Declaration by Judge Nagendra Singh (as appended immediately after the judgment)

hence 1 consider them of such importance as to be appropriately em-
phasized to convey the true significance of the Judgment-its extent as
well as its depth. These reasons, as well as those aspects of the Judgment

which have that importance from my viewpoint are briefiy stated as
follows :

While basing its findings on the bilateral law, namely the Exchange of
Notes of 1961which has primacy in this case, the Court has pronounced
upon the first and second submissions of the Applicant's Memorial on
the merits, in terms of non-opposability to the Federal Republic of
Germany as requested by the Applicant. This suffices for the purpose of
that part of the Judgment. Itwas, therefore, not necessary for the Court

to adjudicate on that aspect of the first submission which relates to the
general law.
In the special circumstances of this case the Court has, therefore, not
proceeded to pronounce upon that particular request of the Applicant
which asks the Court to declare that Iceland's extension of its exclusive
fishery limit to50 nautical miles has no basis in international law which
amounts to asking the Court to find that such extension is ipso jure

illegal and invalid erga omnes. Having refrained from pronouncing on
that aspect it was, consequently, unnecessary for the Court to pro-
nounce on the Applicant's legal contention in support of its first
submission, namely, that a customary rule of international law exists
today imposing a general prohibition on extension by States of their
fisheries jurisdiction beyond 12miles.

There is still a lingering feature of development associated with the
general law. The rules of customary maritime law relating to the limit of
fisheries jurisdiction have still been evolving and confronted by a widely
divergent and, discordant State practice, have not so far crystallized.
Again, the conventional maritime law though substantially codified by

the Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea of 1958 and 1960 has
certain aspects admittedly left over to be settled and these now constitute,
among others, the subject of subsequent efforts at codification. The
question of the extent of fisheries jurisdiction which is still one of the
unsettled aspects could not, therefore, be settled by the Court since it
could not "render judgment sub specie legisferendae, or anticipate the
law before the legislator has laid it down".

This is of importance to me but 1do not have to elaborate this point
any further since 1 have subscribed to the views expressed by my col-
leagues in the joint separate opinion of the five Judges wherein this
aspect has been more fully dealt with. The contribution which the Judgment makes towards the development
of the Law of the Sea lies in the recognition which it gives to the concept
of preferential rights of a coastal State in the fisheries of the adjacent
waters particularly if that State is in a special situation with its population
dependent on those fisheries. Moreover, the Court proceeds further to
recognize that the law pertaining to fisheries must accept the primacy for

the need of conservation based on scientific data. This aspect has been
properly emphasized to the extent needed to establish that the exercise
of preferential rights of the coastal State as well as the historic rights of
other States dependent on the same fishing grounds, have al1 to be
subject to the over-riding consideration of proper conservation of the
fishery resources for the benefit of al1concerned. This conclusion would

appear warranted if this vital source of man's nutrition is to be preserved
and developed for the community.
In addition there has always been the need for accepting clearly in
maritime matters the existence of the duty to "have reasonable regard to
the interests of other Statesv-a principle enshrined in Article 2 of the
Geneva Convention of the High Seas 1958 which applies even to the
four freedoms of the seas and has weighed with the Court in this case.

Thus the rights of the coastal State which must have preference over the
rights of other States in the coastal fisheries of the adjacent waters have
nevertheless to be exercised with due regard to the rights of other States
and the claims and counter-claims in this respect have to be resolved on
the basis of considerations of equity. There is, as yet, no specific con-
ventional law governing this aspect and it is the evolution of customary

law which has furnished the basis of the Court's Judgment in this case.

III

The Court, asthe principal judicial organ of the United Nations, taking

into consideration the special field in which it operates, has a distinct
role to play in the administration of justice. In that context the resolving
of a dispute brought before it by sovereign States constitutes an element
which the Court ought not to ignore in its adjudicatory function. This
aspect relating to the settlement of a dispute has been emphasized in more
than one article of the Charter of the United Nations. There is Article 2,
paragraph 3,as well as Article 1, which both use words like "adj~l.stment

or settlement of international disputes or situations", whereas Article 33
directs Members to "seek a solution" of their disputes by peaceful means.

