Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Sepúlveda

Document Number
128-20040331-JUD-01-06-EN
Parent Document Number
128-20040331-JUD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

SEPARATEOPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC SEPULVEDA

Thzrdcase before the Court clarmzngbreaches rn the applicatronand inter-
pretatlon of VzennaConventionon ConsularRelations - Basrcagreement with
thefindrngsof the Court, butreservatronsabout certurnconclusrons - Untimely
objections onjurzsdzctronand adrnrsszbzhty - Restrzcted interpretatronof the
responszbzlityof States

The rlght to dzplomatic protectronof natzonals - The nature of the oblzga-
tions rncurnbentupon the United States and to whom are these oblrgatzons
owed - The instztutzon of drplomaticprotectzon andthe institution ofconsular
asszstance
The recognrtronof the existence of zndzv~duar lzghts in the VzennaConven-
tion - The localremedresrule, the doctrrneofproceduraldefault and thedenial
of justice - The 'ffutzl~ty"princzple - Clemency 1s not a jud#czalremedy
and thus u not a remedy tobe exhausted - Severe restrrctionson reviewand
reconsrderatronbecause of the procedural default rule - Post-LaGrand
experience shows remoteposs~bilitresof meaningful and effectrve review and
reconsrderatron

Unfoundedlnterpretation of the rlght of consular officers to arrange legal
representatcon - The Mrranda warnzng,fundamental due process rrghts and

Artzcle 36
The nature of thereparat~onclaimed - Meanrngof revrewand reconsldera-
tlon of convictions and sentences - Lack of effectiveness - Legal baszs to
declarethe cessationofbreaches of Artzcle36 - Previouscasesdecrdedby the
Court - Insuf$cient developmentof fhe law of State responsrbzbty

1. The present case constitutes a third attempt by the International
Court of Justice to resolve Issuesrelated to the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. For a third
tirne, the Court is requested to define the nature and scope of certain
international obligations established in that treaty and the consequences

produced by a breach of the Convention On this third opportunity, the
Court is asked to adjudge whether the United States has "violated its
international legalobligationsto Mexico,inits ownright and in the exer-
cise of its nght to diplomatic protection" of 52 Mexican nationals on
death row The Court is also required to determine whether Mexico has

been deprived of the right it has to provide consular protection and
whether the 52 Mexican nat~onalson death row were deprived of their
nght to receivesuch consular protection An affirmativeanswer to these
questions must mean that an international wrongfulact of a State entailsIegalconsequences,the mostimportant one being that Mexico 1sentitled
to reparation for those injuries Yet in the present Judgment, the Court
provides only a partial satisfaction to Mexico'sclaims,establishingin its
findings a restricted and limted perspective on a number of matters,
especiallythose related to the essence ofthe reparations owed

2, Even if 1 may be basically in agreement wrth most of the findings
of the Court, 1 have misgivings and reservations about the reasoning
employed by the Court to reach certain conclusions Such reasoning 1s
reflected in various operative paragraphs of the Judgment Not being
able to concur with al1of its terms1 wishto point out the arguments that
lead me to question aspects of the Judgment which 1 may regard as
unsatisfactory

3 The Court should have rejected, as untimely, the United States

objections regarding the jurisdiction of the Court and the adrmssibility
of Mexico'sApplication It is true that paragraph 1 of Article 79 of the
Rules of Court charactemes as preliminary an objection "the decision
upon which is requested before any further proceedings" The effect
of the timelypresentation of such an objectionis that the proceedingson
the meritsare suspended(Art 79,para 5) There is a generalunderstand-
ing that the United States did not submit a preldnary objection but
then no other objection of any sortshould have been recognizedas sut-
able, if the text of Article 79, paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court is to be
strictIyinterpreted and applied The text states that

"Any objection by the respondent to thejunsdiction of the Court
or to the admissibilityof the application shallbe made in writing
as soon as possible, and not later than three months after the
deliveryof the Mernorial "
The United States presented its objections to jurisdictlon and admissibil-

ity far beyond the time-limitprescnbed by the Rules of Court More than
four months elapsed before the United States provided to the Court a
number of objections Thus it is at least arguable that "An objection that
is not presented as a preliminary objection in accordance with para-
gsaph 1of Article 79does not thereby becomeinadmissible", and that a
party "failing to avail itself of the Article 79 procedure may forfeit the
right to bring about a suspension of the proceedings on the merits, but
can still argue the objection along with the merits", as the Court has
established(Judgment,para 24) The basicissuerelates to the interpreta-
tion of the above-quoted first phrase of Article 79, paragraph 1 "Any
objection "Followinga literal interpretation, any objectionhas to be
submitted within a definedperiod of time, in accordance with the Rulesof Court. The United States did not comply with such ttme-limitand tts
objections should have been rejectedby the Court

4. On the other hand, 1can certainly accept the observation made by
the Court that "many of its objections are of such a nature that they

would inany event probably have had to be heard along with the merits"
(Judgment, para 24) By examining very attentively each one of the
objectionstojunsdiction and admissibilityadvancedbythe Un~tedStates,
the Court has provided a ncher legal foundation to the basis of its com-
petence,definingand reaffimng the nature of its roie as a tribunal with
the powers to determine the scope of the international obligations that
are a matter of a dispute betweenthe parties

5 On two previous occasionsthe Court has rejectedthe notion that it
is assuming the role of ultimate appellate tribunal in na.tiona1criminal
proceedings,To this effect the Court has found that

"the function of this Court is to resolveinternational legal disputes
betweenStates, isttealla when theyanse out of the interpretation or
appl~catlonof international conventions,and not to act as a court of
criminal appeal" (V~ennaConventionan Consular Relations(Para-
guay v UnztedStates ofAmerica), Provisronal Measures, Order of
9 Aprzl 1998,1 CJ Reports 1998, p 257, para 38).

In the LaGrand Judgment, the Court again established the essence of
the legal objectives it fulfils, according to its own Statute What 1s
required from the Court is

"to do no more than apply the relevant rules of international law
to the issues indispute betweenthe Parties to this case. The exercise
of this functîon, expressly mandated by Article 38 of its Statute,
does not convert this Court inta court of appeal of national crimi-
na1 proceedings" (LaGrand, Judgment, I C J Reports 2001,
p 486, para 52)

6 The Court has also established that a dispute regarding the appro-
pnate remediesfor the violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations "1sa dispute that anses out of the interpretation or application
of the Convention and this is within the Court's junsdiction" (ibtd.,
p 485, para 48)
7 Mexico's final submissions seek to achieve the settlement of an
international legaldispute ansing out of the interpretation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, with a specific reference to
Article 36 Its basic argument 1sthat the application of Article 36 bythe United States is inconsistent with its international legal obligations
towards Mexico It followsthat if such a breach has been found by the
Court, as it happens in the present case, the ~nternationallaw of State
responsibility is to come into operation, providing the remedial action
that 1sdue as a consequenceof an internationally wrongful act
8 Thus the jurisdiction of the Court in this caseis beyond doubt and
its functions are welldefined Furthemore, there is no question that the
Court is empoweredto determine the legal consequencesthat anse from
an international wrongfulact Such consequencesentai1the obligation to
make reparations. The Court can also impose a duty on the State that
has committed the internationally wrongfulact to perform the obligation
it has breached The Court may order the cessation of a wrongful con-
duct But in the present Judgment, the Court has opted m favour of a
restricted interpretation of the law of State responsibility, providing a
limitedreach to the claimsfor reparation sought by Mexico The effectof
this decision is not only to assign insufficient relief to a breach of an

~nternational obligation, but also to miss the opportunity before the
Court to substantially developthe international legal foundations of the
responsibilityof States, to contribute to the jurisprudence of the repara-
tions that are incumbent upon the Statethat is found to have cornmtted
an internationally wrongfulact, and to definethe nature and scope of the
right to a reparation that an injured State is entitledto An unsatisfactory
rule on the remedial action that is to be assumed by a State found in a
breach of a treaty obligation or of a customary rulernaymean a chain of
proceedings beforethe Court in the forthcomingfuture, as a result of an
inconclusivedetermination of howto remedy a violation of international
duties by States

III

9 In its final submission, Mexico requests the Court to adjudge and
declare that the United States "violated its international legal obligations
to Mexico, in its own nght and in the exercise ofits right to diplomatic
protection of its nationals" by failingto comply withthe duties imposed
to it by Article36, paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c)

10 In the operativepart of the present Judgrnent, theCourt has found
that the United States is in breach of Article 36, paragraph 1 (a), (b)
and (c) Bas~calIy,the Court has decided that:

"by not infoming, without delayupon their detention, the 51 Mexi-
can nationals of their nghts under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b),
of the ViennaConvention the United States of Americabreached
the obligations incumbent upon it under that subparagraph (Judg-
ment, para. 153(4)),
"by not notifying the appropnate Mexican consular post without
delay of the detention of the 49 Mexican nationals and thereby depriving the UnitedMexicanStatesof the nght, in a timelyfashion,
to render the assistance provided for by the Vienna Convention to
the individuals concerned, the United States of Amenca breached
theobligationsincumbentupon it under Article36,paragraph 1(b)"
(Judgrnent,para. 153(5));
"in relation to the 49 Mexican nationals the United States of

Amenca deprived the United Mexican Statesof the right, in a timely
fashion, to communicate with and have access to those nationals
and to visit them in detention, and thereby breached theobligations
incumbentupon it under Article 36,paragraph 1(a) and (c), of the
Convention" (zbid, para 153(6))

11 It is sufficientlyclear that the United States of Americais in viola-
tion of treaty obligations incumbent upon it What is not sufficiently
clear in the present Judgment is the nature of the obligations incumbent

upon the United States and, more importantly, to whom are these obli-
gations owed7 Obviously, the answer to this question has an intimate
relationship with the clairn made by Mexico that the United States has
breached "its international legal obligations to Mexico in its own nght
and in the exercise ofdiplomaticprotection of its nationals".

12 In the LaGrand Judgment it is possible to find an authontative
response to these legalmatters, In that case, Germany contended that
"the breach of Article36 by the United States did not only infringe

upon the rights of Germanyas a State party to the [Vienna]Conven-
tion but also entailed a violation of the individual nghts of the
LaGrand brothers" (LaGrand, Judgment, I C J Reports 2001,
p 492, para 35)
Thus Germany invoked its right of diplomatic protection, seeking relief
against the United States also on this specificround

13 The Court provided in LaGrand a definition of the obligations
incumbent upon the United States under Article 36 of the Vienna Con-
vention the recognition that this Article creates individual rights, that

such rights may be invoked beforethe Court by the national State of the
detained person, and that theserights wereviolated in the LaGrandcase

14 According to the Court, in the terms established in LaGrand,the
obligation incumbent upon the United States are as follows
"Article36,paragraph 1 (b), spellsout the obligationsthe receiving
State has toward the detained person and the sending State It pro-
vides that, at the request of the detained person, the receivingstate must inform the consular post of the sending State of the indivi-
dual'sdetention'withoutdelay' It providesfurther that any commu-

nication by the detainedperson addressedto theconsularpost of the
sendingState must be forwarded to it by authorities of the receiving
State 'without delay' Significantly,this subparagraph ends with the
following language 'The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of hm rrghts under this subparagraph'
(emphasisadded) Moreover, under Article 36, paragraph 1 (c),the
sending State'snght to provide consular assistance to the detained
person may not be exercised 'if heexpressly opposes such action'
The clanty of theseprovisions, viewed intheir context, admits of no
doubt. It follows, as has been held on a number of occasions, that
the Court must apply these as they stand" (LaGrand, Judgment,
I C J Reports2001, p. 494, para. 77.)

15 Theclarity that the Court found, in the context of LaGrand,of the
provisions of Article 36, is no longer found in the context of the present
case It seemsevident that, in the present case,the previously recognized
claritynow admitsmany doubtsand that, now, theseprovisionsmust not
be applied as they stand

16 Clanty is needed to determine whether Mexicohas a right to dip-
lomatic protection of its nationals and whether the individual rights
already recognizedby the Court as having been created rnay be invoked,
in the present case, by the national State of the detalned person The
answer provided in the Judgment does not sufficientlycover the sub-
stance of Mexico's claims.The Court observesthat

"violations of the rights of the individualer Article 36may entai1
a violation of the nghts of the sending State, and that violations of
the rights of the latter mayntai1a violation of the rights of the indi-
vidual In these special circumstances of interdependence of the
nghts of the State and of individual rights, Mexico may, in sub-
mittinga claimin its ownname, request theCourt to mle on the vio-
lation of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and
through the violation of individual rights conferred on Mexican
nationals under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) The duty to exhaust
local remedies does not apply to such a request " (Judgment,
para 40)

17 This statement contained in the present Judgment introduces an
undesirable element of vagueness with respectto what had already been
advanced in the LaGrand Judgment In this latter Judgment, issues
related to diplomaticprotection, consular assistance and the creation of
individual rights by Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conventionhad been substantially defined Also matters concerning the problems
that arise with the application of the procedural default rule and the
questionoftheexhaustionoflocalremedieswereproperly and adequately
settledby the Court in LaGrand In the present Judgment, al1theseissues
are examined under a totally different light, one that is not in every
aspect in fullharmony and accordance with the LaGrandJudgment
18, In LaGrand,the Court rejected as unfounded the claim made by
the United States that "the Vienna Convention deals with consular
assistance it does not deal with diplomaticprotection" In its submis-
sions, the United States assumed wrongfullythat

"Legally,a world of differenceexistsbetweenthe right of the con-
sul to assist an incarceratednational of his country, and the wholly
different question whether the State can espouse the clams of its
nationals through diplomatic protection The former is within the
junsdiction of the Court under the Optional Protocol, the latter is
not." (LaGrand,Judgment,I C J Reports 2001, p 482, para 40 )

In its objectionsto the junsdiction of the Court, the United States tned
to introduce a distinction betweenjurisdiction over treaties and junsdic-
tion overcustomary law, observingthat "evenifa treaty norm and a cus-
tomary norm wereto have exactlythe samecontent", each wouldhave its
"separate applicability"
19 The Court provided an impeccablelegal reasoning explainingwhy
the arguments of the United States were untenable

"The Court cannot accept the United States objections The dis-
pute between the Parties as to whether Article 36, paragraph 1 (a)
and (c), of the Vienna Convention have been violated in this casein
consequenceofthe breach ofparagraph 1(b) doesrelate to the inter-
pretation and application of the Convention This is also tme of the
dispute as to whether paragraph 1 (b) creates individual nghts and
whether Germany has standingto assert those nghts on behalf ofits
nationals Moreover, the Court cannot accept the contention of
the United States that Germany's claim based on the individual
rights of the LaGrand brothers is beyond the Court's jurisdiction
because diplomatic protection is a concept of customary inter-
national law Thisfact does not preventa State party to a treaty,
whzchcreates zndzvldualrlghts,from takingup thecase of oneof zts
,natlonalsand mstltutingznternatronajludiclulproceedzngson behaif
of that natronal,on the basls of a generaljurrsdrctzonalclause in
sucha treaty " (LaGrand,Judgment,I CJ Reports 2001, pp 482-
483, para 42, emphasis added )

20. In its final submissions, Mexico clearly distinguishes between
the institution of diplomatic protection and the institution of consular
assistance It asks the Court to adjudge and declare "(1) that the United States of Arnerica violated its international
legalobligationsto Mexico,in its own nght and in the exercise
of its nght of diplomat~cprotection of its nationals, by failing
to infonn, without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their

arrest of their right to consular notification and access under
Article 36(1) (b) of the Vienna Convernt~on on Consular Rela-
tions, and by deprivingMexico ofits right to provide consular
protection and the 52nationals' nght to receivesuchprotection
as Mexico would provide under Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of
the Convention "

21 The reading of this submission makes obviousthat there are two
different kinds ofbreaches. one is related to obligations owed to Mexico
in its own right and in the exercise ofits right of diplomaticprotection of
its nationals, the secondone has to do with Mexico'sdeprival of its right
to consular assistance and the corresponding right of its nationals to
receive such assistance. Itisto be understood that

"diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or
other means of peaceful settlement by a State adopting in its own
right the cause of its national in respect ofan injury to that national
arising from an internationally wrongful act of another State",

accordmg to the definitionof the International Law Commission That is
preciselythe basis of Mexico'sclaim
22 It is believedthat the Court, in response to Mexico'ssubmission,
should have recognized, as a matter of its nght to exercisediplomatic
protection, theespousal by Mexicoat the international levelof the claims
of the 52 Mexican nationals whose individual rights have been denied,
amounting to the denial of justice through the judicial process of the
United States Such a recognition would havebeen particularly relevant
in the cases of Mr Fierro Reyna, Mr Moreno Ramos and Mr Torres
Aguilera, three cases in which al1judicial remedieshave been exhausted.

But the right of diplomaticprotection of Mexicois also valid in the case
of the other 49 Mexicannationals, sincethe application of the doctrine of
procedural default by United States courts means, for al1practical pur-
poses, that there are no remedies to exhaust, and that the futility rule
becornesfully operative, as willbe explained later on

23 Had the Court followedits previousjunsprudence and applied it
in the present case,it would have been acting in line with the LaGrandJudgment, where the Court rejected the argument made by the United
States that "theright of a State to provide consular assistanceto nation-

als detained in another country, and the nght of a State to espouse the
laws of its nationals through diplomatic protection, are legallydifferent
concepts" (LaGrand, Judgment, I CJ Reports 2001, p 493, para. 76).
The Court also rejectedin LaGrand the contention of the United States
that "rights of consular notdication and access under the Vienna Con-
vention are nghts of States, and not of individuals, even though these
nghts may benefitindividualsby pemtting Statesto offerthem consular
assistance" (rbrd.) One would have thought that these claims by the
United States wereput to rest, definitivelyand convincinglyby the Court
when it stated that

"the Court concludesthat Article 36,paragraph 1,createsindividual
nghts, which,by virtue ofArticle 1of the Optional Protocol, may be
invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained person
Thesenghts wereviolatedin the present case " (LaGrand, Judgment,
I CJ Reports2001, p 494, para 77.)
24 If individual nghts were violated in the LaGrand case, and if indi-
vidual rights are being violated in the present case, then it followsfrom

thesepremses that there is only one legal, obviousand necessaryconclu-
sion that the individual nghts of the 52 Mexican nationals may be
invoked in this Court by Mexico.A contrary conclusion is incompatible
with the decision of the Court in the LaGrand Judgment

25 Furthemore, the present Judgment departs substantiallyfrom the
findingsin the LaGrand Judgrnent in a number of other aspects, related
to the circumstances in which local remedies must be exhausted, to
application of the procedural default rule and to the question of denial
ofJustice
26 The mles that are to be applied in order to settle the issue of the
exhaustion of local remedieshave previouslybeen decidedby the Court
They are Iinked to the doctrine of procedural default In LaGrand, the
Court found that

"the procedural default nile prevented them from attaching any
legal significanceto the fact, inter aha, that the violation of the
nghts setforth in Article 36, paragraph 1,prevented Germany, in a
timely fashion, from retaining pnvate counsel for them and other-
Wiseassisting in their defence as provided for by the Convention
Under theseclrcurnstances,the procedural default rule had the effect
ofpreventing'full effect[frombeing]givento the purposes for which
the rights accorded under this Article are intended', and thus vio-
latedparagraph 2ofArticle36 " (LaGrand,Judgment, ZC J. Reports
2001, pp 497-498,para 91) 27. It is generally accepted by the Court that the procedural default
rule representsa bar to obtain a remedy in respect ofthe violation of the
rights containedin the ViennaConvention Thus Mexico'sclaimscannot
be rejected on the basis of the non-exhaustion of local remedies, as "it
was the United States itselfwhichfailedto carry out its obligationsder
the Convention", as was nghtly established by the Court in LaGrand.

28 Local remedies must be exhausted, but not if the exerciseis "a
clearlyfutileand pointlessactivity"(BarcelonaTractzon,Lzghtand Power
Company, Lzmrted,1 CJ Reports 1961,p 145) The need for the prin-

cipleof the exhaustion of local remediesto have a degreeof effectiveness
was provided by the Court when it found that

"for an international claim to be admissible, it1ssufficient if the
essenceof theclam has beenbrought before thecompetent tribunals
and pursued as far as permitted by local law and procedures, and
wilihoutsuccess"(ElettronicaSzculaSp A (ELSZ), Judgment,I C J

Reports 1989, p. 46, para 59,emphasis added)
29 The United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) has
been working on the topic of diplomatic protection for a number of
years The SpecialRapporteur, in his Third Report, submitted to theILC
a draft Article by which local rernediesdo not need to be exhausted if
they provide no reasonable possibility of an effective redress.Thus the

non-recourse to local remediesrequre a tnbunal to

"examine circumstancespertaining to a particular claim which may
not be imrnediatelyapparent, such as the independenceof the judi-
ciary, the ability of local courts to conduct a fair trial, thepresence
of alzneafprecedentsadverseto the clutmantandthe conducdof the
respondent State. The reasonableness of pursuing local remedies
must therefore be considered in each case" (ILL, Third Report on
Diplomatic Protection,NCN 4/523,7 March 2002,para 45, empha-

sis added )
30 There isan evidentneedto examne thenature of the rernediesthat
are to be exhausted For these purposes, the "futility rule" is to be
applied There is a clear support tthe notion that

"the local remedies whichmust be exhausted include remedies of a
legalnature 'but not extra-legalremediesor remediesas of grace',or
those whose 'purpose is to obtain a favor and not to indicate a
nght'. Administrative or other remedies whichare not judicial or
quasi-judicialn character and are of a discretionarycharacter there-
fore fa11outside the application of the local remedies rule '"ILC, Third Report on DiplomaticProtection, AICN4/523,7 March 2002,
para 14 )

Thus clemencyis not a local remedy that must be exhausted, and, as the
Court has found in the present Judgment, clemencyis "not sufficient in
itself to serve as an appropnate means of 'reviewand reconsideration'"
(para 143) The reason for this fmding is that "the process of review
and reconsideration should occur within the overall judiciairoceedings
relating to the individual defendant concerned" (Judgment, para. 141).
Thus the Court regards clemencyas a non-judicial procedure

31 The ILC SpecialRapporteur on Diplornatic Protection establishes
in his commentary, includedin his Third Report, that there isno need to
exhaust local remedieswhen such remediesare ineffectiveor the exercise
of exhausting such remedies wouldbe futile The reason for this is that
a clamant is not required to exhaust justice in a foreign State "when
there is no justice to exhaust" (ILC, Third Report on DiplomaticProtec-
tion, NCN 41523, 7 March 2002). As a result of the application of the

procedural default rule by the United States courts to the Mexican
nationals that are under Mexico'sdiplornaticprotection, it is not suitable
to sustain that there is a need to exhaust local remedies when it has
already been found that the doctrine of procedural default imposes a
judiciai bar to such reniedialaction, thus establishinga legalimpediment
to a municipal redress

32 As interpreted by the Court in the LaGrand Judgment, Article 36,
paragraph 2, imposes a number of obligations on the parties*

(a) As a consequence of the determination made by the Court of the
nature of the rights contained in Article 36, paragraph 1, "the
reference to 'rights'in paragraph 2 must be read as applying not
only to the rights of the sending State, but also to the nghts of
the detained individual" (LaGrand,Judgment,I C J Reports 2001,
p 497, para 89)
(6) The specificapplication of the "procedural default" rule becomes
problematical whenthe ruledoes not "allow the detainedindividual
to challengea convictionand sentence"by clamng that a breach of
the "without delay" consular notification has occurred, "thus pre-
venting the person from seeking and obtaining consular assistance
frorn thesending State" (ibrd., p 497, para 90)

(c) At the request of the detalned person, the sendingState has the right
to arrange for his legalrepresentation
(d) The procedural default ruleis an impediment for the United States courts to attach "any Iegalsignificanceto the fact, znteralza,that the
violation of the rights setrth in Article36,paragraph 1,prevented
Germany, in a tmely fashion,from retaining private counselfor [its
nationals]and otherwise assistingin their defenceas provided for by
the Convention" (1CJ Reports 2001, pp 497-498,para 91)

(e) The procedural default nile had the effect, under these circum-
stances,of preventing "'fulleffect[frombeing]givento the purposes
for which the rights accorded under this art~cleare intended', and
thus violated paragraph 2 of Article 36" (ibid, p 498, para 91).

33,Yet, according to the evidence provided in the written and oral
proceedings, the United Statescourts, even after LaGrand, still continue
to apply the procedural default mle in the same manner as those courts
did in thepre-LaGrand phase The reason subnutted by the United States
is that "procedural default rules will possibly preclude such clam on
direct appeal or collateral review, unlessthe court finds there is cause for
the default and prejudice as a result of these alleged breach" (Counter-
Memorial of the United States of Amenca (CMUS), para 6 65) How-
ever, no court in the United States has found that "there iscause for the
default and prejudice" m cases of a Vienna Convention claim, under the
argument that Article 36 rights are not constitutional nghts

34 In this context, it may be useful to recall what Justice Stevens,of
the United States SupremeCourt, had to Sayon thematter The Supreme
Court declined to grant certtorari to hear a recent case, but in this
separate opinion, Justice Stevensstated

"applying the procedural default suleto Article36claimsisnot only
in directviolationof the Vienna Convention,but it is also manifestly
unfair. The ICJ's decision in LaGrand underscores that a foreign
national who is presumptively ignorant of his right to notification
should not be deemed to have waived the Article 36 protection
simplybecause he failed to assert that right in a state cnminal pro-
ceeding " (CR2003124,para 244)

35 The actual and acceptedpracticeof the Un~tedStatescourts on the
interpretation and application of Art~cle36, paragraph 2, and of the
LaGrand Judgrnent imposes severe restrictionson the concept of review
and reconsideration, sinceit fails to provide a legal remedy that may be
in agreement with the letter and the spint of the Vienna Convention and
LuGrand The United Statescourts are condemned to repetition, since a
legal straightjacket is imposed by the prevailing system, a system thatdoes not regard a breach of Article 36 as a breach of a constitutional
right.
36 The detained foreignperson subjectto a tnal in thejudiciai system
of the United States wil find himselftrapped in a cloistered legal situa-
tion He may be unaware of his rights to consular notification and com-
munication And then due to the faiiure of the competent authonttes to

comply with Article 36, he will be unable to raise the violation of his
rights as an issue at trial. Becauseof that, and sincehe did not claim his
nghts at the proper judicial time due to ignorance, federal and state
courts will hold the doctrine of procedural default, which will bnng
about the defeat of remediesfor the violation of rights established by
Article 36 As a result of this chain ofjudicial events,there willbe a legal
impossibilityto escapefrom thisentrapment unlessa way out isprovided
by a precisedefinitionof the purposes that are to be achieved by a pro-
cessof reviewand reconsideration Such a definition mustbreak the bar-
ner that imposesa recurrent and absurd circularlegalargument, one that
paralyses any meaningful remedialaction that may be undertaken when
there is a breach of Article 36
37, In the present Judgrnentthe Court correctlyStates(para 112)that

the problem to which attention was drawn in the LaGrand case, and
whch is also pertinent in the present case,
" 'arises whenthe proceduraldefault mle doesnot allowthe detained
individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by claming, in

relianceon Article36,paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the com-
petent national authonties failed to comply withtheir obligation to
provide the requisite consular information "without delay", thus
preventing the person from seeking and obtaining consular assis-
tancefromthe sendingState.' (1CJ Reports2001,p 497,para 90) "

On this basis, the Court concluded in LaGrandthat "the procedural
default rule prevented counselfor the LaGrands to effectivelychallenge
their convictions and sentences other than on United States constitu-
tional grounds" (1 C J Reports 1001, p, 497, para 91) But what is even
more relevant is the findingof the Court in the present case "This state-
ment of the Court seems equally vahd in relation to the present case,
wherea number of Mexicannationals have been placed exactlyin such a
situation " (Judgrnent, para 112 ) Furthemore, there is one additional
important conclusion.

