etat ;
— secundo , cette solution respecte à la fois la compétence du TPIY et
les limites dans lesquelles s’inscrit l’activité judiciaire de la Chour,
laquelle doit se borner à la responsabilité internationale pour
génocide;
506
7 CIJ1077.indb 1009 18/04/16 08:54 506 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
— tertio , enabling interconnecting international jurisdictions relating to
genocide for the purpose of “[u]nity of substantive law as a remedy
for jurisdictional fragmentation” (E. Cannizzaro, “Interconnecting
International Jurisdictions : A Contribution from the Genocide Deci -
sion of the ICJ”, European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 1, 2007);
— quarto, opening space for “integrating the mandate and methodolo-
gies of international courts” (D. Groome, “Adjudicating Genocide: Is
the International Court of Justice Capable of Judging State Criminal
Responsibility ?”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, 2008,
p. 976).
The negative reasons relate to the capability of the Court, in practicalh
terms, to act as a criminal court and the avoidance of competing jurisdic -
tion with the fellow court — the ICTY.
Although the Court “can and does have much to say on matters of
criminal justice” (K. J. Keith, “The International Court of Justice and
Criminal Justice”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 59,
2010, p. 895), its proper judicial activity in genocide cases calls for institu
tional and methodological accommodation, in particular as regards evi -
dential matters. It appears that the Court considered competing
jurisdiction with the ICTY undesirable, not only because of the problems
of principle regarding competing jurisdiction in the legal environment ohf
the international community which does not know the judicial system
stricto sensu, but also because of the fact that the ICTY was established
by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations.
86. In principle, “interconnection” with a specialized tribunal such ahs
the ICTY can be desirable and productive for the International Court of h
Justice. However, it must not ignore the substantial differences between h
the two bodies and the proper effects deriving from these differences.
The differences are many and range from those of a judicial nature and
concerning the adjudicative function to judicial reasoning.
86.1. The International Court of Justice is a “World Court”, estab -
lished in accordance with a general multilateral treaty as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations.
Although a principal organ of the United Nations, co-existing with the
other principal organs of the world organization on the basis of Articleh 7,
paragraph 1, of the Charter, the International Court of Justice is primarily
the “principal judicial organ” (UN Charter, Art. 92), and “[t]he formula
‘principal judicial organ’ stresses the independent status of the Court in
the sense that it is not subordinate or accountable to any external author -
ity in the exercise of its judicial functions” (S.Rosenne, The Law and Prac‑
tice of the International Court: 1920‑2005, 2006, 4th ed., Vol. I, p. 141).
507
7 CIJ1077.indb 1010 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 506
— troisièmement, elle permet d’établir un lien entre les juridicthions
internationales compétentes en matière de génocide afin de fahire de
« l’unité du droit matériel un remède à la fragmentation dehs juridictio »ns
(E. Cannizzaro, « Interconnecting International Jurisdictions : A
Contribution from the Genocide Decision of the ICJ », European
Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, 2007) ;
— quatrièmement, elle ouvre la possibilité d’« intégrer les mandats et les
méthodes des tribunaux internationaux » (D. Groome, « Adjudicating
Genocide: Is the International Court of Justice Capable of Judging
State Criminal Responsibility?», Fordham International Law Journal,
vol. 31, 2008, p. 976).
Quant aux raisons négatives qui sous -tendent le choix de la troisième
solution, elles tiennent à la capacité pratique de la Cour d’ashsumer les
fonctions d’une cour pénale, et à sa volonté de ne pas faireh double emploi
avec le TPIY.
Bien que la Cour «ait beaucoup à dire sur les questions de justice pénal» e
(K. J. Keith, «The International Court of Justice and Criminal Justice »,
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 59, 2010, p. 895), son
activité judiciaire dans les affaires de génocide, pour être conhduite de façon
appropriée, suppose des aménagements institutionnels et méthodohlogiques,
en particulier en ce qui concerne l’administration de la preuve. Il semble
que la Cour ait considéré qu’une éventuelle concurrence de jhuridiction avec
le TPIY n’était pas souhaitable, non seulement à cause des probhlèmes de
principe que pose ce phénomène dans l’environnement juridique dhe la com -
munauté internationale, qui ne connaît pas de système judiciairhe stricto
sensu , mais aussi parce que le TPIY a été créé par le Conseil de hsécurité en
vertu du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies.
86. En principe, l’établissement d’un « lien» avec une juridiction spé -
cialisée comme le TPIY pourrait être souhaitable et fructueux pourh la
Cour internationale de Justice. Il ne faudrait pas cependant qu’elle hignore
les différences substantielles qui existent entre ces deux organes et les
effets produits par ces différences.
Ces différences sont nombreuses, depuis celles qui sont de nature pro -
prement judiciaire et concernent l’administration de la justice jusqu’à
celles qui tiennent au raisonnement judiciaire.
86.1. La Cour internationale de Justice est une « Cour mondiale» créée
par un traité multilatéral général en qualité d’organeh judiciaire principal
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
Bien qu’elle soit un organe principal de l’Organisation des Nationh Usnies
au même titre que les autres organes principaux de l’organisation mondiale
en vertu du paragraphe 1 de l’article 7 de la Charte, la Cour internationale
de Justice est surtout son «organe judiciaire principal» (Charte, art. 92) et
«l’expression «organe judiciaire principal» souligne l’indépendance statu -
taire de la Cour en ce sens que, dans l’exercice de ses fonctions judhiciaires,
elle n’est subordonnée et n’a de comptes à rendre à aucunhe autorité exté-
rieure » (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court :
1920‑2005, 2006, 4 eéd., vol. I, p. 141).
507
7 CIJ1077.indb 1011 18/04/16 08:54 507 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The ICTY, for its part, is a specialized, criminal tribunal established hby
resolution 827 of the Security Council, whose competence is limited in all
relevant aspects — ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione loci —
representing, basically, an “ad hoc measure” aiming to “contribute to the
restoration and maintenance of peace” (UN Security Council resolu -
tion 827, doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, Preamble) or, promoting the idea
of selective justice versus universal justice as inherent in the very essence
of law and the judiciary. In the light of that fact, the ICTY has, actuahlly,
been established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, which ish
also reflected, inter alia, in its function according to Security Council res -
olution 827 (see para. 86.2 below). It raises the question of its legitimacy,
to which no proper legal answer has been provided to this day. The ICTY h
itself, in the Tadić case, reacting to the argument of the defence that the
tribunal was “not established by law”, as required, inter alia, by the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pointed out that, in
terms of the principle of competence de la competence, it had the inherent
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction (Tadić, IT -94-1, Appeals
Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, paras. 18-19).
The position taken by the Appeals Chamber can hardly be considered
satisfactory, for at least two reasons.
Primo , the principle of competence de la competence is not an omni -
potent principle capable of transforming illegitimacy into legitimacy, ille
gality into legality or vice versa. It is simply a basic functional and h
structural principle inherent in any adjudicatory body, whether a regulahr
court or any other body possessing adjudicatory powers. The principle is,
as pointed out by United States Commissioner Gore in the Betsey case,
“indispensably necessary to the discharge of any . . . duties” for any adju -
dicatory body (J. B. Moore (ed.), International Adjudications, Ancient and
Modern, History and Documents, Modern Series, Vol. IV, p. 183).
As such, the principle of competence de la competence, operating within
the particular judicial structure, is neutral as regards the legitimacy hor
illegitimacy of the adjudicating body.
Secundo , even, if arguendo, the principle of competence de la compe ‑
tence is capable of serving as a basis of legitimacy of the ICTY, the find -
ing of the Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case does not appear sufficient
in that regard in the light of the fundamental principle — nemo iudex in
causa sua. The proper forum for a proper assessment of legitimacy of the
ICTY is the ICJ which, however, avoided explicit pronouncement in that
regard (some other models of judicial review and of UN constitutional
interpretation are also possible, see J. Alvarez, “Nuremberg Revisited :
The Tadić Case”, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, 1996,
p. 250).
86.2. The differences as regards adjudicatory functions between the
ICJ and the ICTY are particularly evident in relation to international
peace and security.
508
7 CIJ1077.indb 1012 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 507
Le TPIY, quant à lui, est une juridiction pénale spécialisée créée par la
résolution 827 du Conseil de sécurité, dotée d’une compétence restrehinte à
tous les points de vue pertinents — ratione materiae, ratione personae et
ratione loci —, qui constitue, au fond, une « mesure spéciale» visant à
«contribuer à la restauration et au maintien de la paix » (Nations Unies,
doc. S/RES/827, 25 mai 1993, préambule) et qui privilégie l’idée d’une justice
sélective plutôt que d’une justice universelle inscrite au cœhur même du droit
et de l’institution judiciaire. Il en ressort que le TPIY a été créé en tant
qu’organe subsidiaire du Conseil de sécurité, ce qui se voit auhssi, notam -
ment, dans le mandat dont l’a chargé le Conseil dans sa résolution827 (voir
par. 86.2 ci-après). Un tel état de choses soulève la question de sa léghitimité,
à laquelle aucune réponse juridique appropriée n’a étéh apportée à ce jour. Le
TPIY lui-même, dans l’affaire Tadić, répondant à l’argument de la défense
selon lequel il n’avait «as été dûment créé par la loi comme l’exige, entre
autres instruments, le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et poli -
tiques, a rappelé que, en vertu du principe de compétence de la cohmpétence,
il était intrinsèquement compétent pour juger de sa propre comphétence
(Tadić, IT-94-1, chambre d’appel, arrêt relatif à l’appel de la défenseh con-cer
nant l’exception préjudicielle de compétence, 2 octobre 1995, par. 18-19).
La position adoptée par la chambre d’appel dans cette affaire n’hest
guère satisfaisante, pour au moins deux raisons.
Premièrement, le principe de « compétence de la compétence » n’est pas
un principe tout-puissant capable de transformer l’illégitimité en légitimité,
l’illégalité en légalité et vice versa. C’est simplement un principe structurel
et fonctionnel fondamental, inhérent à toute institution judiciairhe, qu’il
s’agisse d’une juridiction ordinaire ou de tout autre organe inveshtd i e pou-
voirs juridictionnels. Comme le soulignait le commissaire américain Ghore
dans l’affaire de la Betsey, ce principe est réellement « indispensable aux
fins de l’accomplissement de [l]a mission » de tout organe juridictionnel
(J. B. Moore (dir. publ.), International Adjudications, Ancientand Modern,
History and Documents, Modern Series, vol. IV, p. 183).
En soi, le principe de compétence de la compétence, opérant danhs une
structure judiciaire particulière, est neutre au regard de la légihtimité ou de
l’illégitimité de l’instance de jugement.
Deuxièmement, même si l’on devait concéder, pour les besoins de l’ar -
gumentation, que ce principe pouvait servir de fondement à la légitimité
du TPIY, la conclusion de la chambre d’appel dans l’affaire Tadić ne
semble pas suffisante pour l’emporter sur le principe fondamental
nemo judex in causa sua. Le for auquel devrait revenir le soin d’examiner
la légitimité du TPIY est la CIJ. Or celle-ci s’est abstenue de se prononcer
explicitement sur la question (d’autres modèles de contrôle juhridictionnel
et d’interprétation des textes des Nations Unies sont possibles ; voir à ce
sujet J. Alvarez, « Nuremberg Revisited : The Tadić Case», European
Journal of International Law, vol. 7, 1996, p. 250).
86.2. Les différences entre la CIJ et le TPIY en matière de fonction
juridictionnelle se manifestent tout particulièrement dans le domaineh de la
paix et de la sécurité internationales.
508
7 CIJ1077.indb 1013 18/04/16 08:54 508 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The activity of the ICTY is strongly linked with international peace
and security.
Security Council resolution 827, establishing the ICTY, proceeded
from the qualification that the situation in the territory of the formher
Yugoslavia “constitute[d] a threat to international peace and securithy”
and that the establishment of the Tribunal “would contribute to the rhes-
toration and maintenance of peace” (UN Security Council resolution 827,
doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, Preamble). The Appeals Chamber, in the
Tadić case, concluded that “the establishment of the International Tribu -
nal falls squarely within the powers of the Security Council under Arti ‑
cle 41” (Tadić, IT -94-1, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995,
para. 36 ; emphasis added) (as an aside, such a conclusion could be con -
troversial in light of the provision of Article 41 of the Charter, which
a limine enumerates the powers of the Security Council proving that mea -
sures “may include complete or partial interruption of economic relathions
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of cohm -
munication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”). The conclushion
in Tadić has been substantiated in the Milošević case in which the Trial
Chamber found that the establishment of the International Tribunal “ihs,
in the context of the conflict in the country at that time, pre‑eminently a
measure to restore international peace and security” (Milošević, IT -02-54,
Trial Chamber, Decision on Preliminary Motions of 8 November 2001,
para. 7; emphasis added).
The instrumental nature of the ICTY is not a subjective perception of
the Tribunal itself, but derives from the act by which it has been estabh -
lished. Resolution 827 provides, inter alia, that the establishment of the
Tribunal, “in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia”h, as
“an ad hoc measure by the Council” (UN Security Council resolution 827,
doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993, Preamble). Such perception of the nature
of the Tribunal is also reflected in the timing of the establishment ohf the
Tribunal by the Security Council. May 1993 was the apex of the conflicht
in the former Yugoslavia, so that the establishment of the Tribunal was ha
part of international peace operations backed by the authority and
enforcement power of the Security Council. Therefore, it can be said thaht
“the overall purpose of the tribunals [ICTY and ICTR] coincides with h
other forms of humanitarian intervention with respect to humanitar -
ian concern for victims in conflict-ridden areas. The ICTY’s relation-
ship with peacekeeping forces in Bosnia -Herzegovina during the
Bosnian war indicates a critical juncture of judicial organs with mili -
tary forces.” (H. Shinoda, “Peace-Building by the Rule of Law : An
Examination of Intervention in the Form of International Tribunals”, h
International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 7, 2002.)
509
7 CIJ1077.indb 1014 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 508
L’activité du TPIY est étroitement liée à la paix et àh la sécurité interna-
tionales.
La résolution 827 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité portant créhation du TPIY
reposait sur la constatation que la situation sur le territoire de l-Yougos-
lavie constituait une «menace contre la paix et la sécurité » et que la créa-
tion du Tribunal «contribuerait à la restauration et au maintien de la paix»
(Nations Unies, doc. S/RES/827, 25 mai 1993, préambule). Dans l’affaire
Tadić, la chambre d’appel a conclu que «la création du Tribunal internatio-
nal relève indéniablement des pouvoirs du Conseil de sécurité en▯ vertu de l’ar‑
ticle 41» (Tadić, IT-94-1, chambre d’appel, arrêt relatif à l’appel de la
défense concernant l’exception préjudicielle decompétence, 2 octobre 1995,
par. 36 ; les italiques sont de moi). Soit dit en passant, cette conclusion
pourrait être controversée au vu des dispositions de l’article41 de la Charte
qui énumère a limine les mesures que le Conseil de sécurité peut prendre,
ces mesures comprenant «l’interruption complète ou partielle des relations
économiques et des communications ferroviaires, maritimes, aériennhes,
postales, télégraphiques, radioélectriques et des autres moyensh de commu -
nication, ainsi que la rupture des relations diplomatiques ». La conclusion à
laquelle est parvenue la chambre d’appel dans l’affaire Tadić a été confir-
mée dans l’affaire Milošević lorsque la chambre de première instance s’est
dite d’avis que la création du Tribunal international « constitu[ait] avant
tout, dans le contexte de l’époque et le conflit qui ravageait ahlors le pays,
une mesure destinée à rétablir la paix et la sécurité i▯ rnationales (Miloše ‑
vić, IT-02-54, chambre de première instance, décision relative aux excep -
tions préjudicielles, 8novembre 2001, par. 7; les italiques sont de moi).
Le caractère « utilitaire» du TPIY n’est pas une impression subjective
que l’on pourrait avoir du Tribunal, mais découle de l’instrumehnt même
qui l’a créé. La résolution 827 du Conseil de sécurité prévoit en effet,
entre autres dispositions, « dans les circonstances particulières qui pré -
valent dans l’ex -Yougoslavie, la création d’un tribunal international, en
tant que mesure spéciale prise par [le Conseil de sécurité]» (Nations Unies,
doc. S/RES/827, 25 mai 1993, préambule). Cette impression du caractère
utilitaire du Tribunal est confortée par la date de sa création pahr le
Conseil de sécurité. Au mois de mai 1993, le conflit dans l’ehx-Yougoslavie
battait son plein, en sorte que la création du Tribunal s’est inscrite dans
un ensemble d’opérations de paix reposant sur l’autorité et hles pouvoirs
d’exécution forcée du Conseil de sécurité. On peut donc dhire que
« le dessein général des tribunaux [TPIY et TPIR] coïncide avec
d’autres formes d’intervention humanitaire qui répondent à un souci
humanitaire pour les victimes dans les zones ravagées par le confliht.
Les rapports du TPIY avec les forces de maintien de la paix en
Bosnie -Herzégovine pendant la guerre montrent un accommodement
extraordinaire entre un organe judiciaire et des forces militaires. »
(H. Shinoda, « Peace-Building by the Rule of Law : An Examination
of Intervention in the Form of International Tribunals », Internatio ‑
nal Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 7, 2002.)
509
7 CIJ1077.indb 1015 18/04/16 08:54 509 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
As such, the ICTY essentially represents a “non -military form of inter -
vention by the international community” (International Journal of Peace
Studies , Vol. 7, 2002, p. 15).
Although there exists an indisputable nexus between law and peace, the
instrumental role of the adjudicatory body in the establishment of peace
hardly represents an inherent feature of judicial activity of the court hof
law. At least of the International Court of Justice.
Restoration of peace is pre -eminently a political matter achieved by
way of measures which are stricto sensu non -legal or extra -legal. The
notions of “peace” and “justice” do not necessarily coincideh. More often
than not, peace is achieved by means of unjust solutions. Moreover, law h
can even be an obstacle to the attainment of peace, as is shown by peaceh
treaties. If the rules of the law of treaties were to be respected as rehgards
peace treaties, the peace achieved through peace treaties could not be
legally established because, as a rule, it is based on superiority on thhe
battle -fiel; which is, in terms of the law of treaties, the essential lack of
consent (vice de consentement) .
The international practice
“has developed two principal methods for settling international affairs
and for dealing with international disputes. One is purely political.
The other is legal. There are degrees of shading off between them, and
various processes for the introduction of different types of third-party
settlement. Because of this fundamental difference between the two
approaches of settling international disputes, analogies from one to
the other are false.” (S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the Inter ‑
national Court: 1920‑2005, 2006, 4th ed., pp. 4-5.)
The role of the Court is manifested in its “bolstering of the structuhre of
peace . . . through its advisory opinions, [as well as through judgments]
through the confidence which it inspired, and through the encouragemenht
which it gave to the extension of the law of pacific settlement, rathehr than
through its disposition of particular disputes” (M. Hudson, International
Tribunals : Past and Future , 1944, p. 239).
86.3. It seems understandable that such a position of the Tribunal is
also reflected in its judicial reasoning. In the interpretation of relhevant
legal rules, the Tribunal strongly, even decisively, relies on the respehctive
interpretation of the Security Council and that of the chief administrathive
officer of the world Organization — the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. By reasoning in this way, the Tribunal in fact conducts itself
loyally towards its founder. There can be no objection to that in the lihght
of the circumstances surrounding the establishment and adjudicatory
function of the ICTY, but the question posed is whether such an approachh
fits within the standards of judicial reasoning of the Court.
86.3.1. In the Blaškić case, the Tribunal found the decisive argument
relating to “existing international humanitarian law” in the asserhtions of
510
7 CIJ1077.indb 1016 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 509
En tant que tel, le TPIY constitue essentiellement « une forme non mili-
taire d’intervention de la communauté internationale » ( International
Journal of Peace Studies, vol. 7, 2002, p. 15).
Bien qu’il existe une incontestable corrélation entre le droit et hla paix,
on ne peut pas dire que le rôle que joue un organe juridictionnel danhs le
rétablissement de la paix soit un trait constitutif de l’activitéh judiciaire
d’une cour. Ou du moins de la Cour internationale de Justice.
Le rétablissement de la paix est d’abord et avant tout une entreprhise poli -
tique mettant en œuvre des moyens qui, stricto sensu, sont non judiciaires ou
extrajudiciaires. Les concepts de « paix» et de « justice» ne coïncident pas
nécessairement. Il est loin d’être rare que le retour à la paix s’opère par des
solutions injustes. Qui plus est, le droit peut même être un obstahcle sur le
chemin de la paix, comme le montrent les traités de paix. En effet, sih les
traités de paix devaient respecter les règles du droit des traités, la paix qu’ils
introduisent ne reposerait pas sur des bases légales parce que, en rèhgle géné-
rale, elle découle de la supériorité des armes sur le champ de hbataille ce qui,
en droit des traités, correspond à un vice du consentement.
La pratique internationale
«a mis au point deux grandes méthodes pour traiter les affaires inter-
nationales et régler les différends internationaux. L’une est puhrement
politique. L’autre est juridique. Il existe certes des gradations menant
de l’une à l’autre, ainsi que des procédures permettant d’hintroduire
différents types de règlement par tierce partie. Cependant, du fait de
la différence fondamentale qui existe entre les deux modes de règleh -
ment des différends internationaux, les analogies entre l’un et l’hautre
sont fausses. » (S. Rosenne, The Law ane Practice of the International
Court of Justice : 1920‑2005 , 2006, 4 éd., p. 4-5.)
L’influence dont jouit la Cour s’explique par « la façon dont elle ren -
force l’architecture de la paix … grâce à ses avis consultatifs [et à ses
arrêts], à la confiance qu’elle inspire et à son action auh service du droit du
règlement pacifique des différends, plutôt que par la façonh dont elle a
réglé tel ou tel différend» (M. Hudson, International Tribunals : Past and
Future , 1944, p. 239).
86.3. Il est bien compréhensible, dans ces conditions, que la position
du Tribunal se reflète dans son raisonnement judiciaire. Lorsqu’hil doit
interpréter les règles de droit pertinentes, le Tribunal s’appuhie fermement,
voire résolument, sur les interprétations respectives du Conseil dhe sécurité
et du plus haut fonctionnaire de l’Organisation mondiale, c’est -à-dire le
Secrétaire général des Nations Unies. En conduisant ainsi son rhaisonne -
ment, le Tribunal manifeste sa fidélité à son fondateur. Le fhait est incon-
testable au vu des circonstances qui ont présidé à la créatihon et à la
fonction juridictionnelle du TPIY, mais la question se pose de savoir sih
une telle approche est conforme aux normes de raisonnement judiciaire
suivies par la Cour.
86.3.1. Dans l’affaire Blaškić, c’est dans les assertions du Conseil de
sécurité et du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies que lhe Tribunal a
510
7 CIJ1077.indb 1017 18/04/16 08:54 510 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
the Security Council and the Secretary -General of the United Nations.
The Tribunal stated inter alia :
“It would therefore be wholly unfounded for the Tribunal to now
declare unconstitutional and invalid part of its jurisdiction which the h
Security Council, with the Secretary-General’s assent, has asserted to
be part of existing international humanitarian law.” (Blaškić,
IT-95-14, Trial Chamber, Decision on the defence motion to strike
portions of the amended indictment alleging “failure to punish” lihability
of 4 April 1997, para. 8.)
86.3.2. The Tribunal found that in cases where there is no manifest
contradiction between the Statute of the ICTY and the Report of the Sec ‑
retary‑General “the Secretary-General’s Report ought to be taken to pro -
vide an authoritative interpretation of the Statute” (Tadić, IT -94-1,
Appeal Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 295).
86.3.3. The Tribunal is inclined to attach decisive weight to interpreta -
tive declarations made by Security Council members :
“In addressing Article 3 the Appeals Chamber noted that where
interpretative declarations are made by Security Council members
and are not contested by other delegations ‘they can be regarded as
providing an authoritative interpretation’ of the relevant provisions
of the Statute. Importantly, several permanent members of the Secu -
rity Council commented that they interpret ‘when committed in
armed conflict’ in Article 5 of the Statute to mean ‘during a period of
armed conflict’. These statements were not challenged and can thus,h
in line with the Appeals Chamber Decision, be considered authorita -
tive interpretations of this portion of Article5.” (Tadić, IT-94-1, Trial
Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 631.)
1.1. The need for a balanced and critical approach to the jurisprudence of
the ICTY
87. The presented reasons require a balanced and critical approach to
the jurisprudence of the ICTY as regards genocide. Balanced in the senseh
of a clear distinction between factual and legal findings of the Tribuhnal.
1.1.1. Factual findings of the ICTY
88. The factual findings of the Tribunal are a proper point for the
establishment of interconnection between two international jurisdictionsh
which relate to genocide.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1018 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 510
trouvé l’argument décisif concernant le « droit international humanitaire
existant ». Le Tribunal a notamment conclu :
«Il serait, en conséquence, totalement infondé que le Tribunal
déclare aujourd’hui inconstitutionnelle et invalide une partie de hsa
compétence que le Conseil de sécurité, en accord avec le Secréhtaire
général, a proclamée comme faisant partie du « droit international
humanitaire existant.» ( Blaškić, IT-95-14, Chambre de première ins -
tance, décision de rejet d’une exception préjudicielle soulevéhe par la
défense aux fins de suppression de parties de l’acte d’accusahtion
modifié alléguant la responsabilité pour « manquement à l’obligation
de punir », 4 avril 1997, par. 8.)
86.3.2. Le Tribunal a décidé que, en l’absence de contradiction entre lhe
rapport du Secrétaire général et le Statut, « le Rapport du Secrétaire géné -
ral doit avoir valeur d’interprétation du Statut faisant autorité » (Tadić,
IT-94-1, arrêt d’appel, 15 juillet 1999, par. 295).
86.3.3. Le Tribunal est enclin à accorder un poids décisif aux déclara -
tions interprétatives des membres du Conseil de sécurité :
«Dans son analyse de l’article 3, la Chambre d’appel a remarqué
que, lorsque des Membres du Conseil de sécurité font des déclarha -
tions interprétatives qui ne sont pas contestées par d’autres dhéléga-
tions, « elles peuvent être considérées comme une interprétation
faisant autorité » des dispositions pertinentes du Statut. Point plus
important encore, plusieurs membres permanents du Conseil de
sécurité ont indiqué qu’ils interprètent l’expression h«orsqu’ils ont été
commis au cours d’un conflit armé » à l’article 5 du Statut comme
signifiant « durant une période d’un conflit armé ». Ces déclarations
n’ont pas été contestées et peuvent de ce fait, dans l’eshprit de l’arrêt
de la Chambre d’appel, être considérées comme étant des ihnterpréta-
tions faisant autorité de ce passage de l’article 5.» (Tadić, IT-94-1,
jugement de première instance, 7 mai 1997, par. 631.)
1.1. Nécessité d’une approche équilibrée et critique de la jur▯isprudence du
TPIY
87. Pour les raisons évoquées plus haut, il importe d’avoir une apphroche
équilibrée et critique de la jurisprudence du TPIY en matière dhe génocide.
« Equilibrée» au sens d’une claire distinction entre les conclusions de fait
et de droit auxquelles parvient le Tribunal.
1.1.1. Conclusions de fait du TPIY
88. Les conclusions de fait du Tribunal sont un bon point de départ
pour l’établissement d’un lien entre deux juridictions internathionales qui
ont à connaître d’affaires de génocide.
511
7 CIJ1077.indb 1019 18/04/16 08:54 511 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
The methodology and techniques of a specialized, criminal judicial
body constitute the basis of the high quality of factual findings of thhe
Tribunal. The Court took cognizance of this, having found in the Bosnian
Genocide case that it “should in principle accept as highly persuasive rel -
evant findings of fact made by the Tribunal at trial” (2007 Judgment,
p. 134, para. 223). The heavy reliance on factual findings of the Tribunal
is, moreover, based on a formal, and not a substantive, criterion. This h
clearly derives from the pronouncement that “the Court cannot treat thhe
findings and determinations of the Trial Chamber as being on an equal h
footing with those of the Appeals Chamber. In cases of disagreement, it h
is bound to accord greater weight to what the Appeals Chamber Judg -
ment says” (Judgment, para. 471). In this sense, the position of the Tribu-
nal as regards claims made by the Prosecutor can also be mentioned. The h
Court stated in a robust way that “as a general proposition the incluhsion
of charges in an indictment cannot be given weight” (2007 Judgment,
p. 132, para. 217). The proposition has been mitigated in the present
Judgment by the qualification that “the fact that the ICTY Prosecuthor
has never included a count of genocide in the indictments in cases relating
to Operation Storm does not automatically mean that Serbia’s counter-h
claim must be dismissed” (Judgment, para. 461).
89. Reliance on ICTY factual findings must have precise limits. It can -
not be considered as a formal verification of factual findings of thhe Tribu-
nal nor as a simple rejection based on formal criteria.
Instead of a formal criterion, a substantive one must be applied with a
view to the proper assessment of the factual finding of the Tribunal ihn
accordance with the standards of judicial reasoning of the Court.
In addition to the general reasons which necessitate such an approach
in the case at hand, of relevance could also be an additional reason whihch
relates to the alleged connection between the institution of proceedings
before the Court by Croatia and the treatment of Croatian citizens before
the Tribunal, as claimed by Professor Zimmermann (CR 2014/14, p. 11).
This claim was ultimately left unanswered by Croatia, nor has it been
answered by the ICTY itself, despite it having been made publicly in theh
Court’s Great Hall of Justice.
1.1.2.Legal findings of the ICTY
90. In contrast to factual findings of the ICTY, the treatment of its
legal findings which relate to genocide needs to be essentially differehnt.
The Court should not allow itself to get into the position of a mere verhi -
fier of legal findings of the Tribunal. For, it would thus seriouslyh jeopar-
dize its judicial integrity and, even, the legality of its actions in thhe disputes
regarding the application of the Genocide Convention.
512
7 CIJ1077.indb 1020 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 511
L’éminente qualité des conclusions de fait du Tribunal tient àh ce qu’il
applique les méthodes et les techniques d’une juridiction pénalhe spécialisée.
La Cour en a pris acte, dans l’affaire Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑
Monténégro , ayant conclu« qu’elle doit en principe admettre comme haute -
ment convaincantes les conclusions de fait pertinentes auxquelles est
parvenu le Tribunal en première instance » (arrêt de 2007, p.134, par. 223).
Le recours appuyé de la Cour aux conclusions de fait du Tribunal faith in-ter
venir, de plus, un critère formel et non matériel. Cela ressort clhairement de
l’affirmation de la Cour selon laquelle « [elle] ne saurait placer sur le même
plan les constatations et appréciations de la chambre de première hinstance
et celles de la chambre d’appel ; en cas de divergences, elle ne peut qu’acco-
der un poids prééminent aux énoncés figurant dans l’arrhêt de la chambre
d’appel » (arrêt, par.471). A cet égard, la position de la Cour vis -à-vis des
allégations du procureur mérite également d’être mentionnhée. La Cour a
vigoureusement affirmé que « l’on ne saurait, en règle générale, accorder de
poids au fait que tel ou tel chef figure dans un acte d’accusation» (arrêt de
2007, p. 132, par. 217). Cette affirmation a été quelque peu tempérée dans
l’arrêt en la présente espèce, où la Cour a déclaréh que «le fait que le procu-
reur du TPIY n’ait jamais inclus dans ses actes d’accusation, dansh les
affaires en rapport avec l’opération «Tempête», le chef de génocide, n’a pas
automatiquement pour effet de vouer à l’échec la demande reconvehntion-
nelle de la Serbie» (arrêt, par. 461).
89. Le renvoi aux conclusions de fait du TPIY doit avoir des limites
précises. Il ne doit pas passer pour une confirmation formelle de ches conc -lu
sions ni pour un simple rejet fondé sur l’application de critèrhes formels.
Plutôt que des critères formels, ce sont des critères matérihels qui doi -
vent être appliqués pour apprécier les conclusions de fait du Thribunal co-r
rectement et en conformité avec les normes de la Cour en matière dhe
raisonnement judiciaire.
Au -delà des raisons générales qui rendent nécessaire en l’espèce une
approche équilibrée et critique des conclusions de fait du TPIY, ihl en est
une autre qui a été signalée à l’audience par le professehur Zimmermann
(CR 2014/14, p. 11) et qui est le rapport allégué entre l’introduction par
la Croatie d’une instance devant la Cour et le procès de certains hcitoyens
croates qui se déroulait alors au Tribunal. Ni la Croatie ni le TPIY hn’ont
répondu à cette allégation, alors même qu’elle avait été faite publique -
ment dans la grande salle de justice.
1.1.2. Conclusions de droit du TPIY
90. Contrairement aux conclusions de fait du TPIY, ses conclusions de
droit en matière de génocide doivent subir de la part de la Cour un traite -
ment entièrement différent. La Cour ne doit pas se laisser réduire à la
position de simple chambre d’enregistrement des conclusions de droit du
Tribunal, sous peine de compromettre gravement son intégrité judichiaire,
voire la légalité de ses décisions dans les différends relatihfs à l’application
de la convention sur le génocide.
512
7 CIJ1077.indb 1021 18/04/16 08:54 512 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
A number of cogent considerations necessitate a critical approach to
the legal findings of the Tribunal.
