202
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE CANÇADO TRINDADE
table of contents
Paragraphs
I. RoleGomena 1-5
II. The Regrettable Delays ihn the Adjudication of theh
Present Case 6-18
1. Procedural delays 6-13
2. Justitia longa, vita brevis 14-18
III. Jurisdiction: Automatic Successionh to the Genocide
Convention as a Human Rihghts Treaty 19-49
1. Arguments of the Parties as to the applicability of the
obligations under the Genocide Convention prior to
27 April 1992 19-21
2. Continuity of application of the Genocide Convention
(SFRY and FRY) 22-23
3. Continuity of State administration and officials (SFRY
and FRY) 24-25
4. Law governing State succession to human rights treaties :
Ipso jure succession to the Genocide Convention 26-33
5. State conduct in support of automatic succession to, and
continuing applicability of, the Genocide Convention (to
FRY prior to 27 April 1992) 34-36
6. Venire contra factum proprium non valet 37-41
7. Automatic succession to human rights treaties in the prac
tice of UnitedNations supervisory organs 42-49
IV. The Essence of the Presenht Case 50-54
1. Arguments of the contending Parties 50-52
2. General assessment 53-54
V. Automatic Succession hto the Convention agaihnst Geno -
cide and Continuity of Iths Obligations, as an Impherative
of Humaneness 55-84
1 The Convention against Genocide and the imperative of
humaneness 55 4
203
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2. The principle of humanity in its wide dimension 65-72
3. The principle of humanity in the heritage of jusnaturalist
thinking 73-76
4. Judicial recognition of the principle of humanity 77-82
5. Concluding observations 83-84
VI. The Convention againsth Genocide and State Respohnsi-
bility 85-95
1. Legislative history of the Convention (Article IX) 85-91
2. Rationale, and object and purpose of the Convention 92-95
VII. Standard of Proof in the Cahse Law of Internationalh
Human Rights Tribunals 96-124
1. A question from the Bench : the evolving case law on the
matter 97-99
2. Case law of the IACtHR 100-115
(a) Cases disclosing a systematic pattern of grave viola -
tions of human rights 100-112
(b) Cases wherein the respondent State has theburden of
proof given the difficulty of the Applicant to obtain it
113-115
3. Case law of the ECHR 116-121
4. General assessment 122-124
VIII. Standard of Proof in the Cahse Law of Internationalh
Criminal Tribunals 125-148
1. Inferring intent from circumstantial evidence (case law of
the ICTR and the ICTY) 126-130
2. Standards of proof : rebuttals of the high threshold of evi -
dence 131-138
(a) Karadžić case (2013) 131-133
(b) Tolimircase (2012) 134-136
(c) Miloševićcase (2004) 137-138
3. General assessment 139-148
IX. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructihon :
Fact-Finding and Case Law 149-194
1. United Nations (Former Commission on Human Rights)
fact-finding reports on systematic pattern of destruction
(1992-1993) 150-158
2. United Nations (Security Council’s Commission of
Experts) fact -finding reports on systematic pattern of
destruction (1993-1994) 159-175
(a) Interim report (of 10 February 1993) 160-161
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(b) Report of a mass grave near Vukovar (of 10 January
1993) 162-163
(c) Second interim report (of 6 October 1993) 164-165
(d) Final report (of 27 May 1994) 166-175
3.Repercussion of occurrences in the United Nations Second
World Conference on Human Rights (1993) 176-179
4. Judicial recognition of the widespread and/or systematic
attacks against the Croat civilian population— Case law
of the ICTY 180-194
(a) Babić case (2004) 181
(b) Martić case (2007) 182-186
(c) Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin case (2007) 187-190
(d) Stanišić and Simatovićcase (2013) 191-194
X. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructihon :
Massive Killings, Tortuhre and Beatings, Systemahtic
Expulsion from Homes anhd Mass Exodus, and Destruch -
tion of Group Culture 195-241
1. Indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population 196-205
2. Massive killings 206-216
3. Torture and beatings 217-226
4. Systematic expulsion from homes and mass exodus,
and destruction of group culture 227-236
5. General assessment 237-241
XI. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructihon :
Rape and Other Sexual Viohlence Crimes Committehd in
Distinct Municipalitihes 242-276
1. Accounts of systematic rape 243-249
(a) Croatia’s claims 243-248
(b) Serbia’s response 249
2. Systematic pattern of rape in distinct municipalities 250-258
3. The necessity and importance of a gender analysis 259-276
XII. Systematic Pattern of Dihsappeared or Missing Pehrsons 277-319
1. Arguments of the Parties concerning the disappeared or
missing persons 277-283
2. Responses of the Parties to questions from the Bench 284-290
3. Outstanding issues and the Parties’ obligation to establish
the fate of missing persons 291-294
4. The extreme cruelty of enforced disappearances of per -
sons as a continuing grave violation of human rights and
international humanitarian law 295-309
5. General assessment 310-319
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XIII. Onslaught, Not Exactly Wahr, in a Widespread and
Systematic Pattern of Dehstruction 320-421
1. Plan of destruction : its ideological content 320-353
(a) Arguments of the contending Parties 321 -328
(b) Examination of expert evidence by the ICTY 329-335
(c) Ideological incitement and the outbreak of hostilities336-353
2. The imposed obligation of wearing white ribbons 354-358
3. The disposal of mortal remains 359-374
4. The existence of mass graves 375-389
5. Further clarifications from the crossxamination of wit-
nesses 390-394
6. Forced displacement of persons and homelessness 395-406
7. Destruction of cultural goods 407-421
(a) Arguments of the contending Parties 408-414
(b) General assessment 415-421
XIV. actus Reus : Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of
Conduct of Destructionh : Extreme Violence and Athro -
cities in some Municihpalities 422-458
1. Preliminary methodological observations 423-426
2. The systematic pattern of acts of destruction 427-428
3. Killings members of the Croat population (Article II (a) 429-439
4. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group (Article II (b)) 440-448
5. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life cal
culated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part (ArticleI (c)) 449-454
6 General assessment of witness statements and conclusions 455-458
(a) Witness statements 455 -456
(b) Conclusions 457 -458
XV. m ensR ea : Proof of Genocidal Intenht by Inference 459-471
1. International case law onmens rea 461 -466
2. General assessment 467-471
XVI. The Need of Reparations : Some Reflections 472-485
XVII. The Difficult Path to Recohnciliation 486-493
XVIII. Concluding Observationh:sThe Need of a Comprehensive
Approach to Genocide unhder the 1948Convention 494 -524
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1. Evidential assessment and determination of the facts 497-507
2. Conceptual framework and reasoning as to the law 508 -524
XIX. Epilogue: A Recapitulation 525 -547
*
I.p RoleGomena
1. I regret not to share the position of the Court’s majority as to the h
determination of the facts as well as the reasoning conducive to the thrhee
resolutory points, nor to its conclusion of resolutory point No. 2, of the
Judgment it has just adopted today, 3 February 2015, in the present case
concerning the Application of the Convention against Genocide, opposing
Croatia to Serbia. My dissenting position encompasses the adopted meth -
odology, the approach pursued, the whole reasoning in its treatment of
issues of evidential assessment as well as of substance, as well as the hcon-
clusion on the Applicant’s claim. This being so, I care to leave on thhe
records the foundations of my dissenting position, given the considerablhe
importance that I attach to the issues raised by Croatia and Serbia, in hthe
course of the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, in respect of the interpreta -
tion and application of the 1948 Convention against Genocide, and bear-
ing in mind that the settlement of the dispute at issue is ineluctably linked,
as I perceive it, to the imperative of the realization of justice.
2. I thus present with the utmost care the foundations of my own entirely
dissenting position on those aspects of the matter dealt with by the Couhrt in
the Judgment which it has just adopted, out of respect for, and zeal in,h the
faithful exercise of the international judicial function, guided above ahll by the
ultimate goal precisely of the realization of justice. To this effect, I shall dwell
upon the relevant aspects concerning the dispute brought before the Court
which form the object of its present Judgment, in the hope of thus contrhibut -
ing to the clarification of the issues raised and to the progressive dhevelopment
of international law, in particular in the international adjudication byh this
Court of a case of the importance of the cas d’espèce, under the Convention
against Genocide, in the light of fundamental considerations of humanityh.
3. Preliminarily, I shall address the regrettable delays in the adjudica -
tion of the present case, and, as to jurisdiction, the automatic successhion
of the 1948 Convention against Genocide as a UN human rights treaty,
and the continuity of its obligations, as an imperative of humaneness
(principle of humanity). Once identified the essence of the present hcase, I
shall consider State responsibility under the Convention against Geno -
cide. My next line of considerations will centre on the standard of proohf,
in the case law of contemporary international human rights tribunals as h
well as international criminal tribunals.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 410 18/04/16 08:54 207 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
4. I shall then proceed to review the fact -finding and case law on the
factual context of the cas d’espèce, disclosing a widespread and systematic
pattern of destruction, in relation to : (a) massive killings, torture and
beatings, systematic expulsion from homes and mass exodus, and destruc-
tion of group culture ; (b) rape and other sexual violence crimes commit -
ted in distinct municipalities ; (c) disappeared or missing persons. Next, I
shall review the onslaught (not exactly war), in its multiple aspects,h
namely: (a) plan of destruction (its ideological content) ; (b) the imposed
obligation of wearing white ribbons (c);the disposal of mortal remains ;
(d) the existence of mass graves ; (e) further clarifications from the
cross-examination of witnesses ; (f) the forced displacement of persons
and homelessness ; (g) the destruction of cultural goods.
5. In sequence, I shall dwell upon the determination, under the Con -
vention against Genocide, of the actus reus of genocide, in the widespread
and systematic pattern of conduct of destruction (extreme violence and
atrocities) in some devastated municipalities, as well as mens rea (proof of
genocidal intent by inference). The path will then be paved, last but nhot
least, for my considerations on the need of reparations, and on the diffih -
cult path to reconciliation, as well as to the presentation of my concluhd -
ing observations (on evidential assessment and determination of the fachts,
as well as conceptual framework and reasoning as to the law), and, lasth
but not least, the epilogue (recapitulation).
II. The Regrettable Delays ihn the Adjudication
of the Present Case
1. Procedural Delays
6. Looking back in time, I cannot avoid expressing my regret at the
considerable delays in the adjudication of the present case concerning thhe
Application of the Convention against Genocide , opposing Croatia to Ser -
bia. The Application instituting proceedings was filed on 2 July 1999. The
first time -limits fixed by the Court for the filing by the Parties of the
Memorial and Counter-Memorial were, respectively, 14 March 2000
and 14 September 2000 1. In a letter dated 25 February 2000, Croatia
requested an extension of six months for filing its Memorial. The requhest
for extension was not objected by Serbia, who also requested an extensiohn
of six months for the filing of its Counter-Memorial. The time -limit for
filing the Memorial was thus extended to 14 September 2000 and, for the
Counter-Memorial, to 14 September 2001 2.
7. In a letter dated 26 May 2000, Croatia requested that the Court
extend by a further period of six months the time-limit for the filing of the
1
2 Order of 14 September 1999 (I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1105).
Order of 10 March 2000 (I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 3).
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Memorial. The request for extension was not objected by Serbia, who
also requested an extension of six months for the filing of its Countehr-
Memorial. Thus, the Court further extended to 14 March 2001 the time-
limit for filing the Memorial and to 16 September 2002 for the filing of
3
the Counter-Memorial . Croatia filed the Memorial on 14 March 2001
within the time-limit extended.
8. On 11 September 2002, within the time-limit so extended for the fil -
ing of the Counter-Memorial, Serbia filed certain preliminary objections
as to jurisdiction and to admissibility. The proceedings on the merits where
suspended, in accordance with Article 79 (3) of the Rules of Court, and a
time-limit for the filing of a written statement of Croatia’s submissionh on
the preliminary objections was fixed for 29 April 2003 4. Hearings on pre-
liminary objections were held half a decade later, from 26 to 30 May
2008. The Court delivered its Judgment on preliminary objections
on 18 November 2008, finding, inter alia, that, subject to its finding on
the second preliminary objection submitted by Serbia, it has jurisdictiohn
pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention to entertain the
Application of Croatia.
9. Serbia then requested an equal time -limit of 18 months to file its
Counter-Memorial, which was the time -limit granted for the filing of the
Memorial of Croatia. The time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memo -
rial was fixed for 22 March 2010 . The Counter-Memorial of Serbia was
filed, within the time -limit, on January 2010, and it contained counter-
claims. Croatia indicated (at a meeting with the President on 3 February
2010) that it did not intend to raise objections to the admissibility ohf the
counter-claims but wished to respond to the substance of the counter-
claims in a Reply. Serbia thus indicated that it accordingly wished to fihle
a Rejoinder.
10. Given that there were no objections by Croatia as to the admissi -
bility of Serbia’s counter-claims, the Court did not consider it necehssary
to rule definitively at that stage on the question as to whether the chounter-
claims fulfilled the conditions of Article 80 (1) of the Rules of Court. The
Court further decided that a Reply and Rejoinder would be necessary,
and to ensure strict equality between the Parties (equality of arms/égalité
des armes) it reserved the right of Croatia to file an additional pleading
relating to the counter-claims. The Court thus fixed the time-limit fohr the
filing of Croatia’s Reply as 20 December 2010, and 4 November 2011 for
6
the Rejoinder of Serbia .
3 Order of 27 June 2000 (I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 108).
4 Order of 14 November 2002 (I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 610).
5 Order of 20 January 2009 (I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 54).
6 Order of 4 February 2010 (I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 3).
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11. Croatia filed its Reply within the time -limit and Serbia also filed its
Rejoinder within the fixed time -limits. Both the Reply and Rejoinder con-
tained submissions as to the claims and counter-claims. The Court autho-
rized the submission by Croatia of an additional pleading relating to thhe
counter-claims of Serbia, and fixed for 30 August 2012 the filing of such
additional pleading, which was filed within the time -limit 7. In light of the
foregoing, the hearings on the merits were thus scheduled to take place —
as they did — from 3 March to 1 April 2014.
12. These facts speak for themselves, as to the regrettable delays in the
adjudication of the present case, keeping in mind in particular those who
seek for justice. Unfortunately, as I have pointed out, on other recent h
occasions within this Court, the time of human justice is not the time of
human beings. In my dissenting opinion in the case of Questions relating
to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009), I pondered that :
“The time of human beings surely does not appear to be the time
of human justice. The time of human beings is not long (vita brevis),
at least not long enough for the full realization of their project of lihfe.
The brevity of human life has been commented upon time and time
again, throughout the centuries ; in his De Brevitate Vitae 8, Seneca
pondered that, except for but a few, most people in his times departed
from life while they were still preparing to live. Yet, the time of humahn
justice is prolonged, not seldom much further than that of human life,
seeming to make abstraction of the vulnerability and briefness of this
latter, even in the face of adversities and injustices. The time of humahn
justice seems, in sum, to make abstraction of the time human beings
count on for the fulfilment of their needs and aspirations.
Chronological time is surely not the same as biological time. The
time of the succession of events does not equate with the time of the
briefness of human life. Tempus fugit. For its part, biological time is
not the same as psychological time either. Surviving victims of cruelty
lose, in moments of deep pain and humiliation, all they could expect
of life the young lose in a few moments their innocence forever, the
elderly suddenly lose their confidence in fellow human beings, not to
speak of institutions. Their lives become deprived of meaning, and all
that is left is their hope in human justice. Yet, the time of human
justice does not appear to be the time of human beings.” (I.C.J R.eports
2009, p. 182, paras. 46-47.)
13. Shortly afterwards, in my dissenting opinion in the case concerning
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) (Counter‑Claim,
Order of 6 July 2010), I deemed it fit again to ponder, in relation to the
7
8 Cf. Order of 23 January 2012 (I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 3).
Written sometime between the years 49 and 62.
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inhuman conditions of the subjection of prisoners of war to forced labouhr,
that:
“Not only had those victims to endure inhuman and degrading
treatment, but later crossed the final limit of their ungrateful livesh
living with impunity, without reparation and amidst manifest injus -
tice. The time of human justice is definitively not the time of human h
beings.” (I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 375, para. 118.)
This holds true, once again, in the present case concerning the Application
of the Convention against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) — involving grave
breaches of international law — where the aforementioned regrettable
delays have extended for a virtually unprecedented prolongation of time h
(1999-2015), of over one and a half decades, despite the vita brevis of
human beings.
2. Justitia Longa, Vita Brevis
14. Paradoxically, the graver the breaches of international law appear
to be, the more time consuming and difficult it becomes to impart justihce.
To start with, all those who find themselves in this world are then
promptly faced with a great enigma posing a life -long challenge to every -
one : that of understanding the passing of time, and endeavouring to
learn how to live within it. Already in the late seventh or early eighth
century bc , this mystery surrounding all of us was well captured by
Homer in his Iliad :
“Like the generations of leaves, the lives of mortal men.
Now the wind scatters the old leaves across the earth,
now the living timber bursts with the new buds
and spring comes round again. And so with men :
as one generation comes to life, another dies away.” 9
15. As if it were not enough, there is an additional enigma to face, that
of the extreme violence and brutality with which human beings got used
to relating to each other, century after century :
“War — I know it well, and the butchery of men.
Well I know, shift to the left, shift to the right
my tough tanned shield. (. . .) I know it all, (. . .)
I know how to stand and fight to the finish,
twist and lunge in the war -god’s deadly dance . (. . .)
Now, as it is, the fates of death await us
thousands poised to strike, and not a man alive
can flee them or escape (. . .) .
9 Homer, The Iliad, Book VI, verses 171-175.
10 Ibid., Book VII, verses 275-278 and 280-281.
11
Ibid., Book XII, verses 378-380.
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We must steel our hearts. Bury our dead,
with tears for the day they die, not one day more.
And all those left alive, after the hateful carnage,
(.. .) wretched mortals (. . .)
like leaves, no sooner flourishing, full of the sun’s fire,
feeding on earth’s gifts, than they waste away and die 12. (. . .)
My sons laid low, my daughters dragged away
and the treasure -chambers looted, helpless babies
hurled to the earth in the red barbarity of war (. . .)
Ah for a young man
all looks fine and noble if he goes down in war,
hacked to pieces under a slashing bronze blade —
he lies there dead (. . .) but whatever death lays bare,
all wounds are marks of glory. When an old man’s killed
and the dogs go at the grey head and the grey beard
and mutilate the genitals — that is the cruellest sight
in all our wretched lives ! ”
16. Homer’s narrative of human cruelty seems endowed with perennial
contemporaneity, especially after the subsequent advent of tragedy. Thish
is the imprint of a true classic. Homer could well be describing the horh -
rors in our times, or in recent times, e.g., in the wars in the former Yhugo-
slavia during the nineties. There are, in the Iliad, murders, brutality, rape,
pillage, slavery and humiliation ;there are, in the present case of the
Application of the Convention against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), mur -
ders, brutality, torture, beatings, enforced disappearances, looting andh
humiliation ; from the late eighth century bc to the late twentieth century,
the propensity of human beings to treat each other with extreme violenceh
has remained the same, and has even at times worsened.
17. This suggests that succeeding generations over the centuries, have
not learned from the sufferings of their predecessors. The propensity of
human beings to do evil to each other has accompanied them from the
times of the Iliad, through those of the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sopho -
cles and Euripides (fourth century bc), until the present, as illustrated by
the cas d’espèce , concerning the Application of the Convention against
Genocide. There is a certain distance from epic to tragedy yet,;the former
paved the way to the latter, and tragedy was then to find its own exprhes-
sion, and, ever since, has never faded away. Tragedy sought inspiration hin
the narrative of epic, but added to it something new : the human senti -
ment, the endurance of living and the human condition. Tragedy has been h
accompanying the human condition throughout the centuries.
12
13Homer, The Iliad, Book XXI, verses 528-530.
Ibid., Book XXII, verses 73-75 and 83-90.
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18. It came to stay, performed throughout the centuries, time and time
again, until our days. The war in the Balkans, portrayed in the present h
case opposing Croatia to Serbia, bears witness of that : it is tragic in its
devastation. Yet, tragedy — which gave a new dimension to epic — was
not focused only on destructiveness and the lessons to extract therefromh,
but also on the need for justice. Aeschylus’s Oresteia trilogy, and in par -
ticular the chorus in the Eumenides, can be recalled in this connection.
Just as the passing of time has not erased the sombre propensity of humahn
beings to do evil to each other, the search for justice has likewise beehn
long -lasting, as also illustrated by the cas d’espèce. This regrettably
appears proper of the human condition, from ancient times to nowadays :
perennial evil, vita brevis; justitia longa, vita brevis.
III. Jurisdiction: Automatic Successionh to the Genocide
Convention as a Human Rihghts Treaty
1. Arguments of the Parties as to the Applicability
of the Obligations under
the Genocide Convention prior to 27 April 1992
19. In its Application filed in 1999, Croatia invoked jurisdiction on the
basis that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a
party to the Genocide Convention and that Serbia was bound by it as a
successor State to the SFRY 14. Both Parties, according to Croatia, were
15
bound by the Genocide Convention as successor States of the SFRY .
The SFRY had become a party to the Convention on 29 August 1950. In
the light of the International Court of Justice’s finding in 2008 that its
jurisdict16n in the present case arises of succession to the Genocide Cohn-
vention rather than accession, Croatia has stressed the existence of a
continuing obligation, rather than one newly entered into 17. Croatia has
thus submitted that the Genocide Convention accords jurisdiction to the
Court over conduct before 27 April 1992 ; it has put forward an alterna -
tive ground for jurisdiction over conduct predating 27 April 1992, namely,
Serbia’s declaration on that date 18.
20. Serbia, for its part, has acknowledged that it succeeded to the
Genocide Convention with effect from 27 April 1992 ; in the light of the
14 Application instituting proceedings, para. 28.
15 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Cr▯ime of Geno‑
cide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.Reports 2008, p. 424,
par16 37 (hereinafte: the “2008udgment”).
17 2008 Judgment, para. 111.
CR 2014/12, of 7 March 2014, p. 38, para. 4.
18 Ibid., p. 40, para. 9.
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2008 Judgment, it has asserted that it became bound by the Geno -
cide Convention from 27 April 1992 onwards, but not prior to that date . 19
It has submitted that acts and omissions that took place before 27 April
1992 cannot entail its international responsibility, as it only came into
existence on that date, and, accordingly, it was not bound by the Geno -
cide Convention before then. Alternatively, it has argued that Croatia
only came into existence on 8 October 1991 and cannot raise claims based
on facts preceding its coming into existence 20.
21. It should be recalled that the International Court of Justice,
in 2008, examined only the effect of the declaration and Note to the
United Nations of 27 April 1992 (to which it attributed the effect of a
notification of succession to treaties), and did not deem it necessarhy to
examine the wider question of the application in this case of the generahl
law relating to succession of States, nor the rules of international lawh
governing State succession to treaties (including the question of ipso jure
succession to some multilateral treaties) 2. The Court’s interpretation of
the declaration of 27 April 1992 was in itself sufficient for the purposes of
establishing whether the respondent was bound by the Genocide Conven-
tion (with attention to Article IX) at the date of the institution of the
proceedings. Be that as it may, now, in the merits phase, the question
arises as to the applicability of the Genocide Convention to acts prior
to 27 April 1992.
2. Continuity of Application of the Genocide Convention
(SFRY and FRY)
22. In deciding, in its Judgment of 2008 on preliminary objections, that
Serbia became bound by the Convention from 27 April 1992 onwards 22,
the Court joined to the merits the question of the applicability of the
obligations under the Genocide Convention to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) before 27 April 1992 23. In this regard, Serbia submit -
ted, in the oral proceedings at the merits stage, that “the Court alrheady
decided, at the preliminary objections stage, that Serbia ‘only’ became
bound by the Convention ‘as of April 1992’” 24. However, the Court only
dealt with the question of whether the conditions were met under Arti -
cle 35 of the Statute for the purposes of determining whether the FRY
had the capacity to participate in the proceedings before the Court on the
date of the Application, namely, 2 July 1999 25.
23. The question was decided not on the basis of whether Serbia suc -
ceeded to the Genocide Convention ipso jure, but solely on the basis of
19
20 CR 2014/14, of 11 March 2014, p. 23, para. 4.
21 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 206, 357-387.
22 2008 Judgment, para. 101.
Ibid., para. 117.
23 Ibid., para. 129.
24 CR 2014/14, of 11 March 2014, p. 14, para. 26.
25 2008 Judgment, paras. 60, 67, 69, 71, 78 and 95.
214
7 CIJ1077.indb 424 18/04/16 08:54 214 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
26
the historical record and of the declaration and Note of 27 April 1992 .
Taking the view that the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility raised
by Serbia’s preliminary objection ratione temporis constituted “two insep-
arable issues” in that case, the Court expressly left the issue of thhe appli-
cability of the obligations under the Genocide Convention to the FRY
before 27 April 1992 open, to be decided at the merits stage of the cas
d’espèce 27.
3. Continuity of the State Administration and Officials
(SFRY and FRY)
24. While the FRY formally came into existence as a State on 27 April
1992, this proclamation only formalized a factual situation which had de
facto arisen during the dissolution of the SFRY. Serbia considers that,
until the proclamation of the dissolution of the SFRY, any act performed
by individuals in the name of the SFRY may be attributable only to that
entity. However, as the Badinter Commission recognized in its Opin -
ion No. 1, from mid -1991 the SFRY ceased to operate as a functioning
State and was authoritatively recognized as in a “process of dissoluthion”.
The dissolution was an extended process, completed on 4 July 1992,
according to Opinion No. 8 of the Badinter Commission. This implies
that, well before April 1992, the territory of the SFRY had already been
divided, and Serbian leadership had effectively taken control of the prinh -
cipal organs of the former SFRY. This determination of the control of
the political and military apparatus during this whole period is thus rehle-
vant.
25. Serbia cannot shift responsibility to an extinct State for the main
reason that the personnel controlling the relevant organs in the interimh
period later assumed similar positions in the new government of the FRY.h
It was the same leadership which, from October1991 — when the relevant
organs of government and other federal authorities of the SFRY ceased to
function — became de facto organs and authorities of the new FRY, act -
ing under Serbian leadership. The former State officials of the SFRY had
close ties with the officials of Serbia and Montenegro (FRY). Serbia hdoes
not deny that these were the same people carrying out the same policies. In
this regard, Croatia provides a list of political and military leaders which
illustrates the personal continuity of the policy and practices from 1991
onwards, on the part of the Serbian authorities located in Belgrade 28. Ser-
bia has not challenged the list of29olitical and military leaders which hattests
this continuity and connections .
262008 Judgment, para. 101.
27Ibid., paras. 129-130.
28Memorial of Croatia, Appendix 8.
29One may refer to seven of the 17 political and military leaders, listed in Appendix 8
of Croatia’s Memorial.
215
7 CIJ1077.indb 426 18/04/16 08:54 215 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
4. Law Governing State Succession to Human Rights Treaties : Ipso Jure
Succession to the Genocide Convention
26. Serbia’s conduct — contrary to its allegations — supports the
applicability of the Genocide Convention to the FRY before 27 April
1992. It is here important to keep in mind, to start with, the law goverhn -
ing State succession to human rights treaties. In effect, leaving aside Shtate
succession in respect of classic treaties, it is generally accepted that certain
types of treaties — such as human rights treaties — remain in force by
reason of their special nature. It can be argued, in this connection, thhat
the application of the Genocide Convention to the FRY, when it was in
statu nascendi, that is, before 27 April 1992, is justified — to paraphrase
the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion of 1951 on the hRes ‑
ervations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (p. 23) — by the Convention’s “special and important pur -
pose” to endorse “the most elementary principles of morality”, hirrespec-
tive of questions of formal succession.
27. In this respect, the International Court of Justice’s understanding
of the object and purpose of the Convention, as set out in that célèbre
Advisory Opinion, may here be recalled :
“The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of
the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as ‘a crime
under international law’ involving a denial of the right of existenceh of
entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of man -
kind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to
moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations (Resolu-
tion 96 (I) of the General Assembly, 11 December 1946). The first
consequence arising from this conception is that the principles under-
lying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized
nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obliga -
tion. A second consequence is the universal character both of the
condemnation of genocide and of the co -operation required ‘in order
to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’ (Preamble to the
Convention).” 30
28. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the Convention, as indi-
cated, has a “special and important purpose” to endorse “the mohst ele -
mentary principles of morality” 3. The Court further stated that the
30
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the C▯rime of
Gen31ide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.
Ibid.
216
7 CIJ1077.indb 428 18/04/16 08:54 216 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
principles of the Convention bind States “even without any conventionhal
obligation” and that the Convention was intended to be “definitely uni -
versal in scope”. In its Judgment on preliminary objections (of 11 July
1996) in the Bosnia Genocide case, the International Court of Justice
referred no less than three times to the special nature of the Geno -
cide Convention as a universal human rights treaty, in order to found its
jurisdiction. There was awareness around the Bench as to the needs of
protection of the segments of the populations concerned, and automatic
succession to the Convention did not pass unnoticed 32.
29. Nowadays, almost two decades later, it is about time to take this
analysis further. It is clear that the Genocide Convention is not a synal -
lagmatic bargain, whereby each State party would bind itself to the othehr ;
it does not simply create rights and obligations between States parties hon
a bilateral basis. As a human rights treaty, it sets up a mechanism of col‑
lective guarantee 33. In my view, it is not sufficient to assert (or reassert), as
the International Court of Justice did almost two decades ago, that the h
1948 Genocide Convention is a human rights treaty : one has, moreover,
to extract the legal consequences therefrom (cf. infra).
30. In the present case concerning the Application of the Convention
against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), the relevant conduct was that of the
JNA (or under its direction and control), and the JNA was a de facto
organ of the nascent Serbian State. It would be utterly artificial to hargue
that the Convention continued to bind the SFRY until it formally disap -
peared , becoming thus no longer able to respond for any breach of an
international obligation. Such a break in the protection afforded by the h
Genocide Convention would not be consistent with the precise object of
safeguarding the very existence of certain human groups, in pursuance ofh
the most elementary principles of morality.
31. This applies even more cogently in a situation of dissolution of
State amidst violence. After all, the consequences of the commission of
grave violations of international law will, in most cases, continue to ahffect
and victimize certain human groups even after the date of succession, anhd
even more so when surrounded by violence. In such circumstance, it
would be unjust for the victims if no responsibility could be vindicatedh for
the commission of internationally wrongful acts and their consequences
32 Cf. case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish ‑
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objec‑
tions, Judgment, I.C.J.eports 1996 (II), separate opinions of Judges Shahabuddeen and
Wee33mantry, pp. 634-637 and 645-655, respectively.
On the notion of collective guarantee, proper to human rights treaties,
cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos [Trea‑
tise of International Law of Human Rights], Vol. II, Porto Alegre/Brazil, S. A. Fabris Ed.,
1999, pp. 47-53.
34 In reality, the SFRY, in 1991 and 1992, was no longer exercising any direction or
control of the JNA, and was already undergoing an irreversible process ohf dissolution.
217
7 CIJ1077.indb 430 18/04/16 08:54 217 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
extended in time 3. To argue that responsibility would vanish with the
dissolution of the State concerned would render the Genocide Conven-
tion irrelevant. An internationally wrongful act and its continuing conshe-
quences cannot remain unpunished and without reparation for damages.
32. The Genocide Convention, as a human rights treaty (as generally
acknowledged), is concerned with State responsibility, besides individual
responsibility. It should not pass unnoticed that human rights treaties h
have a hermeneutics of their own (cf. infra), and are endowed with a
mechanism of collective guarantee. Moreover, the Genocide Convention
implies the undertaking by each State party to treat successor States ash
continuing (as from independence) any commitment and status which the h
predecessor State had as a party to the Convention.
33. It may be recalled, in this regard, that, in the context of the present h
proceedings, the Badinter Commission emphasized the need for all human
rights treaties to which the SFRY was party to remain in force with
respect to all of its territories6. I am of the view that there is automatic
37
State succession to universal human rights treaties , and that Serbia has
succeeded to the Genocide Convention (under customary law), without
the need for any formal confirmation of adherence as the successor Stahte.
In light of the declaratory character of the Convention and the need to h
secure the effective protection of the rights enshrined therein, the de facto
organs of the nascent Serbia were bound by the Genocide Convention
before 27 April 1992.
5. State Conduct in Support of Automatic Succession to, and Continuing
Applicability of, the Genocide Convention
(to FRY prior to 27 April 1992)
34. Serbia’s conduct itself evidences the applicability to it of the multhi-lat
eral conventions to which the SFRY had been a State party at the time of
itsdissolution ; its conduct itself provides evidence that it remained bound
by them. In the particular circumstances of the present case, the FRY hahd,
35
Cf., in this sense, e.g., P. Dumberry, State Succession to International Responsibility,
Leiden, Nijhoff, 2007, pp. 278, 283-284, 297, 366, 409, 411, 424-425 and 428.
36 Arbitration Commission, EC Conference on Yugoslavia (Robert Badinter,
Chairman), Opinion No. 1, of 29 November 1991, 92 International Law Reports, p. 162.
37 In relation to international human rights instruments, cUN Human Rights
Commission resolutions 1993/23, 1994/16 and 1995/18, UN doc. E/CN4/1995/80 p. 4;
Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 26 (61), UN doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.8/Rev.1. Cf. also, in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s succession to the ICCPRh,
Decision adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 7 October 1992, and discussion
thereto, Official Records of the Human Rights Committee, 1992-1993, Vol. 1, p. 15.
218
7 CIJ1077.indb 432 18/04/16 08:54 218 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
since 1992, claimed to possess the status of a State party to the C38vention
against Genocide; thus, in its declaration of 27 April 1992 , it stated that:
“The [FRY], continuing the state, international legal and political
personality of the [SFRY], shall strictly abide by all the commitments
39
that the SFR[Y] assumed internationally.”
35. It follows that, by accepting that it was bound by all the obliga -
tions assumed by the SFRY, Serbia (the FRY) took expressly the posi -
tion that the substantive obligations of the Convention against Genocideh,
like other obligations assumed by the SFRY, continued to apply without
any temporal break, including before April 1992. It is important to note
that, in its declaration, the FRY did not expressly or implicitly excludhe its
intention to be bound by the Convention before the date of the declara -
tion (27 April 1992). It rather expressed an attitude of continuity at all
relevant times, including with regard to obligations emanating from the h
Convention against Genocide. In this regard, it is useful to highlight thhat,
in its official Note to the United Nations on the same date (27 April 1992),
the FRY stated that :
“Strictly respecting the continuity of the international personality h
of Yugoslavia, the [FRY] shall continue to fulfil all the rights con -
ferred to, and obligations assumed by, the [SFRY] in international
relations, including its membership in all international organizations
and participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by h
Yugoslavia.” 40
38
During the stage of preliminary objections in the present case, Serbia hhad disputed
that the declaration of 27 April 1992 amounted to a notification of succession. The
Court however, rejected that claim and concluded that Serbia did succeedh to the Geno -
cide Convention on 27 April 1992:
“The Court, taking into account both the text of the declaration and hNote
of 27 April 1992, and the consistent conduct of the FRY at the time of its making ahnd
throughout the years 1992-2001, considers that it should attribute to those documents
precisely the effect that they were, in the view of the Court, intended tho have on the
face of their terms : namely, that from that date onwards the FRY would be bound
by the obligations of a party in respect of all the multilateral conventions to which the
SFRY had been a party at the time of its dissolution, subject of course hto any -aserv
tions lawfully made by the SFRY limiting its obligations.” (2008 Judhgment, par. 117.)
This was acknowledged by Counsel for Serbia at the hearings in the presehnt proceedings
cf.39 2014/14, of 11 March 2014, p. 23, para. 4.
Joint declaration of the SFRY Assembly, the National Assembly of the Rephublic of
Serbia and the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro, 27April 1992, UN doc.A/46/915,
Annex II.
40 Note to the United Nations (addressed to the Secretary -General), of 27 April 1992,
ibid.
219
7 CIJ1077.indb 434 18/04/16 08:54 219 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
36. It thus stems from these two documents (the 1992 declaration and
the official Note to the United Nations) that there was immediate and
automatic succession, whereby Serbia (the FRY) deemed itself bound to h
become the successor State and to assume all obligations of the SFRY,
including obligations ensuing from the Genocide Convention. In other
words, Serbia (the FRY), by its own declaration of 27 April 1992, stated
clearly its engagement to succeed the SFRY as a State party to the Con -
vention against Genocide. This entails that Serbia was already bound by h
the obligations of the Convention in relation to acts that occurred befohre
the date of its declaration of 1992.
6. Venire Contra Factum Proprium Non Valet
37. Thus, in the circumstances of the present case, the International
Court of Justice should bear in mind that Serbia (the FRY) itself recohg -
nized its commitment to continue its participation in international treahties
ratified or acceded to by former Yugoslavia. The FRY’s binding declhara-
tion strongly supports the continuing applicability of the obligations ohf the
Convention against Genocide to the nascent Serbian State before 27 April
1992. Furthermore, it can be argued that the International Court of Jus -
tice appears to have resolved this issue in its 2008 Judgment on prelimi-
nary objections in the cas d’espèce 41. When the International Court of
Justice stated that “the 1992 declaration and Note had the effect of a noti-
fication of succession by the FRY to the SFRY in relation to the Genocide
Convention”, it seems that it thereby acknowledged that there was conti -
nuity as to the conventional obligations (between SFRY and FRY).
38. One decade later, the FRY’s notification of accession of 6 March
2001 (deposited on 12 March 2001), after referring to the 1992 declara-
tion and to the subsequent admission of the FRY to the United Nations
as a new Member, stated, however, that
“the [FRY] has not succeeded on April 27, 1992, or on any later date,
to treaty membership, rights and obligations of the [SFRY] in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen -
ocide on the assumption of continued membership in the United
Nations and continued state, international legal and political person-
ality of the [SFRY] (. . .)”2
The notification of accession contained the following reservation :
“The [FRY] does not consider itself bound by Article IX of the
Convention (. . .) and, therefore, before any dispute to which the
41
422008 Judgment, para. 117.
Ibid., para. 116.
220
7 CIJ1077.indb 436 18/04/16 08:54 220 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
[FRY] is a party may be validly submitted to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice under this Article, the specifi43and
explicit consent of the FRY is required in each case.”
39. Be that as it may, this step was inconsistent with the status which
Serbia (the FRY), since its declaration of 1992, had been claiming to hpos -
sess, namely, that of a State party to the Convention against Genocide. h
By the end of the nineties, there remained no doubt that the FRY had
assumed all the international obligations that had been entered into by h
44
the SFRY, including those pertaining to the respect for human rights . It
should further be noted that the FRY never contended before this Court, h
in the previous proceedings, that it was not a party to the Convention
against Genocide.
40. It was only when the FRY, abandoning its claim to continue the
UN membership of the SFRY, was admitted to the United Nations
in 2000, that it advanced the opposite view, initially in its written obserhva -
tions, filed on 18 December 2002, on the preliminary objections submitted
in the Legality of Use of Force cases 45. One cannot avail itself of a posi-
tion a contrario sensu to the one earlier upheld, by virtue of a basic prin -
ciple going as far back as classic Roman law : venire contra factum
proprium non valet. In any case, the International Court of Justice, having
concluded, at the preliminary objections stage, that the FRY was a partyh
to the Convention against Genocide, considered that it was not necessary
to make a finding as to the legal effect of Serbia’s notification hof accession
to the Convention (dated 6 March 2001).
41. In the light of the aforementioned, in my understanding Serbia’s
change of attitude can have no bearing upon the jurisdiction of the Courht.
In this regard, citing its own jurisprudence constante, the International
Court of Justice stated in 2008 that, if a title of jurisdiction is shown to
have existed at the date of institution of proceedings, any subsequent
lapse or withdrawal of the jurisdictional instrument is without effect onh
the jurisdiction of the Court 46. Accordingly, the FRY, by way of its dec -
432008 Judgment, para. 116.
44The declaration of 27 April 1992, whereby the formation of the FRY was proclaimed,
“is the act which laid stress, in all its provisions, on continuity whith the SFRY. Its content
emphasizes that the country will keep the legal and political subjectivihty of the former State
and promises strict respect for its international obliga;iM. Sahović, “Le droit inter-
national et la crise en ex -Yougoslavie”, 3 Cursos Euromediterráneos Bancaja de Derecho
Internacional (1999), p. 392.
45The FRY requested the International Court of Justice to decide on its juhrisdiction
considering that the FRY “did not continue the personality and treatyh membership of
the former Yugoslavia”, and was thus “not bound by the Genocide Convention until it
acceded to that Convention (with a reservation to Article IX) in March 2001”.
46
Cf., e.g., Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objection, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 1;2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
221
7 CIJ1077.indb 438 18/04/16 08:54 221 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
laration of 1992, bound itself as the successor State of the SFRY ;this
declaration operated automatic succession. Serbia remained bound by the h
Convention against Genocide for acts or omissions having occurred prior h
to 27 April 1992. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction
under the Convention in relation to those acts or omissions, and Croa -
tia’s claims in relation thereto are admissible.
7. Automatic Succession to Human Rights Treaties
in the Practice of
United Nations Supervisory Organs
42. Already in the early nineties, while the devastation was taking
place in the Balkans, there was firm support, on the part of the
United Nations supervisory organs, for automatic succession and con -
tinuing applicability of human rights treaties to successor States. Thus, in
its resolution 1993/23, of 5 March 1993, the (former) UN Commission on
Human Rights stated that successor States “shall succeed to internatihonal
human rights treaties to which the predecessor States have been parties
and continue to bear responsibilities” 4. After calling upon the continuity
by successor States of fulfilment of “international human rights trheaty
48
obligations of the predecessor State” , the Commission urged successor
States “to accede or to ratify those international human rights treaties to
which the predecessor States were not parties” 49.
43. The following year, in its resolution 1994/16, of 25 February 1994,
the Commission on Human Rights evoked the “relevant decisions of the h
Human Rights Committee [HRC] and the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination [CERD] on succession issues, in respect of inter-
national obligations in the field of human rights” 50. It further welcomed
the recommendation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1986, p. 28,
para. 36; and case concerning thepplication of the Convention on the Prevention and Puni‑
shment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 445, para. 95. In this sense, as the International Court of Justice
stated in its Judgments in 2004 in the Legality of Use of Force cases, “the significance of
this new development in 2000 is that it has clarified the thus far amorphous legal situation
concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the United Nations”
(p.47191, para. 78).
Third preambular paragraph.
48 Fifth preambular paragraph.
49 Operative part, para. 3.
50 Second preambular paragraph. For an account of this aspect of the practice of the
HRC and the CERD Committees in the nineties, cf.A. A. Cançado Trindade, International
Law for Humankind — Towards a New Jus Gentium, op. cit. infra note 67, pp. 472-475.
222
7 CIJ1077.indb 440 18/04/16 08:54 222 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Action, recently adopted by the Second World Conference on Human
Rights (1993), “to encourage and facilitate the ratification of, hand acces-
51
sion or succession to, international human rights treaties and protocolsh”.
In the operative part of resolution 1994/16, the Commission, after empha-
sizing “the special nature of the human rights treaties” 52 aimed at the
protection of the rights of the human person, requested the UN super -
visory organs of human rights treaties “to consider further the continuing
applicability of the respective international human rights treaties to shuc-
cessor States, with the aim of assisting them in meeting their obligatiohns” 53.
44. Once again, in its following resolution 1995/18, of 24 February
1995, the Commission on Human Rights evoked the relevant decisions
and recommendations of HRC and CERD, as well as the aforementioned
recommendation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
adopted by the UN Second World Conference on Human Rights (1993) 54.
55
And it again stressed “the special nature of the human rights treatiehs” ,
and it reiterated its request to the UN supervisory organs of human righhts
treaties to keep on considering “the continuing applicability of the hrespe-c
tive human rights treaties to successor States”, so as to assist themh “in
56
meeting their obligations” . It is clear that, already at the time, in the
early nineties, while the wars and devastation in the former Yugoslavia
were taking place, the work at the United Nations in the present domain
was being guided by basic considerations of humanity, rather than State
sovereignty.
45. And it could hardly be otherwise. The “special nature” of human
rights treaties — and the Genocide Convention is characterized as such,
as a human rights treaty, — requires their continuing applicability, irre -
spective of the uncertainties of State succession. States themselves havhe
acknowledged the special nature of human rights and humanitarian trea -
ties, and have not objected to the understanding espoused by
United Nations supervisory organs of their continuing applicability, ipso
jure, to successor States. After all, the local populations cannot become
suddenly deprived of any protection when they most need it, in cases of h
turbulent dissolution of a State, when considerations of humanity need tho
prevail over invocations of State sovereignty.
46. The UN Secretary-General, in his report to the United Nations
General Assembly (of 19 October 1994), on the Implementation of
57
Human Rights Instruments , recalled that, shortly after the Second
51Fourth preambular paragraph.
52Operative part, para. 2.
53Ibid., para. 3.
54
55Second and third preambular paragraphs.
56Operative part, para. 2.
Ibid., para. 3.
57UN doc. A/49/537, of 19 October 1994, pp. 1-14.
223
7 CIJ1077.indb 442 18/04/16 08:54 223 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 14 -25 June 1993), the
fourth meeting of persons chairing the UN human rights conventional
supervisory organs took steps towards the elaboration of “early warnihng
measures and urgent procedures” aiming at the prevention of the occurh-
rence, or recurrence, of grave violations of human rights ; the chairper-
sons, moreover, welcomed the establishment, by the World Conference,
of the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (para. 12).
47. The UN Secretary-General, in his aforementioned report, then
turned to the fifth meeting of chairpersons, where they espoused the view
that their respective UN human rights treaties were “universal in nature
and in application” (para. 13), and further stressed that “full and effective
compliance” with their conventional obligations “is an essential chompo -
nent of an international order based on the rule of law” (para. 17). The
Secretary-General added that the chairpersons endorsed his own initia -
tive to urge States to “ratify, accede or succeed to those principal hhuman
rights treaties to which they are not yet a party” (para. 16).
48. It was further reported that their work on prevention of grave vio -
lations of human rights, including early warning and urgent procedures, h
continued (paras. 26-29). And the Secretary-General added, significantly,
that the chairpersons were of the view that
“successor States are automatically bound by obligations under inter-
national human rights instruments from their respective date of inde-
pendence and (. . .) the respect of their obligations should not depend
on a declaration of confirmation made by the new Government of the
successor State” (para. 32).
49. For its part, the United Nations General Assembly, even earlier, in
its resolution 47/121, of 18 December 1992, acknowledged, in relation to
the “consistent pattern of gross and systematic violations of human
rights” in the wars in the former Yugoslavia — with its concentration
camps and “mass expulsions of defenceless civilians from their homes”h—
that “ethnic cleansing” appeared to be not the consequence of war,h “but
rather its goal”. And the United Nations General Assembly added that
“the abhorrent practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’” was “a forhm of genocide” 58.
The same General Assembly resolution, inter alia, urged the Secu -
rity Council to consider recommending the establishment of an Ad Hoc
international war crimes tribunal — the ICTY — t59try and punish those
responsible for the perpetration of the atrocities .
58
59Seventh and ninth preambular paragraphs.
Operative part, para. 10.
224
7 CIJ1077.indb 444 18/04/16 08:54 224 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
IV. The Essence of the Presenht Case
1. Arguments of the Contending Parties
50. A careful examination of the arguments of the contending Parties,
in both the written and oral phases of the proceedings as to the merits hin
the present case of the Application of the Convention against Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia), reveals that the contending Parties, not surprisingly,
devoted considerably more attention to the substance of the case (the
merits themselves, in relation to Croatia’s main claim) than to issues per -
taining to jurisdiction/admissibility. These latter occupy only a small h
portion of the documents submitted by the contending Parties, namely :
(a) in Croatia’s Memorial, one chapter out of eight chapters, seven pages
(pp. 317 -323) out of a total of 414 pages ; (b) in Serbia’s Counter-
Memorial, one chapter out of fourteen chapters, 50 pages (pp. 85 -134) out
of a total of 478 pages (;) in Croatia’s Reply, one chapter out of twelve
chapters, 26 pages (pp. 243-269) out of a total of 473 pages ; and (d) in
Serbia’s Rejoinder, one chapter out of eight chapters, 55 pages (pp. 39-93)
out of a total of 322 pages.
51. As to the oral phase of the present proceedings as to the merits of
the cas d’espèce , the same picture is disclosed. The arguments of the con -
tending Parties, as expected, were rather brief on issues pertaining to
jurisdiction/admissibility; the vast majority of their arguments focused on
the substance of the cas d’espèce (the merits themselves, in relation to
Croatia’s main claim). May it be recalled that the public sittings before
the Court extended for more than one month, having lasted from3 March
2014 until 1 April 2014. In its first round of oral arguments, Croatia has
dedicated not more than a part of one day of its pleadings to discuss inh
60
particular the specific question of jurisdiction . And in its second round
of oral arguments, Croatia has devoted only a small portion of pleadingsh
to rebutting Serbia’s arguments on jurisdiction 61.
52. For its part, in Serbia’s first round of oral arguments, the bulk ohf
62
the pleadings on questions of jurisdiction took place in just one sessiohn .
And, in its second round of oral arguments, Serbia has dedicated only a h
small part of its pleadings to a discussion of questions of jurisdictionh 63. It
ensues from an examination of the contending Parties’ oral pleadings hthat
the vast majority of their arguments concerned questions pertaining to
the merits ; they have devoted only a small portion of their pleadings
(around two sessions each) to the issue of jurisdiction.
60Cf. mainly CR 2014/12, of 7 March 2014, pp. 37-55. And cf. also CR 2014/5, of
3 March 2014, pp. 23-3; and CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, pp. 32-49.
61Cf. mainly CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, pp. 63-67. And cf. also CR 2014/21,
of 21 March 2014, pp. 10-33.
62Cf. mainly CR 2014/14, of 11 March 2014, pp. 10-69.
63Cf. mainly CR 2014/22, of 27 March 2014, pp. 16-47.
225
7 CIJ1077.indb 446 18/04/16 08:54 225 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
2. General Assessment
53. The foregoing shows that the contending Parties, at this stage of
the merits of the present case, in the written phase of proceedings, havhe
seen no need to devote more than a very small portion of their argumentsh
to questions of jurisdiction/admissibility. They have rightly focused on
the merits of the case. Likewise, in the oral phase of proceedings, both
Croatia and Serbia have concentrated their pleadings on substantive
issues; the two contending Parties have well captured the essence of the
present case, pertaining to the interpretation and application of the Con -
vention against Genocide and not to State succession.
54. It has been the Court that seems to have misapprehended this,
devoting considerable more attention, at this final stage of the adjudhica -
tion of the present case, again to the issue of jurisdiction, which shouhld
have been decided some years ago. The International Court of Justice, inh
the present Judgment on the merits of the cas d’espèce, concerning the
Application of the Convention against Genocide, has devoted no less than
50 paragraphs to the jurisdiction issue, guarding small proportion in this h
respect.
V. Automatic Succession hto the Convention agaihnst Genocide,
and Continuity of Its Oblihgations,
as an Imperative of Humhaneness
1. The Convention against Genocide and the Imperative
of Humaneness
55. Since the Court has done so in the present Judgment, I feel obliged,
in the present dissenting opinion, to dwell upon the foundations of my
own personal position in support of the automatic succession (supra) to
the Convention against Genocide. It is generally acknowledged that the
Genocide Convention is a human rights treaty ; one of the legal conse -
quences ensuing therefrom is the automatic succession to it and the con -
tinuity of its obligations.
56. As this Court itself indicated in its célèbre Advisory Opinion of
1951, States parties to the 1948 Genocide Convention do not have indi -
vidual interests of their own, but are rather jointlyguided by the high
ideals and basic considerations of humanity having led the UnitedNations
to condemn and punish the international crime of genocide, which
“shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humahn -
ity”, being contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations . The
fundamental principles underlying the Convention are “binding on Stathes,
even without any conventional obligation”. The condemnation of geno -
cide has a “universal character”, with all the co-operation requirhed “to
64UN, General Assembly resolution 96 (I), of 11 December 1946.
226
7 CIJ1077.indb 448 18/04/16 08:54 226 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge”, as stated in the Preamhble
to the Convention (cf. supra).
57. This calls for the automatic succession to the Genocide Conven-
tion, with the continuity of its obligations ; international responsibility for
the grave wrongs done to segments of the population concerned survives
State disruption and succession. To argue otherwise would militate
against the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention, depriving it h
of its effet utile it would thereby deprive the targeted “human groups” of
any protection, when they most needed it, thus creating a void of protech -
tion which would render the Genocide Convention an almost dead letter.
58. The corpus juris gentium for the international safeguard of the
rights of the human person is conformed by the converging trends of pro-
tection of international law of human rights, of international humanitarh-
ian law, and of international law of refugees 65. The rights protected
thereunder, in any circumstances, are not reduced to those “granted” by
the State : they are inherent to the human person, and ought thus to be
respected by the State. The protected rights are superior and anterior to
the State, and must thus be respected by this latter, by all States, even in
the occurrence of State disruption and succession. It has taken much sufh -
fering and sacrifice of succeeding generations to learn this. The aforhemen -
tioned corpus juris gentium is people-oriented, victim-oriented, and not at
all State-sovereignty oriented.
59. The 1948 Genocide Convention is people‑oriented, rather than
State-centric: it is centred on human groups, whom it aims to protect. As
contemporary history shows, in the event of dissolution of States the
affected local populations become particularly vulnerable; that is the time
when they stand most in need of the protection extended to them by
human rights treaties, the Genocide Convention (to which their State hahd
become a party) being one of them. The fact remains that the corpus juris
gentium of international protection of the rights of the human person,
essentially victim-oriented, has been erected and consolidated along the
last decades (almost seven decades) to the benefit of human beings, hindi -
vidually (like under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the
1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1965 UN Conven-
tion for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) or in
groups (like under the 1948 Convention against Genocide).
60. That corpus juris gentium , which forms, in my view, the most
important legacy of the international legal thinking of the twentieth cen-
tury, cannot be undermined by the vicissitudes of State succession. The h
65 Cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos,
Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados y Derecho Internacional Humani— Aproxi‑
maciones y Convergencias, Geneva, ICRC, [2000], pp. 1-66.
227
7 CIJ1077.indb 450 18/04/16 08:54 227 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
population — the most precious constitutive element of statehood —
surely cannot be subjected to those vicissitudes, when State succession h
takes place amidst extreme violence. It is in those circumstances of theh
disruption of the State that the population concerned stands most in neehd
of protection, such as the one afforded by the core Conventions of the
international law of human rights, the international humanitarian law
and the international law of refugees.
61. To attempt to withdraw their protection, rendering human beings,
individually and in groups, extremely vulnerable, if not defenceless, wohuld
go against the letter and spirit of those Conventions. Moreover, when ith
comes to the Convention against Genocide, we find ourselves in the reahlm
not only of conventional international law, but likewise of general or chus -
tomary international law itself. As the International Court of Justice pher-
spicaciously pondered in its aforementioned Advisory Opinion of 1951,
the principles underlying the Convention against Genocide are “bindinhg
on States, even without any conventional obligation” 6. And it could not
be otherwise, as, in my own conception, the universal juridical conscience
67
is the ultimate material source of international law, the jus gentium .
62. It is indeed in times of violent State disruption — as that of the
former Yugoslavia — that human beings, individually or in groups, stand
in most need of protection. After all, States exist for human beings, anhd
not vice versa. To deprive human beings of international protection whenh
they most need it, would go against the very foundations of contempo -
rary international law, both conventional and customary, and would
make abstraction of the principle of humanity, which permeates it. The
corpus juris gentium of protection of human beings, in any circumstances,
is — may I reiterate — essentially victim -oriented, while the outlook of
State succession is ineluctably and strictly State -centric.
63. Such an outlook cannot at all be made to prevail in violent State
disruption, entailing the discontinuity of that protection when it is most
needed. The automatic succession to the Convention against Genocide is
an imperative of humaneness. The corpus juris gentium of protection of the
human person enshrines rights which are anterior and superior to the
State. They are listed, inter alia, in the core Conventions of the
United Nations (the two Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 ; the Con -
ventions for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and h
of Discrimination against Women, of 1965 and 1979 ; the 1984 Conven -
tion against Torture ; and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the
Child). Moreover, in the last decades international legal doctrine has h
66Reservations to the Convention on the Preventand Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.
67A. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind — Towards a New Jus
Gentium, 2nd rev. ed., Leiden/The Hague, Nijhoff/The Hague Academy of International
Law, 2013, Chap. VI, pp. 139-161.
228
7 CIJ1077.indb 452 18/04/16 08:54 228 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
endeavoured to identify a hard core of universal human rights —
non -derogable ones — which admit no restrictions, namely, the funda -
mental rights to life and to personal integrity, the absolute prohibitiohn of
torture and of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
64. Contemporary international law is particularly sensitive to the
pressing need of humane treatment of persons, in any circumstances, so
as to prohibit inhuman treatment, by reference to humanity as a whole,
in order to secure protection to all, even more so when they stand in sihtu-
ations of great vulnerability. Humaneness is to orient human behaviour in
all circumstances, in times of peace as well as of disturbances and armehd
conflict. The principle of humanity permeates the whole corpus juris of
protection of the human person, providing one of the illustrations of thhe
approximations or convergences between its distinct and complementary
trends (international humanitarian law, the international law of human h
rights, and international refugee law), at the hermeneutic level, and ahlso
manifested at the normative and the operational levels 6.
2. The Principle of Humanity in Its Wide Dimension
65. My own understanding is in the sense that the principle of human -
ity is endowed with a wide dimension : it applies in the most distinct cir -
cumstances, in times both of armed conflict and of peace, in the relathions
between public power and all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the h
State concerned. That principle has a notorious incidence when these
latter are in a situation of vulnerability or great adversity, or evendefence‑
lessness, as evidenced by relevant provisions of distinct treaties conform-
ing to the international law of human rights 69.
66. The United Nations Charter itself professes the determination to
secure respect for human rights everywhere. Adopted in one of the rare
moments of lucidity in the last century, it opens up its Preamble by staht -
ing that :
“We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save suc -
ceeding generations from the scourge of war ; (. . .) to reaffirm faith
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person (. . .); to establish conditions under which justice and respect
68
Cf., on this particular point, e.A. Cançado Trindade, Derecho Internacional
de los Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados y Derec▯ho Internacional
Humanitario — Aproximaciones y Convergencias, op. cit. supra note 65, pp. 1-66.
69 Thus, for example, at UN level, the 1990 International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Artihcle 17 (1); the
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, (Art. 37 (b)). Provisions of the kind can
also be found in human rights treaties at regional level, e.g.,American9Conven-
tion on Human Rights, (Art. 5 (2)); the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights (Art. 5).
229
7 CIJ1077.indb 454 18/04/16 08:54 229 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna -
tional law can be maintained ; (. . .) have resolved to combine our
efforts to accomplish these aims.”
67. And the UN Charter includes, among the purposes of the
United Nations, to solve problems of humanitarian character, and to pro-
mote and encourage respect for human rights for all (Art. 1 (3)). It deter-
mines that the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make
recommendations for assisting in the realization of human rights for allh
(Art. 13 (1) (b)). It further states that, in order to create the “conditions of
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly rela-
tions among nations”, the United Nations shall promote “universalrespect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (Art.55 (c)).
68. It is clear that the principle of humanity permeates the law of the
United Nations. It encompasses the whole corpus juris of the interna -
tional protection of the human person, comprising its converging trends h
of international humanitarian law, international law of human rights,
and international law of refugees. In effect, when one evokes the principhle
of humanity, there is a tendency to consider it in the framework of inter -
national humanitarian law. It is beyond doubt that, in this framework,
for example, civilians and persons hors de combat are to be treated with
humanity. The principle of humane treatment of civilians and persons
hors de combat is provided for in the 1949 Geneva Conventions on Inter-
70
national Humanitarian Law . Such a principle, moreover, is generally
regarded as one of customary international humanitarian law 71.
69. The principle of humanity, in line with the long-standing thinking
of natural law, is an emanation of human conscience, projecting itself
into conventional as well as customary international law. The treatment h
dispensed to human beings, in any circumstances, ought to abide by the
principle of humanity, which permeates the whole corpus juris of the inter -
national protection of the rights of the human person (encompassing
international humanitarian law, the international law of human rights,
and international refugee law), conventional as well as customary, at
global (UN) and regional levels. The principle of humanity, usually
invoked in the domain of international humanitarian law, thus extends
itself also to that of international human rights law 72.
70 Common Article 3, and Articles 12 (1)/13/5 and 27 (1); and their Additional Proto -
cols I (Art. 75 (1)) and II (Art. 4 (1)).
71 For a study in depth, cf.ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law (eds.
J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck), Geneva/Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2005, Vol. I Rules, pp. 3-621Vol.II, Part I Practice, pp. 3-1982ol.II, Part II
Pra72ice, pp. 1983-4411.
Cf., to this effect, Human Rights Committee, General Comment note 31 (of 2004),
para. 11 ; and cf.also its General Comments, note 9 (of 1982), para. 3, and note 21
(of 1992), para. 4. It may further be recalled that, in the aftermath of the SWorld
230
7 CIJ1077.indb 456 18/04/16 08:54 230 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
70. In faithfulness to my own conception, I have, in recent decisions of
the International Court of Justice (and, earlier on, of the Inter -American
Court of Human Rights as well), deemed it fit to develop some reflehctions
on the basis of the principle of humanity lato sensu. I have done so, e.g.,
in my dissenting opinion (paras. 24-25 and 61) in the case of the Obliga ‑
tion to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Provisional Mea‑
sures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009), and in my dissenting
opinion (paras. 116, 118, 125, 136 -139 and 179) 73in the case of Jurisdic‑
tional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) (Counter‑Claim, Order
of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I)), as well as in my lengthy separate
opinion (paras. 67-96 and 169 -217) in the Court’s Advisory Opinion on
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde ‑
pendence in Respect of Kosovo [hereinafter Declaration of Independence of
Kosovo] (ibid., p. 403). I have likewise sustained the wide dimension of the
principle of humanity in my lengthy separate opinion (paras. 93-106 and
107-142) in the International Court of Justice’s Judgment (of 30 Novem-
ber 2010) in the case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Demo‑
cratic Republic of the Congo), Merits.
71. The International Court of Justice has lately given signs — as I
perceive them — of its preparedness to take into account the principle of
humanity. Thus, in its Order of Provisional Measures of Protection of
18 July 2011, in the case of the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand), the International Court of Justice, in deciding inter alia to
order the establishment of a provisional demilitarized zone around the
Temple (part of the world’s cultural and spiritual heritage) and iths vicin -
ity, it extended protection (as I pointed out in my separate opinion,
paras. 66-113) not only to the territory at issue, but also to the local
inhabitants, in conformity with the principle of humanity in the frame -
work of the new jus gentium of our times (paras. 114-117). Territory and
people go together.
72. Subsequently, in the recent case of the Frontier Dispute (Judgment
of 16 April 2013), the contending Parties (Burkina Faso and Niger) them -
selves expressed before the Court their concern, in particular with locahl
nomadic and semi-nomadic populations, and assured that their living
conditions would not be affected by the tracing of the frontier. Once
again, as I pointed out in my separate opinion (paras. 90, 99 and 104-105),
the principle of humanity seemed to have permeated the handling of the
case by the International Court of Justice.
War, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed that “[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (Art. 1).
73 In this lengthy dissenting opinion, my reflections relating to the prihnciple of humaitny
are found particularly in its XII,on human beings as the true bearers (titulaires) of
the originally violated rights and the pitfalls of State voluntarism (pharas.112-123), as well
as in its Part XIII, on the incidence of jus cogens (paras. 126-146), besides the Conclusions
(mainly paras. 178-179).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 458 18/04/16 08:54 231 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
3. The Principle of Humanity in the Heritage of Jusnaturalist Thinking
73. It should not pass unnoticed that the principle of humanity is in
line with natural law thinking. It underlies classic thinking on humane h
treatment and the maintenance of sociable relationships, also at internah-
tional level. Humaneness came to the fore even more forcefully in the
treatment of persons in situation of vulnerability, or even defencelessness,
such as those deprived of their personal freedom, for whatever reason.
The jus gentium, when it emerged as amounting to the law of nations,
came then to be conceived by its “founding fathers” (F. de Vitoria,
A. Gentili, F. Suárez, H. Grotius, S. Pufendorf, C. Wolff) as regulating
the international community constituted by human beings socially orga -
nized in the (emerging) States and co -extensive with humankind, thus
conforming to the necessary law of the societas gentium.
74. The jus gentium, thus conceived, was inspired by the principle of
humanity lato sensu. Human conscience prevails over the will of individ -
ual States. Respect for the human person is to the benefit of the commhon
good 74. This humanist vision of the international legal order pursued —
as it does nowadays — a people‑centred outlook, keeping in mind the
humane ends of the State. The precious legacy of natural law thinking,
evoking the right human reason (recta ratio), has never faded away ; this
should be stressed time and time again, particularly in face of the indihffer -
ence and pragmatism of the “strategic” droit d’étatistes, so numerous in
the legal profession in our days. The principle of humanity may be con -
sidered as an expression of the raison d’humanité imposing limits on the
raison d’Etat 7.
75. States, created by human beings gathered in their social milieu, are
bound to protect, and not at all to oppress, all those who are under thehir
respective jurisdictions. This corresponds to the ethical minimum, univehr -
sally reckoned by the international community of our times. At the time hof
theadoption of the Universal Declaration on10 December 1948 (on the day
following the adoption of the Convention against Genocide), one could
hardly anticipate that a historical process of generalization of the intherna -
tional protection of human rights was being launched, on a truly universal
76
scale . States are bound to safeguard the integrity of the human person
from repression and systematic violence, from discriminatory and arbitrary
treatment.
74
A. A. Cançado Trindade, A Humanização do Direito Internacional, Belo Horizonte/
Br75il, Edit. Del Rey, 2006, pp. 9-14, 172, 318-319, 393 and 408.
A. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind — Towards a New Jus
Gentium, op. cit. supra note 67, pp. 150-152 and 275-285.
76 Throughout almost seven decades, of remarkable historical projection, thhe declara-
tion has gradually acquired an authority which its draftsmen could not hhave foreseen. This
happened mainly because successive generations of human beings, from distinct cultures
and all over the world, recognized in it a “common standard of achievhement” (as originally
proclaimed), which corresponded to their deepest and most legitimate ashpirations.
232
7 CIJ1077.indb 460 18/04/16 08:54 232 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
76. The conception of fundamental and inalienable human rights is
deeply -engraved in the universal juridical conscience ; in spite of varia -
tions in their enunciation or formulation, their conception marks pres -
ence in all cultures, and in the modern history of human thinking of all
peoples 77. The 1948 Universal Declaration warns that “disregard and
contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of mankind” (Preamble, para. 2); it further
warns that “it is essential, if man is not compelled to have recourseh, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human righhts
should be protected by the rule of law” (ibid., para. 3). Moreover, it
acknowledges that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda -
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (ibid., para. 1).
4. Judicial Recognition of the Principle of Humanity
77. May I now turn attention, however briefly, to the acknowledgment
of the principle of humanity in the case law of contemporary interna -
tional tribunals. The fundamental principle of humanity has indeed met
therein with full judicial recognition 78. Its acknowledgment is found, e.g.,
in the jurisprudence constante of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR), which holds that it applies even more forcefully whenh
persons are found in an “exacerbated situation of vulnerability” 79. In my
separate opinion in the Judgment of the IACtHR (of 29 April 2004) in
the case of the Massacre of Plan de Sánchez, concerning Guatemala (one
of a pattern of 626 massacres), I devoted a whole section
(Part III, paras. 9-23) of it to the judicial acknowledgement of the prin -
ciple of humanity in the recent case law of the IACtHR as well as of theh
Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY).
77 Cf., e.g., A. A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito International dos Direitos
Humanos [Treatise of International Law of Human Rights], Vol. I, 1st ed., Porto Alegre/
Brazil, S. A. Fabris Ed., 1997, pp. 31-57Various Authors]Universality of Human Rights
in a Pluralistic World (Proceedings of the 1989 Strasbourg Colloquy), Strasbourg/Kehl,
N. 78 Engel Verlag, 1990, pp. 45, 57, 103, 138, 143 and 155.
Cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, “Le déracinement et la protection des migranths dans
le droit international des droits de l’homme”, 19 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme,
Brussels (2008), pp. 289-328, esp. pp. 295 and 308-316.
79 IACtHR, Judgments in the cases of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, of 27 November
2003, para. 87; ofJuan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, of 7 June 2003, para. 96; and of
Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, of 18 August 2000, para. 90and cfcase of Bámaca Velásquez
v. Guatemala, of 25 November 2000, para. 150. For a recent study on the protection of the
vulnerable, cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, A Proteção dos Vulneráveis como Legado da II
Conferência Mundial de Direitos Humanos (1993‑2013) [The Protection of the Vulnerable as
Legacy of the Second World Conference on Human Rights (1993‑2013)], Fortaleza/Brazil,
IBDH, 2014, pp. 13-356.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 462 18/04/16 08:54 233 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
78. I pondered therein that the primacy of the principle of humanity is
identified with the very end or ultimate goal of the law, of the wholeh legal
order, both national and international, in recognizing the inalienabilithy of
all rights inherent to the human person (para. 17). The same principle of
humanity — I concluded in the aforementioned separate opinion in the
case of the Massacre of Plan de Sánchez — also has incidence in the
domain of international refugee law, as disclosed by the facts of the cas
d’espèce, involving massacres and the State policy of tierra arrasada, i.e.,
the destruction and burning of homes, which generated a massive forced
displacement of persons (para. 23).
79. Likewise, the ICTY has devoted attention to the principle
of humanity in its judgments, e.g., in the cases of Mucić et alii (2001) and
of Celebići (1998). In the Mucić et alii case (Judgment of 20 February
2001), the ICTY (Appeals Chamber), pondered that both interna -
tional humanitarian law and the international law of human rights take
as a “starting point” their common concern to safeguard human dignhity,
which forms the basis of their minimum standards of humanity
80
(para. 149) .
80. Earlier on, in the Celebići case (Judgment of 16 November 1998),
the ICTY (Trial Chamber) qualified as inhuman treatment an intentional
or deliberate act or omission which causes serious suffering (or mental hor
physical damage), or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity ;
thus, the Tribunal added, “inhuman treatment is intentional treatment
which does not conform with the fundamental principle of humanity, and
forms the umbrella under which the rema81der of the listed ‘grave
breaches’ in the Conventions fall” . Subsequently, in the Blaškić case
(Judgment of 3 March 2000), the ICTY (Trial Chamber) reiterated this
position 82.
81. Likewise, in its Judgment of 10 December 2003 in the Obrenović
case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) stated that it is the “abhorrent discrimi -
natory intent” that renders crimes against humanity “particularly hgrave”
(para. 65). Evoking the Tribunal (Appeals Chamber)’s finding in the
Erdemović case (Judgment of 7 October 1997), it added that, because
of their “heinousness and magnitude”, those crimes (against humanityh)
“constitute egregious attacks on human dignity, on the very notion
of humaneness. They consequently affect, or should affect, each and
80
In fact, the principle of humanity can be understood in distinct ways ; first, it can be
conceived as a principle underlying the prohibition of inhuman treatmenth, established by
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949secondly, the principle can be
invoked by reference to humankind as a whole, in relation to matters of hcommon, general
and direct interest to it; and thirdly, the same principle can be employed to qualify a given
quality of human behaviour (humaneness).
81Paragraph 543 of that Judgment.
82Paragraph 154 of that Judgment.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 464 18/04/16 08:54 234 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
every member of [human]kind, whatever his or her nationality, ethnic
group and location” (para. 65) 83.
82. For its part, the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) pondered, in the case of J.‑P. Akayesu (Judgment of
2 September 1998), that the concept of crimes against humanity had
already been recognized well before the Nuremberg Tribunal itself
(1945-1946). The Martens clause contributed to that effect ; in fact,expres -
sions similar to that of those crimes, invoking84ictimized humanity,
appeared much earlier in human history . The ICTR further pointed
out, in the case J. Kambanda (Judgment of 4 September 1998), that in all
periods of human history genocide has inflicted great losses to human -
kind, the victims being not only the persons slaughtered but humanity
itself (in acts of genocide as well as in crimes against humanity) 85.
5. Concluding Observations
83. There is, in sum, in contemporary (conventional and general) inter-
national law, a greater consciousness, in a virtually universal scale, ohf the
principle of humanity. Grave violations of human rights, acts of geno -
cide, crimes against humanity, among other atrocities, are in breach of h
absolute prohibition of jus cogens. The feeling of humaneness permeates
the whole corpus juris of contemporary international law. I have called
this development, — inter alia in my concurring opinion (para. 35) in the
Advisory Opinion (of 1 October 1999), of the IACtHR, on the Right to
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of▯
the Due Process of Law — a historical process of a true humanization of
international law. The prevalence of the principle of humanity is identi -
fied with the ultimate aim itself of law, of the legal order, both nathional
and international.
84. By virtue of this fundamental principle, every person ought to be
respected (in her honour and in her beliefs) by the simple fact of belhong-
ing to humankind, irrespective of any circumstance. In its application in
any circumstances (in times both of armed conflict and of peace), inh the
relations between public power and human beings subject to the jurisdic -
tion of the State concerned, the principle of humanity permeates the
whole corpus juris of the international protection of the rights of the
human person (encompassing international humanitarian law, the inter -
83
Those words were actually taken by the ICTY (Trial Chamber) in the Obrenović case
(para.65),from a passage of the joint separate opinion 21)rof Judges McDonald and
Vohrah, in the ICTY’s Appeal Judgment in the aforementioned Erdemović case (1997).
84Paragraphs 565-566 of that Judgment.
85Paragraphs 15-16 of that Judgment. An equal reasoning is found in the juhdgments
of the same Tribunal in the aforementioned caseJ.‑P. Akayesu, as well as in the case
O. Serushago (Judgment of 5 February 1999, para. 15).
235
7 CIJ1077.indb 466 18/04/16 08:54 235 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
national law of human rights, and international refugee law) 8, conven-
87
tional as well as customary . And it has further projected itself into the
law of international organizations, and in particular into the law of thhe
United Nations.
VI. The Convention againsth Genocide and State Respohnsibility
1. Legislative History of the Convention (Article IX)
85. Turning now, in particular, to the 1948 Convention against Geno-
cide, it appears from its travaux préparatoires that State responsibility for
breaches of the Convention was in fact considered in the drafting of whaht
was to become its Article IX. This occurred in order to cope with amend-
ments to the Draft Convention which seemed to have “weakened” prevhi-
ous views on the responsibility of Heads of State. The insertion of a
reference to State responsibility also appeared as an answer to the rejehc -
tion, during the debates of the travaux préparatoires, of a “stronger” form
of State liability for genocide related to what then was Draft Article V
(and then became Article IV) of the Convention.
86. It may be recalled that, originally, Draft Article X (as prepared by
the Ad Hoc Committee) did not contain the reference — found later on in
what was to become Article IX of the Genocide Convention — to State
responsibility for acts of genocide 88. Article IX of the Genocide Conven-
tion, as it now stands, can be traced back to a joint amendment, proposehd
by Belgium and the United Kingdom, to what was then Article X. The
proposed joint amendment to that provision was as follows :
“Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,
including disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for any of the
acts enumerated in Articles II and IV, shall be submitted to the Inter -
national Court of Justice at the request of any of the High Contract -
89
ing Parties.”
87. The reasons for this insertion can be found in the discussions on
the joint amendment in the Sixth Committee of the United Nations Gen -
86
87Paras. 58, 60, 64, 69 and 79, supra.
88Paras. 60 and 68-69, supra.
Article X of the Draft Convention, as drawn up by the Ad Hoc Committee, used to
read as follows:
“Disputes between the High Contracting Parties relating to the interphretation
or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the Internationahl Court of
Justice, provided that no dispute shall bemitted to the International Court of
Justice involving an issue which has been referred to and is pending before or has
been passed upon by competent international criminal tribunal.” UN docE/794,
p.38.
89
UN doc. A/C.6/258, p. 1 (emphasis added).
236
7 CIJ1077.indb 468 18/04/16 08:54 236 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
eral Assembly. The delegate of the United Kingdom (Mr. Fitzmaurice)
explained that both the United Kingdom and Belgium considered that
the Convention would not be complete if it did not contemplate State
liability for genocidal acts and other punishable offences provided for in
90
the Convention . In opposition to this amendment, another joint amend-
ment was proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
France, without providing for obligatory reference to the International h
Court of Justice with respect to the Convention ; it only contemplated an
optional reference mechanism.
88. The French delegate (Mr. Chaumont) did not show any opposition
towards the principle of liability, insofar as it was of a civil nature,h and
not criminal 91. The Egyptian delegate (Mr. Rafaat) also supported the
principle of State liability, as no international mechanism of punishmenht
existed 92. But the proposed amendment also faced opposition from a few
delegations 93. In addition, the Canadian delegate (Mr. Lapointe), for his
part, asked clarification from the United Kingdom delegation as to the
meaning intended to ascribe to “State responsibility”— whether hit was
criminal or civil— having in mind in particular that the Committee, ihn its
93rd meeting, had rejected the idea of criminal State responsibility during
discussions related to Article V 94. The Bolivian delegate (Mr. Medeiros)
expressed his support for the United Kingdom/Belgian amendment, find -
ing it necessary 95.
90 UN doc. A/C.6/SR.103, p. 430.
91
92 Ibid., p. 431.
Ibid. The Greek delegate (Mr. Spiropoulos) raised an issue as to responsibility
relating to cases where a State had its liability triggered for ge: in such cases, respon-
sibility for that State would involve indemnifying itself, as, in his vihew, individuals were not
considered as right-holders in international law at those timesbid., p. 433.
93
The Philippines delegate (Mr. Ingles) insisted on his opposition to the principle or
criminal liability (which he posited earlier with respect to ArticV), and further argued
that, although the joint amendment was not explicitly included in the prhoposition, the very
nature of the Convention, purported to punish genocide implied that liabhility would be
criminal. This, in his view, would bring stigmatization of a whole Stateh for acts committed
only by its rulers or officials and not by the State itself, showing thhat responsibility of the
State could not be possibl; ibid., p. 433. The delegation of Pakistan also expressed concern
about the introduction of State liability in an international instrumenth which was mainly
aimed at a criminal matter ; he expressed his preference for the wording of ArticV when
it referred to the “constitutionally responsible leade;s” ibid., p. 438. The delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics argued that the proposed joint amendhment was only
an intent to submit in a different manner an amendment to Article V so as to introduce
some form of criminal liability of the Sta;e ibid., p. 441.
94 Ibid., pp. 438-439. The British representative replied that the amendment was indeed
referring to civil liability (international responsibility for violatiohn of the Convention).
95
In the light of the decisions taken up by the Committee in the course ithsheeting;
ibid., p. 439.
237
7 CIJ1077.indb 470 18/04/16 08:54 237 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
89. For its part, the Haitian delegation proposed a consequential
amendment to the aforementioned joint amendment, which would add
“or of any victims of the crime of genocide (groups of individuals)h”. This
met the opposition of some delegations, which argued that such an
amendment would imply a modification of the ICJ Statute. Yet, the Syr -
ian delegation considered that such a consequential amendment was not
contrary to the ICJ Statute, as in its view there was no reason for the h
signatory State to impede groups victims of genocide to seize the Internha -
tional Court of Justice for such breaches. In support of its proposal, thhe
Haitian delegation asserted, inter alia, that States could be liable only
directly towards the victims themselves, and not towards other States, for
having committed genocide 9.
90. Some delegations, such as those of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and Poland, voiced concerns as to the effect of the reference tho
the International Court of Justice of disputes relating to State liability
under the Genocide Convention. The preoccupation was related to the
possibility of Draft Article X (as then worded) precluding submission to
the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council of com -
plaints with respect to genocidal acts 97. The United Kingdom delegate
replied that submission to the International Court of Justice could not hin
any way preclude submission before other competent organs of the
United Nations 98. And the United Kingdom delegate concluded that, giv-
ing the International Court of Justice jurisdiction for State liability haris -
ing out of breaches of the Genocide Convention was necessary in order toh
ensure an effective enforcement of the Convention, considering in partic -
ular the practical difficulties in prosecuting Heads of State 99.
91. The joint amendment was then adopted by 23 votes to 13, with
8 abstentions 100. (Then) Article X, with other amendments, was adopted
by 18 to 2, with 15 abstentions ; it came to read as follows :
“Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,
including disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for any of h
96 Cf. UN doc. A/C.6/SR.103, p. 436.
97 Cf. ibid., p. 444.
98 Ibid. Furthermore, in response to the criticism, he asserted that reference to the Inter-
national Court of Justice might be useless, as that Court would act too hlate in cases of
genocide: genocide is a process, he added, and once it started being committed, ha State
party could seize the Court.
99
Ibid.
100Ibid., p. 447.
238
7 CIJ1077.indb 472 18/04/16 08:54 238 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
the acts enumerated in Articles II and IV, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
101
the dispute.”
This version of (then) Article X underwent minor changes, leading to the
final version of what is now Article IX of the Convention against Geno -
cide, which reads as follows :
“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, includingh
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any h
of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.”
2. Rationale, and Object and Purpose of the Convention
92. The determination of State responsibility under the Convention
against Genocide is well -founded, not only because this was intended by
the draftsmen of the Convention, as its travaux préparatoires show
(supra), but also because such determination is in line with the rationale
of the Convention, as well as its object and purpose. Today, 66 years after
its adoption, the Convention against Genocide counts on 146 States par -
ties; and the States which have not yet ratified, or acceded to it, are alhso
aware that the prohibition of genocide is one likewise of general or cush -
tomary international law. It is not conditioned by alterations in State hso-v
ereignty or vicissitudes of State succession ; it is an absolute prohibition,
belonging to the realm of jus cogens.
93. The Convention against Genocide is meant to prevent and punish
the crime of genocide, which is contrary to the spirit and aims of the
United Nations, so as to liberate humankind from such an odious scourge.
Nowadays, six and a half decades after the adoption of the Convention
against Genocide, much more is known about that heinous international
crime. “Genocide studies” have been undertaken in recent decades ihn dis -
tinct branches of human learning, attentive to an interdisciplinary per-
spective (cf. Part XI, infra). They have shown that genocide has been
committed in modern history in furtherance of State policies.
94. To attempt to make the application of the Genocide Convention to
States is an impossible task, one which would render the Convention
meaningless, an almost dead letter ; it would furthermore create a situa -
tion where certain State egregious criminal acts, amounting to genocide,h
would pass unpunished — especially as there is at present no interna -
tional convention on crimes against humanity. Genocide is in fact an
egregious crime committed under the direction, or the benign complicity,h
101 UN doc. A/C.6/269, p. 1. Cf. also Article IX (as it then became), UN doc. A/760,
p. 10.
239
7 CIJ1077.indb 474 18/04/16 08:54 239 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
of the State and its apparatus 102. Unlike what was assumed by the
Nuremberg Tribunal in its célèbre Judgment (Part 22, p. 447), States are
not “abstract entities” ; they have been concretely engaged, together with
individual executioners (their so -called “human resources”, acting on
their behalf), in acts of genocide, in distinct historical moments and
places.
95. They have altogether — individuals and States — been responsible
for such heinous acts. In this context, individual and State responsibility
complement each other. In sum, the determination of State responsibilityh
cannot at all be discarded in the interpretation and application of the h
Convention against Genocide. When adjudicating a case such as the pres -
ent one, concerning the Application of the Convention against Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia), the International Court of Justice should bear in
mind the importance of the Convention as a major human rights treaty,
with all its implications and legal consequences. It should bear in mindh
the Convention’s historic significance for humankind.
VII. Standard of Proof in the Cahse Law of Internationalh
Human Rights Tribunals
96. The case law of international human rights tribunals is of central
importance to the determination of the international responsibility of
States (rather than individuals) for grave violations of human rights,h and
cannot pass unnoticed in a case like the present one, concerning the
Application of the Convention against Genocide , opposing Croatia to Ser -
bia. It cannot thus be overlooked by the International Court of Justice,h
concerned as it is, like international human rights tribunals, with State
responsibility, and not individual (criminal) responsibility.
1. A Question from the Bench :
The Evolving Case Law on the Matter
97. In the course of the oral proceedings in the present case, the con -
tending Parties were, however, referring only to the case law of interna -
tional criminal tribunals (concerned with individual responsibility), until
the moment, in the Court’s public sitting of 5 March 2014, that I deemed
it fit to put the following question to both of them, on also the caseh law
of international human rights tribunals :
“My question concerns the international criminal responsibility of
individuals, as well as the international responsibility of States, for h
102The expert evidence examined by the ICTY, for example, in the Milošević case
(2004), maintained that the knowledge sedimented on the matter shows thhat State author-
itieare always responsible for a genocidal processPartXIII of the present dissenting
opinion, infra.
240
7 CIJ1077.indb 476 18/04/16 08:54 240 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
genocide. References have so far been made only to the case law of
international criminal tribunals (the ICTY and the ICTR), pertaining
to individual international criminal responsibility. Do you consider
that the case law of international human rights tribunals is also of
relevance here, for the international responsibility of States for gen -
ocide, as to standard of proof and attribution ?”103
From then onwards, both Croatia and Serbia started referring, comme 104
ilfaut, to the case law of international human rights tribunals as well
— concerned as these latter are with the determination of State responsi -
bility.
98. In addition to what the contending Parties argued in the proceed -
ings of the present case concerning the Application of the Convention
against Genocide , there is, in effect, a wealth of relevant indications as to
the standard of proof (and reversal of the burden of proof), which shohuld
not pass unnoticed here. This is so, in particular, in the case law of thhe
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), in cases disclosing a
systematic or widespread pattern of gross violations of human rights,
where the IACtHR has resorted to factual presumptions.
99. Moreover, the IACtHR has held that it is the respondent State
which is to produce the evidence, given the applicant’s difficulty tho obtain
it and the respondent’s access to it. There are indications to this ehffect
also in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
Given the relevance of the case law of international human rights tribu -
nals for the determination of international State responsibility, it cannot
at all be overlooked in the consideration of the cas d’espèce, in so far as
the key issue of standard of proof is concerned. I thus care to proceed hto
its review.
2. Case Law of the IACtHR
(a) Cases disclosing a systematic pattern of grave violations of human
rights
100. The case law of the IACtHR is particularly rich in respect of the
standard of proof in cases disclosing a systematic pattern of grave viola -
tions of human rights. In the case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras
(Judgment of 7 June 2003), for example, the IACtHR determined the
occurrence, in the respondent State, in the eighties and beginning of the
103Question put by Judge Cançado Trindade, in CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 59.
104Croatia’s responses, in CR 2014/12, of 7 March 2014, p. 44, para. 20; and
CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, pp. 14-16, paras. ; Serbia’s response, in CR14/23, of
28 March 2014, pp. 50-52, paras. 27-36.
241
7 CIJ1077.indb 478 18/04/16 08:54 241 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
nineties, of a systematic pattern of arbitrary detentions, enforced disap -
pearances of persons, and summary or extrajudicial executions commit -
ted by the military forces (IACtHR, Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras,
Judgment of 7 June 2003, paras. 70 (1) and 96-97), wherein the cas
d’espèce is inserted (ibid., para. 80).
101. The IACtHR thus inferred, even in the absence of direct proof,
that the victim suffered cruel and inhuman treatment during the time of
his detention (ibid., para. 98) 10, before his mortal remains were found.
The facts that occurred at the time of the pattern of ill -treatment and
torture and summary executions, lead the IACtHR to the presumption of
the responsibility of the State for those violations in respect of persohns
under the custody of its agents (ibid., para. 99)106. This being so — the
Court added — it was incumbent upon the respondent State to provide
reasonable explanations of what occurred to the victim (ibid., paras. 100
and 135).
107
102. Other pertinent decisions of the IACtHR can here be recalled .
For example, in the case of the Massacres of Ituango v. Colombia (Judg -
ment of 1 July 2006), the IACtHR, having found in the municipality at
issue a systematic pattern of massacres (in 1996-1997) perpetrated by
paramilitary groups, determined the responsibility of the State for “homis -
sion, acquiescence and collaboration” of the public forces (para. 132).
103. The IACtHR further found that State agents had “full know -
ledge” of the activities of paramilitary groups terrorizing the localh popu-
lation, and, far from protecting this latter, they omitted doing so, andh
even participated in the armed incursion into the municipality and the
killing of local inhabitants by the paramilitaries ( ibid., paras. 133 and 135).
Within the context of this systematic pattern of violence, the respondent
State incurred into grave violations of the rights of the victims under hthe
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (ibid., paras. 136-138).
104. In the case of the Massacre of Mapiripán v. Colombia (Judgment
of 15 September 2005), the IACtHR observed that, although the killings
in Mapiripán (in mid -July 1997) were committed by members of para -
military groups,
105
Cf. also, to this effect, IACtHR, case BámacVelásquez v. Guatemala (Judgment
of 25 November 2000), supra, para. 150; caseCantoral Benavides v. Peru (Judgment of
18 August 2000), paras. 83-84 and 89and case of th“Street Children” Villagrán Morales
and Others v. Guatemala (Judgment of 19 November 1999), para. 162.
106Cf. also, in this sense, op. cit. supra note 105, IACtHR, case BáVelásquez v.
Guatemala, paras. 152-15; and case of thetreet Children” Villagrán Morales and Others
v. Guatemala, op. cit. supra note 105, para. 170.
107Another example of inference of a summary or extrajudicial execution, in a context
of a generalized or systematic pattern of crimes against humanity (in the period 1973-1990),
victimizing the “civilian population” (with thousands of individuhal victims), is afforded by
the IACtHR’s Judgment (of 26 September 2006) in the case of Almonacid Arellano and
Others v. Chile (paras. 96 and 103-104).
242
7 CIJ1077.indb 480 18/04/16 08:54 242 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
“the preparation and execution of the massacre could not have been
perpetrated without the collaboration, acquiescence and tolerance,
manifested in various actions and omissions, of members of the State
armed forces, including of its high officers in the zones. Certainly thhere
is no documental proof before this Tribunal that demonstrates that
the State directed the execution of the massacre or that there existed
a relation of dependence between the army and the paramilitary
groups or a delegation of public functions from the former to these
latter.” (IACtHR, Massacre of Mapiripán v. Colombia, Judgment of
15 September 2005, para. 120.)
105. The IACtHR then attributed to the respondent State the conduct
of both its own agents and of the members of paramilitary groups in the h
zones which were “under the control of the State”. The incursion ohf para -
militaries in Mapiripán, it added, had been planned for months, and was
executed “with full knowledge, logistic previsions and collaboration hof
the armed forces”, which facilitated the journey of the paramilitariehs from
Apartadó and Neclocí until Mapiripán “in zones which were unhder their
control”, and, moreover, “left unprotected the civilian population during
the days of the massacre with the unjustified moving of the troops to h
other localities” (ibid.).
106. The “collaboration of members of the armed forces with the para -
militaries” was manifested in a pattern of “grave actions and omissions”
aiming at allowing the perpetration of the massacre and the cover -up of
the facts in search of “the impunity of those responsible” (ibid., para.121).
The Court added that the State authorities who knew the intentions of
the paramilitary groups to perpetrate a massacre to instil terror in theh
population, “not only collaborated in the preparation” of the killhings, but
also left the impression before public opinion that the massacre had beehn
perpetrated by paramilitary groups “without its knowledge, participathion
and tolerance” (ibid.).
107. The IACtHR, discarding this pretension, and having established the
links between the armed forces and the paramilitary groups in the perpe -
tration of the massacre, determined that “the international responsibhility
of the State was generated by a pattern of actions and omissions of Stathe
agents and particuliers, which took place in a co-ordinated, parallel or
organized way aiming at perpetrating the massacre” (ibid., para. 123).
108. In its Judgment (of 22 September 2006) in the case Goiburú and
Others v. Paraguay, the IACtHR observed that that particular case was
endowed with “a particular historical transcendence”, as the factsh had
occurred “in a context of a systematic practice of arbitrary detentiohns,
tortures, executions and disappearances perpetrated by the forces of sechu -
rity and intelligence of the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, in the
framework of the Operation Condor” (para. 62).
109. That is to say, the grave facts are framed in the flagrant, massive
and systematic character of the repression which the population was sub -
jected to, at inter-State scale; in fact, the structures of State security were
243
7 CIJ1077.indb 482 18/04/16 08:54 243 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
put into action in a co-ordinated way against the nations at trans -frontier
level by the dictatorial governments concerned (IACtHR, Goiburú and
Others v. Paraguay, Judgment of 22 September 2006, para. 62). The IAC -
tHR thus found that the context in which the facts occurred engaged and h
conditioned the international responsibility of the State in relation toh its
obligation to respect and guarantee the rights set forth in Articles 4, 5, 7,
8 and 25 of the ACHR (ibid., para. 63).
110. The illegal and arbitrary detentions or kidnapping, torture and
enforced disappearances — the IACtHR added — were [the] “product of
an operation of policial intelligence”, planned and executed, and covhered
up by members of the national police, “with the knowledge and by the h
order of the highest authorities of the government of General Stroessner,
and, at least in the earlier phases of planification of the detentionsh or
kidnappings, in close collaboration with Argentine authorities” ( ibid.,
para. 87). Such was the modus operandi of the systematic practice of ille -
gal and arbitrary detentions, torture and enforced disappearances verified
in the epoch of the facts, in the framework of Operation Condor (ibid.).
111. There was, moreover, a generalized situation of impunity of the
grave violations of human rights that occurred, undermining the protec -
tion of the rights at issue. The IACtHR stressed the general obligation to
ensure respect for the rights set forth in the American Convention on
Human Rights (Art. 1 (1)),wherefrom ensued the obligation to investi -
gate the cases of violations of the protected rights.
112. Thus, in cases of extrajudicial executions, enforced disappear -
ances and other grave violations of human rights, the IACtHR consid-
ered that the prompt and ex officio investigation thereof should be
undertaken, without delay, as a key element for the guarantee of the proh-
tected rights, such as the rights to life, to personal integrity, and toh per -
sonal freedom (ibid., para. 88). In this case — the IACtHR added — the
lack of investigation of the facts constituted a determining factor of thhe
systematic practice of violations of human rights and led to the impunithy
of those responsible for them ( ibid., para. 90).
(b) Cases wherein the respondent State has the burden of proof given the
difficulty of the applicant to obtain it
113. In the case Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (Judgment of 29 July
1988), the IACtHR, in dwelling upon the standards of proof, began by
acknowledging the prerogative of international tribunals to evaluate
freely the evidence produced (para. 127). “For an international tribunal”,
the IACtHR added, “the criteria of assessment of proof are less formal
than in the national legal systems” (ibid., para. 128). There is a “special
gravity” in the attribution of gross violations of human rights (suchh as
enforced disappearances of persons) to States parties to the ACHR, and h
the Court has this in mind (ibid., para. 129) ; yet, in such circumstances,
244
7 CIJ1077.indb 484 18/04/16 08:54 244 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
direct proof (testimonial or documental) is not the only means that ith can
base itself upon. Circumstantial evidence (indicia and presumptions) chan
also be taken into account, whenever the Court can therefrom “infer chon-
sistent conclusions” on the facts (IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Hon‑
duras, Judgment of 29 July 1988, para. 130).
114. Such circumstantial evidence, the IACtHR proceeded, may
become of special importance in cases of grave violations, such as enforhced
disappearances of persons, characterized by the intent to suppress “ahny
element which may prove the kidnapping, the whereabouts and the fate
of the victims” (ibid., para.131). The IACtHR then warned that the inter -
national protection of the rights of the human person “is not to be chon -
fused with criminal justice”, as States do not appear before the Courht as
subjects of a criminal legal action ( ibid., para. 134).
115. Its goal, it went on, is not to impose penalties to those held cul-
pable of violations of human rights, but rather provide for reparation tho
the victims for the damages caused by the States responsible for them
(ibid.). In the legal process, here, “the defence of the State cannot rest
upon the impossibility of the applicant to produce evidence which, in
many cases, cannot be obtained without the co-operation of the State”h
concerned (ibid., para. 135), which “has the control of the means to clar -
ify the facts occurred within its territory” (ibid., para. 136) 10.
3. Case Law of the ECHR
116. The case law of the ECHR, like that of other international tribu -
nals, is built on the understanding of the free evaluation of evidence. In
recent years, the ECHR has been pursuing an approach which brings it
closer to that of the IACtHR (supra). It so happened that, in its earlier
decades, and until the late nineties, the ECHR consistently invoked the h
standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” ; yet, by no means the
ECHR understood it as meaning a particularly high threshold of stan -
dard of proof as the one required in domestic criminal law, in particulahr
in common-law jurisdictions. The standard of proof “beyond reasonable
doubt”, as used by the ECHR, was endowed with an autonomous mean -
ing under the European Convention on Human Rights, certainly less
stringent than the one applied in national (criminal) proceedings as tho the
admissibility of evidence.
108
In the case Yatama v. Nicaragua (Judgment of 23 June 2005), e.g., the IACtHR
again deemed it fit to warn that, in cases before an international humhan rights tribunal,
it may well occur that the applicant is faced with the impossibility to hproduce evidence,
“which can only be obtained with the co-operation” of the respondehnt State (para.134).
245
7 CIJ1077.indb 486 18/04/16 08:54 245 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
117. Criticisms to applying a high standard of proof were to emerge,
within the ECHR, from the bench itself, from dissenting judges, as in,
e.g., the cases of Labita v. Italy (Judgment of 6 April 2000) and Vezneda‑
roglu v. Turkey (Judgment of 11 April 2000). The point was made therein
that, to expect victims of grave violations of their rights to prove thehir
allegations “beyond reasonable doubt” would place an unfair burdenh
upon them, impossible to meet ; such standard of proof, applicable only
in “ criminal culpability”, is not so in “other fields of judicial enquiry”h,
where “the standard of proof should be proportionate to the aim whichh
the search for truth pursues” 109.
118. In their joint partly dissenting opinion in the case of Labita v.
Italy, Judges Pastor Ridruejo, Bonello, Makarczyk, Tulkens, Strážnická,
Butkevych, Casadevall and Zupančič lucidly stated that the standard of
proof “beyond reasonable doubt” would be “inadequate”, if noht “illogi-
cal and even unworkable”, when State authorities fail even to identifhy the
perpetrators of the grave breaches allegedly inflicted upon the indivihdual
applicants. This, in their view, would unduly limit State responsibilityh.
Whenever only the State authorities have exclusive knowledge of “someh
or all the events” that took place, the burden of proof should be shifted
upon them (ECHR, Labita v. Italy, Judgment of 6 April 2000, para. 1).
119. The dissenting judges proceeded that the standard to be met by
the applicants is lower if State authorities “have failed to carry out effec -
tive investigations and to make the findings available to the Court”. And
they added:
“Lastly, it should be borne in mind that the standard of proof
‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ is, in certain legal systems, used ihn cri-m
inal cases. However, this Court is not called upon to judge an indi -
vidual’s guilt or innocence or to punish those responsible for a
violation ; its task is to protect victims and provide redress for damage
caused by the acts of the State responsible. The test, method and
standard of proof in respect of responsibility under the Convention
are different from those applicable in the various national systems as
regards responsibility of individuals for criminal offences.” (Ibid.)
120. Thus, the nature of certain cases — of grave breaches of human
rights — brought also before the ECHR has made it clear that a stringent
or too high a standard of proof would be unreasonable, e.g., when
respondent States had entire control of the evidence or exclusive know -
109ECHR, case of Veznedaroglu v. Turkey (Judgment of 11 April 2000), Application
No. 32357/96, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bonello, paras. 12-14.
246
7 CIJ1077.indb 488 18/04/16 08:54 246 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ledge of the facts, and the alleged victims when in a particular adverseh
situation, of great vulnerability or even defencelessness. The ECHR, likhe
the IACtHR, admitted shifting the burden of proof (onto the respondent
States) whenever necessary, as well as resorting to inferences (from chir -
cumstantial evidence) and factual presumptions, so as to secure proce -
dural fairness, in the light of the principle of equality of arms (égalité des
armes).
121. In its Judgment (of 18 September 2009) in the case of Varnava and
Others v. Turkey, the ECHR expressly stated that, even if one starts from
the test of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”, there are cases in whhich it
cannot be applied too rigorously, and has to be mitigated (para. 182).
Where the information about the occurrences at issue lie wholly, or in
part, within the exclusive knowledge of the State authorities, the ECHR
proceeded, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of the injuries,
the burden of proof then resting on the State authorities to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation (ECHR, Varnava and Others v.
Turkey, Judgment of 18 September 2009, para. 183). The same takes
place if the respondent State has exclusive knowledge of all that has hahp -
pened (ibid., para. 184).
4. General Assessment
122. As I have just indicated in the present dissenting opinion, interna-
tional human rights tribunals have not pursued a stringent and high
threshold of proof in cases of grave violations of human rights ; given the
difficulties experienced in the production of evidence, they have resorhted
to factual presumptions and inferences, and have proceeded to the rever -
sal of the burden of proof. The IACtHR has done so since the beginning
of its jurisprudence, and the ECHR has been doing so in more recent
years. They both conduct the free evaluation of evidence.
123. The standard of proof they uphold is surely much less demanding
than the corresponding one (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) in domehstic
criminal law. This is so, with all the more reason, when the cases lodgehd
with them disclose a pattern of widespread and systematic gross viola -
tions of human rights, and they feel obliged to resort, even more force -
fully, to presumptions and inferences, to the ultimate benefit of the h
individual victims in search of justice. This important issue begins to h
attract the attention of expert writing in our days 110.
110 For updated studies on the subject, cf., as to the IACtHR, e.g., A.A. Cançado Trin-
dade, El Ejercicio de la Función Judicial Internacional — Memorias de la▯ Corte Interameri ‑
cana de Derechos Humanos, 3rd ed., Belo Horizonte/Brazil, Edit. Del Rey, 2013, pp. 60-79
and 137-142; and cf., as to the ECHR, e.g., M.’Boyle and N. Brady, “Investigatory
Powers of the European Court of Human Rights”, 4 European Human Rights Law Review
(2013), pp. 378-391.
247
7 CIJ1077.indb 490 18/04/16 08:54 247 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
124. Regrettably, none of these jurisprudential developments was
taken into account by the International Court of Justice in the present h
Judgment. It my understanding, it could, and should, have done so, as
the issue was addressed by the contending Parties, as from the moment inh
the proceedings I put a question to both of them in this respect (para.h 97,
supra). The International Court of Justice preferred to stick to a stringenth
and high threshold of proof in the present case concerning the Application
of the Convention against Genocide (2015), just as it had done eight years
ago in the Bosnian Genocide case (“the 2007 Judgment”). May I here only
add that expert writing, dwelling upon the complementarity between
State and individual responsibility for international crimes (despite thheir
111
distinct regimes) , has likewise been attentive to the orientation and
contribution of the case law of international human rights tribunals
(IACtHR and ECHR, supra), particularly on the handling of evidence
112
and the shifting of the burden of proof .
VIII. Standard of Proof in the Cahse Law
of International
Criminal Tribunals
125. May I now turn to the case law of international criminal tribunals
as to the standard of proof. Here we find that the intent to commit gehno-
cide can be proved by inference, whenever direct evidence is not availabhle.
In effect, requiring direct or explicit evidence of genocidal intent in ahll
cases is neither in line with the case law of international criminal trihbunals
nor is it practical or realistic. When there is no explicit evidence of hintent,
it can be inferred from the facts and circumstances. A few examples and h
references of relevant jurisprudence are provided herein in support of thhis
point.
1. Inferring Intent from Circumstantial Evidence
(Case Law of the ICTR and the ICTY)
126. In the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda (ICTR), it has been established that intent to commit
111
Cf., e.g., B. I. Bonafè, The Relationship between State and Individual Responsibility
for International Crimes, Leiden, Nijhoff, 2009, pp11-255; A. A. Cançado Trindade,
“Complementarity between State Responsibility and Individual Responsihbility for Grave
Violations of Human Rights :The Crime of State Revisited”, inInternational Responsi‑
bility Today — Essays in Memory of O. Schachter (ed. M. Ragazzi), Leiden, Nijhoff, 2005,
pp. 253-269 ; A.Nollkaemper, “Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and Stateh
Responsibility in International Law”, 52International and Comparative Law Quarterly
(2003), pp. 615-640.
112 Cf., e.g., P.Gaeta, “Génocide d’Etat et responsabilité pénale individuhelle”,
111 Revue générale de droit international public (2007), pp. 273-284, esp.; P.Gaeta,
“On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide ?”, 18European
Journal of International Law (2007), p. 646.
248
7 CIJ1077.indb 492 18/04/16 08:54 248 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
genocide can be inferred from facts and circumstances. Thus, in the Ruta‑
ganda case (Judgment of 6 December 1999), the ICTR (Trial Chamber)
stated that “intent can be, on a case -by-case basis, inferred from the
material evidence submitted to the Chamber, including the evidence
which demonstrates a consistent pattern of conduct by the accused”
(paras. 61-63) 11. Likewise, in the Semanza case (Judgment of 15 May
2003), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) stated that a “perpetrator’s mens rea
may be inferred from his actions” (para. 313).
127. Furthermore, in the same line of thinking, in the Bagilishema case
(Judgment of 7 June 2001), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) found that
“evidence of the context of the alleged culpable acts may help the
Chamber to determine the intention of the accused, especially where
the intention is not clear from what that person says or does. The
Chamber notes, however, that the use of context to determine the
intent of an accused must be counterbalanced with the actual conduct
of the accused. The Chamber is of the opinion that the accused’s
intent should be determined, above all, from his words and deeds, and
should be evident from patterns of purposeful action.” (Para. 63.)
128. In the landmark case Akayesu case (Judgment of 2 September
1998), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) found that “intent is a mental factor
which is difficult, even impossible to determine”, and it held that h“in the
absence of a confession from the accused”, intent may be inferred frohm
the following factors (a) “general context of the perpetration” of grave
breaches “systematically” against the “same group” (b) “;cale of atroci -
ties committed” ; (c) “general nature” of the atrocities committed “in a
region or a country” (d) “the fact of deliberately and systematically tar -
geting victims on account of their membership of a particular group,
while excluding the members of other groups” ; (e) “the general political
doctrine which gave rise to the acts” ; (f) grave breaches committed
against members of a group specifically because they belong to that
group; (g) “the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts” ; and
(h) the perpetration of acts which violate, or which “the perpetrators
themselves consider to violate the very foundation of the group”, comh -
mitted as part of “the same pattern of conduct” (paras. 521 and 523-524).
129. Shortly afterwards, in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case (Judg -
ment of 21 May 1999), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) also stated that intent
might be difficult to determine and that the accused’s “actions, hincluding
circumstantial evidence”, may “provide sufficient evidence of inthent”, and
that “intent can be inferred either from words or deeds and may be dehm -
onstrated by a pattern of purposeful action”. The ICTR (Trial Chambehr)
asserted that the following can be relevant indicators: (a) “the number of
113Cf. also the Musema case, ICTR Trial Chamber’s Judgment o27 January 2000,
para. 167.
249
7 CIJ1077.indb 494 18/04/16 08:54 249 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
group members affected” ; (b) “the physical targeting of the group or
their property” ; (c) “the use of derogatory language toward members of
the targeted group” (d) “the weapons employed and the extent of bodily
injury”; (e) “the methodical way of planning” (f) “;he systematic man -
ner of killing” ; and (g) “the relative proportionate scale of the actual or
attempted destruction of a group” (ICTR, Kayishema and Ruzindana,
Judgment of 21 May 1999, paras. 93 and 527).
130. Later on, the ICTR (Appeals Chamber), in its Judgment of 7 July
2006 in the Gacumbitsi case, pondered that, as intent, by its nature, is “not
usually susceptible to direct proof”, it has to be inferred from relehvant
facts and circumstances, such as the systematic perpetration of atrocitihes
against the same group, or the repetition of “destructive and discrimina -
tory acts” (paras. 40-41). In a similar vein, the Appeals Chamber of the
Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
also asserted, in the Jelisić case (Judgment of 5 July 2001), that:
“As to proof of specific intent, it may, in the absence of direct
explicit evidence, be inferred from a number of facts and circum -
stances, such as the general context, the perpetration of other culpable
acts systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atroc-
ities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their
membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and
discriminatory acts.” (Para. 47.)
The ICTY (Appeals Chamber) further stated, in the Krstić case (Judg -
ment of 19 April 2004), that, when proving genocidal intent on the basis
of an inference, “that inference must be the only reasonable inferenche
available on the evidence” (para. 41).
2. Standards of Proof :
Rebuttals of the High Threshold of Evidence
(a) Karadžić case (2013)
131. In its Judgment of 26 February 2007, in the case of the Applica ‑
tion of the Convention against Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia
and Montenegro), the International Court of Justice, referring to the Ker-
aterm camp in Prijedor, Kazneno -Popravní Dom in Foča, and Omarska
in Prijedor, observed that, having “carefully examined the criminal phro -
ceedings of the ICTY and the findings of its Chambers”, it appearedh that
“none of those convicted were found to have acted with specific inthent
(dolus specialis)” (para. 277). Yet the ICTY (Appeals Chamber), in its
recent Judgment (of 11 July 2013) in the Karadžić case, found that “the
question regarding Karadžić’s culpability with respect to the chrimes of
genocide committed in the Municipalities remains open” (para. 116).
250
7 CIJ1077.indb 496 18/04/16 08:54 250 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
132. The ICTY (Appeals Chamber), in this recent Judgment in the
Karadžić case, reinstated the charges of genocide under count 1 of the
indictment ; it referred to seven municipalities of Bosnia -Herzegovina
claimed as Bosnian Serb territory (para. 57), and mentioned the Kera -
term camp in Prijedor, the Kazneno -Popravní Dom camp in Foča, and
the Omarska camp in Prijedor (ICTY, Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July
2013, para. 48). It then observed :
“The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that evidence adduced by the
Prosecution, when taken at its highest, indicates that Bosnian Mus -
lims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to conditions of life that
would bring about their physical destruction, including severe over -
crowding, deprivation of nourishment, and lack of access to medical
care.” (Ibid., para. 49.)
133. Further on, in its same Judgment of 11 July 2013, the ICTY
(Appeals Chamber) significantly stated :
“The Appeals Chamber also recalls that by its nature, genocidal
intent is not usually susceptible to direct proof. As recognized by the
Trial Chamber, in the absence of direct evidence, genocidal intent may
be inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the gen ‑
eral context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the ▯
systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a
particular group, the repetition of de114uctive and discriminatory acts,▯
or the existence of a plan or policy. ” (Ibid., para. 80.)
The ICTY (Appeals Chamber) then saw it fit to add, in the same Judg -
ment of 11 July 2013 in the Karadžić case, that, as to “factual findings
and evidentiary assessments”, that it was bound neither by the decisihons
of the Trial Chambers of the ICTY itself, nor by those of the Interna -
tional Court of Justice (para. 94). It thus made clear that it did not sup -
port the high threshold of evidence.
(b) Tolimir case (2012)
134. In another recent Judgment (of 12 December 2012), in the Tolimir
case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber II) sustained that :
“Where direct evidence is absent regarding the ‘conditions of lifeh’
imposed on the targeted group and calculated to bring about its phys-
ical destruction, a Chamber can be guided by ‘the objective probabil-
ity of these conditions leading to the physical destruction of the grouph
in part’ and factors like the nature of the conditions imposed, the
length of time that members of the group were subjected to them, and
114Emphasis added.
251
7 CIJ1077.indb 498 18/04/16 08:54 251 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
characteristics of the targeted group such as its vulnerability.” (IhCTY,
Tolimir, Judgment of 12 December 2012, para. 742.)
135. The ICTY (Trial Chamber II) proceeded that, as indications of
the intent to destroy (mens rea of genocide) are “rarely overt”, it is thus
“permissible to infer the existence of genocidal intent” on the bahsis of the
whole of the evidence, “taken together”. It then added that
“factors relevant to this analysis may include the general context, thhe
perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the
same group, the scale of atrocities, the systematic targeting of victims
on account of their membership in a particular group, or the repeti -
tion of destructive and discriminatory acts. The existence of a plan or h
policy, a perpetrator’s display of his intent through public speechesh
or meetings with others may also support an inference that the per -
petrator had formed the requisite specific intent.” (Ibid., para. 745.)
136. In sum, even in the absence of direct evidence, genocidal intent
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and the general context
and pattern of extreme violence and destruction. May I add that concern h
with the needed protection of individuals and groups in situations of vuhl-
nerability form today — for the last two decades — the legacy of the Sec-
ond World Conference on Human Rights (1993) 115. It should not pass
unnoticed that this points nowadays to a wider convergence between the
international law of human rights, international humanitarian law and
the international law of refugees, as well as international criminal lawh,
taken together.
(c) Milošević case (2004)
137. In the adjudication of the aforementioned 2007 Judgment, the
International Court of Justice did not react negatively against Serbia’s
refusal to produce the (unredacted) documents of its Supreme Defence
Council (SDC), as the Court apparently did not want to infringe upon
Serbia’s sovereignty. The International Court of Justice insisted on hits
high threshold of evidence. For its part, the ICTY (Trial Chamber),
already in its decision of 16 June 2004 (on motion for judgment of acquit -
tal) in the Milošević case, had found that
“there is sufficient evidence that genocide was committed in Brčkho,
Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Ključ and BosanskiNovi
and (. . .) that the accused was a participant in a joint criminal enter -
prise, which included the Bosnian Serb leadership, the aim and inten-
115 Cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, A Proteção dos Vulneráveis como Legado da II Confer‑
ência Mundial de Direitos Humanos (1993‑2013) [The Protection of the Vulnerable as
Legacy of the Second World Conference on Human Rights (1993‑2013)],op. cit.supra
note 79, pp. 13-356.
252
7 CIJ1077.indb 500 18/04/16 08:54 252 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tion of which was to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslims as a
group” (ICTY, Milošević, decision of 16 June 2004, para. 289, and
cf. also para. 288).
138. The final judgment never took place, due to the death of
S. Milošević. Yet, although this decision of the ICTY Trial Chamber ohf
16 June 2004 had a bearing on the 2007 Judgment, the International
Court of Justice preferred not to give any weight to it 116. The high stan -
dard of proof adopted by the International Court of Justice — and criti-
cized by a trend of expert writing — finds justification in international
individual criminal responsibility, facing incarceration, but not in interna-
tional State responsibility, aiming only at declaratory and compensatoryh
relief, where a simple balance of evidence would be appropriate, with a
117
lower standard of proof than for international crimes by individuals .
3. General Assessment
139. The jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals thus clearly
holds that proof of genocidal intent may be inferred from the aforemen -
tioned factors (such as, inter alia, e.g., the plan or policy of destruction)
pertaining to facts and circumstances. Even in the absence of direct prohof,
the finding of those factors may lead to the inference of genocidal inhtent
on the part of the perpetrators. In the present case of the Application of
the Convention against Genocide, opposing Croatia to Serbia, the con -
tending Parties themselves have made arguments in relation to the ques -
tion whether genocidal intent can be proven by inferences.
140. For example, Croatia argues that “[t]he Parties also appear to be
in agreement that the118urt (. . .) can draw proof of genocidal intent from
inferences of fact” . It further argues that Serbia “acknowledges in the
Counter-Memorial [para. 135] that it is sometimes difficult to show by
direct evidence the intent to commit genocide as the mental element of the
crime”. The Respondent goes on to refer to “the possibility (. . .) of119li-
ance on indirect evidence and drawing proof from inferences of fact” .
141. May it be recalled that, despite all the aforementioned indications
from the case law of the international criminal tribunals — added to
those from the case law of international human rights tribunals — the
International Court of Justice held, in this respect, in the earlier 200h7
Judgment, opposing Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, that :
“The dolus specialis , the specific intent to destroy the group in
whole or in part, has to be convincingly shown by reference to par -
116Cf. D. Groome, op. cit. infra note 117, pp. 964-965.
117Cf., to this effect, e.g.Groome, “Adjudicating Genocide : Is the International
Court of Justice Capable of Judging State Criminal Responsib?”, 31Fordham Interna‑
tional Law Journal (2008), p. 933.
118Reply of Croatia, para. 2.11.
119Ibid., para. 2.12.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 502 18/04/16 08:54 253 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ticular circumstances, unless a general plan to that end can be con -
vincingly demonstrated to exist ; and for a pattern of conduct to be
accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be such that it h
could only point to the existence of such intent.” (Para. 373.)
142. Keeping in mind the case law of contemporary international tri -
bunals on the matter (cf. Sections V and VI, supra), the International
Court of Justice seems to have imposed too high a threshold of evidence h
(for the determination of genocide), which does not seem to follow theh
established case law of international criminal tribunals and of interna -
tional human rights tribunals on standard of proof (cf. also infra). The
Court seems to have set too high the standard of proof for finding the
Serbian regime in time of war in Croatia complicit in genocide. Even
when direct evidence is not available, the case law of contemporary intehr-
national tribunals holds that intent can be inferred on the basis of cirhcum-
stantial evidence.
143. Ultimately, intent can only be inferred, from such factors as the
existence of a general plan or policy, the systematic targeting of humanh
groups, the scale of atrocities, the use of derogatory language, among
others. The attempts to impose a high threshold for proof of genocide,
and to discredit the production of evidence (e.g., witness statements) are
most regrettable, ending up in reducing genocide to an almost impossibleh
crime to determine, and the Genocide Convention to an almost dead let -
ter. This can only bring impunity to the perpetrators of genocide, States
and individuals alike, and make any hope of access to justice on the parht
of victims of genocide fade away. Lawlessness would replace the rule of h
law.
144. Another word of caution is to be added here against what may
appear as a regrettable deconstruction of the Genocide Convention. One
cannot characterize a situation as one of armed conflict, so as to discard
genocide. The two do not exclude each other. In this connection, it has h
been pertinently warned that perpetrators of genocide will almost alwaysh
allege that they were in an armed conflict, and their actions were takhen
“pursuant to an ongoing military conflict” ; yet, “genocide may be a
means for achieving military objectives just as readily as military conflhict
may be a means for instigating a genocidal plan” 120.
145. In adjudicating the present case, the International Court of Jus -
tice should have kept in mind the importance of the Genocide Conven-
tion as a major human rights treaty and its historic significance for
humankind. A case like the present one can only be decided in the light,h
not at all of State sovereignty, but rather of the imperative of safeguahrd-
ing the life and integrity of human groups under the jurisdiction of the
120 R. Park, “Proving Genocidal Intent : International Precedent and the ECCC Case
002”, 63 Rutgers Law Review (2010), pp. 169-170, and cf. pp. 150-152.
254
7 CIJ1077.indb 504 18/04/16 08:54 254 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
State concerned, even more so when they find themselves in situations hof
utter vulnerability, if not defencelessness. The life and integrity of thhe
population prevail over contentions of State sovereignty, particularly in
the face of misuses of this latter.
146. History has unfortunately shown that genocide has been commit -
ted in furtherance of State policies. Making the application of the Genoh-
cide Convention to States parties an almost impossible task, would render
the Convention meaningless. It would also create a situation where cer -
tain State egregious criminal acts amounting to genocide would go
unpunished — even more so in the current absence of a convention on
crimes against humanity. Genocide is indeed an egregious crime commit -
ted — more often 121than one would naively assume — under the direc -
tion or the benign complicity of the sovereign State and its apparatus.
147. The repeated mass murders and atrocities, with the extermination
of segments of the population, pursuing pre-conceived plans and policies,
coldly calculated, have counted on the apparatus of the State public
power, with its bureaucracy, with its so -called material and human
“resources”. Historiography shows that the successive genocides and
121Cf., in general, inter alia, e.g., Y. Ternon, Guerres et génocides au XX siècle, Paris,
Ed. Odile Jacob, 2007, pp. 9-37; B.Bruneteau, Le siècle des génocides, Paris, Armand
Colin, 2004, pp. 5-233; B.A. Valentino, Final Solutions — Mass Killing and Genocide
in the Twentieth Century, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2004, pp.1-309;
G. Bensoussan, Europe — Une passion génocidaire, Paris, Ed. Mille et Une Nuits, 2006,
pp. 7-460; S.Totten, W. S. Parsons and I. W. Charny (eds.), Century of Genocide —
Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, N.Y./London, Garland Publ., 1997, pp3-466;
B. Kiernan, Blood and Soil — A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta
to Darfur, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 1-697; R. Gellately
and B. Kiernan (eds.), The Specter of Genocide— Mass Murder in Historical Perspec ‑
tive, Cambridge University Press, 2010 [repr.], pp. 3-380; D. Olusoga and C. W. Erichsen,
The Kaiser’s Holocaust — Germany’s Forgotten Genocide, London, Faber & Faber,
2011, pp. 1-379; J-B. Racine, Le génocide des Arméniens— Origine et permanence du
crime contre l’humanité, Paris, Dalloz, 2006, 61-102; R. G. Suny, F. M. Göçek and
N. M. Naimark (eds.), A Question of Genocide, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 3-414;
G. Chaliand and Y. Ternon, 1915, le génocide des Arméniens, Brussels, Ed.Complexe,
2006 (reed.), pp. 3-19; I.hang, The Rape of Nanking — The Forgotten Holocaust of
World War II, London, Penguin Books, 1997, pp. 14-220; N.M. Naimark, Stalin’s Geno‑
cides, Princeton/N.J., Princeton University Press, 2012 [repr.], pp. 1-154; E. Kogon, L’Etat
SS — Le système des camps de concentration allemands [1947], [Paris,Jeune Parque,
1993, pp. 7-447 L.Rees, El Holocausto Asiático, Barcelona, Crítica Ed., 2009, pp. 13-212
B. Kiernan, Le génocide au Cambodge (1975‑1979), Paris, Gallimard, 1998, pp.7-702;
B. Allen, Rape Warfare — The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia‑Herzegovina and Croatia,
Minneapolis/London, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 1-162.Prunier, Africa’s
World War — Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastroph▯e,
Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.-468; K. Moghalu, Rwanda’s Genocide — The Poli ‑
tics of Global Justice, N.Y., Palgrave, 2005,1-236; J.-P. Chrétien and M. Kabanda,
Rwanda — Racisme et génocide — l’idéologie hamitique, Paris, Ed. Belin, 2013, pp; 7-361
S.Leydesdorff, Survivinthe Bosnian Genocide— The Women of Srebrenica Speak, Bloom-
ington/Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2011, p1-229; M. W. Daly, Darfur’s
Sorrow — A History of Destruction and Genocide, Cambridge University Press, 2007,
pp. 1-316.
255
7 CIJ1077.indb 506 18/04/16 08:54 255 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
atrocities over the twentieth century have in effect been committed pursu-
ant to a plan, have been organized and executed as a State policy, by
those who held power, with the use of euphemistic language in the pro -
122
cess of dehumanization of the victims .
148. Widespread and systematic patterns of destruction have been car -
ried out amidst ideological propaganda, without any moral assessment,
blurring the sheer brutality and any responsibility, and erasing any guihlty
feeling. All was lost in the organic and totalitarian entity. Those massh
murders have often been committed without any reparation to the next of h
123
kin of the fatal victims . Furthermore, not all such mass atrocities have
been taken before international tribunals. As to the ones that have beenh,
in an international adjudication of a case concerning the application ofh
the Convention against Genocide, making the elements of genocide too
difficult to determine, would maintain the shadow of impunity, and creahte
a situation of lawlessness, contrary to the object and purpose of that Con -
vention.
IX. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructiho:n
Fact -Finding and Case Law
149. May I turn now to the fact-finding that was undertaken, and the
reports that were prepared, at the time those grave breaches of human
rights and international humanitarian law were being committed, conform -
ing a systematic practice of destruction. I refer to the fact-finding hand
Reports prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the (former) UN Com-
mission on Human Rights (1992 -1993), as well as the fact-finding and
reports prepared by the UN Security Council’s Commission of Experts
(1993-1994). I shall seek to detect their elements which bear relevance for
the consideration of the cas d’espèce.
122
123 Cf. further, Part XIII of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
E. Staub, The Roots of Evil — The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence,
Cambridge University Press, 2005 [reimpr.], pp. 7-8, 10, 19, 24, 29, 107, 109, 119, 121-123,
129, 142, 151, 183 -187, 221, 225, 227 and 26Muchnik and A. Garvie, El Derrumbe
del Humanismo — Guerra, Maldad y Violencia en los Tiempos Modernos, Buenos Aires/
Barcelona, Edhasa, 2007, pp. 36-37, 116, 128, 135 -136, 142, 246 and 250. And cf. also,
in general, inter alia, e.g., V. Klemperer, A Linguagem do Terceiro Reich, Rio de
Janeiro, Contraponto Ed., 2009, pp. 11-; D.J. Goldhagen, Worse than War — Geno‑
cide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, London, Abacus, 2012 [reed.],
pp.6-564;J. Sémelin, Purificar Destrui— Usos Políticos dos Massacres e dos Genocí ‑
dios, Rio de Janeiro, DIFEL, 2009, pp. 19-532; M. Kullashi, Effacer l’autre — Identités
culturelles et identités politiques dans les Balkans, Paris, L’Harmattan, 7-246;pp.
S.Matton, Srebrenica — Un génocide annoncé, Paris, Flammarion, 2005, pp.21-420;
P. Mojzes, Balkan Genocides — Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century,
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publs., 2011, pp. 34-229.
256
7 CIJ1077.indb 508 18/04/16 08:54 256 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
1. United Nations (Former Commission on Human Rights) Fact‑Finding
Reports on Systematic Pattern of Destruction (1992‑1993)
150. There are passages in the “Reports on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia”, of the Special
Rapporteur of the (former) UN Commission on Human Rights
(Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki), which pertain to alleged crimes committed
against Croat populations and by the Serb official or paramilitary entih -
ties. There are reported facts that assist in evidencing a systematic pattern
of destruction during the armed attacks in Croatia in particular. The
124
Report of 28 August 1992 , for example, referred to the shops and busi-
nesses of ethnic Croats that were burned and looted (para. 12).
151. Other forms of intimidation, it continued, involved shooting at
the houses of other ethnic groups and throwing explosives at them
(Report of 28 August 1992, para. 13). Attacks on churches and mosques
were part of the campaign of intimidation (ibid., para. 16). Another tactic
included “the shelling of population centres and the cutting off of suhpplies
of food and other essential goods” (ibid., para. 16). Cultural centres were
also targeted, and snipers shot “innocent civilians” ; any movement “out
of doors” was “hazardous” (ibid., paras. 17-18).
152. Detention of civilians was intended to put pressure on them to
leave the territory (ibid., para. 23). That Report also referred to the exis -
tence of detention facilities containing between 10 to 100 prisoners in
Croatia, and which were “under the control of the Government as well has
territories under the control of ethnic Serbs” ( ibid., para. 34). It added
that the situation in which prisoners lived (including poor nutrition, hover -
crowding and poor conditions of detention) was a real threat to their
lives, and, in effect, prisoners have died of torture and mistreatment inh
Croatia (ibid., para. 39). The aforementioned Report further referred to
the massive disappearances that occurred in territories under the controhl
of ethnic Serbs in particular, 3,000 disappearances were reported follow -
ing the fall of Vukovar, with people allegedly detained in camps before h
disappearing (ibid., para. 41).
153. The subsequent Report of 27 October 1992 125 expressed concern
as to the need to investigate further the existence of mass graves in Vuhk-
ovar and surrounding areas (para. 18). Generally speaking, this Report
stressed much more on Bosnia and Herzegovina than on Croatia. The
following Report, of 17 November 1992 126, addressed the facts occurred
in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs). The Special Rappor -
124UN doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9.
125UN doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10.
126
UN doc. A/47/666/S/24809.
257
7 CIJ1077.indb 510 18/04/16 08:54 257 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
teur stated that in the Krajina parts of UNPA Sector South, murders,
robberies, looting “and other forms of criminal violence often relatehd to
ethnic cleansing” took place (para. 78). People were only allowed to flee
upon relinquishment of their properties. As to UNPA Sector East, ethnic h
cleansing was undertaken by Serbian militias and local Serbian authori -
ties, and people were subjected to extremely violent intimidation
(para. 83). Furthermore, Catholic churches were destroyed (para. 84).
154. Moreover, that Report expressed concern with the disappearance
of 2,000 to 3,000 people, following the fall of Vukovar in 1991 ; it referred
to the potential mass grave in Ovčara close to Vukovar. On the site ohf the
potential mass grave referred to, four bodies were found, but there might
have been many more bodies, including some of the 175 Croatian patients
who were evacuated from the Vukovar hospital and then disappeared ;
there might have been eight other mass graves in the area (para. 86).
155. Last but not least, the Report of 17 November 1992 stated, in its
conclusions, that “the continuation of ethnic cleansing is a deliberahte
effort to create a fait accompli in flagrant disregard of internationalh com-
mitments entered into by those who carry out and benefit from ethnic
cleansing” (para. 135). It is worth noticing that the Report referred to all
those identified elements of extreme violence as a “policy” (pahra.135).
127
156. The subsequent Report of 10 February 1993 likewise referred
to an ethnic cleansing policy undertaken by local Serbian authorities anhd
paramilitaries still taking place in some UNPAs, as disclosed by the conh-
stant harassment towards the non -Serbs who refused to flee, the destruc -
tion of churches and 128ses (para. 141). The following Report, of
17 November 1993 , asserted that the organized massive ethnic cleans-
ing of the Croats from the Republic of Krajina then became a “fait
accompli” (para. 144), and crimes committed against Croats would gener-
ally fall into impunity (para. 145). In UNPA Sector South and the Pink
Zones, there were only 1,161 Croats left (whereas there were 44,000 of
them in the area in 1991. Killings, looting and confiscation of farm equip-
ment were reported. Moreover, the same Report gave account of disap -
pearances and killings that had been occurring in UNPA Sector North
(paras. 151-152).
157. As to UNPA Sector East, the census of 1991 and 1993 evidenced
that the Croat population in the area had dropped from 46 per cent to
6 per cent, while the Serb population arose from 36 per cent to approxi-
mately 73 per cent (para. 157). Intimidation acts and crimes were often
127
128UN doc. E/CN.4/1993/50.
UN doc. E/CN.4/1994/47.
258
7 CIJ1077.indb 512 18/04/16 08:54 258 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
directed at minorities, including killings, robbery and looting, forced h
recruitment in the armed forces, beatings, among others (para. 158). Fur-
thermore, the Report of 17 November 1993 expressed concerns about dis-
crimination against Croats when it comes to medical treatments and food h
distribution (para. 159). And the Report then referred to the “deliberate
and systematic shelling of civilian objects in Croatian towns and villaghes”
(para. 161).
158. The Report added that, according to Croatian sources, between
April 1992 and July 1993, “Serbian shelling” caused “187 civilian deaths
and 628 civilian injuries”, and, between 1991 and April 1993, an esti -
mated total of 210,000 buildings outside the UNPAs were either seriously
damaged or destroyed, primarily as a result of shelling (para. 161). Parts
of the Dalmatian coast areas
“have sustained several hundred impacts. There have been numerous
civilian deaths and injuries and extensive damage to civilian objects
including schools, hospitals and refugee camps, as well as houses and
apartments” (para. 162).
There were cases of civilian objects, hospitals and refugee camps, seem -
ingly “not situated in the proximity of a military object”, which hwere nev -
ertheless “deliberately shelled from Serbian positions within visual range
of the targets” (para. 163). The Special Rapporteur received accounts of
Croatian forces having also become engaged in “deliberate shelling ofh
civilian areas” (para. 164). Violence breeds violence.
2. United Nations (Security Council’s Commission of Experts)
Fact‑Finding Reports on Systematic Pattern
of Destruction (1993‑1994)
159. The Commission established by the UN Security Council resolu-
tion 780 (1992), of 6 October 1992, started in early November 1992 its
fact-finding work on the international crimes perpetrated in the war in
Croatia. By the time it concluded its work, by the end of May 1994, the
Commission of Experts had issued four reports, namely : “Interim
Report” (of 10 February 1993), “Report of a Mass Grave Near Vukovar”
(of 10 January 1993), “Second Interim Report” (of 6 October 1993), and
“Final Report” (of 27 May 1994). Each of them, and in particular the last
one, contains accounts of the grave breaches of international humanitar -
ian law, international human rights law, international refugee law and
international criminal law, committed during the war in Croatia. It is
thus important to review the results of the fact -finding work of the Com-
mission of Experts.
259
7 CIJ1077.indb 514 18/04/16 08:54 259 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
(a) Interim Report (of 10 February 1993)
160. In his presentation of the first Interim Report of the Commission of
Experts established by the Security Council, the (then) UN Secretary-
General (B. Boutros-Ghali) deemed it fit to stress that, already in that
first Report, the Commission had already established that :
“Grave breaches and other violations of international humanitar-
ian law have been committed, including wilful killing, ‘ethnic cleans -
ing’ and mass killings, torture, rape, pillage and destruction of civhilian
property, destruction of cultural and religious property and arbitrary
arrests.” 129
161. In effect, in its aforementioned “Interim Report”, the Commis -
sion of Exper130 bearing in mind the relevant conventional basis for itsh
fact-finding , observed that “ethnic cleansing”, a “relatively new”
expression, is “contrary to international law” (para. 55). And it added :
“Based on the many reports describing the policy and practices
conducted in the former Yugoslavia, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been cahr-
ried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention,
extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of civih -l
ian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and
deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or
threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruc-
tion of property. Those practices constitute crimes against humanity
and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts
could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.”
(“First Interim Report”, para. 56.)
The Commission of Experts then reported on “widespread and systematich
rape and other forms of sexual assault” throughout the various phasesh of
the armed conflicts ( ibid., para. 58), as well as on mass executions, disap -
pearances and mass graves during the war in Croatia (ibid., paras. 62-63).
129UN doc. S/25274, of 10 February 1993, p. 1.
130The 1949 Geneva Conventions of International Humanitarian Law (for “grave
breaches”) and Additional Protocol I, the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex : Regulations concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land ; the 1948onvention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide ; the 1954Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict and the 198Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Exchessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (paras.39 and 47).
260
7 CIJ1077.indb 516 18/04/16 08:54 260 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
(b) Report of a mass grave near Vukovar (of 10 January 1993)
162. The next Report of the Commission of Experts focused specifi -
cally on the mass grave near Vukovar. A mass execution took place at theh
gravesite, and “the executioners sought to bury their victims secretlhy” ;
the grave contained some 200 bodies (item I). The mass grave was discov-
ered by members of the UNPROFOR Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) and
an international forensic team, in an area south-east of the farming vilh -
lage of Ovčara, near Vukovar. The Commission of Experts reported thath
“[t]he discovery of the Ovčara site is consistent with witness testimony of
the disappearance of about 200 patients and medical staff members from
the Vukovar Hospital during the evacuation of Croatian patients from
that facility on 20 November 1991” (item II).
163. JNA soldiers and Serbian paramilitaries loaded a truck with
groups of 20 men, beating them, and driving them away (to execution) ; at
“intervals of about 15 to 20 minutes, the truck returned empty and
another group was loaded onto it” (item II). A mass execution took place,
and the mortal remains (of some 200 bodies) were then put in a clandes -
tine mass grave. The Commission of Experts reiterated that “[t]he remote
location of the grave suggests that the executioners intended to bury thheir
victims secretly” (item III).
(c) Second Interim Report (of 6 October 1993)
164. In its following Report (UN doc. S/26545), the Commission of
Experts again dwelt upon the mass execution at the grave site in Ovčahra
(para. 78). Besides mass killings, in its fact -finding missio131 it found
widespread violations of human rights in detention centres , including
torture, beatings, and other forms of physical and psychological mistreah-t
ment (“Second Interim Report”, paras. 84-85). Furthermore, there was
an “overall pattern” of rapes (330 reported cases), suggesting a “system -
atic rape policy” ; among the factors pointing in this direction, the Com -
mission of Experts proceeded,
“is the coincidence in time between military action designed to dis -
place civilian populations and widespread rape of the same popula -
tions. Group involvement of the members of the same military units
in rape suggests command responsibility by commission or omission ;
in this respect, the manner in which this type of rape was conducted
in multiple locations and within a fairly close period of time (mostly h
between May and December 1992) is also a significant factor. Another
factor in this connection is the contemporaneous existence of other
131There were 353 reported detention centres (para. 35).
261
7 CIJ1077.indb 518 18/04/16 08:54 261 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
violations of international humanitarian law in a given region occur -
ring simultaneously in prison camps, in the battlefield and in the civh-il
ian regions of occupied areas.” (Second Interim Report, para. 69.)
165. The general framework was one of destruction, with findings of
mass killings (in the Vukovar area), brutal mistreatment of prisoners,h sy-s
tematic sexual assaults, “ethnic cleansing”, and destruction of prhoperty
(ibid., paras. 9-10). There were thousands of “incidents of victimization”
(ibid., para. 29), mostly against the civilian population (kidnapping or
hostage-taking, forced eviction, imprisonment, rapes, torture, killings)
(ibid., paras. 32 and 35). In the Vukovar area, there was abduction of
civilians and personnel (some 200 persons) from the Vukovar Hospital,
followed by their execution and burial in a mass grave at Ovčara (ibid.,
paras. 35 and 37). More than a war, it was an onslaught.
(d) Final Report (of 27 May 1994)
166. The “Final Report” of the Commission of Experts gives a detailed
account of the findings of the horrifying atrocities perpetrated against the
targeted victims. In its presentation of the “Final Report”, the (then)
UN Secretary-General (B. Boutros-Ghali) drew attention to the “reported
grave breaches” of international humanitarian law, committed “on ah
large scale”, and “brutal and ferocious in their execution”. Heh further
drew attention to the Commission’s “substantive findings on allehged
crimes of ‘ethnic cleansing’, genocide and other massive violationhs of
elementary dictates of humanity” 132. As to “ethnic cleansing” and rape
and sexual assault, he added that they have been carried out “so system -
atically that they strongly appear to be the product of a policy”, whhich
“may also be inferred from the consistent failure to prevent the commhis-
sion of such crimes and to prosecute and punish their perpetrators” 133.
167. Throughout its “Final Report”, the Commission of Experts
stressed its findings of grave breaches of international humanitarian
law 134, mainly in Croatia and Bosnia -Herzegovina (paras. 45, 231, 253
and 311). It was attentive to detect the systematicity of victimization, dis -
closing a policy of persecution or discrimination (“Final Report”h,
para. 84). At a certain point, the Commission dwelt upon the Convention
against Genocide, adopted — it recalled — for “humanitarian and civiliz-
ing purposes”, in order to safeguard the existence itself of certain hhuman
132UN doc. S/1994/674, of 27 May 1994, p. 1.
133Ibid., pp. 1-2.
134Articles 50, 51, 130 and 147 of the 194Geneva Conventions on International
Humanitarian Law, and Articles 11 (4) and 85 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
262
7 CIJ1077.indb 520 18/04/16 08:54 262 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
groups and to assert basic “principles of humanity” (Final Reporth,
para. 88). The Convention, it added, had a “historical evolutionary
nature” (ibid., para. 89).
168. In the perpetration of those grave breaches, there was ample use
of paramilitaries, and the chain of command was thus blurred ( ibid.,
paras. 114, 120-122 and 128), so as intentionally to conceal responsibility
(ibid., para. 124). In this way “ethnic cleansing” was conducted (to build
the “Greater Serbia”) as a “purposeful policy”, terrorizingh the civilian
population, in order to remove ethnic or religious groups from certain
geographic areas, moved at times by a “sense of revenge” (ibid.,
paras. 130-131). The areas were strategic, “linking Serbia proper with
Serb-inhabited areas in Bosnia and Croatia” (ibid., para. 133).
169. The acts of violence, to remove the civilian population from those
areas, were carried out with “extreme brutality and savagery”, inshtilling
terror, so that the persecuted would flee and never return. They incluhded
mass murder, torture and rape, other mistreatment of civilians and pris -
oners of war, using of civilians as human shields, indiscriminate killings,
forced displacement, destruction of cultural property, attacks on hospi -
tals and medical locations, burning and blowing up of houses and destruc-h
tion of property (ibid., paras. 134-137).
170. The Commission of Experts also found frequency of shelling
(ibid., para. 188) and a pattern of “systematic targeting” (ibid., para. 189).
Such policy and practices of “ethnic cleansing” were carried out bhy mem-
bers of distinct segments of Serbian society, such as members of the Serh-
bian army, militias, special forces, police and individuals (ibid.,
paras. 141-142) 13, as illustrated by the destruction of the city of Vukovar
in 1991 (ibid., para. 145). The Commission of Experts also singled out the
attack on Dubrovnik, a city with no defence it p:ndered that the destruc-
tion of cultural property therein could not at all be justified as a “hmilitary
necessity” (ibid., paras. 289 and 293-294). The battle of Dubrovnik was
criminal (ibid., para. 297); there was a deliberate attack on civilians and
cultural property ( ibid., paras. 299-300).
171. The Commission of Experts then turned to the concentration camp : s
the living conditions in those camps were “appalling”, with executions en
masse, rapes, torture, killings, beatings and deportations (i.b,daras.169 -1).
Concentration camps were the scene of “the worst inhumane acts”, chomm - it
ted by guards, police, special forces and others (ibid., para. 223). Those
135 This generated further violence, the Commission of Experts added, and Croatian
forces also engaged in such practices, though the Croatian authorities dheplored them, ind-i
cating that they were not part of a governmental policy (para. 147).
263
7 CIJ1077.indb 522 18/04/16 08:54 263 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
atrocities were accompanied by “purposeful humiliation and degradatiohn”,
a “common feature in almost all camps” (Final Report, paras. 229-230 (d)).
172. Men of “military age”, between the ages of 16 (or younger)
and 60, were separated from older men, women and children, and trans -
ferred to heavily guarded larger camps, where killings and brutal torturhe
were committed ( ibid., para. 230 (i)). Prisoners in all camps were sub -
jected to “mental abuse and humiliation”. There was no hygiene, anhd
soon there were epidemics. Prisoners nearly starved to death ; “[o]ften sick
and wounded prisoners” were “buried alive in mass graves along withh the
corpses of killed prisoners” (ibid., para. 230 (p)).
173. The Commission of Experts proceeded, focusing on the practice
of rape, which was not often reported for fear of reprisals, lack of conhfi -
dence in justice, and the social stigma attached to it (ibid., paras.233-234).
The reported cases of rape occurred between the fall of 1991 and the endh
of 1993, most of them having occurred between April and November1992
(ibid., para. 237). From the reported cases, five patterns of rape emerged,
namely: (a) rape as intimidation of the targeted group, involving indi -
viduals or small groups (ibid., para. 245); (b) rape — sometimes in pub-
lic — linked to the fighting in an area, involving individuals or smallh
groups (ibid., para. 246) (c) rape in detention camps (after the men were
killed), followed at times by the murder of the raped women (ibid.,
par. 247) ; (d) rape as terror and humiliation, as part of the policy of
“ethnic cleansing”, keeping pregnant women detained until they could no
longer have an abortion (ibid., para. 248) ; and (e) rape (in hotels or other
facilities) for entertainment of soldiers, more often followed by the mhur -
der of the raped women (ibid., para. 249).
174. Rapes, amidst shame and humiliation, the Commission pro-
ceeded, were intended “to displace the targeted group from the regionh” ;
moreover, “[l]arge groups of perpetrators subject[ed] victims to multhiple
rapes and sexual assault” ( ibid., para. 250). They ended up being “com -
mitted by all sides to the conflict” (ibid., para. 251); the patterns of rape
(supra) suggest that “a systematic rape policy existed in certain areas”
(ibid., para. 253).
175. The Commission concluded that practices of “ethnic cleansing”,
with rapes, were systematic, and appeared as a policy (also by omissionh,
ibid., para. 313). Those grave breaches could thus be reasonably inferred
from such “consistent and repeated practices” (ibid., para. 314). The
264
7 CIJ1077.indb 524 18/04/16 08:54 264 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Commission of Experts confessed to have been “shocked” by the highh
level of victimization and the manner in which these crimes were commit -
ted (Final report, para. 319).
3. Repercussion of Occurrences in the United Nations Second World
Conference on Human Rights (1993)
176. It should not pass unnoticed that the occurrences in the wars in
the former Yugoslavia had prompt repercussions at the Second
World Conference of Human Rights, held in Vienna in June 1993. Hav-
ing participated in all stages of that United Nations World Conference, I
remember well that the original intention was not to single out any counh-
try, but soon two exceptions were made, so as to address the situation ohf
the affected populations in the ongoing armed conflicts in the former
136 137
Yugoslavia and in Angola .
177. The special declarations on the two conflicts were adopted therein,
on 24 June 1993. As to the former, the concern it expressed was directed
to the occurrences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular at
Goražde. An appeal to the UN Security Council accompanying the spe -
cial declaration, referred to the attacks as “genocide”. The declahration
referred to that “tragedy”, as “characterized by the naked Serbhian aggre-s
sion, unprecedented violations of human rights and genocide”, being “han
affront to the collective conscience of mankind” (third preambular para-
graph). And it added that :
“The World Conference believes that the practice of ethnic cleansing
resulting from Serbian aggression against the Muslim and Croat pop-
ulation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes geno -
cide in violation of the Convention on thePrevention and Punishment
138
of the Crime of Genocide.” (Eighth preambular paragraph.)
178. Although the occurrences which attracted the attention of the
UN World Conference in 1993 were the ones that were taking place in
one particular locality, in the European continent, not so far away fromh
Vienna (mainly in Goražde), they occurred likewise, and were to keehp on
occurring, in other parts of former Yugoslavia. The atrocities at issue h
formed part of a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction
(cf.Sections VIII-X, infra). They were committed pursuant to a plan ; the
chain of command (the Supreme Defence Council) and the perpetrators
were the same, engaging State responsibility.
136 “Decision and Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina”,in Report of the UN
Secretary‑General on the Second World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 14-25 June
1993), in A/CONF.157/24, Part I, of 13 October 1993, p. 47.
137 “Special Declaration on Angola”, in ibid., p. 50.
138 “Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in ibid., pp. 47-48.
265
7 CIJ1077.indb 526 18/04/16 08:54 265 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
179. The final document adopted by the World Conference — the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) — clearly addressed
the problem. The Declaration asserted that :
“The World Conference on Human Rights expresses its dismay at
massive violations of human rights, especially in the form of genocide, h
‘ethnic cleansing’, and systematic rape of women in war situationsh,
creating mass exodus of refugees and displaced persons. While
strongly condemning such abhorrent practices, it reiterates the call
that perpetrators of such crimes be punished and such practices imme -
diately stopped.” (Part I, para. 28.)
And the Programme of Action, for its part, added that :
“The World Conference on Human Rights calls on all States to
take immediate measures, individually and collectively, to combat the
practice of ethnic cleansing to bring it quickly to an end. Victims of
the abhorrent practice of ethnic cleansing are entitled to appropriate
and effective remedies.” (Part II, para. 24.)
4. Judicial Recognition of the Widespread and/or Systematic Attacks
against the Croat Civilian Population —
Case Law of the ICTY
180. On successive occasions in its evolving case law, the ICTY has
addressed the atrocities committed during the war in Croatia (1991 -1992),
stressing that what occurred was not simply an armed conflict between h
opposing armed forces, but rather a devastation of villages and mass
murder of their populations. References can be made, in this connection,h
e.g., to the ICTY’s findings in the cases of Babić (2004), Martić (2007)
Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin (2007) and Stanišić and Simatović (2013).
(a) Babić case (2004)
181. Thus, in its Judgment of 29 June 2004 in the Babić case, the ICTY
139
(Trial Chamber) found that the regime that launched the armed attacks
within Serbia, committed “the extermination or murder of hundreds of h
Croat and other non-Serb civilians” (para. 15), and did so “in order to
transform that territory into a Serb-dominated State” (paras. 8 and 16).
And the ICTY (Trial Chamber) added significantly that :
“After the take-over, in co-operation with the local Serb authori -
ties, the Serb forces established a regime of persecutions designed to
drive the Croat and other non -Serb civilian populations from these
territories. The regime, which was based on political, racial, or reli -
139Together with Serbian forceincluding the JNA and TO units from Serbia, in
concert with Serbian authorities.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 528 18/04/16 08:54 266 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
gious grounds, included the extermination or murder of hundreds of
Croat and other non -Serb civilians in Dubića, Cerovljanji, Baćin,
Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovača and the neighbouring hamlets of Ska -
brnja, Nadin, and Bruška in Croatia ; the prolonged and routine
imprisonment and confinement of several hundred Croat and other
non-Serb civilians in inhumane living conditions in the old hospital
and the JNA barracks in Knin, which were used as detention facili -
ties; the deportation or forcible transfer of thousands of Croat and
other non-Serb civilians from the SAO Krajina ; and the deliberate
destruction of homes and other public and private property, cultural
institutions, historic monuments, and sacred sites of the Croat and
other non-Serb populations in Dubića, Cerovljanji, Baćin, Saborsko,
Poljanak, Lipovača and the neighbouring hamlets of Vaganac, Ska -
brnja, Nadin and Bruška.” (ICTY, Babić, Judgment of 29 June 2004,
para. 15.)
And the ICTY (Trial Chamber) then concluded, in the aforementioned
Babić case, on the basis of the factual statement and other evidence pre -
sented to it, that the execution (of the JCE) at issue “entailed a hwide -
spread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population” ahnd
“was carried out with discriminatory intent, on political, racial, orh reli -
gious grounds” (ibid., para. 35).
(b) Martić case (2007)
182. Likewise, in the Martić case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber), in its
Judgment of 12 June 2007, found that there had been a “widespread and
systematic attack”(para. 352) against the Croat population, committed
by the JNA, TO, Serbian police and Serbian paramilitaries, acting in conh -
cert ; that attack involved “the commission of widespread and grave
crimes” (para. 443), with “the goal of creating an ethnically Serb State”
(para. 342). In its assessment, “[t]here is evidence of Croats being killedh
in 1991, having their property stolen, having their houses burned, that
Croat villages and towns were destroyed, including churches and religious
buildings, and that Croats were arbitrarily dismissed from their jobs”h
(ICTY, Martić, Judgment of 12 June 2007, para. 324). The attacks con -
tinued in 1992 140.
183. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) further found that “numerous attacks
were carried out on Croat majority villages by the JNA acting in co-operh -
ation with the TO and the Milicija Krajine” (ibid., para. 344), and that
“[t]hese attacks followed a generally similar pattern, which involvedh the
killing and removal of the Croat population” ( ibid., para. 443). More-
over, it added, hundreds of Croat civilians were imprisoned and subjected
140It proceeded that “[d]uring 1992 on the territory of the RSK, there was a continu -
ation of incidents of killings, harassment, robbery, beatings, burning ohf houses, theft, and
destruction of churches carried out against the non-Serb population” (ibid., para. 327).
267
7 CIJ1077.indb 530 18/04/16 08:54 267 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
to “severe mistreatment” (ICTY, Martić, Judgment of 12 June 2007,
para. 349). It further determined that “widespread crimes of violence and h
intimidation and crimes against private and public property were perpe-
trated against the Croat population, including in detention facilities rhun
by MUP forces of the SAO Krajina and the JNA” ( ibid., para. 443).
184. By the end of the summer of 1991, it added, “the JNA became an
active participant in Croatia on the side of the SAO Krajina” (ibid.,
para. 330). The ICTY (Trial Chamber) also referred to the persecution,
forced displacement, deportation and forcible transfer of the Croat popuh -
lation (civilians), and “further evidence that in 1991 Croats were killed by
Serb forces in various locations in the SAO Krajina” ( ibid., para. 426).
There was, in sum,
“evidence of a generally similar pattern to the attacks. The area or
village in question would be shelled, after which ground units would
enter. After the fighting had subsided, acts of killing and violence
would be committed by the forces against the civilian non -Serb pop -
ulation who had not managed to flee during the attack. Houses,
churches and property would be destroyed in order to prevent their
return and widespread looting would be carried out. (. . .) Moreover,
members of the non-Serb population would be rounded up and taken
away to detention facilities (. . .)” (Ibid., para. 427.)
185. Moreover, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) referred to the co-opera -
tion and assistance with Serbia on the part of Milan Martić (third Presi-
dent of the so -called “RSK”) ; in this respect, the Trial Chamber stated
that, “[t]hroughout 1992, 1993 and 1994, the RSK leadership, including
Milan Martić, requested financial, logistical and military support from
Serbia on numerous occasions, including directly from Slobodan
Milošević” (ibid., para. 159). And, as to the political objective of the Serb
leadership, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) stated that :
“[T]he President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, (. . .) covertly
intended the creation of a Serb state. Milan Babić testified that Slo -
bodan Milošević intended the creation of such a Serb State through
the establishment of paramilitary forces and the provocation of inci -
dents in order to allow for JNA intervention, initially with the aim to h
separate the warring parties but subsequently in order to secure ter -
ritories envisaged to be part of a future Serb state.” (Ibid., para.329.)
186. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) added that, as to the period 1991-1995,
it had been furnished with “a substantial amount of evidence of massihve and
widespread acts of violence and intimidation committed against the non-
Serb population (. . .)” (ibid., para. 430). It found inter alia that there had
occurred widespread and systematic attacks “directed against the Croaht and
other non-Serb civilian population” in Croatia in the period1991-1995, not -
withstanding the presence of Croat forces in some areas (ibid., para349-352).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 532 18/04/16 08:54 268 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
(c) Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin case (2007)
187. In the case of Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin, the ICTY (Trial
Chamber) made important findings (Judgment of 27 September 2007) as
to the “complete command and full control” exercised by the JNA over
the TOs and Serb paramilitaries, in “all military operations” (pahra. 89).
In addressing the “devastation brought on Vukovar over the prolonged h
military engagement in 1991” (ICTY, Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin,
Judgment of 27 September 2007, para. 8), the ICTY (Trial Chamber)
described, inter alia, how
“in the evening and night hours of 20 -21 November 1991 the prison -
ers of war were taken in groups of 10 to 20 from the hangar at Ovčara
to the site where earlier that afternoon a large hole had been dug.
There, members of Vukovar TO and paramilitary soldiers executed
at least 194 of them. The killings started after 21:00 hours and con-
tinued until well after midnight. The bodies were buried in the mass
grave and remained undiscovered until several years later.” ( Ibid.,
para. 252.)
188. In the aforementioned Judgment in the case of Mrkšić, Radić and
Sljivančanin, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) again made important findings on
the widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian populhation
in Vukovar. It stated, e.g., that, from23 August 1991 to18 November 1991,
“the town of Vukovar and its surroundings were increasingly subjectedh
to shelling and other fire : it came to be almost on a daily basis. The
damage to the city of Vukovar was devastating. (. . .) A large Serb
force comprising mainly well armed and equipped troops were involved
in far greater numbers than the Croat forces. In essence, the city of
Vukovar was encircled and under siege from Serb forces, including air
and naval forces, until the Croat forces capitulated on 18 Novem -
ber 1991. By the beginning of November virtually none of the houses
along the road from Vukovar to Mitnica were left standing above the
cellar. The supply of essential services to the whole of Vukovar was
disrupted. Electricity and water supplies and the sewage system all
failed. The damage to civilian property was extensive. By 18 Novem -
ber 1991, the city had been more or less totally destroyed. It was abso -
lutely devastated. Those still living in the city had been forced to takhe
141
shelter in cellars, shelters and the like.” (Ibid., para. 465.)
141
In its aforementioned Judgment, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) proceeded thaht
“the Vukovar hospital, schools, public buildings, offices, wells, thhe water and elec -
tricity supply and roads were severely damaged during the conflict. All buildings
were shelled, including the hospital, schools and kindergartens. Many wehlls were
also targeted and destroyed. Most of the wells in Vukovar were privatelyh owned, so
houses with a water supply were among the first to be destroyed. From hSeptember
to November 1991 there was no drinking water available, except from the remaining
wells.” (Ibid., para. 466.)
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7 CIJ1077.indb 534 18/04/16 08:54 269 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
189. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) then stated, in the same Judgment of
27 September 2007 in the Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin case, that:
“The battle for Vukovar caused a large number of casualties, both
dead and wounded, combatants and civilians. There can be no exact
number for the wounded treated in Vukovar by Croat services,
because the extremely difficult and improvised treatment facilities didh
not allow the luxury of thorough records. There is no overall evidence
of the Serb forces’ casualties. What remained of Vukovar hospital,
together with a secondary nursing facility in a nearby cellar of a ware -
house, dealt with most of the wounded, but there were other facilities
in the Vukovar area. (. . .) Civilians, including women and children
were amongst the wounded. While precise statistics were not main -
tained in the circumstances, the Chamber accepts as a reliable esti -
mate that the casualties were 60 -75 per cent civilian. A report (. . .)
on 25 October 1991 from the medical director of the hospital noted
that 1250 wounded had been admitted since 25 August with a further
300 dead on arrival.” (ICTY, Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin, 27 Sep -
tember 2007, para. 468.)
190. And the ICTY (Trial Chamber) significantly added that :
“There can be no question that the Serb forces were, in part, directihng
their attack on Vukovar (. . .). [T]he Serb attack was also consciously
and deliberately directed against the city of Vukovar itself and its haphless
civilian population, trapped as they were by the Serb military blockade
of Vukovar and its surroundings and forced to seek what shelter they
could in the basements and other underground structures that survived
the ongoing bombardments and assaults. What occurred was not, in the
finding of the Chamber, merely an armed conflict between a military force ▯
and an opposing force in the course of which civilians became casualties
and some property was damaged. The events, when viewed overall, disclose▯
an attack by comparatively massive Serb forces, well armed, equipped and▯
organized, which slowly and systematically destroyed a city and its civil▯ ian
and military occupants to the point where there was a complete surrender▯
of those that remained. While the view is advanced before the Chamber
that the Serb forces were merely liberating besieged and wronged Serb
citizens who were victims of Croatian oppressiveness and discrimina -
tion, this is a significant distortion of the true position as revealehd by
142
the evidence, when reviewed impartially.” ( Ibid., para.470.)
(d) Stanišić and Simatović case (2013)
191. Subsequently, in its Judgment of 30 May 2013 in the Stanišić and
142
[Emphasis added.] And cf., furthermore, Part X (1) of the present dissenting
opinion, infra.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 536 18/04/16 08:54 270 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Simatović case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) found that, from April 1991 to
April 1992, between 80,000 and 100,000 Croat and other non -Serb civil-
ians fled the SAO Krajina, as a result of the situation then prevailinhg in
that region,
“which was created by a combination of : the attacks on villages and
towns with substantial or completely Croat populations ; the killings,
use as human shields, detention, beatings, forced labour, sexual abuse
and other forms of harassment (including coercive measures) of Croat
persons ; and the looting and destruction of property. These actions
were committed by the local Serb authorities and the members and
units of the JNA (including JNA reservists), the SAO Krajina TO,
the SAO Krajina Police (including Milan Martić), and Serb paramil -
itary units, as well as local Serbs as set out in the Trial Chamber’sh
findings.” (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović, Judgment of 30 May 2013,
para. 404, and cf. para. 997.)
192. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) stressed that “[h]arassment and intim-
idation” of the Croat population were carried out “on a large scalhe” :
“Croats were killed in 1991, their property was stolen, their houses h
were burned, Croat villages and towns were destroyed, including
churches and religious buildings and Croats were arbitrarily dismissed
from their jobs. During 1992 (. . .) there was a continuation in inci -
dents of killings, harassment, robbery, beatings, burning of houses,
theft and destruction of churches carried out against the non -Serb
population. Throughout 1993 there were further reports of killings,
intimidation and theft.” (Ibid., para. 153.)
193. There were also cases of deportation and forcible transfer of
groups of persons (ibid., paras. 996-1054) ; the ICTY (Trial Chamber) fur-
ther found that Serb forces “committed deportation and forcible transhfer
of many thousands of Croats” ; in such incidents “people were moved
against their will or without a genuine choice”, as :
“Serb forces created an environment where the victims had no
choice but to leave. This included attacks on villages and towns, arbi-
trary detention, killings and ill treatment. These conditions prevailed
during the days or weeks, and sometimes months, prior to people
leaving. The Trial Chamber has also found that the crimes of murder,
deportation and forcible transfer constituted underlying acts of per -
secution as well.” (Ibid., para. 970.)
194. It added that, “the persons targeted were primarily members of
the civilian population” (ibid., para. 971). In the ICTY (Trial Chamber)’s
view, “the requirements of ‘attack’, ‘widespread’, and ‘hcivilian popula -
tion’ have been met” (ibid.). The crimes were perpetrated in widespread
271
7 CIJ1077.indb 538 18/04/16 08:54 271 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
armed attacks against the non -Serb civilian population, against unde -
fended non-Serb villages, with systematic executions of non-Serb civilians
and destruction of mosques, churches and homes of non-Serbs and other
civilian targets (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović, Judgment of 30 May 2013,
paras. 969-970). Those attacks, in the ICTY (Trial Chamber)’s finding,
were part of a pattern of destruction “against a civilian population”h and
“the perpetrators knew” that their acts were part of it (ibid., para. 972).
In this widespread and systematic pattern of destruction, all such attachks
were, as reckoned in the case law of the ICTY (supra) deliberate, inten -
tional.
X. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructiho:n
Massive Killings, Tortuhre and Beatings, Systemahtic Expulsion
from Homes and Mass Exoduhs and Destruction
of Group Culture
195. An examination of the factual context, as a whole, of the cas
d’espèce, discloses a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction,
carried out in the villages brought to the attention of the Court in theh
course of the present proceedings. Such a pattern of destruction, as it hwill
be shown next, encompassed massive killings, torture and beatings, sys -
tematic expulsion from homes and mass exodus, and destruction of group
culture. After reviewing and assessing the occurrence of those crimes, Ih
143
shall move on to other manifestations of the widespread and system -
atic pattern of destruction in the attacked villages in Croatia.
1. Indiscriminate Attacks against the Civilian Population
196. In the factual context of the present case of the Application of the
Convention against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), the question whether
the population attacked was either civilian in its entirety or predomi -
nantly civilian, does not raise any jurisdictional issue, as crimes of gheno-
cide can be committed against any individual, whether civilian or
combatant. In distinct contexts, the ICTY (Trial Chambers), faced withh
the jurisdictional requirements also of crimes against humanity and war h
crimes, has clarified the meaning to be attached to “civilian populhation” :
in all instances, it has adopted a wide definition of what constitutesh a
civilianpopulation, including, inter alia, individuals who performed acts
of resistance 14.
143
144 Parts XI, XII and XIII of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
For example, in theTadić case (Judgment of 7May 1997), the ICTY (Trial Chamber)
held, as to the targeted civilian population, that “[t]he presence ofh certain non-civilians in
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7 CIJ1077.indb 540 18/04/16 08:54 272 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
197. Moreover, in the cas d’espèce, the presence of Croatian armed
forces and formations should not be used to distort the reality. The evehnts
that took place in Vukovar illustrate what was probably the case in other
municipalities attacked in Croatia. As the ICTY (Trial Chamber) stated in
case Mrkšić, Radić and S ljivančanin (“Vukovar Hospital”, Judgment of
27 September 2007), there was a “gross disparity between the numbers ofh
the Serb and Croatian forces” engaged in the battle for Vukovar (ICThY,
Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin, Judgment of 27 September 2007, para.470).
198. The attack of “massive Serb forces”, facing a “comparatively
small and very poorly armed and organized Croatian forces”, and bringh -
ing “devastation on Vukovar and its surroundings” — added the ICTY —
was “consciously and deliberately directed against the city of Vukovahr
itself and its hapless civilian population (. . .) forced to seek what shelter
they could in the basements and other underground structures that sur -
vived the ongoing bombardments and assaults” (ibid., para. 470).
199. I have already referred, in the present dissenting opinion, to the
ICTY’s finding of the widespread and systematic attacks by Serb forhces
against the Croat civilian population 14. In addition to the passages already
quoted from the ICTY Judgment of 27September 2007 (Trial Chamber) in
the Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanincase, may I here recall that, in that same
Judgment, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) proceeded that “[t]he terrible fhate
that befell the city and the people of Vukovar was but one part of a muchh
more widespread action against the non -Serb peoples of Croatia and the
areas of Croatia in which they were substantial majorities” (ibid., para 4.71).
200. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) added that, in its view, “the overall
effect of the evidence is to demonstrate that the city and civilian populha -
tion of and around Vukovar were being punished, and terribly so”, forh
their midst does not change the character of the population” (para. 638). It reiterated this
point in the case Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment of 22 February 2001, para. 425).
In the case Blaškić (Judgment of 3March 2000), it again held that the presence of indi -
viduals bearing arms in a resistance movement did not change the characther of the civilian
population (paras. 213-214). In the case Kordić and Cerkez (Judgment of 26 February
2001), it singled out the consistent adoption, by ICTY Trial Chambers, hof “a wide defini-
tion of what constitutes a civilian population” (para.). In the case Martić (Judgment
of 12 June 2007), the ICTY (Trial Chamber I), keeping in mind the size of the attacked
civilian population, found that “the presence of Croatian armed forcehs and formations
in the Skabrnja and Saborsko areas does not affect the civilian character of the hattacked
population” (para. 350). This was confirmed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber (Judgment of
8 October 2008) in the same case Martić (para. 317). In the case Popović et alii (Judgment
of 10 June 2010), the ICTY (Trial Chamber II) held that the term “civilian population”
is to be “interpreted broadly”, referring to a population that is h“predominantly civilian in
nature”, even if there are “members of armed resistance groups”h (p.591). Again in the
recent case Stanišić and Zupljanin (Judgment of 27 March 2013), it pointed out that “the
presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come whithin the defini-
tion of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian charachter” (26); it
again upheld the test of the “predominantly civilian nature” of the population 26).It
pursued the same approach in the case Limaj, Bala and Musliu (Judgment of 30 November
2005, para. 186), and in the case Brđanin (Judgment of 1 September 2004, para. 134).
145 Cf. Part IX (4) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 542 18/04/16 08:54 273 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
not having accepted “the Serb controlled federal government in Bel -
grade”, and for Croatia’s declaration of independence (ICTY, Mrkšić,
Radić and Sljivančanin, Judgment of 27 September 2007, para. 4 71). The
ICTY (Trial Chamber) further stated that, what occurred,
“was not, in the finding of the Chamber, merely an armed conflicth
between a military force and an opposing force in the course of which
civilians became casualties and some property was damaged. The
events, when viewed overall, disclose an attack by comparatively mas -
sive Serb forces, well armed, equipped and organized, which slowly
and systematically destroyed a city and its civilian and military occu-
pants to the point where there was a complete surrender of those that
remained. While the view is advanced before the Chamber that the
Serb forces were merely liberating besieged and wronged Serb citizens
who were victims of Croatian oppressiveness and discrimination, this
is a significant distortion of the true position as revealed by the evhi -
dence, when reviewed impartially.” (Ibid., paras. 470-471.)
201. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) found, in the case of Mrkšić, Radić
and Sljivančanin (“Vukovar Hospital”), that what happened
“was in fact, not only a military operation against the Croat forces hin
and around Vukovar, but also a widespread and systematic attack by the
JNA and other Serb forces directed against the Croat and other non‑Serb
civilian population in the wider Vukovar area. The extensive damage to
civilian property and civilian infrastructure, the number of civilians killed
or wounded during the military operations and the high number of civilian ▯ s
displaced or forced to flee clearly indicate that the attack was carried▯ out
in an indiscriminate way, contrary to international law.It was an unlaw -
ful attack. Indeed it was also directed in part deliberately against theh
civilian population. The widespread nature of the attack is indicated byh
the number of villages in the immediate area around Vukovar which
were damaged or destroyed and the geographical spread of these vil -
lages, as well as by the damage to the city of Vukovar itself. The sys -
tematic character of the attack is also evidenced by the JNA’s approahch
to the taking of each village or town and the damage done therein and
the forced displacement of those villagers fortunate enough to survive
the taking of their respective villages.” (Ibid., para.72.)146
202. In effect, in the adjudication of distinct cases pertaining to the war
in Croatia, the ICTY has found a widespread and systematic pattern of
extreme violence, victimizing the civilian population. The dossier of thhe
present case of the Application of the Convention against Genocide con -
tains elements revealing that pattern ; planned and premeditated. The
extreme violence went far beyond establishing military and administrativhe
hegemony: it involved massive killings, brutal torturing and beatings of
Croatian civilians, and the removal by force of the remaining ones from h
146Emphasis added.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 544 18/04/16 08:54 274 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
their villages. They were forced to sign documents attesting their “vholun-
tary” consent that all their property should be left to the “SAO Khrajina”.
Moreover, Serbian artillery was used t147estroy all traces of Croatian
architecture, culture and religion .
203. Such indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population in Croa -
tia formed a pattern of extreme violence and destruction, as follows :
(a) firstly, prior to the occupation of a village, the JNA would send an
ultimatum to the Croatian inhabitants to lay down their weapons, or elseh
face the village levelled to the ground ; at the same time, promises were made
that the Croatian civilians would not be harmed if they did not offer armhed
resistance; (b) secondly, the JNA would then engage in artillery attack, fol -
lowed by its infantry of the JNA entering the village together with Serbh
paramilitary groups; (c) thirdly, they would then, after capturing the vil -
lage, embark on a campaign of terror, making it physically or psychologih -
cally impossible for the surviving Croatians to continue living there.
204. Even where there was not a complete destruction of the village,
as, for example, in Poljanak, serious crimes were committed in that vil -
lage, as the ICTY recognized in the Martić case. Yet, those serious crimes
have not been extensively depicted in the present Judgment, neither in
respect of Poljanak, nor of other villages. As to Poljanak, there were ahlso
accounts of killings ; for example, B. V. testified that his family was killed
and he was heavily beaten, that Chetniks searched houses in the village h
and set them on fire, and captured people, and he also witnessed kill -
148
ings . Another witness, M. V., found two victims dead, with their heads
smashed and the brains scattered around 149.
205. Similarly to Saborsko, it is significant to note that Serbia acknowl-
edged that the ICTY (Trial Chamber) in the Martić ca150“confirmed the
killings in Poljanak and its hamlet Vuković” . There were also accounts
of houses having been burned in Poljanak. M. L. testified that prisoners
were locked in a room in the camp Manjača, where “they did not get
anything to eat or drink for four or five days, while being interrogated
over and over, and were beaten and molested” 151. B. V. testified that
Chetniks searched houses in Poljanak, set them on fire and captured
152
people .
2. Massive Killings
206. At the final stage of the attacks by the Serb armed forces, when a
village was captured, a campaign of terror was launched, followed by
147
Application instituting proceedings, para. 34, and Memorial of Croatia,
par148 4.8-4.9.
149 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 387.
Ibid., Annex 388.
150 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 861.
151 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 385.
152 Ibid., Annex 387.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 546 18/04/16 08:54 275 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
mass and non-selective executions of Croatian civilians. The smaller
remainder of the Croat population was subjected to variants of martial
law, imprisonment, forced exile or deportation to camps ; in some villages
they were forced to display white ribbons, on their sleeves, as armbands,
153
or white sheets attached to the doors of their houses . During the occu-
pation, many Croatians fled to the neighbouring towns, not yet captured,
and some were killed in ambushes by Serb paramilitary units on the way.
207. In its 2007 Judgment in the Application of the Convention against
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), the Inter -
national Court of Justice observed, as to the verification of a systemhatic
pattern of destruction, that :
“[I]t is not necessary to examine every single incident reported by
the Applicant, nor is it necessary to make an exhaustive list of the
allegations; the Court finds it sufficient to examine those facts that
would illuminate the question of intent, or illustrate the claim by the h
Applicant of a pattern of acts committed against members of the
group, such as to lead to an inference from such pattern of the exist -
ence of a specific intent (dolus specialis).” (Para. 242.)
208. Bearing in mind this consideration by the Court, I do not pur -
port, nor is it necessary, in this dissenting opinion, to proceed to an in-
depth analysis of individual crimes, as this is not an international crihminal
court. More important to me is the verification of a widespread and sys -
tematic pattern of destruction disclosed by those crimes, all over the vhil -
lages that were attacked, as brought to the attention of the Court.
Numerous crimes — revealing such pattern of destruction — have been
described by witnesses, and others have been determined by the ICTY
itself, as indicated throughout the present dissenting opinion.
209. In effect, the dossier of the cas d’espèce indicates that criminal acts
were committed in the various regions occupied by the Serbian forces. Inh
the region of Eastern Slavonia, for example, the following villages are
mentioned : Tenja, Dalj, Berak, Bogdanovci, Sarengrad, Ilok, Tompo -
154
jevci, Bapska, Tovarnik, Sotin, Lovas, Tordinci and Vukovar . The
wrongful acts evidencing the systematic pattern of destruction which
occurred in Eastern Slavonia spread to the other regions of Western Sla -
vonia, Banovina, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia 155.
210. The first villages and civilian populations to be attacked were those
of Dalj, Erdut and Aljmaš, at the beginning of Augus 1t991. Between28Sep-
153Cf. Section XIII, infra, of the present dissenting opinion.
154Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.20-4.30, 4.31-4.37, 4.38-4.46, 4.47-4.55, 4.56-4.61,
4.62-4.72, 4.73 -4.80, 4.81 -4.93, 4.94 -4.106, 4.107 -4.115, 4.116 -4.132, 4.133 -4.138, and
4.139-4.190, respectively.
155Cf. ibid., paras. 5.3-5.64, 5.65-5.122, 5.123-5.186, and 5.187-5.241, respectively.
276
7 CIJ1077.indb 548 18/04/16 08:54 276 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tember 1991 and 17 October 1991, the villages of Sotin, Ilok, S arengrad,
Lovas, Bapska and Tovarnik were captured by the JNA and Serb para -
military groups. Killings were committed in pursuance of a systematic pah -t
tern of brutality, including the perpetration of massacres of entire famhilies,
156
or random murders to force Croats to flee ; the campaign culminated in
the massacre at Vukovar (after 18 November 1991) 157.
211. Several mass graves were discovered (e.g., in the regions of Bano -
vina, and Kordun and Lika), with little or no indication of who the vich -
tims were, or where they were originally from. Such mass graves were
found out in the municipalities of Tenja, Dalj, Ilok, Sotin, Lovas,
Tordinci, Ovčara, Vukovar, Pakrac, Lađevac and Skabrnja 158. Croatia
pointed out that, by the time of the filing of its Memorial (March 2001),
61 mass graves had been found in Eastern Slavonia. Many of the mass
graves, which then appeared were used as temporary burial sites only ; the
JNA often dug up the bodies and moved them to other parts of the occu -
159
pied territory or of Serbia .
212. For its part, Serbia challenged the evidence presented by Croa -
tia160; it contended that the killing of Croats by Serbian forces was not
intended to destroy that group, and, accordingly, did not amount to
genocide; on the other hand, it added, the killing of Serbs by Croatian
forces was committed, in its view, with the intent to destroy the group as
161
such . Croatia replied that Serbia did not dispute that Croats were sub -
jected to torture and to serious bodily and mental harm, on a systematich
basis 16. Serbia, for its part, did not dispute that serious bodily and men -
tal harm was committed by Serbian forces against Croats during the war
in Croatia between 1991 and 1995, but it further submitted that serious
bodily and mental harm was also committed against Serbs by the Croa -
163
tian forces .
213. A Book of Evidence included by Croatia in the dossier of the pres-
164
ent case, titled Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92 , identifies
four phases in the war in Croatia, from the perspective of “civilian casual -
ties and the destruction of Croatian villages and towns”, namely :
“In the first phase (July -August 1991), the Serbian paramilitary
troops armed by JNA had the predominant role. With the aid of JNA
156Cf. Memorial of Croatia., Chapter 4.
157Cf. ibid., para. 4.19.
158
Ibid., paras. 4.29, 4.35, 4.72, 4.107, 4.116, 4.138, 4.178, 4.188, 5.27, 5.77, 5.137, h
5.1159 and 5.226, respectively.
Cf. ibid., para. 4.07.
160Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 660 and 663.
161Cf. ibid., para. 48.
162Cf. Reply of Croatia, para. 9.47.
163Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 81.
164Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence, Zagreb, Ministry
of Health of Croatia, 1992, pp. 1-207.
277
7 CIJ1077.indb 550 18/04/16 08:54 277 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
they attacked completely unarmed Croatian villages, especially in the
area of Banija and in the surrounding of Knin. At that time JNA still
pretended to be creating buffer -zones between the ‘two sides in con -
flict’. However, the examples of Dalj, Kraljevčani, Dragotinci ahnd
Kijevo clearly show the active role of JNA using tanks and air force
to destroy residential buildings regardless of the fact that there were h
no Croatian Police (MUP) or National Guard forces (ZNG). In the
second phase of the war (September 1991), JNA undertook the con -
quest of larger areas in Croatia, and it conquered Kostajnica, Dubica,
Petrinja, Drniš, Jasenovac, Okučani and Stara Gradiška. This is the
phase when the Croatian army did not have adequate heavy artillery
so that it could not even neutralize the aggressor. This resulted in
a number of Croatian defeats, having as a consequence masses of
refugees and displaced persons from the areas of Banija, Dalmacija
and partly Slavonia. The following third phase, took place during
October -November 1991, when JNA waged intensive total war
using air force, heavy artillery and armoured units on the line of the
Greater Serbia border Virovitica -Karlovac-Karlobag. Established
front-line made possible the stabilization of defence. Still, heavy
artillery of JNA produced immense destruction of Croatian cities,
including the cities at the seaside which were sealed off. In this periodh
important Croatian cities, e.g., Vukovar, Slunj, Dubrovnik, were
surrounded and suffered great damages or total destruction. (. . .) The
last, fourth phase of the war, begins after the ceasefire of 3 January
1992. During April 1992 a dramatic escalation of artillery attacks
occurred on a number of civilian targets, especially on Osijek,
Vinkovci, Slavonski Brod, Zupanja, Karlovac, Zadar, Gospić and
Nova Gradiška. This phase especially threatened the civilians, unpre -
pared for artillery attacks. A new wave of refugees started as well.