"the Court simply notes that the procedural default rule has not
been revised,nor has any provision been made to prevent its appli-
cation in cases where it has been the failure of the United States
itself to inform that may have precluded counsel from being in a
position to have raised the question of a violation of the Vienna
Convention in the initial tnal" (Judgment, para 113) 38 In examining the issue of the procedural default doctrine, the
Court seemsto agree, in the first instance, with the contention made by
Mexico,the argument as expressedby Mexicobeingbasicallythe follow-
ing
" 'a defendant who could have raised, but fails to raise, a legal issue

at trial will generallynot be perm~ttedto raise it in future proceed-
ings, on appeal or in a petition for a wnt of habeascorpus'[Memo-
rial of Mexico (MM), para. 2241 The rule requires exhaustion of
remedies, inter alza, at the state level and before a habeas corpus
motion can be filedwith federalcourts. In the LaGrandcase,the rule
in question was applied by the United States federal courts; in the
present case,Mexicoalso complainsof the application of the rule in
certainstate courts of cnminal appeal [MM,paras 228-2291 " (Judg-
ment, para 111 )

39 There seemsto be an essential coincidencebetween Mexico'sargu-
ments and the reasoning contained in the present Judgment The Court
establishesthe following basic premises

(a) "the procedural default rule has not been revised, nor has any pro-
vision been made to prevent its application in cases where it has
been the failure of the United States itselfto inform that may have
precluded counsel from being in a position to have raised the
question of a violation of the Vienna Convention in the initial
trial",
(b) "[ilt thus remains the casethat the procedural default rule may con-
tinue to prevent courts from attaching legal significanceto the fact,
inter aka, that the violat~onof the rights set forth in Article 36,
paragraph 1, prevented Mexico,in a tmely fashion, from retaining
private counselfor certain nationals and otherwiseassistingin their
defence" ,
(c) "[i]n such cases, application of the procedural default rule would
have the effect of preventing 'full effect [from being] given to the
purposes for which the nghts accorded, under this Article are
intended',and thus violate paragraph 2 of Article 36";

(d) "in severalof the casescited in Mexico'sfinal submisnons the pro-
cedural default rule has already been applied, and that in others it
could be applied at subsequent stages in the proceedings" (Judg-
ment, para 113)
40 Being in essence in agreement with these fundamental prernises,
the Court and Mexico then part Companyand reach different conclu-

sions Mexicocontends that the United Stateshas violated and continues
to violate the Vienna Convention
"By applying provisionsof its municipallaw to defeat or foreclose
rernediesfor the violation of nghts conferred by Article 36 - thus
failing to provide meaningful review and reconsideration of severe sentences imposed inproceedings that violated Article 36." (MM,
p 93, para 226)

41 One first issuein Mexico" argument is related to the continuity in
the non-complianceand the non-applicability,in the courts of the United
States, of the concept of "review and reconsideration" mandated in
LaGrand But there 1san additional element
"despite this Court's clearanalysis in LaGrand, U S courts at both
the state and federal level, continue to invoke defaultdoctnnes to
bar any reviewof Article 36 violations - even when the national
had been unaware of his nghts to consular notification and commu-

nication and thus his ability to raise their violation as an issue
at tnal, due to the competent authonties' fadure to comply with
Article 36" (MM, p 93, para 227).

42 More as an expression of hope than as a reflection of the
mechanics that have been imposed in the United States courts by the

application of the procedural default doctrine, the present Judgment
finds that, with the exception ofMr. Fierro (case No 31), Mr Moreno
(case No. 39) and Mr Torres (case No. 53), where conviction and
sentencehave becomefinal, in none of the other 49 cases
"have the cnminal proceedings against the Meucan nationais con-
cemed already reached a stage at which there 1sno further possi-
bility of judicial re-examnation of those cases, that 1sto Say, al1
possibility is not yet excluded of 'review and reconsideration' of
conviction and sentence, as called for in the LaGrand case

It would therefore be premature for the Court to conclude at this
stage that, inthose cases, there1salready a violation of the obliga-
tions under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention "
(Judgment, para 113.)
43 The Court may be right in leaving open a possibility of a process
of reviewand reconsideration and in findingthat it is premature to con-
cludethat there is alreadya breach of Article 36 But ifthe post-LaGrand
experience1sof any value, the potential to submit the rule of procedural
default to a meaningfd and effective system ofreviewand reconsidera-

tion by the courts of the United States is rather remote Notwithstanding
the clear mandate provided in the LaGrand Judgment, the aftermath of
LaGrand provides evidencethat there is littlejudiciai wish in the United
States courts to "allow the reviewand reconsideration of the conviction
and sentenceby taking account ofthe violation of the rights set forth" in
the Vienna Convention, as ordered by the Court in the LaGrand Judg-
ment
44 The fact is that, as has been already stated, no judiaai reviewandreconsideration is left for Mr Fierro (case No. 31), Mr Moreno (case
No 39),and Mr Torres (caseNo 53),sincethere are no further judiciai
remediesfor these three Mexicannationals who, according to the Court,
have been at risk of execution at least from the time the Court ordered
provisionalmeasureson 5 February 2003,obligatingthe United States to
take al1necessarysteps to ensure that they were not executed before the
Court rendered judgment on Mexico'sclaims In addition to these three
cases, ten Mexican nationals are unable to challenge their convictions
and sentences on the basis of violations of Article 36, paragraph 1,
because their ability to do so has been barred by the procedural default
doctnne Furthermore, 18 Mexican nationals will find themselves in a
similar situation, because they did not raise the Vienna Conventton
claims at tnal Again, because of the procedural default rule, they will
convictions and sentenceson this
also be barred from challengingtheir
basis, once they attempt to raise the claim on appeal or in post-convic-
tion proceedingsthat are still ongoing (CR2003124,p 69, para 245)

45 It seemsfar beyondthe realm of the possiblethat these 31Mexican
nationals can rely, once they have no further judicial redress, or once
they are subject to the application of the procedural default doctrine, on
a process of judicial review and reconsideration by the United States
courts The room for legal manŒuvnngis already too narrow ta deposit
any realrstichope in an effectiveand meaningfuljudiciai remedy oncethe
procedural default rule is put into operation One cannot but share the
viewprovided by the Court in the present Judgrnent

"The crucial point in this situation is that, by the operation of the
procedural default rule as it is applied at present, the defendant is
effectivelybarred from raising the Issueof the violation of his nghts
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and is limited to seeking
the vindication of his rights under the United States Constitution "
(Judgment, para 134 )

Yet having reached such an unobjectionable conclusion, the Court
does not followits holding to its ultimate consequences,remainingmuch
too shy as to the redress that should be provided. It is not unreasonable
to assumethat oncethejudicial processiscompletedand the remediesfor
the violat~onsare finallyunavailable, a denial of justice may come into
being,unleashing a chain of legalconsequencesat the international level

46 According to Article 36,paragraph 1 (c), consular officers have
the right to arrange for the legal representation of a national who is in
pnson, custody or detention Such a right 1sparticularly important incases in whicha severepenalty may be unposed In a peculiar interpreta-
tion of the nature of this nght, in the present Judgrnent it ispointed out

that
"the exercise of the nghts of the sending State under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (c), depends upon notification by the authorities of the
receivingState It may be, however,that information drawn to the
attention of the sending State by other means may still enable its
consular officers to assist in arrangtng legal representation "

(Judgment, para 104 )

And then the Judgment reachesa conclusion that may have no factual or
legal support

"the Mexican consular authonties learned of their national's deten-
tion in timeto providesuchassistance,eitherthrough notificationby
United States authorities (albelt belatedly ln terms of Artlcle 36,
paragraph 1 (b)),or through other channels" (rbld ,emphasisadded)

m the case of the 16Mexican nationals that are listed in the Judgment,
providing their name and the number of their case
47 A reviewof these 16casesshould lead to a different conclusion In
most if not al1caseslegalrepresentation was badly neededfrom the very
beginning,when such assistanceis of the utmost necessityand benefit In
certain of the quoted cases the legal representation was provided when
the Mexicannational had already been convicted There are certain cases
of severe mental illness that required proper legal representation at an
early stage of the trial, one that could have been provided by a consular
officerready to assist also in the impaired and disadvantaged condition
of the mentally il1Mexican national There are cases of mental retarda-
tion, a circumstance that facilitatedincruninatingstatements made with-
out a lawyer beingpresent, which later negativelyaffected the Mexican

national dunng his trial There are certain casesof confessionsobtained
through torture, an event that would certainly contradict the notion that
notification was not so late as to effectivelypreclude arranging legalrep-
resentation There are certain casesof Mexicannationals that understood
no Englishwhatsoever, be it written or spoken, and yet had to sign self-
incnminating statements without the benefit of an interpreter or of a
Spanish-speaking lawyer There are certain cases where Mexican con-
sular officials learned of the arrest of a Mexican national three years
after his arrest, once he had been already sentenced to death

48 From a legalpoint of view,a matter of great concern must be the
notion implicit inthe Judgment that notification under Article 36, para-
graph 1(b), albeit not made "without delay", was not so late as to effec-

tivelypreclude legalrepresentation (Judgment,para 104) In most if notal1of the 16casesquoted there was no consularnotification made by the

competentauthorities, whichhas already been found to be a violation of
Vienna Convention obligations In the operative part of the Judgment,
the Court clearly establishes that the United States is in breach of the
obligationsirnposedupon it by Article 36,paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c)
Three fundamental breachesare found by the Court (not informing with-
out delay of the rights of 51Mexican nationals, not notifying the appro-
pnate Mexican consular post without delay of the arrest of 48 Mexican
nationals,depr~vingMexico of the right to provide, rna tlmel yashlon,
assistanceto the individualsconcerned, depriving Mexico ofthe right, m
a timely fashron t,cornrnunicatewith and have access to its nationals
and to visitthem in detention) Yet it seemsrather odd that the Court, in
spite of thesefindings,establishes,with nofurther argument, that "Mexi-
can consular authorities learned of their national's detention ln time to
provide" legal assistance Furthemore, the "without delay" breach,

already established by the Court, radically contradicts the idea that legal
representation may be provided at a later period, belatedly, whateverthe
circumstancesof the detentionand whateverthe stageof the trial may be,
without infringing Article36, paragraph 2. This exegesisof the Vienna
Convention finds no foundation in the text of the treaty and defeats
the traditional rules of hermeneutics But, in addition to the breach of
Article36,nothing in the Vienna Convention allowsfor suchan interpre-
tation, one that subjectivelydeclareswhether or not Iegalrepresentation
in accordance with Article 36,paragraph 1 (c),is being provided at the
nght time Such an interpretation does not complywith the Vienna Con-
vention or with any of the previous holdingsof the Court Yet its conse-
quencesare most damaging It means exclud~ngfrom thedecisionof the
Court those 16cases quoted in paragraph 104 of the present Judgment.
If, as Mexico claims, it hasbeendepnved specificallyta arrange legalrep-
resentation, and consequently its nat~onalswere deprived of the possi-

bility of receivlngthe corresponding assistance, under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (c), and the claim is to be applicable only to the 34 Mexican
nationals listed in paragraph 106(4) of the Judgment and mentioned in
findingNo 7 of its operative part, then the dramatic effect is that, with-
out any legalor factual basis, Mexicoand 16Mexicannationals are being
depnved of their right to provide and receive legal representation in
cnminal proceedingsthat have resultedin their beingon death row Such
a dramatic effect runs contrary to previous findingsby the Court:

"It follows that when the sending State 1sunaware of the deten-
tion of its nationals due to the failure of the receivingState to pro- videthe requisiteconsularnotificationwithout delay, . the sending
State has been prevented for al1practical purposes from exercising

its nghtsunder Article 36, paragraph 1 It is material for the pur-
poses of the present case whether the LaGrands would have sought
consular assistance from Germany, whether Germany wou1dhave
rendered such assistance,or whether a different verdict would have
been rendered It is sufficient that the Convention conferred these
nghts, and that Germany and the LaGrands werein effectprevented
by the breach of the United Statesfrom exercisingthem, had they so
chosen." (LaGrand,Judgment, 1 CJ Reports2001,p 492,para. 74 )

49 The purpose of Article 36 is to facilitate the exercise of consular

functions related to nationals of the sending State It imposes a number
of obligations on the receiving State and provides certain nghts of
consular protection on behalf of a national of the sending State that has
been "arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in anyother manner" Whenever suchan event mayhappen, the
receiving State "shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State". Additionally, "consular officers shall have the right to
visit a national of the sending State who 1s in pnson, custody or
detention to arrange for his legalrepresentation" Surelythe essential
objectiveof this pnnciple is to guarantee that the protected national who
1sin pnson, custody or detention has the benefit of expert Iegal advice
before any action 1staken potentially detnmental to his nghts As a con-
sequence of this pnnciple, the notification should be givenimmediately
and pnor to interrogation, especially inthe case of sertous cnrnes, if the
exerciseof nght is to be useful

50 Thenght of the consular officerto arrange for the legalrepresenta-
tion of the protected national is beyond question If the competent
authorities of the receivingState are under the obligation to inform the
protected national, without delay, of his rights of consular assistance,
which include arranging for legal representation, in accordance with
Article 36, then this principlecan be regarded as closelyrelated, in spint
and content, to the Miranda warning. The Adviseof Rights established
in the Miranda warning compnses seven elements Four of them are
directly Iinked to legal representatian

(a) you have the nght to talk to a lawyerfor advicebefore we ask you
any questions,
(b) you havethe rightto havea lawyerwithyou dunng your questionmg,
(c) if you cannot afford a lawyer, one willbe appointed for you before
any questioning if you wish, and(d) ifyou decideto answerquestionsnow without a lawyerpresent, you
have the right to stop answenng at any time

51. To be useful,the consularright to arrange for the legal representa-
tion of the protected national should be exercisedby the sending State as
soon as possible There should be a correspondingobligationon the part
of the receiving State not to undertake any action that may affect the
nghts of the protected person To this effect, it may be useful to quote
LaGrand

"the procedural default rule prevented them from attaching any
legal significanceto the fact, Inter alla, that the violation of the
rights setorth in Article 36, paragraph 1,prevented Germany, m a
tlmelyfashzon, from retaining pnvate counsel for them and other-
Wiseassisting their defence as provided for by the convention"^
(LaGrand,Judgment, 1 CJ Reports 2001, pp 497-498, para, 91,
emphasis added)

52 The essence ofthe controversy centres on the nature and scope of
the rights provided by Article 36. If the United States courts deny that
the Vienna Convention creates individual nghts no conciliationwill be
found with the LaGrand Judgment, which has already recognized the
existenceof such individual nghts The issue to be decided 1swhether a
breach of Article 36 willmean, under certain circumstances,a breach of
a constitutional right, thus violating the pnnciple of due process of law
and the individual rights of the foreign national subject to a trial.

53 The Miranda warning,an integral part of the United States system
of constitutional rights, includes a number of pnnciples related to legal

representation, regarded as fundamental due process nghts. One of the
purposes of Article 36is to identifyand validate certainindividualrights
This pnnciple has been clearlyestablished in the LaGrandJudgment To
exercisean ~ndividualright there is a need to provide a mechanismfor its
implementation, sincer~ghtsdo not operate in a void. The importance of
this mechanismis particularly relevant wheneverthere is a breach of the
corresponding obligations, imposinga duty to redress the wrong done

54 The Miranda warning provides the foundation for due process of
lawof the detained person from the verymoment of his arrest Asmay be
understood by the findingsin the LaGrandJudgment and in the present
Judgment, under certain circumstancesArticle 36 establishesa number of
basic elementsto ensure a fair trail from the tirne a foreign national is
subjectto custody by competent authonties up to the end of hisjudicial
process. There is an intimate link between the Miranda warning and
Article 36 in the sensethat both aim at creating a scheme of protection
of rightsthat directlyimpinge onthefairnessof atnal Thisschemeof pro-

tection may and shouldbecome effectiveand operativefrom the veryfirststages,preservingthe nghts of the detained person from an interrogation
that may do him an unjustifiedharm at a later period of hisjudiciai pro-
cess. Under theseassumptions,the individual rightsof a detained person
willbe better protected if the correspondingconsular officerarranges for
hs legal representation, involving a defencecounsel of quality and with
expenence in the legal procedures that affect foreign nationals in capital
cases The scheme of protection will also be essential on other issues
that are also anintegral part of due process of law plea-bargaining,the
gathering of evidence,submissionof investigativeevidence

55 Consdar protection may be an important elementfor due process
of law, especiallyin capital cases Depending on the circumstances of
each case, individual rights emanating from Article 36 can be equated
with constitutional rights when the question to decide 1scloselyrelated
to the fair administration of justice If this premise is recognized and
accepted, then the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
can be invoked This amendment specificallyprovides for procedural
guarantees in cases of "a capital or otherwise infamous cnme", adding
that no person shalI"be depnved of hfe, liberty or property, without due
process of law"

56 In LaGrand,the Court found that "it would be incubent upon
the United States to allow the reviewand reconsideration of the convic-
tion and sentenceby taking account of the violationof the nghts set forth
in the Convention" These nghts must be çonsideredfundamental to due
process A distinctionhas been made by the United States, arguing that
those rights are procedural rights and not substantive rights But it may

well be that a violation of a procedural right willprofoundly affect due
process of law There has to be a fine lme drawn between substantive
nghts and procedural nghts in certain cases In the Miranda warning, is
the right to talk to aawyerfor advice before any questions are asked a
substantive or a procedural nght? Whatever the preference may be the
answerto this question,thefact isthat the Miranda waming isembedded
in the constitutional system of the United States and 1spart of its legal
culture Fundamental procedural rights become an essential element in
the protection of individualrights,,transforming a legalinstrument into a
constitutional pnnciple Thus the nghts afforded by Art~cle36 of the
Vienna Convention should be considered fundamental to due process

57 The Court found, in the LaGrandJudgment, that

"Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spellsout the obligationsthe receivmg

State has towards the detained person and the sending State Based on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that
Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which, by
virtue of Article1of the Optional Protocol, may beinvoked in this
Court by the national State of the detained person "{I C J Reports
2001, p 494, para 77)

The sendingState is thus the depository of a nght to provide consular
protection to its detained nationals, and foreign nationals have the nght
to seekthe assistanceof its consular officerswhen detained By depriving
Mexico and its nationals of the exercise of the rights provided in the
Vienna Convention and established bythe Court in LaGrand, the breach
committed by the United States has resulted in fundamentally unfair
criminal proceedingsfor the Mexican nationals

58 Mexico has requested that, "pursuant to the injuries suffered by
Mexicoin its own right and in the exerciseofdiplomaticprotection of its
nationah, [it]1sentitledto full reparation for theseinjunes in the form of
restitutio m integrum" In the present Judgment, the Court seems,at first,
to agreeto the petition made by Mexico It quotes what itconsidersto be
the general principle applicable tu the legal consequences of an inter-
nationally wrongful act "It is a principle of international law that the
breach of an engagement involvesan obligation to make reparation in an

adequate form " {Factory at Chorzbw, Jurrsdzctzon,Judgment No 8,
1927, P C 1 J, Serles A, No 9, p 21 )Then the Court takes the argu-
mentfurther by quotinga classicalelaboration ofwhat reparation means:
"The essential pnnciple contained in the actual notion of an
illegalact- a principlethat seemsto be establishedby international
practice and in particular by the decisionsof arbitral tribunals- 1s
that reparation must,as far as possible,wipeout al1the consequences
of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in
al1probability, have existedif that act had not been committed "
(Factory ut Chorzbw, Merrts, Judgwrent No 13, 1928, P CI J,

Serles A, No 17, p 47 )
59 If the Court had assumed the full consequences of this finding,
made by itsjudiciai predecessor,by establishingthat, in the present case,
the reparation for the violation shouldliein "re-establishingthe situation
which would, in al1probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed", that would have meant answering affirmatively al1 the
remedial actions requested by Mexico

60 But the Court has preferred to remain aloof from the principle of
restoration and concentrate its attention in definingwhat it considers to
be the task of the Court in the present case, whichis "to determine what
would be adequate reparation for the violation of Article 36" (Judgment,
para 121)a concept that according to the Judgment "varres dependingupon the concrete circumstances surrounding each case and the precise
nature and scope of the injury" (Judgment, para. 119) The Judgrnent
concludes that

"the intemationally wrongful acts committed by the United States
were the failure of its competent authonties to inform the Mexican
nationals concerned,to notify Mexicanconsularposts and to enable
Mexicoto provideconsular assistance.It followsthat the remedyto
make good these violations should consist in an obligation on the
United Statesto permitreviewand reconsiderationof thesenationals'
cases by the United States courts " (Judgment, para. 121 )

This findingfalls short of what Mexicohad requested, since Mexico was
sustaining its arguments on the basis of the "essential pnnciple" conse-
crated in the Chozbw Factory case and previously recognizedby this
Court, which is to re-establish the situation which would, in al1proba-
bility, have existedif that act had not been committed

61 There is, in the present Judgment, a definitionof the character and
scope of reviewand reconsideration of convictions and sentences. The

qualificationis that is has to be carried outtaking account of the viola-
tion of the rights set forth m the Convention", as establ~shedin the
LaGrand Judgment, and "including, in particular, the question of the
legal consequencesof the violation upon the cnminal proceedings that
have followedthe violatlon" (Judgment, para f 31). Unfortunately, this
qualification is not specificallyincluded in the respectivefinding that is
contained in the operativeparagraphs of the Judgment
62 The scope of the obligation to allow "review and reconsidera-
tion of the conviction and sentence" has to be interpreted examning
Article 36 as a whole. As the Court found in LaGrand, the first para-
graph of this Article "begins with the basic pnnciple governing consular
protection: the nght of communication and access" Next cornes the
modalitiesof consular notification Then there are the measures consular
authonties may take in rendering consular assistance to a detained
national If this interrelated system of consular protection is breached,

there is a duty of the receiving State to undertake certain measures,
which are, according to the LaGrandJudgment, the following

(a) Where the individualsconcerned have been subjectedto prolonged
detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties, it would
be incurnbent upon (the receiving State) to allow the review and
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence.

(b) The reviewand reconsideration process must take into account the
violation of the nghts set forth in this Convention.(c) The obligation to reviewand reconsider can be carned out in vari-
ous ways; the choice of means must be left to the receivingState

63 Article36,paragraph 2,oftheViennaConventionand theLaGrand
Judgment Imposean essentialcondition *the process ofreviewand recon-
sideration must take into account the violations of the rights set forth in
the Convention and the process must givefull effect to the purposes for
which the nghts accorded in Article 36 are intended In LaGrand, the
Court aiso found the United States in breach of its obligations by 'hot

permitting the review and reconsideration, in the Iight of the nghts set
forth in the Convention, of theconvictionsand sentences ofthe LaGrand
brothers " (LaGrand, Judgment, ZC J Reports 2001, p 515,
para 128(4))
64 Indeed the rights that are stipulated in Article 36,paragraph 1,are
to be implemented in accordance with the laws and regulations of the
receivingState But theselawsand regulations "must enable full effectto
be given tothe purposes for whichthe rights accordedunder this Article
are intended" In the present Judgment, it is difficultto find any clanfy-

ing statements as to how these obligations are to be implemented and
what are the preciseconditions that are to be applied in order to ensure
that the process ofreviewand reconsiderationwillbe effectiveand mean-
ingful. Such statements and conditions should be an integral part of the
Judgment, particularlyin its operative part, as an essentialdetermination
of the remedialmeasures that are being required by the Court
65 The United States has indicated that, if there has been a breach of
Article 36,

"The whole point 1ssimply to examine the conviction and sen-
tence in light of the breach to seewhether, in the particular circum-
stances of the individual case, the Article 36 breach did have some
consequences - someimpact that impingedupon fundamental fair-
ness and to assess what action with respect to the conviction and
sentencethat may require " (CR2003129,p 20, para. 3 6, Philbin )

It is also said by the United States that it is true that

"if a defendant failsto raise a claimunder the Vienna Convention at -
the proper time, he will be barred by the procedural default rule
from raising the clam on appeal, Here again, however, as long as
the defendant has preserved his claim reIating to the underlying
injury, an injury to somesubstantivenght - suchas a claimthat he
did not understand that he was waivingh~sright to counsel in an

interrogation - that claim can be addressed. As a result, an exami-
nation of the impact of the Article 36 violation on the trial and
its fundamental fairness - whichis at the core of reviewand recon-
sideration calledfor by LaGrand - is fully available" (CR2003129,
p 25, para 323, Philbin) 66 Yet, according to the evidence provided in the written and oral
proceedings, the United States courts, even after LaGrand, continue to
apply the procedural defaultrule in the same manner as its courts d~din
the pre-LaGrand phase The reason submitted by the United States is
that "procedural default des willpossiblypreciude such claim on direct
appeal or collateral review,unless the court finds there is cause for the
default and prejudice as a result of these alleged breaches" (CMUS,
p 11 1, para 6 65) However, no court in the United States has found
that "there is cause for the default and prejudice" in cases of a Vienna
Convention clam, under the argument that Article36nghts arenot con-
stitutional rights The weaknessand limitations of ordenng a process of
reviewand reconsiderationbecorneevident when the results haveproven
to lack effectiveness

67. There is a need to definethe nature of the obligations ~mposedby
the concept "by means of its own choosing". If the issueis not properly
clanfied by the Court, the two Parties in the present casewillnot hava
sufficientlysolid legal guideline on the adequate measures to be under-
taken in order to find the reparation sought by Mexico and in order to
complywith the remedydecidedby the Court to relievethe United States
of its responsibility The settlement of this issue is necessary inorder to
deal with the consequences that anse by virtue of an internationally
wrongful act The responsibleState has the duty to make full reparation
for the injury caused by its wrongful act To dispel any potential mis-
understandings, there is a precedent that provides a gu~delineand that
can beinvokedin order to ensurea cleardefinition.ThePermanent Court
of International Justice found that there is a need to

"ensure recognition ofa situation at law, once and for al1and with
binding forceas betweenthe Parties; so that the legalposition thus
established cannot again be called in question in so far as the legal
effectsensuing therefrom are concemed" (Interpretatron of Judg-
ments, Nos 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzdw), Judgment No 11, 1927,
P C I J, Series A, No 13, p 20).

