Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE WEERAMANTRY

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THEISSUE OFAUTOMATS IUCCESSIOTN THEGENOCIDC EONVENTION 641

THEORIER SELATINTO STATESUCCESSION 641
THE"CLEAN SLATEP"RINCIPLE 643

(a) Historical antecedents of the clean slate principle 643
(b) Theoretical bases of the clean slate principle 644
(c) Necessary exceptions to the clean slate principle 645

REASONF SAVOURIN VGIEWOF AUTOMATS ICUCCESSIOTNTHE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION

1. It is not centred on individual State interests
2. It transcends concepts of State sovereignty
3. The rights it recognizes impose no burden on the State
4. The obligations imposed by the Convention exist independently
of conventional obligations
5. It embodies rules of customary international law
6. It is a contribution to global stability
7. The undesirability of a hiatus in successionto the Genocide Con-

vention
8. The specialimportance of human rights guarantees against geno-
cide during periods of transition
9. The beneficiaries of the Genocide Convention are not third par-
ties in thense which attracts the res inter alios acta principle
10. The rights conferred by the Convention are non-derogable 1agree with the majority of my colleagues that the Court does have
jurisdiction in this case. However, this case raises the important issue of
automatic succession to the Genocide Convention, which has not been
developed in the Court's Judgment. 1 believe it warrants consideration.

One of the principal concerns of the contemporary international legal
system is the protection of the human rights and dignity of every indi-
vidual.The question of successionto the GenocideConvention raises one
of the most essential aspects of such protection.
The topic which 1 wish to address in this opinion is the continuing
applicability of the Convention to the populations to which it has applied.
When a convention so significant for the protection of human life has
been entered into by a State, and that State thereafterdivides into two or

more successor States, what is the position of its subjects in the interim
period that elapses before the formal recognition of the successor States,
or before the new State's forma1 accession to treaties such as the
Genocide Convention? 1 think this situation should not be passed by
without attention, especially having regard to the fact that the founda-
tions for a consideration of this matter are to be found in the Court's
Opinion in the earlier case on genocide which came before it over forty
years ago (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion,I. C. J. Reports 1951,
p. 15).
Another reason calling for attention to this topic is the fact that the
international community is passing through a historical period, when,
throughout the world, the phenomenon is being experienced of the splin-
tering of States. This has occurred with particular intensity especially
after the end of the Cold War. It is vitally important that the principle of

protection of populations against human rights abuses and atrocities
should be strengthened in every manner available under current legal
principles; and the clarification of the law relating to State successionto
a humanitarian treaty so important as the Genocide Convention is emi-
nently such an area.
Bosnia has contended that there is automatic successionto this treaty,
and Yugoslavia denies this proposition. Thisproblem leadsinto the intri-
cate field of State succession to treaties - a field in which there has
been much difference of juristic opinion, and in which many competing
theories strive for recognition.

State succession is one of the oldest problems of international law.
As Oscar Schachter reminds us, this problem goes al1 the way back (a) Historical Antecedents of the Clean Slate Pvinciple

The principle that a new State ought not in general to be fettered with
treaty obligations which it has not expressly agreed to assume after it has
attained statehood (the clean slate principle) is of considerablehistorical
and theoreticalimportance. New Statesought not, in principle, to be bur-
dened with treaty-based responsibilities without their express consent.

With the sudden advent into the international community of nearly
eighty newly independent States in the late fifties and early sixties, there
was a realization among them, in the words of Julius Stone, that:

"their authority or their territory or both are burdened with debts,
concessions,commercial engagements of various kinds or other obli-
gations continuing on from the earlier colonial regime . .."3.

For example, in Nigeria, 300 treaties negotiated by Britain were said to
be applicable to the country4.

Other newly emerging countries soon became conscious of the dangers
to their autonomy involved in this principle, and what came to be known
as the Nyerere Doctrine emerged under which none of the colonial trea-
ties became applicable unless the new State, within a specifiedperiod of
time, notified its accession to such treaties5. In the language of Jenks, in
relation to State successionto colonialtreaties, "The psychology of newly
won independence is a formidable realit~."~

This was not, however, the only historical reality that favoured the
clean slate theory. There were numerous older precedents, of which a few
illustrative examples may be mentioned. Following the Franco-Prussian
war and the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine,French treaties applicable to the

Julius Stone, "A Common Law for Mankind?', International Studies, 1960,Vol. 1,
pp. 430-431.Seealso E. G. Bello,"Reflectionson Successionof States in the Light of the
Vienna Convention on Successionof States in Respectof Treaties1978", German Year-
book of International Law, 1980,Vol. 23, p. 298; D. P. O'Connell,State Succession, op.
cit., p. 116.
By exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the United Kingdom High
Commissionon the veryday of independence, theFederation assumed al1rights and obli-
gations entered into "on their behalf' before independence,and undertook to keeph
agreements in forceuntil the Governrnent of Nigeria couldconsiderwhether they required
modification or renegotiation in any respect G. Bello,op. cit., p. 298).

Ibid., pp. 298-299.
Year Book of International Law, 1952, Vol.29, p. 108.Law-Making Treaties", British provinces had, in genera17,to cease to have effect and be replaced by
German treaties. Again, Britishjurists, facing the problem of annexation
of colonial territories, tended towards the view that "the treaties of the

expunged legal person died with it" s, so that they receivedthose colonies
free of the burden of prior treaties. At the United Nations Conference on
Succession ofStates in Respect of Treaties9, several other examples were
referred to, among them the situation resulting from the termination of
theAustro-Hungarian Empire, when Czechoslovakiaand Poland emerged
as independent States with a clean slate in regard to treaties of the former
Austro-Hungarian Empire, except for certain multilateral treaties 'O.

The clean slate theory was thus the result of many historical trends",
and had received favour at one time or another from both emerging and
established nations.

(b) Theoretical Basesof the Clean Slate Principle

Theoretically, the clean slate principle can be justified on several

powerful bases - the principle of individual State autonomy, the principle
of self-determination, the principle of res inter alios acta, and the prin-
ciple that there can be no limitations on a State's rights, except with its
consent. Newly independent States should not have to accept as a
fait accomplithe contracts of predecessor States, for it is self-evidentthat
the new State must be free to make its own decisions on such matters.

The clean slate principle could also be described as an important cor-
ollary to the principle of self-determination, which is of cardinal impor-

tance in modem international law. The principle of self-determination
could be emptied of an important part of itscontent if prior treaties auto-
matically bind the new State.
One of the bases of the negativist view is that treaties entered into
by the predecessor State are res inter alios acta. Castrén, dealing spe-
cially with the case of division of a pre-existing State into new States,
observes :

"When a State is dismembered into new independent States, its
treaties as a rule become nul1and void without descending to the
new States. Treaties are generally persona1 in so far as they pre-
suppose, in addition to the territory, also the existence of a certain

An exception was, however, in regard to ecclesiastical law, whereNapoleon's Con-
cordat with the Holy See continued to apply.
D. P. O'Connell, "Reflections on the State Succession Convention", Zeitschrift fur
auslandischesoffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, 1979,Vol. 39, p. 735.
Vienna, 4 April-6 May 1977,and 31 July-23August 1978.
'O Ojjcial Records, VolIIIp. 92, para. 14.
O'Connell, "Reflections on the State SuccessionConvention", op. cit., p. 735. sovereign over the territory. To the succeeding State, the treaties
concluded by the former State are res interalios acta." l2

Basicconcepts of State sovereigntyalso require that any curtailment of
the sovereign authority of a State requires the express consent of the
State.
If there is to be, in a given case, a deviation from the clean slate prin-
ciple, sufficientlycogent reasons should exist to demonstrate that the new
State's sovereignty is not being thereby impaired. The question needs
therefore to be examined as to whether there is any impairment of State
sovereignty implicit in the application of the principle of automatic suc-

cession to any given treaty.

(c) Necessary Exceptions to the Clean Slate Principle

Human rights and humanitarian treaties involve no loss of sovereignty
or autonomy of the new State, but are merely in line with general prin-
ciples of protection that flow from the inherent dignity of every human

being which is the very foundation of the United Nations Charter.

