Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel

Document Number
068-19840321-JUD-01-08-EN
Parent Document Number
068-19840321-JUD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SCHWEBEL

1. 1 regret that 1 am unable to concur in the Judgment of the Court
denying the request of Italy for permission to intervene in the pending
proceedings between Libya and Malta. Italy clearly "has an interest of a

legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case" between
Libya and Malta. SinceItaly thus fulfilstheprovisions of Article 62of the
Statute, the Court should have decided positively upon Italy's request for
permission to intervene.
2. The Court's negative Judgment does not deny that Italy "has an
interest ofalegalnature" in theproceedingsbetween Malta and Libya. But
it rejects the Italian application to intervene,apparently on threegrounds.
It indicated that Italy'sinterest may not be "affected" by the decision in
the case. It concludesthat Italy, seeking,asin the viewof the Courtit does,
a decision on a "dispute" between it and the principal Parties, does not
request "genuine intervention" within the meaning of the Statute. And it
decides that, since Italy seeks a decision upholding the rights it asserts
against theprincipalPartiesinthat dispute,the Court can havejurisdiction
to grant such a decision only with theconsent of theprincipal Parties or by
showing of a valid title of jurisdiction between Italy and those Parties,
which islacking. It is believed that the Court isin erroron al1threecounts.
This opinion will accordinglyendeavour to demonstrate why the Italian
request to intervene meets the terms of Article 62 and why that request is
one for "genuine intervention". It will then consider what is the only

substantial ground of objection to it : the alleged absence of a jurisdic-
tional link between Italy and the principal Parties to the case.

3. In its Application for permission to intervene, Italy submitted
that :
"some of the areas of continental shelf disputed between Malta and

Libya in thepresent proceedings are areas over which Italy considers
that it has undeniable rights. Taking into account the object of the
controversy between the two Parties to the present proceedings,Italy
consequentlyhas a legal interest which is indisputably en causein the
case. Its position is even,in procedural law, an absolutely classic case
for intervention, and one in whch intervention in practice is always
admitted :the situation in which the intervener relies on rights as the
true dominus of the object which is disputed, or a part thereof. the Court willnot confine itself to laying down principlesand rules of
international law. It will have to determine how such principles and
rules should be applied by the Partiesindrawingthedelimitationline.
That line will thus be predetermined in the Court's judgment with a
sufficient degree of precision to prevent the Parties meeting difficul-
ties at the final stage of the delimitation operation.

In addition, it is perfectly evident that such a predetermined line,
passing within areas which Italy regards as appertaining to itself,
would de facto and dejure effect the attribution to the Parties of the
areas of continental shelf to be delimited by that line.

It would be difficultfor Italy subsequently toobtain recognition of
its rights, either by negotiation,sincethe Party with which it soughtto
negotiate would obviously take refuge behind the Court's judgment
and refuse to make any concessions, or by proposing to submit the
dispute to the decision of the Court, which would, in addition, be
bound by its previous judgment." (Paras. 11-12.)

In the oral hearing, counsel for Italy indicated in what areas of the con-
tinental shelf at issuebetween the principal Parties claims of Italy overlap
claims of Malta (and,ineffect, of Libya).Coordinates of the Italian claims
were provided in answer to a question posed by Judge de Lacharrière.
Italy's counsel maintained that :

"The main point ... is that in a number of crucial zones among
those claimed by Malta, it would be for Italy and not for Malta to
proceed to a delimitation vis-à-vis Libya."

4. Where States A and B, parties to a case before the Court, make
territorial claimsagainst each other, and State C, which requests permis-
sion to intervene,maintains that Aand Bseek ajudgment of the Court to
territory to part of which C has better title, it is obvious that C "has an
interest of alegalnature which maybe affected by the decision inthe case".
Amore compellingcase of a legalinterest of an intervening State wouldbe
hard to imagine. That in substance is Italy's position in the proceedings at
bar.
5. It has been maintained that, while Italy indubitably considersthat it
has theforegoing interest of a legalnature, it has not proved thatit has and
that the Court should reject itsrequest for permission to intervene because
of the lack of that proof. However,while Italy would have to prove that its
interest of a legalnature is wellfounded in order to prevail on themerits of
a case in which permission to intervene were to have been granted, it need
not so prove in order forits request to intervene to be granted. To require
that itpresent suchproof is to requireit to argue and sustain a casewhichit
has not been accorded permission to present. Al1that the Court at ths
stage need establish is that the interest of a legal nature which Italy makes

out is,prima facie, aplausibleinterest.Nor need Italy showthat its interest 133 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS.OP. SCHWEBEL)

was the subject of dispute with the principal Parties before it filed its
Application to intervene. The idea of intervention is that two parties are
litigating their dispute;a thrd Party, apprehending that judicial settle-

ment of their dispute may prejudice its interests, seeksto intemene. As the
Court put it in the Haya de la Torrecase :
"every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case ; it
follows that a declaration filed as an intervention only acquires that
character, in law, if it actually relates to the subject-matter of the
pending proceedings" (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76).

There is no requirement that the intervenor must independently and as a
condition of intervention demonstrate that it has had a distinct dispute
with one orboth of the parties in litigation which had matured before the
bringing of the request to intervene.
6. Italy's continental shelf claims presumably are in its legal interest.
They are not easilydistinguished from "an interest of a legalnature7'.The
Court cannot deny, and does not deny, the undeniable :that where Italy,
juxtaposed as it is geographically within the narrow limits of the Medi-

terranean Sea on the very continental shelf over which Malta and Libya
make conflicting claims,foritspart advances claimsto some of those same
areas of continental shelf, Italy "has an interest of a legal nature. .".The
Italian legalinterest not onlyiseminentlyplausible, it issoobvious as to be
beyond question.

"...WHICHMAYBEAFFECTED BY THE DECISION IN THE CASE .. ."

7. May Italy's interest of a legal nature be affected by the Court's
decision in the case ? In its Application for permission to intervene which
has been quoted in pertinent part above, Italy submits that its legal
interests will be affected by a decision of the Court which, when applied,
would effect the attribution to Malta or Libya of areas to which Italy lays
claim, and it illustrates in what manner its interests would be adversely

affected.
8. It should be recalled (asthe Court failed to recall in 1981in rejecting
Malta's application for permission to intervene) that Article 62 of the
Statute specifies that should a State consider that it has an interest of a
legal nature which "may"be "affected"by the decision in the case, it may
submita request to the Court to be permitted to intervene. Article 62 does
not provide that, should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal
nature which "shall" be "determined" by the decision in the case, it may
submit such a request. The State seekingto intervene accordinglyneed not
prove thatit has a legalinterest that the Court's decision willdetermine ;it
need merely show that it has a legalinterest whichjust "rnay" be no more
than "affected" - prejudiced, promoted orin somewayaltered. That isnot
an exigent standard to meet. And Italy has more than met it. If the Court
should render ajudgment which lays down "what principles and rules of international law are applicable to the
delirnitation of the area of the continental shelf whch appertains to
the Republic of Malta and the area of continental shelf whch apper-
tains to the Libyan Arab Republic, and how in practice such princi-
ples and rules can be applied by the two Partiesin thisparticular case
in order that they may without difficulty delimit such areas.. .",

it is difficult to see how such principles and rules can be asseveratedand
appliedwithout "affecting" Italy's "interest of a legalnature" in respect to
areas of the continental shelf which, it claims, lie between or athwart the
properly delimited claims of Malta and Libya and appertain to Italy.

9. It is no answer to Say - as, in substance, the Court appears to Say -
that Italy's interest of a legal nature cannot be affected by the decision in
the casebecause, by theterms ofArticle 59of the Statute, "The decision of
the Court has no bindingforce exceptbetween theparties and in respect of
that particular case". If that answer were good, then Article 62 would be
pointless :there would never be a case to which Article 62should or could
apply, since,by reason of Article 59,a third State's legalinterest never can
be affected by a decision in a case. Article 59 cannot, by any canon of
interpretation, be read so as to read Article 62 out of the Statute.

10. The Court endeavours to meet thisevidentconclusion by maintain-
ing that its interpretation of Article 59 actually does not render Article 62

pointless, for the reason that, while, by the force of Article 59, the legal
interest of athird Statecannot be affected by adecisionin acasetowhichit
is not Party, such third State stillhas the choice afforded by the conjunc-
tion of Articles 62 and 59 either of seeking the procedural economy of
means which the former affords or the legal immunity which the latter
ensures. That is to Say,the purpose of Article 62,in the logicof the Court,
apparently is not to afford third Statesthe facility of intervention in order
toprotect or promote an interest of alegalnature which maybe affected by
the decision in the case, since, by reason of Article 59, no decision of the
Court can affect such legalinterest of a third State. It ismerely to allowthe
third State to Saveitself theburden of subsequent,direct litigation against
the principal Parties - in the event that there is ajurisdictional basis for
such litigation - by permitting it to intervenein their case, if the Court so

decides. Such an analysisreducesArticle 62 to an improbable procedural
convenience which neither its terms nor its travauxpréparatoiressupport.
It is virtually tantamount to reading Article62 out of the Statute.

11. Moreover, it cannot be persuasively maintained that ajudgment of
the Court setting out the applied rules for the division of areas of conti-
nental shelf between two States willnot even "affect" the legalinterests of
athird State whch laysclaims to someof those same areas. To somaintain
is to devalue the legal worth of the Court'sjudgments, to which al1mem-bers of theinternational community shall givedue weight as authoritative
holdings of international law.
12. Even if the Court were to hand down ajudgment as between Malta
and Libya whch explicitlyissubject to the rights and titles of third States,
whichexpresslyreservescompeting claims of Italy, and whichdeclaresthat
it is without prejudice to those claims - assuming that the Court were to
find itself able to write ajudgment on the merits of the case in these legal
and geographic circumstances whch when applied delimits the shelf
between Malta and Libya without treating Italy's intervening claims - the

judgment "may" merely "affect" Italy's claims by its reasoning and in so
far as its effect is to allot shelf areas (however conditionally) to Malta or
Libya whch are areas to whch Italyalso lays claim. Thiscould be so even
if the Court's future judgment were to speak of the relative and not the
absolute titles of Malta and Libya. The Court could go further. It could
limit the scope of itsjudgment by refraining from indicating thepractical
application ofprinciples of delimitation to those areas of continental shelf
which Italy claims,holding that, asto theseareas, delirnitation must follow
from negotiation or adjudication between or among Italy, Malta and
Libya. Such ajudgment might satisfy Italy, but would it not constitute a
measure of endorsement by the Court of Italy's claims without troubling

Italy either tojustify those claims or to place them at stake in the current
proceedings between the principal Parties ? Indeed, such a judgment
would in effect acknowledge that Italy "has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case7'were it not for that
element of the decision which exempts from its reach the areas which are
the object of Italian claims. Thus the more reasonable approach - given
thefact that theseareas are already in issuebetween the principal Parties -
would be to grant Italy's request to intervene and oblige it to defend its
claims. That would do justice not only to Italy but to Malta and Libya,
whichotherwisecould find that the judgment they seekhas been truncated

to accommodate claimswhichthey wouldhave forgone the opportunityto
refute.

"IT SHALLBE FOR THE COURT TO DECIDE . . ."

13. Paragraph 1 ofArticle 62provides that, should a State consider that
it has an interest of a legalnature whichmay be affected by the decision in
thecase, it may submit a request to theCourt to bepermitted to intervene.
Paragraph 2 provides that :"It shall be for the Court to decide upon this
request." In its 1981Judgment on Malta's application, the Court referred
to this provision, and emphasized

"that itdoesnot consider Paragraph 2to confer anygeneral discretion
to accept or reject a request for permission to intervene for reasons
simply of policy. On the contrary, in the view of the Court the task
entrusted to it by that paragraph is to determine the admissibility or othenvise of the request by reference to the relevant provisions of the
Statute." (I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 12,para. 17.)

14. That, however, is not to say that the relevant provisions of the
Statute speak for themselves ; rather, they leave room for a substantial

margin of appreciation, as has been demonstrated by intermittent discus-
sionsin theCourt for some60years.As SirGerald Fitzmaurice pointed out
in an article written 25 years ago, Article 62 leaves :

"room for considerable freedom of appreciation ;and sinceinterven-
tion under Article 62 is not as of right, it must follow that the Court

exercises a quasi-discretionary power under it, and is not absolutely
bound to grant the request, even if the necessary conditions are
present, or there would be no effective difference between this case
and that ofArticle 63.Consequently, theCourt isentitled to take into
account thequestion ofpropriety, appropriateness, weightofinterest,
etc." ("The Lawand Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
1951-54 : Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure",
XXXIV British Year Book of International Law (1958), p. 127.)

15. In exercise of the measure of discretion whichArticle 62 affords it,
the Court in 1981found that the sort of "non-party" intervention which
Malta sought was not intervention within the meaning of the Statute. That
wasnot a necessaryconclusion, as the separate opinions of JudgeOda and
myselfindicated,but it was a not unreasonable one. In this case, theCourt
could exercise the measure of discretion accorded by Article 62 to admit
Italy's intervention, which, whle markedly evocative of Malta's applica-
tion of 1981in many respects - as counsel for Malta so skilfullyargued in

the recent oral hearing - neverthelessmay be distinguished from it. It may
be distinguished in the following respects :

(a) Italy assertsclaimsto swaths ofcontinental shelfwhichliebetween or
athwart some of the Maltese and Libyan claims ;Malta's claims were
to areas at the end of a line which would divide the adjacent, not

opposite, claims of Libya and Tunisia, and accordingly raised inter-
estswhichcould be taken into account by an indication of alinewhose
angle but not terminus was required.

(b) Moreover, whileMalta described itscontinental shelf claims in Court
at length, it took pains not to place those claims before the Court for
decision, while,in contrast, Italy does place its overlapping continen-
tal shelf claims "at stake".
(c) Malta sought to intervene in 1981as a kind of purposeful commen-
tator on the governingprinciples of international law and their appli- 137 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS.OP. SCHWEBEL)

cation to the claims of Libya and Tunisia, as they might affect the
position of Malta. Italy seeksto argue not simplylegal pnnciples but
to defend concrete zones of material interest with which, one way or
another (and unlike the situation which obtained in 1981)the Court
will have to deal in this case.

(d) Italy, unlike Malta, requests permission to intervene as a party to the
case. Not as a party to a new dispute not submitted in the Special
Agreement ; not as a party taking the side of one principal Party

against the other in the dispute which the Special Agreement does
submit ;not (allegedly)as aparty making claimsagainst theprincipal
Parties ;but as a party which seeks permission to defend its claims
against what it viewsas the competing claims of theprincipal Parties
in the very geographc area at issue between them. Italy has denom-
inated its status as that of an "intervening party". That is anapt term.
But others may choose - in view of Italy's position that it does not
seek to advance claims against Libya and Malta and does not seek a
delimitation of its own claims - to see Italy as seeking a kind of
non-party intervention. In its 198 1 Judgment, the Court debarred

"the direct yet limited form of participation in the subject-matter of
the proceedings for which Malta here seeks permission. .." as one
which could not be "properly admitted as falling within the terms of
the intervention for which Article 62 of the Statute provides" (I.C.J.
Reports1981,p. 19,para. 34). But it does not follow that it debarred
the somewhat different - direct, limited but different - form of
participation in the subject-matter of the proceedings for which here
Italy seeks permission, whether it is viewed as party or non-party
intervention.

(e) In its Judgment rejecting Malta's application, the majority of the
Court insisted on holding that :
"the very character of the intervention for which Malta seeks
permission shows ... that the interest of a legal nature invoked
by Malta cannot be considered to be one 'whichmay be affected
by the decisionin thecase'within the meaning ofArticle62of the

Statute" (ibid, para. 33).
TheCourt quotes this holding with apparent approval inits Judgment
on Italy's application. In my view, which 1 set out in my separate
opinion on Malta's application, this conclusion - which embodied a
striking non sequitur - was both needless and erroneous. It was

needless, for the Court's decision that "the direct yet limited form of
participation. .. for which Malta here seeks permission could not
properly be admitted as falling within the terms of intervention for
whch Article 62 of the Statute provides" was sufficient ground to
sustain the Court's denial of Malta's request. It was erroneous, for it
did not recognize the fact that Malta, by reason of its claims and 138 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS.OP.SCHWEBEL)

geographicalsituation,had legalinterests which might wellhave been
"affected" by the Court's judgment in the Tunisia/Libya case. The
result of the Court's 1981Judgment was to establish a link between
theobject of theintervention and theinterests of a legalnature which
may be affected by the decision in the case, a link which appears to
hold that if the object is lirnited so as not to put the claims of the
intended intervenor at issue, there is ipsojure no interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by the decision in the case. Since,
however, in the current case the Court holds exactly the opposite -
namely, that the Italian object is not solimited and Italy does put its
claims at issue - it follows not only that, on this ground as well, the
Italian application is to be distinguishedfrom the Maltese, but that,

by application of the Court's reasoning of 1981and of the logicof the
Court's Judgment in this case, Italy has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in this case.