Furthermore, this approach is very much in accordance with the
jurisprudence of the Court. On 19 August 1929the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice in its Order in the case of the Free Zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 22,at p. 13)observed
that the judicial settlement of international disputes is simply an alter-

native to the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the
parties. Thus if negotiations become necessary in the special circumstances
of a particular case the Court ought not to hesitate to direct negotiations
in the best interests of resolving the dispute. Defining the content of the
obligation to negotiate, the Permanent Court in its Advisory Opinion
of 1931 in the case of Railway Trafic between Lithuania and Poland

(P.C.I.J.,Series AIB, No. 42, 1931,at p. 116)observed that the obligation
was "not only to enter into negotiations, but also to pursue them as far
as possible, with a view to concluding agreements" even if "an obligation
to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement". This
does clearly imply that everything possible should be done not only to
promote but also to help to conclude successfully the process of negotia-

tions once directed for the settlement of a dispute. In addition we have
also the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (I.C.J. Reports 1969) citing
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter and where the Parties were to
negotiate in good faith on the basis of the Judgment to resolve the
dispute.

Though it would not only be improper but quite out of the question

for a court of law to direct negotiations in every case or even to con-
template such a step when the circumstances did not justify the same, it
would appear that in this particular case negotiations appear necessary
and flow from the nature of the dispute, which is confined to the same
fishing grounds and relates to issues and problems which best lend
themselves to settlement by negotiation. Again, negotiations are also

indicated by the nature of the law which has to be applied, whether it
be the treaty of 1961 with its six months' notice in the compromissory
clause provided ostensibly for negotiations or whether it be reliance on
considerations of equity. The Court has, therefore, answered the third
submission of the Applicant's Memorial on the merits in the affirmative
and accepted that negotiations furnished the correct answer to the

problem posed by the need for equitably reconciling the historic right
of the Applicant based on traditional fishing with the preferential rights
of Iceland as a coastal State in a situation of special dependence on its
fisheries. The Judgment of the Court, in asking the Parties to negotiate a
settlement, has thus emphasized the importance of resolving the dispute
in the adjudication of the case.

No court of law and particularly not the International Court of Justice
could ever be said to derogatefrom its function when it gives due impor-
tance to the settlement of a dispute which is the ultimate objective of al1
adjudication as well as of the United Nations Charter and the Court, as
its organ, could hardly afford to ignore this aspect. A tribunal, while
discharging its function in that manner, would appear to be adjudicating215 FISHERIESJURISDICTION (DECL. NAGENDRA SINGH)

in the larger interest and ceasing to be narrow and restrictive in its
approach.
Thus, when confronted with the problem of its own competence in
dealing with that aspect of the dispute which relates to the need for
conservation and the exercise of preferential rights with due respect for
historic rights, the Court has rightly regarded those aspects to be an
integral part of the dispute. Surely, the dispute before the Court has to be
considered in al1its aspects if it is to be properly resolved and effectively
adjudicated upon. This must be so if it is not part justice but the whole
justice which a tribunal ought always to have in view. It could, therefore,
be said that it was in the overall interests of settlement of the dispute that

certain parts of it which were inseparably linked to thecore of the conflict
were not separated in this case to be left unpronounced upon. TheCourt
has, of course, to be mindful of the limitations that result from the
principle of consent as the basis of international obligations, which also
governs its own competence to entertain a dispute. However, this could
hardly be taken to mean that a tribunal constituted as a regular court of
1awwhen entrusted with the determination of a dispute by the willing
consent of the parties should in any way faIl short of fully and effectively
discharging its obligations. It would be somewhat disquieting if the Court
were itself to adopt either too narrow an approach or too restricted an
interpretation of those very words which conferjurisdiction on the Court
such as in the case "the extension of the fishery jurisdiction of Iceland"
occurring in the compromissory clause of the Exchange of Notes of 1961.
Those words could not be held to confine the competence conferred on
the Court to the sole question of the conformity or otherwise of Iceland's
extension of its fisherylimits with existing legal rules. Similarly, the Court

could not hold that it was without competence to deal with the fourth
submission of the Applicant pertaining to a claim for compensation
against Iceland since that submission arises out of and relates to the
dispute. The Court, therefore, need not lose sight of the consideration
relating to the settlement of the dispute whileremainingstrictly within the
framework of the law which it administers and adhering always to the
procedures which it must follow.