At the same time, it is important that the circle of exceptions should
not be too widely drawn. Conceivably some human rights treaties may
involve economic burdens, such as treaties at the economic end of the
spectrum of human rights. It is beyond the scope of this opinion to exam-
ine whether al1 human rights and humanitarian treaties should be
exempted from the clean slate principle. It is sufficientfor the purposes of
this opinion to note a variety of reasons why it has been contended that

human rights and humanitarian treaties in general attract the principle of
automatic succession. These reasons apply with special force to treaties
such as the Genocide Convention or the Convention against Torture,
leaving no room for doubt regarding automatic succession to such trea-
ties. The international community has a special interest in the continuity
of such treaties.

1. It Is Not Centred on IndividualState Interests

This Court, in its earlier consideration of the Genocide Convention,
drew pointed attention to the difference between a humanitarian treaty

l2E. Castrén, "Obligationsof States Arising from the Dismemberment of Another
State",Zeitschrift furauslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, 1950-1951,
Vol. 13,p. 754 (emphasis added); cited by M. G. Maloney in Virginia Journalof Znter-
national Law, 1979-1980,Vol. 19,p. 892.such as the Genocide Convention, and a convention aimed at protecting
the interests of a State. The Court stated in its Opinion on Reservations

to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide that :
"In such a convention the contracting States do not have any
interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common
interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which

are the raison d'êtreof the convention. Consequently, in a conven-
tion of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or dis-
advantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual
balance between rights and duties." (1C ..J. Reports 1951, p. 23.)
Charles De Visscher has remarked on the contrast

"between the frailty of agreements of merely individual interest,
dependent as these are upon transitory political relations, and the
relative stability of conventions dictated by concern for order or
respect for law" 13.

He has also remarked in this context that the growing part played by
multilateral treaties in the development of international law should count
in favour of the transmission rather than disappearance of the obliga-
tions they create 14.
Human rights and humanitarian treaties do not represent an exchange

of interests and benefits between contracting States in the conventional
sense, and in this respect may also be distinguished from the generality of
multilateral treaties, many of which are concerned with the economic,
security or other interests of States. Human rights and humanitarian
treatiesrepresent, rather, a commitment of the participating States to cer-
tain noms and values recognized by the international community.

Stated another way, the personality of the sovereign is not the essence
of such an agreement.Multilateral treaties are most often concluded with

the object of protecting and benefiting the international community as a
whole, and for the maintenance of world order and CO-operation,rather
than of protecting and advancing one particular State's interests.

2. It Transcends Concepts of State Sovereignty

The Genocide Convention does not come to an end with the dismem-
berment of the original State, as it transcends the concept of State sov-
ereignty. An important conceptual basis denying continuity to treaties is
that the recognition of the continuity of the predecessor State's treaties
would be an intrusion upon the sovereignty of the successor State. This-

l3Theorv and Realitvin Public InternatioLaw, revised ed., 1968,translated from
the ~rench by P. E. ~orbett, p. 179.
l4Zbid.would be so if it were a matter confined within the ambit of a State'ssov-
ereignty. But with human rights and humanitarian treaties, we are in a
sphere which reaches far beyond the narrow confines of State sover-
eignty, and enters the domain of universal concern.

In its ongoing development, the concept of human rights has long
passed the stage when it was a narrow parochial concern between sov-
ereign and subject. We have reached the stage, today, at which the
human rights of anyone, anywhere, are the concern of everyone, every-
where. The world's most powerful States are bound to recognize them,
equally with the weakest, and there isnot even the semblanceof a sugges-
tion in contemporary international law that such obligations amount to a
derogation of sovereignty.

3. The Rights It Recognizes Impose No Burden on the State

Moreover, a State, in becoming party to the Convention, does not give
away any of its rights to its subjects. Itdoes not burden itself with any
new liability. It merely confirms its subjects in the enjoyment of those
rights which are theirs by virtue of their humanity. Human rights are
never a gift from the State and hence the State, in recognizing them, is
not imposing any burden upon itself. We have long passed the historical
stagewhen a sovereign,granting to his subjectswhat wewould today cal1
a human right, could claim their gratitude for surrendering to them what
was then considered to be a part of his absolute and undoubted rights as
a sovereign.Human rights treaties are no more than a forma1recognition
by the sovereign of rights which already belong to each of that sover-
eign's subjects.Far from being largesse extended to them by their sov-
ereign, they represent the entitlement to which they were born.

Quite contrary to the view that human rights treaties are a burden on

the new State, it could indeed be asserted that the adherence by a new
State to a system which is universally accepted, whereby the new State
becomespart of that system,is indeed a benefit to the new State, in sharp
contrast to the position of disadvantage in which it would place itselfifit
stood outside that system.

4. The Obligations Imposed by the Convention Exist Independently of
Conventional Obligations

This Court observed in Reservations to the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,"the principles underlying
the [Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civi-
lizednations as binding on States, even without any conventional obliga-
tion" (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23). The same may be said of al1treaties
concerning basic human rights. The Court referred also in the same Opinion to the universal character
of the condemnation of genocide. This condemnation has its roots in the
convictions of humanity, of which the legal rule is only a reflection. The
same could likewise be said of many of the basic principles of human
rights and humanitarian law.

5. It Embodies Rules of Customary International Law

The human rights and humanitarian principles contained in the Geno-
cide Convention are principles of customary international law. These
principles continue to be applicable to both sovereign and subjects, irre-
spective ofchanges in sovereignty, for the new sovereign,equally with the
old, is subject to customary international law. The customary rights
which the subjects of that State enjoy continue to be enjoyed by them,
whoever may be their sovereign. The correlative duties attach to the
sovereign, whoever he may be. The position is no different when those

customary rights are also embodied in a treaty.

This factor may indeed be seenin wider context as essential to the evo-
lution of international law into a universal system. Among writers who
have stressed this aspect in relation to multilateral treaties are Wilfred
Jenks, who observed :
"It is generally admitted that a new State is bound by existing

rules of customary international law. This principle has, indeed,
been of fundamental importance in the development of international
law into a world-wide system .. .It is not clear why, now that the
rules established by multipartite legislativeinstruments constitute so
large a part of the operative law of nations, a new State should be
regarded as starting with a clean slate in respect ofrules which have
a conventional rather than a customary origin." l5

In regard to such a matter as genocide, there can be no doubt that the
treaty is of fundamental importance to the development of the operative
law of nations.

6. It Is a Contribution to Global Stability

The strengthening of human rights protectio_ns in accordance with
universally held values is a matter of universal concern and interest.

The promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights is,
according to Article 1 (3) of the United Nations Charter, one of the Pur-
poses of the United Nations, and the reaffirmation of faith in fundamen-
ta1 human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person are

W. Jenks, op. cit., p. 107

57among the foremost objects that the peoples of the United Nations set
before themselves "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war".

Genocide attacks these concepts at their very root and, by so doing,
strikes at the foundations of international stability and security.
A State's guarantees of human rights to its subjects in terms of even
such a Covenant as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights are thus a matter which does not concern that State alone, but
represent a contribution to human dignity and global stability - as dis-
tinguished, for example, from a commercial or trading treaty. This aspect
is al1the more self-evidentin a treaty of the nature of the Genocide Con-
vention.

At the United Nations Conference on State Succession on 22 April
1977,the Soviet Union drew attention to a letter by the International
Cornmittee of the Red Cross to the Chairman of the International Law
Commission to the effect that no State had ever claimed to be released
from any obligation under the Geneva Conventions. In this connection,
the representative of the Soviet Union observed that, "Such a practice
had not created difficulties for newly independent States"16. He also

observed :
"Thus treaties of a universal character were of paramount impor-
tance for the whole international community, and particularly for
newly independent States. It was therefore in the interests of not

only newly independent States but also of the international commu-
nity as a whole that a treaty of universal character should not cease
to be in force when a new State attained independence." l7

7. The Undesivabilityof a Hiatus in Succession to the Genocide
Convention

If the contention is sound that there is no principle of automatic suc-
cession to human rights and humanitarian treaties, the strange situation
would result of the people within a State, who enjoy the full benefit of a
human rights treaty, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and have enjoyed it for many years, being suddenly
deprived of it as though these are special privileges that can be given or
withdrawn at the whim or fancy of Governments. Populations once pro-
tected cease to be protected, may be protected again, and may again

cease to be protected, depending on the vagaries of political events. Such
a legal position seernsto be altogether untenable, especiallyat this stage
in the development of human rights.

l624th meeting, 22April 197OfJiciRaecord s,ol. 1,p. 164,para. 5.
l7Zbid .,163,para. 2.

