DECLARATION OF JUDGE REZEK
[Translation]
It is rare to find in classic international law propositions as flimsy -
and as inadmissibly so in moral terms - as those which would have it
that agreements entered into the past between colonial Powers and indi-
genous communities - organized communities which had been masters
of their territories for centuries and were subject to a recognized author-
ity- are not treatie:;, because "native chiefs and tribes are neither States
nor International Organizations; and thus pos;ess no treaty-making
capacity" (The Law of Treuties, 1961, p. 53). Wliile expressing in these
terms the doctrine prevailing in Europe in his time, Arnold McNair
nevertheless pointed out that the matter had been understood differently
in the United States, where the indigenous commiinities were recognized
as foreign nations until promulgation of the Indian Appropriations Act
of 3 March 1871, which made them wards of, ancl integrated them into,
the Union. The agreements which these commuiiities had entered into
with the Federal Government were regarded as treaties, to be honoured
as such; moreover, if they required interpretation, the Supreme Court
applied the rule contraproferentein.
In the Western Stzhara case, the Court appears to have rejected the
notion that a European Power could unilaterally appropriate a territory
inhabited by indigenous communities. It found that even nomadic tribes
inhabiting a territory and having a social and political organization had
a personality sufficient under international law fcr their territory not to
be considered terra rzulliusAccording to that jurisprudence, title of sov-
ereignty over a territory thus inhabited cannot therefore be acquired by
occupation but only "through agreements conclt~ded with local rulers"
(1.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 39, para. 80).
In the present case, the Bakassi Peninsula was part of the territory of
Old Calabar, subject to the original rule of its Kings and Chiefi. The
Applicant itself, paradoxically required by the circumstances to espouse
some particularly unacceptable propositions of colonialist discourse, has
sought to cast doubit on the existence and independence of that rule by
recourse to c~nsider~~tionswhich, rather, confirm them. Moreover, only
the 1884 Treaty, concluded with that form of 1oc;ilrule, could have jus-
tified the functions aijsumed by Great Britain whe~iit became the protect-
ing State of those territories, for, if the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar
did not have capacity to enter into an international agreement, if the
1884Treaty was not a treaty and had no legal foice whatsoever, it mustbe asked what was the basis for Great Britain to assert its authority over
these territories, by what mysterious divine right did it set itself up as the
protecting State of thieseareas of Africa.
Pursuant to the 1884 Treaty, Great Britain beitowed upon itself the
power to oversee the African nation's foreign relatcons, without granting
itself authority to negotiate in its name, let alone to settle or relinquish
any claim of whatever nature during international negotiations, and in
particular to dispose of any part of the nation's territory. The unlawful-
ness of the act of cession renders the Anglo-Germsn Treaty of 11 March
1913invalid in so far as, in defining the last sector of the land boundary,
it determines the treatment of Bakassi.
The defect in the provisions concerning the Bakassi Peninsula does not
however affect the validity of the remainder of the Treaty. This is the
situation provided foirin Article 44 (3) (a) of the 'Jienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, j~hich could in theory be overridden by the effect of
the next subparagraph, were it possible to show that the cession of
Bakassi was an essential condition of Germany's consent to the rest of
the Treaty; but, as far as 1 recall, no one so argued.
Further, 1am unable to regard the Maroua Decl ration of 1June 1975
as a treaty, and therefore to draw the resultant iriferences. 1 even have
some difficulty in vi~cwingit as a treaty which .,vas signed but never
entered into force, fxiling ratification by the two parties. Rather, 1see it
as a declaration by the two Heads of States, further to other similar dec-
larations that were never followed up, thus demon:.trating that they were
not definitive as sources of law. True, formal adoption of the document
by the organs vested with treaty-making power wcbuldhave given rise to
a conventional instrument. That is to say that, no niatter what the title or
form of a text, no maltter what procedure was followed in negotiating it,
that text can obviously become a treaty if the parties' competent organs
ultimately express their consent. Here, the Respondent has stated, with-
out being challenged., that the Maroua Declaraticm was not ratified by
Nigeria, failing approval by the competent organ under the constitution
in force at the time.
