Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Charlesworth

Document Number
148-20140331-JUD-01-11-EN
Parent Document Number
148-20140331-JUD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

453

SEPARATE OPINION
OF JUDGE AD HOC CHARLESWORTH

Special permit whaling under Article VIII of the ICRW — The use of lethal
methods “for purposes of scientific research” under the ICRW must ▯be indispensable
to the research — The precautionary approach is relevant to the interpretation of
the ICRW — States parties to the ICRW have a duty to co-operate with the IWC
and its committees — Japan has breached paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the
ICRW.

1. As my vote indicates, I largely agree with the conclusions the Court

has reached and its reasoning. There are, however, two areas in which my
views differ from those of the majority.

Lethal Methods

2. My first point of difference from the majority turns on the nature of é
the restrictions on lethal methods in scientific research on whales in Arti-
cle VIII of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling

(1946) (ICRW): can lethal methods be used when a State party considers
it necessary or only when no other methods for the relevant scientific
research are available ? Both Parties to this dispute accept that lethal
methods may be essential for research on some scientific questions about

whales.

3. At the time the ICRW was adopted, scientific research on whales
was largely dependent on lethal methods. As the Court notes, however,

the ICRW is an evolving instrument (Judgment, para. 45). The most
obvious mechanism of evolution is contained in the ICRW itself. Arti -
cle V gives the International Whaling Commission (IWC) the power to
amend the ICRW though the adoption of amendments to the ICRW’s
Schedule by a three-fourths majority of those IWC members voting

(Art. III, para. 2). The Schedule has the same legal status as the Conven -
tion by virtue of Article I, paragraph 1.

4. A second, less direct, mode of evolution is through recommenda -

tions of the IWC (Art. VI) which are adopted by a simple majority of
members voting (Art. III, para. 2). Although such recommendations do
not bind IWC members, they are relevant to the interpretation of the
ICRW if they come within the terms of Article 31, paragraph 3 (a) or (b)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Article 31, para -

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8 CIJ1062.indb 590 18/05/15 09:29 454 whaling in the antarcétic (sep. op. charlesworéth)

graph 3 (a) requires that “any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its proévi -

sions” be taken into account in its interpretation, together with theé trea -
ty’s context. Article 31, paragraph 3 (b) takes the same approach to “any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes téhe
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. Since the moréato -
rium on commercial whaling came into effect in the 1985-1986 pelagic

and 1986 coastal seasons, most IWC resolutions on special permit whal -
ing have attracted a number of negative votes, which precludes them as
evidence of the parties’ agreement on the ICRW’s interpretation. Héow -
ever, there remain some significant resolutions that were adopted by coné-
sensus and thus must inform the interpretative task. I note that resolutéions
adopted by a vote of the IWC have some consequence although they do

not come within the terms of Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Con -
vention. Particularly when they are adopted by a large majority of IWC
members, the resolutions are relevant to the duty of co-operation, dis -
cussed below.

5. The issue of the status of IWC resolutions is of special significance
in this case with respect to the use of lethal methods “for purposes éof
scientific research” under Article VIII. While Article VIII envisages the

killing of whales for scientific ends, it must be read in light of develéop -
ments in the treaty parties’ views on lethal research methods. Althouégh
the Court acknowledges at a general level that resolutions adopted by
consensus or by a unanimous vote “may be relevant for the interpretatéion
of the Convention or its Schedule” (Judgment, para. 46), with respect to
lethal research methods it states that any such resolutions “do not eéstab -

lish a requirement that lethal methods be used only when other methods
are not available” (ibid., para. 83). In my view, however, the applicable
resolutions establish a principle that lethal methods should be of last é
resort in scientific research programmes under Article VIII. IWC resolu -
tion 1986-2 on “Special Permits for Scientific Research” was adopted by

consensus and records the views of parties to the ICRW that both permit-
issuing Governments and the IWC’s Scientific Committee in review -
ing permits should take into account whether the relevant scientific
research objectives “are not practically and scientifically feasible through
non-lethal research techniques”. Annex P, the most recent version of the

Guidelines for the Review of Scientific Permit Proposals, adopted by coné -
sensus by the Scientific Committee and endorsed by the IWC in 2008,
requires an assessment of “why non-lethal research methods . . . have
been considered to be insufficient”. These resolutions and Guidelineés give
primacy to non-lethal methods in scientific research relating to whaling
and insist that permit-issuing States explain why non-lethal methods are

inadequate. In turn, the Scientific Committee must assess such explana -
tions against current scientific knowledge and practice. These instrumenéts

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thus support an interpretation of Article VIII that lethal methods should
be essential to the objectives of the scientific research programme.

6. The precautionary approach to environmental regulation also rein -
forces this analysis of the conditions in which lethal research methods é
may be undertaken. The approach was formulated in Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 as “[w]here
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientéific

certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective mea -
sures to prevent environmental degradation”. The precautionary approaéch
entails the avoidance of activities that may threaten the environment evéen
in the face of scientific uncertainty about the direct or indirect effects of
such activities. It gives priority to the prevention of harm to the

environment in its broadest sense, including biological diversity, resouérce
conservation and management and human health. The essence of the
precautionary approach has informed the development of international
environmental law and is recognized implicitly or explicitly in instru -
ments dealing with a wide range of subject-matter, from the regulation of

the oceans and international watercourses to the conservation and man -
agement of fish stocks, the conservation of endangered species and bio -
safety.
7. This Court has referred to the precautionary approach in Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (although not using this term)

and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay). In both
these cases, the Court contemplated the interpretation of treaty obliga -
tions in light of new approaches to environmental protection. In the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary/Slovakia) case, dealing with a bilateral
treaty signed in 1977, the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of

the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Barrage System, the Court stated :

“The Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental protec -
tion, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often
irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limit-
ations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of
damage.

Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other rea -
sons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often
done without consideration of the effects upon the environment.
Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the
risks for mankind — for present and future generations — of pursuit

of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new
norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number

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of instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to
be taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper

weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when
continuing with activities begun in the past.” (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 78,
para. 140.)

8. In the Pulp Mills case, the Court considered that “a precautionary
approach may be relevant in the interpretation and application of the

provisions of [the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay]” (Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay (Argentina v.Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I),
p. 71, para. 164). It went on to state that :

“the obligation to protect and preserve, [under the Statute] [. . .], has
to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in recent years
has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now be
considered a requirement under general international law to under -

take an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that
the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact
in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource” (ibid.,
p. 83, para. 204).