68. Full reparation seemsunlikely to be achieved if the ambiguity of
the notion of "by means of its own choosing" remains and is not
strengthenedwith the addition of somespecificmeasures.From the exist-
ing evidencein the pre-LaGrand and post-LaGrand periods, the United
Stateshas followeda pattern of compliancewith the Vienna Convention
and the Court's Judgment that is far from satisfactory To claim that a
clemencyprocedure 1sa sufficientinstrument to carryout the obligations
contained in theLaGrandJudgment is to ignorethe need for an adequate
reparation As the Permanent Court of International Justice found,

"the essential principle is that reparation must, as far as possible,
wipe out al1the consequencesof the illegalact and re-establish the situation whichwould, in al1probability, have existedif that act had
not been committed" (Factoryat Chorzdw,Merits,JudgmentNo 13,
1928, P C 1J , Serzes A, No 17, p 47)

69 The remedial action to be provided must determine how the laws
and regulationsof the United States, introducing an elementof effective-
ness that has to be mandatory and compulsive,will"enable full effectto
be givento the purposes for which the rights accorded under [Article361
are intended" The reviewand reconsideration of the convictionand sen-
tence has to take into account the breach of the nghts set forth in the

Convention These rights should be considered as belonging to the
category of fundamental rights that impinge on due process of law If
full effectis to be givento thepurposes of these nghts, and if the review
and reconsideration has to take into account the nature of the violation
of the rights, then the margin in the application of the principle of "by
means of its own choosing" becomesfar narrower The means must be
effectiveand the choosinghas to be very selective
70 Mexico's requestfor a meaningfuland effectivereviewand recon-
sideration of convictionsand sentences findssupport in the Cornrnentary
to Article 35 contained in the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on State Responsibility

"the term 'jundical restitution'is sometimesused where restitution
requzresor znvolves themodrJication of a legalsztuationeither withzn
the legalsystem of the responsrbleState or in its legalrelations with
the injured State Such cases rncludethe revocation, annulmentor
amendmentof a constitutional or legislative provisionenactedin vio-
lation ofa ruleof international law,theresczndzngor reconszderation

of anadmrnistrativeorjudicialmeasureunlawfullyadoptedm respect
of theperson or property ofa foreigner " (Al56110,p 240,
para 5, emphasisadded )

71 Under the assumption that the United States is in breach of an
international obligation, that Mexico suffered an injury for which a
remedyissought, andthat the United Statescannot "relyon the provisions
of itsinterna1law as justification for failure to comply with its obliga-
tions", there are sufficient legalgrounds to assume that if the procedural
default rule is perpetuated in the United States courts, then there is Iittle
future for a meaningful and effectivemechanism of judiciai review and
reconsideration If this assumption remains valid, then it may be indis-
pensable for the Court to recover the concept of '(luridicalrestitution"
invoked by the International Law Commission, which becomes appli-
cable when there is a need to modify a legal situation within the legal
system of the responsible State It is worth repeating jundicai restitu-

tion may "mclude the revocation, annulment or amendment of a constitu-
tional or legislativeprovision enacted in violation of a rule of inter-
national law, the rescindingor reconsideration of an administrative
or judicial measure unlawfuiiyadopted in respect of the person or
property of a foreigner"(A/56/10,p 240, para 5).

It may happen that the judiciai measure,iffound in breach of an inter-
national obligation, has to beresclndedthrough legislativemeans

XII
72 In its final submission,Mexicorequests the Court to adjudge that
the United States "shaI1cease its violations of Article 36 of the Vienna

Convention with regard to Mexico and its 52 nationals'Tet the Court
found that "Mexico has not established a continuing violation of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention with respect to the 52 individuals"
(Judgrnent, para 148) But the continuing violation can be estab-
lished by examining the cases detailed in the Application of Mexico
(paras 67-267) By consulting the spechc cases, it becomes clear that
there are two elements in the continuous breach of obligations by the
United States
(a) from 1979to 1999,that is to say during the 20 years considered in
Mexico'sApplication (in tenns of the first arrest and the last arrest

of the 52 Mexicannationals included in the Application), there was
no compliance on the part of the competent authonties of the
United States in the fufilment of their Article36 obligations That
has already been decided by the Court in the present case;
(b) in the post-LaGrand stage, United States courts continue to apply
the doctnne of procedural default. Asthe Court has stated,"a claim
based on the violation of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna
Convention, however mentonous in itself, could be barred in the
courts of the United States by the operation of the procedural
default rule" (Judgment,para 133) The Court in LaGrandhad the
opportunity to define the scope of the procedural default doctnne:

"In itself, theule does not violate Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention The problem ariseswhen the procedural default rule
does not allow the detained individual to challengea conviction
and sentenceby claiming that the competentnational authori-

ties failed to complywith their obligation to provide the requisite
consular information 'without delay', thus preventing the person
from seekingand obtaining consular assistancefrom the sending
State." (LaGrand. Judgment, I CJ Reports 2001, p 497,
para 90)
73 In the post-LaGrand phase, the process ofreviewand reconsidera-
tion has not meant the inapplicabiiityof the procedural default doctnneIf the Court has found that the United States is in breach of Article 36of
the Vienna Convention, as it already has, it follows that a cessation of
such continuous violations isa proper measure in order to securean end
to a continuing wrongful conduct.
74 According to the arguments submitted during the proceedings,
there are 102 Mexican nationals that have been detained and charged

with serious felonies after the LaGrand Judgment was issued, without
being notified of their nghts to consular notification and access In 46 of
these 102cases, the United States effectivelydoes not dispute the wola-
tion Six out of the 46 cases face the potential imposition of the death
penalty
75 The United States provides a number of countervailingarguments
but no evidenceto contradict the facts submitted by Mexico The argu-
mentspoint out that "the United Stateshas demonstrated that itsefforts
to improve the conveyance of information about consular notification
are continuingunabated and are achieving tangibleresults" It adds that

"Mexico wouldhave the Court dictate to the United States that it
cease applying - and also guarantee that it would in fact not
apply - a widevariety of fullyproper municipallegaldoctnnes and
decisions, the combined scope of which is staggenng" (CMUS,
paras 8.36 and 8 38)

76 The United States considersthat the 102cases - or, for that mat-
ter, the six cases- submitted by Mexico are "isolated cases" But the
issue is to determinewhetherthere is a continuity in the failureto comply
with Article 36 obligations by the United States. That seems to be the
case The United States may undertake a cornmitment "to ensure imple-
mentation of the specificmeasures adopted in performance of its obliga-
tions under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention" But the effec-
tiveness ofthis commitmentis what islacking Thus the need to establish
the concrete guidelines that should be followed by the United States.

Theseguidelinesmust comprisethe obligation to ceasean internationally
wrongful act.
77 The International Law Commission(ILC), in its Draft Articleson
State Responsibility,has introduced the cnteria governing the extension
in time of the breach of an international obligation. In its Commentary
to Article 14,paragraph 2, it indicates

"a continuing wrongful act, on the other hand, occuples the entire
period dunng whichthe act continues and remainsnot in confomuty
with the international obligation, provided that the State is bound
by the international obligation during that period Examplesof con-
tinuing wrongful acts includethe mwntenance in effectof legislative
provisions incompatible with treaty obligations of the enactlng
State " (A156110p , 139,para 3.)

78. The Court has found, rn a number of cases,the need to order the
cessation of an unlawful conduct Examples of these orders include thecaseof MilztaryandPararnzbtaryActrvrtiesrnandagainst Nicaragua, the
case of UnrtedStates Dzplomatrcand Consular Staff m Tehran,and the
Arrest Warrantcase
In the Tehrancase the Court decided unanimously that Iran "must
immediatelytenninate the unlawfuldetentton of theUnited StatesChargé
d'Affairesand other diplomatic and consular staff " (UnrtedStates
Diplomatzcand ConsularStaff rnTehran,Judgrnent,I C J Reports 1980,
para 95).
The Court decided,in the Nrcaraguacase, that "the United States of
Amenca 1sunder a duty unmediatelyto ceaseand to refrain from al1such
acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligation" (Mili-
tary and ParamzlltaryActzvztlesinand agarnstNzcaragua(Nzcaraguav
UnrtedStatesofAmerzca),Merzts,Judgment,I C J Reports1986,p.149,
para 12)
In the Arrest Warrantcase the Court found that: "the Kingdom
of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the arrest
warrant . " (Arrest Warrantof 11 Aprll2000 (DemocratzcRepublicof
the Congov Belgrurn),Judgment,I CJ Reports2002, p 33, para. 3)

79 The legal reasoning that compels the need for the cessation and

non-repetition of a breach of an international obligation isthe continued
duty of performance To extend in time the performance of an illegalact
would frustrate the verynature and foundations ofthe rule of law.Asthe
ILC in Article 29 of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility indicates,
"The legal consequences of an international wrongful act do not
affect the continued duty of the responsible State to perform the obliga-
tion breached " In the Comrnentary to this Article,the TLCstates

"Even if the responsible State complieswith its obligations under
Part Two to ceasethe wrongfulconduct andto make fullreparation
for the injurycaused,it isnot relievedthereby of the duty to perform
the obligation breached The continuing obligation to perform an
international obligation, notwithstanding a breach, underIles the
concept of a continuingwrongfulact . and the obligation of cessa-
tion " (A/56/10,p 215, para 2 )

80 To cease an illegal act and to offer appropnate assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstancesso require, is not a discre-
tionary matter the State responsiblefor an internationally wrongful act
is under an obligation to do preciselythat, according to Article 30of the
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility In its Comrnentary to this
Article, the ILCprovides a useful consideration

"Where assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are sought
by an injured State, the question is essentiallythe reinforcement of
a continuing legal relationship and the focus is on the future, not
the past" (Al56110,p 221,para 1 1) 81 Mexico's claimsare only partially answered in the present Judg-
ment Someof the holdingsare more modest than the ones that are to be
found in the LaGrandJudgrnent. Some even contradict the rulings of
LaGrand The limited legalreach provided m the present Judgrnentmay
not sufficientlyservethe purpose of establishingthe grounds for repara-
tions as a result of a wrongful act and the breach of an international
obligation The law of State responsibility may not find in the present
Judgment a source of further development

(Szgned) Bernardo SEPULVEDA

Bilingual Content

SEPARATEOPINION OF JUDGE AD HOC SEPULVEDA

Thzrdcase before the Court clarmzngbreaches rn the applicatronand inter-
pretatlon of VzennaConventionon ConsularRelations - Basrcagreement with
thefindrngsof the Court, butreservatronsabout certurnconclusrons - Untimely
objections onjurzsdzctronand adrnrsszbzhty - Restrzcted interpretatronof the
responszbzlityof States

The rlght to dzplomatic protectronof natzonals - The nature of the oblzga-
tions rncurnbentupon the United States and to whom are these oblrgatzons
owed - The instztutzon of drplomaticprotectzon andthe institution ofconsular
asszstance
The recognrtronof the existence of zndzv~duar lzghts in the VzennaConven-
tion - The localremedresrule, the doctrrneofproceduraldefault and thedenial
of justice - The 'ffutzl~ty"princzple - Clemency 1s not a jud#czalremedy
and thus u not a remedy tobe exhausted - Severe restrrctionson reviewand
reconsrderatronbecause of the procedural default rule - Post-LaGrand
experience shows remoteposs~bilitresof meaningful and effectrve review and
reconsrderatron

Unfoundedlnterpretation of the rlght of consular officers to arrange legal
representatcon - The Mrranda warnzng,fundamental due process rrghts and

Artzcle 36
The nature of thereparat~onclaimed - Meanrngof revrewand reconsldera-
tlon of convictions and sentences - Lack of effectiveness - Legal baszs to
declarethe cessationofbreaches of Artzcle36 - Previouscasesdecrdedby the
Court - Insuf$cient developmentof fhe law of State responsrbzbty

1. The present case constitutes a third attempt by the International
Court of Justice to resolve Issuesrelated to the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. For a third
tirne, the Court is requested to define the nature and scope of certain
international obligations established in that treaty and the consequences

produced by a breach of the Convention On this third opportunity, the
Court is asked to adjudge whether the United States has "violated its
international legalobligationsto Mexico,inits ownright and in the exer-
cise of its nght to diplomatic protection" of 52 Mexican nationals on
death row The Court is also required to determine whether Mexico has

been deprived of the right it has to provide consular protection and
whether the 52 Mexican nat~onalson death row were deprived of their
nght to receivesuch consular protection An affirmativeanswer to these
questions must mean that an international wrongfulact of a State entails OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M LE JUGE AD HOC
SEPULVEDA

[Traductron]

Trorsiémeaffarre dans laquellela Cour est sazsied'allégationsde vrolatzons
dansl'applrcationet I'interpretation dela conventzonde Vzennesurles relations
consulazres - Approuve dans l'ensemblela déczsron de la Cour,mats avec des
réservessur certaines conclusions - Excepfions d'incompétenceet d'rrreceva-
bzkténon présentéee sn temps voulu - Interpretatzon restrictivedu droit de la
responsabrlrtedes Etats
DroztdesEtats ri:assurerlaprotectron diplomatique de leurs ressortissant s
Nature des oblrgationszncombantaux Etats-Unis, et benejciaires de celles-ci -
L'mstrtutronde laprotection dzplomatrque etcelle de l'assistance consulaire

Reconnazssancede i'extstence de drortsindivzduelsdans la conventzon de
Vzenne - Règle dei'éputsementdes voles de recours znternes,doctrzne de la
carenceprocéduraleet denr de justice - Condition d'effectivitédes voles de
recours znternes - Procédure de recours en grâceexclue des recoursjudzcrazres
et, partant, sans incidenceau regard de la règlede E'epursemen t Sérzeuses
restrictionsrmposeesau réexamenet à la revrsionpar la règle dela carence
procédurale - Après-LaGrand démontrantla mediocrzté des chances d'obtenir
un réexamen etune revrsronvérztableset effectifs
Znterpretatron znfondée dd urott desfonctionnazres consulaires de pourvoir à
lareprésentationenjustice de leursressortzssants-Lecture des droitsMiranda,
droitsfondamentaux de ladéfense etartrcle36
Nature de la réparatzon demandé -e Sens du reexamen et de la revisiondes

verdictsde culpabrlitéet despeines - Défautd'efjcacrté - Basejurid~quepour
ordonnerla cessatrondes vrolatlonsde l'article36 - Affarres tranchéesprécé-
demmentpar daCour - Contrrbutronrnsuf'jsanteau deveioppementdu droit de
la responsabrhté desEtats

1 La présenteaffaire constituait la troisième tentative de la Cour
internationale de Justice en vue de résoudredes questions liées à l'inter-
prétationet à l'application de la convention de Vienne sur les relations
consulaires Pour la troisième fois, laCour étaitinvitée a définirla nature
et la portée de certaines obligations internationales énoncéesdans ce

traité ainsi que les conséquences engendrées par une violation de la
convention En cette troisième occasion,la Cour étaitpriéede dire si les
Etats-Unis (([avaient] violéleurs obhgations juridiques internationales
envers le Mexiqueagissant en sonnom propre et dans l'exerc~ce du droit

qu'a cetEtat d'assurer la protection diplomatique» de cinquante-deux
Mexicainscondamnés à mort. La Cour étaitégalementpriéede détemi-
ner si le Mexique avait été privé de son droit d'assurer une protection
consulaire et les cinquante-deux ressortissants mexicains condamnés à
mort privés de leur droit de bénéficied re cetteprotection consulaire UneIegalconsequences,the mostimportant one being that Mexico 1sentitled
to reparation for those injuries Yet in the present Judgment, the Court
provides only a partial satisfaction to Mexico'sclaims,establishingin its
findings a restricted and limted perspective on a number of matters,
especiallythose related to the essence ofthe reparations owed

2, Even if 1 may be basically in agreement wrth most of the findings
of the Court, 1 have misgivings and reservations about the reasoning
employed by the Court to reach certain conclusions Such reasoning 1s
reflected in various operative paragraphs of the Judgment Not being
able to concur with al1of its terms1 wishto point out the arguments that
lead me to question aspects of the Judgment which 1 may regard as
unsatisfactory

3 The Court should have rejected, as untimely, the United States

objections regarding the jurisdiction of the Court and the adrmssibility
of Mexico'sApplication It is true that paragraph 1 of Article 79 of the
Rules of Court charactemes as preliminary an objection "the decision
upon which is requested before any further proceedings" The effect
of the timelypresentation of such an objectionis that the proceedingson
the meritsare suspended(Art 79,para 5) There is a generalunderstand-
ing that the United States did not submit a preldnary objection but
then no other objection of any sortshould have been recognizedas sut-
able, if the text of Article 79, paragraph 1,of the Rules of Court is to be
strictIyinterpreted and applied The text states that

"Any objection by the respondent to thejunsdiction of the Court
or to the admissibilityof the application shallbe made in writing
as soon as possible, and not later than three months after the
deliveryof the Mernorial "
The United States presented its objections to jurisdictlon and admissibil-

ity far beyond the time-limitprescnbed by the Rules of Court More than
four months elapsed before the United States provided to the Court a
number of objections Thus it is at least arguable that "An objection that
is not presented as a preliminary objection in accordance with para-
gsaph 1of Article 79does not thereby becomeinadmissible", and that a
party "failing to avail itself of the Article 79 procedure may forfeit the
right to bring about a suspension of the proceedings on the merits, but
can still argue the objection along with the merits", as the Court has
established(Judgment,para 24) The basicissuerelates to the interpreta-
tion of the above-quoted first phrase of Article 79, paragraph 1 "Any
objection "Followinga literal interpretation, any objectionhas to be
submitted within a definedperiod of time, in accordance with the Rulesréponse affirmative à ces questions avait nécessairementun corollaire*le
fait mternationalement illicited'un Etat entraîne des conséquencesjuri-
diques, la plusimportante étanticique le Mexiquea droit a obtenir répa-
ration au titre decespréjudicesOr, dans leprésentarrêt,la Cour ne donne
que partiellement satisfactionaux demandes du Mexique,exposant dans
sesconclusionsun point de vuerestreint etlimitésur un certain nombrede
questions,en particuliercellesliéesàla nature des réparationsdues

2 Quoique fondamentalement d'accord avec l'essentielde la décision
de la Cour, je ne puis m'empêcher dn eourrir quelques réticenceset ré-
servesquant au raisonnement swvi par celle-cipour parvenir à certaines
conclusions Ce raisonnement transparaît dans plusieurs paragraphes du
dispositif de l'arrêt Ne pouvantm'associerà tous les termes de ce der-
nier, je tiensa exposer les arguments qui m'ont conduit a remettre en
question certains de sesaspects qui ne me semblentpas satisfaisants

3 Les exceptions d'incompétencede la Cour et d'irrecevabilitéde la
requêtedu Mexique souleveespar lesEtats-Unis auraient dû êtrerejetées
comme soulevéeshors délai Certes, le paragraphe 1 de l'article 79 du
Règlement de la Cour qualifie de préliminairetoute exception «sur
laquellele défendeur demandeune décisionavant que la procédure surle
fond se poursuive)) La présentationen temps utile d'une telle exception

a pour effet de suspendre la procédure sur lefond (art 79, par 5) Il est
incontestéqueles Etats-Unis n'ont pas soulevéd'exception préliminaire
une stricteinterprétationet applicationdu paragraphe 1de l'article79du
Règlement dela Cour ne permettait dèslors de considéreraucune autre
exceptioncomme recevable Le texte dit que
«[tlouteexceptiona la compétencede la Cour ou à la recevabilitéde
la requête [soulevépear le défendeur] doit êtreprésentée par ecrit
des que possible, et au plus tard trois mois après le dépôt du
mémoire»

Les Etats-Unis ont soulevéleurs exceptions d'incompétence et d'irrece-
vabilité bienaprèsle delai prescrit par le Règlementde la Cour Plus de
quatre mois se sont écoulés avant que les Etats-Unis ne présentent à la
Cour un certain nombre d'exceptions 11est donc a tout le moins permis
de s'interroger sur le bien-fondédes deux affirmationsde la Cour selon
lesquelles«[u]ne exception qul n'est pas soulevéesous la forme d'une
exception préliminaire conformémena tu paragraphe 1de l'article 79 ne
devient pas pour autant irrecevable))et une partie «qui n'use pasde la
procédureprévuea l'article79 perd sans doute le droit d'obtenir la sus-
pension de la procéduresurlefond, mais n'enpeut pas moinsfairevaloir

cette exception en mêmetemps que ses arguments au fond)) (arrêt,
par 24) La question essentiellequi sepose touche a l'interprétation dela
premièrephrase, citéeplus haut, du paragraphe 1 de l'article79 ((touteof Court. The United States did not comply with such ttme-limitand tts
objections should have been rejectedby the Court

4. On the other hand, 1can certainly accept the observation made by
the Court that "many of its objections are of such a nature that they

would inany event probably have had to be heard along with the merits"
(Judgment, para 24) By examining very attentively each one of the
objectionstojunsdiction and admissibilityadvancedbythe Un~tedStates,
the Court has provided a ncher legal foundation to the basis of its com-
petence,definingand reaffimng the nature of its roie as a tribunal with
the powers to determine the scope of the international obligations that
are a matter of a dispute betweenthe parties

5 On two previous occasionsthe Court has rejectedthe notion that it
is assuming the role of ultimate appellate tribunal in na.tiona1criminal
proceedings,To this effect the Court has found that

"the function of this Court is to resolveinternational legal disputes
betweenStates, isttealla when theyanse out of the interpretation or
appl~catlonof international conventions,and not to act as a court of
criminal appeal" (V~ennaConventionan Consular Relations(Para-
guay v UnztedStates ofAmerica), Provisronal Measures, Order of
9 Aprzl 1998,1 CJ Reports 1998, p 257, para 38).

In the LaGrand Judgment, the Court again established the essence of
the legal objectives it fulfils, according to its own Statute What 1s
required from the Court is

"to do no more than apply the relevant rules of international law
to the issues indispute betweenthe Parties to this case. The exercise
of this functîon, expressly mandated by Article 38 of its Statute,
does not convert this Court inta court of appeal of national crimi-
na1 proceedings" (LaGrand, Judgment, I C J Reports 2001,
p 486, para 52)

6 The Court has also established that a dispute regarding the appro-
pnate remediesfor the violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations "1sa dispute that anses out of the interpretation or application
of the Convention and this is within the Court's junsdiction" (ibtd.,
p 485, para 48)
7 Mexico's final submissions seek to achieve the settlement of an
international legaldispute ansing out of the interpretation of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, with a specific reference to
Article 36 Its basic argument 1sthat the application of Article 36 byexception » Si l'on interprète cette disposition littéralement, toute
exception doit êtreprésentée dans un délaidéterminéc ,onformémentau
Règlementde la Cour Les Etats-Unis n'ont pas respectéce délaiet leurs
exceptionsauraient dû êtrerejetéespar la Cour
4 Cela dit, je reconnais avec la Cour que, probablement, «bon
nombre des exceptions qu[e les Etats-Unis] ont soulevées[auraient de
toute manière dû],en raison deleurnature, êtreexaminéesenmême temps
quelesargumentssur lefond» (arrêt,par24) En sepenchanttrèsattenti-
vement sur chacune des exceptions d'incompétenceet d'irrecevabilité
soulevéespar les Etats-Unis, la Cour a affermi les basesjuridiques de sa
compétence, définissanett confirmant la nature du rôle qui est le sien en
tant quejundiction investiedu pouvoir de déterminerla portéedes obli-
gations internationalesqui font l'objet d'un différendentre les parties

5 A deux reprises déja, laCour a rejeté l'idée qu'eljloeuera~tle rôle
d'une jundiction de dernièreinstance dans des procédurespénalesin-
ternes.Elle a ainsi conclu que
«[s]afonction [était]de réglerdesdifférendsjuridiques internatio-
naux entre Etats, notamment lorsqu'ils découlentde l'interprétation
ou de l'applicationde conventions internationales, et non pas d'agir
en tant que cour d'appel en matière criminelle» (Convention de

Viennesur les reiatronsconsularres(Paraguay c Etats-Unrsd'Am&
rzque), mesures conservatozres,ordonnancedu 9 avril 1998, C I J
Recueil 1998, p 257, par 38)
Dans l'arrêtLaGrand,la Cour a une nouvellefois précisé l'essencdee
la missionjundique qui, conformémentàson Statut, est la sienne Ce qui
est demandé à la Cour, c'estexclusivement

«d'appliquer les règlespertinentes de droit international aux ques-
tions litigieusesopposant les[plartlàsl'instance.L'exercicede cette
fonction, expressément prévu par l'article38 de son Statut, ne fait
pas decette Cour unejuridiction statuant en appel sur des questions
pénales soumisFsaux tribunaux internes » (LaGrand, arrêt,CI J
Recueil2001, p 486, par 52 )

6 La Cour a égalementconsidérq éu'un différendportant sur les voies
de droit àmettre en Œuvreen cas de violation de la conventionde Vienne
sur les relations consulaires était«un différendconcernant l'interpréta-
tion ou l'application dela conventionet qui de cefait [relevade]la com-
pétencede la Cour» (ibzd, p 485, par. 48)
7 Dans ses conclusions finales, le Mexique demandait le règlement
d'un différendjundique international né de l'interprétation dela conven-
tion de Vienne sur les relations consulaires, et plus précisémente l'ar-
ticle36 de celle-ci,son principal argument étantque la manièredont lesthe United States is inconsistent with its international legal obligations
towards Mexico It followsthat if such a breach has been found by the
Court, as it happens in the present case, the ~nternationallaw of State
responsibility is to come into operation, providing the remedial action
that 1sdue as a consequenceof an internationally wrongful act
8 Thus the jurisdiction of the Court in this caseis beyond doubt and
its functions are welldefined Furthemore, there is no question that the
Court is empoweredto determine the legal consequencesthat anse from
an international wrongfulact Such consequencesentai1the obligation to
make reparations. The Court can also impose a duty on the State that
has committed the internationally wrongfulact to perform the obligation
it has breached The Court may order the cessation of a wrongful con-
duct But in the present Judgment, the Court has opted m favour of a
restricted interpretation of the law of State responsibility, providing a
limitedreach to the claimsfor reparation sought by Mexico The effectof
this decision is not only to assign insufficient relief to a breach of an

~nternational obligation, but also to miss the opportunity before the
Court to substantially developthe international legal foundations of the
responsibilityof States, to contribute to the jurisprudence of the repara-
tions that are incumbent upon the Statethat is found to have cornmtted
an internationally wrongfulact, and to definethe nature and scope of the
right to a reparation that an injured State is entitledto An unsatisfactory
rule on the remedial action that is to be assumed by a State found in a
breach of a treaty obligation or of a customary rulernaymean a chain of
proceedings beforethe Court in the forthcomingfuture, as a result of an
inconclusivedetermination of howto remedy a violation of international
duties by States

III

9 In its final submission, Mexico requests the Court to adjudge and
declare that the United States "violated its international legal obligations
to Mexico, in its own nght and in the exercise ofits right to diplomatic
protection of its nationals" by failingto comply withthe duties imposed
to it by Article36, paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c)

10 In the operativepart of the present Judgrnent, theCourt has found
that the United States is in breach of Article 36, paragraph 1 (a), (b)
and (c) Bas~calIy,the Court has decided that:

