Separate opinion of Judge Ago (translation)

Document Number
070-19860627-JUD-01-05-EN
Parent Document Number
070-19860627-JUD-01-00-EN
Document File
Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AG0

/Trunslurior~/

1. In the separate opinion which 1appended to the Judgment of 26 No-
vember 1984 on the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the
Application in the present case, 1explained why 1had felt able to vote in
favour of the findirig that the Court had "a jurisdiction in the present case
enabling it to proceed to examination of the merits", convinced as 1was

that sufficient warrant for this finding was to be found in the existence
between the Parties, under Article 36, paragraph 1. of the Statute of the
Court, of a valid and indisputable jurisdictional link, one contractually
and unchallengeably established in Article XXIV, paragraph 2, of the
bilateral treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded on

21 January 1956. On the other hand, 1 rejected the majority view of the
Court that another jurisdictional link between Nicaragua and the United
States of America existed under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
Here 1had reachedl mvconclusion - which 1feel bound to confirm. givun
the unshaken consitancy of my conviction on the matter - because, to my
mind. Nicaragua's alleged acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdic-

tion was not and had never become real. The intention manifested on the
subject in 1937 haid at no time materialized in the formal undertaking
which alone would have possessed legal force. It followed that no obliga-
tion had yet been accepted or even come into being on the date of the
extinction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, so therewas no
obligation which could be "maintained" after that date, since it is impos-

sible to maintain what does not yet exist. And if the obligation itself did not
exist, neither coultl it have any effects that might conceivably be trans-
ferred from the Permanent Court to its successor, the International Court
of Justice. In sum, Ihe declaration of acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction which had been made by the United States of America on

14August 1946 w,as not matched, as it indispensably had to be, by an
equally valid acceptance on the part of Nicaragua ; hence nojurisdictional
link could be founded on such a basis between the two States.
2. If the majority of the Court had in 1984adopted the same position as
certainjudges, the 1-esultin thepresent, meritsphase of the case would have
been that only actsthat might be regarded as breaches of obligations under

the Treaty of 21 January 1956 could be taken into consideration as acts
whereby the United States of America might have incurred international
responsibility towards Nicaragua. However, the situation is otherwise,
since the ma-jorityof the Court, in the 1984Judgment. approved and gave MlLITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. AGO) 182

pride of place to the idea that a jurisdictional link existed between the
Parties on the basis of the coincidence of two unilateral declarations

accepting the Court's compulsoryjurisdiction, both of which. and no less
that of Nicaragua than that of the United States, had in its view been
regularly made. Though somewhat reluctantly, 1have felt obliged to re-
spect the majority decision of the Court, which is now res judicata, and
accordingly to agrec:to reason in the present merits phase on the basis of

the supposition that when proceedings were instituted two different links
of jurisdiction existed between the Parties. Of those two links, the one
based upon the Optional Clause in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
was manifestly of wider scope and was bound to receive the main empha-
sis.

3. As it happens. my scruples in this connection have to some extent
been softened. though not entirely removed, on account of the recognition
by the majority of the Court, in the present phase, of the effect of the
restriction placed ori the acceptance of itscompulsoryjurisdiction through

the "multilateral treaty reservation", also known as the "Vandenberg
Reservation" from the name of the Senator who successfully presented it
for the approval of the United States Senate. Under that reservation, the
United States' acceptance of the Court's compulsoryjurisdiction did not
extend to :

"disputes arisirig under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) al1parties to
the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before

the Court. or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to
jurisdiction l".

4. In this conneclion. the Court, in its Judgment of 26 November 1984
on questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, had declared that the ob-
jection advanced by the United States of America with regard to the ex-
clusion from its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction under the Optional
Clause of "disputes arising under a multilateral treaty" raised a problem
"concerning matter:; of substance relating to the merits of the case". This

had led the Court to the conclusion that the objection did not possess an
"exclusively preliminary" character and could not in the circumstances
constitutean obstacle to its entertaining the merits of the case, given that
Nicaragua's Application did not solely complain of breaches of multila-
teral conventions biit also relied, quite apart from the bilateral treaty of

1956, on a number of principles of "general and customary international
law". In this, the merits phase, the Court has accordingly been entirely
consistent and proci:eded to examine the question raised by the Respon-
dent in its ob-jectiori.

'If 1make use solely of the original English text, this is because of the problerns of
interpretationto which .theFrenchtranslation in the UnitedNations Treaty Series rnight
give rise- problems which there is no ground for allowing any role in the case. 5. It is in paragraphs 42 ff. of the present Judgment that the Court has
given its ruling on the consequences arising from the United States' mul-
tilateral treaty resenration in thepresent case.In doing soit has reliedin the
main on the followirigtwopoints : (a)the originalsource of itsjurisdiction
to pass upon a dispute involving a particular State is always that State's
consent, which implies, inter alia, that any State accepting its compul-

soryjurisdiction under the Optional Clause is entirely free to restrict that
acceptance in any way it wishes and, more especially, to exclude disputes
arising out of certain categories of treaty ; (b)in the instant case, at least
one third State, nannelyEl Salvador, had to be considered as potentially
"affected" by any decision involvingtheapplication ofcertain multilateral
treaties including, but not limited to, the Charter of the United Nations
and that of the 0rg;anization of American States. The necessary conse-
quencewas that theapplication of thoseinstruments wasexcluded sofar as
the decision of this casewasconcerned. Thus the Court rightly rejected the
idea of setting up against the United States an interpretation of the
"Vandenberg Reservation" which would be manifestly different from the
one always advanced by that Party and reduce it to mere redundancy. It
can never be sufficiently emphasized that acceptance of the Court's com-
pulsoryjurisdiction on the basis of Article 36,paragraph 2, of its Statute is
a sovereign, voluntary act the effects of which are strictly confined to the

limits within which it was conceived and intended. The Court therefore
proceeded correctly in holding itself obliged to conclude that thejurisdic-
tion conferred upon it by the declaration of acceptance which the United
States made in 1946under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not
enable it to entertain the complaints submitted by Nicaragua concerning
the violation of the treaties in question. But at the same time and, in my
view,in perfect accord with its premises, it held that itsjurisdiction to pass
upon Nicaragua's complaints regardingthe violation by the United States
of obligations under rules proceeding from customary international lawor
the 1956 FCN Treaty remained intact.

6. Given the starting-point of the Court's reasoning, 1cannot but find
the conclusion it reached entirely correct. 1have also to acknowledge its
concem to uphold the independent existence in customary international
law of each of the rules it has applied in the case. Even so, 1am bound to

express serious reservations with regard to the seeming facility with which
the Court - while expressly denying that al1 the customary rules are
identical in content to the rules in the treaties (para. 175)- has neverthe-
less concluded in respect of certain key matters that there is a virtual
identity of content ,asbetween customary international law and the law
enshrined in certain majormultilateral treatiesconcluded on a universal or
regional plane. 1 am ready to agree with the Court that, so far as the basic
rule prohibiting use of force is concerned (para. 188),and even the rule
requinng respect for the territorial sovereignty of other States (para. 212),
there may be a close correspondence between unwntten general interna-
tional law and the written law embodied in the Charter. But 1 remainunconvinced that, for example, certain restrictive requirements on which

the Charter makes resort to self-defenceconditional arealso to be found in
customary international law. And 1am still inclined todoubt whether the
customary international law that exists not only at universal ' but also at
regional levelinthe Americashas alreadyendorsed al1the acluevements of
treaty law where the prohibition of intervention is concerned.1 am more-
over most reluctant to be persuaded that any broad identity of content
exists between the CrenevaConventions and certain "fundamental general
principles of humanitarian law", which, according to the Court, were
pre-existent in customary law, to which the Conventions "merely give
expression" (para. ;!20)or of which they are at most "in some respects a
development" (para. 218). Fortunately, after pointing out that the Appli-
cant hasnot reliedon the four GenevaConventions of 12August 1949,the
Court has shown caution in regard to the consequences of applying this
idea, which in itself is debatable.

7. There are, simiilarly,doubts which 1feel bound to express regarding
the idea which occasionally surfaces in the Judgment (paras. 191,192,202
and 203) that the acceptance of certain resolutions or declarations drawn
up in the framework.of the United Nations or the Organization of Ameri-
can States,as wellas in another context, can be seen asproof conclusiveof
the existence among the States concerned of a concordant opinij ouris
possessing al1the force of a rule of customary international law. 1 shall
confine myselfhere ltoa mereplacing of theseimpressions on record, while
emphasizing that such reservations as 1 might express on the points con-
cerned do not carry the implication that 1should disagree with the basic

findings of the Judgment.

8. Coming now to those aspects of the present case which more spe-
cificallyand exclusi~dyconcern the merits, 1would first point out that the
findings reached by theCourt in thepresentJudgment coincide in themain
with those which, from another angle, it had already adumbrated in its
Order of 10 May 1984on the request for provisional measures filed by
Nicaragua on 9 April of that year. Needless to Say,the present analysis is
developed at far greater length and the reasoning presented in order to
underpin the findings isfar more substantial. But the fact remains that the

acts which the Coui-t today considers should be imputed to the United
Statesof America art:the sameas thedecision on provisional measures had
succinctly mentioned, while, more particularly, the breaches of interna-

1am somewhat surprised at the assurance with which the Court in its Judgment
(para.202)has felt able to assert that "the existence injourisf States of the
principle ofon-intervention is backed by established and substantial practice". MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. AGO) 185

tional law which the Court now holds those acts to have constituted are
practically the sami: as already enumerated under B (1) and (2) in para-

graph 41 of the Order of 10 May 1984. The obligations now declared to
have been violated are virtually the same as those found to exist on that
previous occasion : the obligations not to intervene in the interna1 affairs
of another State, to refrain from any recourse to the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State,

to accord its territorial sovereignty full respect and not to disrupt or
endanger its maritime commerce. At the time, 1 voted knowingly and
conscientiously in favour of the decisions adopted by the Court on these
various points, and at the present juncture 1see no reason to do other-
wise.
9. Nevertheless, 1 cannot but be struck by the presence in the Judgment

now rendered - with of course my own participation - of certain aspects
in the appraisal of the factual and legal situation which are in my view
mutually inconsistent and appear to cal1 for some rectification.

10. The first concerns the perspective in which theJudgment appears to
place and envisage the case on which the Court was required to give its

decision. To my mind, it is impossible to grasp the overall, meaningful
reality of this case without keeping in view thefact that the soi1in which the
present dispute between Nicaragua and the United Statesgerminated, and
from which it sprarig, was compounded of a situation of civil strife, of
conflict within a State. Today also, this situation characterizes the present

case to a greater de,gree than appears to have been realized.

