Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Yusuf

Document Number
136-20080604-JUD-01-09-EN
Parent Document Number
136-20080604-JUD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

293

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC YUSUF

[Translation]

I. Jurisdiction of the Court — II. Violation by France of the 1986 Conven-
tion on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (CMACM) — A. Violation by
France of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters — B. Violation by France of Articles 2 and 3, paragraph 1,
and Article 17 of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters —
III. Attacks on the immunity from jurisdiction and inviolability of the Head of

State of Djibouti — A. The witness summons of 17 May 2005 — B. The witness
summons of 14 February 2007.

1. Even though I have voted in favour of paragraph 1 (a), (b) and
(c) and paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part, I disagree with the Court
on key points in the decision, in particular the issue of the Court’s juris-

diction ratione temporis, the extent of the violations by France of the
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 27 Septem-
ber 1986, and the attacks on the immunity, inviolability, honour and dig-
nity of the Djiboutian Head of State.

I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

2. I accept paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the operative part, in which
the Court states that it has jurisdiction to entertain not only the dispute
relating to execution of the letter rogatory addressed by the Republic of

Djibouti to France on 3 November 2004 but also that relating to the
witness summonses addressed to the President of the Republic of Dji-
bouti on 17 May 2005 and to two senior Djiboutian officials on 3 and
4 November 2004 and 17 June 2005. I also accept paragraph 1 (c) of the
operative part, in which the Court states that it has jurisdiction to adju-

dicate upon the dispute concerning the witness summons addressed to the
President of the Republic of Djibouti on 14 February 2007. On the other
hand, I disagree with the Court over the reasoning that led it to that con-
clusion. Also, I do not accept paragraph 1 (d) of the operative part,
because in my view the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dis-
pute concerning the arrest warrants issued on 27 September 2006 against

two senior Djiboutian officials.

3. The reasoning of the Court displays inconsistencies both in logic
and in law. The Court asserts that its jurisdiction to entertain acts sub-
sequent to the filing of the Application is governed by what France

expressly accepted in its letter of 25 July 2006. France’s consent was valid
“‘only for the purposes of the case’”, i.e., “regarding ‘the dispute forming

120 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP.OP .YUSUF ) 294

the subject of the Application strictly within the limits of the claims for-
mulated therein by the Republic of Djibouti’” (Judgment, para. 88). Tak-
ing the view that “in Djibouti’s Application there are no claims relating

to arrest warrants” (ibid., para. 88) issued against senior Djiboutian offi-
cials on 27 September 2006, the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain them. However, it comes to a contrary finding regarding the
summons addressed to the President of the Republic of Djibouti on
14 February 2007 — a fact also subsequent to the filing of the Applica-

tion — because it “was but a repetition of the preceding one, even though
it had been corrected as to form” (ibid., para. 91).

4. In the opinion of the Court,

“what is decisive is that the question of its jurisdiction over the
claims [relating to the arrest warrants issued against the senior Dji-

boutian officials] is not to be answered by recourse to jurisprudence
relating to ‘continuity’ and ‘connexity’, which are criteria relevant
for determining limits ratione temporis to its jurisdiction, but by that
which France has expressly accepted in its letter of 25 July 2006”

(ibid., para. 88).

However, the Court relies on the same criterion of “connexity” to estab-
lish its jurisdiction to consider the witness summons addressed to the Dji-
boutian President on 14 February 2007.
5. There is no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Court is based on the
consent of the Parties and “only exists in so far as this consent has been

given . . .” (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2 , p. 16). However, the Court seems to be saying
that when consent is given on the basis of forum prorogatum as laid down
in Article 38, paragraph 5, of its Rules, determining its jurisdiction must
meet criteria completely different from those that have to be used for

other ways of expressing consent to its jurisdiction. However, I take the
view that the fact that consent has been given pursuant to Article 38,
paragraph 5, of the Rules does not affect the relevance of the criteria
regarded by the Court in the past as decisive in determining its jurisdic-

tion ratione temporis in respect of acts or events subsequent to the filing
of the Application.

6. Thus the Court has consistently recognized that its jurisdiction over
acts subsequent to the filing of an Application was dependent on the one

hand on the existence of a close link between those acts and those already
within its jurisdiction, and on the other by the absence of any effect
which would transform the nature of the dispute (see, inter alia, Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992 , p. 266, para. 67; Temple of Preah Vihear

(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962 ,p.36;

121 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SE. OP.YUSUF ) 295

Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 203, para. 72).
7. These criteria are applicable in the present case. There is no doubt
that the arrest warrants issued against senior Djiboutian officials are acts
stemming directly from issues that are the subject of the Application,

more particularly those relating to the immunity of senior Djiboutian
officials. The above-mentioned arrest warrants were issued following the
two senior Djiboutian officials’ refusal to answer the summonses to
appear as témoins assistés addressed to them on 3 and 4 November 2004

and then on 17 June 2005. Thus the Court accepts that according to
French legislation (Article 109 of the French Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure) a person called as a witness “is obliged to appear before the
judge, on pain of being compelled to do so by the law enforcement

agencies . . . through the issuing of an arrest warrant against him” (Judg-
ment, para. 184). However, the Court refuses to draw the conclusions in
terms of a finding of “connexity” between the refusal to answer to the
witness summonses and the issue of the arrest warrants. It is nevertheless

clear that these arrest warrants were a way of executing the witness sum-
monses which, according to Djibouti in the Application, violated inter-
national obligations relating to immunities binding on France. So these
arrest warrants, though issued after the date of the filing of the Applica-

tion, are certainly within the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis.

8. Moreover, the Court has applied the “connexity” criterion in the

present case to the witness summons addressed to the Djiboutian Head of
State on 14 February 2007. It considered this summons “identical in sub-
stance” to the summons of 17 May 2005 because it was “in relation to the
same case”, “was issued by the same judge” and “was in relation to the

same legal question” (ibid., para. 91). So there was a close connection
between the summons of 14 February 2007 and the summons of 17 May
2005. Also, since the Court had recognized that it had jurisdiction to
entertain the first summons, the situation could not reasonably be other-

wise with the second. Therefore the Court should have dealt with both
acts subsequent to the date of the filing of the Application (the arrest
warrants issued against the two senior Djiboutian officials and the sum-
mons of 14 February 2007 addressed to the Djiboutian Head of State) in

the same way, stating that it had jurisdiction to entertain them.

II. VIOLATION BY FRANCE OF THE 1986 C ONVENTION ON M UTUAL

A SSISTANCE INC RIMINAL M ATTERS (CMACM)

9. I voted in favour of paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part, in which
the Court states that France was in breach of its international obligation

under Article 17 of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters. However, I consider that France has also violated other provi-

122 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 296

sions of the Convention, inter alia Articles 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 (c) and
3, paragraph 1. I will set out my reasons below.

A. Violation by France of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

10. It follows from the wording of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Con-
vention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters that the two parties

undertake
“to afford each other, in accordance with the provisions of this Con-

vention, the widest measure of mutual assistance in proceedings in
respect of offences the punishment of which, at the time of the
request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial
authorities of the requesting State”.

The undertaking “to afford each other . . . the widest measure of mutual
assistance” is a fundamental duty of the States parties to the Convention,

which must be assessed in the light of its object and purpose. And the
object and purpose of the Convention is to facilitate “mutual assistance”
in criminal matters. This duty must be discharged mutually and on the
basis of equality and co-operation between the two parties.

11. The expression “the widest measure” describes the extent of the
mutual assistance in criminal matters that each party undertakes to
afford the other. Its aim is the fullest and most open co-operation, both
as regards the conditions necessary for providing mutual assistance and

the practical implementation of certain forms of mutual assistance, such
as letters rogatory. As for the expression “to afford mutual assistance”, it
refers to the duty of reciprocity incumbent on the parties to the Conven-
tion. It means that each party discharging its duty to co-operate in good
faith is entitled to expect similar conduct from the other.

12. The Court accepts that “Article 1 of the Convention of 1986 refers
to mutuality in the performance of the obligations laid down therein”
(Judgment, para. 119). However, it considers that “Djibouti cannot rely

on the principle of reciprocity in seeking execution of the international
letter rogatory it submitted to the French judicial authorities” (ibid.).
Even if it took the view that a distinction was to be made between the
performance of duties “mutually” and “reciprocally”, which is not the
case, it must be acknowledged that in the present case France has not

fulfilled its obligation to afford Djibouti “the widest measure of mutual
assistance” as laid down in Article 1 of the Convention.

13. France refused to comply with a request for mutual assistance
from Djibouti in the context of the Borrel case on two occasions. The

first request, submitted by the procureur de la République of Djibouti on

123 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 297

17 June 2004 was rejected by the French authorities on the ground that it
was “‘outside the framework’” of the Convention and “‘without regard
for its provisions’” (Judgment, para. 25). This statement, however, does

not reflect the reality.
14. According to Article 1 of the Convention, the parties undertake
“to afford each other” “the widest measure of mutual assistance in pro-
ceedings in respect of offences the punishment of which, at the time of the
request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial authori-

ties of the requesting Party”. Also, it can be inferred from the wording of
Article 13 of the Convention that requests for mutual assistance may take
various forms, the letter rogatory being one of them. Meanwhile, Arti-
cle 13, paragraph 1, states that requests for mutual assistance must indi-
cate: the authority making the request, the object of and the reason for

the request, the identity and the nationality of the person concerned
(where possible), and where necessary, the name and address of the per-
son to be served or as much information as possible allowing for the per-
son to be identified and located. Article 13, paragraph 2, requires com-

pliance with additional conditions when the request for mutual assistance
takes the form of a letter rogatory, in particular a statement of the
offence and a summary of the facts.

15. The first request for mutual assistance by Djibouti, on 17 June

2004, was in the form prescribed by Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Con-
vention. France nevertheless refused to execute this request and insisted
that it should be in the form of an international letter rogatory. It would
seem that Djibouti agreed to submit a second request in that form on
3 November 2004, in the interests of co-operation. This was also refused

by the French authorities.
16. While it is true that a State party may refuse to comply with a
request for mutual assistance in criminal matters, such a refusal may only
be exceptional, and must in any event be based on proper grounds. This
was not so in the present case. Without reciprocity and mutual co-opera-

tion the Convention would no longer be a convention for mutual assist-
ance, but merely an instrument to assist one of the parties. It would be
devoid of all meaning and would answer the purpose for which it was
concluded for one of the parties only (in this case France).

17. So the necessity for both parties to comply with the fundamental
and reciprocal duty “to afford each other the widest measure of mutual
assistance” is at the very heart of the Convention. Djibouti was entitled
to demand execution of the letter rogatory submitted to the French judi-

cial authorities on the basis of the principle of reciprocity stated in Arti-
cle 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Mutual Assistance, since it had
itself afforded France the widest measure of mutual assistance by execut-
ing the three letters rogatory requested by the French authorities in the
Borrel case.

124 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 298

B. Violation by France of Articles 2, 3, paragraph 1, and Article 17 of
the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

18. Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in

Criminal Matters states the following principle:

“The requested State shall execute in accordance with its law any
letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by
the judicial authorities of the requesting State for the purpose of
procuring evidence or transmitting articles to be produced in evi-
dence, records or documents.” (Emphasis added.)

19. The Court observes that “the obligation to execute international

letters rogatory laid down in Article 3 of the 1986 Convention is to be
realized in accordance with the procedural law of the requested State”
(Judgment, para. 123). It deduces from this that “the ultimate treatment
of a request for mutual assistance in criminal matters . . . depends on the

decision by the competent national authorities, following the procedure
established in the law of the requested State” (ibid.). However, the Court
refrains from considering whether France fulfilled its obligations under
Article 3 of the 1986 Convention, more specifically whether it executed
the letter rogatory issued by Djibouti in accordance with French proce-

dural law.
20. Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention is a typical case of renvoi
by international law to internal law. This occurs when international law
makes compliance with internal law a condition for its application. In
this case Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention imposes upon Dji-

bouti and France the obligation to execute their respective letters roga-
tory in accordance with their respective laws. Conformity with internal
law is relevant from the viewpoint of international responsibility “because
the rule of international law makes it relevant, e.g., by incorporating the
standard of compliance with internal law as the applicable international

standard or as an aspect of it” (J. Crawford, The International Law Com-
mission’s Articles on State Responsibility , Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2002, p. 89). Compliance with the provisions of the Franco-
Djiboutian Convention on Mutual Assistance, more specifically those

relating to letters rogatory, is dependent on compliance with French
criminal procedure relating thereto. Failure by France to comply with its
criminal procedure may therefore engage its international responsibility.

21. The Court has jurisdiction to ascertain whether the procedure pre-
scribed by internal law (in this case the French Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure) was complied with in the decision by France to refuse to execute
the letter rogatory requested by Djibouti. Although normally it is not for
international courts to check whether internal law has been complied

with by national authorities, the situation is otherwise in cases where a

125 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP.OP .YUSUF ) 299

convention refers directly to that law. In these cases failure to comply
with internal legal procedures entails a violation of the Convention, and
when the Court is seised by the parties to such a convention it can and

must exercise a measure of control. In the present Judgment, however,
the Court has not done so.
22. In the present case the legality of France’s conduct should have
been assessed on the basis of whether it was in conformity with the pro-
cedures laid down by its internal law. France has not acted in accordance

with these procedures, especially with regard to judgmental authority
which, according to the French Code of Criminal Procedure is responsi-
ble for assessing the concepts of threats to sovereignty, security and ordre
public. The French Code of Criminal Procedure makes no provision for
an investigating judge, on his own initiative, to reject a request for

mutual assistance likely to prejudice the ordre public or the fundamental
interests of France, or to assess the effect of such a request on these inter-
ests, even though, on the basis of Article 694-9 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, he may make the information forwarded subject to certain

conditions.
23. The relevant provision to which the renvoi is made by Article 3,
paragraph 1, of the Convention when a request for international mutual
assistance is deemed likely to prejudice the ordre public or the fundamen-
tal interests of France is Article 694-4 of the French Code of Criminal

Procedure. According to this provision,
“if the enforcement of a request for judicial assistance coming from

a foreign judicial authority is liable to prejudice ordre public or the
fundamental interests of the nation, the district prosecutor seised of
this request in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 694-1
sends this to the prosecutor general who decides, if appropriate, to
seise the Minister of Justice and gives, where applicable, notice of

this reference to the investigating judge. If he is seised, the Minister
of Justice informs the authority which made the request, if appro-
priate, that no action, total or partial, may be taken in relation to
the request . . .”

24. According to this provision, should the procureur de la République
take the view that a request for mutual assistance “is likely to prejudice

ordre public or the fundamental interests of the nation”, he forwards it to
the procureur général. If the latter considers this opinion to be justified,
he seises the Minister of Justice, who, on the basis of the information he
has, decides whether or not to give effect to the request for mutual assist-
ance. Thus it is for the Minister of Justice, and for him alone, to deter-

mine whether the request is likely to prejudice ordre public or the funda-
mental interests of France. The investigating judge is not involved at any
stage in this decision: it is not for him either to seise the Minister of Jus-
tice or to refuse to execute the request for mutual assistance when the
request from the requesting State is considered likely to prejudice the sov-

ereignty or other fundamental interests of France. At most he may be

126 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 300

informed that the request has been forwarded by the procureur de la
République to the procureur général if the request concerns him.