16. Although, asjust indicated, the thrust of the Court's Judgment in
thiscaseappears itself to lead to theconclusionthat Italyhas an interest of
alegal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, the Court
neverthelessrejects Italy's application for permission to intervene. While
the essential ground of its decision appears to be what it views as the
absence of ajurisdictional link between Italy and the principal Parties to
the case,it alsoconcludesthat what Italy seeksis not genuineintervention
within the meaning of Article 62. The Court observes that Italy itself
conceded that where a State seeks to intervene in order to assert a right
equivalent to a mainlineclaim,that application is not within the ambit of
Article 62. It concludes that

"there is nothing in Article 62 to suggest that it was intended as an
alternative means of bringing an additional dispute as a case before
the Court. . .or as a method of asserting the individual rights of a
State not party to the case".

And since the Court holds that Italy does seekmore than the preservation
of its rights, that it makes claims with a view to the establishment of its
rights, the Court concludes that it may debar Italy's application as not
being one for genuine intervention within the meaning of Article 62.

17. The flawin this analysisis that Italy'srequest, evenif,arguendo,itis
acknowledged to advance claims against the principal Parties, does not
give rise to an additional dispute, except in so far as what is a dispute
between two parties would be a dispute between three. It is not possible to
contemplate intervention which excludes a third party. Thus Italy's inter-
vention of itself cannot be afactor which places its application outside the
bounds ofArticle 62.The question rather is,isit genuineintervention when
measured against the critical criterion set out in the Haya de la Torre
case : "every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case ; it
follows that a declaration filed as an intervention only acquires that
character, in law, if it actually relates to the subject-matter of the
pending proceedings" (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76).

The Italian application is addressed to some of the very areas of conti-
nental shelf which are in dispute between Malta and Libya and to the
dispute over their delimitation. Thus it "actually relates to the subject-
matter of the pending proceedings". It is "incidental" to those proceed-
ings,intimatelyrelated asit is to the existing dispute between theprincipal
Parties. Accordingly, the Italian intervention is well within the ambit of
Article 62. It would be otherwise if Italy sought to make claims against
Malta and Libya whichwereunrelated to thesubject-matter of thepending

proceedings ;that would not be intervention at all. But clearly that is not
the fact. That Italy makes claims of itself is not enough to justify the
Court's conclusion that what it seeks is not genuine intervention. On the
contrary, what Italy seeks is intervention of a classic kind. The Court's
virtually unsupported conclusion that it is not intervention within the
meaning of the Statute isnotjustified by theterms of the Statute, and finds
scant support in the travauxpréparatoiresof Article 62or, for that matter,
in the institution of intervention as it is understood in the general prin-
ciplesoflawrecognizedby civilizednations.Nor isit easyto reconcilewith
the Court's Judgment of 1981 rejecting Malta's application. A primary
ground of that Judgment was that Malta's application was inadmissible
because it refrainedfromplacing Malta'sclaims in issue.But in the instant
case,the Court rejects Italy's application on theground that, sinceit places
Italy's claims against Malta and Libya in issue, it is not genuineinterven-
tion.

18. SinceItaly seekspermission to intervenein order to defend claimsto
certain continental shelf zones to which Malta and Libya lay claim the
Court's Judgment holdsthat in realityItaly seeksto assert claimsand thus
establishrightsagainsttheprincipalParties. From ths itdeduces that Italy
seeks to intervene as a party claimant in a dispute with the principal
Parties, with the result that, unlikethe Malta case,it isnecessary to decide,
not "in general", but on the facts of this case, whether the existence of a
valid link ofjurisdiction with theprincipal Parties is an essentialcondition
for the granting of permission to intervene.The Court concludesthat it is.
The remainder of ths dissent will consider this superveningquestion.

19. It is beyond dispute that the Court'sjurisdiction invariably isbased upon the consent of theparties impleaded before it.TheCourt's Judgment
in this case holds that such a consensual title of jurisdiction cannot be
found in the terms or intendment of Article 62. Accordingly, the Court
infers that a State seekingto intervene must do so either with the assent of
both of the principal parties to the case, or it must show a separate title of
jurisdiction manifesting an earlier consent of the principal parties to liti-
gate withit. Thisis a conclusion which theCourt has reached in the light of
"primarily the principle of consent, but also the principles of reciprocity
and equality of States". An exception to these principles "could not be
admitted unless it were veryclearly expressed". While there is much to be
saidfor theCourt's position, there are cogent considerations which cut the

other way.

20. Article 62 of the Statute provides that the Court shall decide upon a
request to intervene, having regard to :

(a) whether the State seeking to intervene "has an interest of a legal
nature" whch
(b) "may be affected by the decision in the case". There is no further
provision, such as
(c) "provided that the State seeking to intervene establishes a title of
jurisdiction with each of the principal parties to the case".

The essenceof the problem then isto decidewhether Article 62ofitself can
and does provide the Court withjurisdiction to admit a request for inter-
vention, or whether intervention can be granted only if the intended
intervener can demonstrate a separate and express title of jurisdiction.

21. It should initially be observed that, where the Statute means to
prescribe a specific title of jurisdiction, it does so expressly. Thus, Arti-
cle 53 of the Statute, which, likeArticle 62, is found in Chapter III, "Pro-
cedure", provides :

"1. Whenever one of theparties does not appear before the Court,
or fails to defend its case, the other party may cal1upon the Court to
decide in favour of its claim.
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it
hasjurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that
the claim is well founded in fact and law."

By way of instructive contrast, Article 62 does not provide that, before
deciding upon arequest for permission to intervene, the Court shallsatisfy
itself "not only that it hasjurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and
37 .. .".
22. On theface of it, the "plain meaning" of Article 62rather is that no
separate title ofjurisdiction is required. That was the conclusion reached
some 25years ago by that most subtle of analysts, SirGerald Fitzmaurice,
in the article earlier cited, at page 124 : "Thejurisdiction of the Court toentertain third-party intervention
is another example of incidentaljurisdiction, the generalcharacter of
which has already been consideredin connection with the indication
of interim measures, and equally arisesfrom the existence of express

provisions of the Statute whichconfer thisjurisdiction upon theCourt
and allow it to be exercised independently of the specific consent of
the parties."
23. Another eminent student of the Court, who, like Fitzmaurice, was

later to be elected a member of the Court, reached a similarconclusionin
his classic treatise, The Permanent Courtof International Justice (1934).
Professor Manley O. Hudson concluded :
"Article 36 of the Statute provides four sources of the Court's
jurisdiction ... Severaladditional articles of the Statute relate to the
exercise of jurisdiction incidental to that conferred : thus, Article

41 ... Article 48 ... Article53 .. .Articles 60 and 61 ... Intervention
as provided for in Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute may be said to
constitute an independent source of the Court's jurisdiction. Under
Article 63,aStatehasa right tointervene ... under Article 62,itrests
with the Court to Saywhetherintervention willbe permitted, and the
Court should only admit such intervention if, in its opinion, the
existenceof an 'interest of alegalnature which may be affected by the
decision' in the pending case, is sufficientlydemonstrated."

"Intervention.Quite apart from the sources ofjurisdiction set out in
Articles 36 and 37of the Statute, the Court may acquire contentious
jurisdiction as a result of a State's intervention under Article 62 or
under Article 63 . ..Article 62 was drafted when it was proposed to
confer on the Court a general obligatoryjurisdiction ; though that

proposa1was rejected, no limits were setfor theapplication of Article
62.If two States are before the Court by reason of declarations made
under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute, it seems a derogation
from the condition of reciprocity therein laid down to allow a third
State whichhasmade no similardeclaration to become aparty totheir
caseupon its ownmotion ;yet theproblem isnot essentially different
if two States are before the Court under a special agreement and a
thrd State which is not a party to the agreement seeks to intervene.
Thejurisprudence of the Court has not set additional conditions for
the application of Article 62." (At pp. 360, 369 and 370.)

24. Similarly, Professor Hans Kelsen - of whose authonty nothing
need be said - concluded :

142142 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS.OP. SCHWEBEL)

"No state can be forced into Court against its will.But that doesnot
mean that a state can be party to acasebefore the Court only together
with that state(or those States)with which it has - either specially or
generally - agreed upon referring the case to the Court. For Articles
62 and 63 of the Statute provide :[quoting the terms thereof]

If the Court grantsthe request submitted by a state under Article 62,
or if a state uses its right to intervene under Article 63, the state
concerned becomes a party to the pending case although there exists
no special or general agreement between this state and the other
parties to the case." (The Law of the United Nations, 1950,p. 522.)

25. Most recently, the President of the International Court of Justice
wrote with respect to the "argument that Article 62 should not be read in
isolation7'the following :

"This may be so,but readingit within thecontext of the Statute asa
whole, including Article 36, must involve not only reading Article 62
(1)above as subject to Article 36,but also to reading it asintended to
be regarded asapart fromand independent of Article 36.If this were

not so, and Article 62 (1) were to be read subject to Article 36,what
would have been more natural than to make the issue of intervention
subject to compulsoryjurisdiction in, Say,a subsection (7) of Article
36 ? Indeed, a cross-reference to Article 36might have been included
in Article 62, making it clear that compulsoryjurisdiction as envis-
aged in Article 36isreallyintended to apply in the caseof contentious
proceedings no less than in the case of intervention. For example,
Article 53 of the Statute, dealing with the problem of the non-
appearingdefendant, contains a specific reference to Articles 36 and

37in thesewords : 'TheCourt must,beforedoing so,satisfy itself,not
only that it hasjurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36and 37,but
also that the claim is well-founded in fact and law' 9. It is clearly no
answer to Saythat it isbecause the defendant State is absent in such a
casethat this specificreference toArticles 36and 37hasbeeninserted.
The Statute really requires the issue ofjurisdiction and stipulates it
expressly." (T. O.Elias, "The Limits of the Right of Intervention in a
Case before the International Court of Justice", Festschriftfür Her-

mann Mosler, 1983,pp. 163-164.)
"Wherever the Statute requires to be specific, it often does so by cross-
references ; e.g., reference in Art31l(6) to Articles 217 (2),20 and 24,
emphasizing the conditions necessary to be fulfilled by ad hocjudges in order to
entitle them to be put on terms of complete equality with their colleagues."

26. Nevertheless. despite the contrast between the terms of Articles 53
and 62, and despite the conclusions not only of the foregoing authorities 143 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS. OP. SCHWEBEL)

but of judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice who are
quoted below,it isarguedthat Article 62must be interpreted inthecontext
ofthe Statute asawhole ;that apostulate of that Statute isthat theconsent
of States must be obtained in order for the Court to exercisejurisdiction
over them ;that theCourt'sjurisdiction isdealt with in another chapter, on

"Competence of the Court", essentially in another article,Article 36 ;and
accordinglythat an exercise ofjurisdiction by the Court where interven-
tionis sought must comport with Article 36regardless of the absence of an
express reference tojurisdictional requirements in Article 62. That is to
say, a requirement for ajurisdictional link must be read into the terms of
Article 62. If it is, the application of Italy must be denied because it has
failed to showthat Libya and Malta haveassented or speciallyagreed toits
intervention, or that the Court hasjurisdiction by the terms of a treaty or
convention in force or under the optional clause.
27. There is indeed no denyingnot only that Article 62must be read in
context but that it must be read consistently with Article 36 and the
fundamental postulate of consent of States to the exercise of the Court's
jurisdiction. It is precisely in appreciation of that position that it is con-
cluded that Article 62 of itself furnishes sufficient title ofjurisdiction to

intervene "in the case" - not to bring a new case in the guise of inter-
vention, but to intervene incidentally "in the case". This is so for the
following reasons.
28. Paragraph 1of Article 36provides that thejurisdiction of theCourt
"comprises.. . al1matters specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations .. ."Bythe terms of Article 92 of the Charter, the Court's
Statute "forms an integral part of the present Charter". The provision of
Article 62authorizingthe Courtto permit aStateto intervene which shows
that it has a legalnterest whichmay be affectedby the decision in the case
is one to which al1parties to the Statute have consented ;on its face, it
appears to empower the Court to permit a Stateto intervene which fulfils
only the conditions which that article specifies ; and thus consent to
jurisdiction is in this manner specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations. The fact that this special provision is not express in

respect ofjurisdiction does not show that it is not special.Indeed, other
articles of the Statute, such as Article 41 respectingprovisionalmeasures,
which afford the Court a limited,incidentaljurisdiction, do not expressly
refer to jurisdiction. But where in the Statute an irnplicit investment of
specialjurisdiction is thought not to suffice, as in Article 53, the Statute
makes express reference to the need for "jurisdiction in accordance with
Articles 36 and 37 .. .".
29. Moreover, thejurisdiction of the Court under Article 36,paragraph
1,also "comprises ... al1matters speciallyprovided for. ..in treaties and
conventions in force". By application of the foregoingreasoning, Article
62 equally provides specialprovision for the exercise of the Court's juris-
diction, for it is part of the Statute which indubitably is a treaty in
force.
30. If it be argued that provisions of the Statute outside of Chapter II and Article 36 cannot of themselves be read as authorizing the Court to
exercisejurisdiction, that argument is refuted not only by the plain mean-
ing and by the foregoing interpretation of Article 62 but by the terms of
Article 63. Under Article 63, a State has "the nght to intervene in the
proceedings" wheretheconstruction of aconvention to which such State is
party is in question in the case. But that right is not conditioned on a
demonstration of theCourt'sjurisdiction beyond that contained in Article
63itself.Thus anarticle outside of ChapterII and Article 36of the Statute,
which makes no express reference tojurisdiction, of itself provides suffi-
cient title ofjurisdiction. If Article 63does this, why cannot Article 6?It
is the more plausible that Article 62 does, linked in substance as it is to

Article 63.

31. Article 63 unconditionally authorizesintervention where the State
seeking it is party to a treaty. Thus even where such a State is party to a
treaty which contains provision(as in an annexedprotocol) for submission
totheCourt'sjurisdiction indisputes overthe interpretationor application
of the treaty, and that State and the parties to the principal case have not
adhered to the protocol, the Court apparently would havejurisdiction to
admit the intended intervenor to the case. If an additional jurisdictional
link need not be established in such an instance under Article 63, why,
again, must it be established under Article 62 ? Why should there be so
fundamental a cleavage between the application of conventional and of
general international law ?
32. It isrecognized that one may arguethat, sinceArticle 63provides for
"a right to intervene in the proceedings", whileArticle 62 provides that it
shall be for the Court to decide upon a State's request to intervene, the
"right" of intervention under Article 63is tantamount to an express grant
ofjurisdiction whereas the possibility of intervention under Article 62 is

not.This is a plausible but not a necessary construction of the two articles.
It is no less plausible to argue that Articles 62 and 63 equally accord the
Court jurisdiction to admit intervention, but that Article 63 speaks of a
"right to intervene" because al1that need be ascertained is that a State
which seeks to exercise that right is party to the convention whose con-
struction is at issue, whereas, under Article 62, the Court must decide
whetherthe State that requestspermission tointervene "has an interest ofa
legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case". Since the
Court necessarily must exercise its judicial appreciation of whether that
State meets those criteria, Article 62 could not speak of a "right" of
intervention.
33. It is difficult to accept the argument that the failure to specify a
jurisdictional link in Article 62 wasan oversight, that when the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice was drawn up originally, it
provided for universal compulsoryjurisdiction under Article 62, and that
when the Statute was revised before its adoption to provide for limited
jurisdiction in the terms contained in Article 36, its drafters neglected to
bring Article62 into express consonance with the intent of Article 36.As shownby the debates amongjudges at the outset of the Court's lifein 1922,
this theory, while advanced by one judge of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, was denied by others in no less a position to know
than he who supported it. Moreover, if the theory ever was credible, it can
nolonger be,inviewofthe fact that the Statute wascarefullyexamined and
somewhat revised in 1945.Article 62 itself was the subject of revision ;
three words weredeleted from its Englishtext. Can it besupposedthat, ifit

were the understanding or apprehension, in the years preceding, that
Article 62 contained an oversight, it would not have been corrected in the
course of the 1945revision of the Statute ?Furthermore, it isunpersuasive
to arguethat Article 62 was not revised to take account of the rejection of
general compulsoryjurisdiction in 1920and 1945because it was assumed
that Article 62 of itself contained no title ofjurisdiction. That argument
runs counter to views expressed in the Permanent Court of International
Justice both by Judge Altamira, who was the source of the claim that
Article 62 had not been revised through oversight, and of those several
judges who maintained that Article 62 of itself grants the Court jurisdic-
tion.
34. Whiletheearly debates among thejudges of thePermanentCourt of
International Justice demonstrate sharply divergent and prescient views
on theproblems of ajurisdictional link, it is significant that the President

of theCourt at that initialjuncture terminated debate on the question with
the following ruling :
"The President stated that hecould not takea vote upon a proposa1
the effect of which would be to limit the right of intervention (as
prescribed in Article 62) to such States ashad accepted compulsory

jurisdiction. If a proposa1 in this sense were adopted, it would be
contrary to the Statute." (Preliminaiy Session of the Court, Seven-
teenth Meeting, 24 February 1922,p. 96.)
35. To read into Article 62 an additional requirement of jurisdiction
could in practice confinetheinstitution of intervention to marginal limits.