11. Not, of coursi:, that the Judgment completely ignores this situation.
Where the Court expresses its position with regard to the breaches of the
rules of humanitarian law committed in the instant case, it does indeed
point out (in para. 219) that :

"The conflict between the contras' forces and those of the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua is an armed conflict which is 'not of an interna-

tional character'. The acts of the contras towards the Nicaraguan
Government are therefore governed by the law applicableto conflicts
of that character ; whereas the actions of the United States in and
against Nicaragua fa11under the legal rules relating to international
conflicts."

This observation is certainly correct. 1readily acknowledge, moreover, that
in itsdescription of the various forms of aid and assistanceprovided by the
United States to the contra rebels, the Court has deliberately avoided

making use of certain expressions. proposed by the Applicant, which
would have given rise todangerous ambiguity, precisely in connection with
the question as to the international nature of the conflict between those
rebels and the forces of the Sandinist government. Thus the Court (in
paras. 113 and 114)has refused to go along with the Applicant's assertions
that the contra forces are mere bands of "mercenaries" recruited by the MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP.OP.AGO) 186

United States ofAmiericafor its own ends, or in other words that they are a
kind of foreign legion constituting an auxiliary body in the United States
armed forces. 1 mus.talso add that the very fact of construing the multi-
farious forms of assistance to thecontras asakind of unlawful intervention

by one State in the internal conflicts of another provides further evidence
that the Court has seen this essential aspect for what it is.

12. On theotherhand,in the Court's manner of presenting the two sides
in contention and, above all, the origins and causes of the internal conflict
that broke out in Nicaragua, it seems to me that the Judgment fails to
accord sufficient weight to the important changes that took place in that
country during the rnonths immediately following the fall of the Somoza
government. In saying this, it is not my intention to question the Judg-
ment's interpretation (in paras. 260-262) of the points included in the
"Plan to secure peace" that the coalescent anti-Somoza elements had
drawn up during the final stage of the liberation struggle against the
dictatorship and that the Junta of the Government of National Recon-
struction of Nicaragua had communicated to the Secretary-General of the

Organization of Annerican States in response to the resolution of the
XVIIth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
that Organization. Neither am 1here concerned to deny the finding that
thecommunication of this plan was merely a "political promise" devoid of
al1binding legalforc~ee,venthough 1stillhavesomedoubts inthat respect ;
for 1cannot understand how the Organization of American States member
governments could have agreed to adopt such an exceptional measure as
the withdrawal of re:cognitionfrom a government which, however dicta-
torial and hateful, was undeniably in charge and, from that angle, "legiti-
mate" unless they possessed a solid guarantee that it would be replaced by
agovernment offeririgthe precisecharacteristicsdefined in the peace plan,
oneof akind whichthe members of the Organization, with theexception of
the Somoza governrnent itself, al1hoped to see materialize.
13. What 1wishhere to stress issimplythefact that at the timewhen the
government which theJudgment itself,at the rare points whereit mentions

it, styles a "democratic coalition" (para. 18) "the democratic coalition
government" (para. 19)or "the Government of National Reconstruction"
(para. 167) took office in Managua it corresponded in its composition,
howeverprovisional that may have been, to the various points in the "Plan
to secure peace". It lwasonly later that matters changed. As 1have found
confirmed bymany piecesof testimony, and interaliaby accounts of avery
recent on-the-spot inquiry in Nicaragua ',the various political trends
whose adherents hacltaken part in the overthrow of the dictatorship were
indeed represented in the government initially resulting from the revolu-
tionary struggle.Thiijgovernment clearlystated itsintention of settingup a
stable régime characterized by democratic pluralism, political, economic

' See the articles entitled "Impressions du Nicarag,nd"IIby Jacques-Simon
Eggly,published in theJournal de Genèveon26and 27 May 1986.
176and trade-union freedom, and non-alignment in international relations.
Only later, and onliyafter a sudden change, did a government come to
power which was eltclusivelySandinist in complexion. That is to Say,the
new government which replaced the first towards the end of 1979 was
practically uniform in its make-up and followed a verydifferent line from
its predecessor in regard to domestic policy, the organization of industrial
and agriculturalproduction, trade-union policy, the structure of thearmed
forces, foreign policy and international relations. By reaction, this de-
velopment led to the formation of an opposition including elements from
some very disparate backgrounds, an opposition which gradually gained
ground despite being subjected to close surveillance and measures of

restriction. In thiscllimate,the elections organized by the government were
boycotted by the political parties which denied their democratic regular-
ity ;relations between the civilauthoritiesand thechurch worsened ;there
was a growing split between the traditional trade unions and those owing
allegiance to the government ; the conditions of the ethnic minorities
deteriorated. On account of the combination of these factors, various
groups belonging ta the trends opposed to the new régime leftthe country,
feeling driven to seek refuge in exile.As it happens, once in exile, the new
refugees felt reluctaintlyimpelled to seek the collaboration of the appar-
ently sparse rernnan.tsof the Somoza guard with a view to setting up a co-
alition of rebel forces capable of fighting in order to provoke a develop-
ment of the situation such as might enable them to return home in new
circumstances. But iihisturn of eventsshould not be allowed to obscurethe
fact that underlying the civilconflict in question there wasthedetermining
factor of a splitbetween the various components of the coalition that had
opposed the Somoz;îdictatorshipand brought about itsdownfall.Neither
must it be allowed to obscure the fact that the receipt by these refugees of
the massive and mi~ltifariousaid and assistance that was vital for their
action has not turned them into anything other than they were, has not

erased their identiti as part of the Nicaraguan people or rendered their
fight against the government of their country anything other than a civil
struggle. In my opinion, the Court could and should in its Judgment have
delved more deeply into this aspect for the sake of a better understanding
ofthe various facetsofthiscase,though in sayingthis 1have nointention of
seekingany substantial modifications in regard to the findings reached on
this subject.

III

14. The other aspect to which 1would like briefly to refer concerns the
question whether the various categories of acts the subject of the Appli-
cant's allegations are or are not imputable to the Respondent qua acts
giving rise to international responsibility.
15. Here 1consider that the findings of the Judgment, at least where MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP.OP. AGO) 188

certain acts are conicerned, merit unhesitating concurrence. Among the
accumulation of acts complained of by Nicaragua, the Court was entirely
right in returningan affirmativeanswer to the question of the imputability
to the Respondent of those which must undeniably be construed as the
conduct of United States agents or organs in the proper sense of those

terms. namely acts performed by persons or groups directly belonging to
the State apparatus of that countryand acting as such. TheCourt has done
well to add that where this conduct took place in the presence or with the
participation of persans or groups that cannot be so described (in the case
in point, contras) the presence or participation of the latter could not
change this finding in the slightest. This is in conformity with the provi-
sions of Article5 (Attribution to the State ofthe conductof its organs)of the

draft articles adopted on the subject by the International Law Commis-
sion. The Court was also right to consider as acts of the United States of
America the conduct of persons or groups that, without strictly being
agents or organs of that State, belong nevertheless to public entities
empowered within its domestic legal order to exercise certain elements of
the government autlîority. Here 1note conformity with the provisions of

Article 7(Attribution totheState ofthe conductofother entities empoweredto
exercise elements of the government authority) of the International Law
Commission's draft. The first of the two hypotheses here mentioned
applied in particular to conduct by members of the government admini-
stration or armed forces of the United States, and thesecond to activities of
members of the CIA, or of UCLAs or of other bodies of thi: same kind.
Although the Court has not outlined, as it would have been interesting

to do, any theoretical justification of its findings with regard to these
hypotheses, 1entirely share the view that they are well founded.

16. On the other hand, the negative answer returned by the Court tothe
Applicant's suggestion that the misdeeds committed by some members of

the contra forces should be considered as acts imputable to the United
States of America is likewise in conformity with the provisions of the
International Law C:ommission's draft '.It would indeed be inconsistent
with the principlesgoverning the question to regard members of the contra
forces as persons or ;proupsacting in the name andon behalf of the United
States of America. (3nly in cases where certain members of those forces
happened to have been specifically charged by United States authoritiesto

commit a particular act, or carry out a particular task of some kind on
behalf of the United States, would it be possible so to regard them. Only in
such instances does international law recognize, as a rare exception to the
rule, that the conduct of persons or groups which are neither agents nor
organs of a State, nor members of its apparatus even in the broadest

' 1 refer to ArticlIl(Conduct ofpersons not acting on behaif of the State) and 8
(Attributionto theStaofthe conductofpersons acting infact onbehaifof rheState), read
together. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP.OP. AGO) 189

acceptation of that ,term,may be held to be acts of that State. The Judg-
ment, accordingly, t;îkesa correct viewwhen, referring in particular to the
atrocities, acts of violence or terrorism and other inhuman actions that
Nicaragua alleges to have been committed by the contras against the
persons and propert:yof civilian populations, it holds that the perpetrators
of these misdeeds inay not be considered as having been specifically

charged by United States authorities to commit them unless, in certain
concrete cases, unchallengeable proof to the contrary has been sup-
plied.

17. Where this last point is concerned, therefore, 1 naturally agree in
principle with what itheJudgment observes in paragraph 116,namely that
the Court, within the framework of the present proceedings, did not have

to concern itself with any anti-humanitarian rnisdeeds as the contras rnay
have committed which Nicaragua wrongly seesas violations, attributable
to the United States of America, of the principles of humanitarian law,but
solely with unlawful acts for which the United States may be responsible
"in connection with itheactivities of the contras". One or twohesitations or
linguistic impropriet.ies that can be noted in the drafting of certain pas-

sages do nothing to impair the essential correctness of that observation.
More especially, 1 cannot but agree with the fundamental recognition that
the misdeeds committed by the contras in the course of their military or
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua are not imputable to the United
States of America (paras. 115, 116and 278).