The endangered population still remains on the occupied territories.
They were being forced away from their homes before the UN forces
arrive.” 165
214. The document singles out, in the first phase of the onslaught, the
destruction of homes, forcing the victims to flee, or else to face deahth or
brutalities. The unarmed residents of the villages attacked were forcefuhlly
displaced, and their homes were destroyed or plundered ; they moved to
more central and safer regions of Croatia. In the second phase, the JNA h
army itself launched fierce armed attacks, with artillery and fightehr jets,
165
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence, Zagreb, Ministry
of Health of Croatia, pp. 1 and 4.
278
7 CIJ1077.indb 552 18/04/16 08:54 278 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
against numerous villages and towns (e.g., Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci,
Sisak, Karlovac, Pakrac, Lipik, Gospić, Otočac, Zadar, Sibenik,
Dubrovnik, Petrinja, Nova Gradiška or Novska), with mass killings of
civilians. The document adds that :
“Many women, children and elderly lost their lives in this manner,
as thousands of private residences and public buildings were totally
destroyed. Civilians died in their own homes, in schools, kindergar -
tens, churches, hospitals, on their farms, while walking in the streets,
riding bicycles or driving their cars. In short, no one was safe any -
where and there was literally no place to take refuge from the bomb -
166
ing and shelling.”
215. Systematic destruction of homes by close -range fire occurred
extensively in, e.g., Vukovar, Osijek, Petrinja, Vinkovci and Gospić,h
among others. After the firing, by tanks, of private residences, “fihrst at the
upper floors, then at the ground floor (. . .), hand grenades were thrown
in the basement in which the owners or residents ha[d] sought refuge”h 167.
Many of the mortal remains were left where they had fallen, and after
some time could no longer be recovered (particularly in the regions of h
Banija, Kordun, Lika and Eastern Slavonia, as well as the hinterland of
Zadar and Sibenik and Dubrovnik). Massacres of civilians occurred (e.g.,
in Voćin and Hum near Podravska Slatina, Obrovac, Benkovac, Knin,
Skabrnja and Nadin), as “part of a planned genocide”, in the occuphied
territories 168.
216. The “major cause” of civilian casualties — including children,
women and the elderly — was “the indiscriminate and extensive artillery
shelling of strictly civilian targets” 169. There were also the “missing per -
sons”, — some 8,000 -12,000 persons, according to the study. The Inter -
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) became involved in their
search. There was, furthermore, the systematic destruction of “schoolhs,
hospitals, monuments, libraries and above all the Catholic churches, a
favourite target of the JNA artillery” 170. Libraries, for example, were
destroyed all over — for the sake of destruction — during the former
Yugoslavia wars, — not only in the attacks i171roatia, but also in those
in Bosnia -Herzegovina and in Kosovo , to the detriment of the popula-
tions concerned.
166 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence, Zagreb, Ministry
of Health of Croatia, 1992, p. 4.
167 Ibid., p. 7.
168 Ibid., p. 6.
169 Ibid., p. 6.
170
171 Ibid., p. 7.
For an account, cf., inter alia, e.g., L. X. Polastron, Livros em Chamas — A História
da Destruição sem Fim das Bibliotecas [Livres en feu], Rio de Janeiro,Olympio Edit.,
2013, pp. 236-238.
279
7 CIJ1077.indb 554 18/04/16 08:54 279 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
3. Torture and Beatings
217. The dossier of the present case concerning the Application of the
Convention against Genocide contains numerous accounts of torture and
beatings of members of the civilian population, by the time the militaryh
offensive was launched by the respondent State, and even before that.
The Applicant’s Memorial, in particular, is permeated with such accounts.
There were reported cases of forced labour and torture and beatings (inh
Dalj, Berak, Bagejci, Bapska, Lovas, Tordinci, Vukovar, Vaganac,
Kijevo, Vujići, Tovarnik, Knin) 172; of extreme violence and psychological
173
torture (in Sotin, Josevica, Lipovača, Sarengrad) ; of abduction and
enforced disappearance (in Pakrac) 174; of the use of civilians as “human
shields” to “protect” Serb armed forces (in Bapska and Cetekovac) 175,
among other atrocities (in Kusonje, Podravska Slatina, Kraljevčani, h
Tovarnik, Joševica) 17.
218. Furthermore, in Poljanak, torture and beatings were likewise
reported. According to M. L., during Easter 1991, Chetnik groups
ambushed the workers of the Ministry of the Interior, and there was an
armed clash where people were killed. The witness testified that prisohners
were locked in a room in the camp “Manjača, where they did not get
anything to eat or drink for four or five days, while being interrogated
over and over and [they] were beaten and molested” 177. B. V. testified
178
that his family members were killed and he was heavily beaten .
219. Beatings occurred in various ways, including with bats, wire,
179
boots, chains, sticks and other objects . On several occasions, torture
and humiliation were followed by the murders of the victims (in Bogdan -
ovci, Sarengrad, Tovarnik, Voćin) 180. There were cases of suicides among
181
Croats . Croatia dwells upon a systematic pattern of destruction of the
targeted victims, within which occurred physical and psychological tor -
ture and beatings, in various ways.
220. Serbia, for its part, in particular in its Rejoinder, acknowledged
that many atrocities were committed against Croats during the con -
172
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.34-4.35, 4.38, 4.40, 4.85, 4.8-4.90, 4.124,
4.135-4.136, 4.168-4.169, 5.175, 5.212, and CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, paras. 20 and 27,
respectively.
173Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.111, 4.50, 5.88 and 5.143, respectively.
174Cf. ibid., para. 5.16, and CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, para. 17.
175Cf. ibid., paras. 4.85 and 5.43, respectively.
176Cf. ibid., paras. 5.27, 5.30, 5.98, 4.100, and 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 25,
res177tively.
178Ibid., Annex 385.
Ibid., Annex 387.
179Cf., e.g., CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, pp. 24-25.
180Memorial of Croatia, paras.4.47-4.55, 4.56-4.59, 4.101, and CR2014/10, of 6March
2014, p. 17, respectively.
181Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 25.
280
7 CIJ1077.indb 556 18/04/16 08:54 280 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
flicts182, but it challenged the trustworthiness of evidence and documents
presented by the applicant State, and in particular the reliability of whit -
nesses statements. In Serbia’s view, the tragic events described by thhe
applicant State do not establish genocidal intent and specific intent hto
destroy ; they establish, at most, it adds, that war crimes and crimes
183
against humanity were committed, but not genocide .
221. Turning its attention to Vukovar, in the region of Eastern Slavo -
nia, Croatia contended that, after the fall of Vukovar, high -ranking JNA
officers aided and abetted the large-scale torture and murder of prisonh -
ers 184, such as those at Velepromet 185. According to the Applicant, in
Vukovar and other towns or villages, Croat civilians, often elderly peophle,
unable or unwilling to flee, were subjected to extreme brutality, wereh tor -
tured and killed by JNA soldiers, TOs and paramilitaries 18. In the Appli-
cant’s view, those atrocities were committed with the intent to destrhoy the
187
Croat population in the targeted regions .
222. Croatia further asserted that, in Vukovar, Serbian forces carried
out a sustained campaign of bombing and shelling ; brutal killings and
torture ; systematic expulsion ; and denial of food, water, electricity, sani -
tation and medical treatment. It adds that the Serb forces established thor -
ture camps to where Croats were taken 188; Velepromet and Ovčara.
According to the Applicant, the Serb forces had the opportunity to dis -
place and not to destroy the surviving Vukovar Croats, but they were,
instead, repeatedly tortured and executed 189.
223. In the Martić case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber I) found (Judgment
of 12 June 2007) that, in their attacks on Croat villages in the SAO Kra -
jina, the Serbian armed forces left the villagers with “no choice buth to
flee”, and those who stayed behind were promptly beaten and killed
(ICTY, Martić, Judgment of 12 June 2007, para. 349). The attacked vil -
lages included Potkonije, Vrpolje, Glina, Kijevo, Drniš, Hrvatska Koshta-
jnica, Cerovljani, Hrvatska Dubica, Baćin, Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovahča,
S kabrnja, Nadin and Bruška ; “grave discriminatory measures were taken
against the Croat population” there (ibid.).
224. By and large, the ICTY (Trial Chamber I) proceeded in the Martić
case, there was a “widespread and systematic attack directed against the
Croat and other non -Serb civilian population”, both in Croatia and in
182
Cf., e.g., CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, paras. 3-5; and Rejoinder of Serbia,
paras. 349, 360, 367-368, 381, 384 and 386.
183 Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, paras.349, 360, 367-368, 381, 384 and386; and CR 2014/13,
of 10 March 2014, paras. 3-5.
184 CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, p. 43.
185 CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, p. 41.
186 Ibid., p. 45.
187 Ibid.
188
189 CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, pp. 29, 31 and 35.
Ibid., p. 39.
281
7 CIJ1077.indb 558 18/04/16 08:54 281 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICTY, Martić, Judgment of 12 June 2007,
para. 352). The crimes of torture, and cruel and inhuman treatment,
“were carried out with intent to discriminate on the basis of ethnicihty”
(ibid., paras. 411 and 413). There was a pattern of beatings, mistreatment
and torture of detainees (ibid., paras. 414-416).
225. Six years later, in theStanišić and Simatović case, the ICTY (Trial
Chamber I) likewise found (Judgment of 30 May 2013) that there was a
“widespread attack” against the same civilian population to which hthe
targeted persons belonged (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović, Judgment of
30 May 2013, paras. 971-972). The perpetrators’ “discriminatory intent”
was clear (ibid., para. 1250). The pattern of extreme violence included
arbitrary detention, beatings, sexual assaults, torture, murders, use of
derogatory language and insults, deportation and forcible transfer — all
on the basis of the ethnicity of the victims (ibid., paras.970 and 1250). It
should be kept in mind — may I add — that the prohibition of torture, in
all its forms, is absolute, in any circumstances : it is a prohibition ofjus
cogens.
226. Last but not least, may I here further add that the ICTY (Appeals
Chamber), in its recent Judgment (of 11 July 2013) in the Karadžić case,
rejected an appeal for acquittal, and reinstated genocide charges against
Mr. R. Karadžić, for the brutalities committed against detainees : although
the atrocities occurred in Bosnian municipalities, the pattern of destruhc -
tion was the same as the one that took place in Croatian municipalities,
and so were the targeted groups : besides Bosnian Muslims, also Bosnian
Croats. As to the conditions of detention, the ICTY (Appeals Chamber) h
found the occurrences of torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, rape and h
sexual violence, forced labour, and inhuman living conditions, with “hfai- l
ure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical
care or hygienic facilities” (ICTY, Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July 2013,
para. 34). It further noted
“evidence on the record indicating that Bosnian Muslim and/or Bos -
nian Croat detainees were kicked, and were violently beaten with a
range of objects, including, inter alia, rifles and rifle butts, truncheons
and batons, sticks and poles, bats, chains, pieces of cable, metal pipesh
and rods, and pieces of furniture. Detainees were often beaten over
the course of several days, for extended periods of time and multiple
times a day. Evidence on the record also indicates that in some
instances detainees were thrown down flights of stairs, beaten until
they lost consciousness, or had their heads hit against walls. These
beatings allegedly resulted in serious injuries, including, inter alia, rib
fractures, skull fractures, jaw fractures, vertebrae fractures, and con-
cussions. Long -term alleged effects from these beatings included, inter
alia, tooth loss, permanent headaches, facial deformities, deformed
282
7 CIJ1077.indb 560 18/04/16 08:54 282 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
fingers, chronic leg pain, and partial paralysis of limbs.” (ICTY,h
Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July 2013, para. 35.)
4. Systematic Expulsion from Homes and Mass Exodus,
and Destruction of Group Culture
227. In addition to mass killings, torture, beatings and other mistreat -
ment, unbearable conditions of life were inflicted on the targeted Crohat
population : there were systematic expulsions from homes, the imposition
of subsistence diets and the reduction of essential medical treatment anhd
190
supplies . The targeted segments of the population were required to dis-
play signs of their ethnicity, and were denied food, water, electricity hand
medical treatment. Their movements were restricted, and they were sub -
jected to repeated looting and to a regime of random and mass killings
(supra) , amidst brutalization and extreme violence. Their cultural and
religious monuments and the signs of their cultural heritage were
destroyed or looted ; the basis of their education was suppressed, so as to
be replaced by education as Serbs 191.
228. There was expulsion or forced displacement of the Croat popula -
tion from the villages of Tenja, Dalj, Berak, Bogdanovci, Sarengrad, Ilok,
Tompojevci, Bapska, Tovarnik, Sotin, Lovas, and Tordinci, as well as
192
Pakrac, Uskok, Donji, Gornji Varos and Pivare ; people were forced to
sign statements relinquishing all rights to their property, and to embarhk
on the mass exodus ; those who did not do so were subjected to a brutal
regime of extreme violence. Croatia recalled that the ICTY (Trial Cham -
ber), in its Judgment (of 2 August 2001) in the Krstić case, found that
“where there is physical or biological destruction there are often
simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and sym-
bols of the targeted group as well, attacks which may legitimately be
considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group.
In this case [Krstić], the Trial Chamber will thus take into account as
evidence of intent to destroy the group the deliberate destruction of
mosques and houses belonging to members of the group.” (ICTY,
Krstić, Judgment of 2 August 2001, para. 580.)
229. The International Court of Justice itself cited this finding in its
2007 Judgment (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun ‑
ishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
190Cf., e.g., Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.23 and 5.30.
191Cf. ibid., paras. 4.60, 4.128, and 5.181.
192Cf. ibid., paras4.30-4.31, 4.37, 4.46 -4.47, 4.61 -4.64, 4.80, 4.93, 4.105, 4.107,
4.132-4.133, 5.14, 5.49, 5.79, 5.92, 5.93, 5.106, 5.121, 5.140-5.141, 5.146, 5h.148, 5.174,
5.181, 5.196, 5.202-5.205, 5.210, 5.223 and 5.225.
283
7 CIJ1077.indb 562 18/04/16 08:54 283 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 185, para. 344). It is
clear that the destruction of cultural and religious heritage, as occurrhed in
the present case of the Application of the Convention against Genocide,
pertaining to the armed attacks in Croatia, can be of significance within
the context of the widespread and systematic pattern of destruction, as
occurred in the cas d’espèce, opposing Croatia to Serbia. Such destruction
of cultural and religious heritage is not to be simply dismissed tout court,
as the International Court of Justice has done in the present Judgment
(paras. 129, 379, 385 -386). It should have taken into due account the
aforementioned pattern of destruction as a whole (encompassing destruc -
tion of cultural and religious sites), as properly warned by the ICTY in
the Krstić case (supra).
230. In the present case, Serbia, for its part, retorted that, for the sys -
tematic expulsion of people from homes to fall under Article II (c) of the
Genocide Convention, it must be part of a “manifest pattern”, capable of
effecting the physical destruction of the group, and not merely its dis -
placement elsewhere ; in its view, the Applicant failed to prove that the
expulsion of Croats, where it has occurred, was accompanied by the
intent to destroy that population 193. In addition, Serbia minimized the
relevance of the destruction of cultural and religious objects, saying that,
in the drafting history of the Genocide Convention, the inclusion of
attacks on cultural and religious objects under the rubric “cultural hgeno-
cide” was discarded in the course of that drafting process 19.
231. On this point, may I here observe that, in his Autobiography,
Raphael Lemkin, who devoted so much energy to the coming into being
of the 1948 Convention against Genocide, warned that genocide has been
“an essential part” of world history, it has followed hu195kind “hlike a
dark shadow from early antiquity to the present” . To him, a group can
be destroyed as a group even when its members are not all destroyed, buth
its cultural identity is;genocide, to Lemkin, means also the destruction of
a culture, impoverishing civilization. The destruction of the cultural ihden -
tity of a group destroys ultimately its “spirit” 196. Lemkin confessed that
the idea of “cultural genocide” was “very dear” to him : “It meant the
destruction of the cultural pattern of a group, such as language, the trhad-i
tions, monuments, archives, libraries, and churches. In brief : the shrines
of a nation’s soul.” 197
232. Lemkin much regretted that there was not support for this idea in
the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, but he kept nour -
193
194Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 84; and Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 333.
195Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 335.
R. Lemkin, Totally Unofficial — The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin (ed.
D.-L. Frieze), New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2013, pp. 125 and 140.
196Ibid., pp. 131, 138 and 168.
197Ibid., p. 172.
284
7 CIJ1077.indb 564 18/04/16 08:54 284 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ishing the hope that in the future an Additional Protocol to the Conven -
tion, on “cultural genocide”, could be adopted. After all, he added, “the
destruction of a group entails the annihilation of its cultural heritageh or
198
the interruption of the cultural contributions coming from the group”h .
Lemkin was attentive to the writings of the “founding fathers” of hinterna -
tional law (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), and expressed his
admiration in particular to those of Bartolomé de Las Casas (and also of
Francisco de Vitoria), for his defence, on the basis of natural law, of the
rights of native populations against the abuses and brutalities of colonhia-l
ism in the New World (which Lemkin called “colonial genocide”) 199.
233. In this connection (destruction of a group’s cultural heritage), thhe
ICTY (Trial Chamber), in its decision (Review of Indictments, of 11 July
1996) in the case Karadžić and Mladić, observed that, in some cases,
“humiliation and terror serve to dismember the group. The destruc-
tion of mosques or Catholic churches is designed to annihilate the
centuries -long presence of the group or groups ; the destruction of the
libraries is intended to annihilate a culture which was enriched throughh
the participation of the various national components of the popula -
tion.” (ICTY, Karadžić and Mladić, decision of 11 July 1996, para. 94.)
I shall come back to this point subsequently in the present dissenting
opinion, when I address the destruction of cultural goods during the
200
bombardments of Dubrovnik (October-December 1991) .
234. In the already mentioned Stanišić and Simatović case, the ICTY
(Trial Chamber I) observed (Judgment of 30 May 2013) that the members
of the local civilian population, when not killed, were marginalized, brhu-
talized and forced to flee, “in order to establish a purely Serb tehrritory”,
so that the attacked villages could afterwards “form part of a Greatehr
Serbia” (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović, Judgment of 30 May 2013,
para. 1250). The ICTY (Trial Chamber) recalled “its findings on the
actions (including attacks, killings, destruction of houses, arbitrary harrest
and detention, torture, harassment, and looting) which occurred in the h
Saborsko region from June to November 1991” (ibid., para. 264). It
upheld the initial “evidence of approximately 20,000 to 25,000 Croats and
other non-Serbs” who were forcefully displaced from the SAO Krajina
region by April 1992 (ibid.).
198
199R. Lemkin, op. cit. supra note 195, pp. 172-173.
Cf. A. Dirk Moses, “Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide”,
The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies (eds. D. Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses), Oxford
University Press, 2010, pp. 26-27and cf.A. A. Cançado Trindade, “Prefacio”, Escuela
Ibérica de la Paz (1511‑1694) — La Conciencia Crítica de la Conquista y Colonización de
América (eds. P. Calafate and R. E. Mandado Gutiérrez), Santander, Ed. Universidad de
Cantabria, 2014, pp. 72-73 and 98-99.
200Cf. Part XII (7) of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
285
7 CIJ1077.indb 566 18/04/16 08:54 285 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
235. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) then added, in the aforementioned
Stanišić and Simatović case, that the total of those forcefully displaced
persons considerably increased until April 1992 ; in its own words,
“between 80,000 and 100,000 Croat and other non-Serb civilians fled the
SAO Krajina”, as a result of the situation created and then prevailing in
the region, which was a combination of “the attacks on villages and
towns with substantial or completely Croat populations ; the killings, use
as human shields, detention, beatings, forced labour, sexual abuse and
other forms of harassment of Croat persons ; and the looting and destruc -
tion of property” (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović , Judgment of 30 May
2013, para. 404, and cf. para. 997) 20.
236. Furthermore, in its Judgment of 12 December 2012 in the Tolimir
case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber II) drew attention to the need and impor-
tance of considering the forcible transfer of segments of the populationh in
connection with other wrongful acts directed against the same targeted
groups. It pondered that, proceeding in this way, it becomes clear that hthe
disclosed pattern of destruction — taking all the wrongful acts together—
is indicative of an intent to destroy all or part of the forcibly displahced
population (ICTY, Tolimir, Judgment of 12 December 2012, paras. 739
and 748).
5. General Assessment
237. The evidence produced before the Court in the present case of the
Application of the Convention against Genocide clearly establishes, in my
perception, the occurrence of massive killings of targeted members of thhe
Croat civilian population during the armed attacks in Croatia, amidst a
systematic pattern of extreme violence, encompassing also torture, arbi -
trary detention, beatings, sexual assaults, expulsion from homes and looh-t
ing, forced displacement and transfer, deportation and humiliation, in thhe
attacked villages. It was not exactly a war, it was a devastating onslauhght
of civilians. It was not only “a plurality of common crimes” that h“cannot,
in itself, constitute genocide”, as Counsel for Serbia argued before hthe
Court in the public sitting of 12 March 2014 202; it was rather an onslaught,
a plurality of atrocities, which, in itself, by its extreme violence andh dev -
203
astation, can disclose the intent to destroy (mens rea of genocide) .
238. The atrocities were not seldom carried out with the use of deroga -
tory language and hate speech. I find it important to stress the circuhm -
stances surrounding the attacked population, which was left in a situation
201And cf. also Part IX (4) (d) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
202Cf. CR 2014/15, of 12 March 2014, p. 18, para. 22. And cf. also Counter-Memorial
of Serbia, para. 54.
203
Cf. Part XV of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
286
7 CIJ1077.indb 568 18/04/16 08:54 286 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
of the utmost vulnerability, if not defencelessness ; such situation consti -
tutes, in my understanding, an aggravating circumstance. Later on in theh
present dissenting opinion, I shall return to the consideration of the
crimes perpetrated, under the relevant parts of the provisions of ArticlheII
of the Convention against Genocide 204.
239. Last but not least, may I here add that, in this factual context, the
expression “ethnic cleansing” seems to try to hide the extreme cruhelty that
it enshrines, in referring to the pursuance with the utmost violence of ha
forced removal of a targeted group from a given territory. I have alreadhy
referred to the rather surreptitious way whereby “ethnic cleansing”h pene -
trated legal vocabulary as a breach of international law (I.C.J. Reports
2010 (II), p. 543, para. 47) in my separate opinion in the International
Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (of
22 July 2010).
240. It so happens that such coerced or forced removal of a group from
a territory, so as to render this latter ethnically “homogeneous”, has not
seldom been carried out — as the wars in the former Yugoslavia show —
by means of killings, torture and beatings, forced labour, rape and other
sexual abuses, expulsion from homes and forced displacement and depor -
tation (with mass exodus) and the destruction of cultural and religiouhs
sites. Thus, what had initially appeared to have been an intent to expel a
group from a territory, may well have become, as extreme violence breeds
more and more violence, an intent to destroy the targeted group.
241. “Ethnic cleansing” and genocide, rather than excluding each other,h
appear to be somehow overlapping 205: with the growth of extreme violence,
what at first appeared to be “ethnic cleansing” turns out to be hgenocide :
the initial “intent to remove”, degenerates into “intent to deshtroy”, the
targeted group. In such circumstances, there is no sense in trying to cam -
ouflage genocide with the use of the expression “ethnic cleansing”h. In some
circumstances, such an expression may well amount to genocide, as reck -
oned by the ECHR in the Jorgić v. Germany case (Judgment of 12 July
204 Cf. Part XIII of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
205 For a discussion, cf., inter alia, e.g., M. Grmek, M. Gjidara and N. Simac (orgs.), Le
nettoyage ethnique — Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe, Fayard, 2002, pp. 7-9,
26, 31, 33, 38, 212, 286, 293 -294, 311-312, 324-325 and 336 -337.Quigley, The Geno ‑
cide Convention — An International Law Analysis, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 191-201;
N. M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred — Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth‑Century Europe,
Cambridge (Mass.)/London, Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 156-157, 164 -165,
168-170, 174 and 183 -184; Ph. Spencer, Genocide since 1945, London/N.Y., Routledge,
2012, pp. 11-12, 29 and 85 -86; N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia — The Policy of “Ethnic
Cleansing”, College Station, Texas A & M University Press, 1995, pp. 3-10, 22-37, 62-85
and 139-180 ;. Lieberman, “‘Ethnic Cleansing’ versus Genocide?”, The Oxford Handbook
of Genocide Studies (eds. D. Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses), Oxford University Press, 2010,
pp. 42-60; C.Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans — Nationalism and the Destruc‑
tion of Tradition, London/N.Y., Routledge, 2002, pp. 2, 66, 112-114.
287
7 CIJ1077.indb 570 18/04/16 08:54 287 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
206
2007) . The ECHR found it fit to ponder that, although there had been
“many authorities” who “had favoured a narrow interpretation ofh the
crime of genocide”, now there are also “several authorities” whho have co -n
strued the crime of genocide in a “wider way” (Jorgić v. Germany, Judg -
ment of 12 July 2007, para. 113), as in the Jorgić case itself.
XI. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructiho:n
Rape and Other Sexual Viohlence Crimes Committehd
in Distinct Municipalhities
242. May I now dwell upon the widespread and systematic pattern of
destruction, in the form of rapes and other sexual violence crimes, sys -
tematically committed in several municipalities, as from the launching ohf
the military campaign waged by Serbia against Croatia. The dossier of
the cas d’espèce , concerning the Application of the Convention against
Genocide, contains in effect several accounts, presented to the Interna -
tional Court of Justice, in the course of both the written and oral phashes
of the proceedings, of the perpetration of rapes of Croats in a number ohf
municipalities. I shall now dwell upon this particular issue, first adhdress-
ing the accounts rendered in the oral proceedings, and then those pre -
sented earlier on, in the course of the written phase. The path will thehn be
paved for the presentation of my thoughts on other aspects of those
atrocities, likewise deserving of close attention.
1. Accounts of Systematic Rape
(a) Croatia’s claims
243. In its oral pleadings, Croatia argued that, in their “genocidal cam-
paign” of “extreme brutality”, during which “[e]ntire Croat hcommunities
were intentionally destroyed”, the JNA and subordinate Serb forces
“raped more Croat women than can be known”, and “destroyed overh
100,000 homes and over 1,400 Catholic buildings and places of worship” ;
they sent over 7,700 detained Croats to “detention camps in occupied
parts of Croatia, Serbia, and other parts of the former Yugoslavia, and h
they forcibly deported over 550,000 others” 207. Croatia next presented a
narrative of rapes “accompanied by terrible ethnic abuse” that occhurred
in Berak 208.
206
The applicant had alleged that the German courts did not have jurisdiction to
convict him of genocide (committed in the villages of Bo-Herzegovina); the ECHR
found that the applicant’s conviction of genocide by the German courths was not in breach
of the European Convention on Human Rights (paras.13-116).
207 CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, p. 45, paras. 11 and 13.
208 Ibid., p. 60, para. 22.
288
7 CIJ1077.indb 572 18/04/16 08:54 288 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
244. Croatia then explained that the first phase of that campaign, the
artillery attacks, were intended to cause terror and “to compel Croaths to
abandon their villages” ; yet, “the worst atrocities” were reserved for
those who refused, or were unable to flee : they were “killed, tortured,
raped and abused by the attacking Serb forces”, with an intent to deshtroy
the Croat population of the region. There was, in Croatia’s perceptiohn, “a
pattern of attack that was genocidal, in that it intended to destroy a phart
of the Croat population” 209.
245. Occurrences of torture and rape were reported in the villages of
210 211
Lovas , Sotin , Bogdanovci — where paramilitaries massacred all or
almost all Croats remaining in the village 212 — and Pakrac 213, and across
the region of Eastern Slavonia 214. Croatia then focused on the raping and
215
other atrocities which victimized the Croat population of Vukovar ; it
contended that, at Velepromet, women and girls “did not escape brutalh
rapes” 21, as described in Croatia’s pleadings 21. And it added that,
“in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia, this Court distinguished between the
destruction of a group on the one hand and its ‘mere dissolution’ hon
the other. To describe the four phases of events at Vukovar in 1991—
the colossal use of force by overwhelmingly greater Serbian forces to
deprive the trapped inhabitants of their basic conditions of life, the
killing, raping and dismembering by the advancing forces of those
who remained, the staged removal to torture and death camps and
the organized mass killing at Velepromet and Ovčara — to describe
that as ‘mere dissolution’ of the Vukovar Croats is so to distort hlan -
guage as to render it meaningless.” 218
246. Croatia argued that “[m]ultiple and gang rapes of Croat women
were commonplace”, in order to “kill the seed of Croatia”, as thhe perpe-
trators threatened 219; this occurred in Siverić, Lovas, Vukovar, Sotin,
Doljani, Bapska and Cakovci, Dalj, Gornji Popovac and Tovarnik,
among other villages, at times even in the victims’ homes. Sexual atthacks
209CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 17, para. 36.
210Cf. ibid., p. 17, para. 36, and cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 23, para. 7.
211Cf. CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 22, para. 54.
212Cf. ibid., p. 24, paras. 62-63.
213
214Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 13, para. 12.
Cf. ibid., pp. 25 and 27, paras. 67 and 71. In Croatia’s account, in “different villages
and towns across Eastern Slavonia, women were forced to act as ‘comfort women’ to
members of the Serb forces” ibid., p. 23, para. 7.
215Cf. CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 31, para. 11, and cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March
2014, p. 23, para. 7.
216
217CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 42, para. 61.
218Cf. CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, p. 33, para. 20, and p. 53, para. 24.
CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 48, para. 88.
219Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, pp. 21-24, para. 4.
289
7 CIJ1077.indb 574 18/04/16 08:54 289 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
often took place in the victims’ homes, “with their relatives beinhg forced
to watch, adding an additional dimension of violation and degradation toh
220
the women’s ordeals” . In Tovarnik, there were also reported cases of
castration of men 221. Croatia added that :
“Raped women often feel ashamed and they do not even report
such attacks. That was the case also in Croatia — the number of
reported incidents hides much bigger figures of unreported cases.
Those attacks have left an enduring legacy of fear, trauma and shame
undiminished by the passage of time.” 222
247. After stressing that “Croat women and girls were frequently the
victims of ethnically targeted violence, including rape and gang rape”h, by
members of the JNA, TO, Serbian police and paramilitaries, Croatia
recalled that resolution 1820 (2008) of the UN Security Council noted
that rape and other forms of sexual violence “can constitute war crimhes,
223
crimes against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to genocide” .
248. It further stressed the numerous accounts by witnesses (direct vic -
tims or observers of those rapes and gang rapes), in several “towns,h vil -
lages and hamlets that fell under occupation of the JNA and the Serb
paramilitary forces”, such as Berše, Brđani, Doljani, Joševica, Korenica,
Kostajnički Majur, Kovačevac, Ljubotić and Lisičić, Novo Selo Glinsko,
Parčić, Puljane, Sarengrad, Sekulinci, Smilčić, Sotin, Tenja, Vukovar and
many others 224. Croatia then concluded, on this particular issue, that :
“The scale and pattern of killing, torture and rape has been dis -
closed by the evidence submitted by the Applicant, and that clearly,
in our submission, makes out the actus reus of genocide within the
meaning of Articles II (a) and (b) of the Genocide Convention. To
argue otherwise, in our submission, is simply not to be credible.
In addition, the conditions of life which were inflicted on the Croat h
population remaining in Serb-occupied territory, including systematic
expulsion from homes, torture, rape and denial of food, access to
water, basic sanitation and medical treatment, were calculated to
bring about its physical destruction as a group. This, too, amounted
to genocide within the meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention.
Finally, just this morning, you have heard in some detail the evi -
dence of systematic rape of Croatian women and men, the sexual
220Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, pp. 21-24, paras. 5-6.
221Cf. ibid., para. 8.
222
223Ibid., pp. 21-24, para. 3.
224Ibid., p. 21, para. 2 [emphasis added].
Cf. ibid., p. 24, para. 9. On the brutalities of sexual abusealso ibid., p. 27,
paras. 22-25 (in Vukovar).
290
7 CIJ1077.indb 576 18/04/16 08:54 290 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
mutilation and castration of Croatian men, and the commission of
other sex crimes which, when viewed in the context of the broader
genocidal policies of the Serb forces, involved the imposition of meas-
ures to prevent births within the Croatian population. This, we say,
falls squarely within the meaning of Article II (d).” 225
(b) Serbia’s response
249. For its part, Serbia, instead of addressing the issue of systematic
practice of rape, tried to discredit the evidence produced by Croatia 22. It
did so, largely on the argument that most witness statements were
unsigned 227, a point already clarified to some extent by Croatia (supra).
In any case, Serbia admitted, in general terms, the occurrence of “sehrious
crimes” (cf. supra); in its own words,
“the fundamental disagreement of the respondent State with the App-li
cant’s approach to the unsigned statements and police reports does noht
mean that the Serbian Government denies that serious crimes were
committed during the armed conflict in Croatia. Yes, the serious crimes
were perpetrated against the members of the Croatian national and
ethnic group. They were committed by groups and individuals of Serb
ethnicity. It goes without saying that Serbia condemns such crimes,
regrets that they were committed, and sympathizes profoundly with the
victims and their families for the suffering that they have experienced.
The Higher Court in Belgrade has so far convicted and imprisoned
15 Serbs for the war crimes against prisoners of war at the Ovčara
farm near Vukovar, and another 14 for the war crimes against civil -
ians in the village of Lovas in EasternSlavonia. The second judgment
has recently been quashed by the Court of Appeal due to the short -
comings concerning the explanation of the individual criminal liabil -
ity for each accused, and the trial must be held again. An additional
ten cases for the war crimes committed by Serbs in Croatia have been
concluded before the Higher Court in Belgrade. In total, 31 individ-
uals of Serb nationality have so far been convicted and imprisoned,
while there are others being accused. Investigations on several crimes
are under way, including the crime in Bogdanovci.
Thus, despite the careless approach to the presentation of evidence
by the Applicant, it is not in dispute that murders of Croatian civilianhs
225CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 54, paras. 16-18. For other accounts, cf., e.g.,
CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, p. 4; CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, pp. 14, 25 and; and
CR 22614/10, of 6 March 2014, paras. 23-24.
Cf. e.g., CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, pp. 65-66, para. 43; CR 2014/22,
of 27 March 2014, pp. 13-14, paras. 10-13.
227Cf. e.g., CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, pp. 64-65, paras. 38 and 42.
291
7 CIJ1077.indb 578 18/04/16 08:54 291 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
and prisoners of war took place during the conflict. This was estab -
lished also in the ICTY Judgment against Milan Martić, who was
convicted as the former Minister of Interior of the Republic of Ser -
bian Krajina, as well as in the case Mrkšić et al. ; the last case is also
known as ‘Ovčara’. In that notorious crime, the ICTY recorded
194 prisoners of war who were killed. This was the gravest mass mur-
228
der in which Croats were the victims during the entire conflict.”
2. Systematic Pattern of Rape in Distinct Municipalities
250. As already indicated, the dossier of the present case, opposing
Croatia to Serbia, contains reports of rapes of Croats in a number of
municipalities. Several witnesses testified to having been raped, often
multiple times, and by several perpetrators. It is also important to nothe
that the rapes were frequently accompanied by derogatory language and
further violence, such as beatings and use of objects.
251. The examples provided, of testimonies regarding the continuous
commission of rape in distinct municipalities, evidence a widespread and
systematic pattern of rape of members of the Croatian population, inflict -
ing humiliation upon the victims. These statements next referred to formh
part of the evidence submitted by Croatia so as to illustrate the numerous
allegations of rape across distinct municipalities and to demonstrate thhe
229
systematic pattern of those grave breaches .
252. For example, in Lovas, it was alleged that paramilitaries routinely
engaged in sexual violence against Croatians 230. A. M. testified to being
raped repeatedly and she reported that paramilitaries made a habit of coh-l
lecting groups of Croatian women in the village in order to rape them 23.
Similarly, P. M. also testified to sexual abuse of Croatian men 232. In Bap-
ska, P. M. described that a Serbian soldier raped her and her 81-year old
228Cf. CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, pp. 64-65, paras. 38-40. And Serbia added :
“If one carefully makes a review of all ICTY indictments in which the crimes
against Croats were alleged, he or she will find many victims, indeed. There is no
doubt that many Croats also died in the combat activities during the fihve -year
conflict. Yet, from the point of view of the subject-matter of this case, those numbers
of victims are of an entirely different magnitude than the many of those hkilled in
Srebrenica — or in Krajina — over the course of several days.” (CR 2014/22, of
27 March 2014, pp. 64-65, para. 41.)
229
Cf. also Memorial of Croatia, paras.5.30, 5.59, 5.88, 5.147, 5.157, 5.175, 5.209-5.210,
5.212 and 5.224; and cf.also ibid., paras. 4.25, 4.44-4.45, 4.60, 4.110, 4.113, 4.129, 4.131,
4.169, 4.185, 4.60, 5.147, 5.157, 5.212, 5.224. See also Reply of Croatiha, par5a.s3.5, 5.46, 5.54,
5.84.
230Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.129.
231Ibid., Annex 108.
232Ibid., Annex 101.
292
7 CIJ1077.indb 580 18/04/16 08:54 292 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
233
mother before he tore her navel with his bare hands . In this village,
there were also accounts of sexual violence against men, according to wih-t
ness F. K. 234. In Pakrac, H. H. described rape and torture of a victim
235
before her ears were cut off and her skull shattered . In a similar violent
vein, there was, in Kraljevčani, a description of rape of a Croat womhan,
whose breasts were cut off 236.
253. Croatian women in the village of Tenja were routinely raped,
along with having to labour in fields and gardens. For example, while h
K. C. was made to clean the police station, she was indecently assaulted
by one of the officers ; according to M. M., K. C.’s experience drove her
to attempt suicide 237. In the village of Berak, M. H., thus described her
rape “(. . .) I was their special target because I had six sons and they were
threatening me because I had delivered six Ustashas” 238. In this village,
there were accounts of sexual assault against Croatian women. L. M. and
M. H. were raped in front of a group of people, and throughout the
night 23. P. B. testified having been raped with brutality by seven JNA
reservists with White Eagle marks 240.
254. In the village of Sotin, V. G. describes how on 30 September 1991
two soldiers came into her house and both raped her while holding a gun h
pointing at her. The next day, one of the soldiers who had raped her camhe
back and raped her mother. After that, V. G. was forced to get down on
her knees and was raped from behind 241. Furthermore, R. G. described
“sexual advantage” being taken of an elderly woman in Sotin, and S. L.
also described other sexual abuses in Sotin 242. As to Tovarnik, the docu -
ment Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence
(pp. 107 -108) also gives account of forced sexual abuses between Croat
prisoners 243.
255. In the dossier of the present case, there are many accounts of rape
and other sexual violence crimes that occurred, in particular, in the
greater Vukovar area. Some examples have been provided by witness tes -
timonies. For example, the Muslim JNA soldier, E. M., described rape
and killing in his account of the JNA conduct in Petrova Gora (a suburb
233 Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.90.
234 Ibid., para. 4.91 and Annex 74.
235 Ibid., para. 5.17 and Annex 175.
236 Ibid., para. 5.98.
237
238 Ibid., para. 4.25.
239 Ibid., para. 4.44.
Ibid.
240 Ibid., para. 4.45.
241 Ibid., para. 4.113, and Annex 94.
242 Ibid., paras. 4.101 and 4.111, respectively.
243 Ibid., para. 4.101.
293
7 CIJ1077.indb 582 18/04/16 08:54 293 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
of Vukovar) 244. A. S. testified how, on 16 September 1991, M. L., from
Vukovar, told her that he was going to kill her. After insulting her, he
raped her 245. T. C. gave likewise an account of what took place in the
suburb of Vukovar, Cakovci. R. I. entered her house and, threatening to
246
kill her, tied her hands and raped her .
256. Velepromet was the backdrop of routine executions, torture, and
rape often committed by multiple rapists. Women of Croatian nationality
that were imprisoned in the Velepromet detention facility in Vukovar
were taken to interrogations during which they were exposed to sexual
abuse. Group rapes also allegedly took place. B. V. was raped the second
day on her arrival in the barracks ; four soldiers raped her one after
another on the floor of the office while insulting her and hitting hehr in the
face. She testified how 15 Serbian soldiers took M. M. to the room next
door to her and raped her in turns 24.
257. M. M. described how, on 18 November 1991, the day of the occu-
pation of Central Vukovar, she and her family were taken to the Vele-
promet building, and later driven in buses to Sand Sabac (Serbia). Back
in Vukovar, she described how she was raped by five men, one after
another, from 9 p.m. until the morning. During the rape she was bleeding
and was forced to sit on a beer bottle. This happened in front of her lihttle
sister, who was248so sexually abused during two weeks and was continu -
ously afraid . Likewise, H. E. testified to daily rapes by Serbian police
and army upon her arrival to prison. The rapes happened in the cell in
front o249ther female prisoners. She also testified to beatings and mehntal
abuse .
258. Witness T. C. stated that Chetniks “were maltreating, expelling,
threatening, beating, raping and killing on a daily basis”, and addedh that
“Croats had white ribbons at our gate in order to enable Chetniks whoh
were not from our village to recognize us” ; she testified that she was
raped 250. In a similar vein, G. K. testified to having been maltreated and
251
raped , and B. V. likewise testified to killings, rape and maltreatment,
and added that she was raped by four men, having used derogatory lan -
guage during the rape 252.
244
245 Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.153, and Annex 127.
246 Ibid., para. 4.155, and Annex 125.
Ibid., para. 4.156, and Annex 128.
247 Ibid., para. 4.185
248 Ibid., para. 4.169, and Annex 117.
249 Ibid., Annex 116.
250 Ibid., Annex 128.
251 Ibid., Annex 130.
252 Ibid., Annex 151.
294
7 CIJ1077.indb 584 18/04/16 08:54 294 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
3. The Necessity and Importance of a Gender Analysis
259. The present case of the Application of the Convention against
Genocide, in my perception, can only be properly adjudicated with a gen ‑
der perspective. This is not the first time that I take this position : in 2006,
almost one decade ago, I did the same, in another international jurisdich-
253
tion , given the circumstances of the case at issue. Now, in 2015, an
analysis of gender is, in my perception, likewise unavoidable and essential
in the present case before the International Court of Justice, given theh
incidence of a social -cultural pattern of conduct, disclosing systemic dis -
crimination and extreme violence against women.
260. At the time that the wars in Croatia, and in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, were taking place, with their abuses against women, the final h
documents of the UN Second World Conference on Human Rights
(Vienna, 1993) and the UN IV World Conference on Women (Bei -
jing, 1995), paid due attention to the difficulties faced by women in the
face of cultural patterns of behaviour in distinct situations and circumh -
stances 254. Attention to the basic principle of equality and non‑discrimina ‑
tion is of fundamental importance here. In the present case of the
Application of the Convention against Genocide , women as well as men,
members of the targeted groups, were victimized, but women (of all agesh)
were brutalized in different ways and in a much greater proportion than
men. Hence the great necessity of a gender perspective.
261. The widespread and systematic raping of girls and women, as
occurred in the armed attacks in Croatia (and also in those in Bosnia ahnd
Herzegovina), had a devastating effect upon the victims. Girls were sud -
denly deprived of their innocence and childhood, despite their young ageh.
This is extreme cruelty. Young and unmarried women were suddenly
deprived of their project of life. This is extreme cruelty. The victims hcould
no longer cherish any faith or hope in affective relations. This is extrehme
cruelty. Young or middle-aged women who, after having been raped,
became pregnant, could not surround their maternity with care and due
respect, given the extreme violence they had been, and continued to be, h
subjected to. This is extreme cruelty.
262. Middle-aged and older women, who had already constituted a
family, had their personal and family life entirely destroyed. Even if thhey
had physically survived, they must have felt like having become walking
253Cf. IACtHR, case of Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment of25 November
2006, separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras. 58-74.
254Cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito International dos Direitos Humanos
[Treatise of International Law of Human Rights], Vol. III, Porto Alegre/Brazil, S. A. Fabris
Ed., 2003, pp. 354-356.
295
7 CIJ1077.indb 586 18/04/16 08:54 295 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
shadows 255. This is extreme cruelty. There were also women who contin -
ued to be raped until dying. Were the ones who survived this ordeal
“luckier” than the ones who passed the last threshold of life ? None
remained secure from acute pain 256. The sacrality of life — before birth,
during pregnancy, after birth, and along with what remained of human
existence — was destroyed with brutality.
263. What happened later, after the brutal raping with humiliation, to
the children who were born of hatred ? Do we know ? What were the
long-term effects of such a pattern of destruction victimizing mainly
women ? Do we know ? What happened to the sons and daughters of
hatred ? Do we know ? The widespread and systematic raping of women
in the cas d’espèce disclosed a pattern of extreme violence in an inter‑
temporal dimension . There were also the women who lost their children,
or husbands, in the war, and those who did not have access to their mor -
tal remains, having been thus deprived of their project of after -life.
264. Many centuries ago, Euripides depicted, in his tragedies Suppliant
Women, Andromache, Hecuba, and Trojan Women (fourth century bc),
the cruel impact and effects of war particularly upon women. Euripides’h
Trojan Women, for example, came to be regarded, in our times, as one of
the greatest anti-war literary pieces of antiquity, depicting its evil. hOver
four centuries later, Seneca wrote his own version of the tragedy Trojan
Women (50 -62 ad ), with a distinct outlook, but portraying likewise the
anguish and sufferings that befell women. In the last decade of the twen -
tieth century, the cruel impact and effects of war upon women marked
likewise presence in the facts of the present case of the Application of the
Convention against Genocide, disclosing the projection of evil in time, its
perennity and omnipresence.
265. In the cas d’espèce, the degradation and humiliation of women by
systematic rape and other sexual violence crimes (supra) did not exhaust
themselves at the level of individual life. The atrocities they were subh -
jected to, caused also (for those who survived) forced separation, andh di- s
ruption of family life. The terrible sufferings inflicted by rapes allehgedly
for “ethnic cleansing”, went far beyond that, to the destruction ohf the
targeted groups themselves, to which the murdered and brutalized women
belonged — that is, to the realm of genocide.
266. May it be recalled that, in its landmark Judgment (of 2 September
1998) in the case Akayesu, the ICTR held precisely that gender -based
crimes of rape and sexual violence, disclosing an intent to destroy, conhst-i
tuted genocide, and in fact destroyed the targeted group (ICTR, Akayesu,
Judgment of 2 September 1998, para. 731). In determining the occurrence
of genocide, the ICTR found that the pattern of rape with public humiliah -
255
256To paraphrase Shakespeare, Macbeth (1605-1606), Act V, Scene V, verse 24.
To paraphrase Sophocles, Oedipus the King (428-425 bc), verses 1528-1530.
296
7 CIJ1077.indb 588 18/04/16 08:54 296 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tion and mutilation, inflicted serious bodily and mental harm on the
women victims, and disclosed an intent to destroy them, their families ahnd
communities, the Tutsi group as a whole (ICTR, Akayesu, Judgment of 2
September 1998, paras. 731 and 733-734). The victimized women were
degraded, in the words of the ICTR, as “sexual objects”, and the extreme
violence they were subjected to “was a step in the process of destruction”
of their social group — “destruction of the spirit, of the will to live and of
life itself” (ibid., para. 732).
267. For its part, the ICTY (Trial Chamber), in its decision (Review of
Indictments, of 11 July 1996) in the case Karadžić and Mladić, stated that
a pattern of sexual assaults began to occur even before the wars in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out, “in a context of loot -
ing and intimidation of the population”. Concentration camps for rape
were established, “with the aim of forcing the birth of Serbian offsprhing,
the women often being interned until it was too late for them to undergoh
an abortion” (ICTY, Karadžić and Mladić, decision of 11 July 1996,
para. 64). Rapes — the ICTY (Trial Chamber) proceeded — increased
“the shame and humiliation of the victims and of the community” ; the
purpose “of many rapes was enforced impregnation” ( ibid., para. 64).
268. Such crimes, of “systematic rape of women”, purporting “to tranh -s
mit a new ethnic identity” to the children, undermined “the very fhounda-
tions of the group”, dismembering it (ibid., para. 94). They “could have
been planned or ordered with a genocidal intent” ( ibid., para. 95). The
ICTY (Trial Chamber) held that “Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić
planned, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, prepara- h
tion or execution of the genocide perpetrated” in the centres of detehntion
(ibid., para. 84).
269. In the present case of the Application of the Convention against
Genocide, opposing Croatia to Serbia, due to the early mobilization of
entities of the civil society, the figures concerning the systematic phractice
of destruction through rape were soon to become known. By the end of
1992, the estimates were that there had been, in the war in Croatia untihl
then, approximately 12,000 incidents of rape. Those incidents rose up
to 50,000-60,000 incidents, in the whole period of 1991 -1995, in the
wars in the former Yugoslavia (both in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herze -
govina).
270. But those are only rough estimates, as it was soon realized — as
257
acknowledged in expert writing — that it was simply not possible to
know with precision the total number of victims (of all ages) of that hbru-
257
Cf., inter alia, e.g., B. Allen, Rape Warfare — The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia‑
Herzegovina and Croatia Minneapolis/London, University of Minnesota Press, 1996,
pp. 65, 72, 76-77 and104Various AuthorsWomen, Violence and War— Wartime Victim‑
297
7 CIJ1077.indb 590 18/04/16 08:54 297 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tality, and the extent of destruction perpetrated with the intent to deshtroy
the victimized families and the targeted social groups, in concentration
camps (rape/death camps), in prisons and detention centres and in brothh-
els. The girls and women victimized were condemned to the utmost
humiliation, and were dehumanized by the victimizers, simply because of h
their ethnic identity.
271. If this systematic pattern of rape was not a plurality of acts of
genocide (for the destructive consequences it entailed), what was it then ?
What is genocide, if that is not genocide ? In the present dissenting opin -
ion, I have already examined the findings (in 1992-1993), e.g., in the
UN (former Commission on Human Rights) “Reports on the Situation
of Human Rights in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia” (Rappor -
teur : T. Mazowiecki) 258, which should here be recalled.
272. In effect, those Reports contain references, inter alia, to the pat -
tern of destruction by means of killings, torture, disappearances, rape hand
sexual violence. I thus limit myself to add here that the Report of 10 Feb-
ruary 1993 259, states that the “[r]ape of women, including minors, has
been widespread in both conflicts” (para. 260) (the wars in Croatia and in
Bosnia and Herzegovina). The systematic pattern of rapes was accompa -
nied by other acts of extreme violence.
273. In the subsequent Report of 10 June 1994 260, the Special Rappor-
teur further referred to the “widespread terrorization” of the pophulation
by means of killings, destruction of homes, and commission of rapes by
soldiers (para. 7) in their “relentless assaults” (para. 11). For its part, the
UN (Security Council’s) Commission of Experts, in its fact -finding
Reports of 1993 -1994 — as I have already indicated in the present dis -
senting opinion, likewise found the occurrence of a widespread and sys -
tematic pattern of rapes — as well as torture and beatings, often followed
261
by killings, spreading terror, shame and humiliation , disrupting family
life and the targeted groups themselves. If this plurality of acts of exhtreme
ization of Refugees in the Balkans (ed. V. Nikolić-Ristanović), Budapest, Central European
University Press, 2000, pp. 41, 43, 56 -57, 80-82, 142 and; S.Fabijanić Gagro, “The
Crime of Rape in the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s Case Law”, 60 Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u
Zagrebu (2010), pp. 1310, 1315-1316 and 1330-133; M. Ellis, “Breaking the Sile: Rape
as an International Crime”, 38Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2007),
pp. 226 and 231-234 ; S.L. Russell-Brown, “Rape as an Act of Genocide”, 21 Berkeley
Journal of International Law (2003), pp.51-352, 355, 363 -364 and371; R. Peroomian,
“When Death Is a Blessing and Life a Prolonged Agony Women Victims of Genocide”, in
Genocide Perspectives II — Essays on Holocaust and Genocide (eds. C. Tatz, P. Arnold and
S. Tatz),Sydney, Brandl & Schlesinger/Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide
Studies, 2003, pp. 314-315 and 327-330.
258 Cf. Part IX of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
259 UN doc. E/CN.4/1993/50.
260 UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/4.
261 Cf. Part IX of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
298
7 CIJ1077.indb 592 18/04/16 08:54 298 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
violence (with all its destructive consequences) was not genocide, whaht
was it then ?
274. In its recent Judgment of 11 July 2013, in the Karadžić case, the
ICTY (Appeals Chamber), in rejecting an appeal for acquittal, and rein -
stating genocide charges against Mr. R. Karadžić (ICTY, Karadžić, Judg-
ment of 11 July 2013, para. 115), pointed out that it had found that
“quintessential examples of serious bodily harm as an underlying act hof
genocide include torture, rape, and non-fatal physical violence that causes
disfigurement or serious injury to the external or internal organs” (ibid.,
para. 33). The ICTY (Appeals Chamber) took into due account the evi -
dence of “genocidal and other culpable acts” on a large -scale and dis -
criminatory in nature, such as killings, beatings, rape and sexual violehnce
and inhumane living conditions ( ibid., paras. 34 and 99).
275. More recently, in its decision of 15 April 2014, in the Mladić case,
the ICTY (Trial Chamber I) rejected a defence motion for acquittal, and
decided to continue trial on genocide charges. It took due note of the
evidence produced on torture and prolonged beatings of detainees (ICTY,h
Mladić, decision of 15 April 2014, pp. 20937 -20938), of “large -scale”
expulsions of non -Serbs (ibid., p. 20944), and of rape of young women
and girls (the youngest one being 12 years old) (ibid., pp. 20935-20936
and 20939). Shortly afterwards (decision of 24 July 2014), the ICTY
(Appeals Chamber) dismissed a defence appeal and confirmed the Trial
Chamber I’s aforementioned decision (ibid., para. 29).
276. Last but not least, as it can be perceived from the selected exam -
ples of witness statements in the cas d’espèce, reviewed above, as to
numerous occurrences of rape and other sexual violence crimes during theh
armed attacks in Croatia, and also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they h
appear intended to destroy the targeted groups of victims. In my percep -
tion, the brutality itself of the numerous rapes perpetrated bears witnehss
of their intent to destroy. The victims were attacked in a situation of the
utmost vulnerability or defencelessness. As from the launching of the Ser -
bian armed attacks in Croatia, there occurred, in effect, a systematic pat‑
tern of rape, which can surely be considered under Article II (b) of the
Genocide Convention (cf. infra).
XII. Systematic Pattern of Dihsappeared
or Missing Persons
1. Arguments of the Parties concerning the Disappeared
or Missing Persons
277. During the written phase of the proceedings of the cas d’espèce,
both Croatia and Serbia referred to the issue of the disappeared or missh-
ing persons, persisting to date. In its Memorial, Croatia asked the Courht
299
7 CIJ1077.indb 594 18/04/16 08:54 299 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
to declare the obligation of the FRY to take all steps at its disposal tho
provide a prompt and full account of the whereabouts of each and every
one of those missing persons, and, to that end, to work in co-operation h
with its own authorities 262. Croatia further stated that “the establishment
of the whereabouts of missing persons, often victims of genocide, is a 263
painful process, but a necessary step for the sake of a better future”h .
278. Croatia claimed that 1,419 persons were, at the date of the filing
264
of its Memorial (of 1 March 2009), still missing and unaccounted for .
According to the information provided in 2009 by Croatia’s Governmenth
Office for the Detained and Missing Persons, there appeared to be a tothal
of at least 886 still “missing persons” from the area of Eastern Slavo-
nia 265; moreover, the destiny of 511 persons from Vukovar remained still
unknown at the time of the filing of its Memorial 266. By an Agreement on
Normalization of Relations, signed between Croatia and FRY
on 23 August 1996, the Parties undertook to “speed up the process of
solving the question of missing persons” and to exchange all available
267
information about those missing (Art. 6) .
279. Subsequently, in its Reply (of 20 December 2010), Croatia facili -
tated an updated List of Missing Persons (of 1 September 2010), indicat-
268
ing a total of 1,024 missing persons . According to the Applicant,
on 27-28 July 2010, “a meeting on missing persons” was held in Belgrade
between Serbia’s Commission for Missing Persons and Croatia’s Com -
mission for Detained and Missing Persons, under the auspices of the
ICRC and the International Commission on Missing Persons. One of the
issues then addressed was “the question of those detained on the terrhitory
of the Respondent” ; in this respect, “representatives of the Respondent
gave to the Applicant’s representatives a list of 2,786 persons who were
detained in the Republic of Serbia in the period 1991-1992” 269.
280. Croatia then requested the Court to adjudge and declare that as a
consequence of its responsibility for these breaches of the Convention, hthe
Respondent is under the obligations
“[t]o provide forthwith to the Applicant all information within its
possession or control as to the whereabouts of Croatian citizens who
are missing as a result of the genocidal acts for which it is responsiblhe,
and generally to co-operate with the authorities of the Applicant to
262 Memorial of Croatia, para. 8.78, and cf. p. 414.
263 Ibid., para. 1.14.
264 Ibid., para. 1.09.
265 Ibid., para. 4.06.
266 Ibid., para. 4.190.
267 Ibid., para. 2.160.
268
269 Reply of Croatia, Annex 41.
Ibid., para. 2.54.
300
7 CIJ1077.indb 596 18/04/16 08:54 300 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
jointly ascertain the whereabouts of the said missing persons or their
remains” 27.
281. The two Parties elaborated further the question of the number of
still missing persons at the oral proceedings. An expert called by Croathia
observed that the data on the missing persons they exhumed “change
from day to day”, and whenever there is an exhumation, “the numberh of
identified persons increases, and the number of missing persons then
271
increases also” . Croatia contended its efforts “to uncover the graves of
the genocide victims” have been “hampered by Serbia’s practice of remov-
ing and reburying victims during its occupation of the region, often in h
Serbia, in a vain attempt to cover up its atrocities” 27.
282. To date, it proceeded, 103 bodies have been repatriated from Ser-
bia ; furthermore, “whilst many of the victims of the genocide have now
been accounted for, and their remains located, hundreds of Croats still h
remain missing. Twenty -three years later, Croatian families continue to
mourn more than 850 missing people. The victims are still denied a proper
burial and a dignified final resting place ; and their families are still denied
the opportunity to lay them to rest” 27. Croatia further stated, with
regard to mass graves, that, by July 2013, 142 mass graves had been dis -
274
covered in Croatia, containing the bodies of 3,656 victims .
283. For its part, Serbia argued that the Croatian list of missing per -
sons was confusing and unhelpful in clarifying the issues in the disputeh. It
added that the Updated List of Missing Persons (of 1 September 2010)
contained data on 1,024 individuals, among whom many “victims of Serb
ethnicity”. Furthermore, it contained the names of Croats “who werhe
missing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in some places that were
under the full and exclusive control of the Croatian governmental forcesh
and far away from military operations”. The aforementioned list also h
contained “the names of ethnic Croats who went missing during the
offensive criminal Operations Maslenica and Storm which were under -
taken by the Croatian Government” 275.
2. Responses of the Parties to Questions from the Bench
284. Given the contradictory information provided, I deemed it fit to
put two questions to the contending Parties, in the public sitting beforhe
270
271Reply of Croatia, p. 472.
272CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 36.
CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 20, para. 44.
273Ibid., para. 45.
274Ibid., para. 39.
275Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 7.
301
7 CIJ1077.indb 598 18/04/16 08:54 301 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
the Court of 14 March 2014. The two questions were formulated as fol -
lows:
“1. Have there been any recent initiatives to identify, and to clarify
further the fate of the disappeared persons still missing to date ?
2. Is there any additional and more precise updated information that
can be presented to the Court by both Parties on this particular
issue of disappeared or missing persons to date ?” 276
285. In response to my questions, Croatia elaborated further on the
issue of the fate of disappeared persons. In this respect, it recalled that
Article II of the Convention enumerates amongst the list of genocidal acts
the causing of “serious (. . .) mental harm to members of the group”. The
questions I put to both Parties drew the Applicant to the case law on
the disappearance of persons. Recalling the Judgments of the IACtHR in
the case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (of 29 July 1988) and of the
ECHR in the case of Varnava v. Turkey (of 18 September 2009), as well
as the decision of the UN Human Rights Committee in the case of
C. A. de Quinteros et alii v. Uruguay (1990), Croatia claimed that disap -
pearance has continuing consequences in several respects. In the light ohf
that jurisprudence, Croatia claims that the
“‘serious (. . .) mental harm’ being suffered by the relatives of the
disappeared is a direct result of acts for which Serbia is either respon- h
sible for its own actions or for which it has a responsibility to punishh
under the [Genocide] Convention. In this way, the continuing failure
of Serbia to account for the whereabouts of some 865 disappeared
Croats is an act or acts falling within Article II (b) of the Conven -
tion.” 277
286. As for the requested additional, and more precise updated infor-
mation, on the issue of disappeared or missing persons, Croatia answeredh
that such information can be found in the updated Book of Missing Per‑
sons on the Territory of the Republic of Croatia, published by Croatia’s
Directorate for Detained and Missing Persons, in conjunction with the
Croatian Red Cross and the ICRC. It informed that the book sets out
detailed data on those who were still missing as of April 2012 27; how-
ever, as the figures concerning the disappeared are being constantly
updated, the numbers provided in the 2012 book are already out of date.
276Questions put by Judge Cançado Trindade to both Croatia and Serbia, in :
CR 2014/18, of 14 March 2014, p. 69.
277CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, p. 15, para. 10.
278Ibid., pp. 34-35, paras. 22-25.
302
7 CIJ1077.indb 600 18/04/16 08:54 302 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
287. Still in response to my questions to both Parties (supra), Croatia
further contacted the Directorate for Detained and Missing Persons, on
Monday 17 March 2014, and provided the International Court of Justice
with the most up-to-date figures relating to persons killed during the course
of Serbia’s attacks on Croatian territory in 1991 -1992, namely (a) the :
bodies of 3,680 persons who were buried irregularly have been exhumed
from 142 mass graves and many more individual graves (b) of th;se, the
bodies of 3,144 persons have been positively identified ; (c) however,
865 persons who disappeared during that period are still missing 279.
288. For its part, Serbia, in its response to the questions I put to both
Parties (supra), stated that tracing missing persons “is a complex and
long-lasting process of co -operation between two sides”, on the basis of
the 1995 Bilateral Agreement on Co -operation in Tracing Missing Per -
sons and the 1996 Protocol on Co-operation between two State Commis-
280
sions . It added that it was
“fully aware of its task in the process of tracing missing persons
regardless of their nationality and ethnic origin. The interest of fami-
lies of the missing persons is a joint interest of Serbia and Croatia. Iht
is also the interest of humanity as a whole, and the Republic of Ser -
281
bia is dedicated to that task.”
As for the number of missing persons, Serbia claims that the Serbian lisht
of missing persons, received from the Serbian Commission for Missing
Persons in the territory of Croatia, today contains 1,748 names 282.
289. Finally, as regards the argument of continuing violation, it
added, disappearance itself is not an act of genocide, but it is equivalent
to enforced disappearance, a crime against humanity. Serbia relied on thhe
definition of “enforced disappearance” contained in the 2006 UN Con -
vention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
which refers to “abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberthy by
agents of the State” and then “followed by a refusal to acknowledghe the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of thhe
disappeared person” (Art. 2).
290. According to Serbia, enforced disappearance is not a continuing
violation of the right to life, with which the acts in Article 2 of the
2006 Convention bear an analogy. The reason why it may be a continuing
violation of human rights, according to Serbia, is that the family of thhe
victim is subject to ongoing “mental harm”, or because of the prochedural
obligation to investigate the crime. Serbia claims that, if the crime cohntin -
279CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, pp. 34-35, paras. 22-25.
280Preliminary Objections of Serbia ; Annex 53, p. 367.
281CR 2014/24, of 28 March 2014, pp. 60-61, para. 10.
282However, Serbia did not consider that list to be evidence of the crime, or of State
responsibility, and referred to the Veritas list of direct victims of Oper; cf.bid.,m
pp. 60-62, paras. 6-10.
303
7 CIJ1077.indb 602 18/04/16 08:54 303 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ues today as Croatia asserts, so must the intent. Croatia is “in errohr to
attempt to force this issue into the frame of Article 2 of the GenocideCon-
vention, essentially so that it can bolster its argument on temporal
283
jurisdiction” .
3. Outstanding Issues and the Parties’ Obligation to Establish
the Fate of Missing Persons
291. In the light of the aforementioned, it is clear the issue of missing
persons remains one of the key problems raised in the proceedings of theh
cas d’espèce . Admittedly, the Parties had the intention in 1995 to tackle
this issue : it may be recalled that in 1995, in Dayton, Croatia and Serbia
celebrated an agreement, the purpose of which was to establish the fate of
all missing persons and to release the prisoners 284. In pursuance to that
agreement, a Joint Commission was established and some progress was
285
made with respect to missing persons . Yet, there remain a number of
outstanding issues that still need to be resolved.
292. For example, the Parties disagree on the role of the Commission.
Croatia claims that the Commission, contrary to what was agreed in 1995
that all missing persons who disappeared in Croatia fell within the com -
petence of Croatian authorities, is currently seeking to act as represenhta-
tive of all missing persons of Serb ethnicity, including those who are
286
citizens of Croatia . Serbia responds that this is needed in order to rep -
resent the unreported 1,000 Serbs from Croatia in the list of missing per -
sons provided by Croatia to the Court 287.
293. Moreover, Croatia contends that Serbia has not yet returned the
documents seized by the JNA from the Vukovar hospital in 1991, which
are considered essential for the identification of the persons removedh from
the hospital 288. Only a small part of those documents was returned, when
the President of Serbia (Mr. Boris Tadić) visited Vukovar in Novem -
ber 2010. Both Parties appear unsatisfied with the efforts and activities ohf
283
284 CR 2014/23, of 28 March 2014, pp. 43-45, paras. 10-12.
Agreement on Co -operation in Finding Missing Persons (Dayton, 17 November
1995).
285 From August 1996 till 1998 Croatia was given access to information, the so -called
protocols, for 1,063 persons who were buried at the Vukovar New Cemetery, and these
protocols helped in the identification of 938eople. In 2001, exhumations started with
respect to unidentified bodies buried in the Republic of Serbia, at mahrked gravesites.
The remains of 394 persons have been exhumed so far, but, regrettably, only 103bodies
have been handed over to Croatia. In 2013, one mass grave was discovered in Sotin,
in Eastern Slavonia, with 13 bodies, as a result of information provided by Serbia.
Cf. CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, pp. 36-38.
286 Ibid., p. 37, para. 10.
287 CR 2014/24, of 28 March 2014, pp. 60-61, paras. 6-10.
288 CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, p. 38, para. 11.
304
7 CIJ1077.indb 604 18/04/16 08:54 304 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
each other in this regard 289. The Court ought thus to ask the Parties to
co-operate in good faith in order to resolve those outstanding issues.
294. As the International Court of Justice stated, in this respect, in the
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France) cases
(I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 253 and 457), one of “the basic principles gov -
erning the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever theirh
source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherhent in
international co-operation” (paras. 46 and 49). On another occasion, in
the North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark ;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) cases (I.C.J. Reports 1969,
p. 3), the International Court of Justice further pondered that the con -
tending Parties “are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that
the negotiations are meaningful” (ibid., para. 85).
4. The Extreme Cruelty of Enforced Disappearances of Persons
as a Continuing Grave Violation of Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law
295. The extreme cruelty of the crime of enforced disappearance of
persons has been duly acknowledged in international instruments, in
international legal doctrine, as well as in international case law. It ghoes
beyond the confines of the present dissenting opinion to dwell at depthh on
the matter — what I have done elsewhere 29. I shall, instead, limit myself
to identifying and invoking some pertinent illustrations, with a direct h
bearing on the proper consideration of the cas d’espèce, concerning the
Application of the Convention against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia).
296. May I begin by recalling that, in 1980, the former UN Com-
mission on Human Rights decided to establish its Working Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 29, to struggle against
292
that international crime , which had already received world
attention, in 1978-1979, at both the United Nations General Assembly 293
and ECOSOC 294, in addition to the former UN Sub-Commission
295
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities .
Subsequently, the 1992 UN Declaration on the Protection of All
289CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, p. 38, para. 11.
290A. A. Cançado Trindade, “Enforced Disappearances of Persons as a Violation of
Jus Cogens: The Contribution of the Jurisprudence of the Intercan Court of Human
Rights”, 81 Nordic Journal of International Law (2012), pp. 507-5A. Cançado Trin-
dade, Tratado de Direito International dos Direitos Humanos [Treatise of International Law
of Human Rights], Vol. II, Porto Alegre/Brazil, S. A. Fabris Ed., 1999, pp. 352-358.
291
Resolution 20 (XXXVI), of 29 February 1980.
292For an account of its work, cF. Andreu-Guzmán, “Le Groupe de travail sur les
disparitions forcées des Nations Unies”, 84 Revue internationale de la Croix‑Rouge (2002),
note 848, pp. 803-818.
293Resolution 33/173, of 20 December 1978.
294Resolution 1979/38, of 10 May 1979.
295Resolution 5B (XXXII), of 5 September 1979.
305
7 CIJ1077.indb 606 18/04/16 08:54 305 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Persons from Enforced Disappearance provided (Art. 1), inter alia,
that:
“1. An act of enforced disappearance is an offence to human dignity.
It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Uni -
versal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and devel -
oped in international instruments in this field.
2. Any act of enforced disappearance places the persons subjected
thereto outside the protection of the law and inflicts severe suffer-
ing on them and their families. It constitutes a violation of the
rules of international law guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to
recognition as a person before the law, the right to liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be subjected to torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
It also violates or constitutes a grave threat to the right to life.”h
297. Subsequently, the 2007 UN Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance referred, in its Preamble (fifthpara-
graph) to the “extreme seriousness” of enforced disappearance, which, it
added in Article 5, when generating a “widespread or systematic prac -
tice”, constitutes “a crime against humanity in applicable internahtional
law”, with all legal consequences. The 2007 Convention further referred
(third preambular paragraph) to relevant (and converging) international
instruments of international human rights law, international humanitar -
ian law and international criminal law.
298. Parallel to these developments at normative level, the grave viola -
tion of enforced disappearance of persons has been attracting growing
attention in expert writing 29, which has characterized it as an extremely
cruel and perverse continuing violation of human rights, extending in tihme,
296 Cf., inter alia, e.g., R. S. Berliner, “The Disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg : A
Resolution Is Possible”, 11 New York Law School Journal of International and Compar‑
ative Law (1990), pp.391-432; R. Broody and F. González, “Nunca Más : An Analysis
of International Instruments on ‘Disappearances’”, 19Human Rights Quarterly (1997),
pp. 365-405 ; C.Callejon, “Une immense lacune du droit international combl ée par la
convention des Nations Unies pour la protection de toutes les personnes hcontre les dispar-i
tions forcées”, 17 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2006), pp. 337-358; T. Scovazzi
and G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United Nations ▯
Convention, Leiden, Nijhoff, 2007, pp. 1-400 G.Venturini, “International Law and the
Offence of Enforced Disappearance”, in :Diritti Individuali e Giustizia Internazio—ale
Liber F. Pocar (eds. G. Venturini and S. Bariatti), Milan, Giuffrè, 2009, pp939-954;
L. Ott, Enforced Disappearance in International Law, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2011, pp.1-294
M. L. Vermeulen, Enforced Disappearance : Determining State Responsibility under the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced▯ Disappearance
Utrecht, Intersentia, 2012, pp.507 I. Giorgou, “State Involvement in the Perpetration
306
7 CIJ1077.indb 608 18/04/16 08:54 306 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
owing to the consequences of the original act (or arbitrary detention ohr
kidnapping), causing a duration in the suffering and anguish, if not agohny
or despair, of all those concerned (the missing persons and their closeh rel-a
tives), given the non -disclosure of the fate or whereabouts of disappeared
or missing persons. The extreme cruelty of enforced disappearances of per-
sons as a continuing grave violation of human rights and international
humanitarian law has, furthermore, also been portrayed, as widely known,h
in the final reports of Truth Commissions, in distinct continents.
299. Soon international human rights tribunals (IACtHR and ECHR)
came to be seized of cases on the matter, and began to pronounce on it. h
The case law of the IACtHR on the matter is pioneering, and nowadays
regarded as the one which has most contributed to the progressive devel -
opment on international law in respect of the protection of all persons h
from enforced disappearance 297. In its early Judgment in the case of
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (of 29 July 1988), the IACtHR drew
attention to the complexity of enforced disappearance, as bringing abouth,
concomitantly, continuing violations of rights protected under the
ACHR, such as the rights to personal liberty and integrity, and often thhe
fundamental right to life itself (Arts. 7, 5 and 4).
300. It is, in sum, a grave breach of the States’ duty to respect human
dignity (IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 29 July
1988, paras. 149-158). It was in its landmark judgments, one decade later,
in the case of Blake v. Guatemala (of 1996 -1999) 298, that the IACtHR
dwelt upon, and elaborated, on the legal nature and consequences of
enforced disappearances, its characteristic elements, the victimized per -
sons, and the engagement of State responsibility in a temporal dimensionh.
301. The Blake case occurred within a systematic pattern of enforced
disappearances of persons, State -planned, and perpetrated not only to
“disappear” with persons regarded as “enemies”, but also to hgenerate a
sense of utter insecurity, anguish and fear ; it involved torture, secret exe -
cution of the “disappeared” without trial, followed by concealmenth of
their mortal remains, so as to eliminate any material evidence of the crhime
and to ensure the impunity of the perpetrators.
302. In its Judgment on the merits (of 24 January 1998) in the Blake
case, the IACtHR asserted that enforced disappearance of persons is a
of Enforced Disappearance and the Rome Statute”, 1Journal of International Criminal
Justice (2013), pp. 1001-1021.
297 Cf., to this effect, e.g., T. Scovazzi and G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced
Disappearance . . ., op. cit. supra note 296, pp. 101, 132 and 398.
298 IACtHR, Judgments on preliminary objections (of 2July 1996), merits (of24 January
1998) and reparations (of 22 January 1999).
307
7 CIJ1077.indb 610 18/04/16 08:54 307 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
complex, multiple and continuing violation of a number of rights protected
by the ACHR (rights to life, to personal integrity, to personal libertyh),
generating the State party’s duty to prevent, investigate and punish such
breaches and, moreover, to inform the victim’s next of kin of the mishsing
person’s whereabouts (IACtHR, Blake, Judgment of 24 January 1998,
paras. 54-58). In the IACtHR’s view, the close relatives of the disap -
peared person were also victims, in their own right, of the enforced disap-
pearance, in breach of the relevant provisions of the ACHR.
303. In my separate opinion appended to that Judgment of the IAC -
tHR in the Blake case, I deemed it fit to stress that enforced disappear -
ance of persons was indeed a grave and complex violation of human
rights, besides being a continuing or permanent violation until the where -
abouts of the missing victims was established, as pointed out in the
travaux préparatoires of the 1985Inter-American Convention on Enforced
Disappearance of Persons, and as acknowledged in Article III of the Con-
vention itself (ibid., para.9).
304. In the same separate opinion, I next warned against the undue
fragmentation of the delict of enforced disappearance of persons, drawinhg
attention to the fact that we were here before fundamental or non -
derogable rights (ibid., paras. 12-14), and there was need to preserve the
special character and the integrity of human rights treaties (ibid.,
paras. 16-22). And I proceeded :
“We are, definitively, before a particularly grave violation of mul -
tiple human rights. Among these are non‑derogable fundamental
rights, protected both by human rig299 treaties as well as by interna -
tional humanitarian law treaties . The more recent doctrinal devel-
opments in the present domain of protection disclose a tendency
towards the ‘criminalization’ of grave violations of human rights,h —
as the practices of torture, of summary and extralegal executions, and
of enforced disappearance of persons. The prohibition of such prac -
tices paves the way for us to enter into the terra nova of the interna -
tional jus cogens . The emergence and consolidation of imperative
norms of general international law would be seriously jeopardized if
one were to decharacterize the crimes against humanity which fall
under their prohibition.” (Ibid., para. 15.)
305. Still in respect to the legal nature and consequences of the enforced
disappearance of persons, I added :
“In a continuing situation proper to the enforced disappearance of
person, the victims are the disappeared person (main victim) as well
as his next of kin ; the indefinition generated by the enforced disap -
299
Cf., e.g., the provisions on fundamental guarantees of Additional ProtocIol
(of 1977) to the GenevaConventions on International Humanitarian Law (of 1949),
Article 75, and of the Additional Protocol II (of the same year), Article 4.
308
7 CIJ1077.indb 612 18/04/16 08:54 308 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
pearance withdraws all from the protection of the law 300. The condi-
tion of victims cannot be denied also to the next of kin of the
disappeared person, who have their day -to-day life transformed into
a true calvary, in which the memories of the person dear to them are
intermingled with the permanent torment of his enforced disappear -
ance. In my understanding, the complex form of violation of multiple
human rights which the crime of enforced disappearance of person
represents has as a consequence the enlargement of the notion of victim
of violation of the protected rights.” (IACtHR, Blake, Judgment of
24 January 1998, paras. 32-38.)
306. In my subsequent separate opinion in the Blake v. Guatemala case
(reparations, Judgment of 22 January 1999), I insisted on the need to con -
solidate the “international regime against grave violations of human
rights”, in the light of the peremptory norms of international law (jus
cogens) and of the corresponding obligations erga omnes of protection of
the human being (IACtHR, Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment of 22 January
1999, para. 39). By means of such development, I added, one would
“overcome the obstacles of the dogmas of the past”, and the current inad -
equacies of the law of treaties, so as to get “closer to the plenitude of the
international protection of the human being” ( ibid., para. 40).
307. Other pertinent decisions of the IACtHR could be recalled, e.g., as
to the need to overcome limitations or restrictions ratione temporis, given
the legal nature of enforced disappearance (supra), the IACtHR’s deci -
sions also in the cases of Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia (2000-2002), and of the
Sisters Serrano Cruz v. El Salvador (2005) ; and, as to the aggravating cir-
cumstances of the grave breach of enforced disappearance, the IACtHR’hs
decisions in the cases of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala (2000 -2002), of
Caracazo v. Venezuela (1999-2002), of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Hondu‑
ras (2003) and of Servellón‑García et alii v. Honduras (2006).
308. For its part, the ECHR has also had the occasion to pronounce
on aspects in the matter at issue. For example, in its Judgment (of 10 May
2001) in the Cyprus v. Turkey case, it stressed the continuation of “agony”
of the family members of the missing persons in not knowing their where -
abouts (para. 157). Shortly afterwards, in its Judgment (of 18 June 2002)
in the Orhan v. Turkey case, it again addressed, as in earlier decisions, the
“vulnerable position” of the individuals concerned (paras. 406 -410).
Other pronouncements of the kind were made by the ECHR in the cycle
of cases (of the last decade) arising out of the armed conflict in Chhechnya.
309. In a particularly illustrative decision, the ECHR, in its Judgment
(of 18 September 2009) in the case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey,
stated that a disappearance is
“characterized by an ongoing situation of uncertainty and unaccount -
ability in which there is a lack of information or even a deliberate
300Cf., in this sense, Arti1 (2) of the UNDeclaration on the Protection of All
Persons against Enforced Disappearances.
309
7 CIJ1077.indb 614 18/04/16 08:54 309 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
concealment and obfuscation of what has occurred [. . .]. This situa-
tion is very often drawn out over time, prolonging the torment of the
victim’s relatives. It cannot therefore be said that a disappearance his,
simply, an ‘instantaneous’ act or event ; the additional distinctive ele-
ment of subsequent failure to account for the whereabouts and fate
of the missing person gives rise to a continuing situation. Thus, the
procedural obligation will, potentially, persist as long as the fate of
the person is unaccounted for ; the ongoing failure to provide the
requisite investigation will be regarded as a continuing violation (. . .)
This is so, even where death may, eventually, be presumed.”
(Para. 148.)
5. General Assessment
310. In the light of the aforementioned, in so far as the present case of
the Application of the Convention of Genocide is concerned, one cannot
thus endorse Serbia’s view, expressed during the oral proceedings,
whereby enforced disappearance may not be a continuing violation of the h
right to life as enshrined in Article II of the Genocide Convention. Serbia
asserts that the reason why it might be a continuing violation of human
rights is that the family of the victim is subject to ongoing mental harhm,
and this brings into play the prohibition of ill -treatment, or because of
the procedural obligation to investigate the crime. According to Serbia,h 301
this issue “might belong in Strasbourg, but certainly not in TheHague” .
311. Both the International Court of Justice and the ECHR in Stras -
bourg are concerned with State responsibility. Recent cases (such as the
Georgia v. Russian Federation case, concerning the fundamental principle
of equality and non-discrimination and the corresponding norms in distinct
but converging international instruments) have been brought before both
the International Court of Justice and the ECHR ; the Hague Court and the
ECHR in Strasbourg do not exclude each other, as recent developments in
the work of contemporary international tribunals have clearly been show -
ing. This is reassuring for those engaged in the international protectiohn of
the rights of the human person, and the justiciables themselves.
312. The pioneering and substantial case law of the IACtHR, together
more recently with the case law of the ECHR, on the matter at issue, is
essential for an understanding of the gravity of the crime of enforced dhis -
appearance of persons and of its legal consequences. As to its legal nathure,
the two aforementioned international human rights tribunals have
asserted the complex and continuing violations of the protected rights, h
while disappearance lasts. In its ground -breaking decisions in the Blake
case (1996-1998), the IACtHR established the expansion of the notion of
301CR 2014/23, of 28 March 2014, p. 44, para. 12.
310
7 CIJ1077.indb 616 18/04/16 08:54 310 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
victims in cases of disappearance, so as to comprise the missing person as
well as their close relatives, in their own right. This has become jurispru ‑
dence constante of the IACtHR and the ECHR on the issue.
313. May I add, in this connection, that the provisions of Article II (b)
of the Convention against Genocide, referring to “serious (. . .) mental
harm to members of the group”, makes the connection with a continuingh
violation rather clear. As I pondered in my dissenting opinion in the cahse
of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy : Greece
intervening), “one cannot take account of inter -temporal law only in a
way that serves one’s interests in litigation, accepting the passing of time
and the evolution of law in relation to certain facts but not to others, of
the same continuing situation” (I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 186, para. 17).
314. The fact that a close family member of the missing persons is a
member of the same group, and is also subject to a continuing mental
harm, prolonging indefinitely in time, together with the State concernhed’s
failure to account for the missing persons, or to take reasonable steps hto
assist in the location of such persons, in my perception, brings into plhay
the prohibition of acts proscribed by the Genocide Convention, including
the obligation to investigate.
315. May I further add, still in this connection, the relevance of the
case law of international human rights tribunals (in particular that ofh the
302
IACtHR, since its start ), to the effect of applying a proper standard of
proof, in cases of grave violations (such as enforced disappearances ofh
persons, torture of incommunicado detainees, among others), when State
authorities hold the monopoly of probatory evidence, and victims have
no access to it, thus calling for a shifting of the burden of proof 30. In
cases of grave violations, such as enforced disappearances of persons, thhe
burden of proof cannot certainly be made to fall upon those victimized bhy
those violations (including, of course, the close relatives of the misshing
persons, who do not know their whereabouts).
316. The effects of enforced disappearances of persons upon the close
relatives of missing persons are devastating. They destroy whole families,
led into agony or despair. I learned this from my own experience in the
international adjudication of cases of this kind. In the present Judgment,
the International Court of Justice does not seem to have apprehended theh
extent of those devastating effects. To require from close relatives, as hit
does (Judgment, para. 160), further proof (of serious suffering), so as to
fall under Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention, amounts to a true
probatio diabolica!
317. The serious mental harm (Art. II (b)) caused to those victimized
can surely be presumed, and, in my view, there is no need to demonstrateh
302
303 Cf. Part VII of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
Cf. Parts VII-VIII of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
311
7 CIJ1077.indb 618 18/04/16 08:54 311 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
that the harm itself contributed to the destruction of the targeted grouhp.
Yet, the Court requires such additional proof (Judgment, para. 160 in
fine). In doing so, it renders the determination of State responsibility for
genocide, under Article II (b) of the 1948 Convention, and of its legal
consequences (for reparations), an almost impossible task. The Court’hs
outlook, portrayed in its whole reasoning throughout the present Judg -
ment is State sovereignty -oriented, not people -oriented, as it should be
under the Genocide Convention, the applicable law in the cas d’espèce.
318. Last but not least, the point I have already made about the abso -
lute prohibition (of jus cogens) of torture (para. 225, supra), in any cir -
cumstances, applies likewise to all the other grave violations of human h
rights and international humanitarian law which occurred in the attacks h
in Croatia, and that have been examined above, namely : massive killings,
rape and other sexual violence crimes, enforced disappearance of persons,
systematic expulsion from homes, forced displacement of persons (in
mass exodus) and destruction of group culture.
319. The prohibition of all those grave violations, like that of torture,
304
in all its forms, is a prohibition belonging to the realm of jus cogens ,
the breach of which entails legal consequences, calling for reparations 305.
This is in line with the idea of rectitude (in conformity with the recta ratio
of natural law), underlying the conception of law (in distinct legal shys -
tems — Droit/Right/Recht/Direito/Derecho/Diritto) as a whole.
XIII. Onslaught, not Exactly Wahr,
in a Widespread and Systematic Pattern
of Destruction
1. Plan of Destruction : Its Ideological Content
320. The occurrence of a widespread and systematic pattern of destruc-
tion has been established in the present case concerning the Application of
the Convention against Genocide , opposing Croatia to Serbia (cf. supra).
The devastation pursued a plan of destruction, that was deliberately andh
304Two contemporary international tribunals which, by their evolving case lhaw, have
much contributed to the expansion of the material content of jus cogens, have been the
IACtHR and the ICTY ; cfA. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind —
Towards a New Jus Gentium, op. cit. supra note 67, pp. 295; A.A. Cançado Trindade,
“Jus Cogens : The Determination and the Gradual Expansion of Its Material Content inh
Contemporary International Case Law”, in XXXV Curso de Derecho Internacional Orga ‑
nizado por el Comité Jurídico Interamerica— 2008, Washington D.C., General Secre -
tariat of the OAS, 2009, pp. 3-29.
305Cf. Part XVI of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
312
7 CIJ1077.indb 620 18/04/16 08:54 312 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
methodically carried out : aerial bombardment, shelling, indiscriminate
killings, torture and beatings, rape, destruction of homes and looting, h
forced displacement and deportation. The execution of the plan of
destruction has already been reviewed (cf. supra), and in my view estab -
lished in the cas d’espèce. The plan of destruction pursued by the Serbian
attacks in Croatia had an ideological component, which goes back to the
historical origins of the conflict.
(a) Arguments of the contending Parties
321. The point was addressed, to a certain depth in the written phase
of the present proceedings, particularly by Croatia. In its Memorial, ith
argued that a catalytic event in relation to the genocide allegedly perphe -
trated against the Croats was the appearance in 1986 of the Memoran-
dum by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (the “SANU
Memorandum”). The SANU Memorandum, it added, which set forth a
Serb nationalist reinterpretation of the recent history of the SFRY, car -
ried great weight and reflected the then growing Serbian nationalist mhove-
ment ; it helped to give rise, in its 306w, to the circumstances for the
perpetration of genocide in Croatia .
322. By emphasizing the right of the Serbian people “to establish their
full national and cultural integrity regardless of which republic or autho -
nomous province they live in”, the SANU Memorandum provided the idea
of a “Greater Serbia”, including parts of the territory in Croatiah and Bos -
nia and Herzegovina within which significant Serbian ethnic populationhs
lived. Furthermore, the SANU Memorandum provided a detailed analysis
of the “crisis” in the SFRY, and it established the idea that Serbhia was “the
only nation in Yugoslavia without its own State”. It bypassed the polhitical
and geographical divisions enshrined in the 1974Constitution 307.
323. Croatia stressed that the ideas proposed in the Memorandum
were based on other views expressed by the Serbian intellectual commu -
nity (including Serbian historians, scientists, writers and journalistsh) on
how Serbs had been “tricked”, “stinted”, “killed”, “hpersecuted even after
being subjected to genocide”. The SANU Memorandum gained support
from militant groups, prompting a nationalist campaign 308.
324. Croatia further argued that the ideas set out in the SANU Memo-
randum “gave vent to the theory that the Croatian people were collec -
tively to blame for the large number of Serbs that were killed by the
Ustashas during the period 1941-1945, and were, accordingly, by their
very nature, genocidal in character and adhering to a continuing geno -
306Memorial of Croatia, para. 2.43.
307Ibid., paras. 2.44-2.47.
308According to Croatia, “[a]rticles appeared and speeches were given whhich promoted
Serbian nationalism, demonized the Albanians, the Muslims and the Croatsh and invoked
their genocidal tendencies, and validated the Chetnik movement” ibid., paras. 2.48-2.51.
313
7 CIJ1077.indb 622 18/04/16 08:54 313 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
309
cidal intent against the Serbs” . Croatia added that the JNA was trans -
formed from an army of the SFRY into a “Serbian army” promptly afther
the publication of the SANU Memorandum 31.
325. Serbia, for its part, briefly responded, in its Counter-Memorial, to
Croatia’s arguments concerning the Memorandum. It claimed that they
amounted to an “enormous exaggeration”, given that the Serbs neverh had
the intent to perpetrate genocide against Croats, and that the SANU
311
Memorandum never contemplated the occurrence of genocide . Croatia
retook the issue in its Reply, wherein it reiterated the importance of thhe
SANU Memorandum for the perpetration of genocide.
326. It dismissed Serbia’s claim of its arguments being an “enormous
exaggeration”, saying that they are supported by a number of indepen -
dent sources, which also described the Memorandum as a “political
bombshell”. Croatia further stated that an expert report from the ICThY,
on the use of propaganda in the conflict at issue, came to the conclushion
that it was the deliberate leaks of the SANU Memorandum that raised
the issue of Serbian nationalism publicly (cf. infra).
327. Croatia insisted that the emergence of extreme Serbian national -
ism was accompanied by the idea that the Croats had always had a geno -
cidal intent against the Serbs, a theory — articulated in 1986 and then
followed by Serbian historians and journalists — that claimed that the
Croatian people were collectively to blame for the large number of Serbsh
who were killed by the “Ustasha” between 1941 -1945 (e.g., the concentra-
tion camp in Jasenovac), during the Second World War, pursua312to a
plan that had a continuing genocidal intent against the Serbs . Accord-
ing to Croatia, various inflammatory articles published by the media chon -
tributed to this idea from 1986 to 1991 31.
328. Also during the oral phase of the present proceedings, Croatia
reiterated its arguments (supra), whereas Serbia did not submit any sub -
stantial new argument in this respect. Croatia asserted that the publicah -
tion of the SANU Memorandum in 1986 precipitated a period of extreme
nationalist propaganda within Serbia, as from the premise that Serbia
and the Serbs in the other Republics of the SFRY “were in a uniquely h
unfavourable position within the SFRY”, and from the proposal of a
review of the SFRY Constitution, so that autonomous provinces would
become an integral part of Serbia, and the federal State would be strength -
ened. Croatia also referred to an expert report (by Professor A. Budding),
309 Memorial of Croatia, para. 2.52.
310 Ibid., para. 3.03.
311 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 428.
312 Reply of Croatia, paras. 3.10-3.12.
313 Ibid., paras. 3.12-3.14.
314
7 CIJ1077.indb 624 18/04/16 08:54 314 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
which referred to the SANU Memorandum as “a political firestorm”h
because of its “inflammatory” language 314.
(b) Examination of expert evidence by the ICTY
329. As brought to the attention of the International Court of Justice
in the course of the proceedings of the present case (cf. supra), the ICTY,
in its decision of 16 June 2004 in the Milošević case, duly took into
account expert evidence concerning the ideological component of the
plan of destruction at issue. The first expert report presented to theh ICTY,
compiled at the request of its Office of the Prosecutor, was titled “hPoliti -
cal Propaganda and the Plan to Create a ‘State for All Serbs’ — Conse-
quences of Using the Media for Ultra -Nationalist Ends” (of 4 February
2003, by R. de la Brosse).
330. According to the expert report, the regime of Slobodan Milošević
sought to take “total control over the media owned by the State or public
institutions”, restricting its freedom and “using all means to prehvent it
from informing people”. Its control of the audio -visual media “began
in 1986-1987 and was complete in the summer of 1991” (Report by R. de
la Brosse, 4 February 2003, para. 27). The expert report proceeded that
“[t]he media were used as weapons of war”, in order to achieve “hstrategic
objectives”, such as “the capture of territories by force, the prahctice of
ethnic cleansing, and the destruction of targets described as symbolic and
having priority”. The plan combined
“propaganda, partial (and biased) information, false news, manipu-
lation, non -coverage of certain events, etc. This entire arsenal would
be mobilized to help justify the creation of a State for all Serbs.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[T]he terms ‘Ustasha fascists’ and ‘cut -throats’ were used to stig -
matize the Croats and ‘Islamic Ustashas’ and ‘Djihad fightersh’ to
describe the Bosnian Muslims pejoratively. Systematic recourse to
such key words imposed on the media by the Milošević regime
undoubtedly provoked and nourished hateful behaviour toward the
non -Serbian communities.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Systematic recourse to false, biased information and non -coverage
of certain events made it possible to inspire and arouse hatred and
314 CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, pp. 33-35. The Memorandum, Croatia reiter -
ated, paved the way for the publication of articles in the Serbian mediah, referring to the
alleged Croats’ genocidal tendencies, and recalling the horrific crimes the Ustasha régime
committed against the Serbs during the Second World War (e.g., the conchentration camp
in Jasenovac; CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, p. ; and cf.lso CR 2014/12, of 7 March
2014, pp. 22-23.
315
7 CIJ1077.indb 626 18/04/16 08:54 315 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
fear among the communities. The media prepared the ground psycho-
logically for the rise in nationalist hatred and became a weapon when
the war broke out.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Historical facts were imbued with mystical qualities to be used
as nationalist objectives so that the Serbian people would feel and
express a desire for revenge directed at the prescribed enemies,
the Croats and Muslims (. . .)” (Report by R. de la Brosse,
paras. 28-31.)
331. The expert report went on to state that, by the invocation of “the
scars of the 1940 war” (ibid., para. 35), “the use of the media for national
ist ends and objectives formed part of a well-thought through plan” (ibid.,
para. 32). It added that the 1986 SANU Memorandum constituted an
“encouragement” for “Serbian nationalism” (ibid., para. 40). The official
propaganda drew on the historical sources of “Serbian mystique”, whith
its victims and the injustices they suffered throughout history (ibid.,
315
paras. 46-49) . State authorities sought to condition public opinion in
order “to justify the upcoming war with Croatia” (ibid., para. 54, and
cf. para. 61). “Disinformation” was used in order “to mislead or to con -
ceal and misrepresent facts”, and to make up “false news” (ibid., paras. 72
and 77).
332. The second expert report submitted (by the Prosecution) to the
ICTY in its decision in the Milošević case (2004), and referred to by Cro -
atia in its oral pleadings in the present case before the International hCourt
of Justice, was titled “Serbian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century”h (of
29 May 2002, by A. Budding). The expert report provided historical
information and the factual context for the understanding of waking Ser -
bian national awareness, and the sequence of events which led to the dish-
integration of the Yugoslav State and the outbreak of the wars in the
region.
333. The expert report also referred to the 1986 SANU Memoran -
dum (report by A. Budding, 29 May 2002, p. 32), explaining its origins
and its consequences for the whole of former Yugoslavia (ibid.,
pp. 36 -37). It characterized the SANU Memorandum as “by far the
most famous document in the modern Serbian national movement”
(ibid., p.36). Referring to the expert report, Croatia argued that the
SANU Memorandum set off “a political firestorm”, and that it was
“inflammatory because of the contrast between its complaints about hthe
position of Serbia and Serbs within Yugoslavia and its ‘vague and ellhip -
315The media contributed to “demonizing the other communities, especiallhy the
Kosovo Albanians, Croats and Bosnian Muslims” (para. 52).
316
7 CIJ1077.indb 628 18/04/16 08:54 316 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tical references to a possible post-Yugoslav future’” 31. According to the
expert report:
“Memorandum nije raspalio debatu u Jugoslaviji zato što je u
njemu eksplicitno iznet srpski nacionalni program posle Jugoslavije—
pošto i nije — već zbog kontrasta između detaljnih i preteranih
primedbi na položaj Srbije unutar postojeće jugoslovenske državhe,
koje su iznete u Memorandumu, kao i neodređenog pozivanja na
moguću budućnost posle Jugoslavije (tvrdnja da Srbija mora ‘jahsno
da sagleda svoje privredne i nacionalne interese kako je događaji ne h
bi iznenadili’). Autori Memoranduma su sugerisali da bi nacionalne
alternative višenacionalnoj jugoslovenskoj državi mogle biti požheljne,
ali su propustili da priznaju da bi njihovo stvaranje neizbežno podrah -
zumevalo uništenje.” 317
334. In the same Milošević case, the ICTY also took into account the
declaration of an expert witness (T. Zwaan), which is summed up in its
decision of 16 June 2004. According to the ICTY, the expert witness testi-
fied about “the importance of ideology and use of propaganda” inh pro -
cesses “leading to the commission of genocide, involving various typehs of
radical nationalism, which dehumanize the targeted group”, also misus -
ing “collective historical memory” to that end (ICTY, Milošević, 16 June
2004, para. 234). It added that “genocide is a crime of State”, as “geno -
cidal crimes never develop from the ‘bottom up’ ; they are ‘top down’
affairs. Such crimes occur with the ‘knowledge, approval and involvement
of the State authorities’” (ibid.).
335. Yet a third expert report compiled for the ICTY
(at the request of its Prosecution), for its adjudication of the
Milošević case (2004), titled “On the Aetiology and Genesis of
Genocides and Other Mass Crimes — Targeting Specific Groups”
(of November 2003, by T. Zwaan), purported to consider, in a con -
densed way, the learning that exists nowadays in relation to
genocide, from an interdisciplinary perspective. The expert report, at
316
317CR 2014/5, pp. 33-35.
[Unofficial translation]
“The Memorandum became an inflammatory element in the Yugoslav debahte not
because it explicitly set out a post -Yugoslav Serbian national programme — and
indeed it did not — but rather because of the contrast between its detailed and exag -
gerated remarks on the position of Serbia within the existing Yugoslav Shtate, and
its vague and elliptical references to a possible postav future (the assertion
that Serbia must ‘look clearly at its economic and national interests, so as not to
be caught by surprise by the course of events’). The authors of the hMemorandum
suggested that national alternatives to the multinational Yugoslav Stateh would be
desirable without acknowledging the destruction that their creation woulhd inevitably
entail.” (Ibid., p.
317
7 CIJ1077.indb 630 18/04/16 08:54 317 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
the end of the examination of the matter, reached the following
findings:
“Firstly, (. . .) genocide and other mass crimes targeting specific
groups should be carefully distinguished from war and civil war, while
at the same time one should recognize that situations of war or civil
war may contribute in various ways to the development of genocidal
processes.
Secondly, it has been pointed out that genocidal crimes only develop
and take place under conditions of serious and enduring crisis. A
general model of the emergence of such crises has been presented in
a very condensed form. Destabilization of the State -society concerned,
polarization processes, de pacification, and increasing use of violence
are at the heart of such crises.
Thirdly, in the course of the crisis a radical and ruthless political
elite may succeed in taking over the State organization. The political
behaviour and decisions of this political leadership may be considered
of decisive importance for the emergence of genocide. It has been
argued that a genocidal process does not develop from ‘bottom up’,h
but that is typically a ‘top down’ development, although the precihse
involvement of the State may take different forms. One corollary is
that the highest State authorities are always responsible for what hap-
pens during the genocidal process, another corollary implies that ‘sih-n
gle’ acts of genocide should be (also) considered against the
background of the prevalent power and authority structure within the
State-society concerned.
Fourthly, it has been emphasized that genocides may be best seen
as (highly complex) processes, with a beginning, a structured course
in which phases can be discerned, and an end — usually brought
about by forceful external intervention. Furthermore, in trying to
understand a genocidal process attention should be paid to the deci -
sion-making, the gradual emergence of planning and organization,
and the division of labour within the category of perpetrators.
Fifthly, it has been argued that ideology is also of crucial impor -
tance for genocide to emerge. Usually, varieties of radical nationalism h
will figure prominently. They contribute to the development of an
extremist political climate ; to the marking off of the groups or cate -
gories to be targeted ; they legitimize, rationalize, and justify the gen-
ocidal process ; and impart to the perpetrators a sense of direction,
intent and purpose.
Sixthly, it has been underlined that every genocidal process should
also be considered from the angle of the victims, who are typically
chosen because of their supposed membership of a group or category
318
7 CIJ1077.indb 632 18/04/16 08:54 318 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
targeted for persecution. It has been argued, moreover, that such
groups are made increasingly vulnerable and defenceless through the
process of persecution itself, that it is usually very difficult for thhem
to foresee what is going to happen, and that their possible courses of
(re)action are severely limited. Keeping their fate central in one’hs mind
seems to be the best compass when studying, assessing and judging
genocide.” (Report by T. Zwaan, November 2003, pp. 38-39.)
(c) Ideological incitement and the outbreak of hostilities
336. In effect, in the course of the proceedings, both contending Parties
paid special attention to the origins and the factual background of the h
conflict in the Balkans in the present case concerning the Application of
the Convention against Genocide. Both Croatia and Serbia expressed their
awareness that the historical context helps to understand better the causes
that lead to the war in Croatia and its pattern of destruction. They
expressed their views, in particular, in the written phase of the cas d’espèce.
The applicant State contended that the devastation that took place in
Croatia was a consequence of the exponential growth of Serbian nation -
alism in order to build a “Greater Serbia”.
337. Thus, in its Memorial, Croatia provided an overview of the back -
ground of the dispute, deeming it essential to understand what happened,h
318
in order to bring justice and redress to the victims . Focusing on the
formation of the FRY, the rise of “Greater -Serbian” nationalism in the
eighties and the rise of S. Milošević to power 319, Croatia argued that,
although the inherent tensions (between ethnic groups) had been sup -
pressed for many years, after President Tito’s death, federal instituhtions
were usurped by the new Serbian leadership (under S. Milošević), which
aimed at establishing a Serb -dominated Yugoslavia, or a “Greater
Serbia”, to include within its borders more than half of the territorhy of
320
Croatia .
338. The Serbian State-controlled media — it proceeded — systemati-
cally demonized the targeted non -Serb ethnic gr321s, creating a climate
conducive to genocide, inciting and justifying it . After tension grew in
Kosovo in 1981, Croatia claimed, Serb nationalists began to express their
ideas more openly and frequently ; it singled out the 1986 SANU Memo-
randum, as a manifesto setting forth a Serb nationalist reinterpretationh of
the recent history of the SFRY, which gave rise to a feeling of anger anhd
318 Memorial of Croatia, paras. 2.01-2.162 and 1.14.
319 Ibid., paras. 2.05-2.35, 2.36-2.59 and 2.60-2.84, respectively. As to the historical
background (in the Second World War), cf. ibid., paras. 2.08-2.09, and cf. para. 2.53.
320 Ibid., para. 1.26.
321 Ibid.
319
7 CIJ1077.indb 634 18/04/16 08:54 319 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
322
revenge against Croats . Moreover, according to Croatia, there was a
large propaganda validating the Chetnik movement and their goals, and
S. Milošević was able to capture such feelings and to promote himselfh as
323
a defender of Serbian interests .
339. In its Counter-Memorial, Serbia submitted that much of what
occurred in the Balkans in 1991-1995 was influenced by the atrocities
324
against Serbs in 1941-1945 and the rise of nationalism in the SFRY .
The events leading to the conflict of 1991 -1995 and the conflict itself,
according to Serbia, cannot be understood without taking this into
325
account . Serbia further stated that there was a rise of nationalism in
the SFRY, following Tito’s death, among Serbians but also Croatians 32.
340. Serbia conceded that there were abundant hate speech and
extreme nationalism demonstrations in Serbian media in the late eightiesh
and during the nineties, but it claimed that such was the case also in Chro-
atia. It did not contest that Serbian nationalists misused the recollections
of past events, though it contended that the claims made in this regard hby
Croatia were not always accurate ; it finally added that Serbian national -
ism could not be held solely accountable for the conflict 327.
341. In its Reply, Croatia stated that, according to an expert report
from the ICTY, the SANU Memorandum sparked Serbian nationalism
328
publicly , giving vent to the view that the Croatian people were collec -
tively to blame for the large number of Serbs who had been killed by theh
Ustashas in 1941-1945 329. It then rebutted the claims of revival of Croa -
tian nationalism and of hate speech and discriminatory policies against h
the Serbs 330. For its part, in its Rejoinder, Serbia contended that the his -
torical background helps to understand the events which originated the
war. It reaffirmed that the causes were not one -sided and that the claims
of Croatia were in its view inaccurate 331; at last, it requested the Interna -
tional Court of Justice to examine the history of the conflict from bohth
322Memorial of Croatia, paras. 2.40, 2.43, 2.51-2.53 and 2.56. The Croats were demon-
ized and blamed for the deaths of Serbs during the Second World War in concentration
camps, and an instigated feeling of anger and revenge arose among the Se; according to
Croatia, the 1986SANU Memorandum was a key element to that end.
323Ibid., paras. 2.54-2.56 and 2.60.
324Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 397-426, and cf. paras. 397, 400, 409 and 419.
325Ibid., para. 419.
326Ibid., para. 422.
327
328Ibid., paras. 434-435, 420 and 424.
Reply of Croatia, para. 3.11.
329Ibid., para. 3.12.
330Ibid., paras. 3.17-24.
331Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 35.
320
7 CIJ1077.indb 636 18/04/16 08:54 320 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
332
the Applicant’s and the Respondent’s perspectives .
342. In the oral phase of the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, one of the
witness-experts (Ms S. Biserko) specifically addressed the factual back -
ground of the conflict and the developments that led to the atrocitiesh. She
singled out the idea of a “Greater Serbia” reviving Serbian nationhalism,
with its propaganda ; the aim of territorial expansion ; the rise of
S. Milošević and its policies ; and the media reports — between 1988
and 1991 — preparing Serbs for th333orthcoming armed attacks in Croa -
tia and Bosnia-Herzegovina .
343. The contending Parties themselves, in the course of the proceed -
ings in the cas d’espèce, focused — each one in its own way — on the
impact of hate speech. Croatia claimed that Serbia sponsored hate speechh
and propaganda in inciting genocide 334. Hate speech, in its view, was an
important factor in the preparations for the Serbian armed incursions inh
Croatia 335. Serbia acknowledged that the media in the country — in the
late eighties and during the nineties — constantly broadcasted hate
336
speech, but claimed that such was also the case in Croatia .
344. Serbia admitted that hate speech was abundant in Serbian media
337
at the end of the eighties and during the nineties , but claimed that it
was not confined to Serbia, and also existed in Croatia 338. Croatia argued
that, as from the early eighties, several Serbian newspapers ran inflahmma -
tory articles about the Ustasha concentration camp in Jasenovac, during
the Second World War 339. Croatia challenged Serbia’s claim that it had
340
also promoted hate speech against the Serbs . Serbia, for its part,
attempted to minimize the proof of incitement to hatred 341.
345. In its oral arguments, Croatia referred, e.g., to S. Milošević’s
speech to the Serbian parliament in March 1991 342, and to the hate speech
of the extremist Serb nationalist Z. Raznjatović (known as Arkan) against
the Croats, constantly referred to as “Ustashas” 343. Serbian newspapers,
it added, ran inflammatory articles about the Ustasha concentration
332Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 36.
333Cf. CR 2014/7, of 4 March 2014.
334
Memorial of Croatia, paras. 1.16, 2.04, 2.43-2.53, 2.56 -2.59, 2.63-2.66, 8.16 and
8.23-8.24.
335Ibid., para. 2.58.
336Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 434-442.
337Cf. ibid., paras. 434-437, 439-442 and 953-954.
338Ibid., para. 439.
339Cf. Reply of Croatia, paras. 3.10-3.14, 3.26-3.27, 3.31-3.33, 3.131 and 9.52.
340
341Cf. ibid., paras. 3.26-3.27, and cf. para. 9.52.
Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, paras. 340-342.
342Cf. CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, para. 20.
343Cf. ibid., para. 30; and cf. also Memorial of Croatia, Vol5, App. 3, pp. 64-65,
paras. 43-45.
321
7 CIJ1077.indb 638 18/04/16 08:54 321 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
camp in Jasenovac, as a reference to the Second World War crimes com-
mitted against the Serbs by the Ustasha regime 344.
346. Serbia, in turn, cited statements from Croatian press and politi-
cians 345. Croatia retorted that the examples cited by Serbia were in sharp
contrast with the Serbian hate speech that emanated from Serbian State
346
media and its most senior leaders . It further insisted that the Serb pop-
ulation’s fear against Croats was created by the hate -speech campaign
against Croats and their demonization as “Ustasha[s]” 347.
347. In the present Judgment, the International Court of Justice flatly
dismissed an examination of the historical origins of the onslaught in thhe
Balkans, in the following terms : “The Court considers that there is no
need to enter into a debate on the political and historical origins of the
events that took place in Croatia between 1991 and 1995.” (Judgment,
para. 422.) Even without embarking on such an examination, the Court,
e.g., dismissed the relevance of the SANU Memorandum, for having “no h
official standing” and for not proving dolus specialis (ibid.).
348. Yet, in the course of the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, that doc -
ument was cited not to this effect, but only to explain the historical orhi -
gins of the devastation in Croatia, which the Court found unnecessary toh
examine in the present Judgment. Once again, I regret not to be able to
follow the Court’s majority on the handling of this question either, hand I
lay on the records, in the present dissenting opinion, the reasons of myh
disagreement with the dismissive posture of the Court thereon, particu -
larly bearing in mind that both contending Parties dwelt upon the issue in
their arguments before the Court, and expected the Court to address it.
349. It is clear that a nationalistic (ethnic) ideology and propaganda,
with their incitement to violence, were at the origins of the outbreak ohf the
former Yugoslavia, having contributed to the hostilities aggravated in thhe
course of the widespread armed conflicts, and then to the “horrors”h of the
wars in the Balkans, “particularly those in Croatia and Bosnia -
348
Herzegovina” . In order to understand the factual context of a case
under the Genocide Convention such as the present one opposing Croatia
to Serbia, it is important to address its causes. They have been addresshed,
before the Court, by the contending Parties themselves. Already in my
separate opinion (I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 543, paras. 46-47 and p. 610,
344Cf. CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, para. 12.
345
Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 438 and 440, and Rejoinder of Serbia,
par346 633-635.
347Cf. Additional Pleadings, para. 2.14.
Cf. CR 2014/19, of 18 March 2014, para. 28.
348S. Letica, “The Genesis of the Current Balkan War”, Genocide after Emotion — The
Postemotional Balkan War (ed. S. G. Meštrović), London/N.Y., Routledge, 1996, p. 91,
and cf. pp. 92-112.
322
7 CIJ1077.indb 640 18/04/16 08:54 322 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
para. 220) in the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on theh
Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (2010), I pointed out the need to
remain attentive to the historical origins of each humanitarian crisis.
350. An international conflict — a devastation — of the scale and
gravity of the wars in the Balkans, lodged with the International Court of
Justice under the Convention against Genocide, cannot be properly exam -
ined in the void. The ICTY did not do so, and, e.g., in the Milošević case
(TrialChamber, decision of 16 June 2004), after studying that conflict as
from its historical origins, took into account an expert report on the uhse
of propaganda by the media in that conflict which determined that
“a comparison between Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian nationalist
propaganda yielded the conclusion that Serbian propaganda sur -
passed the other two both in the scale and the content of the media
messages put out” (ICTY, Milošević, decision of 16 June 2004,
para. 237).
351. In this way, hatred was widespread, and made its numerous vic -
tims. Villagers began to hate each other, sometimes their own former
neighbours, solely on the basis of their ethnicity, without knowing exachtly
why. The consequences of this campaign of hatred were catastrophic, —
as were so many other man -made devastations throughout the history of
humankind and illustrative of the perennial presence of evil in the humahn
condition (cf. infra).
352. Last but not least, with the outbreak of the armed attacks, there
is an additional element for the examination of the campaign of extreme h
nationalism which should not pass unperceived here : the unredacted
Minutes of the Supreme Defence Council (SDC) of the FRY, the same
unredacted Minutes that, in the earlier case concerning the GenocideCon -
vention, were not made available to the International Court of Justice, h
nor did the International Court of Justice consider them indispensable, h
for its 2007 Judgment. Today, eight years later, the unredacted transcripts
of the SDC Minutes (1992-1996), as lately brought to the attention of the
ICTY, are publicly known.
353. It is not my intention to review them here, but only to refer briefly h
to two passages, with a direct bearing on the preceding considerations. h
The (short-hand) unredacted Minutes of the SDC, of 7 August 1992,
referred to the violence of paramilitary formations, and contained an
instruction to dress paramilitaries with “uniforms of Yugoslav soldiehrs”,
and to give them weapons. And the unredacted Minutes of the SDC, of
9 August 1994, asserted that the armies of Republika Srpska and of the
Serbian Republic of Krajina “are armies of the Serbian people”, anhd,
“[t]herefore, they must serve the interests of the Serbian people as ha
whole” 349.
349FRY/SDC, Unredacted Transcripts of Minutes (1992-1996), of 7 August 1992, and
of 9 August 1994.
323
7 CIJ1077.indb 642 18/04/16 08:54 323 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
2. The Imposed Obligation of Wearing White Ribbons
354. In my perception, it is clear, from the atrocities already surveyed,
that the cas d’espèce, concerning the Application of the Convention against
Genocide, opposing Croatia to Serbia, is not exactly one of war, but
rather of onslaught, in a widespread and systematic pattern of destructihon
(cf. supra ). There are other aspects of it which, in the course of the pro -
ceedings, were also brought to the attention of the Court, and to which hI
turn attention now. One of them pertains to the obligation imposed upon h
targeted individuals to wear white ribbons.
355. In the written phase of the proceedings, Croatia claimed, in its
Memorial, that, in some municipalities, the Croat population was requirehd
to identify themselves and their property with white ribbons or other dihs-
tinctive marks 350. It submitted various witness statements concerning this
351
practice by Serbia . On the basis of the probatory evidence (and witness
statements), it appears that this practice of marking Croats with whiteh
ribbons was widespread its r;tionale was to identify and single out Cro -
ats and subject them to varying degrees of humiliation, such as forced
labour, violence, and limitation of their freedom of movement (e.g. by h
imposing curfews). According to Croatia,
“[t]he local Croat population would be required to identify themselves
and their property with white ribbons and other distinctive marks ;
they would be denied access to food, water, electricity and telecom -
munications and proper medical treatment ; their movements would
be restricted ; they would be put to forced labour ; their property
would be destroyed or looted ; Croatian cultural and religious mon -
uments would be destroyed ; and schools and other public utilities
would be required to adopt Serbian cultural traditions and lan -
guage” 352.
356. As to the aims of the practice of marking Croats with white rib -
bons, Croatia submitted that the local Serb “authorities” would eshtablish
their power and “would impose a regime of humiliation and dehumaniza-
tion on the remaining Croat population, who would be required to iden -
tify themselves and their property with white ribbons and other distincthive
marks” 353. Croatia argued that the majority of the Croat inhabitants of
Antin, for instance, left the village, and the 93 Croats that remained there
had to wear white ribbons on their sleeves ; Croatia added that, at the
350
Cf., Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.08, 4.60, 4.87 and 4.98. According to Croatia,
this obligation to wear white ribbons occurred, e.g., in Sarengrad, Bapska and; ibid.
para. 8.16.8.
351 Ibid., Vol. 2 (I), Annexes 53 (Sarengrad), 66 (Bapska), 76 (Tovarnik), 84 (Tovarnik);
101, 106 and 108 (Lovas), and 128 (Vukovar).
352 Ibid., para. 8.60.
353 Ibid., para. 3.73.
324
7 CIJ1077.indb 644 18/04/16 08:54 324 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
time of the writing of its Memorial, it was still unknown what happened h
to 15 of them 354. Another example was afforded by the village of Saren-
grad, where 412 Croatian inhabitants stayed behind, and all remaining
Croats in the village were forced to wear white ribbons 355.
357. In its oral pleadings, Croatia reiterated its allegations concerning
the marking of the Croatian population. As to the fate of the Croats whoh
were forced to identify themselves by wearing white ribbons, Croatia did
not report a common fate, to all of them. It is not clear from its pleadhings
that absolutely all Croats wearing white ribbons were doomed to be
356
exterminated . Yet Croatia stated, in this connection, that
“across the occupied communities and regions — not isolated inci-
dents, numerous, set out in the pleadings — Croat civilians were
forced to wear white ribbons, and ordered to adorn their homes with
white rags. These were measures of ethnic designation. Thus ear -
marked, they were ready targets for destruction . In Bapska, Croats
were forced to hang white ribbons on their doors by Serbs who
shouted, ‘Ustasha ! We will kill you all’ — in the witness statements.
The Croat populations in Arapovac, Lovas, Sarengrad, Sotin, Tovar-
nik and Vukovar, amongst other places, were forced to wear white
357
bands by Serb forces.”
358. Croatia mainly referred to the fact that they were obliged to iden -
tify themselves with white ribbons to show that they were Croats ;
although their fate seems to have been diverse, the targeted individualsh,
once targeted, became more vulnerable. In this respect, in a response toh a
question I put, during the public sitting before the Court on 5 March
2014, a Croatia’s expert witness stated that Croats
“who were in the camps, were not thus marked (. . .). Such markings
were used in several cases (. . .) — precisely in Lovas and Tovarnik—
where we found victims in mass graves having these markings. And,
according to the general information, it is known that in these locationhs,
358
persons of Croat ethnicity were thus marked with white armbands.”
Thus, it appears from the evidence submitted in the present case that
some of the Croats who were exterminated, were first marked with whiteh
ribbons, or armbands 35, or white sheets on the doors of their homes.
354Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.17.
355Ibid., para. 4.60.
356CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 35.
357
358CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, p. 57 [emphasis added].
359CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 35.
It is not clear from the pleadings of Croatia that absolutely all Croats wearing white
ribbons were doomed to be exterminated, cf. CR 2014/9, p. 35.
325
7 CIJ1077.indb 646 18/04/16 08:54 325 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
3. The Disposal of Mortal Remains
359. In the course of the proceedings in the present case, Croatia
referred to various witness statements describing the mistreatment by
Serbs of the mortal remains of the deceased Croats. There were many
reported cases of corpses that were burnt, or else thrown into mass gravhes
(cf. infra ), and also occurrences in which they were shot (in Central
360 361
Vukovar) , dismembered (in Berak) , and thrown into wells (in Glina),
canals (in Lovas) 362and rivers 363. This was a way, Croatia added, to con-
364
ceal the murders ; excavators were used to transport the mortal remains .
360. For example, in the written phase of the present proceedings, it
was further reported by Croatia that there were mortal remains that wereh
365
simply burnt (in, e.g., Ervenik, Cerovljani, Hum/Podravska, Joševicah) .
Croatia presented also several accounts of corpses that were disposed ofh,
in a haphazard, if not careless way 366. Corpses were found everywhere.
Mortal remains were reported to have been a problem in Vukovar during
the shelling : many corpses remained on the streets, in yards and base -
ments ; 520 deceased persons were transported by Croatians volunteers
367
and soldiers for identification . In Vukovije, according to a witness
three corpses were found on the steps of a house 368. A witness narrated
that, in Tovarnik, there were 48 corpses lying on a road and in yards and
369
their burial was not allowed .
361. I deem it fit to come back to a point I made earlier on, in the pres-
ent dissenting opinion (Part II, supra). This scenario, of the disposal of
unburied mortal remains, brings to the fore (at least in my mind), in han
inter-temporal dimension, the tragedy of Antigone, by Sophocles, some
25 centuries ago. Antigone expresses her determination to defy the tyran -
nical decision of the powerful Creon to expose the corpse of her brother
Polynices so as to rot on the battlefield ; she announces that she will give
360
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.165.
361 Cf. ibid., para. 4.42.
362 Cf. ibid., para. 4.127.
363 Cf. ibid., para. 5.80.
364 Cf. ibid., para. 4.136.
365 Cf. ibid., paras. 5.215, 5.122, 5.41, 5.85 and 5.169-5.170, respectively.
366
A witness stated that he was responsible for collecting the corpses of thhe killed Cro-a
tian civilians with a tractor ; 24 were buried, but it was not possible to identify some of
them ; Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.102. Another witness reports that he was also respon-
sible for digging graves and transporting the deceased ; ibid. Another witness stated that
she saw dead bodies on a trailer driving to the graveyard, where they wehre dropped into
a hole and covered with an excavator ; ibid., para. 4.122. It was reported that columns
of JNA trucks were used to transport the remains of the deceased ; only fivecorpses in
Tor367ci, and nine in Antin, were left in the grav;s ibid., para. 4.138.
Ibid., para. 4.152.
368 Ibid., para.5.62. Elsewhere, a witness saw a corpse on a cargo truck; ibid., para.5.37.
369 Ibid., para. 4.97; and cf. CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, para. 51.
326
7 CIJ1077.indb 648 18/04/16 08:54 326 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
her brother’s mortal remains a proper burial, as she looks forward to her
reunion one day with her deceased beloved relatives :
“I shall bury him myself.
And even if I die in the act, that death
will be a glory. (. . .) I have longer
to please the dead than please the living here (. . .).
(.. .) What greater glory could I win
than to give my own brother [a] decent burial ?”370
362. As a self -inflicted death falls upon Antigone, disgrace promptly
falls upon the despotic Creon as well. The chorus limits itself to say thhat
“the sorrows of the house”, as in ancient times, piles on “the hsorrows of
the dead”, in such a way that “one generation cannot free the nexth” 37.
Love is “never conquered in battle”, and is “alone the victor”h 372. And it
warns that the “power of fate” is a “terrible wond373 neither wealth nor
armies (. . .) can save us from that force” . At the end, the “mighty
blows of fate (. . .) will teach us wisdom” 374.
363. Sophocles’ masterpiece has survived the onslaught of time, and
has continued to inspire literary pieces in distinct ages. With the passhing
of time, Antigone became the symbol of resistance to the omnipotence of
the rulers, as well as of the clash between natural law (defended by hehr)
and positive law (represented by Creon). Its lesson has been captured hby
writers, and has become the object of philosophers’ attention, over the
centuries. In the mid -twentieth century, J. Anouilh wrote his own version
of Antigone’s tragedy, with a distinct outlook, but likewise portraying the
fatality that befell Antigone and the other characters. Anouilh’s trahgedy
Antigone was originally published in 1942, and first performed in 1944, in
Paris under Nazi occupation.
364. Over the centuries, the battlefield has been full of abandoned
corpses, as depicted in so many writings (historical, philosophical andh lit -
erary). It is against this abandonment that Antigone stands. She shows,h
from Sophocles’ times to date, that the dead and the living are close to
each other in many cultures, and ultimately in human conscience. The
determination of Antigone to secure a proper burial of her brother’s hmo-r
tal remains brings the beloved dead closer to their living, and the belohved
living closer to their dead. This perennial lesson is full of humanism. h
Against the imposition of calculations of raison d’Etat, Antigone resists
and remains faithful to herself, upholding fundamental principles and thhe
superior human values underlying them. She sets an example to be fol -
lowed.
370Sophocles, Antigone, verses 85-86, 88-89 and 561-562.
371Ibid., verses 667 and 669-670.
372Ibid., verses 879 and 890.
373Ibid., verses 1045-1047 and 1050.
374Ibid., verses 1469-1470.
327
7 CIJ1077.indb 650 18/04/16 08:54 327 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
365. Nowadays, 25 centuries after Sophocles’ Antigone, have the
“blows of fate” taught us wisdom ? I doubt it. Have the lessons of the suf-
ferings of so many preceding generations been learned ? I am afraid not.
As the present case concerning the Application of the Convention against
Genocide (shows, in situations of conflict, mortal remains continue to be
treated with disdain (cf. supra). And the complaints go on and on. Croa -
tia states that, in 1993, in Tordinci (Eastern Slavonia), corpses were
removed from a mass grave and transported to an unknown place in Ser -
375
bia . In Glina, at least 10 people were killed, but no remains were found
by the date of the submission of the Memorial 376. Still in Glina, the mor-
tal remains of nine civilians were exhumed (on 13 March 1996), but
377
only six of them were identified . Other mortal remains remain missing
elsewhere 37.
366. Furthermore, in Karlovac, Croatia added, the corpses of
five women and one man were removed to an unknown destination, and
by the date of the submission of the Memorial they were not found,
except the corpse of a woman (which was found in a box on the outskirts
379
of the village of Banski Kovačevac) in the spring of 1992 . In its Reply,
Croatia again evoked witness statements found in the Memorial ; and it
adds that, in Dalj, Croat civilians were prevented to flee (after 1 August
1991), and were forced to collect and bury the mortal remains of those
380
killed in the attack .
367. In its arguments in the written phase of the present proceedings,
Serbia did not expressly dismiss Croatia’s claims on mortal remains ahnd
their mistreatment by Serb forces. It instead challenged the reliabilityh of
the evidence produced by Croatia, e.g., as to the number of corpses founhd
in Velepromet (claimed by Croatia to be around a thousand) 381. Then it
contended, in its counter-claim, that Croatia was responsible for misdeehds
against mortal remains of Serbs and for hiding evidence ; it claims, e.g.,
that Croatian soldiers shot into the corpses of Serbs 38. It evoked a wit -
ness statement that, in Glina, a total of 20 dead bodies were strewn all
over the road and on the sides 383. Another witness described that, near
Zirovac, tanks were driven over dead bodies scattered on the road 384.
368. Serbia further claimed that, in Knin, bodies were removed from
the streets in order to hide them from the United Nations ; it added that
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)’s Canadian battal -
375
Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.138, and cf. also para. 4.07.
376 Ibid., para. 5.93.
377 Cf. ibid., para. 5.83.
378 Cf., e.g., ibid., para. 5.179.
379 Ibid., para. 5.157.
380 Cf. Reply of Croatia, para. 5.21.
381 Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 736.
382 Cf. ibid., para. 1222.
383
384 Cf. ibid., para. 1248.
Cf. ibid., para. 1249.
328
7 CIJ1077.indb 652 18/04/16 08:54 328 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ion witnessed that Croatian forces were removing and burning corpses in h
385
order to hide evidence . All this, it argued, was aimed at preventing that
the precise number of victims could be determined 386. In its Rejoinder,
Serbia contended that on the road towards the bridge on the River Sava, h
387
there were many dead bodies of Serbs for about 3.5 km . It added that
Croatian forces removed any traces of dead bodies in order to conceal thhe
388
extent of the alleged crimes committed , by first burning the bodies and
then burying them 389. Many dead bodies were seen lying on the streets in
civilians’ columns fleeing Knin 390.
369. For its part, Croatia, in the oral phase of the present proceedings,
complained that it lacks information on the whereabouts of the remains
of more than 840 Croatian citizens, still missing as the result of the attacks
on civilians 391; it added that Serbia still refuses to help locate their mortal
remains 39. It further referred to another witness statement that there
were countless bodies lying in the streets in the residential area southh of
the Vuka River, which could not be buried because of the danger from
393
shelling . In the town centre by the Danube River, it proceeded, there
were also corpses which remained unburied 394. In Borovo Selo, it
added, Serb paramilitaries killed 12 Croat police officers and mutilated
395
their remains .
370. According to the Applicant, after the shelling of the city of
396
Vukovar, dismembered bodies were seen lying in the rubble ; corpses
lined the street 397. In Velepromet, a witness describes 15 decapitated
bodies by a hole in the ground 398. Turning to the occurrences in Donji
Caglić, Croatia stated that the corpses of civilians were buried in a
trench, dug by a JNA vehicle 399. In Siroka Kula, it added, 29 Croats
were killed by the SAO Krajina and their corpses were thrown into burn -
ing houses 400. Moreover, Croatia proceeded, a witness described
that, around Lovas, Croats were used to clear minefields ; mines would
385
386Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 1262 and 1131.
Ibid., para. 1238.
387Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 652-4.
388Cf. ibid., para. 654.
389Cf. ibid.
390Cf. ibid., para. 760.
391
392CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, para. 6.
CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, para. 40.
393Cf. CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, para. 13.
394Cf. ibid., para. 14.
395Ibid., para. 13.
396
397Ibid., para. 32.
Ibid., para. 38.
398Cf. Ibid., para. 57. Another witness, who was in Vukovar and was taken to Dalj,
described a pit of corpse; cf.bid. para. 77.
399Cf. Reply of Croatia, Vol. 1, para. 6.8; and cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014,
para. 16.
400
Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, para. 27.
329
7 CIJ1077.indb 654 18/04/16 08:54 329 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
go offand ther401ere dead bodies lying all over, and Serb forces were fir -
ing at them .
371. Croatia cited an agreement between Croatia and Serbia, concluded
in 1995, whereby they established a Joint Commission in order, inter alia,
to exhume and identify mortal remains of unidentified bodies. Croatia
contended that the mortal remains of 394persons have been exhumed, but
402
only 103 bodies have been handed over to it . Serbia retorted that “only
103” corpses have been returned to Croatia because only 103 DNA
profiles have matched the DNA samples of the Croatian missing per -
403
sons .
372. In the oral phase of the present proceedings, Serbia claimed that
Croat forces disrespected the mortal remains of Serbs following the Operh -
ation Storm, and removed traces of the corpses that were lying in the
roads 404. Serbia added that the Croats shot at the bodies of dead Serbs 405,
and also referred to occurrences of corpses having been burned by Cro -
406 407
ats ; five of them were found in Bijeli Klanac . According to Serbia,
five tractor drivers were killed by Croatian soldiers and their bodiesh were
thrown into a river 40.
373. From time immemorial to the present, the proper disposal of
mortal remains, particularly in situations of armed conflict or extremhe
violence and disruption of the social order, has been a perennial concerhn.
It marked presence already in the minds of the “founding fathers” hof the
law of nations. One decade ago, in another international jurisdiction
(IACtHR), in my separate opinion in the case of the massacre of the Moi ‑
wana Community v. Suriname (Judgment of 15 June 2005), I deemed it fit
to ponder that :
“It cannot pass unnoticed that an acknowledgement of the duties
of the living towards their dead was, in fact, present in the very ori -
gins, and along the development, of the law of nations. Thus, to refer
but to an example, in his treatise De Jure Belli ac Pacis (of 1625),
H. Grotius dedicated Chapter XIX of Book II to the right of burial
(derecho de sepultura). Therein Grotius sustained that the right of
burying the dead has its origin in the voluntary law of nations, and
401
Cf. CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, p. 55, para. 33.
402CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, p. 37, para. 9.
403CR 2014/24, of 28 March 2014, pp. 60-61, para. 8.
404CR 2014/16, of 12 March 2014, p. 43, para. 3. Serbia cited statements in support of
its clai; cf.bid., pp. 46-51. It further referred to a witness who was called to recognize his
father’s dead body but it was torched the identification was only possible through DNA
analysis; ibid., p. 57, para. 52. Another witness found the mortal remains of a deceased
beneath a burned family house after six months of the conflict in the har;aibid., p. 59,
para. 3.
405Ibid., pp. 44-45, para. 10.
406Ibid., p. 60, para. 11.
407CR 2014/17, of 13 March 2014, p. 44, para. 104.
408Cf. ibid., p. 36, para. 80.
330
7 CIJ1077.indb 656 18/04/16 08:54 330 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
all human beings are reduced to an equality by precisely returning to
the common dust of the earth 409.
Grotius further recalled that there was no uniformity in the original
funeral rites (for example, the ancient Egyptians embalmed, while
most of the Greeks burned, the bodies of the dead before committing
them to the grave ; irrespective of the types of funeral rites, however,
the right of burial was ultimately explained by the dignity of the
410
human person . Grotius further sustained that all human beings,
including ‘public enemies’ (enemigos públicos) were entitled to
burial, this being a precept of ‘virtue and humanity.’” 411(IACtHR,
Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Judgment of 15 June 2005,
paras. 60-61.)
374. Despite this long-lasting concern, mortal remains keep on being
disrespected, as the present case concerning the Application of the Conven‑
tion against Genocide shows. And this is not the only contemporary exam-
ple of this sad disdain. This is so — as I further pointed out in my
aforementioned separate opinion in the Moiwana Community case (ibid.,
para. 63) — despite the fact that international humanitarian law provides
for respect for the remains of the deceased. Article 130 of the
1949 IV Geneva Convention (on the Protection of Civilian Persons)
requires all due care and respect with mortal remains. Article 34 of Pro -
tocol I of 1977 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 elaborates on the
matter in greater detail ; and
“the commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross
on that Article points out that the respect due to the remains of the
deceased ‘implies that they are disposed of as far as possible in accho-rd
ance with the wishes of the religious beliefs of the deceased, insofar
as these are known’, and warns that ‘even reasons of overriding puhb -
lic necessity cannot in any case justify a lack of respect for the remains
of the deceased’” 412(ibid.).
4. The Existence of Mass Graves
375. In the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, Croatia submitted argu -
ments in relation to mass graves discovered in various municipalities,
both in its written and in its oral pleadings. It focused on the description
of crimes committed in each municipality and the existence of mass gravehs
409
H. Grotius, Del Derecho de la Guerra y de la Paz [1625], Vol. III (Books II and III),
Madrid, Edit. Reus, 1925, p. 39, and cf., p. 55.
410 Ibid., pp. 43 and 45.
411 Ibid., pp. 47 and 49; and cf.H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis [1625] (ed.
B. M. Telders), The Hague, Nijhoff, 1948, p. 88 (abridged version).
412 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva, ICRC/
Nijhoff, 1987, pp. 369 and 379.
331
7 CIJ1077.indb 658 18/04/16 08:54 331 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
proving the commission of the crimes. It also submitted material evidenche
of mass graves, including photographs and colour plates of mass graves,
as annexes to its pleadings.
376. The analysis of Croatia’s arguments demonstrates that mass
graves were common across many of the municipalities that it presented. h
Croatia submitted photographic and documentary evidence recording the
findings made during the excavation of mass graves, as proof of the
crimes that it alleges to have been committed. It seems, from the evidenhce
and arguments examined, that the amount of mass graves in various
municipalities supports the allegation that mass killings were committedh
against Croats.
377. In the course of the written phase of the present proceedings, Cro -
413
atia developed its arguments concerning mass graves in its Memorial .
It submitted that, in total, 126 mass graves were found (at the time of the
writing of the Memorial), of which 61 were in Eastern Slavonia 414. Croa-
tia mentioned mass graves found in various municipalities, including, e.hg.,
villages in Eastern Slavonia : in Banovina, where 39 mass graves were dis-
covered and 241 bodies have been exhumed (of which 175 have been
identified) 415; in Kordun and Lika, where 11 mass graves were found 41;
and in the village of Lovas. Croatia submitted arguments and informa -
tion in relation to each mass grave. In relation to Vukovar, for exampleh,
Croatia submitted that most of Vukovar was completely destroyed and
that the mass grave at Ovčara, where some 200 Croats were taken by
Serbs from the Vukovar Hospital, summarily executed and then left in a
shallow mass grave 417.
378. Still in respect of Vukovar, Croatia submitted that three mass
graves were found : Ovčara, where 200 corpses were found (and 145 per-
sons were identified) ; in Novo Groblje, 938 mortal remains were found
(and 722 persons were identified) ; in Nova Street 10 mortal remains were
found (and six persons were identified). A grave containing three corpses
was found in Borovo Selo. Croatia submits that “[t]hese numbers are pha-r
alleled only in the Prijedor County in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 418. In
total, Croatia contended, 1,151 corpses were found in the mass graves in
Vukovar 419.
413
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, Annexes 165-166. Cf. also ibid., Vol. 3, Section 7 (Identi-
fied Mass Graves).
414Ibid., para. 8.11.
415Ibid., para. 5.77.
416Ibid., para. 5.137.
417Cf. ibid., para. 4.175. As to the Ovčara mass grave, Croatia refers to the Report on
Evacuation of the Vukovar Hospital and the Mass Grave at Ovčara, UN Commission of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council resolution780 (1993), and Physicians for
Human Rights, Reports of Preliminary Site Exploration of a Mass Grave Nehar Vukovar,
Former Yugoslavia, and Appendices A-D (19 January 1993).
418
Ibid., para. 4.188.
419Ibid.
332
7 CIJ1077.indb 660 18/04/16 08:54 332 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
379. At the time of the writing of the Memorial, Croatia further argued
that, due to the operations of the Serb paramilitary groups and the JNA
in the area of Western Slavonia, five mass graves were found, from which
20 bodies were exhumed and identified, and that almost all of the identi -
fied corpses were Croats 420. Croatia added that, at the time of the writing
of the Memorial,
“sixty-one mass graves have been found in Eastern Slavonia (. . .)
2,028 people have been exhumed of whom 1,533 have been identified.
In the Osijek-Baranja County, 171 persons were exhumed and 135 of
them were identified. In the Vukovar SrijemCounty 1,857persons were
exhumed, and 1,418 of them were identified. Further mass graves are
still being discovered. Moreover, many of the mass graves, which came
into being in the relevant period, acted as temporary burial sites only.h”21
380. Croatia further submitted that “[t]he JNA often dug up the bodies
and moved them to other parts of the occupied territory or Serbia. For
example, dead bodies from the village of Tordinci were taken to Serbia
422
and dead bodies from Tikveš were taken to Beli Manastir” . In relation
to Eastern Slavonia, for example, Croatia contended, as to the village ohf
Tenja, that a mass grave was exhumed on the farm, and the remains of
three persons were identified. In the village of Berak, in the region hof
Eastern Slavonia, a mass grave between Orolik and Negoslavci, in a val -
ley called “Sarviz”, was also found 423. Croatia also reported exhumations
of mass graves in Ilok 42. In the village of Tovarnik, Croatia added, it
was common for the Serb paramilitary groups to force Croats to bury
their fellow dead, and it referred to a witness testimony confirming thhe
existence of mass graves and numerous murders of Croatian civilians 42.
381. Similarly, at the time of the writing of the Memorial, in the village
of Lovas, the mass grave of 68people at the local graveyard was exhumed,
and 67 were identified. As to the village of Tordinci, Croatia asserted that h
the corpses of
“approximately 209 Croats [were] discovered near the Catholic
Church. (. . .) The registrar of Tordinci was to list the people in the
mass grave, but because of the number of corpses, he was unable to
complete the task. Till today the identity of some of these persons is
not known. In 1993, the bodies were removed from the grave and
transported to an unknown place in Serbia. (. . .) Columns of JNA
trucks were used to transport the remains of the dead and only
five bodies of the inhabitants of Tordinci and nine inhabitants of the
420
421Memorial of Croatia, para. 5.04.
422Ibid., para. 4.07.
Ibid.
423Ibid., para. 4.41.
424Ibid., para. 4.72.
425Ibid., para. 4.102; and cf. Annex 83.
333
7 CIJ1077.indb 662 18/04/16 08:54 333 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
village of Antin were left in the grave. These were subsequently exhumedh
and identified, while the others are still registered as missing.” 426
Furthermore, in relation to the village of Saborsko, Croatia submitted
that “the village was completely obliterated and the population exterhmi-
nated. Bodies of the murdered Croats were buried several days later in ah
mass grave prepared by an excavator” 42.
382. In its Reply, Croatia reiterated its arguments and updated the
information submitted in its Memorial,428cluding information about the
location and exhumation of bodies found since the filing of the Memo-
rial. In its Reply, Croatia relied upon further sites of mass graves “has
showing the context and breadth of the killings committed by the Serbianh
429
forces” . Croatia also retorted Serbia’s arguments as to an alleged lack
of impartiality of the information obtained : it asserts that international
entities, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR), the Organization for Security and Co -operation in
Europe (OSCE), and the Observation Commission of the European Com -
munity (in addition to the ICTY itself) were invited to observe the exhhu-
mation of mass graves in Croatia 430.
383. Further in its Reply, Croatia recalled that the ICTY also made
findings in relation to mass graves in Croatia, in the Mrkšić, Radić and
Sljivančanin case. In the words of the ICTY :
“In the Chamber’s finding, in the evening and night hours of
20-21 November 1991 the prisoners of war were taken in groups of
10 to 20 from the hangar at Ovčara to the site where earlier that
afternoon a large hole had been dug. There, members of Vukovar TO
and paramilitary soldiers executed at least 194 of them. The killings
started after 21:00 hours and continued until well after midnight. The
bodies were buried in the mass grave and remained undiscovered
until several years later.” (ICTY, Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin,
431
paras. 252-253.)
384. Croatia further referred to the ICTY (Trial Chamber) findings in
the Martić case in relation to mass graves. It found, e.g., that some per -
sons from Cerovljani (it names them) were intentionally killed. It thehn
recalled “the manner in which the victims from Hrvatska Dubica were
rounded up and detained in the fire station” on 20 October 1991, and
then killed on 21 October 1991 at Krečane near Baćin, and “buried in the
mass grave at that location”. The Trial Chamber considered that the
crimes in Cerovljani were “almost identical” to those in Hrvatska Dubica,
426
427Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.138.
428Ibid., para. 5.152.
Cf. Reply of Croatia, Annexes 43-46.
429Ibid., para. 5.12.
430Ibid., para. 2.56.
431Ibid., para. 5.80.
334
7 CIJ1077.indb 664 18/04/16 08:54 334 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
“including that most of the victims were buried at the mass grave in h
Krečane”. The Trial Chamber considered it “proven beyond reasonhable
doubt that these victims were civilians and that they were not taking an
active part 432the hostilities at the time of their deaths” (ICTY, Martić,
para. 359) .
385. Serbia, for its part, submitted that some of the evidence, especially
433
graphics called “mass graves”, were prepared by Croatian official bodies .
In its view, evidence of mass graves was of “little worth”, considhering that
“the exhumation reports do not provide evidence of genuinely mass
graves of the sort found in Srebrenica, Rwanda and Eastern Europe
following World War II. Rather, the burials seemed to be of relatively
small clusters of deceased persons, dispersed throughout the various
regions and municipalities of Slavonia.” 434
However, much as it tried to discredit the evidence, Serbia did not come
to the point of denying the existence of mass graves.
386. In the course of its oral pleadings, Croatia reiterated its conten -
tions in relation to the existence of mass graves, their location and the
bodies found therein. It added that new mass graves were found more
recently, e.g., the mass grave in Sotin, containing 13 corpses 435. Croatia
also argued, in relation to Eastern Slavonia, that, within a year of Ser -
bia’s occupation, the communities of the region had been destroyed anhd
that
“[t]he intent to destroy the Croat population is as clear as the figures
are stark (. . .): 510 mass graves have since been discovered, contain-
ing the corpses of nearly 2,300 men, women and children ; many
others have been discovered in individual graves. More still are being
discovered yearly.” 436
387. Croatia further recalled the statement of an expert witness during
its oral pleadings (Mr. Grujić), who testified, inter alia, about mass graves.
He stated that “[a]s regards exhumations and the discovery of mass grhaves,
and the time of their creation”, he had to say that “the first mhass graves had
432Reply of Croatia, para. 6.35. And cf. also ICTY (Trial Chamber), Martić case,
paras. 364-367, as to atrocities committed in Bać; paras.202-208, as to Lipovača; and
paras.233-234, as to killings in Saborsko.
433
434Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 264.
Ibid., para. 349.
435CR 2014/8, p. 22, para. 55.
436Ibid., p. 27, para. 71. Croatia then corrected this statement in the following terms :
“What I intended to say was that a total of 510mass and individual graves had
been discovered in Eastern Slavonia containing almost 2,300 bodies. We have now
checked the most up -to-date figures on the website of the Directorate for Missing
and Detained Persons, and it is 71 mass graves, and 432 individual graves in
Eastern Slavonia, giving a total of 503.” (CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 10.)
335
7 CIJ1077.indb 666 18/04/16 08:54 335 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
come into existence as early as July 1991437and “were continually coming
into existence still [in] the year1992” . He further asserted that the largest
mass grave found is the one at the new Vukovar Cemetery, where there areh
938 victims 43. In an answer to a question that I posed, the witness stated
that, in Lovas and Tovarnik, corpses of victims were found in mass gravehs
having markings such as white bands on their arms, and that, “accordihng
to the general information, it is known that in these locations, personsh of
439
Croat ethnicity were thus marked with white armbands” (cf. supra).
388. Croatia further stated, in respect of individual and mass graves,
that, upon Serbia’s withdrawal from the occupied areas of Croatia in h
1995, “mass and individual graves containing the remains of Croat vich -
tims of the genocide began to be uncovered. These graves have been
painstakingly excavated and recorded by [its] Directorate for Detained
440 441
and Missing Persons” . As to the numbers of victims in those graves ,
Croatia submitted that,
“by July 2013, 142 mass graves [plate on] had been discovered in
Croatia, containing the bodies of 3,656 victims. Three thousand,
one hundred and twenty-one (3,121) of those have been identified.
Twenty -seven (27) per cent of these 3,121 bodies were women, and
38.5 per cent of them wer442lder than 60. Thirty-seven (37) minors
were also identified.”
389. Croatia proceeded that, “[b]y December 2013, over 1,100 such
graves have been identified across the formerly occupied territory of h
Croatia”. Croatia added that its efforts to discover the graves have
been hindered by “Serbia’s practice of removing and reburying vic -
tims during its occupation of the region — often in Serbia — in a vain
attempt to cover up its atrocities” 443. In any case, the existence of mass
graves had not been denied, and, towards the end of the nineties, such
graves — in Croatia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina — were fully
documented 444.
437CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 28.
438
439Ibid., p. 29.
440Ibid., p. 35.
CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 18.
441As to the definition of mass graves, Croatia contends that, since therhe is no univer-
sally accepted definition of a “mass grave” in international lawh, it thus follows the defini-
tion coined by the UNSpecial Rapporteur of the (former) Commission on Human Rights,
appointed “to investigate first hand the human rights situation in hthe territory of the
former Yugoslavia”, who defined mass grave as a grave containing thhree or more bodies
cf.ibid. p. 19, para. 42.
442
Ibid., p. 19.
443Ibid., p. 20.
444On the results of the research on the matter, conducted in both Croatia hand Bosnia
and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1997, cf., e.g., The Graves — Srebrenica and Vukovar (eds.
E. Stover and G. Peress), Berlin/Zurich/N.Y., Scalo Ed., 1998, pp. 5-334.
336
7 CIJ1077.indb 668 18/04/16 08:54 336 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
5. Further Clarifications from
the Cross‑Examination of Witnesses
390. The information provided to the International Court of Justice in
the course of the proceedings of the present case concerning the Applica‑
tion of the Convention against Genocide leaves it crystal clear, in my per -
ception, that the attacks in Croatia were an onslaught, not exactly a wahr ;
there was a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction of the civihl-
ian population, of the villagers, on account of their ethnicity. In my pher-
ception, as extreme violence intensified, there was, clearly, an intenht, not
only to displace them forcefully from their homes, but also to destroy
them. Further clarifications were provided by the cross -examination of
witnesses, that I cared to undertake in the public and closed sittings
before the International Court of Justice from 4 to 6 March 2014. Those
additional clarifications pertain to three specific topics, namely :(a) acts
of intimidation and extreme violence ; (b) marking of Croats with white
ribbons; (c) burials of mortal remains.
391. As to the first point, in the Court’s public sitting of 4 March 2014,
I asked the witness (Mr. Kožul) the following question : “What was the
decisive factor for sorting the persons detained in Vukovar ? Where and
how was the selection carried out ?” And he replied that they “knew that
the army was coming to different parts of the cities. Because of that, weh
invited people to come to the hospital. Most of the separations took plahce
in the hospital. The rest of the separations took place where people haph -
445
pened to be.” Next, in the Court’s closed sitting of 6 March 2014, I
asked the following question to the witness (Ms Milić), and she provided
the following response :
“— Did you know of, or do you remember, any initiative to con -
tain, to avoid, or to stop the continued acts of violence reported
in your statement ? (. . .) Do you have knowledge of, or do you
remember, any initiative to contain, to avoid, or to stop the
continued acts of violence narrated in your statement ?
— I did not hear that there were any attempts to help or to defend
446
us.”
392. In the International Court of Justice public sitting of 5 March
2014, I proceeded to the cross-examination on the issue of the marking of
Croats with white ribbons, thus reported :
“Judge Cançado Trindade : I thank the expert witness very much
for his testimony. I have one particular question to ask.
The Data on Victims contained in your statement refers, in Part 2
(paras. 6-9), to victims exhumed from mass and individual graves.
445
446CR 2014/7, of 4 March 2014, p. 20.
CR 2014/11, of 6 March 2014, pp. 23-24.
337
7 CIJ1077.indb 670 18/04/16 08:54 337 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
And Part 3 (paras. 10-13) refers to persons detained in camps, sub -
jected, as stated in paragraph 13, to violence with ‘the utmost level of
cruelty’.
In respect of the former, that is, victims exhumed from mass and
individual graves, it is mentioned in your statement (para. 8) that ‘in
certain locations in the Croatian Podunavlje, the killing of Croats
who remained to live in their homes was preceded by their marking
(white bands on the upper arms)’. To the best of your knowledge,
(. . .) did this also happen in respect of the latter, that is, of those
detained in camps? If so, did all those so marked have the same fate?
Mr. Grujić [witness]: Persons who were in the camps, were not thus
marked as far as I know. Such markings were used in several cases
that we have established — precisely in Lovas and Tovarnik— where
we found victims in mass graves having these markings. And, accord -
ing to the general information, it is known that in these locations,
447
persons of Croat ethnicity were thus marked with white armbands.”
393. The other point on which further clarifications were obtained
from the witnesses, that of burials of mortal remains, was the subject ohf
the cross-examination that I deemed it fit to conduct in the International
Court of Justice public sitting of 5 March 2014, reported as follows :
“ Judge Cançado Trindade : (. . .) I thank the witness very much
for her testimony, and I proceed to my questions, pertaining to the
burying of the murdered people after the fall of Bogdanovci.
At the end of your statement (last paragraph) it is asserted that,
after the destruction of the village of Bogdanovci, those who were
buried in the so-called School Square were so ‘in such a way that their
bodies were wrapped in tents and buried with a bottle next to their
bodies. These bottles contained the data of the dead persons’.
Ms Katić: Yes, the data were names and surnames of those persons.
Judge Cançado Trindade : Do you know if the burials described in
your statement were attended by the close relatives of the deceased
ones Or were they buried by third persons ?In that case, was there
a disruption of family life and after -life in Bogdanovci ? (.. .) I won
der whether the funerals were prepared and carried out by persons
who belonged to the inner family circles of the deceased ones.
Ms Katić: The burials of our dead friends, I was the one to prepare
the dead for the burial. In the medical corps, I would remove the
clothes, I would put them either in tent halves, or in black sacks, and h
I would put that bottle containing the names and surnames. There
was a young man, IvicaSimunović is his name, his brother was killed.
447CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 35.
338
7 CIJ1077.indb 672 18/04/16 08:54 338 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
He would usually say a prayer, because we had no priest. We had
some sacred water, we would sprinkle the dead. Branko Krajina was
another person who would assist with the burials of those persons.
But sometimes, it was not possible to take the dead bodies out of the
places where they were, such as basements or garages. So, if it was
not possible to remove the dead body, we would cover it with slack
lime.
Judge Cançado Trindade: Thank you for this clarification.” 448
394. These further clarifications which ensued from the cross-examina-
tion of witnesses in public and closed sittings before the Court, in addhi -
tion to those lodged with it by means of affidavits, are further evidenhce of
the widespread and systematic pattern of destruction which occurred in
the attacks against the civilian population in Croatia which form the dos ‑
sier of the cas d’espèce. To that evidence we can also add the findings of
the ICTY, of the devastation that took place, in particular in the
period 1991-1992, as examined in the course of the present dissenting
opinion.
6. Forced Displacement of Persons and Homelessness
395. The case law of the ICTR, likewise, contains relevant indications
as to the imposition of unbearable conditions of life upon the targeted h
groups. In the Kayishema and Ruzindana case (Judgment of 21 May
1999), for example, the ICTR adopted the interpretation whereby “delhib -
erately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bringh about
its physical destruction in whole or in part” 449includes
“methods of destruction which do not immediately lead to the death
of members of the group. (. . .) [T]he conditions of life envisaged
include rape, the starving of a group of people, reducing required
medical services below a minimum, and withholding sufficient living
accommodation for a reasonable period, provided the above would
lead to the destruction of the group in whole or in part.” (ICTR,
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment of 21 May 1999, para. 116.)
396. In the same vein, in the Gacumbitsi case (7 July 2006), the ICTR,
after recalling that, in accordance with its jurisprudence, genocidal intent
can be proven by inference from the facts and circumstances of a case
(ICTR, Gacumbitsi, Judgment of 7 July 2006, para. 40), added that these
latter could include “the general context”, and
“the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed agaihnst
the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic tar -
448
449CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, pp. 22-23.
Cf. Part XIII (4) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
339
7 CIJ1077.indb 674 18/04/16 08:54 339 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
geting of victims on account of their membership of a particular
group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts”
(ICTR, Gacumbitsi, Judgment of 7 July 2006, para. 41).
397. In effect, in the present case concerning the Application of the
Convention against Genocide, those who were forcibly displaced, expelled
from their homes (many of them destroyed), were subjected to unbear -
able conditions of life, or rather, of seeking to survive. It is not surhprising
that, in the course of the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, both Croatia, in
its main claim, and Serbia, in its counter-claim, presented arguments inh
relation to refugees, albeit in different contexts.
398. As to its claim, Croatia contended that many atrocities were com -
mitted against refugees by Serb forces. It stated that nearly 7,000 refugees
from neighbouring villages were established in Ilok 450, which was the ini-
tial site of refuge for Croats banished from other parts of the region of
Eastern Slavonia ; according to Croatia, a mass exodus took place from
the town on 17 October 1991 451. During the exodus, the refugees were
exposed to humiliation and molestation by the JNA and paramilitary
Serbian forces. Many properties were allegedly confiscated 452. Croats
who decided not to leave were subjected to physical and psychological
453
harassment and even killing .
399. Croatia furthermore reports additional cases of harassment
against Croatian refugees that were leaving Bapska after its occupation.h
It contends that around 1,000 Croats fled in the direction of Sid in Serbia,
when they were stopped by Serb police and later imprisoned. Croatia
states that some of them were used as “human shield” to protect Sehrb
forces and others killed, while some others had to look for refuge in thhe
surrounding woods 45. According to Croatia, Croat refugees in Serb
occupied territories were prevented to return home on a permanent
455
basis . It added that the “RSK” charged Croatian refugees who fought
in the Croatian forces with various criminal offences and thus created
obstacles for their return 456.
400. For its part, as to its counter-claim, Serbia also reported on
attacks against Serb refugees on the part of Croatia : according to Serbia,
refugee columns and fleeing individuals were targeted and attacked by h
457
Croatian forces during August 1995 . Serbia further claimed that Croa-
tia imposed physical barriers to the return of Serb refugees, mainly by h
450
451 Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.64.
452 Ibid., para. 4.62.
Ibid., para. 4.65.
453 Ibid., para. 4.66.
454 Ibid., para. 4.85.
455 Reply of Croatia, paras. 10.34 and 10.40.
456 Ibid., para. 10.42.
457 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 1242-1257; cf. also Rejoinder of Serbia,
paras. 745-761.
340
7 CIJ1077.indb 676 18/04/16 08:54 340 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
458
destroying houses and properties , in addition to legal barriers, inter
alia, by enacting laws to confiscate their properties 459.
401. Both Croatia and Serbia cited common legal efforts to address the
issues of refugees 46, but each contending Party claimed they were vio -
lated by the opposing Party 461. Thus, it can be concluded that both Par -
ties have addressed, and acknowledged, the issue of attacks against
refugees, and in more generic terms, the treatment of refugees by the
opposing Party. In the present Judgment, the International Court of Jus -
tice referred to evidence produced before it, but in particular in relation
to the counter-claim only 462. Yet, the dossier of the present case clearly
shows that there were refugees on both sides, under attacks or harassment
and humiliation, as demonstrated by pleadings of both Parties.
402. If one considers, in the course of the proceedings of the present
case, the depth of the arguments of the contending Parties in relation tho
the main claim as a whole, to try to put the counter-claim on an almost h
equal footing as the claim would seem, to a certain extent, unfair. Nothh-
ing would justify it, as there is a lack of proportion between them. In h
effect, the contending Parties have submitted voluminous evidence in
relation to the claim including witness statements (both in the writtenh and
oral phases), photographs, mass graves data, and other important
material evidence of the alleged genocide committed in Croatia. In con -
trast, the evidence submitted in support of the counter-claim does not
seem comparable, in quantitative and qualitative terms.
403. In my perception, the evidence submitted by Croatia in support of
its main claim is far more convincing in terms of the actus reus and mens
rea of genocide. Likewise, the contending Parties’ arguments, at both theh
written and oral phases of the proceedings, have dedicated far greater
458
Rejoinder of Serbia, paras. 773-774.
459Ibid., paras. 775-780.
460Cf., inter alia, the role of UNPROFOR in securing the return of refugees and
displaced persons to their homes, Memorial of Croatia, para.2.125; the signature of the
Dayton Agreement of 1995, addressing inter alia the issues of refugees, ibid., para. 2.153-
2.154. Cf. also the role of the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia
(UNTAES — established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1037 (1996), which
had among its duties to enable all refugees and displaced persons to exehrcise the right of
free return to their homes), ibid., paras. 2.155-2.158. Cf., moreover, the Agreement on the
Procedures for Return (addressing the issue of refugees), signed by Croatia, UNTAES,
and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1997, ibid., para. 2.157 ; and
cf. further the Vance Plan of December 1991, in Reply of Croatia, paras. 10.12-10.24.
461
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 2.129 and 2.148; Counter-Memorial of Serbia,
para. 570; Rejoinder of Serbia, paras.9-685. As to the Vance Plan, cf. Reply of Croatia,
paras. 10.39-10.43. The mandate of the UNTAES, however, was considered a major h
success; cf.emorial of Croatia, para. 2.158.
462Cf. paras. 458, 484 and 492.
341
7 CIJ1077.indb 678 18/04/16 08:54 341 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
attention to the main claim than to the counter-claim. The evidence pro -
duced as to this latter 463 is, in contrast, far less convincing ; this does not
mean that war crimes were not committed, e.g., in the course of the
“Operation Storm”, with its numerous Serb (civilians) victims. Thhe pres-
ent Judgment of the International Court of Justice recounts aspects of thhe
counter-claim (Part VI) that could have been considered in less extensive
terms 464, without an apparently superficial attempt to address the claim
and the counter-claim on an almost equal footing.
404. Last but not least, it is nowadays widely known that the problem
of forced migrations assumed great proportions in the wars in the formerh
Yugoslavia during the nineties, with thousands of refugees and displacedh
persons from Croatia, Bosnia -Herzegovina and Kosovo, successively.
There are accounts and studies of the sufferings and almost unbearable
conditions of life to which victims were exposed, not seldom with the
465
separation and dissolution of families and the destruction of homes .
405. The humanitarian crisis of mass forced migrations began with a
first wave of internally displaced persons (end of 1991), followed bhy waves
of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia -Herzegovina (early 1992 onwards).
It was estimated, half a decade later, that there were 180,000 internally
displaced persons in Croatia, as well as 170,000 refugees from Bosnia -
466
Herzegovina (over 80 per cent of them being Bosnian -Croats) . Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were engaged in assisting the
voluntary repatriation or return of refugees to Croatia and Bosnia -
Herzegovina. Mass forced migrations were another component of the
widespread and systematic pattern of extreme violence and destruction inh
the wars in the Balkans during the nineties.
406. It cannot pass unnoticed here that, in its Decision of 11 July 1996,
in the Karadžić and Mladić case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber), in reviewing
the indictments, invoked the charge of genocide (ICTY, Karadžić and
Mladić, decision of 11 July 1996, para. 6), and stressed the subhuman
conditions of detention of civilians, with the occurrence of crimes (suhch as
torture and rape of women inside the camps or at other places) (ibid.,
para. 13); it further addressed the devastating effects of forced displace -
463
E.g., in relation to Operation Storm (August 1995).
464There would, e.g., hardly be anything to add to what the International Chourt of
Justice found, in the present Judgment, in relation to the transcript ofh the Brioni meeting
of 31 July 1995 (paras. 501-507).
465Cf., inter alia, e.g., N. Mrvić-Petrović, “Separation and Dissolution of the Family”,
Women, Violence and War — Wartime Victimization of Refugees in the Balkans (ed.
V. Nikolić-Ristanović), Budapest, Central European University Press, 2000, pp. 135-149
N. Mrvić-Petrović and I. Stevanović, “Life in Refuge — Changes in Socioeconomic and
Fam466al Status”, in ibid., pp. 151-169.
Cf., for an account, inter alia, P. Stubbs, Displaced Promises — Forced Migration,
Refuge and Return in Croatia and Bosnia‑Herzegovina, Uppsala/Sweden, Life & Peace
Institute, 1999, pp. 1 and 21-22.
342
7 CIJ1077.indb 680 18/04/16 08:54 342 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ments and abandonment (meant to be definitive) of homes (ICTY,
Karadžić and Mladić, decision of 11 July 1996, para. 14), and of expulsion
and deportation (ibid., paras. 16-17) 467.
7. Destruction of Cultural Goods
407. Earlier on in the present dissenting opinion, in examining the
widespread and systematic pattern of extreme violence and destruction inh
the factual context of the cas d’espèce, I dwelt upon the destruction of
group culture 46. In addition to the examples already mentioned, I see it
fit now to consider the shelling of Dubrovnik (October -December 1991),
as it was the object of particular attention on the part of the contendihng
Parties in the course of the proceedings of the present case.
(a) Arguments of the contending Parties
408. According to Croatia, Serb politicians were planning to include
the city of Dubrovnik in Serbian territory ; the JNA carefully planned and
premeditated the attacks against the Old Town, and the indiscriminate
shelling of Dubrovnik began on the 1 October 1991 and continued until
December 1991 ; under fear, 34,000 were expelled from their homes, and
the inhabitants who remained in the occupied surrounding villages were
taken to camps and some were tortured 46. There were also killings 470.
Supplies were cut off, while the town kept being bombarded with heavy
artillery. Inhabitants were denied access to medical assistance, food anhd
water. Mistreatments, physical and mental intimidation, and house
471
destruction were routinely conducted .
409. Furthermore, Croatia added, there was a deliberate intent to
destroy important symbols of Croatian culture ; many cultural and sacral
objects were destroyed in Dubrovnik, mainly in the Old Town : the JNA
caused damage to at least 683 monuments, such as churches, chapels, city
472
walls and others . In its attacks against Dubrovnik, it proceeded, the
JNA tried to destroy the town in a way that could not be justified by hany
principle of military necessity or logic, thus pointing to its genocidalh
467It also addressed the “policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’” (parash.60-62, 90 and 93-95).
468Cf. Part X (4) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
469
470Memorial of Croatia, paras. 2.77, 3.90 and 5.237.
According to Croatia, some 161 civilians were killed, 272 wounded, and one is still
missing; ibid., para. 5.237.
471According to Croatia, 11 men from the villages of Bistroće and Berojeh were brought
to camp Morinje, where they were subjected to mistreatments of all sortsh including ;orture
ibid. para. 5.238. Some others were made prisoners and taken in “the camps Morinjhe, in
Boka Kotorska and Bileća in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some were beahten to death” ;
ibid. para. 5.240.
472Ibid., para. 5.241.
343
7 CIJ1077.indb 682 18/04/16 08:54 343 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
473
intentions . Croatia further referred to the ICTY (Appeals Chamber)
Judgments relating to Dubrovnik, in the Strugar case (of 17 July 2008)
and in Jokić case (of 30 August 2005), and claimed that the conduct in
474
Dubrovnik was an attempt to commit genocide .
410. Serbia also referred to the ICTY’s convictions and sentencing of
M. Jokić and P. Strugar for the shelling of the Old Town of the city on
475
6 December 1991 , and claimed that Croatia had failed to prove that
any of the crimes were committed or attempted with genocidal intent.
Serbia challenged the witness st476ments (for allegedly not fulfillinhg the
requirements of affidavits) . It added that the ICTY addressed the
alleged crimes in the area of Dalmatia and concluded that they did not
fulfil the requirements of extermination as crime against humanity (the
killings were allegedly not committed on a large scale) 477. In Serbia’s
view, no genocidal intent was demonstrated in relation to the events in
478
Dubrovnik .
411. As to the differences concerning the number of victims, Croatia
observed that the charges in the Strugar and Jokić cases pertained only to
the attacks on Dubrovnik in December 1991 (commencing with the shell-
ing on 6 December 1991), and did not give detailed consideration to the
crimes committed in the period between 1 October 1991 and 5 December
1991, other than by way of background context. It added that the deaths h
in Dubrovnik occurred over a much longer period, and not solely as a
479
result of the December attacks .
412. Croatia acknowledged that the Jokić and Strugar cases did not
provide the exact number of victims killed by the attacks on Dubrovnik
in October and November 1991, since the main focus was on the events
of 6 December 1991 ; the charges in those two cases did not take into
account the crimes committed between 1 October 1991 and 5 December
1991 480. According to Croatia, both the Jović and Strugar cases support
its claims that they refer to the factual background of what occurred in
481
Dubrovnik, i.e., to the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik .
473
474Memorial of Croatia, para. 5.236.
Ibid., para. 8.27.
475Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 924.
476Ibid., para. 920.
477Ibid., paras. 994 and 927, and cf. paras. 923-924.
478Ibid., para. 925.
479Cf. Reply of Croatia, para. 6.97. Croatia further noted that the ICTY itself
referred to the shelling of Dubrovnik in both October and November 1991; cf.ibid.,
paras. 6.99-6.105. And, according to the ICTY, “the evidence establishes that theh shelling
of the Old Town on 12 November was intense” ; cf.bid., para. 6.100.
480Cf. ibid., paras. 6.101-6.102.
481Cf. ibid., paras. 6.98-6.105.
344
7 CIJ1077.indb 684 18/04/16 08:54 344 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
413. Moreover, Croatia quoted the ICTY’s Strugar decision, where it
was stated that : (a) “the Old Town was extensively targeted by JNA” ;
(b) “no military firing points or other objectives, real or believed, ihn the
Old Town were targeted by the JNA” (c) as a;consequence to the previ-
ous fact, “in the Chamber’s finding, the intent of the perpetrathors was to
target civilians and civilian objects in the Old Town” ; (d) the ICTY
found as a fact that the JNA had carefully planned and premeditated the h
482
attack and it was not a spontaneous action .
414. Serbia retorted that Jokić and Strugar were not charged for crimes
against humanity or genocide in those cases, and claimed that the attacks
483
on Dubrovnik do not satisfy the requirements of genocide . It further
argued that the attacks were not authorized by the leadership of the JNAh,
and that there was no policy aimed at the destruction of the Croats 48. In
its view, the Strugar and Jokić cases do not contain evidence that the
attacks on Dubrovnik were ordered or instructed by the leadership of
Serbia 485.
(b) General assessment
415. As just seen, much of the debate between Croatia and Serbia was
around the cases against M. Jokić and P. Strugar — JNA officials alleged
to be responsible for the attacks of 6 December 1991 against Dubrovnik—
before the ICTY. Yet, Dubrovnik was under heavy attack by the JNA
not only on 6 December 1991, but for a much longer period, during which
a number of concomitant occurrences took place during and after the
attacks, namely, torture, transfer of prisoners, beatings and killings, hdis -
closing altogether a pattern of extreme violence and destruction.
416. Serbia stated, as to occurrences in Dubrovnik, that there were no
charges of genocide in the aforementioned cases in the ICTY 486. But what
can be the relevance of the absence of the charge of genocide for the prhes -
ent case opposing Croatia to Serbia before the International Court
of Justice, as regards the occurrences in Dubrovnik, considering that
different standards of proof apply (cf. supra) in cases pertaining to indi -
vidual (domestic) criminal responsibility and to international State
responsibility ?
417. All groups and peoples have the right to the preservation of their
cultural heritage, of their modus vivendi, of their human values. The
482Cf. Reply of Croatia, paras. 6.103-6.105.
483Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, paras. 408 and 473.
484Cf. ibid., para. 474.
485Cf. ibid., para. 475.
486Cf. ibid., paras. 403-404; and cf. Reply of Croatia, paras. 6.97-6.105.
345
7 CIJ1077.indb 686 18/04/16 08:54 345 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
destruction of cultural goods, that occurred in the JNA bombardments of h
Dubrovnik, shows lack of and — worse still — disdain for, human val -
ues 48. There was a deliberate destruction, by the JNA, of cultural goods
in the old city of Dubrovnik (part of UNESCO’s World Heritage List, h
inscription in 1979, extension in 1994); the discriminatory intent against
the targeted group was manifest 488, as acknowledged in the case law of
the ICTY.
418. In my perception, this form of destruction is indeed related to
physical and biological destruction, as individuals living in groups canhnot
prescind from their cultural values, and, in any circumstances, in any chir-
cumstances (even in isolation), from their spiritual beliefs. Life itshelf, and
the beliefs that help people face the mysteries surrounding it, go togethher.
The right to life and the right to cultural identity go together, they ahre
ineluctably intermingled. Physical and biological destruction is interreh -
lated with the destruction of a group’s identity as part of its life,h its living
conditions.
419. In a factual context disclosing a widespread and systematic pat -
tern of destruction, can we, keeping in mind the victims, really dissocihate
physical/biological destruction from cultural destruction ? In my percep -
tion, not at all; bearing in mind the relevance of culture, of cultural iden -
tity, to the safeguard of the right to life itself, the right to live wihth dignity.
In this respect, I had the occasion to ponder, almost one decade ago, inh
another international jurisdiction, that :
“The concept of culture — originated from the Roman colere,
meaning to cultivate, to consider, to care for and to preserve, — was
originally manifested in agriculture (care of the land). With Cicero, h
the concept came to be applied to matters of the spirit and the soul
(cultura animi). With the passing of time, it became associated with
humanism, with the attitude of preserving and taking care of the
things of the world, including those in the past. The peoples — human
beings in their social milieu — faced with the mystery of life, develop
and preserve their cultures in order to understand and relate with the
outside world. Hence the importance of cultural identity as a compo -
nent or aggregate of the fundamental right to life itself.” 489
487Cf. C. Bories, Les bombardements serbes sur la vieille ville de Dubro— La
protection internationale des biens culturels, Paris, Pedone, 2005, pp. 145 and 169-170, and
cf. pp. 150-154.
488Cf. ibid., pp. 150-157 and 161-163.
489IACtHR, case of theSawhoyamaxa Community v. Paraguay (Judgment of29 March
2006), separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade, para. 4.
346
7 CIJ1077.indb 688 18/04/16 08:54 346 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
420. I have already pointed out, in the present dissenting opinion, that,
in its case law, — e.g., its decision of 1996 in the Karadžić and Mladić
case, — the ICTY was particularly attentive to the destruction of cultural h
and religious sites. And, in its Judgment of 2001 in the Krstić case, the
ICTY properly warned that the pattern of destruction as a whole (includh -
ing the destruction of cultural and religious heritage) is to be duly thaken
490
into account, as evidence of the intent to destroy the group .
421. The International Court of Justice, contrariwise, has in the pres -
ent Judgment preferred to close its eyes to it, repeatedly remarking (Jhudg -
ment, paras. 136, 388-389), in a dismissive way, that the destruction of
cultural and religious heritage does not fall under the categories of achts of
genocide set out in Article II of the Convention against Genocide. To
attempt to dissociate physical/biological destruction from the cultural h
one, for the purpose of the determination of genocide, appears to me an h
artificiality. Whether one wishes to admit it or not, body and soul come
together, and it is utterly superficial, clearly untenable, to attempt to dis
sociate one from the other. Rather than doing so, one has to extract theh
consequences ensuing therefrom.
XIV. a ctus R eus of Genocide: Widespread and Systemathic Pattern
of Conduct of Destructiohn : Extreme Violence and
Atrocities in some Munhicipalities
422. With the aforementioned considerations, I have completed the
examination, in the present dissenting opinion, of all the components ofh
the onslaught, in a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction,
brought to the attention of the Court in the present case. The time has h
now come to examine the actus reus and the mens rea, in the factual con -
text of the present case concerning the Application of the Convention
against Genocide .
1. Preliminary Methodological Observations
423. Let me turn attention first to the element of actus reus. A careful
examination of the arguments of the contending Parties, as well as wit -
ness statements, presented to the Court, discloses a systematic pattern hof
conduct of destruction, in the period of the armed attacks of Serb forcehs
in Croatia, in particular in some selected municipalities, — namely,
Lovas, Ilok, Bogdanovci and Vukovar (in the region of Eastern Slavo-
nia), and Saborsko (in the region of Lika). The events occurred therehin,
as narrated in sequence, can, in my perception, be clearly examined in thhe
light of the relevant provisions of the Convention against Genocide (inh
490
Cf. Part X (4) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
347
7 CIJ1077.indb 690 18/04/16 08:54 347 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
particular Article 2), to establish the actus reus of the crime of genocide
(and also, in my understanding, the mens rea — infra).
424. In other villages, there was also a wide range of serious crimes
committed, for example, in Poljanak, Dalj, Bapska, Tovarnik. I draw
attention to these and other villages in other parts of the present disshent-
ing opinion. But here, after reviewing the occurrences in all the affectehd
villages, I am focusing only on the five selected villages : Vukovar, Sabor-
sko, Ilok, Bogdanovci and Lovas, in view of their complete devastation
amidst the extreme violence and the perpetration of atrocities therein, dis-
closing a widespread and systematic pattern of conduct of destruction
(actus reus, to my mind together with mens rea).
425. It seems regrettable to me that the International Court of Justice
did not address all the localities referred to by Croatia, and some villhages
or municipalities were excluded from the reasoning of the Court. Such ish
the case, e.g., of Ilok, which was devastated. The Court’s Judgment sheeks
to explain its own approach as follows :
“The Court does not consider it necessary to deal separately with
each of the incidents mentioned by the Applicant, nor to compile an
exhaustive list of the alleged acts. It will focus on the claims concern-
ing localities put forward by Croatia as representing examples of sys-
tematic and widespread acts committed against the protected group,
from which an intent to destroy it, in whole or in part, could be
inferred. These are the localities cited by Croatia during the oral pro-
ceedings or in regard to which it called witnesses to give oral testi -
mony, as well as those where the occurrence of certain acts has been
established before the ICTY.” (Judgment, para. 203.)
426. This outlook of the Court, trying to explain its own selective
choice of municipalities, seems unsatisfactory to me, given the Court’hs
overall conclusion as to genocide, dismissing, tout court, mens rea, with-
out giving its reasons for it. In this respect, the Court’s Judgment hshould
have examined all villages where Croatia claimed that serious crimes werhe
committed. A more comprehensive, if not exhaustive, examination of the
systematic pattern of conduct of destruction would have been appropri -
ate — and indeed necessary — in a case of the importance of the cas
d’espèce.
2. The Systematic Pattern of Acts of Destruction
427. The review of the evidence, and in particular witness statements,
challenged in general terms by Serbia, reveal that many atrocities were h
committed in various municipalities. These atrocities range from arbi-
trary and large -scale killings of members of the Croat population (Arti -
cle II (a) of the Genocide Convention); causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the Croat population, including by cruel acts of vio -
lence (such as mutilation of limbs), torture and sexual violence (Arthicle II
(b) of the Genocide Convention); and deliberately inflicting conditions
348
7 CIJ1077.indb 692 18/04/16 08:54 348 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
of life to bring about the destruction of the Croat population and its ehlim -
ination from the regions concerned, including destruction of towns and
villages, systematic expulsion from homes (Article II (c) of the Conven -
tion).
428. Witness statements in relation to five municipalities refer to simi -
lar events having taken place in those municipalities. These acts, exam -
ined closely, demonstrate the consistent and systematic pattern of acts hin
breach of provisions of the Convention against Genocide, evidencing a
genocidal plan. I thus proceed to a review of those breaches in the selected
municipalities, as brought to the Court’s attention.
3. Killing Members of the Croat Population (Article II (a))
429. “Killings of members of the group” is an act prohibited by the
Genocide Convention, within the meaning of Article II (a). A violation
of this provision requires evidence that the victim was killed by an unlaw -
ful act, with the intention to kill or to cause serious bodily harm whichh
the perpetrator should reasonably have known might lead to death 491.
The question is thus whether the evidence submitted by the Parties, and h
in particular witness statements examined in the selected municipalitiesh,
support a finding that there were “killings of members of the group”.
Upon review of the evidence, it stems clearly that there were killings ohf
members of the Croat group in various municipalities in Croatia. Such
killings occurred by unlawful acts, with the intention to kill or cause seri -
ous bodily harm to the victims.
430. There are statements in the record of eyewitnesses concerning kill-
ings of members of the civilian population of Croatian nationality durinhg
the occupation of Lovas. The village was invaded and occupied by the
JNA on 10 October 1991, after a 10-day heavy shelling by the JNA, caus-
ing the death of at least 23 Croat civilians 492. During the attacks in occu-
pied Lovas, defenceless civilian victims were killed : victims hid in the
493
basements during attacks and Serbs tossed bombs in the basements 494.