90.1. In dealing with the disputes relating to genocide on the basis of
Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the Court is bound to apply only
the provisions of the Convention as the relevant substantive law. In thaht
regard, the Judgment states expressis verbis :
“since Article IX provides for jurisdiction only with regard to ‘the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention, includ -
ing . . . the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the
other acts enumerated in Article III’, the jurisdiction of the Court does
not extend to allegations of violations of the customary international
law on genocide. It is, of course, well established that the Convention
enshrines principles that also form part of customary international
law. Article I provides that ‘[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a
crime under international law’. The Court has also repeatedly stated h
that the Convention embodies principles that are part of customary
international law. That was emphasized by the Court in its 1951 Advi -
sory Opinion . . .
That statement was reaffirmed by the Court in Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp.110-111, para.161).” (Judgment, para.87 ;
emphasis added.)
The position of the ICTY as regards applicable substantive law seems
different.
In its judgment in the Krstić case, which served as the basis for the
Court’s conclusion that genocide was committed in Srebrenica, the Trihal
Chamber stated that it “must interpret Article 4 of the Statute taking into
account the state of customary international law at the time the events in
Srebrenica took place” (Krstić, IT -98-33, Trial Chamber, Judgment,
2 August 2001, para. 541 ; emphasis added).
The Trial Chamber referred to a variety of sources in order to arrive ath
the definition of genocide that it applied :
“The Trial Chamber first referred to the codification work under -
taken by international bodies. The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide . . . whose provisions Article 4
adopts verbatim, constitutes the main reference source in this respect.
Although the Convention was adopted during the same period that
the term ‘genocide’ itself was coined, the Convention has been viehwed
as codifying a norm of international law long recognized and which
case law would soon elevate to the level of a peremptory norm of
general international law (jus cogens). The Trial Chamber has inter -
preted the Convention pursuant to the general rules of interpretation
of treaties laid down in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
513
7 CIJ1077.indb 1022 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 512
Un certain nombre de puissantes considérations imposent d’adopter h
une approche critique des conclusions de droit du Tribunal.
90.1. Lorsqu’elle statue sur des différends en matière de génocide sur la
base de l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide, la Cour n’applique
que les dispositions de ladite Convention, lesquelles constituent le drohit
matériel pertinent. Sur ce point, l’arrêt déclare expresséhment :
«puisque la compétence prévue par l’article IX est limitée à «l’inter
prétation, l’application ou l’exécution de la … Convention, y com -
pris… à la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière de génocideh ou de l’un
quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l’article III », elle ne s’étend
pas aux allégations concernant la violation du droit international cou▯ tu
mier en matière de génocide. Bien entendu, il est constant que la
Convention consacre des principes qui font également partie du droit
international coutumier. Ainsi, l’article premier dispose que « [l]es
Parties contractantes confirment que le génocide, qu’il soit comhmis en
temps de paix ou en temps de guerre, est un crime du droit des gens ».
La Cour a elle-même rappelé maintes fois que la Convention énonçait
des principes appartenant au droit international coutumier. C’est ce
qu’elle a souligné dans son avis consultatif de 1951…
La Cour a repris cet énoncé dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu hen
l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et
la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑
Monténégro) ( arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 110-111, par. 161). »
(Arrêt, par. 87; les italiques sont de moi.)
Le TPIY ne semble pas avoir la même position en ce qui concerne le
droit matériel applicable.
Dans son jugement en l’affaire Krstić, sur lequel la Cour s’est appuyée
pour conclure qu’un génocide avait été commis à Srebrenicha, la chambre
de première instance a déclaré qu’elle « [devait] interpréter l’article 4 du
Statut en prenant en compte l’état du droit international coutumier à
l’époque des événements de Srebrenica » (Krstić, IT-98-33, chambre de pre -
mière instance, jugement, 2 août 2001, par. 541; les italiques sont de moi).
Pour parvenir à la définition du génocide qu’elle a appliqhuée, la
chambre de première instance a puisé à plusieurs sources :
« La Chambre s’est appuyée en premier lieu sur les travaux de codi -
fication effectués dans le cadre d’instances internationales. La Conven -
tion sur la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide … dont
les dispositions sont reprises textuellement à l’article 4 du Statut,
constitue de ce point de vue la principale source. Bien que son adop -
tion soit contemporaine de la création du terme de « génocide», la
Convention est considérée comme la codification d’une norme dhe
droit international bien établie, que la jurisprudence allait rapidement
élever au rang de norme impérative du droit international général(jus
cogens). La Chambre de première instance a interprété la Convention
conformément aux règles générales d’interprétation desh traités énon -
513
7 CIJ1077.indb 1023 18/04/16 08:54 513 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
on the Law of Treaties. As a result, the Chamber took into account
the object and purpose of the Convention in addition to the ordinary
meaning of the terms in its provisions. As a supplementary means of
interpretation, the Trial Chamber also consulted the preparatory
work and the circumstances which gave rise to the Convention. Fur -
thermore, the Trial Chamber considered the international case law on
the crime of genocide, in particular, that developed by the ICTR. The
Report of the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Draft
Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind received par-
ticular attention. Although the report was completed in 1996, it is the h
product of several years of reflection by the Commission whose pur -
pose was to codify international law, notably on genocide: it therefore
constitutes a particularly relevant source for interpretation of Arti -
cle 4. The work of other international committees, especially the
reports of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities of the UN Commission on Human Rights,
was also reviewed. Furthermore, the Chamber gave consideration to
the work done in producing the Rome Statute on the establishment
of an international criminal court, specifically, the finalized drafht text
of the elements of crimes completed by the Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court in July 2000. Although that doc-
ument post -dates the acts involved here, it has proved helpful in
assessing the state of customary international law which the Chamber
itself derived from other sources. In this regard, it should be noted
that all the States attending the conference, whether signatories of theh
Rome Statute or not, were eligible to be represented on the Prepara -
tory Commission. From this perspective, the document is a useful key
to theopinio juris of the States. Finally, the Trial Chamber also looked
for guidance in the legislation and practice of States, especially their
judicial interpretations and decisions.” (Krstić, IT-98-33, Trial Cham-
ber, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 541; footnotes omitted.)
90.2. It appears that the fact that Article 4 of the ICTY Statute ad ver‑
batim reproduces Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention does not
automatically mean that the law of genocide as contemplated by the
ICTY Statute is equivalent to the law of genocide established by the Conh -
vention. Article 4 of the Statute is but a provision of the Statute, which is
itself a unilateral act of one of the political organs of the United Nathions.
As such, the provision cannot change its nature simply by reproducing
the text of ArticlesII and III of the Convention, without any renvoi to the
Genocide Convention. Consequently, interpretation of Article 4 of the
Statute on the basis inter alia of the travaux preparatoires of the Conven -
tion, on which the ICTY amply draws, is essentially misleading. It reflhects
the difference in judicial reasoning between the ICJ and the ICTY (see, h
para. 86.3 above).
514
7 CIJ1077.indb 1024 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 513
cées aux articles 31 et 32 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des
traités. La Chambre a donc tenu compte non seulement du sens ordi-
naire des termes qui y étaient employés, mais aussi de l’objet het du but
de la Convention. Elle a, de surcroît, pris en considération les thravaux
préparatoires et les circonstances qui ont présidé à son éhlaboration.
La Chambre a par ailleurs tenu compte de la jurisprudence interna -
tionale relative au crime de génocide, en particulier de celle du TPIhR.
Elle a porté une attention particulière au rapport de la Commission
du droit international («CDI») sur le projet de code des crimes contre
la paix et la sécurité de l’humanité. Quoique achevé en 1h996, ce rap-
port est le fruit de plusieurs années d’un travail de réflexihon mené par
la Commission dont le but était de codifier le droit international,h
notamment en matière de génocide: c’est dès lors une source particu-
lièrement utile pour l’interprétation de l’article 4 du Statut. Ont éga -
lement été pris en compte les travaux d’autres comités interhnationaux,
comme les rapports de la sous -commission de la lutte contre les
mesures discriminatoires et de la protection des minorités (Commis -
sion des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies). La Chambre a, en
outre, analysé les travaux effectués dans le cadre de l’élabohration du
Statut de Rome relatif à la création d’une cour pénale interhnationale
et, en particulier, la version définitive du projet d’élémhents des crimes
rédigé par la Commission préparatoire de la Cour pénale intehrnatio-
nale en juillet 2000. Bien que postérieur aux faits qui nous occupenth
ici, ce document s’est révélé d’une certaine utilité phour évaluer l’état
du droit international coutumier, que la Chambre avait elle -même
dégagé des autres sources. Il convient de noter à cet égard hque tous les
Etats participant à la conférence, qu’ils soient signataires ouh non du
Traité, pouvaient être représentés au sein de la Commission hprépara -
toire. Ce document est de ce point de vue bien utile pour connaître
l’opinio juris des Etats. Enfin, la chambre s’est aussi inspirée de la
législation et de la pratique des Etats, et notamment des interpréhta -
tions et décisions judiciaires.» (Krstić, IT-98-33, chambre de première
instance, jugement, 2 août 2001, par.541; notes de bas de page omises).
90.2. Le fait que l’article du Statut du TPIY reproduise textuellement
les articles II et III de la convention sur le génocide ne signifie pas auto -
matiquement que le droit en matière de génocide tel qu’il ressohrt du Sta-
tut du TPIY soit le même que celui qu’a établi la Convention. L’article 4
du Statut n’est qu’une disposition du Statut, qui lui -même est un acte
unilatéral de l’un des organes politiques des Nations Unies. Cetteh disposi -
tion ne peut pas changer de nature du seul fait qu’elle reproduit le htexte
des articles II et III de la convention sur le génocide, sans aucun renvoi à
ladite Convention. Il s’ensuit qu’une interprétation de l’arhticle4 du Statut
du TPIY, qui se fonde, entre autres, sur les travaux préparatoires deh la
Convention, dont s’inspire largement le TPIY, est pour l’essentiel falla -
cieuse. On trouve là un exemple de la différence en matière de rhaisonne -
ment judiciaire qui existe entre la CIJ et le TPIY (voir supra par. 86.3).
514
7 CIJ1077.indb 1025 18/04/16 08:54 514 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
90.2.1. The interpretation of relevant provisions of the Convention
can, however, be one thing and the application of these provisions quiteh
another. Thus, the interpretation provided in paragraphs 87 and 88 of the
Judgment appears to be in discrepancy with the positions of the Court inh
the Bosnian Genocide case, which, as the first case alleging acts of geno -
cide dealt with by the International Court of Justice, represents some short
of a judicial parameter in genocide cases before the Court.
In the Bosnian Genocide case, conclusio of the Court that genocide was
committed in Srebrenica was based on the ICTY judgment in the Krstić
case, (2007 Judgment, pp. 163-166, paras. 292-297) which was decided by
the ICTY on the basis of “customary international law at the time theh
events in Srebrenica took place” (Krstić, IT -98-33, Trial Chamber, Judg -
ment, 2 August 2001, para. 541).
91. In connection with “customary law of genocide”, two legal ques -
tions are posed which, due to their specific weight, transcend the quehstion
of customary law of genocide, affecting the very understanding of cus -
tom, as one of the main sources of international law, and the relationshhip
between the Genocide Convention and customary law emerging, or which
could merge, following the adoption of the Convention.
91.1. The ICTY perception of custom as a source of international law
is highly innovative, going well beyond the understanding of custom in
the jurisprudence of the ICJ.
According to the well settled jurisprudence of the ICJ, which follows
the provision of its Statute referring to “international custom, as ehvidence
of a general practice accepted as law” (Art. 38, para. 1 (b)), custom is
designed as a source based on two elements : general practice and opinio
iuri sive necessitatis. As it pointed out in the Nicaragua case : “[b]ound as
it is by Article 38 of its Statute . . . the Court may not disregard the essen‑
tial role played by general practice” (Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 97-98, para. 184; emphasis added).
The jurisprudence of the ICTY generally moves precisely in the oppo-
site direction, giving the predominant role to opinio juris in the determina-
tion of custom (G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc
Tribunals, 2005, p. 13, fn. 4) and, thus, showing a strong inclination
towards the single element conception of custom !
In doing so, it considers opinio juris in a manner far removed from its
determination by the Court. For, in order “to constitute the opinio
juris . . . two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned
amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried hout
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendehred
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it” (North Sea Conti ‑
nental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark ; Federal Republic of
515
7 CIJ1077.indb 1026 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 514
90.2.1. Cela dit, interpréter les dispositions pertinentes de la Conven -
tion et les appliquer peuvent être deux choses fort différentes. Ainsi, l’in -
terprétation fournie aux paragraphes 87 et 88 de l’arrêt semble s’écarter
des positions de la Cour dans l’affaire Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑
et‑Monténégro qui, en sa qualité de première affaire alléguant des actes de
génocide en laquelle la Cour ait statué, constitue une sorte de réhférence
judiciaire pour les affaires de génocide portées devant elle.
Dans cette affaire, la conclusion de la Cour voulant qu’un génocideh ait
été commis à Srebrenica s’appuyait sur le jugement du TPIY ehn l’affaire
Krstić (arrêt de 2007, p. 163-166, par. 292-297), dans laquelle le TPIY a
statué « en prenant en compte l’état du droit international coutumier à
l’époque des événements de Srebrenica » (Krstić, IT-98-33, chambre de
première instance, jugement, 2 août 2001, par. 541).
91. Au sujet du « droit international coutumier du génocide », deux
questions de droit se posent qui, en raison de leur poids spécifiquhe,
dépassent leur sujet propre et concernent à la fois le sens de la coutume en
tant que l’une des principales sources du droit international et la rhelation
entre la convention sur le génocide et le droit coutumier émergent, ou qui
pourrait émerger, après l’adoption de la Convention.
91.1. L’idée que se fait le TPIY de la coutume comme source du droit
international est tout à fait inédite et va bien au -delà de la conception de
la coutume dans la jurisprudence de la CIJ.
Selon la jurisprudence constante de la CIJ, qui se conforme à la dispo -
sition de son Statut évoquant « la coutume internationale comme preuve
d’une pratique générale, acceptée comme étant le droit » (art. 38, par. 1,
al. b)), la coutume est reconnue comme source de droit à partir de deux
éléments : la pratique générale et l’ opinio juris sive necessitatis. Comme
elle l’a fait observer dans l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires
au Nicaragua et contre celui‑ci : «La Cour, à laquelle l’article 38 du Statut
prescrit entre autres d’appliquer la coutume internationale « comme
preuve d’une pratique générale acceptée comme étant le drhoit », ne peut
ignorer le rôle essentiel d’une pratique générale. » (Activités militaires et
paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua c. Etats‑Unis
d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 97-98, par. 184 ; les ita
liques sont de moi.)
Or la jurisprudence du TPIY va dans le sens exactement opposé en
accordant un rôle dominant à l’ opinio juris dans la détermination de la
coutume (G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals,
2005, p. 13, note 4), manifestant ainsi une forte propension à s’appuyer
sur un seul des deux éléments de la coutume.
En cela, le TPIY appréhende l’opinio juris d’une façon entièrement diffé -
rente de celle de la Cour. Celle -ci considère en effet que, pour constituer
l’opinio juris, «deux conditions doivent être remplies. Non seulement les
actes considérés doivent représenter une pratique constante, mahis en outre
ils doivent témoigner, par leur nature ou la manière dont ils sonth accomplis,
de la conviction que cette pratique est rendue obligatoire par l’exishtence
d’une règle de droit. » (Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (République
515
7 CIJ1077.indb 1027 18/04/16 08:54 515 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 44, para. 77).
Opinio juris cannot be divorced from practice because “[t]he Court must
satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opiniojuris of States is
confirmed by practice” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 98, para. 184).
The ICTY has often satisfied itself with “extremely limited case law”
and State practice (A. Nollkaemper, “The Legitimacy of International
Law in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for -
mer Yugoslavia” in : T. A. J. A. Vandamme and J. H. Reestman (eds.),
Ambiguity in the Rule of Law : The Interface between National and Inter ‑
national Legal Systems, 2001, p. 17).
A large part of law qualified by the ICTY as customary law is based onh
decisions of municipal courts (A. Nollkaemper, “Decisions of National
Courts as Sources of International Law : An Analysis of the Practice of
the ICTY” in G. Boas and W. A. Schabas (eds.), International Criminal
Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY, 2003, p. 282) which are
of a limited scope in the jurisprudence of the Court (H. Thirlway, The
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice : Fifty Years of
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 2013, p. 248). In the case concerning Certain Ger ‑
man Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court stated that
national judicial acts represent “facts which express the will and cohnsti -
tute the activities of States” (Merits, Judgment No. 7, 1926, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 7, p. 19).
91.2. Hidden under the surface of the general characteristic of the
ICTY’s approach to customary law, which is dubious per se, is incoher-
ence and subjectivism. It has been well noted that differently -composed
Chambers of the ICTY have utilized different methods for identifying
and interpreting customary law, even in the same case, including simply h
referring to previous ICTY decisions themselves as evidence of a custom -
ary rule (N. Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International
Law : Methods of Interpreting the Concept of Custom in International
Criminal Tribunals, 2014, p. 117). In addition, the ICTY has failed to con-
sistently and rigorously address the concepts of State practice and
opinio juris by, inter alia, failing to refer to evidence of either, referring
merely to the bulk existence of national legislation as evidencing custohm
without addressing opinio juris or framing policy or “humanity” related
rationales as opinio juris (ibid., p. 118).
92. The establishment of customary law in the ICTY resembles in
many aspects a quasi-customary law exercise based on deductive reason -
ing driven by meta -legal and extra -legal principles. As can be perceived
“many a Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals have been too ready to brand
norms as customary, without giving any reason or citing any authority
for that conclusion” (G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc
Tribunals, 2005, p. 15). This has resulted in judicial law -making through
purposive, adventurous interpretation (M. Swart, “Judicial Law-Making
516
7 CIJ1077.indb 1028 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 515
fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark ; République fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays ‑
Bas), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969 , p. 44, par. 77.) L’opiniojuris ne saurait être
séparée de la pratique parce que « [l]a Cour doit s’assurer que l’existence de
la règle dans l’opiniojuris des Etats est confirmée par la pratique Activités
militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua▯
c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p.98, par. 184).
Le TPIY s’est souvent contenté d’une jurisprudence et d’une hpratique
des Etats « extrêmement limitées » (A. Nollkaemper, « The Legitimacy of
International Law in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribu -
nal for the former Yugoslavia », dans T. A. J. A. Vandamme et
J. H. Reestman (dir. publ.), Ambiguity in the Rule of Law : The Interface
between National and International Legal Systems , 2001, p. 17).
Une grande partie du droit qualifié de coutumier par le TPIY est fohndé
sur des décisions de tribunaux nationaux (A. Nollkaemper, « Decisions of
National Courts as Sources of International Law : An Analysis of the
Practice of the ICTY », dans G. Boas et W. A. Schabas (dir. publ.), Inter ‑
national Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY, 2003,
p. 282), qui n’ont qu’une influence limitée sur la jurisprudenche de la Cour
(H. Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Jus ‑
tice: Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, vol. I, 2013, p. 248). Dans l’affaire rela-
tive à Certains intérêts allemands en Haute‑Silésie polonaise, la Cour
permanente de Justice internationale a déclaré que les décisionhs judiciaires
« sont de simples faits, manifestations de la volonté et de l’activihté des
o
Etats » (fond, arrêt nº 7, 1926, C.P.J.I. série A n 7, p. 19).
91.2. Dissimulées sous l’approche générale du droit coutumier suivhie
par le TPIY, qui est déjà douteuse en soi, l’incohérence et hla subjectivité
abondent. Il est bien connu que des chambres du TPIY de composition
différente ont utilisé des méthodes différentes pour identifiher et interpréter
le droit coutumier, allant dans certains cas jusqu’à citer des déhcisions
antérieures du TPIY lui -même comme preuves de l’existence d’une règle
coutumière (N. Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary Internatio ‑
nal Law : Methods of Interpreting the Concept of Custom in International
Criminal Tribunals, 2014, p. 117). Qui plus est, le TPIY s’est dispensé
d’appliquer de façon cohérente et rigoureuse les concepts de prhatique des
Etats et d’opinio juris, notamment en s’abstenant de citer des exemples de
l’une ou de l’autre, préférant évoquer en bloc les législations nationales en
vigueur comme preuve de la coutume sans se poser la question de l’opi ‑
nio juris, ou en déguisant des raisons politiques ou humanitaires en opi‑
nio juris (ibid., p. 118).
92. La formation du droit coutumier au TPIY ressemble à bien des
points de vue à un exercice de droit quasi coutumier basé sur un raisonne-
ment déductif guidé par des principes méta- et extrajuridiques.h On a ainsi
pu écrire que « de nombreuses chambres des tribunaux spéciaux ne se sont
montrées que trop disposées à qualifier certaines normes de choutumières
sans donner aucune raison ni citer aucune autorité à l’appui deh cette qua-li
fication » (G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals,
2005, p. 15). Il en est résulté un «gouvernement des juges» à force d’inter-
516
7 CIJ1077.indb 1029 18/04/16 08:54 516 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
at the Ad Hoc Tribunals : The Creative Use of Sources of International
Law and ‘Adventurous Interpretation’”, Heidelberg Journal of Interna ‑
tional Law, Vol. 70, 2010, pp. 463-468, 475-478), although, according to
the Secretary-General, on the establishment of the ICTY, the judges of the
Tribunal could apply only those laws that were beyond doubt part of cus-
tomary international law (UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary ‑
General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council resolution 808 (1993),
United Nations doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 34).Being in substantial
conflict with custom, as perceived by the ICJ, the ICTY perception of h
custom, applied in its jurisprudence, opens the way to a fragmentation ohf
international criminal law and, even, general international law (see
G. Mettraux, op. cit., p. 15 citing Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem ‑
ocratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002,
p. 3).
93. It is customary law to which is usually attributed the dynamic
capacity in the development of treaty law, both as regards the scope of h
the established obligation and as regards its content. The question of
modification of the substantive rules of the Convention in the form ofh
custom is, as a rule, a neglected question although it seems to be of
far-reaching importance.
Is custom capable of modifying a rule which belongs to corpus juris
cogentis?
Given the inherent characteristics of customary law, on the one hand,
and legal force of the rules of corpus juris cogentis, on the other, the
answer to this question is necessarily negative.
The other side of the flexibility of custom, as a positive characterishtic
from the aspect of the creation of peremptory norms, is the fact that cuhs -
tomary rules, as a rule, come into existence slowly and painstakingly.
This fact, besides the vagueness and imprecision of custom, is a big hanhd -
icap in relation to an international treaty, in particular at a time of hrapid
and all -embracing changes in the overall set of relations regulated by
international law. In the words of Friedmann, “custom is too clumsy ahnd
slow moving a criterion to accommodate the evolution of international
law in our time” (W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International
Law, 1964, p. 122).
Precisely because of this, the advantages of custom as a source of existh-
ing peremptory norms of general international law represent, at the sameh
time, and in certain cases, also a difficulty, if not an obstacle, to thhe for -
mulation of new peremptory norms or the modification of those already h
in existence.
94. Namely, the very mechanism of the creation of an international
customary rule by way of permanent, continual repetition of certain
behaviour, coupled with the opinio juris, is certainly not in full harmony
with the status enjoyed by the peremptory norm of general international h
law; in particular in relation to consequences inherent in such a norm in
relation to contrary acts undertaken by a State or a group of States. Thhe
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1030 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 516
prétations téléologiques et aventureuses (M. Swart, « Judicial Law -Making
at the Ad Hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of Sources of International
Law and «Adventurous Interpretation»», Heidelberg Journal of Internatio‑
nal Law, vol. 70, 2010, p. 463-468, 475-478), alors même que, dans son rap-
port préalable à la création du TPIY, le Secrétaire généhral disait que les
juges du TPIY ne pourraient appliquer que des règles « qui faisaient partie
sans aucun doute possible du droit international coutumier » (Conseil de
sécurité,Rapport du Secrétaire général établi conformément au parag ▯ raphe2
de la résolution 808 (1993) du Conseil de sécurité, Nations Unies, doc.
S/25704, 3 mai 1993, par. 34). Dès lors qu’elle est matériellement en conflit
avec la coutume selon la CIJ, la coutume selon le TPIY, telle qu’elleh informe
sa jurisprudence, ouvre la voie à une fragmentation du droit internathional
pénal, voire du droit international général (voir G. Mettraux, op.cit., p. 15,
où l’auteur cite l’affaire relative au Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (Répu ‑
blique démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p.3).
93. C’est au droit coutumier qu’on attribue généralement le rôle le plus
dynamique dans le développement du droit conventionnel, tant en ce quhi
concerne la portée des obligations qu’il établit qu’en ce quhi concerne leur
teneur. La question d’une modification éventuelle des règles hmatérielles de
la Convention par la coutume a été généralement négligéhe, bien qu’elle
présente une importance considérable.
La coutume est -elle en mesure de modifier une règle qui appartient au
corpus juris cogentis?
Les caractéristiques propres du droit coutumier, d’un côté, et la force
juridique des règles du corpus juris cogentis , de l’autre, dictent la réponse
à cette question, qui est nécessairement négative.
La souplesse de la coutume, qui est une caractéristique favorable du
point de vue de la création de normes péremptoires, s’accompagnhe d’un
inconvénient, qui est qu’en général les règles coutumièhres ne prennent
forme que lentement et laborieusement. S’ajoutant au flou et à
l’imprécision de la coutume, cette lenteur constitue un lourd handhicap
dans le jeu global des relations réglementées par le droit internahtional.
Pour citer Friedmann, « la coutume est un critère trop approximatif et
trop lent pour accompagner l’évolution du droit international de nhotre
temps» (W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law,
1964, p. 122).
C’est précisément pour cette raison que les avantages de la couhtume
comme source de certaines normes péremptoires de droit international h
général sont en même temps et dans certains cas un inconvénihent, sinon
un obstacle, lorsqu’il s’agit de formuler de nouvelles normes péhremptoires
ou de modifier des normes existantes.
94. Ainsi, le mécanisme même de création d’une règle coutumière inter -
nationale par la répétition constante et continue d’un certain hcomporte -
ment, confirmée par l’opinio juris, ne permet pas d’atteindre le statut
reconnu à la norme impérative du droit international généralh ; en particu-
lier du point de vue des conséquences qu’entraînent nécessairement les
actes contraires à une norme péremptoire commis par un Etat ou un
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customary rule implies certain regularity as a characteristic of particular
forms of behaviour which constitute the being of the material element ofh
custom ; a regularity on the basis of which the subjects of international
law perceive this practice as an expression of the obligatory rule of con -
duct. On the other hand, such regularity should have overall scope, that
is, it must be included, directly or indirectly, in the practice of the hover -
whelming majority of member countries of the international community.
In view of the fact that the custom came into being diffusely, general
practice is achieved through the accumulation of varied individual and
common behaviours and acts (see Special Rapporteur M. Wood, “Second
report on identification of customary international law”, International
Law Commission, doc. A/CN.4/672, 22 May 2014).
However, it follows from the character of a norm of jus cogens that all
acts which are contrary to it are null and void ab initio. In other words,
such practice does not possess legal validity ; therefore it cannot represent
a regular form of the coming into existence of a norm of jus cogens super‑
veniens in the matter which is already covered by the cogent régime.
95. The inherent incapability of custom to modify the existing rule of
jus cogens has been diagnosed in a subtle way by the International Law
Commission. In the commentary to Draft Article 50 (Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), the Commission, having foundh
that “it would be clearly wrong to regard even rules of juscogens as immu -
table and incapable of modification. . .”, concludes that “a modification of
a rule ofjus cogens would today most probably be effected through a general
multilateral treaty. . .(United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
“Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, Adopted by hthe
International Law Commission at Its Eighteenth Session”, First and Sehcond
Sessions, Vienna, 26 March-24 May 1968 and 9April-22 May 1969, Official
Records, Documents of the Conference, p.68, para. 4; emphasis added).
Only “instant custom” would possess the proper capacity for modifica -
tion of an existing jus cogens rule, a conception of custom that has not
become part of positive law.
96. The perception of customary law developed by the ICTY is highly
destructive as regards the normative integrity of international law. Beihng
essentially a subjective perception of customary law divorced from its dheeply
rooted structure which derives from the Statute of the Court as part of the
internationalordre public , actually a judicial claim of custom contradictory
not only per se but also in se, it generates diversity in the determination of
customary law, including the rules of juscogens of a customary nature.
97. It can be qualified as the most serious challenge to the construction h
of customary law in the recent history of international law. Reducing
“general practice” to isolated judgments of national courts or, evhen, to
statements in the United Nations Security Council and derivingopinio juris
from these acts, or, going even further, simply asserting that a certainh rule
is of a customary nature, not only contradicts the positive -legal concep -
tion of custom reflected in the jurisprudence of the Court, but also thrivia-l
518
7 CIJ1077.indb 1032 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 517
groupe d’Etats. D’un côté, la règle coutumière a pour caractéristique la
régularité de certains comportements particuliers qui constituent hl’élément
matériel de la coutume ; une régularité telle que les sujets de droit interna-
tional acquièrent la conviction que cette pratique est l’expressiohn d’une
règle de conduite obligatoire. De l’autre, cette régularité hdevrait avoir une
portée universelle, c’est-à-dire qu’elle devrait faire partie, directement ou
indirectement, de la pratique de la très grande majorité des Etatsh qui com -
posent la communauté internationale. Du fait que la coutume se forme de
façon diffuse, une pratique aussi générale ne se constitue que phar l’accu -
mulation de toute sorte d’actes et de comportements individuels et cohm -
muns (voir M. Wood, Rapporteur spécial de la Commission du droit
international, «Deuxième rapport sur la détermination du droit interna -
tional coutumier », Nations Unies, doc. A/CN.4/672, 22 mai 2014).
Or la norme de jus cogens a pour caractéristique que tout acte qui y
contrevient est nul et non avenu ab initio. En d’autres termes, une telle
pratique n’a aucune validité juridique ; elle ne saurait par conséquent
constituer une forme régulière de création d’une norme de jus cogens
superveniens dans un domaine déjà couvert par un régime de jus cogens.
95. La Commission du droit international a subtilement diagnostiqué
l’impuissance naturelle de la coutume à modifier une règle deh jus cogens
dans son commentaire de l’article 50 du projet de convention de Vienne
sur le droit des traités (qui sera l’article 53 du texte final). Elle constate en
effet que « ce serait une erreur de considérer les normes de jus cogens
elles-mêmes comme immuables et non susceptibles de modification » et
conclut qu’« actuellement une modification d’une règle impérative s’effec‑
tuerait probablement par voie de traité multilatéral général » (Annuaire de
la Commission du droit international , 1966, volume II, « Projet d’articles
sur le droit des traités et commentaires, adopté par la Commissionh du
droit international à sa dix-huitième session », p. 270, par. 4; les italiques
sont de moi).
Seule une « coutume instantanée » serait apte à modifier une règle de
juscogens; or une telle conception de la coutume ne fait pas encore partie
du droit positif.
96. La conception du droit coutumier selon le TPIY est très dangereuse
pour l’intégrité normative du droit international. Conception phour l’essentiel
subjective, coupée des racines profondes du droit coutumier qui plonghent
dans le Statut de la Cour en tant qu’il fait partie de l’ordre public internatio
nal, mainmise judiciaire sur la coutume, contradictoire non seulement per se
mais aussi in se, elle est source de fragmentation dans la détermination du
droit coutumier, y compris les règles de juscogens de caractère coutumier.
97. On peut à bon droit voir dans cette idée la menace la plus grave dhe
l’histoire récente du droit international contre la formation du dhroit cou -
tumier. Réduire la « pratique générale» à des arrêts isolés de cours natio -
nales, voire à des déclarations du Conseil de sécurité, et dhériver
l’pinio juris de ces actes, ou, allant encore plus loin, se contenter d’affir -
mer que telle ou telle règle a un caractère coutumier, non seulemehnt
contredit la conception de la coutume en droit positif telle qu’elle hressort
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1033 18/04/16 08:54 518 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
izes the will of the international community as a whole as the basis of h
obligations in international law, in particular obligations of a customahry
nature. In sum, the ICTY’s perception of customary law as a demonstrah-
tion of judicial fundamentalism would seem to incarnate Lauterpacht’sh
metaphor of custom as a metaphysical joke (H. Lauterpacht, “Sover -
eignty over Submarine Areas”, British Yearbook of International Law,
Vol. 27, 1950, p. 394).
The dangers of the ICTY’s perception of customary law can hardly be
overestimated. The effects of such a perception are not limited to the juhd-i
cial activity of the ICTY and other ad hoc bodies. For a number of rea-
sons, including, inter alia, the inclination to deductive reasoning based on
meta -legal and, even, extra -legal considerations, not even the Court is
immune to such perception.
98. Furthermore, the pronouncement of the Court that a customary
law of genocide existed before the adoption of the Genocide Convention ihs
unclear (see Judgment, paras. 87 and 88). The arguments on which relies
the conclusio of the Court are not excessively persuasive. The arguments of
the Court are basically : (i) that it is “well established that the Convention
enshrines principles that also form part of customary international law”h;
and (ii) that Article I provides that “the Contracting Parties confirm that
genocide . . . is a crime under international law” (Judgment, para. 87).
98.1. As far as the first argument is concerned, it is, in fact, a strong
assertion which lacks precision and proper evidence. In its 1951 Advisory
Opinion, the Court rightly found “denial of the right of existence ofh entire
human groups”, which is genus proximum of genocide, contrary “to moral
law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations” (Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23; emphasis added). It appears
that, in the opinion of the Court, “the principles underlying the Conhven -
tion are principles which are recognized by civilized nations . . .”, in
essence, “most elementary principles of morality” (ibid.).