18. However, 1fee:lobliged topoint out that theJudgment exhibits some

hesitancy, a fewat least apparent contradictions and acertain paucity of

' The underlying idea is expressed most precisely in paragraph 115. where the
Judgment holds that "even the generalcontrol by therespondent State over a forcewith
a high degree of dependlency on it" would not in itself mean "that the United States
directed or enforcedthe perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humani-
tarian law alleged by the applicant State" (emphasis added). Subsequently, in this
paragraph and another (277). the Judgment relies to the same purpose on the fact that
the Courtis "not satisfietithat theevidenceavailable demonstratesthat the contraswere
'controlled' by the United States when committing" the acts in question. This obser-
vation is not wrong asar as it goes, but it is less precise than the previous one I have
"control", accompanied by such expressions as those in paragraph 116which contrastdea of
the acts of thecontras to those for which the United States rnight be "responsible
directly", should implant in readers the erroneous idea that the Courtablishing an
analogy between the situation here envisaged and instances where itappropriate to
speak of "indirect resporisibility" as opposed to "direct responsibility". In my view,the
situations whichcan be correctly termed cases of indirect responsibility are those in
which oneState that, in certain circumstances,exerts control overtheactions of another
can be held responsible for an internationally wrongful act commrttedby and imputable
tothatsecondState. The question that arises in suchcases isnot that of the imputabilityto
a State of the conduct of persons and groups that do not form part of its official
apparatus, but that of the transfer to a State of the international responsibility incurred
through an act imputable to another State.legal reasoning in seeking to substantiate the position the Court takes on
the points in question. 1am above al1inclined to regret that the Judgment
does not refer explicitly to the precedent provided by the Judgment of
24 May 1980in thecase conceming UnitedStates DiplornaticandConsular
Staffin Tehran.The Court seemsto me to have overlooked thefact that, at
that time, it was faced with a situation in many ways similar to thepresent
one. Inter alia, it haclto decide whether and, if so, to what extent the acts
committed in the iriitial phase of the affair, namely the armed attack
perpetrated on 4 November 1979 by Iranian "militants" against the
Embassyof theUnited States,the invasion ofitspremises andthe taking of
the persons there as hostages, the seizure of the Embassy's property and
archives,al1those "active" misdeeds, in other words, could or couldnot be
imputed to the Iraniiin State.And it reached a negative conclusion on this

subject, because the "militants" in question had no officia1status of any
kind as agents or organs of the State and there was nothing to prove that
they had in fact acted in the name and on behalf of the Iranian authorities.
The Court explicitl!, noted that even the congratulatory or approving
statements made immediately following the misdeeds in question could
not alter thefact thatthese acts committed by the "militants" couldnot, at
that time, be attributed to the State, even if their authors were the darlings
of the supreme authorities of the country. The only thing the Court con-
sidered couldbe attributed to the state, in thisfirstphase ofevents,wasthe
"negative" fact of having neglected to take appropriate steps for the
protection of the premises and staff, so as to ward off attacks which were
only to be expected on the part of over-excited hostile elements, or the
equally "negative" fact that, once the attack had been perpetrated, the
officia1 authorities failed to respond to the incessant appeals for help
addressed to them and did not intervene to freethe persons and premisesin
question.
19. In the present case the Court has in effect reached similar conclu-
sions as to the non-imputability - to the United States of America this
time - of the misdeeldsperpetrated by theinsurgentsagainst the Sandinist
government in thecontext of thehostilities pursued by them in Nicaraguan

territory, and the imputability to the United States solelyof such conduct
as can be duly proved to be that of organs of the United States "in
connection with" these misdeeds of the contras.In sum, this is the second
time in a verybrief period that theCourt hashad to deal with questions of
international responisibilityand, more specifically, situations in which the
principles to be applied have been those concerning problems of imputa-
bility, which is one of the most delicate aspects of the entire theory of
responsibility. 1can only regret that the Court has not seized the oppor-
tunity to emphasize, by appropriate references, a confirmation of the
position it took before and of the theoretical reasoning developed in
support, so as to uriderline the continuity and solidity of the junspru-
dence. Thereare other points in theJudgment onwhich 1could comment and in
regard to which, pe:rhaps, 1 could express some partial disagreement l.
However, 1prefer tloconfine myself here to these few observations and
points that 1 feel it has been necessary to put fonvard in order to make
known my viewsregarding some selected aspects of fact and lawwhich to

my mind were the inost important. Here and there the reader will note
somereservations wlhichare not merely formal in regard to the holdings set
forth in certain chapters or paragraphs of the Judgment and its attendant
reasoning. Yet, in tlhelast resort, there are no disagreements of such an
order as to impel me to forsake the general concurrence that 1 believein al1
objectivity 1 may accord the Judgment delivered today.

(Signed) Roberto AGO.

' For example, 1findthatthe Court hasdevoted adisproportionately lengthy passage
and attached undue importance (in paras. 117 ff.) to the- apparently limited-
dissemination among the contra forces of the CIA-published manual on Operaciones
sicolbgicasen guerra de guerrillas. Even apart from the-frecognized by the Judg-
need notoutside encouragement toengage in activities which may beanti-humanitarian,agua
1have difficulty in seeingprecisely how the responsibility deriving from such "encour-
agement", the reality and efficacy of which remain moreover to be proved, would take
shape in general international law.

Bilingual Content

OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. AG0

1. Dans mon opinion individuelle jointe àl'arrêt du26 novembre 1984
sur la compétencede la Couret la recevabilitéde la requêteen I'affaire qui
nous occupe, j'avais précisé les raisons qui m'avaient permis de voter en
faveur de la conclusion d'aprèslaquelle la Cour avait, dans lecas d'espèce,

une compétencepermettant de procéder à l'examende l'affairequant au
fond )>J'étaisen effet convaincu que, pour étayer cette conclusion,il suffi-
sait de reconnaître l'existenceentre les Parties, aux termes de l'article 36,
paragraphe 1,du Statut de la Cour, d'un lien valable et incontestable de
juridiction, contractuellement et incontestablement établi et fournipar l'ar-
ticle XXIV, paragraphe 2, du traité bilatéral d'amitié,de commerce et
de navigation du 21janvier 1956.Je rejetais par contre la thèse,partagée
par la majoritéde la Cour, de l'existence, entre le Nicaragua et les Etats-
Unis d'Amérique, d'un autre lien de juridiction, fondé sur l'article 36,
paragraphe 2, du Statut. J'étaisparvenu à cette conclusion - et je me
plais à la confirmer vu la ferme persistence de ma conviction à ce sujet-

car, d'après moi, la prétendueacceptation par le Nicaragua de la compé-
tence obligatoire de la Cour n'enétaitpas une et n'enétaitjamais devenue
une. L'intention manifestéeen 1937 à ce sujet ne s'étaita aucun moment
traduite par un engagement formel qui seul aurait étéjuridiquementva-
lable. Par conséquent, une obligation qui n'avait pas encore étéacceptée
et qui n'était mêmpeas née à la datede l'extinction de la Courpermanente
de Justice internationale ne pouvait pas être t(maintenue )>après cette
date, car on ne peut pas maintenir ce qui n'existepas encore. Il étaitdonc
impensable de transférerde la Cour permanente àson successeur, la Cour
internationale de Justice, des effets non moins inexistants de ladite obli-

gation. En conclusion, àmon avis, l'acceptation de la compétence obliga-
toire de la Cour, faite par les Etats-Unis d'Amériquele 14 août 1946,
n'avait pas son pendant indispensable dans une acceptation également
valable de la part du Nicaragua ; aucun liendejuridiction ne pouvait donc
s'être établsiur une telle base entre les deux Etats.
2. Si,en 1984,la majoritéde la Cour avait adoptéla mêmeposition que
certains d'entre nous, il en aurait découlé que,dans la phase actuelle de
l'examen de l'affaire sur le fond, seuls des faits susceptibles d'êtreconsi-
déréscomme des infractions à des obligations prévuespar le traité du
21 janvier 1956 pourraient être prisen considération en tant que faits
générateursd'une responsabilité internationale des Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique envers le Nicaragua. Cette hypothèse ne s'est toutefois pas réalisée, SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE AG0

/Trunslurior~/

1. In the separate opinion which 1appended to the Judgment of 26 No-
vember 1984 on the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the
Application in the present case, 1explained why 1had felt able to vote in
favour of the findirig that the Court had "a jurisdiction in the present case
enabling it to proceed to examination of the merits", convinced as 1was

that sufficient warrant for this finding was to be found in the existence
between the Parties, under Article 36, paragraph 1. of the Statute of the
Court, of a valid and indisputable jurisdictional link, one contractually
and unchallengeably established in Article XXIV, paragraph 2, of the
bilateral treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded on

21 January 1956. On the other hand, 1 rejected the majority view of the
Court that another jurisdictional link between Nicaragua and the United
States of America existed under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
Here 1had reachedl mvconclusion - which 1feel bound to confirm. givun
the unshaken consitancy of my conviction on the matter - because, to my
mind. Nicaragua's alleged acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdic-

tion was not and had never become real. The intention manifested on the
subject in 1937 haid at no time materialized in the formal undertaking
which alone would have possessed legal force. It followed that no obliga-
tion had yet been accepted or even come into being on the date of the
extinction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, so therewas no
obligation which could be "maintained" after that date, since it is impos-

sible to maintain what does not yet exist. And if the obligation itself did not
exist, neither coultl it have any effects that might conceivably be trans-
ferred from the Permanent Court to its successor, the International Court
of Justice. In sum, Ihe declaration of acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction which had been made by the United States of America on

14August 1946 w,as not matched, as it indispensably had to be, by an
equally valid acceptance on the part of Nicaragua ; hence nojurisdictional
link could be founded on such a basis between the two States.
2. If the majority of the Court had in 1984adopted the same position as
certainjudges, the 1-esultin thepresent, meritsphase of the case would have
been that only actsthat might be regarded as breaches of obligations under

the Treaty of 21 January 1956 could be taken into consideration as acts
whereby the United States of America might have incurred international
responsibility towards Nicaragua. However, the situation is otherwise,
since the ma-jorityof the Court, in the 1984Judgment. approved and gavepuisque la majorité dela Cour, dans son arrêtde 1984.a retenu aussi. et en
premier lieu, l'idéede l'existence,entre lesdeux pays en litige.d'un lien de

juridiction fondésurlejeu de deux déclarations unilatérales d'acceptation
de la compétence obligatoire de la Cour. déclarations qui. à son avis,
auraient étérégulièrementfaites aussi bien par le Nicaragua que par les
Etats-Unis. Mêmesi c'est quelque peu à contrecŒur. je me suis donc cru
tenu de respecter la décision prisepar la Cour à la majoritéet devenue
chose jugée, et d'accepterpar conséquent de raisonner. dans la présente
phase sur lefond. sur labase de laprémisse qu'il existaitentre lesdeux pays
en litige. au moment de l'introduction de la présenteinstance. deux liens
différents de juridiction. Le lien fondé sur la clause facultative de I'ar-
ticle 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut avait manifestement une plus ample

portéeet était appelé à tenir le rôle principal.
3. Mes scrupules à ce sujet ont d'ailleurs étéj,e ne dirais pas levésmais
atténuésdans une certaine mesure, du fait que la majoritéde la Cour a
reconnu. dans la présente phasedu procès,l'effetde la limitation apportée
à I'acceptation de la compétence obligatoire de la Cour par la réserve
relative aux traités multilatéraux o.dite aussi réserveVandenberg ))du
nom du sénateur qui la soumit avec succès à l'approbation du Sénat des
Etats-Unis. En vertu de cette réserve, I'acceptationde lajuridiction obli-
gatoire de la Cour par les Etats-Unis ne s'étendaitpas aux

disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless(1) al1parties to
the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before
the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to

jurisdiction u '.
4. A ce sujet, la Cour avait déclarédans son arrêt du26 novembre 1984
sur lesquestions de compétenceet de recevabilitéque l'exception, soulevée
par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique concernant l'exclusion des <différends
résultant d'un traitémultilatéral )de I'acceptation par eux de la compé-

tence de la Cour en vertu de la clausefacultative. suscitait un problèmequi
touchait a des points de substance <(relevant du fond de l'affaire D. La
Cour avait ainsi été amenée à constater que cette exception n'avait pas un
caractère exclusivement préliminaire ))et que, en l'espèce.ellenepouvait
avoir pour effet d'empêcherla Cour de connaître du fond de I'affaire.vu
que la requêtedu Nicaragua ne limitait pas ses griefs à des violations de
conventions multilatérales mais invoquait aussi. outre le traitébilatéralde
1956,un certain nombre de principes du «droit international généralet
coutumier D. En parfaite cohérenceavec cette conclusion, la Cour a donc

dûment procédé.dans la présente phase sur le fond, à l'examen de la
question que le défendeur avait soulevéedans son exception.