Captured Croats were used as human shields to enter Croats’ houses .
Several men were taken and separated from their families, and were then h
executed 495.
431. In an episode which became known as the “minefield massacre”,
the JNA, on 17 October 1991, singled out all the Croat males in Lovas
(around 100, aged between 18 and 65), of whom 50 were taken onto a
491
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 7.59-7.61, and Counter-Memorial of Serbia,
paras. 76-78.
492Cf. CR 2014/12, of 7 March 2014, p. 28, para. 59, and CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014,
p. 17, para. 23.
493Cf. witness statement of M. M., in Memorial of Croatia, Annex 99.
494Ibid., para. 4.126.
495Ibid., para. 4.122.
349
7 CIJ1077.indb 694 18/04/16 08:54 349 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
496
minefield . On their way, one of them was shot and killed by the Serb
forces because he was unable to keep up with the rest of the group, due hto
being stabbed in the leg during a torture session the previous night 497. As
soon as the members of the group arrived in the minefield, they were
forced to hold each other’s hands and to walk forward on the minefiheld 498.
432. A witness reported that, at a certain point, they saw some of the
mines ahead of them. A young Croat man was pushed onto one of the
mines, which immediately exploded and initiated a chain detonation of
the mines around the area ; according to the Applicant, the explosions
immediately killed 21 people and left 12 wounded. Thereafter, Serb sol -
diers asked for the wounded to shout and raise their hands so that they h
could be helped. Witnesses described that, as soon as the wounded raisedh
their hands and shouted for help, the Serb soldiers began to shoot and tho
kill them 499. The dead bodies were taken to a mass grave 500.
433. Serbia acknowledged that “fourteen accused are currently stand -
ing trial before the Belgrade District Court for the alleged killing of h
68 Croat victims from the village of Lovas” 501. Moreover, in Ilok, for
instance, there were also reports of killings of Croats by Serbs : for exam-
ple, the statement of F. D. (who was kept in custody in Ilok from1 Novem-
ber 1991 to 31 March 1992), reported brutal killings, including by beating
502
to death .
434. In Bogdanovci, there were many accounts of killings of Croats
during the occupation. Many Croats were allegedly murdered in their
503
houses. Croats were killed while attempting to flee the village . Accord-
ing to Croatia, many killings of Croats were committed while they were
being forced to go outside their houses, or inside the houses when they h
504
would rather stay inside . The village was occupied by paramilitaries
and JNA on 10 November 1991 after it had been attacked by heavy artil -
lery and infantry. Marija Katić 505, e.g., testified that the village was com -
pletely destroyed, and that “during the destruction ten people were khilled,
were buried in the so-called School Square in such a way that their bodies
were wrapped in tents and buried with a bottle next to their bodies. Thehse
bottles contained the data of the dead persons” ; other witnesses also
reported killings of Croats and torture to death. 506
496CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, para. 24, p. 15.
497
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.118-4.119 and 4.123 -4.126; and witness state-
ments of S.P., Annex 97, and of P. V., Annex 95.
498Cf. ibid., para. 4.125; and witness statement of Z. T., Annex 102.
499Cf. ibid., para. 4.125, and witness statements of T., Annex 102, and of L. S.,
Annex 98.
500On the mass grave in Lovas, cf. ibid., Annex 168B.
501Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 720.
502
503Memorial of Croatia, Annex 55.
Cf. ibid., para. 4.51, and cf.witness statements of A.T., in ibid., Annex39.
504Ibid., para. 4.52, and Annexes 41 and 45.
505Ibid., Annex 40.
506Cf. ibid., Annexes 41 and 45.
350
7 CIJ1077.indb 696 18/04/16 08:54 350 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
435. Likewise, in Saborsko, there is evidence of killings of Croats ;
there are accounts, e.g., of some men who were lined up and shot, and
women who were shot in the back 507. There are also accounts of bodies
508
of Croats being buried in a mass grave . According to M. M.,
“[a]fter the fall of Saborsko, nobody buried the dead people so they
were all left on the places where they died. In the last 15days, because
of the arrival of the blue helmets, the army buried those people with
excavators on the places where they got killed and the graves were
509
marked with the crosses that had no names or surnames on them” .
As to the acts having taken place in Saborsko, Serbia significantly
accepted that most of them had been confirmed by the judgment of the
ICTY 510.
436. There is, moreover, extensive evidence referring to killings of Cro-
ats in Vukovar 511; according to the record, 1,700 persons were allegedly
killed (70 per cent civilian), and around 2,000 were killed after the occu -
512
pation . It stems from the case file that a concentration camp was estab-
lished in Velepromet, to be later used for organized killings. Accordingh to
a witness statement, about 50 people were executed in that camp before
the final fall o513ukovar. The hospital of Vukovar was bombed with twoh
250 kg bombs .
437. In central Vukovar, e.g., executions took place 514: grenades were
thrown in houses and streets were covered with dead bodies. According
to E. M. 515, every day 4-5 people were killed by weapons or slaughtered.
He stated that houses were set on fire, and added that, in Velepromet,h
there were mass executions of people (at least 50 corpses or even more).
Another witness, F. G., reported having been cut on the forehead and
having seen about 15 decapitated bodies in a hole and a garbage pit in
516
Velepromet, and heads scattered; he also saw a man being decapitated .
In Ovčara, an alleged mass execution of 260 people took place, and they
were buried in a mass grave 517. Exhumation took place in 1996 and
145 bodies were identified, but the whereabouts of 60 of the patients
taken from the hospital is still unknown 518.
438. Other civilians were taken from the hospital to Velepromet, a
warehouse which was basically a concentration camp, where 15,000 Cro-
507
508Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 5.149-5.152.
Cf. ibid., Annexes 364-365.
509Ibid., Annex 365.
510Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 841.
511In relation to Vukovar, cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.139-4.192.
512Ibid., para. 4.139.
513Ibid., para. 4.154.
514
515Ibid., paras. 4.164-4.167.
Ibid., Annex 126.
516Ibid., Annex 121.
517Ibid., para. 4.175.
518Ibid., para. 4.178.
351
7 CIJ1077.indb 698 18/04/16 08:54 351 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ats were sent during the occupation. In Velepromet, atrocities took plache,
including decapitations and killings. According to F. J., mass murders
occurred in Velepromet 519. Significantly, in relation to the greater Vuk -
ovar area, Serbia acknowledged that “[t]he ICTY has indicted several h
people for the crimes allegedly committed in Vukovar, but the number of h
deaths for which the accused are charged is significantly smaller thanh
claimed by [Croatia]” 520.
439. In conclusion, it seems clear from the evidence that there was a
consistent and systematic pattern of killings of Croats across the munichi-
palities examined. All witness statements in relation to each village rehport
killings, and the intention to kill, as part of the physical element of hthe
crime. The examination of the case record and the corresponding evi -
dence point to a systematic pattern of killing of Croats. There seems thhus
to be sufficient evidence of the actus reus of “killing members of the
group” under Article II (a) of the Genocide Convention.
4. Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of
the Group (Article II (b))
440. Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention prohibits “causing seri-
ous bodily or mental harm to members of the group”. As to the physicahl
element of this prohibited act, the contending Parties agree that seriouhs
bodily or mental harm does not need to be permanent and irremediable,
and that sexual violence crimes can fall within the ambit of this provi -
sion 521. Upon review of the evidence submitted by the Parties, and in par-
ticular witness statements examined in the selected municipalities, it is
clear that there occurred serious “bodily and mental harm” committhed
against members of the Croat population across various municipalities inh
Croatia.
441. Torture, beatings, maltreatment and sexual violence against Cro -
ats were common denominators in the evidence produced before the
Court. As to Lovas, for example, there were accounts of torture, mal -
treatment and beatings as well as humiliation suffered therein ; those
accounts provide evidence of “serious bodily and mental harm” commhit-
ted against members of the population. An illustration is the statement hof
witness P. V. concerning events during the occupation of Lovas 522. She
testified that they were held during the day in the “collective yarhd”, and
some were kept during the night. The witness reported beatings of those h
in captivity and torture : she stated that “[t]hey would beat the victims
every morning in front of everyone”. The witness reported having to dhis -
519Memorial of Croatia, Annex 129.
520Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 741.
521Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 7.62-7.64, and Counter-Memorial of Serbia,
paras. 79-81.
522Ibid., Annex 95.
352
7 CIJ1077.indb 700 18/04/16 08:54 352 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
arm mines ; she named some of the victims of torture whom she knew
523
personally .
442. There was a series of testimonies of heavy beatings. StjepanPeulić,
e.g., testified about interrogation methods and cruel torture :
“Petronije slapped me repeatedly and then hit me with his boot in
the chin, which left a scar and two teeth were broken ; he continued
beating me. At the same time, Ljuban Devetak started calling people,
who were then taken out and beaten with iron tubes and stabbed with
bayonets before us.” 524
The statements of P. M. 525and J. K. 526also referred to heavy beatings.
443. Similar brutalities were reported to have occurred in Ilok ; for
example, when thousands of Croatian civilians were leaving the city in ah
convoy, they were exposed to humiliation and molestation by the JNA
and paramilitaries, who also robbed them. Croats that did not wish to
leave their homes were subject to physical and psychological harassment,h
robbery and arbitrary detention. Witness P. V., e.g., reported living in
fear to have to leave his home 527. He stated that
“[p]eople would work for days without any food or any compensa -
tion. The Serbs would humiliate us all the time. (. . .) We were not
allowed to gather publicly. When we walked on the streets, for exam-
528
ple, the Serbs (. . .) would hit us with rocks and insult us.”
Witness M. V. 529also reported having been tortured for four years.
444. In Bogdanovci, there were also reported cases of torture and mal -
treatment of Croats. Heavy attacks causing serious bodily injury were
also a common denominator in the witness statements. According to
Marija Katić, there were artillery attacks every few days (as in
August 1991), destroying family houses and farming objects. Witness
M. B. also testified about cases of torture, including the stretching of ha
Croat on a tree in front of a church until he died 530. Similar cases of
bodily and mental harm were reported in Saborsko. A witness reported,
e.g., that, in Saborsko, while the commanders were issuing the orders toh
523Memorial of Croatia, Vol. II, Annexes, p. 284.
524Ibid., Annex 97.
525Ibid., Annex 101.
526Ibid., Annex 104.
527Ibid., Annex 58.
528Ibid., Vol. II, Annex 58, p. 165.
529
530Ibid., Annex 59.
Ibid., Annex 41.
353
7 CIJ1077.indb 702 18/04/16 08:54 353 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
kill the civilians, they used to say that these latter were all “Ustashas”,
and should all be killed 53.
445. In Vukovar, serious bodily and mental harm was also reported to
have been committed. There were accounts of torture in Velepromet ;
civilians were mistreated and experienced mental distress. There were alhso
accounts of sexual violence, humiliation and cutting of limbs. The narrah -
tive of witness Franjo Kožul, e.g., reports of bodily and mental harm
having been inflicted upon Croats from Vukovar. He reported that he
“could hear” shots, people screaming and sobbing, hits, beating, ahmong
other brutalities. He added that :
“As we entered the stable, we had to pass through a cordon of men
who beat us with everything, the cordon was about 30 metres long.
They ordered me to make a list of people that were there, so I knew
the number, I made a list of 1242 people, in alphabetical order. After
some time I found out that in another stable were 480men. They were
offending us, beat us, maltreated us (. . .).During the first few days
we were sitting and sleeping one over the other, on bare concrete.
They would give us some water, one little slice of bread and some
cheese, twice a day, and they beat us and tortured us 24 hours a day.
I cannot describe all kinds of physical and psychological tortures, I
would never imagine that people we lived and worked with would do
532
that crime.”
446. In a similar vein, witness H. E. testified to daily rapes by Serbian
police and army officers upon her arrival to prison. The rapes happenedh
in the cell in front of other female prisoners. She also testified to hbeatings
533
and mental abuse . Likewise, M. M. also testified to repeated sexual
violence, maltreatment and mental distress :she was taken with her two-
month-old baby and six-year-old sister to Serbia, and then to Vukovar,
where they were both raped repeatedly by local Serbs. She testified toh the
killing of her husband and the mental harm she suffered. She reported
that she had to perform forced labour, and, if she did not work, she
would not have any food. She also testified about having been torturedh,
and about repeated rapes by several men, lasting for hours (and in fronht
of her little sister who was very a534id all the time), and with the ushe of
objects causing heavy bleeding .
447. Witness T. C. stated that Chetniks “were maltreating, expelling,
threatening, beating, raping and killing on a daily basis. They were
harshly terrorizing us. All our men, who were capable of work, were
taken to camps”. Some of them were ordered to keep on “digging up h
531Memorial of Croatia, Annex 365, Statement of M. M.
532Ibid., Annex 114.
533Ibid., Annex 116.
534Ibid., Annex 117.
354
7 CIJ1077.indb 704 18/04/16 08:54 354 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
holes”; they “never returned to their homes”, and no one learned any -
thing about them anymore. The witness testified that she was raped, anhd
further stated that “Croats had white ribbons at our gate in order to
enable Chetniks who were not from our village to recognize us” 535.
448. In conclusion, it stems clearly from the evidence in the case file
that, across the municipalities examined, victims suffered serious bodilyh
and mental harm in the form of torture, mistreatment, beatings, sexual
violence, psychological distress and forced labour. These accounts were h
not isolated events ; they were repeated in testimonies of witnesses from
different municipalities. The aforementioned evidence a systematic pat -
tern of the prohibited acts of destruction, demonstrating the physical
element of the acts prohibited under Article II (b) of the Geno -
cide Convention.
5. Deliberately Inflicting on the Group Conditions
of Life Calculated to Bring
about Its Physical Destruction in Whole or in Part (Article II (c))
449. “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” is a prohhibited
act under Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention. As to the physical
element (actus reus), Serbia recognized that systematic expulsion from
homes can fall within the scope of this provision, if such action is carhried
out with genocidal intent and forms part of a manifest pattern of conducht
that is capable of effecting the physical destruction of the group, and nhot
536
simply its displacement elsewhere . Thus, the question left is whether,
upon analysis of the case file, and in particular witness statements ehxam-
ined in the selected municipalities, it can be concluded that there was ha
violation of Article II (c) of the Convention.
450. Those witness statements referred to, in addition to rape and sex -
ual violence, also to deprivation of food and basic conditions of life ; they
also reported on deportation from entire regions. In Lovas, e.g., there h
were measures which caused the fleeing of Croats, such as the destructhion
of homes and deportations. According to J. K., before the occupation
Lovas had 1700 residents, 94 per cent of whom were Croats ; later on,
“they settled around 1500 Serbs” there, and, in “the occupied Lovas there
remained about 100 Croats, 25 people in mixed marriages and 144 Serbs
from Lovas. The settlers arrived in cars or tractors and they moved into
our houses with the permission of the housing commission” 537.
535Memorial of Croatia, Annex 128.
536Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 83-84, and Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 333.
537
Memorial of Croatia, Annex 104, p. 316.
355
7 CIJ1077.indb 706 18/04/16 08:54 355 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
451. In Ilok, the statement of P. V. reported of being forced to leave
his house and remaining in fear to have to leave it ; he added that
“[p]eople would work for days without any food or any compensa -
tion. The Serbs would humiliate us all the time. (. . .) We were not
allowed to gather publicly. When we walked on the streets for exam -
ple the Serbs would spit on us from the church, they would hit us with
rocks and insult us.” 538
In relation to Ilok, it is significant to note that even Serbia itselfh acknow-
ledged that “[t]he Prosecutor of the ICTY charged SlobodanMilošević for
539
deportation or forcible transfer of inhabitants from Ilok” . Likewise, in
Bogdanovci, there were accounts of civilians being forced to leave, and h
the occupation was designed to decimate the population of the village
through destruction of the houses, farms and their infrastructure, and
churches. It appears that the occupation was designed to make the life ohf
Croats impossible. The experience of D. B. is illustrative of how the
540
attack made life in Bogdanovci impossible .
452. The village of Saborsko, likewise, appeared to have been com -
pletely destroyed. According to the testimony of M. M., the intention was
“to clean” ethnically the village 541. In the same vein, A. S. stated that
bombs were thrown from a plane on the village and houses and churches
were set on fire t;e witness further testified to people taking goods from
Saborsko 542. Similarly, M. M. testified that “[a]fter Saborsko was
attacked, Nedjeljko Trbojević called ‘Kičo’, during the action of ‘clean -
ing’, went from house to house and he threw bombs”, and “burnt ha few
houses with rocket launchers” 543.
453. It may be recalled that Serbia acknowledged that the Judgment of
the ICTY (Trial Chamber) in the Martić case confirmed the Novem -
ber 1991 attack on the village, and “most of the acts alleged to have takhen
544
place in Saborsko” . As to Vukovar, there were, likewise, accounts of
attempts to destroy all signs of Croatian life and culture in the city, h
destruction of property and heavy bombings. The majority of the people
of the city stayed in basements for three months and common shelters, 545
and many got killed while trying to get food, water and other supplies .
454. D. K. was in Vukovar until he was wounded ; then he was loaded
into a bus and deported to Serbia. He testified about the living condihtions
538 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 58.
539 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 693.
540 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 45.
541 Ibid., Annex 365.
542 Ibid., Annex 364.
543 Ibid., Annex 365.
544
545 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 840-841.
Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.151.
356
7 CIJ1077.indb 708 18/04/16 08:54 356 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
546
in Stajićevo and Sremska Mitrovica ; victims had inhumane living con -
ditions, with very little food supply 54. B. V. reported not having any -
thing to eat day and night 548. And L. D. stated that “houses were on fire,
grenades were falling and killing people. The Serbs had sent their womenh
and children to Serbia earlier and the men stayed in Vukovar to slaughtehr
us Croats” 54. In sum, there is evidence produced before the Court that
breaches of Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention were committed,
within a systematic pattern of extreme violence, aiming at deliberately h
inflicting conditions of life designed to bring about the physical deshtruc -
tion of the targeted groups of Croats, in whole or in part.
6. General Assessment of Witness Statements and Conclusions
(a) Witness statements
455. The witness statements in relation to each of the selected munici -
palities — namely, Lovas, Ilok, Bogdanovci, Saborsko and Vukovar —
all refer to similar occurrences in each of those municipalities. All witness
statements have been analysed, including those statements that were
unsigned by witnesses. All converge to similar occurrences which fall
under Article II of the Convention against Genocide. I consider even wit -
ness statements that are unsigned relevant for the assessment of events h
that occurred in the aforementioned municipalities, given that they are hin
the same line as those statements that are signed. The totality of witnehss
testimonies (signed and unsigned), read together, provide substantial hevi-
dence of the crimes perpetrated in those municipalities, in breach of Arhti-
cleII of the Convention against Genocide.
456. In the same line of thinking, I have deemed it relevant to examine
the acts alleged to have occurred in all municipalities for which Croatia
submitted evidence, rather than single out one or another specific munhici -
pality, so as to determine whether there was a systematic pattern of
destruction. In the present case, the Court, instead of looking at a selhected
sample of incidents, as it has done, should rather have examined the
totality of criminal acts committed during the entire military campaign h
against Croatia, brought to its attention in the cas d’espèce, to determine
whether a systematic pattern of conduct of destruction amounting to
genocide occurred. The reference to incidents at given municipalities
serves to illustrate the general pattern of destruction.
546 These are localities in Serbia, where there appears to have been camps whhere some
Croats were taken to.
547 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 138.
548 Ibid., Annex 151.
549 Ibid., Annex 143.
357
7 CIJ1077.indb 710 18/04/16 08:54 357 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
(b) Conclusions
457. In my perception, the witness statements in their totality provide
evidence of the widespread and systematic pattern of destruction that
occurred in those municipalities plagued by extreme violence. The wide -
spread and systematic pattern of destruction, as established in the preshent
case, consisted of the widespread and systematic perpetration of the
aforementioned wrongful acts (grave breaches) falling under the Convenh -
tion against Genocide.
458. They comprised, as seen above, killing members of the Croat
(civilian) population (Art. II (a)), causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of targeted groups (Art. II (b)), and deliberately inflicting on
the groups concerned conditions of life calculated to bring about their h
physical destruction in whole or in part (Art. II (c)). It appears that it
can be concluded, on the basis of atrocities committed in the selected
municipalities, that the actus reus of genocide of Article II (a), (b) and
(c) of the Convention against Genocide has been established.
XV. m ens R ea of Genocide: Proof of Genocidal
Intent by Inference
459. May I now, at this stage of my dissenting opinion, move from
actus reus of genocide to the element of mens rea (intent to destroy) under
the Convention against Genocide, as applied in the present case. In the h
course of the proceedings of the cas d’espèce, the contending Parties
themselves presented arguments as to the issue whether genocidal intent h
550
can be proven by inferences . From a cumulative analysis of the dossier
of the cas d’espèce as a whole, in my perception the intent to destroy the
targeted groups, in whole or in part, can be inferred from the evidence h
submitted (even if not direct proof). The extreme violence in the perphetra -
tion of atrocities bears witness of such intent to destroy.
460. The widespread and systematic pattern of destruction across
municipalities, encompassing massive killings, torture and beatings,
enforced disappearances, rape and other sexual violence crimes, system -
atic expulsion from homes (with mass exodus), provides the basis for
inferring a genocidal plan with the intent to destroy the targeted groups,
in whole or in part, in the absence of direct evidence. In effect, to reqhuire
direct evidence of genocidal intent in all cases is not in line with theh juris-
prudence of international criminal tribunals, as we shall see next.
550Cf., e.g., Croatia’s argument in Reply of Croatia, 2.11, invoking Serbia’s
acknowledgment in Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para135 (difficulty to obtain direct
evidence, and reliance on indirect evidence, with inferences therefrom)h Reply of Croatia,
para. 2.12.
358
7 CIJ1077.indb 712 18/04/16 08:54 358 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
1. International Case Law on Mens Rea
461. When there is no direct evidence of intent, this latter can be
inferred from the facts and circumstances. Thus, in the Akayesu case
(Judgment of 2 September 1998), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) held that the
intent to commit genocide requires that acts must be committed against
members of a group specifically because they belong to that group
(para. 521). A couple of jurisprudential illustrations to this effect can here h
be referred to. For example, the ICTY (Appeals Chamber) asserted, in
the Jelisić case (Judgment of 5 July 2001), that,
“[a]s to proof of specific intent, it may, in the absence of directh explicit
evidence, be inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such
as the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts system -
atically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities com -
mitted, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their
membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and
discriminatory acts” (para. 47).
The ICTY further stated, in the Krstić case (Judgment of 19 April 2004),
that, when proving genocidal intent based on an inference, “that infehr -
ence must be the only reasonable inference available on the evidence”
(para. 41).
462. Again, in the jurisprudence of the ICTR, it has been established,
in the same vein, that intent to commit genocide can be inferred from
facts and circumstances. In the Rutaganda case, e.g., the ICTR
(Trial Chamber, Judgment of 6 December 1999) stated that: “[I]ntent can
be, on a case-by-case basis, inferred from the material evidence submitted
to the Chamber, including the evidence which demonstrates a consistent
pattern of conduct by the accused” 551(paras. 61-63). Likewise, in the
Semanza case, the ICTR (Trial Chamber, Judgment of 15 May 2003)
stated that a “perpetrator’s mens rea may be inferred from his actions”
(para. 313).
463. Furthermore, in the Bagilishema case, the ICTR (Trial Chamber,
Judgment of 7 June 2001) found that
“evidence of the context of the alleged culpable acts may help the
Chamber to determine the intention of the accused, especially where
the intention is not clear from what that person says or does. The
Chamber notes, however, that the use of context to determine the
intent of an accused must be counterbalanced with the actual conduct
of the accused. The Chamber is of the opinion that the accused’s
intent should be determined, above all, from his words and deeds, and
should be evident from patterns of purposeful action.” (Para. 63.)
551And cf. also, ICTR, case Musema, Judgment of 27 January 2000, para. 167.
359
7 CIJ1077.indb 714 18/04/16 08:54 359 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
464. In this regard, in the landmark case of Akayesu, the ICTR
(Trial Chamber, Judgment of 2 September 1998) found that “intent is a
mental factor which is difficult, even impossible to determine”, andh it
decided that, “in the absence of a confession from the accused”, ihntent
may be inferred from the following factors : (a) “the general context of
the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against hthat
same group”, whether committed “by the same offender or by others”h ;
(b) “the scale of atrocities committed” ;(c) the “general nature” of the
atrocities committed “in a region or a country” ; (d) “the fact of deliber-
ately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membershihp
of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups” ;
(e) “the general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts” ; (f) “the
repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts” ; and (g) “the perpetra -
tion of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves considehr
to violate the very foundation of the group — acts which are not in them-
selves covered by the list (. . .) but which are committed as part of the
same pattern of conduct” (paras. 523-524).
465. In the case of Kayishema and Ruzindana, the ICTR (Trial Cham-
ber, Judgment of 21 May 1999) stated that intent might be difficult to
determine and that the accused’s “actions, including circumstantiahl evi -
dence, however may provide sufficient evidence of intent”, and that
“intent can be inferred either from words or deeds and may be demon -
strated by a pattern of purposeful action”. The ICTR (Trial Chamber)
affirmed that the following can be relevant indicators : (a) the number of
group members affected ; (b) physical targeting of the group or their
property; (c) use of derogatory language toward members of the tar -
geted group; (d) weapons employed and extent of bodily injury ;
(e) methodical way of planning ; (f) systematic manner of killing ; and
(g) relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of
a group (paras. 93 and 527).
466. In the light of the foregoing, the jurisprudence of international
criminal tribunals holds that proof of genocidal intent may be inferred
from facts and circumstances, and provides some guidelines to that effecth,
even in the absence of documentary evidence. Factual elements which can h
be taken into account for that inference are, e.g., indications of premehdi-
tation, of the existence of a State policy or plan, the repetition of athroci -
ties against the same targeted groups, the systematic pattern of extremeh
violence against, and destruction of, vulnerable or defenceless groups ohf
individuals.
2. General Assessment
467. In the light of the foregoing, the International Court of Justice
seems to have imposed too high a threshold for the determination of mens
rea of genocide, which does not appear in line with the jurisprudence con ‑
360
7 CIJ1077.indb 716 18/04/16 08:54 360 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
stante of international criminal tribunals on the matter. The International
Court of Justice has pursued, and insisted upon pursuing, too high a stan-
dard of proof for the determination of the occurrence of genocide or
complicity in genocide. In my understanding, mens rea cannot simply be
discarded, as the International Court of Justice does in the cas d’espèce,on
the basis of an a priori adoption of a standard of proof — such as the one
the International Court of Justice has adopted — entirely inadequate for
the determination of State responsibility for grave violations of the rihghts
of the human person, individually or in groups.
468. The Court cannot simply say, as it does in the present Judg -
ment, that there has been no intent to destroy, in the atrocities perpe -
trated, just because it says so 552. This is a diktat, not a proper handling of
evidence. This diktat goes against the voluminous evidence of the material
element of actus reus under the Convention against Genocide (Art. II),
wherefrom the intent to destroy can be inferred. This diktat is unsustain -
able, it is nothing but a petitio principii militating against the proper exer -
cise of the international judicial function. Summum jus, summa injuria.
Mens rea , the dolus specialis, can only be inferred, from a number of
factors.
469. In my understanding, evidential assessments cannot prescind from
axiological concerns. Human values are always present, as acknowledged
by the historical emergence of the principle, in process, of the conviction
intime (livre convencimento/libre convencimiento/libero convincimento) of
the judge. Facts and values come together, in evidential assessments. Thhe
inference of mens rea/dolus specialis for the determination of responsibility
for genocide, is taken from the conviction intime of each judge, from
human conscience.
470. Ultimately, conscience stands above, and speaks higher than, any
wilful diktat. The evidence produced before the International Court of
Justice pertains to the overall conduct of the State concerned, and not to
the conduct only of individuals, in each crime examined in an isolated
way. The dossier of the present case concerning the Application of the
Convention against Genocide contains irrefutable evidence of a widespread
and systematic pattern of extreme violence and destruction, as already
examined in the present dissenting opinion.
471. Such a widespread and systematic pattern of extreme violence and
destruction encompassed massive killings, torture, beatings, rape and
552The Court did the same, eight years ago, in its 2007 Judgmen: after finding it
“established that massive killings of members of the protected group hoccurrI.C.J.
Reports 2007 (I), p. 154, para. 276), it added that it was not “conclusively established” that
those “massive killings” had been carried out “with the specific intent (dolus specialis) on
the part of the perpetrators to destroy, in whole or in part, the group has such” (ibid., p2.55,
para. 277) — because it said so, without any explanation. Cf., likewise, paras. 440-441 of
the present Judgment.
361
7 CIJ1077.indb 718 18/04/16 08:54 361 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
other sex crimes, enforced disappearances of persons, expulsion from
homes and looting, forced displacement and humiliation 553 (supra). The
facts conforming with this pattern of destruction have been proven,
554
in international case law and in UN fact-finding (supra). Even in
the absence of direct proof, genocidal intent (mens rea) can reasonably
be inferred from such a planned and large -scale pattern of destruction,
systematically directed against the same targeted groups.
XVI. The Need of Reparations :
Some Reflections
472. The widespread and systematic pattern of destruction in the fac -
tual context of the cas d’espèce discloses, ultimately, the ever -lasting pres-
ence of evil, which appears proper to the human condition, in all times.h It
is thus understandable that it has attracted the concern of, and has preh -
sented challenges to, legal thinking, in our times and previous centuriehs,
as well as other branches of knowledge (such as, e.g., history, psycholhogy,
anthropology, sociology, philosophy and theology, among others). It hash
a marked presence in literature as well. This long -standing concern, over
centuries, has not, however, succeeded to provide an explanation of evilh.
473. Despite the endeavours of human thinking, through history, we
have not been able to rid humankind of evil. Like the passing of time, thhe
ever-lasting presence of evil is yet another mystery surrounding human
beings, wherever and while they live. Whenever individuals purport to
subject their fellow human beings to their “will”, placing this lahtter above
conscience, evil is bound to manifest itself. In one of the most learned
writings on the problem of evil, R. P. Sertillanges ponders that the aware -
ness of evil and the anguish emanated therefrom have marked presence in h
all civilizations. The ensuing threat to the future of humankind has
accounted for the continuous presence of that concern throughout the
555
history of human thinking .
474. Religions were the first to dwell upon the problem of evil, which
came also to be considered by philosophy, history, psychology, social sch-i
ences and literature. Over the centuries, human thinking has always
acknowledged the need to examine the problem of evil, its incidence in
human relations, in the world wherein we live, without losing faith in
human values 556. Despite the perennial quest of human thinking to find
answers to the problem of evil, going as far back as the Book of Job, or
553 Parts IX, X and XI of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
554 Part IX of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
555 R. P. Sertillanges, Le problème du mal — l’histoire, Paris, Aubier, 1948, pp. 5-412.
556 Ibid., pp. 5-412.
362
7 CIJ1077.indb 720 18/04/16 08:54 362 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
557
even further back, to the Genesis itself , not even theology has found an
explanation for it that is satisfactory to all.
475. In a devastation, such as the one of the factual context of the
present case concerning the Application of the Convention against Geno ‑
cide, the damage done to so many persons, thousands of them, was truly
an irreparable one. There is no restitutio in integrum at all for the fatal
direct victims, the memory of whom is to be honoured. As for the surviv -
ing victims, reparations, in their distinct forms, can only alleviate their
suffering, which defies the passing of time. Yet, such reparations are hmost
needed, so as to render living — or surviving atrocities — bearable. This
should be constantly kept in mind.
476. The determination of breaches of Article II of the Convention
against Genocide (cf. supra) renders inescapable the proper consideration
of reparations. In effect, in the course of the proceedings, both contendh -
ing Parties, in their written and oral arguments, have made claims for
reparation for genocide allegedly committed by each other. Croatia’s h
main arguments in this respect are found in its Memorial, where it beganh
by arguing that, although the Convention contains no specific provision
concerning the consequences of a violation by a party, breaches of inter -
national obligations entail the obligation to make full reparation. In thhis
558
sense, Croatia claimed that if Serbia was found to be internationally
responsible for the alleged violations of the Genocide Convention, it must
make full reparation for material and immaterial damage 559.
477. Croatia has in fact requested the Court to reserve this issue “to a
subsequent phase of the proceedings”, as in previous cases. A declarahtory
judgment by the International Court of Justice of Serbia’s responsibihlity it,
added, would already provide a primary means of satisfaction, stressing
the importance of the obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention,
and underscoring the rule of law and the respect for fundamental human
rights. To Croatia, such a declaratory judgment would also “assist inh the
process of setting the historical record straight”, and would therebyh “con -
560
tribute towards reconciliation over the longer term” .
557
Cf., inter alia, e.g., M. Neusch, L’énigme du mal, Paris, Bayard, 2007, p7-193;
J. Maritain, Dio e la Permissione del Male, 6th ed., Brescia, Edit. Morcelliana, 2000,
pp. 9-100; E. Fromm, Anatomía de la Destructividad Humana, Mexico/Madrid/Buenos
Aires, Siglo XXI Edit., 2009 [reimpr.], pp. 11; P.Ricœur, Evil — A Challenge to Philo‑
sophy and Theology, London, Continuum, 2007, pp. 33-72 ; P.Ricœur, Le mal — Un défi
à la philosophie et à la théologie, Geneva, Ed. Labor et Fides, 2004, pp. 19-S. Nino,
Juicio al Mal Absoluto, BuenosAires, Emecé Edit., 1997, pp. 7-29; A. Morton, On Evil,
N.Y./London, Routledge, 2004, pp. 1-148; T. Eagleton, On Evil, New Haven/London,
Yale University Press, 2010, pp.1-16; P.ews, The Idea of Evil, Oxford, WileBlackwell,
2013, pp.1-234.
558FRY, at the beginning of the proceedings.
559Memorial of Croatia, para. 8.75.
560Ibid., paras. 8.75-8.77.
363
7 CIJ1077.indb 722 18/04/16 08:54 363 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
478. Croatia has further asked the Court to declare Serbia’s obligation
to take all steps at its disposal to provide an immediate and full accouhnt
to Croatia of the whereabouts of missing persons, and to order Serbia toh
return cultural property which was stolen in the course of the genocidal
campaign. Furthermore, Croatia has claimed that, as a consequence of
Serbia’s illegal conduct, it is entitled to obtain full reparation fohr the
damages caused and for the losses suffered, in particular for the wrongfuhl
acts connected to the Serbian genocidal campaign, as described in its
Memorial 561.
479. Compensation, it has added, is “due for all damage caused to the
physical and moral integrity and well-being of the citizens of Croatia”h.
Croatia then concludes that, “in a case relating to genocide, where thhere
has been a massive loss of life and untold human misery has been caused”h,
restitutio will never wipe out the consequences of the illegal act ; it thus
562
claims also for satisfaction for the damages suffered . At last, in its final
submissions read at the end of the oral proceedings, Croatia has repeatehd
its request for reparation 563.
480. Serbia, for its part, responded briefly to those arguments on repa -
ration, having stated first that they appear hypothetical, as, in its view, its
responsibility for genocide cannot be engaged. As to the claim for com -
pensation when restitutio in kind is not possible, Serbia has contended
that Croatia was trying to get compensation for all possible damages
which might have been caused by the war in Croatia. It has added that
Croatia’s claims for reparation were not to be determined by the Intehrna-
tional Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction concerns only possible violah -
564
tions of the Convention against Genocide .
481. Serbia has also submitted a request for reparation, in relation to
its counter-claim, as stated in its Counter-Memorial. It has requested thhe
International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare Croatia’s respohnsi-
bility to “redress the consequences of its international wrongful acts” and
in particular to provide full compensation for “all damages and lossehs
caused by the acts of genocide” 565. In its final submissions in relation to
the counter-claim, read at the end of the oral proceedings, it reiteratehd its
566
request .
482. It should not pass unnoticed that both contending Parties have
requested reparation for alleged acts of genocide be determined by the
International Court of Justice in a subsequent phase of the case. The
International Court of Justice should, in my understanding, have found, h
in relation to Croatia’s claim, that acts of genocide were committed,h for
the reasons expressed in the present dissenting opinion. Accordingly,
Croatia’s request for reparation should have been entertained by the h
561 Memorial of Croatia, paras. 8.78-8.79. Cf. also Application instituting proceedings,
pp. 18-20; Memorial of Croatia, p.414; and Reply of Croatia, p.72.
562 Memorial of Croatia, paras. 8.80-8.84.
563
564 Cf. CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, pp. 40-41.
565 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 1059-1068.
Ibid., p. 471; cf. also Rejoinder of Serbia, p. 322.
566 Cf. CR 2014/24, of 28 March 2014, p. 64.
364
7 CIJ1077.indb 724 18/04/16 08:54 364 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Court, and the International Court of Justice should thus have reserved
the issue of the determination of reparation to a separate phase of the
proceedings in this case, as requested by the Applicant.
483. In this respect, it may be recalled that, in the recent case Ahmadou
Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo)
the International Court of Justice examined, during the merits phase, thhe
violations of the international human rights conventions invoked by
Guinea 567. In its Judgment of 30 November 2010, the International Court
of Justice held that the Democratic Republic of the Congo had violated
certain obligations contained in those conventions, namely, Articles 9
and 13 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 6
and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in addition
to Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 568.
The International Court of Justice accordingly held, in relation to repahra -
tion, that :
“In the light of the circumstances of the case, in particular the funh-
damental character of the human rights obligations breached and
Guinea’s claim for reparation in the form of compensation, the Court h
is of the opinion that, in addition to a judicial finding of the violahtions,
reparation due to Guinea for the injury suffered by Mr. Diallo must
take the form of compensation.” 569
484. In this respect, the Court reserved for a subsequent phase of the
proceedings the question of compensation for the injury suffered by
Mr. A. S. Diallo 570. In that phase of reparations, the International Court of
Justice then adjudicated the question of the compensation owed by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to Guinea for the damages suffered by
the victim, Mr. A. S. Diallo, and delivered its Judgment on the issue
on 19 June 2012 571. In my extensive separate opinion (paras.1-101), I exam-
ined the matter in depth, and upheld, inter alia, that the ultimate titulaire or
beneficiary of the reparations ordered by the International Court of Jhustice
was the human person victimized, rather than his State of nationality.
485. In the present Judgment in the case relating to the Application of
the Convention against Genocide, had the Court found — which it regret -
tably did not — that the respondent State incurred breaches of the Geno -
cide Convention, it should have opened a subsequent phase of the
proceedings, for the adjudication of the reparations (in its distinct fhorms)
due, ultimately to the victims (human beings) themselves. In recent years,
the challenges posed by the determination of reparations in the most
567
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),
Mer568, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 639.
Ibid., paras. 73-74, 85 and 97.
569Ibid., para. 161.
570Cf. ibid., p. 693, resolutory points 7-8.
571Cf. I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 324.
365
7 CIJ1077.indb 726 18/04/16 08:54 365 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
complex situations, have begun to attract scholarly attention ; yet, we are
still— surprisingly as it may seem — in the infancy of this domain of
international law.
XVII. The Difficult Path to Recohnciliation
486. In the violent conflicts which form the factual context of the pres -
ent case opposing Croatia to Serbia, the numerous atrocities committed
(torture and massive killings, extreme violence in concentration camps,
rape and other sexual violence crimes, enforced disappearances of per -
sons, expulsions and deportations, unbearable conditions of life and
humiliations of various kinds, among others), besides victimizing thou -
sands of persons, made hatred contaminate everyone, and decomposed
the social milieux. The consequences, in long -term perspective, are, like -
wise, and not surprisingly, disastrous, given the resentment transmittedh
from one generation to another.
487. Hence the importance of finding the difficult path to reconciliation.h
In my understanding, the first step is the acknowledgment that a wide -
spread and systematic pattern of destruction ends up dismantling everyone,
the oppressed (victims) and the oppressors (victimizers). From the times of
the Iliad of Homer until nowadays, the impact of war and destruction upon
human beings has been constantly warning them as to the perennial evil
surrounding humanity, and yet lessons of the past have not been learned.h
488. In a penetrating essay (of 1934), Simone Weil, one of the great
thinkers of the last century, drew attention to the utterly unfair demands
of the struggle for power, which ends up victimizing everyone. From
Homer’s Iliad to date, individuals, indoctrinated and conditioned for war
and destruction, have become objects of the struggle for domination.
There occurs “the substitution of the ends by the means”, transforhming
human life into a simple means, which can be sacrificed ; individuals
become unable to think, and abandon themselves entirely to “a blind chol -
lectivity”, struggling for power (the end) 572.
489. The distinction between “oppressors and oppressed”, Weil aptly
observed, almost loses meaning, given the “impotence” of all indivhiduals
in face of the “social machine” of destruction of the spirit and fhabrication
of the inconscience 573. The consequences, as shown by the present case
concerning the Application of the Convention against Genocide generate
long -lasting resentment.
572 S. Weil, Reflexiones sobre las Causas de la Libertad y de la Opresión Social, Barce -
lona, Ed. Paidós/Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 1995, pp. 81-82, 84 and 130.
573 Ibid., pp. 130-131; S. Weil, Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression
sociale, Paris, Gallimard, 1955, pp. 124-125, and cf. pp. 114-115 and 144.
366
7 CIJ1077.indb 728 18/04/16 08:54 366 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
490. The next step in the difficult path to reconciliation, lies in the prov-hi
sion of reparations— in all its forms— to the victims. Reparations (supra)
are, in my understanding, essential for advancing in the long and diffihcult
path to reconciliation, after the tragedy of the wars in the former Yugosla-
via in the nineties. In the framework of reparations, besides the judicihal
(declaratory) acknowledgment of the breaches of the Genocide Conven-
tion, there are other measures to pursue the path to reconciliation.
491. In this connection, may I single out that, in a particularly enlight -
ened moment of the long oral proceedings in the present case concerning h
the Application of the Convention against Genocide , in the public sitting
before the Court of 10 March 2014, the Agent of Serbia took the com -
mendable step of making the following statement :
“In the name of the Government and the People of the Republic
of Serbia, I reiterate the sincere regret for all victims of the war andh
of the crimes committed during the armed conflict in Croatia, what -
ever legal characterization of those crimes is adopted, and whatever
the national and ethnic origin of the victims. Each victim deserves fullh
respect and remembrance.” 574
492. The path to reconciliation is certainly a difficult one, after the dev-h
astation of the wars in the Balkans. The contending Parties are surely
aware of it. In the same public sitting before the International Court ohf
Justice, of 10 March 2014, the Agent of Serbia further asserted that :
“The cases in which Serbia was a party were of an exceptional
gravity: these were cases born out of the 1990s conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia, which left tragic consequences to all Yugoslav peoples
and opened important issues of State responsibility. This case is the
final one in that sequence. In this instant case Serbia expects — more
than in any of its previous cases — that suffering of the Serb people
should also be recognized, get due attention, and a remedy.
Today it is well known that the conflict in Croatia was followed by
grave breaches of international humanitarian law. There is no doubt
that Croats suffered a lot in that conflict. This case is an opportunithy
for all of us to remind ourselves of their tragedy (. . .). However, the
Croatian war caused grave sufferings to Serbs as well (. . .)”575
493. Croatia, for its part, contends that one of the remedies it seeks is
576
the return of the mortal remains of t577deceased to their families . It
reports that at least 840 bodies are still missing as the result of the
574CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, para. 5.
575Ibid., paras. 2-3.
576Memorial of Croatia, para. 1.10 and 1.37.
577CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, para. 6.
367
7 CIJ1077.indb 730 18/04/16 08:54 367 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
alleged genocidal acts carried out by Serb forces. Croatia claims that Sher-
bia has not been providing the required assistance to carry on the searchhes
for those mortal remains and their identification. The contending Parthies’
identification and return of all the mortal remains to each other is yhet
another relevant step in the path towards reconciliation. I dare to nourish
the hope that the present dissenting opinion may somehow, however
modestly, serve the purpose of reconciliation.
XVIII. Concluding Observationh:sThe Need of
a Comprehensive Approahch to Genocide
under the 1948 Convention
494. Contrary to what contemporary disciples of Jean Bodin and
Thomas Hobbes may still wish to think, the Peace Palace here at
The Hague was not built and inaugurated one century ago to remain a
sanctuary of State sovereignty. It was meant to become a shrine of interh -
national justice, not of State sovereignty. Even if the mechanism of sethtle -
ment of contentious cases by the Permanent Court of International Justiche/
International Court of Justice has remained a strictly inter -State one, by
force of mental inertia, the nature and subject -matters of certain cases
lodged with the Hague Court over the last nine decades have required of
578
it to go beyond the strict inter -State outlook . The artificiality of the
exclusively inter-State outlook, resting on a long-standing dogma of the
past, has thus been made often manifest, and increasingly so.
495. More recently, the contentious cases wherein the Court’s concerns
have had to go beyond the strict inter-State outlook have further increased
in frequency 579. The same has taken place in the two more recent Advi-
580
sory Opinions of the Court . Half a decade ago, for example, in my
separate opinion in the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opihnion
578 For a study of this issue, cf.A. A. Cançado Trindade, “A Contribuição dos Tribunais
Internacionais à Evolução do Direito Internacional Contemporâhneo”, :n O Direito Inter‑
nacional e o Primado da Justiça (eds. A. A. Cançado Trindade and A. C. Alves Pereira),
Rio de Janeiro, Edit. Renovar, 2014, pp. 3-89, esp. pp. 18-20, 46-47, 51, 64 and 68.
579 E.g., the case onQuestions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal) (2009 -2012), pertaining to the principle of universal jurisdiction
under the UN Convention against Torture ; the case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of
Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) (1998-2012) on detention and expulsion of a
foreigner; the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germanyal: Greece
intervening) (20082012); the case of tApplication of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia Russian Federation) (2008-
2011); theRequest for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15June 1962 in the Case concerning
the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand) (2011-2013).
580 On the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of In‑e
pendence in Respect of Kosovo (2010), and on a Judgment No.2867 of the Administrative
Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint Filed▯ against the Inter‑
national Fund for Agricultural Development (2012), respectively.
368
7 CIJ1077.indb 732 18/04/16 08:54 368 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
on the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (of 22 July 2010), I deemed
it fit to warn against the shortcomings of the strict inter -State outlook
(I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 599, para. 191), and stressed the need, in face
of a humanitarian crisis in the Balkans, to focus attention on the people
or population concerned (ibid., paras. 53, 65-66, 185 and 205-207), in pur-
suance of a humanist outlook (ibid., paras. 75-77 and 190), in the light of
the principle of humanity (ibid., para. 211) 58.
496. The present case concerning the Application of the Convention
against Genocide provides yet another illustration of the pressing need to
overcome and move away from the dogmatic and strict inter -State out -
look, even more cogently. In effect, the 1948 Convention against Geno -
cide, adopted on the eve of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,is
not State -centred, but rather people‑centred. The Convention against
Genocide cannot be properly interpreted and applied with a strict
State-centred outlook, with attention turned to inter-State susceptibilities.
Attention is to be kept on the justiciables, on the victims — real and
potential victims — so as to impart justice under the Genocide Conven -
tion.
1. Evidential Assessment and Determination of the Facts
497. I thus regret not to be able to share at all the Court’s reasoning in
the cas d’espèce, nor its conclusion as to the Applicant’s claim. To start
with, the Court’s evidential assessment and determination of the facts are
atomized and not comprehensive. It chooses some municipalities
(cf. Judgment, para. 203) and describes summarily some 582 occurrences
therein. Its examination of the facts is rather aseptic . Not surprisingly,
the International Court of Justice fails to characterize the pattern, as a
whole, of the atrocities committed, as being widespread and systematic.
498. The Court has taken note of atrocities — such as summary execu-
tions and decapitations — perpetrated in Vukovar and its surrounding
area, admitted by the Respondent ( ibid., paras. 212-224). It has taken
note of massacres, inter alia, e.g., in Lovas (ibid., paras. 231-240) and in
Bogdanovci, admitted by Serbia (ibid., paras. 225-230). It has taken note
of other massacres, inter alia, e.g., in Saborsko (ibid., paras. 268-271), in
Poljanak (ibid., paras. 272-277), in Hrvatska Dubika and its surrounding
area (ibid., paras. 257-261). Yet, this is just a sample of the atrocities that
were committed in the cas d’espèce.
581In that same separate opinion, I also drew attention to the expansion ofh interna -
tional legal personality and capacity, as well as international responsihbility (I.C.J. Reports
2010 (II), p. 617, para. 239), in contemporary international law.
582Already in my separate opinion ( I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 610, para. 219) in the
International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, I had warned
against an aseptic examination of the facts.
369
7 CIJ1077.indb 734 18/04/16 08:54 369 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
499. In addition to the localities cited by the International Court of
Justice in the present Judgment, there are numerous other localities
wherein atrocities occurred in the regions of Eastern Slavonia, West -
ern Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia, brought to
the attention of the Court by Croatia, which were not cited or addressedh
directly in the present Judgment of the Court. Not surprisingly, the Couhrt
fails to establish a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction wihth
the intent to destroy, without any satisfactory explanation why it has cho -
sen this path for the examination of the facts.
500. In the present Judgment, the International Court of Justice takes
note of the findings of the ICTY (in its Judgments in the cases of Mrkšić,
Radić and Sljivančanin [“Vukovar Hospital”], 2007; Martić, 2007 ; and of
Stanišić and Simatović, 2013) that
“from the summer of 1991, the JNA and Serb forces had perpetrated
numerous crimes (including killing, torture, ill -treatment and forced
displacement) against Croats in the regions of Eastern Slavonia,
Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia” (Judgment, para2 .08).
Yet, apart from massive killings, the Court fails to characterize other h
crimes as having been committed also on a large scale, conforming a
widespread and systematic pattern of destruction. From time to time the h
Court minimizes the scale of crimes such as rape and other sexual vio -
lence crimes (ibid., para. 364), expulsion from homes and forced displace-
ments (ibid., para. 376), deprivation of food and medical care (ibid.,
paras. 366 and 370).
501. Even an international criminal tribunal such as the ICTY,
entrusted with the determination of the international criminal responsibhil -
ity of individuals, has been attentive to a comprehensive approach to evhi-
dence in order to determine genocidal intent. This particular point has
recently been made by the ICTY (Appeals Chamber) in the Karadžić case
(Judgment of 11 July 2013), where it warned that :
“Rather than considering separately whether an accused intended
to destroy a protected group through each of the relevant genocidal
acts, a trial chamber should consider whether all of the evidence,
taken together, demonstrates a genocidal mental state.” (Para. 56.)
502. The ICTY (Appeals Chamber) further asserted, in the same
Karadžić case, that, “by its nature, genocidal intent is not usually suscep -
tible to direct proof” (ICTY, Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July 2013,
para. 80). This being so, it added,
“in the absence of direct evidence, genocidal intent may be inferred h
from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the general con -
text, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed
against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the system-
370
7 CIJ1077.indb 736 18/04/16 08:54 370 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
atic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a particu-
lar group, the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts, or theh
existence of a plan or policy” (ICTY, Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July
2013, para. 80).
503. In face of the task of the determination of the international respon -
sibility of States — with which the International Court of Justice is
entrusted — is all the more reason one is to pursue a comprehensive
approach to evidence. Contemporary international human rights tribunals
which, like the International Court of Justice, are also entrusted with hthe
determination of the international responsibility of States,know well, from
their own experience, that respondent States tend to withhold the mono -
poly of evidence of the atrocities perpetrated and attributable to them.h
504. It is thus not surprising that, in their evolving case law, addressed
to by the contending Parties, but entirely overlooked by the Internationhal
Court of Justice’s Judgment in the present case, international human
rights tribunals have rightly avoided a high threshold of proof, and havhe
583
applied the distribution or shifting of the burden of proof . In the deter-
mination of facts in cases of the kind (pertaining to grave breaches),h they
have remained particularly aware of the primacy of concern with funda -
mental rights inherent to human beings over concern with State suscepti -
bilities. After all, the raison d’humanité prevails over the raison d’Etat.
505. In the present Judgment in the case concerning the Application of
the Convention against Genocide, the International Court of Justice has
seen only what it wanted to see (which is not much), trying to make onhe
believe that the targeted groups were simply forced to leave the territohry
claimed as Serb (para. 426, and cf. para. 435). As if trying to convince
itself of the absence of genocidal intent, the International Court of Juhstice
has further noted — making its own the argument of Serbia 584 — that the
ICTY Prosecutor has never charged any individuals for genocide in the
context of the armed attacks in Croatia in the period 1991-1995 (Judg-
ment, para. 440).
506. This does not at all have a bearing upon State responsibility. Indi-
viduals other than the ones charged, could, as State agents, have been
responsible ; indictments can be confirmed (as in the Karadžić case in
mid-2013), so as to encompass genocide ; and, in his indictments, the
Prosecutor exerts a discretionary power, its statute being entirely distinct
from that of international judges. In any case, in respect of State respon -
sibility, as I have already pointed out, the standards of proof are not the
same as in respect of individual criminal responsibility.
583
584Cf. Part VII of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 944.
371
7 CIJ1077.indb 738 18/04/16 08:54 371 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
507. Even if we do not know — and will never know — the total
amount of victims who were tortured or raped (they were numerous), allh
the facts, taken together, conform, in my perception, a widespread and
systematic pattern of destruction, under the Genocide Convention, as
examined in the present dissenting opinion. They are facts of common
knowledge (faits de notoriété publique/fatos de conhecimento público e
notorio/hechos de conocimiento público y notorio/fatti notori [di comune
esperienza]), which thus do not need to be subjected to a scrutiny pursu -
ant to a high threshold of proof, depriving the Genocide Convention of
its effet utile, in the determination of State responsibility.
2. Conceptual Framework and Reasoning as to the Law
508. The Court’s conceptual framework and reasoning as to the law are
likewise atomized and not comprehensive. First of all, its reading of thhe
categories of acts of genocide under the Convention against Genocide
(Art. II) is as strict as it can possibly be. The Court, furthermore, consid -
ers separately the interrelated elements of actus reus and mens rea of
genocide, applying a high threshold of proof, which finds no parallel hin
the evolving case law of international criminal tribunals as well as inther -
national human rights tribunals. This ends up rendering, regrettably, thhe
determination of State responsibility for genocide under the Convention
an almost impossible task, and the Convention itself an almost dead let -
ter. The way is thus paved for the lack of legal consequences, and for
impunity for the atrocities committed.
509. The Court’s conceptual framework and reasoning as to the law
are, furthermore, atomized also in its perception of each branch of intehr-
national law on its own — even those branches that establish regimes of
protection of the rights of the human person — namely, the international
law of human rights (ILHR), international humanitarian law (IHL), anhd
the international law of refugees (ILR). The Court thus insists in
approaching even IHL and international criminal law (ICL) in a separathe
and compartmentalized way.
510. In its insistence on its atomized approach, in separating, e.g., the
Genocide Convention from IHL (Judgment, para. 153), the Court fails to
perceive that the Genocide Convention, being a human rights treaty (as
generally acknowledged), converges with international instruments whichh
form the corpus juris of human rights. They all pertain to the determina -
tion of State responsibility. Some grave breaches of IHL may concomi-
tantly be breaches of the Genocide Convention.
511. This atomized approach, in several aspects, appears static and
anti-historical to me, for it fails to grasp the evolution of international
legal thinking in respect of the remarkable expansion, over the last
decades, of international legal personality and capacity, as well as inther -
372
7 CIJ1077.indb 740 18/04/16 08:54 372 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
national responsibility, a remarkable feature of the contemporary jus gen‑
tium. Contrary to what the International Court of Justice says in the
present Judgment, there are, in my perception, approximations and con -
vergences between the three trends of protection of the rights of the
human person (ILHR, IHL, ILR) 58, in addition to contemporary ICL.
512. Moreover, contemporary ICL nowadays is also concerned with
the situation of the victims. The Convention against Genocide, for its
part, being people‑oriented, is likewise concerned with the victims of
extreme human cruelty. The Convention is not separated (as the Court
assumes) from other branches of safeguard of the rights of the human
person; it rather converges with them, in seeking to protect human dig -
nity. The Genocide Convention, by itself, bears witness of the approxima-
tions or convergences between ICL and the ILHR.
513. Last but not least, the Court’s reasoning is, moreover, atomized
also in its counter-position of customary and conventional IHL itself
(Judgment, paras. 79 and 88-89, supra). In my understanding, customary
and conventional IHL are to be properly seen in interaction, and are noth
to be kept separated from each other, as the Court attempts to do. Afterh
all, there is no violation of the substantive provisions of the Geno -
cide Convention which is not, at the same time, a violation of customary
international law on the matter as well. The atomized approach of the
Court, furthermore, fails to recognize the great importance — for both
conventional and customary international law — of the general principles
of law, and in particular of the principle of humanity.
514. The determination of State responsibility for genocide calls for a
comprehensive outlook, rather than an atomized one, as pursued by the
International Court of Justice. As I pointed out earlier on, in the preshent
dissenting opinion, the Genocide Convention is generally regarded as a
human rights treaty, and human rights treaties have a hermeneutics of
their own (para. 32), and are endowed with a mechanism of collective
guarantee (para. 29). The proper hermeneutics of the Genocide Conven -
tion is, in my understanding, necessarily a comprehensive one, and not an
atomized or fragmented one, as pursued by the International Court of
Justice in the present Judgment, as well as in its prior 2007 Judgment.
515. Each international instrument is a product of its time, and exerts
its function continuously by being applied as a “living instrument”h. I have
carefully addressed this particular point, in detail, in respect of humahn
rights treaties, in my extensive dissenting opinion (paras. 167-185) in the
case concerning the Application of the International Convention on the
585Paras. 58, 60, 64, 69, 79 and 84, supra.
373
7 CIJ1077.indb 742 18/04/16 08:54 373 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. RussianFed‑
eration) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I))).
516. In my dissenting opinion, I warned against the posture of the
International Court of Justice in the CERD Convention case, also reflected
in the present Judgment of the International Court of Justice (para.85), as
well as in its prior 2007 Judgment, of ascribing an “overall importanhce” to
individual State consent, “regrettably putting it well above the imperatives
of the realization of justice at international level” (I.C.J.Reports 2011 (I),
para. 44). The CERD Convention, like other human rights treaties, I con -
tinued, contains obligations of “an essentially objective character, imple -
mented collectively”, and showing that, in this domain of protection,h
international law appears, more than voluntary, as “indeed necessary”h
(ibid., paras. 63 and 72). The protected rights and fundamental human
values stand above State “interests” or its “will” (ibid., paras. 139
and 162).
517. The proper hermeneutics of human rights treaties, — I proceeded
in the same dissenting opinion, — moves away from “a strict State -
centred voluntarist perspective” and from the “exaltation of Stateh con -
sent”, and seeks guidance in fundamental principles (prima principia),
such as the principle of humanity, which permeates the whole corpus jurihs
of the ILHR, IHL, ILR and ICL ( ibid., paras. 209-212). Such prima prin‑
cipia confer to the international legal order “its ineluctable axiological
dimension” ; they conform its substratum, and convey the idea of an
objective justice, in the line of jusnaturalist thinking (ibid., para. 213).
518. Only in this way, I added, can we abide by “the imperative of the
realization of justice at international level”, acknowledging that “con ‑
science stands above the will” (ibid., para. 214). And I further warned in
my aforementioned dissenting opinion that :
“The Court cannot remain hostage of State consent. It cannot keep
displaying an instinctive and continuing search for State consent,
(. . .) to the point of losing sight of the imperative of realization of
justice. The moment State consent is manifested is when the State
concerned decides to become a party to a treaty, such as the human
rights treaty in the present case, the CERD Convention. The herme -
neutics and proper application of that treaty cannot be continuously
subjected to a recurring search for State consent. This would unduly
render the letter of the treaty dead, and human rights treaties are
meant to be living instruments, let alone their spirit.” (id., para.198.)
519. The present Judgment of the Court again misses the point, and fails
to render a service to the Genocide Convention. In a case pertaining to hthe
374
7 CIJ1077.indb 744 18/04/16 08:54 374 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
interpretation and application of this latter, the Court even makes recourse
586
to the so -called Monetary Gold “principle” , which has no place in a case
like the present one, and which does not belong to the realm of the prima
principia, being nothing more than a concession to State consent, within an
outdated State voluntarist framework. In face of the pursuance of this oh-ut
look, I wonder whether the Genocide Convention has any future at all . . .
520. The Convention, essentially people‑centred, will have a future if
attention is rightly turned to its rationale, to its object and purpose,h keep -
ing in mind the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat, so to secure to
it the appropriate effects (effet utile), and, ultimately, the realization of
justice. Already for some time, attention has been drawn to the shortcomh -
ings of the Convention against Genocide as originally conceived, namely :
(a) the narrowing of its scope, excluding cultural genocide and massive
slaughter of political and social groups ; (b) the much lesser attention to
prevention of genocide, in comparison with its punishment 587; (c) the
weakening of provisions for enforcement, with concern for State sover -
588
eignty taking precedence over concern for protection against genocide .
521. From the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948 until our
days, the vulnerability or defencelessness of targeted groups has continh -
ued, just as much as the reluctance of States to deal with the matter anhd
protect them against genocide under the Convention has persisted. This
discloses, as I have already pointed out in the present dissenting opin -
ion, the manifest inadequacy of examining genocide from a strictly inter -
State outlook, with undue deference to State sovereignty. After all, as hI
have already stressed, the Genocide Convention is people‑oriented.
522. Genocide, which occurs at the intra -State level, calls for a people-
centred outlook, focused on victims surrounded by extreme vulnerability.h
There are, among genocide scholars, those who are sensitive enough and
support a generic concept, so as not to leave without protection any segh -
ment of victims of “genocidal wars” or “genocidal massacres”h 589, even
beyond the Genocide Convention. It is not my intention here to dwell
586
Even if only to dismiss it (Judgment, para. 116).
587 As transposed, historically, from domestic into international criminal lhaw.
588 Cf. L. Kuper, International Action against Genocide, London, Minority Rights
Group (Report No. 53), 1982, pp. 9, 11 and 13-14 ; G. J. Andreopoulos, “Introduc -
tion : The Calculus of Genocide”, in Genocide : Conceptual and Historical Dimensions
(ed. G. J. Andreopoulos), Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, pph. 2-3
and 6-17 ; M. Lippman, “Genocide : The Crime of the Century — The Jurisprudence of
Death at the Dawn of the New Millenium”, 23 Houston Journal of International Law
(2001), pp. 477-478, 487, 503-506, 523-526 and 533.
589 Cf., e.g., L. Kuper, “Other Selected Cases of Genocide and Genocidal Massacres :
Types of Genocide”, in Genocide — A Critical Bibliographic Review (ed. IW. Charny),
London, Mansell Publ., 1988, pp. 155-171; L. Kuper, “Theoretical Issues Relating to
Genocide : Uses and Abuses”, inGenocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions op. cit.
supra note 588, pp. 32-37 and 4; I.. Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Geno -
cide”, in ibid., pp. 64-78, 84-85 and 90-92.
375
7 CIJ1077.indb 746 18/04/16 08:54 375 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
upon such a generic concept or definition ; distinctly, I concentrate, more
specifically, on the comprehensive outlook, that I sustain, of genocidhe
under the 1948 Convention.
523. Such a comprehensive outlook takes into due account the whole
factual context of the present case opposing Croatia to Serbia — and not
only just a sample of selected occurrences in some municipalities, as thhe
Court’s majority does. That whole factual context, in my assessment, h
clearly discloses a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction whihch
the Court’s majority seems to be at pains with, at times minimizing iht, or
not even taking it into account. All the aforesaid, in my own understandh -
ing, further calls for a comprehensive, rather than atomized, consider -
ation of the matter, faithful to humanist thinking and keeping in mind thhe
principle of humanity 590, which permeates the whole of the ILHR, IHL,
ILR and ICL, including the Genocide Convention.
524. From all the preceding considerations, it is crystal clear that my
own position, in respect of the aforementioned points — of evidential
assessments as well as of substance — which form the object of the pres -
ent Judgment of the International Court of Justice on the case concerninhg
the Application of the Convention against Genocide, stands in clear opposi-
tion to the view espoused by the Court’s majority. My dissenting posihtion
is grounded not only on the assessment of the arguments produced before h
the Court by the contending Parties (Croatia and Serbia), but above alhl
on issues of principle and on fundamental values, to which I attach evenh
greater importance. I have thus felt obliged, in the faithful exercise ohf the
international judicial function, to lay the foundations of my own dissenht -
ing position in the cas d’espèce in the present dissenting opinion.
XIX. Epilogue: A Recapitulation
525. I deem it fit, at this final stage of my dissenting opinion, as an
epilogue, to recapitulate all the points of my dissenting position, exprhessed
herein, for the sake of clarity, and in order to stress their interrelathedness.
Primus : Prolonged delays — such as the unprecedented one of 16 years in
the cas d’espèce — in the international adjudication of cases of the kind
are most regrettable, in particular from the perspective of the victims ;
paradoxically, the graver the breaches of international law appear to beh,
the more time consuming and difficult it becomes to impart justice.
526. Secundus: In the cas d’espèce, opposing Croatia to Serbia, respon -
sibility cannot be shifted to an extinct State ; there is personal continuity
of policy and practices in the period of occurrences (1991 onwards). Ter‑
tius: The 1948 Genocide Convention being a human rights treaty (as gen-
590Cf. Part V of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
376
7 CIJ1077.indb 748 18/04/16 08:54 376 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
erally acknowledged), the law governing State succession to human righths
treaties applies (with ipso jure succession). Quartus : There can be no
break in the protection afforded to human groups by the Genocide Con-
vention in a situation of dissolution of State amidst violence, when proh-
tection is most needed.
527. Quintus: In a situation of this kind, there is automatic succession
to, and continuing applicability of, the Genocide Convention, which
otherwise would be deprived of its appropriate effects (effet utile). Sex‑
tus: Once the Court’s jurisdiction is established in the initiation of prho -
ceedings, any subsequent lapse or change of attitude of the State concerhned
can have no bearing upon such jurisdiction. Septimus: Automatic succes-
sion to human rights treaties is reckoned in the practice of United Nations
supervisory organs.
528. Octavus: The essence of the present case lies on substantive issues
pertaining to the interpretation and application of the Genocide Conven -
tion rather than on issues of jurisdiction/admissibility, as acknowledgehd
by the contending Parties themselves in the course of the proceedings.
Nonus: Automatic succession to, and continuity of obligations of, the
Genocide Convention, is an imperative of humaneness so as to secure
protection to human groups when they stand most in need of it.
529. Decimus: The principle of humanity permeates the whole Con-
vention against Genocide, which is essentially people‑oriented ; it perme-
ates the whole corpus juris of protection of human beings, which is
essentially victim‑oriented, encompassing also the international law of
human rights (ILHR), international humanitarian law (IHL) and the
international law of refugees (ILR), besides contemporary internationahl
criminal law (ICL). Undecimus : The principle of humanity has a clear
incidence in the protection of human beings, in particular in situationsh of
vulnerability or defencelessness.
530. Duodecimus: The United Nations Charter itself professes the
determination to secure respect for human rights everywhere ; the princi -
ple of humanity — in line with the long-standing jusnaturalist thinking
(recta ratio) — permeates likewise the law of the United Nations. Ter ‑
tiusdecimus: The principle of humanity, furthermore, has met with judi -
cial recognition, on the part of contemporary international human rightsh
tribunals as well as international criminal tribunals.
531. Quartus decimus: The determination of State responsibility under
the Genocide Convention not only was intended by its draftsmen (as its
travaux préparatoires show), but also is in line with its rationale, as well
as its object and purpose. Quintus decimus : The Genocide Convention is
meant to prevent and punish the crime of genocide, which is contrary to
the spirit and aims of the United Nations, so as to liberate humankind
377
7 CIJ1077.indb 750 18/04/16 08:54 377 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
from this scourge. To attempt to make the application of the Geno -
cide Convention an impossible task, would render the Convention mean -
ingless, an almost dead letter.
532. Sextus decimus: International human rights tribunals (IACtHR
and ECHR), in their jurisprudence, have not pursued a stringent and highh
threshold of proof in cases of grave breaches of the rights of the humanh
person they have resorted to factual presumptions and inferences, as well
as to the shifting or reversal of the burden of proof. Septimus decimus :
International criminal tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) have, in their jurispru -
dence, even in the absence of direct proof, drawn proof of genocidal
intent from inferences of fact.
533. Duodevicesimus: The fact -finding undertaken by the United
Nations, at the time of the occurrences, contains important elements conh -
forming with the widespread and systematic pattern of destruction in the
attacks in Croatia : such is the case of the reports of the former UN Com-
mission on Human Rights (1992 -1993) and of the reports of the Security
Council’s Commission of Experts (1993 -1994). Undevicesimus : Those
occurrences also had repercussion in the UN Second World Conference
on Human Rights (1993). There has also been judicial recognition (in hthe
case law of the ICTY) of the widespread and/or systematic attacks againhst
the Croat civilian population.
534. Vicesimus: Such widespread and systematic pattern of destruc -
tion, well-established in the present proceedings before the International
Court of Justice, encompassed indiscriminate attacks against the civilian
population, with massive killings, torture and beatings, systematic expuhl-
sion from homes (and mass exodus), and destruction of group culture.
Vicesimus primus: That widespread and systematic pattern of destruction
also comprised rape and other sexual violence crimes, which disclose theh
necessity and importance of a gender analysis.
535. Vicesimus secundus: There was, furthermore, a systematic pattern
of disappeared or missing persons. Enforced disappearance of persons is h
a continuing grave breach of human rights and international humanitar -
ian law ; with its destructive effects, it bears witness of the expansion of
the notion of victims (so as to comprise not only the missing persons, hbut
also their close relatives, who do not know their whereabouts). The sithu-
ation created calls for a proper standard of evidence, and the shifting hor
reversal of the burden of proof, which cannot be laid upon those victim -
ized.
536. Vicesimus tertius: The aforementioned grave breaches of human
rights and of international humanitarian law amount to breaches of jus
cogens, entailing State responsibility and calling for reparations to the
victims. This is in line with the idea of rectitude (in conformity with the
378
7 CIJ1077.indb 752 18/04/16 08:54 378 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
recta ratio of natural law), underlying the conception of law (in distinct
legal systems — Droit/Right/Recht /Direito/Derecho/Diritto) as a whole.
537. Vicesimus quartus: In the present case, the widespread and sys-
tematic pattern of destruction took place in pursuance of a plan, with ahn
ideological content. In this respect, both contending Parties addressed the
historical origins of the armed conflict in Croatia, and the ICTY examh -
ined expert evidence of it. The International Court of Justice did not fihnd
it necessary to dwell upon this ; yet, the ideological incitement leading to
the outbreak of hostilities was brought to its attention by the contendihng
Parties, as an essential element for a proper understanding of the case.h
538. Vicesimus quintus: The evidence produced before the Court, con -
cerning the aforementioned widespread and systematic pattern of destruc-
tion, shows that the armed attacks in Croatia were not exactly a war, but
rather an onslaught. Vicesimus sextus: One of its manifestations was the
practice of marking Croats with white ribbons, or armbands, or of plac -
ing white sheets on the doors of their homes. Vicesimus septimus: Another
manifestation was the mistreatment by Serb forces of the mortal remains h
of the deceased Croats, and other successive findings in numerous massh
graves, added to further clarifications obtained from the cross -examina-
tion of witnesses before the Court (in public and closed sittings).
539. Vicesimus octavus: The widespread and systematic pattern of
destruction was also manifested in the forced displacement of persons
and homelessness, and subjection of the victims to unbearable conditionsh
of life. Vicesimus nonus : That pattern of destruction, approached as a
whole, also comprised the destruction of cultural and religious heritageh
(monuments, churches, chapels, city walls, among others). It would be h
artificial to attempt to dissociate physical/biological destruction frhom the
cultural one.
540. Trigesimus : The evidence produced before the Court in respect of
selected devastated villages : Lovas, Ilok, Bogdanovci and Vukovar (in
the region of Eastern Slavonia), and Saborsko (in the region of Lika) —
shows that the actus reus of genocide (Article II (a), (b) and (c) of the
Genocide Convention) — has been established. Trigesimus primus : Fur -
thermore, the intent to destroy (mens rea) the targeted groups, in whole
or in part, can be inferred from the evidence submitted (even if not dihrect
proof). The extreme violence in the perpetration of atrocities in the
planned pattern of destruction bears witness of such intent to destroy.
The inference of mens rea cannot prescind from axiological concerns, and
is undertaken as from the conviction intime (livre convencimento/libre con ‑
vencimiento/libero convincimento) of each judge, as from human con -
science.
379
7 CIJ1077.indb 754 18/04/16 08:54 379 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
541. Trigesimus secundus : There is thus need of reparations to the vic -
tims — an issue which was duly addressed by the contending Parties
themselves before the Court — to be determined by the International
Court of Justice in a subsequent phase of the case. Trigesimus tertius The
difficult path to reconciliation starts with the acknowledgment that thhe
widespread and systematic pattern of destruction ends up victimizing
everyone, on both sides. The next step towards reconciliation lies in thhe
provision of reparations (in all its forms). Reconciliation also callsh for
adequate apologies, honouring the memory of the victims. Another step
by the contending Parties in the same direction lies in the identificahtion
and return of all mortal remains to each other.
542. Trigesimus quartus: The adjudication of a case like the present
one shows the need to go beyond the strict inter-State outlook. The
Genocide Convention is people‑centred, and there is need to focus atten -
tion on the people or population concerned, in pursuance of a humanist
outlook, in the light of the principle of humanity. In interpreting and h
applying the Genocide Convention, attention is to be turned to the vic -
tims, rather than to inter-State susceptibilities.
543. Trigesimus quintus: The Court’s evidential assessment and deter -
mination of the facts of the cas d’espèce has to be comprehensive, and not
atomized. All the atrocities, presented to the Court, conforming with thhe
aforementioned pattern of destruction, have to be taken into account, noht
only a sample of them, for the determination of State responsibility undher
the Genocide Convention. Trigesimus sextus: Large-scale crimes, such as
rape and other sexual violence crimes, expulsion from homes (and home -
lessness), forced displacements, deprivation of food and medical care, h
cannot be minimized.
544. Trigesimus septimus: The Court’s conceptual framework and rea-
soning as to the law have likewise to be comprehensive, and not atom -
ized, so as to secure the effet utile of the Genocide Convention. The
branches that conform the corpus juris of the international protection of
the rights of the human person — ILHR, IHL, ILR and ICL — cannot
be approached in a compartmentalized way ; there are approximations
and convergences among them.
545. The Genocide Convention, which is victim‑oriented, cannot be
approached in a static way, as it is a “living instrument”. Trigesimus
octavus: Customary and conventional IHL are to be properly seen in
interaction, and not to be kept separately from each other. A violation h
of the substantive provisions of the Genocide Convention is bound to be
a violation of customary international law on the matter as well.
Trigesimus nonus : Furthermore, the interrelated elements of actus reus
and mens rea of genocide cannot be approached separately either.
380
7 CIJ1077.indb 756 18/04/16 08:54 380 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
546. Quadragesimus: General principles of law (prima principia), and
in particular the principle of humanity, are of great relevance to both
conventional and customary international law. Such prima principia con -
fer an ineluctable axiological dimension to the international legal ordehr.
Quadragesimus primus: Human rights treaties (such as the Genocide Con-
vention) have a hermeneutics of their own, which calls for a comprehen-
sive approach as to the facts and as to the law, and not an atomized or h
fragmented one.
547. Quadragesimussecundus: The imperative of the realization of justice
acknowledges that conscience (recta ratio) stands above the “will”. Con -
sent yields to objective justice. Quadragesimusertius: The Genocide Con-
vention is concerned with human groups in situations of vulnerability orh
defencelessness. In its interpretation and application, fundamental prinhc-i
ples and human values exert a relevant role. Quadragesimus quartus: There
is here the primacy of the concern with the victims of human cruelty, ash,
after all, the raison d’humanité prevails over the raison d’Etat. Quadragesi‑
mus quintus: These are the foundations of my firm dissenting position in
the cas d’espèce in my understanding, this is what the International Court
of Justice should have decided in the present Judgment on the case concer-n
ing the Application of the Convention against Genocide.
(Signed) Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade.
381
7 CIJ1077.indb 758 18/04/16 08:54
202
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE CANÇADO TRINDADE
table of contents
Paragraphs
I. RoleGomena 1-5
II. The Regrettable Delays ihn the Adjudication of theh
Present Case 6-18
1. Procedural delays 6-13
2. Justitia longa, vita brevis 14-18
III. Jurisdiction: Automatic Successionh to the Genocide
Convention as a Human Rihghts Treaty 19-49
1. Arguments of the Parties as to the applicability of the
obligations under the Genocide Convention prior to
27 April 1992 19-21
2. Continuity of application of the Genocide Convention
(SFRY and FRY) 22-23
3. Continuity of State administration and officials (SFRY
and FRY) 24-25
4. Law governing State succession to human rights treaties :
Ipso jure succession to the Genocide Convention 26-33
5. State conduct in support of automatic succession to, and
continuing applicability of, the Genocide Convention (to
FRY prior to 27 April 1992) 34-36
6. Venire contra factum proprium non valet 37-41
7. Automatic succession to human rights treaties in the prac
tice of UnitedNations supervisory organs 42-49
IV. The Essence of the Presenht Case 50-54
1. Arguments of the contending Parties 50-52
2. General assessment 53-54
V. Automatic Succession hto the Convention agaihnst Geno -
cide and Continuity of Iths Obligations, as an Impherative
of Humaneness 55-84
1 The Convention against Genocide and the imperative of
humaneness 55 4
203
7 CIJ1077.indb 402 18/04/16 08:54 202
OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. LE JUGE CANÇADO TRINDADE
[Traduction]
table des matières
Paragraphes
I. Prolégomènes 1-5
II. Déplorable longueur dehs délais de justice enh la présente
affaire 6-18
1. Retards de procédure 6-13
2. Justitia longa, vita brevis 14-18
III. Compétence: succession automatihque à la convention
sur le génocide en tanht que traité relatif ahux droits de
l’homme 19-49
1. Arguments des Parties sur l’applicabilité, antérieurement
au 27 avril 1992, des obligations prévues par la convention
sur le génocide 19-21
2. Continuité de l’application de la convention sur le géno -
cide (RFSY et RFY) 22-23
3. Continuité de l’administration et des représentants de
l’Etat (RFSY et RFY) 24-25
4. Droit régissant la succession des traités relatifs aux droits
de l’homme : succession ipso jure à la convention sur le
génocide 26-33
5. Le comportement de la RFY atteste qu’elle a succédé
automatiquement à la convention sur le génocide et que
laConvention lui était applicable antérieurement au
27 avril 1992 34-36
6. Venire contra factum proprium non valet 37-41
7. La succession automatique aux traités relatifs aux droits
de l’homme dans la pratique des organes de surveillance
des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies 42-49
IV. L’essence de la présenhte affaire 50-54
1. Les arguments des Parties au litige 50-52
2. Appréciation générale 53-54
V. Succession automatiqhue à la convention suhr le génocide
et continuité des obligahtions découlant de celhle -ci en
tant qu’impératif d’hhumanité 55-84
1. La convention sur le génocide et l’impératif d’humanité 55-64
203
7 CIJ1077.indb 403 18/04/16 08:54 203 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
2. The principle of humanity in its wide dimension 65-72
3. The principle of humanity in the heritage of jusnaturalist
thinking 73-76
4. Judicial recognition of the principle of humanity 77-82
5. Concluding observations 83-84
VI. The Convention againsth Genocide and State Respohnsi-
bility 85-95
1. Legislative history of the Convention (Article IX) 85-91
2. Rationale, and object and purpose of the Convention 92-95
VII. Standard of Proof in the Cahse Law of Internationalh
Human Rights Tribunals 96-124
1. A question from the Bench : the evolving case law on the
matter 97-99
2. Case law of the IACtHR 100-115
(a) Cases disclosing a systematic pattern of grave viola -
tions of human rights 100-112
(b) Cases wherein the respondent State has theburden of
proof given the difficulty of the Applicant to obtain it
113-115
3. Case law of the ECHR 116-121
4. General assessment 122-124
VIII. Standard of Proof in the Cahse Law of Internationalh
Criminal Tribunals 125-148
1. Inferring intent from circumstantial evidence (case law of
the ICTR and the ICTY) 126-130
2. Standards of proof : rebuttals of the high threshold of evi -
dence 131-138
(a) Karadžić case (2013) 131-133
(b) Tolimircase (2012) 134-136
(c) Miloševićcase (2004) 137-138
3. General assessment 139-148
IX. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructihon :
Fact-Finding and Case Law 149-194
1. United Nations (Former Commission on Human Rights)
fact-finding reports on systematic pattern of destruction
(1992-1993) 150-158
2. United Nations (Security Council’s Commission of
Experts) fact -finding reports on systematic pattern of
destruction (1993-1994) 159-175
(a) Interim report (of 10 February 1993) 160-161
204
7 CIJ1077.indb 404 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 203
2. Le principe d’humanité au sens large 65-72
3. Le principe d’humanité dans l’héritage de la pensée jus -
naturaliste 73-76
4. Reconnaissance judiciaire du principe d’humanité 77-82
5. Observations finales 83-84
VI. La convention sur le ghénocide et la responshabilité de
l’État 85-95
1. Historique de l’adoption de la Convention (article IX) 85-91
2. Raison d’être, but et objet de la Convention 92-95
VII. Critères d’établissemhent de la preuve dans lha juris -
prudence des juridicthions internationalehs des droits
de l’homme 96-124
1. Question émanée d’un membre de la Cour : l’évolution de
la jurisprudence en la matière 97-99
2. Jurisprudence de la CIDH 100-115
a) Affaires révélant un ensemble de violations graves et
systématiques des droits de l’homme 100-112
b) Affaires dans lesquelles la charge de la preuve pèse sur
l’Etat mis en cause, étant donné la difficulté pour le
demandeur d’obtenir des éléments de preuve 113-115
3. Jurisprudence de la CEDH 116-121
4. Analyse générale 122-124
VIII. Le critère d’établissehment de la preuve dansh la juris -
prudence des tribunauhx pénaux internationhaux 125-148
1. Déduire l’intention à partir d’indices (jurisprudence du
TPIR et du TPIY) 126-130
2. Critère d’établissement de la preuve : contestations d’un
niveau de preuve élevé 131-138
a) Affaire Karadžić (2013) 131-133
b) Affaire Tolimir (2012) 134-136
c) Affaire Milošević (2004) 137-138
3. Analyse générale 139-148
IX. Campagne de destructiohn systématique et génhéralisée:
établissement des faihts et jurisprudence 149-194
1. Rapports de l’ex -Commission des droits de l’homme des
Nations Unies faisant état d’une campagne de destruction
systématique (1992-1993) 150-158
2. Rapports d’enquête de la Commission d’experts du
Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies faisant état d’une
campagne de destruction systématique (1993 -1994) 159-175
a) Premier rapport intérimaire (10 février 1993) 160-161
204
7 CIJ1077.indb 405 18/04/16 08:54 204 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
(b) Report of a mass grave near Vukovar (of 10 January
1993) 162-163
(c) Second interim report (of 6 October 1993) 164-165
(d) Final report (of 27 May 1994) 166-175
3.Repercussion of occurrences in the United Nations Second
World Conference on Human Rights (1993) 176-179
4. Judicial recognition of the widespread and/or systematic
attacks against the Croat civilian population— Case law
of the ICTY 180-194
(a) Babić case (2004) 181
(b) Martić case (2007) 182-186
(c) Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin case (2007) 187-190
(d) Stanišić and Simatovićcase (2013) 191-194
X. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructihon :
Massive Killings, Tortuhre and Beatings, Systemahtic
Expulsion from Homes anhd Mass Exodus, and Destruch -
tion of Group Culture 195-241
1. Indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population 196-205
2. Massive killings 206-216
3. Torture and beatings 217-226
4. Systematic expulsion from homes and mass exodus,
and destruction of group culture 227-236
5. General assessment 237-241
XI. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructihon :
Rape and Other Sexual Viohlence Crimes Committehd in
Distinct Municipalitihes 242-276
1. Accounts of systematic rape 243-249
(a) Croatia’s claims 243-248
(b) Serbia’s response 249
2. Systematic pattern of rape in distinct municipalities 250-258
3. The necessity and importance of a gender analysis 259-276
XII. Systematic Pattern of Dihsappeared or Missing Pehrsons 277-319
1. Arguments of the Parties concerning the disappeared or
missing persons 277-283
2. Responses of the Parties to questions from the Bench 284-290
3. Outstanding issues and the Parties’ obligation to establish
the fate of missing persons 291-294
4. The extreme cruelty of enforced disappearances of per -
sons as a continuing grave violation of human rights and
international humanitarian law 295-309
5. General assessment 310-319
205
7 CIJ1077.indb 406 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 204
b) Rapport du 10 janvier 1993 sur un charnier proche de
Vukovar 162-163
c) Deuxième rapport intérimaire (6 octobre 1993) 164-165
d) Rapport final (27 mai 1994) 166-175
3. Répercussions de ces événements sur la deuxième confé -
rence mondiale sur les droits de l’homme (1993) 176-179
4. Reconnaissance judiciaire des attaques généralisées et/ou
systématiques contre la population civile croate — La
jurisprudence du TPIY 180-194
a) Affaire Babić (2004) 181
b) Affaire Martić (2007) 182-186
c) Affaire Mrkšić, Radić et Sljivančanin (2007) 187-190
d) Affaire Stanišić et Simatović (2013) 191-194
X. Campagne de destructiohn générale et systémahtique :
meurtres de masse, torhture et sévices physiqhues, expul -
sion systématique desh logements et exode mahssif, et
destruction de la culthure du groupe 195-241
1. Attaques sans discrimination contre la population civile 196-205
2. Meurtres de masse 206-216
3. Actes de torture et sévices physiques 217-226
4. Expulsion systématique des logements et exode massif,
et destruction de la culture du groupe 227-236
5. Appréciation générale 237-241
XI. Campagne de destructiohn générale et systémahtique :
viols et autres violehnces sexuelles commihs dans diffé -
rentes municipalitéhs 242-276
1. Descriptions de viols systématiques 243-249
a) Les griefs de la Croatie 243-248
b) La réplique de la Serbie 249
2. Campagne de viols systématiques dans différentes munici -
palités 250-258
3. La nécessité et l’importance d’une analyse par sexe 259-276
XII. Ensemble de disparitions systématiques de personnes non
retrouvées à ce jour 277-319
1. Moyens des Parties relatifs aux personnes disparues et
non retrouvées 277-283
2. Réponses des Parties aux questions du juge 284-290
3. Les questions non résolues et l’obligation qu’ont les Par-
ties d’établir le sort des personnes disparues 291-294
4. La cruauté extrême de la disparition forcée de personnes
en tant que grave violation continue des droits de l’homme
et du droit international humanitaire 295-309
5. Appréciation générale 310-319
205
7 CIJ1077.indb 407 18/04/16 08:54 205 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
XIII. Onslaught, Not Exactly Wahr, in a Widespread and
Systematic Pattern of Dehstruction 320-421
1. Plan of destruction : its ideological content 320-353
(a) Arguments of the contending Parties 321 -328
(b) Examination of expert evidence by the ICTY 329-335
(c) Ideological incitement and the outbreak of hostilities336-353
2. The imposed obligation of wearing white ribbons 354-358
3. The disposal of mortal remains 359-374
4. The existence of mass graves 375-389
5. Further clarifications from the crossxamination of wit-
nesses 390-394
6. Forced displacement of persons and homelessness 395-406
7. Destruction of cultural goods 407-421
(a) Arguments of the contending Parties 408-414
(b) General assessment 415-421
XIV. actus Reus : Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of
Conduct of Destructionh : Extreme Violence and Athro -
cities in some Municihpalities 422-458
1. Preliminary methodological observations 423-426
2. The systematic pattern of acts of destruction 427-428
3. Killings members of the Croat population (Article II (a) 429-439
4. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group (Article II (b)) 440-448
5. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life cal
culated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part (ArticleI (c)) 449-454
6 General assessment of witness statements and conclusions 455-458
(a) Witness statements 455 -456
(b) Conclusions 457 -458
XV. m ensR ea : Proof of Genocidal Intenht by Inference 459-471
1. International case law onmens rea 461 -466
2. General assessment 467-471
XVI. The Need of Reparations : Some Reflections 472-485
XVII. The Difficult Path to Recohnciliation 486-493
XVIII. Concluding Observationh:sThe Need of a Comprehensive
Approach to Genocide unhder the 1948Convention 494 -524
206
7 CIJ1077.indb 408 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 205
XIII. Pas exactement une guherre, plutôt une camphagne de
dévastation, dans le chadre d’une entrepriseh de destru-c
tion systématique eth généralisée 320-421
1. Le plan de destruction : composante idéologique 320-353
a) Moyens des Parties 321-328
b) Examen par le TPIY des dépositions des experts 329-335
c) L’incitation idéologique et le début des hostilités 336-353
2. L’obligation de porter un ruban blanc 354-358
3. Le sort réservé aux corps 359-374
4. L’existence de charniers 375-389
5. Nouveaux éclaircissements apportés par le contre -
interrogatoire des témoins 390-394
6. Déplacement forcé de personnes et privation de domicile 395-406
7. Destruction de biens culturels 407-421
a) Moyens des Parties 408-414
b) Appréciation générale 415-421
XIV. Élément matériel (actus Reus ) du génocide : volonté
de destruction systémathique et générale — viholences
extrêmes et atrocitéhs dans certaines munihcipalités 422-458
1. Observations méthodologiques préliminaires 423-426
2. La campagne d’actes de destruction systématiques 427-428
3. Le meurtre de membres de la population croate ( litt. a) de
l’article II) 429-439
4. Atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou mentale de mem -
bres du groupe (litt.) de l’article II) 440-448
5. Soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions
d’existence devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale
ou partielle litt. c) de l’article 449-454
6. Appréciation générale des déclarations de témoins et
conclusions 455-458
a) Déclarations de témoins 455-456
b) Conclusions 457-458
XV. Élément moral ( mens Rea ) du génocide : preuve de
l’intention génocidahire par déduction 459-471
1. Jurisprudence internationale relative à l’élément moral
(mens rea) 461-466
2. Appréciation générale 467-471
XVI. La nécessité de réparahtions : quelques réflexionsh 472-485
XVII. La difficile voie de la rhéconciliation 486-493
XVIII. Observations finales : la nécessité de s’atthaquer glo -
balement à tous les ashpects du génocide en vhertu de la
Convention de 1948 494-524
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7 CIJ1077.indb 409 18/04/16 08:54 206 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
1. Evidential assessment and determination of the facts 497-507
2. Conceptual framework and reasoning as to the law 508 -524
XIX. Epilogue: A Recapitulation 525 -547
*
I.p RoleGomena
1. I regret not to share the position of the Court’s majority as to the h
determination of the facts as well as the reasoning conducive to the thrhee
resolutory points, nor to its conclusion of resolutory point No. 2, of the
Judgment it has just adopted today, 3 February 2015, in the present case
concerning the Application of the Convention against Genocide, opposing
Croatia to Serbia. My dissenting position encompasses the adopted meth -
odology, the approach pursued, the whole reasoning in its treatment of
issues of evidential assessment as well as of substance, as well as the hcon-
clusion on the Applicant’s claim. This being so, I care to leave on thhe
records the foundations of my dissenting position, given the considerablhe
importance that I attach to the issues raised by Croatia and Serbia, in hthe
course of the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, in respect of the interpreta -
tion and application of the 1948 Convention against Genocide, and bear-
ing in mind that the settlement of the dispute at issue is ineluctably linked,
as I perceive it, to the imperative of the realization of justice.
2. I thus present with the utmost care the foundations of my own entirely
dissenting position on those aspects of the matter dealt with by the Couhrt in
the Judgment which it has just adopted, out of respect for, and zeal in,h the
faithful exercise of the international judicial function, guided above ahll by the
ultimate goal precisely of the realization of justice. To this effect, I shall dwell
upon the relevant aspects concerning the dispute brought before the Court
which form the object of its present Judgment, in the hope of thus contrhibut -
ing to the clarification of the issues raised and to the progressive dhevelopment
of international law, in particular in the international adjudication byh this
Court of a case of the importance of the cas d’espèce, under the Convention
against Genocide, in the light of fundamental considerations of humanityh.
3. Preliminarily, I shall address the regrettable delays in the adjudica -
tion of the present case, and, as to jurisdiction, the automatic successhion
of the 1948 Convention against Genocide as a UN human rights treaty,
and the continuity of its obligations, as an imperative of humaneness
(principle of humanity). Once identified the essence of the present hcase, I
shall consider State responsibility under the Convention against Geno -
cide. My next line of considerations will centre on the standard of proohf,
in the case law of contemporary international human rights tribunals as h
well as international criminal tribunals.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 410 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 206
1. Appréciation des éléments de preuve et détermination
des faits 497-507
2. Cadre théorique et raisonnement juridique 508-524
XIX. Épilogue : récapitulatif 525-547
*
I. Prolégomènes
1. Je regrette de ne pouvoir souscrire à la position de la majorité dhe la
Cour ni sur la qualification des faits et le raisonnement conduisant ahux
trois points du dispositif de l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu ce 3 février 2015 en
l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la
répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie), ni sur la conclusion
o
qu’exprime le point n 2 du dispositif. Ma dissidence concerne la méthode
suivie, l’approche retenue, l’intégralité du raisonnement sur les questions
d’appréciation des preuves et le fond, et enfin la conclusion suhr la requête
du demandeur. Dans ces conditions, j’ai tenu à consigner par échrit les
fondements de ma position dissidente, en raison de l’importance consihdé -
rable que j’attache aux questions intéressant l’interprétatihon et l’applica-
tion de la convention de 1948 sur le génocide soulevées par la Croatie et
la Serbie au cours de la procédure, et sachant que le règlement duh diffé -
rend en cause est inextricablement lié, selon moi, à l’impérhatif de réalisa‑
tion de la justice.
2. C’est donc avec un soin tout particulier que, animé du zèle le hplus r-es
pectueux et le plus loyal pour l’exercice de la fonction judiciaire ihnternationale
etguidé avant tout par l’objectif ultime deréalisation de la justice, j’exposerai
les fondements de ma position entièrement dissidente sur certains aspects de
la matière traitée par la Cour dans l’arrêt qu’elle vienth d’adopter. Pour cela,
j’analyserai les aspects du différend dont était saisie la Cour hqui font l’objet
du présent arrêt, avec l’espoir de clarifier les questions qui ont été soulevées
et de contribuer au développement progressif du droit international, hparticu -
lièrement en ce qui concerne le règlement judiciaire international par la Cour
d’une affaire aussi importante que celle-ci, sous le régime de la convention
sur le génocide et à la lumière des considérations fondamentales d’humanité.
3. A titre préliminaire, j’examinerai d’abord la déplorable longueur des
délais de justice dans la présente affaire ; puis, en rapport avec la compé -
tence, la question de la succession automatique à la convention de 1948
sur le génocide en sa qualité de traité des Nations Unies relatif aux droits
de l’homme et la question de la continuité des obligations décohulant de
cette convention en tant qu’impératif humanitaire (principe d’hhumanité).
Une fois l’essence de la présente espèce mise en évidence, jh’examinerai la
question de la responsabilité de l’Etat selon la convention sur leh génocide.
La suite de mes considérations concernera principalement le régimeh de la
preuve dans la jurisprudence des juridictions internationales des droitsh de
l’homme et des tribunaux pénaux internationaux.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 411 18/04/16 08:54 207 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
4. I shall then proceed to review the fact -finding and case law on the
factual context of the cas d’espèce, disclosing a widespread and systematic
pattern of destruction, in relation to : (a) massive killings, torture and
beatings, systematic expulsion from homes and mass exodus, and destruc-
tion of group culture ; (b) rape and other sexual violence crimes commit -
ted in distinct municipalities ; (c) disappeared or missing persons. Next, I
shall review the onslaught (not exactly war), in its multiple aspects,h
namely: (a) plan of destruction (its ideological content) ; (b) the imposed
obligation of wearing white ribbons (c);the disposal of mortal remains ;
(d) the existence of mass graves ; (e) further clarifications from the
cross-examination of witnesses ; (f) the forced displacement of persons
and homelessness ; (g) the destruction of cultural goods.
5. In sequence, I shall dwell upon the determination, under the Con -
vention against Genocide, of the actus reus of genocide, in the widespread
and systematic pattern of conduct of destruction (extreme violence and
atrocities) in some devastated municipalities, as well as mens rea (proof of
genocidal intent by inference). The path will then be paved, last but nhot
least, for my considerations on the need of reparations, and on the diffih -
cult path to reconciliation, as well as to the presentation of my concluhd -
ing observations (on evidential assessment and determination of the fachts,
as well as conceptual framework and reasoning as to the law), and, lasth
but not least, the epilogue (recapitulation).
II. The Regrettable Delays ihn the Adjudication
of the Present Case
1. Procedural Delays
6. Looking back in time, I cannot avoid expressing my regret at the
considerable delays in the adjudication of the present case concerning thhe
Application of the Convention against Genocide , opposing Croatia to Ser -
bia. The Application instituting proceedings was filed on 2 July 1999. The
first time -limits fixed by the Court for the filing by the Parties of the
Memorial and Counter-Memorial were, respectively, 14 March 2000
and 14 September 2000 1. In a letter dated 25 February 2000, Croatia
requested an extension of six months for filing its Memorial. The requhest
for extension was not objected by Serbia, who also requested an extensiohn
of six months for the filing of its Counter-Memorial. The time -limit for
filing the Memorial was thus extended to 14 September 2000 and, for the
Counter-Memorial, to 14 September 2001 2.
7. In a letter dated 26 May 2000, Croatia requested that the Court
extend by a further period of six months the time-limit for the filing of the
1
2 Order of 14 September 1999 (I.C.J. Reports 1999 (II), p. 1105).
Order of 10 March 2000 (I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 3).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 412 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 207
4. Je passerai ensuite en revue les enquêtes et la jurisprudence sur le
contexte factuel de l’espèce, qui révèlent une campagne de dhestruction gé-né
rale et systématique sous forme de : a) massacre, torture et sévices, expulsion
systématique des foyers et exode massif, et destruction de la cultureh d’un
groupe; b) viols et autres violences sexuelles commis dans plusieurs munic-i
palités; c) disparitions forcées ou autres depersonnes. Puis j’examinerai cette
entreprise de dévastation (qui n’était pas exactement une guerhre) sous ses
différents aspects, à savoir :) plan de destruction (sa teneur idéologique) ;
b) obligation de porter des rubans blancs c) ;raitement des dépouilles mor -
telles; d) existence de fosses communes ; e) nouveaux éclaircissements appo-r
tés par le contre -interrogatoire des témoins ; f) déplacement forcé de
personnes et privation de domicile g) destruction de biens culturels.
5. Ensuite j’examinerai successivement, sous l’angle de la conventionh
sur le génocide, la détermination de l’ actus reus du génocide dans cette
campagne de destruction générale et systématique (violences extrêmes et
atrocités) et plus particulièrement dans quelques -unes des municipalités
dévastées, puis la détermination de la mens rea (preuve par déduction de
l’intention de commettre un génocide). Cet examen conduira, last but
not least, à des considérations sur la nécessité de réparations eth sur la dif -
ficile voie de la réconciliation, à quelques observations finahles sur l’appré -
ciation des preuves, l’établissement des faits, le cadre conceptuehl et le
raisonnement juridique, et, enfin, à un épilogue (récapitulahtion).
II. Déplorable longueur dehs délais de justice
en la présente affaireh
1. Retards de procédure
6. Rétrospectivement, je ne peux m’empêcher de déplorer la longhueur
considérable des délais de justice dans la présente affaire Croatie c. Serbie.
La requête introductive d’instance a été déposée le 2 juillet 1999. Les pre-
mières dates d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt du méhmoire et du
contre -mémoire des Parties ont été fixées par la Cour au 14 mars 2000 et
au 14 septembre 2000 1 respectivement. Par lettre du 25 février 2000, la
Croatie a prié la Cour de proroger de six mois le délai pour le déhpôt de
son mémoire. La Serbie ne s’est pas opposée à cette prorogathion et a
demandé que le délai fixé pour le dépôt de son contre -mémoire soit pro-
rogé de la même manière. Les dates d’expiration des délaihs pour le dépôt
du mémoire et du contre -mémoire ont ainsi été reportées au 14 sep-
tembre 2000 et au 14 septembre 2001 . 2
7. Par lettre du 26 mai 2000, la Croatie a demandé à la Cour de proro -
ger une nouvelle fois de six mois le délai fixé pour le dépôht de son mémoire.
1
2 Ordonnance du 14 septembre 1999 (C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 1015).
Ordonnance du 10 mars 2000 (C.I.J. Recueil 2000, p. 3).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 413 18/04/16 08:54 208 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Memorial. The request for extension was not objected by Serbia, who
also requested an extension of six months for the filing of its Countehr-
Memorial. Thus, the Court further extended to 14 March 2001 the time-
limit for filing the Memorial and to 16 September 2002 for the filing of
3
the Counter-Memorial . Croatia filed the Memorial on 14 March 2001
within the time-limit extended.
8. On 11 September 2002, within the time-limit so extended for the fil -
ing of the Counter-Memorial, Serbia filed certain preliminary objections
as to jurisdiction and to admissibility. The proceedings on the merits where
suspended, in accordance with Article 79 (3) of the Rules of Court, and a
time-limit for the filing of a written statement of Croatia’s submissionh on
the preliminary objections was fixed for 29 April 2003 4. Hearings on pre-
liminary objections were held half a decade later, from 26 to 30 May
2008. The Court delivered its Judgment on preliminary objections
on 18 November 2008, finding, inter alia, that, subject to its finding on
the second preliminary objection submitted by Serbia, it has jurisdictiohn
pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide Convention to entertain the
Application of Croatia.
9. Serbia then requested an equal time -limit of 18 months to file its
Counter-Memorial, which was the time -limit granted for the filing of the
Memorial of Croatia. The time-limit for the filing of the Counter-Memo -
rial was fixed for 22 March 2010 . The Counter-Memorial of Serbia was
filed, within the time -limit, on January 2010, and it contained counter-
claims. Croatia indicated (at a meeting with the President on 3 February
2010) that it did not intend to raise objections to the admissibility ohf the
counter-claims but wished to respond to the substance of the counter-
claims in a Reply. Serbia thus indicated that it accordingly wished to fihle
a Rejoinder.
10. Given that there were no objections by Croatia as to the admissi -
bility of Serbia’s counter-claims, the Court did not consider it necehssary
to rule definitively at that stage on the question as to whether the chounter-
claims fulfilled the conditions of Article 80 (1) of the Rules of Court. The
Court further decided that a Reply and Rejoinder would be necessary,
and to ensure strict equality between the Parties (equality of arms/égalité
des armes) it reserved the right of Croatia to file an additional pleading
relating to the counter-claims. The Court thus fixed the time-limit fohr the
filing of Croatia’s Reply as 20 December 2010, and 4 November 2011 for
6
the Rejoinder of Serbia .
3 Order of 27 June 2000 (I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 108).
4 Order of 14 November 2002 (I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 610).
5 Order of 20 January 2009 (I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 54).
6 Order of 4 February 2010 (I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 3).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 414 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 208
La Serbie ne s’est pas opposée à cette nouvelle prorogation et ha demandé
à bénéficier de la même prorogation pour le dépôt deh son contre -mémoire.
La Cour a donc reporté au 14 mars 2001 la date de dépôt du mémoire et
au 16 septembre 2002 celle du contre-mémoire 3. La Croatie a déposé son
mémoire le 14 mars 2001 dans le délai ainsi prorogé.
8. Le 11 septembre 2002, dans le délai prorogé pour le dépôt de son
contre-mémoire, la Serbie a présenté des exceptions préliminaires portant
sur la compétence de la Cour pour connaître de l’affaire et sur hla receva-
bilité de la requête. La procédure sur le fond a été suspendue en vertu des
dispositions du paragraphe 3 de l’article 79 du Règlement de la Cour, et
celle-ci a fixé au 29 avril 2003 4la date d’expiration du délai pour la pré -
sentation, par la Croatie, d’un exposé écrit sur les exceptionsh prélimi -
naires. Des audiences publiques sur ces exceptions préliminaires ont hété
tenues du 26 au 30 mai 2008, soit cinq ans plus tard. Le 18novembre 2008,
la Cour a rendu un arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires dans leqhuel elle
concluait notamment que, sous réserve de ce qu’elle avait déclahré concer-
nant la deuxième exception préliminaire soulevée par la Serbie, elle avait
compétence, sur la base de l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide,
pour connaître de la requête de la Croatie.
9. La Serbie a demandé alors, pour déposer son contre -mémoire, à
bénéficier du même délai de dix-huit mois qui avait été accordé à la Croa -
tie pour déposer son mémoire. La date d’expiration du délai hpour le dépôt
du contre -mémoire a été fixée au 22 mars 2010 . Déposé le 4 janvier 2010,
dans le délai prescrit, le contre -mémoire de la Serbie contenait des
demandes reconventionnelles. Au cours d’une réunion avec le préhsident
de la Cour tenue le 3 février 2010, la Croatie a indiqué qu’elle n’entendait
pas soulever d’objections à la recevabilité des demandes reconvhention -
nelles, mais désirait pouvoir y répondre au fond dans une réplihque. La
Serbie a exposé que, dans ce cas, elle souhaitait déposer une duplhique.
10. Compte tenu de l’absence d’objections de la Croatie à la recevahbi-
lité des demandes reconventionnelles de la Serbie, la Cour n’a pas estimé
devoir à ce stade se prononcer définitivement sur la question deh savoir si
lesdites demandes satisfaisaient aux conditions énoncées au paragrhaphe 1
de l’article80 de son Règlement. Elle a considéré par ailleurs que le déhpôt
d’une réplique et d’une duplique était nécessaire, et, pour assurer une
stricte égalité entre les Parties («égalité des armes»), elle a réservé le droit,
pour la Croatie, de s’exprimer une seconde fois par écrit sur les hdemandes
reconventionnelles de la Serbie, dans une pièce additionnelle. Elle ah fixé
au 20 décembre 2010 et au 4 novembre 2011, respectivement, les dates
d’expiration des délais pour le dépôt de la réplique de lha Croatie et de la
duplique de la Serbie 6.
3 Ordonnance du 27 juin 2000 (C.I.J. Recueil 2000, p. 108).
4 Ordonnance du 14 novembre 2002 (C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 610).
5 Ordonnance du 20 janvier 2009 (C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 54).
6 Ordonnance du 4 février 2010 (C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (I), p. 3).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 415 18/04/16 08:54 209 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
11. Croatia filed its Reply within the time -limit and Serbia also filed its
Rejoinder within the fixed time -limits. Both the Reply and Rejoinder con-
tained submissions as to the claims and counter-claims. The Court autho-
rized the submission by Croatia of an additional pleading relating to thhe
counter-claims of Serbia, and fixed for 30 August 2012 the filing of such
additional pleading, which was filed within the time -limit 7. In light of the
foregoing, the hearings on the merits were thus scheduled to take place —
as they did — from 3 March to 1 April 2014.
12. These facts speak for themselves, as to the regrettable delays in the
adjudication of the present case, keeping in mind in particular those who
seek for justice. Unfortunately, as I have pointed out, on other recent h
occasions within this Court, the time of human justice is not the time of
human beings. In my dissenting opinion in the case of Questions relating
to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Provi ‑
sional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009), I pondered that :
“The time of human beings surely does not appear to be the time
of human justice. The time of human beings is not long (vita brevis),
at least not long enough for the full realization of their project of lihfe.
The brevity of human life has been commented upon time and time
again, throughout the centuries ; in his De Brevitate Vitae 8, Seneca
pondered that, except for but a few, most people in his times departed
from life while they were still preparing to live. Yet, the time of humahn
justice is prolonged, not seldom much further than that of human life,
seeming to make abstraction of the vulnerability and briefness of this
latter, even in the face of adversities and injustices. The time of humahn
justice seems, in sum, to make abstraction of the time human beings
count on for the fulfilment of their needs and aspirations.
Chronological time is surely not the same as biological time. The
time of the succession of events does not equate with the time of the
briefness of human life. Tempus fugit. For its part, biological time is
not the same as psychological time either. Surviving victims of cruelty
lose, in moments of deep pain and humiliation, all they could expect
of life the young lose in a few moments their innocence forever, the
elderly suddenly lose their confidence in fellow human beings, not to
speak of institutions. Their lives become deprived of meaning, and all
that is left is their hope in human justice. Yet, the time of human
justice does not appear to be the time of human beings.” (I.C.J R.eports
2009, p. 182, paras. 46-47.)
13. Shortly afterwards, in my dissenting opinion in the case concerning
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) (Counter‑Claim,
Order of 6 July 2010), I deemed it fit again to ponder, in relation to the
7
8 Cf. Order of 23 January 2012 (I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 3).
Written sometime between the years 49 and 62.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 416 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 209
11. La Croatie a déposé sa réplique et la Serbie sa duplique dans lhes
délais prescrits. La réplique et la duplique contenaient des conclusions sur
les demandes principale et reconventionnelles. La Cour a autorisé la h
Croatie à présenter une pièce additionnelle sur les demandes reconven -
tionnelles de la Serbie et a fixé au 30 août 2012 la date d’expiration du
délai pour le dépôt de cette pièce, qui a été déposhée dans le délai prescrit 7.
Dans ces conditions, les audiences sur le fond ont été programméhes — et
se sont tenues — du 3 mars au 1 er avril 2014.
12. Les faits parlent d’eux -mêmes pour dénoncer la longueur déplo -
rable des délais de justice en la présente affaire, en particulier pour ceux
qui demandent justice. Malheureusement, comme je l’ai fait observer à la
Cour en plusieurs occasions récentes, le temps de la justice n’est pas le
même que celui des victimes. Dans mon opinion dissidente en l’affaire rela-
tive à des Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader
(Belgique c. Sénégal) (mesures conservatoires,ordonnance du 28mai 2009),
je faisais valoir ce qui suit :
«L’heure des victimes ne semble assurément pas être celle de la h
justice humaine. L’être humain n’a que peu de temps à vivre hsur cette
terre (vita brevis), du moins trop peu pour réaliser pleinement son
projet de vie. La brièveté de la vie humaine a été maintes fois com -
mentée au fil des siècles : dans un ouvrage intitulé De brevitate vitae , 8
Sénèque fit observer que, à quelques exceptions près, la plupart de
ses contemporains disparaissaient alors qu’ils s’apprêtaient tohut juste
à vivre. Or, la justice humaine s’éternise, prenant souvent biehn plus
de temps qu’une vie humaine, dont elle paraît dédaigner la fragilité et
la fugacité, même face à l’adversité et à l’injustihce. La justice semble,
en somme, faire fi du temps dont les êtres humains disposent pour
concrétiser leurs besoins et leurs aspirations.
Certes, le temps chronologique n’est pas le temps biologique. Les
événements ne s’égrènent pas au même rythme que la vie humaine,
bien plus fugace. Tempus fugit. Cela dit, l’heure biologique n’est pas
l’heure psychologique non plus. Ceux qui survivent à la cruautéh
perdent, dans les moments de profonde souffrance et d’humiliation,
tout ce qu’ils pouvaient attendre de la vie ; en un instant, les plus
jeunes perdent à jamais leur innocence et les aînés leur confiance
dans leurs semblables, sans parler des institutions. Leurs vies
deviennent vides de sens, et il ne leur reste que leur foi en la justiceh
humaine. Pourtant, l’heure de la justice humaine ne paraît pas êhtre
celle des victimes. » (C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 182, par. 46-47.)
13. Peu de temps après, dans mon opinion dissidente en l’affaire des
Immunités juridictionnelles de l’Etat (Allemagne c. Italie) (demande recon ‑
ventionnelle, ordonnance du 6 juillet 2010), j’ai jugé opportun de rappeler,
7
8 Ordonnance du 23 janvier 2012 (C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (I), p. 3).
Ecrit entre 49 et 62 après J.-C.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 417 18/04/16 08:54 210 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
inhuman conditions of the subjection of prisoners of war to forced labouhr,
that:
“Not only had those victims to endure inhuman and degrading
treatment, but later crossed the final limit of their ungrateful livesh
living with impunity, without reparation and amidst manifest injus -
tice. The time of human justice is definitively not the time of human h
beings.” (I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 375, para. 118.)
This holds true, once again, in the present case concerning the Application
of the Convention against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) — involving grave
breaches of international law — where the aforementioned regrettable
delays have extended for a virtually unprecedented prolongation of time h
(1999-2015), of over one and a half decades, despite the vita brevis of
human beings.
2. Justitia Longa, Vita Brevis
14. Paradoxically, the graver the breaches of international law appear
to be, the more time consuming and difficult it becomes to impart justihce.
To start with, all those who find themselves in this world are then
promptly faced with a great enigma posing a life -long challenge to every -
one : that of understanding the passing of time, and endeavouring to
learn how to live within it. Already in the late seventh or early eighth
century bc , this mystery surrounding all of us was well captured by
Homer in his Iliad :
“Like the generations of leaves, the lives of mortal men.
Now the wind scatters the old leaves across the earth,
now the living timber bursts with the new buds
and spring comes round again. And so with men :
as one generation comes to life, another dies away.” 9
15. As if it were not enough, there is an additional enigma to face, that
of the extreme violence and brutality with which human beings got used
to relating to each other, century after century :
“War — I know it well, and the butchery of men.
Well I know, shift to the left, shift to the right
my tough tanned shield. (. . .) I know it all, (. . .)
I know how to stand and fight to the finish,
twist and lunge in the war -god’s deadly dance . (. . .)
Now, as it is, the fates of death await us
thousands poised to strike, and not a man alive
can flee them or escape (. . .) .
9 Homer, The Iliad, Book VI, verses 171-175.
10 Ibid., Book VII, verses 275-278 and 280-281.
11
Ibid., Book XII, verses 378-380.
211
7 CIJ1077.indb 418 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 210
au sujet des conditions inhumaines auxquelles étaient soumis les prishon -
niers de guerre astreints aux travaux forcés, que
«[n]on seulement ces victimes subirent un traitement inhumain et
dégradant, mais elles arrivèrent par la suite au bout de leur vieingrate
après avoir assisté à l’impunité, sans obtenir de répahration et dans une
situation d’injustice flagrante. Le temps de la justice humaine n’hest
décidément pas celui des êtres humains. » (C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (I),
p. 375, par. 118.)
On pourrait en dire autant aujourd’hui au sujet de l’affaire Croatie c. Ser ‑
bie, qui concerne de graves violations du droit international et dans
laquelle les déplorables délais de justice susmentionnés se sonht prolongés
sur une période de temps virtuellement sans précédent, de 1999 à 2015,
soit plus de trois lustres, malgré la vita brevis des humains.
2. Justitia longa, vita brevis
14. Paradoxalement, plus les violations du droit international sont
graves, plus il semble long et difficile de rendre la justice. Pour comhmen-
cer, quiconque naît dans ce monde se trouve rapidement confronté àh une
immense énigme dont il ne lui suffira pas de toute une vie pour relever le
défi; ce défi, c’est celui de comprendre quee le temps passe et d’appreedre
à vivre dans ce passage. A la fin du VIII siècle ou au début du VII siècle
av. J. -C., dans l’Iliade, Homère évoquait ainsi ce mystère dans lequel
nous sommes tous plongés :
«Il en est de la race des humains comme des feuilles.
Le vent a beau les coucher sur le sol, il en vient d’autres,
Dans les bois verdoyants, dès que s’annonce le printemps.
Ainsi les hommes tour à tour naissent, puis disparaissent. »9
15. Et comme si cette énigme ne suffisait pas, nous en avons une autre
à résoudre, qui est celle de l’extrême violence et de la bruhtalité qui ont
caractérisé les relations entre humains au fil des siècles :
«Je m’y connais parfaitement en combats et carnages,
Et sais mouvoir de tout côté mon bouclier de peau de bœuf séhchée
Qui me permet de guerroyer en homme invulnérable.
Je sais bondir aussi dans le fracas des chars rapides.
10
Je sais danser du pied la danse du cruel Arès…
Mais mille chances de mort nous enveloppent,
Et il n’est point permis à l’homme vivant de les éviter ni dhe les
11
fuir…
9 Homère, L’Iliade, chant VI, versets 146-149, traduit par Frédéric Mugler.
10Ibid., chant VII, versets 237-241.
11Ibid., chant XII, versets 326-327.
211
7 CIJ1077.indb 419 18/04/16 08:54 211 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
We must steel our hearts. Bury our dead,
with tears for the day they die, not one day more.
And all those left alive, after the hateful carnage,
(.. .) wretched mortals (. . .)
like leaves, no sooner flourishing, full of the sun’s fire,
feeding on earth’s gifts, than they waste away and die 12. (. . .)
My sons laid low, my daughters dragged away
and the treasure -chambers looted, helpless babies
hurled to the earth in the red barbarity of war (. . .)
Ah for a young man
all looks fine and noble if he goes down in war,
hacked to pieces under a slashing bronze blade —
he lies there dead (. . .) but whatever death lays bare,
all wounds are marks of glory. When an old man’s killed
and the dogs go at the grey head and the grey beard
and mutilate the genitals — that is the cruellest sight
in all our wretched lives ! ”
16. Homer’s narrative of human cruelty seems endowed with perennial
contemporaneity, especially after the subsequent advent of tragedy. Thish
is the imprint of a true classic. Homer could well be describing the horh -
rors in our times, or in recent times, e.g., in the wars in the former Yhugo-
slavia during the nineties. There are, in the Iliad, murders, brutality, rape,
pillage, slavery and humiliation ;there are, in the present case of the
Application of the Convention against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), mur -
ders, brutality, torture, beatings, enforced disappearances, looting andh
humiliation ; from the late eighth century bc to the late twentieth century,
the propensity of human beings to treat each other with extreme violenceh
has remained the same, and has even at times worsened.
17. This suggests that succeeding generations over the centuries, have
not learned from the sufferings of their predecessors. The propensity of
human beings to do evil to each other has accompanied them from the
times of the Iliad, through those of the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sopho -
cles and Euripides (fourth century bc), until the present, as illustrated by
the cas d’espèce , concerning the Application of the Convention against
Genocide. There is a certain distance from epic to tragedy yet,;the former
paved the way to the latter, and tragedy was then to find its own exprhes-
sion, and, ever since, has never faded away. Tragedy sought inspiration hin
the narrative of epic, but added to it something new : the human senti -
ment, the endurance of living and the human condition. Tragedy has been h
accompanying the human condition throughout the centuries.
12
13Homer, The Iliad, Book XXI, verses 528-530.
Ibid., Book XXII, verses 73-75 and 83-90.
212
7 CIJ1077.indb 420 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 211
Un preux vient-il à succomber, il faut l’ensevelir,
D’un cœur impitoyable, après l’avoir pleuré un jour.
Mais tous ceux qui ont survécu à l’affreuse bataille
Doivent songer à manger et à boire, afin de mieux
Se battre avec les ennemis, sans trêve, obstinément.
… pauvres humains
qui, pareils à des feuilles, tantôt vivent pleins d’éclat
Et mangent les fruits que fournit la terre labourée,
Tantôt retombent au néant. 12…
Mes fils agonisants, toutes mes filles enlevées,
Mes appartements dévastés, mes pauvres petits -fils
Précipités contre le sol dans l’atroce carnage…
Un jeune guerrier mort,
Déchiré par le bronze aigu, ne perd rien de sa grâce :
Tout ce qui apparaît de lui, même mort, reste beau.
Mais quand les chiens outragent le front blanc, la barbe blanche
Et jusqu’à la virilité d’un vieux qu’on vient d’abattrhe,
13
Est-il rien de plus désolant pour les pauvres humains ? »
16. Le tableau que peint Homère de la cruauté des hommes semble
éternellement contemporain, tout particulièrement à la lumière des tragé -
dies qui ont suivi. C’est la marque d’un vrai classique. Homèreh pourrait
tout aussi bien décrire les horreurs de notre temps, ou d’un tempsh récent,
par exemple les guerres sur le territoire de l’ex -Yougoslavie pendant les
années 1990. L’Iliade regorge de meurtres, violences, torture, sévices, dis -
paritions forcées, pillage et humiliations; l’affaire Croatie c. Serbie regorge
de meurtres, violences, torture, sévices, disparitions forcées, pihllage et
humiliations; de la fin du VIII e siècle avant J.-C. à la fin du XX e siècle
après J.-C., la propension des humains à se traiter les uns les autres avec
la plus extrême violence est restée la même, et parfois s’esht aggravée.
17. C’est à croire que les générations qui se sont succédé de siècle en
siècle n’ont rien appris des souffrances subies par celles qui les hont précé -
dées. A en juger par la présente affaire Croatie c. Serbie, la propension au
mal dont font preuve les humains les uns à l’égard des autres lhes a accom -
pagnés depuis le temps de L’Iliade jusqu’à l’époque contemporaine, en
passant par les tragédies d’Eschyle, de Sophocle et d’Euripide hau IV esiècle
av. J.-C. Il y a, bien entendu, une certaine distance entre l’épopée et lha
tragédie, mais la première a ouvert la voie à la seconde, la trhagédie a
ensuite trouvé son propre mode d’expression, et depuis elle n’a jamais
quitté le devant de la scène. La tragédie a puisé son inspirhation dans les
récits épiques et leur a ajouté une dimension nouvelle : le sentiment, la
volonté de vivre et la condition humaine. La tragédie a accompagnéh la
condition humaine au fil des siècles.
12 Homère, L’Iliade, chant XIX, versets 228-233; chant XXI, versets 463-466.
13
Ibid., chant XXII, versets 62-64 et 71-76.
212
7 CIJ1077.indb 421 18/04/16 08:54 212 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
18. It came to stay, performed throughout the centuries, time and time
again, until our days. The war in the Balkans, portrayed in the present h
case opposing Croatia to Serbia, bears witness of that : it is tragic in its
devastation. Yet, tragedy — which gave a new dimension to epic — was
not focused only on destructiveness and the lessons to extract therefromh,
but also on the need for justice. Aeschylus’s Oresteia trilogy, and in par -
ticular the chorus in the Eumenides, can be recalled in this connection.
Just as the passing of time has not erased the sombre propensity of humahn
beings to do evil to each other, the search for justice has likewise beehn
long -lasting, as also illustrated by the cas d’espèce. This regrettably
appears proper of the human condition, from ancient times to nowadays :
perennial evil, vita brevis; justitia longa, vita brevis.
III. Jurisdiction: Automatic Successionh to the Genocide
Convention as a Human Rihghts Treaty
1. Arguments of the Parties as to the Applicability
of the Obligations under
the Genocide Convention prior to 27 April 1992
19. In its Application filed in 1999, Croatia invoked jurisdiction on the
basis that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a
party to the Genocide Convention and that Serbia was bound by it as a
successor State to the SFRY 14. Both Parties, according to Croatia, were
15
bound by the Genocide Convention as successor States of the SFRY .
The SFRY had become a party to the Convention on 29 August 1950. In
the light of the International Court of Justice’s finding in 2008 that its
jurisdict16n in the present case arises of succession to the Genocide Cohn-
vention rather than accession, Croatia has stressed the existence of a
continuing obligation, rather than one newly entered into 17. Croatia has
thus submitted that the Genocide Convention accords jurisdiction to the
Court over conduct before 27 April 1992 ; it has put forward an alterna -
tive ground for jurisdiction over conduct predating 27 April 1992, namely,
Serbia’s declaration on that date 18.
20. Serbia, for its part, has acknowledged that it succeeded to the
Genocide Convention with effect from 27 April 1992 ; in the light of the
14 Application instituting proceedings, para. 28.
15 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Cr▯ime of Geno‑
cide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.Reports 2008, p. 424,
par16 37 (hereinafte: the “2008udgment”).
17 2008 Judgment, para. 111.
CR 2014/12, of 7 March 2014, p. 38, para. 4.
18 Ibid., p. 40, para. 9.
213
7 CIJ1077.indb 422 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 212
18. Elle est montée sur la scène pour ne plus la quitter, traversant lhes
siècles de théâtre en théâtre jusqu’à nos jours. Lah guerre des Balkans telle
que l’illustre la présente affaire opposant la Croatie à la Serbhie en porte
témoignage: elle est tragique dans la dévastation qu’elle a semée. Or la h
tragédie — qui a donné une dimension nouvelle à l’épopée — ne mettait
pas exclusivement en scène la destruction et les leçons à en tihrer, mais
aussi la soif de justice. On citera à ce propos les trois pièces d’Eschyle
composant l’Orestie, et en particulier le chœur dans les Euménides. De
même que le passage du temps n’a nullement diminué la noire prohpension
des humains à infliger le mal à leur prochain, il n’a rien ôhté à leur soif de
justice, comme le montre notre affaire. Depuis les âges les plus reculés
jusqu’à nos jours, telle est malheureusement la loi de l’humainhe condi -
tion : pérennité du mal, vita brevis; justitia longa, vita brevis.
III. Compétence: succession automatihque à la convention
sur le génocide en tanht que traité relatif ahux droits de l’homme
1. Arguments des Parties sur l’applicabilité,
antérieurement au 27 avril 1992,
des obligations prévues par la convention sur le génocide
19. Dans la requête introductive d’instance qu’elle a déposéeh en 1999, la
Croatie a fondé la compétence de la Cour sur le fait que la Réphublique fé -dé
rative socialiste de Yougoslavie (RFSY) était partie à la convenhtion sur le
génocide et que la Serbie était liée par cette convention en tahnt qu’Etat s- uc
cesseur de la RFSY 1. Toujours selon la Croatie, les deux Parties étaient
liées par la convention sur le génocide en tant qu’Etats succeshseurs de la
15
RFSY . La RFSY était partie à la Convention depuis le 29août 1950. A la
lumière de l’arrêt de 2008 dans lequel la Cour a conclu que sa compétence
en l’espèce naissait de la succession plutôt que de l’adhéhsion à la convention
16
sur le génocide , la Croatie a souligné que cette compétence se fondait par
conséquent sur une obligation qui existait déjà et non sur une obligation
nouvellement contractée 1. Elle a soutenu que la convention sur le génocide
conférait donc compétence à la Cour pour statuer sur les agissehments de la
Serbie antérieurs au 27 avril 1992; et, à titre subsidiaire, que la Cour serait
compétente pour connaître des actes antérieurs au 27 avril 1992 sur le fon -
dement de la déclaration de la Serbie portant cette date . 18
20. De son côté, la Serbie a admis qu’elle avait succédé àh la convention
sur le génocide avec effet au 27 avril 1992; suite à l’arrêt de 2008, elle a
14
15Requête introductive d’instance, par. 28.
Affaire relative à l’ Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression d▯u
crime de génocide (Croatie c. Serbie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2008,
p. 424, par. 37 (ci-après «rêt de 2008»).
16Arrêt de 2008, par. 111.
17CR 2014/12, p. 34, par. 4.
18Ibid., p. 36, par. 9.
213
7 CIJ1077.indb 423 18/04/16 08:54 213 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
2008 Judgment, it has asserted that it became bound by the Geno -
cide Convention from 27 April 1992 onwards, but not prior to that date . 19
It has submitted that acts and omissions that took place before 27 April
1992 cannot entail its international responsibility, as it only came into
existence on that date, and, accordingly, it was not bound by the Geno -
cide Convention before then. Alternatively, it has argued that Croatia
only came into existence on 8 October 1991 and cannot raise claims based
on facts preceding its coming into existence 20.
21. It should be recalled that the International Court of Justice,
in 2008, examined only the effect of the declaration and Note to the
United Nations of 27 April 1992 (to which it attributed the effect of a
notification of succession to treaties), and did not deem it necessarhy to
examine the wider question of the application in this case of the generahl
law relating to succession of States, nor the rules of international lawh
governing State succession to treaties (including the question of ipso jure
succession to some multilateral treaties) 2. The Court’s interpretation of
the declaration of 27 April 1992 was in itself sufficient for the purposes of
establishing whether the respondent was bound by the Genocide Conven-
tion (with attention to Article IX) at the date of the institution of the
proceedings. Be that as it may, now, in the merits phase, the question
arises as to the applicability of the Genocide Convention to acts prior
to 27 April 1992.
2. Continuity of Application of the Genocide Convention
(SFRY and FRY)
22. In deciding, in its Judgment of 2008 on preliminary objections, that
Serbia became bound by the Convention from 27 April 1992 onwards 22,
the Court joined to the merits the question of the applicability of the
obligations under the Genocide Convention to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) before 27 April 1992 23. In this regard, Serbia submit -
ted, in the oral proceedings at the merits stage, that “the Court alrheady
decided, at the preliminary objections stage, that Serbia ‘only’ became
bound by the Convention ‘as of April 1992’” 24. However, the Court only
dealt with the question of whether the conditions were met under Arti -
cle 35 of the Statute for the purposes of determining whether the FRY
had the capacity to participate in the proceedings before the Court on the
date of the Application, namely, 2 July 1999 25.
23. The question was decided not on the basis of whether Serbia suc -
ceeded to the Genocide Convention ipso jure, but solely on the basis of
19
20 CR 2014/14, of 11 March 2014, p. 23, para. 4.
21 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 206, 357-387.
22 2008 Judgment, para. 101.
Ibid., para. 117.
23 Ibid., para. 129.
24 CR 2014/14, of 11 March 2014, p. 14, para. 26.
25 2008 Judgment, paras. 60, 67, 69, 71, 78 and 95.
214
7 CIJ1077.indb 424 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 213
déclaré qu’elle était liée par la convention sur le géhnocide depuis le
27 avril 1992, mais non avant cette date 1. Elle a soutenu que les actes et
omissions antérieurs au 27 avril 1992 ne sauraient engager sa responsabi -
lité internationale puisqu’elle n’a vu le jour qu’à cetteh date et que, par
conséquent, elle ne pouvait être liée par la convention sur le hgénocide
avant ladite date. A titre subsidiaire, elle a fait valoir que la Croatihe n’a
vu le jour que le 8 octobre 1991 et ne saurait former des demandes fon -
dées sur des faits survenus avant sa naissance 20.
21. Il convient de rappeler qu’en 2008 la Cour a limité son examen àh
l’effet de la déclaration et de la note du 27 avril 1992 au Secrétaire général
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (auxquelles elle a attribué l’effet
d’une notification de succession aux traités), et qu’elle n’ha pas estimé
devoir examiner la question plus générale de l’application à l’espèce du
droit général de la succession d’Etats ou celle des règles dhu droit interna -
tional régissant la succession d’Etats aux traités (y compris la question de
21
la succession ipso jure à certains traités multilatéraux) . Son interpréta-
tion de la déclaration du 27 avril 1992 a suffi à la Cour pour trancher la
question de savoir si le défendeur était lié par la convention hsur le géno -
cide (y compris son article IX) à la date d’introduction de l’instance. Quoi
qu’on puisse penser de sa décision, la question se pose maintenanth, au
stade de l’examen au fond, de savoir si la convention sur le génocide s’ap -
plique aux faits antérieurs au 27 avril 1992.
2. Continuité de l’application de la convention sur le génocide
(RFSY et RFY)
22. Lorsqu’elle a décidé, dans son arrêt de 2008 sur les exceptions pré-
liminaires, que la Serbie était liée par la Convention à comptehr du
27 avril 1992 22, la Cour a renvoyé à la phase du fond la question de l’ap -
plicabilité à la République fédérale de Yougoslavie (RFYh) antérieure23nt
au 27 avril 1992 des obligations découlant de la Convention . A ce sujet,
la Serbie a soutenu, pendant l’audience sur le fond, que la Cour avaiht
décidé, au stade des exceptions préliminaires, que cet Etat «h n’était devenu
24
lié par cet instrument qu’en avril 1992» . Or la Cour n’avait examiné que
la question de savoir si les conditions prévues à l’article 35 de son Statut
pour que la RFY ait qualité pour participer à une procédure devhant elle
25
étaient remplies à la date de la requête, c’est -à-dire au 2 juillet 1999 .
23. La question a été tranchée non pas en décidant si la Serbie havait
succédé ou non à la convention sur le génocide ipso jure, mais uniquement
19 CR 2014/14, p. 16, par. 4.
20 Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 206, 357-387.
21 Arrêt de 2008, par. 101.
22
23 Ibid., par. 117.
24 Ibid., par. 129.
CR 2014/14, p. 14, par. 26.
25 Arrêt de 2008, par. 60, 67, 69, 71, 78 et 95.
214
7 CIJ1077.indb 425 18/04/16 08:54 214 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
26
the historical record and of the declaration and Note of 27 April 1992 .
Taking the view that the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility raised
by Serbia’s preliminary objection ratione temporis constituted “two insep-
arable issues” in that case, the Court expressly left the issue of thhe appli-
cability of the obligations under the Genocide Convention to the FRY
before 27 April 1992 open, to be decided at the merits stage of the cas
d’espèce 27.
3. Continuity of the State Administration and Officials
(SFRY and FRY)
24. While the FRY formally came into existence as a State on 27 April
1992, this proclamation only formalized a factual situation which had de
facto arisen during the dissolution of the SFRY. Serbia considers that,
until the proclamation of the dissolution of the SFRY, any act performed
by individuals in the name of the SFRY may be attributable only to that
entity. However, as the Badinter Commission recognized in its Opin -
ion No. 1, from mid -1991 the SFRY ceased to operate as a functioning
State and was authoritatively recognized as in a “process of dissoluthion”.
The dissolution was an extended process, completed on 4 July 1992,
according to Opinion No. 8 of the Badinter Commission. This implies
that, well before April 1992, the territory of the SFRY had already been
divided, and Serbian leadership had effectively taken control of the prinh -
cipal organs of the former SFRY. This determination of the control of
the political and military apparatus during this whole period is thus rehle-
vant.
25. Serbia cannot shift responsibility to an extinct State for the main
reason that the personnel controlling the relevant organs in the interimh
period later assumed similar positions in the new government of the FRY.h
It was the same leadership which, from October1991 — when the relevant
organs of government and other federal authorities of the SFRY ceased to
function — became de facto organs and authorities of the new FRY, act -
ing under Serbian leadership. The former State officials of the SFRY had
close ties with the officials of Serbia and Montenegro (FRY). Serbia hdoes
not deny that these were the same people carrying out the same policies. In
this regard, Croatia provides a list of political and military leaders which
illustrates the personal continuity of the policy and practices from 1991
onwards, on the part of the Serbian authorities located in Belgrade 28. Ser-
bia has not challenged the list of29olitical and military leaders which hattests
this continuity and connections .
262008 Judgment, para. 101.
27Ibid., paras. 129-130.
28Memorial of Croatia, Appendix 8.
29One may refer to seven of the 17 political and military leaders, listed in Appendix 8
of Croatia’s Memorial.
215
7 CIJ1077.indb 426 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 214
sur la base des données historiques et de la déclaration et de la hnote du
27 avril 1992 2. Etant d’avis que les questions de compétence et de receva-
bilité soulevées par l’exception préliminaire ratione temporis de la Serbie
constituaient, en la présente affaire, « deux questions indissociables », la
Cour a expressément choisi de laisser ouverte la question de l’apphlicabilité
à la RFY antérieurement au 27 avril 1992 des obligations découlant de la
convention sur le génocide, et d’en renvoyer l’examen à la phhase du fond 27.
3. Continuité de l’administration et des représentants de l’Eta▯t
(RFSY et RFY)
24. Bien que la RFY n’ait officiellement vu le jour comme Etat que le
27 avril 1992, cette proclamation n’a fait qu’officialiser une situation
concrète qui avait émergé de facto pendant la dissolution de la RFSY. La
Serbie considère que, jusqu’à la proclamation de la dissolution de la
RFSY, les actes accomplis par des personnes au nom de celle-ci ne peuvent o
être attribués qu’à cette entité et à elle seule. Cependant, dans son avis n 1,
la commission Badinter a officiellement constaté que, depuis la mi -1991,
la RFSY avait cessé de fonctionner comme un Etat viable et qu’elleh était
o
engagée dans un « processus de dissolution ». Selon l’avis n 8 de ladite
commission, cette dissolution a été un long processus qui est arrivé à son
terme le 4 juillet 1992. Cela implique que, bien avant avril 1992, le terri -
toire de l’ex-Yougoslavie avait déjà été divisé et que les dirigeants sherbes
avaient pris le contrôle effectif des principaux organes de l’ex -RFSY.
Cette constatation du contrôle exercé sur l’appareil politique et militaire
pendant toute la période considérée est donc pertinente.
25. La Serbie ne saurait se défausser de sa responsabilité sur un Etath
défunt, pour la bonne raison que les personnes qui contrôlaient lehs
organes pertinents de ce dernier pendant la période intérimaire onht ensuite
assumé des fonctions similaires dans le gouvernement de la nouvelle
RFY. Ce sont les mêmes dirigeants serbes qui, à partir d’octobrhe 1991
— c’est-à-dire lorsque les organes de gouvernement et autres autorités
fédérales compétentes de la RFSY ont cessé de fonctionner —, sont deve -
nus de facto les organes et autorités de la nouvelle RFY sous direction
serbe. Les anciens représentants de la RFSY ressemblaient fort aux rehpr-é
sentants de la Serbie -et-Monténégro (RFY). La Serbie ne conteste pas
qu’il s’agissait des mêmes personnes et qu’elles appliquaienht les mêmes
politiques. Sur ce point, la Croatie a fourni une liste de dirigeants pohli -
tiques et militaires qui illustre la continuité depuis 1991, parmi les autorités28
serbes de Belgrade, des personnels chargés des politiques et des prat▯iques .
La Serbie n’a pas contesté cette liste de dirigeants politiques eth militaires
qui atteste la continuité et le maillage des personnels considéréhs 29.
26Arrêt de 2008, par. 101.
27Ibid., par. 129-130.
28Mémoire de la Croatie, appendice 8.
29On pourrait mentionner sept des dix -sept dirigeants politiques et militaires dont la
liste figure à l’appendice 8 du mémoire de la Croatie.
215
7 CIJ1077.indb 427 18/04/16 08:54 215 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
4. Law Governing State Succession to Human Rights Treaties : Ipso Jure
Succession to the Genocide Convention
26. Serbia’s conduct — contrary to its allegations — supports the
applicability of the Genocide Convention to the FRY before 27 April
1992. It is here important to keep in mind, to start with, the law goverhn -
ing State succession to human rights treaties. In effect, leaving aside Shtate
succession in respect of classic treaties, it is generally accepted that certain
types of treaties — such as human rights treaties — remain in force by
reason of their special nature. It can be argued, in this connection, thhat
the application of the Genocide Convention to the FRY, when it was in
statu nascendi, that is, before 27 April 1992, is justified — to paraphrase
the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion of 1951 on the hRes ‑
ervations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (p. 23) — by the Convention’s “special and important pur -
pose” to endorse “the most elementary principles of morality”, hirrespec-
tive of questions of formal succession.
27. In this respect, the International Court of Justice’s understanding
of the object and purpose of the Convention, as set out in that célèbre
Advisory Opinion, may here be recalled :
“The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of
the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as ‘a crime
under international law’ involving a denial of the right of existenceh of
entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of man -
kind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to
moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations (Resolu-
tion 96 (I) of the General Assembly, 11 December 1946). The first
consequence arising from this conception is that the principles under-
lying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized
nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obliga -
tion. A second consequence is the universal character both of the
condemnation of genocide and of the co -operation required ‘in order
to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge’ (Preamble to the
Convention).” 30
28. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the Convention, as indi-
cated, has a “special and important purpose” to endorse “the mohst ele -
mentary principles of morality” 3. The Court further stated that the
30
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the C▯rime of
Gen31ide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.
Ibid.
216
7 CIJ1077.indb 428 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 215
4. Droit régissant la succession des traités relatifs aux droits de l▯’homme :
succession ipso jure à la convention sur le génocide
26. La conduite de la Serbie, contrairement à ce qu’elle prétend,
conforte la thèse de l’opposabilité de la convention sur le géhnocide à la
RFY antérieurement au 27 avril 1992. Il importe ici de rappeler, en pre -
mier lieu, le droit qui régit la succession d’Etats aux traitésh relatifs aux
droits de l’homme. En effet, abstraction faite de la succession d’Ehtats aux
traitésclassiques, il est généralement admis que certaines catégories de
traités, comme les traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme, resthent en vigueur
sans solution de continuité en raison de leur caractère particuliehr. On est
fondé à soutenir, à cet égard, que l’application à la hRFY in statu nascendi,
c’està-dire antérieurement au 27 avril 1992, de la convention sur le géno -
cide est justifiée — pour paraphraser l’avis consultatif de 1951 de la Cour
sur les Réserves à la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime
de génocide (p. 23) — par le but particulièrement important visé par la
Convention, qui est de « sanctionner les principes de morale les plus élé -
mentaires », sans considération des questions formelles de succession.
27. Il convient à ce propos de rappeler l’interprétation que fait lha Cour
de l’objet et du but de la Convention dans ce célèbre avis conshultatif:
« Les origines et le caractère de la Convention, les fins poursuiviesh
par l’Assemblée générale et par les parties contractantes, lhes rapports
que présentent les dispositions de la Convention entre elles et avec
ces fins, fournissent des éléments d’interprétation de la hvolonté de
l’Assemblée générale et des parties. Les origines de la Convhention
révèlent l’intention des Nations Unies de condamner et de réprimer
le génocide comme « un crime de droit des gens » impliquant le refus
du droit à l’existence de groupes humains entiers, refus qui bouleh -
verse la conscience humaine, inflige de grandes pertes à l’humanhité,
et qui est contraire à la fois à la loi morale et à l’esprith et aux fins des
Nations Unies (résolution96 (I) de l’Assemblée générale, 11décembre
1946). Cette conception entraîne une première conséquence : lesprin-
cipes qui sont à la base de la Convention sont des principes reconnush
par les nations civilisées comme obligeant les Etats même en dehorhs
de tout lien conventionnel. Une deuxième conséquence est le carac -
tère universel à la fois de la condamnation du génocide et de lha
coopération nécessaire « pour libérer l’humanité d’un fléau aussi
odieux» (préambule de la Convention). » 30
28. La Cour a donc, dans cet avis consultatif, souligné que la Conven -
tion vise un but particulièrement important qui est de « sanctionner les
principes de morale les plus élémentaires »31. Elle y déclare que les prin -
30
Réserves à la convention pour la prévention et la répression▯ du crime de génocide, avis
co31ultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 23.
Ibid.
216
7 CIJ1077.indb 429 18/04/16 08:54 216 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
principles of the Convention bind States “even without any conventionhal
obligation” and that the Convention was intended to be “definitely uni -
versal in scope”. In its Judgment on preliminary objections (of 11 July
1996) in the Bosnia Genocide case, the International Court of Justice
referred no less than three times to the special nature of the Geno -
cide Convention as a universal human rights treaty, in order to found its
jurisdiction. There was awareness around the Bench as to the needs of
protection of the segments of the populations concerned, and automatic
succession to the Convention did not pass unnoticed 32.
29. Nowadays, almost two decades later, it is about time to take this
analysis further. It is clear that the Genocide Convention is not a synal -
lagmatic bargain, whereby each State party would bind itself to the othehr ;
it does not simply create rights and obligations between States parties hon
a bilateral basis. As a human rights treaty, it sets up a mechanism of col‑
lective guarantee 33. In my view, it is not sufficient to assert (or reassert), as
the International Court of Justice did almost two decades ago, that the h
1948 Genocide Convention is a human rights treaty : one has, moreover,
to extract the legal consequences therefrom (cf. infra).
30. In the present case concerning the Application of the Convention
against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), the relevant conduct was that of the
JNA (or under its direction and control), and the JNA was a de facto
organ of the nascent Serbian State. It would be utterly artificial to hargue
that the Convention continued to bind the SFRY until it formally disap -
peared , becoming thus no longer able to respond for any breach of an
international obligation. Such a break in the protection afforded by the h
Genocide Convention would not be consistent with the precise object of
safeguarding the very existence of certain human groups, in pursuance ofh
the most elementary principles of morality.
31. This applies even more cogently in a situation of dissolution of
State amidst violence. After all, the consequences of the commission of
grave violations of international law will, in most cases, continue to ahffect
and victimize certain human groups even after the date of succession, anhd
even more so when surrounded by violence. In such circumstance, it
would be unjust for the victims if no responsibility could be vindicatedh for
the commission of internationally wrongful acts and their consequences
32 Cf. case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish ‑
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objec‑
tions, Judgment, I.C.J.eports 1996 (II), separate opinions of Judges Shahabuddeen and
Wee33mantry, pp. 634-637 and 645-655, respectively.
On the notion of collective guarantee, proper to human rights treaties,
cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos [Trea‑
tise of International Law of Human Rights], Vol. II, Porto Alegre/Brazil, S. A. Fabris Ed.,
1999, pp. 47-53.
34 In reality, the SFRY, in 1991 and 1992, was no longer exercising any direction or
control of the JNA, and was already undergoing an irreversible process ohf dissolution.
217
7 CIJ1077.indb 430 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 216
cipes qui sont à la base de la Convention obligent les Etats « même en
dehors de tout lien conventionnel », et que la Convention elle -même a été
voulue « comme une convention de portée nettement universelle ». Dans
son arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 sur les exceptions préliminaires en l’affaire
Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro, la Cour n’invoque pas moins
de trois fois le caractère particulier de la convention sur le génhocide en
tant que traité relatif aux droits de l’homme pour fonder sa compéhtence.
Certains de ses membres se sont montrés conscients de la nécessité de
protéger les segments concernés de la population et ont soulevéh la ques -
tion de la succession automatique à la Convention 32.
29. Aujourd’hui, alors que près de deux décennies se sont écoulées, le
moment est venu de pousser plus loin l’analyse. Il est évident queh la
convention sur le génocide n’est pas un contrat synallagmatique dans le
cadre duquel un Etat partie se lierait à un autre ; elle ne se contente pas de
créer des droits et des obligations entre les Etats parties sur une bhase bila -
térale. En tant que traité relatif aux droits de l’homme, elle hmet en place
un système de garantie collective 3. A mon avis, il ne suffit pas d’affirmer
(ou de confirmer) comme la Cour l’a fait il y a près de vingt hans que la
convention sur le génocide est un traité relatif aux droits de l’homme :
encore faut -il en tirer les conséquences juridiques (voir ci -après).
30. Dans la présente Croatie c. Serbie, le comportement pertinent est
celui de la JNA (Armée populaire yougoslave) ou des forces placées sous
sa direction et son contrôle, et la JNA était de facto un organe de l’Etat
serbe naissant. Il serait extrêmement artificiel de prétendre quhe la Conven -
tion a continué à lier la RFSY jusqu’à ce que celle -ci disparaisse officiel-
34
lement , ce qui la dispensait d’avoir à répondre de ses manquements àh
ses obligations internationales. Une telle interruption dans la protection
accordée par la convention sur le génocide est incompatible avec shon
objet, qui est de préserver l’existence même de certains groupehs humains,
en application des principes de morale les plus élémentaires.
31. Cela vaut à plus forte raison dans une situation où la dissolutionh
d’un Etat donne lieu à des violences. Car les effets des graves viohlations
du droit international commises dans ce cadre continueront, dans la plu -
part des cas, de se faire sentir sur les groupes humains qui en sont les
victimes, même après la date de la succession d’Etats, et plus hencore
quand ces groupes sont menacés de violences. Dans de telles circons -
tances, il serait injuste pour les victimes que personne ne puisse êthre appelé
32
Affaire relative à l’ Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression d▯u
crime de génocide (Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1996 (II), opinions individuelles des juges Shahabuddeen et Weeramantry,
p. 634-637 et 645-655 respectivement.
33 Sur le concept de garantie collective propre aux traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme,
voir A.A. Cançado, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, vII,orto
Alegre (Brésil), S. A. Fabris Ed., 1999, p. 47-53.
34 En fait, en 1991 et 1992, la RFSY ne dirigeait ni ne contrôlait plus la JNA et elle éthait
déjà engagée dans un irréversible processus de dissolution.
217
7 CIJ1077.indb 431 18/04/16 08:54 217 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
extended in time 3. To argue that responsibility would vanish with the
dissolution of the State concerned would render the Genocide Conven-
tion irrelevant. An internationally wrongful act and its continuing conshe-
quences cannot remain unpunished and without reparation for damages.
32. The Genocide Convention, as a human rights treaty (as generally
acknowledged), is concerned with State responsibility, besides individual
responsibility. It should not pass unnoticed that human rights treaties h
have a hermeneutics of their own (cf. infra), and are endowed with a
mechanism of collective guarantee. Moreover, the Genocide Convention
implies the undertaking by each State party to treat successor States ash
continuing (as from independence) any commitment and status which the h
predecessor State had as a party to the Convention.
33. It may be recalled, in this regard, that, in the context of the present h
proceedings, the Badinter Commission emphasized the need for all human
rights treaties to which the SFRY was party to remain in force with
respect to all of its territories6. I am of the view that there is automatic
37
State succession to universal human rights treaties , and that Serbia has
succeeded to the Genocide Convention (under customary law), without
the need for any formal confirmation of adherence as the successor Stahte.
In light of the declaratory character of the Convention and the need to h
secure the effective protection of the rights enshrined therein, the de facto
organs of the nascent Serbia were bound by the Genocide Convention
before 27 April 1992.
5. State Conduct in Support of Automatic Succession to, and Continuing
Applicability of, the Genocide Convention
(to FRY prior to 27 April 1992)
34. Serbia’s conduct itself evidences the applicability to it of the multhi-lat
eral conventions to which the SFRY had been a State party at the time of
itsdissolution ; its conduct itself provides evidence that it remained bound
by them. In the particular circumstances of the present case, the FRY hahd,
35
Cf., in this sense, e.g., P. Dumberry, State Succession to International Responsibility,
Leiden, Nijhoff, 2007, pp. 278, 283-284, 297, 366, 409, 411, 424-425 and 428.
36 Arbitration Commission, EC Conference on Yugoslavia (Robert Badinter,
Chairman), Opinion No. 1, of 29 November 1991, 92 International Law Reports, p. 162.
37 In relation to international human rights instruments, cUN Human Rights
Commission resolutions 1993/23, 1994/16 and 1995/18, UN doc. E/CN4/1995/80 p. 4;
Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 26 (61), UN doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.8/Rev.1. Cf. also, in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s succession to the ICCPRh,
Decision adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 7 October 1992, and discussion
thereto, Official Records of the Human Rights Committee, 1992-1993, Vol. 1, p. 15.
218
7 CIJ1077.indb 432 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 217
à répondre des faits internationalement illicites qui ont étéh commis et de
35
leurs conséquences à long terme . Prétendre que la responsabilité s’éteint
avec la dissolution de l’Etat concerné ôterait toute pertinenceh à la conven -
tion sur le génocide. Un fait internationalement illicite et ses conshéquences
ne sauraient rester impunis et échapper à toute réparation.
32. La convention sur le génocide en tant que traité relatif aux droiths
de l’homme (qualité qui lui est généralement reconnue) met en cause la
responsabilité non seulement des personnes, mais aussi de l’Etat. On ne
saurait ignorer que les traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme onth leur her -
méneutique propre (voir ci -après) et sont assortis d’un mécanisme de
garantie collective. De surcroît, la convention sur le génocide imhplique
que chaque Etat partie s’engage à se comporter envers les Etats suhcces -
seurs comme s’il était acquis que ceux -ci assuraient, à compter de leur
indépendance, la continuité des obligations et de la qualité d’hEtat partie à
la Convention qu’avait leur Etat prédécesseur.
33. Il convient de rappeler, dans le contexte de la présente espèce, qhue
la commission Badinter a souligné que tous les traités relatifs auhx droits
de l’homme auxquels la RFSY étai36partie devaient rester en vigueuhr sur
l’ensemble de ses territoires . Je suis d’avis que la succession d’Etats aux
traités universels relatifs aux droits de l’homme 37 est automatique et que
la Serbie a succédé à la convention sur le génocide (selon hle droit coutu -
mier) sans qu’une confirmation formelle de son adhésion en qualhité d’Etat
successeur ait été nécessaire. Compte tenu du caractère déhclaratoire de la
convention sur le génocide et de la nécessité de garantir une phrotection
effective des droits qui y sont prévus, les organes de facto de la Serbie
naissante étaient liés par ladite convention antérieurement au h2a7vril 1992.
5. Le comportement de la RFY atteste qu’elle a succédé automatique▯ment
à la convention sur le génocide et que la Convention lui était
applicable antérieurement au 27 avril 1992
34. Le comportement de la Serbie atteste que lui étaient applicables les h
conventions multilatérales auxquelles la RFSY était partie à lah date de sa
dissolution ; il découle de son comportement même qu’elle restait liée phar
ces conventions. Dans les circonstances de l’espèce, la RFY a prétendu
35 Voir par exemple, sur ce point, P. Dumberry, State Succession in International
Res36nsibility, Leyde, Nijhoff, 2007, p. 278, 283-284, 297, 366, 409, 411, 424-425 et 428.
Commission d’orbitrage présidée par Robert Badinter, Conférence pour la paix en
Yougoslavie, avis n 1 du 29 novembre 1991, Revue générale de droit international public,
tome XCVI, 1992, p. 264-266.
37 Sur les instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme, voir les résolutions
1993/23, 1994/16 et 1995/18 de la Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies; le
rapport du Secrétaire général de l’ONU publié sous la cothe E/CN.4/1995/80, p. et l’ob-
servation générale 26/61 du Comité des droits de l’homme pubhliée sous la cote CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1. Voir aussi, sur la succession de la Bosnie -Herzégovine au Pacte inter-
national relatif aux droits civils et politiques, la décision adoptée par le Comité des droits
de l’homme le 7 octobre 1992 et le débat correspondant dans Documents officiels du Comité
des droits de l’homme, 1992-1993, vol. I, p. 15.
218
7 CIJ1077.indb 433 18/04/16 08:54 218 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
since 1992, claimed to possess the status of a State party to the C38vention
against Genocide; thus, in its declaration of 27 April 1992 , it stated that:
“The [FRY], continuing the state, international legal and political
personality of the [SFRY], shall strictly abide by all the commitments
39
that the SFR[Y] assumed internationally.”
35. It follows that, by accepting that it was bound by all the obliga -
tions assumed by the SFRY, Serbia (the FRY) took expressly the posi -
tion that the substantive obligations of the Convention against Genocideh,
like other obligations assumed by the SFRY, continued to apply without
any temporal break, including before April 1992. It is important to note
that, in its declaration, the FRY did not expressly or implicitly excludhe its
intention to be bound by the Convention before the date of the declara -
tion (27 April 1992). It rather expressed an attitude of continuity at all
relevant times, including with regard to obligations emanating from the h
Convention against Genocide. In this regard, it is useful to highlight thhat,
in its official Note to the United Nations on the same date (27 April 1992),
the FRY stated that :
“Strictly respecting the continuity of the international personality h
of Yugoslavia, the [FRY] shall continue to fulfil all the rights con -
ferred to, and obligations assumed by, the [SFRY] in international
relations, including its membership in all international organizations
and participation in international treaties ratified or acceded to by h
Yugoslavia.” 40
38
During the stage of preliminary objections in the present case, Serbia hhad disputed
that the declaration of 27 April 1992 amounted to a notification of succession. The
Court however, rejected that claim and concluded that Serbia did succeedh to the Geno -
cide Convention on 27 April 1992:
“The Court, taking into account both the text of the declaration and hNote
of 27 April 1992, and the consistent conduct of the FRY at the time of its making ahnd
throughout the years 1992-2001, considers that it should attribute to those documents
precisely the effect that they were, in the view of the Court, intended tho have on the
face of their terms : namely, that from that date onwards the FRY would be bound
by the obligations of a party in respect of all the multilateral conventions to which the
SFRY had been a party at the time of its dissolution, subject of course hto any -aserv
tions lawfully made by the SFRY limiting its obligations.” (2008 Judhgment, par. 117.)
This was acknowledged by Counsel for Serbia at the hearings in the presehnt proceedings
cf.39 2014/14, of 11 March 2014, p. 23, para. 4.
Joint declaration of the SFRY Assembly, the National Assembly of the Rephublic of
Serbia and the Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro, 27April 1992, UN doc.A/46/915,
Annex II.
40 Note to the United Nations (addressed to the Secretary -General), of 27 April 1992,
ibid.
219
7 CIJ1077.indb 434 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 218
dès 1992 posséder la qualité d’Etat partie à la convention sur lhe génocide;
38
dans sa déclaration du 27 avril 1992 , elle affirmait en effet que
« [l]a République fédérale de Yougoslavie, assurant la continuité de
l’Etat et de la personnalité juridique et politique internationale de la
République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie, respectera strhicte -
ment tous les engagements que la République fédérative socialiste de
Yougoslavie a pris à l’échelon international ».39
35. Il s’ensuit que, en se déclarant liée par toutes les obligationhs assu -
mées par la RFSY, la Serbie (RFY) a expressément adopté une position
voulant que les obligations de fond découlant de la convention sur le
génocide, comme les autres obligations assumées par la RFSY, éthaient
restées en vigueur sans solution de continuité, y compris avant leh mois
d’avril 1992. Il importe de noter que, dans sa déclaration, la RFY n’a ni h
expressément ni implicitement exclu l’intention d’être liéhe par la Conven -
tion avant la date de la déclaration (27 avril 1992). Elle a plutôt, par son
attitude, revendiqué la continuité à toutes les dates pertinenthes, y compris
à l’égard des obligations découlant de la convention sur le hgénocide. Il
n’est pas inutile dans ce contexte de souligner que, dans sa note offihcielle
du même jour (27 avril 1992), la RFY a déclaré ce qui suit :
« Dans le strict respect de la personnalité internationale de la You -
goslavie, la République fédérale de Yougoslavie continuera àh exercer
tous les droits conférés à la République fédérative sohcialiste de
Yougoslavie et à s’acquitter de toutes les obligations assuméesh par
cette dernière dans les relations internationales, y compris en ce quhi
concerne son appartenance à toutes les organisations internationales h
et sa participation à tous les traités internationaux que la Yougohsla -
40
vie a ratifiés ou auxquels elle a adhéré. »
38Au stade des exceptions préliminaires en la présente affaire, la Serbie avait contesté
que la déclaration du 27avril 1992 constituât une notification de succession. La Cour a
rejeté ses arguments et conclu que la Serbie avait succédé àh la convention sur le génocide
le 27 avril 1992:
«La Cour considère que, dans la présente affaire, compte tenu de la teneur de la
déclaration et de la note du 27 avril 1992 ainsi que du comportement concordant de
la RFY tant au moment de leur rédaction que tout au long des annéehs 1992 à 2001,
il convient d’attribuer précisément à ces documents l’effeht qu’ils étaient, selon elle,
censés avoir d’après leur libellé, à savoir que, à comhpter de cette date, la RFY serait
liée, en tant que partie, par les obligations découlant de toutes hles conventions mult-i
latérales auxquelles la RFSY était partie au moment de sa dissoluthion, à moins, bien
sûr, que celleci n’eût formulé de manière régulière des réserves hlimitant ses obliga -
tions.» (Arrêt de 2008, par. 117.)
Le conseil de la Serbie l’a reconnu à l’audience sur le fond (hCR2014/14, p. 23, par. 4).
39Déclaration commune de l’Assemblée de la République fédéhrative socialiste de You-go
slavie, de l’Assembléeationale de la République de Serbie et de l’Assemblée de la Réhpu-
blique du Monténégro adoptée le 27avril 1992, NationsUnies, doc. A/46/915, annexeII.
40Note adressée au Secrétaire général en date du 27 avril 1992, ibid.
219
7 CIJ1077.indb 435 18/04/16 08:54 219 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
36. It thus stems from these two documents (the 1992 declaration and
the official Note to the United Nations) that there was immediate and
automatic succession, whereby Serbia (the FRY) deemed itself bound to h
become the successor State and to assume all obligations of the SFRY,
including obligations ensuing from the Genocide Convention. In other
words, Serbia (the FRY), by its own declaration of 27 April 1992, stated
clearly its engagement to succeed the SFRY as a State party to the Con -
vention against Genocide. This entails that Serbia was already bound by h
the obligations of the Convention in relation to acts that occurred befohre
the date of its declaration of 1992.
6. Venire Contra Factum Proprium Non Valet
37. Thus, in the circumstances of the present case, the International
Court of Justice should bear in mind that Serbia (the FRY) itself recohg -
nized its commitment to continue its participation in international treahties
ratified or acceded to by former Yugoslavia. The FRY’s binding declhara-
tion strongly supports the continuing applicability of the obligations ohf the
Convention against Genocide to the nascent Serbian State before 27 April
1992. Furthermore, it can be argued that the International Court of Jus -
tice appears to have resolved this issue in its 2008 Judgment on prelimi-
nary objections in the cas d’espèce 41. When the International Court of
Justice stated that “the 1992 declaration and Note had the effect of a noti-
fication of succession by the FRY to the SFRY in relation to the Genocide
Convention”, it seems that it thereby acknowledged that there was conti -
nuity as to the conventional obligations (between SFRY and FRY).
38. One decade later, the FRY’s notification of accession of 6 March
2001 (deposited on 12 March 2001), after referring to the 1992 declara-
tion and to the subsequent admission of the FRY to the United Nations
as a new Member, stated, however, that
“the [FRY] has not succeeded on April 27, 1992, or on any later date,
to treaty membership, rights and obligations of the [SFRY] in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen -
ocide on the assumption of continued membership in the United
Nations and continued state, international legal and political person-
ality of the [SFRY] (. . .)”2
The notification of accession contained the following reservation :
“The [FRY] does not consider itself bound by Article IX of the
Convention (. . .) and, therefore, before any dispute to which the
41
422008 Judgment, para. 117.
Ibid., para. 116.
220
7 CIJ1077.indb 436 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 219
36. Il ressort de ces deux documents (la déclaration et la note adresséhe
au Secrétaire général de l’ONU en 1992) qu’il y a eu succession immédiate
et automatique, dans le cadre de laquelle la Serbie (RFY) considérait
qu’elle serait l’Etat successeur de la RSFY et qu’elle assumerahit toutes les
obligations de cette dernière, y compris les obligations découlant de la
convention sur le génocide. Autrement dit, la Serbie (RFY), par sa hdécla-
ration du 27 avril 1992, a pris clairement l’engagement de succéder à la
RFSY comme Etat partie à la convention contre le génocide. Cela imhplique
qu’elle était déjà liée par les obligations découlant hde la Convention à
l’égard des événements survenus avant la date de sa déclahration de1992.
6. Venire contra factum proprium non valet
37. Ainsi donc, dans les circonstances de l’espèce, la Cour devrait
garder à l’esprit que la Serbie (RFY) elle -même a admis qu’elle s’était
engagée à continuer de participer aux traités internationaux que l’ex -
Yougoslavie avait ratifiés ou auxquels elle avait adhéré. Cethte déclaration
contraignante de la RFY constitue un puissant argument en faveur de
l’opposabilité à l’Etat serbe naissant, antérieurement au 27 avril 1992 et
sans solution de continuité, des obligations découlant de la Convehntion.
On peut faire valoir en outre que la Cour semble avoir réglé ce prhoblème
dans son arrêt de 2008 sur les exceptions préliminaires 4. En décidant que
«la déclaration et la note de 1992 ont eu l’effet d’une notification de suc -
cession de la RFY à la RFSY à l’égard de la convention sur lhe génocide »,
la Cour semble avoir admis la continuité des obligations conventionnehlles
entre la RFSY et la RFY.
38. Une décennie plus tard cependant, une notification d’adhésionh de
la RFY à la convention sur le génocide, datée du 6 mars 2001 et déposée
auprès du Secrétaire général le 12 mars 2001, après un renvoi à la décla -
ration de 1992 et à l’admission ultérieure de la RFY à l’ONU en qualité
de nouveau membre, déclarait que
«la République fédérale de Yougoslavie n’a succédé ni lhe 27 avril 1992
ni à aucune autre date ultérieure à la République fédéhrative socialiste de
Yougoslavie en sa qualité de partie à la convention pour la préhvention
et la répression du crime de génocide et dans ses droits et obligahtions
découlant de cette convention en postulant qu’elle aurait continuéh d’être
membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et qu’elle aurait assuré la
continuité de l’Etat et de la personnalité juridique et politiqhue interna
tionale de la République fédérative socialiste de Yougoslavie…h ».42
La notification d’adhésion comportait la réserve suivante :
«La République fédérale de Yougoslavie ne se considère pas lihée
par l’articleIX de la Convention… c’est pourquoi, pour qu’un dif -
41
42 Arrêt de 2008, par. 117.
Ibid., par. 116.
220
7 CIJ1077.indb 437 18/04/16 08:54 220 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
[FRY] is a party may be validly submitted to the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice under this Article, the specifi43and
explicit consent of the FRY is required in each case.”
39. Be that as it may, this step was inconsistent with the status which
Serbia (the FRY), since its declaration of 1992, had been claiming to hpos -
sess, namely, that of a State party to the Convention against Genocide. h
By the end of the nineties, there remained no doubt that the FRY had
assumed all the international obligations that had been entered into by h
44
the SFRY, including those pertaining to the respect for human rights . It
should further be noted that the FRY never contended before this Court, h
in the previous proceedings, that it was not a party to the Convention
against Genocide.
40. It was only when the FRY, abandoning its claim to continue the
UN membership of the SFRY, was admitted to the United Nations
in 2000, that it advanced the opposite view, initially in its written obserhva -
tions, filed on 18 December 2002, on the preliminary objections submitted
in the Legality of Use of Force cases 45. One cannot avail itself of a posi-
tion a contrario sensu to the one earlier upheld, by virtue of a basic prin -
ciple going as far back as classic Roman law : venire contra factum
proprium non valet. In any case, the International Court of Justice, having
concluded, at the preliminary objections stage, that the FRY was a partyh
to the Convention against Genocide, considered that it was not necessary
to make a finding as to the legal effect of Serbia’s notification hof accession
to the Convention (dated 6 March 2001).
41. In the light of the aforementioned, in my understanding Serbia’s
change of attitude can have no bearing upon the jurisdiction of the Courht.
In this regard, citing its own jurisprudence constante, the International
Court of Justice stated in 2008 that, if a title of jurisdiction is shown to
have existed at the date of institution of proceedings, any subsequent
lapse or withdrawal of the jurisdictional instrument is without effect onh
the jurisdiction of the Court 46. Accordingly, the FRY, by way of its dec -
432008 Judgment, para. 116.
44The declaration of 27 April 1992, whereby the formation of the FRY was proclaimed,
“is the act which laid stress, in all its provisions, on continuity whith the SFRY. Its content
emphasizes that the country will keep the legal and political subjectivihty of the former State
and promises strict respect for its international obliga;iM. Sahović, “Le droit inter-
national et la crise en ex -Yougoslavie”, 3 Cursos Euromediterráneos Bancaja de Derecho
Internacional (1999), p. 392.
45The FRY requested the International Court of Justice to decide on its juhrisdiction
considering that the FRY “did not continue the personality and treatyh membership of
the former Yugoslavia”, and was thus “not bound by the Genocide Convention until it
acceded to that Convention (with a reservation to Article IX) in March 2001”.
46
Cf., e.g., Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Preliminary Objection, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 1;2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
221
7 CIJ1077.indb 438 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 220
férend auquel la République fédérale de Yougoslavie est partie puisse
être valablement soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice en verhtu
dudit article, son consentement spécifique et exprès est nécehssaire
dans chaque cas. » 43
39. Quoi qu’il en soit, cette démarche contredisait la qualité d’hEtat
partie à la convention sur le génocide que la Serbie (RFY) préhtendait
avoir depuis sa déclaration de 1992. A la fin des années 1990, il ne faisait
plus aucun doute que la RFY avait assumé toutes les obligations interhna -
tionales souscrites par la RFSY, y compris en matière de respect des h
droits de l’homme 44. On notera également que la RFY n’a jamais soutenu
devant la Cour, dans des procédures antérieures, qu’elle n’était pas partie
à la convention sur le génocide.
40. Ce n’est que lorsque la RFY, renonçant à sa prétention à hsuccéder
à la RFSY comme Etat membre de l’ONU, a été admise à l’hOrganisation
en 2000 qu’elle a soutenu le point de vue opposé, d’abord dans hles exposés
écrits contenant ses observations et conclusions sur les exceptions phrélimi -
naires soulevées dans les affaires relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi de la
force . Or nul n’est admis à soutenir une position a contrario sensu de
celle qu’il soutenait antérieurement, en vertu d’un principe fohndamental
qui remonte au droit romain classique : venire contra factum proprium
non valet. De toute façon, la Cour, ayant conclu au stade des exceptions
préliminaires que la RFY était partie à la convention sur le géhnocide, a
considéré qu’il n’était pas nécessaire de statuer sur hl’effet juridique de la
notification par la Serbie de son adhésion en date du 6 mars 2001 à la
Convention.
41. A la lumière de ce qui précède, selon mon interprétation, leh chan -
gement d’attitude de la Serbie n’emporte aucun effet sur la compéhtence de
la Cour. A cet égard, citant sa propre jurisprudence constante, la Cohur a
rappelé en 2008 que, s’il est démontré qu’un titre de comhpétence existait à
la date de l’introduction de l’instance, la caducité de l’inhstrument établis -
sant sa juridiction ou le retrait dont il peut ultérieurement faire lh’objet
46
sont sans effet sur cette compétence . En conséquence, par sa déclaration
43Arrêt de 2008, par. 116.
44La déclaration du 27 avril 1992 proclamant la naissance de la RFY « est l’acte qui a
dans toutes ses dispositions insisté sur la continuité avec la RSFhY. Son contenu souligne
que le pays garde la subjectivité juridique et politique de l’ancihen Etat et promet de respecter
strictement ses obligations internationa» M. Sahović, «Le droit international et la crise
en ex-Yougoslavie», 3 Cursos Euromediterráneos Bancaja de Derecho Internacional, 1999,
p. 452.
La RFY priait la Cour de statuer sur sa compétence à la lumièreh du fait qu’elle
«n’a[vait] pas assuré la continuité de la personnalité juridihque de l’exavie ni de sa
qualité de partie à la Convention avec pour conséquence, en parhticulier, que la République
fédérale de Yougoslavie n’était pas liée par la conventiohn sur le génocide avant d’y adhérer
(avec une réserve à l’article IX) en mars 2001».
46Nottebohm (Liechtenstein c. Guatemala) exception préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil
1953, p. 12; Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua
221
7 CIJ1077.indb 439 18/04/16 08:54 221 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
laration of 1992, bound itself as the successor State of the SFRY ;this
declaration operated automatic succession. Serbia remained bound by the h
Convention against Genocide for acts or omissions having occurred prior h
to 27 April 1992. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction
under the Convention in relation to those acts or omissions, and Croa -
tia’s claims in relation thereto are admissible.
7. Automatic Succession to Human Rights Treaties
in the Practice of
United Nations Supervisory Organs
42. Already in the early nineties, while the devastation was taking
place in the Balkans, there was firm support, on the part of the
United Nations supervisory organs, for automatic succession and con -
tinuing applicability of human rights treaties to successor States. Thus, in
its resolution 1993/23, of 5 March 1993, the (former) UN Commission on
Human Rights stated that successor States “shall succeed to internatihonal
human rights treaties to which the predecessor States have been parties
and continue to bear responsibilities” 4. After calling upon the continuity
by successor States of fulfilment of “international human rights trheaty
48
obligations of the predecessor State” , the Commission urged successor
States “to accede or to ratify those international human rights treaties to
which the predecessor States were not parties” 49.
43. The following year, in its resolution 1994/16, of 25 February 1994,
the Commission on Human Rights evoked the “relevant decisions of the h
Human Rights Committee [HRC] and the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination [CERD] on succession issues, in respect of inter-
national obligations in the field of human rights” 50. It further welcomed
the recommendation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1986, p. 28,
para. 36; and case concerning thepplication of the Convention on the Prevention and Puni‑
shment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 445, para. 95. In this sense, as the International Court of Justice
stated in its Judgments in 2004 in the Legality of Use of Force cases, “the significance of
this new development in 2000 is that it has clarified the thus far amorphous legal situation
concerning the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the United Nations”
(p.47191, para. 78).
Third preambular paragraph.
48 Fifth preambular paragraph.
49 Operative part, para. 3.
50 Second preambular paragraph. For an account of this aspect of the practice of the
HRC and the CERD Committees in the nineties, cf.A. A. Cançado Trindade, International
Law for Humankind — Towards a New Jus Gentium, op. cit. infra note 67, pp. 472-475.
222
7 CIJ1077.indb 440 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 221
de 1992, la RFY s’était liée en qualité d’Etat successeur de la RFSY ; la
déclaration entraînait succession automatique. La Serbie restait lhiée par la
convention sur le génocide pour les actes et omissions survenus antéhrieu-
rement au 27 avril 1992. La compétence que la Cour tient de la Conven -
tion s’étend à ces actes et omissions, et les demandes de la Crhoatie à leur
sujet sont recevables.
7. La succession automatique aux traités relatifs aux droits de l’▯homme
dans la pratique des organes de surveillance
des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies
42. Dès le début des années 1990, alors que la dévastation s’abattait
sur les Balkans, la thèse de la succession automatique des Etats sucches -
seurs aux traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme et de l’opposahbilité inin -
terrompue de ces derniers bénéficiait du ferme soutien des organes de
surveillance des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies. Ainsi, dans sa réso-
lution 1993/23 du 5 mars 1993, l’ancienne Commission des droits de
l’homme des Nations Unies déclarait que « les Etats successeurs, en ce qui
concerne les traités internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme aux -
quels les Etats prédécesseurs étaient parties, devront prendre hla succession
des Etats prédécesseurs et continueront d’assumer les responsabhilités ainsi
47
contractées » . Après avoir engagé les Etats successeurs à continuer de
s’acquitter « des obligations qui incombaient aux Etats prédécesseurs au
titre des traités internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme » 48, la Com-
mission leur demandait instamment d’« adhérer aux instruments interna-
tionaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme auxquels leurs Etats prédéhcesseurs
n’étaient pas parties ou de les ratifier »49.
43. L’année suivante, dans sa résolution 1994/16 du 25 février 1994, la
Commission des droits de l’homme évoquait « lesdécisions du Comité des
droits de l’homme et du comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination
raciale relatives à la question de la succession en ce qui concerne lhes obli -
50
gations internationales dans le domaine des droits de l’homme » . Elle se
félicitait de la recommandation formulée en 1993 par la deuxième confé -
c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 28, par. 36; et affaire relative
à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression d▯u crime de génocide
(Croatie c. Serbie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 200445, par. 95.
En ce sens, comme la Cour l’a noté dans ses arrêts de 2004 en les affahires relatives à la
Licéité de l’emploi de la forcel’importance de cette évolution survenue en 2000 tient
au fait qu’elle a clarifié la situation juridique, jusque -là indéterminée, quant au statut de
la République fédérale de Yougoslavie vis-à-vis de l’Organisation des NationsUnies »
(p.1191, par. 78).
47 Alinéa 3 du préambule.
48 Alinéa 5 du préambule.
49 Point 3 du dispositif.
50 Alinéa 2 du préambule. Cet aspect de la pratique de la Commission des droitsh
de l’homme et du Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale pendant les
années 1990 fait l’objet d’un commentaire dans A. A. Cançado Trindade, International
Law for Humankind — Towards a New Jus Gentium, op. cit. infra note 67, p. 472-475.
222
7 CIJ1077.indb 441 18/04/16 08:54 222 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Action, recently adopted by the Second World Conference on Human
Rights (1993), “to encourage and facilitate the ratification of, hand acces-
51
sion or succession to, international human rights treaties and protocolsh”.
In the operative part of resolution 1994/16, the Commission, after empha-
sizing “the special nature of the human rights treaties” 52 aimed at the
protection of the rights of the human person, requested the UN super -
visory organs of human rights treaties “to consider further the continuing
applicability of the respective international human rights treaties to shuc-
cessor States, with the aim of assisting them in meeting their obligatiohns” 53.
44. Once again, in its following resolution 1995/18, of 24 February
1995, the Commission on Human Rights evoked the relevant decisions
and recommendations of HRC and CERD, as well as the aforementioned
recommendation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
adopted by the UN Second World Conference on Human Rights (1993) 54.
55
And it again stressed “the special nature of the human rights treatiehs” ,
and it reiterated its request to the UN supervisory organs of human righhts
treaties to keep on considering “the continuing applicability of the hrespe-c
tive human rights treaties to successor States”, so as to assist themh “in
56
meeting their obligations” . It is clear that, already at the time, in the
early nineties, while the wars and devastation in the former Yugoslavia
were taking place, the work at the United Nations in the present domain
was being guided by basic considerations of humanity, rather than State
sovereignty.
45. And it could hardly be otherwise. The “special nature” of human
rights treaties — and the Genocide Convention is characterized as such,
as a human rights treaty, — requires their continuing applicability, irre -
spective of the uncertainties of State succession. States themselves havhe
acknowledged the special nature of human rights and humanitarian trea -
ties, and have not objected to the understanding espoused by
United Nations supervisory organs of their continuing applicability, ipso
jure, to successor States. After all, the local populations cannot become
suddenly deprived of any protection when they most need it, in cases of h
turbulent dissolution of a State, when considerations of humanity need tho
prevail over invocations of State sovereignty.