58 Jenks observes, "It is not a matter of perpetuating the dead hand of the

past, but of avoiding a legal vacuum." l8This vacuum could exist over
"hundreds of thousands of square miles and millions of citizens . .."19.
He also refers to :
"the uncertainty, confusion and practical inconvenience of a legal

vacuum which may be gravelyprejudicial not only to the interests of
other States concerned but equally to the interests of the new State
itself and its citizens" 20.
The undesirability of such a result becomes more evident still if the

human rights treaty under consideration is one as fundamental as the
Genocide Convention. If the principle set out earlier is not clearly recog-
nized, the international legal system would be endorsing the curious
result that people living under guarantees that genocide will not be com-
mitted against them willsuddenly be deprived of that guarantee, precisely
ut the time they need it most - when there is instability in their State.
The anomaly of a grant followed by a withdrawal of the benefits, of such

a Covenant as the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights,
becomes compounded in the case of the Genocide Convention, and the
result is one which, in my view, international law does not recognize or
endorse at the present stage of its development.
Furthermore, there may be circumstances where, after a new State has
proclaimed its independence, the accession of that State to statehood
may itself be delayed by the non-recognition of a breakaway State by the
State from which it breaks away. In such a situation, where advent of the

new State to statehood is deliberately delayed by action of the former
State, there can be no accession to the treaty by the breakaway State for
a considerable time. During that period, it seems unreasonable that the
citizens of that breakaway State should be deprived of such protection as
the Convention may give them, against acts of genocide by the State
from which the secession has occurred, as well as by the State that has
seceded. The longer the delay in recognition, the longer then would the

period be during which those citizens are left unprotected. Such a result
seems to me to be totally inconsistent with contemporary international
law - more especially in regard to a treaty protecting such universally
recognized rights as the Genocide Convention.

8. The Special Importance of Human Rights Guarantees against

Genocide during Periods of Transition

To the strong conceptual position resulting from the foregoing consid-
erations, there must be added the practical imperatives that result from

l8Jenks, op. cit., p. 109
l9Ibid.
20Ibid.

59a realisticview ofthe international situation occurringin the processof the
dismembermentof a State, with al1the political,socialand military turmoil
that is known only too wellto accompany that process in modern times.
It would in fact be most dangerous to view the break-up of a State as
clearing the decks of the human rights treaties and obligations of the
predecessor State. It is dangerous even to leave the position unclear,
and that is why 1 have felt impelled to state my opinion upon this all-
important matter.
Al1around us at the present time, the break-up of Stateshas often been
accompanied by atrocities of the most brutal and inhuman kind, prac-
tised on a scale that defiesquantification. To leave a lacuna in the con-
tinuity of the law or any vagueness in the perception of that continuity
would be fraught with danger to the most cherished values of civilization.

If the principle of continuity in relation to successionof States,adopted
in Article 34 (1) in the 1978Vienna Convention on Succession of States
in Respect of Treaties, is to apply to any treaties at all, the Genocide
Convention must surely be among such treaties.

Furthermore, humanitarian treaties formulate principles that are an
established part of the law of war. The law of war applies, of course, even
in regard to an internal war (vide Geneva Convention 1977,Protocol II).
The applicability of the principles underlying these treaties, among which
the Genocide Convention may also be reckoned, becomes particularly
important in times of internal turmoil. Such treaties cannot be suspended
sine die during times of internal unrest such as accompany the break-up
of a State, when they are most needed.

9. The BeneJîciariesof the Genocide Convention Are Not Third Parties
in the Sense Which Attracts the Res Inter Alios Acta Principle

The beneficiariesof the Genocide Convention, as indeed of al1human
rights treaties, are not strangers to the State which recognizes the rights
referred to in the Convention. The principle that res inter alios acta are
not binding, an important basis of the clean slate rule, does not therefore
apply to such conventions. There is no vesting of rights in extraneous
third parties or in other States, andno obligation on the part of the State

to recognize any rights of an external nature. Far from being a trans-
action inter alios, such treaties promote the highest internal interests
which any State can aspire to protect.

10. The Rights Conferred by the Convention Are Non-derogable

The rights and obligations guaranteed by the Genocide Convention are
non-derogable, for they relate to the right to life, the most fundamentalof human rights, and an integral part of the irreducible core of human
rights. It relates not merely to the right to life of one individual, but to
that right en masse.

Moreover, under the Genocide Convention, the obligation of States is

not merely to refrain from committing genocide, but to prevent and pun-
ishacts of genocide.The failure by a successorrégimeto assume and dis-
charge this obligation would be altogether incompatible with State obli-
gations as recognized in contemporary international law.

Another possible line of enquiry, not necessary for the determination
of the present matter, is the analogy between a treaty vesting human
rights, and a dispositive treaty vesting property rights. From the time of
Vatte121,such a dispositive treaty, as for example a treaty recognizing a

servitude, has been looked upon as vesting rights irrevocably in the party
to whom they were granted; and those rights, once vested, could not be
taken away. Perhaps in comparable fashion, human rights, once granted,
become vested in the persons enjoying them in a manner comparable, in
their irrevocable character, to vested rights in a dispositive treatyZ2.
This interesting legal hypothesis need not detain us here as the conclu-
sion 1have reached is amply supported by the other principles discussed.

Some of the reasons set out above, even considered individually, are
cogent enough to demonstrate the applicability of automatic succession
to the Genocide Convention (and indeed to a widerange of human rights
and humanitarian treaties). Taken cumulatively, they point strongly to
the clear incompatibility with international law ofthe contention that the
Genocide Convention ceasesto apply to the subjects of a State upon the

division of that State.

21See E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law, C. Fenwick
Itrans.). 1916. o. 169. referred to in Vir~iniaJournal of International Law. 1979-1980.
vol. 19:p. 8s83note 16. -
22On the ~ossibleextension to human rights of the doctrine of acauired rights which
has traditiokally been applied to di~~ositivetreaties and property rights, see Malcolm N.
Shaw, "State Succession Revisited",Finnish Yearbook ofInternational Law, 1994,Vol. 5,
p. 82; Rein Mullerson, "The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the
Former USSR and Yugoslavia", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1993,
members referring to these rights as "acquired rights" which were not "diluted" when a
State was divided (Serrano Caldera, CCPRICISR.1178IAdd.1,5 November 1992,p. 9). In the discussionsthat took place at the United Nations Conference on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, this aspect of a need to pre-

vent a hiatus occurring in the process of succession of States received
emphasis from several States. The position was well summarized by one
delegate who, whilepointing out that the "essence of the problem was to
strike a balance between continuity and the freedom of choicewhich was
the basis of the 'cleanslate'prin~iple"~~,stated that, in the case of multi-
lateral treaties, the need for continuity was pressing. He described as an
"international vacuum" the situation that could arise if this were not the
case, and spoke of this as "a lacuna inconvenient both to the newly inde-
pendent State and to the international ~omrnunity"~~.
This question has also been considered in some depth by the Commis-

sion on Human Rights and by the Human Rights Committee.

At its forty-ninth session, the Commission on Human Rights adopted
resolution 1993123of 5 March 1993, entitled "Succession of States in
respect of international human rights treaties". This resolution encour-
aged successor States to confirm officially that they continued to be
bound by international obligations under relevant human rights treaties.
The specialnature of human rights treaties was further confirmed by the
Commission in its resolution 1994116of 25 February 1994,and the Com-
mission, in that resolution, reiterated its cal1to successor States which

had not yet done so to confirm to appropriate depositories that they
continued to be bound by obligations under international human rights
treaties.

The Committee on Human Rights, at its forty-seventh session
(March-April 1993), stated that al1the people within the territory of a
former State party to the Covenant remained entitled to the guarantees
under the Covenant.
Itis worthy of note also that during the fifth meeting of persons chair-

ing the human rights treaty bodies, held from 19to 23 September 1994:

"The chairpersons emphasized, however, that they were of the
view that successor States were automatically bound by obligations

under international human rights instruments from the respective
date of independence and that observance of the obligations should

23Mr. Shahabuddeen, speaking for Guyana, 23rd Meeting, 21 April 1977, Official
Records Vol. 1,p.163.
24Zbid.p.,162. See, also, Sweden, Mr. Hellners, 26th meeting, 25 April 1977, ibid.,
p. 177. not depend on a declaration of confirmation made by the Govern-
ment of the successor State."25

The Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide also made the important point
that the crime of genocide generally entails the complicity or direct
involvement of Governments2'j,and national courts are likelyto be reluc-

tant or ineffective in adjudicating claims of State-sponsored genocideZ7
- hence the importance of Article IX.