25. Thus the decision whether or not to execute a request for mutual
assistance likely to prejudice ordre public or the fundamental interests of
France is not within the jurisdiction of an investigating judge. So the gov-
ernment alone assesses whether it is appropriate to forward the docu-
ments to the requesting State or to refuse. Control by the French courts

extends only to whether investigations at the request of foreign authori-
ties have been properly conducted from the viewpoint of French pro-
cedural rules. In fact the French courts have assumed a measure of con-
trol over the execution of international letters rogatory in France. That
control was expressly recognized in a judgment of 24 June 1997 by the

Criminal Division of the French Cour de cassation. In that case the
Criminal Division recognized the principle that the procedure in France
for the execution of an international letter rogatory is subject to the for-
malities prescribed by the law of the requested State. It deduced from this

that the courts of that State may control whether international letters
rogatory are properly executed.

26. The Criminal Division has also ruled on the extent of the powers
of an investigating judge as regards refusing to execute an international

letter rogatory. In a judgment of 30 March 1999 it found that the inves-
tigating judge responsible for executing a letter rogatory issued pursuant
to the Franco-Senegalese Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters had exceeded his powers by refusing to perform the acts requested
owing to the political nature of the offences concerned. The solution

adopted by the highest French court seems to mean that it was not for
the investigating judge requested to pass judgment on this point. The
decision to reject a request for mutual assistance thus allegedly falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice. It is therefore
possible to assert “the possible effects of mutual assistance on the secu-

rity, ordre public or the fundamental interests of the nation are the only,
not very legal, matters which the delegated judge should not assess” (see
Study by M. F. Desportes, Assistant Judge at the Cour de cassation,
Internet site: http://www.courdecassation.fr/article5791.html). [Transla-

tion by the Registry.]
27. In the present case, the procureur de la République in Paris inter-
preted Article 694-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this way,
declaring that the investigating judge dealing with the international letter
rogatory could do no more than express an opinion on the compatibility

of the measures requested with the ordre public and the fundamental
interests of the nation, because the decision not to execute a letter roga-
tory was a matter for the Ministry of Justice. The procureur général con-
firmed this interpretation, maintaining that only the Minister was com-
petent to determine whether the request for mutual assistance might be

prejudicial to the fundamental interests of France, the investigating judge

127 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 301

having no decision-making powers in matters of international mutual
assistance. The chambre d’instruction of the Court of Appeal in Paris
itself declared in its judgment of 19 October 2006 that government

authorities alone were competent to assess the concepts of prejudice to
the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other fundamental interests of
the nation. It added that the provisions of Article 694-4 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure:

“establish[ed] the conditions on which the government authority
may ultimately determine, in the light of the ordre public or the
essential interests of the Nation, whether it is to oppose compliance

with the foreign request for mutual assistance by transmitting or not
transmitting the items requested therein” (see Counter-Memorial of
France, Ann. XI).

28. The Djiboutian request for mutual assistance was transmitted by
the Foreign Minister of Djibouti to the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs through the Embassy of France in Djibouti. The request was then

transmitted to the procureur de la République in Paris. At this stage the
Ministry of Justice’s Director of Criminal Affairs and Pardons had
already drawn the Ministry’s attention to the need to omit from the
record any documents likely to prejudice the sovereignty, the security, the
ordre public or other essential interests of the Nation, pursuant to Arti-

cle 2, paragraph (c), of the Franco-Djiboutian Convention on Mutual
Assistance. However, a letter dated 27 January 2005 sent by the French
Minister of Justice’s Principal Private Secretary to the Djiboutian authori-
ties shows that he had asked “for all steps to be taken to ensure that a
copy of the record of the investigation into the death of Mr. Ber-

nard Borrel is transmitted to the Minister of Justice . . . of the Republic
of Djibouti before the end of February 2005”.

29. He also allegedly “asked the procureur de la République in Paris to
ensure that there is no undue delay in dealing with this matter”. On

8 February 2005 the French investigating judge refused to transmit the
Borrel file on the ground that this was likely to compromise the funda-
mental interests of France, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph (c),ofthe
1986 bilateral Convention. On 6 June 2005 the Ambassador of France to

Djibouti informed the Djiboutian Foreign Minister that France was not
in a position to comply with the request to execute the international letter
rogatory.
30. An examination of these factors shows that the decision to refuse
mutual assistance was not taken by a person competent under French

law, in violation of Articles 3, paragraph 1, and 2 (c), of the Convention.
The investigating judge had no basis for assessing the fundamental inter-
ests of France that might be compromised by execution of the letter roga-
tory or for refusing the request for mutual assistance on that basis. The
French Code of Criminal Procedure, to which Article 3, paragraph 1, of

the Convention refers, makes no provision for an investigating

128 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 302

judge to reject a request for mutual assistance on his own initiative, even
though, on the basis of Article 694-9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
he may make the information subject to certain conditions. French crimi-

nal law makes no provision for an investigating judge to oppose the for-
warding of the said information, or even for his opinion to be sought on
this matter. This decision by the investigating judge by letter of 8 Febru-
ary 2005 was allegedly then forwarded to the Djiboutian authorities by
letter of 31 May 2005. However, the wording of the letter suggests that

the Ministry of Justice confined itself to informing the Djiboutian authori-
ties of the decision by the French investigating judge to refuse to forward
the Borrel file on the basis of Article 2, paragraph (c), of the Mutual
Assistance Convention. The suggestion was therefore that it had not
itself decided to refuse to forward the record. The letter is worded as fol-

lows:
“After giving the matter careful attention, the investigating judge,

by a judicial decision not open to appeal, considered that Arti-
cle 2 (c) of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters between France and Djibouti of 27 September 1986 had to be
applied and that this did not allow a favourable response to be given

to the request from your judicial authorities. I have no alternative
but to inform you of this sovereign decision of the competent judi-
cial authority.” (Counter-Memorial of the French Republic, Ann. V.)

In any event the Court found that it “c[ould] not take this document
into consideration in its examination of the present case” for the follow-
ing reasons: France did not allege that this letter “was delivered to Dji-
bouti’s Ambassador in Paris or to a member of his staff through the

usual diplomatic channels”, did not adduce evidence that the letter “was
sent by post or conveyed by courier” and lastly did not offer “evidence
that the despatch of the letter was recorded in a mail registry at the Min-
istry of Justice or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with
French administrative practice” (Judgment, para. 143).

31. The last letter in which there was a reference to the refusal of
mutual assistance was the one addressed by the Ambassador of France in

Djibouti to the Djiboutian Foreign Minister. In this letter, dated 6 June
2005, the Ambassador stated that “after consulting [my] authorities”,
France was not in a position to comply with this request for mutual
assistance. This letter did not reveal the grounds on which France was
refusing to afford mutual assistance.

32. It is therefore apparent that, by its letter of 6 June 2005, France
violated Articles 3, paragraph 1, and 2 (c) of the Convention in that it
informed the Djiboutian authorities of the refusal by the investigating
judge to comply with the request for mutual assistance, although that
official was not competent to take such a decision.

33. France also violated Article 17 of the Convention in that the letter

129 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 303

of 6 June 2005 gave no reasons whatever. Although this provision is in a
section of the Convention separate from the one containing Article 2, it
does not mean that there is no direct and effective link between the two

provisions, because this is a provision common to all the forms of mutual
assistance covered by the Convention. In fact, Article 2 is not the only
provision in the Convention that provides for a possible refusal of
mutual assistance. For example, Article 5 lays down that the requested
State “may delay the handing over of any property, records or docu-

ments requested, if the said property, records or documents are required
in connection with pending criminal proceedings”. Article 10 on transfer
is even more specific, and states that transfer can be refused under certain
conditions. Thus Article 17 applies to all provisions envisaging a possible
refusal, stating that reasons must be given for “any refusal of mutual

assistance” (whether general or specific). Giving no reasons for a refusal
constitutes a violation of the Convention. France’s failure to comply with
Article 17 therefore involves a violation of Article 1 of the Convention,
given that France cannot rely on Article 2 (c), without giving reasons for

its refusal.

34. Also, any refusal without giving reasons in conformity with Arti-
cle 17 of the Convention is devoid of legal effect. The co-operation and
mutual assistance that Djibouti was entitled to expect under the Conven-

tion are not given, either by the letter of 31 May 2005, which should not
be taken into account, or by the letter of 6 June 2005, in which the
Ambassador of France to Djibouti wrote to the Djiboutian Foreign Min-
ister as follows: “I regret to inform you that we are not in a position to
comply with this request.” The mere reference by France in the letter of

31 May 2005 to Article 2 (c), of the Convention and the refusal pure and
simple in the letter of 6 June 2005 amount to a breach of its international
obligations under Article 1 and Article 17 of the Convention, given that
neither the obligation to “afford each other . . . the widest measure of
mutual assistance” nor the obligation to give reasons for any refusal was

complied with.

35. I regret that the Court did not wish to take up these violations of
the Convention that engage France’s international responsibility, and

that it decided to reject the submissions by the Republic of Djibouti
regarding the violation by France of the rules relating to mutual assist-
ance laid down by the 1986 Convention, leaving aside its conclusion in
paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part on the breach by France of its
obligation under Article 17 of the Convention . Had the Court taken

note of all the violations described above, this might have helped the
two States to return to better co-operation in their relations in general,
and to more effective mutual assistance in legal matters and on firmer
legal bases. The fact that these two States were willing to submit their
dispute to the Court by mutual consent and by way of forum proroga-

tum is evidence of their willingness to find a complete and final solution

130 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP.YUSUF ) 304

to this dispute in order to strengthen the traditional ties of friendship

between them.

III. ATTACKS ON THE IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION AND INVIOLABILITY
OF THE H EAD OF STATE OF D JIBOUTI

36. The Court treats attacks on the immunity and inviolability of the

Head of State of Djibouti as acts in the past, submitted to the Court
solely for historical reasons. The witness summonses addressed to the
Djiboutian Head of State in 2005 and 2007 have never been withdrawn
by the French judicial authorities. Therefore, instead of saying in the rea-

sons for the judgment that “an apology [was] due”, the Court should
have included the requirement for apologies in the operative part of the
judgment itself and should have asked France to withdraw both sum-
monses. There was indeed a violation by France of its international obli-

gations regarding the immunity from jurisdiction and inviolability of the
Head of State of Djibouti, a violation worthy of a firm, clear decision by
the Court in order to avoid continuing violation as well as a repetition of
it in the future.

37. The customary validity of the immunity of a Head of State abroad
has been recognized by several conventions. Thus Article 21, paragraph 1,
of the Convention on Special Missions and Article 3, paragraph 2, of the

Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property
expressly recognize the immunity conferred upon Heads of State by gen-
eral international law. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
of 18 April 1961 contains no provision specifically devoted to Heads of

State. However, it does codify many aspects of the status enjoyed by dip-
lomatic representatives when they are in a receiving State. Heads of State
are by definition the highest representatives of the States that they lead.
Therefore the rules in this Convention may be applied to them in many

cases. Article 29 of this Convention states in particular:

“The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not
be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall
treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to pre-
vent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.”

38. The immunity granted to Heads of State may be of various types:

personal inviolability, immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from
execution. The inviolability and immunity from criminal jurisdiction of a
Head of State are aimed in particular at protecting him from any form of
coercion when on a visit abroad. Article 1 of the resolution of the Institut

de droit international of 26 August 2001 summarizes the type of immu-
nity quite clearly:

131 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP.OP .YUSUF ) 305

“When in the territory of a foreign State, the person of the Head
of State is inviolable. While there, he or she may not be placed under
any form of arrest or detention. The Head of State shall be treated

by the authorities with due respect and all reasonable steps shall be
taken to prevent any infringement of his or her person, liberty, or
dignity.”

39. The Court recognizes in the present Judgment, in accordance with
its recent jurisprudence, that the rule of customary international law
reflected in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
“translates into positive obligations for the receiving State as regards the

actions of its own authorities, and into obligations of prevention as
regards possible acts by individuals” (Judgment, para. 174). It also
imposes on receiving States “the obligation to protect the honour and
dignity of Heads of State, in connection with their inviolability” (ibid.).
40. However, examination of the witness summonses addressed to the

Djiboutian Head of State on 17 May 2005 and 14 February 2007 lead the
Court to conclude that France had not infringed the rules on immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability applicable to him. Neverthe-
less it is clear that these summonses are not merely a breach of the “cour-

tesy due to a foreign Head of State”, but also violate the duty incumbent
on France to protect the honour and dignity of foreign Heads of State.

41. The Court finds first that the summons addressed to the Djibou-
tian Head of State on 17 May 2005 “was not associated with the meas-

ures of constraint provided for by Article 109 of the French Code of
Criminal Procedure”. On the contrary, it was “merely an invitation to
testify which the Head of State could freely accept or decline” (ibid.,
para. 171). This statement is unsound, because the summons was cer-
tainly associated with measures of constraint which infringed the immu-

nity of the Djiboutian Head of State.

A. The witness summons of 17 May 2005

42. The witness summons of 17 May 2005 related to “the murder of
Mr. Bernard Borrel on 18 or 19 October 1995 in Djibouti, punishable
under Articles 113-7, 221-1, 221-3, 221-8, 221-9 and 221-11 of the Penal
Code”. The question that arises is whether these proceedings fall under
Article 101 or Article 656 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because

France allegedly infringed the immunities from jurisdiction and the invio-
lability of the Djiboutian Head of State in the former case only. Arti-
cle 656 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states:

“The written statement of the representative of a foreign Power is
requested through the intermediary of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs. If the application is granted, the statement is received by the

president of the appeal court or by a judge delegated by him.”

132 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 306

43. In this instance the Djiboutian President was invited to attend in
person the judge’s chambers to be heard as a witness. He was not invited
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make a written statement. Thus the

procedure was clearly not based on Article 656 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, which requires a request for a written statement through the
intermediary of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is closer to the pro-
cedure laid down by Article 101 of the Code.
44. According to the first paragraph of Article 101 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, “The investigating judge summons any person whose
statement appears useful to him before him through a bailiff or a police
officer. A copy of this summons is handed over to the person.” In this
case the investigating judge did indeed summon the Djiboutian President
before him. A copy of the summons was indeed handed over to him.

Paragraph 3 of this Article states that “[w]here he is summoned or sent
for, the witness is informed that if he does not appear or refuses to
appear, he can be compelled to by the law enforcement agencies in
accordance with the provisions of Article 109”. Article 109 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure provides that “[a]ny person summoned to be heard
in the capacity of a witness is obliged to appear, to swear an oath, and to
make a statement, subject to the provisions of Articles 226-13 and 226-
14 of the Penal Code [which relate to professional secrecy]”. “If the wit-
ness does not appear or refuses to appear, the investigating judge may, on

the request of the district prosecutor, order him to be produced by the
law enforcement agencies.” Also, Article 434-15-1 of the Penal Code
states that:

“Any person, summoned by an investigating judge or a judicial
police officer acting in the exercise of a rogatory commission in
order to be heard as a witness, who refuses to appear, to take the

oath or to make a deposition without justification or excuse, is pun-
ished by a fine of J3,750.”

45. The Djiboutian President naturally refused to comply with this
summons, so he could have been compelled to appear by the law enforce-
ment agencies and liable to penal sanctions, in breach of the rules on the

immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability of Heads of State.
This immunity enjoyed by Heads of State is supposed to cover all the
stages of criminal proceedings. Consequently it should not be possible for
a Head of State to be summoned to testify. He can only be requested to
make a written statement through the intermediary of the Minister for

Foreign Affairs (Article 656 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). This
was not done in the present case.
46. In a judgment of 10 October 2001, the French Cour de cassation
recognized the incompatibility between the status of the President of the
French Republic and the duty to appear as a witness. It stated:

“during his term of office the President of the Republic cannot be

133 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 307

heard as a témoin assisté or indicted, summoned or brought before
any criminal court for any offence whatever, neither is he subject to
the duty to appear as a witness laid down by Article 101 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure because that duty is associated with a meas-
ure of constraint by the law enforcement agencies provided for by
Article 109 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure and punish-
able under criminal law”. [Translation by the Registry.]