~ p
terprétation que pourrait faire naître la traduction française qui figure au Recuerldes
traitépublié par les Nations Unies et qui n'a aucune raison de jouer un rôle en
l'espèce.

172 MlLITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. AGO) 182

pride of place to the idea that a jurisdictional link existed between the
Parties on the basis of the coincidence of two unilateral declarations

accepting the Court's compulsoryjurisdiction, both of which. and no less
that of Nicaragua than that of the United States, had in its view been
regularly made. Though somewhat reluctantly, 1have felt obliged to re-
spect the majority decision of the Court, which is now res judicata, and
accordingly to agrec:to reason in the present merits phase on the basis of

the supposition that when proceedings were instituted two different links
of jurisdiction existed between the Parties. Of those two links, the one
based upon the Optional Clause in Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute
was manifestly of wider scope and was bound to receive the main empha-
sis.

3. As it happens. my scruples in this connection have to some extent
been softened. though not entirely removed, on account of the recognition
by the majority of the Court, in the present phase, of the effect of the
restriction placed ori the acceptance of itscompulsoryjurisdiction through

the "multilateral treaty reservation", also known as the "Vandenberg
Reservation" from the name of the Senator who successfully presented it
for the approval of the United States Senate. Under that reservation, the
United States' acceptance of the Court's compulsoryjurisdiction did not
extend to :

"disputes arisirig under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) al1parties to
the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before

the Court. or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to
jurisdiction l".

4. In this conneclion. the Court, in its Judgment of 26 November 1984
on questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, had declared that the ob-
jection advanced by the United States of America with regard to the ex-
clusion from its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction under the Optional
Clause of "disputes arising under a multilateral treaty" raised a problem
"concerning matter:; of substance relating to the merits of the case". This

had led the Court to the conclusion that the objection did not possess an
"exclusively preliminary" character and could not in the circumstances
constitutean obstacle to its entertaining the merits of the case, given that
Nicaragua's Application did not solely complain of breaches of multila-
teral conventions biit also relied, quite apart from the bilateral treaty of

1956, on a number of principles of "general and customary international
law". In this, the merits phase, the Court has accordingly been entirely
consistent and proci:eded to examine the question raised by the Respon-
dent in its ob-jectiori.

'If 1make use solely of the original English text, this is because of the problerns of
interpretationto which .theFrenchtranslation in the UnitedNations Treaty Series rnight
give rise- problems which there is no ground for allowing any role in the case. 183 ACTIVITÉS MILITAIRES ET PARAMILITAIRES (OP. IND.AGO)

5. C'est auxparagraphes 42 et suivants du présent arrêtqu'ellea statué

sur les conséquences que la réservedes Etats-Unis relative aux traités
multilatéraux devait entraîner en l'espèce.A cette fin elle s'estessentiel-
lement baséesur deux constatations : a)que sa compétence pour se pro-
noncer sur un différendconcernant un Etat déterminé repose toujours à
l'originesur le consentement de cedernier, ce qui comporte en particulier
la pleine libertéde1'Etatqui accepte la compétenceobligatoire de la Cour
en vertu de laclausefacultative de limiteràsongréunetelleacceptationet,
en particulier, d'enexclure leslitigesnésde certaines catégoriesde traité;
et h)que, dans le casconcret,un Etat tiers au moins, à savoir El Salvador.
devait êtreconsidérécomme pouvant être affecté par une décision
comportant l'application de certains traités multilatéraux dont notam-

ment, quoique non exclusivement, la Charte des Nations Unies et cellede
l'organisation des Etats américains.Il en résultait forcémentque I'appli-
cation de ces instruments était exclueen ce qui concerne la décisionen la
présente affaire. La Cour a ainsi àjuste titre rejetél'idéed'opposer aux
Etats-Unis une interprétation de lat(réserveVandenberg manifestement
différentede cellequ'ilsen ont donnéedèsl'origineetqui l'aurait réduite à
une simple redondance. En effet, on ne soulignera jamais assez que l'ac-
ceptation de la compétenceobligatoire de la Cour, sur la base de I'ar-
ticle 36.paragraphe 2, du Statut de celle-ci,est un acte souverain et volon-
taire, qui ne produit d'effet que dans les limitesl'intérieur desquellesil a
étéconçu et voulu. 11est donc correct que la Cour se soit vue dans

l'obligation de conclure que la compétenceque pouvait lui avoir attribuée
la déclaration d'acceptation formuléeen 1946par les Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique en vertu de l'article 36.paragraphe 2,du Statutne lui permettait pas
deconnaître des griefs concernant laviolation des traités multilatérauxen
question avancéspar le Nicaragua. Mais en mêmetemps, et, à mon avis,
tirant la conclusion qui s'impose de ces prémisses, elle aaffirméque sa
compétencepour statuer sur les griefs du Nicaragua relatifs à la violation
par les Etats-Unis d'obligations découlantde règlesdu droit international
coutumier ou du traitébilatéralde 1956restait intacte.
6. Vu la base de départadoptéeparla Cour,je nepeux qu'estimer tout à
fait correcte la conclusion à laquelle elle est arrivée.Je dois de même

reconnaître son souci d'affirmer I'existenceautonome dans le droit inter-
national coutumier de chacune des règlesqu'elle aappliquéesen l'espèce.
Cette constatation ne m'empêchepas toutefois d'exprimer de sérieuses
réserves àpropos de lafacilitéaveclaquelleilmesembleque la Cour - tout
en niant expressémentque toutes les règlescoutumières aient un contenu
identique à celui des règlesénoncéesdans les conventions (par. 175) - a
néanmoinsconclu, pour plusieurs matières clés, à l'existenced'une quasi-
identitéde contenu entre le droit international coutumier et le droit consi-
gnédans certains grands traités multilatéraux conclussur le plan uni-
verselou sur le plan régional.Je suisprêtà admettre, avec la Cour, que, en
ce qui concerne la règlefondamentale interdisant l'emploi de la force
(par. 188).et mêmela règleexigeant le respect de la souveraineté territo-

rialedesautresEtats (par. 212),ilpuisse yavoirune correspondanceétroite 5. It is in paragraphs 42 ff. of the present Judgment that the Court has
given its ruling on the consequences arising from the United States' mul-
tilateral treaty resenration in thepresent case.In doing soit has reliedin the
main on the followirigtwopoints : (a)the originalsource of itsjurisdiction
to pass upon a dispute involving a particular State is always that State's
consent, which implies, inter alia, that any State accepting its compul-

soryjurisdiction under the Optional Clause is entirely free to restrict that
acceptance in any way it wishes and, more especially, to exclude disputes
arising out of certain categories of treaty ; (b)in the instant case, at least
one third State, nannelyEl Salvador, had to be considered as potentially
"affected" by any decision involvingtheapplication ofcertain multilateral
treaties including, but not limited to, the Charter of the United Nations
and that of the 0rg;anization of American States. The necessary conse-
quencewas that theapplication of thoseinstruments wasexcluded sofar as
the decision of this casewasconcerned. Thus the Court rightly rejected the
idea of setting up against the United States an interpretation of the
"Vandenberg Reservation" which would be manifestly different from the
one always advanced by that Party and reduce it to mere redundancy. It
can never be sufficiently emphasized that acceptance of the Court's com-
pulsoryjurisdiction on the basis of Article 36,paragraph 2, of its Statute is
a sovereign, voluntary act the effects of which are strictly confined to the

limits within which it was conceived and intended. The Court therefore
proceeded correctly in holding itself obliged to conclude that thejurisdic-
tion conferred upon it by the declaration of acceptance which the United
States made in 1946under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute did not
enable it to entertain the complaints submitted by Nicaragua concerning
the violation of the treaties in question. But at the same time and, in my
view,in perfect accord with its premises, it held that itsjurisdiction to pass
upon Nicaragua's complaints regardingthe violation by the United States
of obligations under rules proceeding from customary international lawor
the 1956 FCN Treaty remained intact.