Apart from the question as to whether there is equivalency between
legal principles stricto sensu and “moral law” or the “most elementary
principles of morality”, it appears that the latter are the guiding phrinciples
for the creation of legal rules on genocide, rather than legal rules perh se.
The term “customary law on genocide” necessarily implies only rulehs or
rules and principles. Principles, no matter how fundamental they can be,h
cannot per se constitute any law whatsoever, including in respect of the
law on genocide. Or, at least, not operational law or law in force.
98.2. The second argument is based on the meaning of the word “con -
firm”. As it is only possible to confirm something that exists, thhe Geno -
cide Convention would express the already constituted law of genocide
or, in a technical sense, it would represent codification of customaryh law
of genocide.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1034 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 518
de la jurisprudence de la Cour, mais encore banalise la volonté de lah com -
munauté internationale tout entière en tant que source d’obligahtions de
droit international, et en particulier d’obligations à caractèrhe coutumier.
En somme, la conception du droit coutumier selon le TPIY, véritable
manifestation d’intégrisme judiciaire, semble incarner la métaphhore de
Lauterpacht qui fait de la coutume une blague métaphysique (H. Lauter -
pacht, «Sovereignty over Submarine Areas», British Yearbook of Interna‑
tional Law, vol. 27, 1950, p. 394).
On ne saurait surestimer les dangers de cette conception du droit inter -
national selon le TPIY, car ses effets ne se limitent pas à l’activhité judi -
ciaire de ce tribunal et d’autres organes ad hoc. Pour plusieurs raisons,
notamment une propension au raisonnement déductif basé sur des conhsi-
dérations métajuridiques, voire extrajuridiques, la Cour elle -même n’est
pas entièrement à l’abri d’une telle conception.
98. De surcroît, l’assertion de la Cour voulant qu’un droit coutumiher
en matière de génocide ait existé avant l’adoption de la Conhvention est
incertaine (arrêt, par. 87 et 88). Les arguments sur lesquels repose sa
conclusio ne sont pas excessivement convaincants. Ce sont pour l’essentiel
les suivants : i) « il est constant que la Convention consacre des principes
qui font également partie du droit international coutumier »; et ii) « l’ar
ticle premier dispose que « [l]es Parties contractantes confirment que le
génocide … est un crime du droit des gens » (arrêt, par.87).
98.1. Le premier argument n’est en fait qu’une vigoureuse assertion qui h
manque de précision et de preuves. Dans son opinion juridique de 1951h,
la Cour a conclu à juste titre que «le refus du droit à l’existence de groupes
humains entiers », qui est cousin du génocide, « est contraire à la fois à la
loi morale et à l’esprit et aux fins des Nations Unies» (Réserves à la conven ‑
tion pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, ▯avis consulta ‑
tif, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 23; les italiques sont de moi). Il semble que,
selon la Cour, « les principes qui sont à la base de la Convention sont des
principes reconnus par les nations civilisées », à savoir essentiellement
«les principes de morale les plus élémentaires » (ibid.).
Au-delà de la question de savoir s’il y a équivalence entre, d’une part,
les principes juridiques stricto sensu et, d’autre part, « la loi morale » et
«les principes de morale les plus élémentaires », il semble que la création
des règles juridiques applicables au génocide se soit guidée suhr ces der -
niers plutôt que sur des règles proprement juridiques. Or l’exphression
«droit coutumier en matière de génocide » implique nécessairement et
exclusivement des règles ou des règles et des principes. Des princhipes, si
fondamentaux qu’ils soient, ne peuvent pas constituer un droit, y comhpris
un droit en matière de génocide. Ou, à tout le moins, un droit hopération -
nel ou produisant des effets juridiques.
98.2. Le deuxième argument se fonde sur le sens du mot « confirme».
Comme on ne peut confirmer que quelque chose qui existe, la conventionh
sur le génocide exprimerait un «droit en matière de génocide» déjà consti-
tué ou, d’un point de vue technique, représenterait la codifihcation d’un
droit coutumier préexistant en matière de génocide.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1035 18/04/16 08:54 519 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
However, there may be a different interpretation. For, it seems that the h
subject of “confirmation” is something else and not customary law of
genocide.
On 11 December 1946, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
resolution 96 (I) on the Crime of Genocide which, inter alia:
“Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the
civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals
and accomplices — whether private individuals, public officials or
statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial,
political or any other grounds — are punishable” (emphasis added).
The Preamble of the Genocide Convention states, inter alia, that “the
Contracting Parties, having considered the declaration made by the Gen -
eral Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated
11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law”
(emphasis added).
It could be said that the relation between resolution 96 (I) and the
Genocide Convention is the embryo of the two -phase legislative activity
which tractu temporis turned into a model for the creation of general mul -
tilateral treaty regimes in United Nations practice (exempli causa, Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, 13 December 1963 ; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon h
and Other Celestial Bodies 1967 ; General Assembly resolution 217 (III),
A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 ; Interna -
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 ; International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966). In this model,
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, adopted unani -
mously or by the overwhelming majority, declare the general principles
relating to the particular subject, these principles become part of intehrna-
tional public policy, and are finally transformed into binding legal rhules in
the form of general international treaty, thus constituting what has beehn
referred to by Judge Alvarez as “international legislation” (Reservations
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, dissenting opinion
of Judge Alvarez, p. 49).
99. If, arguendo, customary law of genocide existed before the adoption
of the Genocide Convention, it is unclear on what practice, in particulahr
general practice, it was based? The Court did not indicate any evidence of
the corresponding practice before the adoption of the Convention.
Moreover, the question may be posed why the corresponding practice,
if it was constituted, was not respected by the Nuremberg and the Tokyo h
520
7 CIJ1077.indb 1036 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 519
Il peut cependant exister une autre interprétation, parce qu’il semble
que l’objet de la « confirmation» soit autre chose que le droit coutumier
en matière de génocide.
Le 11 décembre1946, l’Assemblée générale des NationsUnies a adopté sa
résolution 96(I) relative au crime de génocide qui, entre autres dispositions,
«[a]ffirme quele génocide est un crime de droit des gens que le monde
civilisé condamne, et pour lequel les auteurs principaux et leurs comh -
plices, qu’ils soient des personnes privées, des fonctionnaires ouh des
hommes d’Etat, doivent être punis, qu’ils agissent pour des raihsons
raciales, religieuses, politiques ou pour d’autres motifs » (les italiques
sont de moi).
On peut lire dans le préambule de la convention sur le génocide que
« [l]es Parties contractantes, [c]onsidérant que l’Assemblée géhnérale de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, par sa résolution 96 (I) en date
du 11 décembre 1946, a déclaré que le génocide est un crime du droit des
gens » (les italiques sont de moi).
Il semble que la relation entre la résolution 96 (I) et la convention sur
le génocide soit l’embryon d’un modèle d’activité normhative en deux
étapes qui, avec le passage du temps, est devenu un mode de créatihon
privilégié de traités multilatéraux généraux dans la phratique des
Nations Unies (résolution 1962 (XVIII) du 13 décembre 1963 de l’Assem -
blée générale, Déclaration des principes juridiques régishsant les activités
des Etats en matière d’exploration et d’utilisation de l’esphace extra-atmos-
phérique ; Traité sur les principes régissant les activités des Etats enh
matière d’exploration et d’utilisation de l’espace extra -atmosphérique, y
compris la lune et les autres corps célestes, de 1967 ; la résolution 217 (III)
du 10 décembre 1948 de l’Assemblée générale, Déclaration universelle desh
droits de l’homme ; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et poli -
tiques de 1966; Pacte international relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux
et culturels de 1966). Selon ce modèle, une résolution de l’Assemblée
générale des Nations Unies adoptée à l’unanimité ou à une très large
majorité porte déclaration de principes généraux applicablesh à un domaine
particulier, ces principes deviennent partie intégrante de la politiqhue
publique internationale, puis sont convertis en règles juridiques conhtrai -
gnantes sous la forme d’un traité international général, conhstituant ainsi
ce que le juge Alvarez a pu appeler « la législation internationale »
(Réserves à la convention pour la prévention et la répression▯ du crime de
génocide, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, opinion dissidente du juge
Alvarez, p. 49).
99. A supposer, pour les besoins de l’argumentation, qu’un droit coutuh -
mier en matière de génocide ait existé avant l’adoption de lha convention
sur le génocide, on voit mal sur quelle pratique, et plus particulièhrement
sur quelle pratique générale, il était fondé. La Cour ne donhne aucun élé -
ment attestant une pratique pertinente avant l’adoption de la Conventhion.
De plus, si cette pratique pertinente avait existé, on peut se demandher
pourquoi elle n’a pas été respectée par les tribunaux de Nurhemberg et de
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1037 18/04/16 08:54 520 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Tribunals which were established precisely at the time when that practiche
must have been constituted ?
Does the thesis that customary law of genocide existed before the adop-
tion of the Convention suggest that the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribu-
nals were unaware of/it or did they, perhaps, intentionally ignore it ?
1.2. Compromising effects on the Court’s jurisprudence on genocide
100. Uncritical acceptance of the legal findings of the ICTY, essentially
its verification, could result in compromising the determination of the
relevant rules of the Genocide Convention by the Court.
There exists a reason of an objective nature which produces, or may
produce, a difference between the law of genocide embodied in the Geno -
cide Convention and the law of genocide applied by the ad hoc tribunals.
The law applied by the ICTY as regards the crime of genocide cannot
be considered equivalent to the law of genocide established by the Con -
vention. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the ICTY can be said to beh a
progressive development of the law of genocide enshrined in the Conven -
tion, rather than its actual application. Article 4 of the ICTY Statute is
but a provision of the Statute as a unilateral act of one of the main polit -
ical organs of the fact that it does not contain any renvoi to the Genocide
Convention, the provision cannot change its nature simply by reproduc -
ing the text of Article II of the Convention.
101. It is not surprising therefore that in the jurisprudence of the Court
as regards the law on genocide there exist a discrepancy between the
interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention expressing as
a rule the letter of the Convention, and its application based on in toto
acceptance of the ICTY’s decision, that goes in the other direction.
I shall give two examples that concern the crucial provisions of the
Convention.
102. The first example relates to the nature of the destruction of the
protected group.
The Court notes that, in the light of the travaux préparatoires, the
scope of the Convention is limited to the physical and biological destruc -
tion of the group (Judgment, para. 136). The finding is consistently imple-
mented in the Judgment as a whole.
Exempli causa the Court considers that,
“in the context of Article II, and in particular of its chapeau and in
light of the Convention’s object and purpose, the ordinary meaning
of ‘serious’ is that the bodily or mental harm referred to in subphara-
graph (b) of that Article must be such as to contribute to the physi -
cal or biological destruction of the group . . .” (ibid., para. 157, see
also paras. 160, 163).
521
7 CIJ1077.indb 1038 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 520
Tokyo qui ont été créés précisément à un moment oùh cette pratique est
censée avoir été constituée.
La thèse voulant qu’un droit coutumier en matière de génocide ait
existé avant l’adoption de la Convention a -t-elle pour corollaire que les
tribunaux de Nuremberg et de Tokyo n’en étaient pas conscients, à moins
qu’ils n’aient peut-être choisi délibérément de l’ignorer ?
1.2. Des effets compromettants sur la jurisprudence de la Cour en matière ▯
de génocide
100. Accepter sans les critiquer les conclusions juridiques du TPIY,
c’est-à-dire en fait les confirmer, risque de compromettre la déterminationh
par la Cour des règles pertinentes de la convention sur le génocidhe.
Il existe une raison objective qui introduit ou peut introduire une dif -
férence entre le droit en matière de génocide incarné dans lha convention
sur le génocide et le droit en matière de génocide appliqué hpar les deux
tribunaux ad hoc.
Le droit appliqué par le TPIY en matière de génocide ne sauraith être
assimilé au droit en matière de génocide établi par la Convehntion. En fait,
la jurisprudence du TPIY constitue un développement progressif du drohit
en matière de génocide incarné dans la Convention, plutôt que l’applica -
tion de ce droit. L’article 4 du Statut du TPIY n’est qu’une disposition
d’un texte qui résulte d’un acte unilatéral de l’un des phrincipaux organes
des Nations Unies. En l’absence de tout renvoi à la convention sur le
génocide, cette disposition ne saurait changer de nature du simple fahit
qu’elle reproduit le libellé de l’article II de la Convention.
101. On ne sera donc pas surpris de trouver dans la jurisprudence de la
Cour, en ce qui concerne le droit en matière de génocide, un écart entre
l’interprétation des dispositions pertinentes de la Convention, qui s’en
tient en règle générale à la lettre de ladite Convention, eth l’application de
ces dispositions, qui est basée sur une acceptation in toto de la décision du
TPIY, laquelle va pourtant en sens contraire.
J’en donnerai deux exemples qui ont trait à des dispositions crucihales
de la Convention.
102. Le premier exemple concerne la définition de la notion de destruc -
tion du groupe protégé.
La Cour constate que, d’après les travaux préparatoires de la Chonven-
tion, le champ d’application de celle -ci est limité à la destruction physique
ou biologique du groupe (arrêt, par. 136). Cette constatation est dûment
respectée dans l’ensemble de l’arrêt.
Ainsi, la Cour se dit d’avis que,
« dans le contexte de l’article II, en particulier son chapeau, et à la
lumière de l’objet et du but de la Convention, le sens ordinaire dhu
terme « grave» est que l’atteinte à l’intégrité physique ou mentaleh
visée par le litt. b)de l’article II doit être telle qu’elle contribue à la
destruction physique ou biologique du groupe… » ( ibid., par. 157,
voir aussi les par. 160 et 163).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1039 18/04/16 08:54 521 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
103. However, “destruction” as applied by ICTY in the Krstić and
Blagojević cases, is a destruction in social terms rather than in physical
and biological terms.
In the Krstić case the Trial Chamber found, inter alia, that the destruc-
tion of a sizeable number of military aged men “would inevitably resuhlt in
the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebren-
ica” (Krstić, IT -98-33, Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 595), since
“their spouses are unable to remarry and, consequently, to have new chhi-l
dren” (ibid., Appeal Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 28). Such a conclu -
sion, reflects rather the idea of a social destruction, rather than a hphysical
or biological one.
The perception of destruction in social terms is even more emphasized
in the Blagojević case. The Trial Chamber applied “[a] broader notion of
the term ‘destroy’, encompassing also ‘acts which may fall shorht of caus -
ing death’” (Blagojević and Jokić, IT -02-60, Trial Judgment, 17 January
2005, para. 662), an interpretation which does not fit with the under -
standing of destruction in terms of the Genocide Convention. In that
sense, the Trial Chamber finds support in the judgment of the Federal h
Constitutional Court of Germany, which held expressis verbis that
“the statutory definition of genocide defends a supra -individual object
of legal protection, i.e., the social existence of the group [and that] the
intent to destroy the group . . . extends beyond physical and biolog -
ical extermination . . . The text of the law does not therefore compel
the interpretation that the culprit’s intent must be to exterminate
physically at least a substantial number of members of the group.”
(Ibid., para. 664; emphasis and ellipses in original.)
Thus perceived, “the term ‘destruction’, in the genocide defihnition can
encompass the forcible transfer of population” ( ibid., para. 665).
104. The finding contradicts the dictum of the Court that “deportation
or displacement of the members of a group, even effected by force, is noth
necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruch -
tion an automatic consequence of the displacement” (2007 Judgment,
para. 190).
Those findings of the ICTY served as a basis for the conclusio of the
Court that genocide was committed in Srebrenica (ibid., paras. 296-297).
In addition, fortunately, the subjective character of destruction in a
sociological sense is clearly shown precisely by the case of Srebrenica.h
One of the key arguments of the Tribunal in the Krstić case and the
Blagojević case was that “destruction of a sizeable number of military
aged men would inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the
522
7 CIJ1077.indb 1040 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 521
103. Or la « destruction» dont parle le TPIY dans les affaires Krstić et
Blagojević s’entend d’une destruction en termes sociaux plutôt que phy -
siques ou biologiques.
Dans l’affaire Krstić, la chambre de première instance a conclu, entre
autres, que la destruction d’un nombre important d’hommes en âge de
porter les armes « entraîner[ait] inévitablement la disparition physique de
la population musulmane de Bosnie à Srebrenica » (Krstić, IT-98-33, juge -
ment de première instance, 2 août 2001, par. 595), puisque «leurs épouses
ne [seraient] pas en mesure de se remarier et donc d’avoir d’autrehs
enfants» (ibid., arrêt d’appel, 19 avril 2004, par. 28). Une telle conclusion
exprime l’idée d’une destruction sociale plutôt que physiqueh ou biolo -
gique.
Cette conception d’une destruction qui serait d’ordre social est ehncore
plus évidente dans l’’affaire Blagojević. La chambre de première instance
a appliqué « une interprétation plus large du terme « détruire» qui inclu-
rait des actes « dont la commission n’a pas entraîné la mort de la vic -
time »» (Blagojević et Jokić, IT -02-60, jugement de première instance,
17 janvier 2005, par. 662 ; les guillemets sont dans l’original) ; or une telle
interprétation ne cadre pas avec le sens du terme « détruire» utilisé dans
la convention sur le génocide. C’est pourquoi la chambre de premièhre ins -
tance s’appuie sur un arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle fédéhrale alle -
mande aux termes duquel
«la définition juridique du génocide défend l’idée d’hune protection
juridique qui, par -delà l’individu, s’étend à l’existence sociale du
groupe [et que] l’intention de détruire le groupe … va au-delà de l’ex-
termination physique et biologique… Par conséquent, le texte de loi
n’implique pas que l’intention du coupable soit d’exterminer phhysi -
quement au moins une partie importante des membres du groupe. »
(Ibid., par. 664; les italiques et les points de suspension sont dans
l’original.)
Selon cette interprétation, « le terme « détruire» figurant dans la défini-
tion du génocide peut s’étendre au transfert forcé d’une hpopulation »
(ibid., par. 665).
104. La conclusion du Tribunal contredit donc le dictum de la Cour
selon lequel « la déportation ou le déplacement de membres appartenant
à un groupe, même par la force, n’équivaut pas nécessairehment à la des -
truction dudit groupe, et une telle destruction ne résulte pas non plhus
automatiquement du déplacement forcé » (arrêt de 2007, par. 190).
C’est sur ces conclusions du TPIY que s’est appuyée la Cour pouhr
conclure que des actes de génocide avaient été commis à Srebhrenica (ibid.,
par. 296-297).
Il convient d’ajouter, et il faut s’en féliciter, que le cas deh Srebrenica
illustre parfaitement le caractère subjectif de la destruction entendue dans un
sens sociologique. L’un des principaux arguments du TPIY dans les affahires
Krstić et Blagojević était en effet que la destruction d’un nombre important
d’hommes en âge de porter les armes «entraîner[ait] inévitablement la dispa -
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1041 18/04/16 08:54 522 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica” ( Krstić, IT-98-33, Trial Judg -
ment, 2 August 2001, para. 595).
Life, however, proved the Tribunal’s prediction wrong. Following the
conclusion of the Dayton Agreement, the Muslim community in Srebren -
ica was reconstituted, so that today the number of the members of the
two communities — the Muslim and the Serbian — is equalized. This is
also evidenced by the fact that a representative of the Muslim communityh
was elected Mayor at the last elections.
105. The other example relates to the relevance of customary law on
genocide in disputes before the Court based on Article IX of the Geno -
cide Convention.
In the present Judgment, the Court devoted considerable attention to
the customary law on genocide and made proper conclusions in clear and
unequivocal terms.
The Court stated in strong words that
“[t]hefact that the jurisdiction of the Court in the present proceedings
can be founded only upon Article IX has important implications for
the scope of that jurisdiction. That Article provides for jurisdiction
only with regard to disputes relating to the interpretation, applicationh
or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention, including disputes relating
to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other achts
enumerated in Article III of the Convention.” (Judgment, para. 85.)
The statement is supported by the following reasoning :
“any jurisdiction which the Court possesses is derived from ArticleIX
of the Genocide Convention and is therefore confined to obligations
arising under the Convention itself. Where a treaty states an obligationh
which also exists under customary international law, the treaty obli -
gation and the customary law obligation remain separate and distinct
(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nica ‑
ragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1986, p. 96, para. 179). Accordingly, unless a treaty discloses a differ-
ent intention, the fact that the treaty embodies a rule of customary
international law will not mean that the compromissory clause of the
treaty enables disputes regarding the customary law obligation to be
brought before the Court. In the case of Article IX of the Genocide
Convention no such intention is discernible. On the contrary, the text
is quite clear that the jurisdiction for which it provides is confined to
disputes regarding the interpretation, application or fulfilment of thhe
Convention, including disputes relating to the responsibility of a Stateh
for genocide or other acts prohibited by the Convention. Article IX
does not afford a basis on which the Court can exercise jurisdiction
over a dispute concerning alleged violation of the customary interna -
tional law obligations regarding genocide.” (Judgment, para. 88.)
523
7 CIJ1077.indb 1042 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 522
rition physique de la population musulmane de Bosnie à Srebrenica »
(Krstić, IT-98-33, jugement de première instance, 2août 2001, par. 595)
La vie, cependant, a démenti la prédiction du Tribunal. Après lha signa-
ture de l’Accord de Dayton, la communauté musulmane de Srebrenica ha
été reconstituée, si bien qu’aujourd’hui les deux communautés — serbe et
musulmane — sont numériquement égales. Une autre preuve de la recons-
titution de la communauté musulmane réside dans le fait qu’un rheprésen-
tant de cette communauté a été élu maire de Srebrenica aux dhernières
élections municipales.
105. Le deuxième exemple concerne la pertinence du droit coutumier
en matière de génocide pour les différends portés devant la Chour sur le
fondement de l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide.
Dans le présent arrêt, la Cour a examiné de près le droit cohutumier en
matière de génocide et tiré de cet examen de justes conclusionsh exprimées
clairement et sans ambiguïté.
La Cour a fermement déclaré que
« [l]e fait que la compétence de la Cour en l’espèce repose excluhsive -
ment sur l’article IX a une incidence importante sur son étendue. La
compétence prévue par cette disposition est limitée aux difféhrends
relatifs à l’interprétation, l’application ou l’exécution de la conven -
tion sur le génocide, y compris ceux relatifs à la responsabilitéh d’un
Etat pour génocide ou l’un quelconque des autres actes énuméhrés à
l’articleIII.» (Arrêt, par. 85.)
Cette déclaration s’appuie sur le raisonnement suivant :
« la compétence de la Cour repose exclusivement sur l’article IX de la
convention sur le génocide et est en conséquence limitée aux obhliga-
tions imposées par la Convention elle -même. Lorsqu’un traité énonce
une obligation qui existe également en droit international coutumier,
l’obligation résultant du traité et celle du droit coutumier demeurent
distinctes (Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre
celui‑ci (Nicaragua c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1986, p. 96, par. 179). En conséquence, à moins que le traité
ne fasse apparaître une intention différente, le fait que ce derniehr
sanctionne une règle du droit international coutumier ne signifie phas
que la clause compromissoire qu’il contient permette de porter
devant la Cour les différends concernant l’obligation existant en
droit coutumier. S’agissant de l’article IX de la convention sur le
génocide, on ne discerne aucune intention à cet effet. Au contraire,
son libellé indique clairement que la compétence qu’il prévohit est
limitée aux différends concernant l’interprétation, l’applhication ou
l’exécution de la Convention, y compris ceux relatifs à la resphonsabi -
lité d’un Etat pour génocide ou tout autre acte prohibé par hla
Convention. Il n’offre aucun fondement permettant à la Cour de
connaître d’un différend portant sur la violation supposée dehs oblig-a
tions qu’impose le droit international coutumier en matière de géno -
cide.» (Arrêt, par. 88.)
523
7 CIJ1077.indb 1043 18/04/16 08:54 523 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
It should be noted that the position of the Court in that regard was
couched in a similar, although more general, way, in the Bosnian Geno‑
cide case.
The Court stated that : “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court in this case is
based solely on Article IX of the Convention” (2007 Judgment, p. 104,
para. 147).
True, the Court continued :
“The jurisdiction of the Court is founded on Article IX of the Con -
vention, and the disputes subject to that jurisdiction are those ‘relhat-
ing to the interpretation, application or fulfilment’ of the Convenhtion,
but it does not follow that the Convention stands alone. In order to
determine whether the Respondent breached its obligation under the
Convention, as claimed by the Applicant, and, if a breach was com -
mitted, to determine its legal consequences, the Court will have
recourse not only to the Convention itself, but also to the rules of
general international law on treaty interpretation and on responsibil-
ity of States for internationally wrongful acts.” (Ibid., p. 105,
para. 149.)
However, it seems clear that the rules of general international law on
treaty interpretation, for its object in concreto, can have only the Geno -
cide Convention itself. These rules, as rules of interpretation of the Con-
vention, cannot introduce through the back door customary law on
genocide as applicable substantive law. As far as the rules on the respohn-
sibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, things seem to be h
equally clear. For, being essentially the secondary rules, the rules on hthe
responsibility of States are “incapable” of modifying the substanche of the
primary rules contained within the Genocide Convention.
106. However, the ICTY’s Judgment in the Krstić case was based, as
the Tribunal stated expressis verbis, on “customary international law at
the time the events in Srebrenica took place” (Krstić, IT -98-33, Trial
Chamber, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 541).
It appears that the Court, having found that it “sees no reason to dihs -
agree with the concordant findings of the Trial Chamber and the Appealhs
Chamber” (2007 Judgment, p. 166, para. 296) in the Krstić and the
Blagojević cases, has, in light of its pronouncement in paragraphs 87 and
88 of the Judgment, exceeded its jurisdiction, since Article IX confers
jurisdiction only with respect to the “interpretation, application or fulfil -
ment of the Convention . . . [and] the jurisdiction of the Court does not
extend to allegations of violation of the customary international law on
genocide” (Judgment, para. 87 ; emphasis added) so that “Article IX does
not afford a basis on which the Court can exercise jurisdiction over a dis ‑
pute concerning alleged violation of the customary international law obl▯iga ‑
tions regarding genocide” (ibid., para. 88; emphasis added).
524
7 CIJ1077.indb 1044 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 523
Il convient de noter que la position de la Cour en l’espèce étahit exprimée
en termes similaires, bien que plus généraux, dans l’affaire Bosnie‑
Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro.
La Cour déclarait alors que « [l]a compétence de la Cour en l’espèce
n’est fondée que sur l’article IX de la Convention » (arrêt de 2007, p. 104,
par. 147).
Certes, la Cour poursuivait ainsi :
«Que la Cour tire sa compétence de l’article IX de la Convention
et que les différends qui relèvent de cette compétence portent shur
«l’interprétation, l’application ou l’exécution » de la Convention n’a
pas nécessairement pour conséquence que seule doive entrer en lignhe
de compte cette Convention. Afin de déterminer si, comme le sou -
tient le demandeur, le défendeur a violé l’obligation qu’il htient de la
Convention et, s’il y a eu violation, d’en déterminer les conséhquences
juridiques, la Cour fera appel non seulement à la Convention propre-
ment dite, mais aussi aux règles du droit international généralh qui
régissent l’interprétation des traités et la responsabilitéh de l’Etat pour
fait internationalement illicite.» (bid., p. 105, par. 149.)
Cependant, il semble clair que les règles du droit international géhnéral
qui régissent l’interprétation des traités ne peuvent avoir hpour objet in
concreto que la convention sur le génocide elle -même. Ces règles, en tant
que règles régissant l’interprétation de la Convention, ne shauraient intro -
duire par la bande le droit coutumier en matière de génocide dans hle droit
matériel applicable en l’espèce. La situation semble tout aussih claire en ce
qui concerne les règles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat pour fahit internatio-
nalement illicite. Comme il s’agit de règles essentiellement seconhdaires,
ellessont impuissantes à modifier la nature des règles primaires énoncées
dans la convention sur le génocide.
106. Or, le jugement du TPIY en l’affaire Krstić était fondé, comme le
Tribunal l’a déclaré textuellement, sur « l’état du droit international cou -
tumier à l’époque des événements de Srebrenica » ( Krstić, IT -98-33,
chambre de première instance, jugement, 2 août 2001, par. 541).
Il appert donc que la Cour, ayant conclu qu’elle « ne vo[yait] pas de
raison de s’écarter des conclusions concordantes de la chambre de hpre -
mière instance et de la chambre d’appel » dans les affaires Krstić et
Blagojević (arrêt de 2007, p. 166, par. 296), a outrepassé sa compétence, à
en juger par ce qu’elle dit aux paragraphes 87 et 88 du présent arrêt,
puisque l’article IX lui confère compétence exclusivement pour ce qui
concerne « l’interprétation, l’application ou l’exécution de la Convhention »
et que cette compétence « ne s’étend pas aux allégations concernant la
violation du droit international coutumier en matière de génocide »
(arrêt, par. 87; les italiques sont de moi), si bien que l’articleIX « n’offre
aucun fondement permettant à la Cour de connaître d’un différend portant
sur la violation supposée des obligations qu’impose le droit inter▯natio ‑
nal coutumier en matière de génocide » (ibid., par. 88; les italiques sont de
moi).
524
7 CIJ1077.indb 1045 18/04/16 08:54 524 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
2. Was Genocide Committed in Croatia ?
107. The essence of the crime of genocide lies in destruction, in whole
or in part, of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such.
108. A genocidal act can exist only under conditions defined by the
body of law established by the Convention. Acts enumerated in Article II,
in subparagraphs (a) to (e), are not genocidal acts in themselves, but
only the physical or material expression of specific, genocidal intenth. In
the absence of a direct nexus with genocidal intent, acts enumerated in
Article II of the Convention are simply punishable acts falling within the
purview of other crimes, exempli causa war crimes or crimes against
humanity.
109. Genocide as a distinct crime is characterized by the subjective ele -
ment — intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial and religious group
as such — an element which represents the differentia specifica distin -
guishing genocide from other international crimes with which it shares
substantially the same objective element 41. In the absence of that intent,
whatever the degree of atrocity of an act and however similar it might bhe
to the acts referred to in the Convention, that act can still not be calhled
genocide. (Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I,
Sixth Committee, 69th meeting.)
110. It appears that four elements are distinguishable within genocidal
intent: (a) the degree of the intent ; (b) destruction ; (c) a national, eth-
nical, racial or religious group ; (d) in whole or in part. Although sepa -
rate, the four elements make up a legal whole characterizing in their
cumulative effect, genocidal intent as the subjective element of the crimhe
of genocide. The absence of any of them disqualifies the intent from bheing
genocidal in nature. As a legal unity, these elements, taken in corpore,
demonstrate that genocidal intent is not merely something added to phys -
ical acts capable of destroying a group of people. It is an integral, pehrme-
ating quality of these acts taken individually, a quality that transforms
them from simple punishable acts into genocidal acts. In other words,
such intent is a qualitative feature of genocide distinguishing it from hall
other crimes, indeed its constituent element stricto sensu.
The ICTR followed the same pattern of reasoning as that described
above.
In the Kanyarukiga case, the Trial Chamber stated, inter alia, that
“[t]o support a conviction for genocide, the bodily or mental harm
inflicted on members of a protected group must be of such a serious
nature as to threaten the destruction of the group in whole or in part”h
(Kanyarukiga, ICTR-02-78-T, Trial Judgment, 1 November 2010,
p. 158, para. 637 ; see also Ndahimana, ICTR-01-68-T, Trial Judg -
ment, 30 December 2011, p. 173, para. 805).
525
7 CIJ1077.indb 1046 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 524
2. Un génocide a‑t‑il été commis en Croatie ?
107. L’essencedu crime de génocide réside dans le fait dedétruire, en tout
ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, comme thel.
108. Pour qu’il y ait acte de génocide, il faut que l’acte considéhré
réponde aux conditions définies par le corpus juridique établhi par la
Convention. Les actes énumérés aux litt. a) àe) de l’articleII sont non pas
des actes de génocide en eux-mêmes, mais seulement l’expression physique
ou matérielle d’une intention génocidaire. En l’absence d’hun lien direct
avec l’intention génocidaire, les actes énumérés à l’harticleII de la Conven -
tion sont simplement des actes punissables sous d’autres incriminatiohns,
telles que celles de crimes de guerre ou de crimes contre l’humanitéh.
109. Le génocide comme crime distinct se caractérise par un élémehnt
subjectif, qui est l’intention de détruire un groupe national, ethhnique,
racial ou religieux, comme tel. Cet élément subjectif est la differentia spe‑
cifica qui distingue le génocide des autres crimes internationaux avec les -
quels il partage en grande partie le même élément objectif. Quehl que soit
le degré d’atrocité d’un acte donné et si proche qu’ilh puisse être de l’un des
actes énumérés dans la Convention, cet acte ne peut pas êtreh taxé de
génocide si l’intention spécifique en est absente ( Documents officiels de
l’Assemblée générale, troisième session, première part▯ie, Sixième Commis ‑
sion, compte rendu analytique de la 69 e séance).