9. These observations suggest that treaties dealing with the environ -
ment should be interpreted wherever possible in light of the precautionaéry
approach, regardless of the date of their adoption. This is also consistéent

with the Court’s statement in Legal Consequences for States of the Contin-
ued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwith -
standing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) : “an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of theé
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation” (Advisory

Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 31, para. 53).

10. Both Parties to this dispute endorsed the precautionary approach
at a theoretical level, although they disagreed about its application toé the
facts. In my view, the precautionary approach requires that non-lethal

methods of research be used wherever possible. In relation to Article VIII,
which contemplates the killing of the subject of research by the researcéh
activity, an implication of the precautionary approach is that lethal meéth -
ods must be shown to be indispensable to the purposes of scientific
research on whales.

Duty of Co-operation

11. The second point on which I differ from the majority is whether

Japan has acted consistently with paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the
ICRW. Paragraph 30 sets out the process by which States parties submit

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proposed scientific permits to the IWC’s Scientific Committee for revéiew
and comment. In my view, paragraph 30 must be read in light of a duty

of co-operation of States parties to the ICRW with the IWC and its com -
mittees. While the Judgment of the Court recognizes such a duty of
co-operation (paras. 83 and 240), it does not specifically address Japan’s
compliance with the duty. As the duty of co-operation is a critical element
of the fabric of the ICRW, it merits some elaboration.

12. The ICRW was designed as a new form of international regulation
of whaling after the failure of two earlier attempts. The Convention foré
the Regulation of Whaling (1931), prepared under the auspices of the
League of Nations, and the International Agreement for the Regulation
of Whaling (1937) (amended by several protocols) had relied on the par -

ties’ national regulatory systems for enforcement. Although they laidé the
foundations for international co-operation to bring scientific knowledge
to bear on the whaling industry, neither instrument was able to respond é
to rampant commercial whaling. The ICRW departed from these treaties’é
national enforcement schemes by creating an international institution, téhe

IWC, of which each treaty party was a member. The fact that member -
ship of the ICRW is open to all States reinforces its purpose of internaé -
tionalizing the regulation of whaling beyond those States directly involéved
in whaling. As noted above, the IWC has the power to regulate whaling
closely through amending the Schedule to the ICRW. The IWC can

deploy a variety of mechanisms to this end, including the designation ofé
protected species and sanctuaries, or setting annual catch quotas and siéze
limits (Art. V, para. 1).

13. Article VIII of the ICRW was based on Article 10 of the 1937
Agreement, which aimed to promote scientific research. An important
difference in the ICRW provision is the monitoring role of the IWC in é
relation to whaling for purposes of scientific research. This entails a duty
of co-operation by States parties with the IWC and its subsidiary bodies

reflecting the overarching object and purpose of the Convention, whiché is
to create “a system of international regulation” for the conservatéion and
management of whale stocks (Preamble, para. 6). The concept of a duty
of co-operation is the foundation of legal régimes dealing (inter alia) with
shared resources and with the environment. It derives from the principle

that the conservation and management of shared resources and the envi -
ronment must be based on shared interests, rather than the interests of é
one party. Article VIII incorporates a specific aspect of this duty in man -
dating immediate reporting to the IWC of the grant of any special per -
mits for lethal activities for purposes of scientific research (Art. VIII,
para. 1). Article VIII, paragraph 3, makes another element of this duty

explicit in providing that States parties

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“shall transmit to such body as may be designated by the Commission
[the Scientific Committee], in so far as practicable, and at intervals of

not more than one year, scientific information available to that Gov -
ernment with respect to whales and whaling, including the results of
research conducted pursuant to [Art. VIII, para. 1] and to Article IV
[general whaling research]”.

Resolutions adopted by the IWC under Article VI, whether by consen -
sus or by vote, may also inform the duty of co-operation. The resolutions

express the views of the IWC and, when adopted by consensus or a large
majority vote, they represent an articulation of the shared interests at
stake in the regulation of whaling. States parties to the ICRW are thus é
required to consider these resolutions in good faith.

14. The duty of co-operation in relation to lethal whaling for purposes
of scientific research was given further definition by paragraph 30, inserted
in the Schedule in 1979. The object of paragraph 30 was to deter abuse of
Article VIII by States parties authorizing commercial whaling in the guise
of scientific research (P. W. Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling :

From Conservation of Whaling to Conservation of Whales and Regulation of▯
Whale Watching, 1985, Vol. 1, p. 190). While the Scientific Committee’s
views on special permit proposals are not legally binding on States partéies
under the terms of paragraph 30, the IWC has empowered the Committee
to review and comment on such proposals, thereby creating an obligation

on the proposing State to co-operate with the Committee. If the proposing
State had no such obligation, it would deprive paragraph 30 of any effect.

15. In this context, the duty of co-operation at the heart of para -

graph 30 requires a permit-authorizing State to provide the IWC with the
permits “before they are issued and in sufficient time to allow the éScien -
tific Committee to review and comment on them” ; to provide specified
information about the proposed scientific permits ; to engage and pro -
mote the participation of the international scientific community in the

research; and to give consideration in good faith to the views of the IWC
and the Scientific Committee. This means that, although a State is not
bound to accept the Committee’s assessment of proposed permits, it muést
show genuine willingness to reconsider its position in light of those viéews.
The duty entails keeping the Scientific Committee apprised of the resultés

of scientific research on an annual basis. The duty also implies that
permit-authorizing States should provide the Scientific Committee with
timely and accurate information about modifications in the implementa -
tion of scientific research programmes already reviewed by the Commit -
tee and the implications for the authorization of special permits. Stateés

may not take a narrow or formalistic approach to the duty of co-
operation. It is a substantive duty to consider the views of the IWC andé

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the Scientific Committee and to co-operate with the international scien -
tific community in any research on whales.