The reason relied on by the Cour de cassation to demonstrate the impos-
sibility for the President to testify is certainly the fact that this duty is
associated with a measure of constraint by the law enforcement agencies
and punishable under criminal law.
47. Given the fact that the French courts can neither summon nor sub-

poena the President of their own country during his term of office, it is
difficult to accept that they could ask foreign Heads of State to attend at
their offices in order to be heard as witnesses. The Court had the oppor-
tunity in the present case to state clearly and unambiguously that this

practice was a violation of international law and that by acting in this
way French judges engaged the international responsibility of France.
Unfortunately the language used in the Court’s conclusions, as well as
the lack of a clear decision in the operative part, might lead to a repeti-
tion of this disrespectful practice of international law.

48. Also, in the case concerning the Arrest Warrant (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), the Court stated that the issue and
circulation of the arrest warrant against Mr. Yerodia, who was then Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, had infringed his immunity from

criminal jurisdiction and his inviolability on the ground that these two
actions, “given the nature and purpose of the [arrest] warrant” had been
“intended to enable the arrest” of the person concerned on Belgian ter-
ritory and abroad. In the present case the witness summons was intended
to enforce a measure of constraint by law enforcement agencies against

the Djiboutian Head of State when he was exercising his legal right to
refuse to comply with the witness summons.
49. All these factors clearly show that the witness summons of 17 May
2005 did indeed infringe the rules of international law relating to the

immunity of Heads of State. The Court recognized that this summons
did not observe the form prescribed by Article 656 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, which refers to a written statement “by a representative of
a foreign Power”. Yet it confined itself to noting that “by inviting a Head
of State to give evidence simply through sending him a facsimile and by

setting him an extremely short deadline without consultation to appear at
her office, [the investigating judge had] failed to act in accordance with
the courtesies due to a foreign Head of State” (Judgment, para. 172). The
immunity and inviolability of a Head of State are not simply matters of
diplomatic courtesy, but derive from rules firmly anchored in interna-

tional conventional and customary law.

134 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 308

50. France itself has recognized that the witness summons of 2005 did
not comply with the procedure laid down for statements by representa-
tives of a foreign Power. While it regarded this summons as null and void

because it did not comply with the provisions of Article 656 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, France offered no apologies to the Djiboutian
Head of State, contrary to what the French Minister for Foreign Affairs
had done when a similar summons was addressed to the Ambassador of
Djibouti in France in 2004. He had apologized for this “infringement of

diplomatic usage”, adding that the investigating judge concerned “had
acknowledged his mistake and wished the summons to be null and void”.
The Court, meanwhile, simply regarded it as “regrettable” that the pro-
cedure was not complied with and that “whilst being aware of that fact,
the French Minister for Foreign Affairs did not offer apologies to the

Djiboutian Head of State, as he had done previously to Djibouti’s
Ambassador when he found himself in a similar situation” (Judgment,
para. 172). In my opinion, the Court should indeed have required France
to offer its apologies to the Djiboutian Head of State.

51. Also, it is clear that the leaking to Agence France-Presse, in breach
of confidentiality of the investigation, of information about the witness
summons to the Djiboutian Head of State should be regarded as an
attack on his dignity. Agence France-Presse had made a public announce-

ment about the witness summons to the Djiboutian Head of State only
minutes after he had been informed of it. This shows that the action by
the French legal authorities was clearly meant as an attack on the dignity
and honour of the Djiboutian Head of State.

B. The witness summons of 14 February 2007

52. The witness summons of 14 February 2007 was issued during the
Djiboutian President’s stay in France on the occasion of the 24th Con-

ference of the Heads of State of Africa and France, to be held in Cannes
on 15 and 16 February.
53. The summons of 14 February 2007 seems only outwardly to follow
the procedure laid down in Article 656 of the Code of Criminal Pro-

cedure. This provision governs written statements by representatives of a
foreign Power. In this case the investigating judge expressed the wish to
obtain the testimony of the Djiboutian Head of State. By failing to com-
ply with the requirements of its own legislation, France acted in violation
of the rules of customary international law relating to the immunities of

Heads of State.
54. Furthermore, it should be noted that media coverage of this sum-
mons and its publication during the Djiboutian President’s stay in France
on the occasion of a conference attended by many delegations from
Africa, as well as by representatives of the United Nations Organization

and the African Union, was evidence of a deliberate intention to embar-

135 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP.OP .YUSUF ) 309

rass the Djiboutian Head of State. The French press (L’Express, Le
Monde and AFP) attributed the origin of the information on the sum-

mons served on the Djiboutian Head of State to “legal sources”, even
before the letter from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been
sent to the Embassy of Djibouti in Paris. This shows that deliberate leaks
about a summons covered by the confidentiality of the investigation had
been well and truly orchestrated in order to attack the honour and dig-

nity of the Djiboutian Head of State and lead the public to believe that he
was involved in one way or another in the death of Judge Borrel.

55. All these factors demonstrate that the French authorities did indeed

attack the honour and dignity of the Djiboutian Head of State and did
not take all necessary steps to protect his immunity from jurisdiction and
his person during his visits to France. Consequently the Court should
have called upon France to put an end to the unlawful act by cancelling
both witness summonses addressed to the Djiboutian Head of State and

to offer Djibouti apologies and guarantees seeking to avoid a repetition
of the attacks on the honour and dignity of its Head of State in the
future.
56. In conclusion, I take the view that the violation by France of the

Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters was much more
extensive than was recognized by the Court in the present Judgment.
Furthermore, I consider that France has infringed customary rules relat-
ing to the immunity, inviolability, honour and dignity of the Djiboutian
Head of State and that the Court should have required France to offer

public apologies, both in its reasons and in the operative part of the
Judgment.

(Signed) Abdulqawi A. Y USUF .

136

Bilingual Content

293

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE AD HOC YUSUF

I. Compétence de la Cour — II. La violation par la France de la convention
d’entraide judiciaire de 1986 en matière pénale (CEJMP) — A. La violation
par la France de l’article premier, paragraphe 1, de la convention d’entraide
judiciaire en matière pénale — B. La violation par la France des articles 2, 3,
paragraphe 1, et 17 de la convention d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale —
III. Les atteintes à l’immunité de juridiction et à l’inviolabilité du chef de l’Etat

de Djibouti — A. La convocation à témoigner du 17 mai 2005 — B. La convo-
cation à témoigner du 14 février 2007.

1. Même si j’ai voté en faveur des alinéas a), b) et c) du point 1, et de
l’alinéa a) du point 2 du dispositif, je suis en désaccord avec la Cour sur
des points essentiels de la décision, s’agissant notamment de la question

de la compétence ratione temporis de la Cour, de l’étendue des violations
par la France de la convention d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale du
27 septembre 1986, et des atteintes à l’immunité, à l’inviolabilité, à l’hon-
neur et à la dignité du chef de l’Etat djiboutien.

I. COMPÉTENCE DE LA C OUR

2. Je souscris aux alinéas a) et b) du point 1 du dispositif, dans les-
quels la Cour dit qu’elle a compétence pour statuer non seulement sur le
différend relatif à l’exécution de la commission rogatoire adressée par la

République de Djibouti à la France le 3 novembre 2004, mais aussi sur
celui concernant les convocations à témoigner adressées au président de
la République de Djibouti le 17 mai 2005 et à deux hauts fonctionnaires
djiboutiens les 3 et 4 novembre 2004 et le 17 juin 2005. Je souscris éga-
lement à l’alinéa c) du point 1 du dispositif, dans lequel la Cour dit

qu’elle a compétence pour statuer sur le différend relatif à la convocation
à témoigner adressée au président de la République de Djibouti le
14 février 2007. Je suis en revanche en désaccord sur le raisonnement qui
a conduit la Cour à la formulation de cette conclusion. Par ailleurs, je ne
souscris pas à l’alinéa d) du point 1 du dispositif car j’estime que la Cour
avait compétence pour connaître du différend relatif aux mandats d’arrêt

délivrés le 27 septembre 2006 à l’encontre de deux hauts fonctionnaires
djiboutiens.
3. Le raisonnement de la Cour présente des incohérences tant sur le
plan de la logique que sur celui du droit. La Cour fait valoir que sa com-
pétence pour connaître de faits postérieurs à la date du dépôt de la

requête est déterminée par ce que la France a expressément accepté dans
sa lettre du 25 juillet 2006. Le consentement de la France ne vaudrait

120 293

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC YUSUF

[Translation]

I. Jurisdiction of the Court — II. Violation by France of the 1986 Conven-
tion on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (CMACM) — A. Violation by
France of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters — B. Violation by France of Articles 2 and 3, paragraph 1,
and Article 17 of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters —
III. Attacks on the immunity from jurisdiction and inviolability of the Head of

State of Djibouti — A. The witness summons of 17 May 2005 — B. The witness
summons of 14 February 2007.

1. Even though I have voted in favour of paragraph 1 (a), (b) and
(c) and paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part, I disagree with the Court
on key points in the decision, in particular the issue of the Court’s juris-

diction ratione temporis, the extent of the violations by France of the
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 27 Septem-
ber 1986, and the attacks on the immunity, inviolability, honour and dig-
nity of the Djiboutian Head of State.

I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

2. I accept paragraph 1 (a) and (b) of the operative part, in which
the Court states that it has jurisdiction to entertain not only the dispute
relating to execution of the letter rogatory addressed by the Republic of

Djibouti to France on 3 November 2004 but also that relating to the
witness summonses addressed to the President of the Republic of Dji-
bouti on 17 May 2005 and to two senior Djiboutian officials on 3 and
4 November 2004 and 17 June 2005. I also accept paragraph 1 (c) of the
operative part, in which the Court states that it has jurisdiction to adju-

dicate upon the dispute concerning the witness summons addressed to the
President of the Republic of Djibouti on 14 February 2007. On the other
hand, I disagree with the Court over the reasoning that led it to that con-
clusion. Also, I do not accept paragraph 1 (d) of the operative part,
because in my view the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dis-
pute concerning the arrest warrants issued on 27 September 2006 against

two senior Djiboutian officials.

3. The reasoning of the Court displays inconsistencies both in logic
and in law. The Court asserts that its jurisdiction to entertain acts sub-
sequent to the filing of the Application is governed by what France

expressly accepted in its letter of 25 July 2006. France’s consent was valid
“‘only for the purposes of the case’”, i.e., “regarding ‘the dispute forming

120294 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND. YUSUF )

««qu’aux fins de l’affaire»», c’est-à-dire ««pour le différend qui fait
l’objet de la requête et dans les strictes limites des demandes formulées

dans celle-ci par la République de Djibouti»» (arrêt, par. 88). Estimant
qu’«on ne trouve, dans la requête de Djibouti, aucune demande portant
sur les mandats d’arrêt» (ibid., par. 88) délivrés à l’encontre des hauts
fonctionnaires djiboutiens le 27 septembre 2006, la Cour conclut qu’elle
n’a pas compétence pour en connaître. Elle parvient pourtant à la conclu-

sion inverse s’agissant de la convocation adressée au président de la Répu-
blique de Djibouti le 14 février 2007 — fait également postérieur à la date
de dépôt de la requête — dans la mesure où celle-ci «n’[est] qu’une simple
répétition de la précédente, quoique la forme en eût été rectifiée» (ibid.,

par. 91).
4. Pour la Cour,

«ce qui est décisif ... pour répondre à la question de savoir si elle est
compétente pour connaître des demandes relatives [aux mandats
d’arrêt délivrés à l’encontre des hauts fonctionnaires djiboutiens]
n’est pas sa jurisprudence relative aux notions de «continuité» et de

«connexité», qui constituent des critères pertinents pour déterminer
les limites ratione temporis de sa compétence, mais ce que la France
a expressément accepté dans sa lettre du 25 juillet 2006» (ibid.,
par. 88).

La Cour se fonde pourtant sur ce même critère de «connexité» pour éta-
blir sa compétence pour examiner la convocation à témoigner adressée au
président djiboutien le 14 février 2007.

5. Il ne fait pas de doute que la juridiction de la Cour est basée sur le
consentement des Parties et «ne saurait subsister en dehors des limites
dans lesquelles ce consentement a été donné...» (affaire des Concessions
Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrêt n o 2 du 30 août 1924, C.P.J.I., série A
o
n 2, p. 16). La Cour semble toutefois affirmer que, lorsque le consente-
ment est donné sur la base du forum prorogatum, prévu à l’article 38,
paragraphe 5, de son Règlement, la détermination de sa compétence doit
obéir à des critères complètement différents de ceux qui doivent être uti-

lisés pour les autres modes d’expression du consentement à sa juridiction.
J’estime, pour ma part, que le fait qu’un consentement ait été donné sur
la base de l’article 38, paragraphe 5, du Règlement n’affecte pas la per-
tinence des critères que la Cour a, par le passé, considérés comme décisifs
pour la détermination de sa compétence ratione temporis à l’égard de

faits ou d’événements postérieurs à la date du dépôt de la requête.
6. La Cour a ainsi constamment reconnu que sa compétence pour
connaître de faits postérieurs à la date de dépôt d’une requête était condi-
tionnée, d’une part, par l’existence d’un lien étroit entre ces faits et ceux

relevant déjà de sa compétence et, d’autre part, par l’absence d’un effet
transformateur de ces faits sur la nature du différend (voir notamment
Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992 , p. 266, par. 67; Temple de Préah
Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962 ,p.36;

121 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP.OP .YUSUF ) 294

the subject of the Application strictly within the limits of the claims for-
mulated therein by the Republic of Djibouti’” (Judgment, para. 88). Tak-
ing the view that “in Djibouti’s Application there are no claims relating

to arrest warrants” (ibid., para. 88) issued against senior Djiboutian offi-
cials on 27 September 2006, the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to
entertain them. However, it comes to a contrary finding regarding the
summons addressed to the President of the Republic of Djibouti on
14 February 2007 — a fact also subsequent to the filing of the Applica-

tion — because it “was but a repetition of the preceding one, even though
it had been corrected as to form” (ibid., para. 91).

4. In the opinion of the Court,

“what is decisive is that the question of its jurisdiction over the
claims [relating to the arrest warrants issued against the senior Dji-

boutian officials] is not to be answered by recourse to jurisprudence
relating to ‘continuity’ and ‘connexity’, which are criteria relevant
for determining limits ratione temporis to its jurisdiction, but by that
which France has expressly accepted in its letter of 25 July 2006”

(ibid., para. 88).

However, the Court relies on the same criterion of “connexity” to estab-
lish its jurisdiction to consider the witness summons addressed to the Dji-
boutian President on 14 February 2007.
5. There is no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Court is based on the
consent of the Parties and “only exists in so far as this consent has been

given . . .” (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, 1924,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2 , p. 16). However, the Court seems to be saying
that when consent is given on the basis of forum prorogatum as laid down
in Article 38, paragraph 5, of its Rules, determining its jurisdiction must
meet criteria completely different from those that have to be used for

other ways of expressing consent to its jurisdiction. However, I take the
view that the fact that consent has been given pursuant to Article 38,
paragraph 5, of the Rules does not affect the relevance of the criteria
regarded by the Court in the past as decisive in determining its jurisdic-

tion ratione temporis in respect of acts or events subsequent to the filing
of the Application.

6. Thus the Court has consistently recognized that its jurisdiction over
acts subsequent to the filing of an Application was dependent on the one

hand on the existence of a close link between those acts and those already
within its jurisdiction, and on the other by the absence of any effect
which would transform the nature of the dispute (see, inter alia, Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992 , p. 266, para. 67; Temple of Preah Vihear

(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962 ,p.36;

121295 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP .IND. YUSUF )

Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d’Allemagne
c. Islande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974 , p. 203, par. 72).

7. Ces critères sont applicables en l’espèce. Il ne fait pas de doute en
effet que les mandats d’arrêt délivrés à l’encontre des hauts fonction-
naires djiboutiens sont des faits découlant directement des questions qui
font l’objet de la requête, et plus particulièrement de celles relatives à

l’immunité des hauts fonctionnaires djiboutiens. Les mandats d’arrêt sus-
visés ont été délivrés consécutivement au refus des deux hauts fonction-
naires djiboutiens de déférer aux convocations à témoigner en tant que
témoins assistés qui leur avaient été adressées les 3 et 4 novembre 2004,

puis le 17 juin 2005. La Cour admet ainsi que, d’après la législation fran-
çaise (article 109 du Code de procédure pénale français), une personne
convoquée en qualité de témoin «est dans l’obligation de se présenter
devant le juge sous peine d’y être contraint[e] par la force publique ... au

moyen d’un mandat d’arrêt émis à son encontre» (arrêt, par. 184). La
Cour refuse toutefois d’en tirer les conséquences dans le sens du constat
de l’existence d’une «connexité» entre le refus de déférer aux convoca-
tions à témoigner et l’émission des mandats d’arrêt. Il est pourtant clair

que ces mandats d’arrêt représentaient un moyen d’exécuter les convoca-
tions à témoigner au sujet desquelles Djibouti avait soutenu, dans sa
requête, qu’elles violaient les obligations internationales liant la France
en matière d’immunités. Ces mandats d’arrêt, bien qu’ils aient été délivrés
postérieurement à la date du dépôt de la requête, relèvent donc bien de la

compétence ratione temporis de la Cour.
8. La Cour a d’ailleurs appliqué le critère de «connexité» dans le cas
d’espèce au sujet de la convocation à témoigner adressée au chef de l’Etat
djiboutien le 14 février 2007. Elle a jugé que cette convocation était iden-

tique «en substance» à la convocation du 17 mai 2005, car elle «portait
sur la même affaire», «émana[it] du même juge» et «concernait la même
question juridique» (ibid., par. 91). Il existait donc un lien étroit entre la
convocation du 14 février 2007 et celle du 17 mai 2005. La Cour ayant

par ailleurs reconnu qu’elle était compétente pour connaître de la pre-
mière convocation, il ne pouvait raisonnablement en être autrement
s’agissant de la seconde. La Cour aurait donc dû offrir le même traite-
ment aux deux faits postérieurs à la date du dépôt de la requête (les man-

dats d’arrêt délivrés à l’encontre des deux hauts fonctionnaires djiboutiens
et la convocation du 14 février 2007 adressée au chef de l’Etat djiboutien)
et affirmer sa compétence pour en connaître.

II. L A VIOLATION PAR LA FRANCE DE LA CONVENTION D ’ENTRAIDE
JUDICIAIRE DE 1986 EN MATIÈRE PÉNALE (CEJMP)

9. J’ai voté en faveur de l’alinéa a) du point 2 du dispositif, dans

lequel la Cour dit que la France a manqué à son obligation internationale
au titre de l’article 17 de la convention d’entraide judiciaire en matière
pénale. J’estime toutefois que la France a également violé d’autres dispo-

122 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SE. OP.YUSUF ) 295

Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p. 203, para. 72).
7. These criteria are applicable in the present case. There is no doubt
that the arrest warrants issued against senior Djiboutian officials are acts
stemming directly from issues that are the subject of the Application,

more particularly those relating to the immunity of senior Djiboutian
officials. The above-mentioned arrest warrants were issued following the
two senior Djiboutian officials’ refusal to answer the summonses to
appear as témoins assistés addressed to them on 3 and 4 November 2004

and then on 17 June 2005. Thus the Court accepts that according to
French legislation (Article 109 of the French Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure) a person called as a witness “is obliged to appear before the
judge, on pain of being compelled to do so by the law enforcement

agencies . . . through the issuing of an arrest warrant against him” (Judg-
ment, para. 184). However, the Court refuses to draw the conclusions in
terms of a finding of “connexity” between the refusal to answer to the
witness summonses and the issue of the arrest warrants. It is nevertheless

clear that these arrest warrants were a way of executing the witness sum-
monses which, according to Djibouti in the Application, violated inter-
national obligations relating to immunities binding on France. So these
arrest warrants, though issued after the date of the filing of the Applica-

tion, are certainly within the Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis.

8. Moreover, the Court has applied the “connexity” criterion in the

present case to the witness summons addressed to the Djiboutian Head of
State on 14 February 2007. It considered this summons “identical in sub-
stance” to the summons of 17 May 2005 because it was “in relation to the
same case”, “was issued by the same judge” and “was in relation to the

same legal question” (ibid., para. 91). So there was a close connection
between the summons of 14 February 2007 and the summons of 17 May
2005. Also, since the Court had recognized that it had jurisdiction to
entertain the first summons, the situation could not reasonably be other-

wise with the second. Therefore the Court should have dealt with both
acts subsequent to the date of the filing of the Application (the arrest
warrants issued against the two senior Djiboutian officials and the sum-
mons of 14 February 2007 addressed to the Djiboutian Head of State) in

the same way, stating that it had jurisdiction to entertain them.

II. VIOLATION BY FRANCE OF THE 1986 C ONVENTION ON M UTUAL

A SSISTANCE INC RIMINAL M ATTERS (CMACM)

9. I voted in favour of paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part, in which
the Court states that France was in breach of its international obligation

under Article 17 of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters. However, I consider that France has also violated other provi-

122296 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP .IND .YUSUF )

sitions de la convention, notamment ses articles premier, paragraphe 1, 2,
alinéa c), et 3, paragraphe 1. J’en exposerai les raisons ci-dessous.

A. La violation par la France de l’article premier, paragraphe 1,
de la convention d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale

10. Il résulte des termes de l’article premier, paragraphe 1, de la
convention d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale que les deux parties

s’engagent
«à s’accorder mutuellement, selon les dispositions de la ... conven-

tion, l’entraide judiciaire la plus large possible dans toute procédure
visant des infractions dont la répression est, au moment où l’entraide
est demandée, de la compétence des autorités judiciaires de l’Etat
requérant».

L’engagement à «s’accorder mutuellement ... l’entraide judiciaire la plus
large possible» constitue une obligation essentielle des Etats parties à la

convention qui doit être appréciée à la lumière de l’objet et du but
de celle-ci. En effet, la convention a pour objet et pour but de faci-
liter «l’entraide judiciaire» [«mutual assistance» en anglais] en matière
pénale. La mise en Œuvre de cette obligation doit se faire de manière
réciproque et sur une base d’égalité et de coopération entre les deux

parties.
11. L’expression «la plus large possible» caractérise l’étendue de
l’entraide judiciaire que chaque partie s’engage à accorder à l’autre par-
tie. Elle vise la coopération la plus ouverte et la plus complète possible,
en ce qui concerne tant les conditions nécessaires à la réalisation de

l’entraide que l’exécution matérielle de certaines formes d’entraide, telles
les commissions rogatoires. L’expression «s’accorder mutuellement» ren-
voie, pour sa part, à l’obligation de réciprocité qui incombe aux parties à
la convention. Elle signifie que chaque partie qui s’acquitte de bonne foi
de son obligation de coopération est en droit d’attendre de l’autre une

conduite similaire.
12. La Cour admet que «l’article premier de la convention de 1986
prévoit que les obligations qu’elle énonce seront mises en Œuvre de façon
mutuelle» (arrêt, par. 119). Elle considère pourtant que «Djibouti ne

peut se fonder sur le principe de réciprocité pour demander l’exécution de
la commission rogatoire internationale qu’il a introduite auprès des auto-
rités judiciaires françaises» (ibid.). Même si l’on considérait qu’une dis-
tinction était à opérer entre la mise en Œuvre des obligations «de façon
mutuelle» et «de façon réciproque», ce qui n’est pas le cas, force est de

constater que la France n’a pas, dans la présente espèce, rempli son obli-
gation d’accorder à Djibouti «l’entraide judiciaire la plus large possible»,
comme le prévoit l’article premier de la convention.
13. La France a refusé, à deux reprises, d’accéder à une demande
d’entraide judiciaire en provenance de Djibouti dans le cadre de l’affaire

Borrel. La première demande, présentée par le procureur de la Répu-

123 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 296

sions of the Convention, inter alia Articles 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 (c) and
3, paragraph 1. I will set out my reasons below.

A. Violation by France of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

10. It follows from the wording of Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Con-
vention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters that the two parties

undertake
“to afford each other, in accordance with the provisions of this Con-

vention, the widest measure of mutual assistance in proceedings in
respect of offences the punishment of which, at the time of the
request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial
authorities of the requesting State”.

The undertaking “to afford each other . . . the widest measure of mutual
assistance” is a fundamental duty of the States parties to the Convention,

which must be assessed in the light of its object and purpose. And the
object and purpose of the Convention is to facilitate “mutual assistance”
in criminal matters. This duty must be discharged mutually and on the
basis of equality and co-operation between the two parties.

11. The expression “the widest measure” describes the extent of the
mutual assistance in criminal matters that each party undertakes to
afford the other. Its aim is the fullest and most open co-operation, both
as regards the conditions necessary for providing mutual assistance and

the practical implementation of certain forms of mutual assistance, such
as letters rogatory. As for the expression “to afford mutual assistance”, it
refers to the duty of reciprocity incumbent on the parties to the Conven-
tion. It means that each party discharging its duty to co-operate in good
faith is entitled to expect similar conduct from the other.

12. The Court accepts that “Article 1 of the Convention of 1986 refers
to mutuality in the performance of the obligations laid down therein”
(Judgment, para. 119). However, it considers that “Djibouti cannot rely

on the principle of reciprocity in seeking execution of the international
letter rogatory it submitted to the French judicial authorities” (ibid.).
Even if it took the view that a distinction was to be made between the
performance of duties “mutually” and “reciprocally”, which is not the
case, it must be acknowledged that in the present case France has not

fulfilled its obligation to afford Djibouti “the widest measure of mutual
assistance” as laid down in Article 1 of the Convention.

13. France refused to comply with a request for mutual assistance
from Djibouti in the context of the Borrel case on two occasions. The

first request, submitted by the procureur de la République of Djibouti on

123297 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND. YUSUF )

blique de Djibouti le 17 juin 2004, a été refusée par les autorités fran-
çaises au motif qu’elle aurait été effectuée «en dehors du champ» de la
convention et «en méconnaissance de ses dispositions» (arrêt, par. 25).

Cette affirmation ne reflète pourtant pas la réalité.
14. D’après l’article premier de la convention, les deux parties s’enga-
gent à «s’accorder mutuellement» «l’entraide judiciaire la plus large pos-
sible» dans «toute procédure visant des infractions dont la répression est,
au moment où l’entraide est demandée, de la compétence des autorités

judiciaires de l’Etat requérant». L’on peut, par ailleurs, déduire des
termes de l’article 13 de la convention que les demandes d’entraide judi-
ciaire peuvent revêtir différentes formes, la commission rogatoire repré-
sentant l’une d’elles. L’article 13, paragraphe 1, énonce, pour sa part,
que les demandes d’entraide doivent contenir les indications suivantes:

l’autorité dont émane la demande, l’objet et le motif de la demande,
l’identité et la nationalité de la personne en cause (dans la mesure du
possible), ainsi que le nom et l’adresse du destinataire s’il y a lieu ou le
plus grand nombre de renseignements permettant son identification et

sa localisation. L’article 13, paragraphe 2, exige le respect de conditions
supplémentaires dans le cas où la demande d’entraide revêt la forme
d’une commission rogatoire. Il s’agit, en particulier, de la mention de
l’inculpation et d’un exposé sommaire des faits.
15. La première demande d’entraide judiciaire formulée par Djibouti

le 17 juin 2004 respectait les formes prescrites par l’article 13, alinéa 1, de
la convention. La France a toutefois refusé d’accéder à cette demande et
a insisté pour qu’elle prenne la forme d’une commission rogatoire inter-
nationale. Il semblerait que, par souci de coopération, Djibouti ait accepté
de présenter, le 3 novembre 2004, sa seconde demande sous cette forme.

Cette dernière a également été refusée par les autorités françaises.
16. S’il est vrai qu’un Etat partie peut refuser d’accéder à une demande
d’entraide judiciaire, un tel refus ne peut être qu’exceptionnel et devra en
tout état de cause être dûment motivé. Tel n’a pas été le cas en l’espèce.
En l’absence de réciprocité et de coopération mutuelle, la convention ne

serait plus une convention d’entraide judiciaire, mais un instrument
d’assistance à l’une des deux parties. Elle serait en effet vidée de
toute signification et ne répondrait plus que pour l’une des deux parties
seulement (en l’occurrence, la France) à l’objet pour lequel elle a été

conclue.
17. La nécessité que les deux parties se conforment à l’obligation fon-
damentale et réciproque de s’«accorder mutuellement l’entraide judiciaire
la plus large possible» relève donc de l’essence même de la convention.
Djibouti était en droit d’exiger l’exécution de la commission rogatoire

introduite auprès des autorités judiciaires françaises sur le fondement du
principe de réciprocité posé à l’article premier, paragraphe 1, de la
convention d’entraide, dès lors qu’il avait lui-même accordé l’entraide
judiciaire la plus large possible à la France en exécutant les trois commis-
sions rogatoires demandées par les autorités françaises dans l’affaire

Borrel.

124 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 297

17 June 2004 was rejected by the French authorities on the ground that it
was “‘outside the framework’” of the Convention and “‘without regard
for its provisions’” (Judgment, para. 25). This statement, however, does

not reflect the reality.
14. According to Article 1 of the Convention, the parties undertake
“to afford each other” “the widest measure of mutual assistance in pro-
ceedings in respect of offences the punishment of which, at the time of the
request for assistance, falls within the jurisdiction of the judicial authori-

ties of the requesting Party”. Also, it can be inferred from the wording of
Article 13 of the Convention that requests for mutual assistance may take
various forms, the letter rogatory being one of them. Meanwhile, Arti-
cle 13, paragraph 1, states that requests for mutual assistance must indi-
cate: the authority making the request, the object of and the reason for

the request, the identity and the nationality of the person concerned
(where possible), and where necessary, the name and address of the per-
son to be served or as much information as possible allowing for the per-
son to be identified and located. Article 13, paragraph 2, requires com-

pliance with additional conditions when the request for mutual assistance
takes the form of a letter rogatory, in particular a statement of the
offence and a summary of the facts.

15. The first request for mutual assistance by Djibouti, on 17 June

2004, was in the form prescribed by Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Con-
vention. France nevertheless refused to execute this request and insisted
that it should be in the form of an international letter rogatory. It would
seem that Djibouti agreed to submit a second request in that form on
3 November 2004, in the interests of co-operation. This was also refused

by the French authorities.
16. While it is true that a State party may refuse to comply with a
request for mutual assistance in criminal matters, such a refusal may only
be exceptional, and must in any event be based on proper grounds. This
was not so in the present case. Without reciprocity and mutual co-opera-

tion the Convention would no longer be a convention for mutual assist-
ance, but merely an instrument to assist one of the parties. It would be
devoid of all meaning and would answer the purpose for which it was
concluded for one of the parties only (in this case France).

17. So the necessity for both parties to comply with the fundamental
and reciprocal duty “to afford each other the widest measure of mutual
assistance” is at the very heart of the Convention. Djibouti was entitled
to demand execution of the letter rogatory submitted to the French judi-

cial authorities on the basis of the principle of reciprocity stated in Arti-
cle 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Mutual Assistance, since it had
itself afforded France the widest measure of mutual assistance by execut-
ing the three letters rogatory requested by the French authorities in the
Borrel case.

124298 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND .YUSUF )

B. La violation par la France des articles 2, 3, paragraphe 1, et 17
de la convention d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale

18. L’article 3, paragraphe 1, de la convention d’entraide judiciaire en

matière pénale pose le principe suivant:

«L’Etat requis fera exécuter, conformément à sa législation , les
commissions rogatoires relatives à une affaire pénale qui lui seront
adressées par les autorités judiciaires de l’Etat requérant et qui ont
pour objet d’accomplir des actes d’instruction ou de communiquer
des pièces à conviction, des dossiers ou des documents.» (Les ita-

liques sont de moi.)
19. La Cour constate qu’«il doit être satisfait à l’obligation d’exécuter

les commissions rogatoires internationales, visée à l’article 3 de la conven-
tion de 1986, dans le respect de la procédure prévue par la législation de
l’Etat requis» (arrêt, par. 123). Elle en déduit que «le sort qui doit être
réservé à la demande d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale dépend ... de

la décision des autorités nationales compétentes, selon la procédure pré-
vue par la législation de l’Etat requis» (ibid.). La Cour s’abstient pour-
tant d’examiner si la France a rempli ses obligations au titre de l’article 3
de la convention de 1986, et plus particulièrement si elle a exécuté la com-
mission rogatoire délivrée par Djibouti dans le respect de la procédure

prévue par la législation française.
20. L’article 3, paragraphe 1, de la convention représente un cas ty-
pique de renvoi du droit international au droit interne. Il en est ainsi lors-
que le droit international fait du respect du droit interne une condition de
son application. En l’occurrence, l’article 3, paragraphe 1, de la conven-

tion impose à Djibouti et à la France l’obligation d’exécuter leurs com-
missions rogatoires respectives en conformité avec leurs législations res-
pectives. La conformité avec le droit interne est pertinente sous l’angle de
la responsabilité internationale «parce que la règle de droit international
la rend pertinente, par exemple en intégrant la norme de conformité avec

le droit interne dans la norme internationale applicable ou un aspect de
celle-ci» («Commentaires, article 3 des articles de la CDI sur la respon-
sabilité de l’Etat», in J. Crawford, Les articles de la CDI sur la respon-
sabilité de l’Etat, Paris, Pedone, 2003, p. 107). Le respect des dispositions

de la convention d’entraide judiciaire franco-djiboutienne, et plus parti-
culièrement de celles relatives aux commissions rogatoires, est condi-
tionné par le respect de la procédure pénale française y relative. Le non-
respect de sa procédure pénale par la France peut donc engager sa
responsabilité internationale.

21. La Cour est compétente pour rechercher si la procédure prescrite
par le droit interne (dans ce cas, le Code de procédure pénale français) a
été observée dans la décision du refus d’exécution par la France de la
commission rogatoire requise par Djibouti. Si, d’ordinaire, il n’appartient
pas aux juridictions internationales de vérifier le respect du droit interne

par les autorités nationales, il en va autrement dans les cas où une

125 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 298

B. Violation by France of Articles 2, 3, paragraph 1, and Article 17 of
the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

18. Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in

Criminal Matters states the following principle:

“The requested State shall execute in accordance with its law any
letters rogatory relating to a criminal matter and addressed to it by
the judicial authorities of the requesting State for the purpose of
procuring evidence or transmitting articles to be produced in evi-
dence, records or documents.” (Emphasis added.)

19. The Court observes that “the obligation to execute international

letters rogatory laid down in Article 3 of the 1986 Convention is to be
realized in accordance with the procedural law of the requested State”
(Judgment, para. 123). It deduces from this that “the ultimate treatment
of a request for mutual assistance in criminal matters . . . depends on the

decision by the competent national authorities, following the procedure
established in the law of the requested State” (ibid.). However, the Court
refrains from considering whether France fulfilled its obligations under
Article 3 of the 1986 Convention, more specifically whether it executed
the letter rogatory issued by Djibouti in accordance with French proce-

dural law.
20. Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention is a typical case of renvoi
by international law to internal law. This occurs when international law
makes compliance with internal law a condition for its application. In
this case Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention imposes upon Dji-

bouti and France the obligation to execute their respective letters roga-
tory in accordance with their respective laws. Conformity with internal
law is relevant from the viewpoint of international responsibility “because
the rule of international law makes it relevant, e.g., by incorporating the
standard of compliance with internal law as the applicable international

standard or as an aspect of it” (J. Crawford, The International Law Com-
mission’s Articles on State Responsibility , Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 2002, p. 89). Compliance with the provisions of the Franco-
Djiboutian Convention on Mutual Assistance, more specifically those

relating to letters rogatory, is dependent on compliance with French
criminal procedure relating thereto. Failure by France to comply with its
criminal procedure may therefore engage its international responsibility.

21. The Court has jurisdiction to ascertain whether the procedure pre-
scribed by internal law (in this case the French Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure) was complied with in the decision by France to refuse to execute
the letter rogatory requested by Djibouti. Although normally it is not for
international courts to check whether internal law has been complied

with by national authorities, the situation is otherwise in cases where a

125299 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND .YUSUF )

convention renvoie directement à ce droit. Dans ces cas, le non-respect
des procédures de droit interne entraîne la violation de la convention, et
la Cour, dans le cas où elle est saisie par les parties à une telle convention,

peut et doit exercer un certain contrôle. Dans le présent arrêt, la Cour n’a
pourtant pas procédé à un tel contrôle.
22. En l’espèce, la licéité du comportement de la France aurait dû être
évaluée sur la base de la conformité de celui-ci avec les procédures pré-
vues par sa législation interne. Or, la France n’a pas agi en conformité

avec ces procédures, en particulier pour ce qui concerne l’autorité dont
relève, d’après le Code de procédure pénale français, le pouvoir d’appré-
ciation des notions d’atteinte à la souveraineté, à la sécurité et à l’ordre
public. En effet, le Code de procédure pénale français ne prévoit pas la
possibilité pour le juge d’instruction de rejeter, de sa seule initiative, une

demande d’entraide de nature à porter atteinte à l’ordre public et aux
intérêts essentiels de la France, ou d’apprécier l’incidence d’une telle
demande sur ces intérêts, même s’il peut soumettre, sur la base de l’ar-
ticle 694-9 du Code de procédure pénale, l’utilisation des informations

qu’il transmet à des conditions déterminées.
23. La disposition pertinente à laquelle le renvoi est opéré par l’ar-
ticle 3, paragraphe 1, de la convention, au cas où une demande d’entraide
judiciaire internationale est considérée de nature à porter atteinte à
l’ordre public ou aux intérêts essentiels de la France, est l’article 694-4 du

Code de procédure pénale français. D’après cette disposition,
«si l’exécution d’une demande d’entraide émanant d’une autorité

judiciaire étrangère est de nature à porter atteinte à l’ordre public ou
aux intérêts essentiels de la nation, le procureur de la République
saisi de cette demande ou avisé de cette demande en application du
troisième alinéa de l’article 694-1 la transmet au procureur général
qui détermine, s’il y a lieu, d’en saisir le ministre de la justice et

donne, le cas échéant, avis de cette transmission au juge d’instruc-
tion. S’il est saisi, le ministre de la justice informe l’autorité requé-
rante, le cas échéant, de ce qu’il ne peut être donné suite, totalement
ou partiellement, à sa demande...»

24. Il ressort de cette disposition que, dans l’hypothèse où le procureur
de la République estime qu’une demande d’entraide judiciaire «est de

nature à porter atteinte à l’ordre public ou aux intérêts essentiels de la
nation», il transmet celle-ci au procureur général. Ce dernier, s’il consi-
dère que cet avis est fondé, saisit le ministre de la justice, qui prend, en
fonction des informations dont il dispose, la décision de donner ou non
suite à la demande d’entraide. Il appartient donc au ministre de la justice,

et à lui seul, de déterminer si la demande est de nature à porter atteinte à
l’ordre public ou aux intérêts essentiels de la France. Le juge d’instruc-
tion n’intervient à aucun stade de cette décision: il ne lui appartient ni de
saisir le ministre de la justice ni de refuser l’exécution de l’entraide judi-
ciaire, lorsque la demande de l’Etat requérant est considérée comme étant

de nature à porter atteinte à la souveraineté ou à d’autres intérêts essen-

126 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP.OP .YUSUF ) 299

convention refers directly to that law. In these cases failure to comply
with internal legal procedures entails a violation of the Convention, and
when the Court is seised by the parties to such a convention it can and

must exercise a measure of control. In the present Judgment, however,
the Court has not done so.
22. In the present case the legality of France’s conduct should have
been assessed on the basis of whether it was in conformity with the pro-
cedures laid down by its internal law. France has not acted in accordance

with these procedures, especially with regard to judgmental authority
which, according to the French Code of Criminal Procedure is responsi-
ble for assessing the concepts of threats to sovereignty, security and ordre
public. The French Code of Criminal Procedure makes no provision for
an investigating judge, on his own initiative, to reject a request for

mutual assistance likely to prejudice the ordre public or the fundamental
interests of France, or to assess the effect of such a request on these inter-
ests, even though, on the basis of Article 694-9 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, he may make the information forwarded subject to certain

conditions.
23. The relevant provision to which the renvoi is made by Article 3,
paragraph 1, of the Convention when a request for international mutual
assistance is deemed likely to prejudice the ordre public or the fundamen-
tal interests of France is Article 694-4 of the French Code of Criminal

Procedure. According to this provision,
“if the enforcement of a request for judicial assistance coming from

a foreign judicial authority is liable to prejudice ordre public or the
fundamental interests of the nation, the district prosecutor seised of
this request in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 694-1
sends this to the prosecutor general who decides, if appropriate, to
seise the Minister of Justice and gives, where applicable, notice of

this reference to the investigating judge. If he is seised, the Minister
of Justice informs the authority which made the request, if appro-
priate, that no action, total or partial, may be taken in relation to
the request . . .”

24. According to this provision, should the procureur de la République
take the view that a request for mutual assistance “is likely to prejudice

ordre public or the fundamental interests of the nation”, he forwards it to
the procureur général. If the latter considers this opinion to be justified,
he seises the Minister of Justice, who, on the basis of the information he
has, decides whether or not to give effect to the request for mutual assist-
ance. Thus it is for the Minister of Justice, and for him alone, to deter-

mine whether the request is likely to prejudice ordre public or the funda-
mental interests of France. The investigating judge is not involved at any
stage in this decision: it is not for him either to seise the Minister of Jus-
tice or to refuse to execute the request for mutual assistance when the
request from the requesting State is considered likely to prejudice the sov-

ereignty or other fundamental interests of France. At most he may be

126300 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND. YUSUF )

tiels de la France. Tout au plus peut-il être informé de la transmission de
la demande du procureur de la République au procureur général si la
demande le concerne.

25. La décision d’exécuter ou non une demande d’entraide judiciaire
de nature à porter atteinte à l’ordre public et aux intérêts essentiels de la
France ne relève donc pas de la compétence d’un juge d’instruction.
Aussi le gouvernement apprécie-t-il seul l’opportunité de transmettre ou
de refuser de transmettre les pièces d’exécution à l’Etat requérant. Le

contrôle des juridictions françaises porte seulement sur la régularité, au
regard des règles de procédure françaises, des actes d’instruction exécutés
à la demande des autorités étrangères. En effet, les juridictions françaises
se sont reconnu un certain pouvoir de contrôle des actes exécutés en
France sur commission rogatoire internationale. Le contrôle fut expres-

sément consacré dans un arrêt du 24 juin 1997 de la chambre criminelle
de la Cour de cassation française. En l’espèce, la chambre criminelle a
reconnu le principe selon lequel les modalités d’exécution en France
d’une commission rogatoire internationale sont soumises aux formes pré-

vues par la législation de l’Etat requis. Elle en a déduit le contrôle, par les
juridictions de cet Etat, de la régularité de l’exécution des commissions
rogatoires internationales.
26. La chambre criminelle s’est également prononcée sur l’étendue des
pouvoirs du juge d’instruction en matière de refus d’exécution d’une com-

mission rogatoire internationale. Dans un arrêt du 30 mars 1999, elle a
considéré que le juge d’instruction chargé d’exécuter une commission
rogatoire délivrée en application de la convention franco-sénégalaise
d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale avait excédé ses pouvoirs en refu-
sant d’effectuer les actes demandés en raison de la nature politique des

infractions poursuivies. La solution retenue par la haute juridiction fran-
çaise semble signifier que le juge d’instruction requis n’avait pas à porter
d’appréciation sur ce point. La décision de rejeter une demande d’entraide
judiciaire relèverait donc ainsi exclusivement de la compétence du mi-
nistre de la justice. Il serait donc possible de soutenir que: «Seule devrait

échapper au juge délégué l’appréciation, assez peu juridique, tenant aux
incidences possibles de l’entraide sur la sécurité, l’ordre public ou les
intérêts essentiels de la nation.» (Voir Etude de M. F. Desportes,
conseiller référendaire à la Cour de cassation, site Internet: http://www.

courdecassation.fr/article5791.html. )
27. Dans le cas d’espèce, le procureur de la République de Paris a
interprété l’article 694-4 du Code de procédure pénale de cette façon
lorsqu’il a déclaré que le juge d’instruction chargé de la commission roga-
toire internationale ne pouvait émettre qu’un avis quant à la compatibi-

lité des mesures sollicitées avec l’ordre public et les intérêts essentiels de la
nation, la décision de ne pas donner suite à une commission rogatoire
relevant du ministère de la justice. Le procureur général a confirmé cette
interprétation en soutenant que seule l’autorité ministérielle était compé-
tente pour déterminer si la demande d’entraide pouvait porter atteinte

aux intérêts essentiels de la France, le magistrat instructeur ne disposant

127 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 300

informed that the request has been forwarded by the procureur de la
République to the procureur général if the request concerns him.

25. Thus the decision whether or not to execute a request for mutual
assistance likely to prejudice ordre public or the fundamental interests of
France is not within the jurisdiction of an investigating judge. So the gov-
ernment alone assesses whether it is appropriate to forward the docu-
ments to the requesting State or to refuse. Control by the French courts

extends only to whether investigations at the request of foreign authori-
ties have been properly conducted from the viewpoint of French pro-
cedural rules. In fact the French courts have assumed a measure of con-
trol over the execution of international letters rogatory in France. That
control was expressly recognized in a judgment of 24 June 1997 by the

Criminal Division of the French Cour de cassation. In that case the
Criminal Division recognized the principle that the procedure in France
for the execution of an international letter rogatory is subject to the for-
malities prescribed by the law of the requested State. It deduced from this

that the courts of that State may control whether international letters
rogatory are properly executed.

26. The Criminal Division has also ruled on the extent of the powers
of an investigating judge as regards refusing to execute an international

letter rogatory. In a judgment of 30 March 1999 it found that the inves-
tigating judge responsible for executing a letter rogatory issued pursuant
to the Franco-Senegalese Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters had exceeded his powers by refusing to perform the acts requested
owing to the political nature of the offences concerned. The solution

adopted by the highest French court seems to mean that it was not for
the investigating judge requested to pass judgment on this point. The
decision to reject a request for mutual assistance thus allegedly falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice. It is therefore
possible to assert “the possible effects of mutual assistance on the secu-

rity, ordre public or the fundamental interests of the nation are the only,
not very legal, matters which the delegated judge should not assess” (see
Study by M. F. Desportes, Assistant Judge at the Cour de cassation,
Internet site: http://www.courdecassation.fr/article5791.html). [Transla-

tion by the Registry.]
27. In the present case, the procureur de la République in Paris inter-
preted Article 694-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this way,
declaring that the investigating judge dealing with the international letter
rogatory could do no more than express an opinion on the compatibility

of the measures requested with the ordre public and the fundamental
interests of the nation, because the decision not to execute a letter roga-
tory was a matter for the Ministry of Justice. The procureur général con-
firmed this interpretation, maintaining that only the Minister was com-
petent to determine whether the request for mutual assistance might be

prejudicial to the fundamental interests of France, the investigating judge

127301 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND. YUSUF )

pas de pouvoir de décision en matière d’entraide internationale. La
chambre d’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris a elle-même déclaré,
dans son arrêt du 19 octobre 2006, que les autorités gouvernementales

étaient les seules compétentes pour apprécier les notions d’atteinte à la
souveraineté, à la sécurité, à l’ordre public ou aux autres intérêts essen-
tiels de la nation. Elle a ajouté que les dispositions de l’article 694-4 du
Code de procédure pénale:

«mett[aien]t en place les conditions qui permettent à l’autorité gou-
vernementale d’apprécier in fine, au regard de l’ordre public ou des
intérêts essentiels de la nation, si elle doit s’opposer ou donner satis-

faction à la demande d’entraide étrangère, par la transmission ou
non des pièces d’exécution» (voir contre-mémoire de la France,
annexe XI).

28. La demande d’entraide judiciaire djiboutienne a été transmise par
le ministère des affaires étrangères de Djibouti au ministère des affaires
étrangères français par le biais de l’ambassade de France à Djibouti. La

demande a ensuite été communiquée au procureur de la République de
Paris. Le directeur des affaires criminelles et des grâces du ministère de la
justice aurait déjà, à ce stade, attiré l’attention de ce dernier sur la néces-
sité d’exclure du dossier les pièces susceptibles de porter atteinte à la sou-
veraineté, à la sécurité, à l’ordre public ou à d’autres intérêts essentiels

de la France, en application de l’article 2, alinéa c), de la convention
d’entraide judiciaire franco-djiboutienne. Il ressort toutefois d’une lettre
datée du 27 janvier 2005 et adressée par le cabinet du ministre de la jus-
tice français aux autorités djiboutiennes que celui-ci aurait déclaré avoir
demandé à ce que «tout soit mis en Œuvre pour que la copie du dossier de

l’instruction judiciaire relative au décès de M. Bernard Borrel soit trans-
mise au ministre de la justice ... de la République de Djibouti avant la fin
du mois de février 2005».
29. Il aurait en outre «demandé au procureur de Paris de faire en sorte
que ce dossier ne connaisse aucun retard non justifié». Le 8 février 2005,

le juge d’instruction français a refusé la transmission du dossier «Borrel»
au motif que celle-ci était de nature à porter atteinte aux intérêts fonda-
mentaux de la France, en application de l’article 2, alinéa c),d el
convention bilatérale de 1986. Le 6 juin 2005, l’ambassadeur de France à

Djibouti a informé le ministre djiboutien des affaires étrangères que la
France n’était pas en mesure de faire exécuter la commission rogatoire
internationale.
30. Il ressort de l’examen de ces éléments que la décision du refus de
l’entraide judiciaire n’a pas été prise par la personne compétente en droit

français, cela en violation des articles 3, paragraphe 1, et 2, alinéa c),de
la convention. Le juge d’instruction n’était pas fondé à apprécier les inté-
rêts fondamentaux de la France auxquels l’exécution de la commission
rogatoire pouvait porter préjudice et refuser la demande d’entraide sur
cette base. Le Code de procédure pénale français, auquel renvoie l’ar-

ticle 3, paragraphe 1, de la convention, ne prévoit en effet pas la possibilité

128 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 301

having no decision-making powers in matters of international mutual
assistance. The chambre d’instruction of the Court of Appeal in Paris
itself declared in its judgment of 19 October 2006 that government

authorities alone were competent to assess the concepts of prejudice to
the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other fundamental interests of
the nation. It added that the provisions of Article 694-4 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure:

“establish[ed] the conditions on which the government authority
may ultimately determine, in the light of the ordre public or the
essential interests of the Nation, whether it is to oppose compliance

with the foreign request for mutual assistance by transmitting or not
transmitting the items requested therein” (see Counter-Memorial of
France, Ann. XI).

28. The Djiboutian request for mutual assistance was transmitted by
the Foreign Minister of Djibouti to the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs through the Embassy of France in Djibouti. The request was then

transmitted to the procureur de la République in Paris. At this stage the
Ministry of Justice’s Director of Criminal Affairs and Pardons had
already drawn the Ministry’s attention to the need to omit from the
record any documents likely to prejudice the sovereignty, the security, the
ordre public or other essential interests of the Nation, pursuant to Arti-

cle 2, paragraph (c), of the Franco-Djiboutian Convention on Mutual
Assistance. However, a letter dated 27 January 2005 sent by the French
Minister of Justice’s Principal Private Secretary to the Djiboutian authori-
ties shows that he had asked “for all steps to be taken to ensure that a
copy of the record of the investigation into the death of Mr. Ber-

nard Borrel is transmitted to the Minister of Justice . . . of the Republic
of Djibouti before the end of February 2005”.

29. He also allegedly “asked the procureur de la République in Paris to
ensure that there is no undue delay in dealing with this matter”. On

8 February 2005 the French investigating judge refused to transmit the
Borrel file on the ground that this was likely to compromise the funda-
mental interests of France, pursuant to Article 2, paragraph (c),ofthe
1986 bilateral Convention. On 6 June 2005 the Ambassador of France to

Djibouti informed the Djiboutian Foreign Minister that France was not
in a position to comply with the request to execute the international letter
rogatory.
30. An examination of these factors shows that the decision to refuse
mutual assistance was not taken by a person competent under French

law, in violation of Articles 3, paragraph 1, and 2 (c), of the Convention.
The investigating judge had no basis for assessing the fundamental inter-
ests of France that might be compromised by execution of the letter roga-
tory or for refusing the request for mutual assistance on that basis. The
French Code of Criminal Procedure, to which Article 3, paragraph 1, of

the Convention refers, makes no provision for an investigating

128302 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND. YUSUF )

pour le juge d’instruction de rejeter de sa seule initiative une demande
d’entraide même s’il peut soumettre, sur la base de l’article 694-9 du Code
de procédure pénale, l’utilisation des informations qu’il transmet à des

conditions déterminées. Le droit pénal français ne prévoit pas que le juge
d’instruction puisse s’opposer à la transmission desdites informations ni
même que son avis soit sollicité sur ce point. Cette décision du juge d’ins-
truction par lettre du 8 février 2005 aurait ensuite été transmise aux auto-
rités djiboutiennes par lettre du 31 mai 2005. Les termes de la lettre

laissent toutefois penser que le ministère de la justice s’est en fait contenté
de faire connaître aux autorités djiboutiennes la décision du juge d’ins-
truction français de refuser la transmission du dossier Borrel sur le fon-
dement de l’article 2, alinéa c), de la convention d’entraide. Il n’aurait
donc pas décidé lui-même de refuser cette transmission. La lettre est rédi-

gée en ces termes:
«Après un examen attentif, le juge d’instruction a, par décision

judiciaire non susceptible de recours, estimé que l’article 2 c) de la
convention franco-djiboutienne d’entraide pénale du 27 septembre
1986 devait recevoir application et ne permettait pas de réserver une
réponse favorable à la demande de vos autorités judiciaires. Je ne

puis que vous faire part de cette décision souveraine de l’autorité
judiciaire compétente.» (Contre-mémoire de la France, annexe V.)

La Cour a, en tout état de cause, considéré qu’elle «n’[était] pas en
mesure de prendre en considération ce document dans l’examen de la pré-
sente affaire» pour les raisons suivantes: la France n’aurait pas allégué
que cette lettre aurait «été remise à l’ambassadeur de Djibouti à Paris ou

à l’un de ses collaborateurs par les voies diplomatiques usuelles», elle
n’aurait pas apporté la preuve que cette lettre «aurait été envoyée par la
voie postale ou acheminée par porteur», enfin, elle n’aurait pas fourni «la
preuve que le départ de la lettre aurait été enregistré dans un bureau
d’ordre du ministère de la justice ou du ministère des affaires étrangères,

selon la pratique en usage au sein des administrations françaises» (arrêt,
par. 143).
31. La dernière lettre dans laquelle le refus d’entraide judiciaire a été
évoqué est la lettre adressée par l’ambassadeur de France à Djibouti au

ministre djiboutien des affaires étrangères. Dans cette lettre, datée du
6 juin 2005, l’ambassadeur affirmait que, «[a]près consultation de [ses]
autorités», la France n’était pas en mesure de donner suite à cette
demande d’entraide judiciaire. Cette lettre ne faisait pas apparaître les
motifs pour lesquels la France refusait d’accorder l’entraide.

32. Il apparaît en conséquence que, par sa lettre du 6 juin 2005, la
France a violé les articles 3, paragraphe 1, et 2, alinéa c), de la conven-
tion, dans la mesure où elle a fait connaître aux autorités djiboutiennes le
refus du juge d’instruction de donner suite à la demande d’entraide, alors
que cette autorité n’était pas compétente pour prendre une telle décision.

33. La France a en outre violé l’article 17 de la convention, dans la

129 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 302

judge to reject a request for mutual assistance on his own initiative, even
though, on the basis of Article 694-9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
he may make the information subject to certain conditions. French crimi-

nal law makes no provision for an investigating judge to oppose the for-
warding of the said information, or even for his opinion to be sought on
this matter. This decision by the investigating judge by letter of 8 Febru-
ary 2005 was allegedly then forwarded to the Djiboutian authorities by
letter of 31 May 2005. However, the wording of the letter suggests that

the Ministry of Justice confined itself to informing the Djiboutian authori-
ties of the decision by the French investigating judge to refuse to forward
the Borrel file on the basis of Article 2, paragraph (c), of the Mutual
Assistance Convention. The suggestion was therefore that it had not
itself decided to refuse to forward the record. The letter is worded as fol-

lows:
“After giving the matter careful attention, the investigating judge,

by a judicial decision not open to appeal, considered that Arti-
cle 2 (c) of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters between France and Djibouti of 27 September 1986 had to be
applied and that this did not allow a favourable response to be given

to the request from your judicial authorities. I have no alternative
but to inform you of this sovereign decision of the competent judi-
cial authority.” (Counter-Memorial of the French Republic, Ann. V.)

In any event the Court found that it “c[ould] not take this document
into consideration in its examination of the present case” for the follow-
ing reasons: France did not allege that this letter “was delivered to Dji-
bouti’s Ambassador in Paris or to a member of his staff through the

usual diplomatic channels”, did not adduce evidence that the letter “was
sent by post or conveyed by courier” and lastly did not offer “evidence
that the despatch of the letter was recorded in a mail registry at the Min-
istry of Justice or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in accordance with
French administrative practice” (Judgment, para. 143).

31. The last letter in which there was a reference to the refusal of
mutual assistance was the one addressed by the Ambassador of France in

Djibouti to the Djiboutian Foreign Minister. In this letter, dated 6 June
2005, the Ambassador stated that “after consulting [my] authorities”,
France was not in a position to comply with this request for mutual
assistance. This letter did not reveal the grounds on which France was
refusing to afford mutual assistance.

32. It is therefore apparent that, by its letter of 6 June 2005, France
violated Articles 3, paragraph 1, and 2 (c) of the Convention in that it
informed the Djiboutian authorities of the refusal by the investigating
judge to comply with the request for mutual assistance, although that
official was not competent to take such a decision.

33. France also violated Article 17 of the Convention in that the letter

129303 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND .YUSUF )

mesure où la lettre du 6 juin 2005 était dépourvue de toute motivation. Si
cette disposition figure dans une section de la convention séparée de celle
où figure l’article 2, cela ne veut pas dire qu’il n’y a pas de lien direct et

effectif entre les deux dispositions en question, car il s’agit d’une disposi-
tion commune à toutes les formes d’entraide judiciaire prévues par la
convention. En effet, l’article 2 n’est pas la seule disposition de la conven-
tion qui prévoit la possibilité de refuser l’entraide judiciaire. Par exemple,
l’article 5 prévoit que l’Etat requis «pourra surseoir à la remise des

objets, dossiers ou documents dont la communication est demandée, s’ils
lui sont nécessaires pour une procédure pénale en cours». L’article 10 sur
le transfèrement est même plus spécifique et prévoit que le transfèrement
pourra être refusé sous certaines conditions. Donc, l’article 17 s’applique
à toutes les dispositions prévoyant un refus éventuel et dispose que «tout

refus d’entraide judiciaire» (qu’il soit de nature générale ou de nature
spécifique) doit être motivé. Si le refus n’est pas motivé, il constitue une
violation de la convention. Le non-respect de l’article 17 par la France
entraîne donc une violation de l’article premier de la convention, étant

donné que la France ne peut se prévaloir de l’article 2, alinéa c), sans
donner les raisons de son refus.
34. Par ailleurs, tout refus non motivé conformément à l’article 17 de
la convention ne peut produire d’effets juridiques. La coopération et
l’assistance mutuelle que Djibouti était en droit d’attendre en vertu de la

convention ne sont satisfaites ni par la lettre du 31 mai 2005, qui ne doit
pas être prise en considération, ni par celle du 6 juin 2005, dans laquelle
l’ambassadeur de France à Djibouti a écrit au ministre des affaires étran-
gères djiboutien ce qui suit: «je suis au regret de vous informer que nous
ne sommes pas en mesure de donner suite à cette demande». La simple

référence par la France, dans la lettre du 31 mai 2005, à l’article 2, ali-
néa c), de la convention, ainsi que le refus pur et simple contenu dans la
lettre du 6 juin 2005, constituent un manquement à ses obligations inter-
nationales au titre de l’article premier et de l’article 17 de la convention,
étant donné que ni l’obligation de «s’accorder mutuellement ... l’entraide

judiciaire la plus large possible» ni celle de motiver tout refus n’ont été
respectées.
35. Je regrette que la Cour n’ait pas voulu relever ces violations de la
convention qui engagent la responsabilité internationale de la France, et

qu’elle ait décidé de rejeter les conclusions présentées par la République
de Djibouti concernant la violation par la France des règles afférentes à
l’entraide judiciaire prévues par la convention de 1986, abstraction faite
de sa conclusion à l’alinéa a) du point 2 du dispositif sur le manquement
par la France à son obligation au titre de l’article 17 de la convention. La

constatation par la Cour de l’ensemble des violations décrites ci-dessus
aurait pu contribuer au retour des deux Etats à une meilleure coopéra-
tion dans leurs relations, en général, ainsi qu’à une assistance mutuelle
plus efficace en matière judiciaire et sur des bases juridiques plus claires.
Le fait que ces deux Etats aient voulu soumettre leur différend à la Cour

par consentement mutuel et par la voie du forum prorogatum témoigne

130 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 303

of 6 June 2005 gave no reasons whatever. Although this provision is in a
section of the Convention separate from the one containing Article 2, it
does not mean that there is no direct and effective link between the two

provisions, because this is a provision common to all the forms of mutual
assistance covered by the Convention. In fact, Article 2 is not the only
provision in the Convention that provides for a possible refusal of
mutual assistance. For example, Article 5 lays down that the requested
State “may delay the handing over of any property, records or docu-

ments requested, if the said property, records or documents are required
in connection with pending criminal proceedings”. Article 10 on transfer
is even more specific, and states that transfer can be refused under certain
conditions. Thus Article 17 applies to all provisions envisaging a possible
refusal, stating that reasons must be given for “any refusal of mutual

assistance” (whether general or specific). Giving no reasons for a refusal
constitutes a violation of the Convention. France’s failure to comply with
Article 17 therefore involves a violation of Article 1 of the Convention,
given that France cannot rely on Article 2 (c), without giving reasons for

its refusal.