"by not infoming, without delayupon their detention, the 51 Mexi-
can nationals of their nghts under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b),
of the ViennaConvention the United States of Americabreached
the obligations incumbent upon it under that subparagraph (Judg-
ment, para. 153(4)),
"by not notifying the appropnate Mexican consular post without
delay of the detention of the 49 Mexican nationals and therebyEtats-Unis appliquaient l'article36était contraira leurs obIigationsjuri-
diques internationales envers lui Dèslors, si la Cour constate une telle
violation, commetel est lecas en l'espèce,ledroit international de la res-
ponsabilitédes Etats et les remèdesqu'il prévoiten cas de fait Interna-
tionalement illicitetrouventà s'appliquer
8 La compétence dela Cour ne fait donc aucun doute en l'espèce,et
ses fonctions sont bien définiesLa Cour est en outre parfaitement habi-
litéea déterminerlesconséquences juridiques découlant d'unfait interna-
tionalement illiclte L'obligation de réparatron fait partie de ces consé-
quences La Cour peut aussi imposer à 1'Etat qui a commis le fait
internationalement illicited'exécuter l'obligatioqu'il a violée Ellepeut
ordonner la cessation d'un comportement ~lliciteMais, dans le présent

arrêt,la Cour a penchépour une interprétationrestnctive du droit de la
responsabilitédesEtats, limitantla portéedesremèdesdemandéspar leMe-
xique Ainsi,non seulementa-t-elleédicté dans cette décisiondesremèdes
insuffisantsà la violation d'une obligation internationale, mais encore
a-t-ellemanquél'occasion quilui était donnée d'apporterune centribu-
tion non négligeableau developpementdes fondements juridiques inter-
nationaux du droit de la responsabilitédes Etats, d'enrichir la jurispru-
dence relative a la réparation due par 1'Etatjugéresponsable d'un fait
internationalementillicite,et de définirla nature et la portéedu droit qu'a
1'Etatlésé d'obtenir réparation La caractérisationinsuffisante des me-
suresde réparationqui doiventêtremisesen Œuvrepar un Etat ayant violé
une obligation conventionnelleou une règlecoutumièrepourrait signifier,
pour la Cour, des sarsinesen chaîne dans un avenir proche, simplement
parce que sa décision n'indique pas de manièredéterminantecomment
remédier à la violation d'obligationsinternationalespar les Etats

III

9 Dans ses conclusions finales, le Mexique prie la Cour de dire et
juger que les Etats-Unis ont «violéleurs obligationsjuridiques interna-
tionales enversle Mexique agissanten son nom propre et dans l'exercice
du droit qu'a cetEtat d'assurerla protection diplomatique de sesressor-
tissants)en manquant aux obligationsqui leur incombaient en vertu des
alinéas a), b) et c) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36
10 Dans le dispositif du présentarrêt,la Cour conclut que les Etats-
Unis ont violéles alinéasa), 6) et c) du paragraphe 1de l'article36 En
substance, la Cour considèreque

«en n'informant pas sansretard, lors de leur détention,lescinquante
et un ressortissantsmexicains desdroits qui sont lesleurs en vertu
de l'alinéab) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne les Etats-Unis d'Amériqueont violéles obligations leur
incombant en vertu dudit alinéa» (arrêt, par.153,point 4),
«en ne notifiant pas sans retard au poste consulairemexicainappro-
prtéla détentiondes quarante-neuf ressortissants mexicains et en depriving the UnitedMexicanStatesof the nght, in a timelyfashion,
to render the assistance provided for by the Vienna Convention to
the individuals concerned, the United States of Amenca breached
theobligationsincumbentupon it under Article36,paragraph 1(b)"
(Judgrnent,para. 153(5));
"in relation to the 49 Mexican nationals the United States of

Amenca deprived the United Mexican Statesof the right, in a timely
fashion, to communicate with and have access to those nationals
and to visit them in detention, and thereby breached theobligations
incumbentupon it under Article 36,paragraph 1(a) and (c), of the
Convention" (zbid, para 153(6))

11 It is sufficientlyclear that the United States of Americais in viola-
tion of treaty obligations incumbent upon it What is not sufficiently
clear in the present Judgment is the nature of the obligations incumbent

upon the United States and, more importantly, to whom are these obli-
gations owed7 Obviously, the answer to this question has an intimate
relationship with the clairn made by Mexico that the United States has
breached "its international legal obligations to Mexico in its own nght
and in the exercise ofdiplomaticprotection of its nationals".

12 In the LaGrand Judgment it is possible to find an authontative
response to these legalmatters, In that case, Germany contended that
"the breach of Article36 by the United States did not only infringe

upon the rights of Germanyas a State party to the [Vienna]Conven-
tion but also entailed a violation of the individual nghts of the
LaGrand brothers" (LaGrand, Judgment, I C J Reports 2001,
p 492, para 35)
Thus Germany invoked its right of diplomatic protection, seeking relief
against the United States also on this specificround

13 The Court provided in LaGrand a definition of the obligations
incumbent upon the United States under Article 36 of the Vienna Con-
vention the recognition that this Article creates individual rights, that

such rights may be invoked beforethe Court by the national State of the
detained person, and that theserights wereviolated in the LaGrandcase

14 According to the Court, in the terms established in LaGrand,the
obligation incumbent upon the United States are as follows
"Article36,paragraph 1 (b), spellsout the obligationsthe receiving
State has toward the detained person and the sending State It pro-
vides that, at the request of the detained person, the receivingstate privant ainsi les Etats-Unis du Mexique du droit de rendre en temps
utile aux intéressés l'assistance prévear la convention, les Etats-
Unis dlAménque ont violé lesobligations leur incombant en vertu
de l'alinéab) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36» (arrêt, par 153,
point 5),
((en ce qui concerne les quarante-neuf ressortissants mexicains.les
Etats-Unis d'Amérique ont privé les Etats-Unis du Mexique du
droit, en temps utile, de communiquer aveccesressortissantset de se
rendre auprès d'eux lorsqu'ils sont en détention, et ont de ce fait
violéles obligations leur incombant en vertu des alinéas) et c) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention» (arrêt, par 153,
point 6)

11 II est suffisamment clair que les Etats-Unis d'Amériqueont violé
des obligations conventionnelles leur incombant Ce qui n'est pas assez
clair dans leprésentarrêt,c'estla nature de ces obligations et, surtout, les
bénéficiairedse celles-ci De toute évidence,la réponsà cette question est
intimement liée à l'allégationdu Mexique selon laquelle les Etats-Unis
ont violé «leurs obligations juridiques internationales envers le Mexique
agissant en son nom propre et dans l'exercice du droit qu'a cet Etat
d'assurer la protection diplomatique de ses ressortissants»

12, Or, i'arrêtLaGrand offre une solide réponsea ces questions juri-

diques Dans cette affaire, l'Allemagne soutenait que
«la violation de l'article 36 par les Etats-Unis ne port[ait] pas seule-
ment atteinte[à ses]droits en tant quztat partie à la convention
[de Vienne], mais constitu[ait] également une violation des droits
individuels des frères LaGrand » (LaGrand, arrêt, C 1 J Recuezl
2001, p 492, par 75)

L'Allemagne invoquait donc son droit de protection diplomatique, fai-
sant valoir ce mêmemoyen pour demander réparation de la part des
Etats-Unis
13 La Cour a défini dans l'arrêt LaGrand les obligations qui
incombent aux Etats-Unis en vertu de l'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne elle a reconnu que cet article créait des droits individuels, que
lesdits droits pouvaient être invoqués devant elle par lYEtat dont la
personne détenueavait la nationalité et que ces droits avaient été vio-
lésdans l'affaireLaGrand
14 Voici, selon les termes utiliséspar la Cour dans l'arrêtLaGrand,
les obligationsqui incombent aux Etats-Unis.

((l'alinéa) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 énonceles obligations
que 1'Etatde résidencea vis-à-visd'une personne détenue etde 1'Etat
d'envoi Il dispose que,à la demande de la personne mise en déten- must inform the consular post of the sending State of the indivi-
dual'sdetention'withoutdelay' It providesfurther that any commu-

nication by the detainedperson addressedto theconsularpost of the
sendingState must be forwarded to it by authorities of the receiving
State 'without delay' Significantly,this subparagraph ends with the
following language 'The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of hm rrghts under this subparagraph'
(emphasisadded) Moreover, under Article 36, paragraph 1 (c),the
sending State'snght to provide consular assistance to the detained
person may not be exercised 'if heexpressly opposes such action'
The clanty of theseprovisions, viewed intheir context, admits of no
doubt. It follows, as has been held on a number of occasions, that
the Court must apply these as they stand" (LaGrand, Judgment,
I C J Reports2001, p. 494, para. 77.)

15 Theclarity that the Court found, in the context of LaGrand,of the
provisions of Article 36, is no longer found in the context of the present
case It seemsevident that, in the present case,the previously recognized
claritynow admitsmany doubtsand that, now, theseprovisionsmust not
be applied as they stand

16 Clanty is needed to determine whether Mexicohas a right to dip-
lomatic protection of its nationals and whether the individual rights
already recognizedby the Court as having been created rnay be invoked,
in the present case, by the national State of the detalned person The
answer provided in the Judgment does not sufficientlycover the sub-
stance of Mexico's claims.The Court observesthat

"violations of the rights of the individualer Article 36may entai1
a violation of the nghts of the sending State, and that violations of
the rights of the latter mayntai1a violation of the rights of the indi-
vidual In these special circumstances of interdependence of the
nghts of the State and of individual rights, Mexico may, in sub-
mittinga claimin its ownname, request theCourt to mle on the vio-
lation of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and
through the violation of individual rights conferred on Mexican
nationals under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b) The duty to exhaust
local remedies does not apply to such a request " (Judgment,
para 40)

17 This statement contained in the present Judgment introduces an
undesirable element of vagueness with respectto what had already been
advanced in the LaGrand Judgment In this latter Judgment, issues
related to diplomaticprotection, consular assistance and the creation of
individual rights by Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention tion, l'Etat de résidencedoit informer «sans retard)) le poste consu-
laire de 1'Etatd'envoi de la détentionde l'individu Il dispose en
outre que toute communication par la personne detenue adresséeau
poste consulairede I'Etatd'envoidoit luiêtretransmisepar lesautori-
tésde 1'Etatde résidence«sans retard)). Il est significatifque cet ali-
néaseterminepar la disposition suivante lesditesautorités ((doivent
sans retard informer l'intéresséde ses drolts aux termes du pre-
sent alinéa»(les italiques sont de la Cour) En outre, en vertu de
l'alinéacj du paragraphe 1 de l'article36, le droit de I'Etat d'envoi
de prêterson assistance consulaire a la personne en détentionne

peut s'exercer sicelle-ci«s'yoppose expressémen» t La clarté deces
dispositions, luesdans leurcontexte, ne laisse enriendésirerDe ce
fait, et commeil a été jugà plusieurs reprises, laCour est tenue de
les appliquer telles qu'elles so»t(LaGrand, arrêt,CI J Recuezl
2001, p 494, par 77.)
15 Les dispositionsde l'article36 ne semblent plus aussiclairespour
la Cour enla présenteespècequecelan'étaitlecasdans l'affaireLaGrand

11sembleévidentque la clartéqu'elley avait précédemment trouvée laisse
maintenant à désireret que, aujourd'hui, ces dispositions ne doivent pas
êtreappliquéestelles quelles

16 De la clarté, 11en faut pour déterminersi le Mexique a le droit
d'assurer la protectiondiplomat~quede ses ressortissants et si les droits
individuelsdont la Cour a déjà reconnu l'existencepeuvent être invoqués
en l'espècepar l'Etat dont la personne détenue a la nationalité Le pré-
sent arrêt n'apporte qu'uneréponse insuffisanteaux demandes du Me-
xique La Cour fait observerque.
«toute violation des droits quel'individu tient de l'article 36 risque

d'entraîner une violation des droits de1'Etatd'envoi et que toute
violation des droits de ce dernier risque de conduire a une violation
des droits de l'individu Dans ces circonstances toutes particulières
d'interdépendancedes droits de 1'Etatet des droits individuels,le
Mex~quepeut, en soumettant une demandeen son nom propre, invi-
ter la Courà statuer sur la violation desdroits dont il soutient avoir
etévictime à la fois directement età travers la violation des droits
individuels conférésà ses ressortissants par l'alinéab) du para-
graphe 1 de l'article36 L'obligation d'épuiserles voies de recours
internes ne s'appliquepasà une telledemande.» (Arrêt,par 40 )

17 Cette affirmation figurant dans le présentarrêtintroduit un flou
inopportun par rapport a ce qui avait déjàété dit dans l'arrLtaGrand
Dans ce dernier, la Cour avait trèsbien cernélesquestions relativesà la
protection diplomatique, à Yassistanceconsulaire et à la création de
droits individuelspar le paragraphe 1 de l'article de la convention dehad been substantially defined Also matters concerning the problems
that arise with the application of the procedural default rule and the
questionoftheexhaustionoflocalremedieswereproperly and adequately
settledby the Court in LaGrand In the present Judgment, al1theseissues
are examined under a totally different light, one that is not in every
aspect in fullharmony and accordance with the LaGrandJudgment
18, In LaGrand,the Court rejected as unfounded the claim made by
the United States that "the Vienna Convention deals with consular
assistance it does not deal with diplomaticprotection" In its submis-
sions, the United States assumed wrongfullythat

"Legally,a world of differenceexistsbetweenthe right of the con-
sul to assist an incarceratednational of his country, and the wholly
different question whether the State can espouse the clams of its
nationals through diplomatic protection The former is within the
junsdiction of the Court under the Optional Protocol, the latter is
not." (LaGrand,Judgment,I C J Reports 2001, p 482, para 40 )

In its objectionsto the junsdiction of the Court, the United States tned
to introduce a distinction betweenjurisdiction over treaties and junsdic-
tion overcustomary law, observingthat "evenifa treaty norm and a cus-
tomary norm wereto have exactlythe samecontent", each wouldhave its
"separate applicability"
19 The Court provided an impeccablelegal reasoning explainingwhy
the arguments of the United States were untenable

"The Court cannot accept the United States objections The dis-
pute between the Parties as to whether Article 36, paragraph 1 (a)
and (c), of the Vienna Convention have been violated in this casein
consequenceofthe breach ofparagraph 1(b) doesrelate to the inter-
pretation and application of the Convention This is also tme of the
dispute as to whether paragraph 1 (b) creates individual nghts and
whether Germany has standingto assert those nghts on behalf ofits
nationals Moreover, the Court cannot accept the contention of
the United States that Germany's claim based on the individual
rights of the LaGrand brothers is beyond the Court's jurisdiction
because diplomatic protection is a concept of customary inter-
national law Thisfact does not preventa State party to a treaty,
whzchcreates zndzvldualrlghts,from takingup thecase of oneof zts
,natlonalsand mstltutingznternatronajludiclulproceedzngson behaif
of that natronal,on the basls of a generaljurrsdrctzonalclause in
sucha treaty " (LaGrand,Judgment,I CJ Reports 2001, pp 482-
483, para 42, emphasis added )

20. In its final submissions, Mexico clearly distinguishes between
the institution of diplomatic protection and the institution of consular
assistance It asks the Court to adjudge and declare AVENA ET AUTRES (OP IND SEPULVEDA) 105

Vienne,tout comme elleavait réglé de la manièrequi convenait les ques-
tions liées l'application dela doctrine de la carence procéduraleetà la
règlede l'épuisementdes voies de recours internes Or, dans le présent
arrêt,l'ensemblede ces questions est examinésous un tout autre angle,
qui n'est pastoujours pleinementen accord avec l'arrêtLaGrand

18. Dans l'affaireLaGrand,la Cour a rejetécomme infondéel'alléga-
tion des Etats-Unis selon laquelle «la convention de Vienne traite de
l'assistance consulaire et non de la protection diplomatique» Dans

leurs conclusions,les Etats-Unis avaientaffirm à tort que
«Juridiquement un monde séparele droit du consul d'assisterun
ressortissant de son pays incarcéré et lquestion totalement diffé-
rente de savoir si 1'Etatpeut endosser lesréclamationsde ses ressor-
tissants au titre de la protection diplomatique Le premierentre dans
le champ de la compétencede la Cour, en vertu du protocole de

signature facultative, non la seconde » (LaGrand, arrêt,C I J
Recueil2001, p 482, par. 40 )
Dans leurs exceptionsà la campétencede la Cour, les Etats-Unis avaient
tenté d'introduireune distinctionentre la compétence en matière conven-
tionnelle et la compétenceen matière coutumière,faisant observer que
«[m]ême si une norme conventionnelleet une norme coutumièreavaient

exactementle mêmc eontenu)),chacuneaurait une«applicabilité distincte))
19 La Cour exposa un raisonnement jundique irréprochable expli-
quant pourquoi les arguments des Etats-Uns ne tenaient pas
«La Cour ne saurait retenir lesobjections formuleespar les Etats-
Unis En effet, le différendqui oppose les Parties sur le point de
savoir siles alinéasa) et c) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 de la

convention de Vienneont étéviolés en l'espèceu fait dela violation
del'alinéab) a traià l'interprétatioet àl'applicationde laconven-
tion Il enest de mêmedu différendsur le point de savoir si l'ali-
néab) créedes droits pour lesparticuliers et sil'Allemagnea qualité
pour fairevaloir cesdroits au nom de sesressortissants Par ailleurs,
la Cour ne peut accepter la thèse desEtats-Unis selon laquelle la
demande de l'Allemagnefondée surles droits individuels des frères
LaGrand ne relèvepas de sa compétence,au motif que la protection
diplomatique serait une notion de droit international coutumier
Cela nefait pas obstacle a ce qu'unEtat partle à un traltéqul crée
desdroztspour les zndzvlduspuisse prendrefaltet causepour l'unde
sesressortrssantset mettre enmouvementl'actionjudlczazreznterna-
tionaleenfaveur de ce ressortrssantsur la base d'uneclauseattnbu-
tive de compétencefigurant dans un tel tralté» (LaGrand, arrêt,
CI J Recuezl2001, p 482-483,par 42, les italiques sont de moi )

20, Dans ses conclusions finales, le Mexique fait clairement la diffe-
rence entre l'institutiode la protection diplomatique et cellede l'assis-
tance consulaire Il pne la Cour de dire et juger "(1) that the United States of Arnerica violated its international
legalobligationsto Mexico,in its own nght and in the exercise
of its nght of diplomat~cprotection of its nationals, by failing
to infonn, without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their

arrest of their right to consular notification and access under
Article 36(1) (b) of the Vienna Convernt~on on Consular Rela-
tions, and by deprivingMexico ofits right to provide consular
protection and the 52nationals' nght to receivesuchprotection
as Mexico would provide under Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of
the Convention "

21 The reading of this submission makes obviousthat there are two
different kinds ofbreaches. one is related to obligations owed to Mexico
in its own right and in the exercise ofits right of diplomaticprotection of
its nationals, the secondone has to do with Mexico'sdeprival of its right
to consular assistance and the corresponding right of its nationals to
receive such assistance. Itisto be understood that

"diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or
other means of peaceful settlement by a State adopting in its own
right the cause of its national in respect ofan injury to that national
arising from an internationally wrongful act of another State",

accordmg to the definitionof the International Law Commission That is
preciselythe basis of Mexico'sclaim
22 It is believedthat the Court, in response to Mexico'ssubmission,
should have recognized, as a matter of its nght to exercisediplomatic
protection, theespousal by Mexicoat the international levelof the claims
of the 52 Mexican nationals whose individual rights have been denied,
amounting to the denial of justice through the judicial process of the
United States Such a recognition would havebeen particularly relevant
in the cases of Mr Fierro Reyna, Mr Moreno Ramos and Mr Torres
Aguilera, three cases in which al1judicial remedieshave been exhausted.

But the right of diplomaticprotection of Mexicois also valid in the case
of the other 49 Mexicannationals, sincethe application of the doctrine of
procedural default by United States courts means, for al1practical pur-
poses, that there are no remedies to exhaust, and that the futility rule
becornesfully operative, as willbe explained later on

23 Had the Court followedits previousjunsprudence and applied it
in the present case,it would have been acting in line with the LaGrand «1) [que]lesEtats-Unis dYAménquo ent violéleurs obligationsjun-
diques internationales envers le Mexique agissant en son nom
propre et dans l'exercicedu droit qu'a cet Etat d'assurer lapro-

tection diplomatiquede sesressortissantspar le fait qu'ilsn'ont
pas informé,sans retard, lescinquante-deuxressortissants mexi-
cains après leur arrestation du droàtla notification et àl'accès
aux autorités consulairesqui étaitle leur en vertue l'alinéab)
du paragraphe 1 de l'article36 de la convention de Vienne sur
lesrelations consula~res,qu'ils ontpnvéle Mexiquede son droit
d'accorder sa protection consulaire et privéles cinquante-deux
ressortissants mexicainsde leur droit de bénéficiere la protec-
tion que le Mexique leur aurait accordéeconformémentauxali-
néasa) et c) du paragraphe 1de l'article36de la convention»

21 Il ressort clairement de cette conclusion qu'ilexistedeux sortes de
violation l'unetouche les obligations enversle Mexique agissanten son
nom propre et dans l'exercicedu droit qu'a cet Etat d'assurer la protec-
tion diplomatique de ses ressortissants, l'autre tient au fait que le Me-
xique a été privéde son droit d'accorder son assistance consulaireet que
ses ressortissants onttéprivés dudroit correspondant de bénéficied re
cette assistance Aux termes de la définitionde la Commission du droit
international,il faut entendre par

{{protectiondiplomatique ,lerecours a une action diplomatique ou
àd'autres moyens de règlementpacifiquepar un Etat qui prend fait
et cause, en son nom propre, pour l'une des personnesayant sa
nationalrté àrarson d'un préjudicesubi par cette dernièredécoulant
d'un fait internationalementillicited'un autre Etat»

C'est précisémen stur cette base que le Mexiquefonde sa demande

22 J'inclineà penser que, en réponsea la conclusion du Mexique, la
Cour aurait dû reconnaître à cet Etat, au titre de son droià exercer sa
protection diplomatique, la facultéd'endosser à l'échelleinternationale
les revendications des cinquante-deux Mexicains s'étantvu dénier leurs
droits individuels- déni de justiceengendre par le processusjudiciaire
des Etats-Unis Pareille reconnaissanceaurait été particuliérementperti-

nente dans Iescasde MM Fierro Reyna,Moreno Ramos et Torres Agui-
lera, trois cas dans lesquels toutes les voies de recours internes ont été
épuiséesM . ais leMexiqueavait égalementledroit d'exercer saprotection
diplomatique dans le cas des quarante-neuf autres ressortissants mexi-
cains, puisque l'application de laoctnne de la carence procéduralepar
lestnbunaux améncainssignifie,dans la pratique, qu'iln'y a aucune voie
de recours à épuiser,donnant ainsi plein effet, comme je I'expliquera~
plus loin, au pnncipe selon lequelune voiede recours interne, pour être
considéréecomme telle, doit êtreeffective.
23 Si la Cour avait survi sajurisprudence anténeure pour l'appliquer
en l'espèce,elleaurait agi dans le droit filde l'arrêtand, dans lequelJudgment, where the Court rejected the argument made by the United
States that "theright of a State to provide consular assistanceto nation-

als detained in another country, and the nght of a State to espouse the
laws of its nationals through diplomatic protection, are legallydifferent
concepts" (LaGrand, Judgment, I CJ Reports 2001, p 493, para. 76).
The Court also rejectedin LaGrand the contention of the United States
that "rights of consular notdication and access under the Vienna Con-
vention are nghts of States, and not of individuals, even though these
nghts may benefitindividualsby pemtting Statesto offerthem consular
assistance" (rbrd.) One would have thought that these claims by the
United States wereput to rest, definitivelyand convincinglyby the Court
when it stated that

"the Court concludesthat Article 36,paragraph 1,createsindividual
nghts, which,by virtue ofArticle 1of the Optional Protocol, may be
invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained person
Thesenghts wereviolatedin the present case " (LaGrand, Judgment,
I CJ Reports2001, p 494, para 77.)
24 If individual nghts were violated in the LaGrand case, and if indi-
vidual rights are being violated in the present case, then it followsfrom

thesepremses that there is only one legal, obviousand necessaryconclu-
sion that the individual nghts of the 52 Mexican nationals may be
invoked in this Court by Mexico.A contrary conclusion is incompatible
with the decision of the Court in the LaGrand Judgment

25 Furthemore, the present Judgment departs substantiallyfrom the
findingsin the LaGrand Judgrnent in a number of other aspects, related
to the circumstances in which local remedies must be exhausted, to
application of the procedural default rule and to the question of denial
ofJustice
26 The mles that are to be applied in order to settle the issue of the
exhaustion of local remedieshave previouslybeen decidedby the Court
They are Iinked to the doctrine of procedural default In LaGrand, the
Court found that

"the procedural default nile prevented them from attaching any
legal significanceto the fact, inter aha, that the violation of the
nghts setforth in Article 36, paragraph 1,prevented Germany, in a
timely fashion, from retaining pnvate counsel for them and other-
Wiseassisting in their defence as provided for by the Convention
Under theseclrcurnstances,the procedural default rule had the effect
ofpreventing'full effect[frombeing]givento the purposes for which
the rights accorded under this Article are intended', and thus vio-
latedparagraph 2ofArticle36 " (LaGrand,Judgment, ZC J. Reports
2001, pp 497-498,para 91)elle avait rejeté l'argument Etats-Unis selon lequel«le droit pour un
Etat d'apporter une assistance consulaire à des ressortissants détenus
dans un pays étranger etle droit pour un Etat d'endosserles revendica-
tions de sesressortissantspar la voie de la protection diplomatique sont
des concepts jundiquement différents))(LaGrand, arrêt,C.I J Recueil
2001, p 493, par 76). Dans l'affaireLaGrand, la Cour avait également
rejeté la thèseéncaineselon laquelle«ce sont lesEtats et non lesindi-
vidus qui sont titulaires desdroits que reconnaît la convention de Vienne
enmatière denotificationconsulaire,même sliesindividuspeuventbéné-
ficierde ces droits, du fait que les Etats sontonsésà leur offnr une
assistance consulaire» (ibid ) Ces arguments des Etats-Unis semblaient
avoir été définitivementréfutpéar cette conclusion de la Cour.