Al1 of these views, though not authoritative in themselves, serve to
underline the principle here under discussion. These are al1committees
with special experience of handling problems in the human rights area,
and the force of their conviction of the necessity of such a rule empha-

sizeshow vital it is in actual practice.

If such should be the principle suggested, in regard to human rights
conventions such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, one can
be left in little doubt regarding its essentiality in regard to conventions
such as the Genocide Convention.
A clarification of this principle is one of the ways in which interna-

tional law can respond to the needs of international society.
In the words of Jenks, written in the context of State succession to
treaties:

"if Our legal system fails to respond to the widely felt and urgent
needs of a developing international society, both its authority as a
legal system and the prospect of developing a peaceful international
order will begravely prejudiced"28.

Al1of the foregoing reasons combine to create what seemsto me to be
a principle of contemporary international law that there is automatic
State succession to so vital a human rights convention as the Genocide
Convention. Nowhere is the protection of the quintessential human right
- the right to life-more heavilyconcentrated than in that Convention.

Without automatic successionto such a Convention, we would have a

situation where the worldwide system of human rights protections con-

25E/CN.4/1995/80, 28 November 1994,p. 4.
26United Nations, Official Records of the Economicand Social Council,Ad Hoc Com-
(1948),pp. 3-5, cited in M. Lippman, "The 1948Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-five Years Later", Temple International and
ComparativeLaw Journal, 1994,Vol. 8, p. 70.
27Zbid.
28Jenks, op. cit., p. 110.tinually generates gaps in the most vital part of its framework, which

open up and close, depending on the break-up of the old political
authorities and the emergence of the new. The international legal system
cannot condone a principle by which the subjects of these States live in a
state of continuing uncertainty regarding the most fundamental of their
human rights protections. Such a viewwould grievously tear the seamless
fabric of international human rights protections, endanger peace, and
lead the law astray from the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations, which al1nations, new and old, are committed to pursue.

(Signed) Christopher Gregory WEERAMANTRY.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE WEERAMANTRY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
THEISSUE OFAUTOMATS IUCCESSIOTN THEGENOCIDC EONVENTION 641

THEORIER SELATINTO STATESUCCESSION 641
THE"CLEAN SLATEP"RINCIPLE 643

(a) Historical antecedents of the clean slate principle 643
(b) Theoretical bases of the clean slate principle 644
(c) Necessary exceptions to the clean slate principle 645

REASONF SAVOURIN VGIEWOF AUTOMATS ICUCCESSIOTNTHE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION

1. It is not centred on individual State interests
2. It transcends concepts of State sovereignty
3. The rights it recognizes impose no burden on the State
4. The obligations imposed by the Convention exist independently
of conventional obligations
5. It embodies rules of customary international law
6. It is a contribution to global stability
7. The undesirability of a hiatus in successionto the Genocide Con-

vention
8. The specialimportance of human rights guarantees against geno-
cide during periods of transition
9. The beneficiaries of the Genocide Convention are not third par-
ties in thense which attracts the res inter alios acta principle
10. The rights conferred by the Convention are non-derogable OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. WEERAMANTRY

[Tuaduction]

TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Page
QUESTIO DE LA SUCCESSIONAUTOMATIQUEÀ LACONVENTIONSUR LE GENOCIDE 641

THÉORIE RELATIVES À LA SUCCESSIOND'ETATS 641
643

a) Historique du principe de la table rase 643
b) Fondements théoriquesdu principe de la table rase 644
c) Exceptions nécessairesau principe de la table rase 645

RAISONS MILITANT EN FAVEUR DE LA SUCCESSION AUTOMATIQUE À LA
CONVENTION SUR LE GÉNOCIDE

1. Elle n'est pas axéesur les intéindividuels des Etats
2. Elle transcende la notion de souveraineté de1'Etat
3. Elle reconnaît des droits qui n'imposent aucune charàe1'Etat

4. Elle crée des obligations qui existent indépendamment des
obligations conventionnelles
5. Elle codifie des règlesdu droit international coutumier
6. Elle contribue à la stabilité mondiale
7. Une interruption dans la successioà la convention sur le géno-
cide n'est pas souhaitable

8. Importance particulière des garanties contre le génocide relevant
des droits de l'homme durant les périodesde transition
9. Les bénéficiairede la convention sur le génocide nesont pas des
tiers au sens où le principe res inter alios acta serait applicable
10. Les droits conféréspar la convention ne sont pas susceptibles

de dérogation
PRESSION INTERNATIONALE EN FAVEUR DE LA RECONNAISSANCE DU PRINCIPE
DE LA SUCCESSION AUTOMATIQUE 1agree with the majority of my colleagues that the Court does have
jurisdiction in this case. However, this case raises the important issue of
automatic succession to the Genocide Convention, which has not been
developed in the Court's Judgment. 1 believe it warrants consideration.

One of the principal concerns of the contemporary international legal
system is the protection of the human rights and dignity of every indi-
vidual.The question of successionto the GenocideConvention raises one
of the most essential aspects of such protection.
The topic which 1 wish to address in this opinion is the continuing
applicability of the Convention to the populations to which it has applied.
When a convention so significant for the protection of human life has
been entered into by a State, and that State thereafterdivides into two or

more successor States, what is the position of its subjects in the interim
period that elapses before the formal recognition of the successor States,
or before the new State's forma1 accession to treaties such as the
Genocide Convention? 1 think this situation should not be passed by
without attention, especially having regard to the fact that the founda-
tions for a consideration of this matter are to be found in the Court's
Opinion in the earlier case on genocide which came before it over forty
years ago (Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion,I. C. J. Reports 1951,
p. 15).
Another reason calling for attention to this topic is the fact that the
international community is passing through a historical period, when,
throughout the world, the phenomenon is being experienced of the splin-
tering of States. This has occurred with particular intensity especially
after the end of the Cold War. It is vitally important that the principle of

protection of populations against human rights abuses and atrocities
should be strengthened in every manner available under current legal
principles; and the clarification of the law relating to State successionto
a humanitarian treaty so important as the Genocide Convention is emi-
nently such an area.
Bosnia has contended that there is automatic successionto this treaty,
and Yugoslavia denies this proposition. Thisproblem leadsinto the intri-
cate field of State succession to treaties - a field in which there has
been much difference of juristic opinion, and in which many competing
theories strive for recognition.

State succession is one of the oldest problems of international law.
As Oscar Schachter reminds us, this problem goes al1 the way back QUESTIO DNE LA SUCCESSION AUTOMATIQUE A LA CONVENTION
SUR LE GÉNOCIDE

Je pense commela majoritéde mes collèguesquela Cour est bien com-
pétente en la présente affaire. Toutefois, celle-ci soulèvel'importante
question de la succession automatique à la convention sur le génocide,
qui n'a pas ététraitée dans l'arrêt de Cour. J'estime qu'ellemérite exa-

men.
L'un desprincipaux soucis du systèmejuridique international contem-
porain est de protéger les droits de l'homme et la dignité de chaque
être humain. La questiondela succession àla convention sur le génocide
touche l'un des aspects les plus essentielsde cette protection.
Le sujet que je souhaite traiter dans la présenteopinion est celui de
I'applicabilitécontinue de la convention aux populations auxquelles ellea
été appliquéeL . orsqu'un Etat devient partie à une convention aussi
importante pour la protection de la vie humaine et que cet Etat se divise
ultérieurementen deux Etats successeurs ou plus, quelle est la situation

de ses sujets durant la périodeintérimairequi précèdela reconnaissance
officielledes Etats successeursou leur accession officielle traitéstels
que la convention sur le génocide?J'estime que cette situation doit rete-
nir l'attention, en particulier parce que les principes sur lesquels doivent
reposer l'examen dela question sont exposésdans l'avis qu'a rendu la
Cour il y a plus de quarante ans dans une précédenteaffaire relative au
génocide (Réserves à la conventionpour lapréventionet la répressiondu
crime de génocide,avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 15).