16. The Judgment of the Court states that “consideration by a State partyé
of revising the original design of the programme for review would demon -
strate co-operation by a State party with the Scientific Committee” (pa 24a0.),
but it nevertheless finds that Japan has met the requirements of paragraéph 30
with respect to permits issued under JARPA II. In this connection, the Céourt

observes that the submission of the JARPA II Research Plan as the basis éfor
annual permits accords with the practice of the Scientific Committee.
17. In my respectful view, however, the evidence indicates that Japan
has not complied with the duty of co-operation with the Scientific Com -
mittee and thus that it has breached paragraph 30. First, JARPA II was
launched before a review of JARPA by the Scientific Committee had

taken place, and there is no sign that the findings of that review were é
taken into account as JARPA II continued. Second, while the JARPA II
Research Plan provided the information specified in paragraph 30 (for
example, objectives, sample sizes, methods and possible effects of theé pro -
gramme), as the Court has observed, there was no evidence of Japan’s

meaningful consideration of the feasibility of non-lethal methods in the
design of JARPA II (paras. 137 to 141). Third, paragraph 30 provides
that “opportunities for participation in the research by scientists of other
nations” should be specified in proposed permits. This matter is reiné -
forced in the Annex P Guidelines. The JARPA II Research Plan referred

to the use of data from the Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic é
Marine Living Resources relating to krill predators (p. 10) and Japan’s
intention “to actively co-operate with international organizations anéd
projects on oceanographic surveys” (p. 15). The Research Plan also noted
that “[p]articipation of foreign scientists will be welcomed” if téhey meet
Japan’s qualification standards (p. 20). However, there is no evidence of

international scientific collaboration in JARPA II’s implementation. In
response to a question on this issue from a Member of the Court, Japan
pointed to JARPA II scientists’ collaboration with other Japanese institu -
tions, but did not identify any broader research participation. Finally,é as
is noted in the Court’s Judgment, the conduct of JARPA II has differed

in substantial ways from the scheme set out in the Research Plan and yeté
Japan has not modified the terms of its permits accordingly (para. 240).
Japan’s continued reliance on JARPA II’s original Research Plan asé a
basis for subsequent annual permits is inconsistent with the duty of
co-operation. For these reasons, I am unable to join my colleagues in vot -

ing for paragraph 6 of the dispositif.

(Signed) Hilary Charlesworth.

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Bilingual Content

453

SEPARATE OPINION
OF JUDGE AD HOC CHARLESWORTH

Special permit whaling under Article VIII of the ICRW — The use of lethal
methods “for purposes of scientific research” under the ICRW must ▯be indispensable
to the research — The precautionary approach is relevant to the interpretation of
the ICRW — States parties to the ICRW have a duty to co-operate with the IWC
and its committees — Japan has breached paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the
ICRW.

1. As my vote indicates, I largely agree with the conclusions the Court

has reached and its reasoning. There are, however, two areas in which my
views differ from those of the majority.

Lethal Methods

2. My first point of difference from the majority turns on the nature of é
the restrictions on lethal methods in scientific research on whales in Arti-
cle VIII of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling

(1946) (ICRW): can lethal methods be used when a State party considers
it necessary or only when no other methods for the relevant scientific
research are available ? Both Parties to this dispute accept that lethal
methods may be essential for research on some scientific questions about

whales.

3. At the time the ICRW was adopted, scientific research on whales
was largely dependent on lethal methods. As the Court notes, however,

the ICRW is an evolving instrument (Judgment, para. 45). The most
obvious mechanism of evolution is contained in the ICRW itself. Arti -
cle V gives the International Whaling Commission (IWC) the power to
amend the ICRW though the adoption of amendments to the ICRW’s
Schedule by a three-fourths majority of those IWC members voting

(Art. III, para. 2). The Schedule has the same legal status as the Conven -
tion by virtue of Article I, paragraph 1.

4. A second, less direct, mode of evolution is through recommenda -

tions of the IWC (Art. VI) which are adopted by a simple majority of
members voting (Art. III, para. 2). Although such recommendations do
not bind IWC members, they are relevant to the interpretation of the
ICRW if they come within the terms of Article 31, paragraph 3 (a) or (b)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Article 31, para -

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OPINION INDIVIDUELLE
DE M me LA JUGE AD HOC CHARLESWORTH

[Traduction]

Chasse à la baleine au titre d’un permis spécial prévue à▯ l’article VIII de la
convention — Nécessité que le recours à des méthodes létales «▯en vue de recherches
scientifiques» autorisé par la convention soit indispensable à ces recher—hes
Pertinence de l’approche de précaution aux fins de l’interprétation de la
convention — Obligation faite aux Etats parties à la convention de coopére▯r avec
la CBI et ses comités — Violation par le Japon du paragraphe 30 du règlement.

1. Comme le montre mon vote, je souscris pour l’essentiel aux conclu -

sions auxquelles la Cour est parvenue et à son raisonnement. Je nourréis
néanmoins des divergences sur deux points.

Méthodes létales

2. Le premier concerne la nature des restrictions à l’utilisation de é
méthodes létales dans le cadre de recherches scientifiques sur lesé baleines
que prévoit l’article VIII de la convention internationale pour la régle -

mentation de la chasse à la baleine de 1946 (dénommée ci-après la
«convention»): peut-il être recouru à de telles méthodes dès lors qu’un
Etat partie l’estime nécessaire, ou uniquement lorsqu’il n’eéxiste aucun
autre moyen de réaliser la recherche scientifique voulue ? Les deux Parties

au différend conviennent en tout état de cause que l’usage deé méthodes
létales peut se révéler indispensable à l’étude de cerétaines questions scien
tifiques concernant les baleines.
3. A l’époque de l’adoption de la convention, la recherche scientiéfique sur
les baleines était essentiellement tributaire du recours aux méthoédes létales.

Toutefois, ainsi que la Cour l’a relevé, la convention est un instérument en
constante évolution (arrêt, par. 45), évolution dont le ressort le plus évident
est à rechercher dans ses propres dispositions, puisque son article V confère
à la commission baleinière internationale (dénommée ci-après la «CBI» ou
la «commission») le pouvoir d’adopter des modifications au règlement qui

lui est annexé à la majorité des trois quarts des votants (arté. III, par. 2) et
que, en vertu du paragraphe 1 de son article premier, ledit règlement revêt le
même statut juridique que la convention elle-même.
4. Un second mécanisme, moins direct, permet cette évolution : les

recommandations de la CBI (art. VI), qui sont adoptées à la majorité
simple des membres votants (art. III, par. 2). Bien qu’elles ne soient pas
opposables aux membres de la commission, ces recommandations sont
pertinentes aux fins de l’interprétation de la convention dès léors qu’elles
entrent dans les prévisions des alinéas a) ou b) du paragraphe 3 de l’ar -

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graph 3 (a) requires that “any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its proévi -

sions” be taken into account in its interpretation, together with theé trea -
ty’s context. Article 31, paragraph 3 (b) takes the same approach to “any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes téhe
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. Since the moréato -
rium on commercial whaling came into effect in the 1985-1986 pelagic

and 1986 coastal seasons, most IWC resolutions on special permit whal -
ing have attracted a number of negative votes, which precludes them as
evidence of the parties’ agreement on the ICRW’s interpretation. Héow -
ever, there remain some significant resolutions that were adopted by coné-
sensus and thus must inform the interpretative task. I note that resolutéions
adopted by a vote of the IWC have some consequence although they do

not come within the terms of Article 31, paragraph 3, of the Vienna Con -
vention. Particularly when they are adopted by a large majority of IWC
members, the resolutions are relevant to the duty of co-operation, dis -
cussed below.