«le paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 créedes droits individuels qui, en
vertu de l'article premier du protocole de signature facultative,
peuvent êtreinvoqués devant laCour par I'Etat dont la personne
détenuea la nationalité En l'espèce, cesdroits ont étéviolés»
(LaGrand, arrêt,C I J Reclaell2001, p 494, par 77)
24 Sides droits individuelsont étéviolésdans l'affaireLaGrand, et si

des droits individuels ont étéviolésdans la présenteaffaire, une seule
conclusion jundique, évidente etnécessaire, s'imposele Mexique peut
invoquerdevant la Cour lesdroits individuelsdescinquante-deuxressor-
tissants mewcains. Toute conclusion contraire est incompatible avec la
décisionénoncée par la Cour dans l'arrêtaGrand

25 En outre, la présentedécisions'écarsebstantiellementdesconclu-
sions énoncéed sans l'arrêtLaGrand à plusieurs autres égards, quiont
trait aux circonstances dans lesquelles les voies de recours internes
doivent êtreépuisées,àl'applicationde la règlede la carenceprocédurale
et àla question du dénidejustice
26 La Cour a déjàdéterminequelles règlesdevaient êtreappliquées
pour trancher la question de l'épmsementdes voies de recours ~nternes
Ces règles sont liées a la doctrine de la carence proddurale Dans
LaGrand, la Cour a conclu que

«la règlede la carenceprocédurale empêchai[tlestribunaux améri-
cains]d'attacherdes conséquencejuridiques au fait, notamment,que
laviolationdesdroitsprévusau paragraphe1del'article36n'avaitpas
permisà l'Allemagned'assureren tempsopportun aux frèresLaGrand
leconcoursd'avocatsprivés et elesassister,demanlèregénéraled,ans
leur défense, commlee prévoitla convention Dans ces conditions,la
règlede la carenceprocéduralea eu pour effet d'empêcher«la pleine
réalisationdesfinspour lesquelleslesdroits sont accordés envertu du
présentarticle))et ainsi violéles dispositionsdu paragraphe 2 de
l'article »(LaGrand,arrêt,CI J Recuer12001,p 497-498,par 91) 27. It is generally accepted by the Court that the procedural default
rule representsa bar to obtain a remedy in respect ofthe violation of the
rights containedin the ViennaConvention Thus Mexico'sclaimscannot
be rejected on the basis of the non-exhaustion of local remedies, as "it
was the United States itselfwhichfailedto carry out its obligationsder
the Convention", as was nghtly established by the Court in LaGrand.

28 Local remedies must be exhausted, but not if the exerciseis "a
clearlyfutileand pointlessactivity"(BarcelonaTractzon,Lzghtand Power
Company, Lzmrted,1 CJ Reports 1961,p 145) The need for the prin-

cipleof the exhaustion of local remediesto have a degreeof effectiveness
was provided by the Court when it found that

"for an international claim to be admissible, it1ssufficient if the
essenceof theclam has beenbrought before thecompetent tribunals
and pursued as far as permitted by local law and procedures, and
wilihoutsuccess"(ElettronicaSzculaSp A (ELSZ), Judgment,I C J

Reports 1989, p. 46, para 59,emphasis added)
29 The United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) has
been working on the topic of diplomatic protection for a number of
years The SpecialRapporteur, in his Third Report, submitted to theILC
a draft Article by which local rernediesdo not need to be exhausted if
they provide no reasonable possibility of an effective redress.Thus the

non-recourse to local remediesrequre a tnbunal to

"examine circumstancespertaining to a particular claim which may
not be imrnediatelyapparent, such as the independenceof the judi-
ciary, the ability of local courts to conduct a fair trial, thepresence
of alzneafprecedentsadverseto the clutmantandthe conducdof the
respondent State. The reasonableness of pursuing local remedies
must therefore be considered in each case" (ILL, Third Report on
Diplomatic Protection,NCN 4/523,7 March 2002,para 45, empha-

sis added )
30 There isan evidentneedto examne thenature of the rernediesthat
are to be exhausted For these purposes, the "futility rule" is to be
applied There is a clear support tthe notion that

"the local remedies whichmust be exhausted include remedies of a
legalnature 'but not extra-legalremediesor remediesas of grace',or
those whose 'purpose is to obtain a favor and not to indicate a
nght'. Administrative or other remedies whichare not judicial or
quasi-judicialn character and are of a discretionarycharacter there-
fore fa11outside the application of the local remedies rule '"ILC, 27 D'une manière générale, la Cour reconnaît que la règle de la
carenceprocéduraleempêche d'obtenir réparationen cas de violation des
droits énoncédsans la convention de Vienne Lesdemandes du Mexique
ne sauraient dèslors êtrerejetéesau motif que les voies de recours in-
ternes n'auraient pas étépuisées,puisque ce sont les Etats-Unis qui ont
«eux-mêmesfailli à l'exécutionde leur obligation .. en vertu de la
convention)), comme la Cour l'a déclarétrès justement dans l'arrêt
LaGrand.
28 Lesvoiesde recours internesdoivent certesêtreépuisées,main son
sila tentative d'y parvenir est «manifestement illusoire et dépourvue de
portée))(BarcelonaTraction,Llght andPower Company,Llmrted, CI J
Recueil 1961, p 145) Le pnncipe de l'épuisement desvoies de recours
internesdoit s'appliquer,maisjusqu'a un certainpoint, commel'aprécisé
la Cour en déclarant que

«pour qu'une demandeinternationale soit recevable,il suffit qu'on
ait soumis la substance de la demande aux jundictions compétentes
et qu'on aitpersévéréaussi loin que le permettent les lois et les pro-
cédureslocales,et ce sans succè»(ElettronrcaSzculaS.p A (ELSI),
arrêt,C I J Recuell 1989, p 46, par 59, lesitaliques sont de moi)

29 La Commission du droit international de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies (CDI) étudiela question de la protection diplomatique
depuis plusieurs annéesDans son troisièmerapport, le rapporteur spé-
cial a présentéà la CD1 un projet d'article d'aprèslequel il n'est pas
nécessaired'épuiserles voies de recours internes si celles-ci n'offrent
aucune posabilitéraisonnable d'obtenir une mesure de réparation effi-
cace C'est pourquoi la dérogationà la règlede l'épuisement desvoiesde
recours internes exigedu tribunal qu'il

((interroge les circonstances qui entourent la demande considérée,
qui ne sont peut être pasimmédiatementapparentes, par exemple
l'mdépendancedu pouvoir judiciaire, l'aptitude des tnbunaux in-
ternesàjuger en toute équité,'exzstenced'unejurisprudencedéfavo-
rable au demandeur et le comportement de I'Erat défendeur On
apprécieraau cas par cas s'il estraisonnable d'exercerdes recours
internes » (CDI, troisièmerapport sur la protection diplomatique,
doc AICN41523,7 mars 2002,par. 45, les italiques sont de moi )

30. Il y a manifestement lieu d'examiner lanature des recours à épui-
ser Il faut pour cela s'interroger sur l'effectde ceux-ci Il est claire-
ment admis que

«[Iles recours internes qui doivent être épuiséscomprennent les
recours de naturejuridique «mais non lesrecours extra-juridiqueni
lesrecoursgracieux))ni ceuxdont «le but estd'obtenir unefaveur et
non de fairevaloir un droit Lesrecoursadministratifset autres qui
ne sont pas judiciairesni quasijudiciaires et ont un caractèrediscré-
tionnaire ne sont donc pas couverts par la règle del'épuisement des Third Report on DiplomaticProtection, AICN4/523,7 March 2002,
para 14 )

Thus clemencyis not a local remedy that must be exhausted, and, as the
Court has found in the present Judgment, clemencyis "not sufficient in
itself to serve as an appropnate means of 'reviewand reconsideration'"
(para 143) The reason for this fmding is that "the process of review
and reconsideration should occur within the overall judiciairoceedings
relating to the individual defendant concerned" (Judgment, para. 141).
Thus the Court regards clemencyas a non-judicial procedure

31 The ILC SpecialRapporteur on Diplornatic Protection establishes
in his commentary, includedin his Third Report, that there isno need to
exhaust local remedieswhen such remediesare ineffectiveor the exercise
of exhausting such remedies wouldbe futile The reason for this is that
a clamant is not required to exhaust justice in a foreign State "when
there is no justice to exhaust" (ILC, Third Report on DiplomaticProtec-
tion, NCN 41523, 7 March 2002). As a result of the application of the

procedural default rule by the United States courts to the Mexican
nationals that are under Mexico'sdiplornaticprotection, it is not suitable
to sustain that there is a need to exhaust local remedies when it has
already been found that the doctrine of procedural default imposes a
judiciai bar to such reniedialaction, thus establishinga legalimpediment
to a municipal redress

32 As interpreted by the Court in the LaGrand Judgment, Article 36,
paragraph 2, imposes a number of obligations on the parties*

(a) As a consequence of the determination made by the Court of the
nature of the rights contained in Article 36, paragraph 1, "the
reference to 'rights'in paragraph 2 must be read as applying not
only to the rights of the sending State, but also to the nghts of
the detained individual" (LaGrand,Judgment,I C J Reports 2001,
p 497, para 89)
(6) The specificapplication of the "procedural default" rule becomes
problematical whenthe ruledoes not "allow the detainedindividual
to challengea convictionand sentence"by clamng that a breach of
the "without delay" consular notification has occurred, "thus pre-
venting the person from seeking and obtaining consular assistance
frorn thesending State" (ibrd., p 497, para 90)

(c) At the request of the detalned person, the sendingState has the right
to arrange for his legalrepresentation
(d) The procedural default ruleis an impediment for the United States AVENA ET AUTRES (OP IND. SEPULVEDA) 109

recours internes » (CDI, [deuxième]rapport sur la protection diplo-
matique, [doc AlCN 41514, 28 février20011,par. 14 )

La procédure de recours en grâce n'est donc pas une voie de recours
interne qu'ilfaut épuiseret, comme la Cour l'a dit dans le présentarrêt,
cette procédure «ne saurait suffireà elle seuleà constituer un moyen
appropnéde ((réexamenet revision»»(par 143) Sila Cour est parvenue
à cette conclusion, c'estparce que «le réexamenet la revision [devraient
avoir] lieu dans le cadre de la procédurejudiciaire globale par laquelle
passe chaque accusé))(arrêt, par.141) La Cour regarde donc le recours
en grâce comme une procédureextra-judiciaire
31 Selon le commentaire que le rapporteur spéctalde la CD1 sur Ia
protection diplomatique a fait figurer dans son troisièmerapport, point
n'est besoind'épuiserles recours interneslorsque ces recours sont ineffi-
caces ou que cette tentative est nécessairementvouéeà l'échec;en effet,
un demandeur n'est pas tenu d'épuiserles voies de droit dans un Etat

étranger~Iorsqu'dn'ya pas de voiesde droit à épuiser))(CDI, troisième
rapport sur la protection diplomatique,doc AlCN41523,7 mars 2002).
Les tribunaux américainsayant apphquéla règlede la carence procédu-
rale aux ressortissants mexicains bénéficiandt e la protection diploma-
tiquedu Mexique,on ne saurait affirmerla nécessitéd'épuiserlesvoiesde
recours internesalors qu'il déjiété conclu que la doctnne de la carence
procédurale,en y faisantjudiciairement obstacle,empêchaittoute répara-
tion à l'échelonnational

32 Dans l'arrêtLaGrand, Ia Cour a interprétéie paragraphe 2 de
l'article36 de la convention de Vienne comme imposant un certain
nombre d'obligations aux parties
a) comptetenu des conclusionsde la Cour sur la nature desdroits énon-
césau paragraphe 1 de l'article 36, «les «droits» visésau para-
graphe 2 désignentnon seulement les droits de l'Etat d'envoi, mais
aussi ceux des personnes détenues» (LaGrand, arrêt, CI J Recuerl
2001, p 497, par 89),

b) l'applicationdans un casd'espècede la règlede la «carence procédu-
raie» devientproblémat~que lorsque cette règle«ne permet pas àune
personne détenue de faire recours contre sa condamnation et sa
peine)) au motif qu'il n'y a pas eu de notification consulaire «sans
retard», «empêchant parlà mêmecette personne de solliciter et
d'obtenir l'assistance consulaire del'Etat d'envoi)) (rbrd, p 497,
Par 901,
c) si la personne détenueen fait la demande, YEtatd'envoi ale droit de
pourvoir à sa représentation enjustice;
d) la règledela carenceprocéduraleaempêché le jsridiCti0nSdes Etats- courts to attach "any Iegalsignificanceto the fact, znteralza,that the
violation of the rights setrth in Article36,paragraph 1,prevented
Germany, in a tmely fashion,from retaining private counselfor [its
nationals]and otherwise assistingin their defenceas provided for by
the Convention" (1CJ Reports 2001, pp 497-498,para 91)

(e) The procedural default nile had the effect, under these circum-
stances,of preventing "'fulleffect[frombeing]givento the purposes
for which the rights accorded under this art~cleare intended', and
thus violated paragraph 2 of Article 36" (ibid, p 498, para 91).

33,Yet, according to the evidence provided in the written and oral
proceedings, the United Statescourts, even after LaGrand, still continue
to apply the procedural default mle in the same manner as those courts
did in thepre-LaGrand phase The reason subnutted by the United States
is that "procedural default rules will possibly preclude such clam on
direct appeal or collateral review, unlessthe court finds there is cause for
the default and prejudice as a result of these alleged breach" (Counter-
Memorial of the United States of Amenca (CMUS), para 6 65) How-
ever, no court in the United States has found that "there iscause for the
default and prejudice" m cases of a Vienna Convention claim, under the
argument that Article 36 rights are not constitutional nghts

34 In this context, it may be useful to recall what Justice Stevens,of
the United States SupremeCourt, had to Sayon thematter The Supreme
Court declined to grant certtorari to hear a recent case, but in this
separate opinion, Justice Stevensstated

"applying the procedural default suleto Article36claimsisnot only
in directviolationof the Vienna Convention,but it is also manifestly
unfair. The ICJ's decision in LaGrand underscores that a foreign
national who is presumptively ignorant of his right to notification
should not be deemed to have waived the Article 36 protection
simplybecause he failed to assert that right in a state cnminal pro-
ceeding " (CR2003124,para 244)

35 The actual and acceptedpracticeof the Un~tedStatescourts on the
interpretation and application of Art~cle36, paragraph 2, and of the
LaGrand Judgrnent imposes severe restrictionson the concept of review
and reconsideration, sinceit fails to provide a legal remedy that may be
in agreement with the letter and the spint of the Vienna Convention and
LuGrand The United Statescourts are condemned to repetition, since a
legal straightjacket is imposed by the prevailing system, a system that Unis ((d'attacher des conséquences juridiquesau fait, notamment,
que la violation des droits prévusau paragraphe 1 de l'article 36
n'avait pas permisà l'Allemagned'assurer en temps opportun [ases
ressortissants] le concours d'avocats pnvés et de les assister, de
manière générale d,ans leur défense,commeleprévoit la convention»
(C I J Recuezl2001, p 497-498,par 91) ,
e) dans ces conditions, l'application de la règlede la carence procédu-
rale a eu pour effet d'empêcher«((la pleine réalisationdes fins pour
lesquelles lesdroits [étaient]accordsn vertu du présentarticle» et a
ainsi violéles dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36)) (zbld,
p 498, par 91).

33 Pourtant, d'aprèsles éléments de preuve produits lors des procé-
dures écriteet orale, les jundictions des Etats-Unis continuent, même
après l'affaireaGrand, d'appliquerla règlede la carenceprocéduralede
la mêmemanièrequ'ellesle faisaient avant celle-cl Le motif avancé par
lesEtats-Unis est que((lesrèglesrelativeà la carenceprocédurale feront
peut-être obstacleà ce que le moyen tiréde cette violation soit soulevé
dans lecadre de l'appel direct ou desvoiesde recours parallèles,moins
que lajuridict~onne conclue quecette carenceétaitjustifiéeet que la vio-
lation alléguéea causéun préjudice))(contre-mémoire desEtats-Unis

d'Amérique(CMEU), par 6.65) Or, aucunejuridiction aux Etats-Unis
n'a conclu «que cette carence étaitjustifiéeet que la violation alléguée
a[vait] causéun préjudice»lorsqu'une violation de la convention de
Vienne a étéinvoquée,et ceau motif que lesdroits tirésde l'article36ne
sont pas des droits constitutionnels
34 Dans ce contexte, il peut êtreutile de rappeler ce que lejuge Ste-
vens, de la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis, a dit sur ce point La Cour
suprêmea récemment refusé de déhvrerune ordonnance de certtorari
pour connaître d'une affaire, mais le juge Stevens n'en a pas moins
déclaréd,ans son opinion individuelle,que

((appliquerla règledela carenceprocédurale àdes moyenstirésdela
violationde I'article36constituenon seulementune violationdirecte
de la convention de Vienne, mais aussi une injustice manifeste La
décisionde la CIJ en l'affaireLaGrand insiste sur le fait qu'un res-
sortlssant étranger qui ignorevraisemblablement son droit de noti-
fication ne doit pas êtrepresuméavoir renoncé auxprotections pré-
vues par l'article 36 au seul motif qu'il n'aurait pas fait valoir
droit dans le cadre d'une procédurepénaleétatique» (CR2003124,
par 244 )
35 La pratiqueconcrèteet reconnuedesjuridictions américainesquant
à l'interprétationeta l'application du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 et de

l'arrêtLaGrand nuit considérablementau respect du principe de réexa-
men et de revision, cette pratique n'ouvrant aucune voie de droit qui
puisses'accorderavecla lettre et l'espritde la conventionde Vienneet de
l'arrêtLaGrand Les juridictions des Etats-Unis sont condamnées à se
répéter,prisonnièresqu'ellessont d'un carcan juridique nédu systèmedoes not regard a breach of Article 36 as a breach of a constitutional
right.
36 The detained foreignperson subjectto a tnal in thejudiciai system
of the United States wil find himselftrapped in a cloistered legal situa-
tion He may be unaware of his rights to consular notification and com-
munication And then due to the faiiure of the competent authonttes to

comply with Article 36, he will be unable to raise the violation of his
rights as an issue at trial. Becauseof that, and sincehe did not claim his
nghts at the proper judicial time due to ignorance, federal and state
courts will hold the doctrine of procedural default, which will bnng
about the defeat of remediesfor the violation of rights established by
Article 36 As a result of this chain ofjudicial events,there willbe a legal
impossibilityto escapefrom thisentrapment unlessa way out isprovided
by a precisedefinitionof the purposes that are to be achieved by a pro-
cessof reviewand reconsideration Such a definition mustbreak the bar-
ner that imposesa recurrent and absurd circularlegalargument, one that
paralyses any meaningful remedialaction that may be undertaken when
there is a breach of Article 36
37, In the present Judgrnentthe Court correctlyStates(para 112)that

the problem to which attention was drawn in the LaGrand case, and
whch is also pertinent in the present case,
" 'arises whenthe proceduraldefault mle doesnot allowthe detained
individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by claming, in

relianceon Article36,paragraph 1, of the Convention, that the com-
petent national authonties failed to comply withtheir obligation to
provide the requisite consular information "without delay", thus
preventing the person from seeking and obtaining consular assis-
tancefromthe sendingState.' (1CJ Reports2001,p 497,para 90) "

On this basis, the Court concluded in LaGrandthat "the procedural
default rule prevented counselfor the LaGrands to effectivelychallenge
their convictions and sentences other than on United States constitu-
tional grounds" (1 C J Reports 1001, p, 497, para 91) But what is even
more relevant is the findingof the Court in the present case "This state-
ment of the Court seems equally vahd in relation to the present case,
wherea number of Mexicannationals have been placed exactlyin such a
situation " (Judgrnent, para 112 ) Furthemore, there is one additional
important conclusion.

"the Court simply notes that the procedural default rule has not
been revised,nor has any provision been made to prevent its appli-
cation in cases where it has been the failure of the United States
itself to inform that may have precluded counsel from being in a
position to have raised the question of a violation of the Vienna
Convention in the initial tnal" (Judgment, para 113)actuel,qui ne voit pas dans une violation de I'article36 la violation d'un
droit constitutionnel
36 Dans le systèmejudiciaire des Etats-Unis, un étranger détenuen
instance de jugement se trouvera dans une impassejundique Peut-être
n'a-t-ilpas connaissance desdroits qui sont les siens enmatièrede noti-
ficationet de communication consulaires Dans cecas, les autoritéscom-
pétentes ne respectant pas l'article36, il ne pourra pas, au procès,tirer
griefdela violationde sesdroits A causedecela, etdu fait que l'intéressé
aura manqué,par ignorance, de faire valoir sesdroits au bon moment de
la procédurejudiciaire,lesjundictions fédéraleest étatiques appliqueront
la règlede la carence procédurale, quifera échecaux recours intentés
pour remédier à la violation desdroits établispar l'article36.Par suitede
cet enchaînement d'événementjs udiciaires,11sera juridiquement impos-
sible desortir de cette ornière,moins de vaincre cette difficultéen défi-
nissant précisémenltesobjectifsdu processusde réexamenet de revision.

C'est par une telle définitionque pourra êtrelevél'obstacle créé par ce
cerclevicieuxjundiquement absurde qui paralyse tout véritablerecours
susceptibled'être formé lorsqu'ily a violation de l'article36
37 Dans leprésentarrêt,la Cour rappelleajuste titre (par. 112)que le
problèmequi étaiten cause dans l'affaireLaGrand, et qui intéresse aussi
notre affaire,

««se pose lorsque la règlede la carenceprocéduralene permet pas à
une personne détenue de fairerecours contre sa condamnation et sa
peineen prétendant, sur labase du paragraphe 1de l'article36de la
convention, que les autorités nationalescompétentesne seseraient
pas acquittéesde leur obligationd'informer «sans retard »les auto-
ritésconsulaires compétentes,empêchantpar là mêmecette per-
sonne de solliciter et d'obtenir l'assistance consulaire de 1'Etat
d'envoi» (CI J Recueil 2001, p. 497, par 90) »

Sur cette base, la Cour avait conclu dans I'affaire LaGrand que «la
règlede la carenceprocéduralea[vait]empêché les avocats des LaGrand
de remettre en cause de façon efficace, sice n'est sur la base du droit
constitutionnel des Etats-Unis, leurs condamnations et leurs peines))
(CI J Recueil 2001, p 497,par. 91) Mais cequi revêtencore davantage
de pertinence,c'estce que la Cour déclareen la présente espèce.«Cette
conclusion paraît êtreaussi valabledans la présenteaffaire, où un cer-
tain nombre de ressortissants mexicains se sont retrouvésexactement
dans la mêmesituation »(Arrêt,par. 112) On relèvera uneautre conclu-
sion importante *

«la Cour se contentera de noter que la règle dela carence procédu-
rale n'a pas étéreviséeet qu'il n'apas davantage étépns de dispo-
sitions pour empêcherson application dans les cas où le défaut
d'information imputable aux Etats-Unis eux-mêmesn'aurait pas
pems aux avocatsde souleveren premièreinstancela question de la
violation de la convention de Vienne* (arrêt, par.13) 38 In examining the issue of the procedural default doctrine, the
Court seemsto agree, in the first instance, with the contention made by
Mexico,the argument as expressedby Mexicobeingbasicallythe follow-
ing
" 'a defendant who could have raised, but fails to raise, a legal issue

at trial will generallynot be perm~ttedto raise it in future proceed-
ings, on appeal or in a petition for a wnt of habeascorpus'[Memo-
rial of Mexico (MM), para. 2241 The rule requires exhaustion of
remedies, inter alza, at the state level and before a habeas corpus
motion can be filedwith federalcourts. In the LaGrandcase,the rule
in question was applied by the United States federal courts; in the
present case,Mexicoalso complainsof the application of the rule in
certainstate courts of cnminal appeal [MM,paras 228-2291 " (Judg-
ment, para 111 )

39 There seemsto be an essential coincidencebetween Mexico'sargu-
ments and the reasoning contained in the present Judgment The Court
establishesthe following basic premises

(a) "the procedural default rule has not been revised, nor has any pro-
vision been made to prevent its application in cases where it has
been the failure of the United States itselfto inform that may have
precluded counsel from being in a position to have raised the
question of a violation of the Vienna Convention in the initial
trial",
(b) "[ilt thus remains the casethat the procedural default rule may con-
tinue to prevent courts from attaching legal significanceto the fact,
inter aka, that the violat~onof the rights set forth in Article 36,
paragraph 1, prevented Mexico,in a tmely fashion, from retaining
private counselfor certain nationals and otherwiseassistingin their
defence" ,
(c) "[i]n such cases, application of the procedural default rule would
have the effect of preventing 'full effect [from being] given to the
purposes for which the nghts accorded, under this Article are
intended',and thus violate paragraph 2 of Article 36";

(d) "in severalof the casescited in Mexico'sfinal submisnons the pro-
cedural default rule has already been applied, and that in others it
could be applied at subsequent stages in the proceedings" (Judg-
ment, para 113)
40 Being in essence in agreement with these fundamental prernises,
the Court and Mexico then part Companyand reach different conclu-

sions Mexicocontends that the United Stateshas violated and continues
to violate the Vienna Convention
"By applying provisionsof its municipallaw to defeat or foreclose
rernediesfor the violation of nghts conferred by Article 36 - thus
failing to provide meaningful review and reconsideration of severe 38 Lorsqu'elleexamine la question de la doctrine de la carence pro-
cédurale, laCour sembletout d'abord donner raison au Mexique, l'argu-

ment formulé parce dernier étantessentiellementle suivant

««le défendeurqui aurait pu soulever une question de droit lors
d'unprocès, maisne l'apas fait, n'estgénéralement pas autoriséà le
faire dans les étapessuivantesde la procédure,en appel ou au stade
de la requêteen habeas corpus [mémoiredu Mexique, par 2241))
Cette règle exigeque soientépuisées les voiedse recours,entre autres
au niveaude I'Etat,avant qu'un recoursen habeas corpuspuisseêtre
introduit devant lesjuridictions fédéralesDans l'affaireLaGrand,la
règle en question était celle qu'avaient appliquéeles juridictions
fédéralesarnéncaines,dans la présenteespèce,le Mexique se plaint
aussi de l'application de cetteregle par certaines cours d'appel pé-

nales au niveau des Etats [ibrd,par 228-2291» (Arrêt,par, 111)
39 Lesargumentsdu Mexiqueet leraisonnementcontenu dans lepré-
sent arrêtsemblent se rejoindre sur l'essentiel. LaCour énonceles pré-
missesfondamentales suivantes

a) «la règlede la carence procédurale n'a pas étereviséeet . il n'a
pas davantage été pris dedispositions pour empêcherson applica-
tion dans les cas où le défaut d'information imputable aux Etats-
Unis eux-mêmesn'aurait pas permis aux avocats de soulever en
première instance la question de la violation de la convention de
Vienne » ;
b) «[il1se peut ainsi que la règlede la carence procédurale continue a
empêcherles tnbunaux d'attacher une postéejuridique notamment
au fait que la violation des droits énoncés au paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle36 a empêché le Mexique de retenir en temps utile les services
d'avocatsprivéspour assurer la représentation de certains desesres-
sortissants et de les assister d'autre façon dans leur defen»,
c) «[d]ansces hypotheses, l'application dela règlede la carence procé-
durale aurait pour effet d'empêcher«la pleine réalisationdes fins
pour lesquelles [dlesdroits sont accordésen vertu [dudit] article))et
violerait par conséquentle paragraphe 2 de l'article 36»,
d) «dans plusieurs descas visésdans lesconclusionsfinalesdu Mexique
la règlede la carenceprocéduraleadéjàtrouvé applicationet dans
d'autres elle pourrait êtreappliquéedans la suite de la procédure))
(arrêt, par 113)

40 Essentiellementd'accordaveccesprémissesfondamentales,la Cour
et le Mexique divergent ensuite, pour parvenir a des conclusions diffé-
rentes Le Mexique soutient que,

«[e]n appliquant les dispositions de leur droit interne pour rejeter
ou empêcherles recours au titre de la violation des droits conférés
par l'article36- et en ne permettant pas, de cefait, un réexamenet sentences imposed inproceedings that violated Article 36." (MM,
p 93, para 226)

41 One first issuein Mexico" argument is related to the continuity in
the non-complianceand the non-applicability,in the courts of the United
States, of the concept of "review and reconsideration" mandated in
LaGrand But there 1san additional element
"despite this Court's clearanalysis in LaGrand, U S courts at both
the state and federal level, continue to invoke defaultdoctnnes to
bar any reviewof Article 36 violations - even when the national
had been unaware of his nghts to consular notification and commu-

nication and thus his ability to raise their violation as an issue
at tnal, due to the competent authonties' fadure to comply with
Article 36" (MM, p 93, para 227).