For purposes of administering the law of the sea and for proper
understanding of matters pertaining to fisheries as well as to appreciate
the facts of this case, it is of some importance to know the precise content

of the expression "fisheries jurisdiction" and for what it stands and
means. The concept of fisheries jurisdiction does cover aspects such as
enforcement of conservation measures, exercise of prefe'rentialrights and
44216 FISHERIESJURISDICTION (DECL. NAGENDRA SINGH)

respect for historic rights since each one may involve an element of
jurisdiction to implement them. Even the reference to "extension" in
relation to fisheries jurisdiction which occurs in the compromissory
clause of the 1961 treaty could not be confined to mean merely the
extension of a geographical boundary line or limit since such an extension

would be meaningless without a jurisdictional aspect which constitutes,
as it were, its juridical content. It is significant, therefore, that the pre-
amble of the Truman Proclamation of 1945 respecting United States
coastal fisheries refers to a "jurisdictional" basis for implementing con-
servation measures in the adjacent seasince such measures have to be

enforced like any other regulations in relation to a particular area. This
further supports the Court'sconclusion that it had jurisdiction toeal
with aspects relatingto conservation and preferential rights since the
1961treaty by the use of the words "extension of fisheries jurisdiction"
must be deemed to have covered those aspects.

Another aspect of the Judgment which has importance from my
viewpoint is that it does not "preclude the Parties from benefiting from
any subsequent developments in the pertinent rirles of international law"
(para. 77).The adjudicatory function of the Court must necessarily be

confined to the case before it. No tribunal could take notice of future
events, contingencies or situations that may arise consequent on the
holding or withholding of negotiations or otherwise even by way of a
further exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, a possibility or even a probability
of changes in law or situations in the future could not prevent the Court
from rendering Judgment today.

Judges FORSTER, BENGZON, JIMÉNEZ DE ARÉCHAGA, NAGENDRA SINGH
and RUDAappend a joint separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court;

Judges DE CASTRO and Sir Hurnphrey WALDOC append separate opinions
to the Judgment of the Court.

Judges GROS, PETRÉN and ONYEAMaA ppend dissenting opinions to the
Judgment of the Court.
(InitialledM.L.

(InitialledS.A.

45

Bilingual Content

de la nécessitépour la Cour de se limiterà son obligation de dire ledroit
tel qu'il existeprésentement par rapport aux faits de la cause soumise à

son appréciation.
Pour le surplus, je trouve absolument normal que, en droit interna-
tional comme en tout autre droit d'ailleurs, le droit existant puisse être
remis en cause de temps àautre - c'est le plus sûr moyen de promouvoir
son développementprogressif - mais il n'y a pas lieu d'en conclure pour
autant que la Cour doit, pour cette raison et à l'occasion du présent dif-
férend entre l'Islande et la République fédéraled'Allemagne, paraître
l'inspiratrice de certaines idéesde plusn plus d'actualité,voire partagées
par un nombre respectable d'Etats, en matière de droit de la mer et qui
hantent, semble-t-il, la plupart des conférenciers siégeant actuellement

à Caracas. Il convient,à mon avis, d'éviterd'entrer dans une voie d'anti-
cipation quant au règlement des problèmes comme ceux que les droits
préférentielset autres impliquent.
Pour terminer cette déclaration,je crois pouvoir m'inspirer de la con-
clusion que formule le secrétaireadjoint du Comité des fonds marins des
Nations Unies, M. Jean-Pierre Lévy,en souhaitant que l'idéequi s'en
dégage puisse inspirer les Etats et plus particulièrement l'Islande qui,
négligeant de suivre la voie du droit, préfèreattendre des assemblées à
caractère politique lajustification de sesdtoits.

Je suis d'accord a.vecM. Jean-Pierre Lévypour penser que:
((il esà espérer que les Etats mettront à profit ces quelques pro-
chaines quatre ou cinq années pour tenter de se prouverà eux-mêmes
et surtout à leurs ressortissants, que l'intérêt générdael la commu-
nauté internationaleet le bien-êtredes peuples de la terre peuvent être

préservéspar la modération, la compréhension mutuelle et l'esprit
de compromis, qui seuls permettront à la troisième Conférencesur le
droit de la mer de se tenir et de réussircodifier un ordre juridique
nouveau pour la mer et ses ressources ))(((La troisième Conférence
sur le droit de la mer,Annuairefrançais de droit international1971,
p. 828).

En attendant l'avènement del'ère nouvelletant souhaitée,je m'honore
de me trouver en accord avec quelques juges de la Cour tels que
MM. Gros, Petrénet Onyeama pour qui la règled'or pour la Cour doit
êtrede se limiter strictement, en de semblables causes, à ses attributions
juridictionnelles.