Une autre raison pour laquelle ce sujet doit retenir l'attention est que

la communauté internationale traverse une périodehistorique, à savoir
que dans le monde entier des Etats se divisent, un phénomènequi a pris
une ampleur particulière depuis la fin de la guerre froide.est vital que
le principe de la protection des populations contre les violations des
droits de l'homme etautres atrocitéssoitrenforcéautant quefaire sepeut
dans le cadre des principesjuridiques en vigueur; et le droit régissant la
successiond'Etats à un traité humanitaire aussi important que la conven-
tion sur le génocideest au premier chefun domainequi appelle des éclair-
cissements.

La Bosnie a fait valoir qu'il y avait successionautomatiquece traité,
ce que nie la Yougoslavie. Ce problèmerelèvedu domaine complexede la
succession d'Etats en matière de traité- un domaine dans lequel les
opinions desjuristes sont très divergenteset de nombreuses théoriessont
en concurrence.

La succession d'Etats est l'un des plus anciens problèmes du droit

international. Comme nous le rappelle Oscar Schachter, il remonte àAristote qui, dans sa Politique, s'est penchésur la question de la conti-
nuitélorsque «l'Etat n'est plusle même) .
Sur ce problème,lesvues desjuristes ont variéentre lesdeux extrêmes,
à savoir la succession universelle (ces théoriessont parmi les plus an-
ciennes et se fondent en grande partie sur une analogie avec le droit ro-

main des successions,impliquant une successionuniverselleaux droits du
défunt)et le négativismetotal, soit une négation complètede la succes-
sion (fondéesur une analogie théoriqueavec un contrat personnel). Il
n'estpas nécessaireaux finsde la présente opinion d'indiquerles diverses
théoriesqui se situent entre ces deux extrêmes.
Les réalités de la vie internationale ont montré qu'aucunede ces théo-

ries absolutistes ne peut rendre compte de toutes les situations possibles
et que, pour êtreapplicable, toute théorie en la matièredoit se situer
quelque part entre ces deux extrêmes2. Il est toutà fait clair que quelle
que soit celle de ces positions que l'on privilégiedes exceptions doivent
nécessairementêtreadmises.
Il s'agit en l'espèced'examiner si, même sil'on retientla théorienéga-
tiviste selon laquelle les traitésde 1'Etatprédécesseur ne lientpas 1'Etat

successeur,une exception doit nécessairement existeren ce qui concerne
les traitéstels que la convention sur le génocide. L'examende la succes-
sion automatique aux traités relatifs aux droits de l'homme et aux traités
de caractère humanitaire en général devrait considérablement éclairer
la question. Les débats quiont eu lieu et ce qui a étépublié à cet égard.
donnent àpenser qu'ilexisteen principe une successionautomatique à une

large gamme de ces traités.La présente opinionne vise pas à prendre en
considérationtous les traitésrelatifs aux droits de l'homme ou de carac-
tère humanitaire, mais examine les principes dégagésau sujet de ces
traitéspour parvenir à la conclusion qu'ils s'appliquent à fortiori à la
convention sur le génocide qui, en conséquence, estun traité auquella
succession d7Etatsest automatique en application des principes du droit

international contemporain.

l Oscar Schachter, «State Succession: The Once and Future Law», Virginia Journalof
International Law, 1992-1993,vol. 33, p. 253,citant Aristote, Politique, livre III,chapitre
premier. Analysant les élémentsconstitutifs de1-Eterritoire, gouvernement et popu-
lation - Aristote se réfèrenotammenàla question de la continuité des obligations con-
tractuelles lorsqu'un changement est intervenudans 1'Etat.
Un certain nombre d'études considèrentles traités multilatéraux comme une excep-
tion au principe de la table rase (voir Ian Brownlie,ciples of Public International
Law, 4e éd., 1990,p. 670, et D. P. O'Connell, State Succession inMunicipal Law and
InternationalLaw, 1967,vol. II, p. 212-219).La dernière éditiond'oppenheim, en faisant
observer qu'ily a plus de possibilitésence qui concerne les traitésenl our que le
ctèrenormatif, fait remarquer que cette opinion vaut en particulier pouràlcara-aitéscara-
ctère humanitaire(Oppenheim'sInternational Law, 9" éd., publié sousla direction de
Jennings et Watts, 1992,vol. 1, p. 222-223). Toutefois, la définition des traités multila-
térauxpose un problèmeet, aux finsde la présente opinion,il n'estpas nécessaired'entrer
dans ce domaine. (a) Historical Antecedents of the Clean Slate Pvinciple

The principle that a new State ought not in general to be fettered with
treaty obligations which it has not expressly agreed to assume after it has
attained statehood (the clean slate principle) is of considerablehistorical
and theoreticalimportance. New Statesought not, in principle, to be bur-
dened with treaty-based responsibilities without their express consent.

With the sudden advent into the international community of nearly
eighty newly independent States in the late fifties and early sixties, there
was a realization among them, in the words of Julius Stone, that:

"their authority or their territory or both are burdened with debts,
concessions,commercial engagements of various kinds or other obli-
gations continuing on from the earlier colonial regime . .."3.

For example, in Nigeria, 300 treaties negotiated by Britain were said to
be applicable to the country4.

Other newly emerging countries soon became conscious of the dangers
to their autonomy involved in this principle, and what came to be known
as the Nyerere Doctrine emerged under which none of the colonial trea-
ties became applicable unless the new State, within a specifiedperiod of
time, notified its accession to such treaties5. In the language of Jenks, in
relation to State successionto colonialtreaties, "The psychology of newly
won independence is a formidable realit~."~

This was not, however, the only historical reality that favoured the
clean slate theory. There were numerous older precedents, of which a few
illustrative examples may be mentioned. Following the Franco-Prussian
war and the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine,French treaties applicable to the

Julius Stone, "A Common Law for Mankind?', International Studies, 1960,Vol. 1,
pp. 430-431.Seealso E. G. Bello,"Reflectionson Successionof States in the Light of the
Vienna Convention on Successionof States in Respectof Treaties1978", German Year-
book of International Law, 1980,Vol. 23, p. 298; D. P. O'Connell,State Succession, op.
cit., p. 116.
By exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and the United Kingdom High
Commissionon the veryday of independence, theFederation assumed al1rights and obli-
gations entered into "on their behalf' before independence,and undertook to keeph
agreements in forceuntil the Governrnent of Nigeria couldconsiderwhether they required
modification or renegotiation in any respect G. Bello,op. cit., p. 298).

Ibid., pp. 298-299.
Year Book of International Law, 1952, Vol.29, p. 108.Law-Making Treaties", British a) Historique du principe de la table rase

Le principe selon lequel d'une manière généralle es nouveaux Etats ne

doivent pas être entravésparles obligations conventionnellesqu'ils n'ont
pas expressémentaccepté d'assumeraprès qu'ils ont acquis la qualité
d7Etat(principe de la table rase) revêtune importancehistorique et théo-
rique considérable.Les nouveaux Etats ne devraient pas, en principe, être
assujettis à des obligations conventionnelles sans leur consentement
exprès.
Avecl'apparition soudaine au seinde la communautéinternationalede
prèsde quatre-vingtsEtats nouvellement indépendants à la fin des années

cinquante et au débutdes annéessoixante, l'idée s'esftaitjour parmi ces
Etats que, pour reprendre les mots de Julius Stone:

«leur autorité et leur territoire ou les deux sont grevés dedettes,
concessions, engagements commerciaux de types divers ou autres
obligations qu'ils ont héritésdu régimecolonial antérieur ...)y3

C'estainsi que trois cents traitésnégociép sar la Grande-Bretagneétaient
réputéslier le Nigéria4.
D'autres Etats nouvellement indépendantsserendirent bienvite compte
des dangers que ce principe faisait courir à leur autonomie, et c'est ainsi
qu'apparut ce que l'on devait appeler la doctrine Nyerere, selon laquelle
aucun des traitéscoloniaux n'étaitapplicable si le nouvel Etat, dans un

délaidéfini,ne notifiait pas son accession auxdits traités5.Pour reprendre
ce qu'a écritJenks, en ce qui concerne la succession d'Etats en matièrede
traitéscoloniaux «la psychologiede l'indépendance nouvellementacquise
est une formidable réalité » 6.
Ce n'était pastoutefois la seuleréalité historiquequi favorisaitla théo-
rie de la table rase. Il y avait de nombreux précédents plus anciens,dont
certains méritent d'être cités à titre d'illustration. A la suite de la guerre
franco-prussienne et du transfert de l'Alsace-Lorraine, les traités français

Julius Stone, «A Common Law for Mankind?)), InternationalStudies, 1960,vol. 1,
Vienna Convention on Succession ofStates in Respect of Treaties, German Year-ht of the
book ofInternationalLaw, 1980,vol. 23, p. 298; D. P. O'Connell,State Succession,op.
cit., p. 116.
Par un échangede lettres entre le premier ministre et la Haute Commission du
Royaume-Uni lejour mêmede l'indépendance, laFédérationfaisait sienstous les droits
assuméset obligations contractéesn son nom» avant l'indépendance, et s'engagtai
maintenir ces accords en vigueur jusqu'à ce que le Gouvernement nigérianait examiné
s'ilsdevaient êtremodifiésou renégocd'une manièreou d'une autre(E. G. Bello, op.
cit.. a. 298).
~'Îbid.p.298-299.
Year Book ofInternationalLaw, 1952,vol. 29, p. 108.f Law-Making Treaties~, British provinces had, in genera17,to cease to have effect and be replaced by
German treaties. Again, Britishjurists, facing the problem of annexation
of colonial territories, tended towards the view that "the treaties of the

expunged legal person died with it" s, so that they receivedthose colonies
free of the burden of prior treaties. At the United Nations Conference on
Succession ofStates in Respect of Treaties9, several other examples were
referred to, among them the situation resulting from the termination of
theAustro-Hungarian Empire, when Czechoslovakiaand Poland emerged
as independent States with a clean slate in regard to treaties of the former
Austro-Hungarian Empire, except for certain multilateral treaties 'O.

The clean slate theory was thus the result of many historical trends",
and had received favour at one time or another from both emerging and
established nations.

(b) Theoretical Basesof the Clean Slate Principle

Theoretically, the clean slate principle can be justified on several

powerful bases - the principle of individual State autonomy, the principle
of self-determination, the principle of res inter alios acta, and the prin-
ciple that there can be no limitations on a State's rights, except with its
consent. Newly independent States should not have to accept as a
fait accomplithe contracts of predecessor States, for it is self-evidentthat
the new State must be free to make its own decisions on such matters.

The clean slate principle could also be described as an important cor-
ollary to the principle of self-determination, which is of cardinal impor-

tance in modem international law. The principle of self-determination
could be emptied of an important part of itscontent if prior treaties auto-
matically bind the new State.
One of the bases of the negativist view is that treaties entered into
by the predecessor State are res inter alios acta. Castrén, dealing spe-
cially with the case of division of a pre-existing State into new States,
observes :

"When a State is dismembered into new independent States, its
treaties as a rule become nul1and void without descending to the
new States. Treaties are generally persona1 in so far as they pre-
suppose, in addition to the territory, also the existence of a certain

An exception was, however, in regard to ecclesiastical law, whereNapoleon's Con-
cordat with the Holy See continued to apply.
D. P. O'Connell, "Reflections on the State Succession Convention", Zeitschrift fur
auslandischesoffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, 1979,Vol. 39, p. 735.
Vienna, 4 April-6 May 1977,and 31 July-23August 1978.
'O Ojjcial Records, VolIIIp. 92, para. 14.
O'Connell, "Reflections on the State SuccessionConvention", op. cit., p. 735.applicables à ces provinces devaient, d'une manière générale7c,esser
d'avoir effet et êtreremplacéspar des traitésallemands. De même,les

juristes britanniques, confrontésau problèmede l'annexion de territoires
coloniaux, avaient tendance à considérerque «les traitésde la personne
juridique qui a disparu s'éteignaient avecelle»8 de telle manière qu'ils
recevaient cescolonieslibres du fardeau des traitésantérieurs. A la confé-
rence des Nations Unies sur la succession d'Etats en matièrede traités9,
plusieurs autres exemples ont été citésn,otamment celui de la situation
qui a résulté dela disparition de l'empire austro-hongrois, lorsque la

Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne sont devenues des Etats indépendants
ayant fait table rase des traitésde l'ex-empire, à l'exception de certains
traitésmultilatéraux 'O.
La théorie de la table rasea donc été l'aboutissementde nombreuses
tendances historiques", et a eu à un moment ou à un autre la faveur tant
des nations en gestation que des Etats bien établis.

b) Fondements théoriquesduprincipe de latable rase

En théorie,leprincipe de la table rase repose sur des bases solides - le
principe de l'autonomie individuelledes Etats, le principe de I'autodéter-
mination, le principe res inter alios acta et le principe selon lequel les
droits d'un Etat ne peuvent êtrelimités qu'avec son consentement. Les
Etats nouvellementindépendantsnedevraient pas avoir a accepter comme
un fait accompli les conventions passéespar les Etats prédécesseursc ,ar

il est évidentque les nouveaux Etats doivent êtrelibres de prendre leurs
propres décisionsdans de tels domaines.
Le principe de la table rase peut aussi êtreconsidéré comme unimpor-
tant corollaire du principe de l'autodétermination,un principe capital du
droit international contemporain. Ce principe risquerait d'êtrevidéd'une
large part de son contenu si les traités antérieursdevaient automatique-
ment lier les nouveaux Etats.
L'un des fondements de la conception négativiste estque les traités

conclus par 1'Etatprédécesseur sont res inter alios acta. Castrén,au sujet
de la division d'un Etat existant en de nouveaux Etats, fait observer:

((Lorsqu'un Etat est démembré en nouveauxEtats indépendants,
ses traités,en règlegénérales ,ont nuls et non avenus et ne passent
pas aux nouveaux Etats. Les traitéssont généralement personnels
dans la mesure où ils supposent, outre le territoire, l'existenced'un

Le droit canon constituait néanmoins une exception, et leConcordat qu'avait conclu
Napoléonavec le Saint-Siègecontinuait de s'appliquer.
D. P. O'Connell, ~Reflections on the State SuccessionConvention)), Zeitschrift für
auslandischesoflentlichesRecht und Volkerrecht, 1979, vol. 39, p. 735.
Vienne, 4 avril-6 mai 1977et 31juillet-23 août 1978.
l1O'Connell, ((Reflectionson the State SuccessionConvention)), op. cit., p. 735. sovereign over the territory. To the succeeding State, the treaties
concluded by the former State are res interalios acta." l2

Basicconcepts of State sovereigntyalso require that any curtailment of
the sovereign authority of a State requires the express consent of the
State.
If there is to be, in a given case, a deviation from the clean slate prin-
ciple, sufficientlycogent reasons should exist to demonstrate that the new
State's sovereignty is not being thereby impaired. The question needs
therefore to be examined as to whether there is any impairment of State
sovereignty implicit in the application of the principle of automatic suc-

cession to any given treaty.

(c) Necessary Exceptions to the Clean Slate Principle

Human rights and humanitarian treaties involve no loss of sovereignty
or autonomy of the new State, but are merely in line with general prin-
ciples of protection that flow from the inherent dignity of every human

being which is the very foundation of the United Nations Charter.

At the same time, it is important that the circle of exceptions should
not be too widely drawn. Conceivably some human rights treaties may
involve economic burdens, such as treaties at the economic end of the
spectrum of human rights. It is beyond the scope of this opinion to exam-
ine whether al1 human rights and humanitarian treaties should be
exempted from the clean slate principle. It is sufficientfor the purposes of
this opinion to note a variety of reasons why it has been contended that

human rights and humanitarian treaties in general attract the principle of
automatic succession. These reasons apply with special force to treaties
such as the Genocide Convention or the Convention against Torture,
leaving no room for doubt regarding automatic succession to such trea-
ties. The international community has a special interest in the continuity
of such treaties.

1. It Is Not Centred on IndividualState Interests

This Court, in its earlier consideration of the Genocide Convention,
drew pointed attention to the difference between a humanitarian treaty

l2E. Castrén, "Obligationsof States Arising from the Dismemberment of Another
State",Zeitschrift furauslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, 1950-1951,
Vol. 13,p. 754 (emphasis added); cited by M. G. Maloney in Virginia Journalof Znter-
national Law, 1979-1980,Vol. 19,p. 892. certain souverain sur ce territoire. Pour 1'Etatsuccesseur, les traités

conclus par 1'Etatantérieursont res inter alios acta.»12
Les notions fondamentales de la souveraineté de1'Etatsubordonnent
égalementtoute limitation del'autoritésouverained'un Etat à sonconsen-

tement exprès.
Pour que l'on puisse, dans un cas donné,s'écarterdu principe de la
table rase, des raisons suffisammentimpérieusesdoivent existerqui mon-
trent que la souveraineté du nouvel Etat n'en serait pas affectée. Il
convient donc de se demander si l'application du principe de la succes-
sion automatique à un traitédonnéimplique une atteinte quelconque àla
souveraineté de1'Etat.

c) Exceptions nécessairesauprincipe de la table rase

Les traités relatifs aux droits de l'homme et les traités de caractère
humanitaire n'impliquent aucune perte de souverainetéou d'autonomie
pour le nouvel Etat, mais sont simplementconformes aux principes géné-
raux de protection qui découlent de la dignité inhérente à tout être
humain, laquelle est le fondement mêmede la Charte des Nations Unies.

Dans le mêmetemps, il est important que la gamme des exceptions ne
soit pas trop large. Certains traitésrelatifs aux droits de l'homme peuvent
certes, de par leur nature, énoncer des obligations économiques, mais la
présente opinion n'entendpas examiner si tous les traités relatifsaux
droits de l'homme etde caractèrehumanitaire doivent échapperau prin-
cipe de la table rase.l suffit en l'occurrence denoter la diversité des rai-
sons avancéespour appliquer le principe de la succession automatique à
cestraitésen général. Ces raisons valent àfortiori pour lestraitéstels que
la convention sur le génocideou la convention contre la torture, et ne

laissent pas de place au doute pour ce qui est de la succession automa-
tique à de tels traités.La communauté internationale a un intérêt parti-
culierà ce que ces traités soientmaintenus en vigueur sans interruption.

RAISONS MILITANT EN FAVEUR DE LA SUCCESSION AUTOMATIQUE

À LA CONVENTION SUR LE GÉNOCIDE

1. Elle n'estpas axéesur les intérêtisndividuels des Etats

La Cour, lorsqu'ellea par le passé examiné la convention sur le géno-
cide, a attiréspécialementl'attention sur la différence existantentre un

l2E. Castrén, «Obligations of States Arising from the Dismemberment of Another
State)), Zeitschrzyt fur auslündisches oyfentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, 1950-1951,
vol. 13,p. 754 (lesitaliques sont de moi); citépar M. G. Maloney dans, Virginia Journal
of International Law, 1979-1980,vol. 19,p. 892.such as the Genocide Convention, and a convention aimed at protecting
the interests of a State. The Court stated in its Opinion on Reservations

to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide that :
"In such a convention the contracting States do not have any
interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common
interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which

are the raison d'êtreof the convention. Consequently, in a conven-
tion of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or dis-
advantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual
balance between rights and duties." (1C ..J. Reports 1951, p. 23.)
Charles De Visscher has remarked on the contrast

"between the frailty of agreements of merely individual interest,
dependent as these are upon transitory political relations, and the
relative stability of conventions dictated by concern for order or
respect for law" 13.

He has also remarked in this context that the growing part played by
multilateral treaties in the development of international law should count
in favour of the transmission rather than disappearance of the obliga-
tions they create 14.
Human rights and humanitarian treaties do not represent an exchange

of interests and benefits between contracting States in the conventional
sense, and in this respect may also be distinguished from the generality of
multilateral treaties, many of which are concerned with the economic,
security or other interests of States. Human rights and humanitarian
treatiesrepresent, rather, a commitment of the participating States to cer-
tain noms and values recognized by the international community.

Stated another way, the personality of the sovereign is not the essence
of such an agreement.Multilateral treaties are most often concluded with

the object of protecting and benefiting the international community as a
whole, and for the maintenance of world order and CO-operation,rather
than of protecting and advancing one particular State's interests.

2. It Transcends Concepts of State Sovereignty

The Genocide Convention does not come to an end with the dismem-
berment of the original State, as it transcends the concept of State sov-
ereignty. An important conceptual basis denying continuity to treaties is
that the recognition of the continuity of the predecessor State's treaties
would be an intrusion upon the sovereignty of the successor State. This-

l3Theorv and Realitvin Public InternatioLaw, revised ed., 1968,translated from
the ~rench by P. E. ~orbett, p. 179.
l4Zbid.traitéde caractère humanitaire comme la convention sur le génocide et
une convention visant à protégerles intérêts d'unEtat. Elle a déclaré,

dans son avis consultatif relatif aux Réservesà la conventionpour lapré-
vention et la répressiondu crime de génocide,que:
«Dans une telleconvention, lesEtats contractants n'ont pasd'inté-
rêtspropres; ils ont seulement, tous et chacun, un intérêt commun,

celui de préserverles fins supérieuresqui sont la raison d'être dela
convention. Il en résulteque l'on ne saurait, pour une convention de
ce type, parler d'avantages ou de désavantages individuelsdes Etats,
non plus que d'un exact équilibrecontractuel à maintenir entre les
droits et les charges.))C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 23.)

Charles De Visscher a relevé lecontraste
((entre la précaritédes accordsd'intérêitndividuel, conditionnéspar
l'étattransitoire des relations politiques, et la stabilitérelative des

conventions dictéespar des préoccupationsd'ordre ou de respect du
droit» 13.
Il a aussi fait observer dans ce contexteque le rôle croissant jouépar les
traités multilatéraux dansle développementdu droit international milite
plus en faveur de la transmission que de la disparition des obligations

qu'ils créent14.
Les traités relatifs aux droits de l'homme et les traités de caractère
humanitaire ne représentent pas un échanged'intérêtset d'avantages
entre Etats contractants au sensconventionnel du terme, et à cet égardon
peut aussi lesdistinguer de la majoritédes traités multilatéraux,dont bon
nombre concernent les intérêts économiques,de sécuritéou autres des
Etats. Les traitésrelatifs aux droits de l'homme etles traités de caractère
humanitaire expriment un engagementdes Etats parties en faveur de cer-
taines normes et valeurs reconnues par la communauté internationale.

En d'autres termes, la personne du souverain ne participe pas de
l'essence de tels accords. Les traités multilatéraux sont très souvent
conclus dans le but de protéger etde servirla communautéinternationale
dans son ensemble,de maintenirl'ordre mondial et la coopérationet non
de protéger ou de promouvoir les intérêts d'un Etat particulier.

2. Elle transcendela notion de souverainetéde I'Etat

La convention sur le génocidene s'éteint pasavecle démembrementde
l'Etat originaire, car elle transcende la notion de souverainetéde 1'Etat.

Un argument théorique important avancé à l'encontre de la continuité
des traitésest que la reconnaissance de la continuitédes traitésde 1'Etat
prédécesseurempiéterait sur la souverainetéde 1'Etat successeur. 11en

l3Théorieet réalité en droiitnternationalpublic, édition revisée1,968,p. 217.

l4Ibid.would be so if it were a matter confined within the ambit of a State'ssov-
ereignty. But with human rights and humanitarian treaties, we are in a
sphere which reaches far beyond the narrow confines of State sover-
eignty, and enters the domain of universal concern.

In its ongoing development, the concept of human rights has long
passed the stage when it was a narrow parochial concern between sov-
ereign and subject. We have reached the stage, today, at which the
human rights of anyone, anywhere, are the concern of everyone, every-
where. The world's most powerful States are bound to recognize them,
equally with the weakest, and there isnot even the semblanceof a sugges-
tion in contemporary international law that such obligations amount to a
derogation of sovereignty.

3. The Rights It Recognizes Impose No Burden on the State

Moreover, a State, in becoming party to the Convention, does not give
away any of its rights to its subjects. Itdoes not burden itself with any
new liability. It merely confirms its subjects in the enjoyment of those
rights which are theirs by virtue of their humanity. Human rights are
never a gift from the State and hence the State, in recognizing them, is
not imposing any burden upon itself. We have long passed the historical
stagewhen a sovereign,granting to his subjectswhat wewould today cal1
a human right, could claim their gratitude for surrendering to them what
was then considered to be a part of his absolute and undoubted rights as
a sovereign.Human rights treaties are no more than a forma1recognition
by the sovereign of rights which already belong to each of that sover-
eign's subjects.Far from being largesse extended to them by their sov-
ereign, they represent the entitlement to which they were born.