There is no reason to believe that the drafters of the Statute meant to
restrict intervention to the unlikely circumstances in which the intervenor
could establish - apart from the terms of Article 62 - a basis of juris-
diction with each of theprincipal parties to the case. On the contrary, the
institution of intervention was regarded as having significant potential. In
Court exchangesin 1922,Lord Finlay went so far as to Saythat, ". ..it was
thanks to the existence of this Article that some States had accepted the
Statute of theCourt" (and he said this in opposinga proposa1to condition
reliance upon Article 62 upon a showing ofjurisdiction, a proposa1which
Judge John Bassett Moore then said "amounted to a proposa1 for the
amendment of Article 62 of the Statute" which was "quite inadmissible7')
(Seventeenth Meeting, foc. cit., pp. 94, 95). The Court should not now
prejudice that potential by imposing ajurisdictional condition on Article
62 which its terms do not contain. 36. The terms of Article 81, paragraph 2 (c),of the most recently
adopted version of the Rules of Court were not intended to introduce and
do not introduce ajurisdictional requirement where none existed before.
The Rules of Court could not of courseprescribe, as of 1978,a condition
not contained, expressly or impliedly, by the governingprovisions of the
Statute. Paragraph 2 (c)of Article 81of the Rules of Court recognizes this

by providing for the specification of "any basis of jurisdiction which is
claimed to exist as between the Stateapplying to interveneand theparties
to the case". The Court acted with deliberationin purposefully specifying
"any" basis of jurisdiction rather than "the" basis of jurisdiction. In so
doing, the Court meant to avoid prejudging and did not prejudge the
question of whether a title of jurisdiction is a necessary precondition of
intervention under Article 62.Itsintention wasmerely to draw attentionto
the point and to ensure that a State which could indicate such a title of
jurisdiction should so inform the Court. This is demonstrated by the
unequivocal statements which the then President of the Court and the
Chairman of the Rules Comrnittee made when the Rule was introduced,

debated and adopted by the Court. Thus to treat Article 81, paragraph 2
(c),of the Rules as informativerather than conditional is not to make it -
as was claimed in the oral hearingon Italy's application - "meaningless",
contrary to the canons of interpretation. Rather, it is to give it the exact
meaning which the drafters of that provision intended.

37. Finally,there is thequestion ofwhether a title ofjurisdiction in case
of intervention beyond that accorded by Article 62is ever required. It was
suggested by counsel for Italy that, if ever required, it would be not in a
truly incidental case of intervention such as Italy's but where, under the
guise of intervention, a State seeks to bring a new "mainline case" - to
bringits own claimsagainsttheprincipalparties to the case.The Courthas

seizedupon this suggestion to hold that Italy actually does seek a decision
on therights ithas claimed againsttheprincipalPartiesand that, therefore,
a specific title of jurisdiction is required.

38. It is believed that in this the Court isinerror. It may not bewrong to
conclude that Italy seeks to assert it own claims when it places its defence
of Italian interestsin specifiedzones of thecontinental shelf "at stake" ; at
any rate, that is arguable. But the Court is on doubtful ground in holding
that, if Italy does so, it is seeking a decision on claims which are not
incidental to the proceedingsin the case and which thus require demon-
stration of a specifictitle ofjurisdiction. For, asobserved above, the object
of Italy's claims are areas of the continental shelf which already are in

dispute between the principal Parties. The new element which Italy seeks
to insert in thecase at barand to assert against its principal Parties is Italy,
i.e., Italy's very presence in the case ; instead of claims to the areas in
question being made before the Court by two States, they would, if Italy
were to be admitted, be made by three. It is of the essence of intervention
that three rather than two parties take part in the case. To hold that, byreason of its intervention and the claims on which it seeksdecision, Italy
would be bringing a claim which is new and thus outside the ambit of the
proceedings and the SpecialAgreement which has givenrise to them, and
that, accordingly, intervention must be debarred in the absence of the
principal Parties' consent or a specificjurisdictional link, seems tanta-
mount to holding that intervention regularly requires a showing ofjuris-
diction beyond that whch Article 62contains. At the sametime, theCourt
disclaims that conclusion and limits the requirement of a specific title of
jurisdiction to thefacts of Italy's intervention.That suggeststhat theremay
be instances of intervention in which a requirement of a specific title of
jurisdiction would not be imposed, for example, where theintervenor does
not assert claims against the principal parties.

39. In its Judgment rejecting Malta's application to intervene, theCourt
went far towards excluding what might be termed "non-party" interven-
tion. That was not a necessary holding but, on the facts of Malta's appli-
cation, itwasadefensibleholding.Now on thefacts ofthe casebeforeit the
Court proceeds to exclude intervention by a State as a party unless that
State can show what normally would render intervention unnecessary in
thefirst place :links ofjurisdiction with each of the principalparties to the
case. In these circumstances, the outlook for intervention in future cases
before the Court is beclouded. Apart from instances where the principal
partiesconsent to intervention, it appears to be confined tothe casewhere
a State, seeking to intervene as a party, and to bring claims within the
bounds of the case against the principal parties before the Court, at the
same time can, apart from Article 62, demonstrate a title of jurisdiction
with each of the principal parties to the case ; and, perhaps, to the case
where a State, seeking to intervene as a party, but lacking suchjurisdic-

tional links, does not assert claims (a case also unlikely to occur). In my
view,reducing Article 62 to such narrow and implausible confines isnotin
conformity with the terms of that article or with the intentions of the
drafters of theStatute. Whether, in fact,theCourt's Judgment in this case,
when taken togetherwith that rejecting Malta'sapplication, actually leaves
wider scope for intervention than appears is to be hoped, but it is not now
apparent.

(Signed) Stephen M. SCHWEBEL.

Bilingual Content

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SCHWEBEL

1. 1 regret that 1 am unable to concur in the Judgment of the Court
denying the request of Italy for permission to intervene in the pending
proceedings between Libya and Malta. Italy clearly "has an interest of a

legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case" between
Libya and Malta. SinceItaly thus fulfilstheprovisions of Article 62of the
Statute, the Court should have decided positively upon Italy's request for
permission to intervene.
2. The Court's negative Judgment does not deny that Italy "has an
interest ofalegalnature" in theproceedingsbetween Malta and Libya. But
it rejects the Italian application to intervene,apparently on threegrounds.
It indicated that Italy'sinterest may not be "affected" by the decision in
the case. It concludesthat Italy, seeking,asin the viewof the Courtit does,
a decision on a "dispute" between it and the principal Parties, does not
request "genuine intervention" within the meaning of the Statute. And it
decides that, since Italy seeks a decision upholding the rights it asserts
against theprincipalPartiesinthat dispute,the Court can havejurisdiction
to grant such a decision only with theconsent of theprincipal Parties or by
showing of a valid title of jurisdiction between Italy and those Parties,
which islacking. It is believed that the Court isin erroron al1threecounts.
This opinion will accordinglyendeavour to demonstrate why the Italian
request to intervene meets the terms of Article 62 and why that request is
one for "genuine intervention". It will then consider what is the only

substantial ground of objection to it : the alleged absence of a jurisdic-
tional link between Italy and the principal Parties to the case.

3. In its Application for permission to intervene, Italy submitted
that :
"some of the areas of continental shelf disputed between Malta and

Libya in thepresent proceedings are areas over which Italy considers
that it has undeniable rights. Taking into account the object of the
controversy between the two Parties to the present proceedings,Italy
consequentlyhas a legal interest which is indisputably en causein the
case. Its position is even,in procedural law, an absolutely classic case
for intervention, and one in whch intervention in practice is always
admitted :the situation in which the intervener relies on rights as the
true dominus of the object which is disputed, or a part thereof. OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. SCHWEBEL

[Traduction]

1. Je regrette de ne pouvoir me rallier à l'arrêtde la Cour rejetant la
requête à fin d'intervention de l'Italiedans l'affaire en coursentre la Libye
et Malte. L'Italie, manifestement, a <<un intérêt d'ordre juridique ...en
cause ))dans le différendentre la Libye et Malte. Puisque l'Italie remplit

ainsi les conditions de l'article 62du Statut,laCour aurait dû accueillirsa
requête à fin d'intervention.

2. La Cour, dans son arrêt,neniepas qu'ilyait pour l'Italie un intérêt
d'ordre juridique )) dans l'instance entre Malte et la Libye. Mais elle se
fonde apparemment sur trois motifs pour rejeter la requêteitalienne :elle

indique que l'intérêdte l'Italiene peut êtremis << encause ))par la décision
en l'espèce ; elle estime que la requêteitalienne, qui selon elle vise à
obtenir une décisionsur un (différend entre l'Italie et les Parties prin-
cipales, ne correspond pas à une <(véritableintervention ))au sens du
Statut ;et elle conclut que, comme l'Italie sollicite une décisionsanction-
nant les droits alléguéspar cet Etat contre les Parties principales au
différend, ellene serait compétentepour accéder à cetterequête.qu'avecle
consentement des Parties principales ou au vu d'un titre valable de com-

pétence entre l'Italie et ces Parties, lequel fait en l'occurrence défaut.
J'estime que la Cour fait erreur sur ces trois motifs. Je m'efforcerai donc
ci-aprèsde démontrerpourquoi larequêteitaliennesatifaisait àl'article62,
et pourquoi elle constituait une << véritableintervention ))J'examinerai
ensuite le seul motif sérieux d'objection :l'absence alléguée d'un lien
juridictionnel entre l'Italie et les Parties principales à l'instance.

L'<<INTÉRÊT D'ORDRE JURIDIQUE ))DE L'ITALIE

3. On peut lire ce qui suit dans la requête à fin d'intervention de
l'Italie:

(<certaines deszones de plateau continental contestéesentre Malte et
la Libye dans la présenteinstancesont deszones sur lesquellesl'Italie
estime avoir des droits indéniables.Compte tenu de l'objet du débat
entre les deux Parties à la présente instance, l'Italiea par conséquent
un intérêt juridique incontestablementen cause en l'espèce.Elle se

trouve mêmedansun cas tout àfait classique d'intervention en droit
judiciaire et où l'intervention, en pratique, est toujours admise :celle
où l'intervenant excipedes droits de véritabledominusdela chose en
litige, ou d'une partie de cette chose. the Court willnot confine itself to laying down principlesand rules of
international law. It will have to determine how such principles and
rules should be applied by the Partiesindrawingthedelimitationline.
That line will thus be predetermined in the Court's judgment with a
sufficient degree of precision to prevent the Parties meeting difficul-
ties at the final stage of the delimitation operation.

In addition, it is perfectly evident that such a predetermined line,
passing within areas which Italy regards as appertaining to itself,
would de facto and dejure effect the attribution to the Parties of the
areas of continental shelf to be delimited by that line.

It would be difficultfor Italy subsequently toobtain recognition of
its rights, either by negotiation,sincethe Party with which it soughtto
negotiate would obviously take refuge behind the Court's judgment
and refuse to make any concessions, or by proposing to submit the
dispute to the decision of the Court, which would, in addition, be
bound by its previous judgment." (Paras. 11-12.)

In the oral hearing, counsel for Italy indicated in what areas of the con-
tinental shelf at issuebetween the principal Parties claims of Italy overlap
claims of Malta (and,ineffect, of Libya).Coordinates of the Italian claims
were provided in answer to a question posed by Judge de Lacharrière.
Italy's counsel maintained that :

"The main point ... is that in a number of crucial zones among
those claimed by Malta, it would be for Italy and not for Malta to
proceed to a delimitation vis-à-vis Libya."

4. Where States A and B, parties to a case before the Court, make
territorial claimsagainst each other, and State C, which requests permis-
sion to intervene,maintains that Aand Bseek ajudgment of the Court to
territory to part of which C has better title, it is obvious that C "has an
interest of alegalnature which maybe affected by the decision inthe case".
Amore compellingcase of a legalinterest of an intervening State wouldbe
hard to imagine. That in substance is Italy's position in the proceedings at
bar.
5. It has been maintained that, while Italy indubitably considersthat it
has theforegoing interest of a legalnature, it has not proved thatit has and
that the Court should reject itsrequest for permission to intervene because
of the lack of that proof. However,while Italy would have to prove that its
interest of a legalnature is wellfounded in order to prevail on themerits of
a case in which permission to intervene were to have been granted, it need
not so prove in order forits request to intervene to be granted. To require
that itpresent suchproof is to requireit to argue and sustain a casewhichit
has not been accorded permission to present. Al1that the Court at ths
stage need establish is that the interest of a legal nature which Italy makes

out is,prima facie, aplausibleinterest.Nor need Italy showthat its interest la Cour ne se limitera pas à énoncerdes principes et règlesde droit
international. Elle auraà déterminer commentces principes et règles
devront êtreappliquéspar les Parties dans le tracé de la ligne de
délimitation. Cette ligne sera donc prédéterminée dans l'arrêtde la
Cour avec un degréde précisionsuffisant pour éviteraux Parties de
rencontrer des difficultésau stade final de l'opérationde délimita-
tion.
Il est bien évident,d'autre part, qu'uneligne ainsi prédéterminéet
passant àl'intérieurde zones que l'Italie considèrecomme lui appar-
tenant opéreraitdefacto et dejure l'attribution aux Parties des zones

de plateau continental que cette ligne est appelée à délimiter.
Il serait difficiàel'Italie de faire reconnaître ultérieurement ses
droits, soit par négociation,car la Partie avec laquelle elle voudrait
négocier seretrancherait évidemmentderrièrel'arrêtde la Courpour
refuser toute concession, soit en proposant de soumettre le différend
aujugement de la Cour, qui d'autre part serait liéepar son précédent
arrêt.>)(Par. 11-12.)

A l'audience, les conseilsde l'Italie ont indiqué surquelles zones en litige
entre les Parties principales les revendications de l'Italie chevauchaient
cellesde Malte(et, d'ailleurs,de la Libye)et,en réponse àunequestion de
M. de Lacharrière, lescoordonnéespermettant de circonscrire les préten-
tions italiennes ont étéfournies. Selon un des conseils de l'Italie

<Le point essentiel ...est que, dans nombre de zones cruciales
parmi cellesque revendique Malte, ce serait à l'Italie et noà Malte
qu'il appartiendrait de procéder à une délimitation vis-à-vis de la
Libye. 1)

4. Si les Etats A et B,partiesàune instance devant la Cour, formulent
des revendications territoriales l'un contre l'autre et si l'Etat C, qui
demande à intervenir, soutient que A et B demandent à la Cour de leur
attribuer, par son arrêt,un territoire surune partie duquel C a un meilleur
titre, il est évidentqu'a un intérêt'ordrejuridique est pour [l'Etat Cl en

cause 1)On imaginerait difficilement un cas plus péremptoire d'intérêt
juridique de la part de 1'Etat intervenant. Telle est, pour l'essentiel, la
position de l'Italie dans la présente instance.
5. On a soutenu que, si l'Italie estime avoir incontestablement un tel
intérêd t'ordrejuridique, ellene l'apas démontré, et que,fauted'une telle
preuve, la Cour devait donc rejeter sa demande d'intervention. Or, s'ilest
vrai que l'Italie, une fois admisà intervenir, aurait euàprouver le bien-
fondé de son intérêt d'ordre juridiquepour obtenir satisfaction au fond,
cettepreuven'était pasnécessairepour que sa demande d'intervention fût
accueillie. Exiger cette preuve revenaità l'obligerà défendreet soutenir
une cause qu'elle n'étaitpas admise àprésenter.A ce stade, la Cour avait
seulement à établirque l'intérêdt'ordrejuridique affirmépar l'Italie était

plausibleprima facie. Et l'Italie n'étaitpas davantage tenue de démontrer
que sonintérêt avaiftait l'objet d'un différend aveclesParties principales 133 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS.OP. SCHWEBEL)

was the subject of dispute with the principal Parties before it filed its
Application to intervene. The idea of intervention is that two parties are
litigating their dispute;a thrd Party, apprehending that judicial settle-

ment of their dispute may prejudice its interests, seeksto intemene. As the
Court put it in the Haya de la Torrecase :
"every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case ; it
follows that a declaration filed as an intervention only acquires that
character, in law, if it actually relates to the subject-matter of the
pending proceedings" (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76).