110. Il semble que quatre éléments puissent être distingués dans hl’inte- n
tion génocidaire : a) le degré de l’intention ; b) le fait de détruire ; c) un
groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux d) en tout ou en partie. Bien
qu’ils soient distincts, ces quatre éléments constituent, par lheur effet cum-ula
tif, un tout juridique qui caractérise l’intention génocidaire hcomme élément
subjectif du crime de génocide. Qu’un seul d’entre eux soit abshent, et l’in-ten
tion ne peut plus être qualifiée de génocidaire. En tant qu’hunité juridique, ces
éléments pris in corpore montrent que l’intention génocidaire n’est pas sim-
plement quelque chose qui s’ajouterait aux actes matériels suscepthibles de
détruire un groupe humain. C’est une qualité intégrante et ihnfuse de ces
actes considérés individuellement, une qualité qui les transforhme de simples
actes punissables qu’ils étaient en actes de génocide. Autremenht dit, l’inten -
tion est une caractéristique qualitative du génocide qui le distinhgue de tous
les autres crimes, c’est en réalité son élément constituthistricto sensu.
Le TPIR a suivi un raisonnement analogue.
Dans l’affaire Kanyarukiga , la chambre de première instance a notam -
ment déclaré ce qui suit :
«Pour fonder une déclaration de culpabilité pour génocide, l’hat -
teinte physique ou mentale des membres d’un groupe protégé doit
être d’une gravité telle qu’elle risque de mener à la deshtruction, en
tout ou en pertie, du groupe visé. » (Kanyarukiga, ICTR-02-78-T,
jugement, 1 novembre 2010, p. 158, par. 637; voir aussi Ndahimana,
ICTR-01-68-T, jugement, 30 décembre 2011, p. 173, par. 805.)
525
7 CIJ1077.indb 1047 18/04/16 08:55 525 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
111. In the case at hand, so called quantitative criteria in terms of the
sheer size of the group and its homogenous numerical composition seems
applicable, since no Party adduced evidence suggesting application of thhe
qualitative criteria contemplating the destruction of the elite of the lhead-r
ship of the group.
As a rule, the quantitative criteria is presented in the form of a “shub -
stantial” part which means “a large majority of the group in questhion”
(Jelisić, IT-95-10, Trial Judgment, 14 December 1999, p. 26, para. 82).
The ICTY emphasizes that :
“The numeric size of the targeted part of the group is the necessary h
and important starting-point. The number of individuals targeted
should be evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation
to the overall size of the entire group.” (Krstić, IT-98-33-A, Appeal
Judgment, 19 April 2004, para. 12 ; see also,Brđanin, IT-99-36-T,
Trial Judgment, 1 September 2004, para. 702 Tolomir, IT-05-88/2-T,
Trial Judgment, 12 December 2012, para. 749 Blagojević and Jokić,
IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, 17 January 2005, para. 668.)
112. Croatia claims that there were over 12,500 victims killed
(CR 2014/6, p. 45, para. 13). It should be noted that evidence concerning
ethnic structure of victims as well as numbers of victims killed in the
capacity of members of military units in military operations is lacking.
Having in mind the object of destruction that characterizes the crime ofh
genocide, its specific collective character, such evidence would be ofh cru-
cial importance. The genocide is directed against a number of individuals
as a group or at them in their collective capacity not ad personam as such.
The International Law Commission stated that :
“The prohibited (genocidal) act must be committed against an indi-
vidual because of his membership in a particular group and as an
incremental step in the overall objective of destroying the group . . .
the intention must be to destroy the group ‘as such’, meaning as ah
separate and distinct entity, and not merely some individuals because
of their membership in a particular group.” (Official Records of the
General Assembly, Fifty -First Session, Supplement No. 10, United
Nations doc. A/51/10/1556, p. 88.)
112.1. Even if, arguendo qua non, all the victims concerned were killed
because of the membership in the Croat national or ethnic group, the
number of 12,500 victims could hardly represent a “substantial part” of
the Croat national and ethnic group. In the relevant period, according tho
the data from the census in Croatia in 1991, there 3,736,356 persons of
Croatian nationality (http://bs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popis_stanovni%C5%
A1tva_u_Hrvatskoj_1991).
112.2. Of relevance as regards the element of dolus specialis is the fact
that the Chief of Staff of the First Military Region, operating in Vukovahr
526
7 CIJ1077.indb 1048 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 525
111. En la présente espèce, des critères « quantitatifs» — du point de
vue de la taille du groupe et de l’homogénéité de sa composihtion numé -
rique — semblent devoir être appliqués, étant donné qu’aucune des Par-
ties n’a présenté d’éléments appelant l’applicationh de critères qualitatifs,
au sens d’une destruction des plus hauts dirigeants du groupe.
En règle générale, le critère quantitatif prend la forme d’hune partie
« substantielle» du groupe, c’est -à-dire «une forte proportion du groupe
en question » (Jelisić, IT-95-10, jugement, 14 décembre 1999, p. 26,
par. 82). Ainsi que le TPIY l’a souligné,
«il faut tenir compte au premier chef de l’importance numérique du h
groupe visé… Le nombre de personnes visées doit être considéhré
dans l’absolu, mais aussi par rapport à la taille du groupe dans shon
ensemble. » (Krstić, IT-98-33-A, arrêt, 19 avril 2004, par. 12 ; voir
aussi Brđanin, IT‑99-36-T, jugement, 1 er septembre 2004, par. 702;
Tolomir, IT-05-88/2-T, jugement, 12 décembre 2012, par. 749 Blago‑
jević et Jokić, IT-02-60-T, jugement, 17 janvier 2005, par. 668.)
112. La Croatie affirme que plus de 12 500 personnes ont été tuées
(CR 2014/6, p. 45, par. 13). Il convient toutefois de relever que les éléments
de preuve liés à la structure ethnique des victimes et au nombre dh’entre
elles qui ont été tuées alors qu’elles prenaient part, en quhalité de membres
d’unités militaires, à des opérations militaires, font déhfaut. Or, au regard
de l’objectif de destruction qui caractérise le crime de génocihde et de son
caractère spécifiquement collectif, pareils éléments se réhvéleraient d’une
importance cruciale. Le génocide vise des individus en nombre en tanth
qu’ils constituent ou représentent un groupe, et non ad personam.
La Commission du droit international a précisé ce point comme suith:
«L’acte prohibé (génocide) doit être commis en raison de l’happar-
tenance de la victime à un certain groupe et à titre de mesure conhcou -
rant à la réalisation de l’objectif global de destruction du grhoupe…
[L]’intention doit être de détruire le groupe « comme tel», c’est-à-dire
comme entité séparée distincte, et non simplement quelques indihvi -
dus en raison de leur appartenance à ce groupe. » (Documents offi-
ciels de l’Assemblée générale, cinquante et unième sessiohn, supplément
n 10, Nations Unies, doc. A/51/10/1556, p. 88.)
112.1. Même en supposant — ce qui n’est pas le cas — que toutes les
victimes concernées aient été tuées en raison de leur apparthenance au
groupe, le chiffre de 12 500 victimes pourrait difficilement être considéré
comme constituant une « partie substantielle» dudit groupe. Au cours de
la période considérée, si l’on en croit les données tiréhes du recensement
effectué en Croatie en 1991, les personnes de nationalité croate étaient au
nombre de 3 736 356 (http://bs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popis_stanovni%C5%
A1tva_u_Hrvatskoj_1991).
112.2. S’agissant de la question dudolusspecialis, on signalera que le chef
d’état-major de la première région militaire, qui opérait à Vukovarh et, plus
526
7 CIJ1077.indb 1049 18/04/16 08:55 526 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
and, generally, Eastern Slavonia, was General Andrije Silić, a Croat (later
appointed as the Inspector-General of the armed forces, JNA) (http://
www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/79367 -popis-generala-jna-iz-hrvatske-
samo -sedam-ih-se-pridruzilo-hv-u.html).
112.3. General Anton Tus, Croat, was Head of the Yugoslavian air
force during the battle for Vukovar. As The Croatian Weekly for Culture,
Science and Social Issues wrote he “just twenty days before the fall of
Vukovar has changed the way” and was promoted to the First Chief of
the General Staff of the Croatian armed forces (http://www.hrvatsk-ifokus.
hr/index.php/hrvatska/3812 -anton-tus-sada-popuje -a-samo-20-dana-
prije-pada-vukovara-odabrao-je-stranu).
It should be born in mind that in the Croatian armed formations were
between ten and twenty thousand Serbs (http://www.jutarnji.hr/davor -
butkovic --i-srbi-su-branili-hrvatsku/901195/).
113. Serbia, for its part, claims that :
(i) the overall number of Serbs victims is 6,381 (Counter -Memorial,
Anns., Vol. V, Ann. 66, List of Serbs victims on the territory of Cro -
atia 1990 -1998; Statement of witness -expert Savo Strbac (4.2.2.);
Updated list of Serb victims, publicly available on the website of
D.I.C. Veritas (http://www.veritas.org.rs/srpske -zrtve-rata-i-poraca-
na -podrucju-hrvatske-i-bivse-rsk-1990-1998-godine/spisak-nestalih/);
(ii) victims killed during and after “Operation Storm”: 1,719 (CR2014/13,
p. 15, para. 16, (Obradović) referring to the Veritas publicly available
list of the victims of Operation Storm (http://www.veritas.org.rs/
wp -content/uploads/2014/02/Oluja-direktne-zrtve-rev2014.pdf).
According to the data from the census in Croatia in 1991, on its terri -
tory there lived 581,663 persons of the Serbian national and ethnic group.
It appears that the number of individuals killed in relation to the actuhal
size of the Serbian national and ethnic group in Croatia, does not satishfy
the “substantial part” standard.
As regards “Operation Storm” it seems to be rather “ethnic cleansing”
than genocide in terms of the Genocide Convention.
As stated by the Court in the Bosnian Genocide case:
“Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area ‘ethhn-i
cally homogenous’, nor the operations that may be carried out
to implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide :
the intent that characterizes genocide is ‘to destroy, in whole or
in part’ a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the
members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily
equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruction
527
7 CIJ1077.indb 1050 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 526
généralement, en Slavonie orientale, n’était autre que le géhnéral Andrije
Silić, un Croate (nommé par la suite inspecteur général des forces armées,
c’est-à-dire, de la JNA) (http://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/7936-7 popis-
generala -jna-iz-hrvatske-samo-sedam-ih-se-pridruzilo-hv-u.html).
112.3. Le général Anton Tus, qui était croate, se trouvait à la tête des
forces aériennes yougoslaves lors de la bataille de Vukovar. Pour
reprendre les mots de l’Hebdomadaire croate de la culture, de la science et
des questions sociales, « vingt jours à peine avant la chute de Vukovar, il a
changé son fusil d’épaule », et est devenu le premier chef de l’état -major
général des forces armées croates (http://www.hrvatski -fokus.hr/index.
php/hrvatska/3812 -anton -tus -sada -popuje -a-samo -20 -dana -
prije-pada-vukovara-odabrao-je-stranu).
Il convient par ailleurs de rappeler que les formations armées croatehs
comptaient dans leurs rangs entre 10 000 et 20 000 Serbes (http://www.
jutarnji.hr/davor-butkovic--i-srbi-su-branili-hrvatsku/901195/)
113. De son côté, la Serbie soutient que
i) le nombre total de victimes serbes s’élève à 6381 (contre -mémoire,
vol.V, annexe 66, liste des victimes serbes sur le territoire de la Croa -
tie, 1990-1998; exposé écrit du témoin -expert Savo Strbac (4.2.2.);
liste mise à jour des victimes serbes, peut être consultée sur hle site
Internet du centre d’information documentaire Veritas (http://www.
veritas.org.rs/srpske -zrtve -rata -i-poraca -na-podrucju -hrvatske -
i-bivse-rsk-1990-1998-godine/spisak-nestalih/);
ii) les victimes tuées pendant et après l’opération « Tempête» étaient au
nombre de 1719 (CR 2014/13, p. 15, par. 16 (Obradović), citant la
liste, publiée par Veritas, des victimes de l’opération « Tempête»
(http://www.veritas.org.rs/wp -content/uploads/2014/02/Oluja -
direktne-zrtve-rev2014.pdf).
Selon les chiffres tirés du recensement effectué en Croatie en 1991,h
581 663 personnes appartenant au groupe national et ethnique serbe rési -
daient alors sur le territoire de la Croatie. En proportion de la tailleh totale
du groupe national et ethnique serbe vivant en Croatie, il apparaît qhue le
nombre total de victimes ne satisfait pas au critère de « partie substan -
tielle du groupe.
L’opération « Tempête» semble davantage relever d’un « nettoyage
ethnique» que d’un génocide au sens de la Convention.
Ainsi que la Cour l’a précisé dans l’affaire Bosnie‑Herzégovine
c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro:
«Ni l’intention, sousforme d’une politique visant à rendre une zone
«ethniquement homogène », ni les opérations qui pourraient être
menées pour mettre en œuvre pareille politique ne peuvent, en tant que
telles, être désignées par le terme de génocidel’intention qui caractérise
le génocide vise à « détruire, en tout ou en partie» un groupe particu -
lier; la déportation ou le déplacement de membres appartenant à un
groupe, même par la force, n’équivaut pas nécessairement àh la destr-uc
527
7 CIJ1077.indb 1051 18/04/16 08:55 527 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
an automatic consequence of the displacement.” (2007 Judgment,
p. 123, para. 190.)
114. In conclusion, it seems indisputable that terrible atrocities and
crimes were committed by both sides in the tragic civil war in Croatia, h
but, in the light of the relevant rules of the Genocide Convention, theyh
cannot be characterized as the crime of genocide. They rather fall withihn
the purview of war crimes or crimes against humanity as evidenced,
interalia, by the jurisprudence of the ICTY.
3. Issue of Incitement to Genocide
115. The matter on which I respectfully disagree concerns incitement
to genocide. In my opinion, the relationship of the regime of President h
Tudjman to the Ustasha ideology and the legacy of the Nezavisna Državha
Hrvatska (NDH), followed by numerous acts and omissions, justifies
finding that direct and implicit incitement to genocide was committed h
(Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 557).
3.1. Issue of incitement to genocide as inchoate crime
3.2. Incitement in terms of Article III (c) of the Convention
116. Under the Convention, direct and public incitement is defined as
a specific punishable act by Article III (c). With respect to such punish -
able act, three elements are of relevance : incitement, direct and public.
117. In common law systems, incitement is defined as encouraging or
persuading another to commit an offence (A. Ashworth, Principles of
Criminal Law, 1995, p. 462). Threats and other forms of pressure also
constitute a form of incitement (ibid.). Civil law systems regard public
and direct incitement in the following terms :
“Anyone, who whether through speeches, shouting or threats uttered
in public places or at public gatherings or through the sale or dissemi-
nation, offer for sale or display of written material, printed matter,
drawings, sketches, paintings, emblems, images or any other written or
spoken medium or image in public places or at public gatherings, or
through the public display of placards or posters, or through any other
means of audio -visual communication, having directly provoked the
perpetrators(s) to commit a crime or misdemeanour, shall be punished
as an accomplice to such a crime or misdemeanour.” (French Penal
Code, Law No. 72-546 of 1 July 1972 and Law No. 85-1317 of
13 December 1985 (unofficial translation) cited in Akayesu, ICTR-96-
4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 555, fn. 124.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1052 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 527
tion dudit groupe, et une telle destruction ne résulte pas non plus ahuto-
matiquement du déplacement forcé. » (Arrêt de 2007, p. 123, par. 190.)
114. En conclusion, s’il semble incontestable que des atrocités et des h
crimes horribles ont été commis de part et d’autre au cours de hla tragique
guerre civile qui s’est déroulée en Croatie, ces crimes ne saurhaient, au
regard des règles de droit issues de la Convention, être qualifihés de géno-
cide. Ils relèvent davantage de la catégorie des crimes de guerre hou des
crimes contre l’humanité, ainsi qu’il ressort notamment de la jhurispru -
dence du TPIY.
3. Question de l’incitation à commettre le génocide
115. Le point sur lequel je suis respectueusement en désaccord est celui
de l’incitation au génocide. A mon avis, les rapports entretenus phar le
régime du président Tudjman avec l’idéologie oustachie et l’hhéritage du
Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (NDH), accompagnés par de nombreux
actes et omissions, justifiaient de conclure qu’il y avait eu incithation
directe et implicite au génocide ( Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, jugement, 2 sep-
tembre 1998, par. 557).
3.1. Question de l’incitation à commettre le génocide en tant que cr▯ime
inchoatif
3.2. L’incitation au sens du litt. c) de l’article III de la Convention
116. L’incitation directe et publique est un acte punissable au titre du
litt.) de l’articleIIIde la Convention. S’agissant de cet acte, les trois élé-
ments suivants méritent d’être définis: incitation, directe et publique.
117. Dans les systèmes de common law, l’incitation est définie comme le
fait d’encourager autrui à commettre une infraction ou de le persuhader de
le faire (A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 1995, p. 462). Les
menaces et autres formes de pression constituent également une forme h
d’incitation (ibid.). Dans les systèmes de droit civil, l’incitation — ou
provocation — directe et publique est définie comme suit :
«Seront punis comme complices d’une action qualifiée crime ou
délitceux qui, soit par des discours, cris ou menaces proférés dans les
lieux ou réunions publics, soit par des écrits, des imprimés, dessins,
gravures, peintures, emblèmes, images ou tout autre support de
l’écrit, de la parole ou de l’image vendus ou distribués, mihs en vente
ou exposés dans des lieux ou réunions publics, soit par des placarhds
ou des affiches, exposés aux regards du public, soit par tout autre h
moyen de communication audiovisuelle, auront directement provo -
qué l’auteur ou les aoteurs à commetere un crime ou un délito. » (Code
pénal français, loi n 72-546 du 1 juillet 1972 et loi n 85-1317 du
13 décembre 1985, cité dans Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, jugement, 2 sep-
tembre 1998, par. 555, note 124.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1053 18/04/16 08:55 528 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
118. In the draft Genocide Convention formulated by the Ad hoc
Committee, public incitement is defined as incitement in the shape of
“‘public speeches or . . . the press . . . the radio, the cinema or other
ways of reaching the public’ while incitement was considered private h
when ‘conducted through conversations, private meetings or mes -
sages’” (Commentary on Articles Adopted by the Committee, United h
Nations doc. E/AC 25W.I, 27 April 1948, p. 2).
The International Law Commission characterized incitement as public
where it is directed at “a number of individuals in a public place or to
members of the general public at large by such means as the mass media, h
for example radio or television” (ibid.).
Only public incitement has been interpreted by the international courts h
as being an inchoate offence. Public incitement is dangerous because it
“leads to the creation of an atmosphere of hatred and xenophobia and h
entails the exertion of influence on people’s minds” (W. K. Timmermann,
“Incitement in International Criminal Law”, International Review of the
Red Cross, Vol. 88, December 2006, p. 825).
In the jurisprudence of the ICTR, reference has repeatedly been made
to the creation of the particular state of mind in the audience that wouhld
induce its members to commit genocidal acts.
119. Direct incitement seems to have been defined in the Akayesu case.
The tribunal noted that direct implies : “that the incitement assume a
direct form and specifically provoke another to engage in a criminal ahct,
and that more than mere vague and indirect suggestion goes to constituteh
direct incitement” (Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 September
1998, para. 557). And, further that
“the direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of iths
cultural and linguistic content . . . The Chamber further recalls that
incitement may be direct, and nonetheless implicit. Thus, at the time
the Convention on Genocide was being drafted, the Polish delegate
observed that it was sufficient to play skilfully on mob psychology by h
casting suspicion on certain groups, by insinuating that they were
responsible for economic or other difficulties in order to create an
atmosphere favourable to the perpetration of the crime.” (Ibid.)
In determining whether certain statements are likely to incite genocide,h
the context is extremely important. The ICTR stated, inter alia, that
“the meaning of a message can be intrinsically linked to the context h
in which it [sic] is formulated. In the opinion of the Appeals Cham -
ber, the Trial Chamber was correct in concluding that it was appro -
priate to consider the potential impact in context — notably, how the
message would be understood by its intended audience — in deter -
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1054 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 528
118. Dans le projet de convention élaboré par le comité spécial dhu géno -
cide, l’incitation publique est définie comme une incitation prehnant la forme
««d[e] discours publics, ou dans la presse, par la radio, le cinéma ou h
d’autres procédés visant à atteindre le public », tandis qu’une incita-
tion est considérée comme privée quand elle « se fait par le moyen de
conversations, de réunions privées, de messages »» (commentaires
des articles adoptés par le Comité, Nations Unies, doc. E/AC 25W.I,
27 avril 1948, p. 2).
Selon la Commission du droit international, pour être qualifiée hde
publique, l’incitation doit être adressée «à un certain nombre d’individus
dans un lieu public ou au public en général … ou en passant par des
médias comme la radio ou la télévision » (ibid.).
Seule l’incitation publique a été considérée par les tribhunaux internatio
naux comme une infraction inchoative. L’incitation publique est dangereuse
en ce qu’elle « mène à l’instauration d’un climat de haine et de xéno -
phobie, et se caractérise notamment par une influence exercée sur les esprihts
(W. K. Timmermann, « Incitement in International Criminal Law», Revue
internationale de la Croix‑Rouge, vol.88, décembre2006, p. 825).
La jurisprudence du TPIR contient de nombreuses références à l’hins -
tauration d’un état d’esprit particulier de nature à pousserh les membres
du public à commettre des actes de génocide.
119. La notion d’incitation directe semble avoir été définie dahns l’af -
faireAkayesu. Le Tribunal a ainsi fait observer « que l’incitation pren[ait]
une forme directe et provoqu[ait] expressément autrui à entreprendhre une
action criminelle et qu’une simple suggestion, vague et indirecte, [éhtait]
quant à elle insuffisante pour constituer une incitation directe » (kayesu,
ICTR -96-4-T, jugement, 2 septembre 1998, par. 557). Il a ajouté :
«il est approprié d’évaluer le caractère direct d’une incihtation à la
lumière d’une culture et d’une langue données… La Chambreh rap -
pelle qu’une incitation peut être directe et néanmoins implicithe. Ainsi,
le délégué polonais avait indiqué, lors de la rédaction dhe la conven -
tion sur le génocide, qu’il suffit d’agir habilement sur la pshychologie
des foules en jetant la suspicion sur certains groupes en insinuant
qu’ils sont responsables de difficultés économiques ou pour crhéer
l’atmosphère propice à l’exécution du crime. » (Ibid.)
Le contexte dans lequel ont été faites certaines déclarations rhevêt la
plus grande importance aux fins de déterminer si elles sont de natuhre à
constituer une incitation au génocide. A cet égard, le TPIR a notahmment
déclaré ce qui suit :
«la signification d’un message peut être intrinsèquement liéhe au
contexte dans lequel il est formulé. De l’avis de la Chambre d’happel,
la Chambre de première instance a correctement conclu qu’il y avaiht
lieu de considérer l’impact potentiel des propos dans leur contexte
particulier — notamment comment le message serait perçu par ses
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1055 18/04/16 08:55 529 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
mining whether it constituted direct and public incitement to commit
genocide.” (Nahimana et al., ICTR -99-52-A, Appeal Judgment,
28 November 2007, para. 711.)
The principal consideration is the meaning of the word use in the spe -
cific context:
“It does not matter that the message may appear ambiguous to
another audience or in another context. On the other hand, if the
discourse is still ambiguous even when considered in its context, it
cannot be found beyond reasonable doubt to constitute direct and
public incitement to commit genocide.” ( Ibid., para. 701.)
There is, of course, a difference where such statements are made by
official: “these will be more likely in actual fact to promote genocide
than similar statements made by individuals who do not command the
same degree of authority . . . Furthermore, such statements may provide
evidence of an actual desire to promote genocide.” (T. Mendel, Study on
International Standards relating to Incitement to Genocide or Racial
Hatred, for the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide, April 2006, pp. 64-65.)
3.3. Ustasha ideology as a genocidal one
120. Two special features characterize the Ustasha ideology in this
particular context. Primo, the teaching about the ethnic descent of the
Croats and, secundo, the perception of Croatia as a State. In the ideology
of the Ustasha movement these two features are organically, inseparably
linked.
121. In contrast to the teaching about the Slavic origin of the Croats,
advocated by progressive Croatian intellectuals and politicians at the
beginning of the nineteenth century (see e.g., A. Trumbić, Hrvatska
seljačka stranka (Croatian Peasant Party)), the proponents of the Ustasha
ideology maintained that the Croats were of Aryan descent.
As observed by the well -known Croatian historian Nevenko Bartulin,
Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Split, in his doctoral dissertha -
tion entitled “The ideology of nation and race : the Croatian Ustasha
regime and its policies toward minorities in the Independent State of Crho -
atia, 1941-1945”, defended at the University of New South Wales (2006),
the Ustasha teaching about the Croatian ethnicity was decisively influh -
enced by I. von Suedland (1874-1933) and by Professor Milan Sufflay
(1879-1931).
Suedland, which is, in fact, the assumed name of the Croatian historian h
and sociologist Ivo Pilar, taught that
530
7 CIJ1077.indb 1056 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 529
destinataires — pour déterminer si ces propos constituent de l’incita-
tion directe et publique à commettre le génocide. » (Nahimana et al.,
ICTR-99-52-A, arrêt, 28 novembre 2007, par. 711.)
Le principal aspect à prendre en compte est le sens des mots dans leuhr
contexte spécifique :
«Il importe peu que le message puisse apparaître équivoque pour
un public différent ou dans un contexte différent. En revanche, si lhe
discours reste équivoque même lorsque le contexte est pris en compte,
alors il peut être conclu au -delà de tout doute raisonnable que le
discours en question constituait de l’incitation directe et publique hà
commettre le génocide. » (Ibid., par. 701.)
Bien évidemment, les déclarations de cette nature faites par des rhespon -
sables sont un cas à part, en ce que ces déclarations « seront davantage
susceptibles, dans les faits, de favoriser la commission d’un génohcide que
des déclarations analogues qui auraient été faites par des individus qui ne
seraient pas investis des mêmes pouvoirs… En outre, ces déclarahtions
peuvent être révélatrices d’un réel désir de favoriserh la commission d’un
génocide. » (T. Mendel, Study on International Standards relating to Inci ‑
tement to Genocide or Racial Hatred, étude réalisée pour le conseiller spé -
cial des Nations Unies pour la prévention du génocide, avril 2006,h
p. 64-65.)
3.3. L’idéologie oustachie en tant qu’idéologie génocidaire
120. Deux éléments distincts caractérisent l’idéologie oustachhie dans ce
contexte particulier. Premièrement, certaines thèses relatives àh l’origine
ethnique des Croates et, deuxièmement, la perception de la Croatie enh
tant qu’Etat. Dans l’idéologie du mouvement oustachi, ces deux caracté -
ristiques sont organiquement et indissociablement liées.
121. A rebours de la thèse de l’origine slave des Croates soutenue par h
des intellectuels et des hommes politiques croates progressistes au début
du XIX esiècle (notamment A. Trumbić, du parti paysan croate (Hrvatska
seljačka stranka)), les partisans de l’idéologie oustachie soutenaient que
les Croates sont d’origine aryenne.
Comme l’a fait observer un historien croate connu, Nevenko Bartulin,
professeur à la faculté de philosophie de Split, dans sa thèse hde doctorat
intitulée «The ideology of nation and race : the Croatian Ustasha regime
and its policies toward minorities in the Independent State of Croatia, h
1941 -1945 » qu’il a soutenue en 2006 à l’Université de Nouvelle -Galles du
Sud, ces enseignements oustachis sur l’origine ethnique des Croates ohnt
été fortement influencés par I. von Suedland (1874-1933) et Milan Sufflay
(1879-1931).
Suedland, qui est en réalité le nom d’emprunt de l’historienh et socio -
logue croate Ivo Pilar, prétendait que
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1057 18/04/16 08:55 530 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
“the Croats had preserved the ‘Nordic-Aryan’ heritage of their Slavic
ancestors far more than the Serbs, who had interbred, to a large
degree, with the Balkan-Romanic Vlachs. . . The Serbs. . . had appar -
ently inherited their predominant physical features of black hair, dark h
eyes and dark skin from the Vlachs and Pilar thought that these traits
were, in turn, probably the result of Vlach admixture with Gypsies.” h
(N. Bartulin, op. cit., pp. 176-177.)
Physiognomic differences between the Croats and the Serbs are accom -
panied, according to Pilar, by the essential differences in the social rohle of
these two peoples. He considers
“the Vlachs, as the core of the Serbian people, to be detriment to the
social harmony and progress of States in which they lived. They were
a race of destructive pastoral nomads and bandits . . . that the Serbs
were accomplished traders . . . In contrast, the Croats were charac -
terized by the values and virtues of their nobility, which was the only h
hereditary aristocracy in the Balkans . . .” (Ibid., pp. 177-178; empha-
sis added.)
Such a qualification is further extended to the present -day Greeks
whom he sees as “the descendants of Slavs and Albanians” and, as shuch,
“worthless people of mixed bloods ‘who didn’t have the materialh and
moral strength’ — to inherit the mantle of successor to the Roman
Empire” (ibid., p. 178).
It seems that Sufflay was primarily concerned with vindicating chauvin -
ism, which necessarily derives from the teaching about the Croats as a
superior Aryan race. Croatian nationalism, according to him, is abso -
lutely positive because it possesses “higher ethical motives, namely,
defence of Western civilization” (M. Sufflay, Characteristics of the Croa ‑
tian Nation and Croatia in the Light of World History and Politics : Twelve
Essays, reprint, Nova hrvatska povjesnica, Zagreb, 1999, pp. 40-41). As
such, it is not a local nationalism, but rather a “loyal service to thhe White
West” (ibid.).
122. The teaching about the Aryan descent of Croats, their racial super-
iority, necessarily bore upon the Ustasha concept of the Croatian State.
The leader of the Ustasha movement, Ante Pavelić, in the document enti -
tled “The Principles of the Ustasha Movement”, published in 1933, hmen-
tioned 17 principles which “became the dogma for Ustasha members . . .
and form the core around which the legal -constitutional system (if one
could call it that) of the Independent State of Croatia would be based”h
(N. Bartulin, op. cit., p. 164).
A certain number of these principles are of special relevance. The firhst
principle is that “the Croatian nation is a self -contained ethnic unit, it is
a nation in its own right and from an ethnic perspective is not identicahl
with any other nation nor is it a part of, or a tribe of, any other natihon”.
The seventh principle states that the Croats maintained their State
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«les Croates avaient bien davantage préservé l’héritage « aryen-
nordique» de leurs ancêtres slaves que les Serbes qui, dans une large
mesure, s’étaient croisés avec les Valaques balkano -romans… Les
Serbes … avaient apparemment hérité des principales caractéristiquehs
physiques des Valaques — cheveux noirs, yeux foncés et peau
basanée —, et que ces caractéristiques étaient probablement le résulh -
tat du métissage des Valaques et des Gitans. » (N. Bartulin, op. cit.,
p. 176-177.)
Selon Pilar, les différences physionomiques entre Croates et Serbes s’hac -
compagnent de différences essentielles dans le rôle social que jouehnt ces
deux peuples. Il considère que
« les Valaques, qui forment le cœur du peuple serbe, étaient nuisibles
à l’harmonie et au progrès social des Etats dans lesquels ils vivaient.
C’était une race de bergers nomades et de bandits ravageurs … les
Serbes étaient des marchands accomplis… Tandis que les Croates se h
caractérisaient par les valeurs et les vertus de leur noblesse, seule
aristocratie héréditaire des Balkans… » ( Ibid., p. 177-178 ; les ita
liques sont de moi.)
Pilar étend ses considérations aux Grecs contemporains, dans lesquels
il voyait « les descendants de Slaves et d’Albanais », et par conséquent un
« peuple de bons à rien métissés « qui n’avait ni la force matérielle, ni la
force morale » suffisante pour hériter de l’autorité des successeurs de h
l’Empire romain » (ibid., p. 178).
Quant à Sufflay, il semble qu’il ait été motivé principalement par lhe
chauvinisme qu’entraîne nécessairement la thèse de l’appahrtenance des
Croates à la race aryenne supérieure. Selon lui, le nationalisme chroate est
entièrement positif, car il repose sur « des raisons éthiques supérieures, à
savoir la défense de la civilisation occidentale » (M. Sufflay, Caractéris ‑
tiques de la nation croate et de la Croatie à la lumière de l’h▯istoire et de la
politique mondiales , Douze essais, réimpression, Nova hrvatska povjes -
nica, Zagreb, 1999, p. 40-41). En soi, il s’agit non pas d’un nationalisme
local, mais plutôt d’un « service loyal rendu à l’Occident blanc » (ibid.).
122. Les enseignements sur l’origine aryenne des Croates et leur supério -
rité raciale ont fatalement influencé la conception de l’Etat croate défendue
par les Oustachis. Dans « Les Principes du mouvement oustach» i de 1933, le
chef du mouvement oustachi, AntePavelić, a énuméré les dix-sept principes
qui sont « devenus des dogmes pour les membres du mouvement oustachi …
et constituent le noyau autour duquel le système juridico -constitutionnel (si
tant est que l’on puisse l’appeler ainsi) de l’Etat indépenhdant de Croatie
viendrait à se constituer» (N. Bartulin, op.cit., p. 164).
Un certain nombre de ces principes revêtent un intérêt particulhier pour
la présente affaire. Selon le premier d’entre eux, « la nation croate consti -
tue une entité ethnique autonome, elle est une nation à part entière qui,
d’un point de vue ethnique, se distingue de toutes les autres et ne repré -
sente ni une partie ni une tribu d’une quelconque autre nation ». Selon le
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1059 18/04/16 08:55 531 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
throughout the centuries up until the end of the First World War and
that they therefore have the right to “restore their own Croatian Stahte on
their whole ethnic and historic territory” with the right to use all hmethods
(principle 8).