Quite contrary to the view that human rights treaties are a burden on

the new State, it could indeed be asserted that the adherence by a new
State to a system which is universally accepted, whereby the new State
becomespart of that system,is indeed a benefit to the new State, in sharp
contrast to the position of disadvantage in which it would place itselfifit
stood outside that system.

4. The Obligations Imposed by the Convention Exist Independently of
Conventional Obligations

This Court observed in Reservations to the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,"the principles underlying
the [Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civi-
lizednations as binding on States, even without any conventional obliga-
tion" (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23). The same may be said of al1treaties
concerning basic human rights.serait ainsi s'ils'agissaitd'une matièrelimitéepar le champ de la souverai-
neté de 1'Etat.Mais en ce qui concerne les traitésrelatifs aux droits de
l'homme etlestraitésde caractèrehumanitaire, on entre dansun domaine
qui dépasse debeaucoup leslimitesétroitesde la souveraineté de l'Etat, le
domaine de l'intérêt universel.
Dans son évolution, la notionde droits de l'homme a depuis longtemps

dépassé le stade étroitdu seul souci des relationsentre souverain et sujets.
Nous sommes aujourd'hui au stade où les droits de l'homme de qui-
conque, n'importe où, concernent chacun, partout. Les Etats les plus
puissants sont comme les plus faibles tenus de reconnaître les droits de
l'homme, et nul n'a jamais ne serait-ce que suggéré qu'endroit interna-
tional contemporain les obligationsy relativesreprésentent unelimitation
de souveraineté.

3. Elle reconnaît des droits qui n'imposent aucune charge à I'Etat

En outre, un Etat qui devient partie à la convention ne renonce à
aucun de ses droits sur ses sujets. Il ne preàdsa charge aucune respon-

sabilité nouvelle.l ne fait que conforter ses sujets dans la jouissance de
droits qui sont leurs en leur qualité d'êtres humains. Les droits de
l'homme ne sont jamais un don de 1'Etatet donc l'Etat, en les reconnais-
sant, ne s'imposeaucune charge. L'époque est depuis longtemps révolue
où un souverain, accordant à sessujetsceque l'on appelleraitaujourd'hui
un droit de l'homme, pouvait prétendre à leur gratitude pour leur avoir
cédé ce que l'on considéraitalors comme faisant partie de sesdroits abso-
lus et incontestés entant que souverain. Les traitésrelatifs aux droits de
l'homme ne sont rien d'autre que la reconnaissance officiellepar le sou-
verain de droits qui appartiennent déjà à chacun de ses sujets. Loin de
résulterd'une largesse du souverain au bénéfice de ses sujets, il s'agit de
droits inhérentsà ceux-cidepuis qu'ils sont nés.

Contrairement à l'opinion selon laquellelestraités relatifs aux droits de
l'homme sont une chargepour le nouvel Etat, on peut de fait affirmerque
l'adhésiond'un nouvel Etat à un régimequi est universellement accepté,
par laquelle ce nouvel Etat entre dans ce régime, estbienà l'avantage de
cet Etat, qui se trouve ainsi dans une position opposée celle- défavo-
rable - qui serait la siennes'ildemeuraià l'extérieurdu système.

4. Elle créedes obligationsqui existent indépendamment
des obligations conventionnelles

La Cour a fait observer dans l'avis qu'elle arendu dans l'affaire des
Réserves à la conventionpour la préventionet la répressiondu crime de

génocide que «les principes qui sont à la base de la convention [sur le
génocide]sont des principes reconnus par les nations civiliséescomme
obligeant les Etats même endehors de tout lien conventionnel)) (C.I.J.
Recueil 1951, p. 23). Cette observation vaut pour tous les traitésconcer-
nant des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine. The Court referred also in the same Opinion to the universal character
of the condemnation of genocide. This condemnation has its roots in the
convictions of humanity, of which the legal rule is only a reflection. The
same could likewise be said of many of the basic principles of human
rights and humanitarian law.

5. It Embodies Rules of Customary International Law

The human rights and humanitarian principles contained in the Geno-
cide Convention are principles of customary international law. These
principles continue to be applicable to both sovereign and subjects, irre-
spective ofchanges in sovereignty, for the new sovereign,equally with the
old, is subject to customary international law. The customary rights
which the subjects of that State enjoy continue to be enjoyed by them,
whoever may be their sovereign. The correlative duties attach to the
sovereign, whoever he may be. The position is no different when those

customary rights are also embodied in a treaty.

This factor may indeed be seenin wider context as essential to the evo-
lution of international law into a universal system. Among writers who
have stressed this aspect in relation to multilateral treaties are Wilfred
Jenks, who observed :
"It is generally admitted that a new State is bound by existing

rules of customary international law. This principle has, indeed,
been of fundamental importance in the development of international
law into a world-wide system .. .It is not clear why, now that the
rules established by multipartite legislativeinstruments constitute so
large a part of the operative law of nations, a new State should be
regarded as starting with a clean slate in respect ofrules which have
a conventional rather than a customary origin." l5

In regard to such a matter as genocide, there can be no doubt that the
treaty is of fundamental importance to the development of the operative
law of nations.

6. It Is a Contribution to Global Stability

The strengthening of human rights protectio_ns in accordance with
universally held values is a matter of universal concern and interest.

The promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights is,
according to Article 1 (3) of the United Nations Charter, one of the Pur-
poses of the United Nations, and the reaffirmation of faith in fundamen-
ta1 human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person are

W. Jenks, op. cit., p. 107

57 Dans le mêmeavis consultatif, la Cour a aussi évoquéle caractère
universel de la condamnation du génocide.Cette condamnation tire son
origine des convictions de l'humanité,dont la règlede droit est seule-
ment l'expression. On pourrait dire de mêmede nombre des principes

fondamentaux des droits de l'homme et du droit humanitaire.

5. Elle codifie des règlesdu droit international coutumier

Les principes concernant les droits de l'homme etles principes huma-
nitaires énoncés dans la convention sur le génocidesont des principes du
droit international coutumier. Ils continuent de s'appliquer aux souve-
rains comme aux sujets quels que soient leschangements de souveraineté,
car le nouveau souverain, au mêmetitre que l'ancien, est assujetti au
droit international coutumier. Les droits coutumiers dont jouissent les
sujets de cet Etat ne s'éteignent pas, quelque puisse êtreleur souverain.
Les obligations correspondantes échoientau souverain, quel qu'il puisse
être.La situation n'est pas différentelorsque ces droits coutumiers sont
de surcroît codifiésdans un traité.
Dans un contexte plus large, ce principe peut êtreconsidéré comme

essentiel pour l'évolutiondu droit international vers l'avènementd'un
systèmeuniversel. Parmi les auteurs qui l'ont souligné ence qui concerne
les traitésmultilatéraux,on peut citer Wilfred Jenks, qui a fait observer:
((11est généralement admisqu'un nouvel Etat est obligépar les
règlesen vigueur du droit international coutumier. De fait, ce prin-
cipe a joué un rôle d'uneimportance fondamentale dans le dévelop-
pement du droit international en un systèmemondial ... On voit mal

pourquoi, maintenant que lesrèglesétabliespar des instruments nor-
matifs multipartites représentent unesilarge part du droit positif des
gens, un nouvel Etat devrait êtreconsidéré comme libre detoute
obligation en ce qui concerne des règlesdont l'origine est conven-
tionnelle et non coutumière.» l5
En ce qui concerne une question comme le génocide,il n'est pas dou-

teux que le traitéest d'une importance fondamentale pour le développe-
ment du droit international positif.

6. Elle contribue à la stabilité mondiale

Le renforcement de la protection des droits de l'homme conformément
à des valeurs universellement acceptéesestdans l'intérêt dle'ensemblede
la communauté internationale.
Le développement et l'encouragementdu respect des droits de I'homme
est, aux termes de l'article 1, paragraphe 3, de la Charte des Nations
Unies, l'un des buts des Nations Unies, et la proclamation de leur foi
dans les droits fondamentaux de l'homme etdans la dignité et la valeur

l5W. Jenks, op. cit., p. 107.among the foremost objects that the peoples of the United Nations set
before themselves "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war".