The Vienna Convention provides a remarkably simple definition of the
unusual circumstances under which a State can deny the legal force of a
treaty by reason of flawed consent of this sort. Tlie interna1 rule which
was not respected must be a fundamental one and its violation must have
been manifest, i.e., the other party could not under normal circumstances
have been unaware o~fthe violation. It is my vieu, however, that Cam-
eroon was not entitled to believe that the Declar~tion in question was
indeed a perfected treaty, entering into force on the date of its signing.1 LAND AND MARITIME BOUNDARY (DECI,. REZEK) 491
know of no legal ortler which authorizes a repre:entative of a Govern-
ment alone definitively to conclude and put into efèct, on the basis of his
sole authority, a treaty concerning a boundary, whether on land or at
sea - and ergo the territory- of the State.1 ask inyself whether there is
any part of the world where such a failure to resprct the most basic for-
malities would be compatible with the complex an3 primordial nature of
an international bouiqdary treaty.
It is to be expecteclthat the case concerning the Legal Status of East-
ern Greenland (P. C.I.J.,Series AIB, No. 53, p. 22) would be referred to
in a discussion of this sort. It is sometimes forgotten that the Court never
said that one of the ways in which treaties could be concluded was by
oral agreement. The Court did not state that the Ililen Declaration was a
treaty. Itsaid that Norway was bound by the giiarantees given by the
Norwegian Minister to the Danish ambassador. rhus, there are other,
less formal, ways by which a State can create international obligations
for itself. That is not the issue. The question iswhether an international
agreement concerning the determination of a bouiidary can take a form
other than that of a treaty in the strict sense, even when the land or mari-
time areas concerned are not large or when the boundary has not been
the subject of long-standing dispute and uncertainty.
Thus, 1 cannot join the majority in respect of'sovereignty over the
Bakassi Peninsula an13adjacent waters. In my view those areas fa11under
the sovereignty of the Respondent.
s signe^') Francisco REZEK.
DECLARATION DE M. LE JUGE REZEK
Rares sont les affirmations, en droit international classique, caractéri-
séespar autant d'inconsistance - et une inconsistance aussi peu admis-
sible sur le plan moral - que celles qui voudraient que les accords
conclus dans le passéentre des puissances coloniales et des communautés
indigènes - maîtresses de leurs territoires depuis des siècles,organisées et
soumises à une autorité reconnue - ne soient pas des traités, parce que
«les chefs et les tribus indigènes ne sont ni des Etats ni des organisations
internationales, et n'ont donc pas la capacité de conclure des traités))
(The Law of Treaties, 1961,p. 53).En employant ce langage pour expri-
mer la doctrine prédominante dans l'Europe de son temps, Arnold
McNair a néanmoins signalé que la question avait été comprisede
manière différenteaux Etats-Unis, où la qualité de nations étrangères fut
reconnue aux communautés indigènesjusqu'à la promulgation de l'lndian
Appropriations Act du 3 mars 1871, loi qui plaça ces communautés sous
la tutelle de l'Union et les intégra a celle-ci. Quant aux accords que ces
communautés avaient conclus avec le Gouvernement fédéral,ils étaient
considéréscomme des traités et devaient être honorés commetels - et
s'il fallait par ailleurs les interpréter, la Cour suprême appliquerait la
règle contra proferentem.
Dans l'affaire du Sahara occi&ntal, la Cour semble avoir rejeté l'idée
qu'un pouvoir européen puisse s'approprier unilatéralement unterritoire
occupépar des communautés indigènes. Ellea en effet estiméque même
des tribus nomades, présentessur un territoire et dotées d'une organisa-
tion socialeet politique, possédaientune personnalité suffisante, au regard
du droit international, pour que leur territoire ne soit pas une terra nul-
lius.Le titre de souveraineté sur un territoire ainsi peuplé ne peut donc
pas, selon cette jurisprudence, être acquis par occupation, mais unique-
ment «au moyen d'accords conclus avec des chefs locaux)) (C.Z.J. Recueil
1975, p. 39, par. 80).