Principle 11 says that “no one who is not by descent and blood a mem -
ber of the Croatian nation can decide on Croatian State and national
matters”. Principle 14, on the other hand, provides that an individual has
no specific rights as he/she only counts as a part of the whole, meanihng
“nation and State” (see VictorNovak, Magnum crimen, 2011, pp.723-724).
The Croatian State, according to Pavelić, ought to be based on the
theory of historic statehood, while denying the right of peoples to
self-determination. At the meeting of the HSP youth of September 1928
held in Zagreb, Pavelić explicitly pointed out that the Croats do noth need
President Wilson’s right to self-determination because “we have our his -
toric State right and according to that right we seek that Croatia becomhes
free” (Jareb, Political Recollections and Work of Dr. Branimir Jelić, Cleve-
land, Mirko Samija, 1982, p. 251; N. Bartulin, op. cit., pp. 165-166). The
theory of the historic State right, as the basis of independent Croatia,h
gave rise to Ustasha-oriented lawyers viewing the State as a notion which
consists of “the territory, the nation and State right” (for examhple, Pro -
fessor Fran Milobar, Jareb, op. cit., p. 253; N. Bartulin, op. cit., p. 156).
The meaning of the historical right title is that the Croats “had exchlu -
sive rights to the territory that encompassed the NDH, despite the size-
able number of non -Croats on this territory” (ibid., p. 275).
123. As far as internal organization is concerned, independent Croatia,
in the Ustasha ideological vision, ought to be founded on the “Fühh -
rerprinzip”, because “all authorities in the NDH were answerable tho the
‘Poglavnik’, while he answered only to ‘history and his own conscience’”
(ibid., p. 279; Slaven Pavlić, “Tko je tko in NDH” (“Who’s Who in the
Independent State of Croatia”), Hrvatska 1941‑1945, Zagreb, Minerva,
1997, p. 477). The reception of the model of government of Nazi Ger -
many was explained as being due to the deficiencies of the democratic h
principle which “almost ruined the world by abolishing the distinctiohn
between good and evil, in other words, democracy was held responsible
for moral relativization” (D. Zanko, “Etička osnova ustaštva” (“The eth-
nic basis of the Ustasha ideology”), Ustaški godišnjak 1943 (Ustasha
Yearbook 1943) , p. 187).
124. It seems clear that the Croatian State, based on the Ustasha ideo-
logy, rested on the logic of genocide. It was a copied Nazi ideology
ratione loci limited to parts of the then Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
Only on the basis of a genocidal paradigm was it possible for the Usta -
sha ideology to create an ethnically clean State of superior Aryan peoplhe,
with the Serbs and the Jews who lived in the same space being regarded
as socially destructive and a “detriment to the social harmony and prog -
532
7 CIJ1077.indb 1060 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 531
septième principe, les Croates ont conservé leur propre Etat à htravers les
siècles jusqu’à la fin de la première guerre mondiale et, partant, ont le
droit de « rétablir cet Etat sur la totalité de son territoire ethnique et hihs-
torique », et ce, par tous les moyens (huitième principe).
Suivant le onzième principe, « quiconque n’est pas membre de la nation
croate par ses ascendants et par le sang ne saurait décider des affairhes de
l’Etat et de la nation croates ». Le quatorzième principe veut qu’un indi-
vidu n’a pas de droits propres, puisqu’il n’existe qu’en tanht que partie
d’un tout, à savoir « la nation et l’Etat » (voir Victor Novak, Magnum
crimen, 2011, p. 723-724).
Selon Pavelić, l’Etat croate devait s’appuyer sur la théorieh de l’Etat his
torique, tout en niant aux autres peuples le droit de disposer d’eux-mêmes.
A un meeting des jeunesses du HSP organisé en septembre 1928 à Zagreb,
il a expressément déclaré que les Croates n’avaient que fairhe du droit à
l’autodétermination du président Wilson, car « nous avons déjà notre
droit à notre Etat historique et, en vertu de ce droit, nous voulons hla libé-
ration de la Croatie » (Jareb, Political Recollections and Work of Dr. Bra‑
nimir Jelić, Cleveland, Mirko Samija, 1982, p. 251; N. Bartulin, op. cit.,
p. 165-166). Pierre angulaire de la Croatie indépendante, cette théorie hdu
droit à l’Etat historique a permis à des juristes pro -oustachis de considé-
rer l’Etat comme une notion constituée du « territoire, de la nation et du
droit à l’Etat » (le professeur Fran Milobar par exemple, voir Jareb,
op. cit., p. 253; N. Bartulin, op. cit., p. 156).
Cet historicisme juridique signifiait que les Croates détenaient des droits
exclusifs sur le territoire couvrant le NDH, en dépit du nombre non nhégli -
geable de non-Croates qui s’y trouvaient» (ibid., p. 275).
123. En matière d’organisation interne, l’idéologie oustachie prôhnait
une Croatie indépendante basée sur le « Führerprinzip», étant donné que
« tous les pouvoirs du NDH relevaient du « Poglavnik» («Führers»), qui
n’était quant à lui responsable que devant « l’histoire et sa propre
conscience»» (ibid., p. 279; Slaven Pavlić, « Tko je tko in NDH » (Qui
fait quoi dans l’Etat indépendant de Croatie), Hrvatska 1941‑1945,
Zagreb, Minerva, 1997, p. 477). Le modèle de l’Allemagne nazie était jus -
tifié par les déficiences du principe démocratique, qui avahit « quasiment
ruiné le monde en abolissant toute distinction entre le bien et le mahl ;
autrement dit, la démocratie était tenue pour responsable du relâhchement
des mœurs » (D. Zanko, « Etička osnova ustaštva » (Les fondements
éthiques de l’idéologie oustachie), Ustaški godišnjak 1943 (Annuaire ous -
tachi 1943), p. 187).
124. Il apparaît clairement que l’Etat croate, issu de l’idéologihe ous -
tachie, reposait sur une logique génocidaire. Il s’agissait d’uhne copie de
l’idéologie nazie limitée ratione locià certaines parties du Royaume de
Yougoslavie.
Ce n’est qu’en s’appuyant sur un modèle génocidaire que lh’idéologie
oustachie pouvait créer un Etat ethniquement pur constitué d’unh peuple
aryen supérieur partageant son espace avec des Serbes et des Juifs «h nui -
sibles à l’harmonie et au progrès social des Etats dans lesquelhs ils
532
7 CIJ1077.indb 1061 18/04/16 08:55 532 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
ress of States in which they lived”. Without that paradigm, the creathion of
an Ustasha Croatian State was simply not possible :
“The Ustasha genocide was underlined by two principal aims. One
was to establish a Croatian nation -State for the first time in modern
history, and secondly, to simultaneously ‘remove the ethnic, racial
and religious minorities that the Ustashe considered both alien and a
threat to the organic unity of the Croatian nation’.” (N. Bartulin,
op. cit., p. 11.)
These two aims are not only organically linked, but, moreover, the reali -
zation of the first aim necessarily implies the removal of national grhoups
which do not fit in the matrix of the Aryan Croatian nation. If the
non-Croatian ethnic and religious groups are “both alien and a threat to h
the organic unity of the Croatian nation” why should they at all be phre -
served? (in other words, the obliteration of such groups can be inferred
from the very essence of the Ustasha ideology). As far as the Serbs areh
concerned, genocidal logic was explained. As academician Viktor Novak,
a leading Croatian historian after the Second World War noted, the main h
Ustasha ideologist and No. 2 of the Independent State of Croatia,
Mile Budak, set out, at the big assembly in Gospić, the genocidal formula h
in the following words : “We will kill one part of the Serbs, will dislocate
the other part and will convert the rest into Catholic religion and thush
have them assimilated into the Croats” (quoted by Viktor Novak,
Magnum Crimen, Gambit, Jagodina, 2011, pp. 786-787).
The Ustasha ideology is, in its substance, a genocidal plan to destroy
the Serb national group in Croatia and parts of the territory of the Kinhg-
dom of Yugoslavia, which, in the Ustasha perception, constitute parts of
Greater Croatia.
3.4. The establishment of the NDH — the Ustasha ideology becomes State
policy
125. The Ustasha State, the so -called Independent State of Croatia,
was formally proclaimed in Zagreb on 10 April 1941 in Pavelićs name
and by the “will of our ally” (i.e., Germany) comprised territorhies of his-
toric Croatia with Međumurje, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herze -
govina and the big part of Vojvodina (Fikreta Jelić -Butić, Ustaše i
Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941‑1945 (Ustasha and the Independent State
of Croatia), Sveučilišna naklada Liber, Zagreb, 1977, p. 67).
126. Following the proclamation of the NDH a number of measures
were taken with a view to the realization of the Ustasha ideology in rela -
tion to Serbs, Jews and Roma. These measures can be divided into two
groups. One group of measures comprised legislative measures, whereas
the other group were institutional measures, meaning the creation of
structures for their implementation. These two kinds of interrelated meah-
sures were supposed to create a “clean Croatian State space” that hwas to
533
7 CIJ1077.indb 1062 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 532
vivaient». Sans ce modèle, la création d’un Etat croate oustachi éhtait tout
simplement impossible.
«Le génocide oustachi visait deux objectifs principaux : l’un consi-
tant à établir, pour la première fois de l’histoire contemporaine, un
Etat -nation croate, l’autre, concomitant, à « se débarrasser des mino-
rités ethniques, raciales et religieuses considérées par les Oustachis
comme étrangères et représentant une menace pour l’unité horganique
de la nation croate ».» (N. Bartulin, op. cit., p. 11.)
Non seulement ces deux objectifs sont unis par un lien organique, mais
encore la réalisation du premier implique nécessairement l’éhlimination des
groupes nationaux qui ne cadrent pas avec la matrice de la nation croate
aryenne. Si les groupes ethniques et religieux non croates sont « à la fois
étrangers et dangereux pour l’unité organique de la nation croahte, pour -
quoi devraient -ils être préservés ?» (En d’autres termes, l’annihilation de
ces groupes peut être déduite de l’essence même de l’idéhologie oustachie.)
En ce qui concerne les Serbes, la logique génocidaire avait étéh précisée.
Comme l’a fait observer Viktor Novak, académicien et historien croate
influent au sortir de la seconde guerre mondiale, le principal idéohlogue et
numéro 2 de l’Etat indépendant de Croatie, Mile Budak, avait exposé le
schéma du génocide lors du grand rassemblement de Gospić : «Nous tue -
rons une partie des Serbes, désorganiserons l’autre partie et convhertirons
le reste à la religion catholique pour en faire des Croates. » (Cité par
Viktor Novak, Magnum Crimen, Gambit, Jagodina, 2011, p. 786-787.)
En substance, l’idéologie oustachie consiste en un plan génocidhaire
visant à détruire le groupe national serbe en Croatie et dans certaines
parties du territoire du Royaume de Yougoslavie qui, selon la conceptionh
oustachie, font partie de la Grande Croatie.
3.4. Proclamation du NDH : l’idéologie oustachie devient politique d’Etat
125. L’Etat oustachi, le prétendu « Etat indépendant de Croatie »
(NDH), a été officiellement proclamé à Zagreb le 10 avril 1941, au nom
de Pavelić et « par la volonté de notre alliée» (l’Allemagne); il couvrait les
territoires de la Croatie historique, ainsi que le Međumurje, la Slavhonie,
la Dalmatie, la Bosnie -Herzégovine et une grande partie de la Voïvo -
dine (Fikreta Jelić-Butić, Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941‑1945
(Les Oustachis et l’Etat indépendant de Croatie 1941-1945), Zagreb, 1977,
Sveučilišna naklada Liber, Zagreb, 1977, p. 67).
126. A la suite de la proclamation du NDH, un certain nombre de
mesures ont été prises en vue de mettre en application l’idéhologie ous -
tachie en ce qui concerne les Serbes, les Juifs et les Roms. Ces mesuresh
peuvent être regroupées en deux catégories : d’une part, des mesures légis-
latives, d’autre part, des mesures institutionnelles, c’est -à-dire visant à la
création de structures pour assurer la mise en œuvre des premièhres. Ces
deux catégories de mesures interdépendantes étaient destinéehs à créer un
533
7 CIJ1077.indb 1063 18/04/16 08:55 533 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
enable the existence of a “clean Croatian nation”. The vital condihtion for
achieving thisaim was the “extermination” primarily of Serbs and Jews
who were declared “the greatest enemies of the Croatian people”, chonse-
quently “there is no place for them in Croatia” (Fikreta Jelić -Butić,
op. cit., p. 158).
127. The establishment of concentration camps took place in two
phases.
In the first phase the so-called “reception camps” were established, i.e.,
places of temporary stay of the arrested, mainly Serbs, from which they h
were deported to concentration camps (ibid., p. 185). The arrested per -
sons, as formulated in the “Legal provision on the sending of objectihon -
able and dangerous persons to forcible stay in reception camps and
forced-labour camps”, were “objectionable persons who were a threat to
the public order and security or persons which could endanger peace and h
calm of the Croatian people or the achievements of the liberation struggle
of the Croatian Ustasha Movement” (Narodne novine, 26 November
1941).
The second phase was the setting up of concentration camps or death
camps. There were a considerable number of death camps in Ustasha
Croatia (Mirko Veršen, Ustasha Camps, Zagreb, 1966, pp. 29-36). The
establishment of these camps took place soon after the proclamation of
the NDH and, in fact, they were the first concentration camps in Europhe,
set up before the concentration camps in Nazi Germany.
128. The accurate number of killed persons in these camps has not been
established. The reason for this was by and large the lack of will on thhe part
of the authorities after the end of the Second World War to establish prhecisely
and to make known the number of perished people and thus avoid triggering
inter-ethnic differences and frictions. The slogan “Brotherhood and Unity”h
of “Yugoslav” peoples proclaimed and strictly adhered to by JB.. Tito, who
saw it as the condition of the survival of Yugoslavia — quite rightly as it
turned out — was not to be impaired in any way whatsoever.
However, it seems indisputable that several hundred thousands of peo -
ple were killed in Jasenovac. According to the data of the Croatian
Regional Commission for the establishment of crimes committed by the
occupiers and their helpers, it is reckoned that the number of victims
ranges between 500,000 -600,000 (Fikreta Jelić-Butić, op. cit., p. 187).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, in the article entitled “Fascism”, statehs that the
Croatian fascists in the German puppet state of Croatia, “in a campaign
of genocide, killed about 250,000 Serbs in Croatia and 40,000 Jews”
(http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/202210/fascism/219386/
Sexism -and-misogyny).
A number of sources assert that 600,000 people, including Serbs (the
overwhelming majority), Jews and Roma were murdered at Jasenovac
(http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/othercamps/jasenovac.html ;
Jasenovac : Proceedings of the First International Conference and Exhibit
534
7 CIJ1077.indb 1064 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 533
«espace Etatique croate pur » qui permettrait à une « nation croate pure»
de voir le jour. La condition essentielle à la réalisation de cet hobjectif était
l’«extermination», en premier lieu, des Serbes et des Juifs, qualifiés de
« principaux ennemis du peuple croate », et qui « n’[avaient donc] pas leur
place en Croatie » (Fikreta Jelić-Butić, op. cit., p. 158).
127. L’établissement des camps de concentration s’est déroulé hen deux
phases.
Durant la première phase, des « camps d’accueil» ont été mis en place ;
il s’agissait de lieux de séjour temporaire pour les personnes quih avaient
été arrêtées, principalement des Serbes, à partir desquelhs ces personnes
étaient envoyées dans les camps de concentration (ibid., p. 185). Pour
reprendre les termes du « Dispositif juridique relatif au placement forcé
des personnes ayant un comportement répréhensible ou dangereux dans
des camps d’accueil et de travail forcé », ces personnes étaient « des per -
sonnes ayant des comportements répréhensibles, qui constitu[aient]h une
menace pour l’ordre public et la sécurité ou [étaient] suscehptibles de mettre
en péril la paix et la tranquillité du peuple croate ou le succèhs de la lutte
pour la libération menée par le Mouvement oustachi croate… » (Narodne
novine, 26 novembre 1941).
La seconde phase a consisté en l’établissement de camps de conchentra -
tion, ou camps de la mort. Ces camps ont été très nombreux dans la
Croatie oustachie (Mirko Veršen, Les Camps oustachis, Zagreb, 1966,
p. 29-36). Ils ont été créés peu de temps après la proclamatiohn du NDH
et, de fait, ont été les premiers camps de concentration en Europeh, précé-
dant même ceux de l’Allemagne nazie.
128. Le nombre exact des personnes tuées dans ces camps n’a pas pu êhtre
établi, principalement en raison du manque d’empressement des autohrités,
au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale, à déterminer avec préhcision et
à communiquer les chiffres relatifs aux personnes décédées afihn de ne pas
attiser les divergences et dissensions interethniques. Il n’était hpas question
que le slogan « Fraternité et Unité» des peuples « yougoslaves», proclamé
et strictement appliqué par J. B. Tito qui y voyait une condition nécessaire
à la survie de la Yougoslavie, fût contredit de quelque manièreh que ce soit.
Il semble néanmoins incontestable que plusieurs centaines de milliersh de
personnes ont été tuées à Jasenovac. Selon les données rehcueillies par la
Commission régionale croate d’enquête sur les crimes commis par les forces
d’occupation et leurs soutiens, le nombre des victimes se situe entreh 50000
et 600 000 personnes (Fikreta Jelić -Butić, op. cit., p. 187). Dans son article
intitulé «Fascisme», l’Encyclopaedia Britannica rapporte que, dans l’Etat
fantoche pro-allemand de Croatie, les fascistes croates, « dans le cadre
d’une campagne de génocide, ont tué environ 250 000 Serbes et40 000 Juifs»
(http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/202210/fascism/219386/
Sexism -and-misogyny).
Selon plusieurs sources, 600 000 Serbes, Juifs et Roms ont été tués à
Jasenovac, la très grande majorité d’entre eux étant constithuée de Serbes
(http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/othercamps/jasenovac.html ;
Jasenovac : Proceedings of the First International Conference and Exhibit
534
7 CIJ1077.indb 1065 18/04/16 08:55 534 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
on the Jasenovac Concentration Camps , 29-31 October 1997, Kingsbor -
ough Community College of the City University of New York, Dallas
Publishing, p. 20 ; Robert Rozett and Shmuel Spector, Encyclopedia of
the Holocaust, p. 280; http://www.museumoffamilyhistory.com/ce/cc/
nf-camps-jasenovac-01.htm ; Padraic Kenney, The Burdens of Freedom:
Eastern Europe since 1989, p. 94; http://www.balkanstudies.org/blog/
holocaust-deniers-us-state-department; David Birnbaum, Jews, Church
and Civilization, Vol. VI; https://books.google.rs/books?id=SDW5owdrH
bIC&pg=PA165&lpg=PA165&dq=Jasenovac+600+000+murdered&sour
ce=bl&ots=3vliR5EeiO&sig=Bco48GL6ePjbfwpmFSn7k6eZb9g&hl=en
&sa=X&ei=Mo3VZbMLajhywOh5oGAAQ&ved=0CCIQ6AEwAjgU#v
=onepage&q=Jasenovac%20600%20000%20murdered&f=fal;sehttp://www .
ag-friedensforschung.de/regionen/jugoslawien/jasenovac.html ; http:// www.
holocaustchronicle.org/staticpages/414.html).
On the occasion of the International Day of Holocaust Remembrance,
the Croatian Parliament held a meeting which included a programme
suited to the occasion on 27 January 2014. In addition, to a good number
of officials and public figures, the commemoration was also attended hby
representatives of religious communities, as well as by the Croatian Prehs-
dent Ivo Josipović and Prime Minister Zoran Milanović who, in addition
to the Speaker of Parliament, Josip Leko, also delivered a speech :
“In his speech, Prime Minister Zoran Milanović observed that this h
should be an opportunity for political speeches rather than commem-
orative ones ‘in a low sense of the word’, because what happened
70 years ago is an everlasting story about the fight between good and
evil, between a moral individual and an immoral society. He reminded
those present of the fact that antiSemitism did not appear overnight ;
that everything that was said about the Jews before the Holocaust
could be considered as hatred speech.
He also recalled the fact that horrible things had happened in
Croatia in 1941, not only to the Jews but also to the Serbs before
them.
Until April 1941 there were no mass executions in Europe on
account of different religious belief or racial origins. This situation
changed in April of that year following the establishment of the Inde-
pendent State of Croatia in which, within a few weeks, mass killings
of people of different religions and nationalities began. The mass exe-
cutions of Serbs started first and were soon followed by the killings
of Jews. It was only at the end of June 1941 that mass executions
started in East Europe, primarily the executions of Jews. That was
not yet the time of concentration camps. That was a time of mass
killings with firearms which, as it soon turned out, could not satisfyh
the high technological standards of the executioners. We all know what
followed soon after.”
535
7 CIJ1077.indb 1066 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 534
on the Jasenovac Concentration Camps, 29-31 octobre 1997, Kings -
borough Community College of the City University of New York, Dallas
Publishing, p. 20 ; Robert Rozett et Shmuel Spector, Encyclopedia of
the Holocaust, p. 280 ; http://www.museumoffamilyhistory.com/ce/cc/
nf-camps-jasenovac-01.htm; Padraic Kenney, The Burdens of Freedom:
Eastern Europe since 1989, p. 94 ; http://www.balkanstudies.org/blog/
holocaust-deniers-us-state-department; David Birnbaum, Jews, Church et
Civilization, vol.VI; https://books.google.rs/books?id=SDW5owdrHbIC
&pg=PA165&lpg=PA165&dq=Jasenovac+600+000+murdered&
source=bl&ots=3vliR5EeiO&sig=Bco48GL6ePjbfwpmFSn7k6eZ
b9g&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Mo3VZbMLajhywOh5oGAAQ&ved=0CC
IQ6AEwAjgU#v=onepage&q=Jasenovac%20600%20000%20murdered -
&f=false ; http://www.ag-friedensforschung.de/regionen/jugoslawien/jase -
novac.html ; http://www.holocaustchronicle.org/staticpages/414.html).
Le 27 janvier 2014, le Parlement croate a tenu une séance spéciale en
l’honneur de la Journée internationale dédiée à la mémhoire des victimes
de l’Holocauste à laquelle ont participé de nombreuses personnahlités poli-
tiques et publiques, les représentants des cultes et le président hde la R-pu
blique, Ivo Josipović. Le président du Parlement, JosipLeko, et le Premier
ministre, Zoran Milanović, ont prononcé des discours :
« Prenant la parole, le Premier ministre Zoran Milanović a observé
que cette cérémonie devrait être l’occasion de prononcer desh discours
politiques plutôt que de simples commémorations, parce que ce qui h
s’était passé soixantedix ans plus tôt appartenait à l’histoire éternelle
du combat entre le bien et le mal, du destin d’un individu moral dans
une société immorale. Il a rappelé à son auditoire que l’hantisémitisme
n’était pas né du jour au lendemain, et que tout ce qui se disahit des
Juifs avant l’Holocauste pouvait être considéré comme des aphpels à
la haine.
Il a aussi rappelé que des choses horribles s’étaient passéehs en
Croatie en 1941, qui visaient non seulement les Juifs, mais encore les
Serbes avant eux.
Jusqu’en avril 1941, l’Europe n’avait pas connu d’exécutions mas -
sives motivées par des croyances religieuses ou une origine diffé -
rentes. La situation avait changé en avril de cette année -là avec la
création de l’Etat indépendant de Croatie. En l’espace de quhelques
semaines, les exécutions massives de personnes que leur religion ou
leur nationalité marquaient comme différentes ont commencé. Ellehs
ont visé d’abord les Serbes, puis les Juifs. Or ce n’est qu’hà la fin du
mois de juin que les exécutions massives ont commencé en Europe
orientale, visant principalement les Juifs. Ce n’était pas encore h
l’époque des camps de concentration. C’était l’époque hdes tueries en
masse avec des armes à feu qui, on s’en apercevrait bientôt, neh pou-
vaient répondre aux normes techniques élevées des bourreaux. Nous
savons tous ce qui a suivi peu de temps après. »
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1067 18/04/16 08:55 535 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
In his speech, the Speaker of the Parliament of Croatia, Josip Leko,
pointed out that :
“One could say that Nazi brutalities began already in the first dayhs
of Hitler’s dictatorship and continued twelve full years ; however, the
real proportions of that unprecedented, planned in detail, and system-
atically carried out policy of annihilation became visible only at the
end of the SecondWorld War following the access of the Allied troops
to the ‘death factories’, the largest of which was the concentratihon
camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau. One of these frightening pages of the
past, the darkest, most inhumane pages of the past, is the death camp
of Jasenovac created on the model of the notorious Nazi concentra -
tion camps.”
3.5. President Tudjman’s Croatia and the legacy of the NDH
129. In the construction of Croatia, the legacy of the NDH could not
be left aside because that legacy, as was repeatedly pointed out in unishon
and almost ritually, is a part of the “thousand -year-old national indepen-
dence and the existence of the State of the Croatian people”. Moreovehr,
although by its emergence and nature, it was a puppet State, Pavelić’s
NDH was in effect the first Croatian State since the year 1102, when the
medieval Croatian State came under the rule of Hungary.
It appears that strong elements of the legacy of the NDH were not
alien to the Croatian State in the period 1990 -1995.
130. President Tudjman clearly determined his perception of the Croa -
tian State. His statements are of special importance because he was the h
unquestionable political authority during his lifetime. He was regarded has
“the Messiah of the Croatian people”. Misha Glenny notes that Tudj -
man, at his inauguration as the President, was introduced with these
words: “On this day (Palm Sunday) Christ triumphant came to Jerusa -
lem. He was greeted as a messiah. Today our capital is the new Jerusalemh.
Franjo Tudjman has come to his people.” (M. Glenny, The Fall of Yugo‑
slavia, 1992.)
For Tudjman, the Croatian State implies an ethnic State based on his -
torical right. In that regard, even genocide in history had some positivhe
consequences, such as
“[bringing] about ethnic homogenization of some peoples, leading to
more harmony in the national composition of the population and
State borders of individual countries, thus also having possible posi -
tive impact on developments in the future, in the sense of fewer rea -
sons of fresh violence and pretexts for the outbreak of new conflicts
and international friction” (F. Tudjman, Wastelands in Historical
Reality, Nakladni Zavod Matiće Hrvatska, Zagreb, p. 163).
536
7 CIJ1077.indb 1068 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 535
Dans son discours, le président du Parlement croate, Josip Leko, a
déclaré:
« On sait que les brutalités nazies ont commencé dès les premiers
jours de la dictature de Hitler et se sont poursuivies pendant douze
années entières; cependant, ce n’est qu’à la fin de la seconde guerre
mondiale que l’on a pu mesurer l’ampleur d’une politique d’extermina -
tion sans précédent, planifiée dans ses moindres détails eht systémati-
quement exécutée; il a fallu pour cela que les troupes alliées parviennent
jusqu’aux « camps de la mort », dont le plus grand était le camp de
concentration d’Auschwitz-Birkenau. Parmi les pages effrayantes de ce
passé, parmi les pages les plus sombres et les plus inhumaines de ce
passé figure le camp de la mort de Jasenovac, créé sur le modhèle des
tristement célèbres camps de concentration nazi. »
3.5. La Croatie de Tudjman et l’héritage du NDH
129. Dans la construction de la Croatie, l’héritage du NDH ne pouvait
pas être ignoré, parce que, comme on ne cessait de le proclamer àh l’unis -
son et de manière quasi rituelle, il faisait partie de l’histoire «millénaire de
l’indépendance nationale et de l’existence de l’Etat du peuphle croate ». De
plus, et bien qu’il eût été de naissance et par nature un Ethat fantoche, le
NDH de Pavelić avait été en réalité le premier Etat croate depuis l’an1102,
date à laquelle l’Etat croate médiéval était passé sous le contrôle de la
Hongrie.
Il est manifeste que de solides éléments de l’héritage du NDhH n’ont pas
été étrangers à l’Etat croate pendant les années 1990 -1995.
130. Le président Tudjman a clairement défini sa conception de l’Ehtat
croate. Ses déclarations revêtent une importance particulière dhu fait que,
tout au long de sa vie, il a été une incontestable référenceh politique. Tudj-
man était considéré comme « le Messie du peuple croate ». Misha Glenny
a ainsi relevé que, lors de sa cérémonie d’investiture en tahnt que président,
il avait été présenté en ces termes: «En ce jour (dimanche des Rameaux),
le Christ triomphant entrait à Jérusalem. Il y était accueilli hen Messie.
Aujourd’hui, notre capitale est la nouvelle Jérusalem. Franjo Tudjman
est venu parmi son peuple. » (M. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 1992.)
Pour Tudjman, l’Etat croate ne pouvait être qu’un Etat ethniqueh fondé
sur un droit historique. A cet égard, même le génocide avait dahns l’his -
toire certains effets positifs
«[en aboutissant à] l’homogénéisation ethnique de certains pehuples,
en amenant une plus grande harmonie dans la composition nationale
de la population et dans les frontières des pays concernés, et de hcette
façon en ayant peut-être une influence favorable sur l’avenir, dans la
mesure où les risques de nouvelles violences et les prétextes àh de nou-
veaux conflits et à de nouvelles tensions internationales en étahient
diminués» (F. Tudjman, Wastelands in Historical Reality, Nakladni
Zavod Matiće Hrvatska, Zagreb, p. 163).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1069 18/04/16 08:55 536 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Hence, even Ustasha Croatia was “not only a quisling organization
and a fascist crime, but was also an expression of the Croatian nation’hs
historic desire for an independent homeland” (Z. Silber and A. Little,
Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation , 1997, pp. 82-87). The last American
Ambassador to the SFRY, Warren Zimmermann, portrayed Presi -
dent Tudjman’s relations with Serbs in the following way :
“Mike Einik and I raised with him or his aides every piece of infor-
mation that came to us about abuses of the civil rights of Serbs, in
hopes that his Government would crack down on the offences and
bring the offenders to book. With a few individual exceptions, he was
unresponsive. I urged him to visit Jasenovac, the notorious
World War II Croatian concentration camp where tens of thousands
of Serbs and other [victims] had perished, as Willy Brandt had gone
to Yad Vashem in Israel in an act of contrition for the Holocaust. He
refused . . .
But toward Croatia’s Serbian population he rejected any gesture
that smacked of reconciliation, co-operation, or healing . . .
Tudjman always seemed to me on the brink of becoming a slightly
ridiculous operetta figure. But this impression was contradicted by
the ruthlessness with which he pursued Croatian interests as he saw
them.” (W. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe : Yugoslavia and
Its Destroyers — America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened
and Why , 1996, pp. 76-77.)
130.1. The meaning of President Tudjman’s policy did not go unno -
ticed. The American expert in geopolitics, Samuel Huntington, also
warned that the Ustasha acts of violence were the key factor which
prompted the reaction of the Serbian minority and thus predetermined
the course of events during the disintegration of the SFRY. “The conflhicts
between Serbs and Croats, for example, cannot be attributed to demogra -
phy, but only partly to history, because these nations lived relatively h
peacefully, one beside the other, until the Croatian Ustasha killed Serbhs
in the Second World War”, says Huntington. The relationship character -
ized by a lack of tolerance towards Serbs enjoyed at that time the suppohrt
of an important ally of the Ustasha NDH — Nazi Germany. During the
meeting between Ante Pavelić and Adolf Hitler, in connection with the
“Serbian question”, Hitler pronounced a sentence which was probablhy
prepared in advance and, hence, particularly stressed : “If the Croatian
State desires to be really strong, it will have to pursue nationally intholer
ant policy for 50 years, because excessive tolerance in these questions
causes only damage.” (S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 1996,
p. 261.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1070 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 536
Par conséquent, la Croatie oustachie n’était « pas seulement une orga -
nisation collaborationniste et un crime fasciste. C’était aussi l’hexpression
de l’aspiration historique de la nation croate à une patrie indéhpendante »
(Z. Silber et A. Little, Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation , 1997, p. 82-87).
Warren Zimmermann, qui fut le dernier ambassadeur des Etats -Unis
auprès de la RFSY, a décrit comme suit les rapports entre le préhsident
Tudjman et les Serbes :
« Mike Einik et moi avons porté à son attention ou à celle de
ses aides toutes les informations qui nous parvenaient sur les
atteintes aux droits civils des Serbes, dans l’espoir que son gouverne -
ment sanctionnerait ces atteintes et traduirait leurs auteurs devant
les tribunaux. A quelques rares exceptions près, Tudjman n’a
pas réagi. Je l’ai exhorté à se rendre à Jasenovac, le tristehment
célèbre camp de concentration croate où, durant la seconde
guerre mondiale, plusieurs dizaines de milliers de Serbes et autres
victimes ont péri, comme Willy Brandt s’était rendu à
Yad Vashem, en Israël, dans un acte de contrition pour l’Holocauste.
Il a refusé…
Mais envers la population serbe de Croatie, il rejetait tout geste
qui pouvait ressembler de près ou de loin à un geste de réconcihlia -
tion, de coopération ou d’apaisement…
Tudjman m’a toujours paru sur le point de basculer dans un rôle
d’opérette un peu ridicule. Mais cette impression était démehntie par
la brutalité avec laquelle il servait les intérêts croates telsh qu’il les
concevait. » (W. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe : Yugoslavia
and Its Destroyers — America’s Last Ambassador Tells What
Happened and Why , 1996, p. 76-77.)