46. The UN Secretary-General, in his report to the United Nations
General Assembly (of 19 October 1994), on the Implementation of
57
Human Rights Instruments , recalled that, shortly after the Second
51Fourth preambular paragraph.
52Operative part, para. 2.
53Ibid., para. 3.
54
55Second and third preambular paragraphs.
56Operative part, para. 2.
Ibid., para. 3.
57UN doc. A/49/537, of 19 October 1994, pp. 1-14.
223
7 CIJ1077.indb 442 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 222
rence mondiale sur les droits de l’homme dans la déclaration et leh pro -
gramme d’action de Vienne « en vue d’encourager et de faciliter la
ratification des traités intern51ionaux relatifs aux droits de l’hhomme et des
protocoles s’y rapportant » . Dans le dispositif de cette même résolu -
tion 1994/16, après avoir souligné « la nature particulière des traités qui
visent à assurer la protection des droits de l’homme »52, la Commission
priait les organes conventionnels compétents « d’examiner plus avant la
possibilité, pour les Etats successeurs, de continuer à appliquer hles instru-
ments internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme, en vue de les aihder à
s’acquitter de leurs obligations » 53.
44. A nouveau, dans sa résolution 1995/18 du 24 février 1995, la Com-
mission des droits de l’homme a évoqué les décisions et recohmmandations
pertinentes du Comité des droits de l’homme et du Comité pour lh’élimin-a
tion de la discrimination raciale, ainsi que la recommandation susmen -
tionnée de la déclaration et du programme d’action de Vienne (1993) 54. A
nouveau encore, elle a souligné « la nature particulière des traités qui
visent à assurer la protection et la promotion des droits de l’homhme» 55et
prié les organes conventionnels d’examiner plus avant « la possibilité,
pour les Etats successeurs, de continuer à appliquer les instruments hinter-
nationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme, en vue de les aider à s’hacquitter
56
de leurs obligations » .
45. Il ne pouvait guère en être autrement. Le « caractère particulier »
que revêtent les traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme — catégorie à
laquelle appartient la convention sur le génocide — exige qu’ils s’ap -
pliquent sans solution de continuité, quelles que soient les incertithudes de
la succession d’Etats. Les Etats eux -mêmes ont reconnu le caractère par -
ticulier des traités relatifs au droit humanitaire et aux droits de lh’homme
et n’ont pas élevé d’objection contre le principe, consacréh par les organes
conventionnels des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies, de leur opposa‑
bilité sans solution de continuité, ipsojure, aux Etats successeurs. Il importe
en effet que les populations locales ne soient pas soudainement privéehs de
toute protection au moment où elles en ont le plus besoin, dans les chas de
dissolution difficile d’un Etat, quand les considérations d’huhmanité
doivent l’emporter sur les invocations de la souveraineté de l’hEtat.
46. Dans son rapport du 19 octobre 1994 à l’Assemblée générale sur
l’application effective des instruments internationaux relatifs aux drhoits
de l’homme 5, le Secrétaire général a rappelé que, peu de temps après
51
52Alinéa 4 du préambule.
53Point 2 du dispositif.
54Point 3 du dispositif.
Alinéas 2 et 3 du préambule.
55Point 2 du dispositif.
56Point 3 du dispositif.
57Nations Unies, doc. A/49/537 du 19 octobre 1994, p. 1-14.
223
7 CIJ1077.indb 443 18/04/16 08:54 223 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 14 -25 June 1993), the
fourth meeting of persons chairing the UN human rights conventional
supervisory organs took steps towards the elaboration of “early warnihng
measures and urgent procedures” aiming at the prevention of the occurh-
rence, or recurrence, of grave violations of human rights ; the chairper-
sons, moreover, welcomed the establishment, by the World Conference,
of the post of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (para. 12).
47. The UN Secretary-General, in his aforementioned report, then
turned to the fifth meeting of chairpersons, where they espoused the view
that their respective UN human rights treaties were “universal in nature
and in application” (para. 13), and further stressed that “full and effective
compliance” with their conventional obligations “is an essential chompo -
nent of an international order based on the rule of law” (para. 17). The
Secretary-General added that the chairpersons endorsed his own initia -
tive to urge States to “ratify, accede or succeed to those principal hhuman
rights treaties to which they are not yet a party” (para. 16).
48. It was further reported that their work on prevention of grave vio -
lations of human rights, including early warning and urgent procedures, h
continued (paras. 26-29). And the Secretary-General added, significantly,
that the chairpersons were of the view that
“successor States are automatically bound by obligations under inter-
national human rights instruments from their respective date of inde-
pendence and (. . .) the respect of their obligations should not depend
on a declaration of confirmation made by the new Government of the
successor State” (para. 32).
49. For its part, the United Nations General Assembly, even earlier, in
its resolution 47/121, of 18 December 1992, acknowledged, in relation to
the “consistent pattern of gross and systematic violations of human
rights” in the wars in the former Yugoslavia — with its concentration
camps and “mass expulsions of defenceless civilians from their homes”h—
that “ethnic cleansing” appeared to be not the consequence of war,h “but
rather its goal”. And the United Nations General Assembly added that
“the abhorrent practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’” was “a forhm of genocide” 58.
The same General Assembly resolution, inter alia, urged the Secu -
rity Council to consider recommending the establishment of an Ad Hoc
international war crimes tribunal — the ICTY — t59try and punish those
responsible for the perpetration of the atrocities .
58
59Seventh and ninth preambular paragraphs.
Operative part, para. 10.
224
7 CIJ1077.indb 444 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 223
la deuxième conférence mondiale sur les droits de l’homme (Vienne, 14-
25 juin 1993), la quatrième réunion des présidents d’organes des
Nations Unies chargés de surveiller l’application des instruments interna-
tionaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme avait décidé de mettre ahu point
«des mesures d’alerte rapide et des procédures d’urgence afin hd’empêcher
que de graves violations des droits de l’homme ne se produisent ou neh se
répètent »; ces présidents se sont par ailleurs félicités de la création du
poste de Haut -Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme
(rapport, par. 12).
47. Dans le même rapport, le Secrétaire général a rendu compte dhe la
cinquième réunion des présidents, au cours de laquelle ceux -ci ont déclaré
que «les instruments internationaux des Nations Unies relatifs aux droits de
l’homme étaient universels par leur nature et dans leur applicatiohn» (par.13)
et souligné que « l’exécution intégrale et effective des obligations assumées
dans [c]es instruments … est un élément essentiel d’un ordre international
fondé sur la primauté du droit» (par. 17). Le Secrétaire général a ajouté que
les présidents s’étaient félicités de l’initiative qu’hil avait prise d’engager les
Etats «à [devenir] parties, par ratification, adhésion ou succession, ahux prin
cipaux instruments relatifs aux droits de l’homme » (par. 16).
48. Les présidents ont fait savoir que les travaux visant à faciliter hla
prévention des violations graves des droits de l’homme par le biais,
notamment, de mesures d’alerte rapide et de procédures d’urgenche, se
poursuivaient (par. 26-29). Le Secrétaire général a jugé important de rap -
porter que les présidents étaient d’avis que
«les Etats successeurs sont automatiquement liés par les obligations
découlant d’instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de
l’homme à partir de la date de leur accession à l’indépenhdance et que
le respect de leurs obligations ne devrait pas être subordonné àh une
déclaration de confirmation faite par le nouveau gouvernement de
l’Etat successeur » (par. 32).
49. De son côté et plus tôt encore, dans sa résolution 47/121 du
18 décembre1992, l’Assemblée générale, commentant la «situation caracté -
risée par des violations constantes, flagrantes et systématiquesh des droits de
l’homme » créée par les guerres dans l’ex -Yougoslavie, avec leurs « camps
de concentration» et les «expulsions massives de civils sans défense de leurs
foyers», prenait acte de ce que « le «nettoyage ethnique» ne semblait pas
être la conséquence de la guerre mais bien son but ». L’Assemblée générale
ajoutait que « l’ignoble politique de « nettoyage ethnique »» était « une
forme de génocide » 58. Dans la même résolution, l’Assemblée générale
demandait instamment au Conseil de sécurité de recommander la constitu-
tion d’un tribunal international spécial — qui devait devenir le Tribunal
pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie — pour juger et châtier les per -
sonnes responsables de atrocités qui étaient commises 59.
58 Alinéas 7 et 9 du préambule.
59 Point 10 du dispositif.
224
7 CIJ1077.indb 445 18/04/16 08:54 224 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
IV. The Essence of the Presenht Case
1. Arguments of the Contending Parties
50. A careful examination of the arguments of the contending Parties,
in both the written and oral phases of the proceedings as to the merits hin
the present case of the Application of the Convention against Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia), reveals that the contending Parties, not surprisingly,
devoted considerably more attention to the substance of the case (the
merits themselves, in relation to Croatia’s main claim) than to issues per -
taining to jurisdiction/admissibility. These latter occupy only a small h
portion of the documents submitted by the contending Parties, namely :
(a) in Croatia’s Memorial, one chapter out of eight chapters, seven pages
(pp. 317 -323) out of a total of 414 pages ; (b) in Serbia’s Counter-
Memorial, one chapter out of fourteen chapters, 50 pages (pp. 85 -134) out
of a total of 478 pages (;) in Croatia’s Reply, one chapter out of twelve
chapters, 26 pages (pp. 243-269) out of a total of 473 pages ; and (d) in
Serbia’s Rejoinder, one chapter out of eight chapters, 55 pages (pp. 39-93)
out of a total of 322 pages.
51. As to the oral phase of the present proceedings as to the merits of
the cas d’espèce , the same picture is disclosed. The arguments of the con -
tending Parties, as expected, were rather brief on issues pertaining to
jurisdiction/admissibility; the vast majority of their arguments focused on
the substance of the cas d’espèce (the merits themselves, in relation to
Croatia’s main claim). May it be recalled that the public sittings before
the Court extended for more than one month, having lasted from3 March
2014 until 1 April 2014. In its first round of oral arguments, Croatia has
dedicated not more than a part of one day of its pleadings to discuss inh
60
particular the specific question of jurisdiction . And in its second round
of oral arguments, Croatia has devoted only a small portion of pleadingsh
to rebutting Serbia’s arguments on jurisdiction 61.
52. For its part, in Serbia’s first round of oral arguments, the bulk ohf
62
the pleadings on questions of jurisdiction took place in just one sessiohn .
And, in its second round of oral arguments, Serbia has dedicated only a h
small part of its pleadings to a discussion of questions of jurisdictionh 63. It
ensues from an examination of the contending Parties’ oral pleadings hthat
the vast majority of their arguments concerned questions pertaining to
the merits ; they have devoted only a small portion of their pleadings
(around two sessions each) to the issue of jurisdiction.
60Cf. mainly CR 2014/12, of 7 March 2014, pp. 37-55. And cf. also CR 2014/5, of
3 March 2014, pp. 23-3; and CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, pp. 32-49.
61Cf. mainly CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, pp. 63-67. And cf. also CR 2014/21,
of 21 March 2014, pp. 10-33.
62Cf. mainly CR 2014/14, of 11 March 2014, pp. 10-69.
63Cf. mainly CR 2014/22, of 27 March 2014, pp. 16-47.
225
7 CIJ1077.indb 446 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 224
IV. L’essence de la présenhte affaire
1. Les arguments des Parties au litige
50. Un examen attentif des arguments développés par les parties au
litige, tant dans la phase écrite que dans la phase orale de la procéhdure sur
le fond en la présente affaire Croatie c. Serbie, révèle que celles -ci ont
prêté infiniment plus attention à la matière de l’espèhce (c’est -à-dire au
fond proprement dit, en rapport avec la demande principale de la Croatie)
qu’aux questions de compétence et de recevabilité, ce qui n’ha rien de sur -
prenant. Ces dernières questions n’occupent qu’une petite partihe des
documents déposés par les parties : a) dans le mémoire de la Croatie,
un chapitre sur huit, soit sept pages (p. 317-323) sur 414 ; b) dans le
contre-mémoire de la Serbie, un chapitre sur quatorze, soit 50 pages
(p. 85-134) sur 478 ; c) dans la réplique de la Croatie, un chapitre sur
douze, soit 26 pages (p. 243-269) sur 473 ; et d) dans la duplique de la
Serbie, un chapitre sur huit, soit 55 pages (p. 39-93) sur 322.
51. Le même tableau vaut pour la phase orale de la procédure sur le
fond. Les arguments des Parties sur les questions de compétence et de
recevabilité étaient plutôt brefs, comme on pouvait s’y attehndre; la vaste
majorité des arguments visait plutôt la matière du cas d’esphèce (c’est -à-dire
le fond proprement dit, en rapport avec la demande principale de la Croa -
tie). On se rappellera que les audieeres publiques devant la Cour ont dhuré
plus d’un mois, du 3 mars au 1 avril 2014. Pendant le premier tour de
plaidoiries, la Croatie n’a pas consacré plus d’une fraction d’hune journée
à la question spécifique de la compétence 60, et pendant le deuxième tour,
elle n’a consacré qu’une petite pa61ie de son temps à réfhuter les arguments
de la Serbie sur cette question .
52. Quant à la Serbie, pendant le premier tour des plaidoiries elle a
formulé le gros d62ses arguments sur les questions de compétence en une
seule audience et, pendant le deuxième tour, elle ne leur a consacré elle
aussi qu’une petite partie de son temps 63. Il ressort de cet examen des
plaidoiries des parties que la vaste majorité de leurs arguments porthaient
sur des questions relevant du fond de l’espèce; elles n’ont consacré qu’une
petite part de leurs plaidoiries (environ deux séances chacune) à la ques-
tion de la compétence.
60 Voir principalement CR 2014/12, p. 37-55; CR 2014/5, p. 23-31; et CR 2014/10,
p. 32-49.
61 Voir principalement CR 2014/20, p. 63-67; et CR 2014/21, p. 10-33.
62 Voir principalement CR 2014/14, p. 10-69.
63 Voir principalement CR 2014/22, p. 16-47.
225
7 CIJ1077.indb 447 18/04/16 08:54 225 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
2. General Assessment
53. The foregoing shows that the contending Parties, at this stage of
the merits of the present case, in the written phase of proceedings, havhe
seen no need to devote more than a very small portion of their argumentsh
to questions of jurisdiction/admissibility. They have rightly focused on
the merits of the case. Likewise, in the oral phase of proceedings, both
Croatia and Serbia have concentrated their pleadings on substantive
issues; the two contending Parties have well captured the essence of the
present case, pertaining to the interpretation and application of the Con -
vention against Genocide and not to State succession.
54. It has been the Court that seems to have misapprehended this,
devoting considerable more attention, at this final stage of the adjudhica -
tion of the present case, again to the issue of jurisdiction, which shouhld
have been decided some years ago. The International Court of Justice, inh
the present Judgment on the merits of the cas d’espèce, concerning the
Application of the Convention against Genocide, has devoted no less than
50 paragraphs to the jurisdiction issue, guarding small proportion in this h
respect.
V. Automatic Succession hto the Convention agaihnst Genocide,
and Continuity of Its Oblihgations,
as an Imperative of Humhaneness
1. The Convention against Genocide and the Imperative
of Humaneness
55. Since the Court has done so in the present Judgment, I feel obliged,
in the present dissenting opinion, to dwell upon the foundations of my
own personal position in support of the automatic succession (supra) to
the Convention against Genocide. It is generally acknowledged that the
Genocide Convention is a human rights treaty ; one of the legal conse -
quences ensuing therefrom is the automatic succession to it and the con -
tinuity of its obligations.
56. As this Court itself indicated in its célèbre Advisory Opinion of
1951, States parties to the 1948 Genocide Convention do not have indi -
vidual interests of their own, but are rather jointlyguided by the high
ideals and basic considerations of humanity having led the UnitedNations
to condemn and punish the international crime of genocide, which
“shocks the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humahn -
ity”, being contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations . The
fundamental principles underlying the Convention are “binding on Stathes,
even without any conventional obligation”. The condemnation of geno -
cide has a “universal character”, with all the co-operation requirhed “to
64UN, General Assembly resolution 96 (I), of 11 December 1946.
226
7 CIJ1077.indb 448 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 225
2. Appréciation générale
53. Il résulte de ce qui précède que les parties au litige, parvenuhes dans
la présente affaire au stade de l’examen au fond, n’ont pas jugé bon, pen -
dant la phase écrite de la procédure, de consacrer plus qu’une hpetite partie
de leurs arguments aux questions de compétence et de recevabilité. Elles
se sont concentrées à juste titre sur le fond. De même, pendanth la phase
orale, la Croatie et la Serbie ont toutes deux fait porter leurs plaidoihries
essentiellement sur les questions matérielles ; ce faisant, elles ont parfaite
ment saisi l’essence de la présente affaire, qui concerne l’interprétation et
l’application de la convention sur le génocide, et non la successihon d’Etats.
54. C’est la Cour qui semble avoir fait fausse route ici, en accordant à
nouveau une attention considérable, en ce stade final de la procéhdure en
l’espèce, à la question de la compétence, qui aurait dû être tranchée il y a
plusieurs années. Dans son arrêt sur le fond en la présente affahire Croatie
c. Serbie, la Cour a consacré pas moins de cinquante paragraphes à cette
question, ce qui n’est pas une mince proportion.
V. Succession automatiqhue à la convention suhr le génocide
et continuité des oblihgations découlant de chelle -ci
en tant qu’impératifh d’humanité
1. La convention sur le génocide et l’impératif
d’humanité
55. Puisque la Cour en a fait autant dans le présent arrêt, je me sens
tenu, dans cet exposé de mon opinion dissidente, d’exposer les fondemenths
de ma position personnelle en faveur de la succession automatique à lha
convention sur le génocide (supra). Il est généralement admis que la
convention sur le génocide est un traité relatif aux droits de l’hhomme : il en
découle une conséquence juridique, qui est la succession automatiqhue à
ladite convention et la continuité des obligations qui en découlenht.
56. Comme l’a fait observer la Cour dans son célèbre avis consultathif
de 1951, les Etats parties à la convention de 1948 sur le génocide n’ont
pas d’intérêts propres ; ils sont seulement tous et chacun guidés par les fins
supérieures et les considérations élémentaires d’humanitéh qui ont poussé
l’Assemblée générale à condamner et punir le crime internhational de
génocide, qui « bouleverse la conscience humaine … inflige de grandes
pertes à l’humanité … et est … contraire à l’esprit et aux fins des
Nations Unies »64. Les principes qui sont à la base de la Convention
« oblig[ent] les Etats, même en dehors de tout lien conventionnel ». Le
préambule de la Convention rappelle que la condamnation du génocidhe a
64 Résolution 96 (I) de l’Assemblée générale, adoptée lhe 11décembre 1946.
226
7 CIJ1077.indb 449 18/04/16 08:54 226 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge”, as stated in the Preamhble
to the Convention (cf. supra).
57. This calls for the automatic succession to the Genocide Conven-
tion, with the continuity of its obligations ; international responsibility for
the grave wrongs done to segments of the population concerned survives
State disruption and succession. To argue otherwise would militate
against the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention, depriving it h
of its effet utile it would thereby deprive the targeted “human groups” of
any protection, when they most needed it, thus creating a void of protech -
tion which would render the Genocide Convention an almost dead letter.
58. The corpus juris gentium for the international safeguard of the
rights of the human person is conformed by the converging trends of pro-
tection of international law of human rights, of international humanitarh-
ian law, and of international law of refugees 65. The rights protected
thereunder, in any circumstances, are not reduced to those “granted” by
the State : they are inherent to the human person, and ought thus to be
respected by the State. The protected rights are superior and anterior to
the State, and must thus be respected by this latter, by all States, even in
the occurrence of State disruption and succession. It has taken much sufh -
fering and sacrifice of succeeding generations to learn this. The aforhemen -
tioned corpus juris gentium is people-oriented, victim-oriented, and not at
all State-sovereignty oriented.
59. The 1948 Genocide Convention is people‑oriented, rather than
State-centric: it is centred on human groups, whom it aims to protect. As
contemporary history shows, in the event of dissolution of States the
affected local populations become particularly vulnerable; that is the time
when they stand most in need of the protection extended to them by
human rights treaties, the Genocide Convention (to which their State hahd
become a party) being one of them. The fact remains that the corpus juris
gentium of international protection of the rights of the human person,
essentially victim-oriented, has been erected and consolidated along the
last decades (almost seven decades) to the benefit of human beings, hindi -
vidually (like under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the
1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1965 UN Conven-
tion for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) or in
groups (like under the 1948 Convention against Genocide).
60. That corpus juris gentium , which forms, in my view, the most
important legacy of the international legal thinking of the twentieth cen-
tury, cannot be undermined by the vicissitudes of State succession. The h
65 Cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos,
Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados y Derecho Internacional Humani— Aproxi‑
maciones y Convergencias, Geneva, ICRC, [2000], pp. 1-66.
227
7 CIJ1077.indb 450 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 226
un «caractère universel» et que « pour libérer l’humanité d’un fléau aussi
odieux la coopération internationale est nécessaire » (voir supra).
57. Tout cela explique qu’il y ait succession automatique à la conven -
tion sur le génocide et la continuité des obligations qui en déhcoulent ; en
effet, la responsabilité internationale née du préjudice grave ihnfligé à cer-
tains segments de la population survit à la désintégration et àh la succes -
sion des Etats. Prétendre qu’il n’en est rien serait militer cohntre le but et
l’objet de la convention sur le génocide et la priver de son effet utile ; ce
serait priver de toute protection les « groupes humains » visés au moment
où ils en ont le plus besoin et ouvrir dans la protection dont ils béhnéficient
une brèche qui risquerait de réduire la Convention à l’état de lettre morte.
58. Le corpus juris gentium qui assure la sauvegarde des droits de la
personne humaine sur le plan international est constitué par des modèhles
convergents de protection issus du droit international des droits de
l’homme, du droit international humanitaire et du droit internationalh des
réfugiés65. Les droits qui y sont protégés en toutes circonstances ne se
réduisent pas aux droits « accordés» par l’Etat ; ce sont des droits inhé‑
rents à la personne humaine, que l’Etat est par conséquent tenu de respec -
ter. Ces droits protégés sont supérieurs et antérieurs à l’Etat et doivent
donc être respectés par celui-ci, ainsi que par tous les Etats, même en cas
de désintégration et de succession. Il a fallu aux génératiohns successives
des souffrances et ces sacrifices immenses pour apprendre cette leçohn. Le
corpus juris gentium précité est axé sur les personnes et sur les victimes, et
absolument pas sur les Etats.
59. La convention de 1948 sur le génocide est axée sur les personnes et
non centrée sur les Etats : elle est centrée sur les groupes humains qu’elle
entend protéger. Comme le montre l’histoire contemporaine, en cas hde
dissolution d’un Etat, les populations locales concernées deviennehnt par -
ticulièrement vulnérables ; c’est à ce moment précis où elles ont le plus
besoin de la protection offerte par les traités relatifs aux droits deh l’homme,
parmi lesquels la convention sur le génocide (à laquelle leur Etaht est par-
tie). Le fait est que le corpus jurisgentium de la protection internationale
des droits de la personne humaine, essentiellement axé sur les victimhes, a
été constitué et consolidé au fil des dernières décehnnies (sur près de
soixante -dix ans) pour être mis au service des humains considérés indivhi-
duellement (comme par la convention sur le statut des réfugiés deh 1951, le
pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques de1966, la conven-
tion internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination
raciale de 1965) ou collectivement (comme par la convention sur le géno -
cide de 1948, qui protège des « groupes»).
60. Ce corpus juris gentium, qui constitue, à mon avis, leacquis le plus
important de la pensée juridique internationale du XX siècle, doit être à
l’abri des vicissitudes de la succession d’Etats. La population —hqui est le
65 Voir A.A. Cançado Trindade, Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, Derecho
Internacional de los Refugiados y Derecho Internacional Humanitario —▯ Aproximaciones y
Convergencias, Genève, Comité international de la Croi-xRouge (CICR), 2000, p.1-66.
227
7 CIJ1077.indb 451 18/04/16 08:54 227 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
population — the most precious constitutive element of statehood —
surely cannot be subjected to those vicissitudes, when State succession h
takes place amidst extreme violence. It is in those circumstances of theh
disruption of the State that the population concerned stands most in neehd
of protection, such as the one afforded by the core Conventions of the
international law of human rights, the international humanitarian law
and the international law of refugees.
61. To attempt to withdraw their protection, rendering human beings,
individually and in groups, extremely vulnerable, if not defenceless, wohuld
go against the letter and spirit of those Conventions. Moreover, when ith
comes to the Convention against Genocide, we find ourselves in the reahlm
not only of conventional international law, but likewise of general or chus -
tomary international law itself. As the International Court of Justice pher-
spicaciously pondered in its aforementioned Advisory Opinion of 1951,
the principles underlying the Convention against Genocide are “bindinhg
on States, even without any conventional obligation” 6. And it could not
be otherwise, as, in my own conception, the universal juridical conscience
67
is the ultimate material source of international law, the jus gentium .
62. It is indeed in times of violent State disruption — as that of the
former Yugoslavia — that human beings, individually or in groups, stand
in most need of protection. After all, States exist for human beings, anhd
not vice versa. To deprive human beings of international protection whenh
they most need it, would go against the very foundations of contempo -
rary international law, both conventional and customary, and would
make abstraction of the principle of humanity, which permeates it. The
corpus juris gentium of protection of human beings, in any circumstances,
is — may I reiterate — essentially victim -oriented, while the outlook of
State succession is ineluctably and strictly State -centric.
63. Such an outlook cannot at all be made to prevail in violent State
disruption, entailing the discontinuity of that protection when it is most
needed. The automatic succession to the Convention against Genocide is
an imperative of humaneness. The corpus juris gentium of protection of the
human person enshrines rights which are anterior and superior to the
State. They are listed, inter alia, in the core Conventions of the
United Nations (the two Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 ; the Con -
ventions for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and h
of Discrimination against Women, of 1965 and 1979 ; the 1984 Conven -
tion against Torture ; and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the
Child). Moreover, in the last decades international legal doctrine has h
66Reservations to the Convention on the Preventand Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23.
67A. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind — Towards a New Jus
Gentium, 2nd rev. ed., Leiden/The Hague, Nijhoff/The Hague Academy of International
Law, 2013, Chap. VI, pp. 139-161.
228
7 CIJ1077.indb 452 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 227
plus précieux des éléments constitutifs de l’Etat — ne devrait pas être
exposée à ces vicissitudes quand une succession d’Etats s’achcompagne des
pires violences. C’est dans ces situations de désintégration deh l’Etat que la
population concernée a le plus grand besoin d’être protégéhe, notamment
par les conventions qui se trouvent au cœur du droit international dehs
droits de l’homme, du droit international humanitaire et du droit intherna -
tional des réfugiés.
61. C’est aller contre la lettre et l’esprit de ces conventions que deh pré-
tendre retirer à des humains considérés individuellement ou colhlective -
ment la protection qu’elles leur assurent et de les rendre de ce faith
extrêmement vulnérables, voire sans défense. De plus, avec la convention
sur le génocide, nous nous trouvons non seulement dans le domaine du h
droit international conventionnel, mais aussi dans celui du droit internha-
tional général ou coutumier. Comme la Cour le soulignait judicieushement
dans son avis consultatif de 1951, les principes qui sont à la base de la
convention sur le génocide « oblig[ent] les Etats, même en dehors de tout
lien conventionnel» 66. Et il ne saurait en être autrement, car, selon moi,
la conscience juridique universe67e est la source matérielle ultime du droit
international, du jus gentium .
62. C’est en vérité aux époques de désintégration violenteh de l’Etat
— comme celle qu’a connue l’ex -Yougoslavie — que les individus et les
groupes humains ont le plus grand besoin de protection. Il importe de
rappeler que les Etats existent pour les humains et non le contraire. Prhiver
les humains de la protection internationale quand ils en ont le plus beshoin
saperait les fondements mêmes du droit international contemporain, tahnt
conventionnel que coutumier, et ferait abstraction du principe d’humanité
qui imprègne ce droit. Je me permets ici de réaffirmer que le corpus
juris gentium de la protection des humains en toutes circonstances est
essentiellement axé sur les victimes, tandis que le régime de la shuccession
d’Etats est inextricablement et strictement centré sur l’Etat.
63. Ilne faut surtout pas laisser ce régime de la succession d’Etats préva -
loir en cas de désintégration violente d’un Etat, car ce seraith introduire une
discontinuité dans la protection au moment où celle -ci est le plus nécessaire.
La succession automatique à la convention sur le génocide est un impératif
d’humanité. Le corpus juris gentium de la protection de la personne humaine
garantit des droits qui sont antérieurs et supérieurs à ceux de l’Etat. Ces
droits sont énoncés, entre autres instruments, dans les grandes conventions
des Nations Unies (les deux pactes internationaux de 1966; les conventions
internationales sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination
raciale et sur 1’é1imination de toutes les formes de discriminatiohn à 1’égard
des femmes de 1965 et1979; la convention contre la torture de 1984 et ;a
66Réserves à la convention pour la prévention et la répression▯ du crime de génocide, avis
consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 23.
67A. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind — Towards a New Jus
Gentium, 2 éd. rév., Leyde/La Haye, Nijhoff/Académie de droit international de La Haye,
2013, chap. VI, p. 139-161.
228
7 CIJ1077.indb 453 18/04/16 08:54 228 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
endeavoured to identify a hard core of universal human rights —
non -derogable ones — which admit no restrictions, namely, the funda -
mental rights to life and to personal integrity, the absolute prohibitiohn of
torture and of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
64. Contemporary international law is particularly sensitive to the
pressing need of humane treatment of persons, in any circumstances, so
as to prohibit inhuman treatment, by reference to humanity as a whole,
in order to secure protection to all, even more so when they stand in sihtu-
ations of great vulnerability. Humaneness is to orient human behaviour in
all circumstances, in times of peace as well as of disturbances and armehd
conflict. The principle of humanity permeates the whole corpus juris of
protection of the human person, providing one of the illustrations of thhe
approximations or convergences between its distinct and complementary
trends (international humanitarian law, the international law of human h
rights, and international refugee law), at the hermeneutic level, and ahlso
manifested at the normative and the operational levels 6.
2. The Principle of Humanity in Its Wide Dimension
65. My own understanding is in the sense that the principle of human -
ity is endowed with a wide dimension : it applies in the most distinct cir -
cumstances, in times both of armed conflict and of peace, in the relathions
between public power and all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the h
State concerned. That principle has a notorious incidence when these
latter are in a situation of vulnerability or great adversity, or evendefence‑
lessness, as evidenced by relevant provisions of distinct treaties conform-
ing to the international law of human rights 69.
66. The United Nations Charter itself professes the determination to
secure respect for human rights everywhere. Adopted in one of the rare
moments of lucidity in the last century, it opens up its Preamble by staht -
ing that :
“We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save suc -
ceeding generations from the scourge of war ; (. . .) to reaffirm faith
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person (. . .); to establish conditions under which justice and respect
68
Cf., on this particular point, e.A. Cançado Trindade, Derecho Internacional
de los Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados y Derec▯ho Internacional
Humanitario — Aproximaciones y Convergencias, op. cit. supra note 65, pp. 1-66.
69 Thus, for example, at UN level, the 1990 International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Artihcle 17 (1); the
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, (Art. 37 (b)). Provisions of the kind can
also be found in human rights treaties at regional level, e.g.,American9Conven-
tion on Human Rights, (Art. 5 (2)); the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights (Art. 5).
229
7 CIJ1077.indb 454 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 228
convention relative aux droits de l’enfant de 1989). De plus, au cours des
dernières décennies, la doctrine juridique internationale s’esth efforcée d’id -en
tifier un noyau dur de droits de l’homme universels ne souffrant aucune
dérogation et n’admettant aucune restriction, à savoir les droihts fondam- en
taux à la vie et à l’intégrité physique et l’interdiction absolue de lah torture et
des traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants.
64. Le droit international contemporain est particulièrement sensible àh
l’impérieuse nécessité de traiter les personnes avec humanithé en toutes ci-r
constances, et par conséquent de proscrire les traitements inhumains hpour
l’ensemble de l’humanité, de façon à garantir la protectihon de tous, et à
plus forte raison de ceux qui se trouvent dans une situation de grande
vulnérabilité. L’humanité doit guider les comportements humains en toutes
circonstances, en temps de paix comme en temps de troubles et de conflhit
armé. Le principe d’humanité imprègne tout le corpus juris de la protection
de la personne humaine, comme le montre la proximité ou la convergenche
de ses branches simultanément distinctes et complémentaires (àh savoir le
droit international humanitaire, le droit international des droits de
l’homme et le droit international des réfugiés) ; et ce principe se manifeste
68
aussi bien au plan herméneutique qu’aux plans normatif et opérationnel .
2. Le principe d’humanité au sens large
65. Selon moi, le principe d’humanité doit être entendu au sens larhge :
il s’applique dans les circonstances les plus différentes, en tempsh de conflit
armé comme en temps de paix, dans les relations entre les pouvoirs
publics et toutes les personnes relevant de la juridiction de l’Etat hconcerné.
Ce principe est d’autant plus important que ces personnes se trouventh
dans une situation de vulnérabilité ou plus grande adversité, vhoire sans
défense, ainsi qu’on le voit dans les dispositions pertinentes des traitéhs
constituant le droit international des droits de l’homme 69.
66. La Charte elle -même proclame la volonté des Nations Unies de
faire respecter les droits de l’homme partout dans le monde. Adoptéhe
pendant l’un des rares moments de lucidité du siècle dernier, ehlle déclare
dès son préambule :
«Nous, peuples des Nations Unies, résolus à préserver les généra -
tions futures du fléau de la guerre …, à proclamer à nouveau notre
foi dans les droits fondamentaux de l’homme, dans la dignité et lah
valeur de la personne humaine …, à créer les conditions nécessaires
68
Voir, par exemple, sur ce point A. A. Cançado Trindade, Derecho Internacional de
los Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional de los Refugiados y Derecho ▯Internacional
Humanitario — Aproximaciones y Convergencias, op. cit. supra note 65, p. 1-66.
69 Voir, par exemple, au niveau des Nations Unies, la convention internationale de 1990
sur la protection des droits de tous les travailleurs migrants et des mehmbres de leur famille,
art. 17, par.1la convention de 1989 relative aux droits de l’enf37, litt.b). Des dispo-
sitions similaires se trouvent dans les traités relatifs aux droits dhe l’homme conclus au niveau
des organisations régionales, comme la convention américaine relathive aux droits de l’homme
(art. 5, par. 2) et la charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des ph)..es (art5
229
7 CIJ1077.indb 455 18/04/16 08:54 229 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna -
tional law can be maintained ; (. . .) have resolved to combine our
efforts to accomplish these aims.”
67. And the UN Charter includes, among the purposes of the
United Nations, to solve problems of humanitarian character, and to pro-
mote and encourage respect for human rights for all (Art. 1 (3)). It deter-
mines that the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make
recommendations for assisting in the realization of human rights for allh
(Art. 13 (1) (b)). It further states that, in order to create the “conditions of
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly rela-
tions among nations”, the United Nations shall promote “universalrespect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (Art.55 (c)).
68. It is clear that the principle of humanity permeates the law of the
United Nations. It encompasses the whole corpus juris of the interna -
tional protection of the human person, comprising its converging trends h
of international humanitarian law, international law of human rights,
and international law of refugees. In effect, when one evokes the principhle
of humanity, there is a tendency to consider it in the framework of inter -
national humanitarian law. It is beyond doubt that, in this framework,
for example, civilians and persons hors de combat are to be treated with
humanity. The principle of humane treatment of civilians and persons
hors de combat is provided for in the 1949 Geneva Conventions on Inter-
70
national Humanitarian Law . Such a principle, moreover, is generally
regarded as one of customary international humanitarian law 71.
69. The principle of humanity, in line with the long-standing thinking
of natural law, is an emanation of human conscience, projecting itself
into conventional as well as customary international law. The treatment h
dispensed to human beings, in any circumstances, ought to abide by the
principle of humanity, which permeates the whole corpus juris of the inter -
national protection of the rights of the human person (encompassing
international humanitarian law, the international law of human rights,
and international refugee law), conventional as well as customary, at
global (UN) and regional levels. The principle of humanity, usually
invoked in the domain of international humanitarian law, thus extends
itself also to that of international human rights law 72.
70 Common Article 3, and Articles 12 (1)/13/5 and 27 (1); and their Additional Proto -
cols I (Art. 75 (1)) and II (Art. 4 (1)).
71 For a study in depth, cf.ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law (eds.
J.-M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck), Geneva/Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2005, Vol. I Rules, pp. 3-621Vol.II, Part I Practice, pp. 3-1982ol.II, Part II
Pra72ice, pp. 1983-4411.
Cf., to this effect, Human Rights Committee, General Comment note 31 (of 2004),
para. 11 ; and cf.also its General Comments, note 9 (of 1982), para. 3, and note 21
(of 1992), para. 4. It may further be recalled that, in the aftermath of the SWorld
230
7 CIJ1077.indb 456 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 229
au maintien de la justice et du respect des obligations nées des traihtés
et autres sources du droit international …, avons décidé d’associer
nos efforts pour réaliser ces desseins. »
67. Et la Charte d’inclure, parmi les buts des Nations Unies, ceux de
résoudre les problèmes d’ordre humanitaire et de développer het encourager
le respect des droits de l’homme pour tous (art. 1, par. 3). Elle déclare que
l’Assemblée générale provoquera des études et fera des rehcommandations
en vue de faciliter à tous la jouissance des droits de l’homme (ahrt. 13,
par. 1 b)). Elle déclare encore que, «en vue de créer les conditions de stabi -
lité et de bien -être nécessaires pour assurer entre les nations des relations
pacifiques et amicales », les Nations Unies favoriseront « le respect universel
et effectif des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales pour tous,
sans distinction de race, de sexe, de langue ou de religion (art» 55, par. c) ).
68. Il est manifeste que le principe d’humanité imprègne le droit des
Nations Unies. Il embrasse l’ensemble du corpus juris de la protection
internationale de la personne humaine, composé des branches convergenhtes
du droit international humanitaire, du droit international des droits deh
l’homme et du droit international des réfugiés. Certes, quand ohn parle du
principe d’humanité, on a tendance à le placer dans le cadre duh droit
international humanitaire. Ainsi, il ne fait pas de doute que, dans ce
cadre, les civils et les personnes hors de combat doivent être traitéhs avec
humanité 7. Or ce principe est généralement considéré comme étant ahussi
71
un principe du droit international coutumier .
69. S’inscrivant dans le droit fil de la réflexion sur le droit nahturel, le
principe d’humanité est une émanation de la conscience humaine qui se
projette sur le droit conventionnel et sur le droit international coutumhier.
Le traitement à accorder aux humains en toutes circonstances devrait hre-s
pecter le principe d’humanité, lequel imprègne l’ensemble du corpus juris
de la protection internationale de la personne humaine qui comprend le
droit international des droits de l’homme, le droit international humhani-
taire et le droit international des réfugiés, conventionnel aussi hbien que
coutumier, au plan mondial des Nations Unies comme au plan des orga -
nisations régionales. Le principe d’humanité, habituellement inhvoqué
dans le domaine du droit international humanitaire, s’étend ainsi hau
domaine du droit international des droits de l’homme 72.
70
L’article 3 commun aux quatre conventions et, respectivement, leurs articles12,
par. 1, 13 et 5, et 27, pa; et les articlespar. 1, et 4, par. 1, respectivement, des proto-
coles additionnels I et II.
71 On trouvera une étude approfondie de la question dans Customary International
Humanitarian Law (dir. publ., J. -M. Henckaerts et L. Doswald-Beck), CICR, Genève/
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, vol.I, Rule, p. -621 vol.II,part.I, Prac‑
tice, p. 3-1982; vol. II, part. II, Practice, p. 1983-4411.
72 Voir à ce sujet le commentaire général n o 31 de 2004 du Comité des droits de
o o
l’homme, par. 11; et les commentaires n 9, par. 3, de 1982 et n 21, par. 4, de 1992. On se
rappellera que, peu après la seconde guerre mondiale, la déclaration universelle des droits
230
7 CIJ1077.indb 457 18/04/16 08:54 230 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
70. In faithfulness to my own conception, I have, in recent decisions of
the International Court of Justice (and, earlier on, of the Inter -American
Court of Human Rights as well), deemed it fit to develop some reflehctions
on the basis of the principle of humanity lato sensu. I have done so, e.g.,
in my dissenting opinion (paras. 24-25 and 61) in the case of the Obliga ‑
tion to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) (Provisional Mea‑
sures, Order of 28 May 2009, I.C.J. Reports 2009), and in my dissenting
opinion (paras. 116, 118, 125, 136 -139 and 179) 73in the case of Jurisdic‑
tional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy) (Counter‑Claim, Order
of 6 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I)), as well as in my lengthy separate
opinion (paras. 67-96 and 169 -217) in the Court’s Advisory Opinion on
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Inde ‑
pendence in Respect of Kosovo [hereinafter Declaration of Independence of
Kosovo] (ibid., p. 403). I have likewise sustained the wide dimension of the
principle of humanity in my lengthy separate opinion (paras. 93-106 and
107-142) in the International Court of Justice’s Judgment (of 30 Novem-
ber 2010) in the case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Demo‑
cratic Republic of the Congo), Merits.
71. The International Court of Justice has lately given signs — as I
perceive them — of its preparedness to take into account the principle of
humanity. Thus, in its Order of Provisional Measures of Protection of
18 July 2011, in the case of the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand), the International Court of Justice, in deciding inter alia to
order the establishment of a provisional demilitarized zone around the
Temple (part of the world’s cultural and spiritual heritage) and iths vicin -
ity, it extended protection (as I pointed out in my separate opinion,
paras. 66-113) not only to the territory at issue, but also to the local
inhabitants, in conformity with the principle of humanity in the frame -
work of the new jus gentium of our times (paras. 114-117). Territory and
people go together.
72. Subsequently, in the recent case of the Frontier Dispute (Judgment
of 16 April 2013), the contending Parties (Burkina Faso and Niger) them -
selves expressed before the Court their concern, in particular with locahl
nomadic and semi-nomadic populations, and assured that their living
conditions would not be affected by the tracing of the frontier. Once
again, as I pointed out in my separate opinion (paras. 90, 99 and 104-105),
the principle of humanity seemed to have permeated the handling of the
case by the International Court of Justice.
War, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed that “[a]ll human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (Art. 1).
73 In this lengthy dissenting opinion, my reflections relating to the prihnciple of humaitny
are found particularly in its XII,on human beings as the true bearers (titulaires) of
the originally violated rights and the pitfalls of State voluntarism (pharas.112-123), as well
as in its Part XIII, on the incidence of jus cogens (paras. 126-146), besides the Conclusions
(mainly paras. 178-179).
231
7 CIJ1077.indb 458 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 230
70. Par fidélité à mes idées, j’ai jugé utile de joindreh à un certain nombre
de décisions de la Cour (et précédemment de la Cour interaméhricaine des
droits de l’homme) quelques réflexions formulées sur la base du principe
d’humanité lato sensu. Je l’ai fait, par exemple, aux paragraphes 24-25
et 61 de mon opinion dissidente en l’affaire relative à des Questions
concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’extrader (Belgique c. Sénégal)
(mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 28 mai 2009, C.I.J. Recueil 2009) ;
aux paragraphes 116, 118, 125, 136 -139 et 179 de mon opinion dissi -
dente 73 en l’affaire des Immunités juridictionnelles de l’Etat (Allemagne
c. Italie) (demande reconventionnelle, ordonnance du 6 juillet 2010,
C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (I)); et aux paragraphes 67 à 96 et 169 à 217 de ma
longue opinion individuelle jointe à l’avis consultatif donné phar la Cour le
22 juillet 2010 sur la Conformité au droit international de la déclaration
unilatérale d’indépendance relative au Kosovo (ibid., p. 403). J’ai de même
commenté le principe d’humanité au sens large aux paragraphes 93 à 106
et 107 à 142 de ma longue opinion individuelle jointe à l’arrêt rendu pahr
la Cour le 30 novembre 2010 en l’affaire Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Répu ‑
blique de Guinée c. République démocratique du Congo), fond.
71. La Cour a récemment laissé entendre, à ce qu’il me semble, qhu’elle
serait disposée à tenir compte du principe d’humanité. Ainsih, lorsqu’elle a
décidé dans son ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoiresh du
18 juillet 2011 en l’affaire de la Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt
du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaï ‑
lande) d’instituer, entre autres mesures, une zone démilitarisée provisoire
autour du temple (qui fait partie du patrimoine culturel et spirituel mhon-
dial) et de ses abords, elle a étendu sa protection (comme je l’ai signalé
aux paragraphes 66 à 113 de mon opinion individuelle), non seulement au
territoire en cause, mais encore à ses habitants, conformément au hprincipe
d’humanité dans le cadre du nouveau jus gentium contemporain (par. 114
à 117). Le territoire et ses habitants vont de pair.
72. Plus tard, dans la récente affaire du Différend frontalier (Burkina
Faso/Niger) (arrêt du 16 avril 2013), les Parties ont exprimé elles -mêmes
devant la Cour leur préoccupation à l’égard, notamment, des popula -
tions nomades ou semi-nomades et donné l’assurance que celles -ci ne
seraient pas affectées par le tracé de la frontière. Là encore, j’ai signalé
dans mon opinion individuelle (par. 90, 99, 104 et 105) que le principe
d’humanité semblait avoir guidé la Cour dans son traitement de
l’affaire.
de l’homme de 1948 a proclamé que « [t]ous les êtres humains naissent libres et égaux en
dignité et en dro» (articleemier).
73Dans cette longue opinion dissidente, mes idées concernant le principhe d’h-ma
nité sont exposées plus particulièrement dans les paragraphes 112 à 123 de la partie XII,
qui portent sur les humains en tant que véritables titulaires des droits hinitialement
violés et sur les écueils du volontarisme étatiques les paragraphe126 à 146 de la
partie XIII, qui portent sur l’incidence du jus ; et dans les paragraphes8 et 179
des conclusions.
231
7 CIJ1077.indb 459 18/04/16 08:54 231 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
3. The Principle of Humanity in the Heritage of Jusnaturalist Thinking
73. It should not pass unnoticed that the principle of humanity is in
line with natural law thinking. It underlies classic thinking on humane h
treatment and the maintenance of sociable relationships, also at internah-
tional level. Humaneness came to the fore even more forcefully in the
treatment of persons in situation of vulnerability, or even defencelessness,
such as those deprived of their personal freedom, for whatever reason.
The jus gentium, when it emerged as amounting to the law of nations,
came then to be conceived by its “founding fathers” (F. de Vitoria,
A. Gentili, F. Suárez, H. Grotius, S. Pufendorf, C. Wolff) as regulating
the international community constituted by human beings socially orga -
nized in the (emerging) States and co -extensive with humankind, thus
conforming to the necessary law of the societas gentium.
74. The jus gentium, thus conceived, was inspired by the principle of
humanity lato sensu. Human conscience prevails over the will of individ -
ual States. Respect for the human person is to the benefit of the commhon
good 74. This humanist vision of the international legal order pursued —
as it does nowadays — a people‑centred outlook, keeping in mind the
humane ends of the State. The precious legacy of natural law thinking,
evoking the right human reason (recta ratio), has never faded away ; this
should be stressed time and time again, particularly in face of the indihffer -
ence and pragmatism of the “strategic” droit d’étatistes, so numerous in
the legal profession in our days. The principle of humanity may be con -
sidered as an expression of the raison d’humanité imposing limits on the
raison d’Etat 7.
75. States, created by human beings gathered in their social milieu, are
bound to protect, and not at all to oppress, all those who are under thehir
respective jurisdictions. This corresponds to the ethical minimum, univehr -
sally reckoned by the international community of our times. At the time hof
theadoption of the Universal Declaration on10 December 1948 (on the day
following the adoption of the Convention against Genocide), one could
hardly anticipate that a historical process of generalization of the intherna -
tional protection of human rights was being launched, on a truly universal
76
scale . States are bound to safeguard the integrity of the human person
from repression and systematic violence, from discriminatory and arbitrary
treatment.
74
A. A. Cançado Trindade, A Humanização do Direito Internacional, Belo Horizonte/
Br75il, Edit. Del Rey, 2006, pp. 9-14, 172, 318-319, 393 and 408.
A. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind — Towards a New Jus
Gentium, op. cit. supra note 67, pp. 150-152 and 275-285.
76 Throughout almost seven decades, of remarkable historical projection, thhe declara-
tion has gradually acquired an authority which its draftsmen could not hhave foreseen. This
happened mainly because successive generations of human beings, from distinct cultures
and all over the world, recognized in it a “common standard of achievhement” (as originally
proclaimed), which corresponded to their deepest and most legitimate ashpirations.
232
7 CIJ1077.indb 460 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 231
3. Le principe d’humanité dans l’héritage de la pensée jusna▯turaliste
73. Il convient peut-être de noter ici que le principe d’humanité s’ins -
crit dans le droit fil de la pensée jusnaturaliste. Il sous -tend la réflexion
classique sur ce qui fait qu’un traitement est humain (plutôt qu’hinhumain)
et sur les relations sociales, y compris au plan international. Les qualhités
d’humanité ont pris une importance encore plus grande lorsqu’ilh s’est agi
du traitement à accorder aux personnesvulnérables, ou même sans défense,
comme celles qui sont privées de liberté pour quelque raison que che soit.
Le jus gentium, lorsqu’il a commencé à correspondre au droit des nations,
en est venu à être considéré par ses « pères fondateurs » (F. de Vitoria,
A. Gentili, F. Suárez, H. Grotius, S. Pufendorf, C. Wolff) comme régis -
sant une communauté internationale constituée par les humains organisés
socialement en Etats (qui émergeaient alors) et coïncidant avec hl’huma -
nité tout entière, devenant ainsi le droit nécessaire de la societas gentium.
74. Le jus gentium ainsi conçu était inspiré par le principe d’humanité
lato sensu. La conscience humaine prime sur la volonté des Etats pris indi-
viduellement. La personne humaine doit être respectée dans l’inhtérêt du
bien public 74. Cette conception humaniste de l’ordre juridique international
s’inscrivait alors — comme elle le fait aujourd’hui — dans une perspective
axée sur la personne et privilégiant les fins d’humanité de l’Etat. Le précieux
legs du droit naturel, qui évoque un droit fondé sur la raison humhaine
juste (recta ratio) , ne s’est jamais évanoui, et il convient de le souligner
sans cesse, particulièrement face à l’indifférence et au pragmatishme du droit
d’étatistes «stratégiques», si nombreux dans la profession juridique de nos
jours. Le principe d’humanité peut être considéré comme lh’expression de la
raison d’humanité imposant des limites à la raison d’Etat 7.
75. Les Etats, créés par des êtres humains réunis en sociétéh, doivent
protéger et non opprimer ceux qui relèvent de leur juridiction. C’hest là
le minimum éthique aujourd’hui universellement requis par la commu -
nauté internationale. On ne pouvait guère prévoir que l’adoption de la
déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme le 10 décembre 1948, un
jour après l’adoption de la convention sur le génocide, allait hêtre à l’ ori -
gine d’un processus historique de généralisation de la protectihon interna-
tionale des droits de l’homme à une échelle véritablement unhiverselle 76.
Les Etats sont tenus de protéger l’intégrité de la personne hhumaine contre
la violence systématique et les traitements discriminatoires et arbithraires.
74
A. A. Cançado Trindade, A Humanização do Direito Internacional, Belo Horizonte
(Br75il), Ed. Del Rey, 2006, p. 9-14, 172, 318-319, 393 et 408.
A. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind — Towards a New Jus
Gentium, op. cit. supra note 67, p. 150-152 et 275-285.
76 Pendant plus de soixante-dix ans d’une projection historique remarquahble, cette déc-lara
tion a progressivement acquis une autorité que ses auteurs n’auraihent pu envisager. Cela s-’ex
plique principalement par le fait que des générations successives hd’êtres humains, appartenant
à diverses cultures et à toutes les régions du monde, l’ont hreconnuel’idéal commun à
atteindre» (ce qu’elle avait d’ailleurs été proclamée à l’horigine), correspondant à leurs asp-ira
tions les plus profondes et les plus légitimes.
232
7 CIJ1077.indb 461 18/04/16 08:54 232 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
76. The conception of fundamental and inalienable human rights is
deeply -engraved in the universal juridical conscience ; in spite of varia -
tions in their enunciation or formulation, their conception marks pres -
ence in all cultures, and in the modern history of human thinking of all
peoples 77. The 1948 Universal Declaration warns that “disregard and
contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of mankind” (Preamble, para. 2); it further
warns that “it is essential, if man is not compelled to have recourseh, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human righhts
should be protected by the rule of law” (ibid., para. 3). Moreover, it
acknowledges that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda -
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (ibid., para. 1).
4. Judicial Recognition of the Principle of Humanity
77. May I now turn attention, however briefly, to the acknowledgment
of the principle of humanity in the case law of contemporary interna -
tional tribunals. The fundamental principle of humanity has indeed met
therein with full judicial recognition 78. Its acknowledgment is found, e.g.,
in the jurisprudence constante of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR), which holds that it applies even more forcefully whenh
persons are found in an “exacerbated situation of vulnerability” 79. In my
separate opinion in the Judgment of the IACtHR (of 29 April 2004) in
the case of the Massacre of Plan de Sánchez, concerning Guatemala (one
of a pattern of 626 massacres), I devoted a whole section
(Part III, paras. 9-23) of it to the judicial acknowledgement of the prin -
ciple of humanity in the recent case law of the IACtHR as well as of theh
Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY).
77 Cf., e.g., A. A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito International dos Direitos
Humanos [Treatise of International Law of Human Rights], Vol. I, 1st ed., Porto Alegre/
Brazil, S. A. Fabris Ed., 1997, pp. 31-57Various Authors]Universality of Human Rights
in a Pluralistic World (Proceedings of the 1989 Strasbourg Colloquy), Strasbourg/Kehl,
N. 78 Engel Verlag, 1990, pp. 45, 57, 103, 138, 143 and 155.
Cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, “Le déracinement et la protection des migranths dans
le droit international des droits de l’homme”, 19 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme,
Brussels (2008), pp. 289-328, esp. pp. 295 and 308-316.
79 IACtHR, Judgments in the cases of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, of 27 November
2003, para. 87; ofJuan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, of 7 June 2003, para. 96; and of
Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, of 18 August 2000, para. 90and cfcase of Bámaca Velásquez
v. Guatemala, of 25 November 2000, para. 150. For a recent study on the protection of the
vulnerable, cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, A Proteção dos Vulneráveis como Legado da II
Conferência Mundial de Direitos Humanos (1993‑2013) [The Protection of the Vulnerable as
Legacy of the Second World Conference on Human Rights (1993‑2013)], Fortaleza/Brazil,
IBDH, 2014, pp. 13-356.
233
7 CIJ1077.indb 462 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 232
76. La notion de droits fondamentaux et inaliénables est profondé -
ment ancrée dans la conscience juridique universelle; malgré des variantes
dans sa présentation ou dans sa formulation, cette notion est préshente
dans toutes les cultures et dans l’histoire de la pensée de tous lhes peuples 77.
La déclaration universelle de 1948 rappelle que « la méconnaissance et le
mépris des droits de l’homme ont conduit à des actes de barbarihe qui
révoltent la conscience de l’humanité » (deuxième alinéa du préambule) ;
elle affirme qu’« il est essentiel que les droits de l’homme soient protégés
par un régime de droit pour que l’homme ne soit pas contraint, en h
suprême recours, à la révolte contre la tyrannie et l’oppreshsion » (troi -
sième alinéa du préambule). De plus, elle considère que « la reconnais-
sance de la dignité inhérente à tous les membres de la famille hhumaine et
de leurs droits égaux et inaliénables constitue le fondement de lah liberté,
de la justice et de la paix dans le monde » (premier alinéa du préambule).
4. Reconnaissance judiciaire du principe d’humanité
77. Je passerai maintenant, si brièvement que ce soit, à la question dhe
la reconnaissance du principe d’humanité dans la jurisprudence desh juri-
dictions internationales contemporaines. Il est incontestable que le prihn-
cipe fondamental d’humanité a été pleinement reconnu sur le hplan
judiciaire 78. Cette reconnaissance est manifeste, par exemple, dans la
jurisprudence constante de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’hhomme
(CIDH), qui tient que le principe d’humanité s’applique avec hencore plus
de force lorsqu’une personne se trouve dans une « situation exacerbée de
vulnérabilité » 79. Dans l’opinion individuelle que j’ai jointe à l’arrêt rhendu
le 29 avril 2004 par la CIDH en l’affaire relative au Massacre de Plan de
Sánchez c. Guatemala, j’ai consacré une section entière de mon exposé
(partie III, par. 9-23) à la reconnaissance judiciaire du principe d’huma -
nité dans la jurisprudence récente de cette Cour et dans celle du hTribunal
pénal international pour l’ex -Yougoslavie (TPIY).
77
Voir par exemple A. A. Cançado, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos
Humanos [Traité de droit international des droits de l’homme], vol.I, 1e édition, Porto
Alegre (Brésil), S. A. Fabris Ed., 1997, p. 3; et (divers auteurs),iversality of Human
Rights in a Pluralistic World (Proceedings of the 1989 Strasbourg Colloquy), Strasbourg/
Kehl, N. P. Engel Verlag, 1990, p. 45, 57, 103, 138, 143 et 155.
78Voir A. A. Cançado Trindade, « Le déracinement et la protection des migrants dans
le droit international des droits de l’homm», Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme,
Bru79lles, vol. 19 (2008), p. 289-328, en particulier p. 295 et p. 308-316.
Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, arrêts Maritza Urrutia c. Guatemala, du
27 novembre 2003, par. 87 ;uan Humberto Sánchez c. Honduras, du 7 juin 2003, par. 96 ;
Cantoral Benavides c. Pérou, du 18 août 2000, par. 90 ; et Bámaca Velásquez c. Guate‑
mala, du 25 novembre 2000, par. 150. Voir aussi une étude plus récente de la qhuestion de
la protection des personnes vulnérables dans A. A. Cançado Trindade, A Proteção dos
Vulneráveis como Legado da II Conferência Mundial de Direitos Huma▯nos (1993‑2013) [La
protection des personnes vulnérables comme legs de la deuxième con▯férence mondiale des
droits de l’homme (1993‑2013)], Fortaleza (Brésil), IBDH, 2014, p. 13-356.
233
7 CIJ1077.indb 463 18/04/16 08:54 233 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
78. I pondered therein that the primacy of the principle of humanity is
identified with the very end or ultimate goal of the law, of the wholeh legal
order, both national and international, in recognizing the inalienabilithy of
all rights inherent to the human person (para. 17). The same principle of
humanity — I concluded in the aforementioned separate opinion in the
case of the Massacre of Plan de Sánchez — also has incidence in the
domain of international refugee law, as disclosed by the facts of the cas
d’espèce, involving massacres and the State policy of tierra arrasada, i.e.,
the destruction and burning of homes, which generated a massive forced
displacement of persons (para. 23).
79. Likewise, the ICTY has devoted attention to the principle
of humanity in its judgments, e.g., in the cases of Mucić et alii (2001) and
of Celebići (1998). In the Mucić et alii case (Judgment of 20 February
2001), the ICTY (Appeals Chamber), pondered that both interna -
tional humanitarian law and the international law of human rights take
as a “starting point” their common concern to safeguard human dignhity,
which forms the basis of their minimum standards of humanity
80
(para. 149) .
80. Earlier on, in the Celebići case (Judgment of 16 November 1998),
the ICTY (Trial Chamber) qualified as inhuman treatment an intentional
or deliberate act or omission which causes serious suffering (or mental hor
physical damage), or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity ;
thus, the Tribunal added, “inhuman treatment is intentional treatment
which does not conform with the fundamental principle of humanity, and
forms the umbrella under which the rema81der of the listed ‘grave
breaches’ in the Conventions fall” . Subsequently, in the Blaškić case
(Judgment of 3 March 2000), the ICTY (Trial Chamber) reiterated this
position 82.
81. Likewise, in its Judgment of 10 December 2003 in the Obrenović
case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) stated that it is the “abhorrent discrimi -
natory intent” that renders crimes against humanity “particularly hgrave”
(para. 65). Evoking the Tribunal (Appeals Chamber)’s finding in the
Erdemović case (Judgment of 7 October 1997), it added that, because
of their “heinousness and magnitude”, those crimes (against humanityh)
“constitute egregious attacks on human dignity, on the very notion
of humaneness. They consequently affect, or should affect, each and
80
In fact, the principle of humanity can be understood in distinct ways ; first, it can be
conceived as a principle underlying the prohibition of inhuman treatmenth, established by
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949secondly, the principle can be
invoked by reference to humankind as a whole, in relation to matters of hcommon, general
and direct interest to it; and thirdly, the same principle can be employed to qualify a given
quality of human behaviour (humaneness).
81Paragraph 543 of that Judgment.
82Paragraph 154 of that Judgment.
234
7 CIJ1077.indb 464 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 233
78. J’y ai fait valoir que la primauté du principe d’humanité éhtait la
finalité même et le but ultime du droit et de l’ordre juridiqhue tout entier,
national et international, parce que ce principe reconnaît le caractèhre ina-
liénable de tous les droits naturels de la personne humaine (Massacre de
Plan de S ánchez, opinion individuelle, partie III, par. 17). Ce même prin-
cipe d’humanité — ai-je conclu dans cette opinion individuelle — a égale-
ment des incidences dans le domaine du droit international des réfugihés,
comme le montrent les faits de l’espèce, où étaient en causeh des massacres
et la pratique par l’Etat d’une politique de la tierra arrasada consistant à
détruire et à incendier les habitations, qui a entraîné des déplacements
massifs de populations (ibid., par. 23).
79. Le TPIY a lui aussi prêté attention au principe d’humanité dhans ses
décisions, par exemple dans les affaires Mucić et consorts (2001) et Celebići
(1998). Dans son arrêt du 20 février 2001 en l’affaire Mucić et consorts, il
affirme que le droit international humanitaire et le droit internationahl des
droits de l’homme « procèdent d’un souci de la dignité humaine, qui est à
80
la base d’une série de règles humanitaires fondamentales » (par. 149) .
80. Auparavant, dans son jugement du 16 novembre 1998 en l’affaire
Celebići, le TPIY avait considéré qu’un traitement inhumain était un acte,
ou une omission, intentionnel ou délibéré qui cause de graves shouffrances
mentales ou physiques, ou constitue une atteinte grave à la dignité
humaine ; ainsi, ajoutait le TPIY, « les traitements inhumains sont des
traitements intentionnellement administrés qui contreviennent au prin -
cipe fondamental d’humanité ; ils constituent une catégorie dans laquelle
entrent toutes les autres infractions graves énumérées dans lesh Conven -
81
tions ». Par la suite, dans son jugement du 382 mars 2000 en l’affaire
Blaškić, le TPIY a réaffirmé cette position .
81. De même, dans son jugement du 10 décembre 2003 en l’af -
faire Obrenović, le TPIY a déclaré que « la gravité de ce crime contre
l’humanité [la persécution] tient à l’odieuse intention dhiscriminatoire
qui l’inspire » (par. 65). Rappelant l’opinion qu’il avait exprimée dans
son arrêt du 7 octobre 1997 en l’affaire Erdemović, il ajoute qu’« en
raison de leur ampleur et de leur caractère odieux », les crimes contre
l’humanité
« constituent de graves attaques contre la dignité humaine, contre la
notion même d’humanité. Ils touchent, ou devraient toucher, parh
80En fait, le principe d’humanité peut s’entendre de plusieurs fahçons : premièrement,
on peut voir en lui un principe qui sous -tend l’interdiction du traitement inhumain établie
à l’article 3 commun aux quatre conventions de Genève de 1949deuxièmement, il peut
être invoqué par référence à l’humanité tout entièhre, relativement à des questions d’intérêt
commun, général et direct ; et, troisièmement, il peut servir à qualifier tel ou tel compohrte-
ment d’«humain».
81Jugement, par. 543.
82Ibid., par. 154.
234
7 CIJ1077.indb 465 18/04/16 08:54 234 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
every member of [human]kind, whatever his or her nationality, ethnic
group and location” (para. 65) 83.
82. For its part, the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) pondered, in the case of J.‑P. Akayesu (Judgment of
2 September 1998), that the concept of crimes against humanity had
already been recognized well before the Nuremberg Tribunal itself
(1945-1946). The Martens clause contributed to that effect ; in fact,expres -
sions similar to that of those crimes, invoking84ictimized humanity,
appeared much earlier in human history . The ICTR further pointed
out, in the case J. Kambanda (Judgment of 4 September 1998), that in all
periods of human history genocide has inflicted great losses to human -
kind, the victims being not only the persons slaughtered but humanity
itself (in acts of genocide as well as in crimes against humanity) 85.
5. Concluding Observations
83. There is, in sum, in contemporary (conventional and general) inter-
national law, a greater consciousness, in a virtually universal scale, ohf the
principle of humanity. Grave violations of human rights, acts of geno -
cide, crimes against humanity, among other atrocities, are in breach of h
absolute prohibition of jus cogens. The feeling of humaneness permeates
the whole corpus juris of contemporary international law. I have called
this development, — inter alia in my concurring opinion (para. 35) in the
Advisory Opinion (of 1 October 1999), of the IACtHR, on the Right to
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of▯
the Due Process of Law — a historical process of a true humanization of
international law. The prevalence of the principle of humanity is identi -
fied with the ultimate aim itself of law, of the legal order, both nathional
and international.
84. By virtue of this fundamental principle, every person ought to be
respected (in her honour and in her beliefs) by the simple fact of belhong-
ing to humankind, irrespective of any circumstance. In its application in
any circumstances (in times both of armed conflict and of peace), inh the
relations between public power and human beings subject to the jurisdic -
tion of the State concerned, the principle of humanity permeates the
whole corpus juris of the international protection of the rights of the
human person (encompassing international humanitarian law, the inter -
83
Those words were actually taken by the ICTY (Trial Chamber) in the Obrenović case
(para.65),from a passage of the joint separate opinion 21)rof Judges McDonald and
Vohrah, in the ICTY’s Appeal Judgment in the aforementioned Erdemović case (1997).
84Paragraphs 565-566 of that Judgment.
85Paragraphs 15-16 of that Judgment. An equal reasoning is found in the juhdgments
of the same Tribunal in the aforementioned caseJ.‑P. Akayesu, as well as in the case
O. Serushago (Judgment of 5 February 1999, para. 15).
235
7 CIJ1077.indb 466 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 234
conséquent tous les membres de l’humanité, indépendamment deh
leur nationalité, de leur appartenance ethnique et de l’endroit où ils
se trouvent » (par. 65) 83.
82. De son côté, le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (ThPIR)
a rappelé, dans son jugement du 2septembre1998 en l’affaire J.‑P. Akayesu,
que le concept de crimes contre l’humanité a été reconnu biehn avant le tr-ibu
nal de Nuremberg (1945 -1946). La clauseMartens ya contribué; en fait, des
expressions voisines de celle de « crime contre l’humanité» sont apparues
bien plus tôt dans l’histoire pour évoquer le fait que ce genreh de 84ime atteint,
au-delà de ses victimes directes, l’humanité dans son ensemble . Le TPIR a
également rappelé, dans son jugement du 4 septembre 1998 en l’affaire
J. Kambanda, que le crime de génocide a, tout au long de l’histoire, inflighé de
grandes souffrances à l’humanité, et que ses victimes sont non sheulement les
personnes massacrées, mais également l’humanité elle -même (cela valant
aussi bien pour les actes de génocide que pour les crimes contre l’hhumanité) 85.
5. Observations finales
83. Pour résumer, il existe dans le droit international contemporain, aushsi
bien conventionnel que général, une conscience aujourd’hui plush aiguë, à
une échelle virtuellement universelle, du principe d’humanité. hLes violations
graves des droits de l’homme, les actes de génocide, les crimes cohntre l’hu -
manité, entre autres atrocités, constituent des infractions aux inhterdictions
absolues du jus cogens. Le sentiment d’humanité imprègne l’ensemble du co ‑r
pus juris du droit international contemporain. J’ai qualifié cette évohlution de
processus historique d’humanisation du droit international, notamment au
paragraphe35 de l’opinion concordante que j’ai jointe à l’avis consulthatif du
er
1 octobre 1999 de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme sur le
Droit à l’information sur l’assistance consulaire dans le cadre des garanties
d’une procédure régulière. La primauté du principe d’humanité est le but
ultime du droit et de l’ordre juridique tant national qu’internatihonal.
84. En vertu de ce principe fondamental, toute personne a droit au
respect (de son honneur et de ses convictions) du simple fait qu’elhle appar -
tient à l’humanité et en toutes circonstances. Parce qu’il sh’applique dans
les circonstances les plus différentes, en temps de conflit armé hcomme en
temps de paix, dans les relations entre les pouvoirs publics et les per -
sonnes relevant de la juridiction de l’Etat considéré, le princhipe d’huma -
nité imprègne l’ensemble du corpus juris de la protection internationale
des droits de la personne humaine (qui comprend le droit international h
83
Ce passage du paragraphe 65 du jugement du TPIY en l’affaire Obrenović est en fait
repris du paragraphe 21 de l’opinion individuelle commune que les jughes McDonald et
Vohrah ont jointe à l’arrêt en l’affaire Erdemović précitée (1997).
84 Jugement, par. 565-566.
85 Ibid., par.15-16. On trouve un raisonnement similaire dans le jugement du
même tribunal en l’affaire J. ‑P. Akayesu précitée et au paragrap15 du jugement du
5 février 1999 en l’affaire O. Serushago.
235
7 CIJ1077.indb 467 18/04/16 08:54 235 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
national law of human rights, and international refugee law) 8, conven-
87
tional as well as customary . And it has further projected itself into the
law of international organizations, and in particular into the law of thhe
United Nations.
VI. The Convention againsth Genocide and State Respohnsibility
1. Legislative History of the Convention (Article IX)
85. Turning now, in particular, to the 1948 Convention against Geno-
cide, it appears from its travaux préparatoires that State responsibility for
breaches of the Convention was in fact considered in the drafting of whaht
was to become its Article IX. This occurred in order to cope with amend-
ments to the Draft Convention which seemed to have “weakened” prevhi-
ous views on the responsibility of Heads of State. The insertion of a
reference to State responsibility also appeared as an answer to the rejehc -
tion, during the debates of the travaux préparatoires, of a “stronger” form
of State liability for genocide related to what then was Draft Article V
(and then became Article IV) of the Convention.
86. It may be recalled that, originally, Draft Article X (as prepared by
the Ad Hoc Committee) did not contain the reference — found later on in
what was to become Article IX of the Genocide Convention — to State
responsibility for acts of genocide 88. Article IX of the Genocide Conven-
tion, as it now stands, can be traced back to a joint amendment, proposehd
by Belgium and the United Kingdom, to what was then Article X. The
proposed joint amendment to that provision was as follows :
“Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,
including disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for any of the
acts enumerated in Articles II and IV, shall be submitted to the Inter -
national Court of Justice at the request of any of the High Contract -
89
ing Parties.”
87. The reasons for this insertion can be found in the discussions on
the joint amendment in the Sixth Committee of the United Nations Gen -
86
87Paras. 58, 60, 64, 69 and 79, supra.
88Paras. 60 and 68-69, supra.
Article X of the Draft Convention, as drawn up by the Ad Hoc Committee, used to
read as follows:
“Disputes between the High Contracting Parties relating to the interphretation
or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the Internationahl Court of
Justice, provided that no dispute shall bemitted to the International Court of
Justice involving an issue which has been referred to and is pending before or has
been passed upon by competent international criminal tribunal.” UN docE/794,
p.38.
89
UN doc. A/C.6/258, p. 1 (emphasis added).
236
7 CIJ1077.indb 468 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 235
humanitaire, le droit international des droits de l’homme et le droith inter-
national des réfugiés) 86, conventionnel aussi bien que coutumier 87. Et
au-delà, il s’est projeté sur le droit des organisations internatihonales, et en
particulier celui des Nations Unies.
VI. La convention sur le ghénocide et la responshabilité de l’État
1. Historique de l’adoption de la Convention (article IX)
85. Je passerai maintenant à la convention sur le génocide de 1948,
dont les travaux préparatoires montrent que la responsabilité de lh’Etat à
raison de violations de ladite convention a été en fait envisagée au cours
de la rédaction de ce qui devait devenir l’article IX. Il s’agissait à ce
moment-là de compenser certains amendements au projet de convention
qui semblaient avoir affaibli des propositions antérieures sur la resphonsa -
bilité des chefs d’Etat. L’insertion d’une référence àh la responsabilité de
l’Etat semble aussi avoir été une réponse au rejet, pendant hles débats des
travaux préparatoires, d’une formule plus vigoureuse de responsabihlité de
l’Etat pour fait de génocide, qui avait été envisagée danhs ce qui était alors
le projet d’article V et qui est devenu l’article IV de la Convention.
86. On se rappellera qu’à l’origine le projet d’article X établi par le
Comité spécial du génocide ne contenait pas la référence hà la responsabilité
de l’Etat pour génocide qui devait être insérée 88térieurement dans ce qui
devait devenir l’article IX de la Convention . L’articleIX de la convention
sur le génocide dans sa rédaction actuelle trouve son origine dansh un am-en
dement commun proposé par la Belgique et le Royaume -Uni à ce qui était
alors l’article X. Le texte de cet amendement commun était le suivant :
«Tout différend entre les Hautes Parties contractantes relatif à
l’interprétation, l’application ou l’exécution de la préhsente Conven -
tion, y compris les différends relatifs à la responsabilité d’un E▯tat dans
les actes énumérés aux articles II et IV, sera soumis à la Cour inter - 89
nationale de Justice, à la requête d’une Haute Partie contractahnte. »
87. Les motifs qui ont présidé à cette insertion sont exposés dahns les
comptes rendus analytiques des débats sur l’amendement commun qui h
86 Voir supra par. 58, 60, 64, 69 et 79.
87 Supra par. 60 et 68-69.
88 L’article X du projet de convention rédigé par le Comité spécial du géhnocide se lisait
comme suit:
« Les différends qui s’élèveraient entre les Hautes Parties conhtractantes concernant
l’interprétation ou l’application de la présente Convention hseront soumis à la Cour
internationale de Justice, sous réserve qu’aucun différend ne sehra soumis à la Cour
internationale de Justice s’il implique une question qui a été hdéférée à un tribunal
international compétent, est pendante devant ce tribunal, ou a déjhà été jugé» par lui.
(NationsUnies, doc. E/794, p. 38.)
89 Nations Unies, doc. A/C.6/258, p. 1 (les italiques sont de moi).
236
7 CIJ1077.indb 469 18/04/16 08:54 236 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
eral Assembly. The delegate of the United Kingdom (Mr. Fitzmaurice)
explained that both the United Kingdom and Belgium considered that
the Convention would not be complete if it did not contemplate State
liability for genocidal acts and other punishable offences provided for in
90
the Convention . In opposition to this amendment, another joint amend-
ment was proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
France, without providing for obligatory reference to the International h
Court of Justice with respect to the Convention ; it only contemplated an
optional reference mechanism.
88. The French delegate (Mr. Chaumont) did not show any opposition
towards the principle of liability, insofar as it was of a civil nature,h and
not criminal 91. The Egyptian delegate (Mr. Rafaat) also supported the
principle of State liability, as no international mechanism of punishmenht
existed 92. But the proposed amendment also faced opposition from a few
delegations 93. In addition, the Canadian delegate (Mr. Lapointe), for his
part, asked clarification from the United Kingdom delegation as to the
meaning intended to ascribe to “State responsibility”— whether hit was
criminal or civil— having in mind in particular that the Committee, ihn its
93rd meeting, had rejected the idea of criminal State responsibility during
discussions related to Article V 94. The Bolivian delegate (Mr. Medeiros)
expressed his support for the United Kingdom/Belgian amendment, find -
ing it necessary 95.
90 UN doc. A/C.6/SR.103, p. 430.
91
92 Ibid., p. 431.
Ibid. The Greek delegate (Mr. Spiropoulos) raised an issue as to responsibility
relating to cases where a State had its liability triggered for ge: in such cases, respon-
sibility for that State would involve indemnifying itself, as, in his vihew, individuals were not
considered as right-holders in international law at those timesbid., p. 433.
93
The Philippines delegate (Mr. Ingles) insisted on his opposition to the principle or
criminal liability (which he posited earlier with respect to ArticV), and further argued
that, although the joint amendment was not explicitly included in the prhoposition, the very
nature of the Convention, purported to punish genocide implied that liabhility would be
criminal. This, in his view, would bring stigmatization of a whole Stateh for acts committed
only by its rulers or officials and not by the State itself, showing thhat responsibility of the
State could not be possibl; ibid., p. 433. The delegation of Pakistan also expressed concern
about the introduction of State liability in an international instrumenth which was mainly
aimed at a criminal matter ; he expressed his preference for the wording of ArticV when
it referred to the “constitutionally responsible leade;s” ibid., p. 438. The delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics argued that the proposed joint amendhment was only
an intent to submit in a different manner an amendment to Article V so as to introduce
some form of criminal liability of the Sta;e ibid., p. 441.
94 Ibid., pp. 438-439. The British representative replied that the amendment was indeed
referring to civil liability (international responsibility for violatiohn of the Convention).
95
In the light of the decisions taken up by the Committee in the course ithsheeting;
ibid., p. 439.
237
7 CIJ1077.indb 470 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 236
ont eu lieu à la Sixième Commission de l’Assemblée généhrale des Nations
Unies. Le représentant du Royaume -Uni, M. Fitzmaurice, a rappelé que
le Royaume-Uni et la Belgique avaient toujours déclaré que la Conven -
tion serait incomplète si elle ne traitait pas de la responsabilité des Etats
dans les actes 90 génocide et autres actes punissables énuméréhs dans la
Convention . En opposition à cet amendement, l’URSS et la France
avaient proposé un amendement commun qui ne prévoyait pas la compéh -
tence obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice à l’égarhd de la
Convention, mais envisageait seulement un renvoi facultatif.
88. Le représentant de la France, M. Chaumont, a déclaré ne pas s’oppo -
ser au principe de la responsabilité internationale des Etats, du momhent qu’il
s’agissait de responsabilité non pas d’ordre pénal mais uniqhuement d’ordre
91
civil . Le représentant de l’Egypte, M. Rafaat, a déclaré que sa délégation
approuverait la notion de responsabilité civile de l’Etat, à déhfaut d’une o-rga
nisation générale de la répression internationale du génocidhe 92. Le projet
d’amendement s’est cependant heurté à l’opposition de quehlques déléga-
tions 93. En outre, le représentant du Canada, M. Lapointe, a demandé au
représentant du Royaume-Uni ce qu’il entendait par « responsabilité d’un
Etat »: s’agissait-il de la responsabilité civile ou de la responsabilité pénale
ou des deux à la fois, sachant que, lors de la discussion de l’arthicleV à sa
e
93 séance, la Commission avait rejeté l’idée de la responsabilité pénale de
l’Etat 94. Le représentant de la Bolivie, M. Medeiros, a secondé l’amende-
ment du Royaume -Uni et de la Belgique, qu’il estimait nécessaire . 95
90 Nations Unies, doc. A/C.6/SR.103, p. 430.
91
92 Ibid., p. 431.
Ibid. Le représentant de la Grèce, M. Spiropoulos, s’est interrogé sur la notion de
responsabilité de l’Etat, étant donné que, dans nombre de cahs, on aboutirait à la situa -
tion suivante: l’Etat responsable du génocide devrait indemniser ses propres rehssortissants,
alors qu’en droit international le vrai titulaire d’un droit, c’hest l’Etat et non les pa;ticuliers
l’Etat s’indemniserait donc lui-même (ibid., p. 433).
93
Le représentant des Philippines, M. Ingles, a rappelé l’hostilité de sa délégation à
toute responsabilité pénale de l’Etat (comme il l’avait faiht au sujet de l’article V); il a fait
valoir que, si l’amendement commun ne précisait pas qu’il s’hagissait de responsabilité
pénale, il était permis de l’induire de la nature même de lah Convention, dont l’objet était
la répression du génocide. Enfin, il a refusé d’accepter lh’idée qu’on stigmatise un Etat tout
entier pour des actes dont, seuls, ses gouvernants ou ses fonctionnairesh étaient respon -
sables, et non l’Etat lui -même, dont la responsabilité ne peut se concevoir (ibidp. 433).
Le représentant du Pakistan a dit douter de l’opportunité d’hintroduire la responsabilité de
l’Etat dans un instrument international qui portait uniquement sur unhe matière criminelle
il préférait à l’expressionresponsabilité d’un Etat » lestermes employés dans l’article V
visant les gouvernements constitutionnellement responsables (ibid., p. 438). Le représen-
tant de l’URSS a soutenu que le projet d’amendement commun n’éhtait qu’une tentative
pour soumettre, sous une autre forme, un amendement à l’article V et introduire l’idée de
la responsabilité pénale des Etats dans les actes de génocide (hibid.,p. 441).
94 Ibid., p. 438-439. Le représentant du Royaume-Uni lui a répondu que la responsabi-
lité envisagée dans l’amendement commun était la responsabilité internationale des Etats
à la suite d’une violation de la Convention et qu’il s’agisshait d’une responsabilité civile et
non pénale.
95 e
«D’autant plus nécessaire que la Commission a refusé [à sa 97h séance] d’accepter le
principe d’une juridiction international» (ibid., p. 439).
237
7 CIJ1077.indb 471 18/04/16 08:54 237 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
89. For its part, the Haitian delegation proposed a consequential
amendment to the aforementioned joint amendment, which would add
“or of any victims of the crime of genocide (groups of individuals)h”. This
met the opposition of some delegations, which argued that such an
amendment would imply a modification of the ICJ Statute. Yet, the Syr -
ian delegation considered that such a consequential amendment was not
contrary to the ICJ Statute, as in its view there was no reason for the h
signatory State to impede groups victims of genocide to seize the Internha -
tional Court of Justice for such breaches. In support of its proposal, thhe
Haitian delegation asserted, inter alia, that States could be liable only
directly towards the victims themselves, and not towards other States, for
having committed genocide 9.
90. Some delegations, such as those of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and Poland, voiced concerns as to the effect of the reference tho
the International Court of Justice of disputes relating to State liability
under the Genocide Convention. The preoccupation was related to the
possibility of Draft Article X (as then worded) precluding submission to
the United Nations General Assembly or the Security Council of com -
plaints with respect to genocidal acts 97. The United Kingdom delegate
replied that submission to the International Court of Justice could not hin
any way preclude submission before other competent organs of the
United Nations 98. And the United Kingdom delegate concluded that, giv-
ing the International Court of Justice jurisdiction for State liability haris -
ing out of breaches of the Genocide Convention was necessary in order toh
ensure an effective enforcement of the Convention, considering in partic -
ular the practical difficulties in prosecuting Heads of State 99.
91. The joint amendment was then adopted by 23 votes to 13, with
8 abstentions 100. (Then) Article X, with other amendments, was adopted
by 18 to 2, with 15 abstentions ; it came to read as follows :
“Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention,
including disputes relating to the responsibility of a State for any of h
96 Cf. UN doc. A/C.6/SR.103, p. 436.
97 Cf. ibid., p. 444.
98 Ibid. Furthermore, in response to the criticism, he asserted that reference to the Inter-
national Court of Justice might be useless, as that Court would act too hlate in cases of
genocide: genocide is a process, he added, and once it started being committed, ha State
party could seize the Court.
99
Ibid.
100Ibid., p. 447.
238
7 CIJ1077.indb 472 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 237
89. De son côté, la délégation haïtienne a proposé une addhition consé-
quente à l’amendement commun précité, qui ajouterait à lah fin du texte les
mots « ou de toutes victimes du crime de génocide (groupes ou indivi -
dus) ». Cet amendement s’est heurté à l’opposition de quelquesh déléga -
tions, qui ont fait valoir qu’il imposerait de modifier le Statut de la CIhJ.
En revanche, le représentant syrien a considéré qu’il n’éhtait nullement
contraire au Statut de la Cour, rien n’empêchant en effet, selon lui, que,
les Etats signataires confient également aux individus et aux grouphes le
soin de saisir la Cour des cas de génocide dont ils auraient étéh victimes. A
l’appui de sa proposition, la délégation haïtienne a notammehnt affirmé
que l’Etat coupable ne pouvait être responsable civilement qu’ehnvers les
victimes du crime de génocide, et qu’il serait illogique que l’hEtat deman -
deur exige des dommages-intérêts sans que les victimes elles -mêmes en
96
bénéficient .
90. Quelques délégations, dont celles de l’URSS et de la Pologne, she
sont déclarées préoccupées par un amendement qui renvoyait dhevant la
Cour internationale de Justice des différends relatifs à la responshabilité
des Etats aux termes de la convention sur le génocide. Elles craignaihent
que le projet d’article X (dans la formulation proposée) n’ait pour but
d’empêcher un Etat de soumettre une plainte pour génocide à hl’Assemblée
97
générale ou au Conseil de sécurité. Le représentant du Royaume -Uni a
répondu que le fait de soumettre à la Cour internationale de Justihce une
affaire de génocide ne saurait empêcher le renvoi des cas de génhocide
devant l’un des organes compétents des Nations Unies 98. Il a conclu qu’il
était indispensable, pour faire effectivement respecter la convention hsur le
génocide, de prévoir que la Cour internationale de Justice serait hcompé -
tente en matière de responsabilité des Etats pour les violations dhe ladite
Convention, compte tenu en particulier du fait que, du point de vue pra -
tique, il était extrêmement difficile de traduire en justice des hgouvernants
et des chefs d’Etat 99.
91. L’amendement commun a été adopté par 23 voix contre 13, avec
100
8 abstentions . L’article X ancien, avec d’autres amendements, a été
adopté par 18 voix contre 2, avec 15 abstentions ; il se lisait comme
suit :
« Tout différend entre les Hautes Parties contractantes relatif
à l’interprétation, l’application ou l’exécution de la préhsente
Convention, y compris les différends relatifs à la responsabilitéh d’un
96 Nations Unies, doc. A/C.6/SR.103, p. 436.
97 Ibid., p. 444.
98
Ibid. En réponse à l’argument voulant qu’il serait inutile de souhmettre les cas de
génocide à la CIJ car celle -ci agirait trop tard, le représentant du Roy-Uni a fait
observer que les actes de génocide ne se produisaient généralement pas subitement mais
étaient progressifs, et que, si un génocide était en voie de perpétration, toute partie à lah
Convention pouvait en saisir la CIJ.
99 Ibid.
100Ibid., p. 447.
238
7 CIJ1077.indb 473 18/04/16 08:54 238 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
the acts enumerated in Articles II and IV, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
101
the dispute.”
This version of (then) Article X underwent minor changes, leading to the
final version of what is now Article IX of the Convention against Geno -
cide, which reads as follows :
“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpre-
tation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, includingh
those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any h
of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to
the dispute.”
2. Rationale, and Object and Purpose of the Convention
92. The determination of State responsibility under the Convention
against Genocide is well -founded, not only because this was intended by
the draftsmen of the Convention, as its travaux préparatoires show
(supra), but also because such determination is in line with the rationale
of the Convention, as well as its object and purpose. Today, 66 years after
its adoption, the Convention against Genocide counts on 146 States par -
ties; and the States which have not yet ratified, or acceded to it, are alhso
aware that the prohibition of genocide is one likewise of general or cush -
tomary international law. It is not conditioned by alterations in State hso-v
ereignty or vicissitudes of State succession ; it is an absolute prohibition,
belonging to the realm of jus cogens.
93. The Convention against Genocide is meant to prevent and punish
the crime of genocide, which is contrary to the spirit and aims of the
United Nations, so as to liberate humankind from such an odious scourge.
Nowadays, six and a half decades after the adoption of the Convention
against Genocide, much more is known about that heinous international
crime. “Genocide studies” have been undertaken in recent decades ihn dis -
tinct branches of human learning, attentive to an interdisciplinary per-
spective (cf. Part XI, infra). They have shown that genocide has been
committed in modern history in furtherance of State policies.
94. To attempt to make the application of the Genocide Convention to
States is an impossible task, one which would render the Convention
meaningless, an almost dead letter ; it would furthermore create a situa -
tion where certain State egregious criminal acts, amounting to genocide,h
would pass unpunished — especially as there is at present no interna -
tional convention on crimes against humanity. Genocide is in fact an
egregious crime committed under the direction, or the benign complicity,h
101 UN doc. A/C.6/269, p. 1. Cf. also Article IX (as it then became), UN doc. A/760,
p. 10.
239
7 CIJ1077.indb 474 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 238
Etat dans les actes énumérés aux articles II et IV, sera soumis à la
Cour internationale de Justice, à la requête d’une partie au dihffé -
101
rend.»
Cette version de l’ancien article X est devenue, après avoir subi quelques
modifications mineures, l’article IX définitif de la convention sur le géno -
cide, qui se lit comme suit :
« Les différends entre les Parties contractantes relatifs à l’interpré -
tation, l’application ou l’exécution de la présente Conventihon, y com -
pris ceux relatifs à la responsabilité d’un Etat en matière hde génocide
ou de l’un quelconque des autres actes énumérés à l’arhticle III, seront
soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice, à la requête d’uhne partie
au différend.»
2. Raison d’être, but et objet de la Convention
92. L’établissement de la responsabilité de l’Etat aux termes deh la
convention sur le génocide est solidement fondé non seulement parche qu’il
répond à l’intention des rédacteurs de la Convention, comme hil ressort de
ses travaux préparatoires (supra), mais encore parce qu’il correspond à la
raison d’être, au but et à l’objet de ladite Convention. Aujhourd’hui,
soixante-six ans après son adoption, la Convention compte 146 Etats par -
ties et les Etats qui n’y ont pas encore adhéré ou ne l’ont pash encore
ratifiée savent que l’interdiction du génocide fait égalemhent partie du
droit international général ou coutumier. Elle n’est pas remiseh en question
par les aléas de la souveraineté de l’Etat ou les vicissitudes hde la succes -
sion d’Etats ; c’est une interdiction absolue qui relève du jus cogens.
93. La convention sur le génocide entend prévenir et réprimer le crhime
de génocide — qui est contraire à l’esprit et aux buts des Nations Unies
— afin de délivrer l’humanité d’un fléau aussi abominabhle. Six décennies
et demie après son adoption, on en sait beaucoup plus sur ce crime odhieux.
Dans plusieurs branches du savoir humain, les études sur le génocihde se
sont constituées en discipline autonome, tout en s’inscrivant dansh une
perspective multidisciplinaire (voir ci -après la partie XI). Ces études ont
montré que, dans l’histoire moderne, des génocides ont étéh commis en
exécution de politiques d’Etat.
94. Essayer de soustraire les Etats à l’application de la convention shur
le génocide risque d’aboutir à ce que, vidée de son sens, cehlle-ci devienne
lettre morte; cela finirait aussi par créer une situation où les crimes exorh -
bitants de certains Etats, équivalents au génocide, resteraient impunis —
d’autant plus qu’il n’existe pas actuellement de convention inthernationale
sur les crimes contre l’humanité. Le génocide est en fait un crime exorbi -
tant commis sous la direction ou avec la complicité bienveillante de l’Etat
101Nations Unies, doc. A/C.6/269, p. 1. Voir aussi l’article IX définitif, Nations Unies,
doc. A/760, p. 11-12.
239
7 CIJ1077.indb 475 18/04/16 08:54 239 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
of the State and its apparatus 102. Unlike what was assumed by the
Nuremberg Tribunal in its célèbre Judgment (Part 22, p. 447), States are
not “abstract entities” ; they have been concretely engaged, together with
individual executioners (their so -called “human resources”, acting on
their behalf), in acts of genocide, in distinct historical moments and
places.
95. They have altogether — individuals and States — been responsible
for such heinous acts. In this context, individual and State responsibility
complement each other. In sum, the determination of State responsibilityh
cannot at all be discarded in the interpretation and application of the h
Convention against Genocide. When adjudicating a case such as the pres -
ent one, concerning the Application of the Convention against Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia), the International Court of Justice should bear in
mind the importance of the Convention as a major human rights treaty,
with all its implications and legal consequences. It should bear in mindh
the Convention’s historic significance for humankind.
VII. Standard of Proof in the Cahse Law of Internationalh
Human Rights Tribunals
96. The case law of international human rights tribunals is of central
importance to the determination of the international responsibility of
States (rather than individuals) for grave violations of human rights,h and
cannot pass unnoticed in a case like the present one, concerning the
Application of the Convention against Genocide , opposing Croatia to Ser -
bia. It cannot thus be overlooked by the International Court of Justice,h
concerned as it is, like international human rights tribunals, with State
responsibility, and not individual (criminal) responsibility.
1. A Question from the Bench :
The Evolving Case Law on the Matter
97. In the course of the oral proceedings in the present case, the con -
tending Parties were, however, referring only to the case law of interna -
tional criminal tribunals (concerned with individual responsibility), until
the moment, in the Court’s public sitting of 5 March 2014, that I deemed
it fit to put the following question to both of them, on also the caseh law
of international human rights tribunals :
“My question concerns the international criminal responsibility of
individuals, as well as the international responsibility of States, for h
102The expert evidence examined by the ICTY, for example, in the Milošević case
(2004), maintained that the knowledge sedimented on the matter shows thhat State author-
itieare always responsible for a genocidal processPartXIII of the present dissenting
opinion, infra.
240
7 CIJ1077.indb 476 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 239
et de son appareil 10. Contrairement à ce que croyait le Tribunal de
Nuremberg dans son célèbre jugement (partie 22, p. 447), les Etats ne
sont pas des « entités abstraites»; ils ont participé concrètement, avec des
exécuteurs qui sont des individus (leurs ressources prétendument
« humaines», agissant au nom de l’Etat), à des actes de génocide en dhivers
lieux et à divers moments de l’histoire.
95. C’est ensemble que les individus et les Etats portent la responsabi -
lité de ces actes odieux. Dans ce contexte, la responsabilité des hindividus
et celle de l’Etat sont complémentaires l’une de l’autre. Pohur résumer, en
matière d’interprétation et d’application de la convention shur le génocide,
on ne peut se dispenser d’établir la responsabilité de l’Etaht. Lorsqu’elle est
appelée à statuer sur une affaire comme la présente espèce (Croatie c. Ser ‑
bie), la CIJ devrait garder à l’esprit l’importance que revêt lah Convention
en tant que traité fondamental relatif aux droits de l’homme, avech toutes
les implications et les conséquences juridiques que cela emporte. Ellhe
devrait aussi garder à l’esprit le caractère historique de la Chonvention aux
yeux de l’humanité.
VII. Critères d’établissehment de la preuve dansh la jurisprudence
des juridictions intehrnationales des droiths de l’homme
96. La jurisprudence des juridictions internationales des droits de
l’homme revêt une importance cruciale pour ce qui est d’étabhlir la respon -
sabilité des Etats (plutôt que des individus) dans les graves viholations des
droits de l’homme, et elle ne saurait être passée sous silence hdans une
affaire comme celle -ci (Croatie c. Serbie). Elle ne peut donc être ignorée
par la CIJ dans la mesure où, comme les juridictions internationales hdes
droits de l’homme, elle est appelée à se prononcer sur la respohnsabilité de
l’Etat et non sur la responsabilité (pénale) d’individus.
1. Question émanée d’un membre de la Cour : l’évolution
de la jurisprudence en la matière
97. Or, au cours de la procédure orale en la présente espèce, les Pharties
n’ont évoqué que la jurisprudence des tribunaux pénaux interhnationaux
(qui traitent de la responsabilité individuelle), jusqu’à ce qu’à l’audience
du 5 mars 2014 j’estime devoir leur poser à toutes deux la question sui -
vante, qui portait aussi sur la jurisprudence des juridictions internatiho -
nales des droits de l’homme :
«Ma question concerne la responsabilité pénale internationale des
personnes ainsi que celle des Etats en matière de génocide. Jusqu’hà
102
Selon les témoignages d’experts recueillis par le TPIY, dans l’Milošević par
exemple, l’histoire montre que les autorités de l’Etat sont touhjours responsables d’un
processus génocidaire (voir ci-après la partie XIII du présent exposé de mon opinion dissi-
dente).
240
7 CIJ1077.indb 477 18/04/16 08:54 240 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
genocide. References have so far been made only to the case law of
international criminal tribunals (the ICTY and the ICTR), pertaining
to individual international criminal responsibility. Do you consider
that the case law of international human rights tribunals is also of
relevance here, for the international responsibility of States for gen -
ocide, as to standard of proof and attribution ?”103
From then onwards, both Croatia and Serbia started referring, comme 104
ilfaut, to the case law of international human rights tribunals as well
— concerned as these latter are with the determination of State responsi -
bility.
98. In addition to what the contending Parties argued in the proceed -
ings of the present case concerning the Application of the Convention
against Genocide , there is, in effect, a wealth of relevant indications as to
the standard of proof (and reversal of the burden of proof), which shohuld
not pass unnoticed here. This is so, in particular, in the case law of thhe
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), in cases disclosing a
systematic or widespread pattern of gross violations of human rights,
where the IACtHR has resorted to factual presumptions.
99. Moreover, the IACtHR has held that it is the respondent State
which is to produce the evidence, given the applicant’s difficulty tho obtain
it and the respondent’s access to it. There are indications to this ehffect
also in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
Given the relevance of the case law of international human rights tribu -
nals for the determination of international State responsibility, it cannot
at all be overlooked in the consideration of the cas d’espèce, in so far as
the key issue of standard of proof is concerned. I thus care to proceed hto
its review.
2. Case Law of the IACtHR
(a) Cases disclosing a systematic pattern of grave violations of human
rights
100. The case law of the IACtHR is particularly rich in respect of the
standard of proof in cases disclosing a systematic pattern of grave viola -
tions of human rights. In the case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras
(Judgment of 7 June 2003), for example, the IACtHR determined the
occurrence, in the respondent State, in the eighties and beginning of the
103Question put by Judge Cançado Trindade, in CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 59.
104Croatia’s responses, in CR 2014/12, of 7 March 2014, p. 44, para. 20; and
CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, pp. 14-16, paras. ; Serbia’s response, in CR14/23, of
28 March 2014, pp. 50-52, paras. 27-36.
241
7 CIJ1077.indb 478 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 240
maintenant, il n’a été fait référence qu’à la jurishprudence des tribu -
naux pénaux internationaux (TPIY et TPIR), laquelle ne concerne
que la responsabilité individuelle en droit pénal international. Ah votre
avis, la jurisprudence des tribunaux internationaux chargés de la
protection des droits de l’homme doit -elle être considérée comme
pertinente en ce qui concerne la responsabilité internationale des
Etats en matière de génocide, du point de vue du critère d’éhtablisse -
ment de la preuve et de l’attribution ?» 103
Dès lors, la Croatie et la Serbie ont commencé à évoquer éhgalement,
comme il se devait, la jurisprudence des juridictions internationales dehs
104
droits de l’homme , pour qui l’établissement de la responsabilité de
l’Etat est une question pertinente.
98. Outre les arguments présentés par les Parties au cours des audienches
en la présente affaire Croatie c. Serbie, il existe un volume considérable
d’informations pertinentes sur l’établissement de la preuve (eht le renverse -
ment de la charge de la preuve) qu’il importe d’exploiter ici. Il s’en trouve
notamment dans la jurisprudence de la Cour interaméricaine des droitsh de
l’homme (CIDH), et en particulier dans les affaires révélant uhne cam -
pagne de violations flagrantes, systématiques et généraliséhes des droits de
l’homme, pour lesquelles la CIDH a eu recours à des présomptionhs de
fait.
99. De surcroît, la CIDH a jugé que c’est à l’Etat mis en cauhse qu’il
incombe de produire les éléments de preuve, étant donné d’hune part que
le demandeur est mal placé pour les obtenir et d’autre part que leh mis en
cause y a accès. Il existe également des indications en ce sens dahns la juris -
prudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH). Vu hla
pertinence de la jurisprudence des juridictions internationales des droihts
de l’homme pour l’établissement de la responsabilité internahtionale de
l’tat, on ne saurait l’ignorer dans l’examen de l’espèce, dans la mesure
où la question primordiale du critère d’établissement de la hpreuve est
concernée. Je vais par conséquent la passer en revue.
2. Jurisprudence de la CIDH
a) Affaires révélant un ensemble de violations graves et systémati▯ques des
droits de l’homme
100. La jurisprudence de la CIDH est particulièrement riche d’enseigne-
ments sur le critère d’établissement de la preuve dans des affaihres qui mettent
en évidence un ensemble de violations graves et systématiques des hdroits de
l’homme. Dans son arrêt du 7juin 2003 en l’affaire JuanHumberto Sánchez
c. Honduras , par exemple, la CIDH a d’abord constaté l’existence dans
103Question posée par le juge Cançado Trindade, CR 2014/8, p. 59.
104Voir les réponses de la Croatie, CR 2014/12, p. 44, par. 20; et CR 2014/20, p. 14-16,
par. 8-; voir la réponse de la Serbie, CR4/23, p. 50-52, par. 27-36.
241
7 CIJ1077.indb 479 18/04/16 08:54 241 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
nineties, of a systematic pattern of arbitrary detentions, enforced disap -
pearances of persons, and summary or extrajudicial executions commit -
ted by the military forces (IACtHR, Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras,
Judgment of 7 June 2003, paras. 70 (1) and 96-97), wherein the cas
d’espèce is inserted (ibid., para. 80).
101. The IACtHR thus inferred, even in the absence of direct proof,
that the victim suffered cruel and inhuman treatment during the time of
his detention (ibid., para. 98) 10, before his mortal remains were found.
The facts that occurred at the time of the pattern of ill -treatment and
torture and summary executions, lead the IACtHR to the presumption of
the responsibility of the State for those violations in respect of persohns
under the custody of its agents (ibid., para. 99)106. This being so — the
Court added — it was incumbent upon the respondent State to provide
reasonable explanations of what occurred to the victim (ibid., paras. 100
and 135).
107
102. Other pertinent decisions of the IACtHR can here be recalled .
For example, in the case of the Massacres of Ituango v. Colombia (Judg -
ment of 1 July 2006), the IACtHR, having found in the municipality at
issue a systematic pattern of massacres (in 1996-1997) perpetrated by
paramilitary groups, determined the responsibility of the State for “homis -
sion, acquiescence and collaboration” of the public forces (para. 132).
103. The IACtHR further found that State agents had “full know -
ledge” of the activities of paramilitary groups terrorizing the localh popu-
lation, and, far from protecting this latter, they omitted doing so, andh
even participated in the armed incursion into the municipality and the
killing of local inhabitants by the paramilitaries ( ibid., paras. 133 and 135).
Within the context of this systematic pattern of violence, the respondent
State incurred into grave violations of the rights of the victims under hthe
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (ibid., paras. 136-138).
104. In the case of the Massacre of Mapiripán v. Colombia (Judgment
of 15 September 2005), the IACtHR observed that, although the killings
in Mapiripán (in mid -July 1997) were committed by members of para -
military groups,
105
Cf. also, to this effect, IACtHR, case BámacVelásquez v. Guatemala (Judgment
of 25 November 2000), supra, para. 150; caseCantoral Benavides v. Peru (Judgment of
18 August 2000), paras. 83-84 and 89and case of th“Street Children” Villagrán Morales
and Others v. Guatemala (Judgment of 19 November 1999), para. 162.
106Cf. also, in this sense, op. cit. supra note 105, IACtHR, case BáVelásquez v.
Guatemala, paras. 152-15; and case of thetreet Children” Villagrán Morales and Others
v. Guatemala, op. cit. supra note 105, para. 170.
107Another example of inference of a summary or extrajudicial execution, in a context
of a generalized or systematic pattern of crimes against humanity (in the period 1973-1990),
victimizing the “civilian population” (with thousands of individuhal victims), is afforded by
the IACtHR’s Judgment (of 26 September 2006) in the case of Almonacid Arellano and
Others v. Chile (paras. 96 and 103-104).
242
7 CIJ1077.indb 480 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 241
l’Etat mis en cause, pendant les années 1980 et au début des années 1990,
d’une campagne systématique de détentions arbitraires, de dispahritions f-or
cées et d’exécutions sommaires ou extrajudiciaires par les forches militaires
(CIDH,Juan Humberto Sánchez c. Honduras , arrêt du 7 juin 2003, par.70 1)
et 96-97), à laquelle appartient le cas d’espèce (ibid., par.80).
101. La CIDH en a déduit, alors même que faisaient défaut les preuves
directes, que la victime avait subi des traitements cruels et inhumains hpen -
dant sa détention (ibid., par. 98) 105, avant que sa dépouille ne fût décou-
verte. Les faits étaient survenus en effet à l’époque de cetthe campagne de
mauvais traitements, torture et exécutions sommaires, ce qui a conduiht la
CIDH à présumer la responsabilité de l’Etat dans ces violations lorsque
les victimes se trouvaient sous la garde des agents dudit Etat (ibid.,
106
par. 99) . Dans ces conditions, a conclu la CIDH, il appartenait à l’Etat
mis en cause de fournir des explications crédibles de ce qui étaith arrivé à
la victime (ibid., par. 100 et 135).
107
102. On peut rappelererci d’autres décisions pertinentes de la CIDH .
Dans son arrêt du 1 juillet 2006 en l’affaire des Massacres d’Ituango
c. Colombie, par exemple, la CIDH, ayant conclu que la municipalité en
question avait été le théâtre de massacres systématiques hcommis par des
groupes paramilitaires en 1996-1997, en a imputé la responsabilité à l’Etat
par « omission, acquiescement ou collaboration » des forces publiques
(par. 132).
103. La CIDH a conclu en outre que les agents de l’Etat étaient « par -
faitement au courant » des activités par lesquelles ces groupes paramili -
taires terrorisaient la population locale et que, loin de protéger cette
dernière, ils s’abstenaient de le faire, allant même jusqu’àh participer à une
incursion armée dans la municipalité et au meurtre d’habitants hpar lesdits
groupes ( ibid., par. 133 et 135). Dans un tel contexte de violence systéma-
tique, la responsabilité de l’Etat mis en cause était engagéhe à raison des
graves violations des droits des victimes reconnus par la convention améh-
ricaine relative aux droits de l’homme (ibid., par. 136-138).
104. Dans son arrêt du 15 septembre 2005 en l’affaire du Massacre de
Mapiripán c. Colombie , la CIDH a fait d’abord observer que, bien que les
meurtres en cause eussent été commis à la mi-juillet 1997 par des membres
de groupes paramilitaires,
105
Voir aussi à ce sujet l’arrêt dunovembre 2000 de la CIDH en l’affaire Bámaca
Velásquez c. Guatemala, par. 15; l’arrêt du 18oût 2000 en l’affaire Cantoral Benavides
c. Pérou, par. 83-84 et 89 et l’arrêt du 1novembre 1999 en l’affaire Enfants des rues
(Villagrán Morales et consorts) c. Guatemala, par. 162.
106Voir aussi, dans le même sens, op. cit. supra note 105, les arrêts de la CIDH dans
les affaires Bámaca Velásquez c. Guatemala, par. 152-1; etEnfants des rues (Villagrán
Morales et consorts) c. Guatemala, par. 170.
107L’arrêt du 26 septembre 2006 de la CIDH en l’affaire Almonacid Arellano et consorts
c. Chili (par. 96 et 103-104) offre un autre exemple de présomption d’exécution sommaireh
ou extrajudiciaire obtenue par déduction, dans un contexte de crimes contre l’humanité
généralisés et systématiques qui, pendant la période allahnt de 191990, ont fait des
milliers de victimes dans la «ulation civile» du Chili.
242
7 CIJ1077.indb 481 18/04/16 08:54 242 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
“the preparation and execution of the massacre could not have been
perpetrated without the collaboration, acquiescence and tolerance,
manifested in various actions and omissions, of members of the State
armed forces, including of its high officers in the zones. Certainly thhere
is no documental proof before this Tribunal that demonstrates that
the State directed the execution of the massacre or that there existed
a relation of dependence between the army and the paramilitary
groups or a delegation of public functions from the former to these
latter.” (IACtHR, Massacre of Mapiripán v. Colombia, Judgment of
15 September 2005, para. 120.)
105. The IACtHR then attributed to the respondent State the conduct
of both its own agents and of the members of paramilitary groups in the h
zones which were “under the control of the State”. The incursion ohf para -
militaries in Mapiripán, it added, had been planned for months, and was
executed “with full knowledge, logistic previsions and collaboration hof
the armed forces”, which facilitated the journey of the paramilitariehs from
Apartadó and Neclocí until Mapiripán “in zones which were unhder their
control”, and, moreover, “left unprotected the civilian population during
the days of the massacre with the unjustified moving of the troops to h
other localities” (ibid.).
106. The “collaboration of members of the armed forces with the para -
militaries” was manifested in a pattern of “grave actions and omissions”
aiming at allowing the perpetration of the massacre and the cover -up of
the facts in search of “the impunity of those responsible” (ibid., para.121).
The Court added that the State authorities who knew the intentions of
the paramilitary groups to perpetrate a massacre to instil terror in theh
population, “not only collaborated in the preparation” of the killhings, but
also left the impression before public opinion that the massacre had beehn
perpetrated by paramilitary groups “without its knowledge, participathion
and tolerance” (ibid.).
107. The IACtHR, discarding this pretension, and having established the
links between the armed forces and the paramilitary groups in the perpe -
tration of the massacre, determined that “the international responsibhility
of the State was generated by a pattern of actions and omissions of Stathe
agents and particuliers, which took place in a co-ordinated, parallel or
organized way aiming at perpetrating the massacre” (ibid., para. 123).
108. In its Judgment (of 22 September 2006) in the case Goiburú and
Others v. Paraguay, the IACtHR observed that that particular case was
endowed with “a particular historical transcendence”, as the factsh had
occurred “in a context of a systematic practice of arbitrary detentiohns,
tortures, executions and disappearances perpetrated by the forces of sechu -
rity and intelligence of the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, in the
framework of the Operation Condor” (para. 62).
109. That is to say, the grave facts are framed in the flagrant, massive
and systematic character of the repression which the population was sub -
jected to, at inter-State scale; in fact, the structures of State security were
243
7 CIJ1077.indb 482 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 242
« lapréparation et l’exécution du massacre n’auraient pu avoir lieu
sans la collaboration, l’acquiescement et la tolérance, manifestéhs par
divers actes et omissions, des membres des Forces armées de l’Etath, y
compris leurs officiers supérieurs, dans les zones concernées. Cehrtes,
la Cour ne dispose pas de preuves documentaires prouvant que l’Etat
a ordonné directement de commettre ce massacre ou qu’il existait
une relation de subordination entre l’Armée et les groupes paramilhi-
taires, ou une délégation de mission de service public de la premihère
aux secondes. » (CIDH, Massacre de Mapiripán c. Colombie, arrêt du
15 septembre 2005, par. 120.)
105. La CIDH a imputé ensuite à l’Etat mis en cause la conduite tanth de
ses propres agents que des membres des groupes paramilitaires dans les
zones qui se trouvaient «sous le contrôle de l’Etat». L’incursion des groupes
paramilitaires, poursuit la CIDH, a été préparée pendant pluhsieurs mois et
exécutée « au su et au vu des forces armées, avec leur aide logistique et leur
collaboration »; les forces armées ont facilité le transport des groupes para-
militaires depuis Apartadó et Neclocí jusqu’à Mapiripán «h à travers des
zones qui étaient sous leur contrôle» et, de surcroît, ont « laissé la popula-
tion civile sans défense pendant les journées du massacre sous le hprétexte
fallacieux de déplacer leurs troupes vers d’autres localité» (ibid.).
106. La « collaboration des membres des Forces armées avec les para -
militaires» a pris la forme d’un ensemble d’« actes et omissions graves »
qui avaient pour but de faciliter la perpétration du massacre et la dhissim- u
lation ultérieure des faits de façon à garantir « l’impunité aux respon -
sables [du massacre] » (ibid., par. 121). La CIDH précise que les autorités
de l’Etat qui étaient informées de l’intention des groupes paramilitaires de
commettre un massacre en vue de terroriser la population avaient « non
seulement collaboré aux préparatifs » de ce massacre, mais encore pré -
tendu devant l’opinion publique qu’il avait été commis « à leur insu et
sans aucune participation ni tolérance de leur part » (ibid.).
107. Après avoir écarté cette prétention et mis en évidence lehs liens
entre les Forces armées et les groupes paramilitaires dans l’exéhcution du
massacre, la CIDH a conclu que « la responsabilité internationale de
l’Etat [était] engagée du fait d’un ensemble d’actes et d’omissions d’agents
de l’Etat et de particuliers qui [avaient] été commis de façhon coordonnée,
parallèle ou organisée en vue de perpétrer ledit massacre (»bid., par. 123).
108. Dans son arrêt du 22 septembre 2006 en l’affaire Goiburú et
consorts c. Paraguay, la CIDH a fait observer que ladite affaire présentait
« une transcendance historique particulière » parce que les faits en cause
s’étaient produits «dans un contexte de pratique systématique de la déten-
tion arbitraire, de la torture, des exécutions et des disparitions pahr les
services de sécurité et de renseignement de la dictature d’Alfrhedo
Stroessner, et cela dans le cadre de l’opération Condor » (par. 62).
109. Cela signifie que ces faits participaient de la répression flagrahnte,
massive et systématique à laquelle était soumise la population,h à une
échelle interétatique ; en réalité, les services de sécurité des Etats concer -
243
7 CIJ1077.indb 483 18/04/16 08:54 243 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
put into action in a co-ordinated way against the nations at trans -frontier
level by the dictatorial governments concerned (IACtHR, Goiburú and
Others v. Paraguay, Judgment of 22 September 2006, para. 62). The IAC -
tHR thus found that the context in which the facts occurred engaged and h
conditioned the international responsibility of the State in relation toh its
obligation to respect and guarantee the rights set forth in Articles 4, 5, 7,
8 and 25 of the ACHR (ibid., para. 63).
110. The illegal and arbitrary detentions or kidnapping, torture and
enforced disappearances — the IACtHR added — were [the] “product of
an operation of policial intelligence”, planned and executed, and covhered
up by members of the national police, “with the knowledge and by the h
order of the highest authorities of the government of General Stroessner,
and, at least in the earlier phases of planification of the detentionsh or
kidnappings, in close collaboration with Argentine authorities” ( ibid.,
para. 87). Such was the modus operandi of the systematic practice of ille -
gal and arbitrary detentions, torture and enforced disappearances verified
in the epoch of the facts, in the framework of Operation Condor (ibid.).
111. There was, moreover, a generalized situation of impunity of the
grave violations of human rights that occurred, undermining the protec -
tion of the rights at issue. The IACtHR stressed the general obligation to
ensure respect for the rights set forth in the American Convention on
Human Rights (Art. 1 (1)),wherefrom ensued the obligation to investi -
gate the cases of violations of the protected rights.
112. Thus, in cases of extrajudicial executions, enforced disappear -
ances and other grave violations of human rights, the IACtHR consid-
ered that the prompt and ex officio investigation thereof should be
undertaken, without delay, as a key element for the guarantee of the proh-
tected rights, such as the rights to life, to personal integrity, and toh per -
sonal freedom (ibid., para. 88). In this case — the IACtHR added — the
lack of investigation of the facts constituted a determining factor of thhe
systematic practice of violations of human rights and led to the impunithy
of those responsible for them ( ibid., para. 90).
(b) Cases wherein the respondent State has the burden of proof given the
difficulty of the applicant to obtain it
113. In the case Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (Judgment of 29 July
1988), the IACtHR, in dwelling upon the standards of proof, began by
acknowledging the prerogative of international tribunals to evaluate
freely the evidence produced (para. 127). “For an international tribunal”,
the IACtHR added, “the criteria of assessment of proof are less formal
than in the national legal systems” (ibid., para. 128). There is a “special
gravity” in the attribution of gross violations of human rights (suchh as
enforced disappearances of persons) to States parties to the ACHR, and h
the Court has this in mind (ibid., para. 129) ; yet, in such circumstances,
244
7 CIJ1077.indb 484 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 243
nés avaient été chargés par leurs gouvernements de mener uneh action
coordonnée à travers les frontières contre leurs populations (hCIDH, Goi‑
burú et consorts c. Paraguay, arrêt du 22 septembre 2006, par. 62). La
CIDH en a conclu que le contexte dans lequel les faits en question
s’étaient produits engageait et mettait en cause la responsabilité de l’Etat,
pour manquement à son obligation de respecter et garantir les droits h
reconnus aux articles 4, 5, 7, 8 et 25 de la convention américaine relative
aux droits de l’homme (ibid., par. 63).
110. Selon la CIDH, les cas de détention illégale et arbitraire ou d’hen -
lèvement, de torture et de disparition forcée étaient « le produit d’une
opération de renseignement policier » organisée, exécutée et dissimulée
par les fonctionnaires de la police nationale « au su et sur ordre des plus
hautes autorités du gouvernement du général Stroessner, et, au moins
pendant les phases initiales de planification des détentions ou des enlève -
ments, en étroite collaboration avec les autorités argentines » ( ibid.,
par. 87). Tel était le mode opératoire de la pratique systématique het prou -
vée de la détention illégale et arbitraire, de la torture et deh la disparition
forcée à l’époque des faits, dans le cadre de l’opérathion Condor(ibid.).
111. La CIDH a dénoncé en outre l’impunité générale dont johuissaient
les auteurs de ces graves violations des droits de l’homme et qui emphêchait
de protéger ces droits. Elle a rappelé l’obligation générhale de respecter les
droits reconnus dans la Convention américaine des droits de l’hommhe et
d’en garantir l’exercice (art. premier, par.1), obligation générale dont pro-
cède celle d’enquêter sur les violations des droits ainsi garanhtis.
112. C’est pourquoi la CIDH a dit considérer que, dans les affaires
d’exécution extrajudiciaire, de disparition forcée et d’autrhes graves viola-
tions des droits de l’homme, la réalisation d’office et sans dhélai d’une
enquête constituait un élément fondamental pour la garantie desh droits
menacés, tels que les droits à la vie, à l’intégrité dhe sa personne et à la
liberté (ibid., par. 88). Dans l’espèce en cause, le fait qu’aucune enquête
n’ait été diligentée sur les faits constituait, pour la CIDHh, un facteur déte-
minant d’une pratique de violations systématiques des droits de l’homme
et favorisait l’impunité des responsables de ces violations (ibid., par. 90).
b) Affaires dans lesquelles la charge de la preuve pèse sur l’Etat mi▯s en
cause, étant donné la difficulté pour le demandeur d’obtenir▯ des éléments
de preuve
113. Dans son arrêt du 29 juillet 1988 en l’affaire Velásquez Rodríguez
c. Honduras, la CIDH s’est penchée sur la question des critères d’éthablisse -
ment de la preuve, en commençant par prendre acte de la prérogativhe
reconnue aux juridictions internationales d’apprécierlibrement les éléments
de preuve produits (par. 127). Elle a fait observer que, « pour une juridic -
tion internationale, les critères d’établissement de la preuve hsont moins f-or
mels que pour les systèmes judiciaires nationaux» (ibid., par.128). Elle s’est
dite consciente qu’il est «particulièrement grave » d’imputer à un Etat par-
tie à la convention américaine relative aux droits de l’homme dhes violations
244
7 CIJ1077.indb 485 18/04/16 08:54 244 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
direct proof (testimonial or documental) is not the only means that ith can
base itself upon. Circumstantial evidence (indicia and presumptions) chan
also be taken into account, whenever the Court can therefrom “infer chon-
sistent conclusions” on the facts (IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Hon‑
duras, Judgment of 29 July 1988, para. 130).
114. Such circumstantial evidence, the IACtHR proceeded, may
become of special importance in cases of grave violations, such as enforhced
disappearances of persons, characterized by the intent to suppress “ahny
element which may prove the kidnapping, the whereabouts and the fate
of the victims” (ibid., para.131). The IACtHR then warned that the inter -
national protection of the rights of the human person “is not to be chon -
fused with criminal justice”, as States do not appear before the Courht as
subjects of a criminal legal action ( ibid., para. 134).
115. Its goal, it went on, is not to impose penalties to those held cul-
pable of violations of human rights, but rather provide for reparation tho
the victims for the damages caused by the States responsible for them
(ibid.). In the legal process, here, “the defence of the State cannot rest
upon the impossibility of the applicant to produce evidence which, in
many cases, cannot be obtained without the co-operation of the State”h
concerned (ibid., para. 135), which “has the control of the means to clar -
ify the facts occurred within its territory” (ibid., para. 136) 10.
3. Case Law of the ECHR
116. The case law of the ECHR, like that of other international tribu -
nals, is built on the understanding of the free evaluation of evidence. In
recent years, the ECHR has been pursuing an approach which brings it
closer to that of the IACtHR (supra). It so happened that, in its earlier
decades, and until the late nineties, the ECHR consistently invoked the h
standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” ; yet, by no means the
ECHR understood it as meaning a particularly high threshold of stan -
dard of proof as the one required in domestic criminal law, in particulahr
in common-law jurisdictions. The standard of proof “beyond reasonable
doubt”, as used by the ECHR, was endowed with an autonomous mean -
ing under the European Convention on Human Rights, certainly less
stringent than the one applied in national (criminal) proceedings as tho the
admissibility of evidence.
108
In the case Yatama v. Nicaragua (Judgment of 23 June 2005), e.g., the IACtHR
again deemed it fit to warn that, in cases before an international humhan rights tribunal,
it may well occur that the applicant is faced with the impossibility to hproduce evidence,
“which can only be obtained with the co-operation” of the respondehnt State (para.134).
245
7 CIJ1077.indb 486 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 244
de ces droits, telles que des disparitions forcées (CIDH, Velásquez Rodrí‑
guez c. Honduras, arrêt du 29 juillet 1988, par. 129); cela étant, les preuves
directes, testimoniales ou documentaires, ne sont pas les seules sur lesh -
quelles elle puisse s’appuyer. La preuve indiciaire et la présompthion peuvent
aussi être prises en compte, dès lors que la CIDH peut « en déduire des
conclusions cohérentes » sur les faits (bid., par. 130).
114. Les preuves indiciaires, poursuit la CIDH dans ce même arrêt,
peuvent revêtir une importance particulière dans des affaires de grhaves
violations des droits de l’homme telles que les affaires de disparitiohn for -
cée, caractérisées par la volonté d’éliminer « tout indice susceptible de
révéler un enlèvement ou le sort des victimes ou le lieu où helles se trouvent »
(ibid., par. 131). La CIDH rappelle ensuite qu’« il ne faut pas confondre
[la protection internationale des droits de l’homme] et la justice péhnale »,
puisque les Etats ne comparaissent pas devant elle comme sujets d’une
action pénale (ibid., par. 134).
115. Le but visé par le droit international des droits de l’homme, conthi -
nue la CIDH, n’est pas de sanctionner les auteurs de violations de cehs
droits, mais de réparer le préjudice causé aux victimes par les actions de
l’Etat responsable (ibid.). Dans les procès pour violations des droits de
l’homme, «la défense de l’Etat ne saurait reposer sur l’impossibilité hpour
le demandeur de faire valoir des preuves qui, dans de nombreux cas, ne
peuvent être obtenues sans la coopération de l’Etat lui -même » (ibid.,
par. 135), car c’est lui qui est « le mieux équipé pour clarifier les faits sur -
108
venus sur son territoire » (ibid., par. 136) .
3. Jurisprudence de la CEDH
116. Comme celle des autres juridictions internationales des droits de
l’homme, la jurisprudence de la CEDH repose sur le principe de la liberté
d’appréciation de la preuve. Depuis quelques années, la démahrche suivie
par la CEDH se rapproche de celle de la CIDH (supra). Ainsi, pendant
les premières décennies de son existence et jusqu’à la finh des années1990,
la CEDH a régulièrement invoqué le critère de la preuve « au -delà de tout
doute raisonnable »; mais son interprétation n’en faisait absolument pas
un critère aussi exigeant que celui du droit pénal national, en pahrticulier
dans les juridictions de common law. Le critère de la preuve « au -delà de
tout doute raisonnable », appliqué par la CEDH, s’entendait en un sens
sui generis, dérivé de la convention européenne des droits de l’homme, et
certainement moins rigoureux que celui que les tribunaux pénaux natioh -
naux appliquent à la recevabilité des preuves.
108
Au paragraphe 134 de son arrêt du 23 juin 2005 en l’affaire Yatama c. Nicaragua,
la CIDH a jugé utile de rappeler une fois de plus que, dans les affairhes portées devant une
juridiction internationale des droits de l’homme, il peut très biehn arriver que le demandeur
se trouve dans l’impossibilité de produire des éléments de phreuve « qu’il ne peut obtenir
qu’avec la coopération de l’Etat mis en cause.
245
7 CIJ1077.indb 487 18/04/16 08:54 245 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
117. Criticisms to applying a high standard of proof were to emerge,
within the ECHR, from the bench itself, from dissenting judges, as in,
e.g., the cases of Labita v. Italy (Judgment of 6 April 2000) and Vezneda‑
roglu v. Turkey (Judgment of 11 April 2000). The point was made therein
that, to expect victims of grave violations of their rights to prove thehir
allegations “beyond reasonable doubt” would place an unfair burdenh
upon them, impossible to meet ; such standard of proof, applicable only
in “ criminal culpability”, is not so in “other fields of judicial enquiry”h,
where “the standard of proof should be proportionate to the aim whichh
the search for truth pursues” 109.
118. In their joint partly dissenting opinion in the case of Labita v.
Italy, Judges Pastor Ridruejo, Bonello, Makarczyk, Tulkens, Strážnická,
Butkevych, Casadevall and Zupančič lucidly stated that the standard of
proof “beyond reasonable doubt” would be “inadequate”, if noht “illogi-
cal and even unworkable”, when State authorities fail even to identifhy the
perpetrators of the grave breaches allegedly inflicted upon the indivihdual
applicants. This, in their view, would unduly limit State responsibilityh.
Whenever only the State authorities have exclusive knowledge of “someh
or all the events” that took place, the burden of proof should be shifted
upon them (ECHR, Labita v. Italy, Judgment of 6 April 2000, para. 1).
119. The dissenting judges proceeded that the standard to be met by
the applicants is lower if State authorities “have failed to carry out effec -
tive investigations and to make the findings available to the Court”. And
they added:
“Lastly, it should be borne in mind that the standard of proof
‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ is, in certain legal systems, used ihn cri-m
inal cases. However, this Court is not called upon to judge an indi -
vidual’s guilt or innocence or to punish those responsible for a
violation ; its task is to protect victims and provide redress for damage
caused by the acts of the State responsible. The test, method and
standard of proof in respect of responsibility under the Convention
are different from those applicable in the various national systems as
regards responsibility of individuals for criminal offences.” (Ibid.)
120. Thus, the nature of certain cases — of grave breaches of human
rights — brought also before the ECHR has made it clear that a stringent
or too high a standard of proof would be unreasonable, e.g., when
respondent States had entire control of the evidence or exclusive know -
109ECHR, case of Veznedaroglu v. Turkey (Judgment of 11 April 2000), Application
No. 32357/96, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bonello, paras. 12-14.
246
7 CIJ1077.indb 488 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 245
117. C’est du banc de la CEDH elle -même, sous la forme d’opinions
dissidentes de certains de ses juges, par exemple dans les affaires Labita
c. Italie (arrêt du 6 avril 2000) et Veznedaroglu c. Turquie (arrêt du
11 avril 2000), que sont issues les premières critiques du niveau trop élehvé
du critère d’établissement de la preuve alors requis par la CEDhH. Les
juges dissidents ont fait valoir que c’était imposer aux victimes de graves
violations de leurs droits une charge de la preuve impossible à suppohrter
que d’attendre d’elles qu’elles prouvent leurs allégations «h auelà de tout
doute raisonnable »; un tel critère de la preuve, applicable uniquement à
la «culpabilité pénale »,ne s’applique pas à d’« autres domaines d’enquête
judiciaire», où « le critère de la preuve devrait être proportionné au but
109
visé par la recherche de la vérité » .
118. Dans l’opinion commune en partie dissidente qu’ils ont jointe àh
l’arrêt de la CEDH en l’affaire Labita c. Italie, les juges Pastor Ridruejo,
Bonello, Makarczyk, Tulkens, Strážnická, Butkevych, Casadevall het
Zupančič ont fait valoir à juste titre que le critère d’évaluation de la
preuve « au-delà de tout doute raisonnable » serait « inadéquat, voire
incohérent ou même impossible à utiliser », quand les autorités de l’Etat
en cause vont jusqu’à s’abstenir d’identifier les auteurs hdes graves viola -
tions alléguées par les requérants. Ce critère aboutirait, shelon ces juges, à
limiter indûment la responsabilité de l’Etat. Toujours selon euhx, « lorsque
les événements litigieux ne peuvent être connus que des autorithés…, [o]n
peut même considérer alors que la charge de la preuve repose entreh les
mains des autorités… » (CEDH, Labita c. Italie, arrêt du 6 avril 2000,
par. 1.)
119. Les juges dissidents poursuivent en opinant que la charge de la
preuve qui repose sur le requérant se trouve allégée lorsque lehs autorités
«n’ont pas mené des enquêtes [effectives] dont les résultats phuissent être
connus de la Cour ». Et d’ajouter :
«Il convient enfin de rappeler que le critère de la preuve « au -delà
de tout doute raisonnable » est employé dans certains systèmes juri -
diques, pour les affaires criminelles ; or, la Cour est appelée non pas
à juger de la culpabilité ou de l’innocence d’un individu nih à sanc -
tionner les auteurs d’une violation, mais à en protéger les vichtimes et
à réparer les préjudices causés par les actions de l’Etath responsable :
le test, la méthode et le niveau de preuve au regard de la responsabi -
lité au titre de la Convention diffèrent de ceux applicables dans lhes
divers systèmes nationaux pour ce qui est de la responsabilité desh
individus en matière d’infractions pénales. » (Ibid.)
120. Ainsi, la nature même de certaines affaires de graves violations
des droits de l’homme portées devant la CEDH a mis en évidence hqu’un
critère d’établissement de la preuve trop exigeant ou trop éhlevé est dérai -
sonnable quand l’Etat mis en cause exerce un entier contrôle sur lhes élé -
109CEDH, Veznedaroglu c. Turquie, arrêt du 11 avril 2000, requête n32357/96,
opinion en partie dissidente de M. Bonello, par. 12-14.
246
7 CIJ1077.indb 489 18/04/16 08:54 246 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ledge of the facts, and the alleged victims when in a particular adverseh
situation, of great vulnerability or even defencelessness. The ECHR, likhe
the IACtHR, admitted shifting the burden of proof (onto the respondent
States) whenever necessary, as well as resorting to inferences (from chir -
cumstantial evidence) and factual presumptions, so as to secure proce -
dural fairness, in the light of the principle of equality of arms (égalité des
armes).
121. In its Judgment (of 18 September 2009) in the case of Varnava and
Others v. Turkey, the ECHR expressly stated that, even if one starts from
the test of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”, there are cases in whhich it
cannot be applied too rigorously, and has to be mitigated (para. 182).
Where the information about the occurrences at issue lie wholly, or in
part, within the exclusive knowledge of the State authorities, the ECHR
proceeded, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of the injuries,
the burden of proof then resting on the State authorities to provide a
satisfactory and convincing explanation (ECHR, Varnava and Others v.
Turkey, Judgment of 18 September 2009, para. 183). The same takes
place if the respondent State has exclusive knowledge of all that has hahp -
pened (ibid., para. 184).
4. General Assessment
122. As I have just indicated in the present dissenting opinion, interna-
tional human rights tribunals have not pursued a stringent and high
threshold of proof in cases of grave violations of human rights ; given the
difficulties experienced in the production of evidence, they have resorhted
to factual presumptions and inferences, and have proceeded to the rever -
sal of the burden of proof. The IACtHR has done so since the beginning
of its jurisprudence, and the ECHR has been doing so in more recent
years. They both conduct the free evaluation of evidence.
123. The standard of proof they uphold is surely much less demanding
than the corresponding one (“beyond a reasonable doubt”) in domehstic
criminal law. This is so, with all the more reason, when the cases lodgehd
with them disclose a pattern of widespread and systematic gross viola -
tions of human rights, and they feel obliged to resort, even more force -
fully, to presumptions and inferences, to the ultimate benefit of the h
individual victims in search of justice. This important issue begins to h
attract the attention of expert writing in our days 110.
110 For updated studies on the subject, cf., as to the IACtHR, e.g., A.A. Cançado Trin-
dade, El Ejercicio de la Función Judicial Internacional — Memorias de la▯ Corte Interameri ‑
cana de Derechos Humanos, 3rd ed., Belo Horizonte/Brazil, Edit. Del Rey, 2013, pp. 60-79
and 137-142; and cf., as to the ECHR, e.g., M.’Boyle and N. Brady, “Investigatory
Powers of the European Court of Human Rights”, 4 European Human Rights Law Review
(2013), pp. 378-391.
247
7 CIJ1077.indb 490 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 246
ments de preuve ou possède une connaissance exclusive des faits, et qhue
les victimes présumées se trouvaient dans une situation de grande vulné -
rabilité ou sans défense. Comme la CIDH, la CEDH a accepté de thrans -
férer, chaque fois que nécessaire, la charge de la preuve à l’hEtat mis en
cause et de procéder par déduction à partir d’indices et de présomptions
de fait, dans l’intérêt de l’équité de la procédureh et à la lumière du prin -
cipe de l’égalité des armes.
121. Dans son arrêt du 18 septembre 2009 en l’affaire Varnava et autres
c. Turquie, la CEDH a expressément reconnu que, même si l’on part du
critère de la preuve « au -delà de tout doute raisonnable », il existe des
situations où ce critère ne doit pas être appliqué trop rigohureusement et où
il se prête à un assouplissement (par. 182). Lorsque les éléments en cause,
dans leur totalité ou pour une large part, sont connus exclusivement hdes
autorités, toute blessure, mort ou disparition survenue quand la victhime
était sous le contrôle des autorités donne lieu à de fortes hprésomptions de
fait. La charge de la preuve pèse alors sur les autorités, qui doihvent fournir
une explication satisfaisante et convaincante (CEDH, Varnava et autres
c.Turquie, arrêt du 18 septembre 2009, par. 183). Il en est de même quand
des personnes sont trouvées blessées ou mortes dans une zone sous hle
contrôle des seules autorités de l’Etat, les événements ehn cause étant alors
connus exclusivement de ces autorités (ibid., par. 184).
4. Analyse générale
122. Comme je l’ai montré dans le présent exposé de mon opinion dhis -
sidente, les juridictions internationales des droits de l’homme n’happliquent
pas un critère exigeant ou élevé d’établissement de la prheuve dans les
affaires de graves violations des droits de l’homme ; conscientes de la dif -
ficulté de produire les preuves voulues, elles ont eu recours aux phrésomp-
tions de fait et procédé par déduction, et elles sont alléesh jusqu’à renverser
le fardeau de la preuve. La CIDH procède ainsi depuis le début de hsa
jurisprudence et la CEDH s’y est mise plus récemment. Ces deux Couhrs
pratiquent la libre appréciation des preuves.
123. Le critère qu’elles appliquent est assurément moins exigeant quhe
le critère de la preuve « au -delà de tout doute raisonnable » des tribunaux
pénaux nationaux. Tel est le cas, et à juste titre, dans les affairhes de viola -
tions flagrantes, systématiques et généralisées des droitsh de l’homme, où
elles s’estiment tenues de procéder encore plus énergiquement phar pré -
somptions et déductions, et cela dans l’intérêt ultime des vhictimes en quête
de justice. Cette importante question commence à susciter l’intéhrêt de la
110
doctrine et des auteurs .
110Pour des études récentes sur le sujet, voir, en ce qui concerne lA..Cançado
Trindade, El Ejercicio de la Función Judicial Internacional — Memorias de la Corte Inter ‑
americana de Derechos Humanos , 3e éd., Belo Horizonte (Brésil), Ed. DeRey, 2013,
p. 60-79 et 137-14; et en ce qui concerne la CEDH, M.O’Boyle et N. Brady, «Investi-
gatory Powers of the European Court of Human Rights », European Human Rights Law
Review, vol. 4, 2013, p. 378-391.
247
7 CIJ1077.indb 491 18/04/16 08:54 247 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
124. Regrettably, none of these jurisprudential developments was
taken into account by the International Court of Justice in the present h
Judgment. It my understanding, it could, and should, have done so, as
the issue was addressed by the contending Parties, as from the moment inh
the proceedings I put a question to both of them in this respect (para.h 97,
supra). The International Court of Justice preferred to stick to a stringenth
and high threshold of proof in the present case concerning the Application
of the Convention against Genocide (2015), just as it had done eight years
ago in the Bosnian Genocide case (“the 2007 Judgment”). May I here only
add that expert writing, dwelling upon the complementarity between
State and individual responsibility for international crimes (despite thheir
111
distinct regimes) , has likewise been attentive to the orientation and
contribution of the case law of international human rights tribunals
(IACtHR and ECHR, supra), particularly on the handling of evidence
112
and the shifting of the burden of proof .
VIII. Standard of Proof in the Cahse Law
of International
Criminal Tribunals
125. May I now turn to the case law of international criminal tribunals
as to the standard of proof. Here we find that the intent to commit gehno-
cide can be proved by inference, whenever direct evidence is not availabhle.
In effect, requiring direct or explicit evidence of genocidal intent in ahll
cases is neither in line with the case law of international criminal trihbunals
nor is it practical or realistic. When there is no explicit evidence of hintent,
it can be inferred from the facts and circumstances. A few examples and h
references of relevant jurisprudence are provided herein in support of thhis
point.
1. Inferring Intent from Circumstantial Evidence
(Case Law of the ICTR and the ICTY)
126. In the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda (ICTR), it has been established that intent to commit
111
Cf., e.g., B. I. Bonafè, The Relationship between State and Individual Responsibility
for International Crimes, Leiden, Nijhoff, 2009, pp11-255; A. A. Cançado Trindade,
“Complementarity between State Responsibility and Individual Responsihbility for Grave
Violations of Human Rights :The Crime of State Revisited”, inInternational Responsi‑
bility Today — Essays in Memory of O. Schachter (ed. M. Ragazzi), Leiden, Nijhoff, 2005,
pp. 253-269 ; A.Nollkaemper, “Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and Stateh
Responsibility in International Law”, 52International and Comparative Law Quarterly
(2003), pp. 615-640.
112 Cf., e.g., P.Gaeta, “Génocide d’Etat et responsabilité pénale individuhelle”,
111 Revue générale de droit international public (2007), pp. 273-284, esp.; P.Gaeta,
“On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide ?”, 18European
Journal of International Law (2007), p. 646.
248
7 CIJ1077.indb 492 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 247
124. Il est à regretter que la Cour n’ait tenu compte d’aucune de cehs
récentes évolutions de la jurisprudence dans le présent arrêht. A mon avis,
elle pouvait et devait le faire, car ce sujet a été traité par les Parties dès le
moment où, à l’audience, je leur ai adressé à toutes deuxh la question men -
tionnée au paragraphe 97 ci-dessus. La Cour a préféré s’en tenir à un
critère d’établissement de la preuve exigeant et élevé enh la présente affaire
Croatie c. Serbie (2015), comme elle l’avait fait il y a huit ans dans l’af -
faire Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro (arrêt de 2007). Je me
permets d’ajouter que la doctrine, en étudiant la complémentarihté entre la
responsabilité de l’Etat et la responsabilité individuelle dansh les crimes
internationaux (malgré leurs régimes distincts) 111, s’est également intéres-
sée aux orientations et aux apports de la jurisprudence des juridictihons
internationales des droits de l’homme (CIDH et CEDH, supra), notam-
ment en ce qui concerne l’administration de la preuve et le transferth de la
112
charge de la preuve .
VIII. Le critère d’établissehment de la preuve
dans la jurisprudenceh
des tribunaux pénaux ihnternationaux
125. Je passerai maintenant au critère d’établissement de la preuve hdans
la jurisprudence des tribunaux pénaux internationaux. Nous y découhvrirons
que l’intention de commettre le génocide peut se prouver par déhduction en
l’absence de preuve directe. De fait, exiger dans tous les cas des prheuves
directes ou expresses de l’intention génocidaire ne correspond pash à la juris -
prudence des tribunaux pénaux internationaux, outre qu’une telle ehxigence
n’est ni pratique ni réaliste. En l’absence de preuve expresse hde l’intention,
celle-ci peut se déduire des faits et des circonstances. On en trouvera ci -
dessous des exemples, ainsi que des renvois à la jurisprudence pertinhente.
1. Déduire l’intention à partir d’indices
(jurisprudence du TPIR et du TPIY)
126. La jurisprudence du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda
(TPIR) a conclu que l’intention de commettre le génocide peut êhtre
111
Voir par exemple B.I. Bonafè, The Relationship between State and Individual Responsi‑
bilily for International Crimes, Leyde, Nijhoff, 2009, p. 11-255; A. A. Cançado Trindade,
«Complementarity between State Responsibility and Individual Responsibilihty for Grave
Violations of Human Rights : The Crime of State Revisited »,International Responsibi‑
lity Today — Essays in Memory of O. Schachter (dir. publ. M. Ragazzi), Leyde, Nijhoff,
2005, p. 253-269; A. Nollkaemper, «Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and
State Responsibility in International Law International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
vol. 52, 2003, p. 615-640.
112 Voir par exemple P. Gaeta, «Génocide d’Etat et responsabilité pénale individuelle»,
Revue générale de droit international publ, vol. 111, 2007, p. 273-284, en particulier
p. 279; P.Gaeta, «On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide ?»,
European Journal of International Law, vol. 18, 2007, p. 646.
248
7 CIJ1077.indb 493 18/04/16 08:54 248 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
genocide can be inferred from facts and circumstances. Thus, in the Ruta‑
ganda case (Judgment of 6 December 1999), the ICTR (Trial Chamber)
stated that “intent can be, on a case -by-case basis, inferred from the
material evidence submitted to the Chamber, including the evidence
which demonstrates a consistent pattern of conduct by the accused”
(paras. 61-63) 11. Likewise, in the Semanza case (Judgment of 15 May
2003), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) stated that a “perpetrator’s mens rea
may be inferred from his actions” (para. 313).
127. Furthermore, in the same line of thinking, in the Bagilishema case
(Judgment of 7 June 2001), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) found that
“evidence of the context of the alleged culpable acts may help the
Chamber to determine the intention of the accused, especially where
the intention is not clear from what that person says or does. The
Chamber notes, however, that the use of context to determine the
intent of an accused must be counterbalanced with the actual conduct
of the accused. The Chamber is of the opinion that the accused’s
intent should be determined, above all, from his words and deeds, and
should be evident from patterns of purposeful action.” (Para. 63.)
128. In the landmark case Akayesu case (Judgment of 2 September
1998), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) found that “intent is a mental factor
which is difficult, even impossible to determine”, and it held that h“in the
absence of a confession from the accused”, intent may be inferred frohm
the following factors (a) “general context of the perpetration” of grave
breaches “systematically” against the “same group” (b) “;cale of atroci -
ties committed” ; (c) “general nature” of the atrocities committed “in a
region or a country” (d) “the fact of deliberately and systematically tar -
geting victims on account of their membership of a particular group,
while excluding the members of other groups” ; (e) “the general political
doctrine which gave rise to the acts” ; (f) grave breaches committed
against members of a group specifically because they belong to that
group; (g) “the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts” ; and
(h) the perpetration of acts which violate, or which “the perpetrators
themselves consider to violate the very foundation of the group”, comh -
mitted as part of “the same pattern of conduct” (paras. 521 and 523-524).
129. Shortly afterwards, in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case (Judg -
ment of 21 May 1999), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) also stated that intent
might be difficult to determine and that the accused’s “actions, hincluding
circumstantial evidence”, may “provide sufficient evidence of inthent”, and
that “intent can be inferred either from words or deeds and may be dehm -
onstrated by a pattern of purposeful action”. The ICTR (Trial Chambehr)
asserted that the following can be relevant indicators: (a) “the number of
113Cf. also the Musema case, ICTR Trial Chamber’s Judgment o27 January 2000,
para. 167.
249
7 CIJ1077.indb 494 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 248
déduite des faits et des circonstances. Ainsi, dans son jugement du
6 décembre 1999 en l’affaire Rutaganda, le TPIR a dit considérer que, « en
pratique, l’intention est déterminée, au cas par cas, par une dhéduction
tirée des é1éments de preuve d’ordre matériel qui lui onth été soumis, y
compris ceux qui permettent d’établir l’existence chez l’acchusé d’une ligne
de conduite délibérée » (par. 61-63)113. De même, dans son jugement du
15 mai 2003 en l’affaire Semanza, il a déclaré que « la mens rea peut se
déduire des agissements de l’auteur présumé du crime » (par. 313).
127. De plus, et dans le même ordre d’idées, la chambre de premièhre
instance du TPIR a conclu, dans son jugement du 7 juin 2001 en l’affaire
Bagilishema, que
«le contexte de perpétration des actes allégués peut … aider la
Chambre à déterminer l’intention de l’accusé, en particulhier lorsque
ses propos et ses actes ne font pas apparaître cette intention. La
Chambre relève cependant que lorsque l’on a recours au contexte
pour déduire l’intention de l’accusé, on doit le faire par rhéférence à la
conduite même de l’accusé. La Chambre est d’avis que l’inhtention de
l’accusé devrait se déduire, avant tout, de ses propos et de sehs actes,
et ressortir clairement d’une ligne de conduite délibérée. » (Par. 63.)
128. Dans un jugement du 2 septembre 1998 en l’affaire Akayesu qui a
fait date, le TPIR a dit considérer que « l’intention est un facteur d’ordre
psychologique qu’il est difficile, voire impossible, d’appréhehnder » et que,
«à défaut d’aveux de la part d’un accusé, son intention pehut se déduire »
des facteurs suivants : a) «contexte général de perpétration d’autres actes
répréhensibles systématiquement dirigés contre le même grhoupe »;
b) « échelle des atrocités commises »; c) « caractère général des atrocités
commises dans une région ou un pays »; d) « le fait de délibérément et
systématiquement choisir les victimes en raison de leur appartenance hà un
groupe particulier tout en excluant les autres groupes »; e) « la doctrine
générale du projet politique inspirant les actes incriminés »;f) la commis -
sion de graves violations contre les membres d’un groupe en leur qualhité
expresse de membres de ce groupe ; g) « la répétition d’actes de destruc -
tion discriminatoires »; et h) «la perpétration d’actes portant atteinte au
fondement du groupe, ou à ce que les auteurs des actes considèrenth
comme tel » et « qui sont commis dans le cadre de la même ligne de
conduite » (par. 521 et 523-524).
129. Peu de temps après, dans son jugement du 21 mai 1999 en l’affaire
Kayishema et Ruzindana, le TPIR, tout en admettant la difficulté de prou -
ver l’intention de l’auteur, a dit aussi que « son existence peut être établie
de manière convaincante à partir des actes de l’auteur, y compris au
moyen de preuves indirectes ». Il a encore déclaré que « l’intention peut
être déduite soit des propos soit des actes de l’auteur, et peuht être établie
par la mise en évidence d’une ligne de conduite délibéréeh ». Le TPIR a
113Voir aussi le jugement en première instance du TPIR du 27 janvier 2000 en l’affaire
Musema, par. 167.
249
7 CIJ1077.indb 495 18/04/16 08:54 249 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
group members affected” ; (b) “the physical targeting of the group or
their property” ; (c) “the use of derogatory language toward members of
the targeted group” (d) “the weapons employed and the extent of bodily
injury”; (e) “the methodical way of planning” (f) “;he systematic man -
ner of killing” ; and (g) “the relative proportionate scale of the actual or
attempted destruction of a group” (ICTR, Kayishema and Ruzindana,
Judgment of 21 May 1999, paras. 93 and 527).
130. Later on, the ICTR (Appeals Chamber), in its Judgment of 7 July
2006 in the Gacumbitsi case, pondered that, as intent, by its nature, is “not
usually susceptible to direct proof”, it has to be inferred from relehvant
facts and circumstances, such as the systematic perpetration of atrocitihes
against the same group, or the repetition of “destructive and discrimina -
tory acts” (paras. 40-41). In a similar vein, the Appeals Chamber of the
Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
also asserted, in the Jelisić case (Judgment of 5 July 2001), that:
“As to proof of specific intent, it may, in the absence of direct
explicit evidence, be inferred from a number of facts and circum -
stances, such as the general context, the perpetration of other culpable
acts systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atroc-
ities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their
membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and
discriminatory acts.” (Para. 47.)
The ICTY (Appeals Chamber) further stated, in the Krstić case (Judg -
ment of 19 April 2004), that, when proving genocidal intent on the basis
of an inference, “that inference must be the only reasonable inferenche
available on the evidence” (para. 41).
2. Standards of Proof :
Rebuttals of the High Threshold of Evidence
(a) Karadžić case (2013)
131. In its Judgment of 26 February 2007, in the case of the Applica ‑
tion of the Convention against Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia
and Montenegro), the International Court of Justice, referring to the Ker-
aterm camp in Prijedor, Kazneno -Popravní Dom in Foča, and Omarska
in Prijedor, observed that, having “carefully examined the criminal phro -
ceedings of the ICTY and the findings of its Chambers”, it appearedh that
“none of those convicted were found to have acted with specific inthent
(dolus specialis)” (para. 277). Yet the ICTY (Appeals Chamber), in its
recent Judgment (of 11 July 2013) in the Karadžić case, found that “the
question regarding Karadžić’s culpability with respect to the chrimes of
genocide committed in the Municipalities remains open” (para. 116).
250
7 CIJ1077.indb 496 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 249
proposé les indices suivants : a) « le nombre des membres du groupe vic -
times de l’acte incriminé »; b) «le fait de s’attaquer physiquement au
groupe ou à ses biens »; c) « l’usage de termes insultants à l’égard des
membres du groupe»; d) «les armes utilisées et la gravité des blessures
subies par les victimes »; e) «le caractère méthodique de la planification»;
f) « le caractère systématique du crime »; et g) « l’étendue relative de la
destruction, ou de la tentative de destruction, du groupe » (TPIR,
Kayishema et Ruzindana , jugement du 21 mai 1999, par. 93 et 527).
130. Plus tard, dans son arrêt du 7 juillet 2006 en l’affaire Gacumbitsi,
le TPIR a déclaré que, « de par sa nature même, l’intention est générale -
ment difficile à établir de façon directe », et que par conséquent elle devait
s’inférer des faits et des circonstances de l’affaire, tels que le fait d’avoir
commis systématiquement des atrocités contre un groupe donné ouh « la
récurrence d’actes destructifs et discriminatoires » (par. 40-41). Dans une
veine similaire, le TPIY, dans son arrêt du 5 juillet 2001 en l’affaire Jelisić,
a formulé l’observation suivante :
«Quant à la preuve de l’intention spécifique, elle peut, à hdéfaut
d’éléments de preuve directs et explicites, procéder d’un certain
nombre de faits et de circonstances, tels le contexte général, la hperpé -
tration d’autres actes répréhensibles systématiquement dirighés contre
le même groupe, l’ampleur des atrocités commises, le fait de vihser
systématiquement certaines victimes en raison de leur appartenance
à un groupe particulier, ou la récurrence d’actes destructifs et discri -
minatoires.» (Par. 47.)
Le TPIY a par ailleurs précisé, dans son arrêt du 19 avril 2004 en l’affaire
Krstić, que, lorsque l’on se fonde sur la preuve de l’intention d’un haccusé
obtenue par déduction, « cell-ci doit être la seule raisonnable possible
compte tenu des éléments réunis » (par. 41).
2. Critère d’établissement de la preuve :
contestations d’un niveau de preuve élevé
a) Affaire Karadžić (2013)
131. Dans son arrêt du 26 février 2007 en l’affaire de l’Application de la
convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de géno▯cide (Bosnie‑
Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro), la Cour, évoquant les camps de
Keraterm à Prijedor, Kazneno -Popravní Dom à Foča et Omarska à Pri -
jedor, a déclaré que, « [a]yant examiné avec attention les affaires portées
devant le TPIY ainsi que les décisions de ses chambres », elle avait constaté
«qu’aucune des personnes déclarées coupables n’avait étéh considérée
comme ayant agi avec une intention spécifique (dolus specialis) »
(par. 277). Or la chambre d’appel du TPIY, dans son arrêt du 11 juil-
let 2013 en l’affaire Karadžić, a conclu que « la question de savoir si
[Radovan Karadžić] est coupable des crimes de génocide commis dans les
municipalités reste ouverte » (par. 116).
250
7 CIJ1077.indb 497 18/04/16 08:54 250 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
132. The ICTY (Appeals Chamber), in this recent Judgment in the
Karadžić case, reinstated the charges of genocide under count 1 of the
indictment ; it referred to seven municipalities of Bosnia -Herzegovina
claimed as Bosnian Serb territory (para. 57), and mentioned the Kera -
term camp in Prijedor, the Kazneno -Popravní Dom camp in Foča, and
the Omarska camp in Prijedor (ICTY, Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July
2013, para. 48). It then observed :
“The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that evidence adduced by the
Prosecution, when taken at its highest, indicates that Bosnian Mus -
lims and Bosnian Croats were subjected to conditions of life that
would bring about their physical destruction, including severe over -
crowding, deprivation of nourishment, and lack of access to medical
care.” (Ibid., para. 49.)
133. Further on, in its same Judgment of 11 July 2013, the ICTY
(Appeals Chamber) significantly stated :
“The Appeals Chamber also recalls that by its nature, genocidal
intent is not usually susceptible to direct proof. As recognized by the
Trial Chamber, in the absence of direct evidence, genocidal intent may
be inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the gen ‑
eral context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the ▯
systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a
particular group, the repetition of de114uctive and discriminatory acts,▯
or the existence of a plan or policy. ” (Ibid., para. 80.)
The ICTY (Appeals Chamber) then saw it fit to add, in the same Judg -
ment of 11 July 2013 in the Karadžić case, that, as to “factual findings
and evidentiary assessments”, that it was bound neither by the decisihons
of the Trial Chambers of the ICTY itself, nor by those of the Interna -
tional Court of Justice (para. 94). It thus made clear that it did not sup -
port the high threshold of evidence.
(b) Tolimir case (2012)
134. In another recent Judgment (of 12 December 2012), in the Tolimir
case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber II) sustained that :
“Where direct evidence is absent regarding the ‘conditions of lifeh’
imposed on the targeted group and calculated to bring about its phys-
ical destruction, a Chamber can be guided by ‘the objective probabil-
ity of these conditions leading to the physical destruction of the grouph
in part’ and factors like the nature of the conditions imposed, the
length of time that members of the group were subjected to them, and
114Emphasis added.
251
7 CIJ1077.indb 498 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 250
132. Dans son arrêt en l’affaire Karadžić, la chambre d’appel du TPIY
a rétabli le chef 1 (génocide) de l’acte d’accusation ; elle a fait référence
aux sept municipalités de Bosnie -Herzégovine dont le territoire était
revendiqué par les Serbes de Bosnie (par. 57); et elle a mentionné les
camps de Keraterm à Prijedor, Kazneno -Popravní Dom à Foča et
Omarska à Prijedor (TPIY, Karadžić, arrêt du 11 juillet 2013, par. 48).
Elle a conclu ainsi:
« [La Chambre d’appel] est convaincue que les éléments de preuve h
à charge, lorsqu’ils sont appréciés à leur valeur maximalhe, montrent
que les Musulmans et les Croates de Bosnie ont été soumis à des
conditions d’existence, notamment le surpeuplement, la privation de
nourriture et le manque d’accès aux soins médicaux, susceptiblehs
d’entraîner leur destruction physique. » (Ibid., par. 49.).
133. Toujours dans le même arrêt du 11 juillet 2013, la chambre d’ap -
pel du TPIY a fait cette importante déclaration :
«La Chambre d’appel rappelle également que, de par sa nature
même, l’intention génocidaire est généralement difficileh à établir de
façon directe. Comme la Chambre de première instance l’a admis, en
l’absence de preuve directe, l’intention génocidaire peut se déduire d’un
certain nombre de faits et de circonstances, tels le contexte génér▯ al, la
perpétration d’autres actes répréhensibles systématiquement dirigés
contre le même groupe, l’ampleur des atrocités commises, le fait ▯ de viser
systématiquement certaines victimes en raison de leur appartenance à▯
un groupe particulier, la récurrence d’actes destructifs et discr▯ ina ‑
114
toires ou l’existence d’un plan ou d’une politique.» (Ibid., par. 80.)
Au sujet des « constatations et [de] l’appréciation [des] éléments de
preuve », la chambre d’appel du TPIY a rappelé, au paragraphe 94 de son
arrêt du 11 juillet 2013 en l’affaire Karadžić, qu’elle n’est liée ni par les
conclusions tirées par les chambres de première instance du TPIY ohu par
la CIJ, ni par les appréciations qu’elles portent. Elle a fait savhoir claire -
ment qu’elle n’approuvait pas un niveau de preuve élevé.
b) Affaire Tolimir (2012)
134. Dans un autre arrêt récent, celui du 12 décembre 2012 en l’af -
faire Tolimir, la chambre d’appel du TPIY a soutenu que
«[f]aute de preuves directes permettant de déterminer si les « condi-
tions d’existence » imposées au groupe visé devaient entraîner sa des -
truction physique, une Chambre peut tenir compte de « la probabilité
objective que ces conditions entraînent la destruction physique d’une
partie du groupe » et d’éléments tels que la nature des conditions
imposées, la période durant laquelle les membres du groupe y ont éhté
114 Les italiques sont de moi.
251
7 CIJ1077.indb 499 18/04/16 08:54 251 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
characteristics of the targeted group such as its vulnerability.” (IhCTY,
Tolimir, Judgment of 12 December 2012, para. 742.)
135. The ICTY (Trial Chamber II) proceeded that, as indications of
the intent to destroy (mens rea of genocide) are “rarely overt”, it is thus
“permissible to infer the existence of genocidal intent” on the bahsis of the
whole of the evidence, “taken together”. It then added that
“factors relevant to this analysis may include the general context, thhe
perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the
same group, the scale of atrocities, the systematic targeting of victims
on account of their membership in a particular group, or the repeti -
tion of destructive and discriminatory acts. The existence of a plan or h
policy, a perpetrator’s display of his intent through public speechesh
or meetings with others may also support an inference that the per -
petrator had formed the requisite specific intent.” (Ibid., para. 745.)
136. In sum, even in the absence of direct evidence, genocidal intent
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and the general context
and pattern of extreme violence and destruction. May I add that concern h
with the needed protection of individuals and groups in situations of vuhl-
nerability form today — for the last two decades — the legacy of the Sec-
ond World Conference on Human Rights (1993) 115. It should not pass
unnoticed that this points nowadays to a wider convergence between the
international law of human rights, international humanitarian law and
the international law of refugees, as well as international criminal lawh,
taken together.
(c) Milošević case (2004)
137. In the adjudication of the aforementioned 2007 Judgment, the
International Court of Justice did not react negatively against Serbia’s
refusal to produce the (unredacted) documents of its Supreme Defence
Council (SDC), as the Court apparently did not want to infringe upon
Serbia’s sovereignty. The International Court of Justice insisted on hits
high threshold of evidence. For its part, the ICTY (Trial Chamber),
already in its decision of 16 June 2004 (on motion for judgment of acquit -
tal) in the Milošević case, had found that
“there is sufficient evidence that genocide was committed in Brčkho,
Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Ključ and BosanskiNovi
and (. . .) that the accused was a participant in a joint criminal enter -
prise, which included the Bosnian Serb leadership, the aim and inten-
115 Cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, A Proteção dos Vulneráveis como Legado da II Confer‑
ência Mundial de Direitos Humanos (1993‑2013) [The Protection of the Vulnerable as
Legacy of the Second World Conference on Human Rights (1993‑2013)],op. cit.supra
note 79, pp. 13-356.
252
7 CIJ1077.indb 500 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 251
soumis et les caractéristiques du groupe visé, telles que sa vulnérabi -
lité.» (TPIY, Tolimir, arrêt du 12 décembre 2012, par. 742.)
135. La chambre d’appel a ensuite fait valoir que « les signes de l’inten-
tion génocidaire sont cependant rarement manifestes, et il est donc permis
de déduire l’existence d’une telle intention en se fondant sur « tous les
éléments de preuve, pris ensemble »». Elle a ajouté que
«[d]ans le cadre de cette analyse, il convient de prendre en compte
notamment le contexte général, la perpétration d’autres actehs répréh -en
sibles systématiquement dirigés contre le même groupe, l’amphleur des
atrocités commises, le fait de viser systématiquement certaines vihctimes
en raison de leur appartenance à un groupe particulier, ou la récuhrrence
d’actes destructifs et discriminatoires. L’existence d’un plan ou d’une
politique et l’intention formulée dans des discours publics ou lorhs de
réunions avec d’autres personnes peuvent aussi permettre de déduire que
l’auteur était animé de l’intention spécifique requise» (Ibid., par.745.)
136. Pour résumer, même en l’absence de preuves directes, l’intention
génocidaire peut être déduite d’indices et d’un contexte hgénéral et systé -
matique d’extrême violence et de destruction. Puis -je ajouter que le souci
de la nécessaire protection des personnes et des groupes en situationh de
vulnérabilité fait partie, depuis une vingtaine d’années déhjà, de l’héritage
de la deuxième conférence mondiale sur les droits de l’homme, qui s’est
tenue en 1993 à Vienne 115. On observera qu’il en résulte aujourd’hui une
convergence croissante entre le droit international des droits de l’hhomme,
le droit international humanitaire et le droit international des réfuhgiés,
ainsi que le droit pénal international, considérés dans leur enhsemble.
c) Affaire Milošević (2004)
137. Au cours de la procédure en l’affaire Bosnie‑Herzégovine c.
Serbie‑et‑Monténégro (2007), la Cour n’a pas voulu censurer le refus par
la Serbie de produire les documents non expurgés de son Conseil suprêhme
de défense, apparemment pour ne pas empiéter sur sa souverainetéh. Elle a
défendu avec insistance son niveau élevé de preuve. Or la chambhre de
première instance du TPIY, dans sa décision du 16 juin 2004 relative à la
demande d’acquittement en l’affaire Milošević, a conclu que
«les éléments de preuve suffisent à établir qu’un génohcide a été com-
mis à Brčko, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Ključh et
Bosanski Novi et … que l’accusé a participé à une entreprise crimi -
nelle commune, avec les dirigeants serbes de Bosnie, dont le but et
115
Voir A. A. Cançado Trindade, A Proteção dos Vulneráveis como Legado da II Confe‑
rência Mundial de Direitos Humanos (199313) [La protection des personnes vulnérables
comme legs de la deuxième conférence mondiale des droits de l’h▯omme (1993 ‑2013)], op. cit.
supra note 79, p. 13-356.
252
7 CIJ1077.indb 501 18/04/16 08:54 252 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tion of which was to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslims as a
group” (ICTY, Milošević, decision of 16 June 2004, para. 289, and
cf. also para. 288).
138. The final judgment never took place, due to the death of
S. Milošević. Yet, although this decision of the ICTY Trial Chamber ohf
16 June 2004 had a bearing on the 2007 Judgment, the International
Court of Justice preferred not to give any weight to it 116. The high stan -
dard of proof adopted by the International Court of Justice — and criti-
cized by a trend of expert writing — finds justification in international
individual criminal responsibility, facing incarceration, but not in interna-
tional State responsibility, aiming only at declaratory and compensatoryh
relief, where a simple balance of evidence would be appropriate, with a
117
lower standard of proof than for international crimes by individuals .
3. General Assessment
139. The jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals thus clearly
holds that proof of genocidal intent may be inferred from the aforemen -
tioned factors (such as, inter alia, e.g., the plan or policy of destruction)
pertaining to facts and circumstances. Even in the absence of direct prohof,
the finding of those factors may lead to the inference of genocidal inhtent
on the part of the perpetrators. In the present case of the Application of
the Convention against Genocide, opposing Croatia to Serbia, the con -
tending Parties themselves have made arguments in relation to the ques -
tion whether genocidal intent can be proven by inferences.
140. For example, Croatia argues that “[t]he Parties also appear to be
in agreement that the118urt (. . .) can draw proof of genocidal intent from
inferences of fact” . It further argues that Serbia “acknowledges in the
Counter-Memorial [para. 135] that it is sometimes difficult to show by
direct evidence the intent to commit genocide as the mental element of the
crime”. The Respondent goes on to refer to “the possibility (. . .) of119li-
ance on indirect evidence and drawing proof from inferences of fact” .
141. May it be recalled that, despite all the aforementioned indications
from the case law of the international criminal tribunals — added to
those from the case law of international human rights tribunals — the
International Court of Justice held, in this respect, in the earlier 200h7
Judgment, opposing Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, that :
“The dolus specialis , the specific intent to destroy the group in
whole or in part, has to be convincingly shown by reference to par -
116Cf. D. Groome, op. cit. infra note 117, pp. 964-965.
117Cf., to this effect, e.g.Groome, “Adjudicating Genocide : Is the International
Court of Justice Capable of Judging State Criminal Responsib?”, 31Fordham Interna‑
tional Law Journal (2008), p. 933.
118Reply of Croatia, para. 2.11.
119Ibid., para. 2.12.
253
7 CIJ1077.indb 502 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 252
l’intention étaient d’exterminer une partie des Musulmans de Bohsnie
en tant que groupe » (TPIY, Milošević, décision du 16 juin 2004,
par. 289 ; voir aussi par. 288).
138. Le jugement définitif en l’affaire Milošević n’a pu être rendu en rai-
son du décès de l’accusé. Quant à la décision du 16 juin 2004 de la chambre
de première instance du TPIY, bien qu’elle ait été pertinenthe pour l’arrêt116
26 février2007 de la CIJ, celle-ci a préféré ne lui accorder aucun poids . Le
niveau de preuve élevé requis par la Cour —et critiqué par une tendance de
la doctrine — est certes justifié en matière de responsabilité pénahle intern-a
tionale individuelle, où l’on risque l’incarcération, mais non en matière de
responsabilité internationale de l’Etat, où n’est recherchéh qu’une satisfaction
ou un jugement déclaratoire pour lesquels une simple preuve prépondérante
serait appropriée, avec un critère d’établissement de la preuve moins élevé
117
que pour juger les crimes internationaux commis par des personnes .
3. Analyse générale
139. Il ressort donc clairement de la jurisprudence des tribunaux pénaux
internationaux que la preuve de l’intention génocidaire peut êthre déduite
des facteurs précités (comme par exemple l’existence d’un phlan ou d’une
politique de destruction) concernant les faits et les circonstances de hl’affaire.
Même en l’absence de preuves directes, la découverte de ces fachteurs peut
permettre d’établir par déduction l’existence d’une intenhtion génocidaire
chez les auteurs des actes incriminés. Dans la présente affaire Croatie c. Ser ‑
bie, les parties elles-mêmes ont échangé des arguments sur la question de
savoir si l’intention génocidaire pouvait être prouvée par voie de déduction.
140. La Croatie, par exemple, a soutenu que « lesParties semblent être
d’accord que la Cour … peut prouver l’intention génocidaire en la dédui -
sant des faits » 11. Elle a soutenu que la Serbie « reconnaît au para-
graphe 135 de son contre-mémoire qu’il est difficile de faire apparaître par
des preuves directes l’intention de commettre le génocide, éléhment moral
du crime ». Le demandeur évoque ensuite « la possibilité … de s’appuyer
sur des indices et de produire des preuves à partir des faits » 119.
141. Je me permets de rappeler que, malgré toutes les décisions préci -
tées tirées de la jurisprudence des tribunaux pénaux internatiohnaux, qui
s’ajoutent à la jurisprudence des juridictions internationales desh droits de
l’homme, la Cour a soutenu à ce sujet, dans son arrêt de 2007 en l’affaire
Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro, que
«[l]e dolus specialis, l’intention spécifique de détruire le groupe en tout
ou en partie, doit être établi en référence à des circonshtances précises, à
116Voir D. Groome, op. cit. infra note 117, p. 964-965.
117Voir par exemple D. Groome, «Adjudicating Genocide: Is the International Court
of Justice Capable of Judging State Criminal Responsibili?», Fordham International
Law, vol. 31, 2008, p. 933.
118Réplique de la Croatie, par. 2.11.
119Ibid., par. 2.12.
253
7 CIJ1077.indb 503 18/04/16 08:54 253 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ticular circumstances, unless a general plan to that end can be con -
vincingly demonstrated to exist ; and for a pattern of conduct to be
accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be such that it h
could only point to the existence of such intent.” (Para. 373.)
142. Keeping in mind the case law of contemporary international tri -
bunals on the matter (cf. Sections V and VI, supra), the International
Court of Justice seems to have imposed too high a threshold of evidence h
(for the determination of genocide), which does not seem to follow theh
established case law of international criminal tribunals and of interna -
tional human rights tribunals on standard of proof (cf. also infra). The
Court seems to have set too high the standard of proof for finding the
Serbian regime in time of war in Croatia complicit in genocide. Even
when direct evidence is not available, the case law of contemporary intehr-
national tribunals holds that intent can be inferred on the basis of cirhcum-
stantial evidence.
143. Ultimately, intent can only be inferred, from such factors as the
existence of a general plan or policy, the systematic targeting of humanh
groups, the scale of atrocities, the use of derogatory language, among
others. The attempts to impose a high threshold for proof of genocide,
and to discredit the production of evidence (e.g., witness statements) are
most regrettable, ending up in reducing genocide to an almost impossibleh
crime to determine, and the Genocide Convention to an almost dead let -
ter. This can only bring impunity to the perpetrators of genocide, States
and individuals alike, and make any hope of access to justice on the parht
of victims of genocide fade away. Lawlessness would replace the rule of h
law.
144. Another word of caution is to be added here against what may
appear as a regrettable deconstruction of the Genocide Convention. One
cannot characterize a situation as one of armed conflict, so as to discard
genocide. The two do not exclude each other. In this connection, it has h
been pertinently warned that perpetrators of genocide will almost alwaysh
allege that they were in an armed conflict, and their actions were takhen
“pursuant to an ongoing military conflict” ; yet, “genocide may be a
means for achieving military objectives just as readily as military conflhict
may be a means for instigating a genocidal plan” 120.
145. In adjudicating the present case, the International Court of Jus -
tice should have kept in mind the importance of the Genocide Conven-
tion as a major human rights treaty and its historic significance for
humankind. A case like the present one can only be decided in the light,h
not at all of State sovereignty, but rather of the imperative of safeguahrd-
ing the life and integrity of human groups under the jurisdiction of the
120 R. Park, “Proving Genocidal Intent : International Precedent and the ECCC Case
002”, 63 Rutgers Law Review (2010), pp. 169-170, and cf. pp. 150-152.
254
7 CIJ1077.indb 504 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 253
moins que l’existence d’un plan général tendant à cette fihn puisse être
démontrée de manière convaincante ; pour qu’une ligne de conduite
puisse être admise en tant que preuve d’une telle intention, elle devrait
être telle qu’elle ne puisse qu’en dénoter l’existence. (Par. 373.)
142. Etant donné la jurisprudence des tribunaux internationaux
contemporains sur la question (voir supra les sections V et VI), la Cour
semble avoir adopté, aux fins de la qualification de génocide,h un niveau
de preuve trop élevé et qui ne semble pas conforme à la jurisprhudence
constante des tribunaux pénaux internationaux et des juridictions inther -
nationales des droits de l’homme en matière de preuve (voir aussi infra).
La Cour semble s’être imposée un critère de la preuve trop ehxigeant pour
pouvoir convaincre de complicité de génocide le régime serbe deh l’époque
de la guerre en Croatie. Or la jurisprudence des tribunaux internationauhx
contemporains veut qu’en l’absence de preuves directes l’intention puisse
être déduite de preuves circonstancielles.
143. En dernier ressort, l’intention ne peut être établie que par vohie de
déduction, à partir de facteurs tels que l’existence d’un plhan ou d’une poli -
tique générale, le fait de prendre systématiquement pour cible un groupe
humain donné, l’ampleur des atrocités commises, l’emploi de htermes
dépréciatifs, etc. Les tentatives visant à imposer un critèrhe élevé d’établis-
sement de la preuve de génocide et à discréditer certains moyens de preuve
telsque les dépositions de témoins sont très regrettables, car elles finissent
par faire du génocide un crime presque impossible à démontrer eht à réduire
quasiment la convention sur le génocide à l’état de lettre mhorte. Il ne peut
en résulter que l’impunité pour les auteurs de génocide — Etats et indivi-
dus —, l’abandon de tout espoir d’obtenir justice pour les victimesh. C’est
remplacer l’état de droit par l’absence de droit.
144. Il me faut ajouter ici une mise en garde contre ce qui semble être
une déplorable déconstruction de la convention sur le génocide. Il est
inadmissible que l’on puisse se contenter de qualifier une situatiohn de
«conflit armé» pour se prémunir contre une accusation de génocide. L’un
n’exclut pas l’autre. A ce sujet, on sait pertinemment que les autheurs de
génocide prétendront presque toujours qu’ils participaient à un conflit
armé et que leurs actes étaient commis « dans le cadre d’un conflit mili -
taire en cours »; or «le génocide peut être un moyen de réaliser des objec-
tifs militaires tout comme un conflit militaire peut être un moyen hde
planifier un génocide » 12.
145. Appelée à statuer en la présente affaire, la Cour aurait dû garder à
l’esprit l’importance de la convention sur le génocide en tant que traité fon -
damental relatif aux droits de l’homme, ainsi que son caractère hihstorique
pour l’humanité. Une affaire comme celle -ci doit être tranchée non pas sous
l’angle de la responsabilité de l’Etat, mais à la lumièreh de l’impératif de
protéger la vie et l’intégrité de groupes humains qui relèvent de la juridich -
120 R. Park, « Proving Genocidal Intent : International Precedent and the ECCC
Case 002», Rutgers Law Review, vol. 63, 2010, p. 169-170 et 150-152.
254
7 CIJ1077.indb 505 18/04/16 08:54 254 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
State concerned, even more so when they find themselves in situations hof
utter vulnerability, if not defencelessness. The life and integrity of thhe
population prevail over contentions of State sovereignty, particularly in
the face of misuses of this latter.
146. History has unfortunately shown that genocide has been commit -
ted in furtherance of State policies. Making the application of the Genoh-
cide Convention to States parties an almost impossible task, would render
the Convention meaningless. It would also create a situation where cer -
tain State egregious criminal acts amounting to genocide would go
unpunished — even more so in the current absence of a convention on
crimes against humanity. Genocide is indeed an egregious crime commit -
ted — more often 121than one would naively assume — under the direc -
tion or the benign complicity of the sovereign State and its apparatus.
147. The repeated mass murders and atrocities, with the extermination
of segments of the population, pursuing pre-conceived plans and policies,
coldly calculated, have counted on the apparatus of the State public
power, with its bureaucracy, with its so -called material and human
“resources”. Historiography shows that the successive genocides and
121Cf., in general, inter alia, e.g., Y. Ternon, Guerres et génocides au XX siècle, Paris,
Ed. Odile Jacob, 2007, pp. 9-37; B.Bruneteau, Le siècle des génocides, Paris, Armand
Colin, 2004, pp. 5-233; B.A. Valentino, Final Solutions — Mass Killing and Genocide
in the Twentieth Century, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2004, pp.1-309;
G. Bensoussan, Europe — Une passion génocidaire, Paris, Ed. Mille et Une Nuits, 2006,
pp. 7-460; S.Totten, W. S. Parsons and I. W. Charny (eds.), Century of Genocide —
Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, N.Y./London, Garland Publ., 1997, pp3-466;
B. Kiernan, Blood and Soil — A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta
to Darfur, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 1-697; R. Gellately
and B. Kiernan (eds.), The Specter of Genocide— Mass Murder in Historical Perspec ‑
tive, Cambridge University Press, 2010 [repr.], pp. 3-380; D. Olusoga and C. W. Erichsen,
The Kaiser’s Holocaust — Germany’s Forgotten Genocide, London, Faber & Faber,
2011, pp. 1-379; J-B. Racine, Le génocide des Arméniens— Origine et permanence du
crime contre l’humanité, Paris, Dalloz, 2006, 61-102; R. G. Suny, F. M. Göçek and
N. M. Naimark (eds.), A Question of Genocide, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 3-414;
G. Chaliand and Y. Ternon, 1915, le génocide des Arméniens, Brussels, Ed.Complexe,
2006 (reed.), pp. 3-19; I.hang, The Rape of Nanking — The Forgotten Holocaust of
World War II, London, Penguin Books, 1997, pp. 14-220; N.M. Naimark, Stalin’s Geno‑
cides, Princeton/N.J., Princeton University Press, 2012 [repr.], pp. 1-154; E. Kogon, L’Etat
SS — Le système des camps de concentration allemands [1947], [Paris,Jeune Parque,
1993, pp. 7-447 L.Rees, El Holocausto Asiático, Barcelona, Crítica Ed., 2009, pp. 13-212
B. Kiernan, Le génocide au Cambodge (1975‑1979), Paris, Gallimard, 1998, pp.7-702;
B. Allen, Rape Warfare — The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia‑Herzegovina and Croatia,
Minneapolis/London, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 1-162.Prunier, Africa’s
World War — Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastroph▯e,
Oxford University Press, 2010, pp.-468; K. Moghalu, Rwanda’s Genocide — The Poli ‑
tics of Global Justice, N.Y., Palgrave, 2005,1-236; J.-P. Chrétien and M. Kabanda,
Rwanda — Racisme et génocide — l’idéologie hamitique, Paris, Ed. Belin, 2013, pp; 7-361
S.Leydesdorff, Survivinthe Bosnian Genocide— The Women of Srebrenica Speak, Bloom-
ington/Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2011, p1-229; M. W. Daly, Darfur’s
Sorrow — A History of Destruction and Genocide, Cambridge University Press, 2007,
pp. 1-316.