There is no requirement that the intervenor must independently and as a
condition of intervention demonstrate that it has had a distinct dispute
with one orboth of the parties in litigation which had matured before the
bringing of the request to intervene.
6. Italy's continental shelf claims presumably are in its legal interest.
They are not easilydistinguished from "an interest of a legalnature7'.The
Court cannot deny, and does not deny, the undeniable :that where Italy,
juxtaposed as it is geographically within the narrow limits of the Medi-

terranean Sea on the very continental shelf over which Malta and Libya
make conflicting claims,foritspart advances claimsto some of those same
areas of continental shelf, Italy "has an interest of a legal nature. .".The
Italian legalinterest not onlyiseminentlyplausible, it issoobvious as to be
beyond question.

"...WHICHMAYBEAFFECTED BY THE DECISION IN THE CASE .. ."

7. May Italy's interest of a legal nature be affected by the Court's
decision in the case ? In its Application for permission to intervene which
has been quoted in pertinent part above, Italy submits that its legal
interests will be affected by a decision of the Court which, when applied,
would effect the attribution to Malta or Libya of areas to which Italy lays
claim, and it illustrates in what manner its interests would be adversely

affected.
8. It should be recalled (asthe Court failed to recall in 1981in rejecting
Malta's application for permission to intervene) that Article 62 of the
Statute specifies that should a State consider that it has an interest of a
legal nature which "may"be "affected"by the decision in the case, it may
submita request to the Court to be permitted to intervene. Article 62 does
not provide that, should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal
nature which "shall" be "determined" by the decision in the case, it may
submit such a request. The State seekingto intervene accordinglyneed not
prove thatit has a legalinterest that the Court's decision willdetermine ;it
need merely show that it has a legalinterest whichjust "rnay" be no more
than "affected" - prejudiced, promoted orin somewayaltered. That isnot
an exigent standard to meet. And Italy has more than met it. If the Court
should render ajudgment which lays down avant le dépôtde sa requête à fin d'intervention. Le principe de l'inter-
ventionest en effet quedeux parties plaident sur leurdifférend ;et qu'une
tierce partie, craignant que le règlementjuridictionnel de ce différendne
compromette sesintérêtsd ,emande àparticiper à l'instance.Comme l'adit
la Cour dans l'affaire Haya de la Torre :

<toute intervention est un incident de procédure ; par conséquent
une déclaration déposée à fin d'intervention ne revêt,en droit, ce
caractèreque sielle a réellementtrait à cequi est l'objet de l'instance
en cours ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 76).

Rien n'oblige donc l'intervenant à démontrer, séparémene ttà titre préa-
lable,qu'un différenddistinct,apparu avant la présentationde sarequête à
fin d'intervention, l'oppose à l'une des parties en cause ou aux deux.

6. On peut présumerque les prétentionsde l'Italie sur le plateau conti-
nental servent son intérêt juridique. Ces prétentionsse distinguent donc
mal d'un <<intérêdt'ordrejuridique ))La Cour ne peut nier - et d'ailleurs
ne nie pas - l'indéniable, à savoir que, lorsque l'Italie,juxtaposée dans le
cadreétroitde laMéditerranéeauxétendues mêmesdeplateau continental
que se disputent Malte et la Libye, émet à son tour des prétentions sur
certaines de ces zones, elle a un (intérêt d'ordre juridiqu e..))Non seu-
lement cet intérêtjuridiquede l'Italie est éminemment défendable,mais il
est patent au point de ne pouvoir êtremis en doute.

7. L'intérêdt'ordrejuridique del'Italiepeut-il êtreencauseen l'espèce ?
Dans sa requête à fin d'intervention, dont les passages pertinents sont
reproduits plus haut, l'Italie déclaraitque ses intérêtsjuridiques seraient
affectéspar la décisionde la Cour, qui, une fois appliquée, emportera
attribution à Malte où à la Libye de certaines zones revendiquéespar
l'Italie, et elle indiquait comment ces intérêts seraientlésés.

8. Ilconvient de rappeler (ceque n'apasfait la Cour en 1981enrejetant
la demande d'intervention de Malte) que, selon les termes exprèsde l'ar-
ticle 62 du Statut, lorsqu'un Etat estime que, dans un différend,un intérêt
d'ordre juridique est pour lui en cause, il peut adresser à la Cour une
requête à fin d'intervention. L'article 62 ne dit pas que 1'Etaten question
peut soumettre une telle requêtes'ilestime avoir un intérêt d'ordre juri-
dique sur lequel la Cour ((jugera ». L'Etat qui demande à intervenir n'a
donc pas àprouver qu'il possèdeun intérêtjuridique surlequel la Cour se

prononcera dans son arrêt ; il lui suffit d'établirqu'un intérêtjuridiqueest
pour lui <en cause ))etrien de plus, c'est-à-direque son intérêptourrait se
trouver compromis, favorisé,ou altéréen quelquemanière.Il ne s'agitpas
là d'une condition rigoureuse. Et l'Italie a fait mieux que la remplir. Si la
Cour rend un arrêt pourétablir : "what principles and rules of international law are applicable to the
delirnitation of the area of the continental shelf whch appertains to
the Republic of Malta and the area of continental shelf whch apper-
tains to the Libyan Arab Republic, and how in practice such princi-
ples and rules can be applied by the two Partiesin thisparticular case
in order that they may without difficulty delimit such areas.. .",

it is difficult to see how such principles and rules can be asseveratedand
appliedwithout "affecting" Italy's "interest of a legalnature" in respect to
areas of the continental shelf which, it claims, lie between or athwart the
properly delimited claims of Malta and Libya and appertain to Italy.

9. It is no answer to Say - as, in substance, the Court appears to Say -
that Italy's interest of a legal nature cannot be affected by the decision in
the casebecause, by theterms ofArticle 59of the Statute, "The decision of
the Court has no bindingforce exceptbetween theparties and in respect of
that particular case". If that answer were good, then Article 62 would be
pointless :there would never be a case to which Article 62should or could
apply, since,by reason of Article 59,a third State's legalinterest never can
be affected by a decision in a case. Article 59 cannot, by any canon of
interpretation, be read so as to read Article 62 out of the Statute.

10. The Court endeavours to meet thisevidentconclusion by maintain-
ing that its interpretation of Article 59 actually does not render Article 62

pointless, for the reason that, while, by the force of Article 59, the legal
interest of athird Statecannot be affected by adecisionin acasetowhichit
is not Party, such third State stillhas the choice afforded by the conjunc-
tion of Articles 62 and 59 either of seeking the procedural economy of
means which the former affords or the legal immunity which the latter
ensures. That is to Say,the purpose of Article 62,in the logicof the Court,
apparently is not to afford third Statesthe facility of intervention in order
toprotect or promote an interest of alegalnature which maybe affected by
the decision in the case, since, by reason of Article 59, no decision of the
Court can affect such legalinterest of a third State. It ismerely to allowthe
third State to Saveitself theburden of subsequent,direct litigation against
the principal Parties - in the event that there is ajurisdictional basis for
such litigation - by permitting it to intervenein their case, if the Court so

decides. Such an analysisreducesArticle 62 to an improbable procedural
convenience which neither its terms nor its travauxpréparatoiressupport.
It is virtually tantamount to reading Article62 out of the Statute.

11. Moreover, it cannot be persuasively maintained that ajudgment of
the Court setting out the applied rules for the division of areas of conti-
nental shelf between two States willnot even "affect" the legalinterests of
athird State whch laysclaims to someof those same areas. To somaintain
is to devalue the legal worth of the Court'sjudgments, to which al1mem- (ilesprincipeset lesrèglesdedroitinternationalquisont applicables à
la délimitation de la zone du plateau continental relevant de la
Républiquede Malte et de lazone du plateau continental relevant de
la République arabe libyenne, et comment, dans la pratique, ces

principeset règlespeuvent-ilsêtreappliquéspar lesdeux Parties dans
le cas d'espèceafin qu'elles puissent délimiterces zones sans diffi-
culté..)),

on voit mal comment de tels principes et règlespourront êtreaffirméset
appliqués sans mettre en cause l'aintérêtd'ordre juridique ))de l'Italie
dans les zones de plateau continental qui, selon elle, lui appartiennent, et

qui séparent ou recoupent en partie cellesoù Malte et la Libye formulent
des revendications.
9. Cen'estpasune réponseque de dire - commela Cour semblelefaire
en substance - que l'intérêd t'ordre juridique de l'Italie ne saurait êtreen
causedans l'arrêten l'espèce, vu qu'auxtermes de l'article59du Statut (<la
décisionde la Cour n'estobligatoire que pour lesparties en litigeet dans le
casqui a été décidé D. Sicetteréponseétaitvalable, l'article 62n'aurait pas
d'objet ;et aucune affaire ne seprésenteraitjamais où l'article 62devrait

ou pourrait s'appliquer, puisqu'en raison de l'article 59 les intérêts juri-
diques desEtats tiersnepeuvent en aucuncas êtretouchéspar lesdécisions
de la Cour. Or aucune règle d'interprétation ne permet de penser que
l'article 59 raye du Statut l'article 62.
10. La Cour s'efforcede répondre à cette conclusion évidenteen affir-
mant que son interprétation de l'article 59 ne rend pas l'article 62 sans
objet, étantdonnéque,silesintérêtsjuridiquesdesEtatstiers sont protégés
par l'article 59 contre les effets des décisionsrendues dans les affaires

auxquellesilsne sont pas parties, lesdits Etats tiers conserventnéanmoins,
grâce à la conjonction des articles 62 et 59, la facultésoit de rechercher
l'économiede procédure offerte par le premier de ces textes, soit de se
contenterde l'immunitéjuridique assuréepar le second.Autrement dit, le
but de l'article62,dans lalogiquedelaCour, neseraitpasd'offrir aux Etats
tiers la faculté d'intervenir pour sauvegarder ou faire valoir un intérêt
d'ordre juridique susceptible d'être misen cause dans l'arrêt enl'espèce,
puisqu'en raisonde l'article 59 aucun arrêt dela Cour ne peut affecter les

intérêtsjuridiques desEtats tiers :il serait seulement depermettre à l'Etat
tiers d'éviterla charge d'une action directe ultérieure contre les Parties
principales - sila basejuridictionnelle nécessaire àune telle action existe
- en l'autorisant àintervenir àl'instance, sila Cour en décideainsi. Cette
analyse, qui réduit l'article62 à une douteuse commodité procédurale,
n'estcorroboréenipar la lettre de cetexte ni par lestravaux préparatoires.
Elle revient pratiquement à rayer du Statut l'article 62.

11. De plus, onne saurait soutenirqu'une décisionde la Courénonçant
les règles à appliquer pour partager entre deux Etats certaines zones de
plateau continental ne puisse avoir pour effet de mettre (ien cause )les
intérêtsjuridiques d'unEtat tiers revendiquant une partie de ces mêmes
zones.Avancer un tel argument serait dévaloriser lesarrêtsde la Cour, quibers of theinternational community shall givedue weight as authoritative
holdings of international law.
12. Even if the Court were to hand down ajudgment as between Malta
and Libya whch explicitlyissubject to the rights and titles of third States,
whichexpresslyreservescompeting claims of Italy, and whichdeclaresthat
it is without prejudice to those claims - assuming that the Court were to
find itself able to write ajudgment on the merits of the case in these legal
and geographic circumstances whch when applied delimits the shelf
between Malta and Libya without treating Italy's intervening claims - the

judgment "may" merely "affect" Italy's claims by its reasoning and in so
far as its effect is to allot shelf areas (however conditionally) to Malta or
Libya whch are areas to whch Italyalso lays claim. Thiscould be so even
if the Court's future judgment were to speak of the relative and not the
absolute titles of Malta and Libya. The Court could go further. It could
limit the scope of itsjudgment by refraining from indicating thepractical
application ofprinciples of delimitation to those areas of continental shelf
which Italy claims,holding that, asto theseareas, delirnitation must follow
from negotiation or adjudication between or among Italy, Malta and
Libya. Such ajudgment might satisfy Italy, but would it not constitute a
measure of endorsement by the Court of Italy's claims without troubling

Italy either tojustify those claims or to place them at stake in the current
proceedings between the principal Parties ? Indeed, such a judgment
would in effect acknowledge that Italy "has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in the case7'were it not for that
element of the decision which exempts from its reach the areas which are
the object of Italian claims. Thus the more reasonable approach - given
thefact that theseareas are already in issuebetween the principal Parties -
would be to grant Italy's request to intervene and oblige it to defend its
claims. That would do justice not only to Italy but to Malta and Libya,
whichotherwisecould find that the judgment they seekhas been truncated

to accommodate claimswhichthey wouldhave forgone the opportunityto
refute.

"IT SHALLBE FOR THE COURT TO DECIDE . . ."

13. Paragraph 1 ofArticle 62provides that, should a State consider that
it has an interest of a legalnature whichmay be affected by the decision in
thecase, it may submit a request to theCourt to bepermitted to intervene.
Paragraph 2 provides that :"It shall be for the Court to decide upon this
request." In its 1981Judgment on Malta's application, the Court referred
to this provision, and emphasized

"that itdoesnot consider Paragraph 2to confer anygeneral discretion
to accept or reject a request for permission to intervene for reasons
simply of policy. On the contrary, in the view of the Court the task
entrusted to it by that paragraph is to determine the admissibility or PLATEAU CONTINENTAL (OP.DISS.SCHWEBEL) 135

doivent, pour tous les membres de la communautéinternationale, consti-
tuer des énoncésautorisésdu droit international.
12. Même si d'ailleursla Cour précisedans son arrêt entreMalte et la
Libye qu'il s'entend sous bénéficedes droits et titres des Etats tiers, et
réserve expressément les revendications concurrentes de l'Italie en décla-
rant que la décisionn'yportepasatteinte - à supposer que la Cour puisse,
dans le présent contextejuridique et géographique,rendre sur le fond un

arrêtdont l'application permette de délimiter le plateau entre Malte et la
Libye, sans examiner les revendications qu'interpose l'Italie - cet arrêt
risque de simplement mettre en cause les intérêtsde l'Italie par sa moti-
vation, et dans la mesure où, mêmesous condition, il aura pour effet
d'attribuerà Malte ou à la Libye des zones de plateau que l'Italie reven-
dique elle aussi.l en sera ainsi même sil'arrêtde la Cour sanctionne les
titres relatifs de Malte et de la Libye, et non pas leurs titres absolus. La
Courpourrait d'ailleursfaireplus encore. Ellepourrait limiterlaportéede

son arrêt en s'abstenant d'indiquerla façon d'appliquer en pratique les
principes de délimitation auxzones de plateau continental revendiquées
par l'Italie, motif pris de ce que, pour ces zones, la délimitation devrait
résulterde négociationsou d'une décisionrendue entre l'Italie, Malte et la
Libye. Un tel arrêtdonnerait peut-être satisfaction à l'Itali; mais ne
serait-ce pas reconnaître dans une certaine mesure les prétentions de
l'Italie sans que celle-ciait eu àilesjustifier nà les mettre enjeu dansla
procédure en cours entre les Parties principales ? Ce serait d'ailleurs là
admettre que dans ce différend (un intérêtd'ordre juridique est pour

[l'Italie]en cause)>n'était cet élémen dte la décisionqui soustrairait de sa
portéeles zones revendiquéespar l'Italie. Ainsil'attitude la plus raison-
nable - étantdonnéque ces zones sont déjàmises enjeu entre les Parties
principales - serait d'accéder à la demande d'intervention de l'Italie et
d'obliger celle-cià défendre ses prétentions. Ce serait faire justice non
seulement à l'Italie, maià Malte et à la Libye, qui, sinon, risquent de
penser que l'arrêt sollicitpar elles a été tronqué en réponse àdes reven-
dications qu'elles n'auront pas réfutées à temps.

13. Selon l'article62,paragraphe 1,lorsqu'un Etat estime que, dans un
différend,un intérêt d'ordrejuridique estpour lue in cause,ilpeut adresser
à la Cour unerequête àfind'intervention. Etleparagraphe 2dispose :(<La
Cour décide. ))Dans son arrêt de1981sur la requêtemaltaise, la Cour,
faisant allusion à cette disposition, a affirmé

qu'elle neconsidèrepas que leparagraphe 2luiconfèreune sorte de
pouvoir discrétionnaire lui permettant d'accepter ou de rejeter une
requête àfind'intervention pour de simplesraisonsd'opportunité.Au
contraire, del'avisdela Cour, lafonction queluiconfie ceparagraphe othenvise of the request by reference to the relevant provisions of the
Statute." (I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 12,para. 17.)