130.1. La signification de la politique de Tudjman n’est pas passée inah -
perçue. Le géopolitologue américain, Samuel Huntington, a lui aussi
reconnu que les actes de violence oustachis étaient le facteur principal qui
a poussé la minorité serbe à réagir et a ainsi déterminéh le cours des événe-
ments pendant la désintégration de la RFSY. « Les conflits entre Serbes et
Croates, par exemple, ne peuvent pas être imputés à la démoghraphie, et
seulement partiellement à l’histoire, parce que ces nations ont vécu de
façon relativement pacifique l’une à côté de l’autreh jusqu’à ce que les Ou-s
tachis croates se mettent à tuer des Serbes pendant la seconde guerreh
mondiale », observe Huntington. Cette intolérance des Croates vis -à-vis
des Serbes a reçu à l’époque le soutien d’un allié imphortant du NDH ous-
tachi: l’Allemagne nazie. Pendant un entretien entre Ante Pavelić et
Adolf Hitler, au sujet de la « question serbe », Hitler a prononcé une
phrase qui avait probablement été préparée d’avance et avhait en consé -
quence un relief particulier : « Si l’Etat croate désire être vraiment fort, il
lui faudra pratiquer une politique d’intolérance nationale pendanth cin -
quante ans, parce qu’une tolérance excessive dans ces questions n’a quhe
des inconvénients. » (S. P. Huntington, Le Choc des civilisations, 1996,
p. 261.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1071 18/04/16 08:55 537 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
130.2. The attention was brought to all these facts in 2009 by the Slo -
vene State Council, the other Chamber of the Slovene Parliament, which
even adopted a separate statement in connection with the cherishing of
the attainments of the NDH in the neighbouring country, which pro -
voked numerous strong reactions. Namely, in the course of the debate
concerning the ratification of the accession of Croatia to the NATO Alhli-
ance, the Slovene State Council adopted, at its 13th meeting, a statement
to the effect that Croatia should be aware of responsibility for the resphect
for the basic values expected of NATO membership. As an aggravating
circumstance for the accession to NATO membership, the neighbouring
country was reproached for “the attitude of Croatia towards NDH tradih -
tion”, in view of the fact that “the NDH is to this day a constituhtive part
of the Croatian national conscience” (“Hrvaška : Gre za škandalozno
obtozbo”, 24ur, 24 January 2009, dostupno preko : http://www.24ur.com/
novice/svet/hrvaska -gre-za-skandalozno-obtozbo.html).
130.3. The mayor of Split, the largest city in Dalmatia, reacted in con -
nection with the meeting organized in Split on 11 January 2014 by the
second-largest political party in Croatia, the HDZ (Croatian Democratic
Union), founded by President Tudjman, on the occasion of the celebra -
tion of its 24th anniversary.
Mayor Baldasar, inter alia, says:
“The messages uttered in Split take us, as a society, several steps
back and do not contribute in any way whatsoever to constructive
solutions aimed at a better present and a better future of citizens who h
are preoccupied with quite concrete problems ; problems for which
not a single solution has been offered by Mr. Karamarko and others.
The Ustasha greetings at public gatherings, hatred speech and manip -
ulation of historical facts do not reflect patriotism nor care for theh
well-being of Croatia and its citizens. Therefore, I wish that the
Split HDZ, as well as the HDZ as a whole, celebrate the next anni -
versary in a more dignified and more decent way befitting to a polith-
ical party calling itself democratic.” (http://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/
hrvatska/111419 -baldasar -porucio -hadezeovcima -iduci -put-k,
12 January 2014.)
131. Special value in that regard possesses statements of high officials
and leading politicians in Croatia as regards President Tudjman’s polhicy
(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicara ‑
gua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986,
p. 41, paras. 64-65, p. 43, para. 70, and p. 47, para. 78 Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 206-207, para. 78).
131.1. Ivica Račan, former leader of the SDP (Party of Democratic
Reform), now the ruling party of Croatia, and Prime Minister of Croatiah
from 2000 -2003, characterized Tudjman’s Party, HDZ (Croatian Demo -
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1072 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 537
130.2. Le Conseil national slovène (deuxième chambre du Parlementh
bicaméral slovène) a attiré l’attention sur cette situationh en 2009, lorsqu’il
a adopté une déclaration qui a fait beaucoup de bruit sur la célébration
par le pays voisin des hauts faits du NDH. Plus précisément, dans hle cadre
du débat sur la ratification de l’adhésion de la Croatie àh l’Organisation du
Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN), le Conseil national slovèhne a
adopté, à sa treizième séance, une déclaration exhortant hla Croatie à res-
pecter les valeurs fondamentales défendues par les membres de l’Orhgani-
sation. En opposition à son adhésion à l’OTAN, le pays voisihn s’est fait
reprocher « l’attitude de la Croatie envers la tradition du NDH », mani-
festée dans le fait que «le NDH fait encore aujourd’hui partie intégrante
de la conscience nationale croate » (« Hrvaška: Gre za škandalozno
obtozbo », 24ur, 24 janvier 2009. dostupno preko : http://www.24ur.com/
novice/svet/hrvaska -gre-za-skandalozno-obtozbo.html).
130.3. Le maire de Split, qui est la plus grande ville de la Dalmatie, a
réagi de la façon suivante à un meeting organisé le 11 janvier 2014 dans
sa ville par le deuxième parti politique croate, le HDZ (Union déhmocra -
tique croate) pour célébrer le vingt -quatrième anniversaire de sa fonda -
tion par le président Tudjman.
Le maire Baldasar a notamment déclaré :
«Les messages proférés à Split nous font profondément régrhesser,
en tant que société, et ne contribuent en aucune façon à desh solutions
susceptibles d’améliorer le présent et l’avenir de citoyens hqui sont aux
prises avec des problèmes concrets ; des problèmes auxquels ni
M. Karamarko ni les autres orateurs n’ont offert la moindre solution.
Les saluts oustachis dans des réunions publiques, les appels à la hhaine
et la déformation systématique de faits historiques ne sauraient phasser
pour des manifestations de patriotisme et ne témoignent pas d’un
véritable souci du bien-être de la Croatie et de ses habitants. J’engage
donc la section locale du HDZ, ainsi que le HDZ au niveau national,
à célébrer le prochain anniversaire de leur parti de façon phlus
décente et digne d’un parti politique qui se prétend démocratique. »
(http://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/111419 -baldasar -porucio-
hadezeovcima-iduci-put-k, 12 janvier 2014.)
131. Les déclarations sur la politique du président Tudjman émanant
de personnalités politiques et de représentants officiels de l’hEtat possèdent
une valeur probante particulière (Activités militaires et paramilitaires
au Nicaragua et contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p.41, par. 64-65, p. 43, par. 70, et p. 47,
par. 78 ; Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République dém▯ocra ‑
tique du Congo c. Ouganda), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2005, p. 206-207,
par. 78).
131.1. Ivica Račan, ancien dirigeant du SDP (parti réformiste démocra-
tique), parti aujourd’hui au pouvoir en Croatie, et lui -même premier
ministre de la Croatie de 2000 à 2003, a qualifié le HDZ (union démocra-
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1073 18/04/16 08:55 538 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
cratic Union), as the “party of dangerous intentions” because it h“invokes
the ghost of the NDH”. Račan’s endeavour to draw attention to the
unacceptability of resurrection of the achievements of the NDH did not
fall on fertile ground the majority of the Croatian public, at least judging
by the great support enjoyed by the HDZ for many years, did not reject
Tudjman’s pronouncements nor did it recognize anything negative in hihs
ideology (http://www.hvatski -fokus.hr/index-php?option=com-content&
view=article&id=1556:prije -dvadeset -godina -ivica -raan -hdz -je-
stranka-opasnih-namjera-10&catid=22:feljtoni&itemd=46).
132. The distinguished Croatian journalist and publisher Slavko Gold-
stein, a founder of the Croatian Social Liberal Party and the party’sh first
leader, said that “the Ustasha regime was an abortive semblance of a h
legal State, a poorly organized combination of legality and wild chaos”h.
He further said that “[f]or understandable reasons, in the historicalh mem-
ory of the Serbian people, the Ustasha NDH has never been and will
never be anything but a fascist crime, slaughterhouse of the Serbs in Crho-
atia and Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Slavko Goldstein, 1941 : Godina koja
se vraća (1941 : The Year that Keeps Returning) , book review available
at: www.nybooks.com/books/imprints/collections/194-1 the-year-that-keeps-
returning).
133. The first Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, and
one of the closest associated to President Tudjman, Josip Boljkovac,
claims “the Ustasha ideology is still alive in Croatia”. He claimsh that this
“must be a serious warning” and that it is “tragic that the Ustasha ideol -
ogy is coming back to Croatia ; that members of the SKOJ (Union of
Communist Youth of Yugoslavia), organizers of the 1941 uprising againsth
fascism, are being tried” (“Boljkovac : Ustastvo I dalje zivu u Hrvatskoj”,
Glas Istre, 6 January 2014, dostupno preko : http://www.glasistre.hr/
vijesti/hrvatska/boljkovac-ustasvo-i-dalje-zivu-u-hrvatskoj-436319).
The realization of the idea of an ethnically clean Croatia does not toleh-r
ate restrictions of any kind, tacitly according to the then President
of Croatia, Stjepan Mesić. What is essential is to achieve the aim. In ah
speech to Croatian expatriates in Australia, delivered in the early 1990hs,
he says:
“You see, in the Second World War, the Croats won twice and we
have no reason to apologize to anyone. What they ask of the Croats
the whole time, ‘Go kneel in Jasenovac, kneel here. . .’ We don’t have
to kneel in front of anyone for anything ! We won twice and all the
others only once. We won on 10 April when the Axis Powers recog -
nized Croatia as a State and we won because we sat after the war,
again with the winners, at the winning table.” (“Croatian leader’hs
speech glorifying World War Two pro -Nazi State widely condemned”,
Text of Report in English by Croatian news agency HINA, BBC Mon-
itoring Europe, 10 December 2006, a video of the speech in the orig -
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1074 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 538
tique croate), qui était le parti de Tudjman, de « parti des intentions dan-
gereuses » parce qu’il « invoqu[ait] l’esprit du NDH ». La tentative de
Račan d’attirer l’attention sur le caractère intolérable de la glorification
des succès du NDH n’a guère reçu d’écho ; en effet, la majorité de la
population croate, à en juger par la forte popularité dont a joui hle NDH
pendant de longues années, n’a guère rejeté les déclarations de Tudjman
ni perçu rien de négatif dans son idéologie (http://www.hvatskhi-fokus.hr/
index-php?option=com -content&view=article&id=1556:prije -dvadeset-
godina -ivica -raan -hdz-je-stranka -opasnih -namjera -10&catid=22:
feljtoni&itemd=46).
132. Un journaliste et éditeur croate respecté, Slavko Goldstein, fon-
dateur du parti croate social -libéral et son premier dirigeant, disait que
« lerégime oustachi était une fiction mort-née d’Etat légal, une combinai-
son mal organisée de légalisme et de chaos ». Il a également déclaré que,
«[p]our des raisons bien compréhensibles, dans la mémoire historiquhe du
peuple serbe, le NDH oustachi n’a jamais été et ne sera jamais hautre chose
qu’un crime fasciste, un abattoir pour les Serbes de Croatie et de Bosnie -
Herzégovine» (Slavko Goldstein, 1941 : Godina koja se vraća , publié en
anglais sous le titre1941 : The Year that Keeps Returning , lire la recension
de l’éditeur américain à l’adresse : http://www.nybooks.com/books/
imprints/collections/1941 -the-year-that-keeps-returning).
133. Le premier ministre de l’intérieur de la République de Croatie et
l’un des plus proches compagnons du président Tudjman, Josip Bolj -
kovac, assure que «l’idéologie oustachie est encore vivante en Croatie». Il
affirme voir «un sérieux avertissement» et «une preuve tragique du retour
de l’idéologie oustachie en Croatie dans le fait que des membres dhe la
SKOJ (union des jeunes communistes de Yougoslavie), organisateurs du
soulèvement de 1941 contre le fascisme, soient aujourd’hui traîhnés devant
les tribunaux » (« Boljkovac: Ustastvo I dalje zivu u Hrvatskoj », Glas
Istre, 6 janvier 2014, dostupno preko : http://www.glasistre.hr/vijesti/
hrvatska/boljkovac -ustasvo-i-dalje-zivu-u-hrvatskoj-436319).
Quand il était encore président de la Croatie, Stjepan Mesić a reconnu
tacitement que la réalisation de l’idée d’une Croatie ethniqhuement pure ne
tolère aucune restriction d’aucune sorte. L’important, c’esth d’atteindre
l’objectif. Dans une allocution à des expatriés croates en Australie, il
disait au début des années 1990 :
« Voyez -vous, pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, les Croates ont
gagné deux fois et nous n’avons à présenter d’excuses àh personne. On
n’arrête pas de dire tout le temps aux Croates : «Allez -vous mettre à
genoux à Jasenovac, mettez-vous à genoux ici, mettez-vous à genoux
là… » Nous n’avons aucune raison de nous mettre à genoux devant
personne! Nous avons gagné deux fois, et les autres une fois seule -
ment. Nous avons gagné le 10 avril quand les puissances de l’Axe ont
reconnu la Croatie comme Etat et nous avons gagné parce qu’aprèhs
la guerre nous nous sommes assis, encore une fois avec les vain -
queurs, à la table des vainqueurs » (« Croatian leader’s speech glo-
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1075 18/04/16 08:55 539 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
inal Serbo -Croatian can be viewed at http://emperor.vwh.net/croatia/
MesicVideo.wmv) 2.
3.6. State symbols and other acts
134. Every State autonomously determines its symbols, i.e., signs by
which it is recognized. The choice of State symbols is a matter of optiohn,
a strictly internal domain of the State.
Under the December 1990 amendments to the Constitution, as a new
State symbol was adopted the HDZ party flag with šahovnica, a red and
white chequerboard pattern “[that] was . . . employed by the Ustasha
regime and which the Croatian Serbs considered as ‘footprint of the
Ustashe’” (Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, 1997,
p. 223). To “many Jews, Serbs and others, it is a symbol almost as hatehful
as the swastika” (S. Kinzer, “Pro-Nazi Rulers’ Legacy Still Lingers for
Croatia”, The New York Times, 31 October 1993). Tudjman’s régime
“also renamed the police into ‘redarstvo’ which had Ustasha conhnota -
tions, renamed streets and public places after World War II generals”h
(C. Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse : Causes, Course and Conse ‑
quences, 1995, p. 141).
Furthermore, at President Tudjman’s proposal, the Croatian parlia-
ment adopted a
“new currency and call[ed] it kuna, which was the name of the national
currency of the Ustasha period. A prominent Croatian Jew,
Slavko Goldstein, wrote in a newspaper’s commentary that the deci -
sion ‘will awaken very deep feelings of antagonism in a not -small
2 As far as the reaction to this statement of President Mesić, Jared IsEncy‑, in
clopedia of the Holocaust states:
“Despite the political significance of this video, both in terms ofh understanding
the Serbian-Croatian conflict over the past sixteen years and judging the sincerithy of
Croatian President Mesić’s current claim to abhor Ustasha politics, and despite the
fact that three leading Croatian TV newspeople were suspended for broadchasting
the video and subsequently reinstated, following an uproar in Croatia, dhespite these
highly newsworthy events, and despite the fact that some of the main inthernational
news agencies — including Associated Press, Agence France Presse, ANSA and BBC
Monitoring — all covered this story, nevertheless, out of the thousands of Englihsh,
French, German, Italian, Spanish and Dutch newspapers and TV news statiohns
archived by the Lexis -Nexis media search engine, we could find only — the
Dutch newspaper, Dagblad van het Noorden — that even mentioned the scandal.”
(http://de-construct.net/e-zine/?p=361)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1076 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 539
rifying World War Two pro -Nazi State widely condemned. » (« Le
discours d’un dirigeant croate glorifiant l’Etat croate pronazi hpen -
dant la deuxième guerre mondiale suscite une large réprobation »),
texte d’un reportage en anglais de l’agence de presse croate HINA,
BBC Monitoring Europe, 10 décembre 2006 ; un enregistrement
vidéo du discours en serbo -croate peut être visionné à l’adresse http://
emperor.vwh.net/croatia/MesicVideo.wmv) 2.
3.6. Emblèmes d’Etat et autres mesures
134. C’est en toute autonomie qu’un Etat choisit ses emblèmes,
c’est-à-dire les signes par lesquels il sera reconnu. Le choix des emblèmes
d’Etat est libre et relève strictement de l’autorité interneh de l’Etat considéré.
En application des amendements de 1990 à la Constitution, un nouvel
emblème d’Etat a été adopté : le drapeau du HDZ orné d’un «šahovnica»,
motif en damier rouge et blanc … [qui] était … utilisé par le régime ous -
tachi et que les Serbes de Croatie considéraient comme la « signature des
Oustachis » (Marcus Tanner, Croatia : A Nation Forged in War , 1997,
p. 223). Pour « de nombreux Juifs, Serbes, et autres, il s’agi[ssai]t d’un
symbole aussi odieux que la swastika » (S. Kinzer, « Pro -Nazi Rulers’
Legacy Still Lingers for Croatia »,The New York Times, 31 octobre 1993).
Le régime de Tudjman « a également rebaptisé la police « redarstvo»,
terme à connotation oustachie, et renommé des rues et autres lieuxh publics
en hommage à certains généraux de la seconde guerre mondiale (C. Ben -
nett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse : Causes, Course and Consequences ,
1995, p. 141).
En outre, sur la proposition du président Tudjman, le parlement croathe
a adopté
«une nouvelle monnaie qu’il a appelée kuna, c’est-à-dire du même
nom que celui de la monnaie nationale sous le régime oustachi.
Slavko Goldstein, un Juif croate influent, a écrit dans un article que
cette décision « [allait] réveiller de très profonds sentiments d’an -
2 Sur la réception de cette allocution du président Mesić, Jared Israel écrThedans
Encyclopaedia of the Holocaust :
« Malgré l’importance politique de cette vidéo, tant pour une meihlleure compré -
hension du conflit de ces seize dernières années entre les Serbehs et les Croates que
pour apprécier la sincérité du président de la Croatie, Stjehpanquand il dit
abhorrer aujourd’hui la politique oustachie, et malgré le fait queh trois journalistes
connus de la télévision croate aient été relevés de leursh fonctions pour avoir diffusé la
vidéo, puis réintégrés sous la pression du public, malgréh l’intérêt de cette affaire et le
fait que les plus grandes agences de presse du monde — y compris l’hAssociated Press,
l’Agence France-Presse, l’ANSA et la BBC Monitoring — lui aient consacré des
dépêches, nous n’avons pu, parmi les milliers de journaux et chhaînes de télévisions
anglais, français, allemands, italiens, espagnols et néerlandais ahrchivés par le moteur
de recherche Lexis-Nexis, en trouver qu’un seul — le quotidien néherlandais Dagblad
van het Noorden — qui ait seulement mentionné ce scanda» (http://de-construct.
net/e-zine/?p=361).
540
7 CIJ1077.indb 1077 18/04/16 08:55 540 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
portion of the population for whom these associations are extremely
painful’.” (C.Bennett, op. cit.)
The names of streets and institutions were changed, i.e., instead of the
names from the period of Yugoslavia, newly-given names are associated
with Ustasha Croatia. Immediately after Tudjman’s coming to power, anh
elementary school in Zagreb was renamed after Mile Budak, Minister of
Justice under the Ustasha State, the main Ustasha ideologist and author
of the formula for the solution of the Serb question. Budak fled from h
Zagreb on 6 May 1945, but was handed over to Tito’s Yugoslavia by the
English authorities on 18 May 1945. As a war criminal Budak was sen -
tenced to death. As can be seen from the decision of the Croatian Minis -
ter of Public Administration, Arsen Banko, about the removal of the
“names of streets given in honour of a senior Ustasha official”, hthere still
remain streets named after Mile Budak in ten cities and local districts
(Danas, Croatian edition, 3 January 2014). The decision met with opposi -
tion, so that the final decision will be made by the competent municiphal
court. It is interesting to note that the Association for the Promotion hof
Local Government and Self-Rule requested already in April 2011 that the
street in Slavonski Brod named after Dr. Mile Budak be renamed ; the
City Council, however, refused with the explanation that the change
would entail considerable financial costs.
135. Upon Tudjman’s rise to power, a plaque in memory of Mile Budak
was raised in Sveti Rok, whereas another plaque in memory of
Juraj Francetić, Commander of the notorious Black Legion and Ustasha
Commissioner for Bosnia and Herzegovina responsible for the massacre
of Bosnian Serbs and Jews was put up in Slunj. Both memorials were
removed in 2004 by the decision of the Croatian Government with the
explanation that the fixing of the plaques was “contrary to the orihginal
basic principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and thath it
harms the reputation and interests of the Republic of Croatia” (Hrvatska
riječ, 10March 2013). However, in January 2005, another memorial to
J. Francetić and Mile Budak was built in the outskirts of Split (E. Pond,
Endgame in the Balkans : Régime Change, European Style , 2006,
pp. 135-136). The 13th and the 14th battalions of the Croatian Defence
Forces were also named after Francetić, as well as a military unit ofh the
Croatian Defence Council which was active in central Bosnia and Herze -
govina in 1993 (C. Shrader, The Muslim‑Croat Civil War in Central Bos ‑
nia: A Military History, 1992‑1994, 2003). The “Victims of Fascism
Square” in Zagreb was renamed the “Square of Croatian Giants”.
Ambassador Zimmermann noted that :
“By changing street names that had previously honoured victims
of fascism and reviving the traditional Croatian flag and coat of armsh
last used during the 1941-1945 Ustaše dictatorship, the Croatian Gov-
ernment contributed to the resurrection of this grotesque period in
541
7 CIJ1077.indb 1078 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 540
tagonisme au sein d’une partie non négligeable de la population pour
qui ces associations [étaient] extrêmement douloureuses » (C. Ben -
nett, op.cit.).
Les noms de certaines rues et institutions ont été changés, ceuhx datant
de la période yougoslave étant remplacés par de nouveaux noms ahssociés
à la Croatie oustachie. Immédiatement après l’arrivée au hpouvoir de
Tudjman, une école élémentaire de Zagreb a été rebaptisée « Mile Budak »,
du nom du ministre de la justice de l’Etat oustachi, principal idéhologue du
régime et inventeur de la solution de la question serbe. Ayant fui Zagreb
le 6 mai 1945, Budak avait été livré par les autorités britanniques àh la
Yougoslavie de Tito le 18 mai 1945. Il a été condamné à mort pour crimes
de guerre. Comme le montre la décision prise par le ministre croate dhe
l’administration publique, Arsen Banko, de renommer « les rues portant
le nom d’un dirigeant oustachi », il existe encore des rues nommées en
l’honneur de Mile Budak dans dix villes et villages (Danas, édition croate,
3 janvier 2014). Cette décision a été contestée, si bien que ce sont hles tri-
bunaux locaux compétentes qui seront appelés à trancher la queshtion. Il
convient de noter que l’« Association pour la promotion de la gouver -
nance locale et de l’autonomie » avait déjà demandé, en avril 2011, que la
rue de Slavonski Brod portant le nom de Mile Budak soit renommée ; le
conseil municipal avait rejeté cette demande, au motif qu’une tellhe mesure
serait trop coûteuse (ibid.).
135. Après l’arrivée de Tudjman au pouvoir, une plaque à la méhmoire de
Mile Budak a été inaugurée à Sveti Rok, tandis qu’une autre plaque en
hommage à Juraj Francetić, commandant de la tristement célèbre Légion
noire, commissaire du régime oustachi pour la Bosnie-Herzégovine et res -
ponsable du massacre de Serbes et de Juifs de Bosnie, était posée hà Slunj.
Sur décision du Gouvernement croate, ces deux plaques ont été dhéposées
en 2004, au motif que leur installation était «contraire aux principes fonda-
mentaux de la Constitution de la République de Croatie et port[ait] ahtteinte
» (Hrvatska riječ,
à la réputation et aux intérêts de la République de Croathie
10 mars 2013). Cela n’a pas empêché que, dès janvier2005, un autre monu-
ment à la mémoire de J. Francetićet MileBudak soit érigé dans les environs
de Split (Elizabeth Pond, Endgame in the Balkans : Régime Change, Euro‑
pean Style, 2006, p. 135-136). Les 13 et 14 bataillonsdes forces de défense
croates ont pris le nom de Francetić, de même qu’une unité mhilitaire du
Conseil croate de défense qui avait opéré dans le centre de la
Bosnie -Herzégovine en 1993 (C. Shrader, The Muslim‑Croat Civil War
in Central Bosnia : A Military History, 1992‑1994, 2003). A Zagreb, la
« place des Victimes du fascisme » a été rebaptisée « place des Géants
croates ».
Ainsi que l’a fait remarquer l’ambassadeur Zimmermann,
« [e]n changeant les noms de rues qui honoraient auparavant les vic -
times du fascisme et en renouant avec le drapeau et les armoiries
croates traditionnels, dont la dernière utilisation remontait à lah dic-
tature oustachie des années 1941-1945, le Gouvernement croate a
541
7 CIJ1077.indb 1079 18/04/16 08:55 541 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
the minds of Serbs.” (W. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe :
Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers — America’s Last Ambassador Tells
What Happened and Why , 1996, p. 75.)
136. The glorification of the Ustasha ideology (Ustaštvo) and its
prominent members was accompanied by the destruction of the symbols
of the anti-fascist struggle.
In the period from 1990 -2000, most of the symbols of the anti -fascist
struggle were devastated in Croatia. Over 3,000 of them were demolished,h
damaged or removed (http://www.slobodnaevropa.org./content/article/
703313.html).
Croatian anti -fascist Juraj Hrženjak, participant in the People’s Libera-
tion War, is one of the authors of the monograph entitled “The Destruc -
tion of the Anti -Fascist Monuments in Croatia 1990 -2000”. Hrženjak
notes, inter ali, that 2,904 destroyed or desecrated memorials, busts and
mass graves have been listed. He says that one should add to this numberh
“about 500 memorials which could not be recorded due to the fact that
the extremist Right was in power in these areas ; that due to this fact our
veterans who wanted to put them on the list were exposed to threats,
sometimes even threats with death” (http://www.dw.de/sramna -epizoda-
hrvatske-istorije-16044052).
137. The requests by the Association of Anti -Fascists for the “safe -
guarding of memorials as heritage usually come up against a wall of
silence” (ibid.).
A very small number of devastated anti -fascist memorials have been
repaired. Among those that have been restored is the monument to the
leader of the Anti-Fascist Movement, Josip Broz Tito, in his native place
of Kumrovec and the memorial plaque in the Ustasha concentration
camp Jadovno. According to the words of Croatian PresidentI. Josipović,
who attended the commemoration in Jadovno, “between 30,000 and
40,000 persons were killed there during the war” (Jutarnji list hr., 26 June
2010). The restoration of the anti -fascist memorials seems, however, to
meet with numerous obstacles.
138. The Croatian daily newspaper with the highest circulation,
Jutarnji list published a text entitle: “We spend 350 million kunas annu -
ally for the military of the NDH.” The text says, inter alia, that the Par -
liament of the Republic of Croatia adopted amendments to the Law on
Pension and Disability Insurance in 1993
“which provide for that each year of service that the members of the h
NDH armed forces, called in that law the ‘homeland army’, spent inh
the NDH armed formations counts as two years of service. The same
criterion is applicable to the years which the members of these forces
spent in captivity as POWs after 16 May 1945. The amendments to
the legislation bear the signature of the then Speaker of the House of
542
7 CIJ1077.indb 1080 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 541
contribué à ressusciter cette période grotesque dans l’espriht des
Serbes» (W. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe : Yugoslavia and
Its Destroyers — America’s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened
and Why , 1996, p. 75).
136. La glorification de l’idéologie oustachie (Ustaštvo) et de hses prin-
cipaux représentants s’est accompagnée de la destruction des syhmboles de
la lutte antifasciste.
Dans les années 1990 -2000, la plupart de ces symboles ont été suppri -
més en Croatie ; plus de 3000 d’entre eux ont été démolis, endommagés ou
déplacés (http://www.slobodnaevropa.org./content/article/703313.hhtml).
Juraj Hrženjak, un antifasciste croate qui a participé à la guerre deh
libération populaire, est l’un des auteurs d’une monographie intitulée «La
destruction des monuments antifascistes en Croatie entre 1990 et 2000»,
dans laquelle figure une liste de 2904 monuments commémoratifs, bustes
et charniers qui ont été soit détruits soit profanés. Selon hHrženjak, il
convient d’ajouter à leur nombre « environ 500 monuments commémora -
tifs qui n’ont pas pu être répertoriés parce que la droite ehxtrémiste se
trouvait au pouvoir dans leur secteur ; nos vétérans qui souhaitaient les
inscrire sur la liste ont été exposés à des menaces, parfoish même des
menaces de mort » (http://www.dw.de/sramna -epizoda-hrvatske-istorije-
16044052).
137. Les appels de l’Association des antifascistes « à la préservation du
patrimoine mémoriel se sont généralement heurtés à un murh de silence »
(ibid.).
Le nombre des monuments commémoratifs antifascistes détruits qui
ont été restaurés est très faible. Parmi eux figurent le monument à la
mémoire du chef du mouvement antifasciste, Josip Broz Tito, dans son
village natal de Kumrovec, et la plaque commémorative du camp de
concentration oustachi de Jadovno. Selon le président croate I. Josipović,
qui assistait aux commémorations de Jadovno, « entre 30 000 et40 000 per-
sonnes y ont été tuées durant la guerre» (Jutarnji list hr., 26 juin 2010). La
restauration des monuments antifascistes semble toutefois se heurter àh de
nombreux obstacles.
138. Le quotidien croate le plus important par son tirage, le Jutarnji
list, a publié un article intitulé «aque année, nous dépensons 350 mil-
lions de kunas pour l’armée du NDH ». Ce texte fait notamment état,
entre autres informations, de l’adoption en 1993, par le Parlement deh la
République de Croatie, d’amendements à la loi sur l’assuranche retraite et
invalidité
«qui prévoient que les années que les membres des forces armées
du NDH — appelées dans cette loi « armée patriotique» — ont pas -
sées dans les formations armées du NDH compteront double. Le même
régime s’applique aux années passées en captivité par lesh membres de
ces forces détenus comme prisonniers de guerre après le 16 mai 1945.
Ces amendements portent la signature de celui qui était alors préshident
542
7 CIJ1077.indb 1081 18/04/16 08:55 542 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Deputies, Stjepan Mesić.” (http://www.jutarnji.hr/za -vojnike-ndh-
godisnje-placamo-350-milijuna-kuna/1134285/)
On the basis of the said law “more than 13,000 members of the Ustashah
units, Poglavnik’s (i.e., Pavelićs) Life Guard(s), World War Two Domo-
brans (home guardsmen) and paramilitary policemen, as well as members h
of their family entitled to pension after the death thereof, are on the hfiles
of the Social Security Bureau” at present (ibid.). The amount of 350 mil-
lion kunas (about 45 million euros) is allocated annually for the members
of the armed forces (ibid.).
In contrast, Croatia has never investigated where and/or in whose
hands ended up gold and other valuable objects plundered during the
persecutions and pogroms of Serbs and Jews. The fate of the property of h
persecuted Serbs and Jews has not been established, nor has anyone suc -
ceeded in getting the Croatian authorities after 1991 to include this ques -
tion on the agenda. And it was precisely in these years that the Croatiahn
President, Franjo Tudjman intensively worked on the project of revital -
ization, toleration and glorification of the Ustasha ideology in todayh’s
Croatia. Susan Woodward, in her book entitled Balkan Tragedy thus
came to the conclusion that the
“revisionist history of the Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman relating
to the genocide committed against Serbs, Jews and Roma during the
existence of the Independent State of Croatia in the period from
1941-1945, became politically dangerous at the moment when the
election of Tudjman as President was financially supported mostly by
the rightist émigrés from that period, who brought with them the State
symbols, as well as when special taxes were imposed on Serbs who
had summer houses in Croatia (but not on other persons from some
other republics)” (S. L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy : Chaos and Dis ‑
solution after the Cold War, 1995, p. 229).
3.7. Statements of Croatia’s officials in the light of the jurisprudence o▯f the
ICTR regarding incitement
Dr. Franjo Tudjman, Pre - The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi
sident of the Republic of Croatia,
during the first election campaign “[T]he Chamber recalls that :
in 1989:
(1) Witness FBX testified that Muvu -
nyi told them that even if people
“Thank God my wife is refused to hand over the Tutsis in hid-
neither a Serb nor a Jew.” ing, they had to do so because when a
(Counter -Memorial, Ann. 51; snake wraps itself around a calabash,
emphasis added.) you have to kill the snake and break
the calabash ; (2) Witness AMJ testi -
Dubravko Horvatić Croatian fied that Muvunyi said that babies
academic and writer, in his arti - born to Tutsi girls married to Hutu
cle Matoš o Srbiji published in men after 6 April had to be killed like
543
7 CIJ1077.indb 1082 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 542
de la Chambre des députés, Stjepan Mesić. » (http://www.jutarnji.hr/
za-vojnike-ndh-godisnje-placamo-350-milijuna-kuna/ 1134285/)
En application de la loi en question, « plus de 13 000 anciens membres
des unités oustachies, de la garde personnelle du Poglavnik [c’esth -à-dire,
de Pavelić], de Domobrans (volontaires de la défense du territoirhe) de la
seconde guerre mondiale et de la police paramilitaire, ainsi que les
membres de leurs familles titulaires d’une pension de réversion, fihgurent
sur les listes du bureau de la sécurité sociale » (ibid.). Chaque année,
quelque 350 millions de kunas (environ 45 millions d’euros) sont alloués
aux membres de ces forces armées (ibid.).