255
7 CIJ1077.indb 506 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 254
tion de l’Etat concerné, et ce, d’autant plus lorsque ces grouphes se trouvent
en situation de grande vulnérabilité, voire sans défense. La vihe et l’intégrité
des personnes doivent l’emporter sur les arguments invoquant la souvehra -i
neté de l’Etat, surtout quand on sait les abus qui sont commis en hson nom.
146. L’histoire nous apprend que, malheureusement, des génocides ont
été commis en exécution de politiques d’Etat. En rendant prehsque impos-
sible l’application aux Etats de la convention sur le génocide, on risque de
vider celle -ci de son sens. On risque aussi de créer une situation où les
crimes exorbitants de certains Etats, équivalents au génocide, reshteraient
impunis — d’autant plus qu’il n’existe pas actuellement de conventiohn
internationale sur les crimes contre l’humanité. Le génocide esht en fait un
crime exorbitant commis — plus souvent 121 qu’on ne serait naïvement
porté à le croire — sous la direction ou avec la complicité bienveillante
d’un Etat souverain et de son appareil.
147. Au cours de l’histoire, des massacres et des atrocités récurrenhts et
l’extermination de groupes entiers de population, dans le cadre de plhans
et de politiques prémédités et froidement mis au point, ont pu hs’appuyer
sur l’appareil d’Etat et les pouvoirs publics, avec leurs fonctionhnaires et
leurs ressources matérielles et prétendument « humaines». La science his -
121 Voir par exemple, entre autres ouvrages, Y. Ternon, Guerres et génocides au
XX siècle, Paris, Éd. Odile Jacob, 2007, p. 9-379; B. Bruneteau, Le siècle des génocides,
Paris, Armand Colin, 2004, p. 5-233 ; B. A. Valentino, Final Solutions — Mass Killing
and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Ithaca/Londres, Cornell University Press, 2004,
p. 1-309 ; G. Bensoussan, Europe — Une passion génocidaire, Paris, Ed. Mille et Une
Nuits, 2006, p. 7-460 ; S.Totten, W. S. Parsons et I. W. Charny (dir. publ.), Century of
Genocide — Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, New York/Londres, Garland Publ.,
1997, p. 3-466; B. Kiernan, Blood and Soil — A World History of Genocide and Extermi‑
nation from Sparta to Darfur, New Haven/Londres, Yale University Press, 2007, p. 1-697;
R. Gellately et B. Kiernan (dir. publ.), The Specter of Genocide — Mass Murder in Histo‑
rical Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2010 [réimpr.], p. 3-380; D. Olusoga et
C. W. Erichsen, The Kaiser’s Holocaust — Germany’s Forgotten Genocide, Londres, Faber
& Faber, 2011, p. 1-379 ; J-B. Racine, Le génocide des Arméniens — Origine et perma ‑
nence du crime contre l´humanité, Paris, Dalloz, 2006, p. 61-102; R. G. Suny, F. M. Göçek
et N. M. Naimark (dir. publ.), A Question of Genocide, Oxford University Press,
2013, p. 3-414 ; G. Chaliand et Y. Ternon, 1915, le génocide des Arméniens, Bruxelles,
Ed. Complexe, 2006 (rééd.), p. 3-199 ; I.Chang, The Rape of Nanking — The Forgotten
Holocaust of World War II, Londres, Penguin Books, p. 14-220 ; N. M. Naimark, Stalin’s
Genocides, Princeton (New Jersey), Princeton University Press, 2012 [réimpr.], p. 1 -154;
E. Kogon, L’Etat SS — Le système des camps de concentration allemands [1947], [Paris,]
Ed. Jeune Parque, 1993, p. 7-447 ; L.Rees, El Holocausto Asiático, Barcelone, Crítica Ed.,
2009, p. 13-212; B. Kiernan, Le génocide au Cambodge (1975‑1979), Paris, Gallimard,
1998, p. 7-702; B.Allen, Rape Warfare — The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia‑Herzegovina and
Croatia, Minneapolis/Londres, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 1-162 ; G. Prunier,
Africa´s World War — Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental
Catastrophe, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 1-468 ; K. Moghalu, Rwanda´s Genocide
— The Politics of Global Justice, New York, Palgrave, 2005, p. 1-236 ; J-P. Chrétien et
M. Kabanda, Rwanda — Racisme et génocide — l´idéologie hamitique, Paris, Ed. Belin,
2013, p. 7-361; S.Leydesdorff, Surviving the Bosnian Genocide —The Women of Srebrenica
Speak, Bloomington/Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2011, p. 1-229; M. W. Daly,
Darfur’s Sorrow — A History of Destruction and Genocide, Cambridge University Press,
2007, p. 1-316.
255
7 CIJ1077.indb 507 18/04/16 08:54 255 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
atrocities over the twentieth century have in effect been committed pursu-
ant to a plan, have been organized and executed as a State policy, by
those who held power, with the use of euphemistic language in the pro -
122
cess of dehumanization of the victims .
148. Widespread and systematic patterns of destruction have been car -
ried out amidst ideological propaganda, without any moral assessment,
blurring the sheer brutality and any responsibility, and erasing any guihlty
feeling. All was lost in the organic and totalitarian entity. Those massh
murders have often been committed without any reparation to the next of h
123
kin of the fatal victims . Furthermore, not all such mass atrocities have
been taken before international tribunals. As to the ones that have beenh,
in an international adjudication of a case concerning the application ofh
the Convention against Genocide, making the elements of genocide too
difficult to determine, would maintain the shadow of impunity, and creahte
a situation of lawlessness, contrary to the object and purpose of that Con -
vention.
IX. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructiho:n
Fact -Finding and Case Law
149. May I turn now to the fact-finding that was undertaken, and the
reports that were prepared, at the time those grave breaches of human
rights and international humanitarian law were being committed, conform -
ing a systematic practice of destruction. I refer to the fact-finding hand
Reports prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the (former) UN Com-
mission on Human Rights (1992 -1993), as well as the fact-finding and
reports prepared by the UN Security Council’s Commission of Experts
(1993-1994). I shall seek to detect their elements which bear relevance for
the consideration of the cas d’espèce.
122
123 Cf. further, Part XIII of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
E. Staub, The Roots of Evil — The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence,
Cambridge University Press, 2005 [reimpr.], pp. 7-8, 10, 19, 24, 29, 107, 109, 119, 121-123,
129, 142, 151, 183 -187, 221, 225, 227 and 26Muchnik and A. Garvie, El Derrumbe
del Humanismo — Guerra, Maldad y Violencia en los Tiempos Modernos, Buenos Aires/
Barcelona, Edhasa, 2007, pp. 36-37, 116, 128, 135 -136, 142, 246 and 250. And cf. also,
in general, inter alia, e.g., V. Klemperer, A Linguagem do Terceiro Reich, Rio de
Janeiro, Contraponto Ed., 2009, pp. 11-; D.J. Goldhagen, Worse than War — Geno‑
cide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, London, Abacus, 2012 [reed.],
pp.6-564;J. Sémelin, Purificar Destrui— Usos Políticos dos Massacres e dos Genocí ‑
dios, Rio de Janeiro, DIFEL, 2009, pp. 19-532; M. Kullashi, Effacer l’autre — Identités
culturelles et identités politiques dans les Balkans, Paris, L’Harmattan, 7-246;pp.
S.Matton, Srebrenica — Un génocide annoncé, Paris, Flammarion, 2005, pp.21-420;
P. Mojzes, Balkan Genocides — Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century,
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publs., 2011, pp. 34-229.
256
7 CIJ1077.indb 508 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 255
e
torique montre que, tout au long du XX siècle, une série de génocides et
autres atrocités ont été planifiés, organisés et exéhcutés en tant que poli -
tique d’Etat, par des gouvernants qui dissimulaient derrière un dihscours
122
euphémistique un processus de déshumanisation des victimes .
148. Toutes sortes de campagnes de destruction généralisée et systéhma -
tique se sont déroulées avec en toile de fond une propagande idéhologique
qui neutralisait le sens moral, glorifiait la brutalité et effaçahit tout sens des
responsabilités et tout sentiment de culpabilité. Tout était subsumé dans
une entité organique et totalitaire. Des massacres ont souvent étéh commis
sans que les membres de la famille des victimes bénéficient de qhuelque
réparation que ce soit 123. En plus, ces campagnes d’atrocités massives
sont loin d’avoir été toutes portées devant des tribunaux internahtionaux.
Certes quelques-unes l’ont été mais;si, dans une procédure internationale
visant à appliquer la convention sur le génocide, on rend les éhléments du
génocide trop difficiles à prouver, on ne fera que perpétuer lh’impunité et
créer une situation d’anarchie tout à fait contraire à l’objet et au but de la
Convention.
IX. Campagne de destructiohn systématique et génhéralisé :e
établissement des faihts et jurisprudence
149. Je passerai maintenant aux activités d’établissement des faits qui
ont été menées et aux rapports qui ont été rédigés hà l’époque même où
étaient commises ces graves violations du droit international des dro▯its de
l’homme et du droit international humanitaire, lesquelles constituaient une
véritable campagne de destruction systématique. Je me réfèreh aux activi -
tés d’établissement des faits et aux rapports du rapporteur spécial de
l’ex-Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies (1992-1993) et
de la Commission d’experts du Conseil de sécurité (1993 -1994). Je m’ef -
forcerai d’en dégager les éléments pertinents pour l’examhen de la présente
affaire.
122
123 Voir la partie XIII ci-après.
E. Staub, The Roots of Evil — The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence,
Cambridge University Press, 2005 [réimpr.], p. 7-8, 10, 19, 24, 29, 107, 109, 119, 121 -123,
129, 142, 151, 183 -187, 221, 225, 227 e264 ; D. Muchnik et A. Garvie, El Derrumbe
del Humanismo — Guerra, Maldad y Violencia en los Tiempos Modernos, Buenos Aires/
Barcelone, Edhasa, 2007, p. 36-37, 116, 128, 135-136, 142, 246 e250. Voir aussi, entre
autres ouvrages, V. Klemperer, LTI — A Linguagem do Terceiro Reich, Rio de Janeiro,
Contraponto Ed. 2009, p. 11-424 ; D. J. Goldhagen, Worse than War — Genocide,
Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, Londres, Abacus, 2012 [rééd.],
p. 6-564; JSémelin, Purificar e Destruir — Usos Políticos dos Massacres e dos Genocídios,
Rio de Janeiro, DIFEL, 2009, p. 19-532 ; M. Kullashi, Effacer l´autre — Identités cultu ‑
relles et identités politiques dans les Balkans, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2005, p.7-246; S. Matton,
Srebrenica — Un génocide annoncé, Paris, Flammarion, 2005, p. 21-42; P.ojzes, Balkan
Genocides — Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century, Lanham, Rowman
& Littlefield Publs., 2011, p. 34-229.
256
7 CIJ1077.indb 509 18/04/16 08:54 256 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
1. United Nations (Former Commission on Human Rights) Fact‑Finding
Reports on Systematic Pattern of Destruction (1992‑1993)
150. There are passages in the “Reports on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia”, of the Special
Rapporteur of the (former) UN Commission on Human Rights
(Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki), which pertain to alleged crimes committed
against Croat populations and by the Serb official or paramilitary entih -
ties. There are reported facts that assist in evidencing a systematic pattern
of destruction during the armed attacks in Croatia in particular. The
124
Report of 28 August 1992 , for example, referred to the shops and busi-
nesses of ethnic Croats that were burned and looted (para. 12).
151. Other forms of intimidation, it continued, involved shooting at
the houses of other ethnic groups and throwing explosives at them
(Report of 28 August 1992, para. 13). Attacks on churches and mosques
were part of the campaign of intimidation (ibid., para. 16). Another tactic
included “the shelling of population centres and the cutting off of suhpplies
of food and other essential goods” (ibid., para. 16). Cultural centres were
also targeted, and snipers shot “innocent civilians” ; any movement “out
of doors” was “hazardous” (ibid., paras. 17-18).
152. Detention of civilians was intended to put pressure on them to
leave the territory (ibid., para. 23). That Report also referred to the exis -
tence of detention facilities containing between 10 to 100 prisoners in
Croatia, and which were “under the control of the Government as well has
territories under the control of ethnic Serbs” ( ibid., para. 34). It added
that the situation in which prisoners lived (including poor nutrition, hover -
crowding and poor conditions of detention) was a real threat to their
lives, and, in effect, prisoners have died of torture and mistreatment inh
Croatia (ibid., para. 39). The aforementioned Report further referred to
the massive disappearances that occurred in territories under the controhl
of ethnic Serbs in particular, 3,000 disappearances were reported follow -
ing the fall of Vukovar, with people allegedly detained in camps before h
disappearing (ibid., para. 41).
153. The subsequent Report of 27 October 1992 125 expressed concern
as to the need to investigate further the existence of mass graves in Vuhk-
ovar and surrounding areas (para. 18). Generally speaking, this Report
stressed much more on Bosnia and Herzegovina than on Croatia. The
following Report, of 17 November 1992 126, addressed the facts occurred
in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs). The Special Rappor -
124UN doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9.
125UN doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10.
126
UN doc. A/47/666/S/24809.
257
7 CIJ1077.indb 510 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 256
1. Rapports de l’ex‑Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unie▯s
faisant état d’une campagne de destruction systématique (1992‑▯1993)
150. On trouve dans les rapports sur la situation des droits de l’homme
dans le territoire de l’ancienne Yougoslavie du rapporteur spécialh de
l’ex-Commission des droits de l’homme, M. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, des allé-
gations de crimes contre la population croate commis par des entités hoffi-
cielles ou paramilitaires serbes. Ces rapports mettent en évidence dehs faits
susceptibles d’aider à prouver l’existence d’une campagne de destruction
systématique, pendant les attaques lancées en Croatie en particuliher. Le r-ap
port du 28 août 1992 12, par exemple, rapporte la preuve que les magasins et
les entreprises appartenant à des Croates ont été brûlés hou pillés (pa1 r. ).
151. Le rapporteur spécial y signale d’autres formes d’intimidation,h qui
consistent à tirer des coups de feu ou à lancer des explosifs contre des mai-
sons appartenant à des membres des autres groupes ethniques (rapport du
28 août 1992, par. 13). Les attaques d’églises et de mosquées font également
partie de la campagne d’intimidation (ibid., par. 16). Une autre tactique
«consiste à assiéger une ville, en bombardant les centres habitéhs par la po -pu
lation civile et en coupant l’approvisionnement en denrées alimenthaires et
autres denrées essentielles» (ibid., par.16). Des centres culturels sont visés et
des tireurs embusqués tirent sur des «civils innocents»; il est aussi «dange-
reux de se risquer à l’extérieur» (ibid., par.17-18).
152. La détention de civils est à l’évidence utilisée pour inchiter les hab-i
tants à quitter le territoire (ibid., par.). Le rapporteur spécial fait état de
centres de détention clandestins où se trouvent « des dizaines et des centaines
de détenus; cette pratique a été signalée «en Croatie, comme dans les terri-
toires bosniaques contrôlés par le Gouvernement, ainsi que dans lehs terri-
toires contrôlés par les Serbes » (ibid., par. 34). Il poursuit en affirmant
qu’« une menace réelle pèse sur la vie des prisonniers en raison de la mau-
vaise alimentation, du surpeuplement et des mauvaises conditions de déht-en
tion», et qu’il dispose de « preuves crédibles que certains prisonniers sont
morts en Croatie sous la torture et des suites de mauvais traitements ibid.,
par. 39). Le rapporteur spécial dit enfin avoir été informé deh cas de dispa-ri
tions en masse dans les territoires contrôlés par les Serbes ; 3000 cas de dis-
paritions ont ainsi été signalés après la chute de Vukovar. hLes victimes
auraient été détenues pendant un certain temps dans des camps, puis
auraient disparu (ibid., par.41).
153. Dans son rapport suivant daté du 27 octobre 1992 125, le rappor-
teur spécial recommande de procéder à des investigations sur dehs char -
niers et fosses communes repérés à Vukovar et dans ses environsh (par. 18).
Ce rapport traite beaucoup plus de la situation en Bosnie- Herzégovine que
de celle en Croatie. Le rapport suivant, daté du 17 novembre 1992 126,
porte sur les faits survenus dans les zones protégées par les NatihonsUnies
124
125 Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/9.
126 Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10.
Nations Unies, doc. A/47/666-S/24809.
257
7 CIJ1077.indb 511 18/04/16 08:54 257 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
teur stated that in the Krajina parts of UNPA Sector South, murders,
robberies, looting “and other forms of criminal violence often relatehd to
ethnic cleansing” took place (para. 78). People were only allowed to flee
upon relinquishment of their properties. As to UNPA Sector East, ethnic h
cleansing was undertaken by Serbian militias and local Serbian authori -
ties, and people were subjected to extremely violent intimidation
(para. 83). Furthermore, Catholic churches were destroyed (para. 84).
154. Moreover, that Report expressed concern with the disappearance
of 2,000 to 3,000 people, following the fall of Vukovar in 1991 ; it referred
to the potential mass grave in Ovčara close to Vukovar. On the site ohf the
potential mass grave referred to, four bodies were found, but there might
have been many more bodies, including some of the 175 Croatian patients
who were evacuated from the Vukovar hospital and then disappeared ;
there might have been eight other mass graves in the area (para. 86).
155. Last but not least, the Report of 17 November 1992 stated, in its
conclusions, that “the continuation of ethnic cleansing is a deliberahte
effort to create a fait accompli in flagrant disregard of internationalh com-
mitments entered into by those who carry out and benefit from ethnic
cleansing” (para. 135). It is worth noticing that the Report referred to all
those identified elements of extreme violence as a “policy” (pahra.135).
127
156. The subsequent Report of 10 February 1993 likewise referred
to an ethnic cleansing policy undertaken by local Serbian authorities anhd
paramilitaries still taking place in some UNPAs, as disclosed by the conh-
stant harassment towards the non -Serbs who refused to flee, the destruc -
tion of churches and 128ses (para. 141). The following Report, of
17 November 1993 , asserted that the organized massive ethnic cleans-
ing of the Croats from the Republic of Krajina then became a “fait
accompli” (para. 144), and crimes committed against Croats would gener-
ally fall into impunity (para. 145). In UNPA Sector South and the Pink
Zones, there were only 1,161 Croats left (whereas there were 44,000 of
them in the area in 1991. Killings, looting and confiscation of farm equip-
ment were reported. Moreover, the same Report gave account of disap -
pearances and killings that had been occurring in UNPA Sector North
(paras. 151-152).
157. As to UNPA Sector East, the census of 1991 and 1993 evidenced
that the Croat population in the area had dropped from 46 per cent to
6 per cent, while the Serb population arose from 36 per cent to approxi-
mately 73 per cent (para. 157). Intimidation acts and crimes were often
127
128UN doc. E/CN.4/1993/50.
UN doc. E/CN.4/1994/47.
258
7 CIJ1077.indb 512 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 257
(ZPNU). Le rapporteur spécial y déclare que dans la Krajina, quih faisait
partie de la ZPNU du secteur sud, « les meurtres, vols, pillages et autres
formes de violence criminelle [sont] souvent associés au nettoyage ethh -
nique » (par. 78). Les habitants non serbes ne sont autorisés à fuir la
région que s’ils renoncent à leurs biens. Quant à la ZPNU duh secteur est,
elle est le théâtre d’une campagne de nettoyage ethnique menéhe par les
milices et les autorités locales serbes, et les habitants non serbes hy sont
soumis à des formes d’intimidation d’une violence extrême (hpar. 83). De
plus, les églises catholiques y ont été détruites (par. 84).
154. Le rapporteur spécial se déclare particulièrement soucieux de
retrouver la trace de 2000 à 3000 personnes qui auraient disparu après la
chute de Vukovar en 1991; il évoque la présence d’un charnier potentiel
près du village d’Ovčara, voisin de cette ville. Quatre squelethtes humains
y ont été trouvés, affleurant à la surface de ce qui pourrahit être un char -
nier contenant de nombreux autres corps, dont ceux de certains des 175
patients croates évacués de l’hôpital de Vukovar et qui ont hdisparu par la
suite ; il existerait au moins huit fosses communes dans le secteur (par. 86).
155. Plus grave encore peut -être, dans la conclusion de son rapport du
17 novembre 1992, le rapporteur spécial déclare que, « en poursuivant le
nettoyage ethnique, on cherche délibérément à créer un fahit accompli au
mépris flagrant des engagements internationaux souscrits par ceux qhui se
livrent à cette pratique et qui en tirent des avantages » (par. 135). Il
importe de noter que le rapporteur spécial regroupe tous les actes d’hex -
trême violence qu’il a identifiés sous le terme de « politique» (par. 135).
156. Dans son rapport subséquent, du 10 février 1993 12, le rapporteur
spécial dénonce à nouveau la politique de nettoyage ethnique que les
milices et les autorités serbes locales continuent de pratiquer dans hcertaines
ZPNU et qui se manifeste par des persécutions constantes contre les
non-Serbes qui ne sont pas encore partis, par la destruction d’églisesh catho -
liques et par l’installation de réfugiés serbes dans les maisonhs abandonnées
(par. 141). Dans le rapport suivant, du 17novembre 1993 12, il affirme que,
dans les zones soumises au contrôle de la « République serbe de Krajina»,
le « nettoyage ethnique »assif et organisé qui visait les Croates est dans
une large mesure « un fait accompli» (par. 144) et que les auteurs des crimes
commis contre les Croates semblent jouir d’une impunité presque tohtale
(par. 145). Dans la ZPNU du secteur sud et dans les « zones roses», il ne
reste plus que 1161 Croates de souche, alors qu’ils étaient au nombre de
44 000 dans la région en 1991. Exécutions, pillage et confiscation de maté -
riel agricole y ont été signalées. Le même rapport fait éhtat de disparitions
forcées et de meurtres dans la ZPNU du secteur nord (par. 151-152).
157. Dans la ZPNU du secteur est, selon des chiffres tirés de recen -
sements effectués en 1991 et en 1993, le pourcentage de Croates dans
la population du secteur est passé de 46 à 6 %, alors que le pourcentage de
Serbes augmentait, passant de 36 à environ 73 % (par. 157). Les membres
127Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/1993/50.
128Nations Unies, doc. E/CN.4/1994/47.
258
7 CIJ1077.indb 513 18/04/16 08:54 258 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
directed at minorities, including killings, robbery and looting, forced h
recruitment in the armed forces, beatings, among others (para. 158). Fur-
thermore, the Report of 17 November 1993 expressed concerns about dis-
crimination against Croats when it comes to medical treatments and food h
distribution (para. 159). And the Report then referred to the “deliberate
and systematic shelling of civilian objects in Croatian towns and villaghes”
(para. 161).
158. The Report added that, according to Croatian sources, between
April 1992 and July 1993, “Serbian shelling” caused “187 civilian deaths
and 628 civilian injuries”, and, between 1991 and April 1993, an esti -
mated total of 210,000 buildings outside the UNPAs were either seriously
damaged or destroyed, primarily as a result of shelling (para. 161). Parts
of the Dalmatian coast areas
“have sustained several hundred impacts. There have been numerous
civilian deaths and injuries and extensive damage to civilian objects
including schools, hospitals and refugee camps, as well as houses and
apartments” (para. 162).
There were cases of civilian objects, hospitals and refugee camps, seem -
ingly “not situated in the proximity of a military object”, which hwere nev -
ertheless “deliberately shelled from Serbian positions within visual range
of the targets” (para. 163). The Special Rapporteur received accounts of
Croatian forces having also become engaged in “deliberate shelling ofh
civilian areas” (para. 164). Violence breeds violence.
2. United Nations (Security Council’s Commission of Experts)
Fact‑Finding Reports on Systematic Pattern
of Destruction (1993‑1994)
159. The Commission established by the UN Security Council resolu-
tion 780 (1992), of 6 October 1992, started in early November 1992 its
fact-finding work on the international crimes perpetrated in the war in
Croatia. By the time it concluded its work, by the end of May 1994, the
Commission of Experts had issued four reports, namely : “Interim
Report” (of 10 February 1993), “Report of a Mass Grave Near Vukovar”
(of 10 January 1993), “Second Interim Report” (of 6 October 1993), and
“Final Report” (of 27 May 1994). Each of them, and in particular the last
one, contains accounts of the grave breaches of international humanitar -
ian law, international human rights law, international refugee law and
international criminal law, committed during the war in Croatia. It is
thus important to review the results of the fact -finding work of the Com-
mission of Experts.
259
7 CIJ1077.indb 514 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 258
des minorités sont souvent visés par des actes de violence et d’hintimida -
tion, parmi lesquels figurent les exécutions, les incendies criminehls, les
vols à main armée, les pillages, l’enrôlement forcé dans les fhorces armées
et les sévices (par. 158). Toujours dans son même rapport du
17 novembre 1993, le rapporteur spécial se dit préoccupé par le traitement h
discriminatoire dont sont victimes les Croates sur le plan des soins méhdi -
caux et de l’aide alimentaire (par. 159). Il dénonce aussi le « bombarde-
ment délibéré et systématique de cibles civiles dans les vilhles et villages
croates » (par. 161).
158. Le rapporteur spécial ajoute que, selon des sources croates, entre
avril1992 et juillet 1993, les «bombardements serbes» ont fait «187 morts
et 628 blessés parmi les civils», et que, entre 1991 et avril 1993, environ
210 000 bâtiments, situés hors des ZPNU, ont été soit gravement endohm -
magés soit détruits, principalement par des bombardements (par. 161).
Certaines parties de la côte dalmate
«ont été touchées plusieurs centaines de fois. Il y a eu de nom -
breux morts et blessés parmi les civils, et des bâtiments civils, notam-
ment des écoles, des hôpitaux, des camps de réfugiés, ainsi hque
des maisons et des appartements, ont été fortement endommagés »
(par. 162).
Des biens de caractère civil, des hôpitaux et des camps de réfuhgiés « qui
n’étaient apparemment pas situés près d’un objectif milithaire», ont néan-
moins « été délibérément bombardés depuis des positions serbesh à portée
[visuelle] de tir des ciblespar.163). Le rapporteur spécial a reçu des infor-
mations selon lesquelles les forces croates ont elles aussi commencé hà bo- m
barder délibérément des zones civiles (par. 164). La violence engendre la
violence.
2. Rapports d’enquête de la Commission d’experts du Conseil de sé▯curité
des Nations Unies faisant état d’une campagne
de destruction systématique (1993‑1994)
159. La Commission d’experts créée par la résolution 780 (1992)h du
6 octobre 1992 du Conseil de sécurité a commencé en novembre 1992 sa
mission d’établissement des faits sur les crimes internationaux cohmmis
pendant la guerre en Croatie. Lorsqu’elle achève ses travaux, àh la fin de
mai 1994, elle a publié quatre rapports : un rapport intérimaire daté du
10 février 1993, un rapport sur une fosse commune près de Vukovar daté
du 10 janvier 1993, un deuxième rapport intérimaire daté du 6 octobre
1993 et un rapport final daté du 27 mai 1994. Chacun de ces rapports, et
en particulier le dernier, fait état de la commission de graves violations du
droit international humanitaire, du droit international des droits de
l’homme, du droit international des réfugiés et du droit internhational
pénal pendant la guerre en Croatie. Il importe donc de passer en revuhe les
conclusions tirées par la Commission d’experts de son travail d’hétablisse -
ment des faits.
259
7 CIJ1077.indb 515 18/04/16 08:54 259 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
(a) Interim Report (of 10 February 1993)
160. In his presentation of the first Interim Report of the Commission of
Experts established by the Security Council, the (then) UN Secretary-
General (B. Boutros-Ghali) deemed it fit to stress that, already in that
first Report, the Commission had already established that :
“Grave breaches and other violations of international humanitar-
ian law have been committed, including wilful killing, ‘ethnic cleans -
ing’ and mass killings, torture, rape, pillage and destruction of civhilian
property, destruction of cultural and religious property and arbitrary
arrests.” 129
161. In effect, in its aforementioned “Interim Report”, the Commis -
sion of Exper130 bearing in mind the relevant conventional basis for itsh
fact-finding , observed that “ethnic cleansing”, a “relatively new”
expression, is “contrary to international law” (para. 55). And it added :
“Based on the many reports describing the policy and practices
conducted in the former Yugoslavia, ‘ethnic cleansing’ has been cahr-
ried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention,
extrajudicial executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of civih -l
ian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and
deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or
threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruc-
tion of property. Those practices constitute crimes against humanity
and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts
could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.”
(“First Interim Report”, para. 56.)
The Commission of Experts then reported on “widespread and systematich
rape and other forms of sexual assault” throughout the various phasesh of
the armed conflicts ( ibid., para. 58), as well as on mass executions, disap -
pearances and mass graves during the war in Croatia (ibid., paras. 62-63).
129UN doc. S/25274, of 10 February 1993, p. 1.
130The 1949 Geneva Conventions of International Humanitarian Law (for “grave
breaches”) and Additional Protocol I, the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex : Regulations concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land ; the 1948onvention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide ; the 1954Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict and the 198Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Exchessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (paras.39 and 47).
260
7 CIJ1077.indb 516 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 259
a) Premier rapport intérimaire (10 février 1993)
160. Dans la lettre par laquelle il transmet au président du Conseil de
sécurité le premier rapport intérimaire de la Commission d’experts, le
Secrétaire général de l’ONU, qui était alors Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a
jugé bon d’attirer l’attention du Conseil sur un certain nombreh de points,
parmi lesquels celui-ci:
«Des violations graves et autres violations du droit international
humanitaire ont été commises, y compris homicides volontaires, neth -
toyage ethnique et tueries massives, torture, viols, pillage et destruc -
tion de biens civils, destru129on de biens culturels et religieux et
arrestations arbitraires.»
161. En effet, dans ce premier rapport intérimaire, la Commission
d’experts — se guidant sur les seuls instruments conventionnels perti -
nents 130 dans son activité d’établissement des faits — fait notamment
observer que l’expression « nettoyage ethnique» est relativement nouvelle,
et que le nettoyage ethnique est « contraire au droit international »
(par. 55). Elle ajoute :
«D’après les nombreux rapports décrivant la politique et les pra -
tiques appliquées dans l’ex -Yougoslavie, le « nettoyage ethnique » se
réalise par le meurtre, la torture, l’arrestation et la détentihon arbi -
traires, les exécutions extrajudiciaires, le viol et les violences sehxuelles,
le cantonnement de la population civile dans des ghettos, les déplaceh -
ments, transferts et déportations de populations civiles contre leur h
gré, les attaques ou menaces d’attaques délibérées contre des civils
dans des zones civiles et la destruction aveugle de biens. Ces
pratiques constituent des crimes contre l’humanité et peuvent être
assimilées à des crimes de guerre bien définis. Qui plus est,h elles
pourraient également relever de la convention sur le génocide. » (Pre -
mier rapport intérimaire, par. 56.)
La Commission d’experts rapporte ensuite que, tout au long des divershes
phases des conflits armés dans l’ex -Yougoslavie, il a été fait état « d’allé-
gations selon lesquelles le viol et d’autres formes de violence sexuehlle se
pratiqueraient de manière généralisée et systématique » ( ibid., par. 58),
ainsi que d’exécutions massives, de disparitions et de charniers phendant la
guerre en Croatie (ibid., par. 62-63).
129Nations Unies, doc. S/25274 du 10 février 1993, p. 1.
130Les conventions de Genève de 1949 (pour les «violations graves » du droit inter-
national humanitaire) et leur protocole additionnel I, la convention de La Haye IV et le
règlement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, la convention de 1948 pour
la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, la convention de 1980 sur l’interdiction
ou la limitation de l’emploi de certaines armes classiques et ses prohto.7, 39 et 47
du premier rapport préliminaire de la Commission d’experts).
260
7 CIJ1077.indb 517 18/04/16 08:54 260 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
(b) Report of a mass grave near Vukovar (of 10 January 1993)
162. The next Report of the Commission of Experts focused specifi -
cally on the mass grave near Vukovar. A mass execution took place at theh
gravesite, and “the executioners sought to bury their victims secretlhy” ;
the grave contained some 200 bodies (item I). The mass grave was discov-
ered by members of the UNPROFOR Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) and
an international forensic team, in an area south-east of the farming vilh -
lage of Ovčara, near Vukovar. The Commission of Experts reported thath
“[t]he discovery of the Ovčara site is consistent with witness testimony of
the disappearance of about 200 patients and medical staff members from
the Vukovar Hospital during the evacuation of Croatian patients from
that facility on 20 November 1991” (item II).
163. JNA soldiers and Serbian paramilitaries loaded a truck with
groups of 20 men, beating them, and driving them away (to execution) ; at
“intervals of about 15 to 20 minutes, the truck returned empty and
another group was loaded onto it” (item II). A mass execution took place,
and the mortal remains (of some 200 bodies) were then put in a clandes -
tine mass grave. The Commission of Experts reiterated that “[t]he remote
location of the grave suggests that the executioners intended to bury thheir
victims secretly” (item III).
(c) Second Interim Report (of 6 October 1993)
164. In its following Report (UN doc. S/26545), the Commission of
Experts again dwelt upon the mass execution at the grave site in Ovčahra
(para. 78). Besides mass killings, in its fact -finding missio131 it found
widespread violations of human rights in detention centres , including
torture, beatings, and other forms of physical and psychological mistreah-t
ment (“Second Interim Report”, paras. 84-85). Furthermore, there was
an “overall pattern” of rapes (330 reported cases), suggesting a “system -
atic rape policy” ; among the factors pointing in this direction, the Com -
mission of Experts proceeded,
“is the coincidence in time between military action designed to dis -
place civilian populations and widespread rape of the same popula -
tions. Group involvement of the members of the same military units
in rape suggests command responsibility by commission or omission ;
in this respect, the manner in which this type of rape was conducted
in multiple locations and within a fairly close period of time (mostly h
between May and December 1992) is also a significant factor. Another
factor in this connection is the contemporaneous existence of other
131There were 353 reported detention centres (para. 35).
261
7 CIJ1077.indb 518 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 260
b) Rapport du 10 janvier 1993 sur un charnier proche de Vukovar
162. Le rapport suivant de la Commission d’experts est centré sur un
charnier découvert près de Vukovar. Une exécution massive a eu hlieu à
cet endroit et « les exécuteurs ont cherché à enterrer leurs victimes clan -
destinement»; le charnier contenait environ 200 corps (point I). Ce char-
nier a été découvert par des membres de la police civile (UNCIhVPOL) de
la Force de protection des Nations Unies (FORPRONU) et une équipe
internationale de médecins légistes, au sud -est du village agricole
d’Ovčara, près de Vukovar. La Commission d’experts déclarhe que « la
découverte du site d’Ovčara est en cohérence avec les témhoignages faisant
état de la disparition d’environ 200 patients et personnels hospitaliers de
l’hôpital de Vukovar pendant l’évacuation des patients croathes de cet éta -
blissement le 20 novembre 1991» (point II).
163. Les soldats de la JNA (armée populaire yougoslave) et des mili -
ciens serbes faisaient monter sous les coups un groupe d’une vingtainhe
d’hommes dans un camion, puis les conduisaient au lieu d’exécution ;
«environ toutes les quinze ou vingt minutes, le camion revenait vide et uhn
autre groupe y était chargé » (point II). Ces hommes ont été exécutés en
masse, puis leurs dépouilles (environ 200 corps) ont été jetées dans un
charnier clandestin. La Commission d’experts réaffirme que « l’emplace -
ment isolé de ce charnier donne à penser que les exécuteurs avahient l’in -
tention d’enterrer leurs victimes clandestinement » (point III).
c) Deuxième rapport intérimaire (6 octobre 1993)
164. Dans son rapport suivant (Nations Unies, doc. S/26545), la Com-
mission d’experts revient sur l’exécution massive au site du chharnier
d’Ovčara (par. 78).Au cours de ses missions d’établissement des faits, elle
a constaté non seulement des massacres, mais encore des violations géhné-
ralisées des droits de l’homme dans les centres de détention 13, notam-
ment des coups, tortures et autres formes de mauvais traitements
physiques et psychologiques (deuxième rapport intérimaire, par. 84-85).
De surcroît, le nombre élevé de viols fait apparaître un «h comportement
généralisé » (330 viols déclarés) et un certain nombre d’éléments peuvent h
donner à penser qu’il existe une « politique de viols systématiques »; l’un
de ces éléments, poursuit la Commission d’experts,
« est le fait que les actions militaires destinées à déplacer lesh popula-
tions civiles ont coïncidé avec le viol généralisé des mêmes popula-
tions. La participation de membres des mêmes unités militaires àh des
viols semble mettre en cause les officiers responsables, soit qu’ilsh en
aient donné l’ordre, soit qu’ils se soient abstenus d’intervhenir. A cet
égard, la façon dont ce type de viol a été pratiqué dans de multiples
endroits et en un laps de temps relativement court (essentiellement
entre mai et décembre 1992) est aussi un élément important. Un autre
131Les centres de détention connus étaient au nombre de 353 (par. 35).
261
7 CIJ1077.indb 519 18/04/16 08:54 261 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
violations of international humanitarian law in a given region occur -
ring simultaneously in prison camps, in the battlefield and in the civh-il
ian regions of occupied areas.” (Second Interim Report, para. 69.)
165. The general framework was one of destruction, with findings of
mass killings (in the Vukovar area), brutal mistreatment of prisoners,h sy-s
tematic sexual assaults, “ethnic cleansing”, and destruction of prhoperty
(ibid., paras. 9-10). There were thousands of “incidents of victimization”
(ibid., para. 29), mostly against the civilian population (kidnapping or
hostage-taking, forced eviction, imprisonment, rapes, torture, killings)
(ibid., paras. 32 and 35). In the Vukovar area, there was abduction of
civilians and personnel (some 200 persons) from the Vukovar Hospital,
followed by their execution and burial in a mass grave at Ovčara (ibid.,
paras. 35 and 37). More than a war, it was an onslaught.
(d) Final Report (of 27 May 1994)
166. The “Final Report” of the Commission of Experts gives a detailed
account of the findings of the horrifying atrocities perpetrated against the
targeted victims. In its presentation of the “Final Report”, the (then)
UN Secretary-General (B. Boutros-Ghali) drew attention to the “reported
grave breaches” of international humanitarian law, committed “on ah
large scale”, and “brutal and ferocious in their execution”. Heh further
drew attention to the Commission’s “substantive findings on allehged
crimes of ‘ethnic cleansing’, genocide and other massive violationhs of
elementary dictates of humanity” 132. As to “ethnic cleansing” and rape
and sexual assault, he added that they have been carried out “so system -
atically that they strongly appear to be the product of a policy”, whhich
“may also be inferred from the consistent failure to prevent the commhis-
sion of such crimes and to prosecute and punish their perpetrators” 133.
167. Throughout its “Final Report”, the Commission of Experts
stressed its findings of grave breaches of international humanitarian
law 134, mainly in Croatia and Bosnia -Herzegovina (paras. 45, 231, 253
and 311). It was attentive to detect the systematicity of victimization, dis -
closing a policy of persecution or discrimination (“Final Report”h,
para. 84). At a certain point, the Commission dwelt upon the Convention
against Genocide, adopted — it recalled — for “humanitarian and civiliz-
ing purposes”, in order to safeguard the existence itself of certain hhuman
132UN doc. S/1994/674, of 27 May 1994, p. 1.
133Ibid., pp. 1-2.
134Articles 50, 51, 130 and 147 of the 194Geneva Conventions on International
Humanitarian Law, and Articles 11 (4) and 85 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
262
7 CIJ1077.indb 520 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 261
élément est le fait que d’autres violations du droit international huma-
nitaire dans une région donnée ont été commises simultanéhment dans
les camps de prisonniers, sur le champ de bataille et dans les zones
civiles des régions occupées. » (Deuxième rapport intérimaire, par. 69.)
165. Il existe un cadre général, qui est celui de la destruction, avec hdes
massacres (dans la région de Vukovar), mauvais traitements des prishon -
niers, violences sexuelles systématiques, « nettoyage ethnique» et destruc-
tion de biens (ibid., par. 9-10). Les cas de «violations et d’actes de brutalité
présumés » se comptent par milliers ( ibid., par. 29), dont les victimes se
recrutent principalement dans la population civile (enlèvements, prihses
d’otages, expulsions sous la contrainte, détention, viols, torture, meurtres)
(ibid., par. 32 et 35). Dans la zone de Vukovar, il y a eu l’enlèvement de
civils et de membres du personnel de l’hôpital de Vukovar (envi -
ron 200 personnes), suivi par leur exécution et leur enterrement dans une
fosse commune à Ovčara (ibid., par. 35 et 37). Plus qu’une guerre, c’est
une campagne de dévastation.
d) Rapport final (27 mai 1994)
166. Dans son rapport final, la Commission d’experts dresse un tableau
détaillé des atrocités commises contre les victimes appartenanth aux popu-la
tions ciblées. Le Secrétaire général Boutros Boutros-Ghali, dans sa lettre de
transmission du rapport au Conseil de sécurité, évoque « les cas signalés de
violations graves» du droit international humanitaire, «commises à grande
échelle », et dont « l’exécution … [a] été particulièrement cruelle et impi -
toyable». Il mentionne également «les conclusions [de la Commission] sur
les crimes de « nettoyage ethnique», le génocide [et] les autres violations
massives des préceptes imprescriptibles de la conscience» (ou principes élé-
132
mentaires d’humanité) . Il ajoute que le « nettoyage ethnique» et le viol
ainsi que les violences sexuelles « ont été pratiqués de façon tellement systé-
matique par certaines des parties qu’il y a tout lieu d’y soupçhonner le pro -
duit d’une politique ». Et encore : « qu’il y ait eu politique peut également
s’induire du fait que l’on a invariablement omis de préveni133ah perpétration
de ces crimes et de poursuivre et punir leurs auteurs» .
167. Tout au long de son rapport final, la Commission d’experts expose
ses conclusions sur les graves violations du droit international humani -
134
taire , principalement en Croatie et en Bosnie-Herzégovine (par. 45, 231,
253 et 311). Elle s’attache à déceler le caractère systématique des actes
commis, pour établir s’ils relèvent d’une politique de perséhcution ou de
discrimination (rapport final, par. 84). A un certain moment, elle évoque
la convention sur le génocide, qui, rappelle-t-elle, « a été adoptée à des fins
humanitaires et civilisatrices», dans le but de sauvegarder l’existence même
132Nations Unies, doc. S/1994/674 du 27 mai 1994, p. 1.
133Ibid., p. 1-2.
134Articles 50, 51, 130 et 147 des conventions de Genève de 1949 et articles 11, par. 4,
et 85 du protocole additionnel I de 1977.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 521 18/04/16 08:54 262 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
groups and to assert basic “principles of humanity” (Final Reporth,
para. 88). The Convention, it added, had a “historical evolutionary
nature” (ibid., para. 89).
168. In the perpetration of those grave breaches, there was ample use
of paramilitaries, and the chain of command was thus blurred ( ibid.,
paras. 114, 120-122 and 128), so as intentionally to conceal responsibility
(ibid., para. 124). In this way “ethnic cleansing” was conducted (to build
the “Greater Serbia”) as a “purposeful policy”, terrorizingh the civilian
population, in order to remove ethnic or religious groups from certain
geographic areas, moved at times by a “sense of revenge” (ibid.,
paras. 130-131). The areas were strategic, “linking Serbia proper with
Serb-inhabited areas in Bosnia and Croatia” (ibid., para. 133).
169. The acts of violence, to remove the civilian population from those
areas, were carried out with “extreme brutality and savagery”, inshtilling
terror, so that the persecuted would flee and never return. They incluhded
mass murder, torture and rape, other mistreatment of civilians and pris -
oners of war, using of civilians as human shields, indiscriminate killings,
forced displacement, destruction of cultural property, attacks on hospi -
tals and medical locations, burning and blowing up of houses and destruc-h
tion of property (ibid., paras. 134-137).
170. The Commission of Experts also found frequency of shelling
(ibid., para. 188) and a pattern of “systematic targeting” (ibid., para. 189).
Such policy and practices of “ethnic cleansing” were carried out bhy mem-
bers of distinct segments of Serbian society, such as members of the Serh-
bian army, militias, special forces, police and individuals (ibid.,
paras. 141-142) 13, as illustrated by the destruction of the city of Vukovar
in 1991 (ibid., para. 145). The Commission of Experts also singled out the
attack on Dubrovnik, a city with no defence it p:ndered that the destruc-
tion of cultural property therein could not at all be justified as a “hmilitary
necessity” (ibid., paras. 289 and 293-294). The battle of Dubrovnik was
criminal (ibid., para. 297); there was a deliberate attack on civilians and
cultural property ( ibid., paras. 299-300).
171. The Commission of Experts then turned to the concentration camp : s
the living conditions in those camps were “appalling”, with executions en
masse, rapes, torture, killings, beatings and deportations (i.b,daras.169 -1).
Concentration camps were the scene of “the worst inhumane acts”, chomm - it
ted by guards, police, special forces and others (ibid., para. 223). Those
135 This generated further violence, the Commission of Experts added, and Croatian
forces also engaged in such practices, though the Croatian authorities dheplored them, ind-i
cating that they were not part of a governmental policy (para. 147).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 522 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 262
de certains groupes humains et d’affirmer « les principes les plus élémen -
taires d’humanité» (rapport final, par. 88). La Convention, ajoute encore
la Commission, a un « caractère évolutif historique» ( ibid., par. 89).
168. Les milices paramilitaires ont été largement mises à contribu -
tion pour commettre ces graves violations, ce qui a entouré la chaîne dhe
commandement (ibid., par. 114, 120-122 et 128) d’une confusion qui ser -
vait à masquer délibérément les responsabilités (ibid., par. 124). Le « net-
toyage ethnique» (en vue d’édifier une Grande Serbie) est « une politique
délibérée» visant à terroriser la population afin de faire disparaître d’une
zone donnée certains groupes ethniques ou religieux; elle est parfois moti-
vée par une «volonté de revanche» (ibid., par. 130-131). Les zones concer-
nées sont des « zones stratégiques qui relient la Serbie proprement dite
aux territoires peuplés par des Serbes situés en Bosnie et en Croahtie »
(ibid., par. 133).
169. Les actes de violence visant à faire disparaître une certaine popuh-
lation civile de ces zones stratégiques sont perpétrés « avec une brutalité et
une sauvagerie [extrêmes] destinées à terroriser les populationhs civiles »
afin de les obliger à fuir et à ne jamais revenir. Ils consistenht en massacres,
torture, viols, mauvais traitements infligés aux prisonniers civilsh et aux
prisonniers de guerre, utilisation de civils comme boucliers humains,
meurtres sans discrimination, déplacements forcés, destruction de hbiens
culturels, attaques contre des hôpitaux et autres établissements mhédicaux,
incendie et démolition de maisons à l’explosif, destruction de hbiens (ibid.,
par. 134-137).
170. La Commission d’experts établit également la fréquence des bhom -
bardements (ibid., par. 188) et conclut qu’il y a eu « bombardement systé-
matique d’objectifs précis » (ibid., par. 189). La politique de « nettoyage
ethnique » et ses pratiques sont exécutées par des personnes appartenanth
à tous les secteurs de la population serbe : membres de l’armée, milices,
forces spéciales, police et civils (d., par. 141-142)135, comme en témoigne
la destruction de la ville de Vukovar en 1991 (ibid., par. 45). La Commis-
sion d’experts a mis en évidence le siège de Dubrovnik, qui éhtait une ville
ouverte : elle conclut que la destruction de biens culturels dans cette ville
ne pouvait absolument pas se justifier par des « exigences militaires »
(bid., par. 289 et 293-294). La bataille de Dubrovnik était criminelle
«d’un point de vue juridique » (ibid., par. 297); des attaques délibérées
ont été dirigées contre des civils et des biens culturels (ibid., par. 299-300).
171. En ce qui concerne les camps de concentration, la Commission
d’experts constate que les conditions de vie y étaient « effroyables», avec
des exécutions collectives, des viols, de la torture, des meurtres, dhes pas -
sages à tabac et des déportations (ibid., par. 169-171). Les « actes les plus
inhumains » sont perpétrés dans ces camps par des gardes, des membres
135La Commission d’experts ajoute que ces comportements ont engendré hde nouvelles
violences et que les forces croates ont recouru aux mêmes pratiques que les Serbes, mais
que les autorités croates ont condamné publiquement ces pratiques,h indiquant ainsi qu’elles
ne font pas partie intégrante de la politique du gouvernement (par. 147).
263
7 CIJ1077.indb 523 18/04/16 08:54 263 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
atrocities were accompanied by “purposeful humiliation and degradatiohn”,
a “common feature in almost all camps” (Final Report, paras. 229-230 (d)).
172. Men of “military age”, between the ages of 16 (or younger)
and 60, were separated from older men, women and children, and trans -
ferred to heavily guarded larger camps, where killings and brutal torturhe
were committed ( ibid., para. 230 (i)). Prisoners in all camps were sub -
jected to “mental abuse and humiliation”. There was no hygiene, anhd
soon there were epidemics. Prisoners nearly starved to death ; “[o]ften sick
and wounded prisoners” were “buried alive in mass graves along withh the
corpses of killed prisoners” (ibid., para. 230 (p)).
173. The Commission of Experts proceeded, focusing on the practice
of rape, which was not often reported for fear of reprisals, lack of conhfi -
dence in justice, and the social stigma attached to it (ibid., paras.233-234).
The reported cases of rape occurred between the fall of 1991 and the endh
of 1993, most of them having occurred between April and November1992
(ibid., para. 237). From the reported cases, five patterns of rape emerged,
namely: (a) rape as intimidation of the targeted group, involving indi -
viduals or small groups (ibid., para. 245); (b) rape — sometimes in pub-
lic — linked to the fighting in an area, involving individuals or smallh
groups (ibid., para. 246) (c) rape in detention camps (after the men were
killed), followed at times by the murder of the raped women (ibid.,
par. 247) ; (d) rape as terror and humiliation, as part of the policy of
“ethnic cleansing”, keeping pregnant women detained until they could no
longer have an abortion (ibid., para. 248) ; and (e) rape (in hotels or other
facilities) for entertainment of soldiers, more often followed by the mhur -
der of the raped women (ibid., para. 249).
174. Rapes, amidst shame and humiliation, the Commission pro-
ceeded, were intended “to displace the targeted group from the regionh” ;
moreover, “[l]arge groups of perpetrators subject[ed] victims to multhiple
rapes and sexual assault” ( ibid., para. 250). They ended up being “com -
mitted by all sides to the conflict” (ibid., para. 251); the patterns of rape
(supra) suggest that “a systematic rape policy existed in certain areas”
(ibid., para. 253).
175. The Commission concluded that practices of “ethnic cleansing”,
with rapes, were systematic, and appeared as a policy (also by omissionh,
ibid., para. 313). Those grave breaches could thus be reasonably inferred
from such “consistent and repeated practices” (ibid., para. 314). The
264
7 CIJ1077.indb 524 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 263
de la police ou des forces spéciales et d’autres personnes venues hde l’exté-
rieur à cette fin (rapport final, par. 223). Ils sont accompagnés par « l’hu-
miliation et la dégradation délibérée des détenus », qui sont «des pratiques
quasi générales dans les camps » (ibid., par. 229-230, al. d)).
172. Les hommes considérés comme étant d’« âge militaire »
— c’est-à-dire âgés de 16 ans, ou moins, à 60 ans — sont séparés des
hommes plus âgés, des femmes et des enfants, et transférés dhans des
camps plus vastes fortement gardés où les meurtres et les torturesh brutales
sont habituels (par. 230, al. i)). Dans tous les camps, les prisonniers sont
victimes de « violences psychologiques et d’humiliations ». L’hygiène est
inexistante et des épidémies se déclarent rapidement. Les prisohnniers sont
soumis à un régime de famine ; « les prisonniers malades ou blessés sont
souvent enterrés vivants dans les fosses communes avec les cadavres dhe
prisonniers tués» ( ibid., par. 230, al. p)).
173. Passant à la pratique du viol, la Commission d’experts rappelle quhe
ce crime est l’un de ceux qui sont le moins souvent dénoncés pahr les vic -
times, à la fois par peur de représailles, par manque de confianhce dans la
justice etn raison de la flétrissure qui, pour la société, s’attachhe à la victime
(ibid., par. 233-234). Les actes dont il est fait état dans les dépositions
recueillies se situent entre l’automne 1991 et la fin de 1993; c’est d’avril à
novembre 1992 que les viols ont été le plus fréquents (ibid., par. 237). Les
cas de viol dénoncés appartiennent à cinq catégories : a) les viols commis
par des individus agissant seuls ou en petits groupes comme moyen d’ihnti -
midation des groupes visés (ibid., par. 245); b) les viols liés à des combats
dans la région et commis — parfois en public — par des individus agissant
seuls ou en petits groupes (ibid., par. 246) c; les viols commis dans des
camps, après que les hommes ont été tués, la femme violéeh étant parfois
tuée ensuite (ibid., par.47); d) les viols commis pour terroriser et humilier
les victimes dans le cadre d’une politique de « nettoyage ethnique», les
femmes enceintes restant prisonnières jusqu’à ce que la grosseshse soit trop
avancée pour un avortement (ibid., par.248) ; ete) les viols commis par des
soldats sur des prisonnières dans des hôtels ou locaux analogues transfor -
més en bordels de campagne, et suivis plus souvent que dans les autres
catégories par le meurtre des femmes ainsi violées ( ibid., par. 249).
174. La Commission d’experts fait observer que ces viols, source de
honte et d’humiliation, sont associés à « la volonté de chasser de la région
le groupe ethnique qui en est victime »; de plus, « les viols et sévices sont
commis collectivement par des individus nombreux et sont répétéhs ibid.» (
par. 250); tous les groupes qui s’opposent dans le conflit ont été accusés
d’avoir commis des viols » (ibid., par. 251); les catégories de viol décrites
supra « incite[nt] donc à conclure que le viol a été systématiquemenht
encouragé dans certains endroits » et constituaient donc une politique de
viol systématique ( ibid., par. 253).
175. La Commission d’experts conclut que les pratiques de « nettoyage
ethnique », les violences sexuelles et les viols sont systématiques et
semblent constituer une politique (et notamment une politique par omis -
sion) (ibid., par.313). On peut raisonnablement inférer « de la constance
264
7 CIJ1077.indb 525 18/04/16 08:54 264 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Commission of Experts confessed to have been “shocked” by the highh
level of victimization and the manner in which these crimes were commit -
ted (Final report, para. 319).
3. Repercussion of Occurrences in the United Nations Second World
Conference on Human Rights (1993)
176. It should not pass unnoticed that the occurrences in the wars in
the former Yugoslavia had prompt repercussions at the Second
World Conference of Human Rights, held in Vienna in June 1993. Hav-
ing participated in all stages of that United Nations World Conference, I
remember well that the original intention was not to single out any counh-
try, but soon two exceptions were made, so as to address the situation ohf
the affected populations in the ongoing armed conflicts in the former
136 137
Yugoslavia and in Angola .
177. The special declarations on the two conflicts were adopted therein,
on 24 June 1993. As to the former, the concern it expressed was directed
to the occurrences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular at
Goražde. An appeal to the UN Security Council accompanying the spe -
cial declaration, referred to the attacks as “genocide”. The declahration
referred to that “tragedy”, as “characterized by the naked Serbhian aggre-s
sion, unprecedented violations of human rights and genocide”, being “han
affront to the collective conscience of mankind” (third preambular para-
graph). And it added that :
“The World Conference believes that the practice of ethnic cleansing
resulting from Serbian aggression against the Muslim and Croat pop-
ulation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes geno -
cide in violation of the Convention on thePrevention and Punishment
138
of the Crime of Genocide.” (Eighth preambular paragraph.)
178. Although the occurrences which attracted the attention of the
UN World Conference in 1993 were the ones that were taking place in
one particular locality, in the European continent, not so far away fromh
Vienna (mainly in Goražde), they occurred likewise, and were to keehp on
occurring, in other parts of former Yugoslavia. The atrocities at issue h
formed part of a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction
(cf.Sections VIII-X, infra). They were committed pursuant to a plan ; the
chain of command (the Supreme Defence Council) and the perpetrators
were the same, engaging State responsibility.
136 “Decision and Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina”,in Report of the UN
Secretary‑General on the Second World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 14-25 June
1993), in A/CONF.157/24, Part I, of 13 October 1993, p. 47.
137 “Special Declaration on Angola”, in ibid., p. 50.
138 “Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in ibid., pp. 47-48.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 526 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 264
et de la persistance » de telles pratiques que ces graves violations du droit
international humanitaire étaient connues (rapport final, par. 314). La
Commission d’experts admet avoir été « choquée» par « l’intensité des
persécutions et la manière dont ces crimes ont été commis » (ibid.,
par. 319).
3. Répercussions de ces événements sur la deuxième confér▯ence mondiale
sur les droits de l’homme (1993)
176. Il n’est pas indifférent de rappeler que les événements des guerres
des Balkans ont rapidement eu des répercussions sur la deuxième cohnfé -
rence mondiale sur les droits de l’homme qui s’est tenue à Vienhne en
juin 1993. Ayant participé à toutes les phases de cette conférence, hje me
souviens parfaitement qu’il avait d’abord été décidé qhu’aucun pays ne
serait pointé du doigt, mais que deux exceptions ont bientôt éthé faites
pour répondre à la situation des populations affectées par les chonflits
armés en cours dans l’ex -Yougoslavie 136et en Angola 13.
177. C’est ainsi que des déclarations spéciales sur deux conflits ont été
adoptées le 24 juin 1993. La première exprime la consternation suscitée
par les événements de Bosnie -Herzégovine. Elle est accompagnée d’un
«appel au Conseil de sécurité au sujet de la Bosnie -Herzégovine », qui
évoque plus particulièrement la situation à Goražde. Le texthe de la décla -
ration affirme que cette « tragédie» est « caractérisée par une agression
serbe flagrante, par des violations sans précédent des droits deh l’homme et
par un génocide, [et] est un affront à la conscience collective de l’huma -
nité» (troisième alinéa du préambule). On y lit encore :
«[La Conférence mondiale] estime que la pratique du nettoyage
ethnique résultant de l’agression serbe contre la population musulh -
mane et croate de la République de Bosnie -Herzégovine constitue un
génocide et une violation de la Convention pour la prévention et lha
répression du crime de génocide.» 138(Huitième alinéa du préambule.)
178. Bien que les faits qui ont attiré l’attention de la Conférence hmondiale
de 1993 se soient déroulés en un lieu particulier du continent européhen guère
éloigné de Vienne (principalement à Goražde), ils se produisaient aussi, et
devaient continuer de se produire, dans d’autres régions de l’ex-Yougosla-
vie. Les atrocités en cause faisaient partie intégrante d’une champagne de-des
truction générale et systématique (voir infra les sections VIII à X). Elles
étaient commises selon un plan organisé ; la chaîne de commandement (le
Conseil suprême de défense) et les auteurs de ces atrocités étaient les mêmes,
et engageaient la responsabilité de l’Etat.
136«Décision et déclaration spéciale sur la Bosni-Herzégovine», Rapport de la
Conférence mondiale sur les droits de l’homme (Vienne, 14 -25 juin 1993), Nations Unies,
doc. A/CONF.157/24 (partie I), 13 octobre 1993, p. 48-51.
137«Déclaration spéciale sur l’Angola », ibid., p. 52-53.
138
«Déclaration spéciale sur la Bosnie-Herzégovine», ibid., p. 49.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 527 18/04/16 08:54 265 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
179. The final document adopted by the World Conference — the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) — clearly addressed
the problem. The Declaration asserted that :
“The World Conference on Human Rights expresses its dismay at
massive violations of human rights, especially in the form of genocide, h
‘ethnic cleansing’, and systematic rape of women in war situationsh,
creating mass exodus of refugees and displaced persons. While
strongly condemning such abhorrent practices, it reiterates the call
that perpetrators of such crimes be punished and such practices imme -
diately stopped.” (Part I, para. 28.)
And the Programme of Action, for its part, added that :
“The World Conference on Human Rights calls on all States to
take immediate measures, individually and collectively, to combat the
practice of ethnic cleansing to bring it quickly to an end. Victims of
the abhorrent practice of ethnic cleansing are entitled to appropriate
and effective remedies.” (Part II, para. 24.)
4. Judicial Recognition of the Widespread and/or Systematic Attacks
against the Croat Civilian Population —
Case Law of the ICTY
180. On successive occasions in its evolving case law, the ICTY has
addressed the atrocities committed during the war in Croatia (1991 -1992),
stressing that what occurred was not simply an armed conflict between h
opposing armed forces, but rather a devastation of villages and mass
murder of their populations. References can be made, in this connection,h
e.g., to the ICTY’s findings in the cases of Babić (2004), Martić (2007)
Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin (2007) and Stanišić and Simatović (2013).
(a) Babić case (2004)
181. Thus, in its Judgment of 29 June 2004 in the Babić case, the ICTY
139
(Trial Chamber) found that the regime that launched the armed attacks
within Serbia, committed “the extermination or murder of hundreds of h
Croat and other non-Serb civilians” (para. 15), and did so “in order to
transform that territory into a Serb-dominated State” (paras. 8 and 16).
And the ICTY (Trial Chamber) added significantly that :
“After the take-over, in co-operation with the local Serb authori -
ties, the Serb forces established a regime of persecutions designed to
drive the Croat and other non -Serb civilian populations from these
territories. The regime, which was based on political, racial, or reli -
139Together with Serbian forceincluding the JNA and TO units from Serbia, in
concert with Serbian authorities.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 528 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 265
179. Le document final de la Conférence mondiale — Déclaration et
programme d’action de Vienne (1993) — a désigné clairement le problème
dans le paragraphe suivant de la Déclaration :
«La Conférence mondiale sur les droits de l’homme se déclare
consternée par les violations massives des droits de l’homme, notahm -
ment celles qui prennent la forme de génocide, de « nettoyage ethnique»
et de viol systématique des femmes en temps de guerre, violations quih
sont à l’origine d’exodes massifs de réfugiés et de déhplacements de p-er
sonnes. Elle condamne énergiquement des pratiques aussi révoltantes et
elle réitère la demande que les auteurs de tels crimes soient punihs et qu’il
soit immédiatement mis fin à ces pratiques. » (Partie I, par. 28.)
De son côté, le programme d’action ajoute :
« La conférence mondiale sur les droits de l’homme engage tous les
Etats à prendre sur le champ, individuellement et collectivement, desh
mesures pour combattre le nettoyage ethnique afin d’y mettre rapideh -
ment un terme. Les victimes de cette pratique odieuse ont droit à desh
recours appropriés et efficaces. » (Partie II, par. 24.)
4. Reconnaissance judiciaire des attaques généralisées et/ou systé▯matiques
contre la population civile croate — La jurisprudence du Tribunal pénal
international pour l’ex‑Yougoslavie (TPIY)
180. A plusieurs reprises au cours de l’évolution de sa jurisprudence, hle
TPIY a commenté les atrocités commises pendant la guerre en Croatihe
(1991 -1992), soulignant que ce qui s’était passé était non pas sihmplement
un conflit armé entre des forces armées opposées, mais plutôht la dévasta-
tion de villages et le massacre de leurs populations. Je renvoie par exehmple,
sur ce sujet, aux affaires Babić (2004), Martić (2007), Mrkšić, Radić et
Sljivančanin (2007) et Stanišić et Simatović (2013).
a) Affaire Babić (2004)
181. Dans son jugement du 29 juin 2004 en l’affaire Babić, le TPIY a
139
conclu que le régime qui avait lancé les attaques armées depuis la Serbie
s’était livré « l’extermination ou au meurtre de centaines de civils croates
et d’autres civils non serbes» (par. 15) sur environ un tiers du territoire de
la Croatie dans le but « d’y créer un Etat dominé par les Serbes » (par. 8
et 16). Il importe de noter que le TPIY a ajouté ce qui suit :
«Ensuite, en collaboration avec les autorités locales serbes, les
forces serbes ont institué un système de persécutions visant à chasser
de ces territoires la population civile croate et les autres populationsh
civiles non serbes. Ces persécutions, de nature politique, raciale ouh
139 Avec les forces serbes y compris la JNA (armée populaire yougoslave) et des
unités de défense du territoire venues de Serbie —, de concert avec les autorités serbes.
266
7 CIJ1077.indb 529 18/04/16 08:54 266 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
gious grounds, included the extermination or murder of hundreds of
Croat and other non -Serb civilians in Dubića, Cerovljanji, Baćin,
Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovača and the neighbouring hamlets of Ska -
brnja, Nadin, and Bruška in Croatia ; the prolonged and routine
imprisonment and confinement of several hundred Croat and other
non-Serb civilians in inhumane living conditions in the old hospital
and the JNA barracks in Knin, which were used as detention facili -
ties; the deportation or forcible transfer of thousands of Croat and
other non-Serb civilians from the SAO Krajina ; and the deliberate
destruction of homes and other public and private property, cultural
institutions, historic monuments, and sacred sites of the Croat and
other non-Serb populations in Dubića, Cerovljanji, Baćin, Saborsko,
Poljanak, Lipovača and the neighbouring hamlets of Vaganac, Ska -
brnja, Nadin and Bruška.” (ICTY, Babić, Judgment of 29 June 2004,
para. 15.)
And the ICTY (Trial Chamber) then concluded, in the aforementioned
Babić case, on the basis of the factual statement and other evidence pre -
sented to it, that the execution (of the JCE) at issue “entailed a hwide -
spread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population” ahnd
“was carried out with discriminatory intent, on political, racial, orh reli -
gious grounds” (ibid., para. 35).
(b) Martić case (2007)
182. Likewise, in the Martić case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber), in its
Judgment of 12 June 2007, found that there had been a “widespread and
systematic attack”(para. 352) against the Croat population, committed
by the JNA, TO, Serbian police and Serbian paramilitaries, acting in conh -
cert ; that attack involved “the commission of widespread and grave
crimes” (para. 443), with “the goal of creating an ethnically Serb State”
(para. 342). In its assessment, “[t]here is evidence of Croats being killedh
in 1991, having their property stolen, having their houses burned, that
Croat villages and towns were destroyed, including churches and religious
buildings, and that Croats were arbitrarily dismissed from their jobs”h
(ICTY, Martić, Judgment of 12 June 2007, para. 324). The attacks con -
tinued in 1992 140.
183. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) further found that “numerous attacks
were carried out on Croat majority villages by the JNA acting in co-operh -
ation with the TO and the Milicija Krajine” (ibid., para. 344), and that
“[t]hese attacks followed a generally similar pattern, which involvedh the
killing and removal of the Croat population” ( ibid., para. 443). More-
over, it added, hundreds of Croat civilians were imprisoned and subjected
140It proceeded that “[d]uring 1992 on the territory of the RSK, there was a continu -
ation of incidents of killings, harassment, robbery, beatings, burning ohf houses, theft, and
destruction of churches carried out against the non-Serb population” (ibid., para. 327).
267
7 CIJ1077.indb 530 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 266
religieuse, ont pris diverses formes: extermination ou meurtre de cen-
taines de civils croates et d’autres civils non serbes à Dubića, Cerovl -
janji, Baćin, Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovača et dans les hameaux
avoisinants, Skabrnja, Nadin et Bruška, en Croatie ; emprisonnement
et détention prolongés et systématiques de plusieurs centaines hde civils
croates et d’autres civils non serbes dans des conditions inhumaines, à
l’ancien hôpital et à la caserne de la JNA à Knin, transformhés en
centres de détention; expulsion ou transfert forcé de milliers de civils
croates et d’autres civils non serbes de la SAO de Krajina; et destruc -
tion délibérée de logements, d’autres biens publics et privéhs, d’instit-u
tions culturelles, de monuments historiques et de lieux de culte de la
population croate et des autres populations non serbes à Dubića,
C erovljanji, Baćin, Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovača et dans les hameaux
avoisinants, Vaganac, Skabrnja, Nadin et Bruška. » (TPIY, Babić,
jugement du 29 juin 2004, par. 15.)
Sur la base de l’exposé des faits et des autres éléments de hpreuve qui lui ont
été présentés en l’affaire Babić, le TPIY s’est déclaré convaincu que la réa -
lisation de l’entreprise criminelle commune en cause « impliquait une
attaque généralisée ou systématique dirigée contre [la] phopulation civile » et
que cette entreprise criminelle avait été «exécutée avec une volonté de dis-
criminer pour des raisons politiques, raciales ou religieuses » (ibid., par.35).
b) Affaire Martić (2007)
182. De même, dans son jugement du 12 juin 2007 en l’affaire Martić,
le TPIY a conclu que « des attaques généralisées et systématiques ont été
dirigées contre la population civile croate » (par. 352) par la JNA, les uni-
tés de défense territoriale, la police serbe et les milices paramihlitaires
serbes opérant de concert ; que des « crimes graves et généralisés » ont été
commis au cours de ces attaques (par. 443) pour atteindre « l’objectif
poursuivi, à savoir la création d’un Etat serbe » (par. 342). Le TPIY a
également conclu qu’il ressortait « des éléments de preuve que, en 1991,
des Croates ont été tués, dépouillés de leurs biens, que hleurs maisons ont
été incendiées, que des villes et des villages croates ont éhté détruits, y com
pris les églises et édifices religieux, et que des Croates ont éhté arbitraire -
ment licenciés » (TPIY, Martić, jugement du 12 juin 2007, par. 324). Ces
attaques se sont poursuivies en 1992 140.
183. Le TPIY a encore constaté que « la JNA, intervenant de concert
avec la TO [unités de défense territoriale] et la milice de Krajina, a lancé de
nombreuses attaques contre les villages peuplés majoritairement de Crhoates »
(ibid., par. 344) et que «es attaques suivaient généralement le même scéna -
rio, à savoir que les Croates étaient tués ou chassés » (ibid., par. 443). De
plus, ajoute le TPIY, des centaines de civils croates ont été capthurés et mis
140Le TPIY ajoute que, «[e]n 1992, le territoire de la RSK a continué d’être le théâhtre de
meurtres; d’actes de harcèlement; de vols aggravés, de brutalités et d’incendies; de vols et de
destructions d’églises visant la population non serbe ibid., par. 327).
267
7 CIJ1077.indb 531 18/04/16 08:54 267 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
to “severe mistreatment” (ICTY, Martić, Judgment of 12 June 2007,
para. 349). It further determined that “widespread crimes of violence and h
intimidation and crimes against private and public property were perpe-
trated against the Croat population, including in detention facilities rhun
by MUP forces of the SAO Krajina and the JNA” ( ibid., para. 443).
184. By the end of the summer of 1991, it added, “the JNA became an
active participant in Croatia on the side of the SAO Krajina” (ibid.,
para. 330). The ICTY (Trial Chamber) also referred to the persecution,
forced displacement, deportation and forcible transfer of the Croat popuh -
lation (civilians), and “further evidence that in 1991 Croats were killed by
Serb forces in various locations in the SAO Krajina” ( ibid., para. 426).
There was, in sum,
“evidence of a generally similar pattern to the attacks. The area or
village in question would be shelled, after which ground units would
enter. After the fighting had subsided, acts of killing and violence
would be committed by the forces against the civilian non -Serb pop -
ulation who had not managed to flee during the attack. Houses,
churches and property would be destroyed in order to prevent their
return and widespread looting would be carried out. (. . .) Moreover,
members of the non-Serb population would be rounded up and taken
away to detention facilities (. . .)” (Ibid., para. 427.)
185. Moreover, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) referred to the co-opera -
tion and assistance with Serbia on the part of Milan Martić (third Presi-
dent of the so -called “RSK”) ; in this respect, the Trial Chamber stated
that, “[t]hroughout 1992, 1993 and 1994, the RSK leadership, including
Milan Martić, requested financial, logistical and military support from
Serbia on numerous occasions, including directly from Slobodan
Milošević” (ibid., para. 159). And, as to the political objective of the Serb
leadership, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) stated that :
“[T]he President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, (. . .) covertly
intended the creation of a Serb state. Milan Babić testified that Slo -
bodan Milošević intended the creation of such a Serb State through
the establishment of paramilitary forces and the provocation of inci -
dents in order to allow for JNA intervention, initially with the aim to h
separate the warring parties but subsequently in order to secure ter -
ritories envisaged to be part of a future Serb state.” (Ibid., para.329.)
186. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) added that, as to the period 1991-1995,
it had been furnished with “a substantial amount of evidence of massihve and
widespread acts of violence and intimidation committed against the non-
Serb population (. . .)” (ibid., para. 430). It found inter alia that there had
occurred widespread and systematic attacks “directed against the Croaht and
other non-Serb civilian population” in Croatia in the period1991-1995, not -
withstanding the presence of Croat forces in some areas (ibid., para349-352).
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7 CIJ1077.indb 532 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 267
en détention, et « des sévices graves leur ont été infligés » (TPIY, Martić,
jugement du 12 juin 2007, par. 349). Le TPIY conclut aussi que « des actes
de violence et d’intimidation généralisés ainsi que des atteintes à la propriété
privée et publique visant la population croate, notamment l’emprishonne-
ment dans des centres de détention administrés par les forces du MhUP
[police de la Serbie] de la SAO [région autonome serbe] de Krajina eth de la
JNA » ont été commis à la suite des attaques précitées (bid., par.443).
184. A la fin de l’ét1991, ajoute le TPIY, « laJNA s’est engagée acti-
vement en Croatie aux côtés de la SAO de Krajina » (ibid., par. 330).
Après avoir rappelé les persécutions, les déplacements forcéhs, les déporta -
tions et les transferts sous la contrainte que la population civile croahte a
subis, le TPIY dit qu’il apparaît que « des Croates ont été tués par les
forces serbes dans plusieurs localités de la SAO de Krajina en 1991»
(ibid., par. 426). Pour résumer,
«les attaques se déroulaient, de manière générale, suivant leh même
scénario… Des unités de l’armée de terre entraient dans lhe secteur ou
le village en question à la suite d’un bombardement. Une fois que hles
combats avaient cessé, les assaillants tuaient ou maltraitaient les
civils non serbes qui n’avaient pas réussi à fuir pendant l’hattaque. Ils
détruisaient les maisons, les églises et d’autres bâtiments hpour empê -
cher le retour des non -Serbes, se livrant en même temps à un pillage
systématique. En outre, les non -Serbes étaient pris dans des rafles et
incarcérés…» (Ibid., par. 427.)
185. De plus, le TPIY a évoqué les rapports de coopération entre la hS-er
bie et Milan Martić, qui était le troisième président de la prétendue R«épu-
blique serbe de la Krajina (RSK) », ainsi que les demandes d’assistance de
Martić à la Serbie ; il a rappelé que, « [t]out au long des années1992, 1993
et 1994, les dirigeants de la RSK, et notamment MilanMartić, ont maintes
fois demandé le soutien financier, logistique et militaire de la Sehrbie, parfois
directement à Slobodan Milošević » (ibid., par. 159). En ce qui concerne
l’objectif politique des dirigeants serbes, il a conclu que
«[l]e président de la Serbie, Slobodan Milošević, … avait l’intention
secrète de créer un Etat serbe. Milan Babić a déclaré que Slobo -
dan Milošević entendait le faire en créant une force paramilitaire het
en provoquant des incidents qui permettraient à la JNA d’intervenihr,
dans un premier temps pour séparer les belligérants, mais à terhme
pour s’emparer des territoires qui constitueraient le futur Etatserbe.»
(Ibid., par. 329.)
186. En ce qui concerne la période allant de 1991 à 1995, le TPIY
déclare qu’il «dispose de nombreux éléments de preuve montrant que des
actes de violence et d’intimidation généralisés ont étéh commis contre la
population non serbe… » (ibid., par. 430). Il conclut, entre autres, que
« des attaques généralisées et systématiques ont été dirhigées contre la popu
lation civile croate et non serbe de Croatie pendant cette période, nonob-
stant la présence de forces croates dans certains secteuribid., par.349-352).
268
7 CIJ1077.indb 533 18/04/16 08:54 268 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
(c) Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin case (2007)
187. In the case of Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin, the ICTY (Trial
Chamber) made important findings (Judgment of 27 September 2007) as
to the “complete command and full control” exercised by the JNA over
the TOs and Serb paramilitaries, in “all military operations” (pahra. 89).
In addressing the “devastation brought on Vukovar over the prolonged h
military engagement in 1991” (ICTY, Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin,
Judgment of 27 September 2007, para. 8), the ICTY (Trial Chamber)
described, inter alia, how
“in the evening and night hours of 20 -21 November 1991 the prison -
ers of war were taken in groups of 10 to 20 from the hangar at Ovčara
to the site where earlier that afternoon a large hole had been dug.
There, members of Vukovar TO and paramilitary soldiers executed
at least 194 of them. The killings started after 21:00 hours and con-
tinued until well after midnight. The bodies were buried in the mass
grave and remained undiscovered until several years later.” ( Ibid.,
para. 252.)
188. In the aforementioned Judgment in the case of Mrkšić, Radić and
Sljivančanin, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) again made important findings on
the widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian populhation
in Vukovar. It stated, e.g., that, from23 August 1991 to18 November 1991,
“the town of Vukovar and its surroundings were increasingly subjectedh
to shelling and other fire : it came to be almost on a daily basis. The
damage to the city of Vukovar was devastating. (. . .) A large Serb
force comprising mainly well armed and equipped troops were involved
in far greater numbers than the Croat forces. In essence, the city of
Vukovar was encircled and under siege from Serb forces, including air
and naval forces, until the Croat forces capitulated on 18 Novem -
ber 1991. By the beginning of November virtually none of the houses
along the road from Vukovar to Mitnica were left standing above the
cellar. The supply of essential services to the whole of Vukovar was
disrupted. Electricity and water supplies and the sewage system all
failed. The damage to civilian property was extensive. By 18 Novem -
ber 1991, the city had been more or less totally destroyed. It was abso -
lutely devastated. Those still living in the city had been forced to takhe
141
shelter in cellars, shelters and the like.” (Ibid., para. 465.)
141
In its aforementioned Judgment, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) proceeded thaht
“the Vukovar hospital, schools, public buildings, offices, wells, thhe water and elec -
tricity supply and roads were severely damaged during the conflict. All buildings
were shelled, including the hospital, schools and kindergartens. Many wehlls were
also targeted and destroyed. Most of the wells in Vukovar were privatelyh owned, so
houses with a water supply were among the first to be destroyed. From hSeptember
to November 1991 there was no drinking water available, except from the remaining
wells.” (Ibid., para. 466.)
269
7 CIJ1077.indb 534 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 268
c) Affaire Mrkšić, Radić et Sljivančanin (2007)
187. Dans son jugement du 27 septembre 2007 en l’affaire Mrkšić,
Radić et Sljivančanin, le TPIY a formulé plusieurs conclusions impor -
tantes sur le fait que «la JNA avait la maîtrise totale des opérations mili -
taires» et exerçait un contrôle effectif sur les unités de la TO (hdéfense du
territoire) et de paramilitaires (par. 89). Au sujet des « dévastations com-
mises à Vukovar pendant les combats militaires prolongés de 1991»
(TPIY, Mrkšić, Radić et Sljivančanin, jugement du 27 septembre 2007,
par. 8), il décrit notamment comment,
«dans la soirée et la nuit du 20-21 novembre 1991, les prisonniers de
guerre ont été emmenés, par groupes de 10 ou 20, du hangar d’hOvčara
à l’emplacement où une grande fosse avait été creusée hplus tôt dans
l’après-midi. Là, des membres de la TO de Vukovar et des paramili -
taires ont exécuté au moins 194 prisonniers de guerre. Les exécutions
ont commencé après 21 heures et se sont poursuivies jusqu’à bien
après minuit. Les corps ont été jetés dans la fosse et n’ont été décou -
verts que plusieurs années plus tard. » (Ibid., par. 252.)
188. Dans ce même jugement, il a fait d’importantes constatations sur
l’attaque générale et systématique dirigée contre la population civile de
Vukovar. Il a notamment constaté que, du 23 août 1991 au 18 novembre
1991,
«Vukovar et ses environs ont, du 23 août au 18 novembre1991, été de
plus en plus la cible de bombardements et d’autres tirs qui ont finhi par
être quasi quotidiens. Les dégâts ont été terribles… Lhes forces serbes,
formées de troupes bien armées et équipées, disposaient d’une supério -
rité numérique écrasante sur les forces croates. La ville de Vuhkovar a
été encerclée et assiégée par les forces serbes, y comprihs par des forces
aériennes et navales, jusqu’à la capitulation des forces croatehs le
18 novembre 1991. Début novembre, des maisons situées le long de la
route reliant Vukovar à Mitnica, il ne restait que les caves. Toute lha
ville de Vukovar était privée de services de base. L’approvisiohnnement
en eau et en électricité était coupé et le système d’éhvacuation des eaux
usées défaillant. Les biens civils ont subi de grands dommages. Leh
18 novembre 1991, Vukovar offrait un spectacle de désolation. Ceux
qui étaient restés avaient été contraints de se retrancher dhans les caves,
141
des abris ou des endroits du même genre. » (Ibid., par.465.)
141
Toujours dans le même jugement, le TPIY constate que
«l’hôpital de Vukovar, les écoles, les bâtiments publics, lesh bureaux, les puits, les
réseaux d’approvisionnement en eau et en électricité, ainsi hque les route-veont été gra
ment endommagés pendant le conflit.Tous les bâtiments ont été bombardés, y compris
l’hôpital, les écoles et les jardins d’enfants.Nombre de puits ont été pris pour cibles et
détruits. La plupart d’entre eux appartenant à des particuliers, les maisonsh alimentées
en eau ont été parmi les premières à être détruites.De septembre à novembre1991, les
puits intacts constituaient la seule source d’eau potable.» (Ibid., par. 466.)
269
7 CIJ1077.indb 535 18/04/16 08:54 269 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
189. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) then stated, in the same Judgment of
27 September 2007 in the Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin case, that:
“The battle for Vukovar caused a large number of casualties, both
dead and wounded, combatants and civilians. There can be no exact
number for the wounded treated in Vukovar by Croat services,
because the extremely difficult and improvised treatment facilities didh
not allow the luxury of thorough records. There is no overall evidence
of the Serb forces’ casualties. What remained of Vukovar hospital,
together with a secondary nursing facility in a nearby cellar of a ware -
house, dealt with most of the wounded, but there were other facilities
in the Vukovar area. (. . .) Civilians, including women and children
were amongst the wounded. While precise statistics were not main -
tained in the circumstances, the Chamber accepts as a reliable esti -
mate that the casualties were 60 -75 per cent civilian. A report (. . .)
on 25 October 1991 from the medical director of the hospital noted
that 1250 wounded had been admitted since 25 August with a further
300 dead on arrival.” (ICTY, Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin, 27 Sep -
tember 2007, para. 468.)
190. And the ICTY (Trial Chamber) significantly added that :
“There can be no question that the Serb forces were, in part, directihng
their attack on Vukovar (. . .). [T]he Serb attack was also consciously
and deliberately directed against the city of Vukovar itself and its haphless
civilian population, trapped as they were by the Serb military blockade
of Vukovar and its surroundings and forced to seek what shelter they
could in the basements and other underground structures that survived
the ongoing bombardments and assaults. What occurred was not, in the
finding of the Chamber, merely an armed conflict between a military force ▯
and an opposing force in the course of which civilians became casualties
and some property was damaged. The events, when viewed overall, disclose▯
an attack by comparatively massive Serb forces, well armed, equipped and▯
organized, which slowly and systematically destroyed a city and its civil▯ ian
and military occupants to the point where there was a complete surrender▯
of those that remained. While the view is advanced before the Chamber
that the Serb forces were merely liberating besieged and wronged Serb
citizens who were victims of Croatian oppressiveness and discrimina -
tion, this is a significant distortion of the true position as revealehd by
142
the evidence, when reviewed impartially.” ( Ibid., para.470.)
(d) Stanišić and Simatović case (2013)
191. Subsequently, in its Judgment of 30 May 2013 in the Stanišić and
142
[Emphasis added.] And cf., furthermore, Part X (1) of the present dissenting
opinion, infra.
270
7 CIJ1077.indb 536 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 269
189. Dans ce jugement du 27 septembre 2007 en l’affaire Mrkšić, Radić
et Sljivančanin, le TPIY constate encore que
«[l]a bataille de Vukovar a fait de nombreux morts et blessés, tant duh
côté des combattants que des civils. On ignore le nombre exact de h
blessés pris en charge à Vukovar par les services croates dans la h
mesure où les centres de soins improvisés qui travaillaient dans dhes
conditions extrêmement difficiles ne pouvaient se permettre le luxe hde
tenir un décompte précis. Rien ne permet de connaître le nombre de
victimes du côté des forces serbes. La plupart des blessés éhtaient
accueillis dans ce qui restait de l’hôpital de Vukovar et d’uneh infirme -
rie secondaire installée dans la cave d’un entrepôt tout procheh, mais
il existait d’autres centres de soins dans le secteur de Vukovar… h
Parmi les blessés figuraient des civils, y compris des femmes et dehs
enfants. Aucun décompte précis n’ayant été tenu dans ces hcircons -
tances, la Chambre considère qu’on peut raisonnablement estimer
que les civils représentaient 60 à 75 % des blessés. Il ressort d’un rap -
port adressé à Zagreb par le directeur des services médicaux leh
25 octobre 1991 que 1250 blessés avaient été admis depuis le 25 août,
et que 300 victimes étaient décédées à leur arrivée. » (TPIY, Mrkšić,
Radić et Sljivančanin, 27 septembre 2007, par. 468.)
190. Et le TPIY d’ajouter l’important commentaire qui suit :
«Il ne fait aucun doute que les forces serbes dirigeaient en partie
leurs attaques contre Vukovar… [L]’attaque serbe était consciemhment
et délibérément dirigée contre la ville et sa malheureuse pohpulation
civile, prise au piège par le siège de Vukovar et des alentours pahr les
forces serbes et contrainte de se réfugier dans les caves et autres
constructions souterraines qui avaient résisté aux bombardements eht
aux assauts. Selon la Chambre, il ne s’agissait pas d’un simple conflit
armé entre une force militaire et des forces adverses qui aurait fait▯ des
victimes civiles et causé certains dommages matériels. Une vue d’e ▯ n ‑
semble révèle l’existence d’une attaque par les forces serbes numérique‑
ment bien supérieures, bien armées, bien équipées et bien org ▯ anisées, qui
ont lentement et systématiquement détruit une ville et ses occupant ▯ s civils
et militaires jusqu’à la reddition complète des derniers surviv▯ nts. L’idée
a été émise devant la Chambre que les forces serbes ne faisaient que
libérer les habitants serbes assiégés qui étaient oppriméhs par les Croates
et victimes de discriminations de leur part, mais c’est là une déhforma -
tion grossière des faits tels qu’ils ont été établis par hles éléments de
preuve considérés sans parti pris.» 142(Ibid., par. 470.)
d) Affaire Stanišić et Simatović (2013)
191. Plus tard, dans son jugement du 30 mai 2013 en l’affaire Stanišić
142 Les italiques sont de moi. Voir aussi ci-après la section X 1) de la présente opinion
dissidente.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 537 18/04/16 08:54 270 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Simatović case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) found that, from April 1991 to
April 1992, between 80,000 and 100,000 Croat and other non -Serb civil-
ians fled the SAO Krajina, as a result of the situation then prevailinhg in
that region,
“which was created by a combination of : the attacks on villages and
towns with substantial or completely Croat populations ; the killings,
use as human shields, detention, beatings, forced labour, sexual abuse
and other forms of harassment (including coercive measures) of Croat
persons ; and the looting and destruction of property. These actions
were committed by the local Serb authorities and the members and
units of the JNA (including JNA reservists), the SAO Krajina TO,
the SAO Krajina Police (including Milan Martić), and Serb paramil -
itary units, as well as local Serbs as set out in the Trial Chamber’sh
findings.” (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović, Judgment of 30 May 2013,
para. 404, and cf. para. 997.)
192. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) stressed that “[h]arassment and intim-
idation” of the Croat population were carried out “on a large scalhe” :
“Croats were killed in 1991, their property was stolen, their houses h
were burned, Croat villages and towns were destroyed, including
churches and religious buildings and Croats were arbitrarily dismissed
from their jobs. During 1992 (. . .) there was a continuation in inci -
dents of killings, harassment, robbery, beatings, burning of houses,
theft and destruction of churches carried out against the non -Serb
population. Throughout 1993 there were further reports of killings,
intimidation and theft.” (Ibid., para. 153.)
193. There were also cases of deportation and forcible transfer of
groups of persons (ibid., paras. 996-1054) ; the ICTY (Trial Chamber) fur-
ther found that Serb forces “committed deportation and forcible transhfer
of many thousands of Croats” ; in such incidents “people were moved
against their will or without a genuine choice”, as :
“Serb forces created an environment where the victims had no
choice but to leave. This included attacks on villages and towns, arbi-
trary detention, killings and ill treatment. These conditions prevailed
during the days or weeks, and sometimes months, prior to people
leaving. The Trial Chamber has also found that the crimes of murder,
deportation and forcible transfer constituted underlying acts of per -
secution as well.” (Ibid., para. 970.)
194. It added that, “the persons targeted were primarily members of
the civilian population” (ibid., para. 971). In the ICTY (Trial Chamber)’s
view, “the requirements of ‘attack’, ‘widespread’, and ‘hcivilian popula -
tion’ have been met” (ibid.). The crimes were perpetrated in widespread
271
7 CIJ1077.indb 538 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 270
et Simatović, le TPIY a conclu que d’avril 1991 à avril 1992, entre 80 000
et100 000 Croates et autres civils non serbes avaient fui la SAO de Kra -
jina en raison de la situation dans cette région au moment de leur déhpart
résultant des facteurs suivants :
«les attaques contre des villages et villes peuplés exclusivement ou lha -r
gement de Croates ; le meurtre, l’utilisation de boucliers humains, la
détention, les sévices, le travail forcé, les violences sexuelles et d’autres
formes de harcèlement (dont des mesures coercitives) visant les
Croates; le pillage et la destruction de biens. Ces actes ont été commis
par les autorités serbes locales et les membres et unités de la JNhA
(dont les réservistes), la TO de la SAO de Krajina, la police de lah SAO
de Krajina (dont la police de Martić) et des formations paramilitaihres
serbes, ainsi que par des Serbes locaux, comme il est dit dans les
conclusions tirées par la Chambre de première instance… » (TPIY,
Stanišić et Simatović, jugement du 30 mai 2013, par.404 et 997.)
192. Le TPIY a souligné que « les actes de harcèlement et d’intimida -
tion» dont la population croate a été l’objet ont été commis « sur une
grande échelle»:
« Des Croates ont été tués en 1991, leurs biens volés et leurs mai -
sons incendiées, des villages et des villes croates, y compris des éhglises
et des édifices religieux, ont été détruits et des Croatesh ont été arbi -
trairement démis de leurs fonctions. Pendant l’année 1992, les
meurtres, le harcèlement, les vols qualifiés, les sévices, l’hincendie de
maisons, les vols et la destruction d’églises se sont poursuivis … et
ont visé la population non serbe. Pendant toute l’année 1993, d’autres
informations ont fait état de meurtres, d’intimidations et de volsh. »
(Ibid., par. 153.)
193. Il y a eu aussi des cas de déportation et de transfert de groupes de h
personnes sous la contrainte (ibid., par. 996 -1054) ;e TPIY, ici encore, a
conclu que les forces serbes « ont expulsé et transféré de force des milliers
de Croates »; dans ce cas, « [l]es personnes avaient été déplacées contre
leur gré ou sans avoir eu véritablement le choix », car
«[l]es forces serbes avaient créé un climat tel que les victimes n’havaient
d’autre choix que de partir, notamment en attaquant des villages et dhes
villes, en procédant à des détentions arbitraires, en commettanht des
meurtres et en infligeant des mauvais traitements. Ces conditions ont
été maintenues pendant des jours ou des semaines, parfois des moish,
avant le départ de la population. La Chambre de première instance ha
également conclu que le meurtre, l’expulsion et le transfert forcéh consti
tuaient aussi des actes sous-jacents aux persécutions. » (Ibid., par.970.)
194. Le TPIY ajoute que « les personnes visées étaient principalement
des civils» (ibid., par. 971). Il conclut que « les conditions voulant que
l’«ttaque» soit « généralisée» et vise une « population civile » sont réu -
nies» (ibid.). Les crimes retenus ont été commis au cours d’attaques
271
7 CIJ1077.indb 539 18/04/16 08:54 271 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
armed attacks against the non -Serb civilian population, against unde -
fended non-Serb villages, with systematic executions of non-Serb civilians
and destruction of mosques, churches and homes of non-Serbs and other
civilian targets (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović, Judgment of 30 May 2013,
paras. 969-970). Those attacks, in the ICTY (Trial Chamber)’s finding,
were part of a pattern of destruction “against a civilian population”h and
“the perpetrators knew” that their acts were part of it (ibid., para. 972).
In this widespread and systematic pattern of destruction, all such attachks
were, as reckoned in the case law of the ICTY (supra) deliberate, inten -
tional.
X. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructiho:n
Massive Killings, Tortuhre and Beatings, Systemahtic Expulsion
from Homes and Mass Exoduhs and Destruction
of Group Culture
195. An examination of the factual context, as a whole, of the cas
d’espèce, discloses a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction,
carried out in the villages brought to the attention of the Court in theh
course of the present proceedings. Such a pattern of destruction, as it hwill
be shown next, encompassed massive killings, torture and beatings, sys -
tematic expulsion from homes and mass exodus, and destruction of group
culture. After reviewing and assessing the occurrence of those crimes, Ih
143
shall move on to other manifestations of the widespread and system -
atic pattern of destruction in the attacked villages in Croatia.
1. Indiscriminate Attacks against the Civilian Population
196. In the factual context of the present case of the Application of the
Convention against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), the question whether
the population attacked was either civilian in its entirety or predomi -
nantly civilian, does not raise any jurisdictional issue, as crimes of gheno-
cide can be committed against any individual, whether civilian or
combatant. In distinct contexts, the ICTY (Trial Chambers), faced withh
the jurisdictional requirements also of crimes against humanity and war h
crimes, has clarified the meaning to be attached to “civilian populhation” :
in all instances, it has adopted a wide definition of what constitutesh a
civilianpopulation, including, inter alia, individuals who performed acts
of resistance 14.
143
144 Parts XI, XII and XIII of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
For example, in theTadić case (Judgment of 7May 1997), the ICTY (Trial Chamber)
held, as to the targeted civilian population, that “[t]he presence ofh certain non-civilians in
272
7 CIJ1077.indb 540 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 271
armées généralisées contre la population civile non serbe, chontre des vil -
lages non serbes non défendus, et accompagnés par l’exécutiohn systéma-
tique de civils non serbes et par la destruction de mosquées, d’éhglises et de
maisons appartenant à des non-Serbes et d’autres cibles à carachtère civil
(TPIY, Stanišić et Simatović, jugement du 30 mai 2013, par. 69 70)9 Ce-9
attaques, selon les conclusions du TPIY, s’inscrivaient dans le cadreh d’une
campagne de destruction dirigée « contre la population civile », et « les
auteurs [desdites attaques le] savaient » (ibid., par. 972). Dans cette cam -
pagne de destruction généralisée et systématique, toutes lesh attaques de ce
genre étaient délibérées et intentionnelles, comme l’attehste la jurispru -
dence du TPIY (supra).
X. Campagne de destructihon générale et systémhatique :
meurtres de masse, acthes de torture et séviches physiques, expulsiohn
systématique des logehments et exode massif,h et destruction
de la culture du grouphe
195. L’examen de l’ensemble du contexte factuel de l’espèce fait happa-
raître l’existence d’une campagne de destruction généraleh et systématique
mise en œuvre dans les villages sur lesquels l’attention de la Couhr a été
appelée dans le cadre de la présente procédure. Cette campagne hde des -
truction, comme il sera montré ci -après, comportait des meurtres de
masse, des actes de torture et des sévices physiques, l’expulsion hsystéma-
tique des logements et un exode massif, et la destruction de la culture hdu
groupe. Après avoir examiné et évalué la question de savoir hsi ces crimes
143
sont établis, je passerai à d’autres faits commis dans le cadre de cette
campagne de destruction générale et systématique dans les villahges atta -
qués en Croatie.
1. Attaques sans discrimination contre la population civile
196. Dans le contexte factuel de la présente affaire relative à l’ Applica‑
tion de la convention sur le génocide (Croatie c. Serbie), la question de
savoir si la population attaquée était intégralement ou principhalement
composée de civils ne soulève aucune question de compétence, car le
crime de génocide peut être commis contre n’importe quel indivihdu, qu’il
soit civil ou combattant. Dans d’autres contextes, le TPIY (chambres de
première instance), qui devait tenir compte aussi des conditions néhces -
saires pour établir des crimes contre l’humanité et des crimes hde guerre, a
clarifié le sens à donner à la « population civile »: dans tous les cas, il a
adopté une définition large, incluant notamment les personnes quhi com -
mettent des actes de résistance 14.
143
144Parties XI, XII et XIII du présent exposé, infra.
Par exemple, dans le jugement Tadić (7mai 1997), le TPIY a dit que, en ce qui
concerne la population civile ciblée, « [l]la présence de certains non-civils en son sein ne
272
7 CIJ1077.indb 541 18/04/16 08:54 272 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
197. Moreover, in the cas d’espèce, the presence of Croatian armed
forces and formations should not be used to distort the reality. The evehnts
that took place in Vukovar illustrate what was probably the case in other
municipalities attacked in Croatia. As the ICTY (Trial Chamber) stated in
case Mrkšić, Radić and S ljivančanin (“Vukovar Hospital”, Judgment of
27 September 2007), there was a “gross disparity between the numbers ofh
the Serb and Croatian forces” engaged in the battle for Vukovar (ICThY,
Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin, Judgment of 27 September 2007, para.470).
198. The attack of “massive Serb forces”, facing a “comparatively
small and very poorly armed and organized Croatian forces”, and bringh -
ing “devastation on Vukovar and its surroundings” — added the ICTY —
was “consciously and deliberately directed against the city of Vukovahr
itself and its hapless civilian population (. . .) forced to seek what shelter
they could in the basements and other underground structures that sur -
vived the ongoing bombardments and assaults” (ibid., para. 470).
199. I have already referred, in the present dissenting opinion, to the
ICTY’s finding of the widespread and systematic attacks by Serb forhces
against the Croat civilian population 14. In addition to the passages already
quoted from the ICTY Judgment of 27September 2007 (Trial Chamber) in
the Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanincase, may I here recall that, in that same
Judgment, the ICTY (Trial Chamber) proceeded that “[t]he terrible fhate
that befell the city and the people of Vukovar was but one part of a muchh
more widespread action against the non -Serb peoples of Croatia and the
areas of Croatia in which they were substantial majorities” (ibid., para 4.71).
200. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) added that, in its view, “the overall
effect of the evidence is to demonstrate that the city and civilian populha -
tion of and around Vukovar were being punished, and terribly so”, forh
their midst does not change the character of the population” (para. 638). It reiterated this
point in the case Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment of 22 February 2001, para. 425).
In the case Blaškić (Judgment of 3March 2000), it again held that the presence of indi -
viduals bearing arms in a resistance movement did not change the characther of the civilian
population (paras. 213-214). In the case Kordić and Cerkez (Judgment of 26 February
2001), it singled out the consistent adoption, by ICTY Trial Chambers, hof “a wide defini-
tion of what constitutes a civilian population” (para.). In the case Martić (Judgment
of 12 June 2007), the ICTY (Trial Chamber I), keeping in mind the size of the attacked
civilian population, found that “the presence of Croatian armed forcehs and formations
in the Skabrnja and Saborsko areas does not affect the civilian character of the hattacked
population” (para. 350). This was confirmed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber (Judgment of
8 October 2008) in the same case Martić (para. 317). In the case Popović et alii (Judgment
of 10 June 2010), the ICTY (Trial Chamber II) held that the term “civilian population”
is to be “interpreted broadly”, referring to a population that is h“predominantly civilian in
nature”, even if there are “members of armed resistance groups”h (p.591). Again in the
recent case Stanišić and Zupljanin (Judgment of 27 March 2013), it pointed out that “the
presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come whithin the defini-
tion of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian charachter” (26); it
again upheld the test of the “predominantly civilian nature” of the population 26).It
pursued the same approach in the case Limaj, Bala and Musliu (Judgment of 30 November
2005, para. 186), and in the case Brđanin (Judgment of 1 September 2004, para. 134).
145 Cf. Part IX (4) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 542 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 272
197. En outre, dans le cas d’espèce, la présence de forces et de forhmations
armées croates ne saurait être invoquée pour déformer la réhalité. Les évé-ne
ments de Vukovar sont un exemple de ce qui s’est probablement passéh dans
d’autres municipalités attaquées en Croatie. Comme l’a dit lhe TPIY dans le
jugement Mrkšić, Radić et Sljivančanin (« Hôpital de Vukovar» , en date du
27 septembre2007), il y avait une «très forte disparité numérique» entre les
forces serbes et croates engagées dans la bataille de Vukovar (TPIY,h Mrkšić,
Radić et Sljivančanin, jugement du 27 septembre 2007, par.470).
198. Selon le TPIY, l’attaque menée par des « forces serbes numérique -
ment bien supérieures » contre des « forces croates qui étaient relative -
ment peu nombreuses, très pauvrement armées et mal organisées », qui a
entraîné des « destructions … à Vukovar et aux abords immédiats » était
« consciemment et délibérément dirigée contre la ville et sa malheureuse
population civile, … contrainte de se réfugier dans les caves et autres
constructions souterraines qui avaient résisté aux bombardements et aux
assauts» (ibid., par. 470).
199. J’ai déjà dit, dans le présent exposé, que le TPIY avait hconclu à
des attaques générales et systématiques menées par les forcehs serbes contre
la population civile croate 145. En sus des passages déjà cités de son juge -
ment du 27 septembre 2007 en l’affaire Mrkšić, Radić et Sljivančanin, qu’il
me soit permis de rappeler ici que, dans le même jugement, le TPIY a dit
que « [l]esort terrible réservé à la ville de Vukovar et à ses habitants s’ins -
crivait dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée dirigée chontre les peuples
non serbes de Croatie et les régions où ces derniers étaient mahjoritaires »
(ibid., par. 471).
200. Le TPIY a ajouté que, à son avis, « les éléments de preuve
montr[ai]ent dans l’ensemble que la punition terrible [avait étéh] infligée à
Vukovar et à la population civile de la ville et des environs » parce qu’elle
modifie pas le caractère de la population » (par. 638). Il a réaffirmé cette position dans le
jugement Kunarac, Kovać et Vuković (22 février 2001, par. 425). Dans le jugement Blaškić
(3 mars 2000), il a dit une nouvelle fois que la présence de personnes portahnt les armes au
sein d’un mouvement de résistance ne modifie pas le caractèreh civil de la population civile
(par. 213 et 214). Dans le jugement Kordić et Cerkez (26 février 2001), il a relevé que les
chambres de première instance du TPIY avaient adopté systématiqhuement « une défini-
tion large de la population civile » (par. 180). Dans le jugement Martić (12 juin 2007), la
chambre de première instance I a conclu, compte tenu de l’importance de la population
civile attaquée, que « la présence des forces et formations armées croates dans les réhgions
de S kabrnja et Saborsko n’alt[érait] pas le caractère civil de la phopulation atta»uée
(par.350), ce que le TPIY a confirmé dans l’arrêt qu’il a rendhu le 8 octobre 2008 dans la
même affaire (par. 317). Dans le jugement Popović et consorts (10 juin 2010), la chambre de
première instance II a dit que l’expression « population civile » devait « se comprendre au
sens large» et désignait une population «majoritairement civile», même s’il y a[vait] en son
sein des « membres de mouvements de résistance armés » (par.591). Dans le récent ju-e
ment Stanišić etupljanin (27 mars 2013), le TPIY a de nouveau souligné que «la présence
au sein de la population civile de personnes isolées ne répondant hpas à la définition de
personnes civiles ne prive pas cette population de sa qua» (par.26); il a une nouvelle
fois réaffirmé le critère selon lequel cette population doit êhtre «composéeairement
de civil» (par.26). Il a suivi la même logique dans le jugement Limaj, Bala et Musliu
(30 novembre 2005, par. 186) et dans le jugement Brđanin (septembre 2004, par. 134).
145Voir partie IX (4) du présent exposé, supra.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 543 18/04/16 08:54 273 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
not having accepted “the Serb controlled federal government in Bel -
grade”, and for Croatia’s declaration of independence (ICTY, Mrkšić,
Radić and Sljivančanin, Judgment of 27 September 2007, para. 4 71). The
ICTY (Trial Chamber) further stated that, what occurred,
“was not, in the finding of the Chamber, merely an armed conflicth
between a military force and an opposing force in the course of which
civilians became casualties and some property was damaged. The
events, when viewed overall, disclose an attack by comparatively mas -
sive Serb forces, well armed, equipped and organized, which slowly
and systematically destroyed a city and its civilian and military occu-
pants to the point where there was a complete surrender of those that
remained. While the view is advanced before the Chamber that the
Serb forces were merely liberating besieged and wronged Serb citizens
who were victims of Croatian oppressiveness and discrimination, this
is a significant distortion of the true position as revealed by the evhi -
dence, when reviewed impartially.” (Ibid., paras. 470-471.)
201. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) found, in the case of Mrkšić, Radić
and Sljivančanin (“Vukovar Hospital”), that what happened
“was in fact, not only a military operation against the Croat forces hin
and around Vukovar, but also a widespread and systematic attack by the
JNA and other Serb forces directed against the Croat and other non‑Serb
civilian population in the wider Vukovar area. The extensive damage to
civilian property and civilian infrastructure, the number of civilians killed
or wounded during the military operations and the high number of civilian ▯ s
displaced or forced to flee clearly indicate that the attack was carried▯ out
in an indiscriminate way, contrary to international law.It was an unlaw -
ful attack. Indeed it was also directed in part deliberately against theh
civilian population. The widespread nature of the attack is indicated byh
the number of villages in the immediate area around Vukovar which
were damaged or destroyed and the geographical spread of these vil -
lages, as well as by the damage to the city of Vukovar itself. The sys -
tematic character of the attack is also evidenced by the JNA’s approahch
to the taking of each village or town and the damage done therein and
the forced displacement of those villagers fortunate enough to survive
the taking of their respective villages.” (Ibid., para.72.)146
202. In effect, in the adjudication of distinct cases pertaining to the war
in Croatia, the ICTY has found a widespread and systematic pattern of
extreme violence, victimizing the civilian population. The dossier of thhe
present case of the Application of the Convention against Genocide con -
tains elements revealing that pattern ; planned and premeditated. The
extreme violence went far beyond establishing military and administrativhe
hegemony: it involved massive killings, brutal torturing and beatings of
Croatian civilians, and the removal by force of the remaining ones from h
146Emphasis added.
274
7 CIJ1077.indb 544 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 273
n’avait pas accepté « le Gouvernement fédéral de Belgrade contrôlé par
les Serbes » et parce que la Croatie avait proclamé son indépendance
(TPIY, Mrkšić, Radić et S ljivančanin, jugement du 27 septembre 2007,
par. 471). Il a ensuite indiqué ce qui suit :
«Selon la Chambre, il ne s’agissait pas d’un simple conflit arméh entre
une force militaire et des forces adverses qui aurait fait des victimes
civiles et causé certains dommages matériels. Une vue d’ensemblhe des
événements révèle l’existence d’une attaque par les fohrces serbes numé -
riquement bien supérieures, bien armées, bien équipées et bihen orga-ni
sées, qui ont lentement et systématiquement détruit une ville eht ses
occupants civils et militaires jusqu’à la reddition complète des derniers
survivants. L’idée a été émise devant la Chambre que les hforces serbes
ne faisaient que libérer les habitants serbes assiégés qui éhtaient oppr-i
més par les Croates et victimes de discriminations de leur part, maish
c’est là une déformation des faits tels qu’ils ont étéh établis par les élé-
ments de preuve considérés sans parti pris. » (Ibid., par.470 et 471.)
201. Dans son jugement en l’affaire Mrkšić, Radić et Sljivančanin
(«Hôpital de Vukovar»), le TPIY a conclu que, à l’époque des faits,
« il existait non seulement une opération militaire menée contre lesh
forces croates présentes à Vukovar et alentour, mais aussi une attaque
généralisée et systématique dirigée par la JNA et d’autres forces serbes
contre la population civile croate et d’autres civils non serbes dans le sec
teur de Vukovar.Les dommages importants causés aux infrastructures
et aux biens de caractère civil, le nombre de civils tués ou blessés durant
les opérations militaires et le grand nombre de civils déplacés▯ ou contraints
de prendre la fuite montrent clairement qu’il s’agissait d’une a ▯ ttaque
indiscriminée contraire au droit international. Dirigée en partie délibéré -
ment contre la population civile, cette attaque était illicite. Le nohmbre
de villages endommagés ou détruits à proximité immédiate hde Vukovar,
l’étendue de la zone concernée, ainsi que les dommages causés à la ville
de Vukovar elle-même, témoignent d’une attaque généralisée. Le carac -
tère systématique de l’attaque est aussi mis en évidence parh la tactique
adoptée par la JNA pour s’emparer de chaque village ou ville et lehs
dommages causés, ainsi que par le déplacement forcé des habitanhts -res
capés des attaques lancées contre leurs villages. » (Ibid., par.472.)146
202. En effet, lorsqu’il a eu à connaître de différentes affaires se rappor-
tant au conflit en Croatie, le TPIY a constaté l’existence d’hun ensemble de
violences extrêmes générales et systématiques, prenant pour hcible la popu -la
tion civile. Le dossier de la présente affaire relative à l’Application de la
convention sur le génocide contient des éléments qui mettent en évidence
l’existence d’une telle campagne, planifiée et préméditée. L’extrême violence
est allée bien au-delà de l’établissement d’une hégémonie militaire et admi-
nistrative: il s’agissait de massacres, de torture brutale et de sévices phyhsiques
146Les italiques sont de moi.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 545 18/04/16 08:54 274 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
their villages. They were forced to sign documents attesting their “vholun-
tary” consent that all their property should be left to the “SAO Khrajina”.
Moreover, Serbian artillery was used t147estroy all traces of Croatian
architecture, culture and religion .
203. Such indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population in Croa -
tia formed a pattern of extreme violence and destruction, as follows :
(a) firstly, prior to the occupation of a village, the JNA would send an
ultimatum to the Croatian inhabitants to lay down their weapons, or elseh
face the village levelled to the ground ; at the same time, promises were made
that the Croatian civilians would not be harmed if they did not offer armhed
resistance; (b) secondly, the JNA would then engage in artillery attack, fol -
lowed by its infantry of the JNA entering the village together with Serbh
paramilitary groups; (c) thirdly, they would then, after capturing the vil -
lage, embark on a campaign of terror, making it physically or psychologih -
cally impossible for the surviving Croatians to continue living there.
204. Even where there was not a complete destruction of the village,
as, for example, in Poljanak, serious crimes were committed in that vil -
lage, as the ICTY recognized in the Martić case. Yet, those serious crimes
have not been extensively depicted in the present Judgment, neither in
respect of Poljanak, nor of other villages. As to Poljanak, there were ahlso
accounts of killings ; for example, B. V. testified that his family was killed
and he was heavily beaten, that Chetniks searched houses in the village h
and set them on fire, and captured people, and he also witnessed kill -
148
ings . Another witness, M. V., found two victims dead, with their heads
smashed and the brains scattered around 149.
205. Similarly to Saborsko, it is significant to note that Serbia acknowl-
edged that the ICTY (Trial Chamber) in the Martić ca150“confirmed the
killings in Poljanak and its hamlet Vuković” . There were also accounts
of houses having been burned in Poljanak. M. L. testified that prisoners
were locked in a room in the camp Manjača, where “they did not get
anything to eat or drink for four or five days, while being interrogated
over and over, and were beaten and molested” 151. B. V. testified that
Chetniks searched houses in Poljanak, set them on fire and captured
152
people .
2. Massive Killings
206. At the final stage of the attacks by the Serb armed forces, when a
village was captured, a campaign of terror was launched, followed by
147
Application instituting proceedings, para. 34, and Memorial of Croatia,
par148 4.8-4.9.
149 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 387.
Ibid., Annex 388.
150 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 861.
151 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 385.
152 Ibid., Annex 387.
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7 CIJ1077.indb 546 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 274
infligés à des civils croates et de l’expulsion par la force hdes habitants des
localités qui étaient encore là. Ceux -ci ont été forcés à signer des documents
attestant qu’ils consentaient « volontairement» à laisser tous leurs biens à la
«SAO de Krajina ». En outre, l’artillerie serbe a été utilisée pour déhtruire
toutes les traces de l’architecture, de la culture et de la religion hcroates 147.
203. Ces attaques aveugles contre la population civile en Croatie
constituaient une campagne d’extrême violence et de destruction, shelon le
mode opératoire suivant : a) tout d’abord, avant l’occupation d’un vil -
lage, la JNA adressait un ultimatum aux habitants croates pour les appe -
ler à déposer leurs armes sous peine de voir leur localité rasée ; dans le
même temps, on leur promettait qu’aucun mal ne serait fait aux civhils
croates s’ils n’opposaient pas de résistance armée b) l’;rtillerie de la JNA
lançait alors l’attaque, suivie de l’infanterie épaulée phar des groupes para -
militaires serbes ; c) enfin, une fois le village occupé, une campagne de
terreur était lancée afin d’empêcher, physiquement ou psychhologique -
ment, les Croates de continuer à vivre sur place.
204. Même lorsque le village n’était pas entièrement détruit, hpar
exemple à Poljanak, des crimes graves étaient commis, comme le TPIY l’a
reconnu dans l’affaire Martić. Pourtant, ces crimes graves n’ont pas été
mentionnés en détail dans le présent arrêt, ni au sujet de che village, ni
d’autres. En ce qui concerne Poljanak, il y a eu aussi des témoignages de
meurtres; ainsi, B. V. a déclaré que sa famille avait été tuée eth qu’il avait
été roué de coups, que des Tchetniks fouillaient des maisons duh village et
les incendiaient, et qu’ils arrêtaient des gens ; il a aussi été témoin de
148
meurtres . Un autre témoin, M. V., a trouvé deux victimes mortes, la
boîte crânienne brisée et la cervelle éparpillée 14.
205. Comme pour Saborsko, il importe de relever que la Serbie a reconnu
que le TPIY, dans le jugement Martić, «a[vait] con150mé les meurtres com-
mis à Poljanak et dans le hameau Vuković » . Selon des témoignages, des
maisons avaient aussi été brûlées à Poljanak. ML . . a déclaré que des prison -
niers étaient enfermés dans une pièce dans le camp de Manjačha, où « on ne
leur a[vait] pas donné à manger ni à boire pendant quatre ou cihnq jours,
alors qu’ils étaient interrogés inlassablement, et ils [avaienth] été battus et
molestés» 15. B. V. a témoigné que des Tchetniks avaient fouillé et incendié
152
des maisons à Poljanak et avaient arrêté des gens .
2. Meurtres de masse
206. Pendant la phase finale des attaques menées par les forces arméehs
serbes, une fois qu’un village était pris, une campagne de terreurh était
147
Voir requête introductive d’instance de la Croatie, par. 34, et mémoire, par. 4.8-4.9.
148
149 Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 387.
Ibid., annexe 388.
150 Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 861.
151 Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 385.
152 Ibid., annexe 387.
275
7 CIJ1077.indb 547 18/04/16 08:54 275 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
mass and non-selective executions of Croatian civilians. The smaller
remainder of the Croat population was subjected to variants of martial
law, imprisonment, forced exile or deportation to camps ; in some villages
they were forced to display white ribbons, on their sleeves, as armbands,
153
or white sheets attached to the doors of their houses . During the occu-
pation, many Croatians fled to the neighbouring towns, not yet captured,
and some were killed in ambushes by Serb paramilitary units on the way.
207. In its 2007 Judgment in the Application of the Convention against
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), the Inter -
national Court of Justice observed, as to the verification of a systemhatic
pattern of destruction, that :
“[I]t is not necessary to examine every single incident reported by
the Applicant, nor is it necessary to make an exhaustive list of the
allegations; the Court finds it sufficient to examine those facts that
would illuminate the question of intent, or illustrate the claim by the h
Applicant of a pattern of acts committed against members of the
group, such as to lead to an inference from such pattern of the exist -
ence of a specific intent (dolus specialis).” (Para. 242.)
208. Bearing in mind this consideration by the Court, I do not pur -
port, nor is it necessary, in this dissenting opinion, to proceed to an in-
depth analysis of individual crimes, as this is not an international crihminal
court. More important to me is the verification of a widespread and sys -
tematic pattern of destruction disclosed by those crimes, all over the vhil -
lages that were attacked, as brought to the attention of the Court.
Numerous crimes — revealing such pattern of destruction — have been
described by witnesses, and others have been determined by the ICTY
itself, as indicated throughout the present dissenting opinion.
209. In effect, the dossier of the cas d’espèce indicates that criminal acts
were committed in the various regions occupied by the Serbian forces. Inh
the region of Eastern Slavonia, for example, the following villages are
mentioned : Tenja, Dalj, Berak, Bogdanovci, Sarengrad, Ilok, Tompo -
154
jevci, Bapska, Tovarnik, Sotin, Lovas, Tordinci and Vukovar . The
wrongful acts evidencing the systematic pattern of destruction which
occurred in Eastern Slavonia spread to the other regions of Western Sla -
vonia, Banovina, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia 155.
210. The first villages and civilian populations to be attacked were those
of Dalj, Erdut and Aljmaš, at the beginning of Augus 1t991. Between28Sep-
153Cf. Section XIII, infra, of the present dissenting opinion.
154Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.20-4.30, 4.31-4.37, 4.38-4.46, 4.47-4.55, 4.56-4.61,
4.62-4.72, 4.73 -4.80, 4.81 -4.93, 4.94 -4.106, 4.107 -4.115, 4.116 -4.132, 4.133 -4.138, and
4.139-4.190, respectively.
155Cf. ibid., paras. 5.3-5.64, 5.65-5.122, 5.123-5.186, and 5.187-5.241, respectively.
276
7 CIJ1077.indb 548 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 275
lancée, suivie d’exécutions massives et aveugles de civils croates. Le reste
de la population croate, souvent réduit, était soumis à diversehs formes de
loi martiale, à l’emprisonnement, à l’exil forcé ou à hla déportation dans
les camps ; dans certains villages, les Croates ont été contraints à porther
un ruban blanc en brassard sur la manche de leur vêtement ou à acchro -
cher un drap blanc sur la porte de leur maison 153. Pendant l’occupation,
nombre d’entre eux ont fui vers les villes voisines qui n’étaiehnt pas encore
tombées, et certains ont été tués dans des embuscades tenduehs par des
unités paramilitaires serbes.
207. Dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu en 2007 en l’affaire relative àh l’ Appli ‑
cation de la convention sur le génocide (Bosnie‑Herzégovine c. Serbie‑
et‑Monténégro), la Cour a observé ce qui suit, à propos de l’existence d’uhne
campagne systématique de destruction :
«Il n’est pas nécessaire d’examiner séparément chacun des hinci -
dents que le demandeur a rapportés, ni de dresser une liste exhaus -
tive des allégations ; la Cour estime qu’il suffit d’examiner les faits qui
éclaireraient la question de l’intention ou fourniraient des exemphles
d’actes dont le demandeur prétend qu’ils ont été commis àh l’encontre
de membres du groupe et qui revêtiraient un caractère systématihque
dont pourrait se déduire l’existence d’une intention spécifihque
(dolus specialis). » (Par. 242.)
208. Compte tenu de cette observation, je n’entends pas —d’autant qu’il
n’est nécessaire de le faire dans le présent exposé— procéder à une analyse
approfondie de crimes particuliers, la Cour n’étant de toute façhon pas une
juridiction pénale internationale. Il m’importe davantage de véhrifier l’exis -
tence d’une campagne de destruction générale et systématiqueh révélée par
ces crimes dans tous les villages attaqués sur lesquels l’attentiohn de la Cour
a été appelée. De nombreux crimes mettant en évidence cette hcampagne de
destruction ont été décrits par des témoins et d’autres ohnt été constatés par
le TPIY, comme je le montre tout au long du présent exposé.
209. En effet, le dossier en l’espèce montre que des actes criminels onth
été commis dans les différentes régions occupées par les fhorces serbes.
Dans la région de la Slavonie orientale, par exemple, les villes et villages
suivants sont mentionnés : Tenja, Dalj, Berak, Bogdanovci, Sarengrad,
154
Ilok, Tompojevci, Bapska, Tovarnik, Sotin, Lovas, Tordinci et Vukovar .
Les actes illicites, attestant une campagne de destruction systématiqhue, qui
ont été commis en Slavonie orientale ont ensuite été commis hen Slavonie
occidentale, dans la Banovina, le Kordun, la Lika et la Dalmatie 155.
210. Les premiers villages et populations civiles attaqués ont été cheux
de Dalj, Erdut et Aljmaš, au début du mois d’août 1991. Entre le 28 sep-
153Voir partie XIII du présent exposé, infra.
154Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.20-4.30, 4.31-4.37, 4.38-4.46, 4.47-4.55, 4.56-4.61,
4.62-4.72, 4.73-4.80, 4.81-4.93, 4.94-4.106, 4.107-4.115, 4.116-4.132, 4h.133-4.138 et 4.139-
4.190, respectivement.
155Ibid., par. 5.3-5.64, 5.65-5.122, 5.123-5.186 et 5.187-5.241, respectivement.
276
7 CIJ1077.indb 549 18/04/16 08:54 276 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tember 1991 and 17 October 1991, the villages of Sotin, Ilok, S arengrad,
Lovas, Bapska and Tovarnik were captured by the JNA and Serb para -
military groups. Killings were committed in pursuance of a systematic pah -t
tern of brutality, including the perpetration of massacres of entire famhilies,
156
or random murders to force Croats to flee ; the campaign culminated in
the massacre at Vukovar (after 18 November 1991) 157.
211. Several mass graves were discovered (e.g., in the regions of Bano -
vina, and Kordun and Lika), with little or no indication of who the vich -
tims were, or where they were originally from. Such mass graves were
found out in the municipalities of Tenja, Dalj, Ilok, Sotin, Lovas,
Tordinci, Ovčara, Vukovar, Pakrac, Lađevac and Skabrnja 158. Croatia
pointed out that, by the time of the filing of its Memorial (March 2001),
61 mass graves had been found in Eastern Slavonia. Many of the mass
graves, which then appeared were used as temporary burial sites only ; the
JNA often dug up the bodies and moved them to other parts of the occu -
159
pied territory or of Serbia .
212. For its part, Serbia challenged the evidence presented by Croa -
tia160; it contended that the killing of Croats by Serbian forces was not
intended to destroy that group, and, accordingly, did not amount to
genocide; on the other hand, it added, the killing of Serbs by Croatian
forces was committed, in its view, with the intent to destroy the group as
161
such . Croatia replied that Serbia did not dispute that Croats were sub -
jected to torture and to serious bodily and mental harm, on a systematich
basis 16. Serbia, for its part, did not dispute that serious bodily and men -
tal harm was committed by Serbian forces against Croats during the war
in Croatia between 1991 and 1995, but it further submitted that serious
bodily and mental harm was also committed against Serbs by the Croa -
163
tian forces .
213. A Book of Evidence included by Croatia in the dossier of the pres-
164
ent case, titled Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92 , identifies
four phases in the war in Croatia, from the perspective of “civilian casual -
ties and the destruction of Croatian villages and towns”, namely :
“In the first phase (July -August 1991), the Serbian paramilitary
troops armed by JNA had the predominant role. With the aid of JNA
156Cf. Memorial of Croatia., Chapter 4.
157Cf. ibid., para. 4.19.
158
Ibid., paras. 4.29, 4.35, 4.72, 4.107, 4.116, 4.138, 4.178, 4.188, 5.27, 5.77, 5.137, h
5.1159 and 5.226, respectively.
Cf. ibid., para. 4.07.
160Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 660 and 663.
161Cf. ibid., para. 48.
162Cf. Reply of Croatia, para. 9.47.
163Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 81.
164Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence, Zagreb, Ministry
of Health of Croatia, 1992, pp. 1-207.
277
7 CIJ1077.indb 550 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 276
tembre et le 17 octobre 1991, les villages de Sotin, Ilok, Sarengrad, Lovas,
Bapska et Tovarnik ont été pris par la JNA et les groupes paramilitaires
serbes. Des meurtres ont été commis dans le cadre d’une campagnhe de
brutalités systématiques — par exemple, des familles entières ont été mas-
sacrées, et des meurtres commis au hasard pour forcer les Croates àh
fuir156; la campagne a atteint son paroxysme lors du massacre de Vukovar
(à partir du 18 novembre 1991) 157.
211. Plusieurs charniers ont été découverts (par exemple, dans la Bhan-o
vina, le Kordun et la Lika) à Tenja, Dalj, Ilok, Sotin, Lovas, Tordinci,
Ovčara, Vukovar, Pakrac, Lađevac, et Skabrnja ; l’identité des victimes et
158
leur lieu d’origine étaient à peine indiqués, quand ils l’hétaient . La Croa-
tie a souligné que, au moment du dépôt de son mémoire (marsh 2001),
61 charniers avaient été découverts en Slavonie orientale. Nombre hdes
charniers découverts par la suite n’avaient servi que de sépulthure provi -
soire ; la JNA a fréquemment déterré les corps pour les transférerh dans
d’autres parties du territoire occupé ou en Serbie 159.
212. De son côté, la Serbie a contesté les éléments de preuve hprésentés
par la Croatie 160; elle a soutenu que les meurtres de Croates par les forces
serbes n’étaient pas destinés à détruire ce groupe, et n’hétaient donc pas
constitutifs de génocide ; à l’inverse, a-t-elle ajouté, les meurtres de Serbes
par les forces croates avaient été commis, selon elle, dans l’ihntention de
161
détruire le groupe comme tel . La Croatie a répondu que la Serbie
n’avait pas nié que des Croates avaient été soumis à la thorture et à de
graves atteintes à leur intégrité physique ou mentale, de manièhre systéma -
162
tique . La Serbie, de son côté, n’a pas contesté que des atteintesh graves
à l’intégrité physique ou mentale avaient été causéhes à des Croates par les
forces serbes au cours de la guerre en Croatie entre 1991 et 1995, mais elle
a fait valoir que les forces croates avaient aussi163usé des atteintehs graves
à l’intégrité physique ou mentale de Serbes .
213. L’ouvrage A Book of Evidence joint par la Croatie au dossier de la
164
présente espèce, intitulé Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92 ,
recense quatre phases dans la guerre en Croatie, du point de vue « des vic-
times civiles et de la destruction de villages et de villes croates », à savoir:
«Dans la première phase (juillet-août 1991), les troupes paramili -
taires serbes armées par la JNA jouaient le rôle principal. Avec lh’aide
156Mémoire de la Croatie, chapitre 4.
157Ibid., par. 4.19.
158
Ibid., par. 4.29, 4.35, 4.72, 4.107, 4.116, 4.138, 4.178, 4.188, 5.27, 5.77, 5.137, h5.146
et 15926, respectivement.
Ibid., par. 4.07.
160Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 660 et 663.
161Ibid., par. 48.
162Réplique de la Croatie, par. 9.47.
163Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 81.
164Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92 : A Book of Evidence , Zagreb, minis-
tère croate de la santé, 1992, p. 1-207.
277
7 CIJ1077.indb 551 18/04/16 08:54 277 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
they attacked completely unarmed Croatian villages, especially in the
area of Banija and in the surrounding of Knin. At that time JNA still
pretended to be creating buffer -zones between the ‘two sides in con -
flict’. However, the examples of Dalj, Kraljevčani, Dragotinci ahnd
Kijevo clearly show the active role of JNA using tanks and air force
to destroy residential buildings regardless of the fact that there were h
no Croatian Police (MUP) or National Guard forces (ZNG). In the
second phase of the war (September 1991), JNA undertook the con -
quest of larger areas in Croatia, and it conquered Kostajnica, Dubica,
Petrinja, Drniš, Jasenovac, Okučani and Stara Gradiška. This is the
phase when the Croatian army did not have adequate heavy artillery
so that it could not even neutralize the aggressor. This resulted in
a number of Croatian defeats, having as a consequence masses of
refugees and displaced persons from the areas of Banija, Dalmacija
and partly Slavonia. The following third phase, took place during
October -November 1991, when JNA waged intensive total war
using air force, heavy artillery and armoured units on the line of the
Greater Serbia border Virovitica -Karlovac-Karlobag. Established
front-line made possible the stabilization of defence. Still, heavy
artillery of JNA produced immense destruction of Croatian cities,
including the cities at the seaside which were sealed off. In this periodh
important Croatian cities, e.g., Vukovar, Slunj, Dubrovnik, were
surrounded and suffered great damages or total destruction. (. . .) The
last, fourth phase of the war, begins after the ceasefire of 3 January
1992. During April 1992 a dramatic escalation of artillery attacks
occurred on a number of civilian targets, especially on Osijek,
Vinkovci, Slavonski Brod, Zupanja, Karlovac, Zadar, Gospić and
Nova Gradiška. This phase especially threatened the civilians, unpre -
pared for artillery attacks. A new wave of refugees started as well.
The endangered population still remains on the occupied territories.
They were being forced away from their homes before the UN forces
arrive.” 165
214. The document singles out, in the first phase of the onslaught, the
destruction of homes, forcing the victims to flee, or else to face deahth or
brutalities. The unarmed residents of the villages attacked were forcefuhlly
displaced, and their homes were destroyed or plundered ; they moved to
more central and safer regions of Croatia. In the second phase, the JNA h
army itself launched fierce armed attacks, with artillery and fightehr jets,
165
Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence, Zagreb, Ministry
of Health of Croatia, pp. 1 and 4.
278
7 CIJ1077.indb 552 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 277
de la JNA, elles attaquaient des villages croates complètement déshar -
més, en particulier aux alentours de Banija et dans les environs
de Knin. A cette époque, la JNA prétendait encore mettre en place
des zones tampons entre les «deux parties en conflit». Cependant, les
exemples de Dalj, Kraljevčani, Dragotinci et Kijevo montrent claire -
ment le rôle actif qu’a joué la JNA qui utilisait des chars et hl’aviation
pour détruire des bâtiments résidentiels, alors même qu’ihl n’y avait
pas de forces de la Police croate (MUP) ou de la Garde nationale
(CNZ). Dans la deuxième phase de la guerre (septembre 1991), la
JNA a entrepris de conquérir des régions plus vastes de Croatie, eht
elle a pris Kostajnica, Dubica, Petrinja, Drniš, Jasenovac, Okučani
et Stara Gradiška. C’est la phase pendant laquelle l’armée croate
n’avait pas l’artillerie lourde nécessaire, de sorte qu’elleh ne pouvait
même pas neutraliser l’agresseur. Cela a donné lieu à un cerhtain
nombre de défaites croates, qui ont eu pour conséquence des massesh
de réfugiés et de personnes déplacées venant de la Banija, dhe la Dal -
macija et pour partie de la Slavonie. La troisième phase s’est déroulée
au cours des mois d’octobre et de novembre 1991, lorsque la JNA
s’est livrée à une guerre intensive totale en ayant recours àh l’aviation,
à l’artillerie lourde et à des unités blindées sur la lighne de la frontière
de la Grande Serbie Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag. La ligne de front
établie a rendu possible la stabilisation de la défense. Pourtant,h l’ar -
tillerie lourde de la JNA a provoqué d’énormes destructions danhs les
villes croates, y compris les villes du bord de mer qui étaient coupéhes
du reste du monde. Pendant cette période, d’importantes villes
croates, comme Vukovar, Slunj ou Dubrovnik, ont été encerclées et
ont subi de lourds dommages, voire ont été rasées. … La quatrième
phase de la guerre, qui est aussi la dernière, commence après le
cessez-le-feu du 3 janvier 1992. Pendant le mois d’avril 1992, il y a eu
une recrudescence terrible des attaques d’artillerie contre plusieursh
cibles civiles, en particulier Osijek, Vinkovci, Slavonski Brod,
Zupanja, Karlovac, Zadar, Gospić et Nova Gradiška. Pendant cette
phase, ce sont les civils, qui n’étaient pas préparés à des attaques
d’artillerie, qui ont été particulièrement visés. Une nouhvelle vague de
réfugiés s’est formée. Il restait encore des membres de la phopulation
menacée dans les territoires occupés. Ils ont été chas165h de leurs loge -
ments avant que les forces de l’ONU n’arrivent. »
214. Ce document distingue, dans la première phase de l’offensive, la
destruction des logements, forçant les habitants à fuir pour ne pahs être
tués ou victimes de brutalités. Les résidents non armés des hvillages atta -
qués ont été déplacés de force et leurs logements détrhuits ou pillés ; ils sont
partis vers des régions plus centrales et plus sûres de la Croatieh. Dans la
deuxième phase, la JNA a lancé de féroces attaques armées, ahppuyées par
165 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92 : A Book of Evidence , Zagreb, minis-
tère croate de la santé, p. 1 et 4.
278
7 CIJ1077.indb 553 18/04/16 08:54 278 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
against numerous villages and towns (e.g., Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci,
Sisak, Karlovac, Pakrac, Lipik, Gospić, Otočac, Zadar, Sibenik,
Dubrovnik, Petrinja, Nova Gradiška or Novska), with mass killings of
civilians. The document adds that :
“Many women, children and elderly lost their lives in this manner,
as thousands of private residences and public buildings were totally
destroyed. Civilians died in their own homes, in schools, kindergar -
tens, churches, hospitals, on their farms, while walking in the streets,
riding bicycles or driving their cars. In short, no one was safe any -
where and there was literally no place to take refuge from the bomb -
166
ing and shelling.”
215. Systematic destruction of homes by close -range fire occurred
extensively in, e.g., Vukovar, Osijek, Petrinja, Vinkovci and Gospić,h
among others. After the firing, by tanks, of private residences, “fihrst at the
upper floors, then at the ground floor (. . .), hand grenades were thrown
in the basement in which the owners or residents ha[d] sought refuge”h 167.
Many of the mortal remains were left where they had fallen, and after
some time could no longer be recovered (particularly in the regions of h
Banija, Kordun, Lika and Eastern Slavonia, as well as the hinterland of
Zadar and Sibenik and Dubrovnik). Massacres of civilians occurred (e.g.,
in Voćin and Hum near Podravska Slatina, Obrovac, Benkovac, Knin,
Skabrnja and Nadin), as “part of a planned genocide”, in the occuphied
territories 168.
216. The “major cause” of civilian casualties — including children,
women and the elderly — was “the indiscriminate and extensive artillery
shelling of strictly civilian targets” 169. There were also the “missing per -
sons”, — some 8,000 -12,000 persons, according to the study. The Inter -
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) became involved in their
search. There was, furthermore, the systematic destruction of “schoolhs,
hospitals, monuments, libraries and above all the Catholic churches, a
favourite target of the JNA artillery” 170. Libraries, for example, were
destroyed all over — for the sake of destruction — during the former
Yugoslavia wars, — not only in the attacks i171roatia, but also in those
in Bosnia -Herzegovina and in Kosovo , to the detriment of the popula-
tions concerned.
166 Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence, Zagreb, Ministry
of Health of Croatia, 1992, p. 4.
167 Ibid., p. 7.
168 Ibid., p. 6.
169 Ibid., p. 6.
170
171 Ibid., p. 7.
For an account, cf., inter alia, e.g., L. X. Polastron, Livros em Chamas — A História
da Destruição sem Fim das Bibliotecas [Livres en feu], Rio de Janeiro,Olympio Edit.,
2013, pp. 236-238.
279
7 CIJ1077.indb 554 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 278
l’artillerie et des avions de combat, contre de nombreux villages et hvilles
(par exemple Vukovar, Osijek, Vinkovci, Sisak, Karlovac, Pakrac, Lipik,
Gospić, Otočac, Zadar, Sibenik, Dubrovnik, Petrinja, Nova Gradiška ou
Novska), accompagnées de massacres de civils. Il est précisé che qui suit:
«Nombre de femmes, d’enfants et de personnes âgées ont perdu la h
vie de cette manière, parce que des milliers de résidences privées het de
bâtiments publics ont été totalement détruits. Les civils mohuraient
chez eux, dans les écoles, les jardins d’enfants, les églises, hles hôpi -
taux, dans leur ferme, alors qu’ils marchaient dans les rues, allaienht à
bicyclette ou conduisaient leur voiture. En bref, personne n’étaith en
sécurité nulle part et il n’y avait littéralement pas d’ehndroit où se
166
protéger des pilonnages et des bombardements. »
215. La destruction systématique de logements par des tirs à bout por -
tant a été opérée à grande échelle, notamment à Vukovar, Osijek, Petrinja,
Vinkovci et Gospić. Après que les chars avaient tiré sur les réhsidences
privées, « d’abord sur les étages supérieurs, puis sur le rez -de-chaussée …,
des grenades à main étaient lancées dans le sous -sol où les propriétaires
ou les résidents a[vaient] cherché refuge »167. Nombre des corps étaient
laissés là où ils étaient tombés, et après un certain temps ne pouvaient
plus être récupérés (en particulier dans la Banija, le Kordhun, la Lika et en
Slavonie orientale, ainsi que dans l’arrière -pays à Zadar et Sibenik, et à
Dubrovnik). Des massacres de civils ont eu lieu (par exemple, à Voćhin et
Hum près de Podravska Slatina, à Obrovac, Benkovac, Knin, Skabrnja et
Nadin) dans le « cadre d’un génocide planifié » dans les territoires occu -
pés 16.
216. Les pertes civiles — dont des enfants, des femmes et des personnes
âgées — avaient pour « principale cause » « les tirs ave169es et nourris
d’artillerie visant des objectifs strictement civils » . Des personnes ont
aussi été « portées disparues » — quelque 8000 à 12 000, selon le docu -
ment. Le Comité international de la Croix -Rouge (CICR) a participé à
leur recherche. En outre, des « écoles, hôpitaux, bibliothèques, monu -
ments et surtout des églises catholiques, cibles privilégiées de l’artillerie de
la JNA », ont été détruits systématiquement 170. Des bibliothèques, par
exemple, ont été détruites partout, pour le seul plaisir de la hdestruction,
pendant les guerres sur le territoire de l’ex -Yougoslavie — lors des
attaques menées en Croatie, mais aussi en Bosnie -Herzégovine et au
Kosovo 171, au détriment des populations concernées.
166Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92 : A Book of Evidence , Zagreb, minis-
tère croate de la santé, 1992, p. 4.
167
168Ibid., p. 7.
169Ibid., p. 6.
170Ibid., p. 6.
Ibid., p. 7.
171Pour un commentaire, voir notamment L. X. Polastron, Livros em Chamas — A
História da Destruição sem Fim das Bibliotecas [Livres en feu], Rio de Janeiro, J. Olympio
Edit., 2013, p. 236-238.
279
7 CIJ1077.indb 555 18/04/16 08:54 279 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
3. Torture and Beatings
217. The dossier of the present case concerning the Application of the
Convention against Genocide contains numerous accounts of torture and
beatings of members of the civilian population, by the time the militaryh
offensive was launched by the respondent State, and even before that.
The Applicant’s Memorial, in particular, is permeated with such accounts.
There were reported cases of forced labour and torture and beatings (inh
Dalj, Berak, Bagejci, Bapska, Lovas, Tordinci, Vukovar, Vaganac,
Kijevo, Vujići, Tovarnik, Knin) 172; of extreme violence and psychological
173
torture (in Sotin, Josevica, Lipovača, Sarengrad) ; of abduction and
enforced disappearance (in Pakrac) 174; of the use of civilians as “human
shields” to “protect” Serb armed forces (in Bapska and Cetekovac) 175,
among other atrocities (in Kusonje, Podravska Slatina, Kraljevčani, h
Tovarnik, Joševica) 17.
218. Furthermore, in Poljanak, torture and beatings were likewise
reported. According to M. L., during Easter 1991, Chetnik groups
ambushed the workers of the Ministry of the Interior, and there was an
armed clash where people were killed. The witness testified that prisohners
were locked in a room in the camp “Manjača, where they did not get
anything to eat or drink for four or five days, while being interrogated
over and over and [they] were beaten and molested” 177. B. V. testified
178
that his family members were killed and he was heavily beaten .
219. Beatings occurred in various ways, including with bats, wire,
179
boots, chains, sticks and other objects . On several occasions, torture
and humiliation were followed by the murders of the victims (in Bogdan -
ovci, Sarengrad, Tovarnik, Voćin) 180. There were cases of suicides among
181
Croats . Croatia dwells upon a systematic pattern of destruction of the
targeted victims, within which occurred physical and psychological tor -
ture and beatings, in various ways.
220. Serbia, for its part, in particular in its Rejoinder, acknowledged
that many atrocities were committed against Croats during the con -
172
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.34-4.35, 4.38, 4.40, 4.85, 4.8-4.90, 4.124,
4.135-4.136, 4.168-4.169, 5.175, 5.212, and CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, paras. 20 and 27,
respectively.
173Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.111, 4.50, 5.88 and 5.143, respectively.
174Cf. ibid., para. 5.16, and CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, para. 17.
175Cf. ibid., paras. 4.85 and 5.43, respectively.
176Cf. ibid., paras. 5.27, 5.30, 5.98, 4.100, and 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 25,
res177tively.
178Ibid., Annex 385.
Ibid., Annex 387.
179Cf., e.g., CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, pp. 24-25.
180Memorial of Croatia, paras.4.47-4.55, 4.56-4.59, 4.101, and CR2014/10, of 6March
2014, p. 17, respectively.
181Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 25.
280
7 CIJ1077.indb 556 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 279
3. Actes de torture et sévices physiques
217. Le dossier de la présente affaire relative à l’ Application de la
convention sur le génocide abonde en témoignages d’actes de torture et de
sévices physiques infligés à des civils lorsque l’Etat déhfendeur a lancé son
offensive militaire, et même avant. Le mémoire du demandeur, en parhti -
culier, regorge de témoignages faisant état de travail forcé, dh’actes de tor-
ture et de sévices physiques (à Dalj, Berak, Bagejci, Bapska, Lovas,
Tordinci, Vukovar, Vaganac, Kijevo, Vujići, Tovarnik, Knin) 172; d’ex-
trême violence et de torture psychologique (à Sotin, Josevica, Lipovača
173 174
et Sarengrad) ; d’enlèvements et de disparitions forcées (à Pakrac) ;
d’utilisation de civils comme « boucliers humains » pour « protéger» les
forces armées serbes (à Bapska et Cetekovac) 175, entre autres atrocités (à
176
Kusonje, Podravska Slatina, Kraljevčani, Tovarnik, Joševica) .
218. En outre, à Poljanak, des cas de torture et de sévices physiques
ont également été rapportés. Selon M. L., à Pâques 1991, des groupes de
Tchetniks avaient tendu une embuscade aux employés du ministère deh
l’intérieur, et il y avait eu un affrontement armé au cours duquhel des gens
ont été tués. Au dire du témoin, des prisonniers avaient éhté enfermés dans
une pièce dans le camp de «Manjača, où on ne leur a pas donné à manger
ni à boire pendant quatre ou cinq jours, alors qu’ils étaient ihnterrogés
177
inlassablement, et ils ont été battus et molestés » . B. V. a déclaré que les
membres de sa famille avaient été tués et qu’il avait étéh roué de coups 178.
219. Les coups étaient portés avec des battes, des fils électriquehs, des
179
bottes, des chaînes, des bâtons et d’autres objets . A plusieurs reprises,
la torture et l’humiliation ont été suivies du meurtre des victhimes (à Bog-
danovci, S arengrad, Tovarnik, Voćin) 180. Il y a eu des cas de suicide
181
parmi les Croates . La Croatie fait longuement état d’une campagne de
destruction systématique des victimes visées, notamment d’actesh de tor -
ture physique et psychologique et de sévices, sous diverses formes.
220. De son côté, la Serbie, en particulier dans sa duplique, a reconnuh
que de nombreuses atrocités ont été commises contre des Croatesh au cours
172
Voir mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.34-4.35, 4.38, 4.40, 4.85, 4.88-4.90, 4.124, 4.135-
4.136, 4.168-4.169, 5.175, 5.212, et CR 2014/10, par. 20 et 27, respectivement.
173Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.111, 4.50, 5.88 et 5.143, respectivement.
174Ibid., par. 5.16, et CR 2014/10, par. 17.
175Ibid., par. 4.85 et 5.43, respectivement.
176Ibid., par. 5.27, 5.30, 5.98, 4.100, et CR 2014/10, p. 25, respectivement.
177
178Ibid., annexe 385.
Ibid., annexe 387.
179Voir par exemple CR 2014/10, p. 24 et 25.
180Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.47-4.55, 4.56 à 4.59, 4.101, et CR 2014/10, p. 17,
respectivement.
181CR 2014/10, p. 25.
280
7 CIJ1077.indb 557 18/04/16 08:54 280 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
flicts182, but it challenged the trustworthiness of evidence and documents
presented by the applicant State, and in particular the reliability of whit -
nesses statements. In Serbia’s view, the tragic events described by thhe
applicant State do not establish genocidal intent and specific intent hto
destroy ; they establish, at most, it adds, that war crimes and crimes
183
against humanity were committed, but not genocide .
221. Turning its attention to Vukovar, in the region of Eastern Slavo -
nia, Croatia contended that, after the fall of Vukovar, high -ranking JNA
officers aided and abetted the large-scale torture and murder of prisonh -
ers 184, such as those at Velepromet 185. According to the Applicant, in
Vukovar and other towns or villages, Croat civilians, often elderly peophle,
unable or unwilling to flee, were subjected to extreme brutality, wereh tor -
tured and killed by JNA soldiers, TOs and paramilitaries 18. In the Appli-
cant’s view, those atrocities were committed with the intent to destrhoy the
187
Croat population in the targeted regions .
222. Croatia further asserted that, in Vukovar, Serbian forces carried
out a sustained campaign of bombing and shelling ; brutal killings and
torture ; systematic expulsion ; and denial of food, water, electricity, sani -
tation and medical treatment. It adds that the Serb forces established thor -
ture camps to where Croats were taken 188; Velepromet and Ovčara.
According to the Applicant, the Serb forces had the opportunity to dis -
place and not to destroy the surviving Vukovar Croats, but they were,
instead, repeatedly tortured and executed 189.
223. In the Martić case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber I) found (Judgment
of 12 June 2007) that, in their attacks on Croat villages in the SAO Kra -
jina, the Serbian armed forces left the villagers with “no choice buth to
flee”, and those who stayed behind were promptly beaten and killed
(ICTY, Martić, Judgment of 12 June 2007, para. 349). The attacked vil -
lages included Potkonije, Vrpolje, Glina, Kijevo, Drniš, Hrvatska Koshta-
jnica, Cerovljani, Hrvatska Dubica, Baćin, Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovahča,
S kabrnja, Nadin and Bruška ; “grave discriminatory measures were taken
against the Croat population” there (ibid.).
224. By and large, the ICTY (Trial Chamber I) proceeded in the Martić
case, there was a “widespread and systematic attack directed against the
Croat and other non -Serb civilian population”, both in Croatia and in
182
Cf., e.g., CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, paras. 3-5; and Rejoinder of Serbia,
paras. 349, 360, 367-368, 381, 384 and 386.
183 Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, paras.349, 360, 367-368, 381, 384 and386; and CR 2014/13,
of 10 March 2014, paras. 3-5.
184 CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, p. 43.
185 CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, p. 41.
186 Ibid., p. 45.
187 Ibid.
188
189 CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, pp. 29, 31 and 35.
Ibid., p. 39.
281
7 CIJ1077.indb 558 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 280
des conflits 182, mais elle a contesté la fiabilité des preuves et des documentsh
présentés par l’Etat demandeur, notamment celle des déclarathions des
témoins. Selon elle, les événements tragiques décrits par l’hEtat demandeur
n’établissent pas l’intention génocidaire et l’intention hspécifique de
détruire ; ils établissent tout au plus, ajoute -t-elle, que des crimes de guerre
183
et des crimes contre l’humanité ont été commis, mais pas un hgénocide .
221. Appelant ensuite l’attention sur Vukovar, en Slavonie orientale,
la Croatie a fait valoir que, après la chute de la ville, des officihers de haut
rang de la JNA avaient facilité et encouragé la torture à grandhe échelle et
le meurtre de prisonniers 184, notamment ceux qui se trouvaient au Vele -
promet 185. Selon le demandeur, à Vukovar et dans d’autres villes ou vil -
lages, des civils croates, souvent des personnes âgées incapables hde fuir ou
se refusant à le faire, avaient été victimes d’actes d’unhe extrême brutalité,
torturés et tués par les soldats de la JNA, les forces de la TO eth des para -
186
militaires . D’après lui, ces atrocités avaient été commises dans 187nten -
tion de détruire la population croate dans les régions visées .
222. La Croatie a en outre affirmé que, à Vukovar, les forces serbes
avaient mené une campagne intense de bombardements et de pilonnages, h
de meurtres brutaux et de torture, d’expulsions systématiques et de priva -
tion de nourriture, d’eau, d’électricité, d’hygiène eth de soins médicaux.
Elle a ajouté que les forces serbes avaient établi des camps de tohrture,
188
notamment Velepromet et Ovčara, où les Croates étaient emmenéhs .
Selon elle, alors que les forces serbes avaient la possibilité de déplacer et
de ne pas éliminer les survivants croates de Vukovar, ceux -ci avaient au
contraire été torturés à de multiples reprises et exécutéhs . 189
223. Dans le jugement en date du 12 juin 2007 en l’affaire Martić, le
TPIY (chambre de première instance I) a constaté que, lors des attaques
menées contre des villages croates de la SAO de Krajina, les forces ahrmées
serbes n’avaient pas laissé aux villageois d’autre choix « que s’enfuir», et que
ceux qui étaient restés étaient immédiatement battus et tuéhs (TPIY, Martić,
jugement du 12 juin 2007, par. 349). Au nombre des villages attaqués figu-
raient Potkonije, Vrpolje, Glina, Kijevo, Drniš, Hrvatska Kostajnica,h
Cerovljani, Hrvatska Dubica, Baćin, Saborsko, Poljanak, Lipovača,
Skabrnja, Nadin et Bruška «; la population croate a fait l’objet de mesures
discriminatoires sévères » dans ces lieux (ibid.).
224. En tout état de cause, a poursuivi le TPIY, « des attaques généra -
lisées et systématiques ont été dirigées contre la population civile croate et
non serbe » tant en Croatie qu’en Bosnie -Herzégovine (ibid., par. 352).
182
Voir par exemple CR 2014/13, par. 3-5; et duplique, par. 349, 360, 367-368, 381,
384 et 386.
183 Voir duplique de la Serbie, par.349, 360, 367-368, 381, 384-386 ; et CR 2014/13,
par. 3-5.
184 CR 2014/5, p. 43.
185 CR 2014/6, p. 41.
186 Ibid., p. 45.
187 Ibid.
188
189 CR 2014/8, p. 29, 31 et 35.
Ibid., p. 39.
281
7 CIJ1077.indb 559 18/04/16 08:54 281 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICTY, Martić, Judgment of 12 June 2007,
para. 352). The crimes of torture, and cruel and inhuman treatment,
“were carried out with intent to discriminate on the basis of ethnicihty”
(ibid., paras. 411 and 413). There was a pattern of beatings, mistreatment
and torture of detainees (ibid., paras. 414-416).
225. Six years later, in theStanišić and Simatović case, the ICTY (Trial
Chamber I) likewise found (Judgment of 30 May 2013) that there was a
“widespread attack” against the same civilian population to which hthe
targeted persons belonged (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović, Judgment of
30 May 2013, paras. 971-972). The perpetrators’ “discriminatory intent”
was clear (ibid., para. 1250). The pattern of extreme violence included
arbitrary detention, beatings, sexual assaults, torture, murders, use of
derogatory language and insults, deportation and forcible transfer — all
on the basis of the ethnicity of the victims (ibid., paras.970 and 1250). It
should be kept in mind — may I add — that the prohibition of torture, in
all its forms, is absolute, in any circumstances : it is a prohibition ofjus
cogens.
226. Last but not least, may I here further add that the ICTY (Appeals
Chamber), in its recent Judgment (of 11 July 2013) in the Karadžić case,
rejected an appeal for acquittal, and reinstated genocide charges against
Mr. R. Karadžić, for the brutalities committed against detainees : although
the atrocities occurred in Bosnian municipalities, the pattern of destruhc -
tion was the same as the one that took place in Croatian municipalities,
and so were the targeted groups : besides Bosnian Muslims, also Bosnian
Croats. As to the conditions of detention, the ICTY (Appeals Chamber) h
found the occurrences of torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, rape and h
sexual violence, forced labour, and inhuman living conditions, with “hfai- l
ure to provide adequate accommodation, shelter, food, water, medical
care or hygienic facilities” (ICTY, Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July 2013,
para. 34). It further noted
“evidence on the record indicating that Bosnian Muslim and/or Bos -
nian Croat detainees were kicked, and were violently beaten with a
range of objects, including, inter alia, rifles and rifle butts, truncheons
and batons, sticks and poles, bats, chains, pieces of cable, metal pipesh
and rods, and pieces of furniture. Detainees were often beaten over
the course of several days, for extended periods of time and multiple
times a day. Evidence on the record also indicates that in some
instances detainees were thrown down flights of stairs, beaten until
they lost consciousness, or had their heads hit against walls. These
beatings allegedly resulted in serious injuries, including, inter alia, rib
fractures, skull fractures, jaw fractures, vertebrae fractures, and con-
cussions. Long -term alleged effects from these beatings included, inter
alia, tooth loss, permanent headaches, facial deformities, deformed
282
7 CIJ1077.indb 560 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 281
Des crimes de torture et des traitements cruels et inhumains cruels ont hété
perpétrés dans « une intention discriminatoire fondée sur l’appartenance
ethnique» (TPIY, Martić, jugement du 12 juin 2007, par. 411 et 413). Il
s’agissait d’une entreprise visant à battre, maltraiter et torthurer systémati-
quement les détenus (ibid., par. 414-416).
225. Six ans plus tard, dans le jugement en date du 30 mai 2013 en
l’affaire Stanišić et Simatović, le TPIY (chambre de première instance I) a
conclu de même qu’il y avait eu une « attaque générale » contre la même
population civile dont les personnes visées étaient membres ( TPIY, Sta ‑
nišić et Simatović, jugement du 30 mai 2013, par. 971-972). «L’intention
discriminatoire » des auteurs était claire (bid., par. 1250). Cette campagne
d’extrême violence s’était caractérisée par des déthentions arbitraires, des
sévices physiques, des agressions sexuelles, des actes de torture, dehs
meurtres, l’emploi de termes péjoratifs et d’insultes, la déhportation et le
transfert forcé — actes ayant tous pour fondement l’origine ethnique des
victimes (ibid., par. 970 et 1250). J’ajouterais qu’il convient de garder à
l’esprit que l’interdiction de la torture sous toutes ses formes ehst absolue
dans toutes les circonstances : c’est une interdiction qui relève du
jus cogens.
226. Enfin, je souhaite préciser que le TPIY, dans l’arrêt qu’ihl a récem -
ment rendu (11 juillet 2013) en l’affaire Karadžić, a rejeté le recours visant
à obtenir un acquittement, et a rétabli les accusations de génohcide contre
M. R. Karadžić, à raison des brutalités commises contre des déthenus : bien
que les atrocités aient eu lieu dans des municipalités de Bosnie, hla campagne
de destruction était la même que celle menée dans les municipalhités croates,
et les groupes visés étaient les mêmes : outre les Musulmans de Bosnie, les
Croates de Bosnie étaient aussi pris pour cible. En ce qui concerne lhes
conditions de détention, le TPIY a pris note des faits de torture, dehs traite-
ments cruels et inhumains, des viols et autres violences sexuelles, du travail
forcé et des conditions d’existence inhumaines, dont «les conditions déplo-
rables en matière d’hébergement, d’approvisionnement en nourriture et en
eau, de soins médicaux ou d’installations sanitaires» étaient établis (TPIY,
Karadžić, jugement du 11 juillet 2013, par. 34). Il a en outre pris note
« des éléments de preuve versés au dossier montrant que des Musulmans
et/ou des Croates de Bosnie ont été, pendant leur détention, frhappés à
coups de pied et violemment battus avec toutes sortes d’objets— fusils
et crosses, matraques et gourdins, bâtons et cannes, battes, chaînhes,
câbles, tuyaux métalliques et barres de fer, éléments de mobhilier et
autres objets. Les détenus étaient fréquemment battus plusieursh jours
durant, pendant de longues périodes ou à de multiples reprises au cours
de la même journée. Les éléments de preuve versés au dosshier illustrent
également plusieurs cas de détenus précipités dans des cagesh d’escalier
ou battus jusqu’à ce qu’ils perdent conscience, ou encore dont hla tête a
été cognée contre les murs. Ces sévices auraient provoqué des blessures
graves, notamment des fractures des côtes, du crâne, de la mâchhoire ou
des vertèbres, ainsi que des commotions cérébrales. Leurs conséhquences
282
7 CIJ1077.indb 561 18/04/16 08:54 282 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
fingers, chronic leg pain, and partial paralysis of limbs.” (ICTY,h
Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July 2013, para. 35.)
4. Systematic Expulsion from Homes and Mass Exodus,
and Destruction of Group Culture
227. In addition to mass killings, torture, beatings and other mistreat -
ment, unbearable conditions of life were inflicted on the targeted Crohat
population : there were systematic expulsions from homes, the imposition
of subsistence diets and the reduction of essential medical treatment anhd
190
supplies . The targeted segments of the population were required to dis-
play signs of their ethnicity, and were denied food, water, electricity hand
medical treatment. Their movements were restricted, and they were sub -
jected to repeated looting and to a regime of random and mass killings
(supra) , amidst brutalization and extreme violence. Their cultural and
religious monuments and the signs of their cultural heritage were
destroyed or looted ; the basis of their education was suppressed, so as to
be replaced by education as Serbs 191.
228. There was expulsion or forced displacement of the Croat popula -
tion from the villages of Tenja, Dalj, Berak, Bogdanovci, Sarengrad, Ilok,
Tompojevci, Bapska, Tovarnik, Sotin, Lovas, and Tordinci, as well as
192
Pakrac, Uskok, Donji, Gornji Varos and Pivare ; people were forced to
sign statements relinquishing all rights to their property, and to embarhk
on the mass exodus ; those who did not do so were subjected to a brutal
regime of extreme violence. Croatia recalled that the ICTY (Trial Cham -
ber), in its Judgment (of 2 August 2001) in the Krstić case, found that
“where there is physical or biological destruction there are often
simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and sym-
bols of the targeted group as well, attacks which may legitimately be
considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group.
In this case [Krstić], the Trial Chamber will thus take into account as
evidence of intent to destroy the group the deliberate destruction of
mosques and houses belonging to members of the group.” (ICTY,
Krstić, Judgment of 2 August 2001, para. 580.)
229. The International Court of Justice itself cited this finding in its
2007 Judgment (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun ‑
ishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
190Cf., e.g., Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.23 and 5.30.
191Cf. ibid., paras. 4.60, 4.128, and 5.181.
192Cf. ibid., paras4.30-4.31, 4.37, 4.46 -4.47, 4.61 -4.64, 4.80, 4.93, 4.105, 4.107,
4.132-4.133, 5.14, 5.49, 5.79, 5.92, 5.93, 5.106, 5.121, 5.140-5.141, 5.146, 5h.148, 5.174,
5.181, 5.196, 5.202-5.205, 5.210, 5.223 and 5.225.
283
7 CIJ1077.indb 562 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 282
à long terme incluraient notamment chute de dents, maux de tête peh -r
manents, visage défiguré, doigts déformés, douleurs chronihques aux
jambes et paralysie partielle des membres. » (TPIY, Karadžić, jugement
du 11 juillet 2013, par. 3.)
4. Expulsion systématique des logements et exode massif,
et destruction de la culture du groupe
227. En plus des meurtres de masse, des actes de torture, des sévices
physiques et d’autres mauvais traitements, la population croate viséhe a
connu des conditions de vie insupportables : expulsion systématique des
logements, imposition d’un rationnement alimentaire et réduction dhes
fournitures et traitements médicaux essentiels 19. Les segments visés de la
population étaient tenus d’afficher des signes de leur appartenanhce eth -
nique et ont été privés de nourriture, d’eau, d’électrhicité et de traitement
médical. Leurs déplacements faisaient l’objet de restrictions eht ils ont été
soumis à des pillages répétés et à un régime de meurtrhes aveugles et de
masse (supra) , et ce dans un contexte de brutalités et de violences
extrêmes. Leurs monuments culturels et religieux et les signes de leur
patrimoine culturel ont été détruits ou pillés ; les bases de leur enseigne -
ment ont été supprimées et remplacées par d’autres 191.
228. La population croate a été expulsée ou déplacée de force dans les
villages suivants: Tenja, Dalj, Berak, Bogdanovci, Sarengrad, Ilok, Tom-
pojevci, Bapska, Tovarnik, Sotin, Lovas et Tordinci, ainsi que Pakrac,
Uskok, Donji, Gornji Varos et Pivare 192; les gens ont été forcés à signer des
déclarations par lesquelles ils renonçaient à tous leurs droitsh sur leurs biens
et à se joindre à l’exode de masse; ceux qui ne l’ont pas fait ont été soumis
à un régime brutal de violences extrêmes. La Croatie a rappeléh que le TPIY,
dans son jugement rendu (le 2 août 2001) en l’affaireKrstić, a constaté que
«la destruction physique ou biologique s’accompagne souvent d’at -
teintes aux biens et symboles culturels et religieux du groupe pris
pour cible, atteintes dont il pourra légitimement être tenu compteh
pour établir l’intention de détruire le groupe physiquement. Lah
Chambre considérera donc en l’espèce la destruction délibéhrée de
mosquées et de maisons appartenant aux membres du groupe comme
une preuve de l’intention de détruire ce groupe. » (TPIY, Krstić, juge-
ment du 2 août 2001, par. 580.)
229. La Cour elle -même a cité cette conclusion dans l’arrêt qu’elle a
rendu en 2007 en l’affaire concernant la Bosnie‑Herzégovine (Application de
la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de gén ▯ ocide (Bosn‑ie
190 Voir, par exemple, mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.23 et 5.30.
191 Ibid., par. 4.60, 4.128 et 5.181.
192 Ibid., par. 4.30-4.31, 4.37, 4.46-4.47, 4.61-4.64, 4.80, 4.93, 4.105, 4.107, 4.132-4.133,
5.14, 5.49, 5.79, 5.92, 5.93, 5.106, 5.121, 5.140-5.141, 5.146, 5.148, 5.174, 5.181, 5.196,
5.202-5.205, 5.210, 5.223 et 5.225.
283
7 CIJ1077.indb 563 18/04/16 08:54 283 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 185, para. 344). It is
clear that the destruction of cultural and religious heritage, as occurrhed in
the present case of the Application of the Convention against Genocide,
pertaining to the armed attacks in Croatia, can be of significance within
the context of the widespread and systematic pattern of destruction, as
occurred in the cas d’espèce, opposing Croatia to Serbia. Such destruction
of cultural and religious heritage is not to be simply dismissed tout court,
as the International Court of Justice has done in the present Judgment
(paras. 129, 379, 385 -386). It should have taken into due account the
aforementioned pattern of destruction as a whole (encompassing destruc -
tion of cultural and religious sites), as properly warned by the ICTY in
the Krstić case (supra).
230. In the present case, Serbia, for its part, retorted that, for the sys -
tematic expulsion of people from homes to fall under Article II (c) of the
Genocide Convention, it must be part of a “manifest pattern”, capable of
effecting the physical destruction of the group, and not merely its dis -
placement elsewhere ; in its view, the Applicant failed to prove that the
expulsion of Croats, where it has occurred, was accompanied by the
intent to destroy that population 193. In addition, Serbia minimized the
relevance of the destruction of cultural and religious objects, saying that,
in the drafting history of the Genocide Convention, the inclusion of
attacks on cultural and religious objects under the rubric “cultural hgeno-
cide” was discarded in the course of that drafting process 19.
231. On this point, may I here observe that, in his Autobiography,
Raphael Lemkin, who devoted so much energy to the coming into being
of the 1948 Convention against Genocide, warned that genocide has been
“an essential part” of world history, it has followed hu195kind “hlike a
dark shadow from early antiquity to the present” . To him, a group can
be destroyed as a group even when its members are not all destroyed, buth
its cultural identity is;genocide, to Lemkin, means also the destruction of
a culture, impoverishing civilization. The destruction of the cultural ihden -
tity of a group destroys ultimately its “spirit” 196. Lemkin confessed that
the idea of “cultural genocide” was “very dear” to him : “It meant the
destruction of the cultural pattern of a group, such as language, the trhad-i
tions, monuments, archives, libraries, and churches. In brief : the shrines
of a nation’s soul.” 197
232. Lemkin much regretted that there was not support for this idea in
the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, but he kept nour -
193
194Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 84; and Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 333.
195Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 335.
R. Lemkin, Totally Unofficial — The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin (ed.
D.-L. Frieze), New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2013, pp. 125 and 140.
196Ibid., pp. 131, 138 and 168.
197Ibid., p. 172.
284
7 CIJ1077.indb 564 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 283
Herzégovine c. Serbie‑et‑Monténégro), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p.185,
par. 344). Il est clair que la destruction du patrimoine culturel et religiehux,
telle qu’elle s’est produite dans la présente affaire relative àh l’Application de
la convention sur le génocide concernant les attaques armées en Croatie,
peut avoir de l’importance dans le contexte de la campagne de destruction
générale et systématique mise en œuvre dans le cas d’espèhce opposant la
Croatie à la Serbie. Cette destruction du patrimoine culturel et relihgieux ne
saurait être simplement écartée sans plus de considération, comme la Cour
l’a fait dans le présent arrêt (par. 129, 379, 385 et 386). La Cour aurait dû
tenir dûment compte de la campagne de destruction susmentionnée dans
son ensemble (y compris de la destruction des sites culturels et religieux),
comme le TPIY l’avait à juste titre relevé dans l’affaire Krstić (supra).
230. En l’espèce, la Serbie, de son côté, a rétorqué que, phour que l’ex -
pulsion systématique d’individus chassés de leurs foyers relève du litt. c)
de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide, elle doit s’inscrire dans le h
cadre d’une « série manifeste » capable de produire la destruction phy -
sique du groupe, et pas seulement son déplacement ; selon elle, le deman -
deur n’est pas parvenu à prouver que, là où elle s’étahit produite, l’expulsion
des Croates s’était accompagnée de l’intention de détruirhe cette popula -
tion 193. En outre, la Serbie a minimisé l’importance de la destruction
d’objets culturels et cultuels, affirmant que, lors des travaux préparatoires
de la convention sur le génocide, l’inscription des attaques contrhe les
objets culturels et cultuels dans la rubrique du « génocide culturel » avait
été rejetée au cours du processus de rédaction 194.
231. Sur ce point, je tiens à faire observer ici que, dans son Autobiogra‑
phy, Raphael Lemkin, qui a consacré tant d’énergie à l’avènement deh la
convention de 1948 sur le génocide, a souligné que le génocide était « un
élément essentiel» de l’histoire du monde, qui suivait l’humanité « comme
une ombre sinistre du début de l’Antiquité à l’heure actuhelle » 195. Pour lui,
un groupe pouvait être détruit en tant que groupe, même si ses hmembres
n’étaient pas tous détruits, mais que son identité culturellhe l’était ; le géno-
cide, pour R. Lemkin, signifiait aussi la destruction d’une culture, l’ap -
pauvrissement de la civilisation. La destruction de l’identité culhturelle
196
d’un groupe finit par détruire son « esprit» . R. Lemkin a reconnu que
l’idée de « génocide culturel» lui était «très chère»: «Cela signifiait la des-
truction du modèle culturel d’un groupe, comme la langue, les tradhitions,
les monuments, les archives, les bibliothèques et les églises. En hbref : les
197
sanctuaires de l’âme d’une nation. »
232. R. Lemkin a beaucoup regretté que cette idée n’ait pas recueilli dh-’ap
pui au cours des travaux préparatoires de la convention sur le génhocide,
193Voir contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 84; et duplique da la Serbie, par. 333.
194Duplique de la Serbie, par. 335.
195R. Lemkin, Totally Unofficial — The Autobiography (dir. publ., D.-L. Frieze), New
Haven/Londres, Yale University Press, 2013, p. 125 et 140.
196Ibid., p. 131, 138 et 168.
197Ibid., p. 172.
284
7 CIJ1077.indb 565 18/04/16 08:54 284 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ishing the hope that in the future an Additional Protocol to the Conven -
tion, on “cultural genocide”, could be adopted. After all, he added, “the
destruction of a group entails the annihilation of its cultural heritageh or
198
the interruption of the cultural contributions coming from the group”h .
Lemkin was attentive to the writings of the “founding fathers” of hinterna -
tional law (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), and expressed his
admiration in particular to those of Bartolomé de Las Casas (and also of
Francisco de Vitoria), for his defence, on the basis of natural law, of the
rights of native populations against the abuses and brutalities of colonhia-l
ism in the New World (which Lemkin called “colonial genocide”) 199.
233. In this connection (destruction of a group’s cultural heritage), thhe
ICTY (Trial Chamber), in its decision (Review of Indictments, of 11 July
1996) in the case Karadžić and Mladić, observed that, in some cases,
“humiliation and terror serve to dismember the group. The destruc-
tion of mosques or Catholic churches is designed to annihilate the
centuries -long presence of the group or groups ; the destruction of the
libraries is intended to annihilate a culture which was enriched throughh
the participation of the various national components of the popula -
tion.” (ICTY, Karadžić and Mladić, decision of 11 July 1996, para. 94.)
I shall come back to this point subsequently in the present dissenting
opinion, when I address the destruction of cultural goods during the
200
bombardments of Dubrovnik (October-December 1991) .
234. In the already mentioned Stanišić and Simatović case, the ICTY
(Trial Chamber I) observed (Judgment of 30 May 2013) that the members
of the local civilian population, when not killed, were marginalized, brhu-
talized and forced to flee, “in order to establish a purely Serb tehrritory”,
so that the attacked villages could afterwards “form part of a Greatehr
Serbia” (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović, Judgment of 30 May 2013,
para. 1250). The ICTY (Trial Chamber) recalled “its findings on the
actions (including attacks, killings, destruction of houses, arbitrary harrest
and detention, torture, harassment, and looting) which occurred in the h
Saborsko region from June to November 1991” (ibid., para. 264). It
upheld the initial “evidence of approximately 20,000 to 25,000 Croats and
other non-Serbs” who were forcefully displaced from the SAO Krajina
region by April 1992 (ibid.).
198
199R. Lemkin, op. cit. supra note 195, pp. 172-173.
Cf. A. Dirk Moses, “Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide”,
The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies (eds. D. Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses), Oxford
University Press, 2010, pp. 26-27and cf.A. A. Cançado Trindade, “Prefacio”, Escuela
Ibérica de la Paz (1511‑1694) — La Conciencia Crítica de la Conquista y Colonización de
América (eds. P. Calafate and R. E. Mandado Gutiérrez), Santander, Ed. Universidad de
Cantabria, 2014, pp. 72-73 and 98-99.
200Cf. Part XII (7) of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
285
7 CIJ1077.indb 566 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 284
mais il a continué à nourrir l’espoir que, à l’avenir, un protocole additionnel
à la Convention, relatif au « génocide culturel», serait adopté. Après tout,
a-t-il ajouté, «la destruction d’un groupe entraîne l’anéantissement de son
patrimoin198ulturel ou l’interruption des apports culturels émananht du
groupe» . Il était attentif aux écrits des «pères fondateurs» du droit inter-
national (des XVI e et XVII siècles)et il a exprimé son admiration en parti-
culier pour ceux de Bartolomé de Las Casas (et aussi pour ceux de
Francisco de Vitoria), en raison de sa défense, fondée sur le droit naturel,
des droits des populations autochtones contre les violences et les brutahlités
du colonialisme dans le Nouveau Monde (ce que R. Lemkin a appelé un
«génocide colonial») 199.
233. A ce sujet (destruction du patrimoine culturel d’un groupe), la
chambre de première instance du TPIY, dans la décision (examen dehs
actes d’accusation, 11 juillet 1996) qu’elle a rendue en l’affaire Karadžić et
Mladić, a fait observer que, dans certains cas,
« c’est un moyen de désorganisation du groupe à travers l’humihlia -
tion et la terreur. La destruction des mosquées ou des églises cathho-
liques vise à l’anéantissement de la présence séculaire dhu ou des
groupes; la destruction des bibliothèques à l’annihilation d’une
culture enrichie de la participation des diverses composantes natio -
nales de la population. » (TPIY, Karadžić et Mladić, décision du
11 juillet 1996, par. 94.)
Je reviendrai sur ce point plus loin dans le présent exposé, lorsqhue je trai-
terai la question de la destruction des biens culturels lors des bombardhe-
200
ments de Dubrovnik (octobre-décembre 1991) .
234. Dans le jugement Stanišić et Simatović (30 mai 2013) déjà men -
tionné, la chambre de première instance I du TPIY a noté que lehs membres
de la population civile locale, quand ils n’avaient pas été tués, avaient été
marginalisés, brutalisés et contraints de fuir « pour qu’un territoire pure -
ment serbe soit établi », afin que les villages attaqués puissent ensuite
«faire partie d’une Grande Serbie » (TIPY, Stanišić et Simatović, juge -
ment du 30 mai 2013, par. 1250). Le TPIY a rappelé « ses conclusions
concernant les événements (attaques, meurtres, destructions de mahisons,
arrestations et détentions arbitraires, torture, harcèlement et pihllage)
survenus dans la région de Saborsko de juin à novembre 1991 »
(ibid.,par. 264). Il a retenu les éléments montrant que « quelque 20 000 à
25 000 Croates et autres civils non serbes » avaient été déplacés de force
de la région SAO de Krajina avant avril 1992 (ibid.).
198
199R. Lemkin, op. cit. supra note 195, p. 172-173.
Voir A. Dirk Moses, « Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide »,
The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies (dir. publ., D. Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses),
Oxford University Press, 2010, p26-27; et voir A. A.Cançado Trindade, «Prefacio»,
Escuela Ibérica de la Paz (1511‑1694— La Conciencia Crítica de la Conquista y Colo ‑
nización de América (dir. publ., Calafate et R. E.Mandado Gutiérrez), Santander,
Ed. Universidad de Cantabria, 2014, p. 72-73 et 98-99.
200Voir partie XII 7) du présent exposé, infra.
285
7 CIJ1077.indb 567 18/04/16 08:54 285 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
235. The ICTY (Trial Chamber) then added, in the aforementioned
Stanišić and Simatović case, that the total of those forcefully displaced
persons considerably increased until April 1992 ; in its own words,
“between 80,000 and 100,000 Croat and other non-Serb civilians fled the
SAO Krajina”, as a result of the situation created and then prevailing in
the region, which was a combination of “the attacks on villages and
towns with substantial or completely Croat populations ; the killings, use
as human shields, detention, beatings, forced labour, sexual abuse and
other forms of harassment of Croat persons ; and the looting and destruc -
tion of property” (ICTY, Stanišić and Simatović , Judgment of 30 May
2013, para. 404, and cf. para. 997) 20.
236. Furthermore, in its Judgment of 12 December 2012 in the Tolimir
case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber II) drew attention to the need and impor-
tance of considering the forcible transfer of segments of the populationh in
connection with other wrongful acts directed against the same targeted
groups. It pondered that, proceeding in this way, it becomes clear that hthe
disclosed pattern of destruction — taking all the wrongful acts together—
is indicative of an intent to destroy all or part of the forcibly displahced
population (ICTY, Tolimir, Judgment of 12 December 2012, paras. 739
and 748).
5. General Assessment
237. The evidence produced before the Court in the present case of the
Application of the Convention against Genocide clearly establishes, in my
perception, the occurrence of massive killings of targeted members of thhe
Croat civilian population during the armed attacks in Croatia, amidst a
systematic pattern of extreme violence, encompassing also torture, arbi -
trary detention, beatings, sexual assaults, expulsion from homes and looh-t
ing, forced displacement and transfer, deportation and humiliation, in thhe
attacked villages. It was not exactly a war, it was a devastating onslauhght
of civilians. It was not only “a plurality of common crimes” that h“cannot,
in itself, constitute genocide”, as Counsel for Serbia argued before hthe
Court in the public sitting of 12 March 2014 202; it was rather an onslaught,
a plurality of atrocities, which, in itself, by its extreme violence andh dev -
203
astation, can disclose the intent to destroy (mens rea of genocide) .
238. The atrocities were not seldom carried out with the use of deroga -
tory language and hate speech. I find it important to stress the circuhm -
stances surrounding the attacked population, which was left in a situation
201And cf. also Part IX (4) (d) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
202Cf. CR 2014/15, of 12 March 2014, p. 18, para. 22. And cf. also Counter-Memorial
of Serbia, para. 54.