5. The issue of the status of IWC resolutions is of special significance
in this case with respect to the use of lethal methods “for purposes éof
scientific research” under Article VIII. While Article VIII envisages the

killing of whales for scientific ends, it must be read in light of develéop -
ments in the treaty parties’ views on lethal research methods. Althouégh
the Court acknowledges at a general level that resolutions adopted by
consensus or by a unanimous vote “may be relevant for the interpretatéion
of the Convention or its Schedule” (Judgment, para. 46), with respect to
lethal research methods it states that any such resolutions “do not eéstab -

lish a requirement that lethal methods be used only when other methods
are not available” (ibid., para. 83). In my view, however, the applicable
resolutions establish a principle that lethal methods should be of last é
resort in scientific research programmes under Article VIII. IWC resolu -
tion 1986-2 on “Special Permits for Scientific Research” was adopted by

consensus and records the views of parties to the ICRW that both permit-
issuing Governments and the IWC’s Scientific Committee in review -
ing permits should take into account whether the relevant scientific
research objectives “are not practically and scientifically feasible through
non-lethal research techniques”. Annex P, the most recent version of the

Guidelines for the Review of Scientific Permit Proposals, adopted by coné -
sensus by the Scientific Committee and endorsed by the IWC in 2008,
requires an assessment of “why non-lethal research methods . . . have
been considered to be insufficient”. These resolutions and Guidelineés give
primacy to non-lethal methods in scientific research relating to whaling
and insist that permit-issuing States explain why non-lethal methods are

inadequate. In turn, the Scientific Committee must assess such explana -
tions against current scientific knowledge and practice. These instrumenéts

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ticle 31 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités de 1969. En effet,
lorsqu’il s’agit d’interpréter un traité, il doit êtreé tenu compte, aux termes

du premier de ces alinéas, non seulement du contexte, mais aussi de «étout
accord ultérieur intervenu entre les parties au sujet de l’interprétation du
traité ou de l’application de ses dispositions» et, aux termes du second, de
«toute pratique ultérieurement suivie dans l’application du traité par
laquelle est établi l’accord des parties à l’égard de l’éinterprétation du

traité». Or, si depuis l’entrée en vigueur du moratoire sur la chasseé com -
merciale pendant la saison pélagique 1985-1986 et la saison côtière 1986, la
plupart des résolutions de la CBI sur la chasse au titre de permis spééciaux
sont loin d’avoir fait l’unanimité, ce qui interdit de les considérer comme
manifestations d’un accord intervenu entre les parties au sujet de l’éinter -
prétation de la convention, certaines de celles qui revêtent une iémportance

ont été adoptées par consensus et doivent par conséquent êétre prises en
compte dans notre interprétation. Je relèverai du reste que les réésolutions
adoptées au terme d’un vote de la CBI ne sont pas sans incidence, même si
elles n’entrent pas dans les prévisions du paragraphe 3 de l’article 31 de la
convention de Vienne. En particulier lorsqu’elles sont adoptées àé une large

majorité des membres votants, ces résolutions sont bien pertinentes s’agis -
sant du devoir de coopération, sur lequel je reviendrai plus loin.
5. Cette question du statut des résolutions de la CBI revêt une imporé -
tance particulière en ce qui concerne le recours à des méthodesé létales «en
vue de recherches scientifiques» au titre de l’article VIII. Car, si l’article VIII

envisage la mise à mort de baleines à des fins scientifiques, il déoit être lu à la
lumière de l’évolution des vues des parties contractantes quant à l’utilisation
de telles méthodes. La Cour reconnaît de manière généraleé que les résolu -
tions adoptées par consensus ou à l’unanimité « peuvent être pertinentes aux
fins de l’interprétation de la convention ou du règlement qui léui est annex »é
(arrêt, par. 46), mais affirme, à propos de l’utilisation de ces méthodes,é que

ces mêmes résolutions ne font pas «obligation de ne recourir à des méthodes
létales qu’en l’absence de toute autre solution » (ibid., par. 83). Or, selon
moi, les résolutions applicables établissent que, en principe, ce én’est qu’en
dernier ressort qu’il doit être recouru à de telles méthodesé dans le cadre de
programmes de recherche scientifique menés en vertu de l’articlV e III. Ainsi,

la résolution 1986-2 de la CBI sur les «permis spéciaux en vue de recherches
scientifiques», adoptée par consensus, traduit une communauté de vues
entre les parties à la convention sur le fait que tant les gouvernemeénts qui
délivrent les permis que le comité scientifique de la commission déoivent,
lorsqu’ils examinent ces permis, rechercher si les objectifs de la reécherche

scientifique «ne sont pas pratiquement et scientifiquement réalisables par
des méthodes de recherche non létales». L’annexe P, la plus récente version
en date des lignes directrices relatives à l’examen des propositioéns de permis,
adoptée par consensus par le comité scientifique et endossée paér la CBI en
2008, impose quant à elle que soient explicitées « [l]es raisons pour lesquelles
les méthodes non létales … ont été jugées insuffisantes». Ces résolutions et

lignes directrices privilégient ainsi les méthodes non létales és’agissant de
recherches scientifiques relatives à la chasse à la baleine, et leés Etats délivrant

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thus support an interpretation of Article VIII that lethal methods should
be essential to the objectives of the scientific research programme.