M. NAGENDRS AINGHj,uge, fait la déclarationsuivante:

Il est certains motifs dont la validité s'impoàemoi avec tant de force
qu'ils me permettent de donner ma voix à l'arrêtque rend la Cour en lahence 1 consider them of such importance as to be appropriately em-
phasized to convey the true significance of the Judgment-its extent as
well as its depth. These reasons, as well as those aspects of the Judgment

which have that importance from my viewpoint are briefiy stated as
follows :

While basing its findings on the bilateral law, namely the Exchange of
Notes of 1961which has primacy in this case, the Court has pronounced
upon the first and second submissions of the Applicant's Memorial on
the merits, in terms of non-opposability to the Federal Republic of
Germany as requested by the Applicant. This suffices for the purpose of
that part of the Judgment. Itwas, therefore, not necessary for the Court

to adjudicate on that aspect of the first submission which relates to the
general law.
In the special circumstances of this case the Court has, therefore, not
proceeded to pronounce upon that particular request of the Applicant
which asks the Court to declare that Iceland's extension of its exclusive
fishery limit to50 nautical miles has no basis in international law which
amounts to asking the Court to find that such extension is ipso jure

illegal and invalid erga omnes. Having refrained from pronouncing on
that aspect it was, consequently, unnecessary for the Court to pro-
nounce on the Applicant's legal contention in support of its first
submission, namely, that a customary rule of international law exists
today imposing a general prohibition on extension by States of their
fisheries jurisdiction beyond 12miles.

There is still a lingering feature of development associated with the
general law. The rules of customary maritime law relating to the limit of
fisheries jurisdiction have still been evolving and confronted by a widely
divergent and, discordant State practice, have not so far crystallized.
Again, the conventional maritime law though substantially codified by

the Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea of 1958 and 1960 has
certain aspects admittedly left over to be settled and these now constitute,
among others, the subject of subsequent efforts at codification. The
question of the extent of fisheries jurisdiction which is still one of the
unsettled aspects could not, therefore, be settled by the Court since it
could not "render judgment sub specie legisferendae, or anticipate the
law before the legislator has laid it down".

This is of importance to me but 1do not have to elaborate this point
any further since 1 have subscribed to the views expressed by my col-
leagues in the joint separate opinion of the five Judges wherein this
aspect has been more fully dealt with.présente affaire;je leur attache une telle importance que je crois devoir
les souligner pour bien mettre en relief la valeur réellede cet arrêt,sa
portéeaussi bien queson sens profond. Je voudrais lesexposer brièvement
ci-après, ainsi que les aspects de l'arrêtqui revktentà mes yeux une si
grande importance.

Fondant sa décisionsur le droit résultant d'accords bilatérauxà savoir
l'échangede notes de 1961qui prime en l'espèce,la Cour s'est prononcée
sur les première et deuxièmeconclusions du mémoiredu demandeur sur
le fond, en proclamant, comme celui-ci l'en sollicite, que les mesures
prises par l'Islande ne sont pas opposables à la République fédérale
d'Allemagne. Cela suffit aux fins de cette partie de l'arrêt.II n'étaitdonc
pas nécessaireque la Cour statue sur l'aspect de la première conclusion
qui fait appel au droit général.

Dans les circonstances spécialesde la présenteaffaire, la Cour ne s'est
donc pas prononcéesur la demande particulière tendant à ce que la Cour
dise que l'élargissementpar l'Islande desa zone de compétenceexclusive
sur les pêcheriesjusqu'à 50 milles marins était sans fondement en droit
international, ce qui équivalait demander à la Cour de dire qu'un tel
élargissement était ipso jurecontraire au droit et dépourvu de validité
erga omnes. S'étant abstenue de statuer sur ce point, la Cour n'a donc
pas eu à se prononcer sur la thèsejuridique que le demandeur faisait
valoir à l'appui de sa première conclusion,à savoir qu'il existe actuelle-
ment une règle de droit international coutumier interdisant de façon
généraleaux Etats d'étendre au-delà de12milles leur compétenceen ma-
tière de pêcheries.
Un élémentde développement subsiste encore en ce qui concerne le