14. That, however, is not to say that the relevant provisions of the
Statute speak for themselves ; rather, they leave room for a substantial

margin of appreciation, as has been demonstrated by intermittent discus-
sionsin theCourt for some60years.As SirGerald Fitzmaurice pointed out
in an article written 25 years ago, Article 62 leaves :

"room for considerable freedom of appreciation ;and sinceinterven-
tion under Article 62 is not as of right, it must follow that the Court

exercises a quasi-discretionary power under it, and is not absolutely
bound to grant the request, even if the necessary conditions are
present, or there would be no effective difference between this case
and that ofArticle 63.Consequently, theCourt isentitled to take into
account thequestion ofpropriety, appropriateness, weightofinterest,
etc." ("The Lawand Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
1951-54 : Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure",
XXXIV British Year Book of International Law (1958), p. 127.)

15. In exercise of the measure of discretion whichArticle 62 affords it,
the Court in 1981found that the sort of "non-party" intervention which
Malta sought was not intervention within the meaning of the Statute. That
wasnot a necessaryconclusion, as the separate opinions of JudgeOda and
myselfindicated,but it was a not unreasonable one. In this case, theCourt
could exercise the measure of discretion accorded by Article 62 to admit
Italy's intervention, which, whle markedly evocative of Malta's applica-
tion of 1981in many respects - as counsel for Malta so skilfullyargued in

the recent oral hearing - neverthelessmay be distinguished from it. It may
be distinguished in the following respects :

(a) Italy assertsclaimsto swaths ofcontinental shelfwhichliebetween or
athwart some of the Maltese and Libyan claims ;Malta's claims were
to areas at the end of a line which would divide the adjacent, not

opposite, claims of Libya and Tunisia, and accordingly raised inter-
estswhichcould be taken into account by an indication of alinewhose
angle but not terminus was required.

(b) Moreover, whileMalta described itscontinental shelf claims in Court
at length, it took pains not to place those claims before the Court for
decision, while,in contrast, Italy does place its overlapping continen-
tal shelf claims "at stake".
(c) Malta sought to intervene in 1981as a kind of purposeful commen-
tator on the governingprinciples of international law and their appli- est de déterminersi la requêteest admissible ou non par application
des dispositions pertinentes du Statut. )i(C.I.J. Recueil 1981, p. 12,
par. 17.)

14. Cela ne signifie pas cependant que les dispositions applicables du
Statut se passent de tout commentaire ; au contraire, elles laissent une
grande marge d'appréciation, ainsique le démontrentles débatsintermit-
tents que la Cour consacre àla question depuis une soixantaine d'années.
Comme l'écrivait sirGerald Fitzmaurice il y a vingt-cinq ans, l'article 62
laisse

<<une grande liberté d'appréciation ; comme l'intervention visée à
l'article 62 n'apas le caractère d'un droit, la Cour exerce nécessaire-
ment une pouvoir quasi discrétionnaire en vertu de cet article, et elle
n'est absolument pas obligéede faire droit à la requête, mêmsei les
conditions nécessairessont remplies, sinon il n'y aurait pas de diffé-
rence réelleentre ce cas et celui de l'article 63.En conséquence,la
Cour est habilitée à se demander par exemple cequi est opportun, ou
approprié, ouquel estlepoids à attribuer àl'intérêt i(<<The Lawand

Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54 :Questions
of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure )),British Year Book of
International Law, XXXIV, 1958,p. 127.)
15. En 1981,la Cour, exerçantle pouvoir discrétionnaireque lui recon-
naît l'article 62, a conclu que le genre d'intervention en qualité de <<non-

partie ))que recherchait Malte n'était pas une intervention au sens du
Statut. Cette conclusion n'était pasla seule possible, comme M. Oda et
moi-même l'avonsindiqué dans nos opinions individuelles, mais elle
n'était pas dénuéd ee logique. En la présenteespèce,la Cour avait la fa-
cultéd'exercer ce pouvoirdiscrétionnairepour admettre l'intervention de
l'Italie, qui, si elle rappelaità bien des égards la requête maltaisede
1981 - commel'onthabilement soutenu lesconseilsde Malte au coursdes
récentes audiences -, pouvait néanmoins en êtredistinguée,notamment
sur les points suivants :

a) L'Italie revendique des étendues de plateau continental séparant ou
chevauchant certaines zones revendiquéespar Malte et la Libye ; les
revendications de Malte, elles, portaient sur des étenduesde plateau
situées à l'extrémité d'une ligne divisant les zoneasdjacentes - et non
pas opposées - revendiquéespar la Libye et la Tunisie, et mettaient
donc enjeu desintérêtd sont ilétaitpossible de tenir comptepar letracé

d'une lignedont on indiquait l'inclinaison, mais non le point d'abou-
tissement.
b) SiMalte avait abondamment exposé à la Cour sesrevendicationssur le
plateau continental, elle s'était bien gardée de soumettre ces revendi-
cations à la décisionde la Cour, alors que, tout au contraire, l'Italie a
mis en jeu ses prétentions sur les zones de chevauchement.
c) Malte avait demandé à intervenir en 1981comme une sorte de com-
mentateur intéressé desprincipes de droitinternational applicables àla 137 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS.OP. SCHWEBEL)

cation to the claims of Libya and Tunisia, as they might affect the
position of Malta. Italy seeksto argue not simplylegal pnnciples but
to defend concrete zones of material interest with which, one way or
another (and unlike the situation which obtained in 1981)the Court
will have to deal in this case.

(d) Italy, unlike Malta, requests permission to intervene as a party to the
case. Not as a party to a new dispute not submitted in the Special
Agreement ; not as a party taking the side of one principal Party

against the other in the dispute which the Special Agreement does
submit ;not (allegedly)as aparty making claimsagainst theprincipal
Parties ;but as a party which seeks permission to defend its claims
against what it viewsas the competing claims of theprincipal Parties
in the very geographc area at issue between them. Italy has denom-
inated its status as that of an "intervening party". That is anapt term.
But others may choose - in view of Italy's position that it does not
seek to advance claims against Libya and Malta and does not seek a
delimitation of its own claims - to see Italy as seeking a kind of
non-party intervention. In its 198 1 Judgment, the Court debarred

"the direct yet limited form of participation in the subject-matter of
the proceedings for which Malta here seeks permission. .." as one
which could not be "properly admitted as falling within the terms of
the intervention for which Article 62 of the Statute provides" (I.C.J.
Reports1981,p. 19,para. 34). But it does not follow that it debarred
the somewhat different - direct, limited but different - form of
participation in the subject-matter of the proceedings for which here
Italy seeks permission, whether it is viewed as party or non-party
intervention.

(e) In its Judgment rejecting Malta's application, the majority of the
Court insisted on holding that :
"the very character of the intervention for which Malta seeks
permission shows ... that the interest of a legal nature invoked
by Malta cannot be considered to be one 'whichmay be affected
by the decisionin thecase'within the meaning ofArticle62of the

Statute" (ibid, para. 33).
TheCourt quotes this holding with apparent approval inits Judgment
on Italy's application. In my view, which 1 set out in my separate
opinion on Malta's application, this conclusion - which embodied a
striking non sequitur - was both needless and erroneous. It was

needless, for the Court's decision that "the direct yet limited form of
participation. .. for which Malta here seeks permission could not
properly be admitted as falling within the terms of intervention for
whch Article 62 of the Statute provides" was sufficient ground to
sustain the Court's denial of Malta's request. It was erroneous, for it
did not recognize the fact that Malta, by reason of its claims and situation, et de leur application aux prétentions de la Libye et de la
Tunisie, dans la mesure où ces prétentionspouvaient affecter sa posi-
tion. L'Italie, elle, ne cherchait pas seulementà soutenir des principes
juridiques, mais àdéfendreun intérêt substantielvisant des étendues
déterminées, etsur lesquelles la Cour aura d'une façon ou de l'autre à
statuer (ce qui n'étaitpas le cas en 1981).
d) Contrairement à Malte, l'Italie demandait l'autorisation d'intervenir
dans l'instance en qualitéde partie. Non pas en tant que partie à un
différend nouveau, ne résultant pas du compromis ; ni en tant que
partie serangeant aux côtésd'une des Parties principales contre l'autre
dans le différend qui, lui,résultedu compromis ;ni àl'encroire en tant

que partie formulant des prétentions contre les Parties au principal -
mais en tant que partie demandant l'autorisation de défendreses pré-
tentions contre ce quilui paraît êtredes prétentions concurrentes de la
part des Parties principales dansla régionqui est précisément en litige
entre celles-ci.L'Italie a dit que son statut étaitcelui de partie inter-
venante ))Lemot estjuste. On pourrait aussivoir dans sonintervention
- étantdonnéqu'elleaffirme nepas chercher à soutenirdesprétentions
contre la Libye et Malte, et ne pas demander la délimitationdes zones
qu'elle revendique pour sa part - une sorte d'intervention de non-
partie. Dans son arrêtde 1981,la Cour a jugéque (le mode de par-
ticipation directe, encore que limitée,à l'objet de l'instanceà laquelle

prétend Malte ... ne constituait pas uneparticipation qui Gpuisse être
considérée à bon droit comme entrant dans le cadre de l'intervention
prévue àl'article 62duStatut (C.I.J. Recueil1981,p. 19,par. 34).Mais
il ne s'ensuit pas qu'elle rejetait par là la forme de participation assez
différente - directe et limitée,maisdifférente - à l'objetde l'instanceà
laquelle prétendaitl'Italie,que1'01y1voieuneintervention en qualitéde
partie ou en qualitéde non-partie.
e) Dans l'arrêtpar lequel la Cour a rejetéla requêtede Malte, la majorité
des juges a tenu à affirmer que :

<lecaractèremêmede l'intervention demandéepar Maltemontre
...que l'intérêd t 'ordre juridique invoquépar elle ne peut être
considérécommesusceptibled'être ecn ause enl'espèceau sensde
l'article 62du Statut )(ibid., par. 33).

Et la Cour citecette déclaration, en l'approuvant apparemment, dans
son arrêtsur la requêtede l'Italie. Or, à mon avis, tel que je l'ai déjà
exprimédans mon opinion individuelle sur la requêtede Malte, cette
coÏnclusion- qui comportait un nonsequiturfrappant - étaità la fois
superflue et erronée. Elleétaitsuperflue, car l'idéeque << le mode de
participation directe, encore que limitée...à laquelle prétend Maltene

puisse êtreconsidéré à bon droit comme entrant dans le cadre de
l'intervention prévue à l'article 62du Statut suffisaitàfonder lerejet
de la requêtede Malte. Elle étaiterronée,car elle méconnaisaitcette
réalité évidente,que.Malte, du fait de sesprétentionset de sa situation 138 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS.OP.SCHWEBEL)

geographicalsituation,had legalinterests which might wellhave been
"affected" by the Court's judgment in the Tunisia/Libya case. The
result of the Court's 1981Judgment was to establish a link between
theobject of theintervention and theinterests of a legalnature which
may be affected by the decision in the case, a link which appears to
hold that if the object is lirnited so as not to put the claims of the
intended intervenor at issue, there is ipsojure no interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by the decision in the case. Since,
however, in the current case the Court holds exactly the opposite -
namely, that the Italian object is not solimited and Italy does put its
claims at issue - it follows not only that, on this ground as well, the
Italian application is to be distinguishedfrom the Maltese, but that,

by application of the Court's reasoning of 1981and of the logicof the
Court's Judgment in this case, Italy has an interest of a legal nature
which may be affected by the decision in this case.

16. Although, asjust indicated, the thrust of the Court's Judgment in
thiscaseappears itself to lead to theconclusionthat Italyhas an interest of
alegal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, the Court
neverthelessrejects Italy's application for permission to intervene. While
the essential ground of its decision appears to be what it views as the
absence of ajurisdictional link between Italy and the principal Parties to
the case,it alsoconcludesthat what Italy seeksis not genuineintervention
within the meaning of Article 62. The Court observes that Italy itself
conceded that where a State seeks to intervene in order to assert a right
equivalent to a mainlineclaim,that application is not within the ambit of
Article 62. It concludes that

"there is nothing in Article 62 to suggest that it was intended as an
alternative means of bringing an additional dispute as a case before
the Court. . .or as a method of asserting the individual rights of a
State not party to the case".

And since the Court holds that Italy does seekmore than the preservation
of its rights, that it makes claims with a view to the establishment of its
rights, the Court concludes that it may debar Italy's application as not
being one for genuine intervention within the meaning of Article 62.

17. The flawin this analysisis that Italy'srequest, evenif,arguendo,itis
acknowledged to advance claims against the principal Parties, does not
give rise to an additional dispute, except in so far as what is a dispute
between two parties would be a dispute between three. It is not possible to
contemplate intervention which excludes a third party. Thus Italy's inter-
vention of itself cannot be afactor which places its application outside the
bounds ofArticle 62.The question rather is,isit genuineintervention when
measured against the critical criterion set out in the Haya de la Torre
case : géographique, avaitdesintérêtd s'ordrejuridique quipouvaient êtremis
<(en cause ))par l'arrêtdela Cour dans l'affaire Tunisie/Libye. L'arrêt
de la Cour de 1981a ainsi eu pour résultatd'établir,entre l'objet de
l'intervention et l'intérêdt'ordrejuridique pouvant êtremis en cause,
un liend'oùilsembledécoulerque, sil'objet estlimitéde façon à nepas
mettre enjeu les revendications de l'intervenant, il n'y a ipsojure pas
d'intérêd t'ordrejuridique pouvant êtreencause.Mais, puisque dans la
présente instance la Cour prend exactement la position contraire - à
savoir,que l'objetde l'Italien'estpas limitéà cepoint et quel'Italiemet
effectivement enjeu ses prétentions - il s'ensuit non seulement que,

pour ce motif également,la requêtede l'Italie devaitêtredistinguéede
cellede Malte, mais aussi que,pour les motifs indiquéspar la Cour en
1981et vu le raisonnement suivi par elle dans le présentarrêt,l'Italie
avait un intérêtd'ordre juridique qui pouvait être en cause en
l'espèce.

16. Quoique, commeje viens de l'indiquer, la logique du présentarrêt
semble elle-mêmeconduire à la conclusion que l'Italie avait un intérêt
d'ordre juridique pouvant êtreen cause en l'espèce, la Cour rejette la
requêtede l'Italie à fin d'intervention. Le motif essentiel de cette décision
semble êtrece que la Cour considère comme l'absence d'un lienjuridic-

tionnel entre l'Italie et les Parties principaleà l'affaire;mais un autre
motif est que ce que recherchait l'Italie n'aurait pas étéune véritable
intervention, au sens de l'article 62.A cet égard, laCour fait observer que
l'Italieaelle-mêmeadmisque,si un Etat cherche àintervenir pour affirmer
un droit équivalant à une demande principale, sa requête ne rentre pas
dans le cadre de l'article 62. Or, selon elle,

rien dans l'article 62 n'indique que ce texte ait été conçu commeun
autre moyen de saisirlaCourd'un litige supplémentaire ..ou comme
un moyen de faire valoir les droits propres d'un Etat non partie à
l'instance )).

Et la Cour, considérant que l'Italie recherchait en fait quelque chose de
plus quela sauvegarde de sesdoits - qu'elleavançait desprétentions, afin
de faire reconnaître ses droits -, conclut qu'elle peut rejeter la requête
italienne pour la raison que celle-cinevisait pas une intervention véritable,
au sens de l'article62.
17. Le défautde cette analyse est que la requêtede l'Italie, même sil'on
admet à titre d'hypothèse qu'elle avançait desprétentionscontre lesParties
principales, ne donnait pas naissance à un différendsupplémentaire,si ce
n'est qu'un litige entre deux parties serait devenu un litige entre trois
parties. Mais comment concevoir une intervention sans tierce partie ?

Ainsi lefait que l'Italie intervînt ne pouvait en soi placer la requêtede cet
Etat hors du cadre de l'article 62. La question est plutôt de savoir s'il
s'agissait d'une intervention véritable,au regard du critère fondamental
énoncédans l'affaire Haya de la Torre : "every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case ; it
follows that a declaration filed as an intervention only acquires that
character, in law, if it actually relates to the subject-matter of the
pending proceedings" (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 76).