203
Cf. Part XV of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
286
7 CIJ1077.indb 568 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 285
235. Dans la même affaire, le TPIY a ajouté que le nombre total des
personnes déplacées de force avait considérablement augmenté jusqu’en
avril1992 ; pour reprendre ses termes, « de 80 000 à 100 000 Croates et
autres civils non serbes ont fui la SAO de Krajina » en conséquence de la
situation créée qui prévalait alors dans la région, à savhoir une combinaison
d’«attaques contre les villages et les villes peuplés essentiellement ouh enti-è
rement de Croates ; … meurtres, utilisation de boucliers humains, déten -
tion, coups, travail forcé, violences sexuelles et autres formes de hharcèlement
des Croates ; et pillage et destruction de biens» (TIPY, Stanišić et Simato‑
201
vić, jugement du 30 mai 2013, par. 404, et voir par. 997) .
236. En outre, dans le jugement Tolimir (12 décembre 2012), la
chambre de première instance II du TPIY a souligné qu’il étahit nécessaire
et important d’examiner le déplacement de force de segments de la popu -
lation à la lumière d’autres actes répréhensibles dirigés contre le même
groupe. Elle a fait valoir que, en procédant de la sorte, il devenaith clair
que la campagne de destruction, qui apparaissait lorsque tous les actes
illicites étaient considérés dans leur ensemble, était le sihgne d’une inten -
tion de détruire tout ou partie de la population déplacée de fohrce (TPIY,
Tolimir, jugement du 12 décembre 2012, par. 739 et 748).
5. Appréciation générale
237. Les preuves produites devant la Cour en la présente affaire rela -
tive à l’Application de la convention sur le génocide établissent clairement,
à mon sens, la perpétration de meurtres de masse de membres cibléhs de la
population civile croate pendant les attaques armées en Croatie, dansh le
contexte d’une campagne systématique de violences extrêmes dansh les vi-l
lages attaqués, qui comprenait aussi des actes de torture, des déthentions
arbitraires, des sévices physiques, des agressions sexuelles, des exphulsions
de logements et des pillages, des déplacements et des transferts forchés, des
déportations et des humiliations. C’était non pas exactement unhe guerre,
mais un assaut dévastateur contre les civils. Ce n’était pas sihmplement une
«pluralité de crimes de droit commun » qui « ne sauraient constituer un
génocide », comme l’a soutenu le conseil de la Serbie devant la Cour à
202
l’audience du 12 mars 2014 ; c’était plutôt une campagne de dévasta-
tion, une multiplication d’atrocités qui, en elles -mêmes, par leur violence
et leur brutalité extrêmes, peuvent mettre en évidence l’inthention de
détruire (mens rea du génocide) 20.
238. Il n’était pas rare que les atrocités commises s’accompagnenht de
l’emploi de termes péjoratifs et de propos haineux. Il me semble ihmpor -
tant de souligner que la population attaquée se trouvait dans une situation
201Voir aussi partie IX 4) d) du présent exposé, supra.
202Voir CR 2014/15, p. 18, par. 22. Voir aussi contre‑mémoire de la Serbie, par. 54.
203
Voir partie XV du présent exposé, infra.
286
7 CIJ1077.indb 569 18/04/16 08:54 286 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
of the utmost vulnerability, if not defencelessness ; such situation consti -
tutes, in my understanding, an aggravating circumstance. Later on in theh
present dissenting opinion, I shall return to the consideration of the
crimes perpetrated, under the relevant parts of the provisions of ArticlheII
of the Convention against Genocide 204.
239. Last but not least, may I here add that, in this factual context, the
expression “ethnic cleansing” seems to try to hide the extreme cruhelty that
it enshrines, in referring to the pursuance with the utmost violence of ha
forced removal of a targeted group from a given territory. I have alreadhy
referred to the rather surreptitious way whereby “ethnic cleansing”h pene -
trated legal vocabulary as a breach of international law (I.C.J. Reports
2010 (II), p. 543, para. 47) in my separate opinion in the International
Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (of
22 July 2010).
240. It so happens that such coerced or forced removal of a group from
a territory, so as to render this latter ethnically “homogeneous”, has not
seldom been carried out — as the wars in the former Yugoslavia show —
by means of killings, torture and beatings, forced labour, rape and other
sexual abuses, expulsion from homes and forced displacement and depor -
tation (with mass exodus) and the destruction of cultural and religiouhs
sites. Thus, what had initially appeared to have been an intent to expel a
group from a territory, may well have become, as extreme violence breeds
more and more violence, an intent to destroy the targeted group.
241. “Ethnic cleansing” and genocide, rather than excluding each other,h
appear to be somehow overlapping 205: with the growth of extreme violence,
what at first appeared to be “ethnic cleansing” turns out to be hgenocide :
the initial “intent to remove”, degenerates into “intent to deshtroy”, the
targeted group. In such circumstances, there is no sense in trying to cam -
ouflage genocide with the use of the expression “ethnic cleansing”h. In some
circumstances, such an expression may well amount to genocide, as reck -
oned by the ECHR in the Jorgić v. Germany case (Judgment of 12 July
204 Cf. Part XIII of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
205 For a discussion, cf., inter alia, e.g., M. Grmek, M. Gjidara and N. Simac (orgs.), Le
nettoyage ethnique — Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe, Fayard, 2002, pp. 7-9,
26, 31, 33, 38, 212, 286, 293 -294, 311-312, 324-325 and 336 -337.Quigley, The Geno ‑
cide Convention — An International Law Analysis, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 191-201;
N. M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred — Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth‑Century Europe,
Cambridge (Mass.)/London, Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 156-157, 164 -165,
168-170, 174 and 183 -184; Ph. Spencer, Genocide since 1945, London/N.Y., Routledge,
2012, pp. 11-12, 29 and 85 -86; N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia — The Policy of “Ethnic
Cleansing”, College Station, Texas A & M University Press, 1995, pp. 3-10, 22-37, 62-85
and 139-180 ;. Lieberman, “‘Ethnic Cleansing’ versus Genocide?”, The Oxford Handbook
of Genocide Studies (eds. D. Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses), Oxford University Press, 2010,
pp. 42-60; C.Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans — Nationalism and the Destruc‑
tion of Tradition, London/N.Y., Routledge, 2002, pp. 2, 66, 112-114.
287
7 CIJ1077.indb 570 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 286
de vulnérabilité extrême, sinon sans défense — ce qui, à mon sens, consti -
tue une circonstance aggravante. Je reviendrai plus loin à l’examehn des
crimes perpétrés, sous l’angle des parties pertinentes des disphositions de
l’article II de la convention sur le génocide 204.
239. Enfin et surtout, je tiens à ajouter que, dans ce contexte factuel,h
l’expression « nettoyage ethnique », employée pour désigner l’expulsion
forcée, mise en œuvre avec la plus grande violence, d’un groupeh visé d’un
territoire donné, semble être une tentative de dissimuler la cruauhté extrême
de la réalité qu’elle recouvre. J’ai déjà fait état, dans l’exposé de mon opi -
nion dissidente (C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (II), p. 543, par. 47) joint à l’avis
consultatif donné par la Cour sur la Conformité au droit international de
la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance relative au Kosovo▯ (22 juil-
let 2010), de la manière plutôt dérobée dont cette expression est entrée
dans le vocabulaire juridique en tant que violation du droit international.
240. Il se trouve que cette expulsion contrainte ou forcée d’un groupe h
d’un territoire en vue de rendre celui -ci ethniquement « homogène» a été
effectuée — comme le montrent les guerres dans l’ex -Yougoslavie — au
moyen de meurtres, de torture et de sévices physiques, de travail forhcé, de
viol et autres violences sexuelles, d’expulsion des logements, de déhplace -
ment forcé, de déportation (avec exode de masse) et de destructihon des
sites culturels et religieux. Ainsi, il se pourrait bien que ce qui sembhlait
avoir été au départ une intention d’expulser un groupe d’un territoire soit
devenue, parce que l’extrême violence engendre une violence accrueh, une
intention de détruire le groupe visé.
241. Le « nettoyage ethnique » et le génocide semblent non pas s’ex -
clure mutuellement, mais en quelque sorte se chevaucher 205 : avec le déve-
loppement de l’extrême violence, ce qui semblait être au déphart un
« nettoyage ethnique» se révèle être un génocide, et l’initiale «intention de
déplacer » dégénère en « intention de détruire » le groupe visé. Dans ces
conditions, il ne rime à rien d’essayer de camoufler le génochide en
employant l’expression « nettoyage ethnique ». Dans certaines circons -
tances, cette expression peut s’entendre d’un génocide, comme lh’a reconnu
204 Voir partie XIII du présent exposé, infra.
205 Pour en savoir plus, voir notamment M. Grmek, M. Gjidara et N. Simac (coord.),
Le nettoyage ethnique — Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe, Fayard, 2002,
p. 7-9, 26, 31, 33, 38, 212, 286, 293294, 311-312, 324-325 et 336-337; JQuigley, The
Genocide Convention — An International Law Analysis, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006,
p. 191-201 ; N. M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred — Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth‑Century
Europe, Cambridge (Mass.)/Londres, Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 156-157, 164-165,
168-170, 174 et 183-18; Ph.Spencer, Genocide since 1945, Londres/N.Y., Routledge, 2012,
p. 11-12,29 et 85-86;N. Cigar, Genocidein Bosnia— The Policy of «Ethnic Cleansing ,
College Station, Texas A & M University Press, 1995, p. 3-10, 22-37, 62-85 et 139-180 ;
B. Lieberman, « Ethnic Cleansing versus Genocide?», The Oxford Handbook of Genocide
Studies (dir. publ., D.Bloxham et A. Dirk Moses), Oxford University Press, 2010, p.42-60
C. Carmichael, Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans— Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradi‑
tion, Londres/N.Y., Routledge, 2002, p. 2, 66 et 112-114.
287
7 CIJ1077.indb 571 18/04/16 08:54 287 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
206
2007) . The ECHR found it fit to ponder that, although there had been
“many authorities” who “had favoured a narrow interpretation ofh the
crime of genocide”, now there are also “several authorities” whho have co -n
strued the crime of genocide in a “wider way” (Jorgić v. Germany, Judg -
ment of 12 July 2007, para. 113), as in the Jorgić case itself.
XI. Widespread and Systemathic Pattern of Destructiho:n
Rape and Other Sexual Viohlence Crimes Committehd
in Distinct Municipalhities
242. May I now dwell upon the widespread and systematic pattern of
destruction, in the form of rapes and other sexual violence crimes, sys -
tematically committed in several municipalities, as from the launching ohf
the military campaign waged by Serbia against Croatia. The dossier of
the cas d’espèce , concerning the Application of the Convention against
Genocide, contains in effect several accounts, presented to the Interna -
tional Court of Justice, in the course of both the written and oral phashes
of the proceedings, of the perpetration of rapes of Croats in a number ohf
municipalities. I shall now dwell upon this particular issue, first adhdress-
ing the accounts rendered in the oral proceedings, and then those pre -
sented earlier on, in the course of the written phase. The path will thehn be
paved for the presentation of my thoughts on other aspects of those
atrocities, likewise deserving of close attention.
1. Accounts of Systematic Rape
(a) Croatia’s claims
243. In its oral pleadings, Croatia argued that, in their “genocidal cam-
paign” of “extreme brutality”, during which “[e]ntire Croat hcommunities
were intentionally destroyed”, the JNA and subordinate Serb forces
“raped more Croat women than can be known”, and “destroyed overh
100,000 homes and over 1,400 Catholic buildings and places of worship” ;
they sent over 7,700 detained Croats to “detention camps in occupied
parts of Croatia, Serbia, and other parts of the former Yugoslavia, and h
they forcibly deported over 550,000 others” 207. Croatia next presented a
narrative of rapes “accompanied by terrible ethnic abuse” that occhurred
in Berak 208.
206
The applicant had alleged that the German courts did not have jurisdiction to
convict him of genocide (committed in the villages of Bo-Herzegovina); the ECHR
found that the applicant’s conviction of genocide by the German courths was not in breach
of the European Convention on Human Rights (paras.13-116).
207 CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, p. 45, paras. 11 and 13.
208 Ibid., p. 60, para. 22.
288
7 CIJ1077.indb 572 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 287
206
la CEDH dans l’arrêt Jorgić c. Allemagne (12 juillet 2007) . La CEDH
a jugé utile de dire que, si «bon nombre d’autorités» avaient «interprét[é]
de manière étroite la notion de génocide », «plusieurs autres» en faisaient
à présent une interprétation « plus large » ( Jorgić c. Allemagne, arrêt du
12 juillet 2007, par. 113), comme en l’espèce en l’affaire Jorgić.
XI. Campagne de destructiohn générale et systémahtiqu :e
viols et autres violehnces sexuelles commihs
dans différentes munichipalités
242. Je m’attarderai à présent sur la campagne de destruction génhérale
et systématique, qui a pris la forme de viols et autres violences sexhuelles
commis systématiquement dans plusieurs municipalités, à compterh du
lancement de la campagne militaire menée par la Serbie contre la Croahtie.
Le dossier de la présente affaire relative à l’ Application de la convention
sur le génocide contient en effet plusieurs témoignages, présentés à la Courh
tant au cours de la phase écrite que de la phase orale de la procéhdure,
faisant état de viols de Croates dans un certain nombre de municipalihtés.
Je m’étendrai à présent sur cette question en particulier, en m’intéressant
tout d’abord aux témoignages présentés lors de la phase oralhe de la pro -
cédure, puis à ceux présentés plus tôt, au cours de la phase écrite. La voie
sera ainsi tracée pour que je fasse part de mes réflexions sur dh’autres
aspects de ces atrocités, tout aussi dignes d’attention.
1. Descriptions de viols systématiques
a) Les griefs de la Croatie
243. Dans ses plaidoiries, la Croatie a fait valoir que, au cours de leur
«campagne génocidaire» d’une «extrême brutalité», pendant laquelle «[d]es
communautés entières de Croates ont été délibérémenht détruites », la JNA et
les forces serbes subordonnées «ont violé plus de femmes croates qu’on ne
le saura jamais » et «détruit plus de 100000 maisons et plus de 1400édifices
et lieux de culte catholiques »; elles ont envoyé plus de 7700 Croates dans
des camps de détention «dans d’autres parties de la Croatie, de la Serbie207
de l’ex-Yougoslavie, et elles en ont déporté plus de 550 000 autres» . La
Croatie a ensuite présenté des récits de viols « accompagnés de violents
sévices à caractère ethnique» qui se sont produits à Berak 208.
206 Le requérant avait affirmé que les juridictions allemandes n’ahvaient pas compétence
pour le reconnaître coupable de génocide (perpétré dans desh villages de Bosnie -Herzégo-
vine); la CEDH a conclu que la condamnation du requérant par les tribunauxh allemands,
pour génocide, n’emportait pas de violation de la convention de sauvegarde des droits de
l’homme et des libertés fondamentales (par. 113-116).
207 CR 2014/6, p. 45, par. 11 et 13.
208 Ibid., p. 60, par. 22.
288
7 CIJ1077.indb 573 18/04/16 08:54 288 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
244. Croatia then explained that the first phase of that campaign, the
artillery attacks, were intended to cause terror and “to compel Croaths to
abandon their villages” ; yet, “the worst atrocities” were reserved for
those who refused, or were unable to flee : they were “killed, tortured,
raped and abused by the attacking Serb forces”, with an intent to deshtroy
the Croat population of the region. There was, in Croatia’s perceptiohn, “a
pattern of attack that was genocidal, in that it intended to destroy a phart
of the Croat population” 209.
245. Occurrences of torture and rape were reported in the villages of
210 211
Lovas , Sotin , Bogdanovci — where paramilitaries massacred all or
almost all Croats remaining in the village 212 — and Pakrac 213, and across
the region of Eastern Slavonia 214. Croatia then focused on the raping and
215
other atrocities which victimized the Croat population of Vukovar ; it
contended that, at Velepromet, women and girls “did not escape brutalh
rapes” 21, as described in Croatia’s pleadings 21. And it added that,
“in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia, this Court distinguished between the
destruction of a group on the one hand and its ‘mere dissolution’ hon
the other. To describe the four phases of events at Vukovar in 1991—
the colossal use of force by overwhelmingly greater Serbian forces to
deprive the trapped inhabitants of their basic conditions of life, the
killing, raping and dismembering by the advancing forces of those
who remained, the staged removal to torture and death camps and
the organized mass killing at Velepromet and Ovčara — to describe
that as ‘mere dissolution’ of the Vukovar Croats is so to distort hlan -
guage as to render it meaningless.” 218
246. Croatia argued that “[m]ultiple and gang rapes of Croat women
were commonplace”, in order to “kill the seed of Croatia”, as thhe perpe-
trators threatened 219; this occurred in Siverić, Lovas, Vukovar, Sotin,
Doljani, Bapska and Cakovci, Dalj, Gornji Popovac and Tovarnik,
among other villages, at times even in the victims’ homes. Sexual atthacks
209CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 17, para. 36.
210Cf. ibid., p. 17, para. 36, and cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 23, para. 7.
211Cf. CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 22, para. 54.
212Cf. ibid., p. 24, paras. 62-63.
213
214Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 13, para. 12.
Cf. ibid., pp. 25 and 27, paras. 67 and 71. In Croatia’s account, in “different villages
and towns across Eastern Slavonia, women were forced to act as ‘comfort women’ to
members of the Serb forces” ibid., p. 23, para. 7.
215Cf. CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 31, para. 11, and cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March
2014, p. 23, para. 7.
216
217CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 42, para. 61.
218Cf. CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, p. 33, para. 20, and p. 53, para. 24.
CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, p. 48, para. 88.
219Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, pp. 21-24, para. 4.
289
7 CIJ1077.indb 574 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 288
244. La Croatie a ensuite expliqué que la première phase de cette cam -
pagne — les attaques d’artillerie — avait pour objectif de semer la terreur
«parmi les Croates afin de les obliger à abandonner leur village »; ce sont
toutefois ceux qui avaient refusé de fuir ou qui se trouvaient dans lh’inca-
pacité de le faire qui ont subi « les pires atrocités »: ils ont été « tués, tor-
turés, violés ou maltraités par les forces serbes assaillantes » résolues à
détruire la population croate de la région. Il s’agissait, selohn la Croatie,
«d’une attaque véritablement génocidaire, en ce qu’elle avait pour but de
détruire une partie de la population croate » 209.
245. Des faits de torture et de viol auraient été commis dans les villahges
de Lovas 210, Sotin 211, Bogdanovci, où les paramilitaires ont massacré
pour ainsi dire tous les Croates qui s’y trouvaient 212, à Pakrac 213, et dans
214
toute la Slavonie orientale . La Croatie a ensuite mis l’accent sur les
viols et les autres atrocités dont la population croate de Vukovar avhait été
victime 215; elle a affirmé que, au Velepromet, les femmes et les filles
216
«n’[avaie]nt pas échappé au viol » brutal , comme cela avait été décrit
lors de ses plaidoiries 217. Et elle a ajouté que,
«dans l’affaireBosnie c. Serbie , la Cour a clairement fait la part entre
la destruction physique et la « simple dissolution». Décrire les quatre
phases des événements survenus à Vukovar en 1991 — l’utilisation
massive de la force par des forces serbes très largement supérieures en
nombre afin de priver la population prise au piège des conditions
essentielles à la vie, le meurtre, le viol et le démembrement de cheux
qui restaient par les forces qui gagnaient du terrain, la mise en scèhne
des transports vers les camps de torture et de mort et le massacre
organisé qui a eu lieu à Velepromet et Ovčara —, dire de ces faits
qu’ils n’étaient qu’une « simple dissolution » du groupe croate de
Vukovar, c’est dénaturer la langue au point de la priver de sens. » 218
246. La Croatie a fait valoir que « [l]es viols multiples et en réunion de
femmes croates étaient fréquents » et visaient à «tuer la graine de la Croa-
tie», comme l’avaient précisé les auteurs 219; ces faits se sont produits à
Siverić, Lovas, Vukovar, Sotin, Doljani, Bapska et Cakovci, Dalj,
Gornji Popovac et Tovarnik, entre autres, parfois même chez les victimes.
209
210CR 2014/8, p. 17, par. 36.
Ibid., p. 17, par. 36, et CR 2014/10, p. 23, par. 7.
211Voir CR 2014/8, p. 22, par. 54.
212Ibid., p. 24, par. 62-63.
213CR 2014/10, p. 13, par. 12.
214Voir ibid., p. 25 et 27, par. 67 et 71. Selon la Croatie, « [d]ans plusieurs villes et
villages de Slavonie orientale, des femmes ont été contraintes de h« réconforter» les forces
ser215»; ibid., p. 23, par. 7.
Voir CR 2014/8, p. 31, par. 11, et voir CR 2014/10, p. 23, par. 7.
216CR 2014/8, p. 42, par. 61.
217CR 2014/20, p. 33, par. 20, et p. 53, par. 24.
218CR 2014/8, p. 48, par. 88.
219CR 2014/10, p. 21-24, par. 4.
289
7 CIJ1077.indb 575 18/04/16 08:54 289 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
often took place in the victims’ homes, “with their relatives beinhg forced
to watch, adding an additional dimension of violation and degradation toh
220
the women’s ordeals” . In Tovarnik, there were also reported cases of
castration of men 221. Croatia added that :
“Raped women often feel ashamed and they do not even report
such attacks. That was the case also in Croatia — the number of
reported incidents hides much bigger figures of unreported cases.
Those attacks have left an enduring legacy of fear, trauma and shame
undiminished by the passage of time.” 222
247. After stressing that “Croat women and girls were frequently the
victims of ethnically targeted violence, including rape and gang rape”h, by
members of the JNA, TO, Serbian police and paramilitaries, Croatia
recalled that resolution 1820 (2008) of the UN Security Council noted
that rape and other forms of sexual violence “can constitute war crimhes,
223
crimes against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to genocide” .
248. It further stressed the numerous accounts by witnesses (direct vic -
tims or observers of those rapes and gang rapes), in several “towns,h vil -
lages and hamlets that fell under occupation of the JNA and the Serb
paramilitary forces”, such as Berše, Brđani, Doljani, Joševica, Korenica,
Kostajnički Majur, Kovačevac, Ljubotić and Lisičić, Novo Selo Glinsko,
Parčić, Puljane, Sarengrad, Sekulinci, Smilčić, Sotin, Tenja, Vukovar and
many others 224. Croatia then concluded, on this particular issue, that :
“The scale and pattern of killing, torture and rape has been dis -
closed by the evidence submitted by the Applicant, and that clearly,
in our submission, makes out the actus reus of genocide within the
meaning of Articles II (a) and (b) of the Genocide Convention. To
argue otherwise, in our submission, is simply not to be credible.
In addition, the conditions of life which were inflicted on the Croat h
population remaining in Serb-occupied territory, including systematic
expulsion from homes, torture, rape and denial of food, access to
water, basic sanitation and medical treatment, were calculated to
bring about its physical destruction as a group. This, too, amounted
to genocide within the meaning of Article II (c) of the Convention.
Finally, just this morning, you have heard in some detail the evi -
dence of systematic rape of Croatian women and men, the sexual
220Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, pp. 21-24, paras. 5-6.
221Cf. ibid., para. 8.
222
223Ibid., pp. 21-24, para. 3.
224Ibid., p. 21, para. 2 [emphasis added].
Cf. ibid., p. 24, para. 9. On the brutalities of sexual abusealso ibid., p. 27,
paras. 22-25 (in Vukovar).
290
7 CIJ1077.indb 576 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 289
Les agressions sexuelles avaient souvent lieu chez les victimes et « leur
famille devait y assister, ce qui rendait le supplice des femmes encore hplus
220
dégradant et humiliant » 221 . A Tovarnik, des cas de castration d’hommes
ont aussi été rapportés . La Croatie a ajouté ce qui suit :
«Les femmes violées ressentent souvent un tel sentiment de honte
qu’elles ne dénoncent pas l’agression dont elles ont été hvictimes. Ce
fut le cas en Croatie aussi où les cas non signalés sont nettementh plus
nombreux que ceux qui l’ont été. La peur222e traumatisme et la hhonte
ne s’estompent pas avec le temps. »
247. Après avoir souligné que « [l]es femmes et les filles croates ont
souvent été les victimes de violences ethniques, dont le viol et lhe viol en
réunion », de la part de membres de la JNA, de la TO, de la police serbe
et des paramilitaires serbes, la Croatie a rappelé que la résolu -
tion 1820 (2008) du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies dispose que le
viol et d’autres formes de violence sexuelle « peuvent constituer un crime
de guerre, un crime contre l’humanité ou un élément constitutif du crime
223
de génocide» .
248. La Croatie a ensuite fait état des nombreuses déclarations de
témoins (victimes directes ou témoins de ces viols et viols en réhunion)
dans plusieurs « villes, villages et hameaux occupés par la JNA et les
forces serbes », comme Berše, Brđani, Doljani, Joševica, Korenica, Kos -
tajnički Majur, Kovačevac, Ljubotić et Lisičić, Novo Selo Glinsko,
Parčić, Puljane, Sarengrad, Sekulinci, Smilčić, Sotin, Tenja, Vukovar et
224
bien d’autres encore . Elle a alors conclu, sur cette question particulière,
ce qui suit :
«Les éléments de preuve présentés par le demandeur ont révhélé
l’échelle et le caractère systématique des meurtres, torturehs et viols
qui constituent à notre sens l’élément matériel du génhocide au sens
des alinéas a) et b) de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide.
Soutenir le contraire serait ne pas être crédible.
Qui plus est, les conditions d’existence imposées à la populatihon
croate demeurée sur le territoire occupé par les Serbes, notammenth
les expulsions systématiques des foyers, les tortures, les viols et les
privations de nourriture, d’eau, d’installations sanitaires et de hsoins
médicaux visaient à détruire cette population en tant que grouphe.
Ces actes constituent également un génocide au sens de l’alinéha c) de
l’article II de la Convention.
Enfin, ce matin, vous avez entendu des témoignages détaillés sur
les viols dont les Croates, femmes et hommes, ont été systématihque -
220
221CR 2014/10, p. 21-24, par. 5-6.
222Ibid., par. 8.
Ibid., p. 21-24, par. 3.
223Ibid., p. 21, par. 2 [les italiques sont de moi].
224Ibid., p. 24, par. 9. Sur la brutalité des violences sexuelles, voir aussi 27,d., p.
par. 22-25 (à Vukovar).
290
7 CIJ1077.indb 577 18/04/16 08:54 290 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
mutilation and castration of Croatian men, and the commission of
other sex crimes which, when viewed in the context of the broader
genocidal policies of the Serb forces, involved the imposition of meas-
ures to prevent births within the Croatian population. This, we say,
falls squarely within the meaning of Article II (d).” 225
(b) Serbia’s response
249. For its part, Serbia, instead of addressing the issue of systematic
practice of rape, tried to discredit the evidence produced by Croatia 22. It
did so, largely on the argument that most witness statements were
unsigned 227, a point already clarified to some extent by Croatia (supra).
In any case, Serbia admitted, in general terms, the occurrence of “sehrious
crimes” (cf. supra); in its own words,
“the fundamental disagreement of the respondent State with the App-li
cant’s approach to the unsigned statements and police reports does noht
mean that the Serbian Government denies that serious crimes were
committed during the armed conflict in Croatia. Yes, the serious crimes
were perpetrated against the members of the Croatian national and
ethnic group. They were committed by groups and individuals of Serb
ethnicity. It goes without saying that Serbia condemns such crimes,
regrets that they were committed, and sympathizes profoundly with the
victims and their families for the suffering that they have experienced.
The Higher Court in Belgrade has so far convicted and imprisoned
15 Serbs for the war crimes against prisoners of war at the Ovčara
farm near Vukovar, and another 14 for the war crimes against civil -
ians in the village of Lovas in EasternSlavonia. The second judgment
has recently been quashed by the Court of Appeal due to the short -
comings concerning the explanation of the individual criminal liabil -
ity for each accused, and the trial must be held again. An additional
ten cases for the war crimes committed by Serbs in Croatia have been
concluded before the Higher Court in Belgrade. In total, 31 individ-
uals of Serb nationality have so far been convicted and imprisoned,
while there are others being accused. Investigations on several crimes
are under way, including the crime in Bogdanovci.
Thus, despite the careless approach to the presentation of evidence
by the Applicant, it is not in dispute that murders of Croatian civilianhs
225CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 54, paras. 16-18. For other accounts, cf., e.g.,
CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, p. 4; CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, pp. 14, 25 and; and
CR 22614/10, of 6 March 2014, paras. 23-24.
Cf. e.g., CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, pp. 65-66, para. 43; CR 2014/22,
of 27 March 2014, pp. 13-14, paras. 10-13.
227Cf. e.g., CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, pp. 64-65, paras. 38 and 42.
291
7 CIJ1077.indb 578 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 290
ment victimes, les mutilations sexuelles, la castration d’hommes
croates et d’autres sévices sexuels qui, dans le contexte plus vashte de
la politique de génocide pratiquée par les forces serbes, sont assimi -
lables à des mesures visant à entraver les naissances au sein de lha
population croate. Pour nous, pareils actes relèvent clairement des
dispositions de l’alinéa d) de l’article II.» 225
b) La réplique de la Serbie
249. De son côté, la Serbie, au lieu de traiter la question de la pratihque
systématique du viol, a tenté de jeter le discrédit sur les prehuves produites
226
par la Croatie . Elle a fait valoir, pour l’ess227iel, que la plupart des
déclarations de témoins n’étaient pas signées , point déjà clarifié dans
une certaine mesure par la Croatie (supra). En tout état de cause, elle a
reconnu, en termes généraux, que des « crimes graves » (voir supra) avaient
été commis; pour la citer :
«le grief fondamental que nourrit le défendeur à l’égard des hdéclara-
tions non signées et rapports de police produits par le demandeur ne h
signifie pas que l’Etat serbe nie la perpétration de crimes gravhes au
cours du conflit armé en Croatie. En effet, de tels crimes ont éthé com -
mis à l’encontre de membres du groupe national et ethnique croate.h
Et ils l’ont été par des personnes et des groupements de soucheh serbe.
Il va sans dire que la Serbie condamne ces crimes, regrette leur per -
pétration et compatit à la souffrance des victimes et de leurs famihlles.
A ce jour, la Haute Cour de Belgrade a condamné et emprisonné
15 Serbes à raison des crimes de guerre commis contre des prison -
niers de guerre à la ferme d’Ovčara, près de Vukovar, et 14 autres
pour les crimes de guerre perpétrés contre des civils dans le villhage de
Lovas, en Slavonie orientale. Le deuxième jugement a récemment été
cassé par la cour d’appel, en raison de déficiences dans le rhaisonne -
ment sous -tendant les déclarations de culpabilité individuelles, et un
nouveau procès doit avoir lieu. Dix autres actions ont été intehntées
devant la Haute Cour de Belgrade à raison de crimes de guerre com -
mis par des Serbes en Croatie. Au total, 31 personnes de nationalité
serbe ont à ce jour été condamnées et emprisonnées, et d’hautres accu -
sations sont en voie d’être portées. L’instruction se poursuhit relative-
ment à plusieurs autres crimes, y compris celui de Bogdanovci.
Ainsi, malgré l’incurie dont le demandeur a fait montre en ce qui
concerne l’administration de la preuve, il n’est pas contesté qhue des
225CR 2014/10, p. 54, par. 16-18. Pour d’autres témoignages, voir par
exemple CR 2014/6, p. 4; CR 2014/8, p. 14, 25 et; CR 2014/10, par. 23-24.
226Voir par exemple CR 2014/13, p. 65-66, par. 43; CR 2014/22, p. 13-14, par. 10-13.
227CR 2014/13, p. 64-65, par. 38 et 42.
291
7 CIJ1077.indb 579 18/04/16 08:54 291 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
and prisoners of war took place during the conflict. This was estab -
lished also in the ICTY Judgment against Milan Martić, who was
convicted as the former Minister of Interior of the Republic of Ser -
bian Krajina, as well as in the case Mrkšić et al. ; the last case is also
known as ‘Ovčara’. In that notorious crime, the ICTY recorded
194 prisoners of war who were killed. This was the gravest mass mur-
228
der in which Croats were the victims during the entire conflict.”
2. Systematic Pattern of Rape in Distinct Municipalities
250. As already indicated, the dossier of the present case, opposing
Croatia to Serbia, contains reports of rapes of Croats in a number of
municipalities. Several witnesses testified to having been raped, often
multiple times, and by several perpetrators. It is also important to nothe
that the rapes were frequently accompanied by derogatory language and
further violence, such as beatings and use of objects.
251. The examples provided, of testimonies regarding the continuous
commission of rape in distinct municipalities, evidence a widespread and
systematic pattern of rape of members of the Croatian population, inflict -
ing humiliation upon the victims. These statements next referred to formh
part of the evidence submitted by Croatia so as to illustrate the numerous
allegations of rape across distinct municipalities and to demonstrate thhe
229
systematic pattern of those grave breaches .
252. For example, in Lovas, it was alleged that paramilitaries routinely
engaged in sexual violence against Croatians 230. A. M. testified to being
raped repeatedly and she reported that paramilitaries made a habit of coh-l
lecting groups of Croatian women in the village in order to rape them 23.
Similarly, P. M. also testified to sexual abuse of Croatian men 232. In Bap-
ska, P. M. described that a Serbian soldier raped her and her 81-year old
228Cf. CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, pp. 64-65, paras. 38-40. And Serbia added :
“If one carefully makes a review of all ICTY indictments in which the crimes
against Croats were alleged, he or she will find many victims, indeed. There is no
doubt that many Croats also died in the combat activities during the fihve -year
conflict. Yet, from the point of view of the subject-matter of this case, those numbers
of victims are of an entirely different magnitude than the many of those hkilled in
Srebrenica — or in Krajina — over the course of several days.” (CR 2014/22, of
27 March 2014, pp. 64-65, para. 41.)
229
Cf. also Memorial of Croatia, paras.5.30, 5.59, 5.88, 5.147, 5.157, 5.175, 5.209-5.210,
5.212 and 5.224; and cf.also ibid., paras. 4.25, 4.44-4.45, 4.60, 4.110, 4.113, 4.129, 4.131,
4.169, 4.185, 4.60, 5.147, 5.157, 5.212, 5.224. See also Reply of Croatiha, par5a.s3.5, 5.46, 5.54,
5.84.
230Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.129.
231Ibid., Annex 108.
232Ibid., Annex 101.
292
7 CIJ1077.indb 580 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 291
civils et des prisonniers croates ont été assassinés au cours du conflit.
Cela a également été établi par le TPIY dans le jugement qu’hil a rendu
à l’issue du procès intenté contre MilanMartić, déclaré coupable en sa
qualité d’ancien ministre de l’intérieur de la Républiqueh serbe de Kr-a
jina, ainsi que dans l’affaire Mrkšić et consorts, qui porte aussi le nom
d’« Ovčara». Dans cette affaire bien connue, le TPIY a constaté que
194 prisonniers de guerre avaient été tués. Il s’agit du plus grhave ma-s 228
sacre dont les Croates aient été les victimes pendant tout le conflhit. »
2. Campagne de viols systématiques dans différentes municipalité▯s
250. Comme il est dit plus haut, le dossier de la présente affaire oppo -
sant la Croatie à la Serbie contient des informations faisant étath de viols
de Croates dans un certain nombre de municipalités. Plusieurs témohins
ont déclaré avoir été violés, souvent à plusieurs reprhises et par plusieurs
auteurs. Il importe aussi de noter que ces viols étaient souvent accompa -
gnés de termes insultants et d’autres actes de violence, tels que des sévices
physiques et l’utilisation d’objets.
251. Les exemples fournis de témoignages concernant la commission
continue de viols dans différentes municipalités attestent une campagne
générale et systématique de viol de membres de la population croate, infli -
geant une humiliation aux victimes. Les déclarations mentionnées chi -après
font partie des éléments de preuve produits par la Croatie afin hd’illustrer
les nombreuses allégations de viol dans différentes municipalitéhs et de
229
démontrer le caractère systématique de ces graves infractions .
252. Ainsi, à Lovas, des paramilitaires auraient infligé régulièhrement
des violences sexuelles à des Croates 230. A. M. a témoigné avoir été violée
à plusieurs reprises et a dit que les paramilitaires avaient pris l’habitude
de réunir des groupes de femmes croates dans le village afin de lesh vio -
ler231. De même, P. M. a fait état de violences sexuelles infligées à des
232
hommes croates . A Bapska, P. M. a décrit la manière dont un soldat
228CR 2014/13, p. 64-65, par. 38-40. Et la Serbie a ajouté :
«L’examen attentif de tous les actes d’accusations dressés par lhe TPIY à raison
des crimes commis contre les Croates révèle que les victimes sont heffectivement
nombreuses. Il ne fait aucun doute par ailleurs que de nombreux Croates hsont tombés
aux champs de bataille au cours de ce conflit qui s’étend sur une période de cinq ans.
Pourtant, dans la perspective de l’objet de la présente procéduhre, ces pertes sont d’un
tout autre ordre que le nombre des victimes tuées en quelques jours àh Srebrenica, ou
même en Krajina. » (CR 2014/22, p. 64-65, par. 41.)
229
Voir aussi mémoire de la Croatie, par. 5.30, 5.59, 5.88, 5.147, 5.157, 5.175, 5.209-
5.210, 5.212 et 5.2; voir aussibid., par. 4.25, 4.44-4.45, 4.60, 4.110, 4.113, 4.129, 4.131,
4.169, 4.185, 4.60, 5.147, 5.157, 5.212 5.224. Voir également réplique de la Croatie,
par. 5.35, 5.46, 5.54 et 5.84.
230Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.129.
231Ibid., annexe 108.
232Ibid., annexe 101.
292
7 CIJ1077.indb 581 18/04/16 08:54 292 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
233
mother before he tore her navel with his bare hands . In this village,
there were also accounts of sexual violence against men, according to wih-t
ness F. K. 234. In Pakrac, H. H. described rape and torture of a victim
235
before her ears were cut off and her skull shattered . In a similar violent
vein, there was, in Kraljevčani, a description of rape of a Croat womhan,
whose breasts were cut off 236.
253. Croatian women in the village of Tenja were routinely raped,
along with having to labour in fields and gardens. For example, while h
K. C. was made to clean the police station, she was indecently assaulted
by one of the officers ; according to M. M., K. C.’s experience drove her
to attempt suicide 237. In the village of Berak, M. H., thus described her
rape “(. . .) I was their special target because I had six sons and they were
threatening me because I had delivered six Ustashas” 238. In this village,
there were accounts of sexual assault against Croatian women. L. M. and
M. H. were raped in front of a group of people, and throughout the
night 23. P. B. testified having been raped with brutality by seven JNA
reservists with White Eagle marks 240.
254. In the village of Sotin, V. G. describes how on 30 September 1991
two soldiers came into her house and both raped her while holding a gun h
pointing at her. The next day, one of the soldiers who had raped her camhe
back and raped her mother. After that, V. G. was forced to get down on
her knees and was raped from behind 241. Furthermore, R. G. described
“sexual advantage” being taken of an elderly woman in Sotin, and S. L.
also described other sexual abuses in Sotin 242. As to Tovarnik, the docu -
ment Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence
(pp. 107 -108) also gives account of forced sexual abuses between Croat
prisoners 243.
255. In the dossier of the present case, there are many accounts of rape
and other sexual violence crimes that occurred, in particular, in the
greater Vukovar area. Some examples have been provided by witness tes -
timonies. For example, the Muslim JNA soldier, E. M., described rape
and killing in his account of the JNA conduct in Petrova Gora (a suburb
233 Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.90.
234 Ibid., para. 4.91 and Annex 74.
235 Ibid., para. 5.17 and Annex 175.
236 Ibid., para. 5.98.
237
238 Ibid., para. 4.25.
239 Ibid., para. 4.44.
Ibid.
240 Ibid., para. 4.45.
241 Ibid., para. 4.113, and Annex 94.
242 Ibid., paras. 4.101 and 4.111, respectively.
243 Ibid., para. 4.101.
293
7 CIJ1077.indb 582 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 292
serbe les a violées, elle et sa mère âgée de 81 ans, avant de tordre le nom -
233
bril de sa mère à mains nues . Dans ce village, des témoignages ont
aussi fait état de violences sexuelles infligées à des hommesh, selon le
témoin F. K. 234. A Pakrac, H. H. a décrit le viol et la torture infligés à
une victime avant que ses oreilles ne soient sectionnées et son crâhne pul -
vérisé 23. Dans le même esprit violent, à Kraljevčani, le viol d’une hfemme
croate, dont les seins ont ensuite été coupés, a été déhcrit 236.
253. Dans le village de Tenja, des femmes croates ont été systématiqhu-e
ment violées et contraintes de travailler dans les champs et les potahgers.
Par exemple, alors que K. C. était affectée au nettoyage du poste de police,
elle a été victime d’une agression sexuelle par l’un des polhiciers ; selon
M. M., K. C. aurait tenté de se suicider à la suite de cette douloureuse
expérience 237. A Berak, M. H. a décrit comme suit les viols qu’elle a subis:
«Ils aimaient particulièrement s’en prendre à moi parce que j’havais six ga -r
çons et qu’ils m’accusaient d’avoir donné naissance à hsix Oustachis. » 238
Dans ce village, il est fait état de sévices sexuels infligés à des femmes
croates. L. M. et M. H. ont été violées devant de nombreuses personnes et
pendant toute la nuit 239. P. B. a déclaré avoir été violée brutalement par
sept réservistes de la JNA arborant l’insigne des Aigles blancs 240.
254. Dans le village de Sotin, V. G. a décrit la manière dont, le 30 sep-
tembre 1991, deux soldats sont entrés dans sa maison et l’ont violée àh
tour de rôle en gardant le canon de leur arme pointé sur elle. Le lende -
main, l’un des soldats qui l’avait violée est revenu et a violéh sa mère.
Après quoi, il a contraint V. G. à se mettre à genoux et lui a infligé un viol
anal 241. En outre, R. G. a dit qu’une femme âgée avait été victime d’«abus
sexuel » à Sotin et S. L. a décrit aussi d’autres violences sexuelles com -
mises dans ce village 242. Quant à Tovarnik, l’ouvrage intitulé Mass Killing
and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence (p. 107-108) fait
aussi état de violences sexuelles que des p243onniers croates ont été
contraints de s’infliger mutuellement .
255. Le dossier de la présente instance contient de nombreux témoi -
gnages de viols et d’autres violences sexuelles qui ont été comhmis, en par-
ticulier, dans la région de Vukovar. Certains exemples en ont étéh fournis
par les dépositions de témoins. Ainsi, le soldat musulman de la JNA,
E. M., a décrit un viol et un meurtre dans le récit qu’il a fait dhe la conduite
233Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.90.
234Ibid., par. 4.91, et annexe 74.
235
236Ibid., par. 5.17, et annexe 175.
237Ibid., par. 5.98.
Ibid., par. 4.25.
238Ibid., par. 4.44.
239Ibid.
240Ibid., par. 4.45.
241Ibid., par. 4.113, et annexe 94.
242Ibid., par. 4.101 et 4.111, respectivement.
243Ibid., par. 4.101.
293
7 CIJ1077.indb 583 18/04/16 08:54 293 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
of Vukovar) 244. A. S. testified how, on 16 September 1991, M. L., from
Vukovar, told her that he was going to kill her. After insulting her, he
raped her 245. T. C. gave likewise an account of what took place in the
suburb of Vukovar, Cakovci. R. I. entered her house and, threatening to
246
kill her, tied her hands and raped her .
256. Velepromet was the backdrop of routine executions, torture, and
rape often committed by multiple rapists. Women of Croatian nationality
that were imprisoned in the Velepromet detention facility in Vukovar
were taken to interrogations during which they were exposed to sexual
abuse. Group rapes also allegedly took place. B. V. was raped the second
day on her arrival in the barracks ; four soldiers raped her one after
another on the floor of the office while insulting her and hitting hehr in the
face. She testified how 15 Serbian soldiers took M. M. to the room next
door to her and raped her in turns 24.
257. M. M. described how, on 18 November 1991, the day of the occu-
pation of Central Vukovar, she and her family were taken to the Vele-
promet building, and later driven in buses to Sand Sabac (Serbia). Back
in Vukovar, she described how she was raped by five men, one after
another, from 9 p.m. until the morning. During the rape she was bleeding
and was forced to sit on a beer bottle. This happened in front of her lihttle
sister, who was248so sexually abused during two weeks and was continu -
ously afraid . Likewise, H. E. testified to daily rapes by Serbian police
and army upon her arrival to prison. The rapes happened in the cell in
front o249ther female prisoners. She also testified to beatings and mehntal
abuse .
258. Witness T. C. stated that Chetniks “were maltreating, expelling,
threatening, beating, raping and killing on a daily basis”, and addedh that
“Croats had white ribbons at our gate in order to enable Chetniks whoh
were not from our village to recognize us” ; she testified that she was
raped 250. In a similar vein, G. K. testified to having been maltreated and
251
raped , and B. V. likewise testified to killings, rape and maltreatment,
and added that she was raped by four men, having used derogatory lan -
guage during the rape 252.
244
245 Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.153, and Annex 127.
246 Ibid., para. 4.155, and Annex 125.
Ibid., para. 4.156, and Annex 128.
247 Ibid., para. 4.185
248 Ibid., para. 4.169, and Annex 117.
249 Ibid., Annex 116.
250 Ibid., Annex 128.
251 Ibid., Annex 130.
252 Ibid., Annex 151.
294
7 CIJ1077.indb 584 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 293
de la JNA à Petrova Gora (un faubourg de Vukovar) 244. A. S. a témoigné
de la manière dont, le 16 septembre 1991, M. L., de Vukovar, lu245 dit
qu’il allait la tuer : après l’avoir insultée, il l’a violée . T. C. a rendu
compte aussi de ce qui s’est passé dans un faubourg de Vukovar,Cakovci:
R. I. est entré dans sa maison et, menaçant de la tuer, lui a attachéh les
246
mains et l’a violée .
256. Le camp du Velepromet a été le théâtre d’exécutions, d’actes
de torture et de viols souvent collectifs commis systématiquement. Les
femmes de nationalité croate qui y étaient emprisonnées étaient emme -
nées pour interrogatoire et soumises à des sévices sexuels. Desh viols col -
lectifs auraient aussi eu lieu. B. V. a été violée le surlendemain de son
arrivée dans le camp ; quatre soldats l’ont violée l’un après l’autre sur le
sol du bureau ; pendant tout ce temps, ils n’ont jamais cessé de l’injurier
et de la frapper au visage. B. V. a raconté que 15 soldats serbes avaient
emmené M247. dans la pièce voisine de la sienne et l’avaient violée à tour
de rôle .
257. M. M. a décrit comment, le 18 novembre 1991, jour de l’occupa -
tion du centre de Vukovar, elle avait été emmenée dans le bâhtiment Vele-
promet avec sa famille, puis transférée en autocar à Sand Sabac (Serbie).
Elle avait ensuite été ramenée à Vukovar et elle a décrith comment elle
avait été violée par cinq hommes, l’un après l’autre, hde 21heures jusqu’au
matin. Pendant le viol, elle s’était mise à saigner et on l’havait obligée à
s’asseoir sur une bouteille de bière. Cela s’était passé hdevant sa petite
sœur, qui avait aussi été victime de violences sexuelles pendanht
248
deux semaines et était tout le temps terrifiée . De même, H. E. a témoi-
gné avoir été violée tous les jours par des policiers et desh soldats serbes
dès qu’elle était arrivée à la prison. Les viols avaient hlieu dans la cellule
devant d’autres détenues. H. E. a aussi fait état de sévices physiques et de
violences psychologiques 249.
258. Le témoin T. C. a déclaré que les Tchetniks « maltraitaient, expul-
saient, menaçaient, battaient, violaient et tuaient [des personnes] quoti -
diennement » et a ajouté que « les Croates devaient mettre des rubans
blancs à leur porte pour que les Tchetniks qui n’étaient pas duh village
250
puissent les reconnaître »; elle a affirmé avoir été viol251 . De même,
G. K. a témoigné avoir été maltraitée et violée ; B. V. a fait état de
meurtres, de viols et de sévices physiques, et a ajouté qu’elleh avait égale -
ment été violée par quatre hommes qui l’avaient insultée hpendant le
252
viol .
244 Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.153, et annexe 127.
245 Ibid., par. 4.155, et annexe 125.
246 Ibid., par. 4.156, et annexe 128.
247 Ibid., par. 4.185.
248 Ibid., par. 4.169, et annexe 117.
249 Ibid., annexe 116.
250 Ibid., annexe 128.
251
252 Ibid., annexe 130.
Ibid., annexe 151.
294
7 CIJ1077.indb 585 18/04/16 08:54 294 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
3. The Necessity and Importance of a Gender Analysis
259. The present case of the Application of the Convention against
Genocide, in my perception, can only be properly adjudicated with a gen ‑
der perspective. This is not the first time that I take this position : in 2006,
almost one decade ago, I did the same, in another international jurisdich-
253
tion , given the circumstances of the case at issue. Now, in 2015, an
analysis of gender is, in my perception, likewise unavoidable and essential
in the present case before the International Court of Justice, given theh
incidence of a social -cultural pattern of conduct, disclosing systemic dis -
crimination and extreme violence against women.
260. At the time that the wars in Croatia, and in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, were taking place, with their abuses against women, the final h
documents of the UN Second World Conference on Human Rights
(Vienna, 1993) and the UN IV World Conference on Women (Bei -
jing, 1995), paid due attention to the difficulties faced by women in the
face of cultural patterns of behaviour in distinct situations and circumh -
stances 254. Attention to the basic principle of equality and non‑discrimina ‑
tion is of fundamental importance here. In the present case of the
Application of the Convention against Genocide , women as well as men,
members of the targeted groups, were victimized, but women (of all agesh)
were brutalized in different ways and in a much greater proportion than
men. Hence the great necessity of a gender perspective.
261. The widespread and systematic raping of girls and women, as
occurred in the armed attacks in Croatia (and also in those in Bosnia ahnd
Herzegovina), had a devastating effect upon the victims. Girls were sud -
denly deprived of their innocence and childhood, despite their young ageh.
This is extreme cruelty. Young and unmarried women were suddenly
deprived of their project of life. This is extreme cruelty. The victims hcould
no longer cherish any faith or hope in affective relations. This is extrehme
cruelty. Young or middle-aged women who, after having been raped,
became pregnant, could not surround their maternity with care and due
respect, given the extreme violence they had been, and continued to be, h
subjected to. This is extreme cruelty.
262. Middle-aged and older women, who had already constituted a
family, had their personal and family life entirely destroyed. Even if thhey
had physically survived, they must have felt like having become walking
253Cf. IACtHR, case of Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment of25 November
2006, separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras. 58-74.
254Cf. A. A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito International dos Direitos Humanos
[Treatise of International Law of Human Rights], Vol. III, Porto Alegre/Brazil, S. A. Fabris
Ed., 2003, pp. 354-356.
295
7 CIJ1077.indb 586 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 294
3. La nécessité et l’importance d’une analyse par sexe
259. La présente affaire relative à l’ Application de la convention sur le
génocide ne peut, selon moi, être jugée correctement que si l’on tient h
compte des différences entre les sexes. Ce n’est pas la première fois que
j’adopte cette position : il y a près d’une décennie, en 2006, j’ai fait de
253
même dans une autre instance internationale , compte tenu des circons-
tances de l’espèce. A présent, en 2015, une analyse par sexe est, à mon
avis, tout aussi inévitable et essentielle dans la présente affaireh, compte
tenu de l’existence d’une ligne de conduite socioculturelle faisanht appa -
raître une discrimination systémique et une extrême violence àh l’égard des
femmes.
260. Tandis que se déroulaient en Croatie et en Bosnie -Herzégovine
des guerres qui s’accompagnaient de violences contre les femmes, l’atten -
tion voulue était portée, dans les documents finals de la conféhrence mon-
diale des Nations Unies sur les droits de l’homme (Vienne, 1993) et de la
quatrième conférence mondiale sur les femmes (Beijing, 1995), auhx diffi -
cultés auxquelles se heurtaient les femmes face à des lignes de cohnduite
culturelles dans des situations et des circonstances distinctes 254. L’atten-
tion prêtée au principe de base de l’égalité et de la non‑discrimination revêt
ici une importance fondamentale. Dans la présente affaire relative à l’Ap ‑
plication de la convention sur le génocide (Croatie c. Serbie), les femmes
comme les hommes qui faisaient partie des groupes visés ont étéh victimes
de sévices, mais les femmes (de tous âges) ont été brutalisées de façon
différente et dans une proportion bien plus élevée que les hommes — d’où
la nécessité de tenir compte du sexe des victimes.
261. Le viol général et systématique des filles et des femmes, telh qu’il
s’est produit lors des attaques armées en Croatie (et aussi de cehlles en
Bosnie -Herzégovine), a eu un effet dévastateur sur les victimes. Des fihlles
ont été privées brutalement de leur innocence et de leur enfanche, malgré
leur jeune âge. C’est une cruauté extrême. Des jeunes femmes célibataires
ont été privées brutalement de leur projet de vie. C’est uneh cruauté
extrême. Les victimes ne pouvaient plus croire à la relation amourheuse ni
espérer en vivre une un jour. C’est une cruauté extrême. Desh femmes
jeunes ou entre deux âges, qui, après avoir été violées, se sont retrouvées
enceintes, n’ont pas pu vivre leur maternité avec l’attention eht le respect
voulus, à cause de l’extrême violence qu’elles avaient subieh et continuaient
à subir. C’est une cruauté extrême.
262. Les femmes entre deux âges et les femmes plus âgées qui avaienth
déjà fondé une famille ont vu leur vie personnelle et leur vie de famille
complètement détruites. Même si elles ont survécu physiquemehnt, elles
253Voir CIDH, affaire de laPrison de Castro‑Castro c. Pérou, arrêt du 25novembre2006,
opinion individuelle du M. le juge Cançado Trindade, par. 58-74.
254Voir A. A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito International dos Direitos
Humanos [Traité de droit international des droits de l’homme], vol. III, Porto Alegre/Brésil,
S. A. Fabris Ed., 2003, p. 354-356.
295
7 CIJ1077.indb 587 18/04/16 08:54 295 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
shadows 255. This is extreme cruelty. There were also women who contin -
ued to be raped until dying. Were the ones who survived this ordeal
“luckier” than the ones who passed the last threshold of life ? None
remained secure from acute pain 256. The sacrality of life — before birth,
during pregnancy, after birth, and along with what remained of human
existence — was destroyed with brutality.
263. What happened later, after the brutal raping with humiliation, to
the children who were born of hatred ? Do we know ? What were the
long-term effects of such a pattern of destruction victimizing mainly
women ? Do we know ? What happened to the sons and daughters of
hatred ? Do we know ? The widespread and systematic raping of women
in the cas d’espèce disclosed a pattern of extreme violence in an inter‑
temporal dimension . There were also the women who lost their children,
or husbands, in the war, and those who did not have access to their mor -
tal remains, having been thus deprived of their project of after -life.
264. Many centuries ago, Euripides depicted, in his tragedies Suppliant
Women, Andromache, Hecuba, and Trojan Women (fourth century bc),
the cruel impact and effects of war particularly upon women. Euripides’h
Trojan Women, for example, came to be regarded, in our times, as one of
the greatest anti-war literary pieces of antiquity, depicting its evil. hOver
four centuries later, Seneca wrote his own version of the tragedy Trojan
Women (50 -62 ad ), with a distinct outlook, but portraying likewise the
anguish and sufferings that befell women. In the last decade of the twen -
tieth century, the cruel impact and effects of war upon women marked
likewise presence in the facts of the present case of the Application of the
Convention against Genocide, disclosing the projection of evil in time, its
perennity and omnipresence.
265. In the cas d’espèce, the degradation and humiliation of women by
systematic rape and other sexual violence crimes (supra) did not exhaust
themselves at the level of individual life. The atrocities they were subh -
jected to, caused also (for those who survived) forced separation, andh di- s
ruption of family life. The terrible sufferings inflicted by rapes allehgedly
for “ethnic cleansing”, went far beyond that, to the destruction ohf the
targeted groups themselves, to which the murdered and brutalized women
belonged — that is, to the realm of genocide.
266. May it be recalled that, in its landmark Judgment (of 2 September
1998) in the case Akayesu, the ICTR held precisely that gender -based
crimes of rape and sexual violence, disclosing an intent to destroy, conhst-i
tuted genocide, and in fact destroyed the targeted group (ICTR, Akayesu,
Judgment of 2 September 1998, para. 731). In determining the occurrence
of genocide, the ICTR found that the pattern of rape with public humiliah -
255
256To paraphrase Shakespeare, Macbeth (1605-1606), Act V, Scene V, verse 24.
To paraphrase Sophocles, Oedipus the King (428-425 bc), verses 1528-1530.
296
7 CIJ1077.indb 588 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 295
ont dû avoir le sentiment d’être devenues des ombres errantes 255. C’est
une cruauté extrême. Des femmes ont aussi été violées jushqu’à en mourir.
Celles qui ont survécu à ce supplice ont -elles eu plus de « chance» que
celles qui ont franchi le terme de la vie ? Toutes auront connu une terrible
souffrance 256. Le caractère sacré de la vie — avant la naissance, pendant
la grossesse, après la naissance et tout au long de l’existence huhmaine— a
été détruit avec brutalité.
263. Qu’est -il advenu ensuite, après le viol brutal et l’humiliation, des
enfants qui sont nés de la haine ? Le savons -nous ? Quels ont été les effets
à long terme de cette campagne de destruction dont les principales vihc -
times étaient des femmes ? Le savons-nous? Qu’est-il arrivé aux fils et aux
filles de la haine ? Le savons -nous ? Le viol général et systématique des
femmes en l’espèce met en évidence un ensemble de violences exthrêmes
qui s’inscrit dans une dimension intertemporelle. Des femmes ont aussi
perdu leurs enfants ou leur mari dans la guerre, et certaines n’ont phas eu
accès à leurs dépouilles, ce qui les a privées de leur projeht funéraire.
264. Il y a maints siècles, Euripide a décrit, dans ses tragédies Les Sup ‑
pliantes, Andromaque , Hécube et Les Troyennes (IV e siècle av. J.-C.), les
incidences et les effets cruels de la guerre sur les femmes en particuliehr. Ses
Troyennes, par exemple, sont considérées de nos jours comme l’un des
plus grands textes littéraires de l’Antiquité contre la guerre, dont il décrit
les maux. Plus de quatre siècles plus tard, Sénèque a écrit sa propre ver -
sion de la tragédie Les Troyennes (50 -62 apr. J.-C.), qui offre un point de
vue différent, mais dépeint aussi l’angoisse et les souffranceseqhui se sont
abattues sur les femmes. Dans la dernière décennie du XX siècle, les inci-
dences et les effets cruels de la guerre sur les femmes apparaissent touth
autant dans les faits de la présente affaire relative à l’ Application de la
convention sur le génocide (Croatie c. Serbie) , révélant la projection du
mal dans le temps, sa pérennité et son omniprésence.
265. En l’espèce, la dégradation et l’humiliation des femmes par hle viol
systématique et d’autres crimes de violence sexuelle (supra) n’ont pas eu
d’effets que sur la seule vie des victimes. Les atrocités que celles -ci ont
subies ont aussi entraîné (pour celles qui ont survécu) des shéparations for -
cées et le bouleversement de leur vie de famille. Les effets des terribles
souffrances infligées par les viols prétendument commis en vue d’hassurer
un « nettoyage ethnique » sont allés bien au-delà de celui -ci, jusqu’à la
destruction des groupes visés auxquels appartenaient les femmes assashsi-
nées et brutalisées — autrement dit, jusqu’au génocide.
266. Je tiens à rappeler que, dans le jugement historique qu’il a rendu
(2 septembre 1998) en l’affaire Akayesu, le TPIR a conclu précisément que
les viols et les violences sexuelles fondés sur le sexe des victimes,h qui avaient
été commis dans l’intention de détruire, étaient constituhtifs de génocide et
avaient bel et bien détruit le groupe ciblé (TPIR, Akayesu, jugement du
2 septembre 1998, par. 731). Pour parvenir à la conclusion qu’un génocide
255
256 Pour paraphraser Shakespeare, Macbeth (1605-1606), acte V, scène V, vers 24.
Pour paraphraser Sophocle, Œdipe roi (428-425 av. J.-C.), vers 1528-1530.
296
7 CIJ1077.indb 589 18/04/16 08:54 296 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tion and mutilation, inflicted serious bodily and mental harm on the
women victims, and disclosed an intent to destroy them, their families ahnd
communities, the Tutsi group as a whole (ICTR, Akayesu, Judgment of 2
September 1998, paras. 731 and 733-734). The victimized women were
degraded, in the words of the ICTR, as “sexual objects”, and the extreme
violence they were subjected to “was a step in the process of destruction”
of their social group — “destruction of the spirit, of the will to live and of
life itself” (ibid., para. 732).
267. For its part, the ICTY (Trial Chamber), in its decision (Review of
Indictments, of 11 July 1996) in the case Karadžić and Mladić, stated that
a pattern of sexual assaults began to occur even before the wars in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out, “in a context of loot -
ing and intimidation of the population”. Concentration camps for rape
were established, “with the aim of forcing the birth of Serbian offsprhing,
the women often being interned until it was too late for them to undergoh
an abortion” (ICTY, Karadžić and Mladić, decision of 11 July 1996,
para. 64). Rapes — the ICTY (Trial Chamber) proceeded — increased
“the shame and humiliation of the victims and of the community” ; the
purpose “of many rapes was enforced impregnation” ( ibid., para. 64).
268. Such crimes, of “systematic rape of women”, purporting “to tranh -s
mit a new ethnic identity” to the children, undermined “the very fhounda-
tions of the group”, dismembering it (ibid., para. 94). They “could have
been planned or ordered with a genocidal intent” ( ibid., para. 95). The
ICTY (Trial Chamber) held that “Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić
planned, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, prepara- h
tion or execution of the genocide perpetrated” in the centres of detehntion
(ibid., para. 84).
269. In the present case of the Application of the Convention against
Genocide, opposing Croatia to Serbia, due to the early mobilization of
entities of the civil society, the figures concerning the systematic phractice
of destruction through rape were soon to become known. By the end of
1992, the estimates were that there had been, in the war in Croatia untihl
then, approximately 12,000 incidents of rape. Those incidents rose up
to 50,000-60,000 incidents, in the whole period of 1991 -1995, in the
wars in the former Yugoslavia (both in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herze -
govina).
270. But those are only rough estimates, as it was soon realized — as
257
acknowledged in expert writing — that it was simply not possible to
know with precision the total number of victims (of all ages) of that hbru-
257
Cf., inter alia, e.g., B. Allen, Rape Warfare — The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia‑
Herzegovina and Croatia Minneapolis/London, University of Minnesota Press, 1996,
pp. 65, 72, 76-77 and104Various AuthorsWomen, Violence and War— Wartime Victim‑
297
7 CIJ1077.indb 590 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 296
avait été commis, il a constaté que les viols systématiques hs’accompagnant
d’humiliation publique et de mutilations avaient constitué des attheintes
graves à l’intégrité physique et mentale des victimes, et réhvélaient une
intention de détruire ces femmes, leurs familles et leur communautéh, soit le
groupe tutsi dans son ensemble (TPIR, Akayesu, jugement du 2 septembre
1998, par. 731 et 733-734). Les femmes victimes ont subi un traitement
dégradant, pour reprendre les termes du TPIR, en tant qu’« objet d’une
utilisation sexuell», et l’extrême violence à laquelle elles ont été soumises
« était une étape dans le processus de destruction» de leur groupe social —
«destruction de son moral, de la volonté de vivre de ses membres et deh
leurs vies elles-mêmes » (bid., par. 732).
267. Pour sa part, la chambre de première instance du TPIY, dans la
décision (examen des actes d’accusation, 11 juillet 1996) qu’elle a rendue
en l’affaire Karadžić et Mladić, a déclaré que des violences sexuelles ont
commencé à être commises avant l’éclatement du conflit hen Croatie et en
Bosnie -Herzégovine, « dans un contexte de pillages et d’intimidation de la
population ». Des camps de concentration consacrés aux viols ont été
créés « dans le but de procréation forcée d’enfants serbes, les femmes h
étant souvent détenues jusqu’à ce qu’il fût trop tard hpour avorter» (TPIY,
Karadžić et Mladić, décision du 11 juillet 1996, par.64). Les viols,a pour -
suivi le TPIY, renforçaient « la honte et l’humiliation des victimes et de la
communauté »; l’objectif «de nombreux viols était la fécondation forcée »
(ibid., par. 64).
268. Ces crimes, à savoir le «violsystématique des femmes » visant «à
la transmission à l’enfant d’une identité ethnique nouvelle », portaient
atteinte «aux fondements du groupe », qu’il détruisait ( ibid., par. 94). Ils
«ont pu être planifiés ou ordonnés dans une intention génochidaire » (ibid.,
par. 95). Le TPIY a jugé que « Radovan Karadžić et Ratko Mladić ont
planifié, ordonné ou de toute autre manière aidé et encourhagé à planifier,
préparer ou exécuter le génocide perpétré » dans les centres d’internement
(ibid., par. 84).
269. Dans la présente affaire relative à l’ Application de la convention
sur le génocide opposant la Croatie à la Serbie, en raison de la mobilisa -
tion précoce d’entités de la société civile, les chiffres hconcernant la pra -
tique systématique de la destruction par le viol n’ont pas tardéh à être
connus. A la fin de 1992, selon les estimations, il y avait eu, dans lhe cadre
de la guerre menée en Croatie jusque -là, quelque 12 000 cas de viol. Ce
nombre a augmenté pour atteindre 50 à 60 000 cas pour l’ensemble de la
période de 1991 à 1995 dans les conflits qui déchiraient l’ex -Yougoslavie
(en Croatie et en Bosnie-Herzégovine).
270. Ce ne sont cependant que des estimations approximatives, car
l’on s’est vite rendu compte — comme l’ont reconnu de nombreux
auteurs 257— qu’il était tout simplement impossible de connaître avec phr-é
257Voir notamment B. Allen, Rape Warfare — The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia‑
Herzegovina and CroatiaMinneapolis/Londres, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p.65,
72, 76-77 et 104[divers auteuWomen, Violence and War — Wartime Victimization of
297
7 CIJ1077.indb 591 18/04/16 08:54 297 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tality, and the extent of destruction perpetrated with the intent to deshtroy
the victimized families and the targeted social groups, in concentration
camps (rape/death camps), in prisons and detention centres and in brothh-
els. The girls and women victimized were condemned to the utmost
humiliation, and were dehumanized by the victimizers, simply because of h
their ethnic identity.
271. If this systematic pattern of rape was not a plurality of acts of
genocide (for the destructive consequences it entailed), what was it then ?
What is genocide, if that is not genocide ? In the present dissenting opin -
ion, I have already examined the findings (in 1992-1993), e.g., in the
UN (former Commission on Human Rights) “Reports on the Situation
of Human Rights in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia” (Rappor -
teur : T. Mazowiecki) 258, which should here be recalled.
272. In effect, those Reports contain references, inter alia, to the pat -
tern of destruction by means of killings, torture, disappearances, rape hand
sexual violence. I thus limit myself to add here that the Report of 10 Feb-
ruary 1993 259, states that the “[r]ape of women, including minors, has
been widespread in both conflicts” (para. 260) (the wars in Croatia and in
Bosnia and Herzegovina). The systematic pattern of rapes was accompa -
nied by other acts of extreme violence.
273. In the subsequent Report of 10 June 1994 260, the Special Rappor-
teur further referred to the “widespread terrorization” of the pophulation
by means of killings, destruction of homes, and commission of rapes by
soldiers (para. 7) in their “relentless assaults” (para. 11). For its part, the
UN (Security Council’s) Commission of Experts, in its fact -finding
Reports of 1993 -1994 — as I have already indicated in the present dis -
senting opinion, likewise found the occurrence of a widespread and sys -
tematic pattern of rapes — as well as torture and beatings, often followed
261
by killings, spreading terror, shame and humiliation , disrupting family
life and the targeted groups themselves. If this plurality of acts of exhtreme
ization of Refugees in the Balkans (ed. V. Nikolić-Ristanović), Budapest, Central European
University Press, 2000, pp. 41, 43, 56 -57, 80-82, 142 and; S.Fabijanić Gagro, “The
Crime of Rape in the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s Case Law”, 60 Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u
Zagrebu (2010), pp. 1310, 1315-1316 and 1330-133; M. Ellis, “Breaking the Sile: Rape
as an International Crime”, 38Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2007),
pp. 226 and 231-234 ; S.L. Russell-Brown, “Rape as an Act of Genocide”, 21 Berkeley
Journal of International Law (2003), pp.51-352, 355, 363 -364 and371; R. Peroomian,
“When Death Is a Blessing and Life a Prolonged Agony Women Victims of Genocide”, in
Genocide Perspectives II — Essays on Holocaust and Genocide (eds. C. Tatz, P. Arnold and
S. Tatz),Sydney, Brandl & Schlesinger/Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide
Studies, 2003, pp. 314-315 and 327-330.
258 Cf. Part IX of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
259 UN doc. E/CN.4/1993/50.
260 UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/4.
261 Cf. Part IX of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
298
7 CIJ1077.indb 592 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 297
cision le nombre total de victimes (de tout âge) de ces brutalitéhs et l’am -
pleur des destructions perpétrées dans l’intention de détruihre les familles
victimes de violences et les groupes sociaux visés dans les camps de h
concentration (camps de viol/d’extermination), dans les prisons et centres
de détention et dans les maisons de prostitution. Les filles et lesh femmes
victimes étaient condamnées à la plus grande humiliation et éhtaient ainsi
déshumanisées par leurs agresseurs, simplement en raison de leur ihdentité
ethnique, pour être celles qu’elles étaient.
271. Si cette campagne systématique de viols n’était pas une pluralihté
d’actes de génocide (en raison des conséquences destructrices hqu’il a entraî -
nées), qu’était -elle donc? Qu’est-ce qu’un génocide, si cela n’en est pas un?
Dans le présent exposé, j’ai déjà examiné les conclusihons (1-9199293) figurant
dans les rapports de l’ONU (Commission des droits de l’homme) suhr la s-itua
tion des droits de l’homme dans le territoire de l’ex -Yougoslavie, soumis par
le rapporteur spécial T.Mazowiecki 258, qu’il convient de rappeler ici.
272. En effet, ces rapports font référence, notamment, à la campagne h
de destruction opérée au moyen de meurtres, de la torture, de disphari -
tions, de viols et de violences sexuelles. Je me bornerai donc à ajouhter ici
que, dans le rapport du 10 février 1993 25, par exemple, il est indiqué
(par. 260) que le « viol des femmes, y compris des mineures, a été lar -
gement pratiqué dans les deux conflits » (les guerres en Croatie et en
Bosnie -Herzégovine). La campagne de viols systématiques s’est accompah -
gnée d’autres actes d’extrême violence.
273. Dans son rapport suivant, en date du 10 juin 1994 260, le rappor-
teur spécial a en outre indiqué que les assaillants « terrorisa[ie]nt la popu-
lation » en tuant des habitants et a fait état de la destruction de maisohns
et de la commission de viols par des soldats (par. 7), ainsi que de leur
« acharnement» (par. 11). Pour sa part, la Commission d’experts de
l’ONU (Conseil de sécurité), dans ses rapports d’enquêthe de 1993 -1994,
comme je l’ai indiqué plus haut, a constaté elle aussi l’exihstence d’une
campagne générale et systématique de viols, ainsi que d’actehs de torture et
de sévices, souvent suivis de meurtres, semant la terreur, la honte eht l’hu -
miliation 261 et bouleversant la vie des familles et les groupes visés
Refugees in the Balkans (dir. publ., VNikolić-Ristanović), Budapest, Central European
University Press, 2000, p. 41, 43, 56-57, 80-82, 142 e; S.abijanić Gagro, «The Crime
of Rape in the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s Case Law », Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu
(2010), vol. 60, p. 1310, 1315-1316, 1330-1; M. Ellis,Breaking the Silence: Rape as an
International Crime», Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2007), vol. 38,
p. 226 et 231-234; S.L. Russell-Brown, «Rape as an Act of Genocide »,Berkeley Journal
of International Law (2003), vol.21, p. 351-352, 355-363, 364 e; R.Peroomian, « When
Death Is a Blessing and Life a Prolonged Agony : Women Victims of Genocide », Geno‑
cide Perspectives II — Essays on Holocaust and Genocide (dir. publ., C. Tatz, P. Arnold et
S. Tatz),Sydney, Brandl & Schlesinger/Australian Institute for Holocaust and Genocide
Studies, 2003, p. 314-315 et 327-330.
258 Voir partie IX du présent exposé, supra.
259 E/CN.4/1993/50.
260 E/CN.4/1995/4.
261 Voir partie IX du présent exposé, supra.
298
7 CIJ1077.indb 593 18/04/16 08:54 298 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
violence (with all its destructive consequences) was not genocide, whaht
was it then ?
274. In its recent Judgment of 11 July 2013, in the Karadžić case, the
ICTY (Appeals Chamber), in rejecting an appeal for acquittal, and rein -
stating genocide charges against Mr. R. Karadžić (ICTY, Karadžić, Judg-
ment of 11 July 2013, para. 115), pointed out that it had found that
“quintessential examples of serious bodily harm as an underlying act hof
genocide include torture, rape, and non-fatal physical violence that causes
disfigurement or serious injury to the external or internal organs” (ibid.,
para. 33). The ICTY (Appeals Chamber) took into due account the evi -
dence of “genocidal and other culpable acts” on a large -scale and dis -
criminatory in nature, such as killings, beatings, rape and sexual violehnce
and inhumane living conditions ( ibid., paras. 34 and 99).
275. More recently, in its decision of 15 April 2014, in the Mladić case,
the ICTY (Trial Chamber I) rejected a defence motion for acquittal, and
decided to continue trial on genocide charges. It took due note of the
evidence produced on torture and prolonged beatings of detainees (ICTY,h
Mladić, decision of 15 April 2014, pp. 20937 -20938), of “large -scale”
expulsions of non -Serbs (ibid., p. 20944), and of rape of young women
and girls (the youngest one being 12 years old) (ibid., pp. 20935-20936
and 20939). Shortly afterwards (decision of 24 July 2014), the ICTY
(Appeals Chamber) dismissed a defence appeal and confirmed the Trial
Chamber I’s aforementioned decision (ibid., para. 29).
276. Last but not least, as it can be perceived from the selected exam -
ples of witness statements in the cas d’espèce, reviewed above, as to
numerous occurrences of rape and other sexual violence crimes during theh
armed attacks in Croatia, and also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they h
appear intended to destroy the targeted groups of victims. In my percep -
tion, the brutality itself of the numerous rapes perpetrated bears witnehss
of their intent to destroy. The victims were attacked in a situation of the
utmost vulnerability or defencelessness. As from the launching of the Ser -
bian armed attacks in Croatia, there occurred, in effect, a systematic pat‑
tern of rape, which can surely be considered under Article II (b) of the
Genocide Convention (cf. infra).
XII. Systematic Pattern of Dihsappeared
or Missing Persons
1. Arguments of the Parties concerning the Disappeared
or Missing Persons
277. During the written phase of the proceedings of the cas d’espèce,
both Croatia and Serbia referred to the issue of the disappeared or missh-
ing persons, persisting to date. In its Memorial, Croatia asked the Courht
299
7 CIJ1077.indb 594 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 298
eux-mêmes. Si cette pluralité d’actes d’extrême violence (avhec toutes ses
conséquences destructrices) n’était pas un génocide, qu’hétait -elle donc ?
274. Dans l’arrêt qu’il a récemment rendu, le 11 juillet 2013, en l’affaire
Karadžić, le TPIY, rejetant un recours aux fins d’acquittement et rétablhis -
sant les accusations de génocide retenues contre M. R. Karadžić (TPIY,
Karadžić, arrêt du 11 juillet 2013, par. 115), a souligné que « la torture, le
viol et les violences ayant pour effet de défigurer la victime ou deh provoquer
des blessures graves à ses organes externes ou internes, sans pour auhtant
causer sa mort, étaient des exemples typiques de l’atteinte grave à l’hintégrité
physique sous-jacente au crime de génocide » (ibid., par. 33). Il a dûment
tenu compte des éléments de preuve montrant que « des actes de génocide et
d’autres actes répréhensibles» de nature discriminatoire — tels que meurtres,
sévices physiques, viols et autres violences sexuelles et conditions hd’existence
inhumaines— ont été commis à grande échelle (ibid., par.34 et 99).
275. Plus récemment, dans la décision qu’il a rendue le 15 avril 2014 en
l’affaire Mladić, le TPIY (chambre de première instance I) a rejeté une
requête de la défense aux fins d’acquittement et décidéh de poursuivre le
procès sur la base des chefs de génocide. Il a pris bonne note desh éléments
de preuve produits pour étayer les griefs de torture et de sévices physiques
prolongés infligés à des détenus (TPIY, Mladić, décision du 15 avril 2014,
p.20937 et 20938), des expulsions « à grande échelle» de non -Serbes (ibid.,
p. 20944) et du viol de jeunes femmes et de filles (la plus jeune éthant âgée de
12 ans) (ibid., p. 20935-20936 et 20939). Peu après (décision du 24 juil
let2014), il a rejeté un recours de la défense et confirmé la dhécision précitée
de la chambre de première instance I (ibid., par. 29).
276. Dernier point, mais non le moindre, comme il ressort des exemples
de déclarations de témoins dans le cas d’espèce examinés hci -dessus, les
nombreux cas de viols et autres violences sexuelles commis pendant les
attaques armées en Croatie et en Bosnie -Herzégovine semblent destinés à
détruire les groupes de victimes visés. Selon moi, la brutalitéh même des
nombreux viols commis atteste l’intention de détruire. Les victimehs ont
été attaquées alors qu’elles se trouvaient dans une situatiohn de vulnérabi ‑
lité extrême, sinon sans défense. A compter du lancement des attaques
armées serbes en Croatie, se met en effet en place un schéma systématique
de viol, qui peut certainement être examiné sous l’angle du litt. b) de l’ar-
ticleII de la convention sur le génocide (voir infra).
XII. Ensemble de disparitiohns systématiques
de personnes non retrhouvées à ce jour
1. Moyens des Parties relatifs aux personnes
disparues et non retrouvées
277. Pendant la phase écrite de la présente espèce, la Croatie et lah Ser-
bie ont toutes deux évoqué la question des personnes disparues et hnon
retrouvées à ce jour. Dans son mémoire, la Croatie a prié la Cour de juger
299
7 CIJ1077.indb 595 18/04/16 08:54 299 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
to declare the obligation of the FRY to take all steps at its disposal tho
provide a prompt and full account of the whereabouts of each and every
one of those missing persons, and, to that end, to work in co-operation h
with its own authorities 262. Croatia further stated that “the establishment
of the whereabouts of missing persons, often victims of genocide, is a 263
painful process, but a necessary step for the sake of a better future”h .
278. Croatia claimed that 1,419 persons were, at the date of the filing
264
of its Memorial (of 1 March 2009), still missing and unaccounted for .
According to the information provided in 2009 by Croatia’s Governmenth
Office for the Detained and Missing Persons, there appeared to be a tothal
of at least 886 still “missing persons” from the area of Eastern Slavo-
nia 265; moreover, the destiny of 511 persons from Vukovar remained still
unknown at the time of the filing of its Memorial 266. By an Agreement on
Normalization of Relations, signed between Croatia and FRY
on 23 August 1996, the Parties undertook to “speed up the process of
solving the question of missing persons” and to exchange all available
267
information about those missing (Art. 6) .
279. Subsequently, in its Reply (of 20 December 2010), Croatia facili -
tated an updated List of Missing Persons (of 1 September 2010), indicat-
268
ing a total of 1,024 missing persons . According to the Applicant,
on 27-28 July 2010, “a meeting on missing persons” was held in Belgrade
between Serbia’s Commission for Missing Persons and Croatia’s Com -
mission for Detained and Missing Persons, under the auspices of the
ICRC and the International Commission on Missing Persons. One of the
issues then addressed was “the question of those detained on the terrhitory
of the Respondent” ; in this respect, “representatives of the Respondent
gave to the Applicant’s representatives a list of 2,786 persons who were
detained in the Republic of Serbia in the period 1991-1992” 269.
280. Croatia then requested the Court to adjudge and declare that as a
consequence of its responsibility for these breaches of the Convention, hthe
Respondent is under the obligations
“[t]o provide forthwith to the Applicant all information within its
possession or control as to the whereabouts of Croatian citizens who
are missing as a result of the genocidal acts for which it is responsiblhe,
and generally to co-operate with the authorities of the Applicant to
262 Memorial of Croatia, para. 8.78, and cf. p. 414.
263 Ibid., para. 1.14.
264 Ibid., para. 1.09.
265 Ibid., para. 4.06.
266 Ibid., para. 4.190.
267 Ibid., para. 2.160.
268
269 Reply of Croatia, Annex 41.
Ibid., para. 2.54.
300
7 CIJ1077.indb 596 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 299
que la RFY avait l’obligation de prendre toutes les mesures à sa dhisposi-
tion pour fournir immédiatement à la Croatie des informations comphlètes
concernant le lieu où se trouvait chacune de ces personnes portéesh dispa-
rues et, à cette fin, de coopérer avec les autorités de la Crhoatie 262. Elle a
en outre déclaré que « l]’obtention d’informations sur le sort des per -
sonnes disparues, souvent victimes du génocide, est un processus doulhou-
reux mais nécessaire au nom d’un meilleur avenir » 263.
278. La Croatie a affirmé que, à la date du dépôt de son mémoire
er
(1 mars26409), le sort de 1419 personnes portées disparues demeurait
inconnu . Selon les informations fournies en 2009 par l’office gouverne-
mental pour les personnes détenues et portées disparues de la Réhpublique
de Croatie, le nombre total de « personnes portées disparues en Slavonie
265
orientale s’élevait encore à 886 ; de plus, le sort de 511 personnes origi-
naires de Vukovar demeurait inconnu à la date de dépôt du mémoire 26.
Par l’accord sur la normalisation des relations conclu le 23 août 1996 entre
la Croatie et la RFY, les Parties se sont engagées à « accélérer le processus
de résolution de la question des personnes disparues» et à échanger toutes
les informations disponibles sur le sort des personnes disparues (art. 6) 26.
279. Par la suite, dans sa réplique (20 décembre 2010), la Croatie a
er
soumis une liste mise à jour des personnes portées disparues (au 1 sep-
tembre 2010) constituée au total de 1024 noms 26. Selon elle, les 27
et 28 juillet 2010, « une réunion sur la question des personnes portées dis -
parues » avait eu lieu à Belgrade entre la commission de la Serbie pour lhes
personnes portées disparues et la commission de la Croatie chargéeh de la
question des personnes détenues et des personnes disparues, sous l’hégide
du CICR et de la commission internationale pour les personnes dispa -
rues. La «question des personnes détenues sur le territoire du défendeur»
avait notamment été abordée lors de cette réunion ; sur ce point, « les
représentants du défendeur ont communiqué aux représentants hdu dema-n
deur une liste de 2786 personnes qui furent détenues en République de
Serbie en 1991 et 1992 »269.
280. La Croatie a ensuite prié la Cour de dire et juger que, en raison de h
sa responsabilité pour ces violations de la Convention, la Serbie éhtait
tenue de
«communiquer sans délai au demandeur toutes les informations en
sa possession ou sous son contrôle sur le sort des ressortissants
croates portés disparus à la suite des actes de génocide dont ehlle s’est
rendue responsable et, plus généralement, coopérer avec les authorités
262Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 8.78, et voir p. 414.
263Ibid., par. 1.14.
264Ibid., par. 1.09.
265Ibid., par. 4.06.
266
267Ibid., par. 4.190.
268Ibid., par. 2.160.
Réplique de la Croatie, annexe 41.
269Ibid., par. 2.54.
300
7 CIJ1077.indb 597 18/04/16 08:54 300 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
jointly ascertain the whereabouts of the said missing persons or their
remains” 27.
281. The two Parties elaborated further the question of the number of
still missing persons at the oral proceedings. An expert called by Croathia
observed that the data on the missing persons they exhumed “change
from day to day”, and whenever there is an exhumation, “the numberh of
identified persons increases, and the number of missing persons then
271
increases also” . Croatia contended its efforts “to uncover the graves of
the genocide victims” have been “hampered by Serbia’s practice of remov-
ing and reburying victims during its occupation of the region, often in h
Serbia, in a vain attempt to cover up its atrocities” 27.
282. To date, it proceeded, 103 bodies have been repatriated from Ser-
bia ; furthermore, “whilst many of the victims of the genocide have now
been accounted for, and their remains located, hundreds of Croats still h
remain missing. Twenty -three years later, Croatian families continue to
mourn more than 850 missing people. The victims are still denied a proper
burial and a dignified final resting place ; and their families are still denied
the opportunity to lay them to rest” 27. Croatia further stated, with
regard to mass graves, that, by July 2013, 142 mass graves had been dis -
274
covered in Croatia, containing the bodies of 3,656 victims .
283. For its part, Serbia argued that the Croatian list of missing per -
sons was confusing and unhelpful in clarifying the issues in the disputeh. It
added that the Updated List of Missing Persons (of 1 September 2010)
contained data on 1,024 individuals, among whom many “victims of Serb
ethnicity”. Furthermore, it contained the names of Croats “who werhe
missing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in some places that were
under the full and exclusive control of the Croatian governmental forcesh
and far away from military operations”. The aforementioned list also h
contained “the names of ethnic Croats who went missing during the
offensive criminal Operations Maslenica and Storm which were under -
taken by the Croatian Government” 275.
2. Responses of the Parties to Questions from the Bench
284. Given the contradictory information provided, I deemed it fit to
put two questions to the contending Parties, in the public sitting beforhe
270
271Reply of Croatia, p. 472.
272CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 36.
CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 20, para. 44.
273Ibid., para. 45.
274Ibid., para. 39.
275Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 7.
301
7 CIJ1077.indb 598 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 300
de la République de Croatie en vue de déterminer conjointement ce h
qu’il est advenu de ces personnes ou de leurs dépouilles » 270.
281. Les deux Parties sont revenues sur la question du nombre de per -
sonnes toujours portées disparues lors de la procédure orale. Un ehxpert cité
par la Croatie a fait observer que les données concernant les personnhes portées
disparues qui étaient exhumées « change[aie]nt de jour en jou» r, et que, chaque
fois qu’il était procédé à une exhumation, « le nombre de personnes identifiées
271
augment[ait] et celui des personnes portées disparues augment[ait] » . La
Croatie a fait valoir que ses démarches « en vue de mettre au jour les fosses
contenant les victimes du génocide» étaient «d’autant plus difficiles que la
Serbie, pendant son occupation de la région, avait pour pratique de dhéterrer
les corps et de les enterrer ailleurs— souvent sur son propre territoire afin de
tenter, en vain, de dissimuler les atrocités qu’elle avait commisehs »272.
282. A ce jour, a ajouté la Croatie, 103 corps ont été rapatriés de Serbie ;
en outre, « [b]ien que le sort de nombre des victimes du génocide ait été
élucidé et leurs dépouilles, localisées, des centaines de Crhoates restent encore
aujourd’hui portés disparus. Vingt -trois ans après les faits, des familles
croates continuent de pleurer plus de 850 personnes disparues. Les victimes
demeurent privées d’un enterrement en bonne et due forme, et d’hune sépul -
ture où reposer dans la dignité ; leurs familles demeurent privées de la pos-
sibilité de leur faire leurs adieux »273. La Croatie a aussi indiqué que, en ce
qui concernait les fosses communes, en juillet 2013, 142 charniers avaient274
été découverts en Croatie, contenant les cadavres de 3656victimes .
283. La Serbie, de son côté, a fait valoir que la liste des personnes dhis-
parues établie par la Croatie prêtait à confusion et ne permettait pas de
clarifier les questions au cœur du litige. Elle a ajouté que la hliste mise à
jour des personnes portées disparues (au 1 erseptembre 2010) contenait les
données relatives à 1024 personnes, parmi lesquelles un grand nombre de
«victimes d’origine serbe ». Sur cette liste figuraient aussi les noms de
Croates « qui [avaie]nt été portés disparus en Bosnie -Herzégovine, ainsi
que dans des zones qui se trouvaient sous l’autorité absolue et exclusive
des forces de l’Etat croate, très éloignées des opérationhs militaires ». La
liste contenait également « les noms de personnes d’origine croate portées
disparues dans le cadre des opérations criminelles offensives Maslenicha et
Tempête, menées par l’Etat croate » 275.
2. Réponses des Parties aux questions du juge
284. Les renseignements fournis étant contradictoires, le soussigné a
jugé opportun d’adresser deux questions aux Parties, lors de l’haudience
270
271Réplique de la Croatie, p. 472.
272CR 2014/9, p. 36.
CR 2014/10, p. 20, par. 44.
273Ibid., par. 45.
274Ibid., par. 39.
275Duplique de la Serbie, par. 7.
301
7 CIJ1077.indb 599 18/04/16 08:54 301 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
the Court of 14 March 2014. The two questions were formulated as fol -
lows:
“1. Have there been any recent initiatives to identify, and to clarify
further the fate of the disappeared persons still missing to date ?
2. Is there any additional and more precise updated information that
can be presented to the Court by both Parties on this particular
issue of disappeared or missing persons to date ?” 276
285. In response to my questions, Croatia elaborated further on the
issue of the fate of disappeared persons. In this respect, it recalled that
Article II of the Convention enumerates amongst the list of genocidal acts
the causing of “serious (. . .) mental harm to members of the group”. The
questions I put to both Parties drew the Applicant to the case law on
the disappearance of persons. Recalling the Judgments of the IACtHR in
the case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (of 29 July 1988) and of the
ECHR in the case of Varnava v. Turkey (of 18 September 2009), as well
as the decision of the UN Human Rights Committee in the case of
C. A. de Quinteros et alii v. Uruguay (1990), Croatia claimed that disap -
pearance has continuing consequences in several respects. In the light ohf
that jurisprudence, Croatia claims that the
“‘serious (. . .) mental harm’ being suffered by the relatives of the
disappeared is a direct result of acts for which Serbia is either respon- h
sible for its own actions or for which it has a responsibility to punishh
under the [Genocide] Convention. In this way, the continuing failure
of Serbia to account for the whereabouts of some 865 disappeared
Croats is an act or acts falling within Article II (b) of the Conven -
tion.” 277
286. As for the requested additional, and more precise updated infor-
mation, on the issue of disappeared or missing persons, Croatia answeredh
that such information can be found in the updated Book of Missing Per‑
sons on the Territory of the Republic of Croatia, published by Croatia’s
Directorate for Detained and Missing Persons, in conjunction with the
Croatian Red Cross and the ICRC. It informed that the book sets out
detailed data on those who were still missing as of April 2012 27; how-
ever, as the figures concerning the disappeared are being constantly
updated, the numbers provided in the 2012 book are already out of date.
276Questions put by Judge Cançado Trindade to both Croatia and Serbia, in :
CR 2014/18, of 14 March 2014, p. 69.
277CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, p. 15, para. 10.
278Ibid., pp. 34-35, paras. 22-25.
302
7 CIJ1077.indb 600 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 301
publique du 14 mars 2014. Ces deux questions étaient formulées comme
suit:
« 1. Des mesures ont -elles été prises récemment pour déterminer ce
qu’il était advenu des personnes toujours portées disparues et héta-
blir leur identité?
2. Les Parties sont -elles en mesure de présenter à la Cour un com -
276
plément d’information précis et à jour sur cette question ?»
285. En réponse à mes questions, la Croatie a donné de plus amples
explications sur la question du sort des personnes disparues. Ainsi, ellhe a
rappelé que l’article II de la Convention énonce dans la liste des actes
génocidaires le fait de causer une « atteinte grave à l’intégrité … mentale
de membres du groupe ». Les questions que j’ai adressées aux deux Parties
ont appelé l’attention du demandeur sur la jurisprudence relative hà la dis -
parition de personnes. Rappelant les arrêts rendus par la CIDH en l’haf -
faire Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (29 juillet 1988) et la CEDH en
l’affaire Varnava c. Turquie (18 septembre 2009), ainsi que la décision ren-
due par le Comité des droits de l’homme de l’ONU dans la communhica -
tion Quinteros et consorts c. Uruguay (1990), la Croatie a affirmé que, à
bien des égards, la disparition des personnes a des conséquences àh long
terme. A la lumière de cette jurisprudence, elle a fait valoir que
« l’«atteinte grave à l’intégrité … mentale » que subissent les proches
des personnes disparues résulte directement d’actes dont la Serbieh est
personnellement responsable ou qu’elle est tenue de punir en vertu deh
la convention [sur le génocide]. En s’abstenant ainsi de manièrhe per -
sistante de donner des explications sur les lieux où se trouvent les h
quelque 865 Croates disparus, la Serbie s’est donc rendue coupable
d’un ou de plusieurs actes tombant sous le coup du litt. b) de l’ar -
ticleII de la Convention. » 277
286. Afin d’apporter des informations plus précises et plus récenthes sur
la question des personnes portées disparues et non retrouvées, la hCroatie
a fait référence à un ouvrage mis à jour, intitulé Book of Missing Persons
on the Territory of the Republic of Croatia (registre des personnes portées
disparues sur le territoire de la République de Croatie) et publiéh par l’of -
fice croate des personnes détenues et portées disparues, conjoinhtement
avec le comité croate de la Croix-Rouge et le CICR. Elle a indiquéh que cet
ouvrage contenait des données détaillées re278ives aux personnehs toujours
portées disparues en date d’avril 2012 ; cependant, comme les chiffres
concernant les disparus étaient régulièrement mis à jour, lehs chiffres figu-
rant dans le registre de 2012 étaient donc déjà obsolètes.
276Questions adressées par le soussigné à la Croatie comme à lah Serbie, CR 2014/18,
p. 69.
277CR 2014/20, p. 15, par. 10.
278
Ibid., p. 34-35, par. 22-25.
302
7 CIJ1077.indb 601 18/04/16 08:54 302 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
287. Still in response to my questions to both Parties (supra), Croatia
further contacted the Directorate for Detained and Missing Persons, on
Monday 17 March 2014, and provided the International Court of Justice
with the most up-to-date figures relating to persons killed during the course
of Serbia’s attacks on Croatian territory in 1991 -1992, namely (a) the :
bodies of 3,680 persons who were buried irregularly have been exhumed
from 142 mass graves and many more individual graves (b) of th;se, the
bodies of 3,144 persons have been positively identified ; (c) however,
865 persons who disappeared during that period are still missing 279.
288. For its part, Serbia, in its response to the questions I put to both
Parties (supra), stated that tracing missing persons “is a complex and
long-lasting process of co -operation between two sides”, on the basis of
the 1995 Bilateral Agreement on Co -operation in Tracing Missing Per -
sons and the 1996 Protocol on Co-operation between two State Commis-
280
sions . It added that it was
“fully aware of its task in the process of tracing missing persons
regardless of their nationality and ethnic origin. The interest of fami-
lies of the missing persons is a joint interest of Serbia and Croatia. Iht
is also the interest of humanity as a whole, and the Republic of Ser -
281
bia is dedicated to that task.”
As for the number of missing persons, Serbia claims that the Serbian lisht
of missing persons, received from the Serbian Commission for Missing
Persons in the territory of Croatia, today contains 1,748 names 282.
289. Finally, as regards the argument of continuing violation, it
added, disappearance itself is not an act of genocide, but it is equivalent
to enforced disappearance, a crime against humanity. Serbia relied on thhe
definition of “enforced disappearance” contained in the 2006 UN Con -
vention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
which refers to “abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberthy by
agents of the State” and then “followed by a refusal to acknowledghe the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of thhe
disappeared person” (Art. 2).
290. According to Serbia, enforced disappearance is not a continuing
violation of the right to life, with which the acts in Article 2 of the
2006 Convention bear an analogy. The reason why it may be a continuing
violation of human rights, according to Serbia, is that the family of thhe
victim is subject to ongoing “mental harm”, or because of the prochedural
obligation to investigate the crime. Serbia claims that, if the crime cohntin -
279CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, pp. 34-35, paras. 22-25.
280Preliminary Objections of Serbia ; Annex 53, p. 367.
281CR 2014/24, of 28 March 2014, pp. 60-61, para. 10.
282However, Serbia did not consider that list to be evidence of the crime, or of State
responsibility, and referred to the Veritas list of direct victims of Oper; cf.bid.,m
pp. 60-62, paras. 6-10.
303
7 CIJ1077.indb 602 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 302
287. Pour répondre aux questions que j’avais posées aux deux Partiesh
(supra), la Croatie a pris contact avec l’office croate des personnes déhtenues
et portées disparues, le lundi 17 mars 2014, et a fourni à la Cour les chiffres
les plus récents concernant les personnes tuées dans les attaques hde la Serbie
sur le territoire croate en 1991-1992 a: les dépouilles de 3680 personnes qui
avaient été enterrées irrégulièrement ont été exhumhées de 1c 42arniers et de
nombreuses sépultures individuelles b) p;rmi ces dépouilles, 3144 ont été
formellement identifiées ; c) toutefois, 865 personnes portées disparues au
279
cours de la période considérée n’ont toujours pas été hretrouvées .
288. De son côté, la Serbie a répondu que retrouver la trace de per -
sonnes disparues « relève du long et complexe processus de coopération
que mènent les deux Parties » sur la base de l’accord bilatéral de coopéra -
tion qu’elles ont conclu en 1995 en vue de localiser les personnes dihspa -
rues et du protocole de 1996 de coopération entre les deux commissionhs
d’Etat 28. Elle a ajouté qu’elle avait
«pleinement conscience de ce qui était attendu d’elle dans le cadreh de
ce processus, où il s’agit de retrouver la trace des personnes dishparues,
indépendamment de leur origine ethnique ou de leur nationalité. L’hi-n
térêt des familles de ces personnes est un intérêt commun àh la Serbie et
à la Croatie. C’est aussi un intérêt commun à l’humanité tout entière,
et la République de Serbie a à cœur de mener à bien cette tâhche. »281
Quant au nombre de personnes disparues, la Serbie a affirmé que la lhiste
établie par la commission serbe chargée des personnes disparues suhr le
282
territoire de la Croatie comportait à ce jour 1748 noms .
289. Enfin, en ce qui concerne l’argument de la violation continue de lah
Convention, la Serbie a ajouté que la disparition n’est pas en soih un acte de
génocide, mais s’apparente à la « disparition forcée », en tant que crime
contre l’humanité. Elle s’est appuyée sur la définitionh que donne de ce terme
la convention internationale pour la protection de toutes les personnes
contre les disparitions forcées (2006), à savoir, notamment, « l’enlèvement
ou toute autre forme de privation de liberté par des agents de l’Etat… suivi
du déni de la reconnaissance de la privation de liberté ou de la dhissimulation
du sort réservé à la personne disparue ou du lieu où elle seh trouve » (art.2).
290. De l’avis de la Serbie, la disparition forcée ne constitue pas uneh
violation continue du droit à la vie qui s’apparenterait aux actes énumérés
à l’article2 de la Convention. Selon elle, si la disparition est susceptible de
constituer une violation continue des droits de l’homme, c’est parhce que
la famille de la victime est soumise à une « atteinte morale » continue ou
en raison de l’obligation procédurale d’enquêter sur le crimhe. La Serbie
279CR 2014/20, p. 34-35, par. 22-25.
280Objections préliminaires de la Serbie ; annexe 53, p. 367.
281CR 2014/24, p. 60-61, par. 10.
282Cependant, la Serbie ne reconnaissait à cette liste aucune valeur prohbante en ce qui
concerne les crimes commis ou la responsabilité de l’Etat et elle ha renvoyé à la liste, établie
par Veritas, des victimes directes de l’opération Tempêteiibid., p. 60-62, par. 6-10.
303
7 CIJ1077.indb 603 18/04/16 08:54 303 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ues today as Croatia asserts, so must the intent. Croatia is “in errohr to
attempt to force this issue into the frame of Article 2 of the GenocideCon-
vention, essentially so that it can bolster its argument on temporal
283
jurisdiction” .
3. Outstanding Issues and the Parties’ Obligation to Establish
the Fate of Missing Persons
291. In the light of the aforementioned, it is clear the issue of missing
persons remains one of the key problems raised in the proceedings of theh
cas d’espèce . Admittedly, the Parties had the intention in 1995 to tackle
this issue : it may be recalled that in 1995, in Dayton, Croatia and Serbia
celebrated an agreement, the purpose of which was to establish the fate of
all missing persons and to release the prisoners 284. In pursuance to that
agreement, a Joint Commission was established and some progress was
285
made with respect to missing persons . Yet, there remain a number of
outstanding issues that still need to be resolved.
292. For example, the Parties disagree on the role of the Commission.
Croatia claims that the Commission, contrary to what was agreed in 1995
that all missing persons who disappeared in Croatia fell within the com -
petence of Croatian authorities, is currently seeking to act as represenhta-
tive of all missing persons of Serb ethnicity, including those who are
286
citizens of Croatia . Serbia responds that this is needed in order to rep -
resent the unreported 1,000 Serbs from Croatia in the list of missing per -
sons provided by Croatia to the Court 287.
293. Moreover, Croatia contends that Serbia has not yet returned the
documents seized by the JNA from the Vukovar hospital in 1991, which
are considered essential for the identification of the persons removedh from
the hospital 288. Only a small part of those documents was returned, when
the President of Serbia (Mr. Boris Tadić) visited Vukovar in Novem -
ber 2010. Both Parties appear unsatisfied with the efforts and activities ohf
283
284 CR 2014/23, of 28 March 2014, pp. 43-45, paras. 10-12.
Agreement on Co -operation in Finding Missing Persons (Dayton, 17 November
1995).
285 From August 1996 till 1998 Croatia was given access to information, the so -called
protocols, for 1,063 persons who were buried at the Vukovar New Cemetery, and these
protocols helped in the identification of 938eople. In 2001, exhumations started with
respect to unidentified bodies buried in the Republic of Serbia, at mahrked gravesites.
The remains of 394 persons have been exhumed so far, but, regrettably, only 103bodies
have been handed over to Croatia. In 2013, one mass grave was discovered in Sotin,
in Eastern Slavonia, with 13 bodies, as a result of information provided by Serbia.
Cf. CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, pp. 36-38.
286 Ibid., p. 37, para. 10.
287 CR 2014/24, of 28 March 2014, pp. 60-61, paras. 6-10.
288 CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, p. 38, para. 11.
304
7 CIJ1077.indb 604 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 303
soutient que, si le crime se poursuit aujourd’hui, comme le prétenhd la
Croatie, il faut que l’intention soit elle aussi continue. La Croatieh « se
trompe en essayant de la faire entrer de force dans le cadre de l’arthicle 2
de la convention sur le génocide, essentiellement pour valider l’ahrgument
283
relatif à la compétence temporelle » .
3. Les questions non résolues et l’obligation qu’ont les Parties
d’établir le sort des personnes disparues
291. A la lumière de ce qui précède, il apparaît clairement que lha ques-
tion des personnes portées disparues reste l’une des principales qhuestions
litigieuses soulevées en l’espèce. Certes, en 1995, les Parties avaient l’in -
tention de s’attaquer à cette question : l’on peut rappeler que, à Dayton,
elles ont conclu un accord dont l’objectif était de permettre de déterminer
ce qu’il était advenu de toutes les personnes portées disparuesh et de libérer
les prisonniers 284. A la suite de cet accord, une commission mixte a été
établie et des progrès ont été réalisés sur la question des personnes portées
285
disparues . Il n’en demeure pas moins qu’il reste encore un certain
nombre de questions à régler.
292. Ainsi, les Parties sont en désaccord sur le rôle que doit jouer lah
commission mixte. La Croatie affirme que, contrairement à l’accorhd
conclu en 1995, selon lequel toutes les personnes portées disparues ehn
Croatie relevaient de la compétence des autorités croates, la commhission
tente actuellement d’agir en tant que représentante de toutes les hpersonnes
de souche serbe portées disparues, y compris celles qui ont la nationhalité
croate 286, ce à quoi la Serbie rétorque qu’il est nécessaire de veillher à la
représentation des 1000 Serbes de Croatie non répertoriés sur les listes de
personnes disparues que la Croatie a fournies à la Cour 287.
293. En outre, la Croatie soutient que la Serbie ne lui a toujours pas
restitué les documents saisis par la JNA en 1991 à l’hôpitalh de Vukovar,
lesquels sont essentiels à l’identification des personnes emmenéhes de l’hô-
pital 288. Seule une petite partie de ces documents lui a été remise en
novembre 2010 quand le président de la République de Serbie, Boris Tadić,
s’est rendu à Vukovar. Chacune des deux Parties semble insatisfaithe des
283 CR 2014/23, p. 43-45, par. 10-12.
284 Accord de coopération en matière de recherche des personnes portéhes disparues,
Dayton, 17 novembre 1995.
285 D’août 1996 à 1998, la Croatie a pu accéder à des informations, figurant dans hce
qu’elle appelle des « protocoles», concernant 1063 personnes enterrées au nouveau cime-
tière de Vukovar, et qui ont permis d’identifier 9personnes. En 2001 a débuté l’exhu -
mation de cadavres non identifiés enterrés en République de Sherbie, dans des charniers
répertoriés. Les dépouilles de 394personnes ont jusqu’à présent été exhumées, mais,
malheureusement, seules 103 d’entre elles ont été restituées à la Croatie. En 2013, un seul
charnier, contenant 13 corps, a été découvert à Sotin, en Slavonie orientale, grâhce à des
informations fournies par la Serbie. Voir CR 2014/21, p. 36-38.
286 Ibid., p. 37, par. 10.
287 CR 2014/24, p. 60-61, par. 6-10.
288 CR 2014/21, p. 38, par. 11.
304
7 CIJ1077.indb 605 18/04/16 08:54 304 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
each other in this regard 289. The Court ought thus to ask the Parties to
co-operate in good faith in order to resolve those outstanding issues.
294. As the International Court of Justice stated, in this respect, in the
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France) cases
(I.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 253 and 457), one of “the basic principles gov -
erning the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever theirh
source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherhent in
international co-operation” (paras. 46 and 49). On another occasion, in
the North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark ;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands) cases (I.C.J. Reports 1969,
p. 3), the International Court of Justice further pondered that the con -
tending Parties “are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that
the negotiations are meaningful” (ibid., para. 85).
4. The Extreme Cruelty of Enforced Disappearances of Persons
as a Continuing Grave Violation of Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law
295. The extreme cruelty of the crime of enforced disappearance of
persons has been duly acknowledged in international instruments, in
international legal doctrine, as well as in international case law. It ghoes
beyond the confines of the present dissenting opinion to dwell at depthh on
the matter — what I have done elsewhere 29. I shall, instead, limit myself
to identifying and invoking some pertinent illustrations, with a direct h
bearing on the proper consideration of the cas d’espèce, concerning the
Application of the Convention against Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia).
296. May I begin by recalling that, in 1980, the former UN Com-
mission on Human Rights decided to establish its Working Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 29, to struggle against
292
that international crime , which had already received world
attention, in 1978-1979, at both the United Nations General Assembly 293
and ECOSOC 294, in addition to the former UN Sub-Commission
295
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities .
Subsequently, the 1992 UN Declaration on the Protection of All
289CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, p. 38, para. 11.
290A. A. Cançado Trindade, “Enforced Disappearances of Persons as a Violation of
Jus Cogens: The Contribution of the Jurisprudence of the Intercan Court of Human
Rights”, 81 Nordic Journal of International Law (2012), pp. 507-5A. Cançado Trin-
dade, Tratado de Direito International dos Direitos Humanos [Treatise of International Law
of Human Rights], Vol. II, Porto Alegre/Brazil, S. A. Fabris Ed., 1999, pp. 352-358.
291
Resolution 20 (XXXVI), of 29 February 1980.
292For an account of its work, cF. Andreu-Guzmán, “Le Groupe de travail sur les
disparitions forcées des Nations Unies”, 84 Revue internationale de la Croix‑Rouge (2002),
note 848, pp. 803-818.
293Resolution 33/173, of 20 December 1978.
294Resolution 1979/38, of 10 May 1979.
295Resolution 5B (XXXII), of 5 September 1979.
305
7 CIJ1077.indb 606 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 304
289
efforts et des démarches de l’autre . La Cour devrait donc demander
aux Parties de coopérer en toute bonne foi en vue de régler ces quhestions.
294. Comme la Cour l’a affirmé à ce sujet dans les affaires des Essais
nucléaires (Australie c. France) (Nouvelle‑Zélande c. France) ( C.I.J.
Recueil 1974, p. 253 et 457), l’un « des principes de base qui président à la
création et à l’exécution d’obligations juridiques, quellhe qu’en soit la
source, est celui de la bonne foi. La confiance réciproque est une condition
inhérente de la coopération internationale » (par. 46 et 49) . A une autre
occasion, dans les affaires du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (Répu ‑
blique fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark ; République fédérale d’Allemagne/
Pays‑Bas) (C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 3), la Cour a dit que les Parties « ont
l’obligation de se comporter de telle manière que la négociation ait un
sens» (ibid., par. 85).
4. La cruauté extrême de la disparition forcée de personnes
en tant que grave violation continue des droits de l’homme et du droi▯t
international humanitaire
295. La cruauté extrême du crime de disparition forcée de personnes ha
été dûment reconnue dans des instruments internationaux, dans lha doc -
trine juridique internationale ainsi que dans la jurisprudence internatiho -
nale. Je sortirais du cadre du présent e290sé si j’approfondisshais cette
question — ce que j’ai fait ailleurs . Je me limiterai donc à recenser et à
mentionner quelques exemples pertinents qui ont un rapport direct avec
l’examen approprié de l’espèce, concernant l’Application de la convention
sur le génocide (Croatie c. Serbie).
296. Je rappelle tout d’abord que, en 1980, la Commission des droits
de l’homme de l’ONU a décidé d’établir son groupe de thravail sur les
disparitions forcées ou involontaires 291afin de lutter contre ce crime de
droit international 292qui avait déjà retenu l’attention de la communauté
internationale en 1978-1979, tant à l’Assemblée générale des Nations
Unies 293 qu’au Conseil économique et social 294et à la sous -commission
de la lutte contre les mesures discriminatoires et de la protection des h
295
minorités de l’ONU . Par la suite, dans la Déclaration des NationsUnies
289
290 CR 2014/21, p. 38, par. 11.
A. A. Cançado Trindade, « Enforced Disappearances of Persons as a Violation
of Jus Cogens : The Contribution of the Jurisprudence of the InterAmerican Court of
Human Rights», Nordic Journal of International Law (2012), vol. 81, p. 507 à 536 ;
A. A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito International dos Direitos Humanos [Treatise
of International Law of Human Rights], voII,Porto Alegre/Brésil, S..Fabris Ed., 1999,
p. 352-358.
291
292 Résolution 20 (XXXVI), en date du 29 février 1980.
Pour un compte rendu de ses travaux, voir F. Andreu-Guzmán, « Le Groupe de
travail sur les disparitions forcées des Nations»,Revue internationale de la Croix‑Rouge
(2002), vol. 84, note 848, p. 803-818.
293 Résolution 33/173, en date du 20 décembre 1978.
294 Résolution 1979/38, en date du 10 mai 1979.
295 Résolution 5B (XXXII), en date du 5 septembre 1979.
305
7 CIJ1077.indb 607 18/04/16 08:54 305 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Persons from Enforced Disappearance provided (Art. 1), inter alia,
that:
“1. An act of enforced disappearance is an offence to human dignity.
It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Uni -
versal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and devel -
oped in international instruments in this field.
2. Any act of enforced disappearance places the persons subjected
thereto outside the protection of the law and inflicts severe suffer-
ing on them and their families. It constitutes a violation of the
rules of international law guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to
recognition as a person before the law, the right to liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be subjected to torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
It also violates or constitutes a grave threat to the right to life.”h
297. Subsequently, the 2007 UN Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance referred, in its Preamble (fifthpara-
graph) to the “extreme seriousness” of enforced disappearance, which, it
added in Article 5, when generating a “widespread or systematic prac -
tice”, constitutes “a crime against humanity in applicable internahtional
law”, with all legal consequences. The 2007 Convention further referred
(third preambular paragraph) to relevant (and converging) international
instruments of international human rights law, international humanitar -
ian law and international criminal law.
298. Parallel to these developments at normative level, the grave viola -
tion of enforced disappearance of persons has been attracting growing
attention in expert writing 29, which has characterized it as an extremely
cruel and perverse continuing violation of human rights, extending in tihme,
296 Cf., inter alia, e.g., R. S. Berliner, “The Disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg : A
Resolution Is Possible”, 11 New York Law School Journal of International and Compar‑
ative Law (1990), pp.391-432; R. Broody and F. González, “Nunca Más : An Analysis
of International Instruments on ‘Disappearances’”, 19Human Rights Quarterly (1997),
pp. 365-405 ; C.Callejon, “Une immense lacune du droit international combl ée par la
convention des Nations Unies pour la protection de toutes les personnes hcontre les dispar-i
tions forcées”, 17 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2006), pp. 337-358; T. Scovazzi
and G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United Nations ▯
Convention, Leiden, Nijhoff, 2007, pp. 1-400 G.Venturini, “International Law and the
Offence of Enforced Disappearance”, in :Diritti Individuali e Giustizia Internazio—ale
Liber F. Pocar (eds. G. Venturini and S. Bariatti), Milan, Giuffrè, 2009, pp939-954;
L. Ott, Enforced Disappearance in International Law, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2011, pp.1-294
M. L. Vermeulen, Enforced Disappearance : Determining State Responsibility under the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced▯ Disappearance
Utrecht, Intersentia, 2012, pp.507 I. Giorgou, “State Involvement in the Perpetration
306
7 CIJ1077.indb 608 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 305
sur la protection de toutes les personnes contre les disparitions forcéhes
(1992), il a notamment été indiqué (article premier) ce qui suit :
«1. Tout acte conduisant à une disparition forcée constitue un outrageh
à la dignité humaine. Il est condamné comme étant contraire haux
buts de la Charte des Nations Unies et comme constituant une
violation grave et flagrante des droits de l’homme et des libertéhs
fondamentales proclamés dans la Déclaration universelle des
droits de l’homme, et réaffirmés et développés dans d’hautres ins -
truments internationaux pertinents.
2. Tout acte conduisant à une disparition forcée soustrait la victimeh
de cet acte à la protection de la loi et cause de graves souffrances
à la victime elle -même, et à sa famille. Il constitue une violation
des règles du droit international, notamment celles qui garan -
tissent à chacun le droit à la reconnaissance de sa personnalitéh
juridique, le droit à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa phersonne et le
droit de ne pas être soumis à la torture ni à d’autres peinehs ou
traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. Il viole en outre le
droit à la vie ou le met gravement en danger. »
297. Ensuite, la convention internationale des Nations Unies pour la
protection de toutes les personnes contre les disparitions forcées (h2007)
fait état, dans son préambule (par. 5), de « l’extrême gravité» de la dispa -
rition forcée, qui, est -il précisé en son article 5, lorsqu’elle prend la forme
d’une « pratique généralisée ou systématique», constitue «un crime contre
l’humanité, tel qu’il est défini dans le droit internationhal applicable » et
entraîne les conséquences prévues par ce droit. La Convention rhenvoie en
outre (préambule, par. 3) aux instruments internationaux pertinentsh (et
convergents) du droit international des droits de l’homme, du droit hinter -
national humanitaire et du droit pénal international.
298. Parallèlement à ces développements au niveau normatif, la violah-
tion grave que constitue la disparition forcée de personnes a retenu hl’at -
tention d’un nombre croissant d’experts 29, lesquels l’ont définie comme
une violation continue extrêmement cruelle et perverse des droits de h
296
Voir notamment R. S. Berliner, « The Disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg : A
Resolution Is Possibl», New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative
Law (1990), vol. 11, p. 391-432; R.Broody et F. González, « Nunca Más : An Analysis
of International Instruments on « Disappearances»», Human Rights Quarterly (1997),
vol.19, p. 365-405; C. Callejon, «Une immense lacune du droit international combl ée
par la convention des NationsUnies pour la protection de toutes les personnes contre les
disparitions forcées», Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2006), vol. 17, p. 337-358;
T.Scovazzi et G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 2007 United
Nations Convention, Leiden, Nijhoff, 2007, p. 1-400. Venturini, «nternational Law and
the Offence of Enforced Disappearance », Diritti Individuali e Giustizia Internazionale —
Liber F. Pocar (dir. publ., G. Venturini et S. Bariatti), Milan, Giuffrè, 2009, p. 939-954
L. Ott, Enforced Disappearance in International Law, Anvers, Intersentia, 2011, 1-294;
M. L. Vermeulen, Enforced Disappearance : Determining State Responsibility under the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced▯ Disappearance
Utrecht, Intersentia, 2012, p. 1-; I.Giorgou, «State Involvement in the Perpetration of
306
7 CIJ1077.indb 609 18/04/16 08:54 306 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
owing to the consequences of the original act (or arbitrary detention ohr
kidnapping), causing a duration in the suffering and anguish, if not agohny
or despair, of all those concerned (the missing persons and their closeh rel-a
tives), given the non -disclosure of the fate or whereabouts of disappeared
or missing persons. The extreme cruelty of enforced disappearances of per-
sons as a continuing grave violation of human rights and international
humanitarian law has, furthermore, also been portrayed, as widely known,h
in the final reports of Truth Commissions, in distinct continents.
299. Soon international human rights tribunals (IACtHR and ECHR)
came to be seized of cases on the matter, and began to pronounce on it. h
The case law of the IACtHR on the matter is pioneering, and nowadays
regarded as the one which has most contributed to the progressive devel -
opment on international law in respect of the protection of all persons h
from enforced disappearance 297. In its early Judgment in the case of
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (of 29 July 1988), the IACtHR drew
attention to the complexity of enforced disappearance, as bringing abouth,
concomitantly, continuing violations of rights protected under the
ACHR, such as the rights to personal liberty and integrity, and often thhe
fundamental right to life itself (Arts. 7, 5 and 4).
300. It is, in sum, a grave breach of the States’ duty to respect human
dignity (IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 29 July
1988, paras. 149-158). It was in its landmark judgments, one decade later,
in the case of Blake v. Guatemala (of 1996 -1999) 298, that the IACtHR
dwelt upon, and elaborated, on the legal nature and consequences of
enforced disappearances, its characteristic elements, the victimized per -
sons, and the engagement of State responsibility in a temporal dimensionh.
301. The Blake case occurred within a systematic pattern of enforced
disappearances of persons, State -planned, and perpetrated not only to
“disappear” with persons regarded as “enemies”, but also to hgenerate a
sense of utter insecurity, anguish and fear ; it involved torture, secret exe -
cution of the “disappeared” without trial, followed by concealmenth of
their mortal remains, so as to eliminate any material evidence of the crhime
and to ensure the impunity of the perpetrators.
302. In its Judgment on the merits (of 24 January 1998) in the Blake
case, the IACtHR asserted that enforced disappearance of persons is a
of Enforced Disappearance and the Rome Statute”, 1Journal of International Criminal
Justice (2013), pp. 1001-1021.
297 Cf., to this effect, e.g., T. Scovazzi and G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced
Disappearance . . ., op. cit. supra note 296, pp. 101, 132 and 398.
298 IACtHR, Judgments on preliminary objections (of 2July 1996), merits (of24 January
1998) and reparations (of 22 January 1999).
307
7 CIJ1077.indb 610 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 306
l’homme qui s’étend dans le temps, en raison des conséquences de l’acte
original (ou de la détention arbitraire ou de l’enlèvement), het inscrit dans
la durée la souffrance et l’angoisse, voire l’affliction ou le désespoir, de
tous les intéressés (les personnes disparues et leurs proches parhents), parce
que le sort ou le lieu où se trouvent les personnes disparues ne sonth pas
révélés. La cruauté extrême de la disparition forcée dhe personnes en tant
que grave violation continue des droits de l’homme et du droit internhatio -
nal humanitaire a aussi été décrite, comme beaucoup le savent, hdans les
rapports finaux établis par les commissions de vérité de divers continents.
299. Les juridictions internationales des droits de l’homme (CIDH et
CEDH) en sont bientôt venues à être saisies d’affaires ayanth trait à cette
question et ont commencé à se prononcer à ce sujet. La jurispruhdence de
la CIDH dans ce domaine a exploré des voies nouvelles et est considéhrée
de nos jours comme celle qui a le plus contribué au développement hpro -
gressif du droit international en ce qui concerne la protection de toutehs les
personnes contre les disparitions forcées 297. Dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu
en l’affaire Velásquez Rodríguez c. Honduras (29 juillet 1988), la CIDH a
appelé l’attention sur la complexité de la disparition forcéhe, au sens où
celle-ci entraîne concomitamment des violations continues de droits pro -
tégés par la convention interaméricaine relative aux droits de hl’homme,
tels que les droits à la liberté et à l’intégrité de lha personne, et souvent le
droit fondamental à la vie lui-même (art. 7, 5 et 4).
300. Il s’agit, en résumé, d’une violation grave de l’obligatihon qu’ont
les Etats de respecter la dignité humaine (CIDH, Velásquez Rodríguez
c. Honduras, arrêt du 29 juillet 1988, par. 149-158). C’est dans l’arrêt his -
torique qu’elle a rendu une décennie plus tard en l’affaire Blake c. Guate‑
298
mala (1996 -1999) que la CIDH a examiné en détail et approfondi les
questions de la nature juridique et des conséquences des disparitionsh for-
cées, de leurs caractéristiques, des victimes et de l’engagemenht de la res -
ponsabilité de l’Etat dans une dimension temporelle.
301. L’affaire Blake s’est inscrite dans le contexte d’une campagne de
disparitions forcées systématiques, planifiée par l’Etat eht mise en œuvre
non seulement pour faire « disparaître» des personnes considérées comme
des « ennemis», mais aussi pour susciter un sentiment d’insécurité totaleh,
d’angoisse et de peur ; cette campagne comprenait des actes de torture et
des exécutions secrètes et extrajudiciaires des « disparus», suivies de la
dissimulation des dépouilles afin de supprimer toute preuve matéhrielle des
crimes et de garantir l’impunité des auteurs.
302. Dans l’arrêt sur le fond (24 janvier 1998) qu’elle a rendu en l’affaire
Blake, la CIDH a affirmé que la disparition forcée de personnes est unhe
Enforced Disappearance and the Rome Statute », Journal of International Criminal Justice
(2013), vol. 11, p. 1001-1021.
297Voir notamment, à cet effet, T.Scovazzi et G. Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced
Disappearance…, op. cit. supra note 296, p. 101, 132 et 398.
298CIDH, arrêts sur les objections préliminaires (2juillet 1996), le fond (24janvier 1998)
et les réparations (22 janvier 1999).
307
7 CIJ1077.indb 611 18/04/16 08:54 307 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
complex, multiple and continuing violation of a number of rights protected
by the ACHR (rights to life, to personal integrity, to personal libertyh),
generating the State party’s duty to prevent, investigate and punish such
breaches and, moreover, to inform the victim’s next of kin of the mishsing
person’s whereabouts (IACtHR, Blake, Judgment of 24 January 1998,
paras. 54-58). In the IACtHR’s view, the close relatives of the disap -
peared person were also victims, in their own right, of the enforced disap-
pearance, in breach of the relevant provisions of the ACHR.
303. In my separate opinion appended to that Judgment of the IAC -
tHR in the Blake case, I deemed it fit to stress that enforced disappear -
ance of persons was indeed a grave and complex violation of human
rights, besides being a continuing or permanent violation until the where -
abouts of the missing victims was established, as pointed out in the
travaux préparatoires of the 1985Inter-American Convention on Enforced
Disappearance of Persons, and as acknowledged in Article III of the Con-
vention itself (ibid., para.9).
304. In the same separate opinion, I next warned against the undue
fragmentation of the delict of enforced disappearance of persons, drawinhg
attention to the fact that we were here before fundamental or non -
derogable rights (ibid., paras. 12-14), and there was need to preserve the
special character and the integrity of human rights treaties (ibid.,
paras. 16-22). And I proceeded :
“We are, definitively, before a particularly grave violation of mul -
tiple human rights. Among these are non‑derogable fundamental
rights, protected both by human rig299 treaties as well as by interna -
tional humanitarian law treaties . The more recent doctrinal devel-
opments in the present domain of protection disclose a tendency
towards the ‘criminalization’ of grave violations of human rights,h —
as the practices of torture, of summary and extralegal executions, and
of enforced disappearance of persons. The prohibition of such prac -
tices paves the way for us to enter into the terra nova of the interna -
tional jus cogens . The emergence and consolidation of imperative
norms of general international law would be seriously jeopardized if
one were to decharacterize the crimes against humanity which fall
under their prohibition.” (Ibid., para. 15.)
305. Still in respect to the legal nature and consequences of the enforced
disappearance of persons, I added :
“In a continuing situation proper to the enforced disappearance of
person, the victims are the disappeared person (main victim) as well
as his next of kin ; the indefinition generated by the enforced disap -
299
Cf., e.g., the provisions on fundamental guarantees of Additional ProtocIol
(of 1977) to the GenevaConventions on International Humanitarian Law (of 1949),
Article 75, and of the Additional Protocol II (of the same year), Article 4.
308
7 CIJ1077.indb 612 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 307
violation complexe, multiple et continue de plusieurs droits protégés par la
convention interaméricaine relative aux droits de l’homme (droitsh à la vie,
à l’intégrité et à la liberté de la personne), qui donne naissance à l’obliga -
tion pour l’Etat partie de prévenir ces violations, de mener des enquêtes et
de punir, ainsi que d’informer les parents de la personne disparue duh lieu
où elle se trouve (CIDH, Blake, arrêt du 24 janvier 1998, par.54-58). Selon
la CIDH, les proches parents de la personne disparue étaient aussi vihc -
times, en eux‑mêmes , de la disparition forcée, en violation des dispositions
applicables de la convention interaméricaine.
303. Dans l’opinion individuelle que j’ai jointe à l’arrêt renhdu en l’af -
faire Blake, j’ai jugé bon de souligner que la disparition forcée de per -
sonnes était en effet une violation grave et complexe de droits de l’hhomme,
en plus d’être une violation continue ou permanente tant que le lieu où se
trouvent les victimes disparues n’a pas été établi, comme ilh est dit dans les
travaux préparatoires de la convention interaméricaine de 1985 surh les
disparitions forcées de personnes, et comme il est reconnu à l’harticle III de
la Convention elle-même (ibid., par. 9).
304. Dans la même opinion, j’ai ensuite mis en garde contre la frag -
mentation excessive de l’infraction de disparition forcée de persohnnes,
appelant l’attention sur le fait que nous étions face à des drohits fonda -
mentaux ou intangibles (ibid., par. 12-14) et qu’il était nécessaire de pré -
server le caractère particulier et l’intégrité des traitéhs relatifs aux droits de
l’homme ( ibid., par. 16-22). Et j’ai poursuivi comme suit :
«Nous sommes, en définitive, face à une violation particulièrehment
grave de plusieurs droits de l’homme. Certains d’entre eux sont des
droits fondamentaux auxquels il ne peut être dérogé, protégés à la
fois par les traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme et par les traités de
droit international humanitaire 299. Les développements doctrinaux
les plus récents dans le présent domaine de protection révèlhent une
tendance à la « criminalisation» des violations graves des droits de
l’homme, telles que la torture, les exécutions sommaires et extrajhudi -
ciaires et la disparition forcée de personnes. L’interdiction de ches pr-a
tiques nous permet d’entrer dans la terra nova du jus cogens
international. L’émergence et la consolidation des normes impérha -
tives du droit international général seraient sérieusement comphro -
mises si l’on déqualifiait les crimes contre l’humanité quhi tombent
sous le coup de cette interdiction. » (Ibid., par. 15.)
305. Toujours au sujet de la nature juridique et des conséquences de la
disparition forcée de personnes, j’ai ajouté :
«Dans la situation continue propre à la disparition forcée d’uneh
personne, les victimes sont la personne disparue (victime principale) h
ainsi que ses plus proches parents ; l’incertitude engendrée par la dis -
299Voir, par exemple, les dispositions relatives aux garanties fondamentalehs énoncées
dans le protocole additionnel I (1977) aux conventions de Genève (1949) relatives au droit
international humanitaire (art.75) et dans le protocole additionnelII (même année) (art.4).
308
7 CIJ1077.indb 613 18/04/16 08:54 308 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
pearance withdraws all from the protection of the law 300. The condi-
tion of victims cannot be denied also to the next of kin of the
disappeared person, who have their day -to-day life transformed into
a true calvary, in which the memories of the person dear to them are
intermingled with the permanent torment of his enforced disappear -
ance. In my understanding, the complex form of violation of multiple
human rights which the crime of enforced disappearance of person
represents has as a consequence the enlargement of the notion of victim
of violation of the protected rights.” (IACtHR, Blake, Judgment of
24 January 1998, paras. 32-38.)
306. In my subsequent separate opinion in the Blake v. Guatemala case
(reparations, Judgment of 22 January 1999), I insisted on the need to con -
solidate the “international regime against grave violations of human
rights”, in the light of the peremptory norms of international law (jus
cogens) and of the corresponding obligations erga omnes of protection of
the human being (IACtHR, Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment of 22 January
1999, para. 39). By means of such development, I added, one would
“overcome the obstacles of the dogmas of the past”, and the current inad -
equacies of the law of treaties, so as to get “closer to the plenitude of the
international protection of the human being” ( ibid., para. 40).
307. Other pertinent decisions of the IACtHR could be recalled, e.g., as
to the need to overcome limitations or restrictions ratione temporis, given
the legal nature of enforced disappearance (supra), the IACtHR’s deci -
sions also in the cases of Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia (2000-2002), and of the
Sisters Serrano Cruz v. El Salvador (2005) ; and, as to the aggravating cir-
cumstances of the grave breach of enforced disappearance, the IACtHR’hs
decisions in the cases of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala (2000 -2002), of
Caracazo v. Venezuela (1999-2002), of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Hondu‑
ras (2003) and of Servellón‑García et alii v. Honduras (2006).
308. For its part, the ECHR has also had the occasion to pronounce
on aspects in the matter at issue. For example, in its Judgment (of 10 May
2001) in the Cyprus v. Turkey case, it stressed the continuation of “agony”
of the family members of the missing persons in not knowing their where -
abouts (para. 157). Shortly afterwards, in its Judgment (of 18 June 2002)
in the Orhan v. Turkey case, it again addressed, as in earlier decisions, the
“vulnerable position” of the individuals concerned (paras. 406 -410).
Other pronouncements of the kind were made by the ECHR in the cycle
of cases (of the last decade) arising out of the armed conflict in Chhechnya.
309. In a particularly illustrative decision, the ECHR, in its Judgment
(of 18 September 2009) in the case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey,
stated that a disappearance is
“characterized by an ongoing situation of uncertainty and unaccount -
ability in which there is a lack of information or even a deliberate
300Cf., in this sense, Arti1 (2) of the UNDeclaration on the Protection of All
Persons against Enforced Disappearances.
309
7 CIJ1077.indb 614 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 308
parition forcée les soustrait tous à la protection de la loi 300. La
condition de victimes ne peut pas non plus être déniée aux prochhes
de la personne disparue, dont la vie quotidienne est transformée en
un véritable calvaire, dans lequel les souvenirs de la personne chèhre
s’entremêlent au tourment permanent de sa disparition forcée. Ah
mon sens, la forme complexe de la violation de plusieurs droits de
l’homme que représente le crime de disparition forcée de la perhsonne
a pour conséquence l’élargissement de la notion de victime d’une vio -
lation des droits protégés. » (CIDH, Blake, arrêt du 24 janvier 1998,
par. 32-38.)
306. Dans l’opinion individuelle ultérieure que j’ai jointe à l’arrêt rendu
en l’affaire Blake c. Guatemala (sur les réparations, 22 janvier 1999), j’ai
insisté sur la nécessité de consolider le « régime international contre les
violations graves des droits de l’homme », à la lumière des normes impéra -
tives du droit international (jus cogens) et des obligations erga omnes cor-
respondantes de protéger l’être humain (CIDH, Blake c. Guatemala, arrêt
du 22 janvier 1999, par. 39). Grâce à ce développement, ai -je ajouté, l’on
«surmonterait les obstacles des dogmes du passé » et les insuffisances
actuelles du droit des traités, afin de se « rapprocher de la plénitude de la
protection internationale de l’être humain » (ibid., par. 40).
307. D’autres décisions pertinentes de la CIDH pourraient être rappehlées,
par exemple au sujet de la nécessité de passer outre les limitatiohns ou restric
tions ratione temporis compte tenu de la nature juridique de la disparition
forcée (supra), ainsi que ses décisions dans les affaires TrujilloOroza c. Boli‑
via (2000-2002) et Sisters Serrano Cruz c. El Salvador (2005); et, s’agissant
des circonstances aggravantes de la violation grave que constitue la dishpa -ri
tion forcée, dans les affaires Bámaca Velásquez c. Guatemala (2000-2002),
Caracazo c. Venezuela (1999-2002), Juan Humberto Sánchez c. Honduras
(2003), et Servellón‑García et alii c.Honduras (2006).
308. De son côté, la CEDH a aussi eu l’occasion de se prononcer sur
certains aspects de la question à l’examen. Par exemple, dans son arrêt
Chyprec. Turquie (10 mai 2001), elle a souligné que les membres des familles
des personnes disparues vivaient dans un « état d’angoisse extrême», faute
d’informations sur leur sort (par. 157). Peu de temps après, dans son arrêt
Orhanc. Turquie(18 juin 2002), elle a de nouveau fait mention, comme dans
des décisions antérieures, de «l’état de vulnérabilité» des personnes concer -
nées (par. 406-410). Elle a rendu d’autres décisions de ce type dans la série
d’affaires (de la dernière décennie) liées au conflit armhé en Tchétchénie.
309. Dans une décision particulièrement symbolique, l’arrêt Varnava et
autres c. Turquie (18 septembre 2009), la CEDH a dit que la disparition
«se caractérise par une situation où les proches sont confrontésh de
manière continue à l’incertitude et au manque d’explicationsh et d’in- for
300Voir, dans ce sens, l’article premier (par. 2) de la Déclaration des Nations Unies sur
la protection de toutes les personnes contre les disparitions forcéesh.
309
7 CIJ1077.indb 615 18/04/16 08:54 309 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
concealment and obfuscation of what has occurred [. . .]. This situa-
tion is very often drawn out over time, prolonging the torment of the
victim’s relatives. It cannot therefore be said that a disappearance his,
simply, an ‘instantaneous’ act or event ; the additional distinctive ele-
ment of subsequent failure to account for the whereabouts and fate
of the missing person gives rise to a continuing situation. Thus, the
procedural obligation will, potentially, persist as long as the fate of
the person is unaccounted for ; the ongoing failure to provide the
requisite investigation will be regarded as a continuing violation (. . .)
This is so, even where death may, eventually, be presumed.”
(Para. 148.)
5. General Assessment
310. In the light of the aforementioned, in so far as the present case of
the Application of the Convention of Genocide is concerned, one cannot
thus endorse Serbia’s view, expressed during the oral proceedings,
whereby enforced disappearance may not be a continuing violation of the h
right to life as enshrined in Article II of the Genocide Convention. Serbia
asserts that the reason why it might be a continuing violation of human
rights is that the family of the victim is subject to ongoing mental harhm,
and this brings into play the prohibition of ill -treatment, or because of
the procedural obligation to investigate the crime. According to Serbia,h 301
this issue “might belong in Strasbourg, but certainly not in TheHague” .
311. Both the International Court of Justice and the ECHR in Stras -
bourg are concerned with State responsibility. Recent cases (such as the
Georgia v. Russian Federation case, concerning the fundamental principle
of equality and non-discrimination and the corresponding norms in distinct
but converging international instruments) have been brought before both
the International Court of Justice and the ECHR ; the Hague Court and the
ECHR in Strasbourg do not exclude each other, as recent developments in
the work of contemporary international tribunals have clearly been show -
ing. This is reassuring for those engaged in the international protectiohn of
the rights of the human person, and the justiciables themselves.
312. The pioneering and substantial case law of the IACtHR, together
more recently with the case law of the ECHR, on the matter at issue, is
essential for an understanding of the gravity of the crime of enforced dhis -
appearance of persons and of its legal consequences. As to its legal nathure,
the two aforementioned international human rights tribunals have
asserted the complex and continuing violations of the protected rights, h
while disappearance lasts. In its ground -breaking decisions in the Blake
case (1996-1998), the IACtHR established the expansion of the notion of
301CR 2014/23, of 28 March 2014, p. 44, para. 12.
310
7 CIJ1077.indb 616 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 309
mations sur ce qui s’est passé, les éléments pertinents àh cet égard pouvant
parfois même être délibérément dissimulés ou obscurcish… Cette situ -a
tion dure souvent très longtemps, prolongeant par là même le tohurment
des proches de la victime. Dès lors, on ne saurait ramener une disparhition
à un acte ou événement « instantané»; l’élément distinctif supplémen-
taire que constitue le défaut ultérieur d’explications sur ce qu’il est
advenu de la personne disparue et sur le lieu où elle se trouve engenhdre
une situation continue. Par conséquent, l’obligation procéduralhe su-b
siste potentiellement tant que le sort de la personne concernée n’ha pas
été éclairci; l’absence persistante de l’enquête requise sera considéréhe
comme emportant une violation continue… Il en est ainsi même lorsqhue
l’on peut finalement présumer que la victime est décédéhe. » (Par.148.)
5. Appréciation générale
310. A la lumière de ce qui précède, l’on ne saurait donc, dans lha pré -
sente affaire de l’Application de la convention sur le génocide, souscrire à
l’avis exprimé lors des audiences par la Serbie, pour qui la dispahrition
forcée ne peut pas être une violation continue du droit à la viheincriminée
à l’article II de la convention sur le génocide. La Serbie affirme que la
raison pour laquelle il peut s’agir d’une violation continue des dhroits de
l’homme est que la famille de la victime continue de subir une atteinhte à
son intégrité mentale, ce qui fait entrer en jeu l’interdictionh de mauvais
traitements, ou encore l’obligation procédurale d’enquêter sur le crime.
Selon elle, cette question « pourrait avoir sa place à Strasbourg, mais cer -
tainement pas à La Haye» 301.
311. La Cour et la CEDH à Strasbourg ont toutes deux à connaître de
la responsabilité de l’Etat. Des affaires récentes (notamment lh’affaire Géo ‑r
gie c.Fédération de Russie, portant sur les principes fondamentaux de l’éga-
lité et de la non -discrimination et les normes correspondantes dans des
instruments internationaux distincts mais convergents) ont été pohrtéetsant
devant la Cour que devant la CEDH ; la Cour à La Haye et la CEDH à
Strasbourg ne s’excluent pas mutuellement, comme l’a clairement déhmontré
l’évolution récente des travaux des tribunaux internationaux cohntempo -
rains — ce qui est rassurant pour ceux qui œuvrent à la protection inhtern-a
tionale des droits de la personne, et pour les justiciables eux -mêmes.
312. La jurisprudence innovante et importante de la CIDH prise avec
celle, plus récente, de la CEDH est essentielle pour comprendre la grhavité
du crime de disparition forcée de personnes et ses conséquences juhri -
diques. En ce qui concerne la nature juridique de cette infraction, ces h
deux juridictions internationales des droits de l’homme ont affirméh que
tant que la disparition dure, elle constitue une violation complexe et
continue de droits protégés. Dans les décisions sans précéhdent qu’elle a
rendues en l’affaire Blake (1996 -1998), la CIDH a élargi la notion de vic ‑
301 CR 2014/23, p. 44, par. 12.
310
7 CIJ1077.indb 617 18/04/16 08:54 310 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
victims in cases of disappearance, so as to comprise the missing person as
well as their close relatives, in their own right. This has become jurispru ‑
dence constante of the IACtHR and the ECHR on the issue.
313. May I add, in this connection, that the provisions of Article II (b)
of the Convention against Genocide, referring to “serious (. . .) mental
harm to members of the group”, makes the connection with a continuingh
violation rather clear. As I pondered in my dissenting opinion in the cahse
of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy : Greece
intervening), “one cannot take account of inter -temporal law only in a
way that serves one’s interests in litigation, accepting the passing of time
and the evolution of law in relation to certain facts but not to others, of
the same continuing situation” (I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 186, para. 17).
314. The fact that a close family member of the missing persons is a
member of the same group, and is also subject to a continuing mental
harm, prolonging indefinitely in time, together with the State concernhed’s
failure to account for the missing persons, or to take reasonable steps hto
assist in the location of such persons, in my perception, brings into plhay
the prohibition of acts proscribed by the Genocide Convention, including
the obligation to investigate.
315. May I further add, still in this connection, the relevance of the
case law of international human rights tribunals (in particular that ofh the
302
IACtHR, since its start ), to the effect of applying a proper standard of
proof, in cases of grave violations (such as enforced disappearances ofh
persons, torture of incommunicado detainees, among others), when State
authorities hold the monopoly of probatory evidence, and victims have
no access to it, thus calling for a shifting of the burden of proof 30. In
cases of grave violations, such as enforced disappearances of persons, thhe
burden of proof cannot certainly be made to fall upon those victimized bhy
those violations (including, of course, the close relatives of the misshing
persons, who do not know their whereabouts).
316. The effects of enforced disappearances of persons upon the close
relatives of missing persons are devastating. They destroy whole families,
led into agony or despair. I learned this from my own experience in the
international adjudication of cases of this kind. In the present Judgment,
the International Court of Justice does not seem to have apprehended theh
extent of those devastating effects. To require from close relatives, as hit
does (Judgment, para. 160), further proof (of serious suffering), so as to
fall under Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention, amounts to a true
probatio diabolica!
317. The serious mental harm (Art. II (b)) caused to those victimized
can surely be presumed, and, in my view, there is no need to demonstrateh
302
303 Cf. Part VII of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
Cf. Parts VII-VIII of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
311
7 CIJ1077.indb 618 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 310
times dans les affaires de disparition, de manière à comprendre la per -
sonne disparue ainsi que ses proches, en eux‑mêmes. Cela est devenu la
jurisprudence constante de la CIDH et de la CEDH sur la question.
313. Je tiens à ajouter, à ce sujet, que les dispositions du litt. b) de
l’article II de la convention sur le génocide, qui mentionnent « l’atteinte
grave à l’intégrité … mentale de membres du groupe », rendent assez lim -
pide la relation avec une violation continue. Comme je l’ai dit dans hl’ex -
posé de l’opinion dissidente que j’ai jointe à l’arrêth rendu en l’affaire des
Immunités juridictionnelles de l’Etat (Allemagne c. Italie; Grèce (inter ‑
venant)) , « [o]n peut tenir compte du droit intertemporel uniquement
d’une manière qui serve ses propres intérêts dans un litige,h et accepter le
passage du temps et l’évolution du droit en relation avec certainsh faits
mais non d’autres, relevant de la même situation qui continue » (C.I.J.
Recueil 2012 (I), p. 186, par. 17).
314. Le fait qu’un membre proche de la famille des personnes disparues
soit un membre du même groupe et soit également soumis à une athteinte
continue à son intégrité mentale qui se prolonge indéfinimhent dans le temps,
ajouté au fait que l’Etat concerné n’a pas expliqué ce quhe sont devenues les
personnes disparues ni pris des mesures raisonnables pour faciliter leurh
localisation, à mon sens, fait entrer en jeu l’interdiction d’ahctes prohibés par
la convention sur le génocide, ainsi que l’obligation d’enquêhter.
315. Je tiens aussi à souligner, toujours à ce sujet, la pertinence de hla
jurisprudence des juridictions internationales des droits de l’homme h (en
302
particulier celle de la CIDH, depuis sa création ) aux fins d’appliquer le
critère d’établissement de la preuve approprié dans les affaihres de viola -
tions graves (telles que les disparitions forcées de personnes, la thorture de
personnes détenues au secret, entre autres), lorsque les autoritéhs de l’Etat
sont seules à détenir des éléments de preuve et que les victhimes n’y ont pas
303
accès, ce qui impose un renversement de la charge de la preuve . Dans
les affaires de violations graves, comme les disparitions forcées de pher -
sonnes, la charge de la preuve ne saurait certainement pas incomber aux h
victimes de ces violations (y compris, bien entendu, les proches parents
des personnes disparues, qui ignorent où celles -ci se trouvent).
316. Les effets des disparitions forcées sur les proches parents des per -
sonnes disparues sont dévastateurs. Ils détruisent des familles entières,
plongées dans l’affliction ou le désespoir. J’en ai fait l’hexpérience lors du
règlement judiciaire international d’affaires de ce type. Dans le phrésent
arrêt, la Cour ne semble pas avoir saisi l’ampleur de ces effets déhvasta -
teurs. Exiger de proches parents, comme elle le fait (arrêt, par. 160), des
preuves supplémentaires de la gravité des souffrances pour que cellhes -ci
entrent dans le champ du litt. b) de l’article II de la convention sur le
génocide, constitue une véritable probatio diabolica!
317. L’atteinte grave à l’intégrité mentale (litt. b) de l’article II) causée
aux victimes peut certainement être présumée, et, à mon avish, il n’est pas
302
303Voir partie VII du présent exposé, supra.
Voir parties VII et VIII du présent exposé, supra.
311
7 CIJ1077.indb 619 18/04/16 08:54 311 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
that the harm itself contributed to the destruction of the targeted grouhp.
Yet, the Court requires such additional proof (Judgment, para. 160 in
fine). In doing so, it renders the determination of State responsibility for
genocide, under Article II (b) of the 1948 Convention, and of its legal
consequences (for reparations), an almost impossible task. The Court’hs
outlook, portrayed in its whole reasoning throughout the present Judg -
ment is State sovereignty -oriented, not people -oriented, as it should be
under the Genocide Convention, the applicable law in the cas d’espèce.
318. Last but not least, the point I have already made about the abso -
lute prohibition (of jus cogens) of torture (para. 225, supra), in any cir -
cumstances, applies likewise to all the other grave violations of human h
rights and international humanitarian law which occurred in the attacks h
in Croatia, and that have been examined above, namely : massive killings,
rape and other sexual violence crimes, enforced disappearance of persons,
systematic expulsion from homes, forced displacement of persons (in
mass exodus) and destruction of group culture.
319. The prohibition of all those grave violations, like that of torture,
304
in all its forms, is a prohibition belonging to the realm of jus cogens ,
the breach of which entails legal consequences, calling for reparations 305.
This is in line with the idea of rectitude (in conformity with the recta ratio
of natural law), underlying the conception of law (in distinct legal shys -
tems — Droit/Right/Recht/Direito/Derecho/Diritto) as a whole.
XIII. Onslaught, not Exactly Wahr,
in a Widespread and Systematic Pattern
of Destruction
1. Plan of Destruction : Its Ideological Content
320. The occurrence of a widespread and systematic pattern of destruc-
tion has been established in the present case concerning the Application of
the Convention against Genocide , opposing Croatia to Serbia (cf. supra).
The devastation pursued a plan of destruction, that was deliberately andh
304Two contemporary international tribunals which, by their evolving case lhaw, have
much contributed to the expansion of the material content of jus cogens, have been the
IACtHR and the ICTY ; cfA. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind —
Towards a New Jus Gentium, op. cit. supra note 67, pp. 295; A.A. Cançado Trindade,
“Jus Cogens : The Determination and the Gradual Expansion of Its Material Content inh
Contemporary International Case Law”, in XXXV Curso de Derecho Internacional Orga ‑
nizado por el Comité Jurídico Interamerica— 2008, Washington D.C., General Secre -
tariat of the OAS, 2009, pp. 3-29.
305Cf. Part XVI of the present dissenting opinion, infra.
312
7 CIJ1077.indb 620 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 311
nécessaire de démontrer qu’elle a en elle -même contribué à la destruction
du groupe visé. Pourtant, la Cour exige que cette preuve supplémenhtaire
soit apportée (arrêt, p. 160 in fine). Ce faisant, elle fait de la détermination
de la responsabilité de l’Etat pour génocide, en vertu du litt. b) de l’ar -
ticleII de la Convention de 1948, et de ses conséquences juridiques (pourh
les réparations), une tâche presque impossible. L’image que dohnne de la
Cour l’ensemble de son raisonnement tout au long du présent arrêht est
celle d’une instance soucieuse de la souveraineté des Etats et nonh des per-
sonnes, contrairement à ce qui devrait être en vertu de la conventhion sur
le génocide, qui est l’instrument applicable en l’espèce.
318. Enfin, ce que j’ai déjà dit à propos de l’interdiction absolue (rele -
vant du jus cogens) de la torture (par. 225, supra), quelles que soient les
circonstances, s’applique aussi à toutes les autres violations grahves des
droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire qui ont éthé com-
mises lors des attaques en Croatie et qui ont été examinées plus haut, à
savoir les meurtres de masse, les viols et autres violences sexuelles, les
disparitions forcées de personnes, les expulsions systématiques dehs loge -
ments et les déplacements forcés de personnes (dans le cadre d’hun exode
massif) et la destruction de la culture d’un groupe.
319. L’interdiction de toutes ces violations graves, comme celle de la
torture sous toutes ses formes, est une interdiction relevant du
jus cogens 304, dont la violation entraîne des conséquences juridiques appe-
lant des réparations 305. Cela est conforme à l’idée de rectitude (conformé-
ment à la recta ratio du droit naturel) qui sous -tend la conception du
droit (dans les différents systèmes juridiques — droit/right/Recht/direito/
derecho/diritto) dans son ensemble.
XIII. Pas exactement une guherre, plutôt une camphagne
de dévastation, dans le chadre d’une entrepriseh de destruction
systématique et généhralisée
1. Le plan de destruction : composante idéologique
320. L’existence d’une entreprise de destruction systématique et géhné-
ralisée a été établie dans la présente affaire relative àh l’Application de la
convention sur le génocide opposant la Croatie à la Serbie (voir supra). La
campagne de dévastation obéissait à un plan de destruction qui ha été dél-i
304La CIDH et le TPIY sont deux juridictions internationales contemporainesh qui, par
l’évolution de leur jurisprudence, ont beaucoup contribué à hl’élargissement des disposi -
tions du juscogens; voir A. A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind —
Towards a New Jus Gentium, op. cit.upra note 67, p295-311;A. A. Cançado Trindade,
«Jus Cogens : The Determination and the Gradual Expansion of Its Material Content inh
Contemporary International Case Law », XXXV Curso de Derecho Internacional Organi ‑
zado por el Comité Jurídico Interamericano — 2008, Washington D.C., General Secretariat
of the OAS, 2009, p. 3-29.
305Voir partie XVI du présent exposé, infra.
312
7 CIJ1077.indb 621 18/04/16 08:54 312 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
methodically carried out : aerial bombardment, shelling, indiscriminate
killings, torture and beatings, rape, destruction of homes and looting, h
forced displacement and deportation. The execution of the plan of
destruction has already been reviewed (cf. supra), and in my view estab -
lished in the cas d’espèce. The plan of destruction pursued by the Serbian
attacks in Croatia had an ideological component, which goes back to the
historical origins of the conflict.
(a) Arguments of the contending Parties
321. The point was addressed, to a certain depth in the written phase
of the present proceedings, particularly by Croatia. In its Memorial, ith
argued that a catalytic event in relation to the genocide allegedly perphe -
trated against the Croats was the appearance in 1986 of the Memoran-
dum by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (the “SANU
Memorandum”). The SANU Memorandum, it added, which set forth a
Serb nationalist reinterpretation of the recent history of the SFRY, car -
ried great weight and reflected the then growing Serbian nationalist mhove-
ment ; it helped to give rise, in its 306w, to the circumstances for the
perpetration of genocide in Croatia .
322. By emphasizing the right of the Serbian people “to establish their
full national and cultural integrity regardless of which republic or autho -
nomous province they live in”, the SANU Memorandum provided the idea
of a “Greater Serbia”, including parts of the territory in Croatiah and Bos -
nia and Herzegovina within which significant Serbian ethnic populationhs
lived. Furthermore, the SANU Memorandum provided a detailed analysis
of the “crisis” in the SFRY, and it established the idea that Serbhia was “the
only nation in Yugoslavia without its own State”. It bypassed the polhitical
and geographical divisions enshrined in the 1974Constitution 307.
323. Croatia stressed that the ideas proposed in the Memorandum
were based on other views expressed by the Serbian intellectual commu -
nity (including Serbian historians, scientists, writers and journalistsh) on
how Serbs had been “tricked”, “stinted”, “killed”, “hpersecuted even after
being subjected to genocide”. The SANU Memorandum gained support
from militant groups, prompting a nationalist campaign 308.
324. Croatia further argued that the ideas set out in the SANU Memo-
randum “gave vent to the theory that the Croatian people were collec -
tively to blame for the large number of Serbs that were killed by the
Ustashas during the period 1941-1945, and were, accordingly, by their
very nature, genocidal in character and adhering to a continuing geno -
306Memorial of Croatia, para. 2.43.
307Ibid., paras. 2.44-2.47.
308According to Croatia, “[a]rticles appeared and speeches were given whhich promoted
Serbian nationalism, demonized the Albanians, the Muslims and the Croatsh and invoked
their genocidal tendencies, and validated the Chetnik movement” ibid., paras. 2.48-2.51.
313
7 CIJ1077.indb 622 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 312
bérément et méthodiquement mis en œuvre : bombardements aériens,
pilonnages, meurtres sans discrimination, torture et sévices physiquehs,
viols, destruction de maisons et pillages, déplacements forcés et hdéporta-
tions. L’exécution de ce plan de destruction a déjà étéh examinée (voir
supra ) et, à mon avis, celui -ci a été établi en l’espèce. Le plan de destruc -
tion mis en œuvre par les attaques serbes en Croatie avait une compo -
sante idéologique, qui remonte aux origines historiques du conflit.h
a) Moyens des Parties
3 21. C e point a été traité relativement en détail dans la phase éhcrite de la
présente procédure, en particulier par la Croatie. Dans son mémhoire,
celleci a fait valoir qu’un catalyseur du génocide qui aurait étéh perpétré
contre les Croates a été la parution en 1986 d’un mémorandumh de l’acad-é
mie serbe des sciences et des arts (le « mémorandum de la SANU »). Ce
mémorandum, qui réinterprétait l’histoire récente de la RhFSY du point de
vue des nationalistes serbes, a-t-elle ajouté, a eu un retentissement considé-
rable et reflétait les principes fondamentaux du mouvement nationalhiste
serbe, alors en plein essor ; selon le demandeur, il a contribué à créer les
circonstances propices à la perpétration d’un génocide en Crhoatie 306.
322. En mettant l’accent sur le droit des membres du peuple serbe « à
établir leur pleine intégrité nationale et culturelle quelle quhe soit la répu-
blique ou la province autonome où ils viv[ai]ent », le mémorandum a
donné naissance à l’idée d’une « Grande Serbie » englobant les parties du
territoire de la Croatie et de la Bosnie -Herzégovine, dans lesquelles vivait
une importante population de Serbes de souche. En outre, il a fourni uneh
analyse détaillée de la « crise» que connaissait la RSFY et avancé l’idée
que la Serbie était désormais « la seule nation de Yougoslavie à ne pas
disposer de son propre Etat ». Il a fait fi des di307ions politiques et géogra
phiques consacrées par la Constitution de 1974 .
323. La Croatie a souligné que les idées énoncées dans le mémohrandum
s’inspiraient de diverses opinions exprimées par le milieu intellehctuel serbe
(historiens serbes, scientifiques, écrivains et journalistes), quhi soutenait
l’idée que les Serbes avaient été « bernés», «frustrés», «tués», «persécutés
même après avoir été soumis au génocide ». Le mémorandum a trouvé le
soutien de groupes militants, déclenchant une campagne nationaliste 308.
324. La Croatie a aussi fait valoir que, dans le mémorandum de la
SANU, il était donné libre cours à « la théorie selon laquelle le peuple
croate [était] collectivement responsable du nombre élevé de Sehrbes tués
par les Oustachis entre 1941 et 1945, qu’il [était] intrinsèquement génoci -
daire et ne cess[ait] de nourrir des intentions génocidaires à l’hégard des
306 Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 2.43.
307 Ibid., par. 2.44-2.47.
308 Selon la Croatie, « [d]es articles sont publiés et des discours prononcés afin de
promouvoir le nationalisme serbe, de diaboliser les Albanais, les Musulmhans et les Croates
et de dénoncer leurs tendances génocidaires, ainsi que de prouver hle bien-fondé du mouve-
ment tchetnik»; ibid., par. 2.48-2.51.
313
7 CIJ1077.indb 623 18/04/16 08:54 313 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
309
cidal intent against the Serbs” . Croatia added that the JNA was trans -
formed from an army of the SFRY into a “Serbian army” promptly afther
the publication of the SANU Memorandum 31.
325. Serbia, for its part, briefly responded, in its Counter-Memorial, to
Croatia’s arguments concerning the Memorandum. It claimed that they
amounted to an “enormous exaggeration”, given that the Serbs neverh had
the intent to perpetrate genocide against Croats, and that the SANU
311
Memorandum never contemplated the occurrence of genocide . Croatia
retook the issue in its Reply, wherein it reiterated the importance of thhe
SANU Memorandum for the perpetration of genocide.
326. It dismissed Serbia’s claim of its arguments being an “enormous
exaggeration”, saying that they are supported by a number of indepen -
dent sources, which also described the Memorandum as a “political
bombshell”. Croatia further stated that an expert report from the ICThY,
on the use of propaganda in the conflict at issue, came to the conclushion
that it was the deliberate leaks of the SANU Memorandum that raised
the issue of Serbian nationalism publicly (cf. infra).
327. Croatia insisted that the emergence of extreme Serbian national -
ism was accompanied by the idea that the Croats had always had a geno -
cidal intent against the Serbs, a theory — articulated in 1986 and then
followed by Serbian historians and journalists — that claimed that the
Croatian people were collectively to blame for the large number of Serbsh
who were killed by the “Ustasha” between 1941 -1945 (e.g., the concentra-
tion camp in Jasenovac), during the Second World War, pursua312to a
plan that had a continuing genocidal intent against the Serbs . Accord-
ing to Croatia, various inflammatory articles published by the media chon -
tributed to this idea from 1986 to 1991 31.
328. Also during the oral phase of the present proceedings, Croatia
reiterated its arguments (supra), whereas Serbia did not submit any sub -
stantial new argument in this respect. Croatia asserted that the publicah -
tion of the SANU Memorandum in 1986 precipitated a period of extreme
nationalist propaganda within Serbia, as from the premise that Serbia
and the Serbs in the other Republics of the SFRY “were in a uniquely h
unfavourable position within the SFRY”, and from the proposal of a
review of the SFRY Constitution, so that autonomous provinces would
become an integral part of Serbia, and the federal State would be strength -
ened. Croatia also referred to an expert report (by Professor A. Budding),
309 Memorial of Croatia, para. 2.52.
310 Ibid., para. 3.03.
311 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 428.
312 Reply of Croatia, paras. 3.10-3.12.
313 Ibid., paras. 3.12-3.14.
314
7 CIJ1077.indb 624 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 313
309
Serbes» . Elle a ajouté que la JNA, qui était l’armée de la RSFY, avhait
été transformée en « armée serbe» immédiatement après la publication du
mémorandum 310.
325. La Serbie, de son côté, a répondu brièvement dans son contreh -
mémoire aux arguments de la Croatie concernant le mémorandum. Selohn
elle, ces affirmations étaient « très exagérées», les Serbes n’ayant jamais eu
l’intention de perpétrer un génocide contre les Croates, pas plhus que le
mémorandum n’envisageait un tel projet 311. La Croatie est revenue sur ce
point dans sa réplique, dans laquelle elle a de nouveau souligné lh’impor -
tance du rôle qu’avait joué le mémorandum de la SANU dans lah perpé -
tration du génocide.
326. La Croatie a rejeté l’affirmation de la Serbie jugeant ses argu -
ments « très exagérés » et a fait valoir que ceux -ci étaient étayés par plu -
sieurs sources indépendantes, qui avaient aussi qualifié le mémorandum
de « bombe politique ». Elle a affirmé en outre que, selon les conclusions
d’un rapport d’expert du TPIY sur l’usage de la propagande pendant le
conflit à l’examen, c’étaient les fuites délibéréhes du mémorandum de la
SANU qui avaient soulevé publiquement la question du nationalisme
serbe (voir infra).
327. La Croatie a insisté sur le fait que l’émergence du nationa -
lisme serbe extrême s’est accompagnée de la théorie selon laquelleh les
Croates avaient toujours été animés d’une intention génochidaire à l’en -
contre des Serbes, théorie — élaborée en 1986 puis reprise par des histo -
riens et des journalistes serbes — qui prétendait que le peuple croate était
collectivement responsable du nombre élevé de Serbes tués par lhes
Oustachis entre 1941 et 1945 (notamment dans le camp de concentra -
tion de Jasenovac), pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, conformément àh
un plan qui 312cessait de nourrir des intentions génocidaires à l’hégard
des Serbes . Selon la Croatie, plusieurs articles incendiaires publiés
par les médias avaient contribué à répandre cette idée entre h1986
et 1991 313.
328. Au cours des audiences, la Croatie a réaffirmé ses moyens (supra),
alors que la Serbie n’a présenté aucun nouvel argument important à ce
sujet. La première a fait valoir que la publication du mémorandum hde la
SANU en 1986 avait été à l’origine d’une période de propagande nationa -
liste extrémiste en Serbie, reposant sur l’idée que la Serbie eht les Serbes
vivant dans les autres républiques de la RSFY « se trouvaient dans une
position particulièrement défavorable au sein de la RSFY », et sur la pro-
position de reviser la Constitution de la RFSY de sorte que les provinces
autonomes deviennent partie intégrante de la Serbie et que l’Etat hfédéral
soit renforcé. Elle a aussi fait état d’un rapport d’expert h(rédigé par
309Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 2.52.
310Ibid., par. 3.03.
311Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 428.
312Réplique de la Croatie, par. 3.10-3.12.
313Ibid., par. 3.12-3.14.
314
7 CIJ1077.indb 625 18/04/16 08:54 314 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
which referred to the SANU Memorandum as “a political firestorm”h
because of its “inflammatory” language 314.
(b) Examination of expert evidence by the ICTY
329. As brought to the attention of the International Court of Justice
in the course of the proceedings of the present case (cf. supra), the ICTY,
in its decision of 16 June 2004 in the Milošević case, duly took into
account expert evidence concerning the ideological component of the
plan of destruction at issue. The first expert report presented to theh ICTY,
compiled at the request of its Office of the Prosecutor, was titled “hPoliti -
cal Propaganda and the Plan to Create a ‘State for All Serbs’ — Conse-
quences of Using the Media for Ultra -Nationalist Ends” (of 4 February
2003, by R. de la Brosse).
330. According to the expert report, the regime of Slobodan Milošević
sought to take “total control over the media owned by the State or public
institutions”, restricting its freedom and “using all means to prehvent it
from informing people”. Its control of the audio -visual media “began
in 1986-1987 and was complete in the summer of 1991” (Report by R. de
la Brosse, 4 February 2003, para. 27). The expert report proceeded that
“[t]he media were used as weapons of war”, in order to achieve “hstrategic
objectives”, such as “the capture of territories by force, the prahctice of
ethnic cleansing, and the destruction of targets described as symbolic and
having priority”. The plan combined
“propaganda, partial (and biased) information, false news, manipu-
lation, non -coverage of certain events, etc. This entire arsenal would
be mobilized to help justify the creation of a State for all Serbs.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[T]he terms ‘Ustasha fascists’ and ‘cut -throats’ were used to stig -
matize the Croats and ‘Islamic Ustashas’ and ‘Djihad fightersh’ to
describe the Bosnian Muslims pejoratively. Systematic recourse to
such key words imposed on the media by the Milošević regime
undoubtedly provoked and nourished hateful behaviour toward the
non -Serbian communities.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Systematic recourse to false, biased information and non -coverage
of certain events made it possible to inspire and arouse hatred and
314 CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, pp. 33-35. The Memorandum, Croatia reiter -
ated, paved the way for the publication of articles in the Serbian mediah, referring to the
alleged Croats’ genocidal tendencies, and recalling the horrific crimes the Ustasha régime
committed against the Serbs during the Second World War (e.g., the conchentration camp
in Jasenovac; CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, p. ; and cf.lso CR 2014/12, of 7 March
2014, pp. 22-23.
315
7 CIJ1077.indb 626 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 314
A. Budding), qui avait qualifié le mémorandum de « tempête politique »
314
en raison des thèses « provocat[rices]» qu’il contenait .
b) Examen par le TPIY des dépositions des experts
329. Comme il a été dit à la Cour dans le cadre de la procédure chonce-r
nant la présente affaire (voir supra), le TPIY, dans la décision qu’il a ren-
due le 16 juin 2004 en l’affaire Milošević, a dûment tenu compte des
dépositions d’experts concernant l’aspect idéologique du plahn de destruc-
tion en cause. Le premier rapport d’expert présenté au TPIY, éhtabli à la
demande du bureau du procureur, était intitulé « Propagande politique et
projet d’« Etat pour tous les Serbes » — conséquences de l’instrumentali -
sation des médias à des fins ultranationalistes » (4 février 2003, rédigé par
R. de la Brosse).
330. Selon ce rapport, le régime de Slobodan Milošević s’était employé
à s’assurer « un contrôle total sur les médias propriétés de l’Etat ou hd’ins-
titutions publiques », en restreignant leur liberté et en les empêchant, «par
tous les moyens, d’informer les citoyens ». La mainmise sur les médias
audiovisuels, « entreprise dès 1986 -1987, [était] complète à l’été 1991 »
(rapport de R. de la Brosse, 4 février 2003, par. 27). Toujours selon le
rapport, « [l]es médias ont été utilisés comme armes de guerre », pour
atteindre des « buts stratégiques», comme « la conquête de territoires par
la force, la pratique de 1’épuration ethnique ou encore la destruchtion
de cibles présentées comme symboliques et prioritaires ». La méthode
combinait
«propagande, informations partielles (et partiales), fausses nouvelles,h
manipulation, absence de couverture de certains faits, etc. Tout cet
arsenal [allait] être mobilisé pour servir à justifier la créhation d’un
Etat pour tous les Serbes.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[Ont été employés] les termes de « fascistes oustachis» et de « cou -
peurs de gorges » pour stigmatiser les Croates ou de « oustachis isla-
mistes » et de « combattants du djihad » pour décrire péjorativement
les Musulmans bosniaques. Le recours systématique à de tels mots
clefs, dont la terminologie a été imposée aux médias par le hrégime
Milošević, a sans aucun doute provoqué et entretenu des comporthe-
ments de haine envers les communautés non serbes.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Un usage systématique de fausses informations, d’informations
partiales, de non-couverture de certains événements a permis d’hinspi -
314
CR 2014/5, p. 33-35. Le mémorandum, a réaffirmé la Croatie, a ouvert la voieh à la
publication d’articles dans les médias serbes, évoquant les suphposées tendance- génoci
daires des Croates et rappelant les crimes atroces commis contre les Serhbes par le régime
oustachi, pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (par exemple, le camp de choncentration de
Jasenovac); CR2014/5, p. 35 voir aussi C2014/12, p. 22-23.
315
7 CIJ1077.indb 627 18/04/16 08:54 315 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
fear among the communities. The media prepared the ground psycho-
logically for the rise in nationalist hatred and became a weapon when
the war broke out.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Historical facts were imbued with mystical qualities to be used
as nationalist objectives so that the Serbian people would feel and
express a desire for revenge directed at the prescribed enemies,
the Croats and Muslims (. . .)” (Report by R. de la Brosse,
paras. 28-31.)
331. The expert report went on to state that, by the invocation of “the
scars of the 1940 war” (ibid., para. 35), “the use of the media for national
ist ends and objectives formed part of a well-thought through plan” (ibid.,
para. 32). It added that the 1986 SANU Memorandum constituted an
“encouragement” for “Serbian nationalism” (ibid., para. 40). The official
propaganda drew on the historical sources of “Serbian mystique”, whith
its victims and the injustices they suffered throughout history (ibid.,
315
paras. 46-49) . State authorities sought to condition public opinion in
order “to justify the upcoming war with Croatia” (ibid., para. 54, and
cf. para. 61). “Disinformation” was used in order “to mislead or to con -
ceal and misrepresent facts”, and to make up “false news” (ibid., paras. 72
and 77).
332. The second expert report submitted (by the Prosecution) to the
ICTY in its decision in the Milošević case (2004), and referred to by Cro -
atia in its oral pleadings in the present case before the International hCourt
of Justice, was titled “Serbian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century”h (of
29 May 2002, by A. Budding). The expert report provided historical
information and the factual context for the understanding of waking Ser -
bian national awareness, and the sequence of events which led to the dish-
integration of the Yugoslav State and the outbreak of the wars in the
region.
333. The expert report also referred to the 1986 SANU Memoran -
dum (report by A. Budding, 29 May 2002, p. 32), explaining its origins
and its consequences for the whole of former Yugoslavia (ibid.,
pp. 36 -37). It characterized the SANU Memorandum as “by far the
most famous document in the modern Serbian national movement”
(ibid., p.36). Referring to the expert report, Croatia argued that the
SANU Memorandum set off “a political firestorm”, and that it was
“inflammatory because of the contrast between its complaints about hthe
position of Serbia and Serbs within Yugoslavia and its ‘vague and ellhip -
315The media contributed to “demonizing the other communities, especiallhy the
Kosovo Albanians, Croats and Bosnian Muslims” (para. 52).
316
7 CIJ1077.indb 628 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 315
rer, de provoquer la haine et la peur parmi les communautés. Les
médias ont préparé psychologiquement le terrain pour la montéhe des
haines nationalistes et sont devenus une arme quand la guerre a
éclaté.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . h . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[D]es faits historiques ont été mystifiés pour servir des objhectifs
nationalistes et pour faire en sorte que le peuple serbe sente et
exprime un désir de revanche envers les ennemis désignés, les Chroates
et les Musulmans… » (Rapport de R. de la Brosse, par. 28-31.)
331. Il est aussi dit dans le rapport que, de par l’invocation des « déchi-
rements de la guerre de 1940» (ibid., par. 35), « l’instrumentalisation des
médias au service d’objectifs et d’intérêts nationalistesh rel[evait] d’un plan
mûrement réfléchi » (ibid., par. 32). L’auteur ajoute que le mémorandum
de la SANU de 1986 avait constitué un « encouragement» au « nationa-
lisme serbe » (ibid., par. 40). La propagande officielle puisait aux sources
historiques de la « mystique serbe », avec ses victimes et les injustices qui
avaient été faites aux Serbes tout au long de leur histoire ( ibid.,
par. 46-49) 31. Les autorités de l’Etat cherchaient à conditionner l’opinion
publique « pour justifier la guerre à venir avec la Croatie » ( ibid., par. 54,
et voir par.61). La « désinformation était utilisée pour induire en erreur,
cacher ou travestir des faits » et pour inventer « de fausses informations »
(ibid., par. 72 et 77).
332. Le deuxième rapport d’expert soumis (par le procureur) au TPIY
dans le cadre de la décision en l’affaire Milošević (2004), et cité par la
Croatie lors des audiences en la présente espèce, était intitulhé « Serbian
Nationalism in the Twentieth Century » (Le nationalisme serbe au ving -
tième siècle, 29 mai 2002, rédigé par A. Budding). Ce rapport présentait
les faits historiques et le contexte nécessaires pour comprendre le rhéveil de
la conscience nationale serbe et la série d’événements qui ahvait conduit à
la dissolution de l’Etat yougoslave et au déclenchement des conflhits dans
la région.
333. Le rapport mentionnait aussi le mémorandum de 1986 de la
SANU (rapport de A. Budding, 29 mai 2002, p. 32), expliquant ses ori -
gines et ses conséquences pour l’ensemble de l’ex -Yougoslavie (ibid.,
p. 36-37). Il qualifiait ce mémorandum d’« ouvrage le plus connu du mou-
vement national serbe contemporain » (ibid., p. 36). Se référant au rap-
port d’expert, la Croatie a fait valoir que le mémorandum avait déhclenché
«une tempête politique» et qu’il était «provocateur en raison du contraste
entre les griefs qui y étaient exprimés concernant la situation deh la Serbie
et des Serbes au sein de la Yougoslavie et les « références vagues et ellip -
315
Les médias ont contribué à « la démonisation des autres communautés, en
particulierelles des Albanais du Kosovo, des Croates et des Musulmans bosniaque»
(par.52).
316
7 CIJ1077.indb 629 18/04/16 08:54 316 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
tical references to a possible post-Yugoslav future’” 31. According to the
expert report:
“Memorandum nije raspalio debatu u Jugoslaviji zato što je u
njemu eksplicitno iznet srpski nacionalni program posle Jugoslavije—
pošto i nije — već zbog kontrasta između detaljnih i preteranih
primedbi na položaj Srbije unutar postojeće jugoslovenske državhe,
koje su iznete u Memorandumu, kao i neodređenog pozivanja na
moguću budućnost posle Jugoslavije (tvrdnja da Srbija mora ‘jahsno
da sagleda svoje privredne i nacionalne interese kako je događaji ne h
bi iznenadili’). Autori Memoranduma su sugerisali da bi nacionalne
alternative višenacionalnoj jugoslovenskoj državi mogle biti požheljne,
ali su propustili da priznaju da bi njihovo stvaranje neizbežno podrah -
zumevalo uništenje.” 317
334. In the same Milošević case, the ICTY also took into account the
declaration of an expert witness (T. Zwaan), which is summed up in its
decision of 16 June 2004. According to the ICTY, the expert witness testi-
fied about “the importance of ideology and use of propaganda” inh pro -
cesses “leading to the commission of genocide, involving various typehs of
radical nationalism, which dehumanize the targeted group”, also misus -
ing “collective historical memory” to that end (ICTY, Milošević, 16 June
2004, para. 234). It added that “genocide is a crime of State”, as “geno -
cidal crimes never develop from the ‘bottom up’ ; they are ‘top down’
affairs. Such crimes occur with the ‘knowledge, approval and involvement
of the State authorities’” (ibid.).
335. Yet a third expert report compiled for the ICTY
(at the request of its Prosecution), for its adjudication of the
Milošević case (2004), titled “On the Aetiology and Genesis of
Genocides and Other Mass Crimes — Targeting Specific Groups”
(of November 2003, by T. Zwaan), purported to consider, in a con -
densed way, the learning that exists nowadays in relation to
genocide, from an interdisciplinary perspective. The expert report, at
316
317CR 2014/5, pp. 33-35.
[Unofficial translation]
“The Memorandum became an inflammatory element in the Yugoslav debahte not
because it explicitly set out a post -Yugoslav Serbian national programme — and
indeed it did not — but rather because of the contrast between its detailed and exag -
gerated remarks on the position of Serbia within the existing Yugoslav Shtate, and
its vague and elliptical references to a possible postav future (the assertion
that Serbia must ‘look clearly at its economic and national interests, so as not to
be caught by surprise by the course of events’). The authors of the hMemorandum
suggested that national alternatives to the multinational Yugoslav Stateh would be
desirable without acknowledging the destruction that their creation woulhd inevitably
entail.” (Ibid., p.
317
7 CIJ1077.indb 630 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 316
tiques à un éventuel avenir post -yougoslave» qui s’y trouvaient » 316. Le
rapport contenait aussi les observations suivantes :
«Memorandum nije raspalio debatu u Jugoslaviji zato što je u
njemu eksplicitno iznet srpski nacionalni program posle Jugosla -
vije— pošto i nije — već zbog kontrasta između detaljnih i pretera -
nih primedbi na položaj Srbije unutar postojeće jugoslovenske
države, koje su iznete u Memorandumu, kao i neodređenog pozi -
vanja na moguću budućnost posle Jugoslavije (tvrdnja da Srbija
mora ‘jasno da sagleda svoje privredne i nacionalne interese kako je h
događaji ne bi iznenadili’). Autori Memoranduma su sugerisali da hbi
nacionalne alternative višenacionalnoj jugoslovenskoj državi mogleh
biti poželjne, ali su propustili da priznaju da bi njihovo stvaranje h
neizbežno podrazumevalo uništenje. »317
334. Toujours en l’affaire Milošević, le TPIY a aussi tenu compte de la
déposition d’un témoin expert (T. Zwaan), qu’il a résumée dans sa
décision du 16 juin 2004. Selon le TPIY, le témoin expert avait déposé
au sujet de « l’importance de l’idéologie et du recours à la propagande »
dans les processus « conduisant à la perpétration d’un génocide : elle
mobilise plusieurs types de nationalisme extrémiste qui déshumanisent le
groupe cible », tout en détournant « la mémoire historique collective » à
cette fin (TPIY, Milošević, décision du 16 juin 2004, par. 234). T. Zwaan
a ajouté que « le génocide était un crime d’Etat », car « les crimes génoci -
daires ne se développent jamais « de bas en haut »; ils se propagent
«de haut en bas ». Les autorités de l’Etat «ont connaissance de ces crimes,
elles les cautionnent et elles y participent »» (ibid.).