droit général.Les règlesde droit maritime coutumier relatives aux limites
de la compétenceen matièrede pêcheriessont encore en voie d'évolution
et, face à des pratiques étatiques largement divergentes et fortement
discordantes, ne se sont pas cristalliséesjusqu'ici.De même, bienqu'on ait
codifié unegrande partie du droit maritimeconventionnel auxconférences
de Genèvede 1958et de 1960sur ledroit de la mer, il est certains éléments
de ce droit qui, tout le monde l'admet, ont été laissédse côtépour être
réglés plustard et qui, avec d'autres matières, sont maintenant l'objet de
nouveaux efforts de:codification. Etant donné.que la question de l'étendue
de la compétencedes Etats en matière de pêcheries estau nombre de ces
élémentssur lesquels l'accord ne s'est pas encore fait, la Cour ne pouvait

pas la réglercar elle ne saurait ((rendre de décisionb specie legisferen-
due, ni énoncerledroit avant que le législateur l'aitédicté)).
Bien que j'attache de l'importanceà ce point, je ne m'y attarderai pas
davantage car je souscris aux vues exprimées par mes collègues dans
l'opinion commune que le groupe de cinq juges dont je fais partie a
présentéeet où cet aspect du problèmeest traitéde façon plus détaillée.
41 The contribution which the Judgment makes towards the development
of the Law of the Sea lies in the recognition which it gives to the concept
of preferential rights of a coastal State in the fisheries of the adjacent
waters particularly if that State is in a special situation with its population
dependent on those fisheries. Moreover, the Court proceeds further to
recognize that the law pertaining to fisheries must accept the primacy for

the need of conservation based on scientific data. This aspect has been
properly emphasized to the extent needed to establish that the exercise
of preferential rights of the coastal State as well as the historic rights of
other States dependent on the same fishing grounds, have al1 to be
subject to the over-riding consideration of proper conservation of the
fishery resources for the benefit of al1concerned. This conclusion would

appear warranted if this vital source of man's nutrition is to be preserved
and developed for the community.
In addition there has always been the need for accepting clearly in
maritime matters the existence of the duty to "have reasonable regard to
the interests of other Statesv-a principle enshrined in Article 2 of the
Geneva Convention of the High Seas 1958 which applies even to the
four freedoms of the seas and has weighed with the Court in this case.

Thus the rights of the coastal State which must have preference over the
rights of other States in the coastal fisheries of the adjacent waters have
nevertheless to be exercised with due regard to the rights of other States
and the claims and counter-claims in this respect have to be resolved on
the basis of considerations of equity. There is, as yet, no specific con-
ventional law governing this aspect and it is the evolution of customary

law which has furnished the basis of the Court's Judgment in this case.

III

The Court, asthe principal judicial organ of the United Nations, taking

into consideration the special field in which it operates, has a distinct
role to play in the administration of justice. In that context the resolving
of a dispute brought before it by sovereign States constitutes an element
which the Court ought not to ignore in its adjudicatory function. This
aspect relating to the settlement of a dispute has been emphasized in more
than one article of the Charter of the United Nations. There is Article 2,
paragraph 3,as well as Article 1, which both use words like "adj~l.stment

or settlement of international disputes or situations", whereas Article 33
directs Members to "seek a solution" of their disputes by peaceful means.

Furthermore, this approach is very much in accordance with the
jurisprudence of the Court. On 19 August 1929the Permanent Court of La contribution que l'arrêtapporte au développement du droit de la
mer réside dans la reconnaissance qu'il accorde à la notion des droits
préférentiels de 1'Etat riverain sur les pêcheries des eaux adjacentes,

surtout quand cet Etat se trouve dans une situation spéciale parce que
sa population est tributaire des pêcheriesdont il s'agit. De plus, la Cour
reconnaît ensuite que le droit en matière de pêche doit accepter la
primauté des impératifs de la conservation sur la base de données
scientifiques. Cet élément està juste titre mis en relief dans la mesure

nécessairepour établir que les droits préférentielsde 1'Etat riverain et les
droits historiques d'autres Etats tributaires des mêmeslieux de pêche
doivent êtreexercéssous réserve de la considération primordiale d'une
conservation rationnelle des ressources halieutiques dans l'intérêt de tous.
Cette conclusion semble justifiée si l'on doit protéger et développer au

profit de la collectivité cette source vitale de l'alimentation humaine.
En outre, il a tou.jours été nécessaired'admettre clairement, en matière
de droit maritime, 1"existenced'une obligation de tenir ((raisonnablement
compte de l'intérêt[des] autres Etats)), ce principe consacré à l'article 2
de la Convention de Genève de 1958 sur la haute mer qui s'applique
même auxquatre libertésde la haute mer et que la Cour a pris en consi-