6. The precautionary approach to environmental regulation also rein -
forces this analysis of the conditions in which lethal research methods é
may be undertaken. The approach was formulated in Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 as “[w]here
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientéific

certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective mea -
sures to prevent environmental degradation”. The precautionary approaéch
entails the avoidance of activities that may threaten the environment evéen
in the face of scientific uncertainty about the direct or indirect effects of
such activities. It gives priority to the prevention of harm to the

environment in its broadest sense, including biological diversity, resouérce
conservation and management and human health. The essence of the
precautionary approach has informed the development of international
environmental law and is recognized implicitly or explicitly in instru -
ments dealing with a wide range of subject-matter, from the regulation of

the oceans and international watercourses to the conservation and man -
agement of fish stocks, the conservation of endangered species and bio -
safety.
7. This Court has referred to the precautionary approach in Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (although not using this term)

and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay). In both
these cases, the Court contemplated the interpretation of treaty obliga -
tions in light of new approaches to environmental protection. In the
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary/Slovakia) case, dealing with a bilateral
treaty signed in 1977, the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of

the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Barrage System, the Court stated :

“The Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental protec -
tion, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often
irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the limit-
ations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of
damage.

Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other rea -
sons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often
done without consideration of the effects upon the environment.
Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the
risks for mankind — for present and future generations — of pursuit

of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new
norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number

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des permis sont instamment appelés à expliquer pourquoi de telles éméthodes
leur apparaissent inadaptées — à charge ensuite pour le comité scientifique

d’apprécier la validité de ces explications à la lumière de la pratique et des
connaissances scientifiques du moment. Ces instruments tendent donc àé
confirmer l’interprétation de l’article VIII selon laquelle les méthodes létales
ne devraient être employées que si elles sont essentielles à laé réalisation des
objectifs du programme de recherche scientifique.

6. L’approche de précaution adoptée en matière de réglementaétion des
questions environnementales va dans le même sens. Elle a été exéprimée en
ces termes dans le principe 15 de la déclaration de Rio sur l’environnement
et le développement de 1992 : « En cas de risque de dommages graves ou
irréversibles, l’absence de certitude scientifique absolue ne doité pas servir

de prétexte pour remettre à plus tard l’adoption de mesures efféectives
visant à prévenir la dégradation de l’environnement.» Cette approche sup-
pose d’éviter toute activité préjudiciable à l’environénement, fût-ce en l’ab-
sence de certitudes scientifiques quant aux effets directs ou indirectés de
telles activités. Priorité est donnée à la protection contreé tout dommage à

l’environnement au sens le plus large, recouvrant diversité biologéique,
conservation et gestion des ressources et santé humaine. Les principeés
sous-tendant cette approche ont façonné l’évolution du droité international
de l’environnement, et ont été implicitement ou expressément reconnus
dans des instruments traitant de questions très diverses, allant de léa régle-

mentation de l’utilisation des océans et des cours d’eau internéationaux à la
conservation et la gestion des ressources halieutiques, en passant par léa
conservation des espèces menacées d’extinction et la biosécuérité.
7. La Cour s’est référée à l’approche de précaution (quoique sans la
désigner ainsi) dans l’affaire relative au Projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros

(Hongrie/Slovaquie) et dans celle des Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve
Uruguay (Argentine c. Uruguay). Dans l’une comme dans l’autre, elle a
abordé l’interprétation d’obligations conventionnelles à éla lumière de
nouvelles manières de concevoir la protection de l’environnement. éDans
son arrêt en l’affaire Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, à propos d’un traité bilatéral

signé en 1977, le traité relatif à la construction et au fonctiéonnement du
système d’écluses éponyme, elle a dit :

«La Cour ne perd pas de vue que, dans le domaine de la protec -
tion de l’environnement, la vigilance et la prévention s’imposent en
raison du caractère souvent irréversible des dommages causés àé l’en -
vironnement et des limites inhérentes au mécanisme même de répara-
tion de ce type de dommages.

Au cours des âges, l’homme n’a cessé d’intervenir dans laé nature
pour des raisons économiques et autres. Dans le passé, il l’a séouvent
fait sans tenir compte des effets sur l’environnement. Grâce auxé nou-
velles perspectives qu’offre la science et à une conscience croissante des
risques que la poursuite de ces interventions à un rythme inconsidééré et

soutenu représenterait pour l’humanité — qu’il s’agisse des générations
actuelles ou futures —, de nouvelles normes et exigences ont été mises

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of instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to
be taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper

weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when
continuing with activities begun in the past.” (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 78,
para. 140.)

8. In the Pulp Mills case, the Court considered that “a precautionary
approach may be relevant in the interpretation and application of the

provisions of [the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay]” (Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay (Argentina v.Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I),
p. 71, para. 164). It went on to state that :

“the obligation to protect and preserve, [under the Statute] [. . .], has
to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in recent years
has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now be
considered a requirement under general international law to under -

take an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that
the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact
in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource” (ibid.,
p. 83, para. 204).

9. These observations suggest that treaties dealing with the environ -
ment should be interpreted wherever possible in light of the precautionaéry
approach, regardless of the date of their adoption. This is also consistéent

with the Court’s statement in Legal Consequences for States of the Contin-
ued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwith -
standing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) : “an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of theé
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation” (Advisory

Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 31, para. 53).

10. Both Parties to this dispute endorsed the precautionary approach
at a theoretical level, although they disagreed about its application toé the
facts. In my view, the precautionary approach requires that non-lethal

methods of research be used wherever possible. In relation to Article VIII,
which contemplates the killing of the subject of research by the researcéh
activity, an implication of the precautionary approach is that lethal meéth -
ods must be shown to be indispensable to the purposes of scientific
research on whales.

Duty of Co-operation

11. The second point on which I differ from the majority is whether

Japan has acted consistently with paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the
ICRW. Paragraph 30 sets out the process by which States parties submit

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au point, qui ont été énoncées dans un grand nombre d’instruments au
cours des deux dernières décennies. Ces normes nouvelles doivent êétre

prises en considération et ces exigences nouvelles convenablement
appréciées non seulement lorsque des Etats envisagent de nouvellesé
activités, mais aussi lorsqu’ils poursuivent des activités qu’éils ont
engagées dans le passé. » (Projet Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/
Slovaquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1997, p. 78, par. 140.)

8. Dans l’affaire des Usines de pâte à papier, la Cour a estimé qu’« une
approche de précaution p[ouvait] se révéler pertinente pour intéerpréter et

appliquer les dispositions du statut [du fleuve Uruguay de 1975] » (Usines
de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c. Uruguay), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2010 (I), p. 71, par. 164). Et d’ajouter :

«l’obligation de protéger et de préserver, énoncée à l’éalinéa a) de
l’article 41 du statut, doit être interprétée conformément à une préa -
tique acceptée si largement par les Etats ces dernières années que l’on
peut désormais considérer qu’il existe, en droit international égénéral,

une obligation de procéder à une évaluation de l’impact sur él’envi -
ronnement lorsque l’activité industrielle projetée risque d’éavoir un
impact préjudiciable important dans un cadre transfrontière, et ené
particulier sur une ressource partagée » (ibid., p. 83, par. 204).