335. Un troisième rapport d’expert rédigé pour le TPIY (à la hdemande
du procureur) dans le cadre de l’affaire Milošević (2004), intitulé « On the
Aetiology and Genesis of Genocides and Other Mass Crimes — Targe -
ting Specific Groups » (De l’étiologie et de la genèse des génocides et
autres crimes de grande ampleur perpétrés contre des groupes spéhcifiques)
(novembre 2003, établi par T. Zwaan), entendait prendre en considéra -
tion, en les condensant, les connaissances contemporaines en matière hde
316
317 CR 2014/5, p. 33-35.
[Traduction non officielle]
«Le mémorandum est devenu dans le débat yougoslave un élémenth de nature
à exciter les passions, non pas parce qu’il énonçait expresshément un programme
nationalserbe post-yougoslav— ce qu’il ne faisait effectivemen—,pmais plutôt
en raison du contraste entre les observations détaillées et exagérées concernant la
position de la Serbie dans l’Etat yougoslave existant et les réféhrences vagues et ellip-
tiques à un éventuel avenir post-yougoslave qui s’y trouvaient h(l’assertion indiquant
que la Serbie devait être lucide quant à ses intérêts économiques et nationauxh,
afin de ne pas être prise au dépourvu par le cours des évéhnementses auteurs
du mémorandum suggéraient que des solutions nationales de substituhtion à l’Etat
yougoslave multinational seraient souhaitables, sans reconnaître la dhestruction que
leur création entraînerait inévitablement. » (Ibid., p. 31.)
317
7 CIJ1077.indb 631 18/04/16 08:54 317 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
the end of the examination of the matter, reached the following
findings:
“Firstly, (. . .) genocide and other mass crimes targeting specific
groups should be carefully distinguished from war and civil war, while
at the same time one should recognize that situations of war or civil
war may contribute in various ways to the development of genocidal
processes.
Secondly, it has been pointed out that genocidal crimes only develop
and take place under conditions of serious and enduring crisis. A
general model of the emergence of such crises has been presented in
a very condensed form. Destabilization of the State -society concerned,
polarization processes, de pacification, and increasing use of violence
are at the heart of such crises.
Thirdly, in the course of the crisis a radical and ruthless political
elite may succeed in taking over the State organization. The political
behaviour and decisions of this political leadership may be considered
of decisive importance for the emergence of genocide. It has been
argued that a genocidal process does not develop from ‘bottom up’,h
but that is typically a ‘top down’ development, although the precihse
involvement of the State may take different forms. One corollary is
that the highest State authorities are always responsible for what hap-
pens during the genocidal process, another corollary implies that ‘sih-n
gle’ acts of genocide should be (also) considered against the
background of the prevalent power and authority structure within the
State-society concerned.
Fourthly, it has been emphasized that genocides may be best seen
as (highly complex) processes, with a beginning, a structured course
in which phases can be discerned, and an end — usually brought
about by forceful external intervention. Furthermore, in trying to
understand a genocidal process attention should be paid to the deci -
sion-making, the gradual emergence of planning and organization,
and the division of labour within the category of perpetrators.
Fifthly, it has been argued that ideology is also of crucial impor -
tance for genocide to emerge. Usually, varieties of radical nationalism h
will figure prominently. They contribute to the development of an
extremist political climate ; to the marking off of the groups or cate -
gories to be targeted ; they legitimize, rationalize, and justify the gen-
ocidal process ; and impart to the perpetrators a sense of direction,
intent and purpose.
Sixthly, it has been underlined that every genocidal process should
also be considered from the angle of the victims, who are typically
chosen because of their supposed membership of a group or category
318
7 CIJ1077.indb 632 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 317
génocide, d’un point de vue interdisciplinaire. Après avoir exahminé cette
question, l’auteur est parvenu aux conclusions suivantes :
« Tout d’abord, … le génocide et d’autres crimes de grande
ampleur perpétrés contre des groupes spécifiques doivent être soi -
gneusement distingués de la guerre et de la guerre civile, même sih,
parallèlement, il convient de reconnaître que les situations de cohnflit
de la guerre civile peuvent contribuer de diverses manières au dévhe -
loppement de processus de génocide.
Deuxièmement, on a fait observer que les crimes génocidaires ne se
conçoivent et ne se mettent en œuvre que dans des conditions de crhise
grave et durable. Un modèle général de l’émergence de cesh crises a été
présenté sous une forme très condensée. La déstabilisatiohn de la
société étatique concernée, les processus de polarisation, lha « dépacifi-
cation» et le recours croissant à la violence sont au cœur de ces crihses.
Troisièmement,dans le cadre de la crise, une élite politique radicale
et impitoyable peut parvenir à s’emparer de l’organisation de lh’Etat. Le
comportement politique et les décisions de cette direction politique
peuvent être considérés comme d’une importance décisive phour la nais -
sance d’un génocide. Il a été dit qu’un processus génohcidaire ne se d-éve
loppe pas «de bas en haut» mais se propage généralement «de haut en
bas», même si l’implication spécifique de l’Etat peut prenhdre différentes
formes. L’un des corollaires de ce constat est que les plus hautes auhto -
rités de l’Etat sont toujours responsables de ce qui se passe au chours du
processus génocidaire, un autre est que de « simples» actes de génocide
devraient être (aussi) envisagés dans le contexte de la structurhe du pou-
voir et de l’autorité qui prévaut au sein de la société éhtatique concernée.
Quatrièmement, il a été souligné que, pour les comprendre auh
mieux, il faut envisager les génocides comme des processus (très hcom -
plexes), comportant un début, un déroulement structuré dans lequel
on peut distinguer plusieurs phases et une fin — généralement provo-
quée par une intervention extérieure par la force. En outre, pour h
essayer de comprendre un processus génocidaire, il convient de prêh-
ter attention à la prise de décisions, à l’apparition progrehssive de la
planification et de l’organisation, et à la division du travail au sein de
la catégorie des auteurs.
Cinquièmement, il a été soutenu que l’idéologie revêt hégalement
une importance cruciale en ce qu’elle permet la naissance du géno -
cide. En général, diverses formes de nationalisme radical figurehnt en
bonne place. Elles contribuent au développement d’un climat poli -
tique extrémiste et à la désignation des groupes ou des catéhgories à
viser; elles légitiment, rationalisent et justifient le processus génhoci -
daire, et elles communiquent aux auteurs le sentiment de suivre une
direction, une intention et un but.
Sixièmement, il a été souligné que chaque processus génochidaire
devrait aussi être envisagé du point de vue des victimes, qui sonth en
général choisies en raison de leur appartenance supposée à uhn groupe
318
7 CIJ1077.indb 633 18/04/16 08:54 318 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
targeted for persecution. It has been argued, moreover, that such
groups are made increasingly vulnerable and defenceless through the
process of persecution itself, that it is usually very difficult for thhem
to foresee what is going to happen, and that their possible courses of
(re)action are severely limited. Keeping their fate central in one’hs mind
seems to be the best compass when studying, assessing and judging
genocide.” (Report by T. Zwaan, November 2003, pp. 38-39.)
(c) Ideological incitement and the outbreak of hostilities
336. In effect, in the course of the proceedings, both contending Parties
paid special attention to the origins and the factual background of the h
conflict in the Balkans in the present case concerning the Application of
the Convention against Genocide. Both Croatia and Serbia expressed their
awareness that the historical context helps to understand better the causes
that lead to the war in Croatia and its pattern of destruction. They
expressed their views, in particular, in the written phase of the cas d’espèce.
The applicant State contended that the devastation that took place in
Croatia was a consequence of the exponential growth of Serbian nation -
alism in order to build a “Greater Serbia”.
337. Thus, in its Memorial, Croatia provided an overview of the back -
ground of the dispute, deeming it essential to understand what happened,h
318
in order to bring justice and redress to the victims . Focusing on the
formation of the FRY, the rise of “Greater -Serbian” nationalism in the
eighties and the rise of S. Milošević to power 319, Croatia argued that,
although the inherent tensions (between ethnic groups) had been sup -
pressed for many years, after President Tito’s death, federal instituhtions
were usurped by the new Serbian leadership (under S. Milošević), which
aimed at establishing a Serb -dominated Yugoslavia, or a “Greater
Serbia”, to include within its borders more than half of the territorhy of
320
Croatia .
338. The Serbian State-controlled media — it proceeded — systemati-
cally demonized the targeted non -Serb ethnic gr321s, creating a climate
conducive to genocide, inciting and justifying it . After tension grew in
Kosovo in 1981, Croatia claimed, Serb nationalists began to express their
ideas more openly and frequently ; it singled out the 1986 SANU Memo-
randum, as a manifesto setting forth a Serb nationalist reinterpretationh of
the recent history of the SFRY, which gave rise to a feeling of anger anhd
318 Memorial of Croatia, paras. 2.01-2.162 and 1.14.
319 Ibid., paras. 2.05-2.35, 2.36-2.59 and 2.60-2.84, respectively. As to the historical
background (in the Second World War), cf. ibid., paras. 2.08-2.09, and cf. para. 2.53.
320 Ibid., para. 1.26.
321 Ibid.
319
7 CIJ1077.indb 634 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 318
ou une catégorie visée par la persécution. Il a été soutehnu, en outre,
que ces groupes sont rendus de plus en plus vulnérables et impuis -
sants par le processus de persécution lui-même, qu’il leur est en géné-
ral très difficile de prévoir ce qu’il va se passer, et que lehurs possibilités
d’agir (de réagir) sont extrêmement limitées. Pour étudhier, évaluer et
juger un génocide, la meilleure ligne de conduite à suivre semble hêtre
de garder leur sort au cœur de ses préoccupations. » (Rapport de
T. Zwaan, novembre 2003, p. 38-39.)
c) L’incitation idéologique et le début des hostilités
336. De fait, au cours de la procédure, les deux Parties ont porté
une attention particulière aux origines et au contexte factuel du
conflit dans les Balkans, en l’espèce concernant l’Application de la conven ‑
tion sur le génocide. La Croatie et la Serbie ont toutes deux dit avoir
conscience que le contexte historique permettait de mieux comprendre
les causes à l’origine de la guerre en Croatie et de la campagne de dehstru-c
tion menée. Elles ont exprimé leurs points de vue, en particulier,h dans la
phase écrite de la procédure. Le demandeur a fait valoir que la déhvasta -
tion qui avait eu lieu en Croatie était une conséquence du dévehloppement
exponentiel du nationalisme serbe visant à construire une « Grande
Serbie».
337. Ainsi, dans son mémoire, la Croatie a donné un aperçu du
contexte du litige, qu’elle estimait essentiel pour comprendre ce quih s’était
passé, afin de rendre justice et d’accorder réparation aux vihctimes 318.
Mettant l’accent sur la formation de la RFY, la montée du nationa -
lisme «grand319rbe» dans les années 1980 et l’arrivée de S. Milošević
au pouvoir , elle a fait valoir que, bien que les tensions inhérentes
(entre les groupes ethniques) aient été étouffées pendant de nom -
breuses années, après la mort du président Tito, les institutions fédérales
avaient été usurpées par les nouveaux dirigeants serbes (menéhs
par S. Milošević), qui entendaient établir une Yougoslavie dominéeh par
les Serbes, ou « Grande Serbie », englobant plus de la moitié de la
Croatie 320.
338. Les médias serbes contrôlés par l’Etat, a ajouté la Croatie, avaient
diabolisé systématiquement les groupes ethniques non serbes viséhs, créant
un climat propice en incitant au génocide et en justifiant celui -ci321. Après
la montée des tensions au Kosovo en 1981, a poursuivi la Croatie, lesh
nationalistes serbes avaient commencé à exprimer leurs idées plhus ouver-
tement et fréquemment ; selon elle, était notamment en cause le mémoran-
dum de la SANU publié en 1986, qui était un manifeste réinterprhétant
318Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 2.01-2.162 et 1.14.
319Ibid., par. 2.05-2.35, 2.36-2.59 et 2.60-2.84, respectivement. Pour le contexte histo -
rique (pendant la seconde guerre mondiale), voir ibid., par. 2.08-2.09, et par. 2.53.
320Ibid., par. 1.26.
321Ibid.
319
7 CIJ1077.indb 635 18/04/16 08:54 319 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
322
revenge against Croats . Moreover, according to Croatia, there was a
large propaganda validating the Chetnik movement and their goals, and
S. Milošević was able to capture such feelings and to promote himselfh as
323
a defender of Serbian interests .
339. In its Counter-Memorial, Serbia submitted that much of what
occurred in the Balkans in 1991-1995 was influenced by the atrocities
324
against Serbs in 1941-1945 and the rise of nationalism in the SFRY .
The events leading to the conflict of 1991 -1995 and the conflict itself,
according to Serbia, cannot be understood without taking this into
325
account . Serbia further stated that there was a rise of nationalism in
the SFRY, following Tito’s death, among Serbians but also Croatians 32.
340. Serbia conceded that there were abundant hate speech and
extreme nationalism demonstrations in Serbian media in the late eightiesh
and during the nineties, but it claimed that such was the case also in Chro-
atia. It did not contest that Serbian nationalists misused the recollections
of past events, though it contended that the claims made in this regard hby
Croatia were not always accurate ; it finally added that Serbian national -
ism could not be held solely accountable for the conflict 327.
341. In its Reply, Croatia stated that, according to an expert report
from the ICTY, the SANU Memorandum sparked Serbian nationalism
328
publicly , giving vent to the view that the Croatian people were collec -
tively to blame for the large number of Serbs who had been killed by theh
Ustashas in 1941-1945 329. It then rebutted the claims of revival of Croa -
tian nationalism and of hate speech and discriminatory policies against h
the Serbs 330. For its part, in its Rejoinder, Serbia contended that the his -
torical background helps to understand the events which originated the
war. It reaffirmed that the causes were not one -sided and that the claims
of Croatia were in its view inaccurate 331; at last, it requested the Interna -
tional Court of Justice to examine the history of the conflict from bohth
322Memorial of Croatia, paras. 2.40, 2.43, 2.51-2.53 and 2.56. The Croats were demon-
ized and blamed for the deaths of Serbs during the Second World War in concentration
camps, and an instigated feeling of anger and revenge arose among the Se; according to
Croatia, the 1986SANU Memorandum was a key element to that end.
323Ibid., paras. 2.54-2.56 and 2.60.
324Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 397-426, and cf. paras. 397, 400, 409 and 419.
325Ibid., para. 419.
326Ibid., para. 422.
327
328Ibid., paras. 434-435, 420 and 424.
Reply of Croatia, para. 3.11.
329Ibid., para. 3.12.
330Ibid., paras. 3.17-24.
331Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 35.
320
7 CIJ1077.indb 636 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 319
l’histoire récente de la RSFY du point de vue des nationalistes sehrbes et
qui avait donné naissance à une colère et un désir de vengeahnce à l’égard
des Croates 322. En outre, toujours selon la Croatie, il y avait eu une vaste
campagne de propagande réhabilitant le mouvement tchetnik et ses objeh-c
tifs, et S.Milošević était parvenu à saisir ces sentiments et à se présenter
comme le défenseur des intérêts serbes 323.
339. Dans son contre -mémoire, la Serbie a fait valoir qu’une grande
partie des événements qui s’étaient produits dans les Balkans en 1991-1995
avait été influencée par les atrocités commises contre lesh Serbes en
324
1941-1945 et la montée du nationalisme dans la RSFY . Les événements
qui avaient mené au conflit de 1991 -1995 et le conflit lui -même, selon la
Serbie, ne pouvaient être compris si l’on n’en tenait pas compthe 325. La
Serbie a en outre affirmé qu’il y avait eu une montée du natiohnalisme dans
la RSFY après la mort de Tito, chez les Serbes mais aussi chez les
Croates 326.
340. La Serbie a reconnu qu’il y avait eu de nombreux propos haineux
et manifestations de nationalisme extrême dans les médias serbes àh la fin
des années 1980 et tout au long des années 1990, mais a affirmé que c’était
aussi le cas en Croatie. Elle n’a pas contesté que les nationalisthes serbes
aient détourné à leur profit le souvenir des événementsh passés, mais elle a
soutenu que les allégations en ce sens portées par la Croatie n’hétaient pas
toujours exactes ; enfin, elle a ajouté que le nationalisme serbe ne saurait
être tenu pour unique responsable du conflit 327.
341. Dans sa réplique, la Croatie a fait valoir que, selon un rapport d’h-ex
pert du TPIY, le mémorandum de la SANU avait mis le feu aux poudres eht
soulevé publiquement la question du nationalisme serbe 328, en donnant
libre cours à la théorie selon laquelle les Croates étaient colhlectivement r- es
ponsables du nombre élevé de Serbes tués entre 1941 et 1945 par les Ousta-
chis329. Elle a ensuite réfuté les allégations de renaissance du natiohnalisme
croate et de propos haineux et politiques discriminatoires à l’égard des
330
Serbes . De son côté, dans sa duplique, la Serbie a soutenu que le contexhte
historique était susceptible de contribuer à la compréhension dhes événe -
ments à l’origine de la guerre. Elle a réaffirmé que les causes n’étaient pas 331
unilatérales et que les allégations de la Croatie étaient à hson avis inexactes ;
322
Mémoire de la Croatie, par.2.40, 2.43, 2.51-2.53 et2.56. Les Croates ont été diabolisés
et tenus pour responsables de la mort de Serbes pendant la seconde guerrhe mondiale dans les
camps de concentration, et un sentiment induit de colère et de vengeahnce s’est développé chez
les Serbes; selon la Croatie, le mémorandum de 1986 de la SANU a été un éhlément clé à cette fin.
323Ibid., par. 2.54-2.56 et 2.60.
324Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 397-426, et voir par. 397, 400, 409 et 419.
325
326Ibid., par. 419.
327Ibid., par. 422.
Ibid., par. 434-435, 420 et 424.
328Réplique de la Croatie, par. 3.11.
329Ibid., par. 3.12.
330Ibid., par. 3.17-3.24.
331Duplique de la Serbie, par. 35.
320
7 CIJ1077.indb 637 18/04/16 08:54 320 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
332
the Applicant’s and the Respondent’s perspectives .
342. In the oral phase of the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, one of the
witness-experts (Ms S. Biserko) specifically addressed the factual back -
ground of the conflict and the developments that led to the atrocitiesh. She
singled out the idea of a “Greater Serbia” reviving Serbian nationhalism,
with its propaganda ; the aim of territorial expansion ; the rise of
S. Milošević and its policies ; and the media reports — between 1988
and 1991 — preparing Serbs for th333orthcoming armed attacks in Croa -
tia and Bosnia-Herzegovina .
343. The contending Parties themselves, in the course of the proceed -
ings in the cas d’espèce, focused — each one in its own way — on the
impact of hate speech. Croatia claimed that Serbia sponsored hate speechh
and propaganda in inciting genocide 334. Hate speech, in its view, was an
important factor in the preparations for the Serbian armed incursions inh
Croatia 335. Serbia acknowledged that the media in the country — in the
late eighties and during the nineties — constantly broadcasted hate
336
speech, but claimed that such was also the case in Croatia .
344. Serbia admitted that hate speech was abundant in Serbian media
337
at the end of the eighties and during the nineties , but claimed that it
was not confined to Serbia, and also existed in Croatia 338. Croatia argued
that, as from the early eighties, several Serbian newspapers ran inflahmma -
tory articles about the Ustasha concentration camp in Jasenovac, during
the Second World War 339. Croatia challenged Serbia’s claim that it had
340
also promoted hate speech against the Serbs . Serbia, for its part,
attempted to minimize the proof of incitement to hatred 341.
345. In its oral arguments, Croatia referred, e.g., to S. Milošević’s
speech to the Serbian parliament in March 1991 342, and to the hate speech
of the extremist Serb nationalist Z. Raznjatović (known as Arkan) against
the Croats, constantly referred to as “Ustashas” 343. Serbian newspapers,
it added, ran inflammatory articles about the Ustasha concentration
332Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 36.
333Cf. CR 2014/7, of 4 March 2014.
334
Memorial of Croatia, paras. 1.16, 2.04, 2.43-2.53, 2.56 -2.59, 2.63-2.66, 8.16 and
8.23-8.24.
335Ibid., para. 2.58.
336Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 434-442.
337Cf. ibid., paras. 434-437, 439-442 and 953-954.
338Ibid., para. 439.
339Cf. Reply of Croatia, paras. 3.10-3.14, 3.26-3.27, 3.31-3.33, 3.131 and 9.52.
340
341Cf. ibid., paras. 3.26-3.27, and cf. para. 9.52.
Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, paras. 340-342.
342Cf. CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, para. 20.
343Cf. ibid., para. 30; and cf. also Memorial of Croatia, Vol5, App. 3, pp. 64-65,
paras. 43-45.
321
7 CIJ1077.indb 638 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 320
enfin, elle a prié la Cour d’examiner l’histoire du conflith en tenant compte
des deux perspectives proposées par le demandeur et par le défendehur . 332
342. Dans la phase orale de la procédure en l’espèce, l’une des
me
témoins-experts (M S. Biserko) a traité expressément le contexte factuel
du conflit et de l’évolution des faits qui a conduit aux atrocithés. Elle a
insisté sur l’idée d’une « Grande Serbie » ranimant le nationalisme serbe
par sa propagande, l’objectif de l’expansion territoriale, l’ashcension de
S. Milošević et de ses politiques, et les reportages des médias — entre
1988 et 1991 — préparant les Serbe333ux attaques armées à venir en Croa -
tie et en Bosnie-Herzégovine .
343. Les Parties elles -mêmes, dans le cadre de la procédure en l’espèce,
ont mis l’accent, chacune à sa manière, sur les incidences des hpropos hai-
neux. La Croatie a affirmé que la Serbie avait attisé les propos hhaineux et
la propagande en incitant au génocide 334. Ces propos haineux, à son avis,
avaient été un élément important des préparatifs en vue dhes incursions
armées serbes en Croatie 335. La Serbie a reconnu que les médias du pays,
à la fin des années 1980 et tout au long des années 1990, diffusaient en
permanence des propos haineux, mais elle a affirmé que tel était haussi le
cas en Croatie 336.
344. La Serbie a admis que les propos haineux abondaient dans les
337
médias serbes à la fin des années 1980 et tout au long des années 1990 ,
mais elle a affirmé que ce phénomène n’était pas circonshcrit à la Serbie et
338
existait aussi en Croatie . La Croatie a fait valoir que, dès le début des
années 1980, plusieurs journaux serbes avaient publié des articlesh incen -
diaires sur le camp de concentration oustachi de Jasenovac, pendant la
339
seconde guerre mondiale . Elle a contesté l’affirmation de la Serbie,
selon qui la Croatie avait elle aussi promu les propos haineux contre lehs
Serbes 340. La Serbie, de son côté, a tenté de minimiser les preuves de lh’in-
341
citation à la haine .
345. Lors des plaidoiries, la Croatie a fait référence, notamment, au
discours prononcé par S. Milošević devant le parlement serbe en
342
mars 1991 et aux propos haineux tenus par l’extrémiste nationaliste
serbe Z. Raznjatović (connu sous le nom d’Arkan) contre les Croates,
constamment appelés «Oustachis» 343. Les journaux serbes, a-t-elle ajouté,
332Duplique de la Serbie, par. 36.
333CR 2014/7.
334
Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 1.16, 2.04, 2.43-2.53, 2.56-2.59, 2.63-2.66, 8.16, 8.23-
8.24.
335Ibid., par. 2.58.
336Contre‑mémoire de la Serbie, par. 434-442.
337Ibid., par. 434-437, 439-442 et 953-954.
338Ibid., par. 439.
339Réplique de la Croatie, par. 3.10-3.14, 3.26-3.27, 3.31-3.33, 3.131 et 9.52.
340
341Ibid., par. 3.26-3.27 et 9.52.
Duplique de la Serbie, par. 340-342.
342CR 2014/5, par. 20.
343Ibid., par. 30; voir aussi mémoire de la Croatie, vol. 5, app. 3, p. 64-65, par. 43-45.
321
7 CIJ1077.indb 639 18/04/16 08:54 321 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
camp in Jasenovac, as a reference to the Second World War crimes com-
mitted against the Serbs by the Ustasha regime 344.
346. Serbia, in turn, cited statements from Croatian press and politi-
cians 345. Croatia retorted that the examples cited by Serbia were in sharp
contrast with the Serbian hate speech that emanated from Serbian State
346
media and its most senior leaders . It further insisted that the Serb pop-
ulation’s fear against Croats was created by the hate -speech campaign
against Croats and their demonization as “Ustasha[s]” 347.
347. In the present Judgment, the International Court of Justice flatly
dismissed an examination of the historical origins of the onslaught in thhe
Balkans, in the following terms : “The Court considers that there is no
need to enter into a debate on the political and historical origins of the
events that took place in Croatia between 1991 and 1995.” (Judgment,
para. 422.) Even without embarking on such an examination, the Court,
e.g., dismissed the relevance of the SANU Memorandum, for having “no h
official standing” and for not proving dolus specialis (ibid.).
348. Yet, in the course of the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, that doc -
ument was cited not to this effect, but only to explain the historical orhi -
gins of the devastation in Croatia, which the Court found unnecessary toh
examine in the present Judgment. Once again, I regret not to be able to
follow the Court’s majority on the handling of this question either, hand I
lay on the records, in the present dissenting opinion, the reasons of myh
disagreement with the dismissive posture of the Court thereon, particu -
larly bearing in mind that both contending Parties dwelt upon the issue in
their arguments before the Court, and expected the Court to address it.
349. It is clear that a nationalistic (ethnic) ideology and propaganda,
with their incitement to violence, were at the origins of the outbreak ohf the
former Yugoslavia, having contributed to the hostilities aggravated in thhe
course of the widespread armed conflicts, and then to the “horrors”h of the
wars in the Balkans, “particularly those in Croatia and Bosnia -
348
Herzegovina” . In order to understand the factual context of a case
under the Genocide Convention such as the present one opposing Croatia
to Serbia, it is important to address its causes. They have been addresshed,
before the Court, by the contending Parties themselves. Already in my
separate opinion (I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 543, paras. 46-47 and p. 610,
344Cf. CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, para. 12.
345
Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 438 and 440, and Rejoinder of Serbia,
par346 633-635.
347Cf. Additional Pleadings, para. 2.14.
Cf. CR 2014/19, of 18 March 2014, para. 28.
348S. Letica, “The Genesis of the Current Balkan War”, Genocide after Emotion — The
Postemotional Balkan War (ed. S. G. Meštrović), London/N.Y., Routledge, 1996, p. 91,
and cf. pp. 92-112.
322
7 CIJ1077.indb 640 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 321
publiaient des articles incendiaires sur le camp de concentration oustachhi
de Jasenovac, en référence aux crimes que le régime oustachi avhait com -
mis contre les Serbes pendant la seconde guerre mondiale 344.
346. La Serbie, de son 345é, a cité des déclarations faites par la presse
et les politiciens croates . La Croatie a rétorqué que les exemples don -
nés par la Serbie contrastaient vivement avec les discours haineux quhi
émanaient des médias publics et des plus hauts dirigeants serbes 346. Elle a
en outre insisté sur le fait que la peur que la population serbe nourhrissait
à l’égard des Croates avait été instillée par la campahgne basée sur des
discours haineux contre les Croates et la diabolisation de ceux -ci en tant
qu’«Oustachis» 347.
347. Dans le présent arrêt, la Cour a exclu catégoriquement d’exahmi -
ner les origines historiques du conflit dans les Balkans, dans les terhmes
suivants : «La Cour estime qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de s’engager dans hun
débat sur les origines historiques et politiques des événementsh qui se sont
déroulés en Croatie entre 1991 et 1995. » (Arrêt, par. 422.) Même sans se
lancer dans un tel examen, elle a, par exemple, rejeté l’importanche du
mémorandum de la SANU, au motif qu’il « n’a[vait] pas de caractère offi -
ciel» et qu’il ne prouvait pas le dolus specialis (ibid.).
348. Pourtant, dans la procédure en l’espèce, ce document n’a pas été
cité à cet effet, mais uniquement pour expliquer les origines histohriques de
l’entreprise de dévastation en Croatie, que la Cour a jugé inuthile d’exam- i
ner dans le présent arrêt. Encore une fois, je regrette de ne pas hpouvoir
souscrire à la manière dont la majorité de la Cour a traité hcette question,
et j’ai tenu à consigner par écrit, dans le présent exposéh, pourquoi je suis
en désaccord avec le peu de cas que la Cour en a fait — étant donné, en
particulier, que les deux Parties ont longuement insisté sur cette question
dans les arguments qu’elles ont présentés à la Cour et s’hattendaient à ce
que celle -ci l’examine.
349. Il est clair qu’une idéologie et une propagande nationalistes (ethh -
niques) ont été, par leur incitation à la violence, à l’horigine de l’éclatement
de l’ex-Yougoslavie et ont contribué à donner lieu aux hostilités aggrahvées
au cours des conflits armés généralisés, puis aux « horreurs» des guerres
dans les Balkans, « en particulier celles en Croatie et en Bosnie -
Herzégovine» 348. Pour comprendre le contexte factuel d’une affaire rele -
vant de la convention sur le génocide, telle que celle qui oppose la Croatie
à la Serbie, il importe d’en examiner les causes. Celles -ci ont été exposées à
la Cour par les Parties elles-mêmes. Dans l’exposé de l’opinion individuelle
(C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (II), p. 543, par. 46-47, et p. 610, par. 220) que j’ai
344
345CR 2014/5, par. 12.
Voir contre‑mémoire de la Serbie, par. 438 et 440, et duplique de la Serbie,
par. 633-635.
346Voir pièce additionnelle, par. 2.14.
347CR 2014/19, par. 28.
348S. Letica, « The Genesis of the Current Balkan War », Genocide after Emotion —
The Postemotional Balkan War (dir. publ., S. GMeštrović), Londres/New York, Rout -
ledge, 1996, p.1, et voir p. 92-112.
322
7 CIJ1077.indb 641 18/04/16 08:54 322 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
para. 220) in the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on theh
Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (2010), I pointed out the need to
remain attentive to the historical origins of each humanitarian crisis.
350. An international conflict — a devastation — of the scale and
gravity of the wars in the Balkans, lodged with the International Court of
Justice under the Convention against Genocide, cannot be properly exam -
ined in the void. The ICTY did not do so, and, e.g., in the Milošević case
(TrialChamber, decision of 16 June 2004), after studying that conflict as
from its historical origins, took into account an expert report on the uhse
of propaganda by the media in that conflict which determined that
“a comparison between Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian nationalist
propaganda yielded the conclusion that Serbian propaganda sur -
passed the other two both in the scale and the content of the media
messages put out” (ICTY, Milošević, decision of 16 June 2004,
para. 237).
351. In this way, hatred was widespread, and made its numerous vic -
tims. Villagers began to hate each other, sometimes their own former
neighbours, solely on the basis of their ethnicity, without knowing exachtly
why. The consequences of this campaign of hatred were catastrophic, —
as were so many other man -made devastations throughout the history of
humankind and illustrative of the perennial presence of evil in the humahn
condition (cf. infra).
352. Last but not least, with the outbreak of the armed attacks, there
is an additional element for the examination of the campaign of extreme h
nationalism which should not pass unperceived here : the unredacted
Minutes of the Supreme Defence Council (SDC) of the FRY, the same
unredacted Minutes that, in the earlier case concerning the GenocideCon -
vention, were not made available to the International Court of Justice, h
nor did the International Court of Justice consider them indispensable, h
for its 2007 Judgment. Today, eight years later, the unredacted transcripts
of the SDC Minutes (1992-1996), as lately brought to the attention of the
ICTY, are publicly known.
353. It is not my intention to review them here, but only to refer briefly h
to two passages, with a direct bearing on the preceding considerations. h
The (short-hand) unredacted Minutes of the SDC, of 7 August 1992,
referred to the violence of paramilitary formations, and contained an
instruction to dress paramilitaries with “uniforms of Yugoslav soldiehrs”,
and to give them weapons. And the unredacted Minutes of the SDC, of
9 August 1994, asserted that the armies of Republika Srpska and of the
Serbian Republic of Krajina “are armies of the Serbian people”, anhd,
“[t]herefore, they must serve the interests of the Serbian people as ha
whole” 349.
349FRY/SDC, Unredacted Transcripts of Minutes (1992-1996), of 7 August 1992, and
of 9 August 1994.
323
7 CIJ1077.indb 642 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 322
joint à l’avis consultatif rendu par la Cour au sujet de la déclaration d’ind-é
pendance du Kosovo (2010), j’avais déjà souligné qu’il hétait nécessaire de
rester attentif aux origines historiques de chaque crise humanitaire.
350. Un conflit international — une entreprise de dévastation — ayant
l’ampleur et la gravité des guerres dans les Balkans, dont la Cour a été
saisie au titre de la convention sur le génocide, ne peut pas être examiné
correctement dans le vide. Ce n’est d’ailleurs pas ce que le TPIY a fait, et,
par exemple, en l’affaire Milošević (chambre de première instance, déci -
sion du 16 juin 2004), après avoir étudié le conflit à partir de ses origines
historiques, il a tenu compte d’un rapport d’expert sur l’utilihsation de la
propagande par les médias dans ce conflit, selon lequel
«une comparaison entre les propagandes nationalistes serbe, croate
et bosniaque porte à conclure que la première surpasse les deux
autres tant par l’échelle que par le contenu des messages médiahtiques
délivrés» (TPIY, Milošević, décision du 16 juin 2004, par. 237).
351. Ainsi, la haine était générale, et elle a fait de nombreuses vihctimes.
Les villageois ont commencé à se haïr mutuellement, parfois enthre anciens
voisins, uniquement en raison de leur appartenance ethnique, sans savoirh
exactement pourquoi. Les conséquences de cette campagne de haine ont h
été catastrophiques — et, comme tant d’autres entreprises de dévastation
menées par l’homme tout au long de son histoire, elles illustrent hla pré -
sence pérenne du mal dans la condition humaine (voir infra).
352. Enfin, avec le déclenchement des attaques armées, il importe de h
rappeler un autre élément qui plaide en faveur de l’examen de lha cam -
pagne de nationalisme extrême : les comptes rendus non expurgés du
Conseil suprême de la défense (CSD) de la RFY — ceux-là mêmes qui,
dans la précédente affaire concernant la convention sur le génochide,
n’avaient pas été mis à la disposition de la Cour, et que cehlle -ci n’avait
d’ailleurs pas jugés indispensables pour rendre son arrêt de 20h07.
Aujourd’hui, huit ans plus tard, les transcriptions non expurgées hdes
comptes rendus du CSD (1992 -1996), sur lesquelles l’attention du TPIY a
été récemment appelée, sont connues du public.
353. Je n’ai pas l’intention de passer ici ces comptes rendus en revue,h et
me bornerai à en mentionner deux bref passages qui ont une incidence h
directe sur les considérations précédentes. Le compte rendu (sténogra -
phié) non expurgé de la CSD, daté du 7 août 1992, fait référence à la
violence des formations paramilitaires et contient l’instruction de vhêtir ces
paramilitaires d’« uniformes de soldats yougoslaves » et de leur donner
des armes. Dans celui daté du 9 août 1994, il est dit que les armées de la
Republika Srpska et de la République serbe de Krajina « sont des armées
du peuple serbe », et que, « [p]ar conséquent, elles doivent servir les inté -
rêts du peuple serbe dans son ensemble » 34.
349 FRY/CSD, comptes rendus non expurgés (1992 -1996) du 7 août 1992 et du
9 août 1994.
323
7 CIJ1077.indb 643 18/04/16 08:54 323 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
2. The Imposed Obligation of Wearing White Ribbons
354. In my perception, it is clear, from the atrocities already surveyed,
that the cas d’espèce, concerning the Application of the Convention against
Genocide, opposing Croatia to Serbia, is not exactly one of war, but
rather of onslaught, in a widespread and systematic pattern of destructihon
(cf. supra ). There are other aspects of it which, in the course of the pro -
ceedings, were also brought to the attention of the Court, and to which hI
turn attention now. One of them pertains to the obligation imposed upon h
targeted individuals to wear white ribbons.
355. In the written phase of the proceedings, Croatia claimed, in its
Memorial, that, in some municipalities, the Croat population was requirehd
to identify themselves and their property with white ribbons or other dihs-
tinctive marks 350. It submitted various witness statements concerning this
351
practice by Serbia . On the basis of the probatory evidence (and witness
statements), it appears that this practice of marking Croats with whiteh
ribbons was widespread its r;tionale was to identify and single out Cro -
ats and subject them to varying degrees of humiliation, such as forced
labour, violence, and limitation of their freedom of movement (e.g. by h
imposing curfews). According to Croatia,
“[t]he local Croat population would be required to identify themselves
and their property with white ribbons and other distinctive marks ;
they would be denied access to food, water, electricity and telecom -
munications and proper medical treatment ; their movements would
be restricted ; they would be put to forced labour ; their property
would be destroyed or looted ; Croatian cultural and religious mon -
uments would be destroyed ; and schools and other public utilities
would be required to adopt Serbian cultural traditions and lan -
guage” 352.
356. As to the aims of the practice of marking Croats with white rib -
bons, Croatia submitted that the local Serb “authorities” would eshtablish
their power and “would impose a regime of humiliation and dehumaniza-
tion on the remaining Croat population, who would be required to iden -
tify themselves and their property with white ribbons and other distincthive
marks” 353. Croatia argued that the majority of the Croat inhabitants of
Antin, for instance, left the village, and the 93 Croats that remained there
had to wear white ribbons on their sleeves ; Croatia added that, at the
350
Cf., Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.08, 4.60, 4.87 and 4.98. According to Croatia,
this obligation to wear white ribbons occurred, e.g., in Sarengrad, Bapska and; ibid.
para. 8.16.8.
351 Ibid., Vol. 2 (I), Annexes 53 (Sarengrad), 66 (Bapska), 76 (Tovarnik), 84 (Tovarnik);
101, 106 and 108 (Lovas), and 128 (Vukovar).
352 Ibid., para. 8.60.
353 Ibid., para. 3.73.
324
7 CIJ1077.indb 644 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 323
2. L’obligation de porter un ruban blanc
354. A mon sens, il est clair, compte tenu des atrocités déjà passéhes en
revue, que, dans le cas d’espèce concernant l’Application de la convention
sur le génocide et opposant la Croatie à la Serbie, il s’agissait non pas
exactement d’une guerre, mais plutôt d’une campagne de dévastation,
dans le cadre d’une entreprise de destruction systématique et géhnéralisée
(voir supra). Je passerai à présent à d’autres aspects sur lesquels l’hatten -
tion de la Cour a aussi été appelée au cours de la procédureh, en commen-
çant par l’obligation de porter un ruban blanc imposée aux pershonnes
prises pour cible.
355. Lors de la phase écrite de la procédure, la Croatie a affirmé hdans
son mémoire que, dans certaines municipalités, les Croates étaient
contraints, pour être reconnaissables, à porter un ruban blanc ou hd’autres
signes distinctifs, ou d’en apposer sur leurs biens 35. Elle a produit diverses
déclar351ons de témoins attestant que la Serbie avait imposé cette pra -
tique , qui, si l’on en croit les éléments de preuve (et lesdites déhclara -
tions), était très répandue et avait pour unique raison d’êhtre d’identifier
les Croates, de les isoler du reste de la population et de les humilier hà des
degrés divers, notamment par le travail forcé, la violence et la rhestriction
de leur liberté de circulation (par exemple en imposant des couvre -feux).
Selon la Croatie,
« [l]a population croate locale était tenue de porter un signe distinc -
tif — ruban blanc et autres signes — et d’en marquer ses biens ; l’ac-
cès à la nourriture, à l’eau, à l’électricité et aux télécommunications
ainsi qu’à des soins médicaux convenables lui était refuséh ; ses dépla-
cements faisaient l’objet de restrictions ; elle était mise au travail
forcé ; ses biens étaient détruits ou pillés ; les monuments culturels et
religieux croates étaient détruits; et les écoles et autres établissements
publics étaient tenus d’adopter les traditions culturelles et la lhangue
serbes » 352.
356. En ce qui concerne les objectifs de la pratique consistant à obliger
les Croates à porter un ruban blanc, la Croatie a fait valoir que desh
«autorités» locales serbes avaient été établies et « impos[ai]ent un régime
d’humiliation et de déshumanisation à la population croate resthante,
laquelle était tenue de porter un signe distinctif — ruban blanc et autres
signes — et d’en marquer ses biens » 353. Elle a affirmé que, à Antin, par
exemple, la plupart des habitants croates avaient quitté le village eht que
les 93 Croates restés sur place devaient porter un ruban blanc au bras ;
350
Voir mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.08, 4.60, 4.87 et 4.98. D’après la Croatie, l’obli-
gation de porter un ruban blanc a été imposée par exemple à Sarengrad, Bapska et Sotin ;
ibid., par. 8.16.8.
351Ibid., vol. 2 (I), annexes 53 (Sarengrad), 66 (Bapska), 76 (Tovarnik), 84 (Tovarnik),
101, 106 et 108 (Lovas) et 128 (Vukovar).
352Ibid., par. 8.60.
353Ibid., par. 3.73.
324
7 CIJ1077.indb 645 18/04/16 08:54 324 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
time of the writing of its Memorial, it was still unknown what happened h
to 15 of them 354. Another example was afforded by the village of Saren-
grad, where 412 Croatian inhabitants stayed behind, and all remaining
Croats in the village were forced to wear white ribbons 355.
357. In its oral pleadings, Croatia reiterated its allegations concerning
the marking of the Croatian population. As to the fate of the Croats whoh
were forced to identify themselves by wearing white ribbons, Croatia did
not report a common fate, to all of them. It is not clear from its pleadhings
that absolutely all Croats wearing white ribbons were doomed to be
356
exterminated . Yet Croatia stated, in this connection, that
“across the occupied communities and regions — not isolated inci-
dents, numerous, set out in the pleadings — Croat civilians were
forced to wear white ribbons, and ordered to adorn their homes with
white rags. These were measures of ethnic designation. Thus ear -
marked, they were ready targets for destruction . In Bapska, Croats
were forced to hang white ribbons on their doors by Serbs who
shouted, ‘Ustasha ! We will kill you all’ — in the witness statements.
The Croat populations in Arapovac, Lovas, Sarengrad, Sotin, Tovar-
nik and Vukovar, amongst other places, were forced to wear white
357
bands by Serb forces.”
358. Croatia mainly referred to the fact that they were obliged to iden -
tify themselves with white ribbons to show that they were Croats ;
although their fate seems to have been diverse, the targeted individualsh,
once targeted, became more vulnerable. In this respect, in a response toh a
question I put, during the public sitting before the Court on 5 March
2014, a Croatia’s expert witness stated that Croats
“who were in the camps, were not thus marked (. . .). Such markings
were used in several cases (. . .) — precisely in Lovas and Tovarnik—
where we found victims in mass graves having these markings. And,
according to the general information, it is known that in these locationhs,
358
persons of Croat ethnicity were thus marked with white armbands.”
Thus, it appears from the evidence submitted in the present case that
some of the Croats who were exterminated, were first marked with whiteh
ribbons, or armbands 35, or white sheets on the doors of their homes.
354Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.17.
355Ibid., para. 4.60.
356CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 35.
357
358CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, p. 57 [emphasis added].
359CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 35.
It is not clear from the pleadings of Croatia that absolutely all Croats wearing white
ribbons were doomed to be exterminated, cf. CR 2014/9, p. 35.
325
7 CIJ1077.indb 646 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 324
elle a ajouté que, au moment de la rédaction de son mémoire, onh ignorait
toujours ce qu’il était advenu de 15 d’entre eux 354. Il en est allé de même
dans le village de Sarengrad, où étaient restés 412 habitants croates qui
ont tous été forcés de porter un ruban blanc 35.
357. Lors des plaidoiries, la Croatie a répété ses allégations cohncernant
le « marquage» de la population croate. Quant aux Croates forcés de se
distinguer du reste de la population en portant un ruban blanc, elle n’ha
pas fait état d’un sort commun que tous auraient subi. Les pièches de pro -
cédure ne permettent pas de savoir si absolument tous ceux qui portaient
356
un ruban blanc étaient condamnés à être exterminés . La Croatie a
néanmoins déclaré ce qui suit :
«[D]es civils croates ont été forcés, dans les communautés eth les
régions occupées (et ces faits, exposés dans les pièces de procédure,
étaient très loin d’être isolés), de porter des rubans bhlancs, et ont reçu
l’ordre d’accrocher des chiffons blancs à leurs maisons. Il s’hagissait
de mesures de marquage ethnique. Ainsi repérés, ils devenaient des
cibles à abattre. A Bapska, au cri de « On vous tuera tous, sales Ous -
tachis !», des Serbes ont obligé les Croates à accrocher des rubans
blancs à leurs portes, comme cela figure dans les déclarations dhe
témoins. Les populations croates d’Arapovac, Lovas, Sarengrad,
Sotin, Tovarnik et Vukovar, entre autres, ont été contraintes par hles
forces serbes de porter des rubans blancs. »357
358. La Croatie a surtout insisté sur le fait que les Croates avaient été
obligés de porter un ruban blanc pour se distinguer du reste de la pohpula -
tion ; même s’ils ne semblent pas avoir tous subi le même sort, une hfois
distingués de la sorte, ils sont devenus plus vulnérables. A cet éhgard,
l’expert -témoin de la Croatie a déclaré, en réponse à une question que
j’ai posée à l’audience du 3 mai 2014, que les Croates
«détenus n’étaient pas marqués de la sorte. Cette marque a éhté utili-
sée dans plusieurs cas — à Lovas et à Tovarnik précisément — où
nous l’avons trouvée sur des victimes dans des charniers. Il est dhe
notoriété publique que, dans ces régions, les Croates devaient hporter
358
un brassard blanc. »
Il ressort donc des éléments produits en l’espèce que certaihns des Croates
qui ont été exterminés ont d’abord été contraints àh porter des rubans ou
des brassards blancs 359, ou à accrocher des draps blancs aux portes de
leurs maisons.
354Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.17.
355Ibid., par. 4.60.
356CR 2014/9, p. 35.
357
358CR 2014/6, p. 57 [les italiques sont de moi].
359CR 2014/9, p. 35.
Il ne ressort pas clairement des pièces de la Croatie si absoltous les Croates
qui portaient un ruban blanc étaient condamnés à être extermh; voir CR2014/9, p. 35.
325
7 CIJ1077.indb 647 18/04/16 08:54 325 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
3. The Disposal of Mortal Remains
359. In the course of the proceedings in the present case, Croatia
referred to various witness statements describing the mistreatment by
Serbs of the mortal remains of the deceased Croats. There were many
reported cases of corpses that were burnt, or else thrown into mass gravhes
(cf. infra ), and also occurrences in which they were shot (in Central
360 361
Vukovar) , dismembered (in Berak) , and thrown into wells (in Glina),
canals (in Lovas) 362and rivers 363. This was a way, Croatia added, to con-
364
ceal the murders ; excavators were used to transport the mortal remains .
360. For example, in the written phase of the present proceedings, it
was further reported by Croatia that there were mortal remains that wereh
365
simply burnt (in, e.g., Ervenik, Cerovljani, Hum/Podravska, Joševicah) .
Croatia presented also several accounts of corpses that were disposed ofh,
in a haphazard, if not careless way 366. Corpses were found everywhere.
Mortal remains were reported to have been a problem in Vukovar during
the shelling : many corpses remained on the streets, in yards and base -
ments ; 520 deceased persons were transported by Croatians volunteers
367
and soldiers for identification . In Vukovije, according to a witness
three corpses were found on the steps of a house 368. A witness narrated
that, in Tovarnik, there were 48 corpses lying on a road and in yards and
369
their burial was not allowed .
361. I deem it fit to come back to a point I made earlier on, in the pres-
ent dissenting opinion (Part II, supra). This scenario, of the disposal of
unburied mortal remains, brings to the fore (at least in my mind), in han
inter-temporal dimension, the tragedy of Antigone, by Sophocles, some
25 centuries ago. Antigone expresses her determination to defy the tyran -
nical decision of the powerful Creon to expose the corpse of her brother
Polynices so as to rot on the battlefield ; she announces that she will give
360
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.165.
361 Cf. ibid., para. 4.42.
362 Cf. ibid., para. 4.127.
363 Cf. ibid., para. 5.80.
364 Cf. ibid., para. 4.136.
365 Cf. ibid., paras. 5.215, 5.122, 5.41, 5.85 and 5.169-5.170, respectively.
366
A witness stated that he was responsible for collecting the corpses of thhe killed Cro-a
tian civilians with a tractor ; 24 were buried, but it was not possible to identify some of
them ; Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.102. Another witness reports that he was also respon-
sible for digging graves and transporting the deceased ; ibid. Another witness stated that
she saw dead bodies on a trailer driving to the graveyard, where they wehre dropped into
a hole and covered with an excavator ; ibid., para. 4.122. It was reported that columns
of JNA trucks were used to transport the remains of the deceased ; only fivecorpses in
Tor367ci, and nine in Antin, were left in the grav;s ibid., para. 4.138.
Ibid., para. 4.152.
368 Ibid., para.5.62. Elsewhere, a witness saw a corpse on a cargo truck; ibid., para.5.37.
369 Ibid., para. 4.97; and cf. CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, para. 51.
326
7 CIJ1077.indb 648 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 325
3. Le sort réservé aux corps
359. Au cours de la procédure, la Croatie a fait état de diverses déhcla -
rations de témoins décrivant les atteintes à l’intégritéh des cadavres croates
commises par les Serbes. Selon de nombreux témoignages, des cadavres h
ont été brûlés ou jetés dans des charniers (voir infra), et parfois criblés de
balles (à Vukovar -centre) 360, démembrés (à Berak) 361et jetés dans des
362 363
puits (à Glina), des canaux (à Lovas) et des rivières . C’était une
façon, selon la Croatie, de dissimuler les meurtres ; des pelleteuses ont
364
servi à transporter les restes .
360. Dans la phase écrite de la présente procédure, la Croatie a aushsi
relevé que les corps étaient parfois simplement brûlés (parh exemple à
365
Ervenik, Cerovljani, Hum/Podravska, Joševica) . Elle a aussi fait état
de plusieurs cas dans lesquels les assaillants s’étaient débarrhassés des
corps un peu au hasard, sinon avec incurie 366. Il y avait des cadavres par-
tout. Selon des témoignages, les cadavres auraient posé problème à
Vukovar lors du bombardement : nombre d’entre eux étaient laissés dans
les rues, les cours ou les caves ; 520 personnes décédées ont été transpor -
367
tées par des bénévoles et des soldats croates pour identificahtion . A
Vukovije, selon un témoin, trois cadavres ont été découverts sur les
marches d’une maison 368. Un autre témoin a raconté qu’il y avait à
Tovarnik 48 cadavres gisant le long de la route et dans les cours, et qu’il
était interdit de les enterrer 369.
361. Il me semble opportun de revenir ici sur une idée que j’ai déjà expri-
mée dans le présent exposé (partie II, supra). Ces scènes dans lesquelles des
dépouilles restent sans sépulture évoque irrésistiblement (du moins dans
mon esprit), dans une dimension intertemporelle, la tragédie d’Antigone
écrite par Sophocle il y a vingt-cinq siècles. Antigone fait part de sa déter -
mination à passer outre la décision tyrannique qu’a prise le puhissant Créon
de laisser le cadavre de son frère Polynice pourrir sur le champ de bhataille ;
360
Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.165.
361 Ibid., par. 4.42.
362 Ibid., par. 4.127.
363 Ibid., par. 5.80.
364 Ibid., par. 4.136.
365 Ibid., par. 5.215, 5.122, 5.41, 5.85 et 5.169-5.170, respectivement.
366
Un témoin a dit qu’il était chargé de ramasser avec un tractheur les corps des civils
croates tués;24 ont été enterrés, mais il était impossible d’en identifier certains (mémoire
de la Croatie, par. 4.102). Un autre témoin a rapporté qu’il était aussi chargéh de creuser des
fosses et de transporter les morts (ibid.). Un autre encore a dit avoir vu des cadavres sur
une remorque emmenés au cimetière, où ils ont été jetéhs dans un trou et recouverts à l’aide
d’une pelleteuse (ibid., par. 4.122). Selon un autre témoignage, des colonnes de camions
de la JNA servaient à transporter les restes des morts ; seuls les corps de cinq habitants
de 367dinci et de neuf habitants d’Antin ont été laissés danhs le charnier (., par. 4.138).
Ibid., par. 4.152.
368 Ibid., par. 5.62. Ailleurs, un témoin a vu un corps sur un camion de marchandises
(ibid., par. 5.37).
369 Ibid., par. 4.97, et CR 2014/8, par. 51.
326
7 CIJ1077.indb 649 18/04/16 08:54 326 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
her brother’s mortal remains a proper burial, as she looks forward to her
reunion one day with her deceased beloved relatives :
“I shall bury him myself.
And even if I die in the act, that death
will be a glory. (. . .) I have longer
to please the dead than please the living here (. . .).
(.. .) What greater glory could I win
than to give my own brother [a] decent burial ?”370
362. As a self -inflicted death falls upon Antigone, disgrace promptly
falls upon the despotic Creon as well. The chorus limits itself to say thhat
“the sorrows of the house”, as in ancient times, piles on “the hsorrows of
the dead”, in such a way that “one generation cannot free the nexth” 37.
Love is “never conquered in battle”, and is “alone the victor”h 372. And it
warns that the “power of fate” is a “terrible wond373 neither wealth nor
armies (. . .) can save us from that force” . At the end, the “mighty
blows of fate (. . .) will teach us wisdom” 374.
363. Sophocles’ masterpiece has survived the onslaught of time, and
has continued to inspire literary pieces in distinct ages. With the passhing
of time, Antigone became the symbol of resistance to the omnipotence of
the rulers, as well as of the clash between natural law (defended by hehr)
and positive law (represented by Creon). Its lesson has been captured hby
writers, and has become the object of philosophers’ attention, over the
centuries. In the mid -twentieth century, J. Anouilh wrote his own version
of Antigone’s tragedy, with a distinct outlook, but likewise portraying the
fatality that befell Antigone and the other characters. Anouilh’s trahgedy
Antigone was originally published in 1942, and first performed in 1944, in
Paris under Nazi occupation.
364. Over the centuries, the battlefield has been full of abandoned
corpses, as depicted in so many writings (historical, philosophical andh lit -
erary). It is against this abandonment that Antigone stands. She shows,h
from Sophocles’ times to date, that the dead and the living are close to
each other in many cultures, and ultimately in human conscience. The
determination of Antigone to secure a proper burial of her brother’s hmo-r
tal remains brings the beloved dead closer to their living, and the belohved
living closer to their dead. This perennial lesson is full of humanism. h
Against the imposition of calculations of raison d’Etat, Antigone resists
and remains faithful to herself, upholding fundamental principles and thhe
superior human values underlying them. She sets an example to be fol -
lowed.
370Sophocles, Antigone, verses 85-86, 88-89 and 561-562.
371Ibid., verses 667 and 669-670.
372Ibid., verses 879 and 890.
373Ibid., verses 1045-1047 and 1050.
374Ibid., verses 1469-1470.
327
7 CIJ1077.indb 650 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 326
elle donnera à la dépouille de son frère une sépulture digneh, car elle se
réjouit de retrouver un jour ses proches bien -aimés qui sont décédés :
«[J]enterrerai, moi, Polynice
et serai fière de mourir en agissant de telle sorte…
Ne dois -je pas plus longtemps plaire à ceux d’en bas
Qu’à ceux d’ici… ?
… Pouvais -je cependant gagner plus noble gloire
que celle d’avoir mis mon frère au tombeau ?» 370
362. Lorsque la mort qu’elle a choisie frappe Antigone, la disgrâce
s’abat aussi, rapidement, sur le despotique Créon. Et le chœur se borne à
dire que, comme dans les temps anciens, « les maux … sous le toit… »,
toujours, « après les morts, s’abatt[ent] sur les vivants », de sorte « qu’au-
cune génération jamais libère la suivante » 37. L’amour «est invincible» et
«triomphe» 372. Et le chœur avertit que « c’est un terrible pouvoir » que le
«pouvoir du Destin. Ni la richesse ni les armes … ne sauraient lui échap-
373 374
per » . A la fin, les «grands coups du sort… apprennent à être sages» .
363. Le chef -d’œuvre de Sophocle a résisté à l’épreuve du temps het a
inspiré des œuvres littéraires à diverses époques. Avec le temps, Antigone
est devenue le symbole de la résistance à la toute -puissance des dirigeants
et de l’affrontement entre le droit naturel (qu’elle défend) eht le droit posi -
tif (que représente Créon). Des écrivains se sont emparés hde ce thème et
des philosophes l’ont étudié tout au long des siècles. Au mihlieu du
XX esiècle, par exemple, J. Anouilh a écrit sa propre version de la tragé -
die d’Antigone, dans une perspective différente, mais en dépeignant aussi
la fatalité qui s’abat sur Antigone et sur les autres personnages.h Son Anti‑
gone a été publiée initialement en 1942 et donnée pour la première fois en
1944 à Paris, sous l’occupation nazie.
364. A travers les siècles, les champs de bataille sont couverts de
cadavres abandonnés, comme l’attestent de si nombreux textes (hishto -
riques, philosophiques et littéraires). C’est contre cet abandon hqu’Anti-
gone s’insurge. La pièce montre que, de l’époque de Sophocle à nos jours,
les morts et les vivants sont proches les uns des autres dans de nombreuhses
cultures, et en fin de compte dans la conscience humaine. La détermhina -
tion d’Antigone à offrir une sépulture digne à la dépouillhe de son frère
rapproche les morts bien -aimés de leurs vivants, et les vivants de leurs
morts. Ce précepte éternel est plein d’humanisme. Face à desh considéra -
tions relevant de la raison d’Etat, Antigone résiste et reste fidèle à
ellemême, respectant des principes fondamentaux et les valeurs humaines
supérieures qui les sous-tendent. Elle incarne un exemple à suivre.
370 Sophocle, Antigone, vers 72-73, 74-76, 502-503, traduit par Paul Mazon.
371 Ibid., vers 594-597.
372 Ibid., vers 782.
373 Ibid., vers 951-954.
374 Ibid., vers 1351-1352.
327
7 CIJ1077.indb 651 18/04/16 08:54 327 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
365. Nowadays, 25 centuries after Sophocles’ Antigone, have the
“blows of fate” taught us wisdom ? I doubt it. Have the lessons of the suf-
ferings of so many preceding generations been learned ? I am afraid not.
As the present case concerning the Application of the Convention against
Genocide (shows, in situations of conflict, mortal remains continue to be
treated with disdain (cf. supra). And the complaints go on and on. Croa -
tia states that, in 1993, in Tordinci (Eastern Slavonia), corpses were
removed from a mass grave and transported to an unknown place in Ser -
375
bia . In Glina, at least 10 people were killed, but no remains were found
by the date of the submission of the Memorial 376. Still in Glina, the mor-
tal remains of nine civilians were exhumed (on 13 March 1996), but
377
only six of them were identified . Other mortal remains remain missing
elsewhere 37.
366. Furthermore, in Karlovac, Croatia added, the corpses of
five women and one man were removed to an unknown destination, and
by the date of the submission of the Memorial they were not found,
except the corpse of a woman (which was found in a box on the outskirts
379
of the village of Banski Kovačevac) in the spring of 1992 . In its Reply,
Croatia again evoked witness statements found in the Memorial ; and it
adds that, in Dalj, Croat civilians were prevented to flee (after 1 August
1991), and were forced to collect and bury the mortal remains of those
380
killed in the attack .
367. In its arguments in the written phase of the present proceedings,
Serbia did not expressly dismiss Croatia’s claims on mortal remains ahnd
their mistreatment by Serb forces. It instead challenged the reliabilityh of
the evidence produced by Croatia, e.g., as to the number of corpses founhd
in Velepromet (claimed by Croatia to be around a thousand) 381. Then it
contended, in its counter-claim, that Croatia was responsible for misdeehds
against mortal remains of Serbs and for hiding evidence ; it claims, e.g.,
that Croatian soldiers shot into the corpses of Serbs 38. It evoked a wit -
ness statement that, in Glina, a total of 20 dead bodies were strewn all
over the road and on the sides 383. Another witness described that, near
Zirovac, tanks were driven over dead bodies scattered on the road 384.
368. Serbia further claimed that, in Knin, bodies were removed from
the streets in order to hide them from the United Nations ; it added that
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)’s Canadian battal -
375
Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.138, and cf. also para. 4.07.
376 Ibid., para. 5.93.
377 Cf. ibid., para. 5.83.
378 Cf., e.g., ibid., para. 5.179.
379 Ibid., para. 5.157.
380 Cf. Reply of Croatia, para. 5.21.
381 Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 736.
382 Cf. ibid., para. 1222.
383
384 Cf. ibid., para. 1248.
Cf. ibid., para. 1249.
328
7 CIJ1077.indb 652 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 327
365. Aujourd’hui, vingt-cinq siècles après l’Antigone de Sophocle, les
« coups du sort » nous ont -ils enseigné la sagesse ? J’en doute. Les leçons
ont-elles été tirées des souffrances de tant de générations quhi nous ont pr-é
cédés ? Je crains que non. Comme le montre la présente affaire concernant
l’Application de la convention sur le génocide, dans des situations de conflit,
les cadavres continuent d’être traités avec mépris (voir supra). Et les plaintes
se succèdent sans fin. La Croatie affirme que, en 1993, à Tordinci (Slavonie
orientale), des corps ont été enlevés d’un charnier et tranhsportés en un lieu
inconnu en Serbie 375. A Glina, au moins 10 personnes ont été tuées, mais
aucun reste n’avait été retrouvé à la date où le méhmoire a été soumis 37.
Toujours à Glina, les corps de neuf civils ont été exhumés (hle 1 m3ars 1996),
mais six d’entre eux seulement ont été identifiés 377. Les corps d’autres vic-
times sont toujours portés disparus ailleurs 378.
366. En outre, à Karlovac, a ajouté la Croatie, les corps de cinq femmehs
et d’un homme ont été emportés vers une destination inconnueh et demeu-
raient portés disparus à la date où le mémoire a été shoumis, à l’exception
du corps d’une femme retrouvé dans une boîte aux alentours du vhillage de
Banski Kovačevac au printemps 1992 379. Dans sa réplique, la Croatie a
de nouveau fait état de déclarations de témoins figurant dansh le mémoire
et a ajouté que, à Dalj, des civils croates ont été empêchés de fuir après le
1 er août 1991 et ont été contraints de ramasser les corps de ceux qui
avaient été tués lors de l’attaque et de les inhumer 380.
367. Lors de la phase écrite de la présente procédure, la Serbie n’ha pas
rejeté expressément les allégations de la Croatie concernant lehs corps des
victimes et les atteintes à l’intégrité des cadavres commisehs par les forces
serbes. Elle a en revanche contesté la fiabilité des élémehnts de preuve pro -
duits par la Croatie, notamment le nombre de corps trouvés au Velepromet
(un millier environ, selon la Croatie) 381. Elle a ensuite soutenu, dans son
contre-mémoire, que la Croatie avait porté atteinte à l’intégrithé des corps de
victimes serbes et avait dissimulé des preuves; elle a prétendu, par exemple,
que des soldats croates avaient tiré sur les cadavres de Serbes 382. Elle a fait
état de la déclaration d’un témoin qui, à Glina383vait vuh une vingtaine de
cadavres joncher la route et les bas-côtés . D’après un autre témoin, près
de Zirovac, des chars avaient roulé sur les cadavres épars sur la routhe 384.
368. La Serbie a en outre affirmé que, à Knin, les cadavres avaient éhté
enlevés des rues afin de les cacher à l’ONU ; elle a ajouté que le bataillon
canadien de la Force de protection des Nations Unies (FORPRONU)
375 Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.138, et voir aussi par. 4.07.
376
377 Ibid., par. 5.93.
378 Ibid., par. 5.83.
Voir par exemple, ibid., par. 5.179.
379 Ibid., par. 5.157.
380 Réplique de la Croatie, par. 5.21.
381 Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 736.
382 Ibid., par. 1222.
383 Ibid., par. 1248.
384 Ibid., par. 1249.
328
7 CIJ1077.indb 653 18/04/16 08:54 328 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ion witnessed that Croatian forces were removing and burning corpses in h
385
order to hide evidence . All this, it argued, was aimed at preventing that
the precise number of victims could be determined 386. In its Rejoinder,
Serbia contended that on the road towards the bridge on the River Sava, h
387
there were many dead bodies of Serbs for about 3.5 km . It added that
Croatian forces removed any traces of dead bodies in order to conceal thhe
388
extent of the alleged crimes committed , by first burning the bodies and
then burying them 389. Many dead bodies were seen lying on the streets in
civilians’ columns fleeing Knin 390.
369. For its part, Croatia, in the oral phase of the present proceedings,
complained that it lacks information on the whereabouts of the remains
of more than 840 Croatian citizens, still missing as the result of the attacks
on civilians 391; it added that Serbia still refuses to help locate their mortal
remains 39. It further referred to another witness statement that there
were countless bodies lying in the streets in the residential area southh of
the Vuka River, which could not be buried because of the danger from
393
shelling . In the town centre by the Danube River, it proceeded, there
were also corpses which remained unburied 394. In Borovo Selo, it
added, Serb paramilitaries killed 12 Croat police officers and mutilated
395
their remains .
370. According to the Applicant, after the shelling of the city of
396
Vukovar, dismembered bodies were seen lying in the rubble ; corpses
lined the street 397. In Velepromet, a witness describes 15 decapitated
bodies by a hole in the ground 398. Turning to the occurrences in Donji
Caglić, Croatia stated that the corpses of civilians were buried in a
trench, dug by a JNA vehicle 399. In Siroka Kula, it added, 29 Croats
were killed by the SAO Krajina and their corpses were thrown into burn -
ing houses 400. Moreover, Croatia proceeded, a witness described
that, around Lovas, Croats were used to clear minefields ; mines would
385
386Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 1262 and 1131.
Ibid., para. 1238.
387Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 652-4.
388Cf. ibid., para. 654.
389Cf. ibid.
390Cf. ibid., para. 760.
391
392CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, para. 6.
CR 2014/6, of 4 March 2014, para. 40.
393Cf. CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014, para. 13.
394Cf. ibid., para. 14.
395Ibid., para. 13.
396
397Ibid., para. 32.
Ibid., para. 38.
398Cf. Ibid., para. 57. Another witness, who was in Vukovar and was taken to Dalj,
described a pit of corpse; cf.bid. para. 77.
399Cf. Reply of Croatia, Vol. 1, para. 6.8; and cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014,
para. 16.
400
Cf. CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, para. 27.
329
7 CIJ1077.indb 654 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 328
avait vu les forces croates déplacer et brûler des corps pour dissimuler les
385
preuves . Toutes ces mesures, selon elle, visaient à empêcher que le
nombre de victimes soit établi avec précision 386. Dans sa duplique, la Ser-
bie a affirmé que la route qui menait au pont sur la Save était chouverte de
387
corps de Serbes morts sur environ 3,5 kilomètres . Elle a ajouté que les
forces croates effaçaient toute trace des cadavres afin de camouflher l’am-
388 389
pleur des crimes commis , en brûlant les corps avant de les enterrer .
De nombreux civils qui avaient constitué des colonnes et tenté de hfuir ont
été tués et leurs corps ont été vus dans les rues de Kninh 390.
369. De son côté, la Croatie, lors de la phase orale de la présente hproc-é
dure, a fait valoir qu’elle ne savait pas où se trouvaient les déhpouilles de plus
de 840 citoyens croates, toujours portées disparues à la suite des attaquhes
contre les civils 391; elle a ajouté que la Serbie s’obstinait à refuser d’aider à
les retrouver 392. Elle a mentionné un autre témoignage selon lequel les rues
de la zone résidentielle située au sud de la Vuka étaient jonchhées d’innom -
brables cadavres qui n’avaient pu être inhumés en raison des rihsques que
393
couraient tous ceux qui sortaient sous les bombardements . Dans le
centre-ville sur le Danube, a-t-elle ajouté, il y avait également des corps res-
tés sans sépulture 39. A BorovoSelo, a-t-elle aussi affirmé, des paramilitaires
395
serbes ont tué 12 policiers croates dont ils ont mutilé les cadavres .
370. Selon le demandeur, après le bombardement de la ville de
Vukovar, des témoins avaient vu des corps démembrés étendus hdans les
décombres 396 ; les corps jonchaient les rues 397. Au Velepromet, un témoin
a affirmé avoir vu 15 corps décapités gisant près d’un trou dans le sol 398.
A Donji Caglić, selon la Croatie, les corps de civils avaient été enterrhés
dans une tranchée creusée par un véhicule de la JNA 399. A Siroka Kula,
a-t-elle ajouté, 29 Croates avaient été tués par la SAO Krajina et leurs
cadavres jetés dans des maisons en feu 400. En outre, un témoin a raconté
que, aux alentours de Lovas, les Croates avaient été utilisés phour nettoyer
385
386 Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 1262 et 1131.
Ibid., par. 1238.
387 Duplique de la Serbie, par. 652-4.
388 Ibid., par. 654.
389 Ibid.
390 Ibid., par. 760.
391
392 CR 2014/5, par. 6.
CR 2014/6, par. 40.
393 CR 2014/8, par. 13.
394 Ibid., par. 14.
395 Ibid., par. 13.
396
397 Ibid., par. 32.
Ibid., par. 38.
398 Ibid., par. 57. Un autre témoin, qui se trouvait à Vukovar et avait été hemmené à
Dalj, a décrit une fosse remplie de corps (voir ibid. par. 77).
399 Voir réplique de la Croatie, vol. 1, par. 6.8, et CR 2014/10, par. 16.
400
CR 2014/10, par. 27.
329
7 CIJ1077.indb 655 18/04/16 08:54 329 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
go offand ther401ere dead bodies lying all over, and Serb forces were fir -
ing at them .
371. Croatia cited an agreement between Croatia and Serbia, concluded
in 1995, whereby they established a Joint Commission in order, inter alia,
to exhume and identify mortal remains of unidentified bodies. Croatia
contended that the mortal remains of 394persons have been exhumed, but
402
only 103 bodies have been handed over to it . Serbia retorted that “only
103” corpses have been returned to Croatia because only 103 DNA
profiles have matched the DNA samples of the Croatian missing per -
403
sons .
372. In the oral phase of the present proceedings, Serbia claimed that
Croat forces disrespected the mortal remains of Serbs following the Operh -
ation Storm, and removed traces of the corpses that were lying in the
roads 404. Serbia added that the Croats shot at the bodies of dead Serbs 405,
and also referred to occurrences of corpses having been burned by Cro -
406 407
ats ; five of them were found in Bijeli Klanac . According to Serbia,
five tractor drivers were killed by Croatian soldiers and their bodiesh were
thrown into a river 40.
373. From time immemorial to the present, the proper disposal of
mortal remains, particularly in situations of armed conflict or extremhe
violence and disruption of the social order, has been a perennial concerhn.
It marked presence already in the minds of the “founding fathers” hof the
law of nations. One decade ago, in another international jurisdiction
(IACtHR), in my separate opinion in the case of the massacre of the Moi ‑
wana Community v. Suriname (Judgment of 15 June 2005), I deemed it fit
to ponder that :
“It cannot pass unnoticed that an acknowledgement of the duties
of the living towards their dead was, in fact, present in the very ori -
gins, and along the development, of the law of nations. Thus, to refer
but to an example, in his treatise De Jure Belli ac Pacis (of 1625),
H. Grotius dedicated Chapter XIX of Book II to the right of burial
(derecho de sepultura). Therein Grotius sustained that the right of
burying the dead has its origin in the voluntary law of nations, and
401
Cf. CR 2014/20, of 20 March 2014, p. 55, para. 33.
402CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, p. 37, para. 9.
403CR 2014/24, of 28 March 2014, pp. 60-61, para. 8.
404CR 2014/16, of 12 March 2014, p. 43, para. 3. Serbia cited statements in support of
its clai; cf.bid., pp. 46-51. It further referred to a witness who was called to recognize his
father’s dead body but it was torched the identification was only possible through DNA
analysis; ibid., p. 57, para. 52. Another witness found the mortal remains of a deceased
beneath a burned family house after six months of the conflict in the har;aibid., p. 59,
para. 3.
405Ibid., pp. 44-45, para. 10.
406Ibid., p. 60, para. 11.
407CR 2014/17, of 13 March 2014, p. 44, para. 104.
408Cf. ibid., p. 36, para. 80.
330
7 CIJ1077.indb 656 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 329
des champs de mines ; les mines explosaient, les cadavres gisaient tout
401
autour et les forces serbes les criblaient de balles .
371. La Croatie a fait état de l’accord conclu entre elle et la Serbie hen
1995, portant création d’une commission conjointe chargée, notamment,
d’exhumer et d’identifier les corps non identifiés. Elle a affirmé que les
dépouilles de 394 personnes avaient été exhumées, mais que 103 corps
seulement lui avaient été restitués 40. La Serbie a répondu que «103 [corps]
seulement » avaient été remis à la Croatie parce que 103 profils ADN
seulement correspondaient aux échantillons d’ADN des Croates dispah -
rus 403.
372. Lors de la phase orale de la présente procédure, la Serbie a affirmé
que les forces croates avaient porté atteinte à l’intégritéh des cadavres de
Serbes après l’opération Tempête et enlevé toute trace des corps qui
gisaient sur les routes 404. Elle a ajouté que les Croates tiraient sur les
405
cadavres de Serbes et a fait état de cas dans lesquels des corps
avaient été brûlés par les Croates 40; cinq corps calcinés avaient été
retrouvés à Bijeli Klanac 40. D’après la Serbie, cinq conducteurs de trac-
teurs av408nt été tués par des soldats croates et leurs corps, hjetés dans une
rivière .
373. Depuis des temps immémoriaux jusqu’à nos jours, le respect dûh
aux morts, en particulier dans les situations de conflits armés ou hd’ex -
trême violence dans la perturbation de l’ordre social, a étéh une préoccup-a
tion constante, déjà présente à l’esprit des « pères fondateurs» du droit
international public. Il y a dix ans, dans une autre juridiction internahtio-
nale (CIDH), j’ai jugé utile, dans l’exposé de l’opiniohn individuelle que
j’ai jointe à l’arrêt rendu en l’affaire du massacre de lah Communauté
moiwana c. Suriname (15 juin 2005), de faire état de ce qui suit :
«L’on ne saurait méconnaître que la reconnaissance des devoirs
des vivants à l’égard de leurs morts était, en fait, présente aux ori -
gines mêmes, et tout au long de l’élaboration, du droit internahtional
public. Ainsi, pour n’en donner qu’un exemple, H. Grotius, dans son
traité De jure belli ac pacis (1625), a consacré le chapitre XIX du
livre II au droit à la sépulture («derecho de sepultura»). Il y soutient
que le droit d’enterrer les morts trouve son fondement dans le droit h
401 CR 2014/20, p. 55, par. 33.
402
403 CR 2014/21, p. 37, par. 9.
404 CR 2014/24, p. 60-61, par. 8.
CR 2014/16, p. 43, par. 3. La Serbie a cité des témoignages à l’appui de ses griefs ;
(voir ibid., p. 46-51). Elle a en outre indiqué qu’un témoin avait été ahppelé à identifier le
cadavre de son père, mais que celui -ci avait été brl’identification avait finalement été
possible grâce à l’analyse de l’ADN (ibid., p. 57, par. 52). Un autre témoin a découvert le
cadavre d’un de ses proches sous les décombres de leur maison brûhlée, six mois après le
conflit dans la région (ibid., p. 59, par. 3).
405 Ibid., p. 44-45, par. 10.
406 Ibid., p. 60, par. 11.
407
408 CR 2014/17, p. 44, par. 104.
Ibid., p. 36, par. 80.
330
7 CIJ1077.indb 657 18/04/16 08:54 330 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
all human beings are reduced to an equality by precisely returning to
the common dust of the earth 409.
Grotius further recalled that there was no uniformity in the original
funeral rites (for example, the ancient Egyptians embalmed, while
most of the Greeks burned, the bodies of the dead before committing
them to the grave ; irrespective of the types of funeral rites, however,
the right of burial was ultimately explained by the dignity of the
410
human person . Grotius further sustained that all human beings,
including ‘public enemies’ (enemigos públicos) were entitled to
burial, this being a precept of ‘virtue and humanity.’” 411(IACtHR,
Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Judgment of 15 June 2005,
paras. 60-61.)
374. Despite this long-lasting concern, mortal remains keep on being
disrespected, as the present case concerning the Application of the Conven‑
tion against Genocide shows. And this is not the only contemporary exam-
ple of this sad disdain. This is so — as I further pointed out in my
aforementioned separate opinion in the Moiwana Community case (ibid.,
para. 63) — despite the fact that international humanitarian law provides
for respect for the remains of the deceased. Article 130 of the
1949 IV Geneva Convention (on the Protection of Civilian Persons)
requires all due care and respect with mortal remains. Article 34 of Pro -
tocol I of 1977 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 elaborates on the
matter in greater detail ; and
“the commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross
on that Article points out that the respect due to the remains of the
deceased ‘implies that they are disposed of as far as possible in accho-rd
ance with the wishes of the religious beliefs of the deceased, insofar
as these are known’, and warns that ‘even reasons of overriding puhb -
lic necessity cannot in any case justify a lack of respect for the remains
of the deceased’” 412(ibid.).
4. The Existence of Mass Graves
375. In the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, Croatia submitted argu -
ments in relation to mass graves discovered in various municipalities,
both in its written and in its oral pleadings. It focused on the description
of crimes committed in each municipality and the existence of mass gravehs
409
H. Grotius, Del Derecho de la Guerra y de la Paz [1625], Vol. III (Books II and III),
Madrid, Edit. Reus, 1925, p. 39, and cf., p. 55.
410 Ibid., pp. 43 and 45.
411 Ibid., pp. 47 and 49; and cf.H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis [1625] (ed.
B. M. Telders), The Hague, Nijhoff, 1948, p. 88 (abridged version).
412 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva, ICRC/
Nijhoff, 1987, pp. 369 and 379.
331
7 CIJ1077.indb 658 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 330
volontaire des gens, et que tous les êtres humains sont rendus à lh’éga -
lité précisément en retournant à la poussière commune de hla terre . 409
Grotius a aussi rappelé que les rites funéraires originaux n’éhtaient
pas uniformes (par exemple, dans l’Egypte ancienne, les corps des
morts étaient embaumés avant d’être mis au tombeau, alors quhe la
plupart des Grecs les brûlaient) ; cela étant, quels que soient les types
de rites funéraires, le droit à la sépulture s’expliquait enh dernière ana -
410
lyse par la dignité de la personne humaine . H. Grotius a en outre
soutenu que tous les êtres humains, y compris les « ennemis publics»
(«enemigos públicos»), avaient le droit à une sépulture, ce qui était
un précepte de « vertu et d’humanité ».» 411 (CIDH, Communauté
moiwana c. Suriname , arrêt du 15 juin 2005, par. 60-61.)
374. Malgré cette préoccupation durable, des atteintes au respect dûh
aux morts continuent d’être commises, comme le montre la présente
affaire relative à l’Application de la convention sur le génocide. Et ce n’est
pas le seul exemple contemporain de ce triste manque de respect. Il en vha
ainsi — comme je l’ai souligné dans l’exposé susmentionné joint àh l’arrêt
rendu en l’affaire de la Communité Moiwana (ibid., par. 63) — en dépit du
fait que le droit international humanitaire prévoit le respect des déhpouilles
des défunts. L’article 130 de la convention IV de Genève (1949) relative à
la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre exige que l’athten -
tion et le respect requis soient portés aux restes mortels. L’artihcle 34 du
Protocole I de 1977 additionnel aux conventions de Genève de 1949
apporte des précisions sur cette question ; et
«le commentaire du Comité international de la Croix -Rouge sur cet
article souligne que le respect des restes « implique aussi qu’il en soit
disposé, dans toute la mesure du possible et dans la mesure où ilsh
sont connus, conformément aux vœux ou aux croyances religieuses
du défunt », et affirme que même des motifs impérieux d’intérêth
public ne sauraient justifier, en aucun cas, de ne pas respecter les
restes des personnes décédées »412 (ibid.).
4. L’existence de charniers
375. Dans la procédure concernant le cas d’espèce, la Croatie a pré -
senté, tant dans ses pièces écrites que dans ses plaidoiries, dhes moyens re- la
tifs aux charniers découverts dans diverses municipalités. Elle a hmis
l’accent sur la description des crimes commis dans chaque municipalithé et
409
H. Grotius, Del Derecho de la Guerra y de la Paz [1625], vol. III (books II and III),
Madrid, Edit. Reus, 1925, p. 39, et p. 55.
410Ibid., p. 43 et 45.
411Ibid., p. 47 et 49 ; et voir Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis [1625] (dir. publ.,
B. M. Telders), La Haye, Nijhoff, 1948, p. 88 (version abrégée).
412Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski et B. Zimmermann (dir. publ.), Commentaire des Proto ‑
coles additionnels du 8juin 1977 aux Conventions de Genève du 12août 1949, Genève, CICR/
Nijhoff, 1987, p. 369 et 379.
331
7 CIJ1077.indb 659 18/04/16 08:54 331 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
proving the commission of the crimes. It also submitted material evidenche
of mass graves, including photographs and colour plates of mass graves,
as annexes to its pleadings.
376. The analysis of Croatia’s arguments demonstrates that mass
graves were common across many of the municipalities that it presented. h
Croatia submitted photographic and documentary evidence recording the
findings made during the excavation of mass graves, as proof of the
crimes that it alleges to have been committed. It seems, from the evidenhce
and arguments examined, that the amount of mass graves in various
municipalities supports the allegation that mass killings were committedh
against Croats.
377. In the course of the written phase of the present proceedings, Cro -
413
atia developed its arguments concerning mass graves in its Memorial .
It submitted that, in total, 126 mass graves were found (at the time of the
writing of the Memorial), of which 61 were in Eastern Slavonia 414. Croa-
tia mentioned mass graves found in various municipalities, including, e.hg.,
villages in Eastern Slavonia : in Banovina, where 39 mass graves were dis-
covered and 241 bodies have been exhumed (of which 175 have been
identified) 415; in Kordun and Lika, where 11 mass graves were found 41;
and in the village of Lovas. Croatia submitted arguments and informa -
tion in relation to each mass grave. In relation to Vukovar, for exampleh,
Croatia submitted that most of Vukovar was completely destroyed and
that the mass grave at Ovčara, where some 200 Croats were taken by
Serbs from the Vukovar Hospital, summarily executed and then left in a
shallow mass grave 417.
378. Still in respect of Vukovar, Croatia submitted that three mass
graves were found : Ovčara, where 200 corpses were found (and 145 per-
sons were identified) ; in Novo Groblje, 938 mortal remains were found
(and 722 persons were identified) ; in Nova Street 10 mortal remains were
found (and six persons were identified). A grave containing three corpses
was found in Borovo Selo. Croatia submits that “[t]hese numbers are pha-r
alleled only in the Prijedor County in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 418. In
total, Croatia contended, 1,151 corpses were found in the mass graves in
Vukovar 419.
413
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, Annexes 165-166. Cf. also ibid., Vol. 3, Section 7 (Identi-
fied Mass Graves).
414Ibid., para. 8.11.
415Ibid., para. 5.77.
416Ibid., para. 5.137.
417Cf. ibid., para. 4.175. As to the Ovčara mass grave, Croatia refers to the Report on
Evacuation of the Vukovar Hospital and the Mass Grave at Ovčara, UN Commission of
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council resolution780 (1993), and Physicians for
Human Rights, Reports of Preliminary Site Exploration of a Mass Grave Nehar Vukovar,
Former Yugoslavia, and Appendices A-D (19 January 1993).
418
Ibid., para. 4.188.
419Ibid.
332
7 CIJ1077.indb 660 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 331
sur l’existence de charniers prouvant la commission de ces crimes. Elhle a
aussi présenté des preuves matérielles de l’existence de chahrniers, notam-
ment des photographies et des planches en couleurs, en annexe à ses phièces.
376. L’analyse des moyens de la Croatie montre que les charniers
étaient courants dans la plupart des municipalités qu’elle a prhésentées. La
Croatie a soumis des preuves photographiques et documentaires consi -
gnant les constatations faites lors de l’excavation de charniers, àh titre de
preuve des crimes qu’elle affirme avoir été commis. Il semble,h d’après les
éléments de preuve et les moyens examinés, que le nombre de chahrniers
découverts dans diverses municipalités vienne appuyer l’alléhgation selon
laquelle les Croates ont été victimes de massacres.
377. Au cours de la phase écrite de la présente procédure, la Croatihe a
développé ses arguments concernant les charniers dans son mémoihre 413.
Elle a fait valoir que, au total, 126 charniers avaient été découverts (au
414
moment de la rédaction du mémoire), dont 61 en Slavonie orientaleh .
Elle a fait état de charniers découverts dans diverses municipalités, notam-
ment dans des villages de Slavonie orientale, dans la Banovina, où
39 charniers av415nt été découverts et 241corps exhumés (dont 175avaient
été identifiés) , le Kordun et la Lika, où 11 charniers avaient été mis au
jour 41, et dans le village de Lovas. Elle a présenté des moyens et des
informations relatifs à chaque fosse. En ce qui concerne Vukovar, par
exemple, elle a fait valoir que l’essentiel de la ville avait étéh complètement
détruite et a fait état du charnier d’Ovčara, où les Serbhes avaient emmené
quelque 200 Croates de l’hôpital de Vukovar, les avaient exécutés som -
417
mairement puis les avaient laissés dans un charnier peu profond .
378. Toujours au sujet de Vukovar, la Croatie a fait valoir que trois
charniers avaient été découverts : à Ovčara, où 200 corps avaient été trou-
vés (dont 145 identifiés), au Novo Groblje [nouveau cimetière], où les
restes de 938 victimes avaient été exhumés (dont 722 identifiés) et rue
Nova, où 10 corps avaient été exhumés (dont six identifiés). Une tomhbe
contenant trois corps avait été découverte à Borovo Selo. La Croatie a
précisé que « [l]e seul autre endroit où le nombre de victimes a atteint
des proportions analogues est le district de Prijedor, en Bosnie-
418
Herzégovine » . Au total, a-t-elle a419rmé, 1151 corps avaient été décou-
verts dans des charniers à Vukovar .
413Voir mémoire de la Croatie, annexes165-166. Voir aussi ibid., vol.3, section 7 (char-
nie414recensés).
415Ibid., par. 8.11.
Ibid., par. 5.77.
416Ibid., par. 5.137.
417Ibid., par. 4.175. En ce qui concerne le charnier d’Ovčara, la Croatie renvoieh au
rapport sur l’évacuation de l’hôpital de Vukovar et le charnhier d’Ovčara, Commission
d’experts des Nations Unies établie en vertu de la résolutio780 (1993) du Conseil de
Sécurité, et à Physicians for Human Rights, Reports of Preliminhary Site Exploration of a
Mass Grave Near Vukovar, Former Yugoslavia et annexes A-D jointes auxdits rapports
(19 janvier 1993).
418
419Ibid., par. 4.188.
Ibid.
332
7 CIJ1077.indb 661 18/04/16 08:54 332 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
379. At the time of the writing of the Memorial, Croatia further argued
that, due to the operations of the Serb paramilitary groups and the JNA
in the area of Western Slavonia, five mass graves were found, from which
20 bodies were exhumed and identified, and that almost all of the identi -
fied corpses were Croats 420. Croatia added that, at the time of the writing
of the Memorial,
“sixty-one mass graves have been found in Eastern Slavonia (. . .)
2,028 people have been exhumed of whom 1,533 have been identified.
In the Osijek-Baranja County, 171 persons were exhumed and 135 of
them were identified. In the Vukovar SrijemCounty 1,857persons were
exhumed, and 1,418 of them were identified. Further mass graves are
still being discovered. Moreover, many of the mass graves, which came
into being in the relevant period, acted as temporary burial sites only.h”21
380. Croatia further submitted that “[t]he JNA often dug up the bodies
and moved them to other parts of the occupied territory or Serbia. For
example, dead bodies from the village of Tordinci were taken to Serbia
422
and dead bodies from Tikveš were taken to Beli Manastir” . In relation
to Eastern Slavonia, for example, Croatia contended, as to the village ohf
Tenja, that a mass grave was exhumed on the farm, and the remains of
three persons were identified. In the village of Berak, in the region hof
Eastern Slavonia, a mass grave between Orolik and Negoslavci, in a val -
ley called “Sarviz”, was also found 423. Croatia also reported exhumations
of mass graves in Ilok 42. In the village of Tovarnik, Croatia added, it
was common for the Serb paramilitary groups to force Croats to bury
their fellow dead, and it referred to a witness testimony confirming thhe
existence of mass graves and numerous murders of Croatian civilians 42.
381. Similarly, at the time of the writing of the Memorial, in the village
of Lovas, the mass grave of 68people at the local graveyard was exhumed,
and 67 were identified. As to the village of Tordinci, Croatia asserted that h
the corpses of
“approximately 209 Croats [were] discovered near the Catholic
Church. (. . .) The registrar of Tordinci was to list the people in the
mass grave, but because of the number of corpses, he was unable to
complete the task. Till today the identity of some of these persons is
not known. In 1993, the bodies were removed from the grave and
transported to an unknown place in Serbia. (. . .) Columns of JNA
trucks were used to transport the remains of the dead and only
five bodies of the inhabitants of Tordinci and nine inhabitants of the
420
421Memorial of Croatia, para. 5.04.
422Ibid., para. 4.07.
Ibid.
423Ibid., para. 4.41.
424Ibid., para. 4.72.
425Ibid., para. 4.102; and cf. Annex 83.
333
7 CIJ1077.indb 662 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 332
379. La Croatie a également affirmé que, au moment de la rédaction h
du mémoire, en raison des opérations menées par les groupes parhamili -
taires serbes et la JNA dans la région de la Slavonie occidentale, cinq char-
niers avaient été mis au jour, ce qui avait permis d’exhumer et d’identifier
20 corps, dont la quasi -totalité étaient ceux de Croates 420. Elle a ajouté
que, au moment de la rédaction du mémoire,
« 61 charniers avaient été découverts en Slavonie orientale… Sur hles
2028 personnes exhumées, 1533 avaient pu être identifiées. Dans leh
district d’Osijek -Baranja, sur les 171 corps exhumés, 135 avaient pu
être identifiés. Dans le district de Vukovar -Srijem, sur les 1857 corps
exhumés, 1418 avaient pu être identifiés. D’autres charniers sont
encore mis au jour. De plus, nombre d’entre eux, creusés à l’hépoque
analysée, n’ont servi que de sépulture provisoire. » 421
380. La Croatie a en outre fait valoir que « [l]a JNA avait fréquemment
déterré les corps pour les transférer dans d’autres parties hdu territoire
occupé ou en Serbie. Ainsi, les cadavres d’habitants du village deh Tordinci
avaient été emportés en Serbie et ceux d’habitants du village de Tikveš
transportés à Beli Manastir »422. En ce qui concerne la Slavonie orientale,
par exemple, la Croatie a affirmé, s’agissant du village de Tenjah, qu’un
charnier avait été mis au jour dans une ferme, et que les restes dhe trois
personnes avaient été identifiés. Dans le village de Berak, uhn charnier situé
entre Orolik et Negoslavci, dans une vallée appelée « Sarviz», avait aussi
été découvert 423. La Croatie a aussi fait état de la mise au jour de charniers
424
à Ilok . A Tovarnik, a -t-elle ajouté, une pratique courante des groupes
paramilitaires serbes occupant le village consistait à contraindre lehs Croates
à enterrer leurs morts, et elle a renvoyé à la déposition d’hun témoin confi-r
425
mant l’existence de charniers et de nombreux meurtres de civils croathes .
381. De même, au moment de la rédaction du mémoire, une fosse
contenant 68 corps, dont 67 ont été identifiés, avait été découvehrte dans le
cimetière du village de Lovas. Quant à Tordinci, la Croatie affirme qu’un
charnier contenant
« environ 209 Croates avait été découvert près de l’église catholiquhe…
L’officier de l’état civil avait été chargé de dresser la liste des personnes
enterrées dans le charnier, mais en raison du nombre de cadavres il
avait été incapable de terminer sa tâche. A ce jour, l’identhité de cer -
tains corps demeure inconnue. En 1993, les corps ont été retirés de la
fosse et transportés en un lieu inconnu en Serbie… Des colonnes deh
camions de la JNA ont servi à transporter les restes des morts et seuhls
les corps de cinq habitants de Tordinci et de neuf habitants d’Antin
420
421Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 5.04.
422Ibid., par. 4.07.
Ibid.
423Ibid., par. 4.41.
424Ibid., par. 4.72.
425Ibid., par. 4.102; et voir annexe 83.
333
7 CIJ1077.indb 663 18/04/16 08:54 333 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
village of Antin were left in the grave. These were subsequently exhumedh
and identified, while the others are still registered as missing.” 426
Furthermore, in relation to the village of Saborsko, Croatia submitted
that “the village was completely obliterated and the population exterhmi-
nated. Bodies of the murdered Croats were buried several days later in ah
mass grave prepared by an excavator” 42.
382. In its Reply, Croatia reiterated its arguments and updated the
information submitted in its Memorial,428cluding information about the
location and exhumation of bodies found since the filing of the Memo-
rial. In its Reply, Croatia relied upon further sites of mass graves “has
showing the context and breadth of the killings committed by the Serbianh
429
forces” . Croatia also retorted Serbia’s arguments as to an alleged lack
of impartiality of the information obtained : it asserts that international
entities, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR), the Organization for Security and Co -operation in
Europe (OSCE), and the Observation Commission of the European Com -
munity (in addition to the ICTY itself) were invited to observe the exhhu-
mation of mass graves in Croatia 430.
383. Further in its Reply, Croatia recalled that the ICTY also made
findings in relation to mass graves in Croatia, in the Mrkšić, Radić and
Sljivančanin case. In the words of the ICTY :
“In the Chamber’s finding, in the evening and night hours of
20-21 November 1991 the prisoners of war were taken in groups of
10 to 20 from the hangar at Ovčara to the site where earlier that
afternoon a large hole had been dug. There, members of Vukovar TO
and paramilitary soldiers executed at least 194 of them. The killings
started after 21:00 hours and continued until well after midnight. The
bodies were buried in the mass grave and remained undiscovered
until several years later.” (ICTY, Mrkšić, Radić and Sljivančanin,
431
paras. 252-253.)
384. Croatia further referred to the ICTY (Trial Chamber) findings in
the Martić case in relation to mass graves. It found, e.g., that some per -
sons from Cerovljani (it names them) were intentionally killed. It thehn
recalled “the manner in which the victims from Hrvatska Dubica were
rounded up and detained in the fire station” on 20 October 1991, and
then killed on 21 October 1991 at Krečane near Baćin, and “buried in the
mass grave at that location”. The Trial Chamber considered that the
crimes in Cerovljani were “almost identical” to those in Hrvatska Dubica,
426
427Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.138.
428Ibid., para. 5.152.
Cf. Reply of Croatia, Annexes 43-46.
429Ibid., para. 5.12.
430Ibid., para. 2.56.
431Ibid., para. 5.80.
334
7 CIJ1077.indb 664 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 333
ont été laissés dans la tombe. Ils ont par la suite été ehxhumés et iden-ti
fiés, alors que les autres sont toujours portés disparus. »426
En outre, s’agissant du village de Saborsko, la Croatie a fait valoirh que l’-is
sue de l’attaque avait été « la destruction intégrale du village et l’extermina -
tion de sa population. Les corps des Croates assassinés avaient éthé enterrés
plusieurs jours plus tard dans un charnier creusé à l’aide d’hun excavateur. » 427
382. Dans sa réplique, la Croatie a de nouveau exposé ses moyens et a
mis à jour les informations figurant dans son mémoire, not428ent celles
concernant l’emplacement et l’exhumation des corps découverts depuis
le dépôt de cette pièce. Elle s’est appuyée sur la déchouverte d’autres char-
niers « pour établir le contexte et montrer l’ampleur des homicides com -
429
mis par les forces serbes » . Elle a aussi répondu aux arguments de la
Serbie concernant le prétendu manque d’impartialité des renseighnements
obtenus, faisant valoir que des organisations internationales telles queh le
Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme (HCDH),
l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE) et la
mission d’observation de la Communauté européenne (en sus du ThPIY
lui-même) avaient été invitées à observer le déroulement hde la mise au
430
jour de charniers en Croatie .
383. Toujours dans sa réplique, la Croatie a rappelé que le TPIY étahit
aussi parvenu aux conclusions suivantes au sujet des charniers en Croatihe,
dans l’affaire Mrkšić, Radić et Sljivančanin :
«La Chambre constate que, dans la soirée du 20 novembre et dans
la nuit du 21 novembre 1991, les prisonniers de guerre ont été emme -
nés, par groupes de 10 ou 20, du hangar d’Ovčaraà l’emplacement où
une grande fosse avait été creusée plus tôt dans l’apr ès-midi. Là, des
membres de la TO de Vukovar et des paramilitaires ont exécuté au
moins 194 prisonniers de guerre. Les exécutions ont commencé après
21 heures et se sont poursuivies jusqu’ à bien après minuit. Les corps
ont été jetés dans la fosse et n’ont été découvertsh que plusieurs années
431
plus tard. » (TPIY, Mrkšić, Radić et Sljivančanin, par. 252-253.)
384. La Croatie a aussi renvoyé aux conclusions rendues par le TPIY
dans le jugement Martić, en ce qui concerne les charniers. Le TPIY a
constaté, par exemple, que certains habitants de Cerovljani (dont ilh énu-
mère les noms) avaient été tués délibérément. Il ah ensuite rappelé que « les
victimes de Hrvatska Dubica avaient été arrêtées au cours d’une rafle et
détenues dans la caserne des pompiers » le 20 octobre 1991, puis tuées le
lendemain à Krečane (près de Ba ćin), avant d’être « enterrées dans une
fosse commune sur place ». Il a constaté que les crimes commis à Cerovljani
426
427Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.138.
428Ibid., par. 5.152.
Réplique de la Croatie, annexes 43-46.
429Ibid., par. 5.12.
430Ibid., par. 2.56.
431Ibid., par. 5.80.
334
7 CIJ1077.indb 665 18/04/16 08:54 334 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
“including that most of the victims were buried at the mass grave in h
Krečane”. The Trial Chamber considered it “proven beyond reasonhable
doubt that these victims were civilians and that they were not taking an
active part 432the hostilities at the time of their deaths” (ICTY, Martić,
para. 359) .
385. Serbia, for its part, submitted that some of the evidence, especially
433
graphics called “mass graves”, were prepared by Croatian official bodies .
In its view, evidence of mass graves was of “little worth”, considhering that
“the exhumation reports do not provide evidence of genuinely mass
graves of the sort found in Srebrenica, Rwanda and Eastern Europe
following World War II. Rather, the burials seemed to be of relatively
small clusters of deceased persons, dispersed throughout the various
regions and municipalities of Slavonia.” 434
However, much as it tried to discredit the evidence, Serbia did not come
to the point of denying the existence of mass graves.
386. In the course of its oral pleadings, Croatia reiterated its conten -
tions in relation to the existence of mass graves, their location and the
bodies found therein. It added that new mass graves were found more
recently, e.g., the mass grave in Sotin, containing 13 corpses 435. Croatia
also argued, in relation to Eastern Slavonia, that, within a year of Ser -
bia’s occupation, the communities of the region had been destroyed anhd
that
“[t]he intent to destroy the Croat population is as clear as the figures
are stark (. . .): 510 mass graves have since been discovered, contain-
ing the corpses of nearly 2,300 men, women and children ; many
others have been discovered in individual graves. More still are being
discovered yearly.” 436
387. Croatia further recalled the statement of an expert witness during
its oral pleadings (Mr. Grujić), who testified, inter alia, about mass graves.
He stated that “[a]s regards exhumations and the discovery of mass grhaves,
and the time of their creation”, he had to say that “the first mhass graves had
432Reply of Croatia, para. 6.35. And cf. also ICTY (Trial Chamber), Martić case,
paras. 364-367, as to atrocities committed in Bać; paras.202-208, as to Lipovača; and
paras.233-234, as to killings in Saborsko.
433
434Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 264.
Ibid., para. 349.
435CR 2014/8, p. 22, para. 55.
436Ibid., p. 27, para. 71. Croatia then corrected this statement in the following terms :
“What I intended to say was that a total of 510mass and individual graves had
been discovered in Eastern Slavonia containing almost 2,300 bodies. We have now
checked the most up -to-date figures on the website of the Directorate for Missing
and Detained Persons, and it is 71 mass graves, and 432 individual graves in
Eastern Slavonia, giving a total of 503.” (CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 10.)
335
7 CIJ1077.indb 666 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 334
étaient « quasiment identiques» à ceux de Hrvatska Dubica, y compris le
fait que «la plupart des victimes ont été enterrées dans la fosse communeh de
Krečane ». Il a conclu en outre qu’il était «établi au -delà de tout doute rai-
sonnable que ces victimes étaient des civils qui ne participaient pash directe-
ment aux hostilités au moment de leur décès » (TPIY, Martić, par. 359) 432.
385. La Serbie, de son côté, a fait valoir que certains éléments de preuve,
en particulier les graphiques intitulés « charniers», avaient été établis par des
organes croates 433. Selon elle, ces éléments n’avaient «guère de valeur», car
«les rapports d’exhumation ne signal[ai]ent pas l’existence de fosshes
communes à l’échelle de celles qui ont été mises au jour à Srebrenica,
au Rwanda ou en Europe orientale après la seconde guerre mon -
diale. Il s’agit surtout de petits groupes de personnes décédées disper-
sés dans les diverses régions et municipalités de Slavonie. » 434
Cependant, même si elle s’est efforcée de déprécier les prheuves, la Serbie
n’est pas allée jusqu’à nier l’existence de charniers.
386. Au cours des plaidoiries, la Croatie a réaffirmé ses arguments
concernant l’existence de charniers, leur emplacement et les corps quhi y
avaient été trouvés. Elle a ajouté que de nouveaux charniersh avaient été
découverts plus récemment, par exemple celui de Sotin, qui contenahit
13 cadavres 43. Elle a aussi affirmé, au sujet de la Slavonie orientale, que,
en moins d’un an d’occupation par la Serbie, les communautés deh la
région avaient été détruites et que
«[l]’évidence de l’intention de détruire la population croateh n’a[vait]
d’égale que la brutalité des chiffres …: on a[vait] découvert depuis
510 charniers et fosses communes contenant les restes de près de
2300 hommes, femmes et enfants. Nombre d’autres victimes [avaie]nt
été exhumées de fosses individuelles, et chaque année apporth[ait] de
nouvelles découvertes à ce chapitre. » 436
387. La Croatie a ensuite rappelé la déclaration faite au cours des plahidoi-
ries par un expert -témoin (M. Grujić), qui a déposé, notamment, au sujet
des charniers. M. Grujić a affirmé que, « [e]n ce qui concerne les exhuma-
tions et la découverte de charniers et l’époque où ceux -ci ont été creusés», il
432Réplique de la Croatie, par. 6.35. Voir aussi TPIY (chambre de première instance),
affaire Martić, par. 364-367, pour les atrocités commises à B; par.02-208, en ce qui
concerne Lipovača, et par. 233-234 pour les meurtres commis à Saborsko.
433Duplique de la Serbie, par. 264.
434
435Ibid., par. 349.
436CR 2014/8, p. 22, par. 55.
Ibid., p. 27, par. 71. La Croatie a ensuite corrigé cette déclaration dans les termesh
suivants:
«En réalité, j’entendais dire qu’on avait découvert en Slahvonie orientale un total de
510 fosses communes et individuelles contenant les restes de près de 2300 personnes.
Nous avons vérifié les données les plus récentes sur le sihte de la direction chargée des
personnes détenues et disparues, et il s’avère que les nombres exacts sont de 71 fosses
communes et de 432 fosses individuelles, pour un total de 503. » (CR 2014/10, p. 10.)
335
7 CIJ1077.indb 667 18/04/16 08:54 335 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
come into existence as early as July 1991437and “were continually coming
into existence still [in] the year1992” . He further asserted that the largest
mass grave found is the one at the new Vukovar Cemetery, where there areh
938 victims 43. In an answer to a question that I posed, the witness stated
that, in Lovas and Tovarnik, corpses of victims were found in mass gravehs
having markings such as white bands on their arms, and that, “accordihng
to the general information, it is known that in these locations, personsh of
439
Croat ethnicity were thus marked with white armbands” (cf. supra).
388. Croatia further stated, in respect of individual and mass graves,
that, upon Serbia’s withdrawal from the occupied areas of Croatia in h
1995, “mass and individual graves containing the remains of Croat vich -
tims of the genocide began to be uncovered. These graves have been
painstakingly excavated and recorded by [its] Directorate for Detained
440 441
and Missing Persons” . As to the numbers of victims in those graves ,
Croatia submitted that,
“by July 2013, 142 mass graves [plate on] had been discovered in
Croatia, containing the bodies of 3,656 victims. Three thousand,
one hundred and twenty-one (3,121) of those have been identified.
Twenty -seven (27) per cent of these 3,121 bodies were women, and
38.5 per cent of them wer442lder than 60. Thirty-seven (37) minors
were also identified.”
389. Croatia proceeded that, “[b]y December 2013, over 1,100 such
graves have been identified across the formerly occupied territory of h
Croatia”. Croatia added that its efforts to discover the graves have
been hindered by “Serbia’s practice of removing and reburying vic -
tims during its occupation of the region — often in Serbia — in a vain
attempt to cover up its atrocities” 443. In any case, the existence of mass
graves had not been denied, and, towards the end of the nineties, such
graves — in Croatia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina — were fully
documented 444.
437CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 28.
438
439Ibid., p. 29.
440Ibid., p. 35.
CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, p. 18.
441As to the definition of mass graves, Croatia contends that, since therhe is no univer-
sally accepted definition of a “mass grave” in international lawh, it thus follows the defini-
tion coined by the UNSpecial Rapporteur of the (former) Commission on Human Rights,
appointed “to investigate first hand the human rights situation in hthe territory of the
former Yugoslavia”, who defined mass grave as a grave containing thhree or more bodies
cf.ibid. p. 19, para. 42.
442
Ibid., p. 19.
443Ibid., p. 20.
444On the results of the research on the matter, conducted in both Croatia hand Bosnia
and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1997, cf., e.g., The Graves — Srebrenica and Vukovar (eds.
E. Stover and G. Peress), Berlin/Zurich/N.Y., Scalo Ed., 1998, pp. 5-334.
336
7 CIJ1077.indb 668 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 335
devait dire que « les premiers l’ont été dès437illet 1991 » et que « les excava-
tions se sont poursuivies jusqu’en 1992» . Il a ensuite affirmé que le plus
grand charnier découvert était celui du nouveau cimetière de Vuhkovar, dans
lequel se trouvaient 938 corps 438. En réponse à une question posée par le
soussigné, le témoin a dit que, à Lovas et à Tovarnik, les corps des victimes
trouvées dans des charniers portaient des signes distinctifs tels qu’hun bras -
sard blanc au bras et qu’« [i]l [était] de notoriété publique que, dans ces
439
régions, les Croates devaient porter un brassard blanc » (voir supra).
388. La Croatie a en outre déclaré, au sujet des fosses individuelles eht
des charniers que, en 1995, lorsque la Serbie s’était retirée dhes zones occu -
pées de Croatie, « des fosses communes et des fosses individuelles conte -
nant les dépouilles de victimes croates du génocide [avaie]nt commhencé à
être mises au jour. Ces fosses [avaie]nt fait l’objet de fouilles hminutieuses
et d’un recensement par la direction [croate] chargée des personnehs déte-
nues et des personnes disparues » 440. En ce qui concerne le nombre de
victimes dans ces fosses 441, la Croatie a fait valoir ce qui suit :
«[E]n juillet 2013, 142 charniers [projection] avaient été découverts
en Croatie, contenant les cadavres de 3656 victimes. Trois mille
cent vingt et un (3121) de ces corps ont été identifiés, dont 27h %
étaient des cadavres de femmes et 38,5 % étaient ceux de personnes
de plu442e 60 ans. Trente-sept (37) mineurs ont également été identi -
fiés.»
389. La Croatie a poursuivi en affirmant que, «[e]n décembre 2013, plus
de 1100 fosses de ce type avaient été repérées dans l’ensemble duh territoire
précédemment occupé de Croatie ». Elle a ajouté que les démarches qu’elle
avait effectuées en vue de mettre au jour les fosses avaient été d’autant plus
difficiles que « la Serbie, pendant son occupation de la région, avait pour
pratique de déterrer les corps et de les enterrer ailleurs — souvent sur son
propre territoire afin de tenter, en vain, de dissimuler les atrocitéhs qu’elle
avait commises» 443. En tout état de cause, l’existence de charniers n’avait
pas été niée, et, vers la fin des années 1990, on disposait de renseignements
444
complets sur ceux-ci, en Croatie comme en Bosnie-Herzégovine .
437 CR 2014/9, p. 28.
438
439 Ibid., p. 29.
440 Ibid., p. 35.
CR 2014/10, p. 18.
441 En ce qui concerne la définition des charniers, la Croatie a fait valoir que, étant
donné qu’il n’existait pas en droit international de définition universellement acceptée de
l’expression «fosse commune », elle s’en tenait à la définition employée par le raphporteur
spécial de la Commission des droits de l’homme des NationsUnies,mandaté pour « réunir
des renseignements de première main au sujet de la situation des droihts de l’homme sur le
territoire de l’exougoslavie », qui a défini comme commune une fosse contenant trois
vic442es au moins (voir ibid., p. 19, par. 42).
Ibid., p. 19.
443 Ibid., p. 20.
444 Sur les résultats des recherches sur le sujet, menées en Croatie eht en Bosni-eHerzégo-
vine de 1992 à 1997, voir, par exemple, The Graves — Srebrenica and Vukovar (dir. publ.,
E. Stover et G. Peress), Berlin/Zurich/New York, Scalo Ed., 1998, p. 5-334.
336
7 CIJ1077.indb 669 18/04/16 08:54 336 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
5. Further Clarifications from
the Cross‑Examination of Witnesses
390. The information provided to the International Court of Justice in
the course of the proceedings of the present case concerning the Applica‑
tion of the Convention against Genocide leaves it crystal clear, in my per -
ception, that the attacks in Croatia were an onslaught, not exactly a wahr ;
there was a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction of the civihl-
ian population, of the villagers, on account of their ethnicity. In my pher-
ception, as extreme violence intensified, there was, clearly, an intenht, not
only to displace them forcefully from their homes, but also to destroy
them. Further clarifications were provided by the cross -examination of
witnesses, that I cared to undertake in the public and closed sittings
before the International Court of Justice from 4 to 6 March 2014. Those
additional clarifications pertain to three specific topics, namely :(a) acts
of intimidation and extreme violence ; (b) marking of Croats with white
ribbons; (c) burials of mortal remains.
391. As to the first point, in the Court’s public sitting of 4 March 2014,
I asked the witness (Mr. Kožul) the following question : “What was the
decisive factor for sorting the persons detained in Vukovar ? Where and
how was the selection carried out ?” And he replied that they “knew that
the army was coming to different parts of the cities. Because of that, weh
invited people to come to the hospital. Most of the separations took plahce
in the hospital. The rest of the separations took place where people haph -
445
pened to be.” Next, in the Court’s closed sitting of 6 March 2014, I
asked the following question to the witness (Ms Milić), and she provided
the following response :
“— Did you know of, or do you remember, any initiative to con -
tain, to avoid, or to stop the continued acts of violence reported
in your statement ? (. . .) Do you have knowledge of, or do you
remember, any initiative to contain, to avoid, or to stop the
continued acts of violence narrated in your statement ?
— I did not hear that there were any attempts to help or to defend
446
us.”
392. In the International Court of Justice public sitting of 5 March
2014, I proceeded to the cross-examination on the issue of the marking of
Croats with white ribbons, thus reported :
“Judge Cançado Trindade : I thank the expert witness very much
for his testimony. I have one particular question to ask.
The Data on Victims contained in your statement refers, in Part 2
(paras. 6-9), to victims exhumed from mass and individual graves.
445
446CR 2014/7, of 4 March 2014, p. 20.
CR 2014/11, of 6 March 2014, pp. 23-24.
337
7 CIJ1077.indb 670 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 336
5. Nouveaux éclaircissements apportés par
le contre‑interrogatoire des témoins
390. Les informations données à la Cour dans le cadre de la procédure
concernant la présente affaire relative à l’Application de la convention sur
le génocide (Croatie c. Serbie) établissent clairement, à mon sens, que les
événements survenus en Croatie étaient non pas exactement une ghuerre,
mais une campagne de dévastation ; une entreprise de destruction systé -
matique et généralisée de la population, des villageois, en raihson de leur
appartenance ethnique, était à l’œuvre. Selon moi, lorsque lh’extrême vio-
lence s’est intensifiée, l’intention était, à l’éhvidence, non seulement de
chasser de force les Croates de chez eux, mais aussi de les détruire.h De
nouveaux éclaircissements ont été apportés par le contre -interrogatoire
des témoins, que j’ai tenu à mener lors des audiences publiquesh et à huis
clos qui se sont tenues devant la Cour du 4 au 6 mars 2014. Ces éclaircis -
sements portent sur trois points précis, à savoir : a) les actes d’intimida-
tion et l’extrême violence ; b) le fait de distinguer les Croates par des
rubans blancs; c) l’inhumation des corps.
391. En ce qui concerne le premier point, lors de l’audience publique du
4 mars 2014, j’ai posé au témoin (M. Kožul) la question suivante « : Quel
était le critère décisif appliqué pour faire le tri des pershonnes détenues à
Vukovar? Où ce tri a -t-il été fait et comment?» Il a répondu qu’ils «savaient
que l’armée arrivait dans différents secteurs des villes. Nous avions donc
invité les gens à venir à l’hôpital et c’est là queh la plupart des séparations ont
eu lieu. Les autres ont eu lieu là où les gens se trouvaient.»445Ensuite, lors
de l’audience à huis clos du 6 mars 2014, j’ai posé la question ci-dessous au
témoin (M me Milić), qui a répondu comme suit:
« — Aviez-vous connaissance, ou vous souvenez-vous, d’une initia-
tive visant à contenir ou empêcher les violences constantes que
vous rapportez dans votre déclaration, ou à y mettre un terme ?
… Avez-vous connaissance, ou vous souvene- zvous, d’une initia-
tive visant à contenir ou empêcher les violences constantes que
vous rapportez dans votre déclaration, ou à y mettre un terme ?
— A ma connaissance, rien n’a été fait pour nous aider ou nous
446
défendre. »
392. Lors de l’audience publique du 5 mars 2014, j’ai procédé à un
contre-interrogatoire sur l’obligation faite aux Croates de porter des
rubans blancs, dont le compte rendu suit :
«Le juge Cançado Trindade : Je remercie infiniment le témoin -
expert pour son exposé. J’ai une question particulière à posher.
Vos données sur les victimes figurant à la partie2 (par.6-9) de votre
exposé concernent des victimes exhumées de charniers et de sépuhltures
445
446CR 2014/7, p. 20.
CR 2014/11, p. 23-24.
337
7 CIJ1077.indb 671 18/04/16 08:54 337 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
And Part 3 (paras. 10-13) refers to persons detained in camps, sub -
jected, as stated in paragraph 13, to violence with ‘the utmost level of
cruelty’.
In respect of the former, that is, victims exhumed from mass and
individual graves, it is mentioned in your statement (para. 8) that ‘in
certain locations in the Croatian Podunavlje, the killing of Croats
who remained to live in their homes was preceded by their marking
(white bands on the upper arms)’. To the best of your knowledge,
(. . .) did this also happen in respect of the latter, that is, of those
detained in camps? If so, did all those so marked have the same fate?
Mr. Grujić [witness]: Persons who were in the camps, were not thus
marked as far as I know. Such markings were used in several cases
that we have established — precisely in Lovas and Tovarnik— where
we found victims in mass graves having these markings. And, accord -
ing to the general information, it is known that in these locations,
447
persons of Croat ethnicity were thus marked with white armbands.”
393. The other point on which further clarifications were obtained
from the witnesses, that of burials of mortal remains, was the subject ohf
the cross-examination that I deemed it fit to conduct in the International
Court of Justice public sitting of 5 March 2014, reported as follows :
“ Judge Cançado Trindade : (. . .) I thank the witness very much
for her testimony, and I proceed to my questions, pertaining to the
burying of the murdered people after the fall of Bogdanovci.
At the end of your statement (last paragraph) it is asserted that,
after the destruction of the village of Bogdanovci, those who were
buried in the so-called School Square were so ‘in such a way that their
bodies were wrapped in tents and buried with a bottle next to their
bodies. These bottles contained the data of the dead persons’.
Ms Katić: Yes, the data were names and surnames of those persons.
Judge Cançado Trindade : Do you know if the burials described in
your statement were attended by the close relatives of the deceased
ones Or were they buried by third persons ?In that case, was there
a disruption of family life and after -life in Bogdanovci ? (.. .) I won
der whether the funerals were prepared and carried out by persons
who belonged to the inner family circles of the deceased ones.
Ms Katić: The burials of our dead friends, I was the one to prepare
the dead for the burial. In the medical corps, I would remove the
clothes, I would put them either in tent halves, or in black sacks, and h
I would put that bottle containing the names and surnames. There
was a young man, IvicaSimunović is his name, his brother was killed.
447CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, p. 35.
338
7 CIJ1077.indb 672 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 337
individuelles. Et la partie 3 (par. 10-13) fait référence à des personnes
détenues dans des camps et soumises, comme indiqué au para -
graphe 13, à des violences atteignant le «paroxysme [de] la cruauté».
S’agissant des premières, c’est -à-dire les victimes exhumées de
charniers ou de sépultures individuelles, vous indiquez (par. 8) que,
«dans certaines localités [de la Podunavlje croate], les meurtres de
Croates restés dans leurs maisons ont été précédés d’hun marquage
(trait blanc sur l’avantbras)». A votre connaissance, … est-ce aussi
ce qui s’est produit pour les secondes, c’est -à-dire les personnes déte
nues dans des camps ? Et dans ce cas, toutes les personnes portant
cette marque ont-elles subi le même sort ?
M. Grujić [témoin] : A ma connaissance, les détenus n’étaient pas
marqués de la sorte. Cette marque a été utilisée dans plusiehurs cas
— à Lovas et à Tovarnik précisément — où nous l’avons trouvée sur
des victimes dans des charniers. Il est de notoriété publique que,h dans
ces régions, les Croates devaient porter un brassard blanc. »447
393. Le dernier point sur lequel de nouveaux éclaircissements ont étéh
apportés par les témoins, à savoir celui de l’inhumation desh corps, a fait
l’objet du contre-interrogatoire auquel j’ai jugé utile de procéder lors de
l’audience publique du 5 mars 2014, dont le compte rendu suit :
«Le juge Cançado Trindade : … Je remercie infiniment le témoin de
sa déposition et je vais lui poser mes questions, qui ont trait à hl’inhu
mation des personnes tuées après la chute de Bogdanovci.
A la fin de votre déclaration (au dernier paragraphe), vous rappoh-r
tez que, après la destruction du village de Bogdanovci, les personnesh
enterréessur ce qu’on appelait la «place de l’école l’ont été selon les
modalités suivantes: «leurs corps [étaient] emballés dans des tentes et
enterrés chacun avec une bouteille à côté contenant les rensheigne -
ments relatifs à la personne décédée ».
me
M Katić: Oui, les renseignements en question étaient leur nom et
leur prénom.
Le juge Cançado Trindade : Savez-vous si les proches des personnes
décédées ont pu assister aux enterrements que vous évoquez dhans
votre déclaration ? Ou les défunts ont -ils été inhumés par de tierces
personnes ?ans l’affirmative, la vie des familles et leurs projets pour
l’audelà ont-ils été perturbés à Bogdanovci ? … Je me demandais si
les funérailles étaient préparées et célébrées par hdes membres de la
famille proche des défunts.
me
M Katić: En ce qui concerne l’enterrement, c’est moi qui prépa -
rais les corps des nôtres pour l’inhumation. Au sein du corps méhdi -
cal, je les déshabillais, j’emballais leurs corps soit dans une toile de
tente repliée soit dans un grand sac noir, et je plaçais à côhté d’eux
cette bouteille qui contenait leur nom et leur prénom. Il y avait un h
447CR 2014/9, p. 35.
338
7 CIJ1077.indb 673 18/04/16 08:54 338 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
He would usually say a prayer, because we had no priest. We had
some sacred water, we would sprinkle the dead. Branko Krajina was
another person who would assist with the burials of those persons.
But sometimes, it was not possible to take the dead bodies out of the
places where they were, such as basements or garages. So, if it was
not possible to remove the dead body, we would cover it with slack
lime.
Judge Cançado Trindade: Thank you for this clarification.” 448
394. These further clarifications which ensued from the cross-examina-
tion of witnesses in public and closed sittings before the Court, in addhi -
tion to those lodged with it by means of affidavits, are further evidenhce of
the widespread and systematic pattern of destruction which occurred in
the attacks against the civilian population in Croatia which form the dos ‑
sier of the cas d’espèce. To that evidence we can also add the findings of
the ICTY, of the devastation that took place, in particular in the
period 1991-1992, as examined in the course of the present dissenting
opinion.
6. Forced Displacement of Persons and Homelessness
395. The case law of the ICTR, likewise, contains relevant indications
as to the imposition of unbearable conditions of life upon the targeted h
groups. In the Kayishema and Ruzindana case (Judgment of 21 May
1999), for example, the ICTR adopted the interpretation whereby “delhib -
erately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bringh about
its physical destruction in whole or in part” 449includes
“methods of destruction which do not immediately lead to the death
of members of the group. (. . .) [T]he conditions of life envisaged
include rape, the starving of a group of people, reducing required
medical services below a minimum, and withholding sufficient living
accommodation for a reasonable period, provided the above would
lead to the destruction of the group in whole or in part.” (ICTR,
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment of 21 May 1999, para. 116.)
396. In the same vein, in the Gacumbitsi case (7 July 2006), the ICTR,
after recalling that, in accordance with its jurisprudence, genocidal intent
can be proven by inference from the facts and circumstances of a case
(ICTR, Gacumbitsi, Judgment of 7 July 2006, para. 40), added that these
latter could include “the general context”, and
“the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed agaihnst
the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic tar -
448
449CR 2014/9, of 5 March 2014, pp. 22-23.
Cf. Part XIII (4) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
339
7 CIJ1077.indb 674 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 338
jeune homme — Ivica Simunović, c’est son nom —, son frère avait
été tué. Il récitait généralement une prière, car nhous n’avions pas de
prêtre. Nous avions de l’eau bénite, nous en aspergions le défunt.
Branko Krajina aidait aussi pour les inhumations. Mais parfois, il
n’était pas possible de retirer les corps des endroits où ils she trou -
vaient, caves ou garages par exemple. S’il n’était pas possibleh d’ex-
traire le cadavre, nous le recouvrions de chaux éteinte.
Le juge Cançado Trindade : Je vous remercie de cette précision. »448
394. Ces nouveaux éclaircissements apportés par le contre -interroga-
toire des témoins lors des audiences publiques et à huis clos tenuhes devant
la Cour, en sus de ceux apportés par voie de déclarations, sont unhe preuve
supplémentaire de la campagne de destruction systématique et généralisée
mise en œuvre lors des attaques contre la population civile en Croatihe qui
constituent le dossier du cas d’espèce. A ces éléments, noush pouvons éga -
lement ajouter les conclusions du TPIY au sujet de l’assaut dévasthateur
qui a eu lieu, en particulier dans la période 1991-1992, tel qu’examiné
dans le cadre du présent exposé.
6. Déplacement forcé de personnes et privation de domicile
395. Dans la jurisprudence du TPIR figurent aussi des indications intér-ehs
santes concernant la soumission des groupes visés à des conditionsh d’exi- s
tence insupportables. Dans le jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana
(21 mai 1999), par exemple, le TPIR a adopté l’interprétation selon lahquelle
«la soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions d’existenche visant
à entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle»449s’entend également
« des méthodes de destruction qui n’entraînent pas immédiatement la
mort des membres du groupe… [L]es conditions d’existence viséesh
incluent, notamment, le viol, la privation de nourriture, la réductiohn
des services sanitaires en dessous du minimum requis et la détention h
des membres du groupe pendant une durée excessive dans des locaux
dont la surface ne répond pas au minimum requis, dès lors que ces h
mesures sont de nature à entraîner la destruction du groupe, en tohut
ou en partie. » (TPIR, Kayishema et Ruzindana, jugement du 21 mai
1999, par. 116.)
396. Dans le même ordre d’idées, dans son arrêt S. Gacumbitsi (7 juil -
let 2006), le TPIR, après avoir rappelé que, conformément à sa hjurispru-
dence, l’intention génocidaire pouvait s’inférer des faits eht des circonstances
d’une affaire (TPIR, Gacumbitsi, arrêt du 7 juillet 2006, par. 0), a ajouté
que ceux-ci pouvaient s’entendre du « contexte général» et
«[de] la perpétration d’autres actes répréhensibles systématiquement
dirigés contre le même groupe, [de] l’ampleur des atrocités hcommises,
448
449CR 2014/9, p. 22-23.
Voir partie XIII 4 du présent exposé, supra.
339
7 CIJ1077.indb 675 18/04/16 08:54 339 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
geting of victims on account of their membership of a particular
group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts”
(ICTR, Gacumbitsi, Judgment of 7 July 2006, para. 41).
397. In effect, in the present case concerning the Application of the
Convention against Genocide, those who were forcibly displaced, expelled
from their homes (many of them destroyed), were subjected to unbear -
able conditions of life, or rather, of seeking to survive. It is not surhprising
that, in the course of the proceedings in the cas d’espèce, both Croatia, in
its main claim, and Serbia, in its counter-claim, presented arguments inh
relation to refugees, albeit in different contexts.
398. As to its claim, Croatia contended that many atrocities were com -
mitted against refugees by Serb forces. It stated that nearly 7,000 refugees
from neighbouring villages were established in Ilok 450, which was the ini-
tial site of refuge for Croats banished from other parts of the region of
Eastern Slavonia ; according to Croatia, a mass exodus took place from
the town on 17 October 1991 451. During the exodus, the refugees were
exposed to humiliation and molestation by the JNA and paramilitary
Serbian forces. Many properties were allegedly confiscated 452. Croats
who decided not to leave were subjected to physical and psychological
453
harassment and even killing .
399. Croatia furthermore reports additional cases of harassment
against Croatian refugees that were leaving Bapska after its occupation.h
It contends that around 1,000 Croats fled in the direction of Sid in Serbia,
when they were stopped by Serb police and later imprisoned. Croatia
states that some of them were used as “human shield” to protect Sehrb
forces and others killed, while some others had to look for refuge in thhe
surrounding woods 45. According to Croatia, Croat refugees in Serb
occupied territories were prevented to return home on a permanent
455
basis . It added that the “RSK” charged Croatian refugees who fought
in the Croatian forces with various criminal offences and thus created
obstacles for their return 456.
400. For its part, as to its counter-claim, Serbia also reported on
attacks against Serb refugees on the part of Croatia : according to Serbia,
refugee columns and fleeing individuals were targeted and attacked by h
457
Croatian forces during August 1995 . Serbia further claimed that Croa-
tia imposed physical barriers to the return of Serb refugees, mainly by h
450
451 Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.64.
452 Ibid., para. 4.62.
Ibid., para. 4.65.
453 Ibid., para. 4.66.
454 Ibid., para. 4.85.
455 Reply of Croatia, paras. 10.34 and 10.40.
456 Ibid., para. 10.42.
457 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 1242-1257; cf. also Rejoinder of Serbia,
paras. 745-761.
340
7 CIJ1077.indb 676 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 339
[du] fait de viser systématiquement certaines victimes en raison de
leur appartenance à un groupe particulier, ou [de] la récurrence
d’actes destructifs et discriminatoires » (TPIR, Gacumbitsi, arrêt du
7 juillet 2006, par.41).
397. En effet, dans la présente affaire concernant l’Application de la
convention sur le génocide, ceux qui ont été déplacés de force, expulsés de
leurs maisons (beaucoup sont détruites), ont été soumis à hdes conditions
d’existence, ou de survie, insupportables. Il n’est pas étonnanht que, dans
le cadre de la procédure en l’espèce, tant la Croatie dans sa dhemande
principale que la Serbie dans sa demande reconventionnelle aient préshenté
des arguments sur les réfugiés, quoique dans des contextes difféhrents.
398. Dans sa demande, la Croatie a fait valoir que les forces serbes
avaient commis de nombreuses atrocités contre les réfugiés. Ellhe a affirmé
que près de 7000 réfugiés venus de villages voisins s’étaient installés àh
Ilok 450, qui était le lieu initial où avaient été évacués lesh Croates chassés
d’autres parties de la Slavonie orientale ; selon la Croatie, un exode massif
451
de la ville a eu lieu le 17 octobre 1991 . Pendant cet exode, les réfugiés
ont été humiliés et molestés par les soldats de la JNA et lehs membres des
forces paramilitaires serbes. De nombreux biens auraient été confihs -
qués 45. Les Croates ayant refusé de partir ont été soumis à un harcèle-
453
ment physique et psychologique, voire tués .
399. La Croatie a fait en outre état d’autres cas de harcèlement de hréf- u
giés croates qui quittaient Bapska à la suite de son occupation. Ehlle a
affirmé qu’un millier environ de Croates fuyaient en direction deh Sid en
Serbie, quand ils avaient été arrêtés par la police serbe puhis placés en dét-en
tion. Elle a déclaré que certains d’entre eux avaient servi de h« boucliers
humains » aux forces serbes et que d’autres avaient été tués, tandis que cer-
454
tains autres avaient dû chercher refuge dans les bois d’alentour . Selon
elle, les réfugiés croates qui se trouvaient dans les territoires hserbes occupés
avaient été empêchés de retourner chez eux 455. Elle a ajouté que la «RSK»
inculpait les réfugiés croates qui avaient combattu dans les forcehs croates de
diverses infractions pénales et faisait donc obstacle à leur retouhr 456.
400. De son côté, dans sa demande présentée à titre reconventihonnel, la
Serbie a aussi fait état d’attaques contre les réfugiés serbhes commises par la
Croatie: selon elle, des colonnes de réfugiés et de personnes qui fuyaienht
ont été prises pour cible et attaquées par les forces croates ehn aoû1 t995 457.
Elle a également affirmé que la Croatie avait imposé des barrihères phy -
450Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.64.
451Ibid., par. 4.62.
452Ibid., par. 4.65.
453Ibid., par. 4.66.
454Ibid., par. 4.85.
455
456Réplique de la Croatie, par. 10.34 et 10.40.
457Ibid., par. 10.42.
Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 1242-1257; voir aussi duplique, par. 74-761.
340
7 CIJ1077.indb 677 18/04/16 08:54 340 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
458
destroying houses and properties , in addition to legal barriers, inter
alia, by enacting laws to confiscate their properties 459.
401. Both Croatia and Serbia cited common legal efforts to address the
issues of refugees 46, but each contending Party claimed they were vio -
lated by the opposing Party 461. Thus, it can be concluded that both Par -
ties have addressed, and acknowledged, the issue of attacks against
refugees, and in more generic terms, the treatment of refugees by the
opposing Party. In the present Judgment, the International Court of Jus -
tice referred to evidence produced before it, but in particular in relation
to the counter-claim only 462. Yet, the dossier of the present case clearly
shows that there were refugees on both sides, under attacks or harassment
and humiliation, as demonstrated by pleadings of both Parties.
402. If one considers, in the course of the proceedings of the present
case, the depth of the arguments of the contending Parties in relation tho
the main claim as a whole, to try to put the counter-claim on an almost h
equal footing as the claim would seem, to a certain extent, unfair. Nothh-
ing would justify it, as there is a lack of proportion between them. In h
effect, the contending Parties have submitted voluminous evidence in
relation to the claim including witness statements (both in the writtenh and
oral phases), photographs, mass graves data, and other important
material evidence of the alleged genocide committed in Croatia. In con -
trast, the evidence submitted in support of the counter-claim does not
seem comparable, in quantitative and qualitative terms.
403. In my perception, the evidence submitted by Croatia in support of
its main claim is far more convincing in terms of the actus reus and mens
rea of genocide. Likewise, the contending Parties’ arguments, at both theh
written and oral phases of the proceedings, have dedicated far greater
458
Rejoinder of Serbia, paras. 773-774.
459Ibid., paras. 775-780.
460Cf., inter alia, the role of UNPROFOR in securing the return of refugees and
displaced persons to their homes, Memorial of Croatia, para.2.125; the signature of the
Dayton Agreement of 1995, addressing inter alia the issues of refugees, ibid., para. 2.153-
2.154. Cf. also the role of the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia
(UNTAES — established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1037 (1996), which
had among its duties to enable all refugees and displaced persons to exehrcise the right of
free return to their homes), ibid., paras. 2.155-2.158. Cf., moreover, the Agreement on the
Procedures for Return (addressing the issue of refugees), signed by Croatia, UNTAES,
and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1997, ibid., para. 2.157 ; and
cf. further the Vance Plan of December 1991, in Reply of Croatia, paras. 10.12-10.24.
461
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 2.129 and 2.148; Counter-Memorial of Serbia,
para. 570; Rejoinder of Serbia, paras.9-685. As to the Vance Plan, cf. Reply of Croatia,
paras. 10.39-10.43. The mandate of the UNTAES, however, was considered a major h
success; cf.emorial of Croatia, para. 2.158.
462Cf. paras. 458, 484 and 492.
341
7 CIJ1077.indb 678 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 340
siques au retour des réfugiés serbes, principalement en détruishant des ma-i
sons et des biens 45, ainsi qu’en posant des obstacles juridiques, notamment
en promulguant des lois permettant la confiscation de leurs biens 459.
401. La Croatie et la Serbie ont toutes deux fait état des efforts déplohyés
en commun pour résoudre les questions relatives aux réfugiés 460, mais cha-
cune a affirmé que la partie adverse avait violé les accords conchlus 46. On
peut donc en conclure que les deux Parties ont traité, et n’ont pahs mésestimé,
la question des attaques contre les réfugiés et, de manière plus générale, la
façon dont la partie adverse a traité les réfugiés. Dans le hprésent arrêt, la
Cour a renvoyé aux éléments de preuve qui lui avaient étéh soumis, mais plus
particulièrement en relation avec la demande reconventionnelle 462. Pour-
tant, le dossier de la présente affaire montre clairement qu’il y ahvait des
réfugiés des deux côtés, qui ont été victimes d’attaques ou de harcèlemhent et
d’humiliation, comme il apparaît dans les pièces des deux Parties.
402. Si l’on considère, dans le cadre de la procédure concernant la hpré -
sente affaire, l’ampleur des arguments des Parties ayant trait à la demande
principale dans son ensemble, il semble, dans une certaine mesure, injushte
d’essayer de mettre la demande reconventionnelle presque sur le même
pied que la demande. Rien ne saurait d’ailleurs le justifier, car ihls ne sont
pas proportionnels. En effet, les Parties ont produit de nombreux élé -
ments se rapportant à la demande — notamment des déclarations de
témoins (dans la phase écrite comme dans la phase orale), des phhotogra-
phies, des données sur les charniers et d’autres preuves matérielles impor -
tantes du génocide qui aurait été commis en Croatie. Les éléhments de
preuve soumis à l’appui de la demande reconventionnelle ne semblenht pas
comparables, sur les plans quantitatif et qualitatif.
403. A mon sens, les éléments de preuve soumis par la Croatie à l’happui
de sa demande principale sont beaucoup plus convaincants en ce qui concehrne
l’élément matériel (actus reus) et l’élément moral (mens rea) du génocide.
De même, les Parties, tant dans la phase écrite que dans la phase horale de la
458
Duplique de la Serbie, par. 773-774.
459Ibid., par. 775-780.
460Voir, notamment, le rôle joué par la FORPRONU en vue d’assurer le retour des
réfugiés et des personnes déplacées dans leurs foyers, méhmoire de la Croatie, par.2.125; la
signature des accords de Dayton de 1995, traitant notamment des réfughiés,., par. 2.153-
2.154. Voir également le rôle de l’administration transitoire dhes NatioUnies pour la
Slavonie orientale (ATNUSO créée par la résolution 1037 (1996) du Conseil de sécurité,
qui était notamment chargée de permettre à tous les réfugiéhs et aux personnes déplacées
d’exercer leur droit de retourner librement dans leurs foyers), ibid., par. 2.155-2.158. Voir
en outre l’accord sur les procédures de retour (qui traite la quehstion des réfugiés), signé
par la Croatie, l’ATNUSO et le Haut -Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés
(HCR) en 1997, ibid., par2.157; voir aussi le plVance de décembre 1991, réplique de la
Croatie, par. 10.12-10.24.
461
Voir mémoire de la Croatie, par 2.129 et 2.148; contre -mémoire de la Serbie,
par. 570; duplique de la Serbie, par.639-685. En ce qui concerne le plan Vance, voir
réplique de la Croatie, par. 10.39-10.43. La mission de l’ATNUSO a cependant été consi -
dérée comme un succès ; voir mémoire de la Croatie, par. 2.158.
462Voir par. 458, 484 et 492.
341
7 CIJ1077.indb 679 18/04/16 08:54 341 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
attention to the main claim than to the counter-claim. The evidence pro -
duced as to this latter 463 is, in contrast, far less convincing ; this does not
mean that war crimes were not committed, e.g., in the course of the
“Operation Storm”, with its numerous Serb (civilians) victims. Thhe pres-
ent Judgment of the International Court of Justice recounts aspects of thhe
counter-claim (Part VI) that could have been considered in less extensive
terms 464, without an apparently superficial attempt to address the claim
and the counter-claim on an almost equal footing.
404. Last but not least, it is nowadays widely known that the problem
of forced migrations assumed great proportions in the wars in the formerh
Yugoslavia during the nineties, with thousands of refugees and displacedh
persons from Croatia, Bosnia -Herzegovina and Kosovo, successively.
There are accounts and studies of the sufferings and almost unbearable
conditions of life to which victims were exposed, not seldom with the
465
separation and dissolution of families and the destruction of homes .
405. The humanitarian crisis of mass forced migrations began with a
first wave of internally displaced persons (end of 1991), followed bhy waves
of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia -Herzegovina (early 1992 onwards).
It was estimated, half a decade later, that there were 180,000 internally
displaced persons in Croatia, as well as 170,000 refugees from Bosnia -
466
Herzegovina (over 80 per cent of them being Bosnian -Croats) . Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were engaged in assisting the
voluntary repatriation or return of refugees to Croatia and Bosnia -
Herzegovina. Mass forced migrations were another component of the
widespread and systematic pattern of extreme violence and destruction inh
the wars in the Balkans during the nineties.
406. It cannot pass unnoticed here that, in its Decision of 11 July 1996,
in the Karadžić and Mladić case, the ICTY (Trial Chamber), in reviewing
the indictments, invoked the charge of genocide (ICTY, Karadžić and
Mladić, decision of 11 July 1996, para. 6), and stressed the subhuman
conditions of detention of civilians, with the occurrence of crimes (suhch as
torture and rape of women inside the camps or at other places) (ibid.,
para. 13); it further addressed the devastating effects of forced displace -
463
E.g., in relation to Operation Storm (August 1995).
464There would, e.g., hardly be anything to add to what the International Chourt of
Justice found, in the present Judgment, in relation to the transcript ofh the Brioni meeting
of 31 July 1995 (paras. 501-507).
465Cf., inter alia, e.g., N. Mrvić-Petrović, “Separation and Dissolution of the Family”,
Women, Violence and War — Wartime Victimization of Refugees in the Balkans (ed.
V. Nikolić-Ristanović), Budapest, Central European University Press, 2000, pp. 135-149
N. Mrvić-Petrović and I. Stevanović, “Life in Refuge — Changes in Socioeconomic and
Fam466al Status”, in ibid., pp. 151-169.
Cf., for an account, inter alia, P. Stubbs, Displaced Promises — Forced Migration,
Refuge and Return in Croatia and Bosnia‑Herzegovina, Uppsala/Sweden, Life & Peace
Institute, 1999, pp. 1 and 21-22.
342
7 CIJ1077.indb 680 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 341
procédure, ont porté beaucoup plus d’attention à la demande hprincipale qu’à
la demande reconventionnelle. Les éléments de preuve ayant trait àh celle -ci463
sont, par comparaison, beaucoup moins convaincants cela ne signifie pas
que des crimes de guerre n’ont pas été commis, notamment dans lhe cadre de
l’opérationTempête, qui a fait de nombreuses victimes serbes (civiles). Dans
le présent arrêt, la Cour reprend des aspects de la demande reconvhentionnelle
464
(partieVI) dont elle aurait pu rendre compte de manière plus concise , sans
essayer, de manière semble-t-il assez artificielle, de traiter la demande et la
demande reconventionnelle dans des conditions de quas-iégalité.
404. Enfin, il est aujourd’hui de notoriété publique que le problèhme des
migrations forcées s’est posé avec une grande ampleur pendant les guerres
en ex-Yougoslavie tout au long des années1990, qui ont vu se succéder des
milliers de réfugiés et de personnes déplacées de Croatie, dhe Bosnie -Herzégo -
vine puis du Kosovo. Les souffrances et les conditions d’existence presque
insupportables auxquelles les victimes ont été exposées, les familles étant
souvent séparées et désintégrées et les maisons détruihtes, ont fait l’objet de
descriptions et d’études 465.
405. La crise humanitaire provoquée par les migrations forcées de
masse a commencé par une première vague de personnes déplacéhes
(fin 1991), suivie par des vagues de réfugiés de Croatie et de Bosnie -
Herzégovine (début 1992). Cinq ans plus tard, selon des estimations, il y
avait en Croatie 180 000 personnes déplacées et 170 000 réfugiés de
Bosnie -Herzégovine (dont plus de 80 % étaient des Croates de Bosnie) 466.
Des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) aidaient au rapatrie -
ment ou au retour volontaires des réfugiés en Croatie et en Bosnie -
Herzégovine. Les migrations forcées de masse ont été un autrhe élément de
la campagne de violence extrême et de destruction systématiques eth géné-
ralisées menée dans les guerres des Balkans tout au long des annéhes 1990.
406. Il importe de rappeler ici que, dans sa décision du 11 juillet 1996
(examen des actes d’accusation) en l’affaire Karadžić etMladić, le TPIY
(chambre de première instance) a mentionné l’accusation de géhnocide
(TPIY, Karadžić et Mladić, décision du 11 juillet 1996, par. 6) et a souli -
gné les conditions inhumaines de détention des civils, notamment lha com -
mission de crimes (comme la torture et le viol des femmes, dans les camps
ou dans d’autres lieux) ( ibid., par. 13) ; il a aussi fait état des effets dévas -
463 Par exemple, au sujet de l’opération Tempête (août 1995).
464 Il n’y aurait, par exemple, pas grand-chose à ajouter à ce que hla Cour a constaté, dans
le présent arrêt, au sujet du procès -verbal de la réunion de Brioni, tenue le 31 juillet 1995
(par. 501-507).
465 Voir notamment N. Mrvić-Petrović, « Separation and Dissolution of the Family »,
Women, Violence and War — Wartime Victimization of Refugees in the Balkans (dir. publ.,
V. Nikolić-Ristanović), Budapest, Central European University Press, 2000, p135-149 ;
N. Mrvić-Petrović et I. Stevanović, « Lifen Refuge — Changes in Socioeconomic and
Familial Status», ibid., p. 151-169.
466 Pour un compte rendu, voir, notamment, P. Stubbs, Displaced Promises — Forced
Migration, Refuge and Return in Croatia and Bosnia‑Herzegovina, Uppsala/Suède, Life &
Peace Institute, 1999, p. 1, 21-22.
342
7 CIJ1077.indb 681 18/04/16 08:54 342 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ments and abandonment (meant to be definitive) of homes (ICTY,
Karadžić and Mladić, decision of 11 July 1996, para. 14), and of expulsion
and deportation (ibid., paras. 16-17) 467.
7. Destruction of Cultural Goods
407. Earlier on in the present dissenting opinion, in examining the
widespread and systematic pattern of extreme violence and destruction inh
the factual context of the cas d’espèce, I dwelt upon the destruction of
group culture 46. In addition to the examples already mentioned, I see it
fit now to consider the shelling of Dubrovnik (October -December 1991),
as it was the object of particular attention on the part of the contendihng
Parties in the course of the proceedings of the present case.
(a) Arguments of the contending Parties
408. According to Croatia, Serb politicians were planning to include
the city of Dubrovnik in Serbian territory ; the JNA carefully planned and
premeditated the attacks against the Old Town, and the indiscriminate
shelling of Dubrovnik began on the 1 October 1991 and continued until
December 1991 ; under fear, 34,000 were expelled from their homes, and
the inhabitants who remained in the occupied surrounding villages were
taken to camps and some were tortured 46. There were also killings 470.
Supplies were cut off, while the town kept being bombarded with heavy
artillery. Inhabitants were denied access to medical assistance, food anhd
water. Mistreatments, physical and mental intimidation, and house
471
destruction were routinely conducted .
409. Furthermore, Croatia added, there was a deliberate intent to
destroy important symbols of Croatian culture ; many cultural and sacral
objects were destroyed in Dubrovnik, mainly in the Old Town : the JNA
caused damage to at least 683 monuments, such as churches, chapels, city
472
walls and others . In its attacks against Dubrovnik, it proceeded, the
JNA tried to destroy the town in a way that could not be justified by hany
principle of military necessity or logic, thus pointing to its genocidalh
467It also addressed the “policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’” (parash.60-62, 90 and 93-95).
468Cf. Part X (4) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
469
470Memorial of Croatia, paras. 2.77, 3.90 and 5.237.
According to Croatia, some 161 civilians were killed, 272 wounded, and one is still
missing; ibid., para. 5.237.
471According to Croatia, 11 men from the villages of Bistroće and Berojeh were brought
to camp Morinje, where they were subjected to mistreatments of all sortsh including ;orture
ibid. para. 5.238. Some others were made prisoners and taken in “the camps Morinjhe, in
Boka Kotorska and Bileća in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some were beahten to death” ;
ibid. para. 5.240.
472Ibid., para. 5.241.
343
7 CIJ1077.indb 682 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 342
tateurs des déplacements forcés et de l’abandon (destiné àh être définitif)
des maisons (TPIY, Karadžić et Mladić, décision du 11 juillet 1996,
par. 14), ainsi que des expulsions et déportations (ibid., par. 16-17) 467.
7. Destruction de biens culturels
407. Plus haut dans le présent exposé, lorsque j’ai examiné la campagne
de violence extrême et de destruction systématiques et généralisées dans le
contexte factuel du cas d’espèce, j’ai insisté sur la destruhction de la culture
du groupe 46. En sus des exemples déjà mentionnés, il me semble opportun
d’examiner le bombardement de Dubrovnik (octobre-décembre 1991), car
les Parties y ont prêté une attention particulière dans le cadrhe de la procé -
dure concernant la présente affaire devant la Cour.
a) Moyens des Parties
408. Selon la Croatie, les politiciens serbes cherchaient à intégrer lah ville
de Dubrovnik en territoire serbe ; la JNA avait soigneusement planifié et
prémédité les attaques contre la vieille ville, et le bombardement aveugle de
Dubrovnik avait commencé le 1 eroctobre 1991 et s’était poursuivi jusqu’en
décembre1991 ; dans ce climat de peur, 34000 personnes avaient été expul-
sées de leurs maisons, et les habitants qui étaient restés dansh les villages
occupés aux alentours avaient été emmenés dans des camps, et certains
469 470
d’entre eux torturés . Des meurtresavaient aussi été commis . Les voies
de ravitaillement avaient été coupées tandis que la ville restahit sous le feu de
l’artillerie lourde. La population s’était vue privée de touhte assistance mé-di
cale, d’eau et de nourriture. Les mauvais traitements, l’intimidathion phy- 471
sique et mentale et la destruction des maisons étaient monnaie couranhte .
409. En outre, a ajouté la Croatie, il y avait une volonté délibérée de
détruire des symboles importants de la culture croate; de nombreux objets
culturels et sacrés avaient été détruits à Dubrovnik, surhtout dans la vieille
ville: la JNA avait endommagé au moins 683 monuments, notamment des
472
églises, des chapelles et les fortifications de la cité . Lors de ses attaques
contre Dubrovnik, a poursuivi la Croatie, la JNA avait essayé de déhtruire
la ville à une échelle que ne justifiait aucun principe de néhcessité ou de
467Il a également examiné la « politique de « nettoyage ethnique »» (par. 60-62, 90
et 93-95).
468Voir partie X.4) du présent exposé, supra.
469
470Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 2.77, 3.90 et 5.237.
Selon la Croatie, 161 civils avaient été tués, 2blessés et 1 porté disparu (ibid.,
par 5.237).
471D’après la Croatie, 11hommes des villages de Bistroće et Beroje avaient été conduits h
au camp de Morinje, où ils avaient été soumis à des séviches de toute sorte, dont la torture
(ibid., par 5.238). D’autres avaient été faits prisonniers et conduits auxh «orinje,
à Boka Kotorska, et de Bileća, en Bosnie-Herzégovine, et certains [avaient été] battus à
mort» (ibid.,par 5.240).
472Ibid., par. 5.241.
343
7 CIJ1077.indb 683 18/04/16 08:54 343 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
473
intentions . Croatia further referred to the ICTY (Appeals Chamber)
Judgments relating to Dubrovnik, in the Strugar case (of 17 July 2008)
and in Jokić case (of 30 August 2005), and claimed that the conduct in
474
Dubrovnik was an attempt to commit genocide .
410. Serbia also referred to the ICTY’s convictions and sentencing of
M. Jokić and P. Strugar for the shelling of the Old Town of the city on
475
6 December 1991 , and claimed that Croatia had failed to prove that
any of the crimes were committed or attempted with genocidal intent.
Serbia challenged the witness st476ments (for allegedly not fulfillinhg the
requirements of affidavits) . It added that the ICTY addressed the
alleged crimes in the area of Dalmatia and concluded that they did not
fulfil the requirements of extermination as crime against humanity (the
killings were allegedly not committed on a large scale) 477. In Serbia’s
view, no genocidal intent was demonstrated in relation to the events in
478
Dubrovnik .
411. As to the differences concerning the number of victims, Croatia
observed that the charges in the Strugar and Jokić cases pertained only to
the attacks on Dubrovnik in December 1991 (commencing with the shell-
ing on 6 December 1991), and did not give detailed consideration to the
crimes committed in the period between 1 October 1991 and 5 December
1991, other than by way of background context. It added that the deaths h
in Dubrovnik occurred over a much longer period, and not solely as a
479
result of the December attacks .
412. Croatia acknowledged that the Jokić and Strugar cases did not
provide the exact number of victims killed by the attacks on Dubrovnik
in October and November 1991, since the main focus was on the events
of 6 December 1991 ; the charges in those two cases did not take into
account the crimes committed between 1 October 1991 and 5 December
1991 480. According to Croatia, both the Jović and Strugar cases support
its claims that they refer to the factual background of what occurred in
481
Dubrovnik, i.e., to the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik .
473
474Memorial of Croatia, para. 5.236.
Ibid., para. 8.27.
475Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 924.
476Ibid., para. 920.
477Ibid., paras. 994 and 927, and cf. paras. 923-924.
478Ibid., para. 925.
479Cf. Reply of Croatia, para. 6.97. Croatia further noted that the ICTY itself
referred to the shelling of Dubrovnik in both October and November 1991; cf.ibid.,
paras. 6.99-6.105. And, according to the ICTY, “the evidence establishes that theh shelling
of the Old Town on 12 November was intense” ; cf.bid., para. 6.100.
480Cf. ibid., paras. 6.101-6.102.
481Cf. ibid., paras. 6.98-6.105.
344
7 CIJ1077.indb 684 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 343
473
logique militaire, ce qui révélait ses intentions génocidaires . La Croatie
a ensuite renvoyé aux jugements du TPIY relatifs à Dubrovnik, dansh les
affaires Strugar (17 juillet 2008) et Jokić (30 août 2005), et a affirmé que le
474
procédé à l’œuvre à Dubrovnik était une tentative dhe génocide .
410. La Serbie a elle aussi fait état de la reconnaissance de culpabilitéh
et de la condamnation par le TPIY de M. Jokić et P. Strugar pour le
475
bombardement de la vieille ville de Dubrovnik le 6 décembre 1991 et a
affirmé que la Croatie n’avait pas prouvé que l’un quelconqhue des crimes
avait été commis dans une intention génocidaire ou avait constitué une
tentative de génocide. Elle a contesté les déclarations de téhmoins (au motif
qu’elles ne satisfaisaient pas au critère d’établissement deh la preuve énoncé
pour les déclarations) 47. Elle a ajouté que le TPIY avait examiné les
crimes prétendument commis dans la région de la Dalmatie et avait h
conclu que les conditions requises pour que lesdits crimes soient constitu -
tifs du crime d’extermination en tant que crime contre l’humanitéh n’étaient
477
pas réunies (les meurtres n’avaient pas été commis à grahnde échelle) .
De l’avis de la Serbie, aucune intention génocidaire n’avait éhté démontrée
s’agissant des événements survenus à Dubrovnik 478.
411. En ce qui concerne la querelle sur le nombre des victimes, la Croa-
tie a fait observer que les actes d’accusation dans les affaires Strugar et
Jokić ne concernaient que les attaques de décembre 1991 sur Dubrovnik
(à partir du bombardement du 6 décembre) et que les crimes commis
entre le 1 er octobre et le 5 décembre 1991 n’avaient pas été minutieuse-
ment examinés et n’avaient été évoqués que dans le buth d’établir le
contexte. Elle a ajouté que les crimes commis à Dubrovnik s’éhtendaient
sur une période beaucoup plus étendue et n’étaient pas tous hla consé -
quence des attaques de décembre 479.
412. La Croatie a reconnu que les affaires Jokić et Strugar ne don -
naient pas le nombre exact de victimes des attaques d’octobre et
novembre 1991 contre Dubrovnik, puisque l’accent était mis sur les évéh-
nements du 6 décembre 1991; les actes d’accusation dans ces deux affaires
ne portaient pas sur les crimes commis entre le 1 er octobre et le
480
5 décembre 1991 . Selon la Croatie, les affaires Jokić et Strugar étayaient
sa cause en précisant le contexte de ce qui s’était produit à Dubrovnik,
c’est-à-dire le bombardement de la vieille ville 481.
473Mémoire de la Croatie, par 5.236.
474Ibid., par. 8.27.
475Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 924.
476Ibid., par. 920.
477Ibid., par. 994 et 927, et voir par. 923-924.
478
479Ibid., par 925.
Réplique de la Croatie, par. 6.97. La Croatie a aussi relevé que le TPIY lui -même
avait fait référence aux bombardements de Dubrovnik d’octobre eht de novembre 1991
(voir ibid., par. 6.99-6.105). Et, selon le TPIY, « ressort des éléments de preuve que le
bombardement subi par la vieille ville le 12 novembre était int» (voiribid., par. 6.100).
480Ibid., par. 6.101-6.102.
481Ibid., par. 6.98-6.105.
344
7 CIJ1077.indb 685 18/04/16 08:54 344 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
413. Moreover, Croatia quoted the ICTY’s Strugar decision, where it
was stated that : (a) “the Old Town was extensively targeted by JNA” ;
(b) “no military firing points or other objectives, real or believed, ihn the
Old Town were targeted by the JNA” (c) as a;consequence to the previ-
ous fact, “in the Chamber’s finding, the intent of the perpetrathors was to
target civilians and civilian objects in the Old Town” ; (d) the ICTY
found as a fact that the JNA had carefully planned and premeditated the h
482
attack and it was not a spontaneous action .
414. Serbia retorted that Jokić and Strugar were not charged for crimes
against humanity or genocide in those cases, and claimed that the attacks
483
on Dubrovnik do not satisfy the requirements of genocide . It further
argued that the attacks were not authorized by the leadership of the JNAh,
and that there was no policy aimed at the destruction of the Croats 48. In
its view, the Strugar and Jokić cases do not contain evidence that the
attacks on Dubrovnik were ordered or instructed by the leadership of
Serbia 485.
(b) General assessment
415. As just seen, much of the debate between Croatia and Serbia was
around the cases against M. Jokić and P. Strugar — JNA officials alleged
to be responsible for the attacks of 6 December 1991 against Dubrovnik—
before the ICTY. Yet, Dubrovnik was under heavy attack by the JNA
not only on 6 December 1991, but for a much longer period, during which
a number of concomitant occurrences took place during and after the
attacks, namely, torture, transfer of prisoners, beatings and killings, hdis -
closing altogether a pattern of extreme violence and destruction.
416. Serbia stated, as to occurrences in Dubrovnik, that there were no
charges of genocide in the aforementioned cases in the ICTY 486. But what
can be the relevance of the absence of the charge of genocide for the prhes -
ent case opposing Croatia to Serbia before the International Court
of Justice, as regards the occurrences in Dubrovnik, considering that
different standards of proof apply (cf. supra) in cases pertaining to indi -
vidual (domestic) criminal responsibility and to international State
responsibility ?
417. All groups and peoples have the right to the preservation of their
cultural heritage, of their modus vivendi, of their human values. The
482Cf. Reply of Croatia, paras. 6.103-6.105.
483Cf. Rejoinder of Serbia, paras. 408 and 473.
484Cf. ibid., para. 474.
485Cf. ibid., para. 475.
486Cf. ibid., paras. 403-404; and cf. Reply of Croatia, paras. 6.97-6.105.
345
7 CIJ1077.indb 686 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 344
413. En outre, la Croatie a cité la décision rendue en l’affaire Strugar,
dans laquelle le TPIY a déclaré ce qui suit : a) « la vieille ville avait été
largement prise pour cible par la JNA »; b) « la JNA n’avait visé aucune
position de tir ou autre objectif militaire, réel ou supposé, dansh la vieille
ville»; c) en conséquence de ce qui précède, « [la Chambre conclut] que
l’intention des auteurs du bombardement était de tirer sur des civhils et des
biens de caractère civil dans la vieille ville »; d) le TPIY a constaté que la
JNA avait soigneusement préparé et prémédité l’attaqueh et qu’il ne s’agis -
482
sait pas d’une action spontanée .
414. La Serbie a répondu que Jokić et Strugar n’étaient pas poursuivis
pour crime contre l’humanité ou pour génocide dans ces affaires,h et a
affirmé que les attaques sur Dubrovnik ne satisfaisaient en rien auxh cri -
483
tères requis pour le crime de génocide . Elle a ensuite fait valoir que ces
attaques n’avaient pas été autorisées par les dirigeants de la JNA et qu’il
n’existait pas de politique visant la destruction des Croates 484. Selon elle,
les affaires Strugar et Jokić ne contenaient aucune preuve que les attaques
sur Dubrovnik avaient été ordonnées par les dirigeants serbes ohu menées
sur leurs instructions 485.
b) Appréciation générale
415. Comme on vient de le voir, l’essentiel du débat entre la Croatie eht
la Serbie tournait autour des affaires de M. Jokić et P. Strugar — diri-
geants de la JNA qui auraient été responsables des attaques du
6 décembre 1991 contre Dubrovnik — jugées par le TPIY. Pourtant,
Dubrovnik avait subi les lourdes attaques de la JNA non seulement le
6 décembre 1991, mais pendant une période beaucoup plus longue, pen -
dant laquelle un certain nombre de faits concomitants se sont produits
pendant et après les attaques, à savoir des actes de torture, le thransfert de
prisonniers, des sévices physiques et des meurtres, l’ensemble conhstituant
une campagne de violence extrême et de destruction.
416. La Serbie a déclaré, au sujet des événements de Dubrovnik, qhu’il
n’y avait pas d’accus486ons de génocide dans les affaires susmenhtionnées
jugées par le TPIY . Mais en quoi l’absence du chef de génocide peut-elle
être pertinente dans la présente affaire opposant la Croatie à la Serbie
devant la Cour, en ce qui concerne les événements de Dubrovnik, éhtant
donné que des critères d’établissement de la preuve différhents s’appliquent
(voir supra) dans les affaires ayant trait à la responsabilité pénale indihvi -
duelle (interne) et à la responsabilité internationale de l’Ehtat?
417. Tous les groupes et les peuples ont le droit à la préservation de h
leur patrimoine culturel, de leur mode de vie et de leurs valeurs humaines.
482Réplique de la Croatie, par. 6.103-6.105.
483Duplique de la Serbie, par. 408 et 473.
484Ibid., par. 474.
485Ibid., par. 475.
486Ibid., par. 403-404; et voir réplique de la Croatie, par. 6.97-6.105.
345
7 CIJ1077.indb 687 18/04/16 08:54 345 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
destruction of cultural goods, that occurred in the JNA bombardments of h
Dubrovnik, shows lack of and — worse still — disdain for, human val -
ues 48. There was a deliberate destruction, by the JNA, of cultural goods
in the old city of Dubrovnik (part of UNESCO’s World Heritage List, h
inscription in 1979, extension in 1994); the discriminatory intent against
the targeted group was manifest 488, as acknowledged in the case law of
the ICTY.
418. In my perception, this form of destruction is indeed related to
physical and biological destruction, as individuals living in groups canhnot
prescind from their cultural values, and, in any circumstances, in any chir-
cumstances (even in isolation), from their spiritual beliefs. Life itshelf, and
the beliefs that help people face the mysteries surrounding it, go togethher.
The right to life and the right to cultural identity go together, they ahre
ineluctably intermingled. Physical and biological destruction is interreh -
lated with the destruction of a group’s identity as part of its life,h its living
conditions.
419. In a factual context disclosing a widespread and systematic pat -
tern of destruction, can we, keeping in mind the victims, really dissocihate
physical/biological destruction from cultural destruction ? In my percep -
tion, not at all; bearing in mind the relevance of culture, of cultural iden -
tity, to the safeguard of the right to life itself, the right to live wihth dignity.
In this respect, I had the occasion to ponder, almost one decade ago, inh
another international jurisdiction, that :
“The concept of culture — originated from the Roman colere,
meaning to cultivate, to consider, to care for and to preserve, — was
originally manifested in agriculture (care of the land). With Cicero, h
the concept came to be applied to matters of the spirit and the soul
(cultura animi). With the passing of time, it became associated with
humanism, with the attitude of preserving and taking care of the
things of the world, including those in the past. The peoples — human
beings in their social milieu — faced with the mystery of life, develop
and preserve their cultures in order to understand and relate with the
outside world. Hence the importance of cultural identity as a compo -
nent or aggregate of the fundamental right to life itself.” 489
487Cf. C. Bories, Les bombardements serbes sur la vieille ville de Dubro— La
protection internationale des biens culturels, Paris, Pedone, 2005, pp. 145 and 169-170, and
cf. pp. 150-154.
488Cf. ibid., pp. 150-157 and 161-163.
489IACtHR, case of theSawhoyamaxa Community v. Paraguay (Judgment of29 March
2006), separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade, para. 4.
346
7 CIJ1077.indb 688 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 345
La destruction de biens culturels, telle qu’elle s’est produite lohrs des bom-
bardements de Dubrovnik par la JNA, révèle l’absence de valeursh
humaines et, pis encore, le mépris de ces valeurs 48. Il y a eu une destruc-
tion délibérée, par la JNA, de biens culturels de la vieille vihlle de
Dubrovnik (site classé sur la liste du patrimoine mondial de l’UNhESCO,
inscription en 1979 et extension en 1994); l’intention discriminatoire
contre le groupe visé était manifeste 488, comme il est reconnu dans la
jurisprudence du TPIY.
418. A mon sens, cette forme de destruction est bel et bien liée à la
destruction physique et biologique, car les individus vivant en groupes hne
peuvent pas faire abstraction de leurs valeurs culturelles, et, dans toutes
les circonstances, quelles qu’elles soient (même dans l’isolemhent), de leurs
croyances spirituelles. La vie elle-même et les croyances qui aident les
gens à faire face aux mystères qui les entourent vont de concert. hLe droit
à la vie et le droit à l’identité culturelle vont de pair, ils sont indihsso -
ciables. La destruction physique et biologique est intimement liée àh la de-s
truction de l’identité d’un groupe en tant que partie de son exhistence, de
ses conditions de vie.
419. Dans un contexte factuel mettant en évidence une entreprise de
destruction systématique et généralisée, pouvons -nous, en gardant à l’es -
prit les victimes, dissocier vraiment la destruction physique/biologiqueh de
la destruction culturelle? A mon avis, c’est exclu, compte tenu de l’impor-
tance qu’a la culture — l’identité culturelle — pour la préservation du
droit à la vie lui-même, du droit de vivre dans la dignité. A ce sujet, j’ai
eu l’occasion de dire, il y a presque dix ans, dans une autre juridiction
internationale, ce qui suit :
«La notion de culture — du latin colere, qui signifie cultiver, tenir
compte de, prendre soin de et préserver — est apparue à l’origine
dans l’agriculture (le soin apporté à la terre). Avec Cicéhron, cette
notion en est venue à être appliquée à des questions touchanht à l’es -
prit et à l’âme (cultura animi). Avec le passage du temps, elle a été
associée à l’humanisme, à l’attitude consistant à préhserver les choses
du monde, y compris celles du passé, et à en prendre soin. Face auh
mystère de la vie, les peuples — les êtres humains dans leur milieu
social — ont développé et préservé leurs cultures afin de comphrendre
le monde extérieur et d’être en lien avec celui -ci. D’où l’importance
de l’identité culturelle, en tant que partie ou tout du droit fondhamen -
489
tal à la vie lui-même.»
487Voir C. Bories, Les bombardements serbes sur la vieille ville de Dubro— La
protection internationale des biens culturels, Paris, Pedone, 145,,169-170, et voir
p. 150-154.
488Voir ibid., p. 150-157 et 161-163.
489CIDH, affaire Communauté sawhoyamaxa c. Paraguay (arrêt du 29 mars 2006),
opinion individuelle du juge A. A. Cançado Trindade, par. 4.
346
7 CIJ1077.indb 689 18/04/16 08:54 346 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
420. I have already pointed out, in the present dissenting opinion, that,
in its case law, — e.g., its decision of 1996 in the Karadžić and Mladić
case, — the ICTY was particularly attentive to the destruction of cultural h
and religious sites. And, in its Judgment of 2001 in the Krstić case, the
ICTY properly warned that the pattern of destruction as a whole (includh -
ing the destruction of cultural and religious heritage) is to be duly thaken
490
into account, as evidence of the intent to destroy the group .
421. The International Court of Justice, contrariwise, has in the pres -
ent Judgment preferred to close its eyes to it, repeatedly remarking (Jhudg -
ment, paras. 136, 388-389), in a dismissive way, that the destruction of
cultural and religious heritage does not fall under the categories of achts of
genocide set out in Article II of the Convention against Genocide. To
attempt to dissociate physical/biological destruction from the cultural h
one, for the purpose of the determination of genocide, appears to me an h
artificiality. Whether one wishes to admit it or not, body and soul come
together, and it is utterly superficial, clearly untenable, to attempt to dis
sociate one from the other. Rather than doing so, one has to extract theh
consequences ensuing therefrom.
XIV. a ctus R eus of Genocide: Widespread and Systemathic Pattern
of Conduct of Destructiohn : Extreme Violence and
Atrocities in some Munhicipalities
422. With the aforementioned considerations, I have completed the
examination, in the present dissenting opinion, of all the components ofh
the onslaught, in a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction,
brought to the attention of the Court in the present case. The time has h
now come to examine the actus reus and the mens rea, in the factual con -
text of the present case concerning the Application of the Convention
against Genocide .
1. Preliminary Methodological Observations
423. Let me turn attention first to the element of actus reus. A careful
examination of the arguments of the contending Parties, as well as wit -
ness statements, presented to the Court, discloses a systematic pattern hof
conduct of destruction, in the period of the armed attacks of Serb forcehs
in Croatia, in particular in some selected municipalities, — namely,
Lovas, Ilok, Bogdanovci and Vukovar (in the region of Eastern Slavo-
nia), and Saborsko (in the region of Lika). The events occurred therehin,
as narrated in sequence, can, in my perception, be clearly examined in thhe
light of the relevant provisions of the Convention against Genocide (inh
490
Cf. Part X (4) of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
347
7 CIJ1077.indb 690 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 346
420. J’ai déjà souligné, dans le présent exposé, que, dans hsa jurispru -
dence — notamment sa décision de 1996 dans l’affaire Karadžić et Mla ‑
dić —, le TPIY a été particulièrement attentif à la destruction de sites
culturels et religieux. Et, dans son jugement de 2001 en l’affaire Krstić, il
a dit à juste titre que l’entreprise de destruction dans son ensemble
(y compris la destruction du patrimoine culturel et religieux) doit êtrhe
dûment prise en considération, comme preuve de l’intention de détruire le
490
groupe .
421. La Cour a au contraire, dans le présent arrêt, préféré fermer les
yeux sur cette réalité, faisant observer à plusieurs reprises (harrêt, par.136,
388-389) avec dédain que la destruction du patrimoine culturel et reli -
gieux ne relève pas des catégories des actes de génocide réprimés à l’ar -
ticle II de la convention sur le génocide. S’efforcer de dissocier la
destruction physique/biologique de la destruction culturelle, aux finsh de la
détermination du génocide, me semble procéder d’une démarche artifi -
cielle. Qu’on veuille l’admettre ou non, le corps et l’âme sont inséparables,
et il est parfaitement artificiel et, à l’évidence, intenableh de tenter de les
dissocier l’un de l’autre. Mieux vaut, au contraire, tirer les conhséquences
qui en découlent.
XIV. L’élément matériel (actus Reus )du génocide: volonté
de destruction systémathique et générale— violences extrêmesh
et atrocités dans cerhtaines municipalitéhs
422. Avec les considérations qui précèdent, j’ai achevé l’ehxamen, dans
le présent exposé, de tous les aspects de l’assaut meurtrier mehné dans le
cadre d’une entreprise de destruction systématique et générahle, qui a été
porté à l’attention de la Cour en l’espèce. Le moment est à présent venu
d’examiner l’élément matériel (actus reus) et l’élément moral (mens rea)
du génocide, dans le contexte factuel de la présente affaire concerhnant
l’Application de la convention sur le génocide.
1. Observations méthodologiques préliminaires
423. Je m’intéresserai en premier lieu à l’élément matérhiel (actus reus).
Un examen attentif des arguments des Parties et des déclarations des
témoins présentés à la Cour fait apparaître une volonté systématique de
destruction, pendant la période où les forces serbes ont mené dhes attaques
armées en Croatie, en particulier dans certaines municipalités — à savoir
Lovas, Ilok, Bogdanovci et Vukovar (dans la région de la Slavonie orhien -
tale) et Saborsko (dans la région de la Lika). Les faits qui s’y sont pro -
duits, tels que relatés chronologiquement, peuvent, à mon avis, êhtre
examinés à la lumière des dispositions pertinentes de la convenhtion sur le
490Voir partie X 4) du présent exposé, supra.
347
7 CIJ1077.indb 691 18/04/16 08:54 347 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
particular Article 2), to establish the actus reus of the crime of genocide
(and also, in my understanding, the mens rea — infra).
424. In other villages, there was also a wide range of serious crimes
committed, for example, in Poljanak, Dalj, Bapska, Tovarnik. I draw
attention to these and other villages in other parts of the present disshent-
ing opinion. But here, after reviewing the occurrences in all the affectehd
villages, I am focusing only on the five selected villages : Vukovar, Sabor-
sko, Ilok, Bogdanovci and Lovas, in view of their complete devastation
amidst the extreme violence and the perpetration of atrocities therein, dis-
closing a widespread and systematic pattern of conduct of destruction
(actus reus, to my mind together with mens rea).
425. It seems regrettable to me that the International Court of Justice
did not address all the localities referred to by Croatia, and some villhages
or municipalities were excluded from the reasoning of the Court. Such ish
the case, e.g., of Ilok, which was devastated. The Court’s Judgment sheeks
to explain its own approach as follows :
“The Court does not consider it necessary to deal separately with
each of the incidents mentioned by the Applicant, nor to compile an
exhaustive list of the alleged acts. It will focus on the claims concern-
ing localities put forward by Croatia as representing examples of sys-
tematic and widespread acts committed against the protected group,
from which an intent to destroy it, in whole or in part, could be
inferred. These are the localities cited by Croatia during the oral pro-
ceedings or in regard to which it called witnesses to give oral testi -
mony, as well as those where the occurrence of certain acts has been
established before the ICTY.” (Judgment, para. 203.)
426. This outlook of the Court, trying to explain its own selective
choice of municipalities, seems unsatisfactory to me, given the Court’hs
overall conclusion as to genocide, dismissing, tout court, mens rea, with-
out giving its reasons for it. In this respect, the Court’s Judgment hshould
have examined all villages where Croatia claimed that serious crimes werhe
committed. A more comprehensive, if not exhaustive, examination of the
systematic pattern of conduct of destruction would have been appropri -
ate — and indeed necessary — in a case of the importance of the cas
d’espèce.
2. The Systematic Pattern of Acts of Destruction
427. The review of the evidence, and in particular witness statements,
challenged in general terms by Serbia, reveal that many atrocities were h
committed in various municipalities. These atrocities range from arbi-
trary and large -scale killings of members of the Croat population (Arti -
cle II (a) of the Genocide Convention); causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the Croat population, including by cruel acts of vio -
lence (such as mutilation of limbs), torture and sexual violence (Arthicle II
(b) of the Genocide Convention); and deliberately inflicting conditions
348
7 CIJ1077.indb 692 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 347
génocide (en particulier l’article 2), pour établir l’élément matériel du
crime de génocide (et aussi, selon moi, l’élément moral ; voirinfra).
424. Dans d’autres villages, notamment à Poljanak, Dalj, Bapska ou
Tovarnik, toute une série de crimes graves a aussi été commise.h J’appelle
l’attention sur ces localités, et sur d’autres, ailleurs dans lhe présent exposé.
Mais ici, après avoir examiné les faits survenus dans tous les vilhlages tou-
chés, je me concentre seulement sur cinq localités particulièrehs— Vukovar,
Saborsko, Ilok, Bogdanovci et Lovas —, au vu de leur dévastation com -
plète, de l’extrême violence qui s’y est déchaînée het des atrocités qui y ont
été commises, révélant une volonté de destruction systéhmatique et généra -
lisée (actusreus, et à mon avis mens rea également).
425. Il me semble regrettable que la Cour n’ait pas pris en considéra -
tion toutes les localités citées par la Croatie, et qu’elle aith exclu de son
raisonnement certains villages ou municipalités. Tel est par exemple le cas
d’Ilok, qui a été dévastée. Dans son arrêt, la Cour a hcherché à expliquer
sa démarche comme suit :
«La Cour estime qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de considérer séhparé -
ment chacun des incidents que le demandeur a rapportés, ni de dres -
ser une liste exhaustive des actes allégués. Elle se concentrera shur les
allégations relatives à des localités qui ont été préshentées par la Croa-
tie comme constituant des exemples d’actes systématiques et génhérali-
sés commis à l’encontre du groupe protégé, dont on pourrahit déduire
l’intention de le détruire, en tout ou en partie. Il s’agit desh localités qui
ont été mises en avant par la Croatie au cours de la procédure horale
ou au sujet desquelles elle a présenté des témoins, ainsi que chelles où
certains actes ont été établis devant le TPIY. » (Arrêt, par. 203.)
426. Ce point de vue de la Cour, qui tente d’expliquer pourquoi elle a
choisi certaines municipalités, ne me semble pas satisfaisant, compteh tenu
de la conclusion générale qu’elle en a tirée au sujet du génocide, dans
laquelle elle a rejeté l’élément moral sans dire pour quelles raisons. La
Cour aurait dû, à cet égard, prendre en considération dans shon arrêt tous
les villages où la Croatie a affirmé que des crimes graves ont été commis.
Un examen plus complet, sinon exhaustif, de la volonté systématiquhe de
destruction aurait été opportun — et en réalité nécessaire — dans une
affaire ayant l’importance du cas d’espèce.
2. La campagne d’actes de destruction systématiques
427. L’examen des preuves, et en particulier des déclarations de témhoins,
contestées en termes généraux par la Serbie, révèle que de nombreuses atro -
cités ont été commises dans diverses municipalités. Ces atrohcités sont
notamment le meurtre arbitraire et à grande échelle de membres de hla
population croate (litt. a) de l’article II de la Convention), l’atteinte grave
à l’intégrité physique ou mentale de membres de la populatiohn croate, y
compris par des actes de violence cruels (comme la mutilation de membrehs),
la torture et la violence sexuelle (litt. de l’article II de la Convention) et
348
7 CIJ1077.indb 693 18/04/16 08:54 348 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
of life to bring about the destruction of the Croat population and its ehlim -
ination from the regions concerned, including destruction of towns and
villages, systematic expulsion from homes (Article II (c) of the Conven -
tion).
428. Witness statements in relation to five municipalities refer to simi -
lar events having taken place in those municipalities. These acts, exam -
ined closely, demonstrate the consistent and systematic pattern of acts hin
breach of provisions of the Convention against Genocide, evidencing a
genocidal plan. I thus proceed to a review of those breaches in the selected
municipalities, as brought to the Court’s attention.
3. Killing Members of the Croat Population (Article II (a))
429. “Killings of members of the group” is an act prohibited by the
Genocide Convention, within the meaning of Article II (a). A violation
of this provision requires evidence that the victim was killed by an unlaw -
ful act, with the intention to kill or to cause serious bodily harm whichh
the perpetrator should reasonably have known might lead to death 491.
