Separate Opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren

Document Number
090-20031106-JUD-01-04-EN
Parent Document Number
090-20031106-JUD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE PARRA-ARANGUREN

Partial disagreement with paragraph 125 (1) - According to 1996 Judg-
ment, Court's jurisdiction is based solely on Article X, paragraph I, of the 1955
Treaty - Iran's main submission was that the military actions of the United
States breached that Article - Task of the Court was to adjudge Iran's submis-
sion before deciding, zj"necessary, whether the military actions were justzjîed

under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty - Court concluded that
Article X, paragraph I,of the 1955 Treaty had not been breached by the United
States - Therefore, the dispute was resolved and the Court had no jurisdiction
to examine thejustzfication advanced by the United States for its hypothetical
breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.

1. 1 have voted for the operative part of the Judgment but my favour-
able vote does not mean that 1 share each and every part of the reasoning

followed by the Court in reaching its conclusions. In particular 1 am not
in agreement with the first sentence of paragraph 125 (1) stating that the
Court :

"Finds that the actions of the United States of America against
Iranian oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot
be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security
interests of the United States of America under Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and

Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran, as
interpreted in the light of international law on the use of force."

2. The reasons for my disagreement are the following.
3. The Court decided in its 12 December 1996 Judgment that :

"it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the
Treaty of 1955, to entertain the claims made by the Islamic Republic
of Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty" (Oil Platforms
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objection, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 821, para. 55 (2)).

4. The first submission presented by Iran requests the Court, rejecting

al1 contrary claims and submissions, to adjudge and declare
"That in attacking and destroying on 19 October 1987 and

18 April 1988 the oil platforms referred to in Iran's Application, the
United States breached its obligations to Iran under Article X, para- graph 1, of the Treaty of Amity, and that the United States bears
responsibility for the attacks."
5. Thus the subject-matter of the dispute submitted by the Islamic
Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) to the Court was whether the military

actions of the United States of America (hereinafter the United States)
breached its obligations to Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights signed in
Tehran on 15 August 1955 (hereinafter the 1955 Treaty), in force between
the parties. Therefore the task of the Court was to decide the claim pre-
sented by Iran, i.e., to examine and determine whether the United States
violated its obligations under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.
It is only if the Court comes to the conclusion that the United States
breached its obligations under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty
that it has jurisdiction to enter into the consideration of the defence
advanced by the United States to justify its military actions against Iran,

in particular whether they were justified under its Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), which provides :

"The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of
measures :

.............................
(d) necessary to fulfil the obligations of a High Contracting Party
for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and
security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests."

6. Notwithstanding, paragraph 35 of the Judgment States:
"To uphold the claim of Iran, the Court must be satisfied both
that the actions of the United States,complained of by Iran, infringed

the freedom of commerce between the territories of the Parties guar-
anteed by Article X, paragraph 1, and that such actions were not
justified to protect the essential security interests of the United States
as contemplated by Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) ."

7. Then paragraph 37 adds:

"In the present case, it appears to the Court that there are
particular considerations militating in favour of an examination
of the application of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), before turning to
Article X, paragraph 1."

8. The first particular consideration militating in favour of reversing
the order of examination of the Articles of the 1955 Treaty is explained in
paragraph 37 of the Judgment as follows:

"It is clear that the original dispute between the Parties related to the legality of the actions of the United States, in the light of inter-
national law on the use of force. At the time of those actions, neither
Party made any mention of the 1955 Treaty. The contention of the
United States at the time was that its attacks on the oil platforms
were justified as acts of self-defence, in response to what it regarded
as armed attacks by Iran, and on that basis it gave notice of its

action to the Security Council under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. Before the Court, it has continued to maintain that it was
justified in acting as it did in exercise of the right of self-defence; it
contends that, even if the Court were to find that its actions do not
fa11within the scope of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), those actions
were not wrongful since they were necessary and appropriate actions
in self-defence. "

9. A second particular consideration is indicated i~iparagraph 38 of
the Judgment in the following terms:

"Furthermore, as the United States itself recognizes in itsRejoin-
der, 'The self-defense issues presented in this case raise matters of the
highest importance to al1 members of the international community',
and both Parties are agreed as to the importance of the implications
of the case in the field of the use of force, even though they draw
opposite conclusions from this observation. The Court therefore
considers that, to the extent that its jurisdiction under Article XXI,
paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty authorizes it to examine and rule on
such issues, it should do so."