42 More as an expression of hope than as a reflection of the
mechanics that have been imposed in the United States courts by the

application of the procedural default doctrine, the present Judgment
finds that, with the exception ofMr. Fierro (case No 31), Mr Moreno
(case No. 39) and Mr Torres (case No. 53), where conviction and
sentencehave becomefinal, in none of the other 49 cases
"have the cnminal proceedings against the Meucan nationais con-
cemed already reached a stage at which there 1sno further possi-
bility of judicial re-examnation of those cases, that 1sto Say, al1
possibility is not yet excluded of 'review and reconsideration' of
conviction and sentence, as called for in the LaGrand case

It would therefore be premature for the Court to conclude at this
stage that, inthose cases, there1salready a violation of the obliga-
tions under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention "
(Judgment, para 113.)
43 The Court may be right in leaving open a possibility of a process
of reviewand reconsideration and in findingthat it is premature to con-
cludethat there is alreadya breach of Article 36 But ifthe post-LaGrand
experience1sof any value, the potential to submit the rule of procedural
default to a meaningfd and effective system ofreviewand reconsidera-

tion by the courts of the United States is rather remote Notwithstanding
the clear mandate provided in the LaGrand Judgment, the aftermath of
LaGrand provides evidencethat there is littlejudiciai wish in the United
States courts to "allow the reviewand reconsideration of the conviction
and sentenceby taking account ofthe violation of the rights set forth" in
the Vienna Convention, as ordered by the Court in the LaGrand Judg-
ment
44 The fact is that, as has been already stated, no judiaai reviewand AVENA ET AUTRES (OP IND. SEPULVEDA) 113

une revisioneffectifsdes peines sévères imposéa es terme de procé-
dures entachéesde violationsde l'article36))(mémoiredu Mexique,
p 93, par 226),
lesEtats-Unis ont violéet continuent de violer la convention de Vienne
41. Un premier élément de l'argumentation du Mexique a trait au
caractère continu du non-respect et de la non-applicabilité,dans les tn-
bunaux américains,du pnncipe de «réexamen etde revision))prescnt en
l'affaireLaGrand Mais il y a un élémens tupplémentaire

((malgrélaclaire analyse qui a étéfaite par la Cour dans l'affaire
LaGrand, les juridictions améncaines,tant étatiques quefédérales,
continuent à invoquer la règlede la carence procéduralepour faire
obstacleà tout examen des violations de l'article 36 - mêmesi le
ressortissant n'était pasconscientde sesdroitsà la notification eà
la communication consulaires et, partant, du fait qu'ilpouvait invo-
quer leur violation lors de son procès, precisémentparce que les
autontéscompétentesn'avaient pas respecté l'article36))(mémoire

du Mexique, p. 93, par 227)
42 Expnmant davantageune aspiration qu'une réflexionsur lesméca-
nismes qu'impose auxtnbunaux améncainsl'application de la doctnne
de la carenceprocédurale,le présentarrêt conclutque, sil'on excepteles
cas de MM Fierro (no 31),Moreno (no39) et Torres (no 53)- dont la
déclaration de culpabilitéet la peine ont acquis un caractèredéfiniti-,
dans aucun des quarante-neuf autres cas

«les procédurespénalesengagéescontre les ressortissants mexicains
n'ensont . encore arrivées au stade ou il n'existerait plusaucune
possibilitéde recours judiciaire, autrement dit, il n'est pas encore
excluque lesverdicts de culpabilité etles peines soient «réexaminés
et revisés),ommeledemandait la Cour dans l'affaireLaGrand Il
serait donc prématuréde la part de la Cour de conclure à ce stade
qu'ily a déjà, dansces cas, violation des obligations découlantdu
paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne » (Arrêt,

par. 113)
43 Peut-êtrela Cour a-t-elleraison de ne pas écartertoute possibilité
de réexamenet de revision et de juger prématuréde conclure qu'il y a
déjàviolation de l'article 36. Mais si l'on tire quelque enseignementde
l'expérienceacquise depuis LaGrand, on sait que les chances de sou-
mettre la règlede la carenceprocédurale à un systèmevéritableet effectif
de réexamenet de revisionpar lesjuridictions des Etats-Unis sont plutôt
minces Nonobstant les termes sans équivoque utilisés dans cette déci-
sion, l'après-LaGrand démontre queles juridictions des Etats-Unis ne

sont guère enclines à({permettrele réexamenet la revisiondu verdict de
culpabilitéet de la peine entenant compte de la violation desdroits pré-
vus» dans la convention de Vienne,ainsi que la Cour le leur a ordonné
dans l'arrêtLaGrand.
44 Le fait est que, comme il a déjàété dit, le réexamen et larevisionreconsideration is left for Mr Fierro (case No. 31), Mr Moreno (case
No 39),and Mr Torres (caseNo 53),sincethere are no further judiciai
remediesfor these three Mexicannationals who, according to the Court,
have been at risk of execution at least from the time the Court ordered
provisionalmeasureson 5 February 2003,obligatingthe United States to
take al1necessarysteps to ensure that they were not executed before the
Court rendered judgment on Mexico'sclaims In addition to these three
cases, ten Mexican nationals are unable to challenge their convictions
and sentences on the basis of violations of Article 36, paragraph 1,
because their ability to do so has been barred by the procedural default
doctnne Furthermore, 18 Mexican nationals will find themselves in a
similar situation, because they did not raise the Vienna Conventton
claims at tnal Again, because of the procedural default rule, they will
convictions and sentenceson this
also be barred from challengingtheir
basis, once they attempt to raise the claim on appeal or in post-convic-
tion proceedingsthat are still ongoing (CR2003124,p 69, para 245)

45 It seemsfar beyondthe realm of the possiblethat these 31Mexican
nationals can rely, once they have no further judicial redress, or once
they are subject to the application of the procedural default doctrine, on
a process of judicial review and reconsideration by the United States
courts The room for legal manŒuvnngis already too narrow ta deposit
any realrstichope in an effectiveand meaningfuljudiciai remedy oncethe
procedural default rule is put into operation One cannot but share the
viewprovided by the Court in the present Judgrnent

"The crucial point in this situation is that, by the operation of the
procedural default rule as it is applied at present, the defendant is
effectivelybarred from raising the Issueof the violation of his nghts
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention and is limited to seeking
the vindication of his rights under the United States Constitution "
(Judgment, para 134 )

Yet having reached such an unobjectionable conclusion, the Court
does not followits holding to its ultimate consequences,remainingmuch
too shy as to the redress that should be provided. It is not unreasonable
to assumethat oncethejudicial processiscompletedand the remediesfor
the violat~onsare finallyunavailable, a denial of justice may come into
being,unleashing a chain of legalconsequencesat the international level

46 According to Article 36,paragraph 1 (c), consular officers have
the right to arrange for the legal representation of a national who is in
pnson, custody or detention Such a right 1sparticularly important injudiciaires ne peuvent plus être appliqués à MM Fierro (cas no 31),
Moreno (cas no 39)et Torres (casno53),puisque aucune voiede recours
judiciaire n'estplus ouverte à ces trois ressortissants mexicains qui,

d'aprèsla Cour, risquent d'être exécutésdepuaiu s,moins, qu'ellea indi-
quédes mesuresconservatoiresle 5 février2003,obligeant lesEtats-Unis
à prendre toutes les mesures nécessairespour garantir que les intéressés
ne seraient pas exécutés avant qu'elle statue sur les demandes du Me-
xique Outre cestrois cas, dixressortissantsmexicainssont, de par la doc-
trine de la carenceprocédurale,dans l'incapacitéde contester, sur la base
des violations du paragraphe 1de l'article36, le verdict de culpabilitéet
la peineprononcés àleurencontre En outre, dix-huitressortissants mexi-
cains vont se trouver dans une situation similairefaute d'avoir excipéde
la convention de Vienne au procès Là encore, à cause de la règlede la
carence procédurale,les ressortissants en question seront empêchéd se
contester sur cette base le verdict de culpabilitéet la peine prononcésà
leur encontre, dèslors qu'ilstenteront de faire valoir ce moyen dans des
procéduresen appel ou celles, toujours pendantes, engagéesaprès leur

condamnation (CR2003124,p 69, par 245)
45 Il sembletout àfait utopique de penserque cestrente et un ressor-
tissantsmexicainspourront compter, une foisqu'ilsauront épuisé tous les
recours en justice ou dèslors que la doctrine de la carence procédurale
leur sera appliquée,sur un processusde réexamenet de revisionjudiciaires
de la part destribunaux américainsLa marge de manŒuvre,du point de
vuejundique, est déjàbien trop restreinte pour autoriser quelque espoir
raisonnable que ce soit de former un recoursjuridique effectifet véritable
une foisla règlede la carence procéduralemiseen Œuvre Onne peut que
partager les vuesexpriméespar la Cour dans le présentarrêt

«Le point cructal, en pareille situation, est que, par l'effet de la
règlede la carence procéduraletelle qu'elleest actuellement appli-
quée,l'intéressése voit en fait interdirede souleverla question de la
violation desdroits que lui reconnaît l'article36 de la conventionde
Vrenneet ne peut que chercher àfaire valoir sesdroits au titre de la
Constitution des Etats-Unis » (Arrêt, par 134 )

Pourtant, après êtreparvenue à une conclusionsi indiscutable, laCour
ne va pas jusqu'au bout de son raisonnement, restant par trop timorée
quant au remède à appliquer II n'est pas déraisonnable depenser que,
une foisleprocessusjudiciaire parvenuàson termeet lesrecoursen viola-
tion définitivement exclus,n déni dejustice risquede voir lejour, déclen-
chant une sériede conséquences juridiquesà l'écheloninternational

46 Aux termesde l'alinéac) du paragraphe 1 de l'article36,les fonc-
tionnaires consulairesont le droit de pourvoirà la représentation enjus-
ticed'unressortissantqui est incarcérée,n état dedétentionpréventiveoucases in whicha severepenalty may be unposed In a peculiar interpreta-
tion of the nature of this nght, in the present Judgrnent it ispointed out

that
"the exercise of the nghts of the sending State under Article 36,
paragraph 1 (c), depends upon notification by the authorities of the
receivingState It may be, however,that information drawn to the
attention of the sending State by other means may still enable its
consular officers to assist in arrangtng legal representation "

(Judgment, para 104 )

And then the Judgment reachesa conclusion that may have no factual or
legal support

"the Mexican consular authonties learned of their national's deten-
tion in timeto providesuchassistance,eitherthrough notificationby
United States authorities (albelt belatedly ln terms of Artlcle 36,
paragraph 1 (b)),or through other channels" (rbld ,emphasisadded)

m the case of the 16Mexican nationals that are listed in the Judgment,
providing their name and the number of their case
47 A reviewof these 16casesshould lead to a different conclusion In
most if not al1caseslegalrepresentation was badly neededfrom the very
beginning,when such assistanceis of the utmost necessityand benefit In
certain of the quoted cases the legal representation was provided when
the Mexicannational had already been convicted There are certain cases
of severe mental illness that required proper legal representation at an
early stage of the trial, one that could have been provided by a consular
officerready to assist also in the impaired and disadvantaged condition
of the mentally il1Mexican national There are cases of mental retarda-
tion, a circumstance that facilitatedincruninatingstatements made with-
out a lawyer beingpresent, which later negativelyaffected the Mexican

national dunng his trial There are certain casesof confessionsobtained
through torture, an event that would certainly contradict the notion that
notification was not so late as to effectivelypreclude arranging legalrep-
resentation There are certain casesof Mexicannationals that understood
no Englishwhatsoever, be it written or spoken, and yet had to sign self-
incnminating statements without the benefit of an interpreter or of a
Spanish-speaking lawyer There are certain cases where Mexican con-
sular officials learned of the arrest of a Mexican national three years
after his arrest, once he had been already sentenced to death

48 From a legalpoint of view,a matter of great concern must be the
notion implicit inthe Judgment that notification under Article 36, para-
graph 1(b), albeit not made "without delay", was not so late as to effec-

tivelypreclude legalrepresentation (Judgment,para 104) In most if nottoute autre forme de détention Cedroit est particulièrement important
lorsque l'intéressénsque une peine sévèreOr, dans une interprétation
singulièrede la nature de ce droit, le présentarrêtindique que

((l'exercicedes droits de 1'Etatd'envoi en vertu de l'alinéac) du
paragraphe 1 de l'article36 est tnbutaire de la notification opérée
par lesautontésde l'Etat de résidence Deséléments d'information
portés à la connaissance d'un Etat d'envoi par d'autres moyens
peuvent toutefois permettre à ses fonctionnaires consulaires de
prêterleurassistanceenvuedepourvoir àla représentationen justice
d'un ressortissantde cet Etat» (Arrêt,par 104 )

Puis l'arrêten vientà une conclusion qui n'a peut-êtrede fondement ni
factuel, nijundique. dans le cas des seizeressortissants mexicainsénu-
mérés dans l'arrêt par leurnom et le numéro correspondant à leur cas,

((lesautoritésconsulaires mexicaines ont appris la détention en
temps utile pour fournir une telle assistance, soit par la notifica-
tion donnéepar les autoritésaméricaines(bien que celle-ci eût été
tardzve au sens de I'alznéb) duparagraphe 1 de I'artzcle 36), soit
par d'autres moyens» (rbld ,lesitaliques sont de moi)

47 Une analysede ces seizecas devrait conduire à une conclusiondif-
ferente Dans la plupart d'entreeux, sinon tous, I'interesaurait séneuse-
ment eu besoin d'êtrereprésenté en justice dès ledébut dela procédure,
lorsquecetteassistanceestleplusnécessaire et leplus profitable.Dans plu-
sieurs des cas cités, a étpourvu àla représentationenjustice du ressor-
tissant mexicainalors que celui-ciavait déjà étédéclaré coupableDans
certains cas, l'accusé,souffrant d'une grave maladie mentale, aurait dû
bénéficie dr'une représentatioenjusticeadéquate à un stade précocede la
procédure judiciaire,représentationqu'aurait pu assurer un fonctionnaire
consulaire disposéà lui venir égalemenetn aide dans sa situation handica-
pante et défavonséeDans d'autrescas, leressortissantmexicain,souffrant
d'arriérationmentale, a témoigné plus facilementcontre IUI-mêmheors la

présenced'un avocat,cequi luia ensuiteportépréjudiceau procès Ailleurs
encore,des aveuxont été obtenus par la torture, ce qui exclut assurément
l'rdéeque la notificationn'étaitpas tardive aupoint d'empêchee rffective-
ment le Mexiquede pourvoir a la représentationen justice deson ressor-
tissant Certainsdesressortissantsmexicains necomprenaientni ne lisaient
un seul mot d'anglaiset ont pourtant dû signer, sansbénéficied re l'aide
d'un interprèteou d'un avocat hispanophone, des déclarations dansles-
quellesils semettaienten cause Dans d'autrescas enfin,lesfonctionnaires
consulairesmexicainsont appris l'arrestation d'un ressortissantmexicain
trois ans plus tard, une foisl'intéressé déàndamné à la peine capitale
48 D'un point de vuejuridique, on ne peut qu'êtregravement préoc-
cupépar la notion, implicitementcontenue dans l'arrêt,selon laquellela
notificationprévue à I'alineab) du paragraphe 1de l'article36, bien que
non intervenue «sans retard», n'a pas été tardiveau point d'empêcheral1of the 16casesquoted there was no consularnotification made by the

competentauthorities, whichhas already been found to be a violation of
Vienna Convention obligations In the operative part of the Judgment,
the Court clearly establishes that the United States is in breach of the
obligationsirnposedupon it by Article 36,paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c)
Three fundamental breachesare found by the Court (not informing with-
out delay of the rights of 51Mexican nationals, not notifying the appro-
pnate Mexican consular post without delay of the arrest of 48 Mexican
nationals,depr~vingMexico of the right to provide, rna tlmel yashlon,
assistanceto the individualsconcerned, depriving Mexico ofthe right, m
a timely fashron t,cornrnunicatewith and have access to its nationals
and to visitthem in detention) Yet it seemsrather odd that the Court, in
spite of thesefindings,establishes,with nofurther argument, that "Mexi-
can consular authorities learned of their national's detention ln time to
provide" legal assistance Furthemore, the "without delay" breach,

already established by the Court, radically contradicts the idea that legal
representation may be provided at a later period, belatedly, whateverthe
circumstancesof the detentionand whateverthe stageof the trial may be,
without infringing Article36, paragraph 2. This exegesisof the Vienna
Convention finds no foundation in the text of the treaty and defeats
the traditional rules of hermeneutics But, in addition to the breach of
Article36,nothing in the Vienna Convention allowsfor suchan interpre-
tation, one that subjectivelydeclareswhether or not Iegalrepresentation
in accordance with Article 36,paragraph 1 (c),is being provided at the
nght time Such an interpretation does not complywith the Vienna Con-
vention or with any of the previous holdingsof the Court Yet its conse-
quencesare most damaging It means exclud~ngfrom thedecisionof the
Court those 16cases quoted in paragraph 104 of the present Judgment.
If, as Mexico claims, it hasbeendepnved specificallyta arrange legalrep-
resentation, and consequently its nat~onalswere deprived of the possi-

bility of receivlngthe corresponding assistance, under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (c), and the claim is to be applicable only to the 34 Mexican
nationals listed in paragraph 106(4) of the Judgment and mentioned in
findingNo 7 of its operative part, then the dramatic effect is that, with-
out any legalor factual basis, Mexicoand 16Mexicannationals are being
depnved of their right to provide and receive legal representation in
cnminal proceedingsthat have resultedin their beingon death row Such
a dramatic effect runs contrary to previous findingsby the Court:

"It follows that when the sending State 1sunaware of the deten-
tion of its nationals due to the failure of the receivingState to pro- AVENA ET AUTRES (OP IND SEPULVEDA) 116

effectivementla représentationenjustice(arrêt,par 104) Dans la plupart,

sinon dans la totalité,des seizecas cités,les autoritéscompétentes n'ont
pas procédé à la notification consulaire,cequi a déjàéjugécontraire aux
obligationsdictéespar la convention deVienne Dans le dispositifde son
arrêt,la Cour établitclairementquelesEtats-Unisont violélesobligations
leur incombant en vertu des alinéasa), b) et c)du paragraphe 1 de l'ar-
ticle36 La Cour constate que trois violations fondamentalesont été com-
mises (enn'informant pas sans retard les cinquante et un ressortissants
mexicainsde leursdroits, en ne notifiant pas sans retard au poste consu-
lairemexicainappropriél'arrestationdesquarante-huitressortissantsmexi-
cains,privant le Mexiquedu droit de prêter assistanceen temps utrle,aux
intéressés, eprivant le Mexiquedu droit, en temps utzle,decommuniquer
avecsesressortissantset de serendreauprèsd'euxlorsqu'ilssont en déten-
tion).Il sembledonc plutôt curieuxque Ia Cour, malgréces conclusions,
déclaresansautre explication que «lesautontésconsulairesmexicainesont

appris la détentionde leur ressortissant en temps utilepour lui fournir))
une assistancejundique En outre, la vioIationde l'obligationd'agir«sans
retard», déjàétabliepar la Cour, contredit radicalement l'idéeque la
représentationen justice puisseêtre assuréa e une période ultérieuret,ar-
divement, quels que soient les circonstancesde la détention etle degré
d'avancementde la procédure judiciaire, sans qu'il y ait là violation du
paragraphe 2 de l'article36. Cette exégèsde la convention deVienne ne
trouve aucun fondementdans letextedecette dernière,et défielesrèglesde
l'herméneutique Mais,outre la violation de l'article 36, rien dans la
convention de Vienne n'autorise pareille interprétation, quiconsiste a
déclarer subjectivemens t'ilest ou non pourvu au bon momentà la repré-
sentationenjustice du ressortissant, conformément àl'alinéac) du para-
graphe 1de i'article36.Une tellernterprétationne respecteni la conven-
tion de Vienne, ni aucune des décisionsantérieures de la Cour Or, ses

conséquences sont desplusnéfastesElleimpose d'exclurede la décisionde
la Cour lesseizecas qui sont citésau paragraphe104 du présentarrêtSile
Mexiquea, commeil leprétend, étp érivé spécifiquemed nt droit de pour-
voir à la représentationenjustice de sesressortissants, en conséquencde
quoi cesderniersont été pnvésde la possibilitéde bénéficiedre l'assistance
correspondante,en vertudel'alinéa c) du paragraphe 1de l'article36- et
cette allégationdoit s'appliquer uniquement auxtrente-quatre ressortis-
santsmexicainsqui sont énumérés à l'alinéa4 du paragraphe 106del'arrêt
et mentionnésau point 7 du dispositi-, alors la conséquencetragique en
est que, sans motifjuridique ou factuel, le Mexiqueet seizede ses ressor-
tissants se trouvent privésde leur droit de représentationen justice (d'y
pourvoir pour le premieret d'enbénéficieprour les seconds)dans le cadre
de procédures pénaleq sui ont fait que lesaccusésse trouvent aujourd'hui
dans lecouloir de la mort Cette conséquence tragiqueva à l'encontre des
déclarations anténeuresde la Cour

«Il s'ensu~tque, lorsque 1'Etatd'envoi n'apas connaissance de la
détention del'un de ses ressortissants, parce que'Etatde résidence videthe requisiteconsularnotificationwithout delay, . the sending
State has been prevented for al1practical purposes from exercising

its nghtsunder Article 36, paragraph 1 It is material for the pur-
poses of the present case whether the LaGrands would have sought
consular assistance from Germany, whether Germany wou1dhave
rendered such assistance,or whether a different verdict would have
been rendered It is sufficient that the Convention conferred these
nghts, and that Germany and the LaGrands werein effectprevented
by the breach of the United Statesfrom exercisingthem, had they so
chosen." (LaGrand,Judgment, 1 CJ Reports2001,p 492,para. 74 )

49 The purpose of Article 36 is to facilitate the exercise of consular

functions related to nationals of the sending State It imposes a number
of obligations on the receiving State and provides certain nghts of
consular protection on behalf of a national of the sending State that has
been "arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in anyother manner" Whenever suchan event mayhappen, the
receiving State "shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State". Additionally, "consular officers shall have the right to
visit a national of the sending State who 1s in pnson, custody or
detention to arrange for his legalrepresentation" Surelythe essential
objectiveof this pnnciple is to guarantee that the protected national who
1sin pnson, custody or detention has the benefit of expert Iegal advice
before any action 1staken potentially detnmental to his nghts As a con-
sequence of this pnnciple, the notification should be givenimmediately
and pnor to interrogation, especially inthe case of sertous cnrnes, if the
exerciseof nght is to be useful

50 Thenght of the consular officerto arrange for the legalrepresenta-
tion of the protected national is beyond question If the competent
authorities of the receivingState are under the obligation to inform the
protected national, without delay, of his rights of consular assistance,
which include arranging for legal representation, in accordance with
Article 36, then this principlecan be regarded as closelyrelated, in spint
and content, to the Miranda warning. The Adviseof Rights established
in the Miranda warning compnses seven elements Four of them are
directly Iinked to legal representatian

(a) you have the nght to talk to a lawyerfor advicebefore we ask you
any questions,
(b) you havethe rightto havea lawyerwithyou dunng your questionmg,
(c) if you cannot afford a lawyer, one willbe appointed for you before
any questioning if you wish, and n'apas effectuésansretard la notificationconsulairerequise, i'Etat
d'envoisetrouve dans l'impossibilitépratique d'exercer,à toutes fins
utiles, les droits que lui confèrele paragraphe de l'article 36 Peu
importe àcet égardde savon, aux fins de la présenteinstance, si les
LaGrand auraient sollicitél'assistanceconsulaire de l'Allemagne,si
l'Allemagneleur aurait apportéune telle assistance et si un verdict
différentaurait alors étéprononcé. II suffit de constater que la
convention conféraitces droits, et quel'Allemagneet les LaGrand,
eussent-ilssouhaités'enprévaloir,onten fait été empêchd éeslefaire
en raison de la violation commise par les Etats-Unis » (LaGrand,
arrêt,C I J Recuezl2001, p 492, par. 74)

49 Le but de l'article36est de faciliterl'exercicedes fonctionsconsu-
laires Al'égardde ressortissantsde i'Etat d'envoi Cet article imposecer-
taines obligationsa 1'Etatde residenceet établit certains droità la pro-
tection consulaire en faveur du ressortissant deI'Etat d'envoiqui a été
((arrêtéi,ncarcéréou mis en étatde détentionpréventiveou toute autre
formede détention» Dèslors qu'unetellechose se prodult, 1'Etatde rési-
dence «doi[t]avertir sansretard leposte consulairede 1'Etatd'envoi)) De
plus, «[Ilesfonctionnaires consulaires ont le droit de se rendre auprès
d'un ressortissant de1'Etatd'envoiqui est incarcérée,n état dedétention
préventiveou toute autre formede détention et de pourvoira sa repré-
sentation en justice)) L'objectif essentielde ce pnncipe ne peut être que

de garantir que leressortissantprotégé qui est incarcéren,étatde déten-
tion préventiveou toute autre forme de détentionbénéficie des conseils
d'unavocat compétentavant quene soit prise aucune mesure susceptible
de léserses droits De ce pnncipe, 11découleque, sauf àperdre sa raison
d'être,la notificationdoit avoir lieu immédiatementet avant I'interroga-
toire, surtout dans le cas de crimes graves

50 Ledroit qu'a lefonctionnaire consulairede pourvoir à la représen-
tation en justice du ressortissant protégéne saurait être contestéSi les
autontéscompétentesde 1'Etatde résidencesont tenues d'informer sans
retard ce ressortissantde son droit l'assistance consulaire-et,partant,
a ce qu'il soit pourvu à sa représentationenjustice- en application de

l'article6, alors ce pnncipe peut êtreconsidéré comme étroitementlié,
tant par la lettre que par l'esprit, règleMzranda La lecture desdroits
Mzranda, établiepar la règledu mêmenom, comprend sept éléments,
dont quatre sont directement liésa la représentationenjustice
a) la personneplacéeen étatd'arrestation aledroit de consulterun avo-
cat avant le début de l'interrogatoire,
b) ellea ledroit d'exigerla présenced'unavocat pendantl'interrogatoire,
c) siellen'a pas lesmoyensd'engagerun avocat elle-mêmei,l lui en sera
commis un d'officeavant le débutde l'interrogatoire, si elle le sou-

haite, et(d) ifyou decideto answerquestionsnow without a lawyerpresent, you
have the right to stop answenng at any time

51. To be useful,the consularright to arrange for the legal representa-
tion of the protected national should be exercisedby the sending State as
soon as possible There should be a correspondingobligationon the part
of the receiving State not to undertake any action that may affect the
nghts of the protected person To this effect, it may be useful to quote
LaGrand

"the procedural default rule prevented them from attaching any
legal significanceto the fact, Inter alla, that the violation of the
rights setorth in Article 36, paragraph 1,prevented Germany, m a
tlmelyfashzon, from retaining pnvate counsel for them and other-
Wiseassisting their defence as provided for by the convention"^
(LaGrand,Judgment, 1 CJ Reports 2001, pp 497-498, para, 91,
emphasis added)

52 The essence ofthe controversy centres on the nature and scope of
the rights provided by Article 36. If the United States courts deny that
the Vienna Convention creates individual nghts no conciliationwill be
found with the LaGrand Judgment, which has already recognized the
existenceof such individual nghts The issue to be decided 1swhether a
breach of Article 36 willmean, under certain circumstances,a breach of
a constitutional right, thus violating the pnnciple of due process of law
and the individual rights of the foreign national subject to a trial.

53 The Miranda warning,an integral part of the United States system
of constitutional rights, includes a number of pnnciples related to legal

representation, regarded as fundamental due process nghts. One of the
purposes of Article 36is to identifyand validate certainindividualrights
This pnnciple has been clearlyestablished in the LaGrandJudgment To
exercisean ~ndividualright there is a need to provide a mechanismfor its
implementation, sincer~ghtsdo not operate in a void. The importance of
this mechanismis particularly relevant wheneverthere is a breach of the
corresponding obligations, imposinga duty to redress the wrong done

54 The Miranda warning provides the foundation for due process of
lawof the detained person from the verymoment of his arrest Asmay be
understood by the findingsin the LaGrandJudgment and in the present
Judgment, under certain circumstancesArticle 36 establishesa number of
basic elementsto ensure a fair trail from the tirne a foreign national is
subjectto custody by competent authonties up to the end of hisjudicial
process. There is an intimate link between the Miranda warning and
Article 36 in the sensethat both aim at creating a scheme of protection
of rightsthat directlyimpinge onthefairnessof atnal Thisschemeof pro-

tection may and shouldbecome effectiveand operativefrom the veryfirstd) sielledécidede répondre surle champ sans êtreassistéed'un avocat,
elle a le droit de cesserde répondre tout moment

51 L'effectivitédu droit consulaire qu'a 1'Etatd'envoi de pourvoir à
la représentation enjustice du ressortissant protégéest subordonnéeà
l'exercicesans délaide cedroit L'Etat de résidencedoit avoirl'obligation
concomitantede ne nen entreprendrequi puisseporter atteinte aux droits
de la personne protégéeIl n'estpeut-étrepas inutile, àcet égard,de citer
l'arrêtLaGrand

«la règlede la carenceprocéduraleempêchait[lestribunaux améri-
cains] d'attacher des conséquencesjuridiques au fait, notamment,
que la violation des droits prévusau paragraphe 1 de l'article 36
n'avait paspermis à l'Allemagned'assurer en temps opportun aux
freresLaGrand le concours d'avocats pnvéset de les assister, de
manière généraled,ans leur défense,comme le prévoitla conven-
tion» (LaGrand,arrêt,CI J Reçuezl2001, p. 497-498,par. 91; les
italiques sont de moi)

52 Le cŒurde la controverserésideicidans la nature et dans la portée
des droits prévuspar l'articl36 Siles tribunaux américains refusentde
reconnaître que la convention de Vienne créedes droits individuels, il
sera difficilede concilierce refus avecle contenu de l'arrêtLaGrand,qui
a déjàreconnu l'existence de telsdroits individuels La question à tran-
cher est cellede savoir si une violation de l'articlevaudra, dans cer-
taines circonstances, violation d'undroit constitutionnel, portant dèslors
atteinte au principed'une procédurerégulièreet aux droits individuelsdu
ressortissant étrangeren instance dejugement
53 Lors de la lecture desdroits Msranda,qui fait partie intégrantedu
systèmeaméricainde droits garantis par la Constitution, sont énoncéusn
certain nombre de pnncipes touchant à la représentation enjustice et
consideres comme fondamentaux pour les droits de la défenseComme

l'a clairementétablil'arrêt LaGrand, l'un des buts de l'article 36 est
d'affirmercertains droits individuels Pour qu'un droit individuelpuisse
trouver a s'exercer, uncadre doit êtrecréédans lequel ce droit pourra
êtremis en Œuvre,un droit ne s'exerçantpas dans le vide. Un tel rnéca-
nisme est particulièrementimportant en cas de manquement aux obliga-
tions correspondantes, imposant réparation du tort causé
54 C'estsur la lecture des droits Msrandaque repose la régularitéde
la procédure dont faitl'objetla personne détenue, etce,dèsson arresta-
tion Ainsi qu'ilressort des conclusions énoncéedsans l'arrêtaGrandet
dans leprésentarrêt,lorsquecertainesconditionssont réunies,l'article36
établit plusieurs principes fondamentaux visant à garantir un procès
équitabledepuis le moment où le ressortissant étranger est placéen
détention par les autoritéscompétentesjusqu'à la fin de la procédure
judiciaire La lecture des droits Mzrandaet l'article 36 sont intimement
liés,en ce sens que tous deux visentà créerun mécanismede protection
des droits qui ont une incidence directe sur le caractère équitable d'unstages,preservingthe nghts of the detained person from an interrogation
that may do him an unjustifiedharm at a later period of hisjudiciai pro-
cess. Under theseassumptions,the individual rightsof a detained person
willbe better protected if the correspondingconsular officerarranges for
hs legal representation, involving a defencecounsel of quality and with
expenence in the legal procedures that affect foreign nationals in capital
cases The scheme of protection will also be essential on other issues
that are also anintegral part of due process of law plea-bargaining,the
gathering of evidence,submissionof investigativeevidence

55 Consdar protection may be an important elementfor due process
of law, especiallyin capital cases Depending on the circumstances of
each case, individual rights emanating from Article 36 can be equated
with constitutional rights when the question to decide 1scloselyrelated
to the fair administration of justice If this premise is recognized and
accepted, then the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
can be invoked This amendment specificallyprovides for procedural
guarantees in cases of "a capital or otherwise infamous cnme", adding
that no person shalI"be depnved of hfe, liberty or property, without due
process of law"

56 In LaGrand,the Court found that "it would be incubent upon
the United States to allow the reviewand reconsideration of the convic-
tion and sentenceby taking account of the violationof the nghts set forth
in the Convention" These nghts must be çonsideredfundamental to due
process A distinctionhas been made by the United States, arguing that
those rights are procedural rights and not substantive rights But it may

well be that a violation of a procedural right willprofoundly affect due
process of law There has to be a fine lme drawn between substantive
nghts and procedural nghts in certain cases In the Miranda warning, is
the right to talk to aawyerfor advice before any questions are asked a
substantive or a procedural nght? Whatever the preference may be the
answerto this question,thefact isthat the Miranda waming isembedded
in the constitutional system of the United States and 1spart of its legal
culture Fundamental procedural rights become an essential element in
the protection of individualrights,,transforming a legalinstrument into a
constitutional pnnciple Thus the nghts afforded by Art~cle36 of the
Vienna Convention should be considered fundamental to due process

57 The Court found, in the LaGrandJudgment, that

"Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spellsout the obligationsthe receivmg

State has towards the detained person and the sending Stateprocès Ce mécanismede protection peut et doit s'enclencher dès les
toutes premièresétapes,protégeantlesdroits de la personnedétenue lors
d'un interrogatoire qui risque de lui causer un préjudice injustifàéun
stade ulténeur de la procédurejudiciaire instituéeà son encontre Les
droits individuels d'une personne détenueseront mieux protégéssi le
fonctionnaire consulaire responsablepourvoit a sa représentat~onen jus-
tice, notamment en luitrouvant un défenseur qualifié ertompu aux pro-
cédures vlsant lesressortissants étrangersqui nsquent la peinecapitale Ce
mécanismede protectionjouera égalementun rôle essentiellors d'étapes

ulténeuresau cours desquelles doivent êtreprotégés desdroits intnn-
sèquementliésaux exigencesd'une procédurerégulièreje pense par
exemple à la négociation pénale(plea bargaznrng), a la constitution du
dossierdepreuveet à laproductionde preuvesrecueillieslorsdel'enquête
55 La protection consulairepeut serévéletrrèsimportante pour garan-
tir laregulantéde la procédure, surtout dansles affaires susceptiblesde
déboucher surune condamnation à la peine capitale Selon les circons-
tances propres a chaque affaire, les droits individuelsdécoulantde l'ar-
ticle36peuventêtreassimilés à desdroitsconstitutionnelslorsque la ques-
tion àrésoudretouche deprèsàla bonne administration de lajustice. En
effet,dèslors qu'est rempliecettecondition, lecinquièmeamendementde
la Constitution des Etats-Unis peut être invoquéCelui-ciprévoit expres-
sémentcertainesgaranties procéduralesen cas de ((crimecapital ou infa-
mant», ajoutant que nul ne sera ((privéde sa vie, de sa libertéou de ses
biens sans procédurejudiciaire régulière»
56. Dans l'arrêtLaGrand, la Cour a conclu que «les Etats-Unis
devraient permettre le réexamenet la revisiondu verdict de culpabilitéet

de la peine en tenant compte de la violation des droits prévuspar la
convention)) Ces droits doivent Etre considéréscomme fondamentaux
pour la régulantéde la procédure Une distinction a étéopéréepar les
Etats-Unis, qui prétendent queces droits sont des droits d'ordre procé-
dural, et non des droits substantiels Mais la violation d'undroit procé-
dural peut fort bien gravement entamer la régulantéde la procédure
judiciaire La distinction entre droits substantiels et droits procéduraux
est parfois ténue Parmiles droitsMzranda,celuide consulter un avocat
avant l'interrogatoire est-il un droit substantielou un droit procédural?
Quellequesoitla réponse, lefait est que cesdroits sont solidement ancrés
dans le systèmeconstitutionnel des Etats-Unis - la lecture des droits
Mzrandafait partie de la culture juridique américaine Les droits procé-
duraux fondamentaux sont devenusun élément essentiedle la protection
des droits individuels,faisant d'unmécanismejuridique un pnncipe cons-
titutionnel C'estpourquoi lesdroits conférépsar l'articledela conven-
tion de Vienne doivent êtreconsidérés commefondamentaux pour la
régularitédela procédure
57 Dans l'arrêtLaGrand, la Cour a conclu*

«l'alinéab) du paragraphe 1 de l'article 36 énonceles obligations
que 1'Etatde résidencea vis-à-visd'une personnedétenueetde 1'Etat Based on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that
Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which, by
virtue of Article1of the Optional Protocol, may beinvoked in this
Court by the national State of the detained person "{I C J Reports
2001, p 494, para 77)

The sendingState is thus the depository of a nght to provide consular
protection to its detained nationals, and foreign nationals have the nght
to seekthe assistanceof its consular officerswhen detained By depriving
Mexico and its nationals of the exercise of the rights provided in the
Vienna Convention and established bythe Court in LaGrand, the breach
committed by the United States has resulted in fundamentally unfair
criminal proceedingsfor the Mexican nationals

58 Mexico has requested that, "pursuant to the injuries suffered by
Mexicoin its own right and in the exerciseofdiplomaticprotection of its
nationah, [it]1sentitledto full reparation for theseinjunes in the form of
restitutio m integrum" In the present Judgment, the Court seems,at first,
to agreeto the petition made by Mexico It quotes what itconsidersto be
the general principle applicable tu the legal consequences of an inter-
nationally wrongful act "It is a principle of international law that the
breach of an engagement involvesan obligation to make reparation in an

adequate form " {Factory at Chorzbw, Jurrsdzctzon,Judgment No 8,
1927, P C 1 J, Serles A, No 9, p 21 )Then the Court takes the argu-
mentfurther by quotinga classicalelaboration ofwhat reparation means:
"The essential pnnciple contained in the actual notion of an
illegalact- a principlethat seemsto be establishedby international
practice and in particular by the decisionsof arbitral tribunals- 1s
that reparation must,as far as possible,wipeout al1the consequences
of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in
al1probability, have existedif that act had not been committed "
(Factory ut Chorzbw, Merrts, Judgwrent No 13, 1928, P CI J,

Serles A, No 17, p 47 )
59 If the Court had assumed the full consequences of this finding,
made by itsjudiciai predecessor,by establishingthat, in the present case,
the reparation for the violation shouldliein "re-establishingthe situation
which would, in al1probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed", that would have meant answering affirmatively al1 the
remedial actions requested by Mexico

60 But the Court has preferred to remain aloof from the principle of
restoration and concentrate its attention in definingwhat it considers to
be the task of the Court in the present case, whichis "to determine what
would be adequate reparation for the violation of Article 36" (Judgment,
para 121)a concept that according to the Judgment "varres depending d'envoi Comptetenu du libelléde cesdispositions,la Cour conclut
que le paragraphe 1de l'article36 créedes droits individuelsgui, en
vertu de l'article premier du protocole de signature facultative,
peuvent être invoqués devant la Cour par 1'Etatdont la personne
détenue ala nationalitén (C I J Recuetl2001, p 494, par 77 )

L'Etatd'envoiestdonc titulaired'undroit d'exercer sa protection consu-
laireen faveurde sesressortissantsdétenus,de même que lesressortissants
étrangersont le droit de solliciter I'assistance desfonctionnaires de leur
consulat lorsqu'ilsse trouvent en étatde détention En empêchantle Me-
xiqueet sesressortissantsd'exercerlesdroits prévusdans la conventionde
Vienneet constatés par la Cour dans l'affaireLaGrand, la violationcom-
misepar lesEtats-Unis a conféré aux procédures pénaleesngagées à i'en-
contre des ressortissantsmexicainsun caractère fondamentalementinique

58 Le Mexiquea soutenu que, «en considérationdes dommages[qu'il
avait] subis dans ses propres droits et dans la personne de ses ressor-
tissants, [il]a[vait]droit à [une]réparation intégral.par la voie de la
restitutizn integrum)) Dans leprésentarrêt,la Cour sembletout d'abord
approuver lademande du Mexique Elle cite un principe générala ,ppli-
cable selonelleaux conséquencesjuridiquesd'un fait internationalement
illicite«[c]'estun principe de droit international que la violation d'un
engagement entraîne l'obligation de réparer dansune forme adéquate))
(Usine de Chorzdw, compétence,arrêtno 8, 1927, C P J I séneA no 9,
p 21). Fuis la Cour développecetargument en citant une interprétation
classiquede cequ'ilfaut entendre par ((réparation))

«Le principe essentiel,qui découlede la notion mêmed'acte 1111-
cite et qui semble se dégagerde la pratique internationale, notam-
ment de lajurisprudence destnbunaux arbitraux, est que la repara-
tion doit, autant que possible, effacer toutes les conséquencesde
l'acte illiciteet rétablir l'étatqui aurait vraisemblablement existé si
ledit acte n'avait pas été commis))(Usine de Chorzdw,fond, arrêt
no13, 1928, C P J I sérieA no17, p 47)

59 Si la Cour avait pleinement assuméles conséquencesde cette
conclusion, énoncée par sa devanciere, en établissant que, dans la pré-
sente affaire, la réparation de la violation devait consister à ((rétablir
l'étatqui aurait vraisemblablementexisté sileditacte n'avait pasétcom-
mis», elleauratt etéconduite aapprouver tous lesremèdesdemandéspar
le Mexique
60 Mais la Cour a préféré laisser de côtéle principe de restitution,
s'attachantà définirla tâche qu'elleestimait etre la sienne en i'espéce,à
savoir «déterminerquelle serait la réparation adéquatedes violationsde
l'article36))(arrêt, par121),notion qui, aux termesdel'arrêt,{dépend
descirconstancesconcrètesde chaqueaffaire amsique de la nature exacteupon the concrete circumstances surrounding each case and the precise
nature and scope of the injury" (Judgment, para. 119) The Judgrnent
concludes that

"the intemationally wrongful acts committed by the United States
were the failure of its competent authonties to inform the Mexican
nationals concerned,to notify Mexicanconsularposts and to enable
Mexicoto provideconsular assistance.It followsthat the remedyto
make good these violations should consist in an obligation on the
United Statesto permitreviewand reconsiderationof thesenationals'
cases by the United States courts " (Judgment, para. 121 )

This findingfalls short of what Mexicohad requested, since Mexico was
sustaining its arguments on the basis of the "essential pnnciple" conse-
crated in the Chozbw Factory case and previously recognizedby this
Court, which is to re-establish the situation which would, in al1proba-
bility, have existedif that act had not been committed

61 There is, in the present Judgment, a definitionof the character and
scope of reviewand reconsideration of convictions and sentences. The

qualificationis that is has to be carried outtaking account of the viola-
tion of the rights set forth m the Convention", as establ~shedin the
LaGrand Judgment, and "including, in particular, the question of the
legal consequencesof the violation upon the cnminal proceedings that
have followedthe violatlon" (Judgment, para f 31). Unfortunately, this
qualification is not specificallyincluded in the respectivefinding that is
contained in the operativeparagraphs of the Judgment
62 The scope of the obligation to allow "review and reconsidera-
tion of the conviction and sentence" has to be interpreted examning
Article 36 as a whole. As the Court found in LaGrand, the first para-
graph of this Article "begins with the basic pnnciple governing consular
protection: the nght of communication and access" Next cornes the
modalitiesof consular notification Then there are the measures consular
authonties may take in rendering consular assistance to a detained
national If this interrelated system of consular protection is breached,

there is a duty of the receiving State to undertake certain measures,
which are, according to the LaGrandJudgment, the following

(a) Where the individualsconcerned have been subjectedto prolonged
detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties, it would
be incurnbent upon (the receiving State) to allow the review and
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence.

(b) The reviewand reconsideration process must take into account the
violation of the nghts set forth in this Convention.et de l'importancedu préjudice))(arrêt, par 119) La Cour conclut dans
l'arrêtque

«les faits internationalement illicitesdes Etats-Unls consistent en ce
que leurs autontéscompétentesn'ont pas informé lesressortissants
mexicains concernés,n'ont pas averti les postes consulaires mexi-

cains et n'ont pas permis que le Mexique fournisse l'assistance
consulaire Par conséquent,le moyen de remédier à ces violations
doit résiderdans une obligation des Etats-Unis de permettre le
réexamenet la revisiondu cas de cesressortissantspar lestnbunaux
américains» (Arrêt, par 121 )
Cette conclusionne répondpas aux demandesdu Mexique,celui-ciayant
fondé sa thésesur le ((principeessentiel», consacré dans l'affaire de
1'Usrnede Chorzbwet déjà reconnupar la présenteCour, consistant à

{(rétablirl'état quiaurait vraisemblablement existési ledit acte n'avait
pas été commis)).

61 Le présentarrêt comporteune définitiondu caractèreetde la por-
téedu réexamenet de la revisiondes verdictsde culpabilitéet des peines
La condition à remplir est que ce réexamenet cette revision doivent se
faire«en tenant compte de la violation des droits prévuspar la conven-
tion)), comme il est établi dans l'arrt aGrand,«y compris notamment
sous l'angle des conséquencejsuridiques qu'a eues cette violation dans la
suite de la procédure pénale» (arrêp t,ar 131).Malheureusement, cette
condition n'est pas expressémentrepnse dans la conclusion correspon-
dante qui figuredans le dispositifde l'arrêt
62. Pour apprécierla portée del'obligation de permettre «le réexamen
et larevlsion du verdict de culpabilitéet de la peine», il faut examiner
l'article36 dans son ensemble Comme la Cour l'a constaté dans l'arrêt
LaGrand,dans lepremierparagraphe de cet article,«[l]eprincipede base
régissantla protection consulaire est énonce dèskbord ledrolt de com-
munication et d'accès» Viennent ensuite les modalitésde notification
consulaire Puis sont énoncées les mesures que les autorités consulaires
peuvent prendre pour prêter assistance àun ressortissant détenu.En cas

de non-respect de ce regime deprotection consulaire, dont les diversélé-
ments sont interdépendants,1'Etatde résidencea l'obligationde prendre
certainesmesures qui, aux termesde l'arrêt LaGrand,sont les suivantes
a) dans lescas où l'intéresséaurait fait I>objetd'une détentionprolongée
ou aurait étcondamné a une peinesévère1 ,'Etatde résidencedevrait
permettre le réexamenet la revisiondu verdict de culpabilitéet de la
peine;
b) le processusde réexamenet de revisiondoit tenir compte de la viola-

tion des droits prévuspar la convention de Vienne,(c) The obligation to reviewand reconsider can be carned out in vari-
ous ways; the choice of means must be left to the receivingState

63 Article36,paragraph 2,oftheViennaConventionand theLaGrand
Judgment Imposean essentialcondition *the process ofreviewand recon-
sideration must take into account the violations of the rights set forth in
the Convention and the process must givefull effect to the purposes for
which the nghts accorded in Article 36 are intended In LaGrand, the
Court aiso found the United States in breach of its obligations by 'hot

permitting the review and reconsideration, in the Iight of the nghts set
forth in the Convention, of theconvictionsand sentences ofthe LaGrand
brothers " (LaGrand, Judgment, ZC J Reports 2001, p 515,
para 128(4))
64 Indeed the rights that are stipulated in Article 36,paragraph 1,are
to be implemented in accordance with the laws and regulations of the
receivingState But theselawsand regulations "must enable full effectto
be given tothe purposes for whichthe rights accordedunder this Article
are intended" In the present Judgment, it is difficultto find any clanfy-

ing statements as to how these obligations are to be implemented and
what are the preciseconditions that are to be applied in order to ensure
that the process ofreviewand reconsiderationwillbe effectiveand mean-
ingful. Such statements and conditions should be an integral part of the
Judgment, particularlyin its operative part, as an essentialdetermination
of the remedialmeasures that are being required by the Court
65 The United States has indicated that, if there has been a breach of
Article 36,

"The whole point 1ssimply to examine the conviction and sen-
tence in light of the breach to seewhether, in the particular circum-
stances of the individual case, the Article 36 breach did have some
consequences - someimpact that impingedupon fundamental fair-
ness and to assess what action with respect to the conviction and
sentencethat may require " (CR2003129,p 20, para. 3 6, Philbin )

It is also said by the United States that it is true that

"if a defendant failsto raise a claimunder the Vienna Convention at -
the proper time, he will be barred by the procedural default rule
from raising the clam on appeal, Here again, however, as long as
the defendant has preserved his claim reIating to the underlying
injury, an injury to somesubstantivenght - suchas a claimthat he
did not understand that he was waivingh~sright to counsel in an

interrogation - that claim can be addressed. As a result, an exami-
nation of the impact of the Article 36 violation on the trial and
its fundamental fairness - whichis at the core of reviewand recon-
sideration calledfor by LaGrand - is fully available" (CR2003129,
p 25, para 323, Philbin)c) l'obligation de réexamenet de revision peut êtremlse en ceuvrede
diversesfaçons, lechoix desmoyensdoit revenir à 1'Etatde résidence

63, Leparagraphe 2 de l'article36dela conventionde Vienneet l'arrêt
LaGrandposent une condition essentielle leprocessusde réexamenet de
revision doit tenir compte des violations des droits enoncésdans la
convention et ce processus doit permettre la pleine réalisationdes fins
pour lesquelleslesdroits énoncés à l'article36sont accordésDans l'arrêt
LaGrand,la Cour a égalementconcluque lesEtats-Unis avaient manqué
a leurs obligations «en ne permettant pas, à la lumièredes droits recon-
nus par la convention, le réexamenet la revisiondes verdictsde culpabi-
litédesfrèresLaGrand et deleurs peines))(LaGrand,arrêtC , I J Recueil
2001, p 515, par 128,point 4)

64 11est vrai que les droits prévusau paragraphe 1 de l'article 36
doivent s'exercerdans le cadre des lois et règlementsde I'Etat de rési-
dence Mais ces lois et règlements {{doivenp termettre la pleine réalisa-
tion des fins pour lesquellesles droits sont accordésen vertu du présent
article)),Dans le présentarrêt,ilest difficilede trouver le moindre éclair-
cissementsur la manièredont cesobligationsdoiventêtreexécutéee st sur
les conditions précises à observer pour garantir que ce processus de
réexamenet de revision sera effectifet véritable Pareils éclaircissements
et conditions devraient faire partie intégrante del'arrêt, eà fortiori du
dispositif, en tant qu'ils sont essentielspour définir lesmesures de répa-

ration requisespar la Cour
65 Les Etats-Unis ont indiquéque, s'il y a eu violation de l'article36,

«[l]'essentielest s~mplementd'examiner le verdict de culpabilitéet
la peineà la lumièrede la violation pour rechercher si, dans lescir-

constancespropres a l'affaire concernée, laviolation de l'article36a
eu la moindri conséquence - la moindre incldence - portant
atteinteà l'équité fondamentale du procès,et pour déterminerles
mesures éventuellementnécessaires à l'égarddu verdict de culpabi-
litéet de la peine»(CR2003129,p 20, par 3 6,Philbin)
Ils reconnarssentpar ailleurs que

«si un accuséomet de faire valoirun moyen fondésur la convention
de Vienneen temps utile, la reglede la carence procéduralel'empê-
chera d'en exciper au stade de l'appel Mais là encore, pour autant
que l'intéresséa préservéson moyen relatif àl'atteinte sous-jacente,
une atteinte à quelque droit substantiel - s'il fait valoir, par

exemple, qu'iln'avait pas consciencede renoncer a son droit de se
faire assister d'un conseil lors deI'interrogatoire-, ce moyen-là
pourra êtreconsidéréAinsi,l'incidencede la violation de l'article36
sur le procèset sur I'équitefondamentale de celui-ci - soit l'objet
principal du réexamen et de la revision prescrits en l'affaire
LaGrand - peut parfaitement êtreexaminée» (CR2003129,p 25,
par 323, Philbrn ) 66 Yet, according to the evidence provided in the written and oral
proceedings, the United States courts, even after LaGrand, continue to
apply the procedural defaultrule in the same manner as its courts d~din
the pre-LaGrand phase The reason submitted by the United States is
that "procedural default des willpossiblypreciude such claim on direct
appeal or collateral review,unless the court finds there is cause for the
default and prejudice as a result of these alleged breaches" (CMUS,
p 11 1, para 6 65) However, no court in the United States has found
that "there is cause for the default and prejudice" in cases of a Vienna
Convention clam, under the argument that Article36nghts arenot con-
stitutional rights The weaknessand limitations of ordenng a process of
reviewand reconsiderationbecorneevident when the results haveproven
to lack effectiveness

67. There is a need to definethe nature of the obligations ~mposedby
the concept "by means of its own choosing". If the issueis not properly
clanfied by the Court, the two Parties in the present casewillnot hava
sufficientlysolid legal guideline on the adequate measures to be under-
taken in order to find the reparation sought by Mexico and in order to
complywith the remedydecidedby the Court to relievethe United States
of its responsibility The settlement of this issue is necessary inorder to
deal with the consequences that anse by virtue of an internationally
wrongful act The responsibleState has the duty to make full reparation
for the injury caused by its wrongful act To dispel any potential mis-
understandings, there is a precedent that provides a gu~delineand that
can beinvokedin order to ensurea cleardefinition.ThePermanent Court
of International Justice found that there is a need to

"ensure recognition ofa situation at law, once and for al1and with
binding forceas betweenthe Parties; so that the legalposition thus
established cannot again be called in question in so far as the legal
effectsensuing therefrom are concemed" (Interpretatron of Judg-
ments, Nos 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzdw), Judgment No 11, 1927,
P C I J, Series A, No 13, p 20).