dération en l'espèce. En conséquence, les droits de I'Etat riverain, qui
doivent avoir priorité sur ceux des autres Etats dans les pêcheries
côtières des eaux adjacentes, doivent néanmoins être exercés compte
dûment tenu des droits des autres Etats et les prétentions opposées qui
sont émisesà ce sujet doivent êtreconciliéessur la base de considérations

d'équité.11 n'existe pas, jusqu'ici, de droit conventionnel qui régisse
expressément la question et c'est l'évolution du droit coutumier qui,
en l'espèce, a servi de fondement à I'arrêt de laCour.

III

La Cour, en tant qu'organe judiciaire principal des Nations Unies et eu
égard au domaine spécial dans lequel elle exerce son activité, a un rôle
particulier àjouer dans l'administration de la justice. Dans cette optique,
la nécessitéd'apporter une solution à tout différendque des Etats souve-
rains lui soumettent est un élémentque la Cour ne doit pas perdre de vue

dans l'exercice de sa fonction judiciaire. Plus d'une disposition de la
Charte des Nations Unies met l'accent sur cet aspect de la question du
rkglement des différends. On peut d'abord citer l'article 2, paragraphe 3,
ainsi que I'article premier, où figurent des expressions telles que ((l'ajuste-
nzent ou le règlement de différends ou de situations de caractère interna-

tional ))ou ctrèglenr leurs différends internationaux »; il y a également
l'article33 qui enjoint aux Etats Membres de ((rechercher la solution ))de
leurs différendspar des moyens pacifiques.
Cette façon de voir les choses est, du reste, tout à fait conforme à la
jurisprudence de la Cour. Dans l'ordonnance qu'elle a rendue le 19 aoûtInternational Justice in its Order in the case of the Free Zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 22,at p. 13)observed
that the judicial settlement of international disputes is simply an alter-

native to the direct and friendly settlement of such disputes between the
parties. Thus if negotiations become necessary in the special circumstances
of a particular case the Court ought not to hesitate to direct negotiations
in the best interests of resolving the dispute. Defining the content of the
obligation to negotiate, the Permanent Court in its Advisory Opinion
of 1931 in the case of Railway Trafic between Lithuania and Poland

(P.C.I.J.,Series AIB, No. 42, 1931,at p. 116)observed that the obligation
was "not only to enter into negotiations, but also to pursue them as far
as possible, with a view to concluding agreements" even if "an obligation
to negotiate does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement". This
does clearly imply that everything possible should be done not only to
promote but also to help to conclude successfully the process of negotia-

tions once directed for the settlement of a dispute. In addition we have
also the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (I.C.J. Reports 1969) citing
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter and where the Parties were to
negotiate in good faith on the basis of the Judgment to resolve the
dispute.

Though it would not only be improper but quite out of the question

for a court of law to direct negotiations in every case or even to con-
template such a step when the circumstances did not justify the same, it
would appear that in this particular case negotiations appear necessary
and flow from the nature of the dispute, which is confined to the same
fishing grounds and relates to issues and problems which best lend
themselves to settlement by negotiation. Again, negotiations are also

indicated by the nature of the law which has to be applied, whether it
be the treaty of 1961 with its six months' notice in the compromissory
clause provided ostensibly for negotiations or whether it be reliance on
considerations of equity. The Court has, therefore, answered the third
submission of the Applicant's Memorial on the merits in the affirmative
and accepted that negotiations furnished the correct answer to the

problem posed by the need for equitably reconciling the historic right
of the Applicant based on traditional fishing with the preferential rights
of Iceland as a coastal State in a situation of special dependence on its
fisheries. The Judgment of the Court, in asking the Parties to negotiate a
settlement, has thus emphasized the importance of resolving the dispute
in the adjudication of the case.