Dans la présente affaire, la presqu'île de Bakassi faisait partie du
domaine du Vieux-Calabar, soumis à l'autorité originaire de ses rois et
cheji. L'Etat demandeur lui-même,paradoxalement contraint par les cir-
constances de reprendre a son compte quelques adages particulièrement
inacceptables du discours colonialiste, a essayéde mettre en doute l'exis-
tence et l'indépendance d'unetelle autorité, en ayant recours à des consi-
dérations qui les confirment plutôt. Par ailleurs, seul le traité de 1884,
conclu avec cette forme d'autorité locale, aurait pu justifier les fonctions
assuméespar la Grande-Bretagne lorsqu'elle devint 1'Etat protecteur de
ces territoires. Car, si les rois et chefs du Vieux-Calabar n'avaient pas
qualité pour conclure un engagement international, si le traité de 1884 DECLARATION OF JUDGE REZEK
[Translation]
It is rare to find in classic international law propositions as flimsy -
and as inadmissibly so in moral terms - as those which would have it
that agreements entered into the past between colonial Powers and indi-
genous communities - organized communities which had been masters
of their territories for centuries and were subject to a recognized author-
ity- are not treatie:;, because "native chiefs and tribes are neither States
nor International Organizations; and thus pos;ess no treaty-making
capacity" (The Law of Treuties, 1961, p. 53). Wliile expressing in these
terms the doctrine prevailing in Europe in his time, Arnold McNair
nevertheless pointed out that the matter had been understood differently
in the United States, where the indigenous commiinities were recognized
as foreign nations until promulgation of the Indian Appropriations Act
of 3 March 1871, which made them wards of, ancl integrated them into,
the Union. The agreements which these commuiiities had entered into
with the Federal Government were regarded as treaties, to be honoured
as such; moreover, if they required interpretation, the Supreme Court
applied the rule contraproferentein.
In the Western Stzhara case, the Court appears to have rejected the
notion that a European Power could unilaterally appropriate a territory
inhabited by indigenous communities. It found that even nomadic tribes
inhabiting a territory and having a social and political organization had
a personality sufficient under international law fcr their territory not to
be considered terra rzulliusAccording to that jurisprudence, title of sov-
ereignty over a territory thus inhabited cannot therefore be acquired by
occupation but only "through agreements conclt~ded with local rulers"
(1.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 39, para. 80).
In the present case, the Bakassi Peninsula was part of the territory of
Old Calabar, subject to the original rule of its Kings and Chiefi. The
Applicant itself, paradoxically required by the circumstances to espouse
some particularly unacceptable propositions of colonialist discourse, has
sought to cast doubit on the existence and independence of that rule by
recourse to c~nsider~~tionswhich, rather, confirm them. Moreover, only
the 1884 Treaty, concluded with that form of 1oc;ilrule, could have jus-
tified the functions aijsumed by Great Britain whe~iit became the protect-
ing State of those territories, for, if the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar
did not have capacity to enter into an international agreement, if the
1884Treaty was not a treaty and had no legal foice whatsoever, it mustn'étaitpas un traitéet n'avait point de valeur juridique, il convient de se
demander sur quelle base la Grande-Bretagne a pu asseoir son autorité
sur ces territoires, en vertu de quel mystérieuxdroit divin s'est-elle érigée
en Etat protecteur de ces espaces africains.
Par la force du traité de 1884,la Grande-Bretagne s'estdotéed'un pou-
voir de contrôle sur les relations extérieuresde la nation africaine, sans
s'attribuer le pouvoir de négocier enson nom, moins encore celui de tran-
siger ou de renoncer àquoi que ce soit lors d'une négociationinternatio-
nale, et surtout pas celui d'aliéner unepartie quelconque de son territoire.
Le défaut de légitimitéqui caractérise l'actede cession fait que le traité
anglo-allemand du 11mars 1913 ne saurait êtrevalable la ou, définissant
le dernier secteur de la frontière terrestre, il décidedu sort de Bakassi.
Cependant, le vice du dispositif concernant la presqu'île de Bakassi ne
remet pas en cause la validitédu reste du traité.Nous sommes ici devant
le cas prévu a l'article 44, paragraphe 3, alinéaa), de la convention de
Vienne sur le droit des traités,qui pourrait d'ailleurs être écartée,n prin-
cipe, par l'application éventuelle de l'alinéaqui suit, s'il était possible
d'établir que la cession de Bakassi était une condition essentielle du
consentement de l'Allemagne à l'égard du reste du traité; mais, pour
autant que je me souvienne, nul n'a affirmé qu'ilen fût ainsi.
En outre, je n'arrive pasà considérer que la déclaration de Maroua du
le*juin 1975constitue un traitéet, partant, a en tirer les conséquences.
J'ai mêmequelque difficulté ay voir un traité qui aurait été conclu mais
qui simplement ne serait pas entréen vigueur, faute de ratification par les
deux parties. J'y voisplutôt une déclaration des deux chefs d7Etat, faisant
suite Ad'autres déclarations analogues demeuréessans lendemain, ce qui
prouve qu'elles n'étaient pasdéfinitivesen tant que sources de droit. Il est
exact que l'adoption formelle du document par les organes investis du
treaty-making power aurait donné naissance àun instrument convention-
nel. Je veux dire qu'un texte, quel que soit son intituléou sa forme, quelle
que soit la procédure suivie pour sa négociation, peut de toute évidence
devenir un traité si les organes compétents des parties expriment finale-
ment leur consentement. Ici, 1'Etat défendeur a soutenu, sans contesta-
tion, que la déclaration de Maroua n'avait pas été ratifiép ear le Nigéria,
faute d'approbation par l'organe compétent, a la lumièrede la Constitu-
tion en vigueur a l'époque.
La convention de Vienne est d'une remarquable simplicité lorsqu'elle
définitles circonstances exceptionnelles dans lesquelles un Etat peut nier
la valeur juridique d'un traité en raison d'un vice du consentement de
cette espèce. 11faut bien que la norme interne, dont l'application a été
méconnue,soit une norme fondamentale, et que sa violation ait étémani-
feste, c'est-a-dire qu'il s'agissed'une violation qui ne pouvait manquer
d'êtrerelevéepar l'autre partie dans des circonstances normales. Or je
suis d'avis que le Cameroun n'était nullement endroit de croire que labe asked what was the basis for Great Britain to assert its authority over
these territories, by what mysterious divine right did it set itself up as the
protecting State of thieseareas of Africa.
Pursuant to the 1884 Treaty, Great Britain beitowed upon itself the
power to oversee the African nation's foreign relatcons, without granting
itself authority to negotiate in its name, let alone to settle or relinquish
any claim of whatever nature during international negotiations, and in
particular to dispose of any part of the nation's territory. The unlawful-
ness of the act of cession renders the Anglo-Germsn Treaty of 11 March
1913invalid in so far as, in defining the last sector of the land boundary,
it determines the treatment of Bakassi.
The defect in the provisions concerning the Bakassi Peninsula does not
however affect the validity of the remainder of the Treaty. This is the
situation provided foirin Article 44 (3) (a) of the 'Jienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, j~hich could in theory be overridden by the effect of
the next subparagraph, were it possible to show that the cession of
Bakassi was an essential condition of Germany's consent to the rest of
the Treaty; but, as far as 1 recall, no one so argued.
Further, 1am unable to regard the Maroua Decl ration of 1June 1975
as a treaty, and therefore to draw the resultant iriferences. 1 even have
some difficulty in vi~cwingit as a treaty which .,vas signed but never
entered into force, fxiling ratification by the two parties. Rather, 1see it
as a declaration by the two Heads of States, further to other similar dec-
larations that were never followed up, thus demon:.trating that they were
not definitive as sources of law. True, formal adoption of the document
by the organs vested with treaty-making power wcbuldhave given rise to
a conventional instrument. That is to say that, no niatter what the title or
form of a text, no maltter what procedure was followed in negotiating it,
that text can obviously become a treaty if the parties' competent organs
ultimately express their consent. Here, the Respondent has stated, with-
out being challenged., that the Maroua Declaraticm was not ratified by
Nigeria, failing approval by the competent organ under the constitution
in force at the time.