34. Also, any refusal without giving reasons in conformity with Arti-
cle 17 of the Convention is devoid of legal effect. The co-operation and
mutual assistance that Djibouti was entitled to expect under the Conven-

tion are not given, either by the letter of 31 May 2005, which should not
be taken into account, or by the letter of 6 June 2005, in which the
Ambassador of France to Djibouti wrote to the Djiboutian Foreign Min-
ister as follows: “I regret to inform you that we are not in a position to
comply with this request.” The mere reference by France in the letter of

31 May 2005 to Article 2 (c), of the Convention and the refusal pure and
simple in the letter of 6 June 2005 amount to a breach of its international
obligations under Article 1 and Article 17 of the Convention, given that
neither the obligation to “afford each other . . . the widest measure of
mutual assistance” nor the obligation to give reasons for any refusal was

complied with.

35. I regret that the Court did not wish to take up these violations of
the Convention that engage France’s international responsibility, and

that it decided to reject the submissions by the Republic of Djibouti
regarding the violation by France of the rules relating to mutual assist-
ance laid down by the 1986 Convention, leaving aside its conclusion in
paragraph 2 (a) of the operative part on the breach by France of its
obligation under Article 17 of the Convention . Had the Court taken

note of all the violations described above, this might have helped the
two States to return to better co-operation in their relations in general,
and to more effective mutual assistance in legal matters and on firmer
legal bases. The fact that these two States were willing to submit their
dispute to the Court by mutual consent and by way of forum proroga-

tum is evidence of their willingness to find a complete and final solution

130304 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND. YUSUF )

de leur volonté de trouver une solution intégrale et définitive à ce diffé-

rend dans le but de renforcer les liens traditionnels d’amitié entre les deux
pays.

III. LES ATTEINTES À L ’IMMUNITÉ DE JURIDICTION ET À L INVIOLABILITÉ
DU CHEF DE L ’u TAT DE D JIBOUTI

36. La Cour traite des atteintes aux immunités et à l’inviolabilité du

chef de l’Etat de Djibouti comme des faits appartenant au passé et pré-
sentés à la Cour seulement pour des raisons historiques. Les convoca-
tions à témoin adressées au chef de l’Etat djiboutien en 2005 et 2007
n’ont jamais été retirées par les autorités judiciaires françaises. Donc, au

lieu de dire dans les motifs de l’arrêt que «des excuses s’imposaient», la
Cour aurait dû inclure l’exigence des excuses dans le dispositif même de
l’arrêt et demander à la France de retirer les deux convocations. Il y a en
effet eu violation par la France de ses obligations internationales relatives

à l’immunité de juridiction et à l’inviolabilité du chef d’Etat de Djibouti,
violation qui méritait une décision ferme et claire de la part de la Cour,
cela afin d’éviter la continuation de celle-ci ainsi que sa répétition dans
l’avenir.

37. La valeur coutumière de l’immunité du chef d’Etat à l’étranger a
été reconnue par plusieurs conventions. Ainsi, l’article 21, alinéa 1, de la
convention sur les missions spéciales et l’article 3, alinéa 2, du projet

d’articles sur les immunités juridictionnelles des Etats et de leurs biens
reconnaissent expressément l’immunité conférée par le droit international
général aux chefs d’Etat. La convention de Vienne sur les relations diplo-
matiques du 18 avril 1961 ne contient aucune disposition consacrée en

particulier aux chefs d’Etat. Toutefois, elle codifie de nombreux aspects
du statut dont jouissent les agents diplomatiques lorsqu’ils se trouvent
dans l’Etat accréditaire. Or, les chefs d’Etat sont, par définition, les plus
hauts représentants des Etats qu’ils dirigent. Par conséquent, les règles

présentes dans cette convention peuvent s’appliquer dans de nombreux
cas à ces derniers. L’article 29 de cette convention dispose en particulier
ce qui suit:

«La personne de l’agent diplomatique est inviolable. Il ne peut
être soumis à aucune forme d’arrestation ou de détention. L’Etat
accréditaire le traite avec le respect qui lui est dû, et prend toutes
mesures appropriées pour empêcher toute atteinte à sa personne, sa

liberté et sa dignité.»
38. L’immunité reconnue aux chefs d’Etat peut être de différents types:

l’inviolabilité personnelle, l’immunité de juridiction et l’immunité d’exé-
cution. L’inviolabilité et l’immunité de juridiction pénale du chef d’Etat
visent, en particulier, à empêcher celui-ci de faire l’objet de mesures de
contrainte lorsqu’il est en visite à l’étranger. L’article premier de la réso-

lution de l’Institut de droit international du 26 août 2001 résume assez
clairement ce type d’immunité:

131 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP.YUSUF ) 304

to this dispute in order to strengthen the traditional ties of friendship

between them.

III. ATTACKS ON THE IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION AND INVIOLABILITY
OF THE H EAD OF STATE OF D JIBOUTI

36. The Court treats attacks on the immunity and inviolability of the

Head of State of Djibouti as acts in the past, submitted to the Court
solely for historical reasons. The witness summonses addressed to the
Djiboutian Head of State in 2005 and 2007 have never been withdrawn
by the French judicial authorities. Therefore, instead of saying in the rea-

sons for the judgment that “an apology [was] due”, the Court should
have included the requirement for apologies in the operative part of the
judgment itself and should have asked France to withdraw both sum-
monses. There was indeed a violation by France of its international obli-

gations regarding the immunity from jurisdiction and inviolability of the
Head of State of Djibouti, a violation worthy of a firm, clear decision by
the Court in order to avoid continuing violation as well as a repetition of
it in the future.

37. The customary validity of the immunity of a Head of State abroad
has been recognized by several conventions. Thus Article 21, paragraph 1,
of the Convention on Special Missions and Article 3, paragraph 2, of the

Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property
expressly recognize the immunity conferred upon Heads of State by gen-
eral international law. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
of 18 April 1961 contains no provision specifically devoted to Heads of

State. However, it does codify many aspects of the status enjoyed by dip-
lomatic representatives when they are in a receiving State. Heads of State
are by definition the highest representatives of the States that they lead.
Therefore the rules in this Convention may be applied to them in many

cases. Article 29 of this Convention states in particular:

“The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not
be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall
treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to pre-
vent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.”

38. The immunity granted to Heads of State may be of various types:

personal inviolability, immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from
execution. The inviolability and immunity from criminal jurisdiction of a
Head of State are aimed in particular at protecting him from any form of
coercion when on a visit abroad. Article 1 of the resolution of the Institut

de droit international of 26 August 2001 summarizes the type of immu-
nity quite clearly:

131305 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP .IND .YUSUF )

«La personne du chef d’Etat est inviolable sur le territoire d’un
Etat étranger. Elle ne peut y être soumise à aucune forme d’arresta-
tion ou de détention. Les autorités de celui-ci traitent ce chef d’Etat

avec le respect qui lui est dû et prennent toutes mesures raisonnables
pour empêcher qu’il soit porté atteinte à sa personne, à sa liberté ou
à sa dignité.»

39. La Cour reconnaît dans le présent arrêt, conformément à sa juris-
prudence récente, que la règle de droit international coutumier reflétée à
l’article 29 de la convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques se
«traduit par des obligations positives à la charge de l’Etat d’accueil, pour ce

qui est des actes de ses propres autorités, et par des obligations de préven-
tion concernant les actes éventuels de particuliers» (arrêt, par. 174). Elle
impose en outre aux Etats d’accueil «l’obligation de protéger l’honneur
et la dignité des chefs d’Etat, en relation avec leur inviolabilité» (ibid.).
40. L’examen des convocations à témoigner adressées au chef de l’Etat

djiboutien le 17 mai 2005 et le 14 février 2007 amène pourtant la Cour à
conclure que la France n’a pas porté atteinte aux règles relatives à
l’immunité de juridiction pénale et à l’inviolabilité qui s’appliquent à lui.
Il est toutefois manifeste que ces convocations constituent non seulement

un manquement à la «courtoisie due à un chef d’Etat étranger», mais
également une violation de l’obligation qui incombait à la France de pro-
téger l’honneur et la dignité des chefs d’Etat étrangers.
41. La Cour constate en premier lieu que la convocation adressée au
chef de l’Etat djiboutien le 17 mai 2005 «n’était pas assortie de mesures

de contrainte prévues par le Code de procédure pénale français en son
article 109». Il s’agissait, au contraire, d’une «simple invitation à témoi-
gner que le chef de l’Etat pouvait accepter ou refuser librement» (ibid.,
par. 171). Cette déclaration n’est pas fondée, dans la mesure où cette
convocation était bien assortie de mesures de contrainte qui portaient

atteinte à l’immunité du chef de l’Etat djiboutien.

A. La convocation à témoigner du 17 mai 2005

42. La convocation à témoigner du 17 mai 2005 portait sur l’«assassi-
nat sur la personne de M. Bernard Borrel, les 18 ou 19 octobre 1995 à
Djibouti, faits prévus et réprimés par les articles 113-7, 221-1, 221-3,
221-8, 221-9 et 221-11 du Code pénal». La question qui se pose est de
savoir si cette procédure relevait de l’article 101 ou de l’article 656 du

Code de procédure pénale car, dans le premier cas seulement, la France
aurait porté atteinte aux immunités de juridiction et à l’inviolabilité du
chef de l’Etat djiboutien. L’article 656 du Code de procédure pénale
énonce ce qui suit:

«La déposition écrite d’un représentant d’une puissance étrangère
est demandée par l’entremise du ministre des affaires étrangères. Si
la demande est agréée, cette déposition est reçue par le premier pré-

sident de la cour d’appel ou par le magistrat qu’il aura délégué.»

132 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP.OP .YUSUF ) 305

“When in the territory of a foreign State, the person of the Head
of State is inviolable. While there, he or she may not be placed under
any form of arrest or detention. The Head of State shall be treated

by the authorities with due respect and all reasonable steps shall be
taken to prevent any infringement of his or her person, liberty, or
dignity.”

39. The Court recognizes in the present Judgment, in accordance with
its recent jurisprudence, that the rule of customary international law
reflected in Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
“translates into positive obligations for the receiving State as regards the

actions of its own authorities, and into obligations of prevention as
regards possible acts by individuals” (Judgment, para. 174). It also
imposes on receiving States “the obligation to protect the honour and
dignity of Heads of State, in connection with their inviolability” (ibid.).
40. However, examination of the witness summonses addressed to the

Djiboutian Head of State on 17 May 2005 and 14 February 2007 lead the
Court to conclude that France had not infringed the rules on immunity
from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability applicable to him. Neverthe-
less it is clear that these summonses are not merely a breach of the “cour-

tesy due to a foreign Head of State”, but also violate the duty incumbent
on France to protect the honour and dignity of foreign Heads of State.

41. The Court finds first that the summons addressed to the Djibou-
tian Head of State on 17 May 2005 “was not associated with the meas-

ures of constraint provided for by Article 109 of the French Code of
Criminal Procedure”. On the contrary, it was “merely an invitation to
testify which the Head of State could freely accept or decline” (ibid.,
para. 171). This statement is unsound, because the summons was cer-
tainly associated with measures of constraint which infringed the immu-

nity of the Djiboutian Head of State.

A. The witness summons of 17 May 2005

42. The witness summons of 17 May 2005 related to “the murder of
Mr. Bernard Borrel on 18 or 19 October 1995 in Djibouti, punishable
under Articles 113-7, 221-1, 221-3, 221-8, 221-9 and 221-11 of the Penal
Code”. The question that arises is whether these proceedings fall under
Article 101 or Article 656 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because

France allegedly infringed the immunities from jurisdiction and the invio-
lability of the Djiboutian Head of State in the former case only. Arti-
cle 656 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states:

“The written statement of the representative of a foreign Power is
requested through the intermediary of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs. If the application is granted, the statement is received by the

president of the appeal court or by a judge delegated by him.”

132306 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP .IND .YUSUF )

43. En l’espèce, le président djiboutien a été invité à se présenter au
cabinet du juge d’instruction pour être entendu en qualité de témoin. Il n’a
pas été invité par le ministre des affaires étrangères à faire une déposition

écrite. La procédure n’a donc clairement pas été menée sur la base de l’ar-
ticle 656 du Code de procédure pénale, qui requiert une demande de déposi-
tion écrite par l’entremise du ministre des affaires étrangères. Elle corres-
pond davantage à la procédure prévue par l’article 101 du même code.
44. Aux termes du paragraphe premier de l’article 101 du Code de

procédure pénale, «[l]e juge d’instruction fait citer devant lui, par un
huissier ou par un agent de la force publique, toutes les personnes dont la
déposition lui paraît utile. Une copie de leur citation est délivrée.» En
l’espèce, le juge d’instruction a bien fait citer devant lui le président
djiboutien. Une copie de cette citation lui a bien été délivrée. Le para-

graphe 3 de cet article précise que, «[l]orsqu’il est cité ou convoqué, le
témoin est avisé que, s’il ne comparaît pas ou qu’il refuse de comparaître,
il pourra y être contraint par la force publique en application des dispo-
sitions de l’article 109». L’article 109 du Code de procédure pénale pré-

voit en effet que «[t]oute personne citée pour être entendue comme
témoin est tenue de comparaître, de prêter serment et de déposer sous
réserve des dispositions des articles 226-13 et 226-14 du Code pénal [qui
concernent le secret professionnel]». «Si le témoin ne comparaît pas ou
refuse de comparaître, le juge d’instruction peut, sur les réquisitions du

procureur de la République, l’y contraindre par la force publique.»
L’article 434-15-1 du Code pénal précise en outre:

«Le fait de ne pas comparaître, de ne pas prêter serment ou de ne
pas déposer, sans excuse ni justification, devant le juge d’instruction
ou un officier de police judiciaire agissant sur commission rogatoire

par une personne qui a été citée par lui pour y être entendue comme
témoin est puni de 3750 euros d’amende.»

45. Le président djiboutien a naturellement refusé de donner suite à
cette convocation. Il pouvait donc être contraint par la force publique à
comparaître et être passible de sanctions pénales, cela en violation des

règles relatives à l’immunité de juridiction pénale et d’inviolabilité des
chefs d’Etat. Cette immunité dont bénéficient les chefs d’Etat est censée
couvrir toutes les étapes de la procédure pénale. En conséquence, un chef
d’Etat ne devrait pas pouvoir être convoqué à témoigner. Seule une dé-
position écrite peut lui être demandée par l’entremise du ministre des

affaires étrangères (article 656 du Code de procédure pénale). Or, cela
n’a pas été fait en l’espèce.
46. La Cour de cassation française avait reconnu, dans un arrêt du
10 octobre 2001, l’incompatibilité entre le statut du président de la Répu-
blique française et l’obligation de comparaître en tant que témoin. Elle

avait déclaré ce qui suit:

«Le Président de la République ne peut, pendant la durée de son

133 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 306

43. In this instance the Djiboutian President was invited to attend in
person the judge’s chambers to be heard as a witness. He was not invited
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make a written statement. Thus the

procedure was clearly not based on Article 656 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, which requires a request for a written statement through the
intermediary of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is closer to the pro-
cedure laid down by Article 101 of the Code.
44. According to the first paragraph of Article 101 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, “The investigating judge summons any person whose
statement appears useful to him before him through a bailiff or a police
officer. A copy of this summons is handed over to the person.” In this
case the investigating judge did indeed summon the Djiboutian President
before him. A copy of the summons was indeed handed over to him.