9. Il s’ensuit que les traités intéressant l’environnement doivéent, autant
que possible, être interprétés à la lumière de l’approéche de précaution,
indépendamment de la date à laquelle ils ont été adoptés. C’est également

ce que tend à confirmer le dictum de la Cour en l’affaire des Conséquences
juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l’Afrique du ▯Sud en
Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du
Conseil de sécurité, qui indique que « tout instrument international doit
être interprété et appliqué dans le cadre de l’ensemble déu système juri -

dique en vigueur au moment où l’interprétation a lieu » (avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 31, par. 53).
10. Les deux Parties au présent différend ont fait leur l’approchée de pré -
caution à un niveau théorique, tout en restant en désaccord quaént à son
application aux faits de l’espèce. Selon moi, cette approche imposée de

recourir dans la mesure du possible à des méthodes de recherche noén létales.
Aussi, s’agissant de l’article VIII, qui ménage la possibilité de mettre à mort
le sujet d’étude dans le cadre de l’activité de recherche, yé a-t-il lieu de
démontrer que l’utilisation de méthodes létales est indispenésable à la réali -
sation des objectifs des recherches scientifiques menées sur les baleéines.

Devoir de coopération

11. Mes vues diffèrent également de celles de la majorité sur le époint de

savoir si le Japon a agi conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 30 du
règlement annexé à la convention. Ce paragraphe, qui définité la procédure

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proposed scientific permits to the IWC’s Scientific Committee for revéiew
and comment. In my view, paragraph 30 must be read in light of a duty

of co-operation of States parties to the ICRW with the IWC and its com -
mittees. While the Judgment of the Court recognizes such a duty of
co-operation (paras. 83 and 240), it does not specifically address Japan’s
compliance with the duty. As the duty of co-operation is a critical element
of the fabric of the ICRW, it merits some elaboration.

12. The ICRW was designed as a new form of international regulation
of whaling after the failure of two earlier attempts. The Convention foré
the Regulation of Whaling (1931), prepared under the auspices of the
League of Nations, and the International Agreement for the Regulation
of Whaling (1937) (amended by several protocols) had relied on the par -

ties’ national regulatory systems for enforcement. Although they laidé the
foundations for international co-operation to bring scientific knowledge
to bear on the whaling industry, neither instrument was able to respond é
to rampant commercial whaling. The ICRW departed from these treaties’é
national enforcement schemes by creating an international institution, téhe

IWC, of which each treaty party was a member. The fact that member -
ship of the ICRW is open to all States reinforces its purpose of internaé -
tionalizing the regulation of whaling beyond those States directly involéved
in whaling. As noted above, the IWC has the power to regulate whaling
closely through amending the Schedule to the ICRW. The IWC can

deploy a variety of mechanisms to this end, including the designation ofé
protected species and sanctuaries, or setting annual catch quotas and siéze
limits (Art. V, para. 1).

13. Article VIII of the ICRW was based on Article 10 of the 1937
Agreement, which aimed to promote scientific research. An important
difference in the ICRW provision is the monitoring role of the IWC in é
relation to whaling for purposes of scientific research. This entails a duty
of co-operation by States parties with the IWC and its subsidiary bodies

reflecting the overarching object and purpose of the Convention, whiché is
to create “a system of international regulation” for the conservatéion and
management of whale stocks (Preamble, para. 6). The concept of a duty
of co-operation is the foundation of legal régimes dealing (inter alia) with
shared resources and with the environment. It derives from the principle

that the conservation and management of shared resources and the envi -
ronment must be based on shared interests, rather than the interests of é
one party. Article VIII incorporates a specific aspect of this duty in man -
dating immediate reporting to the IWC of the grant of any special per -
mits for lethal activities for purposes of scientific research (Art. VIII,
para. 1). Article VIII, paragraph 3, makes another element of this duty

explicit in providing that States parties

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en vertu de laquelle les Etats parties soumettent des propositions de peérmis
scientifiques au comité scientifique de la CBI pour examen et commentéaires,

doit, selon moi, être interprété à la lumière du devoir de coopération avec la
commission et ses comités qui incombe aux Etats parties à la conveéntion. Or,
si la Cour, dans l’arrêt, reconnaît l’existence d’un tel devoir (par. 83 et 240),
elle ne se pose pas spécifiquement la question de savoir si le Japon él’a res -
pecté. Cependant, le devoir de coopération constitue un éléméent essentiel du

régime de la convention, et méritait un développement à parté.
12. Intervenant après l’échec de deux tentatives d’instituer uneé régle -
mentation internationale de la chasse à la baleine, la convention devéait
constituer un mécanisme d’un genre nouveau. La convention pour la
réglementation de la chasse à la baleine de 1931, établie sous éles auspices
de la Société des Nations, et l’accord international pour la réglementation

de la chasse à la baleine de 1937 (tel que modifié par plusieurs éprotocoles)
dépendaient des systèmes de réglementation nationale des partieés. S’ils
ont jeté les fondements d’une coopération internationale où les connais -
sances scientifiques devraient influer sur les activités de l’inédustrie balei -
nière, ils n’ont ni l’un ni l’autre été en mesure de féreiner la chasse commerciale

effrénée qui se pratiquait alors. La convention de 1946 se distiénguait de ces
instruments, tributaires, de mécanismes nationaux, en ce qu’elle établissait
une institution internationale, la CBI, dont chacun des Etats parties aué
traité était membre. Le fait que la convention soit ouverte à téous les Etats
met aussi en évidence cet objectif consistant à internationaliser éla régle -

mentation de la chasse à la baleine, au-delà des seuls Etats se livrant direc-
tement à des activités de chasse. Ainsi que je l’ai déjà énoté, la commission
a le pouvoir d’encadrer strictement cette chasse en modifiant le rèéglement
annexé à la convention. Elle dispose de divers moyens, dont la déésignation
d’espèces protégées et la création de zones de refuge, oué encore la fixation
de quotas annuels et de tailles minimales (art. V, par. 1).