The Vienna Convention provides a remarkably simple definition of the
unusual circumstances under which a State can deny the legal force of a
treaty by reason of flawed consent of this sort. Tlie interna1 rule which
was not respected must be a fundamental one and its violation must have
been manifest, i.e., the other party could not under normal circumstances
have been unaware o~fthe violation. It is my vieu, however, that Cam-
eroon was not entitled to believe that the Declar~tion in question was
indeed a perfected treaty, entering into force on the date of its signing.1déclaration en cause était vraiment un traité achevé, en vigueurle jour
mêmede sa signature. Je ne connais pas d'ordre juridique qui autoriserait
le gouvernant à conclure seul, de manière définitive, et à mettre en
vigueur, sur la basede sa seule autorité, un traité concernant une fron-
tière, donc le territoire deEtat, qu'il soit terrestre ou maritime. Je me
demande s'il ya une partie du monde où ce non-respect des formalitésles
plus élémentaires seraitcompatible avec le caractèrecomplexe et éminent
d'un traitéde frontière international.
II est normal, dans un débatde cette nature, que l'on évoquel'affaire
du Statut juridique du Groënland oriental (C.P.J.I. série AIB no 53,
p. 22). On oublie parfois que la Cour n'ajamais dit que, parmi les modes
de conclusion des traités, on trouvait la formulation orale. La Cour n'a
pas dit que la déclarationIhlen étaitun traité.Elle a dit que les garanties
donnéespar le ministre norvégien àl'ambassadeur danois engageaient la
Norvège. Il y a donc d'autres modes, moins formalistes, par lesquels un
Etat peut créerpour lui-même desobligations internationales. Là n'est
pas la question. Ce qu'il faut se demander, c'est si un engagement inter-
national relatif la détermination d'une frontière peut prendreune forme
autre que celledu traitéau sens étroit,mêmelorsque lesespaces terrestres
ou maritimes concernéssont peu étendus,ou lorsque ladite frontière n'est
pas caractériséepar une longue histoire de contestations et d'incertitudes.
Je ne puis donc m'associer A la majoritéen ce qui concerne la souve-
rainetésur la presqu'île de Bakassi et leseaux adjacentes. A mon sens,ces
espaces relèventde la souverainetéde 1'Etatdéfendeur.
(Signé) Francisco REZEK. LAND AND MARITIME BOUNDARY (DECI,. REZEK) 491
know of no legal ortler which authorizes a repre:entative of a Govern-
ment alone definitively to conclude and put into efèct, on the basis of his
sole authority, a treaty concerning a boundary, whether on land or at
sea - and ergo the territory- of the State.1 ask inyself whether there is
any part of the world where such a failure to resprct the most basic for-
malities would be compatible with the complex an3 primordial nature of
an international bouiqdary treaty.
It is to be expecteclthat the case concerning the Legal Status of East-
ern Greenland (P. C.I.J.,Series AIB, No. 53, p. 22) would be referred to
in a discussion of this sort. It is sometimes forgotten that the Court never
said that one of the ways in which treaties could be concluded was by
oral agreement. The Court did not state that the Ililen Declaration was a
treaty. Itsaid that Norway was bound by the giiarantees given by the
Norwegian Minister to the Danish ambassador. rhus, there are other,
less formal, ways by which a State can create international obligations
for itself. That is not the issue. The question iswhether an international
agreement concerning the determination of a bouiidary can take a form
other than that of a treaty in the strict sense, even when the land or mari-
time areas concerned are not large or when the boundary has not been
the subject of long-standing dispute and uncertainty.
Thus, 1 cannot join the majority in respect of'sovereignty over the
Bakassi Peninsula an13adjacent waters. In my view those areas fa11under
the sovereignty of the Respondent.
s signe^') Francisco REZEK.
Declaration of Judge Rezek (translation)