The Italian application is addressed to some of the very areas of conti-
nental shelf which are in dispute between Malta and Libya and to the
dispute over their delimitation. Thus it "actually relates to the subject-
matter of the pending proceedings". It is "incidental" to those proceed-
ings,intimatelyrelated asit is to the existing dispute between theprincipal
Parties. Accordingly, the Italian intervention is well within the ambit of
Article 62. It would be otherwise if Italy sought to make claims against
Malta and Libya whichwereunrelated to thesubject-matter of thepending

proceedings ;that would not be intervention at all. But clearly that is not
the fact. That Italy makes claims of itself is not enough to justify the
Court's conclusion that what it seeks is not genuine intervention. On the
contrary, what Italy seeks is intervention of a classic kind. The Court's
virtually unsupported conclusion that it is not intervention within the
meaning of the Statute isnotjustified by theterms of the Statute, and finds
scant support in the travauxpréparatoiresof Article 62or, for that matter,
in the institution of intervention as it is understood in the general prin-
ciplesoflawrecognizedby civilizednations.Nor isit easyto reconcilewith
the Court's Judgment of 1981 rejecting Malta's application. A primary
ground of that Judgment was that Malta's application was inadmissible
because it refrainedfromplacing Malta'sclaims in issue.But in the instant
case,the Court rejects Italy's application on theground that, sinceit places
Italy's claims against Malta and Libya in issue, it is not genuineinterven-
tion.

18. SinceItaly seekspermission to intervenein order to defend claimsto
certain continental shelf zones to which Malta and Libya lay claim the
Court's Judgment holdsthat in realityItaly seeksto assert claimsand thus
establishrightsagainsttheprincipalParties. From ths itdeduces that Italy
seeks to intervene as a party claimant in a dispute with the principal
Parties, with the result that, unlikethe Malta case,it isnecessary to decide,
not "in general", but on the facts of this case, whether the existence of a
valid link ofjurisdiction with theprincipal Parties is an essentialcondition
for the granting of permission to intervene.The Court concludesthat it is.
The remainder of ths dissent will consider this superveningquestion.

19. It is beyond dispute that the Court'sjurisdiction invariably isbased <(toute intervention est un incident de procédure ;par conséquent,
une déclaration déposée à fin d'intervention ne revêt,en droit, ce
caractèreque sielle a réellementtrait à cequi est l'objet de l'instance
en cours >(C.Z. Re cueil 1951, p. 76).

Or la requête italienneportait sur certaines des zones mêmesde plateau
continentalquesedisputent Malte etla Libye,et sur ledifférendrelatif à la
délimitationde ces zones. Donc elle avait <réellementtrait à ce qui est
l'objet de l'instance en cours )).Et c'était bienun tincident >) de cette

procédure,puisqu'elle était intimement liéeau différendactuel entre les
Partiesprincipales. Par conséquent, l'interventionitaliennerentrait dans le
cadre del'article62.Iln'enserait pas allédemêmesil'Italie avait cherché à
faire valoir contre Malte et la Libye des prétentions sans relation avec
l'objetdel'instance encours ;dans une tellehypothèse,cen'eûtpas étéune
intervention. Mais ce n'est manifestement pas le cas. Que l'Italie eût elle
aussi énoncé des prétentionsn'autorisait paslaCour à conclure que ceque
recherchait l'Italie ne constituait pas une véritableintervention. Au con-
traire, l'Italie recherchait précisémentune intervention de type toutà fait

classique. La conclusion pratiquement non motivée de la Cour selon
laquelleilne s'agissaitpasd'une intervention,au sensduStatut, ne découle
pas destermes decelui-ci,et n'estpasjustifiéepar lestravaux préparatoires
de l'article62,ni d'ailleurspar l'institution del'intervention tellequ'ilfaut
l'entendre en vertu des principes générauxde droit reconnus par les
nations civilisées.D'autre part, il n'est pas facile de concilier cette con-
clusion avecl'arrêtde la Cour de 1981rejetant la requêtede Malte. Un des
motifs essentiels de cet arrêt étaiten effet que la requêtede Malte était
irrecevable parce que Malte s'abstenait d'ymettre enjeu ses prétentions.

Or, dans la présente affaire,la Cour rejette la requête italienne pour le
motif que,parce qu'ellemetenjeu lesprétentionsde l'Italiecontre Malte et
la Libye, elle ne constituerait pas une véritableintervention.

18. L'Italie ayant demandé à intervenir pour défendre ses prétentions
sur certaines zones de plateau continental revendiquéespar Malte et la

Libye, la Cour considère dans son arrêtque l'Italie veut en réalitéfaire
valoir ces prétentions et fonder ainsi ses droits contre les Parties princi-
pales. Elle en déduitque l'Italie chercheà intervenir en tant que partie
demanderesse dans un litige avec les Parties principales, de sorte que,
contrairement aucasdelademande d'intervention de Malte, ilfaut décider
ici, non pas <en général >)mais sur la base des faits de l'espèce,si l'exis-
tence d'un lienjuridictionnel valable avec lesdites Parties principales est
unecondition essentiellepour admettre l'intervention. Acettequestion, la
Cour répond par l'affirmative. Le reste de mon opinion sera consacrée à
l'examen de cette question.

19. Ilest incontestable quela compétencedela Cour estinvariablement upon the consent of theparties impleaded before it.TheCourt's Judgment
in this case holds that such a consensual title of jurisdiction cannot be
found in the terms or intendment of Article 62. Accordingly, the Court
infers that a State seekingto intervene must do so either with the assent of
both of the principal parties to the case, or it must show a separate title of
jurisdiction manifesting an earlier consent of the principal parties to liti-
gate withit. Thisis a conclusion which theCourt has reached in the light of
"primarily the principle of consent, but also the principles of reciprocity
and equality of States". An exception to these principles "could not be
admitted unless it were veryclearly expressed". While there is much to be
saidfor theCourt's position, there are cogent considerations which cut the

other way.

20. Article 62 of the Statute provides that the Court shall decide upon a
request to intervene, having regard to :

(a) whether the State seeking to intervene "has an interest of a legal
nature" whch
(b) "may be affected by the decision in the case". There is no further
provision, such as
(c) "provided that the State seeking to intervene establishes a title of
jurisdiction with each of the principal parties to the case".

The essenceof the problem then isto decidewhether Article 62ofitself can
and does provide the Court withjurisdiction to admit a request for inter-
vention, or whether intervention can be granted only if the intended
intervener can demonstrate a separate and express title of jurisdiction.

21. It should initially be observed that, where the Statute means to
prescribe a specific title of jurisdiction, it does so expressly. Thus, Arti-
cle 53 of the Statute, which, likeArticle 62, is found in Chapter III, "Pro-
cedure", provides :

"1. Whenever one of theparties does not appear before the Court,
or fails to defend its case, the other party may cal1upon the Court to
decide in favour of its claim.
2. The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only that it
hasjurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that
the claim is well founded in fact and law."

By way of instructive contrast, Article 62 does not provide that, before
deciding upon arequest for permission to intervene, the Court shallsatisfy
itself "not only that it hasjurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and
37 .. .".
22. On theface of it, the "plain meaning" of Article 62rather is that no
separate title ofjurisdiction is required. That was the conclusion reached
some 25years ago by that most subtle of analysts, SirGerald Fitzmaurice,
in the article earlier cited, at page 124 :fondéesurleconsentement des partiesestant devant elle.Dans sonprésent
arrêt,la Cour considèrequ'un teltitre de compétence consensuelneressort
ni de la lettre ni de l'esprit de l'article 62. Elleen déduitdonc qu'un Etat

désireux d'intervenir doit, ou bien le faire avec l'assentiment des deux
parties principales àl'instance, ou bien justifier d'un titre de compétence
distinct établissant que lesdites parties principales ont antérieurement
consenti à plaider avec cet Etat. La Cour arrive à cette conclusion à la
lumière <en premier lieu [du]principe du consentement, mais aussi [des]
principes de réciprocitéet d'égaliteé ntre lesEtats ;et une exception àces

<principes fondamentaux à la base de sa compétence ..ne pourrait être
admise que si elle étaitclairement exprimée ))S'ily a beaucoup à dire en
faveur de la position ainsi adoptéepar la Cour, il y a aussi de puissants
arguments militant en sens contraire.
20. L'article 62du Statut disposeque, pour statuer surunerequête àfin

d'intervention, la Cour examine :
a) si l'Etat qui demande à intervenir a <(un intérêtd'ordre juridique >),

qui
b) <(est pour lui en cause >)dans le différend.Il ne contient pas d'autres
dispositions, et il n'y est pas demandé,par exemple,
c) <(que 1'Etatqui demande à intervenir établisse l'existenced'un lien de
juridiction avec chacune des parties à l'instance principale )).

Le problème est donc de décidersi l'article 62 à lui seul peut donner - et

donne effectivement - compétence à la Cour pour admettre unerequête à
fin d'intervention, ou si l'intervention ne peut êtreadmise que lorsque
l'intervenant éventueljustifie d'untitre de compétencedistinct et spéci-
---1~.
21. On notera toutd'abord que, lorsque leStatut entendstipuler un titre
de compétence spécifique,il lefait en termes exprès. C'est ainsique l'ar-

ticle53 - qui, comme l'article 62,faitpartie duchapitre III, c Procédure ))
- dispose :

<(1. Lorsqu'une desparties ne seprésentepas, ou s'abstient defaire
valoir ses moyens, l'autre partie peut demander à la Cour de lui
adjuger ses conclusions.
2. La Cour, avant d'yfaire droit, doit s'assurer non seulement
qu'elle a compétence aux termesdes articles 36 et 37, mais que les

conclusions sont fondées en fait et en droit. ))

11est instructif de constater que l'article62,lui, ne stipule pas qu'avant de
statuer sur une requête à fin d'intervention la Cour doit s'assurer << non
seulement qu'elle a compétence aux termes des articles 36 et 37 ...>)

22. A premièrevue, le <(sens clair ))de l'article 62 serait qu'il n'estpas

besoin d'un titre de compétence spécial. Telleest la conclusion à laquelle
étaitparvenueily aquelquevingt-cinq ansleremarquableanalysteque fut
sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, dans l'article citéplus haut, page 124 : "Thejurisdiction of the Court toentertain third-party intervention
is another example of incidentaljurisdiction, the generalcharacter of
which has already been consideredin connection with the indication
of interim measures, and equally arisesfrom the existence of express

provisions of the Statute whichconfer thisjurisdiction upon theCourt
and allow it to be exercised independently of the specific consent of
the parties."
23. Another eminent student of the Court, who, like Fitzmaurice, was

later to be elected a member of the Court, reached a similarconclusionin
his classic treatise, The Permanent Courtof International Justice (1934).
Professor Manley O. Hudson concluded :
"Article 36 of the Statute provides four sources of the Court's
jurisdiction ... Severaladditional articles of the Statute relate to the
exercise of jurisdiction incidental to that conferred : thus, Article

41 ... Article 48 ... Article53 .. .Articles 60 and 61 ... Intervention
as provided for in Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute may be said to
constitute an independent source of the Court's jurisdiction. Under
Article 63,aStatehasa right tointervene ... under Article 62,itrests
with the Court to Saywhetherintervention willbe permitted, and the
Court should only admit such intervention if, in its opinion, the
existenceof an 'interest of alegalnature which may be affected by the
decision' in the pending case, is sufficientlydemonstrated."

"Intervention.Quite apart from the sources ofjurisdiction set out in
Articles 36 and 37of the Statute, the Court may acquire contentious
jurisdiction as a result of a State's intervention under Article 62 or
under Article 63 . ..Article 62 was drafted when it was proposed to
confer on the Court a general obligatoryjurisdiction ; though that

proposa1was rejected, no limits were setfor theapplication of Article
62.If two States are before the Court by reason of declarations made
under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute, it seems a derogation
from the condition of reciprocity therein laid down to allow a third
State whichhasmade no similardeclaration to become aparty totheir
caseupon its ownmotion ;yet theproblem isnot essentially different
if two States are before the Court under a special agreement and a
thrd State which is not a party to the agreement seeks to intervene.
Thejurisprudence of the Court has not set additional conditions for
the application of Article 62." (At pp. 360, 369 and 370.)

24. Similarly, Professor Hans Kelsen - of whose authonty nothing
need be said - concluded :

142 PLATEAU CONTINENTAL (OP. DISS. SCHWEBEL) 141

(La compétencede la Cour pour connaître des interventions des

Etats tiers est un autre exemple de juridiction incidente, dont les
caractères générauxont déjà été étudiés à propos de l'indication de
mesures conservatoires, et découlent égalementde l'existencede dis-
positions expresses du Statut qui attribuent cettejuridiction à la Cour
et lui permettent de l'exercer indépendamment du consentement
exprès des parties. )>

23. Manley O.Hudson, autre éminent spécialiste de la Cour (commesir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, ildevait par la suitey siéger),arrivait àune conclusion
analogue dans son traitéclassique, The Permanent Courtof International
Justice (1934) :

(<L'article 36 du Statut prévoit,pour la Cour, quatre sources de
compétence ...Plusieurs autres articles du Statut visent, en outre,
l'exercice d'une juridiction incidente à celle qui est conférée à la
Cour : par exemple, l'article 41 ...l'article 48 ... l'article 5...les
articles 60 et 61 ...L'intervention, telle qu'elle est prévueaux ar-

ticles62et 63 du Statut, peut êtreconsidérée commeconstituant une
source indépendantedejuridiction pour la Cour. Aux termes de I'ar-
ticle 63, un Etat a le droit d'interveni...aux termes de l'article 62,il
appartient à la Cour de dire si l'intervention peut êtreautoriséeet la
Cour ne doit admettre cette intervention que si l'existence d7<u<n
intérêt d'ordre juridique [qui]est en cause )>lui paraît suffisamment
établie. ))

<Intervention. Indépendamment des sources dejuridiction consti-
tuéespar les articles 36 et 37 du Statut, une juridiction en matière

contentieuse peut êtreconférée à la Cour du fait del'intervention d'un
Etat, sur la base de l'article 62 ou de I'article 63 ...L'article 62 fut
rédigé à un moment où il était proposéde conférer à la Cour une
juridiction obligatoire de caractère général ;bien que cette proposi-
tion ait étérejetée,aucune limite ne fut mise à l'application de l'ar-
ticle 62. Si deux Etats se présentent devant la Cour, à raison de
déclarationsfaites en vertu de l'alinéa2 de l'article 36 du Statut, il
semblequece soitdéroger à lacondition de réciprocitéq , ui estinsérée
dans cette disposition, que depermettre à un Etat tiers qui n'apasfait
une déclaration semblable, de devenir partie en cause sur sa propre

initiative;cependant, le problèmene seprésentepassous une forme
essentiellementdifférentedans lecasoù deux Etats viennent devant la
Cour en vertu d'un compromis et qu'un Etat tiers, qui n'estpaspartie
àcecompromis, cherche àintervenir. Lajurisprudence de la Cour n'a
pas ajoutéde condition supplémentaire, en matière d'application de
lkrticle 62.))(P. 420-421 et 432-433.)

24. De même,Hans Kelsen, dont l'autoritén'a pas à êtrerappelée,
concluait :142 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS.OP. SCHWEBEL)

"No state can be forced into Court against its will.But that doesnot
mean that a state can be party to acasebefore the Court only together
with that state(or those States)with which it has - either specially or
generally - agreed upon referring the case to the Court. For Articles
62 and 63 of the Statute provide :[quoting the terms thereof]

If the Court grantsthe request submitted by a state under Article 62,
or if a state uses its right to intervene under Article 63, the state
concerned becomes a party to the pending case although there exists
no special or general agreement between this state and the other
parties to the case." (The Law of the United Nations, 1950,p. 522.)

25. Most recently, the President of the International Court of Justice
wrote with respect to the "argument that Article 62 should not be read in
isolation7'the following :

"This may be so,but readingit within thecontext of the Statute asa
whole, including Article 36, must involve not only reading Article 62
(1)above as subject to Article 36,but also to reading it asintended to
be regarded asapart fromand independent of Article 36.If this were

not so, and Article 62 (1) were to be read subject to Article 36,what
would have been more natural than to make the issue of intervention
subject to compulsoryjurisdiction in, Say,a subsection (7) of Article
36 ? Indeed, a cross-reference to Article 36might have been included
in Article 62, making it clear that compulsoryjurisdiction as envis-
aged in Article 36isreallyintended to apply in the caseof contentious
proceedings no less than in the case of intervention. For example,
Article 53 of the Statute, dealing with the problem of the non-
appearingdefendant, contains a specific reference to Articles 36 and

37in thesewords : 'TheCourt must,beforedoing so,satisfy itself,not
only that it hasjurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36and 37,but
also that the claim is well-founded in fact and law' 9. It is clearly no
answer to Saythat it isbecause the defendant State is absent in such a
casethat this specificreference toArticles 36and 37hasbeeninserted.
The Statute really requires the issue ofjurisdiction and stipulates it
expressly." (T. O.Elias, "The Limits of the Right of Intervention in a
Case before the International Court of Justice", Festschriftfür Her-

mann Mosler, 1983,pp. 163-164.)
"Wherever the Statute requires to be specific, it often does so by cross-
references ; e.g., reference in Art31l(6) to Articles 217 (2),20 and 24,
emphasizing the conditions necessary to be fulfilled by ad hocjudges in order to
entitle them to be put on terms of complete equality with their colleagues."