The question is thus whether the evidence submitted by the Parties, and h
in particular witness statements examined in the selected municipalitiesh,
support a finding that there were “killings of members of the group”.
Upon review of the evidence, it stems clearly that there were killings ohf
members of the Croat group in various municipalities in Croatia. Such
killings occurred by unlawful acts, with the intention to kill or cause seri -
ous bodily harm to the victims.
430. There are statements in the record of eyewitnesses concerning kill-
ings of members of the civilian population of Croatian nationality durinhg
the occupation of Lovas. The village was invaded and occupied by the
JNA on 10 October 1991, after a 10-day heavy shelling by the JNA, caus-
ing the death of at least 23 Croat civilians 492. During the attacks in occu-
pied Lovas, defenceless civilian victims were killed : victims hid in the
493
basements during attacks and Serbs tossed bombs in the basements 494.
Captured Croats were used as human shields to enter Croats’ houses .
Several men were taken and separated from their families, and were then h
executed 495.
431. In an episode which became known as the “minefield massacre”,
the JNA, on 17 October 1991, singled out all the Croat males in Lovas
(around 100, aged between 18 and 65), of whom 50 were taken onto a
491
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 7.59-7.61, and Counter-Memorial of Serbia,
paras. 76-78.
492Cf. CR 2014/12, of 7 March 2014, p. 28, para. 59, and CR 2014/8, of 5 March 2014,
p. 17, para. 23.
493Cf. witness statement of M. M., in Memorial of Croatia, Annex 99.
494Ibid., para. 4.126.
495Ibid., para. 4.122.
349
7 CIJ1077.indb 694 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 348
la soumission intentionnelle de la population croateà des conditions d’exis-
tence devant entraîner sa destruction et son élimination des régions concer -
nées, y compris la destruction de villes et villages et l’expulsiohn systématique
des logements (litt. c) de l’article II de la Convention).
428. Les déclarations de témoins concernant cinq municipalités font h
état d’événements similaires qui s’y sont produits. L’examen approfondi
de ces faits démontre l’existence d’une campagne cohérente et systéma -
tique d’actes contraires aux dispositions de la convention sur le géhnocide,
attestant un plan génocidaire. Je passerai donc à présent en rehvue les
infractions commises dans ces municipalités, telles que portées à l’atten -
tion de la Cour.
3. Le meurtre de membres de la population croate ( litt. a) de l’article II)
429. Le « meurtre de membres du groupe » est un acte interdit par la
convention sur le génocide, au titre du litt. a) de l’article II. Pour que la
violation de cette disposition soit établie, il faut des preuves que la mort
de la victime résulte d’un acte illégal, commis dans l’intenhtion de tuer ou
d’infliger une atteinte physique grave dont l’auteur aurait dûh raisonnable -
491
ment savoir qu’elle pourrait conduire à la mort . Il s’agit donc de savoir
si les éléments de preuve soumis par les Parties, et notamment lesh déclara -
tions de témoins examinées dans les municipalités retenues, apphuient la
conclusion qu’il y a eu des « meurtres de membres du groupe ». Il ressort
clairement de l’étude de ces éléments qu’il y a eu des mehurtres de membres
du groupe croate dans diverses municipalités en Croatie. Ces meurtresh
étaient des actes illégaux, commis dans l’intention de tuer ou hd’infliger
aux victimes des atteintes physiques graves.
430. Dans le dossier figurent des déclarations de témoins oculaires
concernant les meurtres de membres de la population civile de nationalithé
croate pendant l’occupation de Lovas. Le village a été envahi et occupé
par la JNA le 10 octobre 1991, après 10 jours de bombardements intensifs
causant la mort d’au moins 23 civils croates 492. Pendant les attaques
menées dans le village occupé, des civils sans défense ont éhté tués : ils se
493
cachaient dans des caves et les Serbes y ont jeté des bombes . Les
Croates faits prisonniers servaient de boucliers humains aux Serbes pourh
pénétrer dans les maisons de Croates 494. Plusieurs hommes ont été emme-
nés et séparés de leurs familles, puis exécutés 49.
431. Lors des événements connus depuis sous le nom de «massacre du
champ de mines , l» 17 octobre 1991, la JNA a mis à part tous les hommes
croates de Lovas (une centaine, âgés de 18 à 65 ans), dont 50 ont été
491
Voir mémoire de la Croatie, par. 7.59-7.61, et contre -mémoire de la Serbie,
par. 76-78.
492Voir CR 2014/12, par. 59, p. 28, et CR 2014/8, par. 23, p. 17.
493Voir déposition de M. M., mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 99.
494Ibid., par. 4.126.
495Ibid., par. 4.122.
349
7 CIJ1077.indb 695 18/04/16 08:54 349 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
496
minefield . On their way, one of them was shot and killed by the Serb
forces because he was unable to keep up with the rest of the group, due hto
being stabbed in the leg during a torture session the previous night 497. As
soon as the members of the group arrived in the minefield, they were
forced to hold each other’s hands and to walk forward on the minefiheld 498.
432. A witness reported that, at a certain point, they saw some of the
mines ahead of them. A young Croat man was pushed onto one of the
mines, which immediately exploded and initiated a chain detonation of
the mines around the area ; according to the Applicant, the explosions
immediately killed 21 people and left 12 wounded. Thereafter, Serb sol -
diers asked for the wounded to shout and raise their hands so that they h
could be helped. Witnesses described that, as soon as the wounded raisedh
their hands and shouted for help, the Serb soldiers began to shoot and tho
kill them 499. The dead bodies were taken to a mass grave 500.
433. Serbia acknowledged that “fourteen accused are currently stand -
ing trial before the Belgrade District Court for the alleged killing of h
68 Croat victims from the village of Lovas” 501. Moreover, in Ilok, for
instance, there were also reports of killings of Croats by Serbs : for exam-
ple, the statement of F. D. (who was kept in custody in Ilok from1 Novem-
ber 1991 to 31 March 1992), reported brutal killings, including by beating
502
to death .
434. In Bogdanovci, there were many accounts of killings of Croats
during the occupation. Many Croats were allegedly murdered in their
503
houses. Croats were killed while attempting to flee the village . Accord-
ing to Croatia, many killings of Croats were committed while they were
being forced to go outside their houses, or inside the houses when they h
504
would rather stay inside . The village was occupied by paramilitaries
and JNA on 10 November 1991 after it had been attacked by heavy artil -
lery and infantry. Marija Katić 505, e.g., testified that the village was com -
pletely destroyed, and that “during the destruction ten people were khilled,
were buried in the so-called School Square in such a way that their bodies
were wrapped in tents and buried with a bottle next to their bodies. Thehse
bottles contained the data of the dead persons” ; other witnesses also
reported killings of Croats and torture to death. 506
496CR 2014/10, of 6 March 2014, para. 24, p. 15.
497
Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.118-4.119 and 4.123 -4.126; and witness state-
ments of S.P., Annex 97, and of P. V., Annex 95.
498Cf. ibid., para. 4.125; and witness statement of Z. T., Annex 102.
499Cf. ibid., para. 4.125, and witness statements of T., Annex 102, and of L. S.,
Annex 98.
500On the mass grave in Lovas, cf. ibid., Annex 168B.
501Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 720.
502
503Memorial of Croatia, Annex 55.
Cf. ibid., para. 4.51, and cf.witness statements of A.T., in ibid., Annex39.
504Ibid., para. 4.52, and Annexes 41 and 45.
505Ibid., Annex 40.
506Cf. ibid., Annexes 41 and 45.
350
7 CIJ1077.indb 696 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 349
496
emmenés dans un champ de mines . En chemin, les forces serbes ont
abattu l’un d’eux qui n’arrivait pas à suivre la cadence parhce qu’il avait
été poignardé à la jambe au cours d’une séance de torture la nuit précé -
497
dente . Dès qu’ils sont arrivés, les membres du groupe ont été hcon498ints
de se tenir par la main et d’avancer dans le champ de mines .
432. Un témoin a rapporté que, à un moment, ils ont vu quelques -unes
des mines devant eux. Un jeune homme croate a été poussé sur l’une des
mines, qui a immédiatement explosé et entraîné une détonahtion en chaîne
des mines tout autour ; selon le demandeur, les explosions ont tué 21 per -
sonnes sur le coup et fait 12 blessés. Les soldats serbes ont alors demandé
aux blessés de crier et de lever la main pour être secourus. Selonh les
témoins, dès que les blessés ont levé la main et crié àh l’aide, les soldats
499
serbes ont commencé à tirer et à les tuer . Les cadavres ont été trans-
portés dans un charnier 500.
433. La Serbie a reconnu que « quatorze personnes sont actuellement
en procès devant le tribunal de district de Belgrade pour le meurtre hpré -
sumé de 68 Croates originaires du village de Lovas » 50. En outre, à Ilok,
par exemple, des meurtres de Croates par des Serbes ont aussi été signa -
lés: ainsi, dans sa déposition, F. D. (qui a été maintenu en détention à
Ilok du 1 ernovembre 1991 au 31 mars 1992) a fait état de meurtres bru-
taux, notamment de personnes battues à mort 502.
434. A Bogdanovci, de nombreux témoignages font état de meurtres
de Croates pendant l’occupation. Beaucoup auraient été tués hchez eux,
d’autres alors qu’ils tentaient de fuir le village 503. Selon la Croatie, de
nombreux Croates ont été tués alors qu’ils étaient forcéhs de sortir de chez
eux, ou à l’intérieur des maisons quand ils préféraient yh rester 504. Le vil-
lage a été occupé le 10 novembre 1991 par des paramilitaires et la JNA
après avoir été505taqué à l’artillerie lourde et par lh’infanterie.
Marija Katić , par exemple, a témoigné que le village avait été complèh-
tement détruit, et que « lors de la destruction dix personnes ont été tuées
et enterrées sur ce qu’on appelait la « place de l’école », leurs corps enve -
loppés dans des tentes et enterrés chacun avec une bouteille à hcôté conte-
nant les renseignements relatifs à la personne décédée »; d’autres témoins
ont fait état de meurtres de Croates et de morts sous la torture 506.
496
CR 2014/10, par. 24, p. 15.
497Voir mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.118-4.119 et 4.123-4.126, et dépositions de S. P.,
annexe 97, et de P. V., annexe 95.
498Voir ibid., par. 4.125, et déposition de Z. T., annexe 102.
499Voir ibid., par. 4.125, et dépositions de Z. T., annexe 102, et de L.S., annexe 98.
500
501Sur le charnier de Lovas, voir ibid., annexe 168B.
502Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 720.
Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 55.
503Voir ibid., par. 4.51, et déposition de A. T., ibid., annexe 39.
504Ibid., par. 4.52, et annexes 41 et 45.
505Ibid., annexe 40.
506Ibid., annexes 41 et 45.
350
7 CIJ1077.indb 697 18/04/16 08:54 350 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
435. Likewise, in Saborsko, there is evidence of killings of Croats ;
there are accounts, e.g., of some men who were lined up and shot, and
women who were shot in the back 507. There are also accounts of bodies
508
of Croats being buried in a mass grave . According to M. M.,
“[a]fter the fall of Saborsko, nobody buried the dead people so they
were all left on the places where they died. In the last 15days, because
of the arrival of the blue helmets, the army buried those people with
excavators on the places where they got killed and the graves were
509
marked with the crosses that had no names or surnames on them” .
As to the acts having taken place in Saborsko, Serbia significantly
accepted that most of them had been confirmed by the judgment of the
ICTY 510.
436. There is, moreover, extensive evidence referring to killings of Cro-
ats in Vukovar 511; according to the record, 1,700 persons were allegedly
killed (70 per cent civilian), and around 2,000 were killed after the occu -
512
pation . It stems from the case file that a concentration camp was estab-
lished in Velepromet, to be later used for organized killings. Accordingh to
a witness statement, about 50 people were executed in that camp before
the final fall o513ukovar. The hospital of Vukovar was bombed with twoh
250 kg bombs .
437. In central Vukovar, e.g., executions took place 514: grenades were
thrown in houses and streets were covered with dead bodies. According
to E. M. 515, every day 4-5 people were killed by weapons or slaughtered.
He stated that houses were set on fire, and added that, in Velepromet,h
there were mass executions of people (at least 50 corpses or even more).
Another witness, F. G., reported having been cut on the forehead and
having seen about 15 decapitated bodies in a hole and a garbage pit in
516
Velepromet, and heads scattered; he also saw a man being decapitated .
In Ovčara, an alleged mass execution of 260 people took place, and they
were buried in a mass grave 517. Exhumation took place in 1996 and
145 bodies were identified, but the whereabouts of 60 of the patients
taken from the hospital is still unknown 518.
438. Other civilians were taken from the hospital to Velepromet, a
warehouse which was basically a concentration camp, where 15,000 Cro-
507
508Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 5.149-5.152.
Cf. ibid., Annexes 364-365.
509Ibid., Annex 365.
510Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 841.
511In relation to Vukovar, cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 4.139-4.192.
512Ibid., para. 4.139.
513Ibid., para. 4.154.
514
515Ibid., paras. 4.164-4.167.
Ibid., Annex 126.
516Ibid., Annex 121.
517Ibid., para. 4.175.
518Ibid., para. 4.178.
351
7 CIJ1077.indb 698 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 350
435. De même, à Saborsko, il existe des preuves de meurtres de Croates;
selon certains témoignages, par exemple, des hommes ont été alihgnés et
abattus, et des femmes abattues dans le dos 507. D’autres font état de corps
508
de Croates enterrés dans une fosse commune . Selon M. M.,
« [a]près la chute de Saborsko, personne n’a enterré les morts, de sorte
qu’ils ont tous été laissés là où ils étaient tombéhs. Au cours des 15 d-er
niers jours, parce que les casques bleus arrivaient, l’armée a utilisé des
pelleteuses pour enterrer ces gens là où ils avaient été tuéhs, et les tombes
509
ont été marquées avec des croix qui ne portaient ni nom ni prénom. »
En ce qui concerne les actes commis à Saborsko, la Serbie a pour une htrès
large part reconnu que la plupart d’entre eux avaient été confihrmés par le
jugement du TPIY 510.
436. Il y a en outre de nombreuses preuves concernant les meurtres de
Croates à Vukovar 511; d’après le dossier, 1700 personnes auraient été
tuées (70 % de civils), et 2000 environ après l’occupation 512. Il ressort du
dossier qu’un camp de concentration a été créé au Veleprohmet et a servi
ultérieurement pour des meurtres organisés. D’après la déhclaration d’un
témoin, une cinquantaine de personnes ont été exécutées dhans ce camp
avant la chute finale de Vukovar. De513bombes de 250 kilos ont été lar -
guées sur l’hôpital de Vukovar .
437. Dans le centre de Vukovar, par exemple, des exécutions ont eu
514
lieu : des grenades étaient lancées dans les maisons et les rues étahient
jonchées de cadavres. Selon E. M. 515, tous les jours, quatre ou cinq per -
sonnes étaient passées par les armes ou massacrées. E. M. a déclaré que
des maisons avaient été incendiées et que, au Velepromet, il y havait des
exécutions de masse (au moins 50 cadavres, sinon plus). Un autre témoin,
F. G., a affirmé avoir été coupé au front et avoir vu une quinhzaine de
corps décapités dans un trou et une fosse à ordures au Velepromhet, et les
têtes éparpillées ; il a aussi vu un homme être décapité 51. A Ovčara, il y
aurait eu une exécution de masse de 260 personnes, dont les corps ont été
517
enterrés dans une fosse commune . Il a été procédé à une exhumation
en 1996 et 145 corps ont été identifiés, mais on ignore toujours quel a éhté
518
le sort de 60 des patients qui ont été emmenés de l’hôpithal .
438. D’autres civils ont été emmenés de l’hôpital au Veleprhomet — un
entrepôt qui était essentiellement un camp de concentration, oùh
507
508Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 5.149-5.152.
Ibid., annexes 364-365.
509Ibid., annexe 365.
510Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 841.
511En ce qui concerne Vukovar, voir mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.139-4.192.
512Ibid., par. 4.139.
513Ibid., par. 4.154.
514
515Ibid., par. 4.164-4.167.
Ibid., annexe 126.
516Ibid., annexe 121.
517Ibid., par. 4.175.
518Ibid., par. 4.178.
351
7 CIJ1077.indb 699 18/04/16 08:54 351 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
ats were sent during the occupation. In Velepromet, atrocities took plache,
including decapitations and killings. According to F. J., mass murders
occurred in Velepromet 519. Significantly, in relation to the greater Vuk -
ovar area, Serbia acknowledged that “[t]he ICTY has indicted several h
people for the crimes allegedly committed in Vukovar, but the number of h
deaths for which the accused are charged is significantly smaller thanh
claimed by [Croatia]” 520.
439. In conclusion, it seems clear from the evidence that there was a
consistent and systematic pattern of killings of Croats across the munichi-
palities examined. All witness statements in relation to each village rehport
killings, and the intention to kill, as part of the physical element of hthe
crime. The examination of the case record and the corresponding evi -
dence point to a systematic pattern of killing of Croats. There seems thhus
to be sufficient evidence of the actus reus of “killing members of the
group” under Article II (a) of the Genocide Convention.
4. Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of
the Group (Article II (b))
440. Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention prohibits “causing seri-
ous bodily or mental harm to members of the group”. As to the physicahl
element of this prohibited act, the contending Parties agree that seriouhs
bodily or mental harm does not need to be permanent and irremediable,
and that sexual violence crimes can fall within the ambit of this provi -
sion 521. Upon review of the evidence submitted by the Parties, and in par-
ticular witness statements examined in the selected municipalities, it is
clear that there occurred serious “bodily and mental harm” committhed
against members of the Croat population across various municipalities inh
Croatia.
441. Torture, beatings, maltreatment and sexual violence against Cro -
ats were common denominators in the evidence produced before the
Court. As to Lovas, for example, there were accounts of torture, mal -
treatment and beatings as well as humiliation suffered therein ; those
accounts provide evidence of “serious bodily and mental harm” commhit-
ted against members of the population. An illustration is the statement hof
witness P. V. concerning events during the occupation of Lovas 522. She
testified that they were held during the day in the “collective yarhd”, and
some were kept during the night. The witness reported beatings of those h
in captivity and torture : she stated that “[t]hey would beat the victims
every morning in front of everyone”. The witness reported having to dhis -
519Memorial of Croatia, Annex 129.
520Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 741.
521Cf. Memorial of Croatia, paras. 7.62-7.64, and Counter-Memorial of Serbia,
paras. 79-81.
522Ibid., Annex 95.
352
7 CIJ1077.indb 700 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 351
15 000 Croates ont été envoyés pendant l’occupation. Des atrocités s’y
sont produites, notamment des décapitations et des meurtres. Selon F.h J.,
des meurtres de masse y ont été commis 51. Fait révélateur, en ce qui
concerne la région de Vukovar, la Serbie a reconnu que « [l]e TPIY a
accusé plusieurs personnes pour les crimes qui auraient été comhmis à
Vukovar, mais le nombre de morts imputés aux accusés est nettementh
inférieur aux chiffres avancés par [la Croatie] » 520.
439. En conclusion, il ressort clairement des éléments de preuve qu’hil y
avait une entreprise cohérente et systématique de meurtres de Croahtes
dans toutes les municipalités examinées. Toutes les déclarations de
témoins concernant chacun des villages font état de meurtres et deh l’inten -
tion de tuer, en tant que partie de l’élément matériel du crhime. Les élé-
ments figurant dans le dossier et les preuves correspondantes révèhlent un
ensemble de meurtres systématiques de Croates. Il semble donc y avoirh
des preuves suffisantes de l’élément matériel du « meurtre de membres du
groupe » réprimé au litt. a) de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide.
4. Atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou mentale
de membres du groupe (litt. b) de l’article II)
440. Le litt. b) de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide interdit de
commettre une « atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou mentale de membres
du groupe »; en ce qui concerne l’élément matériel de cet acte interdith, les
parties conviennent que la grave atteinte physique ou mentale n’a pash
besoin d’être permanente et irrémédiable, et que les vi521nches sexuelles
peuvent tomber sous le coup de cette disposition . Après examen des
preuves présentées par les Parties, et en particulier des déclahrations des
témoins dans les municipalités retenues, il ressort clairement queh de graves
«atteintes à l’intégrité physique ou mentale » ont été commises contre des
membres de la population croate dans diverses municipalités de Croatihe.
441. La torture, les sévices physiques, les mauvais traitements et la vio -
lence sexuelle contre les Croates étaient les dénominateurs communhs des
preuves produites devant la Cour. En ce qui concerne Lovas, par exemple,h
il y avait des témoignages de torture, de mauvais traitements et de shévices
physiques ainsi que d’humiliation ; ces récits apportent la preuve
d’«atteintes graves à l’intégrité physique ou mentale » commises contre
des membres de la population. La déclaration du témoin P. V. concernant
les événements survenus pendant l’occupation de Lovas en est unh
exemple 522. P. V. a affirmé que des personnes étaient détenues le jour
dans la « cour collective» et que certaines y étaient gardées la nuit. Elle a
fait état de sévices physiques infligés aux détenus et de htorture, déclarant
519 Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 129.
520 Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 741.
521 Voir mémoire de la Croatie, par. 7.62-7.64, et contre-mémoire de la Serbie, annexe,
par. 79-81.
522 Ibid., annexe 95.
352
7 CIJ1077.indb 701 18/04/16 08:54 352 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
arm mines ; she named some of the victims of torture whom she knew
523
personally .
442. There was a series of testimonies of heavy beatings. StjepanPeulić,
e.g., testified about interrogation methods and cruel torture :
“Petronije slapped me repeatedly and then hit me with his boot in
the chin, which left a scar and two teeth were broken ; he continued
beating me. At the same time, Ljuban Devetak started calling people,
who were then taken out and beaten with iron tubes and stabbed with
bayonets before us.” 524
The statements of P. M. 525and J. K. 526also referred to heavy beatings.
443. Similar brutalities were reported to have occurred in Ilok ; for
example, when thousands of Croatian civilians were leaving the city in ah
convoy, they were exposed to humiliation and molestation by the JNA
and paramilitaries, who also robbed them. Croats that did not wish to
leave their homes were subject to physical and psychological harassment,h
robbery and arbitrary detention. Witness P. V., e.g., reported living in
fear to have to leave his home 527. He stated that
“[p]eople would work for days without any food or any compensa -
tion. The Serbs would humiliate us all the time. (. . .) We were not
allowed to gather publicly. When we walked on the streets, for exam-
528
ple, the Serbs (. . .) would hit us with rocks and insult us.”
Witness M. V. 529also reported having been tortured for four years.
444. In Bogdanovci, there were also reported cases of torture and mal -
treatment of Croats. Heavy attacks causing serious bodily injury were
also a common denominator in the witness statements. According to
Marija Katić, there were artillery attacks every few days (as in
August 1991), destroying family houses and farming objects. Witness
M. B. also testified about cases of torture, including the stretching of ha
Croat on a tree in front of a church until he died 530. Similar cases of
bodily and mental harm were reported in Saborsko. A witness reported,
e.g., that, in Saborsko, while the commanders were issuing the orders toh
523Memorial of Croatia, Vol. II, Annexes, p. 284.
524Ibid., Annex 97.
525Ibid., Annex 101.
526Ibid., Annex 104.
527Ibid., Annex 58.
528Ibid., Vol. II, Annex 58, p. 165.
529
530Ibid., Annex 59.
Ibid., Annex 41.
353
7 CIJ1077.indb 702 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 352
que «[i]s battaient les victimes chaque matin devant tout le monde ». Elle
a affirmé avoir dû désamorcer des mines ; elle a donné les noms de523r -
taines victimes de la torture qu’elle connaissait personnellement .
442. Selon toute une série de témoignages, des personnes ont été vio -
lemment rouées de coups. Stjepan Peulić, par exemple, a témoigné au
sujet des méthodes d’interrogatoire et de la cruauté de la torthure :
«Petronije m’a giflé à plusieurs reprises puis m’a donnéh un coup de
botte dans le menton, qui m’a laissé une cicatrice et deux dents chas -
sées; il a continué à me battre. En même temps, LjubaDevetak a com-
mencé à appeler les gens, qui ont été emmenés dehors, battus à coups
de tubes de fer et poignardés avec des baïonnettes devant nous. » 524
Les déclarations de P. M. 525 et de J. K. 526font aussi état de personnes
violemment rouées de coups.
443. Des brutalités similaires se seraient produites à Ilok ; ainsi, alors
qu’ils quittaient la ville en convoi, des milliers de civils croates hont été
victimes d’humiliations et de brutalités infligées par la JNAh et les para -
militaires, qui leur volaient aussi leurs biens. Les Croates qui ne voulhaient
pas quitter leurs maisons étaient victimes de harcèlement physiqueh et psy -
chologique, de vol et de détention arbitraire. Le témoin P. V., par exemple,
a affirmé avoir vécu dans la peur de devoir quitter sa maison 527. Il a
déclaré que
«[l]es gens travaillaient pendant des jours sans nourriture ni aucune
indemnité. Les Serbes nous humiliaient tout le temps… Nous n’éhtions
pas autorisés à nous réunir en public. Quand nous marchions danhs
les rues, par exemple, les Serbes… nous lançaient des pierres et nhous
insultaient.» 528
Le témoin M. V. 529a aussi affirmé avoir été torturé pendant quatre ans.
444. A Bogdanovci, des cas de torture et de mauvais traitements infligésh
aux Croates ont aussi été signalés. Les déclarations de téhmoins font toutes
état de lourdes attaques causant de graves préjudices corporels. Shelon
Marija Katić, il y avait des attaques d’artillerie tous les deux ou troish jours
(comme en août 1991), détruisant les maisons et les outils agricoles. Le
témoin M. B. a aussi fait état de cas de torture, notamment de « l’étire-
ment » jusqu’à la mort d’un Croate sur un arbre en face d’une héglise 530.
Des cas similaires d’atteintes physiques et mentales ont été signalés à
Saborsko. Un témoin a par exemple dit que, à Saborsko, lorsque lesh com -
523 Mémoire de la Croatie, vol. II, annexes, p. 284.
524 Ibid., annexe 97.
525 Ibid., annexe 101.
526 Ibid., annexe 104.
527 Ibid., annexe 58.
528 Ibid., vol. II, annexe 58, p. 165.
529
530 Ibid., annexe 59.
Ibid., annexe 41.
353
7 CIJ1077.indb 703 18/04/16 08:54 353 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
kill the civilians, they used to say that these latter were all “Ustashas”,
and should all be killed 53.
445. In Vukovar, serious bodily and mental harm was also reported to
have been committed. There were accounts of torture in Velepromet ;
civilians were mistreated and experienced mental distress. There were alhso
accounts of sexual violence, humiliation and cutting of limbs. The narrah -
tive of witness Franjo Kožul, e.g., reports of bodily and mental harm
having been inflicted upon Croats from Vukovar. He reported that he
“could hear” shots, people screaming and sobbing, hits, beating, ahmong
other brutalities. He added that :
“As we entered the stable, we had to pass through a cordon of men
who beat us with everything, the cordon was about 30 metres long.
They ordered me to make a list of people that were there, so I knew
the number, I made a list of 1242 people, in alphabetical order. After
some time I found out that in another stable were 480men. They were
offending us, beat us, maltreated us (. . .).During the first few days
we were sitting and sleeping one over the other, on bare concrete.
They would give us some water, one little slice of bread and some
cheese, twice a day, and they beat us and tortured us 24 hours a day.
I cannot describe all kinds of physical and psychological tortures, I
would never imagine that people we lived and worked with would do
532
that crime.”
446. In a similar vein, witness H. E. testified to daily rapes by Serbian
police and army officers upon her arrival to prison. The rapes happenedh
in the cell in front of other female prisoners. She also testified to hbeatings
533
and mental abuse . Likewise, M. M. also testified to repeated sexual
violence, maltreatment and mental distress :she was taken with her two-
month-old baby and six-year-old sister to Serbia, and then to Vukovar,
where they were both raped repeatedly by local Serbs. She testified toh the
killing of her husband and the mental harm she suffered. She reported
that she had to perform forced labour, and, if she did not work, she
would not have any food. She also testified about having been torturedh,
and about repeated rapes by several men, lasting for hours (and in fronht
of her little sister who was very a534id all the time), and with the ushe of
objects causing heavy bleeding .
447. Witness T. C. stated that Chetniks “were maltreating, expelling,
threatening, beating, raping and killing on a daily basis. They were
harshly terrorizing us. All our men, who were capable of work, were
taken to camps”. Some of them were ordered to keep on “digging up h
531Memorial of Croatia, Annex 365, Statement of M. M.
532Ibid., Annex 114.
533Ibid., Annex 116.
534Ibid., Annex 117.
354
7 CIJ1077.indb 704 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 353
mandants ordonnaient de tuer les civils, ils disaient généralementh que
ceux-ci étaient tous des « Oustachis» et devaient tous être tués 53.
445. A Vukovar, de graves atteintes physiques et mentales auraient
aussi été commises. Il y a eu des témoignages de torture au Velepromet ;
des civils ont été maltraités et subissaient des souffrances morhales. Il y
avait aussi des récits faisant état de violence sexuelle, d’humhiliation et de
mutilations. Le témoin Franjo Kožul, par exemple, a fait état d’atteintes
physiques et mentales infligées à des Croates à Vukovar. Il ah dit qu’il
«avait entendu » des coups de feu, des gens crier et pleurer, être frappés,
roués de coups, entre autres brutalités. Il a ajouté ce qui suiht:
« Quand nous sommes entrés dans l’écurie, nous avons dû passerh
devant une rangée d’hommes, sur une trentaine de mètres, qui nous
frappaient avec tout et n’importe quoi. On m’a ordonné de faireh la
liste des personnes présentes, de sorte que j’en connais le nombreh —
j’ai établi une liste de 1242 personnes, par ordre alphabétique. Après
un certain temps j’ai découvert qu’il y avait 480 hommes dans une
autre écurie. Nous étions insultés, battus, maltraités… Lhes premiers
jours, nous nous asseyions et dormions les uns sur les autres, sur le
béton nu. Ils nous donnaient de l’eau, une petite tranche de pain het
un peu de fromage, deux fois par jour, et ils nous battaient et nous
torturaient 24 heures sur 24. Je ne peux pas décrire tous les actes de
torture physique et psychologique, je n’aurais jamais imaginé que des 532
gens avec qui nous vivions et travaillions commettraient ce crime. »
446. De même, le témoin S.E. a fait état de viols quotidiens par la police
serbe et des officiers de l’armée à son arrivée en prison. hLes viols avaient
eu lieu dans la cellule devant les autres détenues. S. E. a aussi fait état de
533
coups et de violences psychologiques . M. M. a elle aussi témoigné avoir
subi à de multiples reprises des violences sexuelles, des mauvais traitements
et des souffrances morales ; avec son bébé de deux mois et sa sœur âgée de
six ans, elle a été emmenée en Serbie, puis à Vukovar, où ellhes ont été
violées à plusieurs reprises par des Serbes locaux. Elle a fait éhtat du meurtre
de son mari et du préjudice moral qu’elle avait subi. Elle a dit qhu’elle avait
été contrainte au travail forcé, et que, si elle ne travaillaith pas, on ne lui
donnait rien à manger. Elle a aussi affirmé avoir été tortuhrée et violée à de
multiples reprises par plusieurs hommes, pendant des heures (devant sa h
petite sœur, qui était tout le temps terrifiée) et avec des hobjets, ce qui avait
provoqué des hémorragies 53.
447. Le témoin T. C. a déclaré que les Tchetniks « maltraitaient, expul-
saient, menaçaient, battaient, violaient et tuaient tous les jours. Ihls nous -ter
rorisaient impitoyablement. Tous nos hommes capables de travailler ont éhté
emmenés dans des camps. » Certains d’entre eux ont reçu l’ordre de continuer
531 Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 365, déclaration de M. M.
532 Ibid., annexe 114.
533 Ibid., annexe 116.
534 Ibid., annexe 117.
354
7 CIJ1077.indb 705 18/04/16 08:54 354 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
holes”; they “never returned to their homes”, and no one learned any -
thing about them anymore. The witness testified that she was raped, anhd
further stated that “Croats had white ribbons at our gate in order to
enable Chetniks who were not from our village to recognize us” 535.
448. In conclusion, it stems clearly from the evidence in the case file
that, across the municipalities examined, victims suffered serious bodilyh
and mental harm in the form of torture, mistreatment, beatings, sexual
violence, psychological distress and forced labour. These accounts were h
not isolated events ; they were repeated in testimonies of witnesses from
different municipalities. The aforementioned evidence a systematic pat -
tern of the prohibited acts of destruction, demonstrating the physical
element of the acts prohibited under Article II (b) of the Geno -
cide Convention.
5. Deliberately Inflicting on the Group Conditions
of Life Calculated to Bring
about Its Physical Destruction in Whole or in Part (Article II (c))
449. “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” is a prohhibited
act under Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention. As to the physical
element (actus reus), Serbia recognized that systematic expulsion from
homes can fall within the scope of this provision, if such action is carhried
out with genocidal intent and forms part of a manifest pattern of conducht
that is capable of effecting the physical destruction of the group, and nhot
536
simply its displacement elsewhere . Thus, the question left is whether,
upon analysis of the case file, and in particular witness statements ehxam-
ined in the selected municipalities, it can be concluded that there was ha
violation of Article II (c) of the Convention.
450. Those witness statements referred to, in addition to rape and sex -
ual violence, also to deprivation of food and basic conditions of life ; they
also reported on deportation from entire regions. In Lovas, e.g., there h
were measures which caused the fleeing of Croats, such as the destructhion
of homes and deportations. According to J. K., before the occupation
Lovas had 1700 residents, 94 per cent of whom were Croats ; later on,
“they settled around 1500 Serbs” there, and, in “the occupied Lovas there
remained about 100 Croats, 25 people in mixed marriages and 144 Serbs
from Lovas. The settlers arrived in cars or tractors and they moved into
our houses with the permission of the housing commission” 537.
535Memorial of Croatia, Annex 128.
536Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 83-84, and Rejoinder of Serbia, para. 333.
537
Memorial of Croatia, Annex 104, p. 316.
355
7 CIJ1077.indb 706 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 354
à «creuser des trous»; ils ne sont jamais rentrés chez eux» et plus personne
n’a entendu parler d’eux. Le témoin a déclaré qu’elle avait été violée et a
ajouté que « les Croates devaient mettre des rubans blancs à leur porte pour
que les Tchetniks qui n’étaient pas du village puissent les reconnhaître » 535.
448. En conclusion, il ressort clairement des éléments de preuve figuh -
rant dans le dossier que, dans les municipalités en question, les vichtimes
ont souffert de graves atteintes physiques et mentales sous la forme de
torture, de mauvais traitements, de coups, de violence sexuelle, de déhtresse
psychologique et de travail forcé. Il ne s’agissait pas de faits isolés;on les
retrouve dans les dépositions des témoins de différentes municipalités.
Les faits mentionnés ci-dessus mettent en évidence un ensemble systéma -
tique d’actes de destruction interdits, ce qui démontre l’élhément matériel
des actes interdits par le litt. b) de l’article II de la convention sur le géno-
cide.
5. Soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions
d’existence devant entraîner
sa destruction physique totale ou partielle (litt. c) de l’article II)
449. La « soumission intentionnelle du groupe à des conditions d’exis -
tence devant entraîner sa destruction physique totale ou partielle » est un
acte interdit par le litt. c) de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide.
En ce qui concerne l’élément matériel (actus reus), la Serbie a reconnu
que l’expulsion systématique des logements peut entrer dans le chahmp
d’application de cette disposition, si elle s’accompagne de l’ihntention
génocidaire requise et s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une ligne de chonduite
patente susceptible d’aboutir à la destruction physique du groupe,h et pas
simplement à son déplacement dans un autre lieu 53. Ainsi, il reste à
examiner la question de savoir si, après analyse du dossier, et notamment
des déclarations des témoins dans les municipalités concernéhes,
l’on peut conclure qu’il y a eu violation du litt. c) de l’article II de la
Convention.
450. Dans ces déclarations, les témoins ont fait état, en sus de viohls et de
violences sexuelles, de privation de nourriture et des biens de premièhre
nécessité ; ils ont aussi fait état de déportation d’habitants de régihons
entières. A Lovas, par exemple, il y a eu des mesures qui ont provoquhé la
fuite des Croates, comme la destruction de maisons et les expulsions. Sehlon
J. K., avant l’occupation, Lovas comptait 1700habitants, dont 94 % étaient
des Croates e;suite, « ils y ont installé 1500 Serbes environ », et dans « le
village occupé il restait une centaine de Croates, 25 couples mixtes et
144 Serbes de Lovas. Les colons sont arrivés en voiture ou en tracteur eth se
sont installés dans nos maisons avec la permission de la commission dhu
537
logement.»
535
536Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 128.
537Voir contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 83-84, et duplique de la Serbie, par. 333.
Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 104, p. 316.
355
7 CIJ1077.indb 707 18/04/16 08:54 355 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
451. In Ilok, the statement of P. V. reported of being forced to leave
his house and remaining in fear to have to leave it ; he added that
“[p]eople would work for days without any food or any compensa -
tion. The Serbs would humiliate us all the time. (. . .) We were not
allowed to gather publicly. When we walked on the streets for exam -
ple the Serbs would spit on us from the church, they would hit us with
rocks and insult us.” 538
In relation to Ilok, it is significant to note that even Serbia itselfh acknow-
ledged that “[t]he Prosecutor of the ICTY charged SlobodanMilošević for
539
deportation or forcible transfer of inhabitants from Ilok” . Likewise, in
Bogdanovci, there were accounts of civilians being forced to leave, and h
the occupation was designed to decimate the population of the village
through destruction of the houses, farms and their infrastructure, and
churches. It appears that the occupation was designed to make the life ohf
Croats impossible. The experience of D. B. is illustrative of how the
540
attack made life in Bogdanovci impossible .
452. The village of Saborsko, likewise, appeared to have been com -
pletely destroyed. According to the testimony of M. M., the intention was
“to clean” ethnically the village 541. In the same vein, A. S. stated that
bombs were thrown from a plane on the village and houses and churches
were set on fire t;e witness further testified to people taking goods from
Saborsko 542. Similarly, M. M. testified that “[a]fter Saborsko was
attacked, Nedjeljko Trbojević called ‘Kičo’, during the action of ‘clean -
ing’, went from house to house and he threw bombs”, and “burnt ha few
houses with rocket launchers” 543.
453. It may be recalled that Serbia acknowledged that the Judgment of
the ICTY (Trial Chamber) in the Martić case confirmed the Novem -
ber 1991 attack on the village, and “most of the acts alleged to have takhen
544
place in Saborsko” . As to Vukovar, there were, likewise, accounts of
attempts to destroy all signs of Croatian life and culture in the city, h
destruction of property and heavy bombings. The majority of the people
of the city stayed in basements for three months and common shelters, 545
and many got killed while trying to get food, water and other supplies .
454. D. K. was in Vukovar until he was wounded ; then he was loaded
into a bus and deported to Serbia. He testified about the living condihtions
538 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 58.
539 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 693.
540 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 45.
541 Ibid., Annex 365.
542 Ibid., Annex 364.
543 Ibid., Annex 365.
544
545 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 840-841.
Memorial of Croatia, para. 4.151.
356
7 CIJ1077.indb 708 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 355
451. A Ilok, P. V. a dit dans sa déposition qu’il avait été forcé de quith-
ter sa maison et qu’il continuait à avoir peur de devoir la quittehr ; il a
ajouté ce qui suit :
«Les gens travaillaient pendant des jours sans nourriture ni aucune
indemnité. Les Serbes nous humiliaient tout le temps… Nous n’éhtions
pas autorisés à nous réunir en public. Quand nous marchions danhs
les rues, par exemple, les Serbes nous crachaient dessus depuis
538
l’église, nous lançaient des pierres et nous insultaient. »
En ce qui concerne Ilok, il importe de relever que même la Serbie a
reconnu que « [l]e procureur du TPIY a mis en accusation Slobo -
dan Milošević pour l’expulsion ou le transfert forcé d’habitahnts d’Ilo» k 53.
De même, à Bogdanovci, des témoins ont affirmé que des civihls avaient
été forcés de partir, et que l’occupation était destinéhe à décimer la popu -
lation du village par la destruction des maisons, des fermes et de leursh
infrastructures, et des églises. Il semble que l’occupation ait euh pour
objectif de rendre la vie des Croates impossible, comme l’illustre l’expé -
540
rience de D. B. .
452. Le village de Saborsko semble lui aussi avoir été complètement h
détruit. Selon le témoignage de M. M., l’intention était de procéder au
541
«nettoyage» ethnique du village . De même, A. S. a déclaré qu’un avion
avait largué des bombes sur le village et que les maisons et les éhglises
avaient été incendiées ; il a aussi affirmé que des gens avaient emporté des
biens de Saborsko 54. M. M. a témoigné que, « [a]près l’attaque de
Saborsko, Nedjeljko Trbojević, dit « Kičo», pendant l’opération de « net-
toyage », allait de maison en maison et jetait des bombes », et «avait brûlé
quelques maisons au lance-roquettes »543.
453. Rappelons que la Serbie a reconnu que, dans le jugement Martić,
le TPIY a confirmé l’attaque menée en novembre 1991 sur le village de
Saborsko et « la plupart des faits allégués à Saborsko »544. En ce qui
concerne Vukovar, il y avait, là aussi, des témoignages faisant état de
tentatives de détruire tous les signes de la vie et de la culture croates dans
la ville, de la destruction de biens et de lourds bombardements. La plu -
part des habitants de la ville ont passé trois mois dans des caves eth des
abris collectifs, et beaucoup ont été tués alors qu’ils545nthaient de se procu -
rer de la nourriture, de l’eau et d’autres produits .
454. D. K. était à Vukovar jusqu’à ce qu’il soit blessé ; il a ensuite été
chargé dans un bus et expulsé vers la Serbie. Il a témoigné hdes conditions
538Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 58.
539
540Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 693.
541Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 45.
542Ibid., annexe 365.
Ibid., annexe 364.
543Ibid., annexe 365.
544Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 840-841.
545Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 4.151.
356
7 CIJ1077.indb 709 18/04/16 08:54 356 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
546
in Stajićevo and Sremska Mitrovica ; victims had inhumane living con -
ditions, with very little food supply 54. B. V. reported not having any -
thing to eat day and night 548. And L. D. stated that “houses were on fire,
grenades were falling and killing people. The Serbs had sent their womenh
and children to Serbia earlier and the men stayed in Vukovar to slaughtehr
us Croats” 54. In sum, there is evidence produced before the Court that
breaches of Article II (c) of the Genocide Convention were committed,
within a systematic pattern of extreme violence, aiming at deliberately h
inflicting conditions of life designed to bring about the physical deshtruc -
tion of the targeted groups of Croats, in whole or in part.
6. General Assessment of Witness Statements and Conclusions
(a) Witness statements
455. The witness statements in relation to each of the selected munici -
palities — namely, Lovas, Ilok, Bogdanovci, Saborsko and Vukovar —
all refer to similar occurrences in each of those municipalities. All witness
statements have been analysed, including those statements that were
unsigned by witnesses. All converge to similar occurrences which fall
under Article II of the Convention against Genocide. I consider even wit -
ness statements that are unsigned relevant for the assessment of events h
that occurred in the aforementioned municipalities, given that they are hin
the same line as those statements that are signed. The totality of witnehss
testimonies (signed and unsigned), read together, provide substantial hevi-
dence of the crimes perpetrated in those municipalities, in breach of Arhti-
cleII of the Convention against Genocide.
456. In the same line of thinking, I have deemed it relevant to examine
the acts alleged to have occurred in all municipalities for which Croatia
submitted evidence, rather than single out one or another specific munhici -
pality, so as to determine whether there was a systematic pattern of
destruction. In the present case, the Court, instead of looking at a selhected
sample of incidents, as it has done, should rather have examined the
totality of criminal acts committed during the entire military campaign h
against Croatia, brought to its attention in the cas d’espèce, to determine
whether a systematic pattern of conduct of destruction amounting to
genocide occurred. The reference to incidents at given municipalities
serves to illustrate the general pattern of destruction.
546 These are localities in Serbia, where there appears to have been camps whhere some
Croats were taken to.
547 Memorial of Croatia, Annex 138.
548 Ibid., Annex 151.
549 Ibid., Annex 143.
357
7 CIJ1077.indb 710 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 356
546
de vie à Stajićevo et Sremska Mitrovica ; les conditions d’existence
étaient inhumaines, les victimes recevant très peu de nourriture 547. B. V.
a affirmé qu’il n’avait rien à manger de jour comme de nuith 54. L. D. a
déclaré que « les maisons étaient en feu, des grenades tombaient et tuaient
les gens. Les Serbes avaient envoyé leurs femmes et leurs enfants en hSerbie
avant et les hommes étaient restés à Vukovar pour nous tuer. » 549
En résumé, il ressort des preuves produites devant la Cour que des vihola-
tions du litt. c) de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide ont été
commises, dans le cadre d’une campagne d’extrême violence systéhmatique
visant à soumettre intentionnellement les groupes visés de Croatesh à des
conditions d’existence devant entraîner leur destruction physique totale
ou partielle.
6. Appréciation générale des déclarations de témoins et conc▯lusions
a) Déclarations de témoins
455. Les déclarations de témoins concernant chacune des municipalitéhs
retenues — Lovas, Ilok, Bogdanovci, Saborsko et Vukovar — font toutes
état d’événements semblables survenus dans chacune d’elles. Elles ont
toutes été analysées, y compris celles qui n’étaient pas hsignées. Toutes
convergent et attestent de faits semblables qui tombent sous le coup de h
l’article II de la convention sur le génocide. Je considère que même les h
déclarations non signées sont pertinentes pour l’appréciatiohn des événe -
ments survenus dans les municipalités susmentionnées, car elles s’hins -
crivent dans le droit fil de celles qui sont signées. Toutes les déhclarations
de témoins (signées et non signées), prises ensemble, apportent des preuves
solides des crimes perpétrés dans ces municipalités, en violatihon de l’ar -
ticleII de la convention sur le génocide.
456. Dans le même ordre d’idées, j’ai jugé opportun d’examihner les
actes qui auraient été commis dans toutes les municipalités pour lesquelles
la Croatie a présenté des éléments de preuve, plutôt que hd’isoler telle ou
telle municipalité, de manière à déterminer s’il existaith une entreprise de
destruction systématique. En l’espèce, la Cour, au lieu d’exhaminer un
nombre limité de preuves, comme elle l’a fait, aurait dû tenir compte de la
totalité des actes criminels commis pendant toute la campagne militaire
contre la Croatie et portés à son attention, pour déterminer sih une volonté
de destruction systématique constitutive de génocide avait étéh à l’œuvre.
La mention de faits survenus dans des municipalités particulières hsert à
illustrer la campagne générale de destruction.
546Il s’agit de localités en Serbie, où il semble qu’il y avaith des camps où des Croates
ont été emmenés.
547Mémoire de la Croatie, annexe 138.
548Ibid., annexe 151.
549Ibid., annexe 143.
357
7 CIJ1077.indb 711 18/04/16 08:54 357 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
(b) Conclusions
457. In my perception, the witness statements in their totality provide
evidence of the widespread and systematic pattern of destruction that
occurred in those municipalities plagued by extreme violence. The wide -
spread and systematic pattern of destruction, as established in the preshent
case, consisted of the widespread and systematic perpetration of the
aforementioned wrongful acts (grave breaches) falling under the Convenh -
tion against Genocide.
458. They comprised, as seen above, killing members of the Croat
(civilian) population (Art. II (a)), causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of targeted groups (Art. II (b)), and deliberately inflicting on
the groups concerned conditions of life calculated to bring about their h
physical destruction in whole or in part (Art. II (c)). It appears that it
can be concluded, on the basis of atrocities committed in the selected
municipalities, that the actus reus of genocide of Article II (a), (b) and
(c) of the Convention against Genocide has been established.
XV. m ens R ea of Genocide: Proof of Genocidal
Intent by Inference
459. May I now, at this stage of my dissenting opinion, move from
actus reus of genocide to the element of mens rea (intent to destroy) under
the Convention against Genocide, as applied in the present case. In the h
course of the proceedings of the cas d’espèce, the contending Parties
themselves presented arguments as to the issue whether genocidal intent h
550
can be proven by inferences . From a cumulative analysis of the dossier
of the cas d’espèce as a whole, in my perception the intent to destroy the
targeted groups, in whole or in part, can be inferred from the evidence h
submitted (even if not direct proof). The extreme violence in the perphetra -
tion of atrocities bears witness of such intent to destroy.
460. The widespread and systematic pattern of destruction across
municipalities, encompassing massive killings, torture and beatings,
enforced disappearances, rape and other sexual violence crimes, system -
atic expulsion from homes (with mass exodus), provides the basis for
inferring a genocidal plan with the intent to destroy the targeted groups,
in whole or in part, in the absence of direct evidence. In effect, to reqhuire
direct evidence of genocidal intent in all cases is not in line with theh juris-
prudence of international criminal tribunals, as we shall see next.
550Cf., e.g., Croatia’s argument in Reply of Croatia, 2.11, invoking Serbia’s
acknowledgment in Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para135 (difficulty to obtain direct
evidence, and reliance on indirect evidence, with inferences therefrom)h Reply of Croatia,
para. 2.12.
358
7 CIJ1077.indb 712 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 357
b) Conclusions
457. A mon sens, les déclarations de témoins dans leur totalité
apportent la preuve de la campagne de destruction systématique et géhné-
rale mise en œuvre dans les municipalités victimes d’extrême violence.
Cette campagne, telle qu’elle a été établie dans la présehnte affaire, consis-
tait en la perpétration généralisée et systématique des ahctes illicites sus -
mentionnés (infractions graves) tombant sous le coup de la conventihon
sur le génocide.
458. Les actes en question, comme on l’a vu plus haut, incluaient le
meurtre de membres de la population (civile) croate (litt.a) de l’article II),
des atteintes graves à l’intégrité physique ou mentale de mehmbres de
groupes visés (litt. b) de l’article II) et la soumission intentionnelle des
groupes en question à des conditions d’existence devant entraîner leur des -
truction physique totale ou partielle (litt.c) de l’article II). Il apparaît que
l’on peut conclure, sur la base des atrocités commises dans les municipalités
retenues, que l’élément matériel (actus reus) du génocide prévu aux ali -
néas a), b) et c) de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide a été établi.
XV. Élément moral (mens Rea ) du génocide: preuve
de l’intention génochidaire par déduction
459. Je passerai à présent, à ce stade de mon exposé, de l’éhlément matériel
(actusreus) du génocide à l’élément moral (mens rea) (intention de détruire)
prévu par la convention sur le génocide, telle qu’appliquée hen l’espèce. Au
cours de la procédure, les Parties elles-mêmes ont présenté des moyens rela -
tifs à la question de savoir si l’intention génocidaire peut êhtre prouvée par
550
déduction . A partir de l’analyse d’ensemble du dossier du cas d’espèche
dans sa totalité, à mon avis, la preuve de l’intention de déhtruire les groupes
visés, en tout ou en partie, peut être déduite des élémenhts produits (même si
ce ne sont pas des éléments de preuve directs). L’extrême violence à l’œuvre
dans la perpétration des atrocités atteste cette intention de déhtruire.
460. La campagne de destruction systématique et générale menée dahns
les municipalités, qui recouvre des meurtres de masse, des actes de thorture
et des sévices physiques, des disparitions forcées, des viols et dh’autres vio-
lences sexuelles et l’expulsion systématique des logements (accomhpagnée
d’exode massif), constitue la base qui permet de déduire, à déhfaut d’élé -
ments de preuve directs, l’existence d’un plan génocidaire mis hen œuvre
dans l’intention de détruire les groupes visés, en tout ou en phartie. En
effet, le fait d’exiger la preuve directe de l’intention génocidhaire dans
toutes les affaires ne va pas dans le sens de la jurisprudence des tribunhaux
pénaux internationaux, comme nous le verrons ci -dessous.
550 Voir, par exemple, l’argument de la Croatie dans sa réplique, par.h 2,11, invoquant
le fait que la Serbie partage cet avis dans son contre-mémoire, par. 135 (difficulté d’obtenir
des preuves directes, et recours à des éléments de preuve indirhecte afin d’établir une preuve
par présomptions de fa; réplique de la Croatie, par..
358
7 CIJ1077.indb 713 18/04/16 08:54 358 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
1. International Case Law on Mens Rea
461. When there is no direct evidence of intent, this latter can be
inferred from the facts and circumstances. Thus, in the Akayesu case
(Judgment of 2 September 1998), the ICTR (Trial Chamber) held that the
intent to commit genocide requires that acts must be committed against
members of a group specifically because they belong to that group
(para. 521). A couple of jurisprudential illustrations to this effect can here h
be referred to. For example, the ICTY (Appeals Chamber) asserted, in
the Jelisić case (Judgment of 5 July 2001), that,
“[a]s to proof of specific intent, it may, in the absence of directh explicit
evidence, be inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such
as the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts system -
atically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities com -
mitted, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their
membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and
discriminatory acts” (para. 47).
The ICTY further stated, in the Krstić case (Judgment of 19 April 2004),
that, when proving genocidal intent based on an inference, “that infehr -
ence must be the only reasonable inference available on the evidence”
(para. 41).
462. Again, in the jurisprudence of the ICTR, it has been established,
in the same vein, that intent to commit genocide can be inferred from
facts and circumstances. In the Rutaganda case, e.g., the ICTR
(Trial Chamber, Judgment of 6 December 1999) stated that: “[I]ntent can
be, on a case-by-case basis, inferred from the material evidence submitted
to the Chamber, including the evidence which demonstrates a consistent
pattern of conduct by the accused” 551(paras. 61-63). Likewise, in the
Semanza case, the ICTR (Trial Chamber, Judgment of 15 May 2003)
stated that a “perpetrator’s mens rea may be inferred from his actions”
(para. 313).
463. Furthermore, in the Bagilishema case, the ICTR (Trial Chamber,
Judgment of 7 June 2001) found that
“evidence of the context of the alleged culpable acts may help the
Chamber to determine the intention of the accused, especially where
the intention is not clear from what that person says or does. The
Chamber notes, however, that the use of context to determine the
intent of an accused must be counterbalanced with the actual conduct
of the accused. The Chamber is of the opinion that the accused’s
intent should be determined, above all, from his words and deeds, and
should be evident from patterns of purposeful action.” (Para. 63.)
551And cf. also, ICTR, case Musema, Judgment of 27 January 2000, para. 167.
359
7 CIJ1077.indb 714 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 358
1. Jurisprudence internationale relative à l’élément moral
(mens rea)
461. La preuve de l’intention peut, à défaut d’éléments de hpreuve
directs, être déduite des faits et des circonstances. Ainsi, dans hle jugement
Akayesu (2 septembre 1998), le TPIR a conclu que l’intention de com -
mettre le génocide suppose que les actes aient été commis contrhe les
membres d’un groupe en raison même de leur appartenance à ce grhoupe
(par. 521). On peut aussi se référer à d’autres exemples de jurishprudence
allant dans le même sens. Dans l’arrêt Jelisić (5 juillet 2001), par exemple,
le TPIY a dit ce qui suit :
«Quant à la preuve de l’intention spécifique, elle peut, à défaut
d’éléments de preuve directs et explicites, procéder d’un certain
nombre de faits et de circonstances, tels le contexte général, la hperpé -
tration d’autres actes répréhensibles systématiquement dirighés contre
le même groupe, l’ampleur des atrocités commises, le fait de vihser
systématiquement certaines victimes en raison de leur appartenance
àun groupe particulier, ou la récurrence d’actes destructifs et discri -
minatoires.» (Par. 47.)
Le TPIY a en outre dit, dans l’arrêt Krstić (19 avril 2004), que, lorsque
l’accusation se fonde sur la preuve de l’intention génocidaire hobtenue par
déduction, « celleci doit être la seule raisonnable possible compte tenu
des éléments réunis » (par. 41).
462. Dans la jurisprudence du TPIR, il a aussi été établi, dans le même
ordre d’idées, que l’intention de commettre le génocide peuth être déduite
des faits et des circonstances. Dans le jugement Rutaganda
(6 décembre 1999), par exemple, le TPIR a déclaré que « l’intention est
déterminée, au cas par cas, par une déduction tirée des éhléments de preuve
qui … ont été soumis [à la Chambre], y compris ceux qui permettent
d’établir l’existence chez l’accusé d’une ligne de conhduite délibérée » 551
(par. 61-63). Il a également affirmé, dans le jugement Semanza
(15 mai 2003), que « la mens reas peut se déduire des agissements de l’au -
teur présumé du crime » (par. 313).
463. En outre, dans le jugement Bagilishema (7 juin 2001), le TPIR a
dit ce qui suit :
«Ainsi, le contexte de perpétration des actes allégués peut -il aider
la Chambre à déterminer l’intention de l’accusé, en partihculier lorsque
ses propos et ses actes ne font pas apparaître cette intention. La
Chambre relève cependant que, lorsque l’on a recours au contexte
pour déduire l’intention de l’accusé, on doit le faire par rhéférence à la
conduite même de l’accusé. La Chambre est d’avis que l’inhtention de
l’accusé devrait se déduire, avant tout, de ses propos et de sehs actes,
et ressortir clairement d’une ligne de conduite délibérée. » (Par. 63.)
551Voir aussi jugement Musema du TPIR, 27 janvier 2000, par. 167.
359
7 CIJ1077.indb 715 18/04/16 08:54 359 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
464. In this regard, in the landmark case of Akayesu, the ICTR
(Trial Chamber, Judgment of 2 September 1998) found that “intent is a
mental factor which is difficult, even impossible to determine”, andh it
decided that, “in the absence of a confession from the accused”, ihntent
may be inferred from the following factors : (a) “the general context of
the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against hthat
same group”, whether committed “by the same offender or by others”h ;
(b) “the scale of atrocities committed” ;(c) the “general nature” of the
atrocities committed “in a region or a country” ; (d) “the fact of deliber-
ately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membershihp
of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups” ;
(e) “the general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts” ; (f) “the
repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts” ; and (g) “the perpetra -
tion of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves considehr
to violate the very foundation of the group — acts which are not in them-
selves covered by the list (. . .) but which are committed as part of the
same pattern of conduct” (paras. 523-524).
465. In the case of Kayishema and Ruzindana, the ICTR (Trial Cham-
ber, Judgment of 21 May 1999) stated that intent might be difficult to
determine and that the accused’s “actions, including circumstantiahl evi -
dence, however may provide sufficient evidence of intent”, and that
“intent can be inferred either from words or deeds and may be demon -
strated by a pattern of purposeful action”. The ICTR (Trial Chamber)
affirmed that the following can be relevant indicators : (a) the number of
group members affected ; (b) physical targeting of the group or their
property; (c) use of derogatory language toward members of the tar -
geted group; (d) weapons employed and extent of bodily injury ;
(e) methodical way of planning ; (f) systematic manner of killing ; and
(g) relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of
a group (paras. 93 and 527).
466. In the light of the foregoing, the jurisprudence of international
criminal tribunals holds that proof of genocidal intent may be inferred
from facts and circumstances, and provides some guidelines to that effecth,
even in the absence of documentary evidence. Factual elements which can h
be taken into account for that inference are, e.g., indications of premehdi-
tation, of the existence of a State policy or plan, the repetition of athroci -
ties against the same targeted groups, the systematic pattern of extremeh
violence against, and destruction of, vulnerable or defenceless groups ohf
individuals.
2. General Assessment
467. In the light of the foregoing, the International Court of Justice
seems to have imposed too high a threshold for the determination of mens
rea of genocide, which does not appear in line with the jurisprudence con ‑
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7 CIJ1077.indb 716 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 359
464. A cet égard, dans le jugement historique qu’il a rendu en l’affaire
Akayesu (2 septembre 1998), le TPIR a jugé que « l’intention est un fac -
teur d’ordre psychologique qu’il est difficile, voire impossible,h d’appré -
hender», et il a décidé, que « à défaut d’aveux de la part de l’accusé »,
l’intention peut se déduire des faits suivants : a) « le contexte général de
perpétration d’autres actes répréhensibles systématiquemehnt dirigés
contre le même groupe», que ces actes soient commis « par le même agent
ou même par d’autres agents »; b) « l’échelle des atrocités commises »;
c) le «caractère général» des atrocités commises « dans une région ou un
pays»; d) « le fait de délibérément et systématiquement choisir les vic -
times en raison de leur appartenance à un groupe particulier, tout enh
excluant les membres des autres groupes »; e) « la doctrine générale du
projet politique inspirant les actes »; f) «la répétition d’actes de destruc -
tion discriminatoires»; g) «la perpétration d’actes portant atteinte au
fondement du groupe, ou à ce que les auteurs des actes considèrenth
comme tel, actes qui ne relèveraient pas nécessairement eux -mêmes de
l’énumération …, mais qui sont commis dans le cadre de la même ligne de
conduite » (par. 523-524).
465. Dans le jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana (21 mai 1999), le TPIR
a déclaré qu’il peut être difficile de prouver l’intentihon mais qu’il n’em -
pêche que «son existence peut être établie de manière convaincante à pah-r
tir des actes de l’auteur, y compris au moyen de preuves indirectes », et
que « l’intention peut être déduite soit des propos soit des actes deh l’au -
teur, et peut être établie par la mise en évidence de l’exishtence d’une ligne
de conduite délibérée ». Il a affirmé que les éléments suivants peuvent être
des indices pertinents : a) le nombre de membres du groupe victimes ;
b) le fait de s’attaquer physiquement au groupe ou à ses biens ;c) l’usage
de termes insultants à l’égard des membres du groupe visé ;d) les armes
utilisées et la gravité des blessures subies par les victimes ;e) le caractère
méthodique de la planification ; f) le caractère systématique du crime ;
g) l’étendue relative de la destruction, ou de la tentative de destruhction,
d’un groupe (par. 93 et 527).
466. La jurisprudence susmentionnée montre que les tribunaux pénaux
internationaux considèrent que la preuve de l’intention génocidhaire peut
être déduite des faits et des circonstances, et énoncent quelquhes lignes dire-
trices à cet effet, même en l’absence de preuves documentaires. hLes éléments
factuels pouvant être pris en considération pour cette déductiohn sont, par
exemple, des indications de la préméditation, de l’existence d’hune politique
ou d’un plan de l’Etat, la répétition des atrocités contrhe les mêmes groupes
visés, le caractère systématique de la violence extrême exerhcée contre des
groupes d’individus vulnérables ou sans défense et de leur desthruction.
2. Appréciation générale
467. Au vu de ce qui précède, la Cour semble avoir imposé un seuil
trop élevé pour la détermination de la mens rea du génocide, qui ne paraît
pas être conforme à la jurisprudence constante des tribunaux péhnaux
360
7 CIJ1077.indb 717 18/04/16 08:54 360 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
stante of international criminal tribunals on the matter. The International
Court of Justice has pursued, and insisted upon pursuing, too high a stan-
dard of proof for the determination of the occurrence of genocide or
complicity in genocide. In my understanding, mens rea cannot simply be
discarded, as the International Court of Justice does in the cas d’espèce,on
the basis of an a priori adoption of a standard of proof — such as the one
the International Court of Justice has adopted — entirely inadequate for
the determination of State responsibility for grave violations of the rihghts
of the human person, individually or in groups.
468. The Court cannot simply say, as it does in the present Judg -
ment, that there has been no intent to destroy, in the atrocities perpe -
trated, just because it says so 552. This is a diktat, not a proper handling of
evidence. This diktat goes against the voluminous evidence of the material
element of actus reus under the Convention against Genocide (Art. II),
wherefrom the intent to destroy can be inferred. This diktat is unsustain -
able, it is nothing but a petitio principii militating against the proper exer -
cise of the international judicial function. Summum jus, summa injuria.
Mens rea , the dolus specialis, can only be inferred, from a number of
factors.
469. In my understanding, evidential assessments cannot prescind from
axiological concerns. Human values are always present, as acknowledged
by the historical emergence of the principle, in process, of the conviction
intime (livre convencimento/libre convencimiento/libero convincimento) of
the judge. Facts and values come together, in evidential assessments. Thhe
inference of mens rea/dolus specialis for the determination of responsibility
for genocide, is taken from the conviction intime of each judge, from
human conscience.
470. Ultimately, conscience stands above, and speaks higher than, any
wilful diktat. The evidence produced before the International Court of
Justice pertains to the overall conduct of the State concerned, and not to
the conduct only of individuals, in each crime examined in an isolated
way. The dossier of the present case concerning the Application of the
Convention against Genocide contains irrefutable evidence of a widespread
and systematic pattern of extreme violence and destruction, as already
examined in the present dissenting opinion.
471. Such a widespread and systematic pattern of extreme violence and
destruction encompassed massive killings, torture, beatings, rape and
552The Court did the same, eight years ago, in its 2007 Judgmen: after finding it
“established that massive killings of members of the protected group hoccurrI.C.J.
Reports 2007 (I), p. 154, para. 276), it added that it was not “conclusively established” that
those “massive killings” had been carried out “with the specific intent (dolus specialis) on
the part of the perpetrators to destroy, in whole or in part, the group has such” (ibid., p2.55,
para. 277) — because it said so, without any explanation. Cf., likewise, paras. 440-441 of
the present Judgment.
361
7 CIJ1077.indb 718 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 360
internationaux en la matière. Elle a recherché, et a insisté pohur continuer
à rechercher, un critère d’établissement de la preuve trop éhlevé pour déte-r
miner l’existence d’un génocide ou une complicité de génohcide. Selon moi,
l’on ne saurait écarter simplement la mens rea — comme la Cour l’a fait
en l’espèce — en se fondant sur l’adoption a priori d’un critère d’établis -
sement de la preuve, tel que celui que la Cour a adopté, parfaitementh
inopportun pour déterminer la responsabilité de l’Etat pour desh viola -
tions graves des droits de la personne humaine, individuellement ou en
groupes.
468. La Cour ne peut pas se contenter de dire, comme elle le fait dans
le présent arrêt, qu’il n’y a pas eu d’intention de déhtruire dans les atrocités
perpétrées, simplement parce qu’elle le déclare 55. Il s’agit là d’un diktat,
pas d’une administration appropriée de la preuve. Ce diktat va à l’en -
contre des nombreuses preuves de l’élément matériel (actus reus) au sens
de la convention sur le génocide (art. II),desquelles l’intention de détruire
peut être déduite. Il n’est pas défendable et n’est qu’hune pétition de prin-
cipe militant contre le bon exercice de la fonction judiciaire internatiho -
nale. Summum jus, summa injuria (l’application excessive du droit conduit
à l’injustice). L’élément moral (mens rea), ou l’intention spécifique
(dolus specialis), ne peut qu’être déduit d’un certain nombre de facteurs.
469. A mon sens, l’appréciation des preuves ne peut faire abstraction dhe
considérations axiologiques. Les valeurs humaines sont toujours préhsentes,
comme le confirme l’émergence historique du principe, qui se faiht jour
actuellement, de la conviction intime (livre convencimento, libre convenci ‑
miento, libero convincimento) du juge. Les faits et les valeurs sont indisso -
ciables dans l’appréciation des éléments de preuve. C’est sur la base de la
conviction intime de chaque juge, autrement dit de la conscience humaineh,
qu’est déduit l’élément moral (mens rea) ou l’intention spécifique
(dolus specialis) aux fins d’établir la responsabilité pour génocide.
470. En fin de compte, la conscience prime — et l’emporte — sur tout
diktat intentionnel. Les éléments produits devant la Cour concernent la h
conduite générale de l’Etat concerné, et pas seulement celle des personnes,
dans chaque crime pris séparément. Le dossier de la présente affhaire rela -
tive à l’Application de la convention sur le génocide contient des preuves
irréfutables d’une campagne généralisée et systématiquhe d’extrême vio -
lence et de destruction, comme on l’a vu dans le présent exposéh.
471. Cette campagne généralisée et systématique d’extrême violence et
de destruction recouvre des meurtres de masse, des actes de torture, desh
552La Cour a fait la même chose, il y a huit ans, dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu en 2007 en
l’affaire concernant la Bosnie‑Herzégo: après avoir estimé qu’il avait été « démontré
que des meurtres de membres du groupe protégé [avaie]nt été hcommis de façon massive
(C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (I), p. 154, par. 276), elle a ajouté qu’il n’avait pas été «établi de façon
concluante» que ces « meurtres de masse » avaient été commis « avec l’intention spécifique
(dolusspecialis), de la part de leurs auteurs, de détruire, en tout ou en partie, le hgroupe
comme tel » (bid., p. 255, par. 277) — simplement parce qu’elle l’affirmait, sans aucune
explication. Voir, de même, par. 440-441 du présent arrêt.
361
7 CIJ1077.indb 719 18/04/16 08:54 361 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
other sex crimes, enforced disappearances of persons, expulsion from
homes and looting, forced displacement and humiliation 553 (supra). The
facts conforming with this pattern of destruction have been proven,
554
in international case law and in UN fact-finding (supra). Even in
the absence of direct proof, genocidal intent (mens rea) can reasonably
be inferred from such a planned and large -scale pattern of destruction,
systematically directed against the same targeted groups.
XVI. The Need of Reparations :
Some Reflections
472. The widespread and systematic pattern of destruction in the fac -
tual context of the cas d’espèce discloses, ultimately, the ever -lasting pres-
ence of evil, which appears proper to the human condition, in all times.h It
is thus understandable that it has attracted the concern of, and has preh -
sented challenges to, legal thinking, in our times and previous centuriehs,
as well as other branches of knowledge (such as, e.g., history, psycholhogy,
anthropology, sociology, philosophy and theology, among others). It hash
a marked presence in literature as well. This long -standing concern, over
centuries, has not, however, succeeded to provide an explanation of evilh.
473. Despite the endeavours of human thinking, through history, we
have not been able to rid humankind of evil. Like the passing of time, thhe
ever-lasting presence of evil is yet another mystery surrounding human
beings, wherever and while they live. Whenever individuals purport to
subject their fellow human beings to their “will”, placing this lahtter above
conscience, evil is bound to manifest itself. In one of the most learned
writings on the problem of evil, R. P. Sertillanges ponders that the aware -
ness of evil and the anguish emanated therefrom have marked presence in h
all civilizations. The ensuing threat to the future of humankind has
accounted for the continuous presence of that concern throughout the
555
history of human thinking .
474. Religions were the first to dwell upon the problem of evil, which
came also to be considered by philosophy, history, psychology, social sch-i
ences and literature. Over the centuries, human thinking has always
acknowledged the need to examine the problem of evil, its incidence in
human relations, in the world wherein we live, without losing faith in
human values 556. Despite the perennial quest of human thinking to find
answers to the problem of evil, going as far back as the Book of Job, or
553 Parts IX, X and XI of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
554 Part IX of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
555 R. P. Sertillanges, Le problème du mal — l’histoire, Paris, Aubier, 1948, pp. 5-412.
556 Ibid., pp. 5-412.
362
7 CIJ1077.indb 720 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 361
sévices physiques, des viols et d’autres crimes sexuels, des disparitions for-
cées de personnes, des expulsions de logements et des pillages, des dhépla-
cements forcés et des humiliations 553 (supra). Les faits constitutifs de
cette campagne de destruction ont été prouvés, par la jurisprudhence 554e- r
nationale et par la mission d’établissement des faits de l’ONU (supra).
Même en l’absence d’éléments de preuve directs, l’intehntion génocidaire
(mens rea) peut être raisonnablement déduite de cette destruction plani -
fiée et à grande échelle, systématiquement dirigée conthre les mêmes
groupes visés.
XVI. La nécessité de réparahtions :
quelques réflexions
472. La campagne généralisée et systématique de destruction, dansh le
contexte factuel du cas d’espèce révèle, en fin de compte,h la présence per-
pétuelle du mal, qui semble propre à la condition humaine, à toutes les
époques. On peut donc comprendre que la pensée juridique, ainsi quhe
d’autres domaines du savoir (histoire, psychologie, anthropologie, socio -
logie, philosophie et théologie), s’y soit intéressée et heurtée, à notre
époque comme aux siècles passés. Il en va de même pour la lihttérature.
Cette réflexion pérenne, égrenée au fil des siècles, hn’est toutefois pas par-
venue à expliquer l’existence du mal.
473. Malgré les efforts déployés tout au long de l’histoire, l’hhumanité
n’a pas été capable de se débarrasser de ce fléau. Commhe le passage du
temps, la présence perpétuelle du mal reste l’un des mystèrehs qui entoure
les êtres humains, où qu’ils soient et tant qu’ils vivent. Qhuand des indivi -
dus prétendent soumettre leurs semblables à leur « volonté», en plaçant
celle-ci au-dessus de leur conscience, le mal se manifeste inévitablement.
Dans l’un des meilleurs ouvrages sur la question du mal, R. P. Sertil-
langes rappelle que toutes les civilisations sont marquées par la conhscience
du mal et l’angoisse que celle -ci génère. Cette menace sur l’avenir de l’es -
pèce humaine justifie l’omniprésence d’une telle préocchupation tout au
555
long de l’histoire de la pensée humaine .
474. Les religions ont été les premières à étudier la questionh du mal,
sujet dont la philosophie, l’histoire, la psychologie, les sciences sociales et
la littérature se sont ensuite emparées. Tout au long des sièclhes, l’homme,
conscient du monde dans lequel il vit et sans perdre foi en ses valeurs,h a
toujours ressenti le besoin d’analyser cette question et ses incidenches sur
les relations humaines 556. En dépit de cette quête pérenne de réponses à la
question du mal — qui remonte au Livre de Job, voire à la Genèse
553Parties IX, X et XI du présent exposé, supra.
554Partie IX du présent exposé, supra.
555R. P. Sertillanges, Le problème du mal — l’histoire, Paris, Aubier, 1948, p. 5-412.
556Ibid., p. 5-412.
362
7 CIJ1077.indb 721 18/04/16 08:54 362 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
557
even further back, to the Genesis itself , not even theology has found an
explanation for it that is satisfactory to all.
475. In a devastation, such as the one of the factual context of the
present case concerning the Application of the Convention against Geno ‑
cide, the damage done to so many persons, thousands of them, was truly
an irreparable one. There is no restitutio in integrum at all for the fatal
direct victims, the memory of whom is to be honoured. As for the surviv -
ing victims, reparations, in their distinct forms, can only alleviate their
suffering, which defies the passing of time. Yet, such reparations are hmost
needed, so as to render living — or surviving atrocities — bearable. This
should be constantly kept in mind.
476. The determination of breaches of Article II of the Convention
against Genocide (cf. supra) renders inescapable the proper consideration
of reparations. In effect, in the course of the proceedings, both contendh -
ing Parties, in their written and oral arguments, have made claims for
reparation for genocide allegedly committed by each other. Croatia’s h
main arguments in this respect are found in its Memorial, where it beganh
by arguing that, although the Convention contains no specific provision
concerning the consequences of a violation by a party, breaches of inter -
national obligations entail the obligation to make full reparation. In thhis
558
sense, Croatia claimed that if Serbia was found to be internationally
responsible for the alleged violations of the Genocide Convention, it must
make full reparation for material and immaterial damage 559.
477. Croatia has in fact requested the Court to reserve this issue “to a
subsequent phase of the proceedings”, as in previous cases. A declarahtory
judgment by the International Court of Justice of Serbia’s responsibihlity it,
added, would already provide a primary means of satisfaction, stressing
the importance of the obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention,
and underscoring the rule of law and the respect for fundamental human
rights. To Croatia, such a declaratory judgment would also “assist inh the
process of setting the historical record straight”, and would therebyh “con -
560
tribute towards reconciliation over the longer term” .
557
Cf., inter alia, e.g., M. Neusch, L’énigme du mal, Paris, Bayard, 2007, p7-193;
J. Maritain, Dio e la Permissione del Male, 6th ed., Brescia, Edit. Morcelliana, 2000,
pp. 9-100; E. Fromm, Anatomía de la Destructividad Humana, Mexico/Madrid/Buenos
Aires, Siglo XXI Edit., 2009 [reimpr.], pp. 11; P.Ricœur, Evil — A Challenge to Philo‑
sophy and Theology, London, Continuum, 2007, pp. 33-72 ; P.Ricœur, Le mal — Un défi
à la philosophie et à la théologie, Geneva, Ed. Labor et Fides, 2004, pp. 19-S. Nino,
Juicio al Mal Absoluto, BuenosAires, Emecé Edit., 1997, pp. 7-29; A. Morton, On Evil,
N.Y./London, Routledge, 2004, pp. 1-148; T. Eagleton, On Evil, New Haven/London,
Yale University Press, 2010, pp.1-16; P.ews, The Idea of Evil, Oxford, WileBlackwell,
2013, pp.1-234.
558FRY, at the beginning of the proceedings.
559Memorial of Croatia, para. 8.75.
560Ibid., paras. 8.75-8.77.
363
7 CIJ1077.indb 722 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 362
elle-même 557—, aucune explication satisfaisante pour tous n’a été trou -
vée, même par la théologie.
475. Dans une entreprise de dévastation telle que celle du contexte fac -
tuel de la présente affaire relative à l’Application de la convention sur le
génocide , le préjudice causé à de si nombreuses personnes — des mil -
liers — s’avère irréparable. Il n’y a aucun rétablissement de la hsituation
antérieure (restitutio in integrum) possible pour les victimes directes qui
sont mortes, et dont le souvenir doit être honoré. Quant aux survivants,
les réparations, sous leurs diverses formes, ne peuvent que soulager leurs
souffrances, qui défient le passage du temps. Pourtant, ces réparhations
sont indispensables pour leur rendre la vie — ou la survie à des atroci -
tés — supportable. Il faudrait toujours garder ce fait à l’esprit.
476. La recherche de violations de l’article II de la convention sur le
génocide (voir supra) rend indispensable l’examen de la question des répa-
rations. En effet, au cours de la procédure, chacune des Parties, dans son
argumentation écrite et orale, a présenté des demandes de réhparation
pour le génocide qu’aurait commis l’autre. Les principaux argumhents de
la Croatie à cet égard figurent dans son mémoire, où elle fait en premier
lieu valoir que, bien que la convention ne contienne aucune disposition h
particulière relative aux conséquences de sa violation par une parhtie, toute
violation d’une obligation internationale entraîne l’obligationh de réparer
intégralement le préjudice subi. En ce sens, la Croatie a affirméh que, si la
558
Serbie était reconnue internationalement responsable des violations
alléguées de la convention sur le génocide, elle serait tenue dhe réparer
intégralement le préjudice matériel et le préjudice moral ochcasionnés 55.
477. La Croatie a demandé à la Cour de réserver la question des réhpa-
rations « pour une phase ultérieure de la procédure », comme dans des
affaires précédentes. Un jugement dans lequel la Cour déclareraiht la res -
ponsabilité de la Serbie, a -t-elle ajouté, fournirait déjà un premier moyen
de satisfaction en soulignant l’importance des obligations imposéehs par la
convention sur le génocide et en réaffirmant la primauté du drhoit et du
respect des droits humains fondamentaux. Pour la Croatie, une telle
déclaration « serait également utile aux fins de rétablir la vérité histho -
rique» et « contribuerait ainsi à la réconciliation à plus long terme » 560.
557Voir, notamment, M. Neusch, L’énigme du mal, Paris, Bayard, 2007, p. 7-193;
J. Maritain, Dio e la Permissione del Male, 6e éd., Brescia, EditMorcelliana, 2000,
p. 9-100; E. Fromm, Anatomía de la Destructividad Humana, Mexico/Madrid/Buenos
Aires, Siglo XXI Edit., 2009 [réimpr.], p. 11-46Ricœur, Evil — A Challenge to Philo‑
sophy and Theology, Londres, Continuum, 2007, p. 33-72; P. Ricœur, Le mal — Un défi
à la philosophie et à la théologie, Genève, Ed. Labor et Fides, 2019-65; C.S. Nino,
Juicio al Mal Absoluto, Buenos Aires, Emecé Edit., 1997, p. 7-292. Morton, On Evil,
New York/Londres, Routledge, 2004, p.1-148 ; T.agleton, On Evil, NewHaven/Londres,
Yale University Press, 2010, p. 1-; P.Dews, The Idea of Evil, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell,
2013, p. 1-234.
558La RFY, au début de la procédure.
559Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 8.75.
560Ibid., par. 8.75-8.77.
363
7 CIJ1077.indb 723 18/04/16 08:54 363 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
478. Croatia has further asked the Court to declare Serbia’s obligation
to take all steps at its disposal to provide an immediate and full accouhnt
to Croatia of the whereabouts of missing persons, and to order Serbia toh
return cultural property which was stolen in the course of the genocidal
campaign. Furthermore, Croatia has claimed that, as a consequence of
Serbia’s illegal conduct, it is entitled to obtain full reparation fohr the
damages caused and for the losses suffered, in particular for the wrongfuhl
acts connected to the Serbian genocidal campaign, as described in its
Memorial 561.
479. Compensation, it has added, is “due for all damage caused to the
physical and moral integrity and well-being of the citizens of Croatia”h.
Croatia then concludes that, “in a case relating to genocide, where thhere
has been a massive loss of life and untold human misery has been caused”h,
restitutio will never wipe out the consequences of the illegal act ; it thus
562
claims also for satisfaction for the damages suffered . At last, in its final
submissions read at the end of the oral proceedings, Croatia has repeatehd
its request for reparation 563.
480. Serbia, for its part, responded briefly to those arguments on repa -
ration, having stated first that they appear hypothetical, as, in its view, its
responsibility for genocide cannot be engaged. As to the claim for com -
pensation when restitutio in kind is not possible, Serbia has contended
that Croatia was trying to get compensation for all possible damages
which might have been caused by the war in Croatia. It has added that
Croatia’s claims for reparation were not to be determined by the Intehrna-
tional Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction concerns only possible violah -
564
tions of the Convention against Genocide .
481. Serbia has also submitted a request for reparation, in relation to
its counter-claim, as stated in its Counter-Memorial. It has requested thhe
International Court of Justice to adjudge and declare Croatia’s respohnsi-
bility to “redress the consequences of its international wrongful acts” and
in particular to provide full compensation for “all damages and lossehs
caused by the acts of genocide” 565. In its final submissions in relation to
the counter-claim, read at the end of the oral proceedings, it reiteratehd its
566
request .
482. It should not pass unnoticed that both contending Parties have
requested reparation for alleged acts of genocide be determined by the
International Court of Justice in a subsequent phase of the case. The
International Court of Justice should, in my understanding, have found, h
in relation to Croatia’s claim, that acts of genocide were committed,h for
the reasons expressed in the present dissenting opinion. Accordingly,
Croatia’s request for reparation should have been entertained by the h
561 Memorial of Croatia, paras. 8.78-8.79. Cf. also Application instituting proceedings,
pp. 18-20; Memorial of Croatia, p.414; and Reply of Croatia, p.72.
562 Memorial of Croatia, paras. 8.80-8.84.
563
564 Cf. CR 2014/21, of 21 March 2014, pp. 40-41.
565 Counter-Memorial of Serbia, paras. 1059-1068.
Ibid., p. 471; cf. also Rejoinder of Serbia, p. 322.
566 Cf. CR 2014/24, of 28 March 2014, p. 64.
364
7 CIJ1077.indb 724 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 363
478. La Croatie a en outre prié la Cour de dire que la Serbie avait l’ohb -li
gation de prendre toutes les mesures à sa disposition pour fournir imhméd -ia
tement à la Croatie des informations complètes concernant le lieu hoù se
trouvent les personnes portées disparues, et d’ordonner à la Sehrbie de res -ti
tuer les biens culturels dérobés au cours de la campagne génocihdaire. Elle a
aussi affirmé que, en conséquence de la conduite illicite dont lah Serbie s’était
rendue responsable, elle était en droit d’obtenir réparation enhtière pour les
préjudices et les pertes occasionnés, en particulier pour les actehs illicites liés
à la campagne génocidaire serbe, tels que décrits dans son méhmoire. 561
479. La Croatie a ajouté qu’une indemnisation était « due pour tous les
dommages causés à l’intégrité physique et morale et au bihen -être des
citoyens de la Croatie ». Elle a ensuite conclu que, « dans une affaire relative
à un génocide ayant entraîné un nombre considérable de vihctimes et une
misère humaine indicible », la réparation sous forme de restitution n’effa-
cera jamais les conséquences de l’acte illicite ; elle a donc demandé aussi
562
satisfaction pour les préjudices subis . Enfin, dans ses conclusions finales
lues à la fin de sa plaidoirie, elle a réitéré sa demande hde réparation . 563
480. La Serbie, de son côté, a répondu brièvement à ces argumehnts rel-a
tifs à la réparation en faisant d’abord valoir qu’ils étahient hypothétiques
car, selon elle, sa responsabilité pour génocide ne saurait êtrhe engagée. En
ce qui concerne la demande de compensation lorsque la restitution en
nature est impossible, elle a affirmé que la Croatie cherchait à hobtenir répa -
ration pour tous les dommages qui auraient pu être causés par la ghuerre sur
son territoire. Elle a ajouté que les demandes de réparation de lah Croatie ne
relevaient pas de la compétence de la Cour, qui se limitait exclusivehment
aux éventuelles violations de la convention sur le génocide 564.
481. La Serbie a aussi soumis une demande de réparation dans le cadre
de sa demande reconventionnelle, comme indiqué dans son contre -
mémoire. Elle a prié la Cour de dire et juger qu’il incombait àh la Croatie
de « réparer les conséquences des faits internationalement illicites quhi lui
sont imputables », et en particulier d’indemniser pleinement les victimes
de l’565emble des dommages et des pertes causés par les actes de géno -
cide . Elle a réitéré cette demande dans les conclusions finales choncer -
nant sa demande reconventionnelle lues à la fin de sa plaidoirie 566.
482. Il importe de rappeler que les deux Parties ont demandé que les
réparations pour les actes allégués de génocide soient déhterminées par la
Cour dans une phase ultérieure de la procédure. Selon moi, en ce qhui
concerne la demande de la Croatie, la Cour aurait dû juger, pour les hrai -
sons exprimées dans le présent exposé, que des actes de génohcide ont été
commis. En conséquence, elle aurait dû prendre en considérationh la
demande de réparation de la Croatie et réserver la déterminatiohn de ces
561
Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 8.78-8.79. Voir aussi requête introductive d’instance,
p. 56220; mémoire de la Croatie, p.14, et réplique de la Croatie, p. 472.
563 Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 8.80-8.84.
Voir CR 2014/21, p. 40-41.
564 Contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 1059-1068.
565 Ibid., p. 471; voir aussi duplique de la Serbie, p. 322.
566 CR 2014/24, p. 64.
364
7 CIJ1077.indb 725 18/04/16 08:54 364 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Court, and the International Court of Justice should thus have reserved
the issue of the determination of reparation to a separate phase of the
proceedings in this case, as requested by the Applicant.
483. In this respect, it may be recalled that, in the recent case Ahmadou
Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo)
the International Court of Justice examined, during the merits phase, thhe
violations of the international human rights conventions invoked by
Guinea 567. In its Judgment of 30 November 2010, the International Court
of Justice held that the Democratic Republic of the Congo had violated
certain obligations contained in those conventions, namely, Articles 9
and 13 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Articles 6
and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in addition
to Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 568.
The International Court of Justice accordingly held, in relation to repahra -
tion, that :
“In the light of the circumstances of the case, in particular the funh-
damental character of the human rights obligations breached and
Guinea’s claim for reparation in the form of compensation, the Court h
is of the opinion that, in addition to a judicial finding of the violahtions,
reparation due to Guinea for the injury suffered by Mr. Diallo must
take the form of compensation.” 569
484. In this respect, the Court reserved for a subsequent phase of the
proceedings the question of compensation for the injury suffered by
Mr. A. S. Diallo 570. In that phase of reparations, the International Court of
Justice then adjudicated the question of the compensation owed by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to Guinea for the damages suffered by
the victim, Mr. A. S. Diallo, and delivered its Judgment on the issue
on 19 June 2012 571. In my extensive separate opinion (paras.1-101), I exam-
ined the matter in depth, and upheld, inter alia, that the ultimate titulaire or
beneficiary of the reparations ordered by the International Court of Jhustice
was the human person victimized, rather than his State of nationality.
485. In the present Judgment in the case relating to the Application of
the Convention against Genocide, had the Court found — which it regret -
tably did not — that the respondent State incurred breaches of the Geno -
cide Convention, it should have opened a subsequent phase of the
proceedings, for the adjudication of the reparations (in its distinct fhorms)
due, ultimately to the victims (human beings) themselves. In recent years,
the challenges posed by the determination of reparations in the most
567
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),
Mer568, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 639.
Ibid., paras. 73-74, 85 and 97.
569Ibid., para. 161.
570Cf. ibid., p. 693, resolutory points 7-8.
571Cf. I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 324.
365
7 CIJ1077.indb 726 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 364
réparations à une phase distincte de la procédure dans la préhsente affaire,
comme cela avait été souhaité par le demandeur.
483. A cet égard, il convient de rappeler que, dans la récente affaire
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (République de Guinée c. République démocratique
du Congo), la Cour a examiné, pendant la phase relative au fond, les vio -
lations des conventions internationales relatives aux droits de l’homme
567
invoquées par la Guinée . Dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu le 30 novembre
2010, elle a jugé que la République démocratique du Congo avait manqué
à certaines obligations énoncées par ces conventions, à savohir les articles 9
et 13 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et lesh
articles 6 et 12 de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples,
en sus du paragraphe 1 b) de l’article 36 de la convention de Vienne sur
les relations consulaires 56. La Cour a donc dit ce qui suit, au sujet de la
réparation:
«Au vu des circonstances propres à l’espèce, en particulier du
caractère fondamental des obligations relatives aux droits de l’hohmme
qui ont été violées et de la demande de réparation sous formhe d’in -
demnisation présentée par la Guinée, la Cour est d’avis que,h outre la
constatation judiciaire desdites violations, la réparation due à la Gui-
née à raison des dommages subis par M. Diallo doit prendre la forme
d’une indemnisation.» 569
484. A cet égard, la Cour a réservé la question de l’indemnisatiohn du
préjudice subi par M. A. S. Diallo à une phase ultérieure de la procé -
570
dure , dans laquelle elle a statué sur la question de l’indemnisation due
par la République démocratique du Congo à la Guinée au titreh des préju -
dices subis par la victime, M. A. S. Diallo, et elle a rendu son arrêt le
19 juin 2012 571. Dans l’exposé de mon opinion individuelle (par. 1-101),
j’ai approfondi cette question et fait valoir, notamment, que le béhnéfi -
ciaire ultime des réparations ordonnées par la Cour était la pehrsonne vic-
time, et non son Etat de nationalité.
485. Dans le présent arrêt relatif à l’ Application de la convention sur le
génocide, opposant la Croatie à la Serbie, si la Cour avait conclu — ce
qu’elle n’a malheureusement pas fait — que l’Etat défendeur avait violé la
Convention, elle aurait dû ouvrir une phase ultérieure de la procéhdure
pour le règlement des réparations (sous leurs diverses formes) dhues, en fin
de compte, aux victimes (êtres humains) elles -mêmes. Au cours des der -
nières années, les problèmes posés par la détermination dhes réparations
567Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (République de Guinée c.République démocratique du Congo),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (II), p. 639.
568Ibid., par. 73-74, 85 et 97.
569Ibid., par. 161.
570Ibid., p. 693, points 7-8 du dispositif.
571Voir C.I.J. Recueil 2012 (I), p. 324.
365
7 CIJ1077.indb 727 18/04/16 08:54 365 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
complex situations, have begun to attract scholarly attention ; yet, we are
still— surprisingly as it may seem — in the infancy of this domain of
international law.
XVII. The Difficult Path to Recohnciliation
486. In the violent conflicts which form the factual context of the pres -
ent case opposing Croatia to Serbia, the numerous atrocities committed
(torture and massive killings, extreme violence in concentration camps,
rape and other sexual violence crimes, enforced disappearances of per -
sons, expulsions and deportations, unbearable conditions of life and
humiliations of various kinds, among others), besides victimizing thou -
sands of persons, made hatred contaminate everyone, and decomposed
the social milieux. The consequences, in long -term perspective, are, like -
wise, and not surprisingly, disastrous, given the resentment transmittedh
from one generation to another.
487. Hence the importance of finding the difficult path to reconciliation.h
In my understanding, the first step is the acknowledgment that a wide -
spread and systematic pattern of destruction ends up dismantling everyone,
the oppressed (victims) and the oppressors (victimizers). From the times of
the Iliad of Homer until nowadays, the impact of war and destruction upon
human beings has been constantly warning them as to the perennial evil
surrounding humanity, and yet lessons of the past have not been learned.h
488. In a penetrating essay (of 1934), Simone Weil, one of the great
thinkers of the last century, drew attention to the utterly unfair demands
of the struggle for power, which ends up victimizing everyone. From
Homer’s Iliad to date, individuals, indoctrinated and conditioned for war
and destruction, have become objects of the struggle for domination.
There occurs “the substitution of the ends by the means”, transforhming
human life into a simple means, which can be sacrificed ; individuals
become unable to think, and abandon themselves entirely to “a blind chol -
lectivity”, struggling for power (the end) 572.
489. The distinction between “oppressors and oppressed”, Weil aptly
observed, almost loses meaning, given the “impotence” of all indivhiduals
in face of the “social machine” of destruction of the spirit and fhabrication
of the inconscience 573. The consequences, as shown by the present case
concerning the Application of the Convention against Genocide generate
long -lasting resentment.
572 S. Weil, Reflexiones sobre las Causas de la Libertad y de la Opresión Social, Barce -
lona, Ed. Paidós/Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 1995, pp. 81-82, 84 and 130.
573 Ibid., pp. 130-131; S. Weil, Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression
sociale, Paris, Gallimard, 1955, pp. 124-125, and cf. pp. 114-115 and 144.
366
7 CIJ1077.indb 728 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 365
dans les situations les plus complexes ont commencé à attirer l’hattention
des théoriciens ; pourtant, aussi étonnant que cela puisse paraître, ce
domaine du droit international n’en est encore qu’à ses débuhts.
XVII. La difficile voie de la rhéconciliation
486. Dans les conflits violents qui forment le contexte factuel de la préh -
sente affaire opposant la Croatie à la Serbie, les nombreuses atrocitéhs
commises (torture et meurtres de masse, violence extrême dans les cahmps
de concentration, viols et autres violences sexuelles, disparitions forchées
de personnes, expulsions et déportations, conditions d’existence ihnsup -
portables et humiliations de toutes sortes, entre autres), outre qu’elles ont
fait des milliers de victimes, ont généralisé la haine et déhcomposé les
milieux sociaux. Les conséquences à long terme sont, comme on pouvhait
s’y attendre, désastreuses, compte tenu du ressentiment transmis dh’une
génération à l’autre.
487. Il importe donc d’avancer dans la difficile voie de la réconciliah -
tion. Selon moi, il est tout d’abord nécessaire de reconnaître hque, en fin de
compte, une campagne de destruction systématique et générale brhise aussi
bien les opprimés (victimes) que les oppresseurs (agresseurs). Deh l’époque
de l’Iliade d’Homère jusqu’à nos jours, les effets de la guerre et de lah des-
truction ont toujours averti les hommes de la pérennité du mal quih accom -
pagne l’humanité, et, pourtant, les leçons du passé n’onth pas été retenues.
488. Dans un essai pénétrant (1934), Simone Weil, l’une des grandes
penseuses du siècle dernier, a appelé l’attention sur les exigehnces totale -
ment injustes de la lutte pour le pouvoir, qui en fin de compte fait dhe tous
des victimes. De l’ Iliade d’Homère jusqu’à nos jours, les individus, endoc-
trinés et conditionnés pour la guerre et la destruction, sont devehnus des
objets de la lutte pour la domination. C’est à ce moment -là que se produit
«le retournement entre fin et moyens », qui fait des humains de simples
moyens pouvant être sacrifiés ; les individus deviennent incapables de pen-
ser et s’abandonnent entièrement à « une collectivité aveugle », luttant
pour le pouvoir (la fin) 57.
489. La distinction entre « oppresseurs et opprimés », observe avec
sagacité S. Weil, est bien près de perdre sa signification compte tenu
de l’«impuissance» de tous les hommes devant la « machine sociale »
à écraser les esprits et à fabriquer de l’inconscience 573. Les conséquences,
comme le montre la présente affaire relative à l’Application de la
convention sur le génocide opposant la Croatie à la Serbie, sont désas -
treuses, et, comme je viens de le souligner, génèrent un ressentimhent de
longue durée.
572S. Weil, Reflexiones sobre las Causas de la Libertad y de la Opresión Social, Barce -
lone, Ed. Paidós/Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, 1995, p.-82, 84 et 130.
573Ibid., p. 130-131; S. Weil, Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l´oppression
sociale, Paris, Gallimard, 1955, p. 124-125, et voir p. 114-115 et 144.
366
7 CIJ1077.indb 729 18/04/16 08:54 366 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
490. The next step in the difficult path to reconciliation, lies in the prov-hi
sion of reparations— in all its forms— to the victims. Reparations (supra)
are, in my understanding, essential for advancing in the long and diffihcult
path to reconciliation, after the tragedy of the wars in the former Yugosla-
via in the nineties. In the framework of reparations, besides the judicihal
(declaratory) acknowledgment of the breaches of the Genocide Conven-
tion, there are other measures to pursue the path to reconciliation.
491. In this connection, may I single out that, in a particularly enlight -
ened moment of the long oral proceedings in the present case concerning h
the Application of the Convention against Genocide , in the public sitting
before the Court of 10 March 2014, the Agent of Serbia took the com -
mendable step of making the following statement :
“In the name of the Government and the People of the Republic
of Serbia, I reiterate the sincere regret for all victims of the war andh
of the crimes committed during the armed conflict in Croatia, what -
ever legal characterization of those crimes is adopted, and whatever
the national and ethnic origin of the victims. Each victim deserves fullh
respect and remembrance.” 574
492. The path to reconciliation is certainly a difficult one, after the dev-h
astation of the wars in the Balkans. The contending Parties are surely
aware of it. In the same public sitting before the International Court ohf
Justice, of 10 March 2014, the Agent of Serbia further asserted that :
“The cases in which Serbia was a party were of an exceptional
gravity: these were cases born out of the 1990s conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia, which left tragic consequences to all Yugoslav peoples
and opened important issues of State responsibility. This case is the
final one in that sequence. In this instant case Serbia expects — more
than in any of its previous cases — that suffering of the Serb people
should also be recognized, get due attention, and a remedy.
Today it is well known that the conflict in Croatia was followed by
grave breaches of international humanitarian law. There is no doubt
that Croats suffered a lot in that conflict. This case is an opportunithy
for all of us to remind ourselves of their tragedy (. . .). However, the
Croatian war caused grave sufferings to Serbs as well (. . .)”575
493. Croatia, for its part, contends that one of the remedies it seeks is
576
the return of the mortal remains of t577deceased to their families . It
reports that at least 840 bodies are still missing as the result of the
574CR 2014/13, of 10 March 2014, para. 5.
575Ibid., paras. 2-3.
576Memorial of Croatia, para. 1.10 and 1.37.
577CR 2014/5, of 3 March 2014, para. 6.
367
7 CIJ1077.indb 730 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 366
490. L’étape suivante dans la difficile voie de la réconciliation chonsiste
à accorder aux victimes une réparation sous toutes ses formes. Lesh répa-
rations (voir plus haut) sont, selon moi, indispensables pour avancer hdans
cette longue et difficile voie, après la tragédie des guerres quih ont déchiré
l’ex-Yougoslavie dans les années 1990. Outre la reconnaissance judiciaire
(jugement déclaratif) des violations de la convention sur le génhocide,
d’autres mesures permettent d’y parvenir.
491. A cet égard, qu’il me soit permis de souligner que lors de l’au -
dience publique du 10 mars 2014, dans un moment de grâce de la longue
procédure orale en la présente affaire relative à l’ Application de la conven‑
tion sur le génocide, l’agent de la Serbie a pris l’initiative louable de faire
la déclaration suivante :
«Au nom du Gouvernement et du peuple de la République de Ser -
bie, je tiens à réitérer l’expression de nos sincères reghrets envers l’en-
semble des victimes de la guerre et des crimes commis au cours du
conflit armé en Croatie, indépendamment de la qualification juhri -
dique de ces crimes qui pourra être retenue et de l’origine ethniqhue et
nationale des victimes. Pour chacune de celles -ci, le devoir de
mémoire doit être pleinement honoré. » 574
492. La voie de la réconciliation est à l’évidence difficile, aphrès la dévas-
tation des guerres dans les Balkans. Il ne fait aucun doute que les Parties
en ont bien conscience. Lors de la même audience publique, l’agenth de la
Serbie a aussi déclaré ce qui suit :
«Les affaires auxquelles la Serbie s’est trouvée partie étaient dh’une
gravité exceptionnelle: elles étaient le résultat des conflits don-You-x
goslavie avait été le théâtre dans les années1990, qui ont eu des consé-
quences tragiques pour l’ensemble des peuples qu’elle abritait, eth
soulevé d’importantes questions de responsabilité de l’Etat.h La présente
instance est la dernière de cette série. Dans cette affaire, la Serhbie espère
— davantage encore que dans les précédentes — que les souffrances du
peuple serbe se verront elles aussi accorder toute l’attention voulueh,
qu’il en sera pris acte et que des remèdes seront ordonnés.
Aujourd’hui, nul n’ignore que le conflit en Croatie a donné lhieu à
de graves violations du droit international humanitaire. Nul doute
que les Croates ont beaucoup souffert. La présente affaire nous
donne l’occasion de nous remémorer la tragédie qu’ils ont véhcue…
Cependant, la guerre en Croatie a aussi été source de terribles sohuf -
575
frances pour les Serbes… »
493. La Croatie, de son côté, fait valoir que l’un de576emèdes qu’elle
sollicite est la restitution des dépouilles aux familles . Elle affirme que
840 corps au moins 577 sont toujours portés disparus à la suite des actes
574CR 2014/13, par. 5.
575Ibid., par. 2-3.
576Mémoire de la Croatie, par. 1.10 et 1.37.
577CR 2014/5, par. 6.
367
7 CIJ1077.indb 731 18/04/16 08:54 367 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
alleged genocidal acts carried out by Serb forces. Croatia claims that Sher-
bia has not been providing the required assistance to carry on the searchhes
for those mortal remains and their identification. The contending Parthies’
identification and return of all the mortal remains to each other is yhet
another relevant step in the path towards reconciliation. I dare to nourish
the hope that the present dissenting opinion may somehow, however
modestly, serve the purpose of reconciliation.
XVIII. Concluding Observationh:sThe Need of
a Comprehensive Approahch to Genocide
under the 1948 Convention
494. Contrary to what contemporary disciples of Jean Bodin and
Thomas Hobbes may still wish to think, the Peace Palace here at
The Hague was not built and inaugurated one century ago to remain a
sanctuary of State sovereignty. It was meant to become a shrine of interh -
national justice, not of State sovereignty. Even if the mechanism of sethtle -
ment of contentious cases by the Permanent Court of International Justiche/
International Court of Justice has remained a strictly inter -State one, by
force of mental inertia, the nature and subject -matters of certain cases
lodged with the Hague Court over the last nine decades have required of
578
it to go beyond the strict inter -State outlook . The artificiality of the
exclusively inter-State outlook, resting on a long-standing dogma of the
past, has thus been made often manifest, and increasingly so.
495. More recently, the contentious cases wherein the Court’s concerns
have had to go beyond the strict inter-State outlook have further increased
in frequency 579. The same has taken place in the two more recent Advi-
580
sory Opinions of the Court . Half a decade ago, for example, in my
separate opinion in the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opihnion
578 For a study of this issue, cf.A. A. Cançado Trindade, “A Contribuição dos Tribunais
Internacionais à Evolução do Direito Internacional Contemporâhneo”, :n O Direito Inter‑
nacional e o Primado da Justiça (eds. A. A. Cançado Trindade and A. C. Alves Pereira),
Rio de Janeiro, Edit. Renovar, 2014, pp. 3-89, esp. pp. 18-20, 46-47, 51, 64 and 68.
579 E.g., the case onQuestions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal) (2009 -2012), pertaining to the principle of universal jurisdiction
under the UN Convention against Torture ; the case Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of
Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) (1998-2012) on detention and expulsion of a
foreigner; the case of the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germanyal: Greece
intervening) (20082012); the case of tApplication of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia Russian Federation) (2008-
2011); theRequest for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15June 1962 in the Case concerning
the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand) (2011-2013).
580 On the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of In‑e
pendence in Respect of Kosovo (2010), and on a Judgment No.2867 of the Administrative
Tribunal of the International Labour Organization upon a Complaint Filed▯ against the Inter‑
national Fund for Agricultural Development (2012), respectively.
368
7 CIJ1077.indb 732 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 367
génocidaires que les forces serbes auraient commis. Elle soutient que la
Serbie n’a pas fourni l’assistance requise pour continuer à chercher ces
dépouilles et les identifier. L’identification et la restitutihon de tous les
corps par chacune des Parties reste encore une autre étape importante
dans la voie de la réconciliation. J’ose nourrir l’espoir que lhe présent
exposé peut d’une certaine façon, même modestement, servir lh’objectif de
la réconciliation.
XVIII. Observations finales: la nécessité de s’atthaquer
globalement à tous lehs aspects du génocide h
en vertu de la Conventihon de 1948
494. Contrairement à ce que les disciples contemporains de Jean Bodin et
de Thomas Hobbes souhaitent peut-être continuer de penser, le Palais de la
Paix à LaHaye n’a pas été construit et inauguré il y a un siècle phour demeu -
rer un sanctuaire de la souveraineté de l’Etat. Il était destinhé à devenir un
sanctuaire de la justice internationale, non de la souveraineté de l’hEtat. Même
si le mécanisme de règlement des différends par la Cour permanente de Ju-s
tice internationale/Cour internationale de Justice est resté strictemhent inter -
étatique, par force d’inertie mentale, le caractère et les sujehts de certaines
procédures engagées devant la Cour de LaHaye au cours des neuf décennies
passées ont obligé celle -ci à dépasser la stricte conception interétatique 578. Le
caractère artificiel de cette conception reposant sur un dogme déhjà ancien du
passé a donc souvent été mis en évidence, et l’est de pluhs en plus.
495. Ces dernières années, la Cour a dû dépasser cette concep -
tion rigide dans un nombre croissant d’affaires contentieuses 579. Il en a
été de même dans les deux avis consultatifs qu’elle a récemment
donnés 580. Il y a cinq ans, par exemple, dans l’opinion individuelle que j’ai
jointe à l’avis consultatif de la Cour concernant la Conformité au droit
578Pour cette question, voir A. A. Cançado Trindade, «A Contribuição dos Tribunais
Internacionais à Evolução do Direito Internacional Contemporâhneo », O Direito Interna‑
cional e o Primado da Justiça (dir. publ., A. A. Cançado Trindade et A. C. Alves Pereira),
Rio579 Janeiro, Edit. Renovar, 2014, p. 3-89, en part. p. 18-20, 46-47, 51, 64 et 68.
Par exemple, l’affaire des Questions concernant l’obligation de poursuivre ou d’ex ‑
trader (Belgique c. Sénégal) (2009-2012), ayant trait au principe de la compétence univer -
selle en vertu de la convention des NationsUnies contre la torture; l’affaire Ahmadou Sadio
Diallo (République de Guinée c. République démocratique du Congo)▯ (1998-2012) concer -
nant la détention et l’expulsion d’un étranger l’affaire des Immunités juridictionnelles de
l’Etat (Allemagne c. Ital; Gréce (intervenant)) (2008-2012); l’affaire de l’lication de
la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les forme▯s de discrimination raciale
(Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie) (2008-2011); l’affaire de laemande en interprétation
de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande)
(Camboge c. Thaïlande) (2011-2013).
580Concernant la Conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale▯ d‑in
dépendance relative au Kosovo (2010), et le Jugement n2867 du Tribunal administratif de
l’Organisation internationale du travail sur requête contre le Fon▯ds international de dévelop ‑
pement agricole (2012), respectivement.
368
7 CIJ1077.indb 733 18/04/16 08:54 368 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
on the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (of 22 July 2010), I deemed
it fit to warn against the shortcomings of the strict inter -State outlook
(I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 599, para. 191), and stressed the need, in face
of a humanitarian crisis in the Balkans, to focus attention on the people
or population concerned (ibid., paras. 53, 65-66, 185 and 205-207), in pur-
suance of a humanist outlook (ibid., paras. 75-77 and 190), in the light of
the principle of humanity (ibid., para. 211) 58.
496. The present case concerning the Application of the Convention
against Genocide provides yet another illustration of the pressing need to
overcome and move away from the dogmatic and strict inter -State out -
look, even more cogently. In effect, the 1948 Convention against Geno -
cide, adopted on the eve of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,is
not State -centred, but rather people‑centred. The Convention against
Genocide cannot be properly interpreted and applied with a strict
State-centred outlook, with attention turned to inter-State susceptibilities.
Attention is to be kept on the justiciables, on the victims — real and
potential victims — so as to impart justice under the Genocide Conven -
tion.
1. Evidential Assessment and Determination of the Facts
497. I thus regret not to be able to share at all the Court’s reasoning in
the cas d’espèce, nor its conclusion as to the Applicant’s claim. To start
with, the Court’s evidential assessment and determination of the facts are
atomized and not comprehensive. It chooses some municipalities
(cf. Judgment, para. 203) and describes summarily some 582 occurrences
therein. Its examination of the facts is rather aseptic . Not surprisingly,
the International Court of Justice fails to characterize the pattern, as a
whole, of the atrocities committed, as being widespread and systematic.
498. The Court has taken note of atrocities — such as summary execu-
tions and decapitations — perpetrated in Vukovar and its surrounding
area, admitted by the Respondent ( ibid., paras. 212-224). It has taken
note of massacres, inter alia, e.g., in Lovas (ibid., paras. 231-240) and in
Bogdanovci, admitted by Serbia (ibid., paras. 225-230). It has taken note
of other massacres, inter alia, e.g., in Saborsko (ibid., paras. 268-271), in
Poljanak (ibid., paras. 272-277), in Hrvatska Dubika and its surrounding
area (ibid., paras. 257-261). Yet, this is just a sample of the atrocities that
were committed in the cas d’espèce.
581In that same separate opinion, I also drew attention to the expansion ofh interna -
tional legal personality and capacity, as well as international responsihbility (I.C.J. Reports
2010 (II), p. 617, para. 239), in contemporary international law.
582Already in my separate opinion ( I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 610, para. 219) in the
International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, I had warned
against an aseptic examination of the facts.
369
7 CIJ1077.indb 734 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 368
international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance relative au Kosovo
(22 juillet 2010), il m’a semblé utile de mettre en garde contre les lacunes h
de la stricte conception interétatique (C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (II), p. 599,
par. 191) et j’ai souligné qu’il était nécessaire, face à hune crise humanitaire
dans les Balkans, de s’intéresser en priorité aux personnes ou à la popula‑
tion concernée (ibid., par. 53, 65-66, 185 et 205-207), en appliquant une
conception humaniste (ibid., par. 75-77 et 190) et à la lumière du principe
d’humanité (ibid., par. 211) 581.
496. La présente affaire relative à l’ Application de la convention sur le
génocide montre une nouvelle fois, de manière encore plus convaincante,
qu’il faut impérativement dépasser la conception interétatiqhue dogma -
tique et stricte, et s’en éloigner. En effet, la convention de 1948h sur le
génocide — adoptée à la veille de la Déclaration universelle des droits deh
l’homme — est non pas axée sur l’Etat, mais sur la personne. Elle ne peut
pas être interprétée et appliquée correctement selon une conhception stricte
centrée sur l’Etat et donnant la priorité à la susceptibilithé des Etats. C’est
aux justiciables, aux victimes — réelles et potentielles — qu’il convient de
continuer d’accorder la priorité pour rendre la justice en vertu dhe la
convention sur le génocide.
1. Appréciation des éléments de preuve et détermination des fai▯ts
497. Je regrette donc de ne pouvoir en aucune façon souscrire au rai -
sonnement de la Cour dans le cas d’espèce, ni à sa conclusion qhuant aux
prétentions du demandeur. Tout d’abord, la Cour a procédé àh uneappré‑
ciation des éléments de preuve et une détermination des faits fragmentaires
et non exhaustives. Elle a choisi certaines municipalités (voir arrêht,
par. 203) et décrit brièvement quelques -uns des événements qui y sont
582
survenus. Son examen des faits est plutôt aseptisé . Comme on pouvait
s’y attendre, elle ne reconnaît pas que les atrocités commises, prises dans
leur ensemble, constituent une campagne systématique et généralhe.
498. La Cour a relevé les atrocités — telles que les exécutions sommaires
et les décapitations— perpétrées à Vukovar et aux environs, reconnues par
le défendeur (ibid., par. 212-224). Elle a pris note de massacres commis,
notamment à Lovas (ibid., par. 231-240) et à Bogdanovci, que la Serbie a
reconnus (ibid., par. 225-230). Elle a aussi pris note d’autres massacres,
notamment ceux commis à Saborsko (ibid., par. 268-271), à Poljanak (ibid.,
par. 272-277) et à Hrvatska Dubika et ses environs (ibid., par. 257-261).
Pourtant, ce n’est là qu’une partie limitée des atrocitésh qui ont été perpétrées
dans le cas d’espèce.
581Dans la même opinion individuelle, j’ai aussi appelé l’attenhtion sur l’élargissement de
la personnalité et de la capacité juridiques internationales, ainshi que de la res-terabilité in
nationale (C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (II), p.617, par. 239), en droit international contemporain.
582Dans mon opinion individuelle ( C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (II),610, par. 219) jointe
à l’avis consultatif de la Cour concernant la Conformité au droit international de la décla ‑
ration unilatérale d’indépendance relative au Kosovo, j’avais déjà mis en garde contre les
dangers d’un examen aseptisé des faits.
369
7 CIJ1077.indb 735 18/04/16 08:54 369 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
499. In addition to the localities cited by the International Court of
Justice in the present Judgment, there are numerous other localities
wherein atrocities occurred in the regions of Eastern Slavonia, West -
ern Slavonia, Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia, brought to
the attention of the Court by Croatia, which were not cited or addressedh
directly in the present Judgment of the Court. Not surprisingly, the Couhrt
fails to establish a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction wihth
the intent to destroy, without any satisfactory explanation why it has cho -
sen this path for the examination of the facts.
500. In the present Judgment, the International Court of Justice takes
note of the findings of the ICTY (in its Judgments in the cases of Mrkšić,
Radić and Sljivančanin [“Vukovar Hospital”], 2007; Martić, 2007 ; and of
Stanišić and Simatović, 2013) that
“from the summer of 1991, the JNA and Serb forces had perpetrated
numerous crimes (including killing, torture, ill -treatment and forced
displacement) against Croats in the regions of Eastern Slavonia,
Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia” (Judgment, para2 .08).
Yet, apart from massive killings, the Court fails to characterize other h
crimes as having been committed also on a large scale, conforming a
widespread and systematic pattern of destruction. From time to time the h
Court minimizes the scale of crimes such as rape and other sexual vio -
lence crimes (ibid., para. 364), expulsion from homes and forced displace-
ments (ibid., para. 376), deprivation of food and medical care (ibid.,
paras. 366 and 370).
501. Even an international criminal tribunal such as the ICTY,
entrusted with the determination of the international criminal responsibhil -
ity of individuals, has been attentive to a comprehensive approach to evhi-
dence in order to determine genocidal intent. This particular point has
recently been made by the ICTY (Appeals Chamber) in the Karadžić case
(Judgment of 11 July 2013), where it warned that :
“Rather than considering separately whether an accused intended
to destroy a protected group through each of the relevant genocidal
acts, a trial chamber should consider whether all of the evidence,
taken together, demonstrates a genocidal mental state.” (Para. 56.)
502. The ICTY (Appeals Chamber) further asserted, in the same
Karadžić case, that, “by its nature, genocidal intent is not usually suscep -
tible to direct proof” (ICTY, Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July 2013,
para. 80). This being so, it added,
“in the absence of direct evidence, genocidal intent may be inferred h
from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the general con -
text, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed
against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the system-
370
7 CIJ1077.indb 736 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 369
499. Outre les localités citées par la Cour dans le présent arrêth, de
nombreuses autres — dans les régions de Slavonie orientale, de Slavonie
occidentale, de Banovina/Banija, de Kordun, de Lika et de Dalmatie —
dans lesquelles des atrocités ont été commises et qui ont éthé portées à
l’attention de la Cour par la Croatie n’ont pas été mentionnées ou exami -
nées expressément dans le présent arrêt. Il n’y a donc rihen d’étonnant à ce
que la Cour, sans expliquer suffisamment pourquoi elle a choisi de ne
retenir que certains faits, ne conclue pas qu’une campagne de destruchtion
générale et systématique a été menée dans l’intentihon de dévaster.
500. Dans le présent arrêt, la Cour note que le TPIY a conclu (dans sehs
jugements Mrkšić, Radić et Sljivančanin [« hôpital de Vukovar »](2007),
Martić (2007) et Stanišić et Simatović (2013)) ce qui suit :
« A partir de l’été 1991, la JNA et des forces serbes ont commis de
nombreux crimes (meurtres, torture, mauvais traitements et déplace -
ment forcé, entre autres) contre des Croates dans les régions de hSla-
vonie orientale, de Banovina/Banija, de Kordun, de Lika et de
Dalmatie. » (Arrêt, par.208.)
Pourtant, en dehors des meurtres de masse, la Cour n’a pas reconnu quhe
d’autres crimes ont aussi été commis à grande échelle, dahns le cadre d’une
campagne de destruction générale et systématique. Parfois, elleh minimise
l’ampleur de crimes tels que les viols et autres actes de violence sexuelle
(ibid., par.364), les expulsions des logements et les déplacements forcés
(ibid., par.376), les privations alimentaires et la privation de soins médicaux
(ibid., par.66 et 370).
501. Même un tribunal pénal international comme le TPIY, chargé de
déterminer la responsabilité pénale internationale des individuhs, a veillé à
examiner l’ensemble des éléments de preuve pour apprécier l’hintention
génocidaire. Dans l’arrêt qu’il a rendu récemment en l’haffaire Karadžić
(arrêt du 11 juillet 2013), il a dit ce qui s:it
«Au lieu de se demander si un accusé était animé de l’intentihon de
détruire un groupe protégé au travers de chacun des actes de géhno -
cide pertinents, une chambre de première instance devrait examiner
si tous les éléments de preuve, pris ensemble, établissent l’hexistence
d’une intention génocidaire. » (Par. 56.)
502. Le TPIY a en outre affirmé, dans la même affaire, que, « de par sa
nature même, l’intention génocidaire est généralement diffihcile à établir de
façon directe » (TPIY, Karadžić, arrêt du 11 juillet 2013, par. 80). Cela
étant, a-t-il ajouté,
«en l’absence de preuve directe, l’intention génocidaire peut se
déduire d’un certain nombre de faits et de circonstances, tels le
contexte général, la perpétration d’autres actes répréhhensibles systé -
matiquement dirigés contre le même groupe, l’ampleur des atrocihtés
370
7 CIJ1077.indb 737 18/04/16 08:54 370 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
atic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a particu-
lar group, the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts, or theh
existence of a plan or policy” (ICTY, Karadžić, Judgment of 11 July
2013, para. 80).
503. In face of the task of the determination of the international respon -
sibility of States — with which the International Court of Justice is
entrusted — is all the more reason one is to pursue a comprehensive
approach to evidence. Contemporary international human rights tribunals
which, like the International Court of Justice, are also entrusted with hthe
determination of the international responsibility of States,know well, from
their own experience, that respondent States tend to withhold the mono -
poly of evidence of the atrocities perpetrated and attributable to them.h
504. It is thus not surprising that, in their evolving case law, addressed
to by the contending Parties, but entirely overlooked by the Internationhal
Court of Justice’s Judgment in the present case, international human
rights tribunals have rightly avoided a high threshold of proof, and havhe
583
applied the distribution or shifting of the burden of proof . In the deter-
mination of facts in cases of the kind (pertaining to grave breaches),h they
have remained particularly aware of the primacy of concern with funda -
mental rights inherent to human beings over concern with State suscepti -
bilities. After all, the raison d’humanité prevails over the raison d’Etat.
505. In the present Judgment in the case concerning the Application of
the Convention against Genocide, the International Court of Justice has
seen only what it wanted to see (which is not much), trying to make onhe
believe that the targeted groups were simply forced to leave the territohry
claimed as Serb (para. 426, and cf. para. 435). As if trying to convince
itself of the absence of genocidal intent, the International Court of Juhstice
has further noted — making its own the argument of Serbia 584 — that the
ICTY Prosecutor has never charged any individuals for genocide in the
context of the armed attacks in Croatia in the period 1991-1995 (Judg-
ment, para. 440).
506. This does not at all have a bearing upon State responsibility. Indi-
viduals other than the ones charged, could, as State agents, have been
responsible ; indictments can be confirmed (as in the Karadžić case in
mid-2013), so as to encompass genocide ; and, in his indictments, the
Prosecutor exerts a discretionary power, its statute being entirely distinct
from that of international judges. In any case, in respect of State respon -
sibility, as I have already pointed out, the standards of proof are not the
same as in respect of individual criminal responsibility.
583
584Cf. Part VII of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
Cf. Counter-Memorial of Serbia, para. 944.
371
7 CIJ1077.indb 738 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 370
commises, le fait de viser systématiquement certaines victimes en raih -
son de leur appartenance à un groupe particulier, la récurrence
d’actes destructifs et discriminatoires ou l’existence d’un plahn ou
d’une politique » (TPIY, Karadžić, arrêt du 11 juillet 2013, par. 80).
503. Avoir à déterminer la responsabilité internationale des Etats
— tâche qui incombe à la Cour — justifie d’autant plus que l’on prenne
en considération l’ensemble des éléments de preuve. Les tribhunaux inter -
nationaux contemporains chargés des droits de l’homme — à qui il
incombe aussi de déterminer la responsabilité internationale des Ehtats—
savent bien, par expérience, que les Etats défendeurs ont tendanceh à gar-
der le monopole des preuves des atrocités qui leur sont imputables.
504. L’on ne s’étonnera donc pas que, dans leur jurisprudence en
constante évolution — mentionnée par les Parties, mais complètement
méconnue par la Cour dans son arrêt en l’espèce —, les juridictions inter-
nationales des droits de l’homme aient à juste titre évité dhe fixer un critère
élevé d’établissement de la preuve et aient appliqué les hprincipes de583
répartition de la charge de la preuve, ou de son renversement . Pour
déterminer les faits dans les affaires de ce type (portant sur des infractions
graves), ils ont gardé une conscience aiguë de la primauté des droits fon -
damentaux inhérents aux êtres humains sur la susceptibilité desh Etats.
Après tout, la raison d’humanité l’emporte sur la raison d’hEtat.
505. Dans le présent arrêt qu’elle a rendu en l’affaire relative à l’Appli ‑
cation de la convention contre le génocide , la Cour n’a vu que ce qu’elle
voulait bien voir (c’est-à-dire pas grand-chose), en essayant de faire croire
que les groupes visés avaient été simplement forcés de quitther le territoire
revendiqué comme serbe (par. 426, et voir par. 435). Comme si elle tentait
de se convaincre elle-même de l’absence d’intention génocidaire, elle a en
outre relevé — faisant sien l’argument de la Serbie 584— que le procureur
du TPIY n’avait jamais inculpé d’individus pour génocide danhs le contexte
du conflit armé qui s’est déroulé sur le territoire de la hCroatie entre 1991
et 1995 (arrêt, par. 440).
506. Cela n’a cependant absolument aucune incidence sur la responsa -
bilité de l’Etat. D’autres individus que ceux qui ont étéh inculpés auraient
pu, en tant qu’agents de l’Etat, être responsables ; les actes d’accusation
peuvent être confirmés (comme dans l’affaire Karadžić, à la mi -2013) de
manière à comprendre le génocide ; et, dans ses actes d’accusation, le pro-
cureur exerce un pouvoir discrétionnaire , car son statut est parfaitement
distinct de celui de juges internationaux. En tout état de cause, en hce qui
concerne la responsabilité de l’Etat, comme je l’ai déjà hsouligné, le critère
d’établissement de la preuve n’est pas le même que celui appliqué à la
responsabilité pénale individuelle.
583
584 Voir partie VII du présent exposé, supra.
Voir contre-mémoire de la Serbie, par. 944.
371
7 CIJ1077.indb 739 18/04/16 08:54 371 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
507. Even if we do not know — and will never know — the total
amount of victims who were tortured or raped (they were numerous), allh
the facts, taken together, conform, in my perception, a widespread and
systematic pattern of destruction, under the Genocide Convention, as
examined in the present dissenting opinion. They are facts of common
knowledge (faits de notoriété publique/fatos de conhecimento público e
notorio/hechos de conocimiento público y notorio/fatti notori [di comune
esperienza]), which thus do not need to be subjected to a scrutiny pursu -
ant to a high threshold of proof, depriving the Genocide Convention of
its effet utile, in the determination of State responsibility.
2. Conceptual Framework and Reasoning as to the Law
508. The Court’s conceptual framework and reasoning as to the law are
likewise atomized and not comprehensive. First of all, its reading of thhe
categories of acts of genocide under the Convention against Genocide
(Art. II) is as strict as it can possibly be. The Court, furthermore, consid -
ers separately the interrelated elements of actus reus and mens rea of
genocide, applying a high threshold of proof, which finds no parallel hin
the evolving case law of international criminal tribunals as well as inther -
national human rights tribunals. This ends up rendering, regrettably, thhe
determination of State responsibility for genocide under the Convention
an almost impossible task, and the Convention itself an almost dead let -
ter. The way is thus paved for the lack of legal consequences, and for
impunity for the atrocities committed.
509. The Court’s conceptual framework and reasoning as to the law
are, furthermore, atomized also in its perception of each branch of intehr-
national law on its own — even those branches that establish regimes of
protection of the rights of the human person — namely, the international
law of human rights (ILHR), international humanitarian law (IHL), anhd
the international law of refugees (ILR). The Court thus insists in
approaching even IHL and international criminal law (ICL) in a separathe
and compartmentalized way.
510. In its insistence on its atomized approach, in separating, e.g., the
Genocide Convention from IHL (Judgment, para. 153), the Court fails to
perceive that the Genocide Convention, being a human rights treaty (as
generally acknowledged), converges with international instruments whichh
form the corpus juris of human rights. They all pertain to the determina -
tion of State responsibility. Some grave breaches of IHL may concomi-
tantly be breaches of the Genocide Convention.
511. This atomized approach, in several aspects, appears static and
anti-historical to me, for it fails to grasp the evolution of international
legal thinking in respect of the remarkable expansion, over the last
decades, of international legal personality and capacity, as well as inther -
372
7 CIJ1077.indb 740 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 371
507. Même si nous ne connaissons pas, et ne connaîtrons jamais, le
nombre total de victimes violées ou torturées (elles ont étéh nombreuses),
tous les faits, pris ensemble, mettent en évidence, selon moi, une cahm-
pagne de destruction générale et systématique, au sens de la cohnvention
sur le génocide, comme le montre cet exposé. Ce sont des faits de notoriété
publique (facts of common knowledge/fatos de conhecimento público e ▯
notorio/hechos de conocimiento público y notorio/fatti notori [di comune
esperienza]) qui n’ont pas besoin, dans le cadre de la responsabilité de
l’Etat, d’être examinés à l’aune d’un critère éhlevé d’établissement de la
preuve qui prive la convention sur le génocide de son effet utile.
2. Cadre théorique et raisonnement juridique
508. Le cadre théorique de la Cour et son raisonnement juridique sont
tout aussi fragmentaires et non exhaustifs. Tout d’abord, la Cour faiht une
lecture aussi restrictive que possible des catégories d’actes de ghénocide
réprimés par la convention sur le génocide (art. II). En outre, elle envisage
séparément les éléments interdépendants que sont l’actus reus et la
mens rea du génocide, en appliquant un critère élevé d’établishsement de la
preuve qui ne trouve aucun pendant dans la jurisprudence en évolutionh
constante émanée des tribunaux pénaux internationaux et des jurhidictions
internationales des droits de l’homme. Cela finit, malheureusement, par
faire de la détermination de la responsabilité de l’Etat en verhtu de la
convention sur le génocide une tâche presque impossible, et de la hConven -
tion elle-même presque une lettre morte. La voie est donc ouverte à l’ab -
sence de conséquences juridiques et à l’impunité des atrocithés commises.
509. Le cadre théorique et le raisonnement juridique de la Cour sont
aussi fragmentaires dans la façon qu’elle a d’appréhender chhaque branche
du droit international en tant que telle, même celles qui établissent des
régimes de protection des droits de la personne humaine, à savoir hle droit
international des droits de l’homme, le droit international humanitaihre et
le droit international des réfugiés. La Cour insiste donc sur une hdémarche
qui envisage même le droit international humanitaire et le droit péhnal
international de manière distincte et cloisonnée.
510. Dans son insistance à appliquer cette démarche cloisonnée, par h
exemple lorsqu’elle sépare la convention sur le génocide du drohit interna -
tional humanitaire (arrêt, par. 153), la Cour ne voit pas que la Conven -
tion, qui est un traité relatif aux droits de l’homme (comme celah est
généralement reconnu), converge avec les instruments internationahux qui
forment le corpus juris des droits de l’homme, et qu’ils s’appliquent tous
pour déterminer la responsabilité de l’Etat. Certaines violatiohns graves du
droit international humanitaire peuvent être en même temps des viohla -
tions de la convention sur le génocide.
511. Cette démarche cloisonnée me paraît à plusieurs égards sthatique et
antihistorique, en ce qu’elle ne saisit pas l’évolution de la phensée juridique
internationale à l’œuvre dans l’élargissement considérable, tout au long
des dernières décennies, de la personnalité et de la capacitéh juridiques
372
7 CIJ1077.indb 741 18/04/16 08:54 372 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
national responsibility, a remarkable feature of the contemporary jus gen‑
tium. Contrary to what the International Court of Justice says in the
present Judgment, there are, in my perception, approximations and con -
vergences between the three trends of protection of the rights of the
human person (ILHR, IHL, ILR) 58, in addition to contemporary ICL.
512. Moreover, contemporary ICL nowadays is also concerned with
the situation of the victims. The Convention against Genocide, for its
part, being people‑oriented, is likewise concerned with the victims of
extreme human cruelty. The Convention is not separated (as the Court
assumes) from other branches of safeguard of the rights of the human
person; it rather converges with them, in seeking to protect human dig -
nity. The Genocide Convention, by itself, bears witness of the approxima-
tions or convergences between ICL and the ILHR.
513. Last but not least, the Court’s reasoning is, moreover, atomized
also in its counter-position of customary and conventional IHL itself
(Judgment, paras. 79 and 88-89, supra). In my understanding, customary
and conventional IHL are to be properly seen in interaction, and are noth
to be kept separated from each other, as the Court attempts to do. Afterh
all, there is no violation of the substantive provisions of the Geno -
cide Convention which is not, at the same time, a violation of customary
international law on the matter as well. The atomized approach of the
Court, furthermore, fails to recognize the great importance — for both
conventional and customary international law — of the general principles
of law, and in particular of the principle of humanity.
514. The determination of State responsibility for genocide calls for a
comprehensive outlook, rather than an atomized one, as pursued by the
International Court of Justice. As I pointed out earlier on, in the preshent
dissenting opinion, the Genocide Convention is generally regarded as a
human rights treaty, and human rights treaties have a hermeneutics of
their own (para. 32), and are endowed with a mechanism of collective
guarantee (para. 29). The proper hermeneutics of the Genocide Conven -
tion is, in my understanding, necessarily a comprehensive one, and not an
atomized or fragmented one, as pursued by the International Court of
Justice in the present Judgment, as well as in its prior 2007 Judgment.
515. Each international instrument is a product of its time, and exerts
its function continuously by being applied as a “living instrument”h. I have
carefully addressed this particular point, in detail, in respect of humahn
rights treaties, in my extensive dissenting opinion (paras. 167-185) in the
case concerning the Application of the International Convention on the
585Paras. 58, 60, 64, 69, 79 and 84, supra.
373
7 CIJ1077.indb 742 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 372
internationales, ainsi que de la responsabilité internationale — caractéris-
tique remarquable du jus gentium contemporain. Contrairement à ce que
dit la Cour dans le présent arrêt, il existe, selon moi, des poinths de rappro-
chement et de convergence entre les trois branches de la protection des h
droits de la personne humaine (droit international des droits de l’homme,
droit international humanitaire, droit international des réfugiés)h 585et le
droit pénal international contemporain.
512. En outre, le droit international des réfugiés contemporain traite h
aussi de la situation des victimes. La convention sur le génocide, deh son
côté, en ce qu’elle fait une large place au facteur humain, s’attache de la
même façon aux victimes de l’extrême cruauté humaine. Elle n’est pas
séparée (comme la Cour en fait l’hypothèse) des autres brahnches de la
sauvegarde des droits de la personne humaine ; elle converge au contraire
avec elles, en cherchant à protéger la dignité humaine. Elle athteste, en
elle-même, les points de rapprochement ou de convergence entre le droit
pénal international et le droit international des droits de l’hommhe.
513. Enfin, le raisonnement de la Cour est aussi fragmentaire dans le
contre-pied qu’il prend du droit international humanitaire coutumier
aussi bien que conventionnel (arrêt, par. 79 et 88-89, supra). Selon moi,
c’est dans leur interaction qu’il faut envisager le droit international huma -
nitaire coutumier et le droit international humanitaire conventionnel, qui
ne doivent pas être séparés l’un de l’autre, comme la Cour cherche à le
faire. Après tout, il n’y a pas de violation des dispositions de fhond de la
convention sur le génocide qui ne soit en même temps une violationh du
droit international coutumier sur la question. La démarche cloisonnéhe de
la Cour, en outre, ne reconnaît pas l’importance majeure — pour le droit
international conventionnel aussi bien que coutumier — des principes
généraux du droit, et en particulier le principe d’humanité.h
514. La détermination de la responsabilité de l’Etat pour génocidhe
impose une démarche globale, et non une démarche cloisonnée comme
celle adoptée par la Cour. Ainsi que je l’ai souligné plus haut dans le pré -
sent exposé, la convention sur le génocide est généralement hconsidérée
comme faisant partie des traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme, lhesquels
ont une herméneutique qui leur est propre (par. 32) et sont assortis d’un
mécanisme de garantie collective (par. 29). L’herméneutique correcte de
la convention sur le génocide impose, à mon sens, nécessairement une
interprétation d’ensemble, et non une interprétation morcelée ou frag -
mentaire, comme celle qu’a faite la Cour dans le présent arrêt hainsi que
dans l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu en 2007 en l’affaire concernant la Bosnie‑
Herzégovine .
515. Chaque instrument international est un produit de son temps et
remplit sa fonction dans le temps en étant considéré comme un «h texte
vivant». J’ai pris soin de traiter en détail ce point particulier au hsujet des
traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme dans le long exposé de lh’opinion
individuelle (par. 167 à 185) que j’ai joint à l’arrêt rendu par la Cour le
585 Par. 58, 60, 64, 69, 79 et 84, supra.
373
7 CIJ1077.indb 743 18/04/16 08:54 373 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. RussianFed‑
eration) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011 (I))).
516. In my dissenting opinion, I warned against the posture of the
International Court of Justice in the CERD Convention case, also reflected
in the present Judgment of the International Court of Justice (para.85), as
well as in its prior 2007 Judgment, of ascribing an “overall importanhce” to
individual State consent, “regrettably putting it well above the imperatives
of the realization of justice at international level” (I.C.J.Reports 2011 (I),
para. 44). The CERD Convention, like other human rights treaties, I con -
tinued, contains obligations of “an essentially objective character, imple -
mented collectively”, and showing that, in this domain of protection,h
international law appears, more than voluntary, as “indeed necessary”h
(ibid., paras. 63 and 72). The protected rights and fundamental human
values stand above State “interests” or its “will” (ibid., paras. 139
and 162).
517. The proper hermeneutics of human rights treaties, — I proceeded
in the same dissenting opinion, — moves away from “a strict State -
centred voluntarist perspective” and from the “exaltation of Stateh con -
sent”, and seeks guidance in fundamental principles (prima principia),
such as the principle of humanity, which permeates the whole corpus jurihs
of the ILHR, IHL, ILR and ICL ( ibid., paras. 209-212). Such prima prin‑
cipia confer to the international legal order “its ineluctable axiological
dimension” ; they conform its substratum, and convey the idea of an
objective justice, in the line of jusnaturalist thinking (ibid., para. 213).
518. Only in this way, I added, can we abide by “the imperative of the
realization of justice at international level”, acknowledging that “con ‑
science stands above the will” (ibid., para. 214). And I further warned in
my aforementioned dissenting opinion that :
“The Court cannot remain hostage of State consent. It cannot keep
displaying an instinctive and continuing search for State consent,
(. . .) to the point of losing sight of the imperative of realization of
justice. The moment State consent is manifested is when the State
concerned decides to become a party to a treaty, such as the human
rights treaty in the present case, the CERD Convention. The herme -
neutics and proper application of that treaty cannot be continuously
subjected to a recurring search for State consent. This would unduly
render the letter of the treaty dead, and human rights treaties are
meant to be living instruments, let alone their spirit.” (id., para.198.)
519. The present Judgment of the Court again misses the point, and fails
to render a service to the Genocide Convention. In a case pertaining to hthe
374
7 CIJ1077.indb 744 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 373
1 avril 2011 en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention interna ‑
tionale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
(Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie) (C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I)) .
516. Dans cet exposé, j’ai mis en garde contre le choix qu’a fait lah Cour
dans l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention internationale sur
l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale — et qui informe
également le présent arrêt (par. 85) et l’arrêt de 2007 en l’affaire concer-
nant la Bosnie‑Herzégovine — d’attribuer une importance déterminante
au consentement de l’Etat concerné, en le « plaçant [malheureusement] …
bien au-dessus des impératifs de réalisation de la justice au niveau interh -
national » (C.I.J. Recueil 2011 (I), par. 44). La CERD, comme d’autres
traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme, ai -je poursuivi, prescrit des obliga -
tions « d’un caractère essentiellement objectif, mises en œuvre collecthive-
ment », et qui montrent que, dans ce domaine de protection, le droit
international semble être, davantage que volontaire, « effectivement néces-
saire » (ibid., par. 63 et 72). Les droits protégés et les valeurs humaines
fondamentales sont au-dessus des « intérêts» ou de la «volonté» de l’Etat
(ibid., par. 139 et 162).
517. L’herméneutique correcte des traités relatifs aux droits de
l’homme, ai -je ajouté dans le même exposé, doit s’écarter d’une «h perspec -
tive volontariste strictement centrée sur les Etats » et cesser « d’exalter le
consentement des Etats », et s’appuyer sur les principes fondamentaux
(prima principia) tels que le principe d’humanité, qui imprègne l’ensemble
du corpus juris du droit international des droits de l’homme, du droit
international humanitaire, du droit international des réfugiés et du droit
pénal international (ibid., par. 209-212). Ces prima principia confèrent à
l’ordre juridique international « sa dimension axiologique inévitable »; ils
sous -tendent l’ordre juridique international en exprimant l’idée d’une jus -
tice objective, propre au droit naturel (ibid., par. 213).
518. C’est seulement ainsi, ai -je ajouté, que nous pouvons nous confor-
mer à l’« impératif de réalisation de la justice au niveau international », en
reconnaissant que « la conscience l’emporte sur la volonté» (ibid., par. 214).
Et j’ai fait la mise en garde suivante :
«La Cour ne peut demeurer l’otage du consentement des Etats.
Elle ne peut continuer de rechercher instinctivement ce consente -
ment, … au point de perdre de vue l’impérieuse nécessité de rendre lha
justice. Le consentement d’un Etat se manifeste au moment où celui-ci
décide de devenir partie à un traité — comme l’instrument de défense
des droits de l’homme en question dans la présente affaire, la CIEDR.
L’interprétation et la bonne application de cet instrument ne peuvhent
être systématiquement assujetties à une recherche continuelle du
consentement de l’Etat. Cela rendrait injustement le trait é lettre
morte ; or, les instruments de défense des droits de l’homme, et a for‑
tiori l’esprit qui les anime, sont censés être vivants. (Ibid., par. 198.)
519. Dans le présent arrêt, la Cour passe une nouvelle fois à côthé de
l’essentiel et ne sert pas la convention sur le génocide. Dans uneh affaire
374
7 CIJ1077.indb 745 18/04/16 08:54 374 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
interpretation and application of this latter, the Court even makes recourse
586
to the so -called Monetary Gold “principle” , which has no place in a case
like the present one, and which does not belong to the realm of the prima
principia, being nothing more than a concession to State consent, within an
outdated State voluntarist framework. In face of the pursuance of this oh-ut
look, I wonder whether the Genocide Convention has any future at all . . .
520. The Convention, essentially people‑centred, will have a future if
attention is rightly turned to its rationale, to its object and purpose,h keep -
ing in mind the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat, so to secure to
it the appropriate effects (effet utile), and, ultimately, the realization of
justice. Already for some time, attention has been drawn to the shortcomh -
ings of the Convention against Genocide as originally conceived, namely :
(a) the narrowing of its scope, excluding cultural genocide and massive
slaughter of political and social groups ; (b) the much lesser attention to
prevention of genocide, in comparison with its punishment 587; (c) the
weakening of provisions for enforcement, with concern for State sover -
588
eignty taking precedence over concern for protection against genocide .
521. From the adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948 until our
days, the vulnerability or defencelessness of targeted groups has continh -
ued, just as much as the reluctance of States to deal with the matter anhd
protect them against genocide under the Convention has persisted. This
discloses, as I have already pointed out in the present dissenting opin -
ion, the manifest inadequacy of examining genocide from a strictly inter -
State outlook, with undue deference to State sovereignty. After all, as hI
have already stressed, the Genocide Convention is people‑oriented.
522. Genocide, which occurs at the intra -State level, calls for a people-
centred outlook, focused on victims surrounded by extreme vulnerability.h
There are, among genocide scholars, those who are sensitive enough and
support a generic concept, so as not to leave without protection any segh -
ment of victims of “genocidal wars” or “genocidal massacres”h 589, even
beyond the Genocide Convention. It is not my intention here to dwell
586
Even if only to dismiss it (Judgment, para. 116).
587 As transposed, historically, from domestic into international criminal lhaw.
588 Cf. L. Kuper, International Action against Genocide, London, Minority Rights
Group (Report No. 53), 1982, pp. 9, 11 and 13-14 ; G. J. Andreopoulos, “Introduc -
tion : The Calculus of Genocide”, in Genocide : Conceptual and Historical Dimensions
(ed. G. J. Andreopoulos), Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, pph. 2-3
and 6-17 ; M. Lippman, “Genocide : The Crime of the Century — The Jurisprudence of
Death at the Dawn of the New Millenium”, 23 Houston Journal of International Law
(2001), pp. 477-478, 487, 503-506, 523-526 and 533.
589 Cf., e.g., L. Kuper, “Other Selected Cases of Genocide and Genocidal Massacres :
Types of Genocide”, in Genocide — A Critical Bibliographic Review (ed. IW. Charny),
London, Mansell Publ., 1988, pp. 155-171; L. Kuper, “Theoretical Issues Relating to
Genocide : Uses and Abuses”, inGenocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions op. cit.
supra note 588, pp. 32-37 and 4; I.. Charny, “Toward a Generic Definition of Geno -
cide”, in ibid., pp. 64-78, 84-85 and 90-92.
375
7 CIJ1077.indb 746 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 374
relative à l’interprétation et l’application de cette Convenhtion, la Cour fait
même appel au « principe» dit de l’ Or monétaire 586, qui n’a pas sa place
ici et qui ne relève pas des prima principia, n’étant rien de plus qu’une
concession faite au consentement de l’Etat au titre d’une idée hdépassée de
l’Etat volontariste. Compte tenu de la persistance de cette conceptiohn, je
me demande si la convention sur le génocide a même un avenir…
520. La convention, qui est essentiellement axée sur les personnes, aura
un avenir si la priorité est dûment accordée à sa raison d’hêtre, son objet et
son but, en gardant à l’esprit la règle ut res magis quam valeat pereat, de
façon à garantir ses effets appropriés (effet utile) et, en fihn de compte, la
réalisation de la justice. Depuis quelque temps déjà, l’attention a été
appelée sur les lacunes de la convention sur le génocide telle qu’elle a été
rédigée, à savoir : a) le rétrécissement de son champ d’application, à l’ex -
clusion du génocide culturel et du massacre de groupes politiques et h
sociaux; b) l’attention bien moindre portée à la prévention du génocihde
par rapport à sa répression 587; c) l’affaiblissement des dispositions rela -
tives à sa mise en œuvre, le souci de la souveraineté de l’Ehtat l’emportant
588
sur celui de la protection contre le génocide .
521. De l’adoption de la Convention en 1948 à nos jours, la vulnérabh- i
lité ou l’impuissance des groupes visés a persisté, de mêhme que la réti -
cence des Etats à traiter cette question et à les protéger conthre le génocide
conformément à la Convention. Cela montre, comme je l’ai déjà souligné
dans le présent exposé, qu’il est à l’évidence inapprohprié d’envisager le
génocide dans une perspective interétatique stricte, en faisant prheuve
d’une déférence indue à l’égard de la souveraineté de l’Etat. Après tout, la
convention sur le génocide est axée sur l’être humain.
522. Le génocide, qui se produit au niveau intra -étatique, exige un
point de vue axé sur l’être humain et mettant l’accent sur lhes victimes, qui
sont dans une situation d’extrême vulnérabilité. Parmi les shpécialistes du
génocide, certains sont assez sensibles pour soutenir une conception géné -
rique qui ne laisse sans protection aucun segment des victimes de « guerres
589
génocidaires » ou de «massacres génocidaires» , en allant même au-delà
586Même si c’est seulement pour l’écarter (arrêt, par. 116).
587Telle que transposée, historiquement, du droit interne dans le droit pénal interna -
tional.
588Voir L. Kuper, International Action against Genocide, Londres, Minority Rights
o
Group (Report n 53), 1982, p. 9, 11 et 13-14 ; G. J. Andreopoulos, « Introduction: The
Calculus of Genocide », Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (dir. publ.,
G. J. Andreopoulos), Philadelphie, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, p.h2-3 et 6-17
M. Lippman, « Genocide: The Crime of the Century — The Jurisprudence of Death at
the Dawn of the New Millenium », Houston Journal of International Law (2001), n 23,
p. 477-478, 487, 503-506, 523-526 et 533.
589Voir, par exemple, L. Kuper, « Other Selected Cases of Genocide and Genocidal
Massacres : Types of Genocide »,Genocide — A Critical Bibliographic Review (dir. publ.,
I.W. Charny), Londres, Mansell Publ., 1988, p. 155-171 ; L.Kuper, « TheoreticalIssues
Relating to Genocide :Uses and Abuses », Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimen ‑
sions, op. cit. supra note 588, p. 32-37 et 44 ; I. W. Charny, «Toward a Generic Definition
of Genocide», ibid., p. 64-78, 84-85 et 90-92.
375
7 CIJ1077.indb 747 18/04/16 08:54 375 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
upon such a generic concept or definition ; distinctly, I concentrate, more
specifically, on the comprehensive outlook, that I sustain, of genocidhe
under the 1948 Convention.
523. Such a comprehensive outlook takes into due account the whole
factual context of the present case opposing Croatia to Serbia — and not
only just a sample of selected occurrences in some municipalities, as thhe
Court’s majority does. That whole factual context, in my assessment, h
clearly discloses a widespread and systematic pattern of destruction whihch
the Court’s majority seems to be at pains with, at times minimizing iht, or
not even taking it into account. All the aforesaid, in my own understandh -
ing, further calls for a comprehensive, rather than atomized, consider -
ation of the matter, faithful to humanist thinking and keeping in mind thhe
principle of humanity 590, which permeates the whole of the ILHR, IHL,
ILR and ICL, including the Genocide Convention.
524. From all the preceding considerations, it is crystal clear that my
own position, in respect of the aforementioned points — of evidential
assessments as well as of substance — which form the object of the pres -
ent Judgment of the International Court of Justice on the case concerninhg
the Application of the Convention against Genocide, stands in clear opposi-
tion to the view espoused by the Court’s majority. My dissenting posihtion
is grounded not only on the assessment of the arguments produced before h
the Court by the contending Parties (Croatia and Serbia), but above alhl
on issues of principle and on fundamental values, to which I attach evenh
greater importance. I have thus felt obliged, in the faithful exercise ohf the
international judicial function, to lay the foundations of my own dissenht -
ing position in the cas d’espèce in the present dissenting opinion.
XIX. Epilogue: A Recapitulation
525. I deem it fit, at this final stage of my dissenting opinion, as an
epilogue, to recapitulate all the points of my dissenting position, exprhessed
herein, for the sake of clarity, and in order to stress their interrelathedness.
Primus : Prolonged delays — such as the unprecedented one of 16 years in
the cas d’espèce — in the international adjudication of cases of the kind
are most regrettable, in particular from the perspective of the victims ;
paradoxically, the graver the breaches of international law appear to beh,
the more time consuming and difficult it becomes to impart justice.
526. Secundus: In the cas d’espèce, opposing Croatia to Serbia, respon -
sibility cannot be shifted to an extinct State ; there is personal continuity
of policy and practices in the period of occurrences (1991 onwards). Ter‑
tius: The 1948 Genocide Convention being a human rights treaty (as gen-
590Cf. Part V of the present dissenting opinion, supra.
376
7 CIJ1077.indb 748 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 375
de la convention sur le génocide. Je ne m’étendrai pas ici sur cette concep-
tion, ou définition, générique ; je me concentre, plus spécifiquement, sur
une conception globale, que je défends, du génocide au sens de la Conven‑
tion de 1948.
523. Cette conception globale tient dûment compte de l’ intégralité du
contexte factuel de la présente affaire opposant la Croatie à la Serbie, et
pas uniquement, comme l’a fait la majorité de la Cour, d’un nombre
limité d’événements choisis dans certaines municipalités.h Ce contexte fac -
tuel pris dans son intégralité met clairement en évidence, à mon sens,
l’existence d’une campagne de destruction générale et systéhmatique ; il
semble poser problème à la majorité de la Cour, qui tantôt lhe minimise,
tantôt l’ignore complètement. Tout ce qui précède, selon hmoi, impose en
outre un examen global plutôt que fragmentaire, fidèle à la phensée huma -
niste et soucieux du principe d’humanité 590qui imprègne l’ensemble du
droit international des droits de l’homme, du droit international humhan- i
taire, du droit international des réfugiés et du droit pénal inhternational, y
compris la convention sur le génocide.
524. Il ressort de toutes les considérations qui précèdent que mon phoint
de vue est clairement à l’opposé de celui adopté par la majohrité de la Cour
en ce qui concerne les points susmentionnés — intéressant l’appréciation
des preuves et le fond — qui font l’objet du présent arrêt en l’affaire rela -
tive à l’Application de la convention sur le génocide. Ma position dissidente
est fondée non seulement sur l’appréciation des arguments préhsentés à la
Cour par les deux Parties (la Croatie et la Serbie), mais aussi et avant tout
sur des principes et des valeurs fondamentales auxquelles j’attache phlus
d’importance encore. Je me suis donc senti tenu, dans le fidèle hexercice de
la fonction judiciaire internationale, d’expliquer dans le présenth exposé les
fondements de ma dissidence en l’espèce.
XIX. Épilogue: récapitulatif
525. Il me semble indiqué, à ce stade, de récapituler à titre d’hépilogue
tous les points de ma position dissidente que j’ai exposés jusqu’ici, par
souci de clarté et pour bien montrer qu’ils sont liés les uns ahux autres.
Primus: La longueur des délais — comme celui, sans précédent, de
seize ans en l’espèce — dans le règlement international de ce type d’af -
faires est déplorable, en particulier du point de vue des victimes ; parado-
xalement, plus les violations du droit international sont graves, plus ihl
semble long et difficile de rendre la justice.
526. Secundus : Dans la présente affaire opposant la Croatie à la Ser -
bie, celleci ne saurait se défausser de sa responsabilité sur un Etat défhun;t
il y a continuité des personnels chargés des politiques et des prahtiques
dans la période considérée (depuis 1991). Tertius: La convention de 1948
590 Voir partie V du présent exposé, supra.
376
7 CIJ1077.indb 749 18/04/16 08:54 376 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
erally acknowledged), the law governing State succession to human righths
treaties applies (with ipso jure succession). Quartus : There can be no
break in the protection afforded to human groups by the Genocide Con-
vention in a situation of dissolution of State amidst violence, when proh-
tection is most needed.
527. Quintus: In a situation of this kind, there is automatic succession
to, and continuing applicability of, the Genocide Convention, which
otherwise would be deprived of its appropriate effects (effet utile). Sex‑
tus: Once the Court’s jurisdiction is established in the initiation of prho -
ceedings, any subsequent lapse or change of attitude of the State concerhned
can have no bearing upon such jurisdiction. Septimus: Automatic succes-
sion to human rights treaties is reckoned in the practice of United Nations
supervisory organs.
528. Octavus: The essence of the present case lies on substantive issues
pertaining to the interpretation and application of the Genocide Conven -
tion rather than on issues of jurisdiction/admissibility, as acknowledgehd
by the contending Parties themselves in the course of the proceedings.
Nonus: Automatic succession to, and continuity of obligations of, the
Genocide Convention, is an imperative of humaneness so as to secure
protection to human groups when they stand most in need of it.
529. Decimus: The principle of humanity permeates the whole Con-
vention against Genocide, which is essentially people‑oriented ; it perme-
ates the whole corpus juris of protection of human beings, which is
essentially victim‑oriented, encompassing also the international law of
human rights (ILHR), international humanitarian law (IHL) and the
international law of refugees (ILR), besides contemporary internationahl
criminal law (ICL). Undecimus : The principle of humanity has a clear
incidence in the protection of human beings, in particular in situationsh of
vulnerability or defencelessness.
530. Duodecimus: The United Nations Charter itself professes the
determination to secure respect for human rights everywhere ; the princi -
ple of humanity — in line with the long-standing jusnaturalist thinking
(recta ratio) — permeates likewise the law of the United Nations. Ter ‑
tiusdecimus: The principle of humanity, furthermore, has met with judi -
cial recognition, on the part of contemporary international human rightsh
tribunals as well as international criminal tribunals.
531. Quartus decimus: The determination of State responsibility under
the Genocide Convention not only was intended by its draftsmen (as its
travaux préparatoires show), but also is in line with its rationale, as well
as its object and purpose. Quintus decimus : The Genocide Convention is
meant to prevent and punish the crime of genocide, which is contrary to
the spirit and aims of the United Nations, so as to liberate humankind
377
7 CIJ1077.indb 750 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 376
sur le génocide étant un traité relatif aux droits de l’homme (qualité qui
lui est généralement reconnue), le droit régissant la successihon d’Etats aux
traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme s’applique (la successihon étant
ipso jure). Quartus: Il ne saurait y avoir d’interruption dans la protection
accordée aux groupes humains par la convention sur le génocide danhs une
situation où la dissolution d’un Etat donne lieu à des violencehs, alors que
cette protection est la plus nécessaire.
527. Quintus : Dans ce type de situation, la succession d’Etats à la
convention sur le génocide est automatique et celle-ci reste applicable, car
à défaut elle serait privée de son effet utile. Sextus : Une fois la compé -
tence de la Cour établie lors de l’introduction de l’instance, haucune cadu-
cité ultérieure de l’instrument établissant sa juridiction eht aucun
changement d’attitude ultérieur de l’Etat concerné n’empohrte d’effet sur
ladite compétence. Septimus: La succession automatique aux traités rela -
tifs aux droits de l’homme est reconnue dans la pratique des organes hdes
Nations Unies chargés de la surveillance des droits de l’homme.
528. Octavus : L’essence de la présente affaire est constituée de ques -
tions matérielles qui concernent l’interprétation et l’applihcation de la
convention sur le génocide, et non de question de compétence/recevhabi -
lité, comme les Parties l’ont elles -mêmes reconnu au cours de la procé -
dure. Nonus : La succession automatique à la convention sur le génocide
et la continuité des obligations découlant de celle -ci sont un impératif
d’humanité, propre à garantir la protection des groupes humainsh au
moment où ils en ont le plus besoin.
529. Decimus : Le principe d’humanité imprègne l’ensemble de la
convention sur le génocide, qui est essentiellement axée sur les personnes ;
il imprègne tout le corpus juris de la protection des êtres humains, qui est
essentiellement axé sur les victimes, et comprend aussi le droit internatio -
nal des droits de l’homme, le droit international humanitaire et le dhroit
international des réfugiés, en plus du droit pénal internationahl contempo -
rain. Undecimus : Le principe d’humanité a une incidence avérée sur la
protection des êtres humains, en particulier lorsque ceux -ci sont vulné ‑
rables ou sans défense.
530. Duodecimus: La Charte elle -même proclame la volonté des
Nations Unies de faire respecter les droits de l’homme partout dans le
monde; le principe d’humanité, inscrit dans le droit fil de la penséhe jus -
naturaliste (recta ratio), imprègne de la même façon le droit des
Nations Unies. Tertius decimus : Le principe d’humanité, en outre, a été
pleinement reconnu sur le plan judiciaire, par les juridictions internathio -
nales des droits de l’homme comme par les tribunaux pénaux internahtio-
naux contemporains.
531. Quartus decimus: L’établissement de la responsabilité de l’Etat en
vertu de la convention sur le génocide ne répond pas seulement à l’inten -
tion des rédacteurs de la Convention (comme il ressort de ses travauhx
préparatoires), mais correspond aussi à la raison d’être, au but et à l’objet
de ladite Convention. Quintus decimus : La convention sur le génocide
entend prévenir et réprimer le crime de génocide — qui est contraire à
377
7 CIJ1077.indb 751 18/04/16 08:54 377 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
from this scourge. To attempt to make the application of the Geno -
cide Convention an impossible task, would render the Convention mean -
ingless, an almost dead letter.
532. Sextus decimus: International human rights tribunals (IACtHR
and ECHR), in their jurisprudence, have not pursued a stringent and highh
threshold of proof in cases of grave breaches of the rights of the humanh
person they have resorted to factual presumptions and inferences, as well
as to the shifting or reversal of the burden of proof. Septimus decimus :
International criminal tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) have, in their jurispru -
dence, even in the absence of direct proof, drawn proof of genocidal
intent from inferences of fact.
533. Duodevicesimus: The fact -finding undertaken by the United
Nations, at the time of the occurrences, contains important elements conh -
forming with the widespread and systematic pattern of destruction in the
attacks in Croatia : such is the case of the reports of the former UN Com-
mission on Human Rights (1992 -1993) and of the reports of the Security
Council’s Commission of Experts (1993 -1994). Undevicesimus : Those
occurrences also had repercussion in the UN Second World Conference
on Human Rights (1993). There has also been judicial recognition (in hthe
case law of the ICTY) of the widespread and/or systematic attacks againhst
the Croat civilian population.
534. Vicesimus: Such widespread and systematic pattern of destruc -
tion, well-established in the present proceedings before the International
Court of Justice, encompassed indiscriminate attacks against the civilian
population, with massive killings, torture and beatings, systematic expuhl-
sion from homes (and mass exodus), and destruction of group culture.
Vicesimus primus: That widespread and systematic pattern of destruction
also comprised rape and other sexual violence crimes, which disclose theh
necessity and importance of a gender analysis.
535. Vicesimus secundus: There was, furthermore, a systematic pattern
of disappeared or missing persons. Enforced disappearance of persons is h
a continuing grave breach of human rights and international humanitar -
ian law ; with its destructive effects, it bears witness of the expansion of
the notion of victims (so as to comprise not only the missing persons, hbut
also their close relatives, who do not know their whereabouts). The sithu-
ation created calls for a proper standard of evidence, and the shifting hor
reversal of the burden of proof, which cannot be laid upon those victim -
ized.
536. Vicesimus tertius: The aforementioned grave breaches of human
rights and of international humanitarian law amount to breaches of jus
cogens, entailing State responsibility and calling for reparations to the
victims. This is in line with the idea of rectitude (in conformity with the
378
7 CIJ1077.indb 752 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 377
l’esprit et aux buts des Nations Unies — afin de délivrer l’humanité de ce
fléau. Essayer de rendre son application impossible risque d’aboutir à ce
que, vidée de son sens, elle devienne lettre morte.
532. Sextus decimus : Les juridictions internationales des droits de
l’homme (CIDH et CEDH), dans leur jurisprudence, n’ont pas retenhu un
critère d’établissement de la preuve exigeant et élevé dahns les affaires de
graves violations des droits de la personne humaine ; elles ont eu recours
aux présomptions de fait et ont procédé par déduction, et elhles sont allées
jusqu’à transférer ou renverser le fardeau de la preuve. Septimus decimus :
Dans leur jurisprudence, les tribunaux pénaux internationaux (TPIY eht
TPIR) se sont, en l’absence de preuves directes, appuyés sur des preuves
obtenues par déduction de l’intention génocidaire à partir dhes faits.
533. Duodevicesimus : Les activités d’établissement des faits menées par
les Nations Unies au moment des événements ont mis en évidence d’im -
portants éléments constitutifs de la campagne de destruction géhnérale et
systématique mise en œuvre dans les attaques en Croatie : tel est le cas des
rapports de l’ex -Commission des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies
(1992-1993) et de ceux de la Commission d’experts du Conseil de sécurithé
(1993-1994). Undevicesimus: Ces événements ont aussi eu des répercus -
sions sur la deuxième conférence mondiale sur les droits de l’hhomme
(1993). Il y a aussi eu une reconnaissance judiciaire (dans la jurisphrudence
du TPIY) des attaques généralisées et/ou systématiques conthre la popula-
tion civile croate.
534. Vicesimus: Cette campagne de destruction générale et systéma -
tique, bien établie au cours de la présente procédure engagéhe devant la
Cour, consistait en attaques sans discrimination contre la population
civile, et notamment en meurtres de masse, actes de torture et sévicehs ph-y
siques, expulsion systématique des logements (et exode massif), et hdes-
truction de la culture du groupe. Vicesimus primus: Cette campagne de
destruction générale et systématique consistait aussi en viols het autres
actes de violence sexuelle, qui mettent en évidence la nécessitéh et l’impor-
tance de procéder à une analyse par sexe.
535. Vicesimus secundus: Il y a eu, en outre, un ensemble systématique
de disparitions ou de personnes portées disparues. La disparition forhcée
de personnes est une violation grave et continue du droit international des
droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire ; compte tenu de
ses effets destructeurs, elle met en évidence la nécessité de l’élargissement
de la notion de victimes (afin qu’elle recouvre non seulement les hpersonnes
portées disparues, mais aussi leurs proches parents, qui ignorent ce hqu’il
est advenu d’elles). La situation ainsi créée justifie l’application d’un cri -
tère approprié d’établissement de la preuve et le transfert hou le renverse-
ment du fardeau de la preuve, qui ne peut incomber à ceux qui en sonth
victimes.
536. Vicesimus tertius : Les graves violations du droit international des
droits de l’homme et du droit international humanitaire mentionnéehs
ci-dessus constituent des violations du jus cogens, qui emportent la res -
ponsabilité de l’Etat et exigent que des réparations soient acchordées aux
378
7 CIJ1077.indb 753 18/04/16 08:54 378 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
recta ratio of natural law), underlying the conception of law (in distinct
legal systems — Droit/Right/Recht /Direito/Derecho/Diritto) as a whole.
537. Vicesimus quartus: In the present case, the widespread and sys-
tematic pattern of destruction took place in pursuance of a plan, with ahn
ideological content. In this respect, both contending Parties addressed the
historical origins of the armed conflict in Croatia, and the ICTY examh -
ined expert evidence of it. The International Court of Justice did not fihnd
it necessary to dwell upon this ; yet, the ideological incitement leading to
the outbreak of hostilities was brought to its attention by the contendihng
Parties, as an essential element for a proper understanding of the case.h
538. Vicesimus quintus: The evidence produced before the Court, con -
cerning the aforementioned widespread and systematic pattern of destruc-
tion, shows that the armed attacks in Croatia were not exactly a war, but
rather an onslaught. Vicesimus sextus: One of its manifestations was the
practice of marking Croats with white ribbons, or armbands, or of plac -
ing white sheets on the doors of their homes. Vicesimus septimus: Another
manifestation was the mistreatment by Serb forces of the mortal remains h
of the deceased Croats, and other successive findings in numerous massh
graves, added to further clarifications obtained from the cross -examina-
tion of witnesses before the Court (in public and closed sittings).
539. Vicesimus octavus: The widespread and systematic pattern of
destruction was also manifested in the forced displacement of persons
and homelessness, and subjection of the victims to unbearable conditionsh
of life. Vicesimus nonus : That pattern of destruction, approached as a
whole, also comprised the destruction of cultural and religious heritageh
(monuments, churches, chapels, city walls, among others). It would be h
artificial to attempt to dissociate physical/biological destruction frhom the
cultural one.
540. Trigesimus : The evidence produced before the Court in respect of
selected devastated villages : Lovas, Ilok, Bogdanovci and Vukovar (in
the region of Eastern Slavonia), and Saborsko (in the region of Lika) —
shows that the actus reus of genocide (Article II (a), (b) and (c) of the
Genocide Convention) — has been established. Trigesimus primus : Fur -
thermore, the intent to destroy (mens rea) the targeted groups, in whole
or in part, can be inferred from the evidence submitted (even if not dihrect
proof). The extreme violence in the perpetration of atrocities in the
planned pattern of destruction bears witness of such intent to destroy.
The inference of mens rea cannot prescind from axiological concerns, and
is undertaken as from the conviction intime (livre convencimento/libre con ‑
vencimiento/libero convincimento) of each judge, as from human con -
science.
379
7 CIJ1077.indb 754 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 378
victimes. Cela est conforme à l’idée de rectitude (conformément à la
recta ratio du droit naturel) qui sous -tend la notion de droit (dans les
différents systèmes juridiques — droit/right/Recht/direito/derecho/diritto)
dans son ensemble.
537. Vicesimus quartus : Dans la présente affaire, la campagne de des -
truction générale et systématique a été menée conforméhment à un plan
qui avait une composante idéologique. A cet égard, les deux Partiehs au
litige ont mentionné les origines historiques du conflit armé enh Croatie et
le TPIY a examiné des témoignages d’experts sur ce sujet. La Cohur n’a
pas jugé nécessaire de s’y attarder ; pourtant, l’incitation idéologique
conduisant au déclenchement des hostilités a été portée àh son attention
par les Parties au litige, en tant qu’élément essentiel pour bihen comprendre
l’affaire.
538. Vicesimus quintus : Les preuves produites devant la Cour, concer -
nant la campagne de destruction générale et systématique susmentionnée,
montrent que les attaques armées menées en Croatie étaient non hpas exa-c
tement une guerre, mais plutôt un assaut meurtrier. Vicesimus sex‑
tus : L’une de ses caractéristiques était l’obligation faite aux Chroates de
porter des rubans ou des brassards blancs, ou d’accrocher des draps
blancs aux portes de leurs maisons. Vicesimus septimus : Cette campagne
s’est aussi caractérisée par des atteintes à l’intégrité des dépouilles mor -
telles de Croates commises par les forces serbes, et par d’autres attheintes
constatées par la suite dans de nombreux charniers, outre les nouveaux
éclaircissements apportés par le contre -interrogatoire des témoins devant
la Cour (lors d’audiences publiques ou à huis clos).
539. Vicesimus octavus : La campagne de destruction générale et systé -
matique s’est aussi caractérisée par des déplacements forcéhs et des priva-
tions de domicile, ainsi que par la soumission des victimes à des conhditions
d’existence insupportables. Vicesimus nonus : Cette campagne, considérée
dans son ensemble, comprenait aussi la destruction du patrimoine cultu -
rel et religieux (monuments, églises, chapelles, fortifications, ehntre autres).
Il serait artificiel’essayer de dissocier la destruction physique/biologique
de la destruction culturelle.
540. Trigesimus : Les preuves produites devant la Cour en ce qui
concerne certaines localités dévastées — Lovas, Ilok, Bogdanovci et
Vukovar (dans la région de la Slavonie orientale), et Saborsko (dahns la
région de la Lika) — montrent que l’élément matériel (actus reus) du
génocide (litt. a), b) et c) de l’article II de la convention sur le génocide)
a été établi. Trigesimus primus: En outre, l’intention de détruire (mensrea)
les groupes visés, en tout ou en partie, peut être déduite des hpreuves pré -
sentées (même si ce ne sont pas des preuves directes). La violenhce extrême
avec laquelle des atrocités ont été perpétrées dans le cahdre de la campagne
planifiée de destruction atteste cette intention de détruire. Lah déduction
de la mens rea ne peut faire abstraction de considérations axiologiques, et
se fait sur la base de la conviction intime (livre convencimento, libre conven‑
cimiento, libero convincimento), autrement dit de la conscience humaine,
du juge.
379
7 CIJ1077.indb 755 18/04/16 08:54 379 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
541. Trigesimus secundus : There is thus need of reparations to the vic -
tims — an issue which was duly addressed by the contending Parties
themselves before the Court — to be determined by the International
Court of Justice in a subsequent phase of the case. Trigesimus tertius The
difficult path to reconciliation starts with the acknowledgment that thhe
widespread and systematic pattern of destruction ends up victimizing
everyone, on both sides. The next step towards reconciliation lies in thhe
provision of reparations (in all its forms). Reconciliation also callsh for
adequate apologies, honouring the memory of the victims. Another step
by the contending Parties in the same direction lies in the identificahtion
and return of all mortal remains to each other.
542. Trigesimus quartus: The adjudication of a case like the present
one shows the need to go beyond the strict inter-State outlook. The
Genocide Convention is people‑centred, and there is need to focus atten -
tion on the people or population concerned, in pursuance of a humanist
outlook, in the light of the principle of humanity. In interpreting and h
applying the Genocide Convention, attention is to be turned to the vic -
tims, rather than to inter-State susceptibilities.
543. Trigesimus quintus: The Court’s evidential assessment and deter -
mination of the facts of the cas d’espèce has to be comprehensive, and not
atomized. All the atrocities, presented to the Court, conforming with thhe
aforementioned pattern of destruction, have to be taken into account, noht
only a sample of them, for the determination of State responsibility undher
the Genocide Convention. Trigesimus sextus: Large-scale crimes, such as
rape and other sexual violence crimes, expulsion from homes (and home -
lessness), forced displacements, deprivation of food and medical care, h
cannot be minimized.
544. Trigesimus septimus: The Court’s conceptual framework and rea-
soning as to the law have likewise to be comprehensive, and not atom -
ized, so as to secure the effet utile of the Genocide Convention. The
branches that conform the corpus juris of the international protection of
the rights of the human person — ILHR, IHL, ILR and ICL — cannot
be approached in a compartmentalized way ; there are approximations
and convergences among them.
545. The Genocide Convention, which is victim‑oriented, cannot be
approached in a static way, as it is a “living instrument”. Trigesimus
octavus: Customary and conventional IHL are to be properly seen in
interaction, and not to be kept separately from each other. A violation h
of the substantive provisions of the Genocide Convention is bound to be
a violation of customary international law on the matter as well.
Trigesimus nonus : Furthermore, the interrelated elements of actus reus
and mens rea of genocide cannot be approached separately either.
380
7 CIJ1077.indb 756 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 379
541. Trigesimus secundus : Il est donc nécessaire d’accorder aux vic -
times des réparations — question que les Parties ont soulevée devant la
Cour — qui devront être déterminées par la Cour dans une phase ulhté -
rieure de l’affaire. Trigesimus tertius: La difficile voie de la réconciliation
commence par la reconnaissance du fait que, en fin de compte, une cam -
pagne de destruction générale et systématique fait de tous des hvictimes,
des deux côtés. L’étape suivante consiste à accorder des réparations (sous
toutes leurs formes). La réconciliation suppose aussi des excuses aphpro -
priées, qui honorent la mémoire des victimes. Une autre étape chonsiste,
pour chacune des Parties, à identifier et à restituer à l’hautre tous les restes
mortels.
542. Trigesimus quartus : Le règlement d’une affaire telle que le cas
d’espèce montre qu’il est nécessaire de dépasser la stricte conception
interétatique. La convention sur le génocide étant axée sur les personnes,
il convient d’appeler l’attention sur les personnes ou la populatihon concer -
nées, conformément à une conception humaniste, à la lumière du principe
d’humanité. Dans l’interprétation et l’application de la hconvention sur le
génocide, la priorité doit être accordée aux victimes, et nohn à la suscepti-
bilité des Etats.
543. Trigesimus quintus: L’appréciation des preuves et la qualification
des faits par la Cour en l’espèce doivent être exhaustives, et hnon fragmen -
taires. Toutes les atrocités soumises à la Cour, qui sont constituhtives de la
campagne de destruction susmentionnée, doivent être prises en conshidéra -
tion, et pas seulement une partie limitée d’entre elles, pour la dhétermina-
tion de la responsabilité de l’Etat en vertu de la convention sur hle génocide.
Trigesimus sextus: Les crimes commis à grande échelle, tels que les viols
et les autres actes de violence sexuelle, les expulsions de logements (het la
privation de domicile), les déplacements forcés, la privation de hnourriture
et de soins médicaux, ne sauraient être minimisés.
544. Trigesimus septimus : Le cadre théorique et le raisonnement juri -
dique de la Cour doivent eux aussi être exhaustifs, et non fragmentaihres, de
façon à garantir l’effet utile de la convention sur le génocihde. Les différentes
branches qui forment le corpus jurisde la protection internationale des
droits de la personne humaine —droit international des droits de l’homme,
droit international humanitaire, droit international des réfugiés et droit
pénal international — ne doivent pas être envisagées d’une manière cloison -
née, car il y a entre elles des points de rapprochement et de converghence.
545. La convention sur le génocide, axée sur les victimes, ne peut pas
être envisagée de manière statique : c’est un « texte vivant ». Trigesi‑
mus octavus: Pour être dûment appliqués, le droit international humani -
taire coutumier et le droit international humanitaire conventionnel
doivent être appréciés dans leur interaction, et non séparéhment. Une
violation des dispositions de fond de la convention sur le génocide ehst
nécessairement une violation du droit international coutumier sur la h
question. Trigesimus nonus: En outre, les éléments liés de l’actus reus
et de la mens rea du génocide ne peuvent pas non plus être appréhen -
dés séparément.
380
7 CIJ1077.indb 757 18/04/16 08:54 380 application of genochide convention (diss. ohp. cançado trindade)
546. Quadragesimus: General principles of law (prima principia), and
in particular the principle of humanity, are of great relevance to both
conventional and customary international law. Such prima principia con -
fer an ineluctable axiological dimension to the international legal ordehr.
Quadragesimus primus: Human rights treaties (such as the Genocide Con-
vention) have a hermeneutics of their own, which calls for a comprehen-
sive approach as to the facts and as to the law, and not an atomized or h
fragmented one.
547. Quadragesimussecundus: The imperative of the realization of justice
acknowledges that conscience (recta ratio) stands above the “will”. Con -
sent yields to objective justice. Quadragesimusertius: The Genocide Con-
vention is concerned with human groups in situations of vulnerability orh
defencelessness. In its interpretation and application, fundamental prinhc-i
ples and human values exert a relevant role. Quadragesimus quartus: There
is here the primacy of the concern with the victims of human cruelty, ash,
after all, the raison d’humanité prevails over the raison d’Etat. Quadragesi‑
mus quintus: These are the foundations of my firm dissenting position in
the cas d’espèce in my understanding, this is what the International Court
of Justice should have decided in the present Judgment on the case concer-n
ing the Application of the Convention against Genocide.
(Signed) Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade.
381
7 CIJ1077.indb 758 18/04/16 08:54 application de convehntion génocide (op. dishs. cançado trindade) 380
546. Quadragesimus: Les principes généraux du droit (prima princi‑
pia), et en particulier le principe d’humanité, ont une grande importance
pour le droit international conventionnel mais aussi coutumier. Ces
prima principia confèrent une dimension axiologique inéluctable à l’ordre
juridique international. Quadragesimus primus: Les traités relatifs aux
droits de l’homme (tels que la convention sur le génocide) ont uhne hermé -
neutique qui leur est propre et qui impose une prise en considérationh de
l’ensemble des faits et du droit, et non une interprétation cloisonnée ou
fragmentée.
547. Quadragesimus secundus : L’impératif de la réalisation de la justice
reconnaît que la conscience (recta ratio) l’emporte sur la « volonté». Le
consentement le cède à la justice objective. Quadragesimus tertius: La
convention sur le génocide s’occupe de groupes humains dans des sihtua -
tions de vulnérabilité, voire sans défense. Les principes fondamentaux et
les valeurs humaines jouent un rôle important dans son interprétation et
son application. Quadragesimus quartus: Le souci des victimes de la
cruauté humaine prime ici, car, après tout, la raison d’humanithé l’emporte
sur la raison d’Etat. Quadragesimus quintus : Ce sont là les fondements de
mon opinion dissidente dans le cas d’espèce ; à mon sens, c’est ce que la
Cour internationale de Justice aurait dû décider dans le présent arrêt
rendu en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention sur le génocide.
(Signé) Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade.
381
7 CIJ1077.indb 759 18/04/16 08:54
Dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade