JOINT DECLARATION OF JUDGES GUILLAUME AND
FLEISCHHAUER
[English Original Text]
Article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court - Objection of mootness
havingan exclusively preliminary character.
Actions ofthe UnitedStates in order to obtainthe surrenderof the suspects
- Last substantivesubmissionof Libya directed againsttheseactions - Juris-
diction ofthe Courtinthis respect onlyto theextent that theactionsinquestion
would becontrary tothe Montreal Convention.
We feelprompted to make the followingjoint declaration with regard
to the Judgment of today's date on the preliminary objections raised by
the United States in the case concerning questions of interpretation and
application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arisingfrom the aerial inci-
dent at Lockerbie :
We voted against the third conclusion in the dispositifthat
"the objection raised by the United States according to which the
claims of Libya becamemoot because Security Council resolutions
748 (1992) and 883 (1993) rendered them without object does not,
in the circumstances of the case, have an exclusivelypreliminary
character".
We find that that conclusion is wrong and that it sets a potentially
dangerous precedent as it undercuts the object and purpose of Article 79
of the Rules of Court.
The conclusion is wrong for the followingreasons.
Thiscaseisabout the Montreal Convention.What isin dispute between
the Parties is the applicability of the Convention to the Lockerbie inci-
dent and the observation of the obligations flowingfrom its provisions in
the aftermath of the incident. The case is not about the Security Council
resolutions 748(1992)and 883(1993)which wereadopted by the Council
on 31 March 1992and 11November 1993respectively, i.e., after Libya
had submitted its Application on 3 March 1992.Libya'ssubstantive sub-
missions as contained in its Application and its Memorial concern the
applicability of the Montreal Convention and the compliance of the
Parties with particular provisions of that instrument in the handling of
the Lockerbie incident. Were it otherwise, the Court would not have
jurisdiction; the onlybaseforjurisdiction in this matter isArticle 14,para-graph 1, of the Montreal Convention which confers on the Court juris-
diction over "any dispute between two or more Contracting States con-
cerning the interpretation or application" of the Convention.
The United States as Respondent claims, as a matter of preliminary
objection,that "Libya's claimshave becomemoot becauseSecurityCoun-
cil resolutions 748 (1992)and 883 (1993)have rendered them without
object" (Judgment, para. 45).The aim of the objection is to obtain a deci-
sion from the Court that there is no ground for proceeding to judgment
on the merits. This is an exclusivelypreliminary objection. The Court
could - and should - have decided on it without thereby passingjudg-
ment - if only in part- on the merits of Libya's claims.
Had the Court rejected - in whole or in part - the preliminary objec-
tion in question, then it would now turn - in so far as the preliminary
objection was rejected - to the merits of the Libyan submissions and
examine them one by one within the limits of its jurisdiction. The out-
come of that examination would in no way be predetermined by the
previous examination of and decision on the objection of the United
States.
Had the Court, on the other hand, acceptedthe objectionraised by the
United States, then the Court would have effectivelyended the case. It
would, however, have done so without deciding on the merits of any of
the submissions presented by Libya or predetermining them. The Court
would have left the Montreal Convention completely aside. It would
have based its decision exclusivelyon a new element, extraneous to the
Montreal Convention and not related to it - the Security Council reso-
lutions. In adopting resolutions 748(1992)and 883(1993),which contain
decisionsmade under Chapter VI1of the Charter and binding under Ar-
ticle 25,the Security Council has not taken a position with regard to the
Montreal Convention; in no wayhas it decided whether the provisions of
the Convention are applicable to the Lockerbie incident, nor has it
decided or taken position on the question whether the provisions of the
Convention have been complied with by the Parties. Rather, in the exer-
cise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security,the Councilfound it necessaryto impose certain obli-
gations on Libya. In accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, those
obligations override al1other obligations of the Parties, irrespective of
whether the latter obligations were contested between the Parties or
whether they had been complied with or not. The lack of connection
between the Security Council resolutions and the position of the Parties
under the Montreal Convention precludesthe evaluation of the objection
of the United States as a defence on the merits; it also prohibits the
Court from stating, as it does, that the objection "does much more than
'touch[ing]upon subjectsbelongingto the merits of the case' "(Judgment,
para. 49) or that it is" 'inextricably interwoven' withthe merits" (ibid.).
Because this is so, the third conclusion of the dispositif of the Judg-
ment seemsto run counter to the jurisprudence of the Court concerningthe application of Article 79 of the Rules of Court since their 1972revi-
sion. The Court, with one exception (Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392),
has always dealt with preliminaryobjectionsin the first phase of the pro-
ceedings and has indeed favoured a restrictive interpretation of the
notion "not exclusivelypreliminary" in the interest of speedy and eco-
nomical disposa1of the objections (ibid.,Merits, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports
1986, pp. 29 ff.).
The Judgrnent seeks to justify its third conclusion by declaring that
accepting the preliminary objection of the United States would have
meant taking "a decision establishing that the rights claimed by Libya
under the Montreal Convention are incompatible with its obligations
under the Security Council resolutions" (para. 49). It adds that accept-
ance of the objection raised by the Respondent would have constituted
"a decision that those obligations prevail over those rights by virtue of
Articles 25 and 103of the Charter" (ibid.). This might be true, but it is
beside the point for the decision to be taken now on the preliminary
objection of the United States. Definingthe meaning and the effectof the
resolutions of the Council and comparing those resolutions with the sub-
missions of Libya regarding the Montreal Convention in no way means
taking position on the rights and obligations of Libya under the Conven-
tion.
That acceptance of the preliminary objection of the United States
would have brought the case to an end is also not in itself an argument
against its exclusivelypreliminary character: the ending of a case is the
intention of every preliminary objection. This is so in the case of objec-
tions of the kind of those dealt with in the third conclusion of the dis-
positif. The Court has in the past had occasion to deal with such objec-
tions and has considered them separate from the merits; it dealt with
them even before turning to jurisdiction and admissibility (Nuclear Tests
cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, Z.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 259-272,
and (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 457-
478). In this connection it has also to be pointed out that if the Council
terminated, with effect ex nunc, the measures prescribed by resolutions
748 (1992)and 883 (1993),the position of the Parties under the Conven-
tion would still exist, unchanged.
The third conclusion of the dispositifruns counter to the object and
purpose of Article 79 of the Rules of Court and sets a dangerous
precedent for the future handling of that provision for the following
reasons.
When the Court, in 1972, adopted the text which later became Ar-
ticle 79,it did so for reasons of procedural economy and of sound admin-
istration of justice. Court and parties were called upon to clear away
preliminary questions of jurisdiction and admissibility as well as other
preliminary objections before entering into lengthy and costly proceed-ings on the merits of a case. Of course, provision had to be made for
objections that did not possess "in the circumstances of the case, an
exclusivelypreliminarycharacter" (Art. 79,para. 7). In order to make the
necessary determinations the Court, "whenever necessary, may request
the parties to argue al1questions of law and fact, and to adduce al1evi-
dence, which bear on the issue" (Art. 79, para. 6). The interpretation
given bythe Court in the present case to the notion "not exclusively pre-
liminary character" is, however, so wide and so vague that the possibility
of acceptinga preliminaryobjection becomesseriouslyrestricted.Thereby
the Judgment acts counter to the procedural economy and the sound
administration of justice which it is theintent of Article 79 to achieve.
We would also like to state that we have voted in favour of the first
conclusion of the dispositif on jurisdiction of the Court over the case on
the following understanding relating to the last of the substantive sub-
missions presented by Libya in its Application and its Memorial.
In the version submitted to the Court in the Libyan Memorialthis sub-
mission concerns an alleged legal obligation of the United States
"to respect Libya's right not to have the [Montreal]Convention set
aside by means which would in any case be at variance with the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter and with the mandatory rules
of general international law prohibiting the use of force and the vio-
lation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, sovereign equality and
political independence of States" (Judgment, para. 33).
We recognize that there is a legal dispute between the Parties concern-
ing this point. That dispute, however, falls under Article 14,paragraph 1,
of the Montreal Convention and therefore within the jurisdiction of the
Court only if, and in so far as, it concernsthe interpretation and applica-
tion of one or more of the provisions of the Convention. The dispute
does not fa11under Article 14, paragraph 1, and the jurisdiction of the
Court if it concerns the interpretation and application of Article2, para-
graph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. That is spelledout in para-
graph 35 of the Judgment, but not so explicitly in the dispositif; that is
why we wish to make Ourposition on the matter quite clear.
(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME.
(Signed) Carl-August FLEISCHHAUER.
DÉCLARATION COMMUNE
DE MM. GUILLAUME ET FLEISCHHAUER
[Texte original français]
Paragraphe 7 de l'article 79 du Règlement dela Cou- Exception de non-
lieu ayant un caractèreexcIusivementpréliminaire.
Actions menéespar les Etats-Unis en vue d'obtenir la livraison des suspects
- Dernières conclusions au fond de la Libye dirigées contre ces action-
Compétence dela Courpour en connaître dans la seule mesureoù les actions
critiquées seraient contraiàela conventionde Montréal.
Nous pensons devoir faire la déclarationcommune suivante concer-
nant l'arrêt rendu aujourd'huimêmesur lesexceptionspréliminairessou-
levéespar les Etats-Unis dans l'affaire concernant les questions d'inter-
prétationet d'application de la conventionde Montréal de 1971résultant
de l'incident aériende Lockerbie.
Nous avons votécontre la décisionfigurant au point 3 du dispositif
d'aprèslaquelle
((l'exception desEtats-Unis, selon laquelle il n'y aurait plus lieuà
statuer sur les demandes de la Libyecar les résolutions748(1992)et
883 (1993)du Conseil de sécurité les auraient privéesde tout objet,
n'a pas, dans les circonstances de l'espèce,un caractère exclusive-
ment préliminaire ».
Nous estimons que cette décision esterronéeetqu'elle crée un précédent
qui pourrait être dangereux,comme contraire à l'objet et au but de l'ar-
ticle 79 du Règlementde la Cour.
Cette décision esterronée pourles motifs développés ci-après.
La présenteaffaire porte sur la convention de Montréal.Le différend
entre lesParties est relatifl'applicabilitéde cetteconvention àl'incident
de Lockerbie et au respect des obligationsrésultantdes dispositions de la
convention à la suite de l'incident. L'affairene porte pas sur les résolu-
tions du Conseil de sécurité748(1992)et 883(1993)qui ont été adoptées
par le Conseil les 31 mars 1992 et 11 novembre 1993, respectivement,
c'est-à-direaprès quela Libyeeut présenté sa requêtele 3 mars 1992.Les
conclusions au fond de la Libye, telles qu'ellesfigurent dans sa requête
et dans son mémoire, concernent l'applicabilitéde la convention de
Montréalet le respectpar lesParties de dispositionsspécifiquesde cetins-
trument dans le traitement de l'incidentde Lockerbie. S'ilen était autre-
ment, la Cour n'aurait d'ailleurspas compétence;en effet laseule basede JOINT DECLARATION OF JUDGES GUILLAUME AND
FLEISCHHAUER
[English Original Text]
Article 79, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Court - Objection of mootness
havingan exclusively preliminary character.
Actions ofthe UnitedStates in order to obtainthe surrenderof the suspects
- Last substantivesubmissionof Libya directed againsttheseactions - Juris-
diction ofthe Courtinthis respect onlyto theextent that theactionsinquestion
would becontrary tothe Montreal Convention.
We feelprompted to make the followingjoint declaration with regard
to the Judgment of today's date on the preliminary objections raised by
the United States in the case concerning questions of interpretation and
application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arisingfrom the aerial inci-
dent at Lockerbie :
We voted against the third conclusion in the dispositifthat
"the objection raised by the United States according to which the
claims of Libya becamemoot because Security Council resolutions
748 (1992) and 883 (1993) rendered them without object does not,
in the circumstances of the case, have an exclusivelypreliminary
character".
We find that that conclusion is wrong and that it sets a potentially
dangerous precedent as it undercuts the object and purpose of Article 79
of the Rules of Court.
The conclusion is wrong for the followingreasons.
Thiscaseisabout the Montreal Convention.What isin dispute between
the Parties is the applicability of the Convention to the Lockerbie inci-
dent and the observation of the obligations flowingfrom its provisions in
the aftermath of the incident. The case is not about the Security Council
resolutions 748(1992)and 883(1993)which wereadopted by the Council
on 31 March 1992and 11November 1993respectively, i.e., after Libya
had submitted its Application on 3 March 1992.Libya'ssubstantive sub-
missions as contained in its Application and its Memorial concern the
applicability of the Montreal Convention and the compliance of the
Parties with particular provisions of that instrument in the handling of
the Lockerbie incident. Were it otherwise, the Court would not have
jurisdiction; the onlybaseforjurisdiction in this matter isArticle 14,para-compétenceen la matièreest le paragraphe 1de l'article 14de la conven-
tion de Montréal qui confère à la Cour compétencesur «tout différend
entre des Etats contractants concernant l'interprétation ou'application»
de la convention.
Les Etats-Unis, en tant que défendeur,soutiennent, à titre d'exception
préliminaire, «qu'il n'y aurait plus lieà statuer sur les demandes de la
Libye car les résolutions748 (1992)et 883 (1993)du Conseil de sécurité
les auraient privéesde tout objet)) (arrêt,par. 45). Le but de cette excep-
tion est d'obtenir de la Cour le prononcéd'un non-lieu.Une telle excep-
tion a un caractère exclusivementpréliminaire.La Cour aurait pu - et
aurait dû - en déciderainsi; ce faisant, elle ne se serait pas prononcée,
mêmeen partie, sur le fond des demandes de la Libye.