10. There can be no doubt that matters relating to the use of force
and to self-defence are of the highest importance to al1 members of the
international community. However, in its 12 December 1996 Judgment,
the Court interpreted Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty

"as affording only a defence on the merits"; recalling that

"The Court, in its Judgment of 27 June 1986 in the case concern-
ing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), adopted the latter inter-

pretation for the application of an identical clause included in
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded
between the United States and Nicaragua on 21 January 1956
(1C..J. Reports 1986, p. 116, para. 222, and p. 136, para. 271). Iran
argues, in this case, that the Court should give the same interpreta-
tion to Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). The United States, for its part,
in the most recent presentation of its arguments, stated that 'consid-
eration of the interpretation and application of Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), was a merits issue'. The Court sees no reason to Vary

the conclusions it arrived at in 1986. It accordingly takes the view that Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), does not restrict itsjurisdiction in
the present case, but is confined to affording the Parties a possible

defence on the merits to be used should the occasion arise." (Oil
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 811,
para. 20.)

11. The Court was perfectly well aware at that time of the two par-
ticular considerations quoted above. Notwithstanding, in its 12 Decem-
ber 1996 Judgment, the Court expressly interpreted Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty "as affording only a defence on the
merits" and concluded that it "is confined to affording the Parties a pos-
sible defence on the merits to be used should the occasion arise".

12. Even though this is not mentioned as a particular consideration
militating in favour of reversing the order of examining the Articles of

the 1955 Treaty, paragraph 36 of the Judgment nonetheless recalls that
the United States suggests that the Court can :
"dismiss the Iranian claim either on the ground that the actions of

the United States did not involve a breach of Article X, paragraph 1,
or on the ground that those actions were measures necessary to pro-
tect the essential security interests of the United States, and therefore
justified under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). On this basis, the
United States suggests, the order in which the issues are treated is a
matter for the discretion of the Court."

13. A suggestion made a posteriori by one of the parties to a case -
even if that party is the United States - does not justify the modification
of a previous decision adopted by the Court, in particular because the
United States has strongly denied that its military actions violated
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, which is the basis for the
claim submitted by Iran to the Court. Therefore, in my opinion, the

Court should have considered Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), as a defence
to be examined only in the event of its having previously established
that the United States had violated Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty.
14. The reasons indicated above explain that there are no "particular
considerations militating in favour of an examination of the application
of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), before turning to Article X, para-
graph 1". On the contrary there are strong considerations in favour of
not having done so. The second sentence of paragraph 125 (1) of the
Judgment states that the Court cannot "uphold the submission of Iran

that those [military] actions constitute a breach of the obligations of the
United States of America under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty,
regarding freedom of commerce between the territories of the parties".
That is the end of the story. Therefore, in my opinion, the Court did nothave jurisdiction to examine the defences advanced by the United States
on the basis of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), to justify its hypothetical
breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.

(Signed) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE PARRA-ARANGUREN

Partial disagreement with paragraph 125 (1) - According to 1996 Judg-
ment, Court's jurisdiction is based solely on Article X, paragraph I, of the 1955
Treaty - Iran's main submission was that the military actions of the United
States breached that Article - Task of the Court was to adjudge Iran's submis-
sion before deciding, zj"necessary, whether the military actions were justzjîed

under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty - Court concluded that
Article X, paragraph I,of the 1955 Treaty had not been breached by the United
States - Therefore, the dispute was resolved and the Court had no jurisdiction
to examine thejustzfication advanced by the United States for its hypothetical
breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.

1. 1 have voted for the operative part of the Judgment but my favour-
able vote does not mean that 1 share each and every part of the reasoning

followed by the Court in reaching its conclusions. In particular 1 am not
in agreement with the first sentence of paragraph 125 (1) stating that the
Court :

"Finds that the actions of the United States of America against
Iranian oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot
be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security
interests of the United States of America under Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and

Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran, as
interpreted in the light of international law on the use of force."

2. The reasons for my disagreement are the following.
3. The Court decided in its 12 December 1996 Judgment that :

"it has jurisdiction, on the basis of Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the
Treaty of 1955, to entertain the claims made by the Islamic Republic
of Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty" (Oil Platforms
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objection, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 821, para. 55 (2)).

4. The first submission presented by Iran requests the Court, rejecting

al1 contrary claims and submissions, to adjudge and declare
"That in attacking and destroying on 19 October 1987 and

18 April 1988 the oil platforms referred to in Iran's Application, the
United States breached its obligations to Iran under Article X, para- OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE PARRA-ARANGUREN

[Traduction]

Désaccord partiel avec le paragraphe 125, point 1) - Selon l'arrêtde 1996,
la compétence de la Cour repose uniquement sur le paragraphe I de l'article X
du traité de 1955 - La principale conclusion de l'Iran était que les actes mili-
taires des Etats-Unis constituaient une violation de cet articl- La Cour avait
pour mission de se prononcer sur la conclusion de l'Iran avant de décider, au
besoin, si les actes militaires étaientjustifiés en vertu de l'alinéa d) du para-
graphe 1 de I'article XX du traitéde 1955 - La Cour a conclu que les Etats-Unis

n'avaient pas violéle paragraphe 1 de I'article X du traité de 1955 - En consé-
quence, le différend était résolu et la Cour n'avait pas compétence pour exami-
ner la justification avancée par les Etats-Unis pour leur hypothétique violation
du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955.

1. J'ai voté pour le dispositif de l'arrêt, mais ce vote ne signifie pas que
je partage en tous points le raisonnement suivi par la Cour pour parvenir
à ses conclusions. En particulier, je suis en désaccord avec la première

phrase du paragraphe 125, point l), de l'arrêt, selon laquelle la Cour:

«Dit que les actions menées par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique contre
les plates-formes pétrolières iraniennes le 19 octobre 1987 et le
18 avril 1988 ne sauraient être justifiées en tant que mesures néces-
saires à la protection des intérêts vitaux des Etats-Unis d'Amérique
sur le plan de la sécuritéen vertu de l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de
l'article XX du traité d'amitié, de commerce et de droits consulaires
de 1955 entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et l'Iran, tel qu'interprété à

la lumière du droit international relatif à l'emploi de la force. »
2. Les raisons de mon désaccord sont les suivantes.

3. La Cour, dans son arrêt du 12 décembre 1996, a décidéque:
((elle [avait] compétence,sur la base du paragraphe 2 de l'article XXI

du traité de 1955, pour connaître des demandes formulées par la
République islamique d'Iran au titre du paragraphe 1 de l'article X
dudit traité» (Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d'Iran
c. Etats- Unis d'Amérique), exception préliminaire, arrêt, C.I. J.
Recueil 1996 (II), p. 821, par. 55 2)).

4. Dans sa première conclusion, l'Iran prie la Cour, en rejetant toutes
prétentions et affirmations contraires, de dire et juger

((qu'en attaquant et en détruisant, le 19 octobre 1987 et le
18 avril 1988, les plates-formes pétrolières visées dans la requête de
l'Iran, les Etats-Unis ont manqué à leurs obligations vis-à-vis de graph 1, of the Treaty of Amity, and that the United States bears
responsibility for the attacks."
5. Thus the subject-matter of the dispute submitted by the Islamic
Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) to the Court was whether the military

actions of the United States of America (hereinafter the United States)
breached its obligations to Iran under Article X, paragraph 1, of the
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights signed in
Tehran on 15 August 1955 (hereinafter the 1955 Treaty), in force between
the parties. Therefore the task of the Court was to decide the claim pre-
sented by Iran, i.e., to examine and determine whether the United States
violated its obligations under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.
It is only if the Court comes to the conclusion that the United States
breached its obligations under Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty
that it has jurisdiction to enter into the consideration of the defence
advanced by the United States to justify its military actions against Iran,

in particular whether they were justified under its Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), which provides :

"The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of
measures :

.............................
(d) necessary to fulfil the obligations of a High Contracting Party
for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and
security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests."

6. Notwithstanding, paragraph 35 of the Judgment States:
"To uphold the claim of Iran, the Court must be satisfied both
that the actions of the United States,complained of by Iran, infringed

the freedom of commerce between the territories of the Parties guar-
anteed by Article X, paragraph 1, and that such actions were not
justified to protect the essential security interests of the United States
as contemplated by Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) ."

7. Then paragraph 37 adds:

"In the present case, it appears to the Court that there are
particular considerations militating in favour of an examination
of the application of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), before turning to
Article X, paragraph 1."

8. The first particular consideration militating in favour of reversing
the order of examination of the Articles of the 1955 Treaty is explained in
paragraph 37 of the Judgment as follows:

"It is clear that the original dispute between the Parties related to l'Iran au regard du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité d'amitié, et
que les Etats-Unis portent la responsabilité de ces attaques)).

5. Ainsi, l'objet du différend soumis à la Cour par la République isla-
mique d'Iran (ci-après «Iran») était de savoir si les actions militaires des
Etats-Unis d'Amérique (ci-après ((Etats-Unis ») constituaient un man-
quement de leurs obligations vis-à-vis de l'Iran au regard du para-
graphe 1 de l'article X du traité d'amitié, de commerce et de droits consu-
laires signé à Téhéran le 15 août 1955 (ci-après dénommé ((traité
de 1955)))' en vigueur entre les Parties. La Cour avait donc pour mission
de se prononcer sur la demande de l'Iran, autrement dit d'examiner et de
décider si les Etats-Unis avaient violéles obligations découlant pour eux
du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955. C'est seulement si la
Cour conclut que les Etats-Unis ont manqué à leurs obligations décou-
lant du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955 qu'elle a compétence
pour aborder l'examen des moyens de défense avancés par les Etats-Unis

pour justifier leurs actions militaires contre l'Iran, en particulier pour
déterminer si ces actions étaient justifiées au regard de l'alinéa d) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article XX de ce traité, lequel dispose:
((Le présent traité ne fera pas obstacle à l'application de mesures:

.............................

d) ...nécessaires à l'exécution des obligations de l'une ou l'autre des
Hautes Parties contractantes relatives au maintien ou au réta-
blissement de la paix et de la sécuritéinternationales ou à la pro-
tection des intérêts vitaux de cette Haute Partie contractante sur
le plan de la sécurité. ))
6. Cependant, aux termes du paragraphe 35 de l'arrêt:

((Pour faire droità la demande de l'Iran, la Cour doit être convain-
cue à la fois que les actions des Etats-Unis dont se plaint l'Iran ont
porté atteinte à la libertéde commerce entre les territoires des Parties
garantie par le paragraphe 1 de l'article X, et que ces actionsn'étaient
pas justifiées par la nécessité d'assurer la protection des intérêts
vitaux des Etats-Unis sur le plan de la sécurité,au sens de l'alinéa d)
du paragraphe 1 de l'article XX. ))
7. Et, aux ternes du paragraphe 37 :

«En la présente espèce, la Cour est d'avis que des considérations
particulièresincitent à examiner l'application de l'alinéa d) du para-
graphe 1 de l'article XX avant d'aborder le paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticleX. ))

8. La première considération particulière qui incite à inverser l'ordre
des articles du traité de 1955 pour les examiner est expliquée comme suit
au paragraphe 37 de l'arrêt:
«Il est indéniable que le différend initial entre les Parties portait the legality of the actions of the United States, in the light of inter-
national law on the use of force. At the time of those actions, neither
Party made any mention of the 1955 Treaty. The contention of the
United States at the time was that its attacks on the oil platforms
were justified as acts of self-defence, in response to what it regarded
as armed attacks by Iran, and on that basis it gave notice of its

action to the Security Council under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. Before the Court, it has continued to maintain that it was
justified in acting as it did in exercise of the right of self-defence; it
contends that, even if the Court were to find that its actions do not
fa11within the scope of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), those actions
were not wrongful since they were necessary and appropriate actions
in self-defence. "

9. A second particular consideration is indicated i~iparagraph 38 of
the Judgment in the following terms:

"Furthermore, as the United States itself recognizes in itsRejoin-
der, 'The self-defense issues presented in this case raise matters of the
highest importance to al1 members of the international community',
and both Parties are agreed as to the importance of the implications
of the case in the field of the use of force, even though they draw
opposite conclusions from this observation. The Court therefore
considers that, to the extent that its jurisdiction under Article XXI,
paragraph 2, of the 1955 Treaty authorizes it to examine and rule on
such issues, it should do so."

10. There can be no doubt that matters relating to the use of force
and to self-defence are of the highest importance to al1 members of the
international community. However, in its 12 December 1996 Judgment,
the Court interpreted Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty

"as affording only a defence on the merits"; recalling that

"The Court, in its Judgment of 27 June 1986 in the case concern-
ing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), adopted the latter inter-

pretation for the application of an identical clause included in
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded
between the United States and Nicaragua on 21 January 1956
(1C..J. Reports 1986, p. 116, para. 222, and p. 136, para. 271). Iran
argues, in this case, that the Court should give the same interpreta-
tion to Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). The United States, for its part,
in the most recent presentation of its arguments, stated that 'consid-
eration of the interpretation and application of Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), was a merits issue'. The Court sees no reason to Vary

the conclusions it arrived at in 1986. It accordingly takes the view sur la licéité desactions menées par les Etats-Unis, à la lumière du
droit international relatif a l'emploi de la force.A l'époque, aucune

des deux Parties n'a mentionné le traité de 1955.Les Etats-Unis sou-
tenaient alors que leurs attaques contre les plates-formes pétrolières
étaient justifiées au titre de la légitime défense, en réponse à ce qu'ils
considéraient comme des agressions armées de l'Iran, raison pour
laquelle ils ont porté leurs actions à la connaissance du Conseil de
sécuritéconformément à l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies.
Devant la Cour, les Etats-Unis ont continué d'affirmer que l'exercice
du droit de légitime défense justifiait leurs actions; ils soutiennent
que, même si la Cour devait conclure que leurs actions n'entraient

pas dans le champ d'application de l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de
l'article XX, elles n'étaient pas illicites, en tant qu'elles constituaient
des actes de légitime défense nécessaires et appropriés. ))
9. Une seconde considération particulière est indiquée au para-

graphe 38 de l'arrêt, selon lequel:
«En outre, ainsi que les Etats-Unis eux-mêmes le reconnaissent
dans leur duplique, «[l]es aspects de la présente espèce touchant à la
légitime défense soulèvent des questions de la plus haute importance
pour l'ensemble des membres de la communauté internationale)),et

les deux Parties conviennent que la présente affaire est loin d'être
sans incidences en matière d'emploi de la force, mêmesi elles tirent
de ce constat des conclusionsopposées. La Cour considère donc que,
dans la mesure où la compétence que lui confère le paragraphe 2 de
l'article XXI du traité de 1955 l'autorise à examiner ces questions et
à se prononcer sur celles-ci, elle doit le faire.))

10. Sans aucun doute, les questions relatives à l'emploi de la force età
la légitime défense sont de la plus haute importance pour tous les
membres de la communauté internationale. Cependant, dans son arrêt
du 12 décembre 1996, la Cour a interprété l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de
l'article XX du traité de 1955 ((comme ouvrant seulement une défense au
fond », rappelant que

«La Cour, dans son arrêt du 27 juin 1986 en l'affaire des Activités
militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicara-
gua c. Etats- Unis d'Amérique), a adopté la seconde interprétation
pour l'application d'une clause identique figurant dans le traité
d'amitié, de commerce et de navigation conclu entre les Etats-Unis
et le Nicaragua le 21 janvier 1956 (C.I. J. Recueil 1986, p. 116,
par. 222, et p. 136, par. 271). L'Iran soutient en l'espèce que la Cour

devrait donner la même interprétation au paragraphe 1 d) de l'ar-
ticle XX. Quant aux Etats-Unis, ils ont, dans le dernier état de leur
argumentation, déclaré qu7«aborder la question de l'interprétation
et de l'application du paragraphe 1 d) de l'article XX relevait de
l'examen au fond)). La Cour ne voit aucune raison d'aboutir à des
conclusions différentes de celles auxquelles elle était parvenue en that Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), does not restrict itsjurisdiction in
the present case, but is confined to affording the Parties a possible

defence on the merits to be used should the occasion arise." (Oil
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America),
Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 811,
para. 20.)

11. The Court was perfectly well aware at that time of the two par-
ticular considerations quoted above. Notwithstanding, in its 12 Decem-
ber 1996 Judgment, the Court expressly interpreted Article XX, para-
graph 1 (d), of the 1955 Treaty "as affording only a defence on the
merits" and concluded that it "is confined to affording the Parties a pos-
sible defence on the merits to be used should the occasion arise".

12. Even though this is not mentioned as a particular consideration
militating in favour of reversing the order of examining the Articles of

the 1955 Treaty, paragraph 36 of the Judgment nonetheless recalls that
the United States suggests that the Court can :
"dismiss the Iranian claim either on the ground that the actions of

the United States did not involve a breach of Article X, paragraph 1,
or on the ground that those actions were measures necessary to pro-
tect the essential security interests of the United States, and therefore
justified under Article XX, paragraph 1 (d). On this basis, the
United States suggests, the order in which the issues are treated is a
matter for the discretion of the Court."