No court of law and particularly not the International Court of Justice
could ever be said to derogatefrom its function when it gives due impor-
tance to the settlement of a dispute which is the ultimate objective of al1
adjudication as well as of the United Nations Charter and the Court, as
its organ, could hardly afford to ignore this aspect. A tribunal, while
discharging its function in that manner, would appear to be adjudicating COMPÉTENCEPÊCHERIES (DÉCL. NAGENDRA SINGH) 214

1929 en l'affaire des Zones franches de la Haute-Savoie et du Pays de Gex
(C.P.J.I. st;rieA no22, p. 13),la Cour permanentede Justice internationale
a déclaréque le règlement judiciaire des conflits internationaux n'était

qu'un succédanéau règlement direct et amiable de ces conflits entre les
parties. Par conséquent, si la conduite de négociations paraît nécessaire
dans les circonstances particulières d'un cas donné, la Cour ne doit pas
hésiter à ordonner aux parties de négocier pour faciliter la solution du
différend. Définissantle contenu de l'obligation de négocier, la Cour

permanente a déclaré,dans l'avis consultatif qu'elle a rendu en 1931 en
I'affaire du Traficferro viaireentre la Lithuanie et la Pologne (C.P.J./. série
A,'Bno 42, 1931,p. 116), qu'il ne s'agissait ((pas seulement d'entamer des
négociations, mais encore de les poursuivre autant que possible, en vue
d'arriver à des accords)), mêmesi ctl'engagement de négocier n'implique
pas celui de s'entendre)). On doit manifestement en déduire qu'une fois

les négociations ordonnées en vue du règlement d'un différend,tout doit
êtremis en Œuvre non seulement pour en favoriser le déroulement, mais
aussi pour contribuer à en assurer l'heureuse issue. Nous avons également
l'arrêtrendu par la Courdans les affaires du Plateau continental de lu mer
d~rNord (C.I.J. Recueil 1969) qui cite l'article 33 de la Charte et d'après

lequel les Parties devaient négocierde bonne foi pour réglerleur différend
sur la base de l'arrct.
De toute évidence, il ne conviendrait guère et il serait mêmehors de
question qu'un tribunal ordonne des négociations dans chaque affaire
dont il est saisi, ou qu'il envisage de le faire lorsque les circonstances ne le

justifient pas; mais en l'espècedes négociations paraissent nécessaireseu
égardà la nature du différend,qui porte sur les mêmeslieux de pêcheet
soulève controverses et problèmes qui, plus que tous autres, se prêtentà
un règlement par voie de négociation. Le recours aux négociations paraît
égalementindiqué si l'on tient compte de la nature du droit qui doit être
appliqué, qu'il s'agisse de l'accord de 1961dont la clause compromissoire

prévoit un préavisde six mois manifestement destiné à permettre des né-
gociations ou que l'on fasse appel à des considérations d'équité.La Cour
a donc accueilli la troisième conclusion du mémoiredu demandeur slir le
fond,et a dit que les négociations étaientle moyen auquel il convenait de
recourir pour résoudre le problème que pose la nécessitéde concilier de

façon équitable les droits historiques que le demandeur tient de son acti-
vitétraditionnelle de pêcheavec les droits préférentielsque l'Islande pos-
shde en tant qu'Eitat riverain spécialement tributaire de ses pêcheries.
Dans son arrêt,la Cour a invitéles Parties à négocierun règlement; elle a
ainsi soulignécombien elle tenait à ce que sa décisionassure la solution du

différend.
On ne peut dire d'aucune instancejudiciaire - et d'autant moins de la
Cour internationale de Justice - qu'elle dérogeà sa fonction lorsqu'elle
accorde au règlement du litige la place importante qu'il mérite - c'est là
l'objectif ultime de toute décision judiciaire de mêmeque celui de la
Charte, et la Cour, en tant qu'organe des Nations Unies, ne saurait guère

manquer d'en tenir compte. Tout tribunal qui s'acquitterait de sa fonc-215 FISHERIESJURISDICTION (DECL. NAGENDRA SINGH)

in the larger interest and ceasing to be narrow and restrictive in its
approach.
Thus, when confronted with the problem of its own competence in
dealing with that aspect of the dispute which relates to the need for
conservation and the exercise of preferential rights with due respect for
historic rights, the Court has rightly regarded those aspects to be an
integral part of the dispute. Surely, the dispute before the Court has to be
considered in al1its aspects if it is to be properly resolved and effectively
adjudicated upon. This must be so if it is not part justice but the whole
justice which a tribunal ought always to have in view. It could, therefore,
be said that it was in the overall interests of settlement of the dispute that