13. L’article VIII de la convention est inspiré de l’article 10 de l’accord
de 1937, qui visait à promouvoir la recherche scientifique, à celaé près —
mais la différence est de taille — qu’il accorde à la CBI un rôle de surveil -
lance lorsque des activités de chasse sont menées aux fins d’unée telle
recherche. Ce rôle implique le devoir, pour les Etats parties, de cooépérer

avec la CBI et ses organes subsidiaires, conformément à l’objet et au but
fondamentaux de la convention, qui consistent à créer un « système de
réglementation internationale» visant à la conservation et à la gestion des
stocks de baleines (préambule, alinéa 6). La notion de devoir de coopéra -
tion est la pierre angulaire de tout régime juridique touchant notamméent

aux ressources communes et à l’environnement. Elle découle du périncipe
voulant que la conservation et la gestion de l’environnement et de reés -
sources communes répondent à des intérêts communs, et non paés aux
intérêts d’une seule partie. L’article VIII en intègre une manifestation spé -
cifique, lorsqu’il impose l’obligation de rendre immédiatement compte à
la CBI de l’octroi de tous permis spéciaux autorisant des activitéés létales

en vue de recherches scientifiques (art. VIII, par. 1). Son paragraphe 3 en
décrit explicitement un autre aspect, lorsqu’il dispose que les Etéatsparties,

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“shall transmit to such body as may be designated by the Commission
[the Scientific Committee], in so far as practicable, and at intervals of

not more than one year, scientific information available to that Gov -
ernment with respect to whales and whaling, including the results of
research conducted pursuant to [Art. VIII, para. 1] and to Article IV
[general whaling research]”.

Resolutions adopted by the IWC under Article VI, whether by consen -
sus or by vote, may also inform the duty of co-operation. The resolutions

express the views of the IWC and, when adopted by consensus or a large
majority vote, they represent an articulation of the shared interests at
stake in the regulation of whaling. States parties to the ICRW are thus é
required to consider these resolutions in good faith.

14. The duty of co-operation in relation to lethal whaling for purposes
of scientific research was given further definition by paragraph 30, inserted
in the Schedule in 1979. The object of paragraph 30 was to deter abuse of
Article VIII by States parties authorizing commercial whaling in the guise
of scientific research (P. W. Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling :

From Conservation of Whaling to Conservation of Whales and Regulation of▯
Whale Watching, 1985, Vol. 1, p. 190). While the Scientific Committee’s
views on special permit proposals are not legally binding on States partéies
under the terms of paragraph 30, the IWC has empowered the Committee
to review and comment on such proposals, thereby creating an obligation

on the proposing State to co-operate with the Committee. If the proposing
State had no such obligation, it would deprive paragraph 30 of any effect.

15. In this context, the duty of co-operation at the heart of para -

graph 30 requires a permit-authorizing State to provide the IWC with the
permits “before they are issued and in sufficient time to allow the éScien -
tific Committee to review and comment on them” ; to provide specified
information about the proposed scientific permits ; to engage and pro -
mote the participation of the international scientific community in the

research; and to give consideration in good faith to the views of the IWC
and the Scientific Committee. This means that, although a State is not
bound to accept the Committee’s assessment of proposed permits, it muést
show genuine willingness to reconsider its position in light of those viéews.
The duty entails keeping the Scientific Committee apprised of the resultés

of scientific research on an annual basis. The duty also implies that
permit-authorizing States should provide the Scientific Committee with
timely and accurate information about modifications in the implementa -
tion of scientific research programmes already reviewed by the Commit -
tee and the implications for the authorization of special permits. Stateés

may not take a narrow or formalistic approach to the duty of co-
operation. It is a substantive duty to consider the views of the IWC andé

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«[d]ans toute la mesure du possible,… devr[ont] transmettre à l’orga-
nisme que la commission pourra désigner à cet effet [le comitéé scien-

tifique], à des intervalles d’un an au maximum, les renseignementsé de
caractère scientifique dont il[s] disposer[ont] sur les baleines et léa
chasse à la baleine, y compris les résultats des recherches effectuées
en application du paragraphe 1 d[e l’]article VIII et de l’article IV
[recherches générales sur la chasse à la baleine] ».

Les résolutions adoptées par la CBI au titre de l’article VI, qu’elles le
soient par consensus ou par vote, permettent également de mieux cerneér

la teneur de ce devoir de coopération. Ces résolutions expriment lée point
de vue de la commission et, lorsqu’elles sont adoptées par consenséus ou à
une large majorité, incarnent l’expression des intérêts comméuns en jeu en
matière de réglementation de la chasse à la baleine. Aussi les éEtats parties
à la convention ont-ils l’obligation d’en tenir compte de bonne foi.

14. Le devoir de coopération s’imposant aux Etats en matière de chaésse
à la baleine à des fins de recherche scientifique a encore étéé précisé au par-
graphe 30, qui a été intégré au règlement en 1979 dans le desseién d’empê-
cher que les Etats parties n’abusent de l’article VIII en autorisant la chasse
commerciale sous le couvert de recherches scientifiques (P. W. Birnie,

International Regulation of Whaling : From Conservation of Whaling to
Conservation of Whales and Regulation of Whale Watching, 1985, vol. 1,
p. 190). Si, selon les dispositions de ce paragraphe, les avis du comitéé
scientifique sur les propositions de permis spéciaux ne sont pas juridique -
ment contraignants pour les Etats parties, la CBI n’en a pas moins coénféré

au comité le pouvoir d’examiner et de commenter lesdites propositiéons,
créant ainsi pour l’Etat qui en est l’auteur l’obligation deé coopérer avec cet
organisme. En l’absence d’une telle obligation, le paragraphe 30 serait
dépourvu de tout objet.
15. Or, en vertu de ce devoir de coopération qui se trouve au cœur du é

paragraphe 30, l’Etat qui délivre les permis est tenu de fournir ceux-ci à la
CBI « avant leur délivrance et dans un délai suffisant pour permettre aéu
comité scientifique de les examiner et de formuler un avis » à leur égard ;
de fournir des informations précises sur les propositions de permis sécien-
tifiques; d’encourager et de promouvoir la participation de la commu -

nauté scientifique internationale à la recherche ; et de tenir compte, de
bonne foi, des avis de la CBI et du comité scientifique. En d’autrées termes,
s’il n’est pas obligé d’accepter l’avis du comité, un éEtat doit néanmoins
faire preuve d’une véritable volonté de revoir ses propositionsé à la lumière
de celui-ci. Le devoir de coopération lui impose de maintenir le comité

scientifique informé des résultats de la recherche scientifique suér une base
annuelle. Il suppose aussi qu’il lui fournisse en temps voulu des inféorma-
tions exactes sur d’éventuelles modifications apportées aux modéalités
d’exécution de programmes de recherche scientifique déjà exaéminés par le
comité et sur leurs implications pour l’octroi de permis spéciaéux. Les

Etats n’ont pas à appréhender sous un angle restrictif ou formaliste ce
devoir de nature substantielle qui impose l’obligation de tenir comptée de

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the Scientific Committee and to co-operate with the international scien -
tific community in any research on whales.