6. Given the starting-point of the Court's reasoning, 1cannot but find
the conclusion it reached entirely correct. 1have also to acknowledge its
concem to uphold the independent existence in customary international
law of each of the rules it has applied in the case. Even so, 1am bound to

express serious reservations with regard to the seeming facility with which
the Court - while expressly denying that al1 the customary rules are
identical in content to the rules in the treaties (para. 175)- has neverthe-
less concluded in respect of certain key matters that there is a virtual
identity of content ,asbetween customary international law and the law
enshrined in certain majormultilateral treatiesconcluded on a universal or
regional plane. 1 am ready to agree with the Court that, so far as the basic
rule prohibiting use of force is concerned (para. 188),and even the rule
requinng respect for the territorial sovereignty of other States (para. 212),
there may be a close correspondence between unwntten general interna-
tional law and the written law embodied in the Charter. But 1 remainentre ledroit international général nonécritet le droit écritconsacrédans

la Charte. Mais je ne suis pas convaincu, par exemple, que certaines
modalitésrestrictives prévuespar la Charte pour le recours à la légitime
défense puissent se retrouver dans le droit international coutumier. De
mêmejerestesceptique quant àI'idéeque,en cequiconcerne l'interdiction
de l'intervention, non seulement le droit international coutumier univer-
sel 'mais mêmecelui qui existe sur le seul plan régionalaméricain ait à
l'heure actuelleentérinétoutes lesconquêtesréalisées par ledroit conven-
tionnel. Je suis également trèshésitant devant I'idéequ'il existerait une
large coïncidence de contenu entre les conventions de Genèveet certains

<(principes générauxde base du droit humanitaire 1).qui, de l'avis de la
Cour, préexisteraient dans le droit coutumier et dont les conventions ne
seraient ((que l'expressionconcrète )ou tout au plus « àcertainségardsle
développement ))(par. 218et 220).Heureusement,ayant elle-mêmerelevé
que ledemandeur n'avaitpas fait étatdesquatre conventions deGenèvedu
12août 1949,la Cour a fait preuve de prudence quant aux conséquences
de l'application de cette idée,en elle-mêmecontestable.
7. De même,je ne puis qu'exprimer des doutes quant à I'idéequi
transparaît parfois dans l'arrêt(par. 191,192,202 et 203) selon laquelle on

peut voir dans l'acceptation de certaines résolutionsou de certaines décla-
rations formuléesdans lecadre des Nations Unies ou de l'organisation des
Etats américains,ainsi quedans un autre contexte, une preuve concluante
de l'existence,chezcesEtats. d'une opiniojurisconcordante ayant lavaleur
d'une véritablerèglecoutumièreinternationale. Je me borne ici à faire état
de ces impressions, en soulignant que les réservesqueje puis formuler sur
ces points n'impliquent pas que je doive différerdes conclusions fonda-
mentales auxquelles l'arrêt estparvenu.

8. Me référant maintenant auxaspects de la présente affairetouchant
plus spécifiquement etplus exclusivementau fond, ma premièreremarque
sera de relever que lesconclusions auxquellesla Cour est parvenue dans le
présentarrêtrejoignent pour l'essentiel cellesque,sousun autre angle, elle
avait déjàesquisséesdans son ordonnance du 10mai 1984sur la demande
enindication de mesuresconservatoires déposéepar leNicaragua le9avril

de la même année.Bien sûr, l'analyse actuelle est bien plus longuement
développée et l'argumentationfournie à l'appui des conclusions est bien
plus étoffée. Maisles faits que la Cour estime aujourd'hui devoir être
imputés aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique restenten réalitéceux-la mêmesque
l'ordonnance relative aux mesures conservatoires avait succinctement

pouvoir affirmer quepNL'existence du principe de non-intervention dans l'opiniojuris
des Etats est étayéepar une pratique importanet bien établie.

174unconvinced that, for example, certain restrictive requirements on which

the Charter makes resort to self-defenceconditional arealso to be found in
customary international law. And 1am still inclined todoubt whether the
customary international law that exists not only at universal ' but also at
regional levelinthe Americashas alreadyendorsed al1the acluevements of
treaty law where the prohibition of intervention is concerned.1 am more-
over most reluctant to be persuaded that any broad identity of content
exists between the CrenevaConventions and certain "fundamental general
principles of humanitarian law", which, according to the Court, were
pre-existent in customary law, to which the Conventions "merely give
expression" (para. ;!20)or of which they are at most "in some respects a
development" (para. 218). Fortunately, after pointing out that the Appli-
cant hasnot reliedon the four GenevaConventions of 12August 1949,the
Court has shown caution in regard to the consequences of applying this
idea, which in itself is debatable.

7. There are, simiilarly,doubts which 1feel bound to express regarding
the idea which occasionally surfaces in the Judgment (paras. 191,192,202
and 203) that the acceptance of certain resolutions or declarations drawn
up in the framework.of the United Nations or the Organization of Ameri-
can States,as wellas in another context, can be seen asproof conclusiveof
the existence among the States concerned of a concordant opinij ouris
possessing al1the force of a rule of customary international law. 1 shall
confine myselfhere ltoa mereplacing of theseimpressions on record, while
emphasizing that such reservations as 1 might express on the points con-
cerned do not carry the implication that 1should disagree with the basic

findings of the Judgment.

8. Coming now to those aspects of the present case which more spe-
cificallyand exclusi~dyconcern the merits, 1would first point out that the
findings reached by theCourt in thepresentJudgment coincide in themain
with those which, from another angle, it had already adumbrated in its
Order of 10 May 1984on the request for provisional measures filed by
Nicaragua on 9 April of that year. Needless to Say,the present analysis is
developed at far greater length and the reasoning presented in order to
underpin the findings isfar more substantial. But the fact remains that the

acts which the Coui-t today considers should be imputed to the United
Statesof America art:the sameas thedecision on provisional measures had
succinctly mentioned, while, more particularly, the breaches of interna-

1am somewhat surprised at the assurance with which the Court in its Judgment
(para.202)has felt able to assert that "the existence injourisf States of the
principle ofon-intervention is backed by established and substantial practice".mentionnés.Surtout lesinfractions internationales qui, selon la Cour, ont
étécommises et ont pour origine lesdits faits sont pratiquement celles qui
figuraient déjàdans le tableau dresséauxpoints 1et 2du paragraphe 41 B
de l'ordonnance du 10mai 1984.Les obligations dont on déclare aujour-
d'hui la violation sont virtuellement celles dont on avait alors constaté
l'existence :obligations de ne pas intervenir dans les affaires intérieures
d'un autre Etat, de s'abstenir de tout recoursà la menace ou à l'emploide
la force contre l'intégritéterritoriale ou l'indépendance politique de cet
autre Etat, de respecter pleinement sa souveraineté territoriale, de ne pas
interrompre ou rendre périlleux son commerce maritime.J'ai alors votéen
toute conscienceen faveur desdécisionsadoptéespar laCour sur cesdivers
points et ne vois pas de raison de ne pas le faire à l'heure actuelle.
9. Cela dit,cependant, je ne puismanquer d'êtrefrappépar laprésence.

dans l'arrêt quivient d'être rendu,avec ma participation d'ailleurs. de
certains aspects à mon avis contradictoires dans l'appréciationde la situa-
tion de fait etdedroit, aspectsqui meparaissent appeler quelques mises au
point de ma part.
10. Le premier de ces aspects concerne la perspective dans laquelle
l'arrêtparaît situer et voir l'affaire dans laquelle la Cour était requise de
donner sa décision.A mon sens l'on n'arrivepas à saisir cette affaire dans
sa réalité effectiveet globale si l'on ne garde pas à l'esprit le fait que
l'humus dans lequel a germéet s'est développéle différend qui oppose
aujourd'hui leNicaragua aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique esttout de mêmefait
d'une situation de lutte civile, de conflit d'ordre interne. Cette situation
caractériseaujourd'hui aussi,et plus qu'on ne semble lepenser, la présente
affaire.
11. Cen'estpas, bien entendu, que l'arrêtveuilleignorer totalement une

telle situation. Sans doute, là où elle a pris position sur des infractions
qu'auraient subies, dans le cas qui nous occupe, les règlesdu droit huma-
nitaire, la Cour a relevé(par. 219) que :
Le conflit entre les forces contraset celles du Gouvernement du
Nicaragua est un conflit armé neprésentant pas un caractère inter-
national )).Les actes des contras à l'égarddu Gouvernement du

Nicaragua relèventdu droit applicable à de tels conflits, cependant
que les actions des Etats-Unis au Nicaragua et contre lui relèventdes
règlesjuridiques intéressant les conflits internationaux.

Cette remarque est certainement exacte. De mêmej,e reconnais volontiers
que, dans sa description des différentes formes d'aideet assistanceprêtées
par lesEtats-Unis auxforcesrebelles des contras,la Cour a sciemmentévité

d'utiliser certaines expressions proposées par le demandeur, qui auraient
crééune dangereuse équivoque,précisément à propos de la nature interne
ou bien internationale du conflit opposant les forces rebelles des contras
aux forces du gouvernement sandiniste.La Cour aen effet refusé (par.113-
114) de suivre le demandeur dans ses assertions d'après lesquelles les
forces des contrasne seraient que des bandes de mercenaires »,recrutés MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP. OP. AGO) 185

tional law which the Court now holds those acts to have constituted are
practically the sami: as already enumerated under B (1) and (2) in para-

graph 41 of the Order of 10 May 1984. The obligations now declared to
have been violated are virtually the same as those found to exist on that
previous occasion : the obligations not to intervene in the interna1 affairs
of another State, to refrain from any recourse to the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State,

to accord its territorial sovereignty full respect and not to disrupt or
endanger its maritime commerce. At the time, 1 voted knowingly and
conscientiously in favour of the decisions adopted by the Court on these
various points, and at the present juncture 1see no reason to do other-
wise.
9. Nevertheless, 1 cannot but be struck by the presence in the Judgment

now rendered - with of course my own participation - of certain aspects
in the appraisal of the factual and legal situation which are in my view
mutually inconsistent and appear to cal1 for some rectification.

10. The first concerns the perspective in which theJudgment appears to
place and envisage the case on which the Court was required to give its

decision. To my mind, it is impossible to grasp the overall, meaningful
reality of this case without keeping in view thefact that the soi1in which the
present dispute between Nicaragua and the United Statesgerminated, and
from which it sprarig, was compounded of a situation of civil strife, of
conflict within a State. Today also, this situation characterizes the present

case to a greater de,gree than appears to have been realized.

11. Not, of coursi:, that the Judgment completely ignores this situation.
Where the Court expresses its position with regard to the breaches of the
rules of humanitarian law committed in the instant case, it does indeed
point out (in para. 219) that :

"The conflict between the contras' forces and those of the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua is an armed conflict which is 'not of an interna-

tional character'. The acts of the contras towards the Nicaraguan
Government are therefore governed by the law applicableto conflicts
of that character ; whereas the actions of the United States in and
against Nicaragua fa11under the legal rules relating to international
conflicts."