certain parts of it which were inseparably linked to thecore of the conflict
were not separated in this case to be left unpronounced upon. TheCourt
has, of course, to be mindful of the limitations that result from the
principle of consent as the basis of international obligations, which also
governs its own competence to entertain a dispute. However, this could
hardly be taken to mean that a tribunal constituted as a regular court of
1awwhen entrusted with the determination of a dispute by the willing
consent of the parties should in any way faIl short of fully and effectively
discharging its obligations. It would be somewhat disquieting if the Court
were itself to adopt either too narrow an approach or too restricted an
interpretation of those very words which conferjurisdiction on the Court
such as in the case "the extension of the fishery jurisdiction of Iceland"
occurring in the compromissory clause of the Exchange of Notes of 1961.
Those words could not be held to confine the competence conferred on
the Court to the sole question of the conformity or otherwise of Iceland's
extension of its fisherylimits with existing legal rules. Similarly, the Court

could not hold that it was without competence to deal with the fourth
submission of the Applicant pertaining to a claim for compensation
against Iceland since that submission arises out of and relates to the
dispute. The Court, therefore, need not lose sight of the consideration
relating to the settlement of the dispute whileremainingstrictly within the
framework of the law which it administers and adhering always to the
procedures which it must follow.

For purposes of administering the law of the sea and for proper
understanding of matters pertaining to fisheries as well as to appreciate
the facts of this case, it is of some importance to know the precise content

of the expression "fisheries jurisdiction" and for what it stands and
means. The concept of fisheries jurisdiction does cover aspects such as
enforcement of conservation measures, exercise of prefe'rentialrights and
44tionde cette manière rendrait, semble-t-il, lajustice dans une optique plus
large, libre de toutes conceptions étroites et limitées.
Ainsi, lorsquela Cour a examinéla question de savoir sielle avait com-
pétencepour connaitre de l'aspect du litige qui avait trait aux nécessités

de la conservation et à l'exercicede droits préférentielscompte dûment
tenu des droits historiques, elle a considéré à juste titre quecet aspect
faisait partie intégrante du différenddont elle était saisie.l est évident
que, pour pouvoir se prononcer efficacement sur le différendqui lui était
soumis et lui trouver la solution appropriée, la Cour devait l'examiner
sous tous ses aspects. Comment en irait-il autrement si I'on veut que la
justice rendue ne soit pas unejustice partielle, maiscette justice complète
laquelle un tribunal doit toujours tendre? On peut donc dire que c'est
également dans l'intérêt générdaul règlement du différendque la Cour
n'en a pas dissociécertains élémentsindissolublement liés à l'essentieldu
présent litige pour refuser de se prononcer à leur égard. La Cour doit
certes ne pas perdre de vue les limitations qui découlent du principe du
consentement en tant que fondement des obligations internationales,

principe qui régitégalementsa propre compétencepour connaître d'un
différend.Cela ne saurait cependant signifier que lorsque, du libre con-
sentement des parties, un organe régulièrementconstitué en cour de
justice est chargé detrancher un différend il doit de quelque manière que
ce soit manquer de s'acquitter pleinement et efficacement de ses obliga-
tions. 11serait un peu inquiétant devoir la Cour elle-mêmeadopter une
conception trop étroite ou une interprétation trop restrictive du libelléde
la disposition qui lui confère compétence,en l'occurrence du membre de
phrase al'élargissement de la juridiction sur les pêcheriesautour de
l'Islande)),que I'ontrouve dans la clause compromissoire de l'échangede
notes de 1961.11serait impossible de considérer quece membre de phrase
limite la compétence conférée à la Cour à la seule question de savoir si
l'extention par l'Islande de sa zone de pêche estou non conforme aux

règlesde droit existantes. De même laCour ne saurait se déclarer incom-
pétentepour connaitre de la quatrième conclusion du demandeur relative
à une indemnisation, car c'est le différend qui est à l'origine de cette
conclusion et c'est à lui qu'elle se rattache. Aussi la Cour ne doit-ellepas
perdre de vue les considérations touchant la solution du litige, tout en se
maintenant rigoureusement dans le cadre du droit qu'elle est chargée
d'appliquer et en demeurant fidèle en toute occasion aux procédures
qu'elle doit suivre.

Aux fins de l'application du droit de la mer, de mêmeque pour bien
comprendre les questions relatives aux pêcherieset se faire une juste

idéedes faits dans la présente espèce,il n'est pas sans importance de
savoir ce qu'est le contenu précis des expressions ((compétenceen ma-
tière depêcheries))ou((juridictionsur les pêcheries))c,e qu'elles signifient
et ce qu'elles recouvrent. La notion de compétenceen matière de pêche-216 FISHERIESJURISDICTION (DECL. NAGENDRA SINGH)