26. Nevertheless. despite the contrast between the terms of Articles 53
and 62, and despite the conclusions not only of the foregoing authorities <(Nul Etat ne peut êtrecité devantla Courcontre savolonté.Mais
celane signifiepas qu'un Etat nepuisse êtrepartie à une affaire portée
devant la Cour que conjointement avec l'Etat, ou les Etats, avec
lesquels il a acceptéd'ester, àtitre particulier ou en général. Eneffet
les articles 62 et 63 du Statut disposent :[suit le texte de ces deux

articles].
.............................
Si la Cour admet la requête présentép ear un Etat en vertu de I'ar-
ticle 62, ou si un Etat use de son droit d'intervenir en invoquant

l'article 63, YEtat en question devient partie à l'instance en cours,
mêmes'iln'existepas d'accord particulier ou générae lntre cet Etat et
les autres parties à l'instance.)>(The Law of the United Nations, 1950,
p. 522.)

25. Plus récemment,le Présidentde la Cour écrivaitce qui suit au sujet
de 1'<<rgument selon lequel l'article 62ne doit pas êtrelu isolément O:

Cela est peut-êtrevrai, mais, si on lit l'article 62dans le contexte
d'ensemble du Statut, y compris l'article 36, il ne suffit pas d'inter-
préterl'article62,paragraphe 1,dans sa subordination à l'article 36:
il faut aussi l'interpréter commeune disposition distincte et indépen-
dantedu mêmearticle 36.Sinon,et sil'article62,paragraphe 1,devait

êtreinterprétésous réservede l'article 36, n'aurait-il pas été naturel
de subordonner l'intervention à une compétence obligatoire, par
exempleen ajoutant un paragraphe 7 àl'article36 ? On aurait pu aussi
ajouter àl'article 62une référence àl'article36,afin de préciserque la
compétence obligatoireenvisagée à l'article 36 s'applique également
aux procédures contentieuses et à l'intervention. Par exemple, l'ar-
ticle53du Statut,traitant de la question du défendeurquifait défaut,

renvoie explicitement aux articles 36et 37 : <La Cour, avant d'yfaire
droit, doit s'assurer non seulement qu'elle a compétence aux termes
desarticles 36et 37mais que lesconclusions sont fondéesen fait et en
droit 1) 9Répondrequec'estparce que 1'Etatdéfendeurne seprésente
pas à l'instancequecette mention formelledes articles 36et 37figure à
l'article 53ne serait passuffisant :lefait estqueleStatut exigeque soit
considérée laquestion de la compétence,et leprévoit expressément. ))

(T.O.Elias, <The Limitsof the Right of Intervention in aCasebefore
the International Court of Justice )>,Festschriftfür Hermann Mosler,
1983,p. 163-164.)

((Quand leStatut veut êtreprécis,c'estsouventpar renvoi àd'autres, articles ;
paragraphe 2, 20 et 24, où sont indiquées lesconditions auxquelles doivent satis-
faire lesjuges ad hoc pour pouvoir êtreplacés en position d'égalité complètaevec
leurs collègues.

26. Or, malgréle contrasteentre les termes utilisésaux articles 53et 62,

et en dépit desconclusions des autoritésprécitéesa ,insi que des membres

143 143 CONTINENTAL SHELF (DISS. OP. SCHWEBEL)

but of judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice who are
quoted below,it isarguedthat Article 62must be interpreted inthecontext
ofthe Statute asawhole ;that apostulate of that Statute isthat theconsent
of States must be obtained in order for the Court to exercisejurisdiction
over them ;that theCourt'sjurisdiction isdealt with in another chapter, on

"Competence of the Court", essentially in another article,Article 36 ;and
accordinglythat an exercise ofjurisdiction by the Court where interven-
tionis sought must comport with Article 36regardless of the absence of an
express reference tojurisdictional requirements in Article 62. That is to
say, a requirement for ajurisdictional link must be read into the terms of
Article 62. If it is, the application of Italy must be denied because it has
failed to showthat Libya and Malta haveassented or speciallyagreed toits
intervention, or that the Court hasjurisdiction by the terms of a treaty or
convention in force or under the optional clause.
27. There is indeed no denyingnot only that Article 62must be read in
context but that it must be read consistently with Article 36 and the
fundamental postulate of consent of States to the exercise of the Court's
jurisdiction. It is precisely in appreciation of that position that it is con-
cluded that Article 62 of itself furnishes sufficient title ofjurisdiction to

intervene "in the case" - not to bring a new case in the guise of inter-
vention, but to intervene incidentally "in the case". This is so for the
following reasons.
28. Paragraph 1of Article 36provides that thejurisdiction of theCourt
"comprises.. . al1matters specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations .. ."Bythe terms of Article 92 of the Charter, the Court's
Statute "forms an integral part of the present Charter". The provision of
Article 62authorizingthe Courtto permit aStateto intervene which shows
that it has a legalnterest whichmay be affectedby the decision in the case
is one to which al1parties to the Statute have consented ;on its face, it
appears to empower the Court to permit a Stateto intervene which fulfils
only the conditions which that article specifies ; and thus consent to
jurisdiction is in this manner specially provided for in the Charter of the
United Nations. The fact that this special provision is not express in

respect ofjurisdiction does not show that it is not special.Indeed, other
articles of the Statute, such as Article 41 respectingprovisionalmeasures,
which afford the Court a limited,incidentaljurisdiction, do not expressly
refer to jurisdiction. But where in the Statute an irnplicit investment of
specialjurisdiction is thought not to suffice, as in Article 53, the Statute
makes express reference to the need for "jurisdiction in accordance with
Articles 36 and 37 .. .".
29. Moreover, thejurisdiction of the Court under Article 36,paragraph
1,also "comprises ... al1matters speciallyprovided for. ..in treaties and
conventions in force". By application of the foregoingreasoning, Article
62 equally provides specialprovision for the exercise of the Court's juris-
diction, for it is part of the Statute which indubitably is a treaty in
force.
30. If it be argued that provisions of the Statute outside of Chapter II de la Cour permanente qui seront cités plus loin, on fait valoir que l'ar-
ticle 62 doit être interprétdans le contexte général duStatut ; qu'un des
postulats du Statut est qu'il faut que les Etats aient donnéleur consente-
mentpour que laCour exercesajuridiction à leurégard ;quelajuridiction
de la Cour fait l'objet d'un autre chapitre, intitulé (<Compétence de la
Cour ))et surtout d'un autre article, l'article 36; et qu'en conséquence,
lorsqu'un Etat demande à intervenir, l'exercicede lajuridiction de la Cour
est soumis à l'article 36, même sil'article 62 ne mentionne pas expressé-
ment la nécessitéd'une base de compétence. Autrement dit, il faut lire
entre les lignes de l'article 62l'exigenced'un lienjuridictionnel. Et, s'ilen
est ainsi, la requête italienne doit êtrerejetéevu que l'Italie n'a établini

que la Libye et Malte avaient agréé ou expressémena tccepté son inter-
vention, ni que la Cour était compétenteen vertu d'un traité ou d'une
convention en vigueur, ou sur la base de la clause facultative.
27. Il est certes incontestable. non seulement aue l'article 62 doit être
interprétédans soncontexte, mais qu'ildoit êtreinterprété compte tenude
l'article 36 et du postulat fondamental du consentement des Etats à
l'exercicede lajuridiction de la Cour. Mais c'est précisémentpourquoije
conclusquel'article 62fournit en soiun titre decompétencesuffisantpour
autoriser l'intervention <<dans un différend - non pas l'introduction
d'un nouveaudifférend,mais l'intervention incidente dans ledifférend en

cours. Cette conclusion repose sur les considérations suivantes.
28. Leparagraphe 1del'article 36dispose quela compétencede laCour
(s'étend ...à tous les cas spécialementprévusdans la Charte des Nations
Unies 1).Or, aux termes de l'article 92 de la Charte, le Statut de la Cour
<fait partie intégrante n de la Charte. L'article 62, qui autorise la Cour à
admettre l'intervention d'un Etat justifiant d'un intérêtjuridiqueen cause
dans le différend,est donc une disposition à laquelle ont consenti tous les
Etats parties au Statut. Prise à la lettre, elle donneà la Cour le pouvoir
d'admettre l'intervention d'un Etat dèslorsquecelui-cisatisfaitauxcondi-
tions prévuesdans cet article ;et, de cette manière, le consentement à la

juridiction est spécialementprévuparlaCharte desNations Unies.Que si
cettedispositionparticulièren'affirmepas expressémentlacompétence de
la Cour, cela ne lui retire rien de son caractère particulier. D'ailleurs le
Statut contient d'autres articles - tel l'article 41, concernant les mesures
conservatoires - qui confèrent à la Cour une compétencelimitée et inci-
dente sans affirmer expressément cette compétence. C'est au contraire
dans les cas où une attribution implicite de compétencespécialene paraît
pas suffisante, comme à l'article 53,que le Statut proclame la nécessitéde
la (<compétence aux termes des articles 36 et 37 ..o.
29. De plus, lajuridiction de la Cour, aux termes de l'article 36, para-

graphe 1, (<s'étend à...tous lescasspécialementprévus ..dans lestraitéset
conventionsen vigueur )>L'application duraisonnementprécédentamène
donc à conclure que l'article 62 prévoit spécialementl'exercicede lajun-
diction de la Cour, puisqu'il fait partie du Statut, lequel est indubitable-
ment un traitéen vigueur.
30. L'argument selonlequel les dispositions du Statut, autres que celles and Article 36 cannot of themselves be read as authorizing the Court to
exercisejurisdiction, that argument is refuted not only by the plain mean-
ing and by the foregoing interpretation of Article 62 but by the terms of
Article 63. Under Article 63, a State has "the nght to intervene in the
proceedings" wheretheconstruction of aconvention to which such State is
party is in question in the case. But that right is not conditioned on a
demonstration of theCourt'sjurisdiction beyond that contained in Article
63itself.Thus anarticle outside of ChapterII and Article 36of the Statute,
which makes no express reference tojurisdiction, of itself provides suffi-
cient title ofjurisdiction. If Article 63does this, why cannot Article 6?It
is the more plausible that Article 62 does, linked in substance as it is to

Article 63.

31. Article 63 unconditionally authorizesintervention where the State
seeking it is party to a treaty. Thus even where such a State is party to a
treaty which contains provision(as in an annexedprotocol) for submission
totheCourt'sjurisdiction indisputes overthe interpretationor application
of the treaty, and that State and the parties to the principal case have not
adhered to the protocol, the Court apparently would havejurisdiction to
admit the intended intervenor to the case. If an additional jurisdictional
link need not be established in such an instance under Article 63, why,
again, must it be established under Article 62 ? Why should there be so
fundamental a cleavage between the application of conventional and of
general international law ?
32. It isrecognized that one may arguethat, sinceArticle 63provides for
"a right to intervene in the proceedings", whileArticle 62 provides that it
shall be for the Court to decide upon a State's request to intervene, the
"right" of intervention under Article 63is tantamount to an express grant
ofjurisdiction whereas the possibility of intervention under Article 62 is

not.This is a plausible but not a necessary construction of the two articles.
It is no less plausible to argue that Articles 62 and 63 equally accord the
Court jurisdiction to admit intervention, but that Article 63 speaks of a
"right to intervene" because al1that need be ascertained is that a State
which seeks to exercise that right is party to the convention whose con-
struction is at issue, whereas, under Article 62, the Court must decide
whetherthe State that requestspermission tointervene "has an interest ofa
legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case". Since the
Court necessarily must exercise its judicial appreciation of whether that
State meets those criteria, Article 62 could not speak of a "right" of
intervention.
33. It is difficult to accept the argument that the failure to specify a
jurisdictional link in Article 62 wasan oversight, that when the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice was drawn up originally, it
provided for universal compulsoryjurisdiction under Article 62, and that
when the Statute was revised before its adoption to provide for limited
jurisdiction in the terms contained in Article 36, its drafters neglected to
bring Article62 into express consonance with the intent of Article 36.As du chapitre II et de l'article 36,ne pourraient pas êtreinterprétéescomme
autorisant à elles seules la Cour à exercer sa juridiction, est réfuté non
seulement par le sens clair de l'article 62 et l'interprétation quivient d'en
êtredonnéem , ais aussi par la teneur de l'article63. En vertu de cet article,
en effet,un Etat a <(le droit d'intervenir au procès ))lorsque est en cause
l'interprétation d'une convention à laquelle il est partie. Or ce droit n'est

pas soumis àl'existenced'une base de compétenceautre que cellefournie
par l'article 63lui-même. Il existe donc un article,qui n'estpas l'article 36
du Statut, qui ne figure pas dans le chapitre II, qui n'affirme pas expres-
sémentlajuridiction delaCour, etquipourtant fournit àlui seulun titre de
compétence suffisant. Si cela est vrai de l'article 63, pourquoi pas de
l'article62?Uneréponseaffirmative à laquestion estencoreplusprobable
si l'on songe aux liens intimes qui existent entre ces deux textes.
31. L'article 63autorisesanscondition l'interventionlorsque 1'Etatqui

la demande est partie à un traité. Donc, mêmesi un Etat est partie àun
traité qui contient (par exemple, dans un protocolejoint en annexe) une
clause stipulant la soumission àla Cour des différendsrelatifs àson inter-
prétationou àson application, et sicetEtat etlespartiesà l'instanceprinci-
pale n'ontpas adhéré à ce protocole,la Cour apparemment a compétence
pour admettre l'intervention demandée.S'iln'ya pas lieu dejustifier d'un
lienjuridictionnel supplémentairedans cecasd'application de l'article63,
pourquoi,je le répète,cela serait-il nécessairedans le cas de l'article 62?

Pourquoi y aurait-il un clivage aussi fondamental entre l'application du
droit conventionnel et l'application du droit international général ?
32. On peut certes soutenirque l'article63prévoit (ledroit d'intervenir
au procès >)alors qu'aux termes de l'article 62 c'estla Cour qui décidede
l'admissibilitéde la requête,et quepar conséquent le droit ))d'intervenir
en vertu del'article 63équivaut à une attribution expressede compétence,
ce qui ne serait pas le cas de la possibilité d'intervention envisagée à
l'article62. C'estlà une interprétation plausiblede ces deux articles, mais

non pas convaincante. Et l'on peut soutenirde façon tout aussi plausible
que les articles 62 et 63 confèrent égalementcompétence à la Cour pour
admettre l'intervention ; que, si l'article 63 parle d'un droit d'interve-
nir >>c,'est qu'iln'ya rien d'autreàétablir dansce casque la participation
de 1'Etatintervenant à la convention dont l'interprétationest enjeu, alors
aA , dans le cas de l'article 62. la Cour doit décider si 1'Etatdemandant à
intervenir a ((dans un différend,un intérêtjuridique [qui]est pour lui en

cause ));et que, comme la Cour doit nécessairement exercer son pouvoir
judiciairepour décidersi1'Etatenquestionsatisfait à cesdernierscritères,
l'article 62 ne pouvait pas parler d'un << droit>)d'intervenir.
33. Il n'est pas plus facile de se ranger à l'opinion qui voudrait que
l'absence de référence à un lien juridictionnel dans l'article 62 soit le
résultatd'un oubli ; que, dans sa première rédaction,le Statut de la Cour
permanente de Justice internationale prévoyait à l'article 62 une juridic-
tion obligatoire universelle;et que, au moment de la revision du Statutqui

précédason adoption, lorsque prévalut laconception de la compétence
limitéetelle qu'on la trouve à l'article 36,les rédacteursdu Statut auraient shownby the debates amongjudges at the outset of the Court's lifein 1922,
this theory, while advanced by one judge of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, was denied by others in no less a position to know
than he who supported it. Moreover, if the theory ever was credible, it can
nolonger be,inviewofthe fact that the Statute wascarefullyexamined and
somewhat revised in 1945.Article 62 itself was the subject of revision ;
three words weredeleted from its Englishtext. Can it besupposedthat, ifit

were the understanding or apprehension, in the years preceding, that
Article 62 contained an oversight, it would not have been corrected in the
course of the 1945revision of the Statute ?Furthermore, it isunpersuasive
to arguethat Article 62 was not revised to take account of the rejection of
general compulsoryjurisdiction in 1920and 1945because it was assumed
that Article 62 of itself contained no title ofjurisdiction. That argument
runs counter to views expressed in the Permanent Court of International
Justice both by Judge Altamira, who was the source of the claim that
Article 62 had not been revised through oversight, and of those several
judges who maintained that Article 62 of itself grants the Court jurisdic-
tion.
34. Whiletheearly debates among thejudges of thePermanentCourt of
International Justice demonstrate sharply divergent and prescient views
on theproblems of ajurisdictional link, it is significant that the President

of theCourt at that initialjuncture terminated debate on the question with
the following ruling :
"The President stated that hecould not takea vote upon a proposa1
the effect of which would be to limit the right of intervention (as
prescribed in Article 62) to such States ashad accepted compulsory

jurisdiction. If a proposa1 in this sense were adopted, it would be
contrary to the Statute." (Preliminaiy Session of the Court, Seven-
teenth Meeting, 24 February 1922,p. 96.)
35. To read into Article 62 an additional requirement of jurisdiction
could in practice confinetheinstitution of intervention to marginal limits.