This observation is certainly correct. 1readily acknowledge, moreover, that
in itsdescription of the various forms of aid and assistanceprovided by the
United States to the contra rebels, the Court has deliberately avoided

making use of certain expressions. proposed by the Applicant, which
would have given rise todangerous ambiguity, precisely in connection with
the question as to the international nature of the conflict between those
rebels and the forces of the Sandinist government. Thus the Court (in
paras. 113 and 114)has refused to go along with the Applicant's assertions
that the contra forces are mere bands of "mercenaries" recruited by thepour leur compte par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, autrement dit une sorte
de légionétrangèreconstituantun corps auxiliaire des forces arméesnord-
américaines.Je tiens aussi à ajouter que le fait même d'avoirvu dans l'aide
multiforme accordée aux forces contras une forme d'intervention illicite

d'un Etat dans un conflit intérieur d'unautre Etat est une preuve supplé-
mentaire de ce que la Cour a perçu de façon correcte cet aspect essen-
tiel.
12. Par contre, dans la présentation qu'il faitdes deux parties en lutte et
surtout des origines et des causes du conflit interne qui a éclatéau Nica-
ragua, l'arrêtne me paraît pas attribuer un poids suffisant aux change-
ments importantsqui se sont produits dans ce pays pendant les mois pos-

térieurs a la chute du gouvernement Somoza. En disant cela,je ne me pro-
pose pas de discuter ici l'interprétation donnéedans l'arrêt(par. 260-262)
des points inclus dans le <plan de paix ))que les éléments antisomozistes
coalisésavaient établi pendant la période finalede la lutte de libération
contre la dictature et que la junte du gouvernement de reconstruction
nationale du Nicaragua avait communiqué au secrétaire générad le l'Or-
ganisation des Etats américains,enréponse à larésolutionde ladix-septième
réunionde consultation des ministres des relations extérieures de I'orga-

nisation. Je n'entends pas non plus m'attacher icia contester la conclusion
d'après laquelle la communication de ce plan ne serait qu'une simple
promesse politique ))dépourvue de tout effet contraignant sur le plan
juridique, encore queje garde des doutes à cesujet. Je necomprendrais pas
eneffet que lesgouvernements réunisal'organisation desEtats américains
aient acceptéd'adopter une mesure aussiexceptionnelle que le retrait de la
reconnaissance d'un gouvernement qui, aussi dictatorial et exécrable qu'il
fût, était indéniablement un gouvernement en charge et, à cet égard,

<légitime D, sans avoir une solide garantie qu'il serait remplacé par un
gouvernementrépondant précisémentauxcaractéristiquesdéfiniesdans le
plan de paix et que les membres de l'Organisation des Etats américains,
gouvernement somozien excepté,étaient d'accord pour souhaiter.
13. Ce que j'entends souligner, c'est seulement qu'au moment où le
gouvernement - qualifiépar l'arrêt lui-mêmd e,ns lesrares occasions où il
le mentionne, <(de coalition nationale (par. 18),<<de coalition démocra-

tique ))(par. 19) ou <(de reconstruction nationale (par. 167) - s'est
installé à Managua, il répondait dans sa composition, aussi provisoire
qu'ellefût, au pluralisme du <(plan de paix o.Ce n'estque plus tard que les
choses ont changé. Dans le gouvernement issu immédiatementde la lutte
révolutionnaire donc, comme j'en trouve la confirmation, parmi tant
d'autres témoignages.dans le reportage d'une enquêteponctuelle menée
tout dernièrement au Nicaragua ', les divers courants politiques qui
avaient pris part au renversement de la dictature étaient représentés.Le

gouvernement disait clairement vouloir instaurer un régime stable de
pluralisme démocratique, de libertédans les domaines politique, écono-

Voir lesreportages Impressions du Nicaragua >)1et II. par Jacques-Simon Eggly.
publiésdans le Journalde Genèvedes 26 et 27 mai 1986. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP.OP.AGO) 186

United States ofAmiericafor its own ends, or in other words that they are a
kind of foreign legion constituting an auxiliary body in the United States
armed forces. 1 mus.talso add that the very fact of construing the multi-
farious forms of assistance to thecontras asakind of unlawful intervention

by one State in the internal conflicts of another provides further evidence
that the Court has seen this essential aspect for what it is.

12. On theotherhand,in the Court's manner of presenting the two sides
in contention and, above all, the origins and causes of the internal conflict
that broke out in Nicaragua, it seems to me that the Judgment fails to
accord sufficient weight to the important changes that took place in that
country during the rnonths immediately following the fall of the Somoza
government. In saying this, it is not my intention to question the Judg-
ment's interpretation (in paras. 260-262) of the points included in the
"Plan to secure peace" that the coalescent anti-Somoza elements had
drawn up during the final stage of the liberation struggle against the
dictatorship and that the Junta of the Government of National Recon-
struction of Nicaragua had communicated to the Secretary-General of the

Organization of Annerican States in response to the resolution of the
XVIIth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
that Organization. Neither am 1here concerned to deny the finding that
thecommunication of this plan was merely a "political promise" devoid of
al1binding legalforc~ee,venthough 1stillhavesomedoubts inthat respect ;
for 1cannot understand how the Organization of American States member
governments could have agreed to adopt such an exceptional measure as
the withdrawal of re:cognitionfrom a government which, however dicta-
torial and hateful, was undeniably in charge and, from that angle, "legiti-
mate" unless they possessed a solid guarantee that it would be replaced by
agovernment offeririgthe precisecharacteristicsdefined in the peace plan,
oneof akind whichthe members of the Organization, with theexception of
the Somoza governrnent itself, al1hoped to see materialize.
13. What 1wishhere to stress issimplythefact that at the timewhen the
government which theJudgment itself,at the rare points whereit mentions

it, styles a "democratic coalition" (para. 18) "the democratic coalition
government" (para. 19)or "the Government of National Reconstruction"
(para. 167) took office in Managua it corresponded in its composition,
howeverprovisional that may have been, to the various points in the "Plan
to secure peace". It lwasonly later that matters changed. As 1have found
confirmed bymany piecesof testimony, and interaliaby accounts of avery
recent on-the-spot inquiry in Nicaragua ',the various political trends
whose adherents hacltaken part in the overthrow of the dictatorship were
indeed represented in the government initially resulting from the revolu-
tionary struggle.Thiijgovernment clearlystated itsintention of settingup a
stable régime characterized by democratic pluralism, political, economic

' See the articles entitled "Impressions du Nicarag,nd"IIby Jacques-Simon
Eggly,published in theJournal de Genèveon26and 27 May 1986.
176mique et syndical, et de non-alignement dans lesrelations internationales.
Ce ne fut que plus tard, encore qu'à la suited'un brusquechangement, que
l'on aboutit à l'instauration d'un régime d'obédience exclusivementsan-

diniste. Le nouveau gouvernement qui, dèsla fin de 1979,se trouva avoir
remplacéle premier n'avait plus, en effet, qu'une composition pratique-
ment uniforme et une orientation bien différente de celle de son prédé-
cesseur sur le plan de la politique intérieure, de l'organisation de la pro-
duction industrielle et agricole, de la politique syndicale, des structures
militaires, de la politique et des relations internationales. Cette évolution
amena par réaction laformation d'une opposition dans laquelle se ren-
contraient des milieux tres différents, cette opposition gagnant graduelle-
ment du terrain malgré sa mise sous surveillance étroite et en dépit des
mesures restrictives dirigées contre elle. Dans ce climat, les élections
organiséespar le gouvernement furent boycottées par les partis qui en
contestaient la régularitédémocratique ; lesrelations entre lepouvoir civil
et l'églisesedétériorèrent;lescontrastes s'accentuèrententre lessyndicats
traditionnels et ceux d'obédiencegouvernementale, la condition des mino-
ritésethniques s'aggrava. Cet ensemble de facteurs amena l'abandon du
pays par des fractions des différents courants d'opposition au nouveau

régime,poussées àchercher refuge dans l'exil.C'est un faitque, dans l'exil,
les nouveaux réfugiésfurent amenés à contrecŒur à rechercher la colla-
boration des résidus,peunombreux àcequ'ilparaît, de la garde somoziste
et ceci afin de constituer une coalition de forces rebelles capable de se
battre pour provoquer une évolution susceptiblede permettre leur retour
dans le pays dans de nouvelles conditions. Mais cela ne doit pas faire
perdre de vue qu'à labase du conflit civil dont on parle il y avait comme
facteur déterminant une scission entre les diverses composantes de la
coalition qui s'étaitopposée à la dictaturede Somoza et en avaitprovoqué
lachute.Cela ne doitpas non plusfaireperdre de vueque, silesréfugiésen
question ont reçu pour leur actionune aide etune assistance, aussi massive
et multiforme que vitale pour eux, cela n'a pas eu pour effet de les trans-
former en autre chose que ce qu'ils étaient, de faire disparaître leur
appartenance au peuple nicaraguayen, de faire changer la nature de lutte
civile du combat qui les oppose au gouvernement de leur pays. L'arrêt
aurait pu et dû utilement,à mon avis,pousser davantage l'investigation de
cet aspect pour faire mieux comprendre lesdiverses facettes de la présente

affaire ;en disant cela, cependant, je ne me propose pas de provoquer des
modifications quant aux conclusions établies à ce sujet.

III

14. L'autre aspect auquelje voudrais brièvement me référer est celud ie
l'imputabilité ounon à 1'Etatdéfendeurdes différentescatégoriesde faits
alléguées par le demandeur, en tant que faits générateursd'une responsa-
bilitéinternationale.
15. Acet effet,j'estime sanshésitationque,pour certainsfaits du moins,and trade-union freedom, and non-alignment in international relations.
Only later, and onliyafter a sudden change, did a government come to
power which was eltclusivelySandinist in complexion. That is to Say,the
new government which replaced the first towards the end of 1979 was
practically uniform in its make-up and followed a verydifferent line from
its predecessor in regard to domestic policy, the organization of industrial
and agriculturalproduction, trade-union policy, the structure of thearmed
forces, foreign policy and international relations. By reaction, this de-
velopment led to the formation of an opposition including elements from
some very disparate backgrounds, an opposition which gradually gained
ground despite being subjected to close surveillance and measures of

restriction. In thiscllimate,the elections organized by the government were
boycotted by the political parties which denied their democratic regular-
ity ;relations between the civilauthoritiesand thechurch worsened ;there
was a growing split between the traditional trade unions and those owing
allegiance to the government ; the conditions of the ethnic minorities
deteriorated. On account of the combination of these factors, various
groups belonging ta the trends opposed to the new régime leftthe country,
feeling driven to seek refuge in exile.As it happens, once in exile, the new
refugees felt reluctaintlyimpelled to seek the collaboration of the appar-
ently sparse rernnan.tsof the Somoza guard with a view to setting up a co-
alition of rebel forces capable of fighting in order to provoke a develop-
ment of the situation such as might enable them to return home in new
circumstances. But iihisturn of eventsshould not be allowed to obscurethe
fact that underlying the civilconflict in question there wasthedetermining
factor of a splitbetween the various components of the coalition that had
opposed the Somoz;îdictatorshipand brought about itsdownfall.Neither
must it be allowed to obscure the fact that the receipt by these refugees of
the massive and mi~ltifariousaid and assistance that was vital for their
action has not turned them into anything other than they were, has not

erased their identiti as part of the Nicaraguan people or rendered their
fight against the government of their country anything other than a civil
struggle. In my opinion, the Court could and should in its Judgment have
delved more deeply into this aspect for the sake of a better understanding
ofthe various facetsofthiscase,though in sayingthis 1have nointention of
seekingany substantial modifications in regard to the findings reached on
this subject.