En revanche, la Croatie n’a jamais diligenté d’enquête sur che qui est
advenu de l’or et des autres biens pillés pendant les persécutions et les
pogroms qui ont visé les Serbes et les Juifs. La destination ultime des
biens des Serbes et des Juifs persécutés n’a jamais été éhtablie et personne
n’a réussi à convaincre les autorités croates de l’aprèhs-1991 d’inscrire la
question à leur programme. Or c’est précisément pendant ces hannées -là
que le président Tudjman s’est énergiquement consacré à shon projet de
blanchiment, de réhabilitation et de glorification de l’idéolhogie oustachie
dans la Croatie contemporaine. Dans un livre intitulé Balkan Tragedy,
Susan Woodward en est venue à la conclusion que
«le révisionnisme historique du dirigeant croate Franjo Tudjman au
sujet du génocide commis contre les Serbes, les Juifs et les Roms danhs
l’Etat indépendant de Croatie pendant la période 1941 -1945 estdevenu
politiquement dangereux à un moment où l’élection de Tudjmanh
comme président était financée en majeure partie par des éhmigrés de
droite de cette période, qui ont ramené avec eux les emblèmes dh’Etat,
et lorsque des taxes spéciales ont été imposées aux propriétaires serbes
de résidences d’été en Croatie (mais non aux propriétairhes ressortis -
sants de certaines autres républiques) » (S. L. Woodward, Balkan
Tragedy : Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War , 1995, p. 229).
3.7. Déclarations de personnalités croates rapprochées de la jurispr▯udence
du TPIR
Franjo Tudjman, président de Le Procureur c. Tharcisse Muvunyi
la République de Croatie, pen -
dant sa première campagne élec- «[L]a Chambre rappelle : 1) que,
torale en 1989 :
selon le témoin FBX, Muvunyi leur a
dit que, même si des gens refusaient
«Dieu merci, ma femme n’est de livrer les Tutsis qui se cachaient, ils
ni serbe ni juive. (Annexe 51 du devaient s’en occuper, car lorsqu’un
contre-mémoire ; les italiques serpent s’enroule autour d’une cale -
sont de moi.) basse, il faut tuer le serpent au risque
de casser la calebasse ; 2) que, aux
Dubravko Horvatić, universi - dires du témoin AMJ, Muvunyi a
taire et écrivain croate, dans son déclaré que les bébés nés après le
article Matoš o Srbiji , publié 6 avril de filles tutsies mariées à des
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7 CIJ1077.indb 1083 18/04/16 08:55 543 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
the daily newspaper Večernj list, snakes are killed ; (3) Witness CCP
Zagreb, 17 June 1992: testified that Muvunyi said that Tutsis
were comparable to snakes and had
to be killed; and (4) Witness CCP tes -
“Matoš [Croatian poet] taught tified that Muvunyi used a Rwandan
both his contemporaries and gen- proverb to the effect that the Tutsi
erations to come what Serbia is girls that had been ‘married’ to Hutu
and what it is like. On reading men should die in a forest in a faraway
him today, we discover that the place.
experience tells us how much
Matoš was right in saying that Accordingly, the Chamber notes
Serbia is the winner of the ‘world that all four witnesses testified that
championship of killing and seri - Muvunyi used Kinyarwanda proverbs
ous crimes’. . . However, by strip- to urge the audience to kill Tutsis, and
ping the mask off Serbia he has
that three Prosecution witnesses
enormously helped us to learn the recalled that Muvunyi used proverbs
lesson that is particularly relevant comparing Tutsis to snakes to urge the
today: in order for Croats and crowd to kill Tutsis.
other nations to be able to survive,
Serbia must be totally and utterly
The Chamber also notes the evi -
defeated.” (Counter -Memorial, dence of Evariste Ntakirutimana, a
Ann. 51 ; emphasis added.) sociolinguist who was accepted as an
expert witness for the Prosecution.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dr. Franjo Tudjman :
Ntakirutimana’s evidence is that a
proverb is a sentence, which may sum ‑
“And there can be no return to marize an entire context ; it is an
the past, to the times when they
the Serbs were spreading cancer in attempt to say the most possible
the heart of Croatia, cancer which through the least possible words. Pro ‑
was destroying the Croatian verbs are universally accepted truths,
so they are employed in an attempt to
national being and which did not summarize a message into a universally
allow the Croatian people to be the
master in its own house and did accepted fact that everyone should be
not allow Croatia to lead an inde - aware of or admit to.
pendent and sovereign life under . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
this wide, blue sky and within the
world community of sovereign [T]he use of a proverb makes it easier
nations.” (Croatian President for such an audience to understand the
Franjo Tudjman’s Speech on meaning of what is being conveyed ; it
“Freedom Train” Journey after reduces the distance between the per ‑
Driving 250,000 Serbian civilians son who is speaking and the target of
from the Krajina Section of the message. Ntakirutimana also
Yugoslavia, BBC Summary of stated that speakers during the Rwan-
World Broadcasts, 28 August dan war avoided calling the adver -
1995 ; emphasis added.) sary, the Tutsi, by its real name to
544
7 CIJ1077.indb 1084 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 543
dans le quotidien Večernj list de Hutus devaient être tués comme on
Zagreb, le 17 juin 1992 : tue des serpents ; 3) que, selon le
témoin CCP, Muvunyi a dit que les
« Matoš [un poète croate] a Tutsis étaient comparables à des ser -
expliqué à ses contemporains et pents et devaient être tués; et 4) que le
aux générations futures ce qu’est même témoin a dit que Muvunyi avait
la Serbie et à quoi elle ressemble. cité un proverbe rwandais à l’effet de
A le lire aujourd’hui avec le dire que les filles tutsies qui avaient été
bénéfice de l’expérience, on com - « [prises pour] épous[es] » par les
prend à quel point Matoš avait Hutus devaient mourir dans une forêt
raison lorsqu’il disait que la Ser- lointaine.
bie est « championne du monde Ainsi, la Chambre note que ces
des meurtres et des crimes quatre témoins ont tous déclaré que
graves»… Cependant, en arra - Muvunyi avait cité des proverbes
chant le masque de la Serbie, il
kinyarwandas pour inciter le public à
nous a énormément aidés à tirer tuer les Tutsis, et que trois témoins à
un enseignement particulière - charge se sont rappelés que Muvunyi
ment important aujourd’hui : s’était servi de proverbes comparant les
pour que les Croates et les autres Tutsis à des serpents pour pousser la
nations puissent survivre, la Ser ‑
foule à les tuer.
bie doit subir une défaite totale La Chambre prend également acte
et absolue.» (Annexe 51 du du témoignage d’Evariste Ntakiruti -
contre-mémoire; les italiques mana, socio-linguiste qu’elle a accepté
sont de moi.) comme témoin expert à charge.
Franjo Tudjman : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Selon Ntakirutimana, le proverbe
est une phrase pouvant résumer tout un
« Ilne peut y avoir de retour contexte. On essaie, en recourant aux
au passé, à un temps où les
Serbes propageaient un cancer au proverbes, de dire le plus avec le moins
cœur de la Croatie, cancer qui de mots possible. Les proverbes expri ‑
détruisait l’identité nationale ment des vérités admises par tous et
sont utilisés pour résumer un message
croate, empêchait le peuple croate en évoquant une réalité que tout le
d’être maître chez lui et ne per -
mettait pas à la Croatie de monde devrait connaître ou accepter.
mener une vie indépendante et . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
souveraine sous le vaste ciel Le recours aux proverbes permet à
un tel public de saisir le sens du mes ‑
bleu, au sein de la communauté
mondiale des nations souve - sage véhiculé; il réduit la distance entre
raines.» (Discours prononcé par le locuteur et celui auquel il s’adresse.
le président Tudjman lors de son Ntakirutimana a en outre déclaré que,
voyage à bord du « train de la pendant la période de guerre au
liberté», après l’expulsion de Rwanda, les orateurs évitaient de
250 000 civils serbes de la Kra - désigner l’adversaire, à savoir les Tut -
jina; BBC Summary of World sis, par leur vrai nom afin d’éviter
Broadcasts [Résumé des com - toute ingérence ou intervention
muniqués de presse du Service d’étrangers.
544
7 CIJ1077.indb 1085 18/04/16 08:55 544 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Metaphor used by Croatian avoid interference or intervention by
Minister of Foreign Affairs, foreigners.
Hrvoje Sarinić in his conversa -
tion with the US Ambassador For example, the term ‘snake’ is uti‑
Mr. Peter Galbraith, when they, lized to show that there should be no
after Operation Storm, discussed pity when dealing with the Tutsi. Nta-
the opportunities for Serbs to kirutimana testified that a calabash is
come back to their homes in a container of great value, in which
Krajina. milk is stored. Consequently, the pro ‑
verb ‘when a snake twirls around a
calabash, the calabash must be broken
According to Galbraith, who in order to destroy the snake’ conveys
testified in Gotovina, Sarinić saidthe meaning that if you have a precious
the following : “We cannot object that comes under threat, you
accept them to come back. They may have to sacrifice the object rather
are cancer in the stomach of than sacrifice yourself.
Croatia.” (Gotovina et al., testi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
mony of witness Peter Gal-
braith, 23June2008, Transcripts, In giving such a speech, the Cham -
p. 4939.)
ber finds that there is no reasonable
doubt that Muvunyi intended to incite
the audience to commit acts of geno ‑
National, Ethnic and Religious cide. The Chamber further finds that
Hatred — context in which the Prosecution has proven beyond all
Operation Storm was conducted reasonable doubt that Muvunyi pos ‑
sessed the requisite intent to destroy
the Tutsi group as such.” (Muvunyi,
Croatian philosopher Zarko ICTR-00-55A-T, Trial Judgment,
Puhovski, described this context 11 February 2010, paras. 120 -128;
clearly in his statement recorded emphasis added.)
in the documentary “Storm over
Krajina”. He said :
The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema
The Effects of Extremist Ideology
“We are talking here about a Disseminated Through the Mass
large number of incidents which Media
were influenced by motions. But
these incidents, these motions “Military and civilian official [sic]
had been prepared for years perpetuated ethnic tensions prior to
through propaganda, from televi ‑ 1994. Kangura newspaper, established
sion to the president of the coun ‑after the 1990 RPF invasion, Radio
try and all public factors. In Television Mille Colline (RTLM) and
Croatia, which convinced the Cro‑ other print and electronic media took
atian population and especially an active part in the incitement of the
the soldiers that the Serbs are Hutu population against the Tutsis.
guilty as such and they should be Kangura had published the ‘Ten
punished as such.” (Gotovina et Commandments’ for the Hutus in
545
7 CIJ1077.indb 1086 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 544
mondial de la BBC], 28 août Par exemple, le terme « serpent» est
1995 ; les italiques sont de moi.) employé pour indiquer qu’il faut être
sans pitié avec les Tutsis. Selon Nta -
Métaphore employée par le
kirutimana, la calebasse est un réci ‑
ministre croate des affaires pient de grande valeur qui sert à
étrangères, Hrvoje Sarinić, lors - conserver le lait. Par conséquent, le
qu’il a évoqué, avec l’ambassa- proverbe « lorsqu’un serpent s’enroule
deur américain Peter Galbraith, autour d’une calebasse, la calebasse
après l’opération « Tempête», la
doit être détruite pour tuer … le
possibilité pour les Serbes de serpent» signifie que si l’on possède un
regagner leurs foyers dans la objet précieux qui devient dangereux, il
Krajina. peut s’avérer nécessaire de sacrifier
l’objet en question plutôt que de se
Selon M. Galbraith, qui a
déposé en l’affaire Gotovina, sacrifier soi‑même.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sarinić a dit: «Nous ne pouvons La Chambre conclut au -delà de
accepter qu’ils reviennent. Ils tout doute raisonnable que, en tenant
sont un cancer dans le ventre
de la Croatie. » ( Gotovina et de tels propos, Muvunyi avait l’inten -
consorts, déposition du témoin tion d’inciter le public à commettre des
actes de génocide . Elle conclut en
Peter Galbraith, compte rendu outre que le procureur a établi au-delà
de l’audience du 23 juin 2008, de tout doute raisonnable que Muvu -
p. 4939.)
nyi était animé de l’intention requise de
Contexte de haine nationale, détruire le groupe tutsi, comme tel. »
ethnique et religieuse dans lequel (Muvunyi, ICTR-00-55A-T, jugement,
11 février 2010, par. 120-128 ; les ita -
l’opération « Tempête» a été liques sont de moi).
conduite
Le philosophe croate Zarko Le Procureur c. Clément Kayishema
Puhovski a très clairement décrit
ce contexte au cours d’un entre - Les effets de l’idéologie extrémiste dif-
fusée par les médias
tien figurant dans le documen -
taire « Tempête sur la Krajina ».
Il a ainsi déclaré: « Les pouvoirs militaire et civil
n’avaient pas attendu 1994 pour com -
«Ce dont il est question, c’est mencer à attiser les tensions ethniques.
Le journal Kangura, lancé après l’in -
d’un grand nombre d’incidents
qui ont été influencés par des vasion du pays par le FPR en 1990, la
émotions. Mais ces incidents, ces Radiotélévision libre des mille collines
émotions, avaient été préparés (RTLM) et d’autres supports de la
pendant des années par la propa ‑ presse écrite et de l’information électro‑
gande — de la télévision jusqu’au nique participent activement à la cam ‑
président du pays en passant par pagne visant à inciter la population
l’ensemble des éléments de la hutue à se dresser contre les Tutsis . En
vie publique de Croatie — qui 1991, dans les «Dix Commandements»
avait fini par convaincre la popu ‑ qu’il publie à l’intention des Hutus,
545
7 CIJ1077.indb 1087 18/04/16 08:55 545 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
1991, al. Transcripts, 13 Febru - 1991, which stated that the Tutsis
ary 2009, p. 15901; emphasis were the enemy. In addition, accord -
added.) ing to witnesses, in 1991 ten military
commanders produced a full report
that answered the question how to
Miro Bajramovic: defeat the enemy in the military, media
and political domains. These witnesses
also testified that inSeptember 1992
“My name is MiroBajramovic the military issued a memorandum,
and I am directly responsible for based on the 1991 report, which also
the death of 86people . . . I killeddefined ‘the enemy’ as the Tutsi popu-
72 people with my own hands, lation, thereby transferring the hostile
among them nine were women. intentions of the RPF to all Tutsis.
We made no distinction, asked no According to one report, prior to
questions, they were ‘Chetniks’
6 April, the public authorities did not
[Serbs], and our enemies.” (Inter- openly engage in inciting the Hutus to
view with Miro Bajramovic, perpetrate massacres. On 19 April
Feral Tribune , Split, Croatia, however, the President of the Interim
1 September 1997; emphasis Government, told the people of
added.)
Butare to ‘get to work’ in the Rwan -
dan sense of the term by using their
machetes and axes.
Miro Bajramovic : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“We did not separate Serb The dissemination and acceptance
of such ideas was confirmed by a
civilians and soldiers from each Hutu policeman to Prosecution wit -
other. If we found a rifle hidden ness Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, a jour-
in his/her house, we considered nalist reporting for the French
him/her a Chetnik. Serbs at the
time could not survive, because newspaper Le Figaro. De Saint -Exu-
there is a saying : wherever we pery remarked that the policeman had
told him how they killed Tutsis
trod, the grass does not grow ‘because they were the accomplices of
again.” (Ibid.) the RFF’ and that no Tutsis should be
“When I recall all that
torturing, I wonder how they left alive.
managed to think of all those . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
methods . For example, the most
painful is to stick little pins In summary, the Trial Chamber
under the nails and to connect it finds that the massacres of the Tutsi
to the three -phase current ; population indeed were ‘meticulously
nothing remains of a man, but planned and systematically co ‑ordi‑
ashes.” nated’ by top‑level Hutu extremists in
“After all, we knew that they the former Rwandan government at the
would all be killed, so it did not time in question. The widespread
matter if we hurt him more nature of the attacks and the sheer
today or tomorrow.” (Ibid.) number of those who perished within
546
7 CIJ1077.indb 1088 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 545
lation, et surtout les soldats, que Kangura identifie les Tutsis comme
les Serbes étaient coupables en l’ennemi. Toujours en 1991, d’après les
tant que tels et qu’ils devaient être dépositions des témoins, dix chefs
punis.» (Gotovina et consorts, militaires produisent un rapport
compte rendu de l’audience du exhaustif répondant à la question de
13 février 2009, p. 15901 ; les ita- savoir comment vaincre l’ennemi sur les
liques sont de moi.) fronts militaire, médiatique et politique.
Les mêmes témoins expliquent que, en
septembre 1992, un mémorandum
Miro Bajramovic:
émanant de l’armée et inspiré du rap -
«Je m’appelle Miro Bajramo - port de 1991 vient confirmer l’amal -
vic, et je suis directement res - game Tutsi -ennemi, prêtant de la sorte
à l’ensemble de la population tutsie les
ponsable de la mort de intentions belliqueuses du FPR. Il res-
86 personnes… J’en ai tué 72 sort toutefois d’un rapport pertinent
de mes propres mains, dont
neuf femmes. Nous ne faisions que, avant le 6 avril, les pouvoirs
aucune distinction, ne posions publics ne s’étaient jamais ouverte -
aucune question : c’étaient des ment livrés à des actes propres à inci -
ter les Hutus à massacrer les Tutsis.
« Tchetniks» [Serbes] et ils Néanmoins, le 19 avril, le président du
étaient nos ennemis. » (Entretien
accordé par Miro Bajramovic, Gouvernement intérimaire enjoint la
Feral Tribune, Split, Croatie, population de Butare de «se mettre au
1 erseptembre 1997 ; les italiques travail», au sens rwandais de l’expres -
sion, c’est-à-dire avec leurs machettes
sont de moi.) et leurs haches.
Miro Bajramovic : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
La diffusion et l’acceptation de
telles idéesont été confirmées par un
« Nous ne séparions pas les
civils des soldats serbes. Si nous policier hutu qui a expliqué à Patrick
trouvions un fusil caché dans de Saint-Exupéry, reporter du journal
une maison, ceux qui y habi - Le Figaro et témoin à charge en
l’espèce, que les Tutsis étaient mis à
taient devenaient immédiate - mort « parce qu’ils sont complices du
ment pour nous des Tchetniks. FPR » et qu’il fallait les tuer jusqu’au
A l’époque, les Serbes n’avaient
aucune chance de survivre, et l’on dernier.
disait que, là où nous étions pas- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
sés, l’herbe ne repoussait plus. »
(Ibid.) La Chambre estime, en résumé, que,
« Lorsque je pense à toutes les à l’origine du massacre de la population
tortures infligées, je me demande tutsie, ily a eu véritablement un plan
comment on a pu imaginer de tels minutieusement préparé et exécuté» par
procédés. Par exemple, la torture des extrémistes hutus occupant des
la plus douloureuse consistait à postes de haut niveau au sein du Gouver‑
enfoncer des aiguilles sous les nement rwandais de l’époque. Ce fait est
ongles d’une personne et à les attesté par le caractère généralisé des
relier à un générateur de courant attaques et le nombre même de ceux
546
7 CIJ1077.indb 1089 18/04/16 08:55 546 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Sime Djodan, Special Envoy just three months is compelling evi -
of the Croatian President dence of this fact. This plan could not
Franjo Tudjman, in his speech have been implemented without the
at a traditional competition in participation of militias and the Hutu
Sinj held in August 1991 : “The population who had been convinced by
Serbs had pointed heads and these extremists that the Tutsi popula ‑
probably also small brains.” tion, in fact was the enemy and respon-
(Counter-Memorial, Ann. 51.) sible for the downing of President
Habyarimana’s airplane.
Krešimir Dolenčić, Director The cruelty with which the attackers
of Gavella Theatre in Zagreb, killed, wounded and disfigured their vic‑
12 November 1991 : tims indicates that the propaganda
unleashed on Rwanda had the desired
effect, namely the destruction of the
“Beasts from the East stand no Tutsi population. The involvement of
chance. A monkey smashes every - the peasant population in the massa -
thing around the house and it is cres was facilitated also by their mis -
all the house and it is all the same placed belief and confidence in their
to the animal whether it smashed leadership, and an understanding that
a glass or a Chinese vase, because the encouragement of the authorities to
it is unable to tell the difference. guaranteed [sic] them impunity to kill
There is no way that the monkey the Tutsis and loot their property.
has any chance in the fight against
the human. There will always be a Final reports produced estimated
way to put it to sleep and place it the number of the victims of the geno-
in a cage where it belongs . . . The cide at approximately 800,000 to
distinction between us and them one million, nearly one -seventh of
is like between computers of the Rwanda’s total population. These
first and the fifth generation. facts combined prove the special intent
They should either be held in cap ‑ requirement element of genocide.
tivity or destroyed, because noth ‑ Moreover, there is ample evidence to
ing better could be expected of find that the overwhelming majority of
them. There could not be much the victims of this tragedy were Tutsi
talk or negotiations with them. civilians which leaves this Chamber
I am convinced that their culture satisfied that the targets of the massa‑
is below the primitive level, cres were ‘members of a group’, in this
since primitive cultures can be case an ethnic group. In light of this
interesting and rich spiritually.” evidence, the Trial Chamber finds a
(Counter -Memorial, Ann. 51 ; plan of genocide existed and perpetra -
emphasis added.) tors executed this plan in Rwanda
between April and June 1994.”
Miro Bajramovic: Kayishema’s Utterances
“We worked in two groups, “Kayishema’s utterances, as well as
one was in charge of taking utterances by other individuals under
547
7 CIJ1077.indb 1090 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 546
triphasé; la personne était qui ont péri en l’espace de trois mois
réduite en cendres.» seulement. Le plan génocide n’aurait
«Après tout, sachant qu’ils pas pu être mis en œuvre sans la parti-
seraient tous tués, cela ne faisait cipation des milices et d’une population
aucune différence de les tortu - hutue convaincue par les extrémistes
rer.» (Ibid.) que les Tutsis étaient l’ennemi et que
c’est par leur faute que l’avion du pré-
Sime Djodan, envoyé spécial sident Habyarimana avait été abattu.
du président de la Croatie, Franjo La cruauté avec laquelle les assail ‑
Tudjman, dans un discours pro -
noncé à l’occasion d’un concours lants tuaient, blessaient et défiguraient
traditionnel organisé à Sinj en les Tutsis confirme que la propagande
dont le pays avait été la cible avait eu
août 1991 : « Les Serbes avaient l’effet escompté, à savoir la destruction
la tête pointue et probable - de la population tutsie. L’implication
ment aussi un petit cerveau. » des masses paysannes dans les mas -
(Annexe 51 du contre-mémoire.)
sacres a été facilitée, d’une part, par le
crédit et la confiance mal placés que
Krešimir Dolenčić, directeur celles-ci accordaient à leurs dirigeants
du théâtre Gavella de Zagreb, le et, d’autre part, par la conviction
12 novembre 1991 : qu’elles pouvaient tuer et piller les Tut ‑
« Ces animaux de l’Est n’ont sis en toute impunité.
Les rapports finaux produits sur le
aucune chance. Un singe va tout Rwanda situent le nombre de victimes
détruire dans une maison et cet du génocide entre 800000 et un million
animal ne fait aucune différence de personnes, soit près du septième de
entre détruire un verre ou un la population totale du pays. Combinés
vase de Chine, parce qu’il est
les uns aux autres, les facteurs précités
incapable d’en voir une. Le singe permettent d’établir l’intention spéci -
n’a absolument aucune chance, fique requise pour que le crime de
s’il se mesure à l’homme. Il y génocide soit constitué. Comme, de
aura toujours un moyen de l’en - surcroît, il existe des preuves abon -
dormir et de le remettre dans
une cage, là où est sa place… Il dantes établissant que l’immense majo‑
rité des victimes de la tragédie était
y a autant de différences entre descivils tutsis, la Chambre est convain
eux et nous qu’entre un ordina - cue que les massacres étaient dirigés
teur de première génération et contre les «membres d’un groupe » , en
un ordinateur de cinquième l’occurrence un groupe ethnique. Au
génération. Il faut soit les main ‑
vu de cette preuve, elle conclut qu’il
tenir en captivité soit les détruire, existait bel et bien un plan génocide au
parce qu’on ne peut rien attendre Rwanda, lequel a été mis à exécution
de mieux de leur part. Il n’est pas entre avril et juin994. »
possible de parler ou de négocier
longuement avec eux. Je suis Les propos de Kayishema
convaincu que leur culture est
inférieure aux cultures primitives « Les propos tenus par Kayishema
puisque celles‑ci peuvent présen ‑ et par d’autres individus agissant sur
ter un certain intérêt et être le ses ordres avant, pendant et après les
547
7 CIJ1077.indb 1091 18/04/16 08:55 547 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
them to Velesajam, and the his direction before, during and after
other of taking them further. I the massacres, also demonstrate the
mostly attended arrests, because existence of his specific intent. Tutsis
I am a rhetoric and I tried to be were called ‘Inkotanyi’ meaning an
civil on such occasions. I always RPF fighter or an enemy of Rwanda.
told prisoners that I was only Inyenzi meaning cockroach. They also
doing my job.” (Interview with were referred to as filth or dirt. Wit -
Miro Bajramovic, Feral Tribune, ness WW testified how she heard the
Split, Croatia, 1 September Tutsi were being referred to as ‘dirt’
1997.) when Kayishema told Bourgmestre
Bagilishema that ‘all the dirt has to be
removed’ referring to the Tutsis who
Franjo Tudjman : had sought shelter in the communal
office. During the attacks at the Sta -
dium, Kayishema called the Tutsis :
“And, particularly, gentle - ‘Tutsi dogs’ and ‘Tutsis sons of bitches’
men, please remember how many when instigating the attackers to kill
Croatian villages and towns have the Tutsis gathered there.
been destroyed, but that’s still
not the situation in Knin
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
today . . .” (Minutes of the
Meeting held by the President of
the Republic of Croatia, Several witnesses who survived the
Dr. Franjo Tudjman, with massacres at the Complex heard Kay-
Military Officials, on 31 July ishema say ‘go to work’ or ‘get down
1995, Brioni, Counter-Memorial, to work’ which, as many witnesses
Ann. 2, p. 11 ; emphasis added.) affirmed, meant to begin killing the
Tutsis. Other witnesses testified to
having heard the attackers, including
Croatian Defence Minister, members of the Interahamwe, who
Spegelj, stated in 1991 : were de facto under Kayishema’s con -
trol, sing songs about exterminating
the Tutsi.
“Listen to the Commander.
First, your entire Command will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
be defeated, no one will survive,
we will spare no one. Give up all
illusion of raising alarm.” In sum, for all the reasons stated
(Memorial, Ann. 148 ; emphasis above the Chamber finds beyond a
added.) reasonable doubt that Kayishema had
the intent to destroy the Tutsi group in
Witness John William Hill whole or in part and, in pursuit of that
further added that he talked to intent, carried out the acts detailed
some Croatian soldiers in front below.” (Kayishema et al.,
of the United Nations camp ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Judgment,
who told him that “they were 21 May 1999, paras.279, 281, 289-291,
going to kill all the Serbs” (see 538-540 ; emphasis added.)
548
7 CIJ1077.indb 1092 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 547
reflet d’une richesse spirituelle. » massacres, démontrent également que
(Annexe 51 du contre -mémoire ; l’accusé était animé de l’intention spé ‑
les italiques sont de moi.) cifique prohibée. Les Tutsis étaient
désignés par le vocable de «Inkotanyi»,
Miro Bajramovic: autrement dit combattant du FPR ou
ennemi du Rwanda, le terme « Inyenzi»
«Nous opérions en deux signifiant cancrelat. Le mot « saleté»
groupes , l’un étant chargé de les était également utilisé pour les dési ‑
emmener à Velesajam, et l’autre
gner. Le témoin WW déclare à cet
de les mener encore plus loin. égard avoir entendu les assaillants uti-
J’étais généralement présent lors liser le terme « saleté» pour désigner
des arrestations, ayant la parole les Tutsis. Il s’agissait notamment de
facile et tâchant de me montrer
courtois. Je disais toujours aux Kayishema qui « a dit » [au bourg -
prisonniers que je ne faisais que mestre Bagilishema] « d’enlever toute
la saleté», faisant ainsi allusion aux
mon travail.» (Entretien accordé Tutsis qui s’étaient réfugiés au Bureau
par Miro Bajramovic, Feral Tri‑ communal. Kayishema a en outre uti-
bune, Split, Croatie, 1 er septem-
bre 1997.) lisé les expressions « chiens de Tutsis»
et «Tutsis, fils de chien »au cours des
attaques lancées contre le stade pour
Franjo Tudjman: inciter les assaillants à tuer les Tutsis
« Je vous prie, Messieurs, de qui s’y étaient réfugiés.
ne pas oublier combien de villes et . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
de villages croates ont été Plusieurs témoins qui ont survécu
détruits, et que Knin est encore
aux massacres dudit Domaine ont
épargnée…» (Procès -verbal de entendu Kayishema dire « allez au tr‑
la réunion entre le président de vail» ou « mettez‑vous au travail,
la République de Croatie, expressions qui, selon eux, signifiaient
Franjo Tudjman, et les hauts commencer à tuer les Tutsis. D’autres
responsables de l’armée, tenue
le 31 juillet 1995 à Brioni, témoins ont déclaré avoir entendu les
assaillants, y compris les Interahamwe,
contre-mémoire, annexe 52, qui étaient sous le contrôle de facto de
p. 10; les italiques sont de moi.) Kayishema, scander des refrains de
En 1991, le ministre croate de chansons appelant à exterminer les
la défense, MartinSpegelj, disait: Tutsis.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
En résumé, pour tous les motifs
«Ecoutez -moi bien, Com -
mandant. Tout d’abord, tous les exposés ci -dessus, la Chambre consi -
soldats sous vos ordres seront dère établi au -delà de tout doute rai -
écrasés, personne ne survivra, sonnable que Kayishema était animé
personne ne sera épargné. de l’intention de détruire le groupe tutsi
Oubliez même jusqu’à l’idée de en tout ou en partie et qu’il a commis
tirer la sonnette d’alarme. » les actes décrits ci -dessous dans un
(Mémoire, annexe 148; les ita - tel dessein.» ( Kayishema et al.,
liques sont de moi.) ICTR-95-1-T, jugement, 21 mai 1999,
548
7 CIJ1077.indb 1093 18/04/16 08:55 548 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
ICTY, Gotovina et al., IT-060-90, The Prosecutor v. J. Kajelijeli
testimony of witness John Wil-
liam Hill, 27 May 2008, Tran - “The Chamber found that at a
script, p. 3751; emphasis added). meeting on the evening of 6April 1994
following the death of the President
of the Republic of Rwanda, at the
Witness Božo Suša stated that canteen next to the Nkuli Commune
he had seen and heard a Croa - Office, the Accused addressed those
tian army officer who on
persons present — who were all of
5 August, entering Knin on the Hutu ethnic origin — saying to them
main road, had ordered his sol - ‘you very well know that it was the
diers to “shoot them all at ran ‑ Tutsi that killed — that brought down
dom”. The execution of Serb the Presidential plane. What are you
refugees, on two tractors was
conducted immediately after. waiting for to eliminate the enemy ?’
The Chamber found that by ‘the
enemy’ the Accused meant the Tutsi
ethnic group.
The evidence is corroborated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
by a statement of one Croatian
war veteran who was interviewed
The Chamber found that a woman
by Croatian daily “Jutarnji list” who was thought to be Tutsi and her
in 1998. He stated : son were singled out at a roadblock in
front of Witness GDQ’s house on
“The plan was to clean every - 8 April 1994, and subsequently killed
thing up as soon as possible. by an lnterahamwe named Musafiri.
Kanoti, a Hutu man who was also
Some will get out, and we’ll waste present, and accompanying these vic -
the others . . . there were no civil‑
ians for us ; they were simply all tims, was not killed. The Accused was
enemies . . . It was an unwritten present at the roadblock during this
order that there were no prison - event and was heard saying, ‘No Tutsi
should survive at Mukingo’.
ers of war to be taken but, for
the sake of saving our face
before world public opinion, a The Chamber found that, on
very small number of prisoners 8 April 1994, the Accused and the
of war were nonetheless left lnterahamwe were inspecting bodies
alive.” (Rejoinder of Serbia, and searching for survivors. Witness
GBH pleaded with the Accused to
para. 720 ; emphasis added.)
stop the killings, however, in the
words of GBH, the Accused
“As a result of these wide- responded by saying ‘that it was nec ‑
spread and systematic unlawful essary to continue, look for those or
acts during the Croatian mili - hunt for those who had survived’.
tary operation, the Medak
Pocket became uninhabitable. On the basis of the established
The villages of the Pocket were facts, the Chamber finds that the kill -
destroyed, thereby depriving the ings upon which the Chamber heard
549
7 CIJ1077.indb 1094 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 548
Le témoin John William Hill a par. 279, 281, 289-291, 538-540 ; les
déclaré avoir discuté avec des sol- italiques sont de moi.)
dats croates devant la base des
Nations Unies, qui lui ont dit Le Procureur c. J. Kajelijeli
qu’«ils allaient tuer tous les
Serbes». (Voir TPIY, Gotovina et «La Chambre a conclu que, au
consorts, IT -060-90 ; déposition cours d’une réunion tenue dans la soi-
du témoin John William Hill, rée du 6 avril 1994 à la cantine située
compte rendu de l’audience du près du bureau communal de Nkuli à
27 mai 2008, p.3751 ; les italiques la suite de la mort du président de la
sont de moi.) République rwandaise, l’accusé s’était
adressé aux personnes présentes
— toutes d’origine ethnique hutue —
Le témoin Božo Suša a en ces termes :« Vous savez très bien
déclaré avoir vu et entendu un
officier croate, pénétrant dans que ce sont les Tutsis qui ont tué —qui
Knin le 5 août par la rue princi - ont abattu l’avion présidentiel.