Paragraph 3 of this Article states that “[w]here he is summoned or sent
for, the witness is informed that if he does not appear or refuses to
appear, he can be compelled to by the law enforcement agencies in
accordance with the provisions of Article 109”. Article 109 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure provides that “[a]ny person summoned to be heard
in the capacity of a witness is obliged to appear, to swear an oath, and to
make a statement, subject to the provisions of Articles 226-13 and 226-
14 of the Penal Code [which relate to professional secrecy]”. “If the wit-
ness does not appear or refuses to appear, the investigating judge may, on

the request of the district prosecutor, order him to be produced by the
law enforcement agencies.” Also, Article 434-15-1 of the Penal Code
states that:

“Any person, summoned by an investigating judge or a judicial
police officer acting in the exercise of a rogatory commission in
order to be heard as a witness, who refuses to appear, to take the

oath or to make a deposition without justification or excuse, is pun-
ished by a fine of J3,750.”

45. The Djiboutian President naturally refused to comply with this
summons, so he could have been compelled to appear by the law enforce-
ment agencies and liable to penal sanctions, in breach of the rules on the

immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability of Heads of State.
This immunity enjoyed by Heads of State is supposed to cover all the
stages of criminal proceedings. Consequently it should not be possible for
a Head of State to be summoned to testify. He can only be requested to
make a written statement through the intermediary of the Minister for

Foreign Affairs (Article 656 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). This
was not done in the present case.
46. In a judgment of 10 October 2001, the French Cour de cassation
recognized the incompatibility between the status of the President of the
French Republic and the duty to appear as a witness. It stated:

“during his term of office the President of the Republic cannot be

133307 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND. YUSUF )

mandat, être entendu comme témoin assisté ni être mis en examen,
cité ou renvoyé pour une infraction quelconque devant une juridic-
tion pénale de droit commun, [qu’]il n’est pas davantage soumis à

l’obligation de comparaître en tant que témoin prévu par l’ar-
ticle 101 du Code de procédure pénale dès lors que cette obligation
est assortie par l’article 109 dudit code d’une mesure de contrainte
par la force publique et qu’elle est pénalement sanctionnée.»

La raison invoquée par la Cour de cassation à propos de l’impossibilité
pour le président de témoigner est donc bien le fait que cette obligation
soit assortie d’une mesure de contrainte par la force publique et qu’elle
soit pénalement sanctionnée.
47. Etant donné que les tribunaux français ne peuvent ni citer ni faire

comparaître le président de leur propre pays pendant la durée de son
mandat, il est difficilement admissible qu’ils puissent inviter des chefs
d’Etat étrangers à se présenter dans leurs bureaux pour être entendus en
qualité de témoins. La Cour avait, dans la présente espèce, l’opportunité

de déclarer clairement et sans ambiguïté que cette pratique constituait
une violation du droit international et que, en agissant ainsi, les juges
français engageaient la responsabilité internationale de la France. Le lan-
gage utilisé dans les conclusions de la Cour, ainsi que l’absence d’une
décision claire dans le dispositif, pourraient malheureusement conduire à

une répétition de cette pratique irrespectueuse du droit international.
48. Par ailleurs, dans l’affaire du Mandat d’arrêt (République démo-
cratique du Congo c. Belgique) , la Cour a déclaré que l’émission et la
diffusion du mandat d’arrêt à l’encontre de M. Yerodia, alors ministre
des affaires étrangères du Congo, avaient méconnu son immunité de juri-

diction pénale et son inviolabilité au motif que ces deux actes, «compte
tenu de la nature et de l’objet du mandat [d’arrêt]», avaient «vocation à
permettre l’arrestation» de l’intéressé sur le territoire belge et à l’étranger.
En l’espèce, la convocation à témoigner avait vocation à l’exécution
d’une mesure de contrainte par la force publique à l’encontre du chef de

l’Etat djiboutien dès lors que celui-ci exerçait son droit légitime de refuser
de ne pas déférer à la convocation à témoigner.
49. L’ensemble de ces éléments démontre que la convocation à témoi-
gner du 17 mai 2005 portait bien atteinte aux règles de droit international

relatives à l’immunité des chefs d’Etat. La Cour a reconnu que cette
convocation ne respectait pas les formes prescrites par l’article 656 du
Code de procédure pénale, qui porte sur la déposition écrite «d’un repré-
sentant d’une puissance étrangère». Elle s’est toutefois contentée de noter
que, «en invitant un chef d’Etat à déposer par simple télécopie et en lui

fixant d’autorité un délai extrêmement bref pour se présenter à son
bureau, le juge d’instruction ... n’a[vait] pas agi conformément à la cour-
toisie due à un chef d’Etat étranger» (arrêt, par. 172). Or, l’immunité et
l’inviolabilité du chef de l’Etat ne relèvent pas simplement de la courtoisie
diplomatique, mais sont des règles solidement ancrées en droit interna-

tional conventionnel et coutumier.

134 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP. OP. YUSUF ) 307

heard as a témoin assisté or indicted, summoned or brought before
any criminal court for any offence whatever, neither is he subject to
the duty to appear as a witness laid down by Article 101 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure because that duty is associated with a meas-
ure of constraint by the law enforcement agencies provided for by
Article 109 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure and punish-
able under criminal law”. [Translation by the Registry.]

The reason relied on by the Cour de cassation to demonstrate the impos-
sibility for the President to testify is certainly the fact that this duty is
associated with a measure of constraint by the law enforcement agencies
and punishable under criminal law.
47. Given the fact that the French courts can neither summon nor sub-

poena the President of their own country during his term of office, it is
difficult to accept that they could ask foreign Heads of State to attend at
their offices in order to be heard as witnesses. The Court had the oppor-
tunity in the present case to state clearly and unambiguously that this

practice was a violation of international law and that by acting in this
way French judges engaged the international responsibility of France.
Unfortunately the language used in the Court’s conclusions, as well as
the lack of a clear decision in the operative part, might lead to a repeti-
tion of this disrespectful practice of international law.

48. Also, in the case concerning the Arrest Warrant (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), the Court stated that the issue and
circulation of the arrest warrant against Mr. Yerodia, who was then Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, had infringed his immunity from

criminal jurisdiction and his inviolability on the ground that these two
actions, “given the nature and purpose of the [arrest] warrant” had been
“intended to enable the arrest” of the person concerned on Belgian ter-
ritory and abroad. In the present case the witness summons was intended
to enforce a measure of constraint by law enforcement agencies against

the Djiboutian Head of State when he was exercising his legal right to
refuse to comply with the witness summons.
49. All these factors clearly show that the witness summons of 17 May
2005 did indeed infringe the rules of international law relating to the

immunity of Heads of State. The Court recognized that this summons
did not observe the form prescribed by Article 656 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, which refers to a written statement “by a representative of
a foreign Power”. Yet it confined itself to noting that “by inviting a Head
of State to give evidence simply through sending him a facsimile and by

setting him an extremely short deadline without consultation to appear at
her office, [the investigating judge had] failed to act in accordance with
the courtesies due to a foreign Head of State” (Judgment, para. 172). The
immunity and inviolability of a Head of State are not simply matters of
diplomatic courtesy, but derive from rules firmly anchored in interna-

tional conventional and customary law.

134308 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND. YUSUF )

50. La France, elle-même, a reconnu que la convocation à témoigner
de 2005 ne respectait pas la procédure prévue en matière de dépositions
de représentants d’une puissance étrangère. Si elle a considéré que cet

acte de procédure était nul et non avenu car il ne respectait pas les dis-
positions de l’article 656 du Code de procédure pénale, la France n’a pas
présenté d’excuses au chef de l’Etat djiboutien, contrairement à ce qu’avait
fait le ministère français des affaires étrangères lorsqu’une convocation
similaire avait été adressée à l’ambassadeur de Djibouti en France en

2004. Celui-ci s’était en effet excusé pour cette «entorse aux usages diplo-
matiques», ajoutant que le juge d’instruction concerné «avait «reconnu
son erreur» et «souhaitait que la convocation soit considérée comme
nulle et non avenue»». La Cour a, pour sa part, jugé simplement «regret-
table» que la procédure n’ait pas été respectée et que, «tout en en étant

conscient, le ministère français des affaires étrangères n’ait pas présenté
des excuses au président de Djibouti, comme il l’avait fait précédemment
à l’ambassadeur de Djibouti en France, qui s’était trouvé dans une situa-
tion similaire» (arrêt, par. 172). A mon avis, la Cour aurait tout de même

dû exiger que la France présente des excuses au chef de l’Etat djiboutien.
51. Par ailleurs, il est clair que la communication à l’Agence France-
Presse, en violation du secret de l’instruction, d’informations relatives à
la convocation à témoigner du chef de l’Etat djiboutien doit être consi-
dérée comme une atteinte à la dignité de celui-ci. L’Agence France-Presse

avait en effet fait une annonce publique au sujet de la convocation à
témoigner du chef de l’Etat djiboutien à peine quelques minutes après
que celui-ci en eut pris connaissance. Cela indique que l’action des ins-
tances judiciaires françaises visait clairement à porter atteinte à la dignité
et à l’honneur du chef d’Etat djiboutien.

B. La convocation à témoigner du 14 février 2007

52. La convocation à témoigner du 14 février 2007 a été émise lors du
séjour du président djiboutien en France à l’occasion de la vingt-

quatrième conférence des chefs d’Etat d’Afrique et de France qui devait
se tenir à Cannes les 15 et 16 février.
53. La convocation du 14 février 2007 ne semble qu’en apparence
suivre la procédure prévue à l’article 656 du Code de procédure pénale

français. Cette disposition régit les dépositions écrites des représentants
d’une puissance étrangère. Or, dans le cas d’espèce, le juge d’instruc-
tion a demandé à recueillir le témoignage du chef de l’Etat djiboutien.
La France, en ne respectant pas les dispositions de sa propre législation,
a agi en violation des règles coutumières du droit international relatives

aux immunités des chefs d’Etat.
54. Par ailleurs, il convient de noter que la médiatisation de cette
convocation ainsi que son émission lors du séjour du président djiboutien
en France à l’occasion d’une conférence qui rassemblait de nombreuses
délégations d’Afrique, mais aussi des représentants de l’Organisation des

Nations Unies et de l’Union africaine, témoignent d’une intention déli-

135 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE SEP .OP. YUSUF ) 308

50. France itself has recognized that the witness summons of 2005 did
not comply with the procedure laid down for statements by representa-
tives of a foreign Power. While it regarded this summons as null and void

because it did not comply with the provisions of Article 656 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, France offered no apologies to the Djiboutian
Head of State, contrary to what the French Minister for Foreign Affairs
had done when a similar summons was addressed to the Ambassador of
Djibouti in France in 2004. He had apologized for this “infringement of

diplomatic usage”, adding that the investigating judge concerned “had
acknowledged his mistake and wished the summons to be null and void”.
The Court, meanwhile, simply regarded it as “regrettable” that the pro-
cedure was not complied with and that “whilst being aware of that fact,
the French Minister for Foreign Affairs did not offer apologies to the

Djiboutian Head of State, as he had done previously to Djibouti’s
Ambassador when he found himself in a similar situation” (Judgment,
para. 172). In my opinion, the Court should indeed have required France
to offer its apologies to the Djiboutian Head of State.

51. Also, it is clear that the leaking to Agence France-Presse, in breach
of confidentiality of the investigation, of information about the witness
summons to the Djiboutian Head of State should be regarded as an
attack on his dignity. Agence France-Presse had made a public announce-

ment about the witness summons to the Djiboutian Head of State only
minutes after he had been informed of it. This shows that the action by
the French legal authorities was clearly meant as an attack on the dignity
and honour of the Djiboutian Head of State.

B. The witness summons of 14 February 2007

52. The witness summons of 14 February 2007 was issued during the
Djiboutian President’s stay in France on the occasion of the 24th Con-

ference of the Heads of State of Africa and France, to be held in Cannes
on 15 and 16 February.
53. The summons of 14 February 2007 seems only outwardly to follow
the procedure laid down in Article 656 of the Code of Criminal Pro-

cedure. This provision governs written statements by representatives of a
foreign Power. In this case the investigating judge expressed the wish to
obtain the testimony of the Djiboutian Head of State. By failing to com-
ply with the requirements of its own legislation, France acted in violation
of the rules of customary international law relating to the immunities of

Heads of State.
54. Furthermore, it should be noted that media coverage of this sum-
mons and its publication during the Djiboutian President’s stay in France
on the occasion of a conference attended by many delegations from
Africa, as well as by representatives of the United Nations Organization

and the African Union, was evidence of a deliberate intention to embar-

135309 QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L ’ENTRAIDE JUDICIAIRE (OP. IND. YUSUF )

bérée d’embarrasser le chef de l’Etat djiboutien. En effet, la presse fran-
çaise (L’Express, Le Monde et l’AFP) a attribué l’origine de l’informa-

tion concernant la convocation du chef de l’Etat djiboutien à des «sources
judiciaires» avant même que la lettre du ministère des affaires étrangères
français n’ait été envoyée à l’ambassade de Djibouti à Paris. Cela montre
que des fuites délibérées concernant un acte couvert par le secret de l’ins-

truction avaient bel et bien été orchestrées aux fins de porter atteinte à
l’honneur et à la dignité du chef d’Etat djiboutien, et de faire croire au
public que celui-ci était impliqué, d’une manière ou d’une autre, dans le
décès du juge Borrel.

55. Tous ces éléments démontrent que les autorités françaises ont bien
porté atteinte à l’honneur et à la dignité du chef d’Etat djiboutien, et
qu’elles n’ont pas pris toutes les mesures nécessaires pour protéger son
immunité de juridiction et sa personne pendant ses visites dans leur pays.

Par conséquent, la Cour aurait dû demander à la France de faire cesser le
fait illicite en annulant les deux convocations à témoigner adressées au
chef d’Etat djiboutien et d’offrir à Djibouti des excuses et des garanties
tendant, à l’avenir, à la non-répétition des atteintes à l’honneur et à la

dignité de son chef d’Etat.
56. En conclusion, j’estime que l’étendue de la violation par la France
de la convention d’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale était beaucoup
plus large que celle reconnue par la Cour dans le présent arrêt. Je consi-
dère par ailleurs que la France a porté atteinte aux règles coutumières

relatives à l’immunité, à l’inviolabilité, à l’honneur et à la dignité du chef
de l’Etat djiboutien et que la Cour aurait dû, non seulement dans
ses motifs, mais aussi dans son dispositif, lui enjoindre de formuler des
excuses publiques.

(Signé) Abdulqawi A. Y USUF .

136 QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE (SEP.OP .YUSUF ) 309

rass the Djiboutian Head of State. The French press (L’Express, Le
Monde and AFP) attributed the origin of the information on the sum-

mons served on the Djiboutian Head of State to “legal sources”, even
before the letter from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been
sent to the Embassy of Djibouti in Paris. This shows that deliberate leaks
about a summons covered by the confidentiality of the investigation had
been well and truly orchestrated in order to attack the honour and dig-

nity of the Djiboutian Head of State and lead the public to believe that he
was involved in one way or another in the death of Judge Borrel.

55. All these factors demonstrate that the French authorities did indeed

attack the honour and dignity of the Djiboutian Head of State and did
not take all necessary steps to protect his immunity from jurisdiction and
his person during his visits to France. Consequently the Court should
have called upon France to put an end to the unlawful act by cancelling
both witness summonses addressed to the Djiboutian Head of State and

to offer Djibouti apologies and guarantees seeking to avoid a repetition
of the attacks on the honour and dignity of its Head of State in the
future.
56. In conclusion, I take the view that the violation by France of the

Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters was much more
extensive than was recognized by the Court in the present Judgment.
Furthermore, I consider that France has infringed customary rules relat-
ing to the immunity, inviolability, honour and dignity of the Djiboutian
Head of State and that the Court should have required France to offer

public apologies, both in its reasons and in the operative part of the
Judgment.

(Signed) Abdulqawi A. Y USUF .

136

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Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Yusuf

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