III

14. The other aspect to which 1would like briefly to refer concerns the
question whether the various categories of acts the subject of the Appli-
cant's allegations are or are not imputable to the Respondent qua acts
giving rise to international responsibility.
15. Here 1consider that the findings of the Judgment, at least whereil convient de souscrire aux conclusions de l'arrêt.Dans la sériedes faits
dénoncéspar le Nicaragua. la Cour a eu pleinement raison de tenir pour
imputables à I'Etat défendeurceux qui correspondaient indéniablement à

des comportements d'agents ou organes proprement dits des Etats-Unis
d'Amérique, à savoir des faits de personnes ou de groupes faisant direc-
tement partie de l'appareil étatique américain et agissant en cette qua-
lité.LaCour a utilement précisé que, aucas où lescomportements enques-
tion se seraient déroulésen présence ou avec la participation de per-
sonnes ou de groupes n'ayant pas une telle qualification (en l'espècedes
contras),cette présenceou participation n'aurait pu changer en quoi cesoit
la conclusion énoncée.Tout cela est conforme aux dispositions de l'ar-
ticle5 (Attribution à I'Etatdu comportement de ses organes)du projet d'ar-
ticles adopté par la Commission du droit international en la matière. La
Cour a également eu raison de considérer comme étant des faits des
Etats-Unis d'Amériqueles comportements de personnes ou de groupes
qui, sans êtreà proprement parler des agents ou des organes de 1'Etaten

question, appartiennent néanmoins àdes entitéspubliqueshabilitées.dans
son ordre juridique interne, à l'exercice de certaines prérogatives de la
puissance publique. Je relèvelà une conformité avec les dispositions de
l'article7(Attribution à I'Etatdu comportement d'uutresentités habilitées
I'exercicedeprérogativesde lapuissance publique) du projet de la Commis-
sion du droit international. La premièredes deux hypothèsesmentionnées
ici s'appliquait notamment à des comportements de membres de I'admi-
nistration étatique ou de membres des forces arméesdes Etats-Unis, la
seconde à des agissements de membres de la CIA, des UCLAs ou d'autres
organismes du mêmegenre. Bien que la Cour n'ait pas esquissé.comme
il aurait étéintéressant de le faire. une justification théorique de ses
conclusions dans ces deux hypothèses,je ne puis que me joindre à elle
pour les reconnaître fondées.

16. La conformitéauxdispositions du projet de la Commission du droit
international 'seretrouve aussi dans le fait que la Cour a par contre donné
une réponsenégative à la suggestion, avancéepar le demandeur, de con-
sidérercomme des faits imputables aux Etats-Unis d'Amériqueles agis-
sements commis par des membres des forces contras. Il serait en effet en
contradiction avec les principes régissant la matière de voir dans des
membres de la contrades personnes ou des groupes agissant au nom et pour
lecomptedes Etats-Unis d'Amérique.Les seulscas où ilserait possible de
le faire seraient ceux où certains membres de la contra auraient étéspé-
cifiquement chargéspar desautoritésdesEtats-Unis de commettrepour le
compte de celles-ci une action ou de remplir une tâche ponctuellement
déterminée.Ce n'est que dans cette hypothèse que le droit international
admet, à titre touà fait exceptionnel, qu'un comportement de personnes
ou de groupesne revêtantpas laqualitéd'agents oud'organesd'un Etat, de

' Je me réfèreau jeu conjoint des articles 11(Comportement depersonnes n'agissant
pas pour le compte de I'Etat) et 8 (AttràbI'Etat du comportement de personnes
agissant enfait pour le compte de I'Etat). MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP.OP. AGO) 188

certain acts are conicerned, merit unhesitating concurrence. Among the
accumulation of acts complained of by Nicaragua, the Court was entirely
right in returningan affirmativeanswer to the question of the imputability
to the Respondent of those which must undeniably be construed as the
conduct of United States agents or organs in the proper sense of those

terms. namely acts performed by persons or groups directly belonging to
the State apparatus of that countryand acting as such. TheCourt has done
well to add that where this conduct took place in the presence or with the
participation of persans or groups that cannot be so described (in the case
in point, contras) the presence or participation of the latter could not
change this finding in the slightest. This is in conformity with the provi-
sions of Article5 (Attribution to the State ofthe conductof its organs)of the

draft articles adopted on the subject by the International Law Commis-
sion. The Court was also right to consider as acts of the United States of
America the conduct of persons or groups that, without strictly being
agents or organs of that State, belong nevertheless to public entities
empowered within its domestic legal order to exercise certain elements of
the government autlîority. Here 1note conformity with the provisions of

Article 7(Attribution totheState ofthe conductofother entities empoweredto
exercise elements of the government authority) of the International Law
Commission's draft. The first of the two hypotheses here mentioned
applied in particular to conduct by members of the government admini-
stration or armed forces of the United States, and thesecond to activities of
members of the CIA, or of UCLAs or of other bodies of thi: same kind.
Although the Court has not outlined, as it would have been interesting

to do, any theoretical justification of its findings with regard to these
hypotheses, 1entirely share the view that they are well founded.

16. On the other hand, the negative answer returned by the Court tothe
Applicant's suggestion that the misdeeds committed by some members of

the contra forces should be considered as acts imputable to the United
States of America is likewise in conformity with the provisions of the
International Law C:ommission's draft '.It would indeed be inconsistent
with the principlesgoverning the question to regard members of the contra
forces as persons or ;proupsacting in the name andon behalf of the United
States of America. (3nly in cases where certain members of those forces
happened to have been specifically charged by United States authoritiesto

commit a particular act, or carry out a particular task of some kind on
behalf of the United States, would it be possible so to regard them. Only in
such instances does international law recognize, as a rare exception to the
rule, that the conduct of persons or groups which are neither agents nor
organs of a State, nor members of its apparatus even in the broadest

' 1 refer to ArticlIl(Conduct ofpersons not acting on behaif of the State) and 8
(Attributionto theStaofthe conductofpersons acting infact onbehaifof rheState), read
together.membres de son appareil (même prisdans son acception la plus large)

puisse être tenupour un fait de cet Etat. Par conséquent I'arrêt voijtuste
lorsque, seréféranten particulier aux atrocités,aux actes de violenceou de
terrorisme et aux autres agissements inhumains qui, selon le Nicaragua,
auraient étécommis par des contras à l'égardde populations civiles, de
leurs membres et de leurs biens, il exclut que les auteurs de ces agisse-

ments puissent être considéréc somme ayant étéspécifiquement chargés
de les commettre par des autorités des Etats-Unis, à moins que, dans
quelques cas concrets, la preuve du contraire n'ait été incontestablement
apportée.

17. Surcedernier point je nepuis donc qu'êtred'accord enprincipe avec
la constatation faite dans I'arrêt(par. 116) que la Cour ne devait pas
s'occuper. dans le cadre du présent procès, des agissements antihumani-
taires que les contras auraient commis et dans lesquels le Nicaragua vou-
drait à tort voir des violations de principes du droit international huma-

nitaire attribuables aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique,et ne devait prendre en
considération quedes illicéités éventuelled sont les Etats-Unis se seraient
rendus responsables en relation avec les activités des contras D. Les
quelques hésitations ainsi que les quelques impropriétésde langage que

parfois I'on peut relever dans la rédactionde certains passages à ce sujet
n'enlèvent rienpour l'essentielau bien-fondéde cette remarque. Je ne puis
surtout qu'êtred'accord avec la reconnaissance fondamentale de la non-
imputabilité aux Etats-Unis d'Amériquedes agissements commis par les
contras au cours de leurs opérations militaires ou paramilitaires au Nica-

ragua (par. 115. 116et 278).
18. Je ne puis toutefois pas manquer de relever dans I'arrêtquelques
hésitationset quelques contradictions, au moins apparentes ',ainsi qu'un

'L'idéede base est évoquéedans les termes les plus exacts au paragraphe 115.là où
I'arrêtdit que«même lecontrôle général exercé par eux [les Etats-Unis] sur une force
extrêmementdépendante à leur égard ne signifierait pas par lui-même((que les
Etats-Unis aient ordonné ou imposé la perpétration des actes contraires aux droits de
l'homme et au droit humanitaire alléguéspar 1'Etatdemandeur (les italiques sont de
moi). Par la suite. dans le mêmeparagraphe et dans un autre(par.7).l'arrêt invoque.
aux mêmes fins,le fait que la Cour n'est..pas convaincue par les informations dont
elle dispose que lescontrasétaien((contrôlés))par les Etats-Unis au moment où >les
actes en question étaient commis. La remarque n'est pas en elle-même inexacte, mais
moins préciseque celle auparavant rapportée. II serait regrettable. je pense, quen-
troduction à cet endroit de l'idéedu<contrôlé 8,accompagnéed'expressions comme
celle figurant au paragraphe 116, qui opposent aux actes des contras ceux dont les
Etats-Unis pourraient être (1directement a responsables. puisse engendrer chez les
lecteurs de I'arrêtfausse idéeque la Cour ferait un rapprochement entre la situation
envisagéeici et leshypothèsesdans lesquelles on peut de façon appropriée parler d'une
a responsabilité indirectspar opposition à une «responsabilitédirecte n.Les hypo-
thèsesque, à mon avis. I'on qualifie correctement comme de responsabilité indirecte,
sont cellesoù un Etat, qui. dans certaines conditions. exerceuncontrôle sur l'actiond'un
cet autre Etat et imputable Li lui. La question qui se pose alors n'est pas celle de
l'imputabilitéou nonà un Etat d'un comportement de personnes ou de groupes n'ap-
partenant pasà l'appareil officielde cet Etat,mais celledu tranàfun Etat déterminé
de la responsabilité internationale découlantd'un agissement imputable autre Etat. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES (SEP.OP. AGO) 189

acceptation of that ,term,may be held to be acts of that State. The Judg-
ment, accordingly, t;îkesa correct viewwhen, referring in particular to the
atrocities, acts of violence or terrorism and other inhuman actions that
Nicaragua alleges to have been committed by the contras against the
persons and propert:yof civilian populations, it holds that the perpetrators
of these misdeeds inay not be considered as having been specifically

charged by United States authorities to commit them unless, in certain
concrete cases, unchallengeable proof to the contrary has been sup-
plied.