68. Full reparation seemsunlikely to be achieved if the ambiguity of
the notion of "by means of its own choosing" remains and is not
strengthenedwith the addition of somespecificmeasures.From the exist-
ing evidencein the pre-LaGrand and post-LaGrand periods, the United
Stateshas followeda pattern of compliancewith the Vienna Convention
and the Court's Judgment that is far from satisfactory To claim that a
clemencyprocedure 1sa sufficientinstrument to carryout the obligations
contained in theLaGrandJudgment is to ignorethe need for an adequate
reparation As the Permanent Court of International Justice found,

"the essential principle is that reparation must, as far as possible,
wipe out al1the consequencesof the illegalact and re-establish the 66 Pourtant, d'aprèsles éléments de preuve produits lors des procé-
dures écnteet orale,lesjuridictions desEtats-Uniscontinuent,même après
l'affaireLaGrand, d'appliquer la règlede la carence procéduralede la
même manièrequ'ellesle faisaientavant cette affaire Le motif avancépar
les Etats-Unis est que «les règlesrelativesà la carenceprocédurale feront
peut-être obstaclae cequelemoyentirédecette violation soitsoulevédans
lecadie de l'appeldirect ou desvoiesde recours parallèles,a moinsque la
juridiction ne conclue que cette carence étaitjustifiéeet que la violation
alléguéa e causéun préjudice))(CMEU, p 111,par 6 65) Or, lorsqu'une
violation delaconvention deVienneétaitinvoquée,aucunejuridiction aux

Etats-Unis n'ajusqu'a présent conclu «que cette carenceétaitjustifiéeet
que la violationalléguéae[vait]causéun préjudice)),t ce,au motif que les
droits tirésde l'article36 ne sont pas desdroits constitutionnels L'insuf-
fisance qu'ily a a ordonner un processus de réexamenet de revision
devientmanifeste lorsquelesrésultats atteintsse sont révéléisefficaces
67 La nature des obligationsimposéespar l'expression«en mettant en
Œuvrelesmoyensdeleurchoix))appelleunedéfinitionSilaCour n'apporte
pas lesprécisions vouluessur cette question,lesdeux Parties a la présente
affaire manqueront d'indications juridiquessuffisammentsolides sur les
mesures nécessairep sour mettre en Œuvre laréparationdemandéepar le
Mexiqueet leremède prescnt par la Cour en vuede releverlesEtats-Unis
de leur responsabilitéCette question doit êtretranchéesil'onveut remé-
dierauxconséquences découlantd'un faitinternationalementilliciteL'Etat
responsableest tenu de réparerintégralementledommage causépar le fait
illicitedont ilest l'auteur Afind'évitertoute méprise,il n'estpas inutile de
s'appuyer sur un précédentqui, grâce aux indications qu'il renferme,

aideraà définirclairementla marcheà suivre La Cour permanentede Jus-
tice internationalea eu l'occasiond'affirmerla nécessitde
«faire reconnaître une situation de droit une fois pour toutes et avec
effet obligatoire entre lesParties, en sorte que la situation jundique
ainsi fixéene puisse plusêtremiseen discussion,pour ce qui est des
conséquences juridiques qui en découlent))(Interprétationdesarrêts

nos7et 8 (usrnede Chorzbw),arrêtno11, 1927,sérreA no13, p 20)

68 Il ne me semble guère possiblede parvenir a une réparationinté-
grale si l'expressionen mettant en Œuvrelesmoyensde leur chour))reste
ambigueet n'estpas renforcéepar d'autresmesures spécifiques A enjuger

par lesélémentfsactuelsdatant del'avantet de l'après-LaGrand,lamanière
dont lesEtats-Unisrespectentla conventionde Vienneet l'arrêd te la Cour
est loind'être satisfaisantAffirmerque la procédurede recours en grâce
constitue un instrument suffisantpour exécuterles obligations énoncées
dans l'arrêtLaGrand, c'est faire fi de la nécessitd'une réparationadé-
quate Comme l'a constatéla Cour permanente de Justice internationale,

«@lepnncipe essentiel est que la réparationdoit, autant que pos-
sible, effacertoutes lesconséquencesde l'acteilliciteet rétablir l'état situation whichwould, in al1probability, have existedif that act had
not been committed" (Factoryat Chorzdw,Merits,JudgmentNo 13,
1928, P C 1J , Serzes A, No 17, p 47)

69 The remedial action to be provided must determine how the laws
and regulationsof the United States, introducing an elementof effective-
ness that has to be mandatory and compulsive,will"enable full effectto
be givento the purposes for which the rights accorded under [Article361
are intended" The reviewand reconsideration of the convictionand sen-
tence has to take into account the breach of the nghts set forth in the

Convention These rights should be considered as belonging to the
category of fundamental rights that impinge on due process of law If
full effectis to be givento thepurposes of these nghts, and if the review
and reconsideration has to take into account the nature of the violation
of the rights, then the margin in the application of the principle of "by
means of its own choosing" becomesfar narrower The means must be
effectiveand the choosinghas to be very selective
70 Mexico's requestfor a meaningfuland effectivereviewand recon-
sideration of convictionsand sentences findssupport in the Cornrnentary
to Article 35 contained in the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on State Responsibility

"the term 'jundical restitution'is sometimesused where restitution
requzresor znvolves themodrJication of a legalsztuationeither withzn
the legalsystem of the responsrbleState or in its legalrelations with
the injured State Such cases rncludethe revocation, annulmentor
amendmentof a constitutional or legislative provisionenactedin vio-
lation ofa ruleof international law,theresczndzngor reconszderation

of anadmrnistrativeorjudicialmeasureunlawfullyadoptedm respect
of theperson or property ofa foreigner " (Al56110,p 240,
para 5, emphasisadded )

71 Under the assumption that the United States is in breach of an
international obligation, that Mexico suffered an injury for which a
remedyissought, andthat the United Statescannot "relyon the provisions
of itsinterna1law as justification for failure to comply with its obliga-
tions", there are sufficient legalgrounds to assume that if the procedural
default rule is perpetuated in the United States courts, then there is Iittle
future for a meaningful and effectivemechanism of judiciai review and
reconsideration If this assumption remains valid, then it may be indis-
pensable for the Court to recover the concept of '(luridicalrestitution"
invoked by the International Law Commission, which becomes appli-
cable when there is a need to modify a legal situation within the legal
system of the responsible State It is worth repeating jundicai restitu-

tion may AVENA ET AUTRES (OP IND SEPULVEDA) 124

qui aurait vraisemblablementexisté siledit acten'avait pasetécom-
mis» (Usme de Chorzbw, fond, arrêtno 13, 1928, C P JI série A
no17, p 47)

69 Le remèdeprescrit doit précisercomment lesloiset règlementsdes
Etats-Unis, en introduisant une obligation d'efficacité,permettrontla
pleineréalisationdes finspour lesquelleslesdroits sont accordésen vertu
[del'article361))Le réexamenet la revisiondu verdictde cuIpabilitéet de
la peine doivent tenir compte de la violation des droits prévuspar la

convention Ces droits doivent êtreconsidérés comme des droits fonda-
mentaux influant sur la régularitée la procédure S'ilfaut permettre la
pleinerealisation desfinspour lesquellesces droits sont accordes,et si le
réexamenet la revision du verdict de culpabilité etde la peine doivent
tenir compte de la nature de la violation de ces droits, la marge d'inter-
prétation del'expression«en mettant en Œuvre les moyensde leurchoix»
en est d'autant réduite Les moyens doivent êtreefficaceset le choix de
ceux-cipartrculièrement rigoureux
70 La demande du Mexique visant à soumettre les verdicts de culpa-
bilitéet les peinesun réexamenet à une revision véritables eteffectifs
trouve appui dans le commentaire du projet d'article35 de la Commis-

sion du droit international sur la responsabihtéde 1'Etat
cc[lterme «restitutionjuridique» estparfois employédans lecas ou
l'exécutionde la restitution requzertou suppose larnod@catlond'une
sltuatzonjurzdique,soatdans le cadre du systèmejurzdcquede ['Etut

responsable,soit dans le cadre de sesrelationsjuridiques avec1'Etat
léséLeshypothèsesderestitutionjuridique sont I'abrogatlon,l'annu-
lation ou laod$cation d'unedispontion constitutionnellou légzs-
Iatlve promulguéeen violation d'une règle du droit internatzonal,
I'annulatlonou le réexamend'unacte admmutratzj-oud'unedénszon
judiczazreprzs illégalement(4l'encontrede la personne ou des biens
d'unétranger » (Doc A.156110 p, 259,par 5, les italiques sont de
moi )

71 Sil'onpart du pnncipe que lesEtats-Unis ont manqué à une obli-
gationinternationale,que leMexiquea subiun préjudicedont ildemande
la réparation, et queles Etats-Unis ne peuventse prévaloir des disposi-
tions de [leur]droit internepour justifier un manquement aux obligations
qui [leur]incombent»,lesmotifsjuridiques sont suffisammentnombreux
de penser que si lestribunaux améncainscontinuent d'appliquer la regle
dela carenceprocédurale,il n'ya guèred'avenir pour unmécanismevéri-

table et effectifde réexamenet de revisionjudiciaires Si donc les Etats-
Unis ont effectivement manqué à une telle obligation internationale,
alors peut-être laCour doit-elle revenir la notion de ((restitution jun-
dique» a laquelle se réfèrela Commission du droit international, qui
trouve à s'appliquer dès lors qu'il apparaît nécessairede modifier une
situation juridique propre à l'ordre interne de 1'Etat responsable Il
convient de le rappeler la restitution juridique peut comprend*e "mclude the revocation, annulment or amendment of a constitu-
tional or legislativeprovision enacted in violation of a rule of inter-
national law, the rescindingor reconsideration of an administrative
or judicial measure unlawfuiiyadopted in respect of the person or
property of a foreigner"(A/56/10,p 240, para 5).

It may happen that the judiciai measure,iffound in breach of an inter-
national obligation, has to beresclndedthrough legislativemeans

XII
72 In its final submission,Mexicorequests the Court to adjudge that
the United States "shaI1cease its violations of Article 36 of the Vienna

Convention with regard to Mexico and its 52 nationals'Tet the Court
found that "Mexico has not established a continuing violation of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention with respect to the 52 individuals"
(Judgrnent, para 148) But the continuing violation can be estab-
lished by examining the cases detailed in the Application of Mexico
(paras 67-267) By consulting the spechc cases, it becomes clear that
there are two elements in the continuous breach of obligations by the
United States
(a) from 1979to 1999,that is to say during the 20 years considered in
Mexico'sApplication (in tenns of the first arrest and the last arrest

of the 52 Mexicannationals included in the Application), there was
no compliance on the part of the competent authonties of the
United States in the fufilment of their Article36 obligations That
has already been decided by the Court in the present case;
(b) in the post-LaGrand stage, United States courts continue to apply
the doctnne of procedural default. Asthe Court has stated,"a claim
based on the violation of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna
Convention, however mentonous in itself, could be barred in the
courts of the United States by the operation of the procedural
default rule" (Judgment,para 133) The Court in LaGrandhad the
opportunity to define the scope of the procedural default doctnne:

"In itself, theule does not violate Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention The problem ariseswhen the procedural default rule
does not allow the detained individual to challengea conviction
and sentenceby claiming that the competentnational authori-

ties failed to complywith their obligation to provide the requisite
consular information 'without delay', thus preventing the person
from seekingand obtaining consular assistancefrom the sending
State." (LaGrand. Judgment, I CJ Reports 2001, p 497,
para 90)
73 In the post-LaGrand phase, the process ofreviewand reconsidera-
tion has not meant the inapplicabiiityof the procedural default doctnne «l'abrogation,l'annulationou la modificationd'une dispositioncons-
titutionnelle ou législativepromulguéeen violation d'une règledu
droit international, l'annulation ou le réexamend'un acte adminis-
tratif ou d'une décisiojudiciaire pris illégalemenà l'encontrede la
personne ou des biens d'un étranger))(doc A156I10,p. 259, par 5)
Il sepeut que la décisionjudiciaire,sielleestjugéecontraire àune obli-
gation internationale, doive être rapportéepar la voie législative

XII

72. Dans sesconclusionsfinales,le Mexique prie la Cour de juger que
lesEtats-Unis«devront cesserleursviolationsdel'article36dela conven-
tion de Vienne à l'égarddu Mexique et de sescinquante-deux ressortis-
sants» La Cour a cependant conclu que «le Mexiquen'a[vait]pas établi
l'existenced'une violation continue de l'article 36 de la convention de
Vienne àl'égard des cinquante-deux personnes))(arrêt, par 148) Or, une
telle violation continue peut être établien examinant les cas énumérés

dans la requêtedu Mexique(par 67-267) Si l'on se reporte aux cas par-
ticuliers,l devient clair que la violation continue, par lesEtats-Unis, des
obligations qui sont les leurs comporte deux éléments
a) de 1979 à 1999,c'est-à-dirependant lesvingtannées considéréd esns la
requêtedu Mexique (soit de la prerniére à la dernièredes cinquante-
deux arrestations viséesdans celle-ci), lesautorités compétentesdes
Etats-Unis n'ont pas respectéles obligations qu'elles tenaient de
l'article36 La Cour l'a déjàconstaté dansla présenteaffaire,

b) au stade de l'après-LaGrand,les tribunaux américainscontinuent
d'appliquer ladoctnne de la carence procédurale Comme l'a déclaré
la Cour, «un recours s'appuyant sur la v~olationdu paragraphe 1de
l'article36de la conventionde Vienne,si fondé fût-ilen soi, pourrait
[,par l'effetde la règlede la carence procédurale,]être déclaré irre-
cevable par les juridictions des Etats-Unis)) (arrêt, par. 133) Dans
l'affaireaGrand, la Cour a eu I'occasionde définir laportée dela
doctrine de la carence procédurale
«En elle-mêmec ,ette règle neviolepas l'article36de la conven-
tion de Vienne. Leproblèmese pose lorsque la règle dela carence
procéduralene permet pas à une personne détenuede fairerecours
contre sa condamnation et sa peine en prétendant queles auto-
ritésnationales compétentesne se seraient pas acquittéesde leur
obligation d'informer «sans retard* lesautoritésconsulaires com-

pétentes,empêchantpar là mêmecette personne de solliciter et
d'obtenirl'assistanceconsulairede I'Etatd'envoi »(LaGrand,arrêt,
C I J Recueil2001, p 497, par. 90 )
73 Depuis l'arrêtLaGrand, l'obligation d'assurer un processus de
réexamenet de revisionne s'est pastraduite par l'abandon de la doctrlneIf the Court has found that the United States is in breach of Article 36of
the Vienna Convention, as it already has, it follows that a cessation of
such continuous violations isa proper measure in order to securean end
to a continuing wrongful conduct.
74 According to the arguments submitted during the proceedings,
there are 102 Mexican nationals that have been detained and charged

with serious felonies after the LaGrand Judgment was issued, without
being notified of their nghts to consular notification and access In 46 of
these 102cases, the United States effectivelydoes not dispute the wola-
tion Six out of the 46 cases face the potential imposition of the death
penalty
75 The United States provides a number of countervailingarguments
but no evidenceto contradict the facts submitted by Mexico The argu-
mentspoint out that "the United Stateshas demonstrated that itsefforts
to improve the conveyance of information about consular notification
are continuingunabated and are achieving tangibleresults" It adds that

"Mexico wouldhave the Court dictate to the United States that it
cease applying - and also guarantee that it would in fact not
apply - a widevariety of fullyproper municipallegaldoctnnes and
decisions, the combined scope of which is staggenng" (CMUS,
paras 8.36 and 8 38)

76 The United States considersthat the 102cases - or, for that mat-
ter, the six cases- submitted by Mexico are "isolated cases" But the
issue is to determinewhetherthere is a continuity in the failureto comply
with Article 36 obligations by the United States. That seems to be the
case The United States may undertake a cornmitment "to ensure imple-
mentation of the specificmeasures adopted in performance of its obliga-
tions under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Convention" But the effec-
tiveness ofthis commitmentis what islacking Thus the need to establish
the concrete guidelines that should be followed by the United States.

Theseguidelinesmust comprisethe obligation to ceasean internationally
wrongful act.
77 The International Law Commission(ILC), in its Draft Articleson
State Responsibility,has introduced the cnteria governing the extension
in time of the breach of an international obligation. In its Commentary
to Article 14,paragraph 2, it indicates

"a continuing wrongful act, on the other hand, occuples the entire
period dunng whichthe act continues and remainsnot in confomuty
with the international obligation, provided that the State is bound
by the international obligation during that period Examplesof con-
tinuing wrongful acts includethe mwntenance in effectof legislative
provisions incompatible with treaty obligations of the enactlng
State " (A156110p , 139,para 3.)

78. The Court has found, rn a number of cases,the need to order the
cessation of an unlawful conduct Examples of these orders include thede la carenceprocédurale Sila Cour conclut que lesEtats-Unis ont violé
l'article36de la conventionde Vienne,commeellel'adéjafait, il s'ensuit
que la cessation de ces violations répétéereprésenteune mesure appro-
priéepour mettre fin àun comportement illicitecontinu
74 D'aprèslesarguments avancéslors de la procédure,cent deux res-
sortissants mexicains ont étéincarcéréset poursuivis pour des crimes
graves aprèsle prononcé de l'arrêt LaGrand sans avoir étéinformésde
leurs droits en matièrede notification consulaire et d'accèsaux autori-
tésconsulaires Dans quarante-six de cescent deuxcas, les Etats-Unis ne
contestent effectivementpas la violation Dans sur de ces quarante-six

cas, les détenusconcernés risquent lapeine demort
75, Les Etats-Unis opposent un certain nombre d'arguments, mais
aucune preuve qui viennecontredire les faits exposéspar le Mexique Ils
soulignentqu'ils «ont démontré qu'ilspoursuivaient sans relâcheleurs
effortspour mieuxtransmettre l'informationsur la notification consulaire
et que ces initiatives produisaientdes résultats concrets)},etajoutent que

«[l]eMexiquevoudrait que la Cour ordonne aux Etats-Unis de ces-
ser d'appliquer - et de garantir qu'ils n'appliqueront plus - un
éventailstupéfiantde doctrines juridiques et de jurisprudence in-
ternes parfaitement valables))(CMEU, par 8 36 et8 38)

76 Les Etats-Unis considèrentaue lescent deuxcas - au1seramènent
à sixpour cequi nous occupeici - invoquéspar leMexiquesont des «cas
isolés».Maisla questionqui seposeest en réalité cellede savoirsila viola-
tion, par lesEtats-Unis, des obligationsénoncéesà I'article36présenteou
non un caractère continu Tel sembleêtrele cas Les Etats-Unis s'engage-
ront peut-êtreà«assurer lamise enŒuvredesmesures spécifiqueasdoptées
en exécution de leursobligationsau titre de l'alinéab) du paragraphe 1de
l'article6de la convention» Maiscequi manque a cet engagement,c'est
un effet concret D'ou la necessitede formuler des indications pratiques
devant êtresuiviespar lesEtats-Unis Cesindications doivent comprendre
l'obligation de mettrefin a un fait internationalementillicite
77 Dans ses projets d'articles surla responsabilitéde lYEtat,la Com-
missiondu droit international a cherché à précisercequ'ilfallait entendre
par violation continue d'une obligation internationale. Dans son com-

mentaire du paragraphe 2 de l'article 14,elle indique
«Par ailleurs un fait illicitecontinu s'étendsur toute la période
durant laquellele fait continue et reste non conforme à I'obligation
internationale, sousréservetoutefoisque 1'Etatsoit liépar cetteobli-
gation internationale pendant cette période A titre d'exemplesde
faits illicites continus, on citera le maintien en vigueur de disposi-

tions législativesincompatiblesaveclesobligations conventionnelles
de 1'Etatqui les a promulguées » (Doc A/56/10,p 147,par 3.)
78 Dans plusieurs affaires,la Cour a conclu a la nécessité d'ordonner
la cessation d'un comportement illicite Je pense par exemple a l'affairecaseof MilztaryandPararnzbtaryActrvrtiesrnandagainst Nicaragua, the
case of UnrtedStates Dzplomatrcand Consular Staff m Tehran,and the
Arrest Warrantcase
In the Tehrancase the Court decided unanimously that Iran "must
immediatelytenninate the unlawfuldetentton of theUnited StatesChargé
d'Affairesand other diplomatic and consular staff " (UnrtedStates
Diplomatzcand ConsularStaff rnTehran,Judgrnent,I C J Reports 1980,
para 95).
The Court decided,in the Nrcaraguacase, that "the United States of
Amenca 1sunder a duty unmediatelyto ceaseand to refrain from al1such
acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligation" (Mili-
tary and ParamzlltaryActzvztlesinand agarnstNzcaragua(Nzcaraguav
UnrtedStatesofAmerzca),Merzts,Judgment,I C J Reports1986,p.149,
para 12)
In the Arrest Warrantcase the Court found that: "the Kingdom
of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the arrest
warrant . " (Arrest Warrantof 11 Aprll2000 (DemocratzcRepublicof
the Congov Belgrurn),Judgment,I CJ Reports2002, p 33, para. 3)

79 The legal reasoning that compels the need for the cessation and

non-repetition of a breach of an international obligation isthe continued
duty of performance To extend in time the performance of an illegalact
would frustrate the verynature and foundations ofthe rule of law.Asthe
ILC in Article 29 of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility indicates,
"The legal consequences of an international wrongful act do not
affect the continued duty of the responsible State to perform the obliga-
tion breached " In the Comrnentary to this Article,the TLCstates

"Even if the responsible State complieswith its obligations under
Part Two to ceasethe wrongfulconduct andto make fullreparation
for the injurycaused,it isnot relievedthereby of the duty to perform
the obligation breached The continuing obligation to perform an
international obligation, notwithstanding a breach, underIles the
concept of a continuingwrongfulact . and the obligation of cessa-
tion " (A/56/10,p 215, para 2 )

80 To cease an illegal act and to offer appropnate assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstancesso require, is not a discre-
tionary matter the State responsiblefor an internationally wrongful act
is under an obligation to do preciselythat, according to Article 30of the
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility In its Comrnentary to this
Article, the ILCprovides a useful consideration

"Where assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are sought
by an injured State, the question is essentiallythe reinforcement of
a continuing legal relationship and the focus is on the future, not
the past" (Al56110,p 221,para 1 1)des Actrvrtésmilitazres et paramilttaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci

ainsi qu'a celles relatives au Personnel diplomatique et consulazre des
Etats-Unis à Téhéran et au Mandat d'arrêt
Dans l'affaire relativeau Personnel dzplomatique, la Cour a décidéà
l'unanrmitéque l'Iran «d[evait] faire cesser immédiatement ladétention
illicitedu chargéd'affaires, d'autresmembresdu personnel diplomatique
et consulaire » (Personnel dplomattque et consulaire des Etats-Unis à
Téhérana ,rrêt,CI J RecuerI1980,p 44, par. 95, point 3 a))
Dans l'affaire des Actrvrtésmrlrtazres et paramilztaires, la Cour a
décidé que «les Etats-Unis d'Amérique [avaient] I'obligationde mettre
immédiatementfin et de renoncer a tout acte constituant une violation
des obligationsjuridiques susmentionnées» (Actzvztésmzhtarreset para-
milztazresauNzcaraguaet contrecelui-cz(Nicaraguac Etafs-Unzsd'Amé-
rique), fond, arrêt, 1 J Recuell1986, p. 149,point 12).

Dans l'affaire relativeau Mandat d'arrêt,la Cour a conclu que «le
Royaume de Belgique d[evait], par les moyens de son choix, mettre à
néantlemandat d'arrêt »(Mandat d'arrêtdu Il avrrl2000 (République
démocratzquedu Congo c Belgrque), arrêt,C 1J. Recuerl 2002, p 33,
point 3)
79 Le pnncipe jundique qui commande la cessation et la non-répéti-
tion de la violation d'une obligation internationale résidedans le carac-
tèrecontinu du devoir d'exécuterl'obligation, Perpétuerla commission
d'un faitilliciteirait a l'encontre dela nature et des fondementsmêdes
l'étatde droit Comme la Commission du droit international l'indique
dans son projet d'article9 sur la responsabilitéde I'Etat, «[Ilesconsé-
quencesjuridiques d'un fait internationalement illiciten'affectent pas
le maintien du devoir de 1'Etatresponsable d'exécuter l'obligationvio-

lée» Dans son commentaire de cet article, laCD1 préciseque
«[m]êmesi I'Etat responsable respecte l'obligation prévuedans la
deuxièmepartie de mettre fin au comportement illiciteet de réparer
intégralementle préjudice cause,il n'est pas dispense de ce fait de
son devoir d'exécuterl'obligation qu'ila violée Le maintien de
l'obligation d'exécuter uebligationinternationale,nonobstant une
violation de celle-ci,sous-tend la notion de fait illicitecontinet
d'obligationde cessation» (Doc AJ56110,p 231, par 2 )

80 Mettre fin à un fait illiciteet offnr des assurances et garanties de
non-repétition appropnées,si les circonstances l'exigent,n'est pas une
questiond'ordre discrétionnairec'estprécisémenc te que, aux termes du
projet d'article0de la Commissiondu droit international sur la respon-
sabilité delYEtat,1'Etatresponsable d'un fait intemationalement illicite
est tenu de faire Dans son commentaire de cet article, la CD1 apporte
une précisionutile

«Lorsqu'un Etat lésécherche à obtenir des assuranceset garanties
de non-répétition,c'est essentiellementpour renforcer une relation
juridique continue et l'accent estmis sur le respect futur d'une obli-
gation et non pas sur sa violationasséen(tbrd, p 238, par 11) 81 Mexico's claimsare only partially answered in the present Judg-
ment Someof the holdingsare more modest than the ones that are to be
found in the LaGrandJudgrnent. Some even contradict the rulings of
LaGrand The limited legalreach provided m the present Judgrnentmay
not sufficientlyservethe purpose of establishingthe grounds for repara-
tions as a result of a wrongful act and the breach of an international
obligation The law of State responsibility may not find in the present
Judgment a source of further development

(Szgned) Bernardo SEPULVEDA 81 Le présentarrêtne répond quepartiellement aux griefs formulés

par le Mexique Certaines des conclusions qu'il énoncesont plus mo-
destesque cellesqui figurentdans l'arrêtLaGrand Certainesvont même
jusqu'à contredire ce précédentJe crains que le présentarrêtn'ait une
portéejuridique trop limitéepour établircommeil lefaudrait les basesde
la réparation due pourcause de fait illiciteet de violation d'une obliga-
tion internationale Il n'est pas certain que le droit de la responsabilité
des Etats y trouve matièrea se développerdavantage.

(Stgné) Bernardo SEPULVEDA

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Sepúlveda

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