13. A suggestion made a posteriori by one of the parties to a case -
even if that party is the United States - does not justify the modification
of a previous decision adopted by the Court, in particular because the
United States has strongly denied that its military actions violated
Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty, which is the basis for the
claim submitted by Iran to the Court. Therefore, in my opinion, the

Court should have considered Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), as a defence
to be examined only in the event of its having previously established
that the United States had violated Article X, paragraph 1, of the
1955 Treaty.
14. The reasons indicated above explain that there are no "particular
considerations militating in favour of an examination of the application
of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), before turning to Article X, para-
graph 1". On the contrary there are strong considerations in favour of
not having done so. The second sentence of paragraph 125 (1) of the
Judgment states that the Court cannot "uphold the submission of Iran

that those [military] actions constitute a breach of the obligations of the
United States of America under Article X, paragraph 1, of that Treaty,
regarding freedom of commerce between the territories of the parties".
That is the end of the story. Therefore, in my opinion, the Court did not 1986. Elle estime, par suite,que le paragraphe 1 d) del'article XX ne
restreint pas sa compétence dans la présente affaire, mais offre seu-
lement aux Parties une défense au fond qu'il leur appartiendra, le cas
échéant, de faire valoir le moment venu. ))(Plates-formes pétrolières
(République islamique d'Iran c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), exception
préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil I996 (II), p. 811, par. 20.)

Il. La Cour était alors parfaitement consciente des deux considéra-
tions particulièresmentionnées plus haut. Et pourtant, dans son arrêtdu
12 décembre 1996, elle a interprété l'alinéa d) du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle XX du traité de 1955 comme ((offrant seulement une défense au
fond» et elle a conclu qu'il (([offrait] seulement aux Parties une défense
au fond qu'il leur [appartiendrait], le cas échéant, de faire valoir le
moment venu ».
12. Mêmesi elle n'en fait pas une considération particulièrel'incitant à
inverser l'ordre des articles du traité de 1955, la Cour, au paragraphe 36
de son arrêt, rappelle néanmoins que les Etats-Unis suggèrent qu'elle
peut :

((rejeter la demande de l'Iran soit au motif que les actions menées
par les Etats-Unis n'ont pas entraîné une violation du paragraphe 1
de l'article X, soit au motif que ces actions étaient des mesures néces-
saires à la protection des intérêts vitauxdes Etats-Unis sur le plan de
la sécurité,etdonc qu'elles étaient autorisées par l'alinéad) du para-
graphe 1 de l'article XX. Sur cette base, les Etats-Unis estiment que
l'ordre dans lequel les questions seront abordées relève de la discré-
tion de la Cour. D

13. Une suggestion faite à posteriori par l'une des parties à une ins-
tance - même s'ils'agit des Etats-Unis - ne justifie pas que la Cour
modifie une décision qu'elle a précédemment adoptée, et cela d'autant
moins que les Etats-Unis ont nié avec force que leurs actions militaires
aient constitué une violation du paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité
de 1955, sur lequel est fondéela demande de l'Iran à la Cour. C'est pour-
quoi, à mon avis, la Cour aurait dû considérer l'alinéa d) du para-
graphe 1 de l'article XX comme un moyen de défense à n'examiner que
dans le cas où elle aurait préalablement établi que les Etats-Unis avaient
violé le paragraphe 1 de l'article X du traité de 1955.
14. Pour les raisons expliquées ci-dessus, il n'y avait pas de ((considé-
rations particulières [incitant] à examiner l'application de l'alinéa d) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article XX avant d'aborder le paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle X». Il y avait mêmedes considérations puissantes en sens contraire.
Dans la deuxième phrase du paragraphe 125, point 1)'de l'arrêt, la Cour
dit ne pas pouvoir ((accueillirla conclusion de la République islamique
d'Iran selon laquelle ces actions [militaires] constituent une violation par

les Etats-Unis d'Amérique des obligations que leur impose le para-
graphe 1 de l'article X dudit traité, relativesàla liberté de commerce entre
les territoires des parties)).Inutile d'aller plus loin. En conséquenceà monhave jurisdiction to examine the defences advanced by the United States
on the basis of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), to justify its hypothetical
breach of Article X, paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty.

(Signed) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.avis, la Cour n'avait pas compétence pour examiner les moyens de
défense tirés par les Etats-Unis de l'alinéad) du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticleXX pour justifier leur hypothétique violation du paragraphe 1 de
l'article du traité de 1955.

(Signé) Gonzalo PARRA-ARANGUREN.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Separate Opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren

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