17. Where this last point is concerned, therefore, 1 naturally agree in
principle with what itheJudgment observes in paragraph 116,namely that
the Court, within the framework of the present proceedings, did not have

to concern itself with any anti-humanitarian rnisdeeds as the contras rnay
have committed which Nicaragua wrongly seesas violations, attributable
to the United States of America, of the principles of humanitarian law,but
solely with unlawful acts for which the United States may be responsible
"in connection with itheactivities of the contras". One or twohesitations or
linguistic impropriet.ies that can be noted in the drafting of certain pas-

sages do nothing to impair the essential correctness of that observation.
More especially, 1 cannot but agree with the fundamental recognition that
the misdeeds committed by the contras in the course of their military or
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua are not imputable to the United
States of America (paras. 115, 116and 278).

18. However, 1fee:lobliged topoint out that theJudgment exhibits some

hesitancy, a fewat least apparent contradictions and acertain paucity of

' The underlying idea is expressed most precisely in paragraph 115. where the
Judgment holds that "even the generalcontrol by therespondent State over a forcewith
a high degree of dependlency on it" would not in itself mean "that the United States
directed or enforcedthe perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humani-
tarian law alleged by the applicant State" (emphasis added). Subsequently, in this
paragraph and another (277). the Judgment relies to the same purpose on the fact that
the Courtis "not satisfietithat theevidenceavailable demonstratesthat the contraswere
'controlled' by the United States when committing" the acts in question. This obser-
vation is not wrong asar as it goes, but it is less precise than the previous one I have
"control", accompanied by such expressions as those in paragraph 116which contrastdea of
the acts of thecontras to those for which the United States rnight be "responsible
directly", should implant in readers the erroneous idea that the Courtablishing an
analogy between the situation here envisaged and instances where itappropriate to
speak of "indirect resporisibility" as opposed to "direct responsibility". In my view,the
situations whichcan be correctly termed cases of indirect responsibility are those in
which oneState that, in certain circumstances,exerts control overtheactions of another
can be held responsible for an internationally wrongful act commrttedby and imputable
tothatsecondState. The question that arises in suchcases isnot that of the imputabilityto
a State of the conduct of persons and groups that do not form part of its official
apparatus, but that of the transfer to a State of the international responsibility incurred
through an act imputable to another State. 190 ACTIVITÉS MILITAIRES ET PARAMILITAIRES (OP.IND. AGO)

certain défaut d'argumentation juridique àl'appui de la position prise sur
les points en question. J'éprouvesurtout quelque regret que l'arrêtne se

soit pas référé expressément ap urécédent deI'arrêtdu 24 mai 1980sur
I'affaire relative aPersonnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis à
Téhéran L.a Cour me semble avoir perdu de vuequ'elle avaitalorsdû faire
face à une situation sous bien des aspects analogue àla situation actuelle.
Elle avait eu notamment à décidersi, et dans quelle mesure, les faits qui
s'étaientproduits dans la première phase de l'affaire, à savoir l'attaque
arméeperpétréele 4 novembre 1979par des militants ))iraniens contre
l'ambassade desEtats-Unis, l'invasionde seslocaux et laprise en otagedes
personnes qui s'ytrouvaient, la saisiede sesbiens et de sesarchives, sitous
ces agissements actifs O,en d'autres termes, étaientou non imputables à

I'Etatiranien. Et elleétaitparvenueà une conclusion négative à cesujet car
les «militants en question ne possédaient pas un statut officiel quel-
conqueen tant qu'agents ouorganes de 1'Etatet que rien ne prouvait qu'ils
avaient agi en fait au nom et pour le compte des autorités iraniennes. La
Cour avait expressémentrelevéque mêmeles déclarations de félicitation
ou d'approbation qui avaient immédiatement suivi les agissements men-
tionnésne pouvaient pas modifier le caractère, à ce moment-là non attri-
buable àI'Etat, de ces faits commis par les militants))qui étaientquand
mêmelesenfants chérisdesautorités suprêmes du pays. La seulechose que
la Cour avait estimépouvoir être attribuée à I'Etat, dans cette première

phase desévénementsé , taitlefait négatif))d'avoir négligéde prendre les
mesures appropriées pour la protection des locaux et du personnel, afin de
prévenir lesattaques auxquelles on pouvait s'attendre de lapart d'éléments
surexcitéset hostiles, et le fait, également négatiO,qu'une foisl'attaque
perpétréeles autorités officielles n'aient pas répondu aux appels au
secours qu'on n'avait cesséde leur adresser et ne soient pas intervenues
pour libérerles personnes et les locaux.
19. Dans la présente affaire l'arrêt est effectivement parvenu à des
conclusions semblables quant à la non-imputabilité - aux Etats-Unis
d'Amérique cette fois - des agissements perpétrés parles rebelles au

gouvernement sandiniste dans les hostilités menéespar eux en territoire
nicaraguayen et quant à l'imputabilitéaux Etats-Unis des seuls compor-
tements dûment prouvésque des organes de cet Etat auraient eus en
relation avec lesagissements des contras.Pourconclure, c'estladeuxième
foisen un trèsbref laps de temps que la Cour aeu à faireàdesquestions de
responsabilité internationale et. plus spécifiquement. à des cas où les
principes à appliquer concernent des problèmes d'imputabilité, l'un des
aspects les plus délicatsde toute la théoriede la responsabilité.Je ne puis
que regretter qu'elle n'ait pas saisi l'occasion pour souligner. par des
référencesappropriéesq , u'elleconfirme sa prise de position précédenteet

l'argumentation théorique développée à son appui, afin de bien marquer
ainsi la continuité et la soliditéde sajurisprudence.legal reasoning in seeking to substantiate the position the Court takes on
the points in question. 1am above al1inclined to regret that the Judgment
does not refer explicitly to the precedent provided by the Judgment of
24 May 1980in thecase conceming UnitedStates DiplornaticandConsular
Staffin Tehran.The Court seemsto me to have overlooked thefact that, at
that time, it was faced with a situation in many ways similar to thepresent
one. Inter alia, it haclto decide whether and, if so, to what extent the acts
committed in the iriitial phase of the affair, namely the armed attack
perpetrated on 4 November 1979 by Iranian "militants" against the
Embassyof theUnited States,the invasion ofitspremises andthe taking of
the persons there as hostages, the seizure of the Embassy's property and
archives,al1those "active" misdeeds, in other words, could or couldnot be
imputed to the Iraniiin State.And it reached a negative conclusion on this

subject, because the "militants" in question had no officia1status of any
kind as agents or organs of the State and there was nothing to prove that
they had in fact acted in the name and on behalf of the Iranian authorities.
The Court explicitl!, noted that even the congratulatory or approving
statements made immediately following the misdeeds in question could
not alter thefact thatthese acts committed by the "militants" couldnot, at
that time, be attributed to the State, even if their authors were the darlings
of the supreme authorities of the country. The only thing the Court con-
sidered couldbe attributed to the state, in thisfirstphase ofevents,wasthe
"negative" fact of having neglected to take appropriate steps for the
protection of the premises and staff, so as to ward off attacks which were
only to be expected on the part of over-excited hostile elements, or the
equally "negative" fact that, once the attack had been perpetrated, the
officia1 authorities failed to respond to the incessant appeals for help
addressed to them and did not intervene to freethe persons and premisesin
question.
19. In the present case the Court has in effect reached similar conclu-
sions as to the non-imputability - to the United States of America this
time - of the misdeeldsperpetrated by theinsurgentsagainst the Sandinist
government in thecontext of thehostilities pursued by them in Nicaraguan

territory, and the imputability to the United States solelyof such conduct
as can be duly proved to be that of organs of the United States "in
connection with" these misdeeds of the contras.In sum, this is the second
time in a verybrief period that theCourt hashad to deal with questions of
international responisibilityand, more specifically, situations in which the
principles to be applied have been those concerning problems of imputa-
bility, which is one of the most delicate aspects of the entire theory of
responsibility. 1can only regret that the Court has not seized the oppor-
tunity to emphasize, by appropriate references, a confirmation of the
position it took before and of the theoretical reasoning developed in
support, so as to uriderline the continuity and solidity of the junspru-
dence. D'autres points de cet arrêt pourraient appelerde ma part des obser-
vations et peut-êtrel'expression d'un désaccord partiel '.Maisje préfère
m'entenir ici àcesquelques remarques et àcesquelques misesau point que
j'ai estimées nécessairep sour précisermesvuessurcertains aspects choisis,
defait etde droit, qui m'ont semblélesplusimportants. On relèveraparfois

des réservesqui nesont pas seulement de forme à proposdesconstatations
faites dans certains chapitres ou certains paragraphes de l'arrêt ed tans le
raisonnement qui les accompagne. Mais, en définitive,il n'y a pas la de
divergences telles queje doive renoncer à l'adhésion globalequej'estime
objectivement pouvoir donner à l'arrêt rendu aujourd'hui.

(Signé)Roberto AGO.

' Je trouve. par exemple, disproportionné ledéveloppementet exagérée l'importance
attribuéedans I'arrêt(par. 117et suivàla question de la diffusion. limitéeà ce qu'il
paraît, auprès des forcescontras, du manuel éditépar la CIA sur les Operaciones
sicologicasenguerradeguerrillas.Mêmeen faisantabstraction du fait que lesparties qui
s'affrontent dans une lutte civilecomme celle qui malheureusement sévitau Nicaragua
n'ont pas besoin d'un encouragement extérieur pour se livrer agissements parfois
antihumanitaires- et I'arrêt lreeconnaît -je vois mal comment prendrait forme. dans
le droit international général.la responsabilitéqui devrait découle(<encourage-
ment >>semblable, dont la réalitéet l'efficacitérestent d'ailleurs à prouver. Thereare other points in theJudgment onwhich 1could comment and in
regard to which, pe:rhaps, 1 could express some partial disagreement l.
However, 1prefer tloconfine myself here to these few observations and
points that 1 feel it has been necessary to put fonvard in order to make
known my viewsregarding some selected aspects of fact and lawwhich to

my mind were the inost important. Here and there the reader will note
somereservations wlhichare not merely formal in regard to the holdings set
forth in certain chapters or paragraphs of the Judgment and its attendant
reasoning. Yet, in tlhelast resort, there are no disagreements of such an
order as to impel me to forsake the general concurrence that 1 believein al1
objectivity 1 may accord the Judgment delivered today.

(Signed) Roberto AGO.

' For example, 1findthatthe Court hasdevoted adisproportionately lengthy passage
and attached undue importance (in paras. 117 ff.) to the- apparently limited-
dissemination among the contra forces of the CIA-published manual on Operaciones
sicolbgicasen guerra de guerrillas. Even apart from the-frecognized by the Judg-
need notoutside encouragement toengage in activities which may beanti-humanitarian,agua
1have difficulty in seeingprecisely how the responsibility deriving from such "encour-
agement", the reality and efficacy of which remain moreover to be proved, would take
shape in general international law.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Separate opinion of Judge Ago (translation)

Links