There is no reason to believe that the drafters of the Statute meant to
restrict intervention to the unlikely circumstances in which the intervenor
could establish - apart from the terms of Article 62 - a basis of juris-
diction with each of theprincipal parties to the case. On the contrary, the
institution of intervention was regarded as having significant potential. In
Court exchangesin 1922,Lord Finlay went so far as to Saythat, ". ..it was
thanks to the existence of this Article that some States had accepted the
Statute of theCourt" (and he said this in opposinga proposa1to condition
reliance upon Article 62 upon a showing ofjurisdiction, a proposa1which
Judge John Bassett Moore then said "amounted to a proposa1 for the
amendment of Article 62 of the Statute" which was "quite inadmissible7')
(Seventeenth Meeting, foc. cit., pp. 94, 95). The Court should not now
prejudice that potential by imposing ajurisdictional condition on Article
62 which its terms do not contain.omis de modifier l'article 62 pour le mettre en harmonie avec l'article 36.
Commelemontrent lesdébatsqui eurent lieuau sein dela Cour dès 1922,
cettethéorie,avancéepar un desmembres delaCourpermanente,avaitété
contestéepar d'autres,tout aussi bien informésde la question. De plus, si
jamais cettethéoriefut soutenable, ellenel'estplusmaintenant, puisquele
Statut a étésoigneusement examinéetlégèrementmodifiéen 1945.L'ar-
ticle 62 lui-mêmea étérevisé : trois mots ont été ôtés du texte anglais.
Faut-il croire que, tout en supposant ou craignant jusqu'alors que l'ar-

ticle62présentait une lacune,on n'eût pas profité de la revision du Statut
de 1945pour combler cette lacune ? Ou bien faut-il penser que, si l'ar-
ticle62n'apasété revisédefaçon à tenir comptedu rejet dela compétence
obligatoiregénéraleen 1920et en 1945,c'est qu'ilétait admisque cet ar-
ticle 62 ne conféraitpar lui-mêmeaucune compétence ? Un tel argument
serait contraire aux vues expriméesau sein de la Cour permanente, qu'il
s'agissede M.Altamira,qui fut lepremier à soutenir que lanon-revisionde

l'article62 venait d'un simpleoubli, ou desjuges qui affirmaient que l'ar-
ticle 62 était parlui-mêmeattributif de compétence.

34. Compte tenu de ces premiers débats entreles membres de la Cour
permanente, qui traduisent des divergences d'opinion très marquées et
laissentprévoirlesproblèmesliés à la question du lienjuridictionnel, ilest
significatif que le résultat finalfut la décisionsuivantedu Présidentde la
Cour :

(Le Président déclarequ'il ne pourrait pas mettre aux voix une
proposition tendant à limiter le droit d'intervention, aux termes de
l'article 62, aux seuls Etats ayant acceptéla juridiction obligatoire.
Cette proposition, si elle étaitacceptée,irait, en effet, à l'encontre

du Statut. )) (Sessionpréliminairede la Cour, dix-septième séance,
24 février1922,p. 96.)
35. Interpréter l'article62comme sous-entendant une exigencesupplé-

mentaire de compétenceserait,enpratique, limiterl'intervention au point
de la rendre marginale. Or rien ne permet de penser que les auteurs du
Statut aient voulu restreindre l'intervention au cas - peu probable - où
l'intervenant peut établirl'existenced'un lien dejuridiction avecchacune
despartiesprincipales,enplus deceluiquefournit cet article.Aucontraire,
l'institution de l'intervention était considérée comme ouvrant de larges
possibilités.Au coursdes débatsde 1922,lord Finlay allajusqu'à affirmer
que ((c'[est]grâceà l'existencedecetarticlequecertains Etats[ont] accepté

le Statut de la Cour ))(cela dit en réponse à une proposition tendant à
subordonner lerecours àl'article62à ladémonstrationdel'existenced'une
base de compétence,proposition qui, selon John Bassett Moore (([équi-
valait]à une proposition d'amender l'article 62 du Statut )),ce qui était
((inadmissible ))(loc.cit.dix-septièmeséance, p.94 et 95). La Cour ne
devrait pas maintenant compromettre cespossibilitésen soumettant l'ap-
plication de l'article 62à une condition de compétence quine figure pas

dans ses dispositions. 36. The terms of Article 81, paragraph 2 (c),of the most recently
adopted version of the Rules of Court were not intended to introduce and
do not introduce ajurisdictional requirement where none existed before.
The Rules of Court could not of courseprescribe, as of 1978,a condition
not contained, expressly or impliedly, by the governingprovisions of the
Statute. Paragraph 2 (c)of Article 81of the Rules of Court recognizes this

by providing for the specification of "any basis of jurisdiction which is
claimed to exist as between the Stateapplying to interveneand theparties
to the case". The Court acted with deliberationin purposefully specifying
"any" basis of jurisdiction rather than "the" basis of jurisdiction. In so
doing, the Court meant to avoid prejudging and did not prejudge the
question of whether a title of jurisdiction is a necessary precondition of
intervention under Article 62.Itsintention wasmerely to draw attentionto
the point and to ensure that a State which could indicate such a title of
jurisdiction should so inform the Court. This is demonstrated by the
unequivocal statements which the then President of the Court and the
Chairman of the Rules Comrnittee made when the Rule was introduced,

debated and adopted by the Court. Thus to treat Article 81, paragraph 2
(c),of the Rules as informativerather than conditional is not to make it -
as was claimed in the oral hearingon Italy's application - "meaningless",
contrary to the canons of interpretation. Rather, it is to give it the exact
meaning which the drafters of that provision intended.

37. Finally,there is thequestion ofwhether a title ofjurisdiction in case
of intervention beyond that accorded by Article 62is ever required. It was
suggested by counsel for Italy that, if ever required, it would be not in a
truly incidental case of intervention such as Italy's but where, under the
guise of intervention, a State seeks to bring a new "mainline case" - to
bringits own claimsagainsttheprincipalparties to the case.The Courthas

seizedupon this suggestion to hold that Italy actually does seek a decision
on therights ithas claimed againsttheprincipalPartiesand that, therefore,
a specific title of jurisdiction is required.

38. It is believed that in this the Court isinerror. It may not bewrong to
conclude that Italy seeks to assert it own claims when it places its defence
of Italian interestsin specifiedzones of thecontinental shelf "at stake" ; at
any rate, that is arguable. But the Court is on doubtful ground in holding
that, if Italy does so, it is seeking a decision on claims which are not
incidental to the proceedingsin the case and which thus require demon-
stration of a specifictitle ofjurisdiction. For, asobserved above, the object
of Italy's claims are areas of the continental shelf which already are in

dispute between the principal Parties. The new element which Italy seeks
to insert in thecase at barand to assert against its principal Parties is Italy,
i.e., Italy's very presence in the case ; instead of claims to the areas in
question being made before the Court by two States, they would, if Italy
were to be admitted, be made by three. It is of the essence of intervention
that three rather than two parties take part in the case. To hold that, by 36. Quant au paragraphe 2 c) de l'article 81 du Règlement de la Cour
dans sa version laplus récente,il n'avait pas pour but - et il n'a pas pour
effet - d'introduire une exigencequi n'existait pasjusqu'alors en matière
de compétence. D'ailleurs le Règlement nepouvait pas prescrire en 1978
une conditionqui n'étaitcontenue, ni expressémentniimplicitement,dans
les dispositionscorrespondantes du Statut. Et c'estbien ce qui ressort du
texteduparagraphe 2 c),qui dispose quelarequêtespécifie toutebase de
compétencequi, selonl'Etat demandant àintervenir, existerait entrelui et
lesparties o.En disant <(toute ))base decompétenceet non (la ))base de

compétence, laCour a fait preuve de circonspection. Elle a par là évité -
comme c'était sonintention - de préjuger laquestion de savoir si l'exis-
tence d'un titre de compétenceétait uneconditionpréalablede l'interven-
tion faite sur la base de l'article 62. Son seul but était d'attirer l'attention
des Etats sur ce point, de manière que les Etats capables d'indiquer à la
Cour un tel titre de compétence le fissent. C'est ce que démontrent les
déclarations sans ambiguïte du Présidentde la Cour et du président du
comitépour la revision du Règlement à l'époqueoù cet article du Règle-
ment fut proposé, discuté, puis adopté par la Cour. Voir dans le para-

graphe 2 c)de l'article 81 du Règlement une demande d'information, et
non pasunecondition, n'estdonc pas vider de son senscettedisposition et
aller contre les règlesde l'interprétation, comme il a étédit pendant les
audiences :c'est au contraire lui donner la signification exacte qu'ont
voulue ses rédacteurs.
37. On peut enfin se poser la question de savoir s'il estjamais besoin
d'un titre de compétencepour l'intervention, autre que le titrerésultant de
l'article 62lui-même. Selonles conseils de l'Italie, si un tel titre estjamais
requis, ce n'est pas dans un cas d'intervention véritablement incidente,
comme celledel'Italie, mais dans lecasoù, souscouvert d'intervention,un

Etat tenterait d'introduire une autre demande principale D, c'est-à-dire
de faire valoir sesdroits contre lesparties principales. Faisant sienne cette
idée.laCour a conclu aue l'Italiedemandait en réalitéune décisionsur les
droits qu'elle revendiquait contre les Parties principales, et que par con-
séquent un titre de compétencespécifiqueétaitnécessaire.
38. Je pense que la Cour fait erreur sur ce point. Il n'est peut-être pas
faux de dire que l'Italie voulait faire valoir ses prétentions quand elle
mettait enjeu la défensede sesinterérêtsdansdes zones de plateau conti-
nental déterminées
; c'est entout cas un point de vue défendable.Mais la
Cours'aventurebeaucoup en concluant que, cefaisant, l'Italie demandait
unedécisionsurdesprétentionsquin'étaient pasincidentes àlaprocédure
en l'instance, et qui exigeaient donc la démonstration de l'existence d'un
titre de compétence spécifique.En effet, comme je l'ai dit plus haut, ces
prétentions del'Italie avaientpour objet des zones de plateau continental
quisontdéjàen litige entre les Partiesprincipales. L'élémenn touveau que
l'Italie cherchaità introduire dans l'affaire en cours, et à défendrecontre
les Parties principales,n'était autre que l'Italie elle-même,c'est-à-dire la

présencede l'Italie en l'espèce ; au lieu de revendications présentées àla
Cour par deux Etats, ces revendications, si la requêtede l'Italie avait étéreason of its intervention and the claims on which it seeksdecision, Italy
would be bringing a claim which is new and thus outside the ambit of the
proceedings and the SpecialAgreement which has givenrise to them, and
that, accordingly, intervention must be debarred in the absence of the
principal Parties' consent or a specificjurisdictional link, seems tanta-
mount to holding that intervention regularly requires a showing ofjuris-
diction beyond that whch Article 62contains. At the sametime, theCourt
disclaims that conclusion and limits the requirement of a specific title of
jurisdiction to thefacts of Italy's intervention.That suggeststhat theremay
be instances of intervention in which a requirement of a specific title of
jurisdiction would not be imposed, for example, where theintervenor does
not assert claims against the principal parties.

39. In its Judgment rejecting Malta's application to intervene, theCourt
went far towards excluding what might be termed "non-party" interven-
tion. That was not a necessary holding but, on the facts of Malta's appli-
cation, itwasadefensibleholding.Now on thefacts ofthe casebeforeit the
Court proceeds to exclude intervention by a State as a party unless that
State can show what normally would render intervention unnecessary in
thefirst place :links ofjurisdiction with each of the principalparties to the
case. In these circumstances, the outlook for intervention in future cases
before the Court is beclouded. Apart from instances where the principal
partiesconsent to intervention, it appears to be confined tothe casewhere
a State, seeking to intervene as a party, and to bring claims within the
bounds of the case against the principal parties before the Court, at the
same time can, apart from Article 62, demonstrate a title of jurisdiction
with each of the principal parties to the case ; and, perhaps, to the case
where a State, seeking to intervene as a party, but lacking suchjurisdic-

tional links, does not assert claims (a case also unlikely to occur). In my
view,reducing Article 62 to such narrow and implausible confines isnotin
conformity with the terms of that article or with the intentions of the
drafters of theStatute. Whether, in fact,theCourt's Judgment in this case,
when taken togetherwith that rejecting Malta'sapplication, actually leaves
wider scope for intervention than appears is to be hoped, but it is not now
apparent.

(Signed) Stephen M. SCHWEBEL. admise, auraient étéprésentéespar trois Etats. Mais la présencede trois
parties, au lieu de deux, est l'essence mêmede l'intervention. Affirmer
qu'en raison de son intervention et des prétentions sur lesquelles elle
souhaitait une décision,l'Italieaurait introduit une demande nouvelle,qui

se serait donc situéehors du cadre du procès et du compromis en vertu
duquel celui-ciaété engagé,etqu'en conséquencecetteintervention devait
êtrerejetéefaute de consentement des Parties principales ou d'un lien
juridictionnel spécifique,équivaut àconsidérerque l'intervention nécessite
normalement la démonstration d'une compétence excédantles stipula-
tions de l'article 62.Cependant la Cour rejette cette conclusion et limitela
nécessitédu titre de compétencespécifiqueaux faits de la demande d'in-
tervention de l'Italie, cequi laissàpenser qu'il y aurait des cas d'inter-
vention où la démonstration de l'existenced'un titre de compétencespé-
cifique ne serait pas exigée,par exemple quand l'intervenant ne fait pas
valoir de prétentions contre les parties principales.

39. La Cour, dans l'arrêtpar lequel ellerejetait larequêtede Malteà fin
d'intervention, étaitalléefort loin vers l'exclusion de ce qu'on pourrait
appelerl'intervention de <non-partie ))Cetteattidude n'étaitpas la seule
logiquement possible,mais, surlabasedesfaits, elleétait défendable.Or, à
la lumière des faits de l'espècedont elle est maintenant saisie, la Cour
rejettel'intervention d'un Etat enqualitéde partieà moins que celui-cine
puisse démontrer précisément cequi rendrait l'intervention superflue :
l'existence d'un lienjuridictionnel avec chacune des parties principales.
Dans ces conditions, l'avenir de l'institution de l'intervention devant la

Cour semble bien menacé.Sauf consentement des parties principales, il
semble que le seul cas qui reste possible soit celui où 1'Etat désireux
d'intervenir en tant que partie et de faire valoir desprétentions contre les
parties principales dans les limites de leur procèspourrait aussi, indépen-
dammentde l'article62,démontrerqu'il possèdeun titre de compétence à
l'égardde chacune desdites parties ; et peut-êtrele cas où 1'Etat qui
souhaiteinterveniren tantque partie, maisnepeut seprévaloird'un tellien
juridictionnel, n'avancerait pas de prétentions (castout aussipeu vraisem-
blable). A mon avis, enfermer l'article 62dans des limites aussi étroiteset
peu plausibles n'est conforme ni aux termes de ce texte ni aux intentions
des auteurs du Statut. Quant à savoir si l'arrêtde la Cour en la présente
espèce,combinéavec l'arrêtpar lequel elle a rejeté larequêtede Malte,

laisse en fait subsister de plus larges possibilitésd'intervention qu'il ne
paraît, cela està espérer, mais n'estpas évidentaujourd'hui.

(Signé S)tephen M. SCHWEBEL.

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Document Long Title

Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel

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