16. The Judgment of the Court states that “consideration by a State partyé
of revising the original design of the programme for review would demon -
strate co-operation by a State party with the Scientific Committee” (pa 24a0.),
but it nevertheless finds that Japan has met the requirements of paragraéph 30
with respect to permits issued under JARPA II. In this connection, the Céourt

observes that the submission of the JARPA II Research Plan as the basis éfor
annual permits accords with the practice of the Scientific Committee.
17. In my respectful view, however, the evidence indicates that Japan
has not complied with the duty of co-operation with the Scientific Com -
mittee and thus that it has breached paragraph 30. First, JARPA II was
launched before a review of JARPA by the Scientific Committee had

taken place, and there is no sign that the findings of that review were é
taken into account as JARPA II continued. Second, while the JARPA II
Research Plan provided the information specified in paragraph 30 (for
example, objectives, sample sizes, methods and possible effects of theé pro -
gramme), as the Court has observed, there was no evidence of Japan’s

meaningful consideration of the feasibility of non-lethal methods in the
design of JARPA II (paras. 137 to 141). Third, paragraph 30 provides
that “opportunities for participation in the research by scientists of other
nations” should be specified in proposed permits. This matter is reiné -
forced in the Annex P Guidelines. The JARPA II Research Plan referred

to the use of data from the Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic é
Marine Living Resources relating to krill predators (p. 10) and Japan’s
intention “to actively co-operate with international organizations anéd
projects on oceanographic surveys” (p. 15). The Research Plan also noted
that “[p]articipation of foreign scientists will be welcomed” if téhey meet
Japan’s qualification standards (p. 20). However, there is no evidence of

international scientific collaboration in JARPA II’s implementation. In
response to a question on this issue from a Member of the Court, Japan
pointed to JARPA II scientists’ collaboration with other Japanese institu -
tions, but did not identify any broader research participation. Finally,é as
is noted in the Court’s Judgment, the conduct of JARPA II has differed

in substantial ways from the scheme set out in the Research Plan and yeté
Japan has not modified the terms of its permits accordingly (para. 240).
Japan’s continued reliance on JARPA II’s original Research Plan asé a
basis for subsequent annual permits is inconsistent with the duty of
co-operation. For these reasons, I am unable to join my colleagues in vot -

ing for paragraph 6 of the dispositif.

(Signed) Hilary Charlesworth.

237

8 CIJ1062.indb 602 18/05/15 09:29 chasse à la baleine déansl’antarctique (op. indé. charlesworth) 459

l’avis de la CBI et du comité scientifique, et de coopérer avecé la commu -
nauté scientifique pour toute recherche concernant les baleines.

16. Dans l’arrêt, et bien qu’elle déclare qu’« un Etat partie qui soumet -
trait à l’examen du comité scientifique un projet revisé monétrerait sa
volonté de coopérer avec celui-ci » (par. 240), la Cour conclut néanmoins
que le Japon a satisfait à cette exigence du paragraphe 30 pour ce qui est
des permis délivrés au titre de JARPA II : en communiquant le plan de

recherche de JARPA II, sur la base duquel sont délivrés les permis annuels,
il se serait conformé à la pratique vis-à-vis du comité scientifique.
17. Or, à mon humble avis, il ressort du dossier que le Japon ne s’esté
pas acquitté de son devoir de coopération à l’égard du coémité scientifique
et que, partant, il a violé le paragraphe 30. Pour commencer, JARPA II a
été lancé avant que le comité scientifique n’eût menéé à bien son examen de

JARPA, rien ne permettant du reste de conclure que les résultats de céet
examen aient été pris en compte par la suite. De surcroît, si lée plan de
recherche de JARPA II fournissait bien les informations visées au para -
graphe 30 (objectifs de la recherche, tailles des échantillons, méthodes uti-
lisées et effets potentiels du programme, par exemple), il n’a énullement été

prouvé, comme l’a d’ailleurs relevé la Cour, que la possibiléité de recourir à
des méthodes non létales ait été effectivement envisagéée au moment de la
conception de JARPA II (par. 137-141). Qui plus est, aux termes du para -
graphe 30, «les possibilités de participation aux recherches de scientifiques
provenant d’autres pays » doivent être précisées dans les propositions de

permis, ce que réaffirment les lignes directrices contenues à l’éannexe P. Or,
si le plan de recherche de JARPA II mentionne l’utilisation de données de
la commission pour la conservation de la faune et de la flore marines éde
l’Antarctique (p. 10) et l’intention exprimée par le Japon de « coopérer
activement avec des organisations internationales et de participer activée -
ment à des projets dans le cadre d’études océanographiques» (p. 15), ajou-

tant que « [l]a participation de scientifiques étrangers sera la bienvenue »
dès lors que ceux-ci remplissent les conditions d’admissibilité établies par
le Japon (p. 20), rien ne permet de conclure à l’existence d’une collabora -
tion scientifique internationale s’agissant de la mise en œuvre deé JARPA II.
En réponse à une question d’un membre de la Cour sur ce point, éle Japon

a évoqué la collaboration entre des chercheurs de JARPA II et d’autres
institutions japonaises, mais sans mentionner le moindre exemple de colléa -
boration plus large. Enfin, ainsi qu’il ressort de l’arrêt, la éfaçon dont
JARPA II a été mis en œuvre diffère par plusieurs aspects importéants de ce
qui était initialement prévu dans le cadre du plan de recherche, séans pour

autant que le Japon ait modifié en conséquence les modalités d’éoctroi de
ses permis (par.240). En continuant de délivrer chaque année de nouveaux
permis sur la base du plan de recherche initial de JARPA II, le Japon a
ainsi manqué à son devoir de coopération. Pour ces raisons, je ne puis
m’associer à la majorité pour voter en faveur du point 6 du dispositif.

(Signé) Hilary Charlesworth.

237

8 CIJ1062.indb 603 18/05/15 09:29

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Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Charlesworth

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