Qu’attendez‑vous pour éliminer
pale, ordonner à ses soldats : l’ennemi?» La Chambre a conclu que
« Tirez‑leur dessus à tous, au
hasard!» Aussitôt après, des par le terme « ennemi», l’accusé
réfugiés serbes qui se trouvaient entendait le groupe ethnique tutsi.
sur deux tracteurs ont été alors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
exécutés. La Chambre a conclu qu’une
femme prise pour une Tutsie et son
fils ont été choisis à un barrage routier
Ces éléments de preuve sont devant le domicile du témoin GDQ le
corroborés par un ancien com ‑ 8 avril 1994 et tués par la suite par un
battant croate. Dans un entre - Interahamwe du nom de Musafiri.
tien qu’il a accordé au quotidien
croate Jutarnji listen 1998, il a Kanoti, un Hutu qui se trouvait en ce
lieu et accompagnait ces victimes, n’a
déclaré ce qui suit : pas été tué. L’accusé se trouvait au
barrage routier pendant cet incident
et on l’a entendu dire qu’« aucun Tutsi
«Le plan était de tout net -
toyer aussi vite que possible. ne doit survivre à Mukingo .»
Certains s’échapperaient, mais La Chambre a conclu que, le
les autres seraient tués. Pour 8 avril 1994, l’accusé et les Intera ‑
nous, il n’y avait pas de civils ; hamwe inspectaient les cadavres à la
recherche de survivants et que le
tous étaient des ennemis… Il y
avait un ordre non écrit de ne témoin GBH l’ayant imploré de
pas faire de prisonniers, mais, mettre fin aux massacres, l’accusé lui
pour préserver les apparences avait répondu qu’il «fallait continuer
devant l’opinion publique de chercher ou traquer ceux qui avaient
mondiale, un petit nombre de survécu».
prisonniers de guerre a eu la Des faits établis, la Chambre
vie sauve. » (Duplique de la Ser - conclut que les tueries perpétrées,
bie, par. 720; les italiques sont selon des témoins, dans les communes
de moi.) de Mukingo, Nkuli et Kigombe
549
7 CIJ1077.indb 1095 18/04/16 08:55 549 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Serbian civilian population of evidence as occurring in Mukingo,
their home and livelihood.” Nkuli and Kigombe Communes,
(ICTY, Ademi and Norac, were, at all relevant times pleaded in
IT-01-46 and IT-04-76, Consoli- the Indictment, systematically directed
dated Indictment, para. 50; against Tutsi civilians. The words and
emphasis added.) deeds of the Accused show clearly
that he directed and participated in
those killings with the specific intent
“In the whole Krajina region to destroy the Tutsi ethnical group.”
houses were burning and even (Kajelijeli, ICTR -98-44A-T, Trial
today, more than five weeks Judgment, 1 December 2003,
after the last battles, they are paras. 819, 826 -828; emphasis
still burning. Destroying big added.)
complex[es] of non -Croat prop -
erties can lead to the conclusion The Prosecutor v. Callixte Kaliman ‑
that this was not done only by zira
mobs and that the whole affair
was tolerated by the Croatian “The Chamber recalls that a call to
Government . . . [The] result defend oneself against the enemy is not
will be an efficient impediment of intrinsically illegitimate, particularly
the Serb return to their houses when the ‘enemy’ is clearly restricted
and it will also create more diffi to the RPF to the exclusion of Tutsi
culties for people to settle down civilians. In this case, however, the
again in this region . .” (Empha- Chamber finds that when exhorting
sis added.) those manning the Kajyanama road -
block to carry arms in order to
‘defend’ themselves against ‘the
Marjan Jurić, Deputy in the enemy’ who might pass through,
Croatian Parliament, at a ses - Kalimanzira was understood to be
sion held on 1-3 August 1991: calling for the killing of the Tutsis,
and that he intended to be understood
as such. The slapping and abduction of
“But I am asking these same the unarmed man emphasized Kaliman ‑
Serbs whether it will dawn on zira’s exhortation and effect on his
them when they — and I am just audience . The incitement was dissemi -
wondering — and I’m not mak - nated in a public place — the road -
ing a statement [sic!] — whether block — to an indeterminate group of
they would come to their senses if people — those present to man it and
ten civilians were executed for anyone else watching or listening.
one killed policeman or if a hun ‑ Kalimanzira exhibited here, and else ‑
dred civilians were killed for one where, an intent to destroy the Tutsi
soldier! group . As such, the Chamber finds
This is something that my Kalimanzira guilty beyond reasonable
Christian, Catholic faith would doubt for committing Direct and
not allow me, because Father Public Incitement to Commit Geno -
Stanko Bogeljic has taught me cide at the Kajyanama roadblock in
that there is one commandment late April 1994.
550
7 CIJ1077.indb 1096 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 549
«Par ces actes illicites générali- étaient, à toutes les époques visées
sés et systématiques commis pen- dans l’acte d’accusation, systémati -
dant l’opération militaire croate, quement dirigées contre des civils tut -
la poche de Medak est devenue sis. II ressort clairement des propos
inhabitable. Les villages ont été et actes de l’accusé que celui -ci a
complètement détruits, ce qui a ordonné ces tueries et qu’il y a parti -
privé la population civile serbe de cipé, étant habité par l’intention spéci ‑
ses habitations et de ses moyens
fique de détruire le groupe ethnique
d’existence.» (TPIY, Ademi et tutsi» (Kajelijeli, ICTR -98-44A-T,
Norac, IT-01-46 et IT-04-76, acte jugement, 1 erdécembre 2003, par. 819,
d’accusation consolidé, par. 50 ; 826-828; les italiques sont de moi.)
les italiques sont de moi.)
Le Procureur c. Callixte Kalimanzira
«Des maisons ont été incen -
diées dans toute la région de la « La Chambre rappelle qu’ un appel
Krajina, et cela continue encore à se défendre contre l’ennemi n’est pas
aujourd’hui, plus de cinq
semaines après les derniers en soi contraire à la loi, en particulier
lorsque l’« ennemi» se limite claire -
affrontements. La destruction de ment au FPR, à l’exclusion des civils
larges ensembles d’habitations tutsis En l’espèce, cependant, la
appartenant à des populations Chambre estime que, lorsqu’il a
non croates laisse à penser que
cela n’était pas uniquement le exhorté ceux qui tenaient le barrage
de Kajyanama à porter des armes
fait de mafias et que cette affaire pour « se défendre » contre « l’en-
a, dans son ensemble, été tolérée nemi » qui viendrait à passer par là,
par le Gouvernement croate…
Cela aura pour conséquence ces derniers ont vu dans les propos de
d’empêcher efficacement le retour Kalimanzira un appel à tuer les Tut -
sis, et en outre que l’accusé avait l’in-
des Serbes dans leurs maisons et tention qu’il en fût ainsi. La gifle
de créer de nouvelles difficultés administrée à l’homme qui ne portait
pour ceux qui souhaiteront se
réinstaller dans la région… » (Les pas d’arme et son enlèvement étaient
italiques sont de moi.) venus ponctuer l’exhortation de Kali ‑
manzira et son effet sur son auditoire.
L’incitation avait été faite en public
Marjan Jurić, membre du
Parlement croate, a déclaré lors — au barrage — à l’intention d’un
de la session parlementaire tenue groupe de personnes indéterminé —
du 1 erau 3 août 1991: ceux qui tenaient le barrage et toux
ceux qui regardaient ou écoutaient.
Kalimanzira a manifesté ici et ailleurs
«Mais ce que je demande à
ces mêmes Serbes, c’est est -ce l’intention de détruire le groupe tutsi.
qu’ils réaliseront un jour — je C’est pourquoi la Chambre déclare
me pose seulement la question Kalimanzira coupable, au -delà de
— et il ne s’agit pas là d’une tout doute raisonnable, d’incitation
prise de position [sic !] — est‑ce directe et publique à commettre le
qu’ils reviendraient à la raison génocide au barrage de Kajyanama
si dix civils étaient exécutés en fin avril 1994.
550
7 CIJ1077.indb 1097 18/04/16 08:55 550 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
in those ten commandments : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
‘thou shall not kill’, and it does
not allow me to say that this is The Chamber therefore finds that
right, but it would be right for
in late May or early June 1994, Kali-
me if ten Serb intellectuals manzira attended a public meeting at
would get the sack in Zagreb, the Nyabisagara football field where
Rijeka, Split or Osijek for every he thanked the audience for their
policeman killed. For, intellectu- efforts at getting rid of the enemy but
als cannot go to the woods.
warned them not to grow complacent,
They are not like those ignorant to remain armed at all times, and
Banija peasants who could go to exhorted the crowd to keep searching
bed without washing their feet for enemies hidden in the bush or in
for a month ! Intellectuals must other persons homes, which they did.
be sacked, because Chetnik ring- He also instructed them to destroy
leaders live in the big cities and
the homes of dead Tutsis and plant
we must prevent it . . . Our trees in their place, which they did. In
Almighty God has created at the the context of these particular instruc-
same time both good people and a tions, which have little to do with
lot of vermin. One such vermin is military combat, and BCZ’s under -
the moth which, when let into the
standing of Kalimanzira’s words, the
closet, in fact when it comes into Chamber finds that ‘the enemy’ meant
it, eats at the shirt, then it turns any Tutsi.
to the pullover ;it eats and eats
until it has eaten everything The Chamber finds that Kaliman -
away. The same is true of those zira’s call for further elimination of
who came to us as our guest‑ Tutsis in hiding was direct, leading
workers.” (Deputy Jurić ended clearly to immediate and commensu -
his speech with a raised hand rate action. It was disseminated in a
in a fasciststyle salute, Counter- public place to a large public audi -
Memorial, Ann. 51 ; emphasis ence. By instructing the people present
added.) to kill any surviving Tutsis, demolish
their homes, and wipe out any traces of
their existence, there is no reasonable
Zvonimir Sekulin, Editor-in- doubt that Kalimanzira intended to
Chief of Hrvatski Vijesnik, in his incite the audience present to commit
interview published in the maga- acts of genocide. Kalimanzira exhib -
zine Globus, Zagreb, on 9 Sep- ited here, and elsewhere, an intent to
tember 1994: destroy the Tutsi group. The Cham -
ber therefore finds Kalimanzira
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
“Considering that the committing direct and public incite -
Hrvatski Vijesnik really runs a ment to commit genocide at the
column entitled ‘hard -core Serb Nyabisagara football field in late
pornographic pages’, I also May or early June 1994.” (Kaliman ‑
admit that this newspaper is in zira, ICTR -05-88-T, Trial Judgment,
part pornographic as the Serbs 22 June 2009, paras. 589, 613 -614 ;
themselves are pornography. emphasis added.)
551
7 CIJ1077.indb 1098 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 550
contrepartie d’un policier tué, ou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
si cent civils étaient exécutés
chaque fois qu’un officier de la
garde [nationale] était tué ? La Chambre conclut donc que, fin
mai ou début juin 1994, Kalimanzira
a participé à une réunion publique au
C’est quelque chose que ma terrain de football de Nyabisagara et
foi chrétienne et catholique ne a remercié les membres de la popula -
me laisserait pas faire, car le
père Stanko Bogelijc m’a appris tion pour les efforts qu’ils avaient
déployés en vue de se débarrasser de
que l’un des dix commande - l’ennemi, mais qu’il les a mis en garde
ments dit ceci : « Tu ne tueras contre toute complaisance, qu’il leur a
point », alors cela ne me permet demandé de s’armer tout le temps et
pas de dire que c’est ce qu’il fau-
drait faire, mais, selon moi, il qu’il a exhorté la foule à continuer de
serait juste que, pour chaque rechercher les ennemis cachés dans la
brousse ou chez d’autres personnes,
policier tué, dix intellectuels de ce qu’ils ont fait. Il leur avait aussi
Zagreb, de Rijeka, de Split ou donné l’ordre de détruire les maisons
d’Osijek soient mis à la porte.
Parce que les intellectuels ne des Tutsis morts et de planter des
peuvent pas s’enfuir dans les arbres à la place, ce qu’ils avaient fait.
De ces instructions précises, qui n’ont
bois. Ils ne sont pas comme ces guère de lien avec le combat militaire,
paysans ignares du Banija, qui et de l’interprétation faite par BCZ
sont capables d’aller se mettre
au lit sans se laver les pieds pen- des propos de Kalimanzira, la
dant un mois entier ! Les intel - Chambre conclut que « l’ennemi» vou ‑
lectuels doivent être virés, car, lait dire le Tutsi.
La Chambre est d’avis que l’appel
chez les Tchetniks, les têtes pen - de Kalimanzira en faveur de la pour -
santes se trouvent dans les
grandes villes, et l’on doit suite de l’éradication des Tutsis qui se
empêcher ça… Notre Dieu cachaient était direct et avait manifes-
tout‑puissant a créé en même tement entraîné une réaction immé-
diate et appropriée. Il avait été lancé
temps les bons et une vermine dans un lieu public devant un large
nombreuse. Cette vermine est
comme la mite qu’on laisse entrer public. En donnant à ceux qui étaient
dans le placard, en fait, lorsqu’elle présents l’ordre de tuer les Tutsis survi
entre dans le placard, elle dévore vants, de détruire leurs maisons et d’ef‑
d’abord la chemise, puis elle facer toutes traces de leur existence, il
n’y a aucun doute raisonnable que
s’attaque au pull ; elle mange et
elle mange, jusqu’à ce qu’il n’y ait Kalimanzira avait l’intention d’inciter
plus rien à manger. Il en est de ceux qui l’écoutaient à commettre des
même de la main ‑d’œuvre actes de génocide . Kalimanzira a
étrangère venue travailler chez manifesté ici et ailleurs l’intention de
nous.» (M. Jurić a terminé son détruire le groupe tutsi. Aussi la
discours en levant son bras Chambre le déclare -t-elle coupable,
dans un salut fasciste, contre- au-delà de tout doute raisonnable,
mémoire, annexe 51 ; les ita - d’incitation directe et publique à com -
liques sont de moi.) mettre le génocide au terrain de foot -
551
7 CIJ1077.indb 1099 18/04/16 08:55 551 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Photograph of Patriarch Pavle The Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi
(Head of the Serbian Orthodox
Church), published on these “When heading towards Kayove,
pages, is more pornographic Bikindi used the public address sys -
that the photos of the biggest tem to state that the majority popula ‑
whores . . . [name] wrote that I tion, the Hutu, should rise up to
said that some people were ver ‑ exterminate the minority, the Tutsi.
min. But I say that only On his way back, Bikindi used the
the so‑called Serbian people are same system to ask if people had been
vermin.” (Counter -Memorial, killing Tutsi who were referred to as
Ann. 51; emphasis added.) snakes.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Franjo Tudjman:
The Chamber finds that both state -
ments, broadcast over loudspeaker,
were made publicly. The Chamber
“We have to inflict such blows also finds that Bikindi’s call on ‘the
that the Serbs will, to all practi
cal purposes disappear, that is to majority’ to ‘rise up and look every ‑
say, the areas we do not take at where possible’ and not to ‘spare any ‑
body’ immediately referring to Tutsis
once must capitulate within a as the minority unequivocally consti ‑
few days.” (Minutes of the tutes a direct call to destroy the Tutsis
Meeting held by the President
of the Republic of Croatia, ethnic group. Similarly, the Chamber
Dr. Franjo Tudjman, with mili- considers that Bikindi’s address to the
tary officials, on 31 July 1995, population on his way back from
Kayove, asking ‘Have you killed the
Brioni, p. 2, Counter-Memorial, Tutsis here ?’ and whether they had
Ann. 52; emphasis added.)
killed the ‘snakes’ is a direct call to kill
Tutsis, pejoratively referred as ‘snakes’.
The Logbook notes “our artil‑ In the Chamber’s view, it is inconceiv-
lery was hitting the column pull - able that, in the context of widespread
killings of the Tutsi population that
ing from Petrovac to Grahovo,
the score is excellent, the Chet‑ prevailed in June 1994 in Rwanda, the
niks have many dead and audience to whom the message was
wounded . . .” (ICTY, Gotovina directed, namely those standing on the
et al., IT -060-90, Reyn - road, could not have immediately
aud Theunes, Expert Report : understood its meaning and implica ‑
Croatian Armed Forces and tion. The Chamber therefore finds
Operation Storm, Part II, that Bikindi’s statements through
p. 189 ; emphasis added.) loudspeakers on the main road
between Kivumu and Kayove consti -
tute direct and public incitement to
commit genocide.
Based on the words he proffered
and the manner he disseminated his
552
7 CIJ1077.indb 1100 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 551
Zvonimir Sekulin, rédacteur ball de Nyabisagara fin mai ou
en chef de Hrvatski Vijesnik, début juin 1994. » ( Kalimanzira,
dans un entretien accordé au ICTR-05-88-T, jugement, 22 juin
magazine Globus de Zagreb le 2009, par. 589, 613-614 ; les italiques
9 septembre 1994 : sont de moi.)
« Etant donné la présence Le Procureur c. Simon Bikindi
dans Hrvatski Vijesnik d’une
chronique intitulée « Pages de
« Alors qu’il marchait en direction
pornographie serbe hard », j’ad - de Kayove, Bikindi a utilisé
mets que ce journal est partielle -
ment pornographique puisque l’amplificateur de voix pour dire que
les Serbes eux -mêmes sont des la majorité de la population, à savoir
pornographes. La photographie les Hutus, devait se lever pour exter ‑
du patriarche Pavle [chef de miner la minorité, les Tutsis. En ren -
trant de Kayove, Bikindi s’est servi du
l’Eglise orthodoxe serbe], publiée même amplificateur de voix pour
dans ces pages, est plus porno -
graphique que celles des plus demander si les gens avaient tué les
grandes putains… [Patronyme] a Tutsis, qui ont été qualifiés de serpents.
écrit que j’avais dit que certains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
La Chambre estime que les deux
peuples étaient de la vermine. Je
précise que seul le soi‑disant déclarations, diffusées au moyen de
peuple serbe est de la vermine. » l’amplificateur de voix, ont été faites
(Contre -mémoire, annexe 51 ; les en public. Elle estime aussi que l’appel
italiques sont de moi.) lancé par l’accusé au « peuple majori‑
taire»: « Levez‑vous et cherchez par ‑
Franjo Tudjman : tout. II ne fau[t] épargner personne »,
qualifiant les Tutsis de minorité, consti‑
« Nous devons infliger aux tue clairement un appel direct à détruire
Serbes des pertes telles que, dans le groupe ethnique tutsi . De même, la
les faits, ils disparaîtront, autre Chambre considère que le fait pour
ment dit, les secteurs que nous Bikindi d’avoir demandé à la popula -
ne prendrons pas immédiate - tion, lorsqu’il rentrait de Kayove, si
ment devront capituler dans les elle avait « tué les Tutsis d’ici » et si
jours qui suivent. » (Procès - elle avait tué les « serpents» est un
verbal de la réunion entre le appel direct à tuer les Tutsis, qualifiés
président de la République de péjorativement de serpents. Aux yeux
de la Chambre, il est inconcevable,
croatie, Franjo Tudjman, et
des responsables de l’armée, le dans le contexte des massacres généra ‑
31 juillet 1995 à Brioni ; lisés de la population tutsie commis
contre -mémoire, annexe 52, en juin 1994 au Rwanda, que le public
p. 2; les italiques sont de moi.) auquel le message était destiné, notam-
ment ceux qui se tenaient sur le bord
Le journal précise que de la route, n’ait pas immédiatement
«[L’]artillerie [croate] a tiré sur compris sa signification et ses consé ‑
la colonne , laquelle qui se retirait quences. La Chambre estime donc que
de Petrovac pour rejoindre les déclarations faites par Bikindi au
552
7 CIJ1077.indb 1101 18/04/16 08:55 552 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Miro Bajramovic: message, the Chamber finds that
Bikindi deliberately, directly and pub ‑
licly incited the commission of genocide
“T. Mercep was commander with the specific intent to destroy the
of Poljane . . . He knew about Tutsi ethnic group. ” (Bikindi,
each execution, because he was a ICTR-01-72-T, Trial Judgment,
commander and was a very 2 December 2008, paras.281, 423-424 ;
charismatic person. He told us emphasis added.)
several times: ‘Tonight you have
to clean all these shits.’ The Prosecutor v. Jean‑Paul Akayesu
This meant that all prisoners
should be executed. The order for
Gospic was to perform ‘ethnic “The Chamber further recalls that
incitement can be direct, and nonethe -
cleansing’ so we killed directors less, implicit.” (Para. 557.)
of post offices and hospitals, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a restaurant owner and many
other Serbs. Executions
were performed by shooting “(iii) It has been established that
Akayesu then clearly urged the popu -
at point blank range since we
did not have much time. I lation to unite in order to eliminate
repeat, orders from the head - what he termed the sole enemy : the
quarters were to reduce the accomplices of the Inkotanyi.
percentage of Serbs in Gospic.”
(Interview with Miro
(iv) On the basis of consistent testi-
Bajramovic, Feral Tribune, Split, monies heard throughout the pro -
Croatia, 1 September 1997 ; ceedings and the evidence of
emphasis added.) Dr. Ruzindana, appearing as expert
witness on linguistic matters, the
Chamber is satisfied beyond a reason -
Franjo Tudjman: able doubt that the population under ‑
stood Akayesu’s call as one to kill the
Tutsi. Akayesu himself was fully
“[I]n view if the situation cre- aware of the impact of his speech on
ated by the liberation of occu- the crowd and of the fact that his call
pied territories affecting the to fight against the accomplices of the
demographic picture, there is a
lnkotanyi would be construed as a
need to make military units one call to kill the Tutsi in general.
of the most effective elements, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
which can happen if we properly
solve one of the most effective
postulates of State politics (vii) The Chamber is of the opin -
in dealing with our essential ion that there is a causal relationship
between Akayesu’s speeches at the
problem of today, namely,
[the] demographic situation gathering of 19 April 1994 and the
in Croatia. That was why I ensuing widespread massacres of
invited to this meeting the Tutsi in Taba.
553
7 CIJ1077.indb 1102 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 552
Grahovo, excellent score, beau ‑ moyen des haut -parleurs sur la route
coup de morts et de blessés parmi principale reliant Kivumu à Kayove
les Tchetniks …» (TPIY, Goto‑ constituent une incitation directe et
vina et consorts, IT-060-90, rap-
publique à commettre le génocide.
port d’expert de M. Reynaud
Theunens : Croatian Armed Compte tenu des propos que
Forces and Operation Storm, Bikindi a tenus et de la manière dont
deuxième partie, p. 189; les ita - il a diffusé son message, la Chambre
liques sont de moi.) conclut qu’il a délibérément, directe‑
ment et publiquement, incité à com‑
Miro Bajramovic : mettre le génocide, avec l’intention
spécifique de détruire le groupe eth ‑
«C’est T. Mercep qui com - nique tutsi. » (Bikindi, ICTR-01-72-T,
mandait à Poljana… C’était un
homme très charismatique. De jugement, 2 décem bre 2008, par. 281,
423-424 ; les italiques sont de moi.)
par son poste de commandant, il
était au courant de chaque exé - Le Procureur c. Jean‑Paul Akayesu
cution. Il nous a dit plusieurs
fois: « Ce soir, vous nettoierez «De plus, la Chambre rappelle
toute cette merde. » Cela signi ‑
qu’une incitation peut être directe et
fiait que tous les prisonniers néanmoins implicite. » (Par. 557.)
devaient être exécutés. En ce qui «iii) Akayesu a … clairement
concerne Gospic, nous avions demandé à la population de s’unir
l’ordre de procéder à son net ‑
toyage ethnique. Nous avons tué pour éliminer ce qu’il a appelé l’ennemi
les directeurs de la poste et de unique : le complice de l’Inkotanyi.
iv) Sur la base des témoignages
l’hôpital, un propriétaire de res - concordants revenus tout au long du
taurant et de nombreux autres procès et sur les indications que lui a
Serbes. N’ayant pas beaucoup
de temps, nous procédions aux fournies le docteur Ruzindana, cité
exécutions en tirant à bout por - comme témoin expert sur des ques -
tant. Je le répète : l’ordre du tions d’ordre linguistique, la Chambre
est convaincue au -delà de tout doute
quartier général était de réduire raisonnable que la population a com ‑
la proportion de Serbes à Gos -
pic.» (Entretien accordé par pris qu’Akayesu appelait ainsi à tuer
Miro Bajramovic, Feral Tribune, les Tutsis . Akayesu lui -même était
Split, Croatie, 1 er septembre parfaitement conscient de la portée de
ses propos sur la foule et du fait que
1997 ; les italiques sont de moi.) ses appels à lutter contre les complices
Franjo Tudjman : des Inkotanyis seraient compris
comme des appels à tuer les Tutsis en
«[C]ompte tenu de la situa - général.
tion créée par la libération des . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
territoires occupés, laquelle a eu vii) II y a bien une relation de
une incidence sur la démogra - cause à effet entre les propos tenus
phie, il est nécessaire de faire des par Akayesu lors du rassemblement
unités militaires l’un des élé - du 19 avril 1994 et les massacres
553
7 CIJ1077.indb 1103 18/04/16 08:55 553 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
Vice-Premier and the Minister From the foregoing, the Chamber
responsible for reconstruction is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
and development, Dr. Radić, to that, by the above‑mentioned speeches
present, at the opening of this made in public and in a public place,
debate, the present demographic Akayesu had the intent to directly cre ‑
situation because of the ate a particular state of mind in his
deployment of military com - audience necessary to lead to the
mands, military districts, destruction of the Tutsi group, as such.
brigade stationing, military Accordingly, the Chamber finds that
training institutions, etc. It the said acts constitute the crime of
may be effective and useful to direct and public incitement to commit
resolve that situation where we genocide, as defined above.” (Akayesu,
have reinforced or at least ICTR -96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 Sep -
should reinforce Croatian tember 1998, paras. 557, 673-674;
dom, like in Istria, and in emphasis added.)
other places the more so
because it is not so much
about changing the composition
today as to populate some places The Prosecutor v. Aloys Simba
and areas. Minister Radić
“Simba was physically present at
explained how they should pro -
ceed : two massacre sites. He provided tradi-
tional weapons, guns, and grenades to
attackers poised to kill thousands of
Tutsi. Simba was aware of the target -
ing of Tutsi throughout his country,
and as a former military commander,
he knew what would follow when he
‘I conclude, therefore, that urge the armed assailants ‘to get rid of
red and blue areas should the filth’. The only reasonable conclu -
promptly, and as a matter of sion, even accepting his submissions
priority, be populated by Croats, as true, is that at that moment, he
as far as possible. These areas acted with genocidal intent .” (Simba,
are marked, including Zrinska ICTR-2001-76-T, Trial Judgment,
Gora, which I skipped for the 13 December 2005, para. 418 ; empha -
time being, and areas such as sis added.)
Lapac and Knin, namely the
hinterland and the Herzegovina The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema
region, which should be given
secondary priority, and this “According to the witness, Musema
empty area in Lika as much as addressed those who had convened in
possible . . .’” (Minutes of the Kinyarwanda, telling them to rise
Meeting held by the President of together and fight their enemy the
the Republic of Croatia, Tutsis and deliver their country from
Dr. Franjo Tudjman, with the enemy. Questions were put to him
Military Officials, 23 August by the crowd, asking what would be
1995, Zagreb, pp. 01325991 ; their rewards considering that they
554
7 CIJ1077.indb 1104 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 553
ments les plus efficaces, ce qui généralisés de Tutsis qui ont ensuite
est possible si nous trouvons la eu lieu à Taba.
bonne solution pour l’un des pos ‑ De ce qui précède, la Chambre en
tulats les plus réels de la politique tire la conviction au -delà de tout
de l’Etat pour traiter le problème doute raisonnable que, par les propos
essentiel qui nous préoccupe susmentionnés tenus publiquement et
aujourd’hui, à savoir la situation sur un lieu public, Akayesu avait l’in ‑
démographique en Croatie . C’est tention de créer directement chez son
pourquoi j’ai convié à cette réu - auditoire l’état d’esprit propre à susci ‑
nion le vice -premier ministre et ter la destruction du groupe tutsi, en
également le ministre chargé de tant que tel . La Chambre considère
la reconstruction et du dévelop - par conséquent que lesdits faits sont
pement, M. Radić, qui présen - constitutifs du crime d’incitation
tera, dès l’ouverture de ce dé - publique et directe à commettre le
bat, la situation démographique génocide, tel qu’elle l’a défini supra. »
actuelle produite par le déploie - (Akayesu, ICTR -96-4-T, jugement,
ment des commandements mili - 2 septembre 1998, par. 557, 673-674 ;
taires, les districts militaires, le les italiques sont de moi.)
cantonnement des brigades et les
camps d’entraînement militaire. Le Procureur c. Aloys Simba
Il peut être également judicieux
et utile de régler cette situation «Simba se trouvait, en personne,
là où nous avons renforcé ou, à dans les deux endroits où les mas -
tout le moins, là où nous sacres ont été commis. Il a fourni des
devrions renforcer le caractère armes traditionnelles, des fusils et des
croate, par exemple en Istrie, grenades aux assaillants qui s’apprê -
d’autant plus qu’il ne s’agit pas taient à y tuer des milliers de Tutsis. Il
tant de modifier la composition savait qu’on s’en prenait aux Tutsis
actuelle de la population que de comme tels à travers tout le pays, et
peupler certaines régions et loca ‑ l’ancien chef militaire qu’il était ne
lités. Le ministre Radić a exposé pouvait ignorer l’effet qu’aurait sur la
ainsi la manière dont ils devaient
foule armée son appel pressant à « se
procéder : débarrasser de la saleté ». Même si
l’on accorde foi aux moyens de la
« Je conclus, par conséquent, défense, la seule conclusion raison -
que les zones rouge et bleue de - nable qui s’impose, c’est que, au
vront rapidement, et en priorité, moment des faits, Simba a agi avec
être peuplées autant que possible l’intention constitutive du crime de
de Croates. Ces zones sont si - génocide. » (Simba, ICTR-2001-76-T,
gnalées, notamment Zrinska jugement, 13 décembre 2005, par. 418 ;
G ora, dont je n’ai pas parlé les italiques sont de moi.)
jusqu’à présent, ainsi que des
secteurs tels que Lapac et Knin, Le Procureur c. Alfred Musema
c’est-à-dire dans l’arrière -pays
et aussi en Herzégovine, qui «Selon le témoin, Musema se serait
devraient constituer une priorité adressé aux gens qui s’étaient regrou -
secondaire, et puis ce secteur pés en ce lieu en Kinyarwanda et leur
554
7 CIJ1077.indb 1105 18/04/16 08:55 554 application of genochide convention (sep. ohp. kreća)
01325993 -01325997; Counter- might lose their lives in this war.
Memorial, Ann. 53, pp. 4-7 ; Musema answered that there would
emphasis added.) be no problem in finding rewards,
that the unemployed would take jobs of
those killed, and that they would appro‑
priate the lands and properties of the
Tutsis.” (Musema, ICTR -96-13-T,
Trial Judgment, 27 January 2000,
para. 373; emphasis added.)
(Signed) Milenko Kreća.
555
7 CIJ1077.indb 1106 18/04/16 08:55 application de convehntion génocide (op. inhd. kreća) 554
inoccupé en Lika, autant aurait demandé de se dresser tous
que possible… »» (Procès-verbal ensemble et de combattre l’ennemi
de la réunion entre le président commun, le Tutsi, afin d’en délivrer
de la République de Croatie, leur pays. Les participants à la réu -
Franjo Tudjman, et des res - nion lui auraient notamment posé la
ponsables de l’armée qui s’est question de savoir quelle serait leur
tenue le 23 août 1995 à récompense, vu qu’ils risquaient de
Zagreb, p. 01325991, 01325993- laisser leur vie dans cette guerre.
01325997 ; contre -mémoire, Musema leur aurait répondu qu’il n’y
annexe 53, p. 4-7 ; les italiques aurait pas de problème à trouver des
sont de moi.) récompenses, dans la mesure où les
personnes au chômage prendraient les
emplois des personnes tuées, et qu’elles
pourraient s’approprier les terres et
les biens des Tutsis. » (Musema,
ICTR-96-13-T, jugement, 27 jan-
vier 2000, par. 373; les italiques sont
de moi.)
(Signé) Milenko Kreća.
555
7 CIJ1077.indb 1107 18/04/16 08:55
Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Kreća