En effet, si la Cour avait, en tout ou en partie, rejetécette exception
préliminaire,elle aurait été amenép ear la suiteàse pencher au fond sur
les conclusions de la Libye dans la mesure où elle aurait écartél'excep-
tion; elle les aurait examinéesune à une dans les limites de sa compé-
tence. Le résultat decet examenn'aurait en aucune manière été prédéter-
miné par l'examen préalable de l'exception des Etats-Unis et par la
décision prisesur cet exception.
Si la Cour avait à l'inverseretenu l'exception soulevéepar les Etats-
Unis, elle en aurait effectivement fini avec l'affaire. Elle l'aurait fait
cependant sans se prononcer au fond sur les conclusions présentées par
la Libye et sans en préjuger.La Cour aurait laisséla convention de
Montréalcomplètementde côté.Elle aurait fondésa décision exclusive-
ment surun nouvel élémenté , trangerla conventionde Montréal et sans
rapport aveccetteconvention, à savoir lesrésolutionsdu Conseilde sécu-
rité.En adoptant les résolutions748(1992)et 883 (1993)qui contiennent
des décisions prisesen application du chapitre VI1de la Charte, obliga-
toires en vertu de l'article25,le Conseil desécuriténpas pris position en
ce qui concernela convention de Montréal;il ne s'estnullementprononcé
sur l'applicabilitéde cette convention l'incidentde Lockerbie; il n'a pas
davantage décidéou pris partie sur la question de savoir si les dispo-
sitions de la convention ont étérespectéespar les Parties. En réalitél,e
Conseil, dans l'exercicede sa responsabilité principaledu maintien de la
paix et de la sécuritéinternationales, a estimé nécessaire d'imposecrer-
taines obligationsà la Libye. Conformémenta l'article 103de la Charte,
ces obligations l'emportent sur toutes autres obligations des Parties, que
ces dernières obligations aient ou non étécontestéesentre les Parties
et qu'ellesaient ou non étérespectées.L'absencede relation entre lesréso-
lutions du Conseil de sécurité et la positiondes Parties sous l'empirede
la convention de Montréal interdit de regarder l'exception des Etats-
Unis comme une défenseau fond; elleinterdit aussi d'affirmer,comme le
fait la Cour, que l'exception«fait bien plus qu'«effleurer des sujetsappar-
tenant au fond de l'affaire))(arrêt, par.49) ou qu'«elle est ((inextricable-
ment liée» à celui-ci)(ibid.).
Pour cesmotifs également,la décisionpriseau point 3 du dispositif de
l'arrêtsemblecontraire àla jurisprudence de la Cour relativeà l'applica-graph 1, of the Montreal Convention which confers on the Court juris-
diction over "any dispute between two or more Contracting States con-
cerning the interpretation or application" of the Convention.
The United States as Respondent claims, as a matter of preliminary
objection,that "Libya's claimshave becomemoot becauseSecurityCoun-
cil resolutions 748 (1992)and 883 (1993)have rendered them without
object" (Judgment, para. 45).The aim of the objection is to obtain a deci-
sion from the Court that there is no ground for proceeding to judgment
on the merits. This is an exclusivelypreliminary objection. The Court
could - and should - have decided on it without thereby passingjudg-
ment - if only in part- on the merits of Libya's claims.
Had the Court rejected - in whole or in part - the preliminary objec-
tion in question, then it would now turn - in so far as the preliminary
objection was rejected - to the merits of the Libyan submissions and
examine them one by one within the limits of its jurisdiction. The out-
come of that examination would in no way be predetermined by the
previous examination of and decision on the objection of the United
States.
Had the Court, on the other hand, acceptedthe objectionraised by the
United States, then the Court would have effectivelyended the case. It
would, however, have done so without deciding on the merits of any of
the submissions presented by Libya or predetermining them. The Court
would have left the Montreal Convention completely aside. It would
have based its decision exclusivelyon a new element, extraneous to the
Montreal Convention and not related to it - the Security Council reso-
lutions. In adopting resolutions 748(1992)and 883(1993),which contain
decisionsmade under Chapter VI1of the Charter and binding under Ar-
ticle 25,the Security Council has not taken a position with regard to the
Montreal Convention; in no wayhas it decided whether the provisions of
the Convention are applicable to the Lockerbie incident, nor has it
decided or taken position on the question whether the provisions of the
Convention have been complied with by the Parties. Rather, in the exer-
cise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security,the Councilfound it necessaryto impose certain obli-
gations on Libya. In accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, those
obligations override al1other obligations of the Parties, irrespective of
whether the latter obligations were contested between the Parties or
whether they had been complied with or not. The lack of connection
between the Security Council resolutions and the position of the Parties
under the Montreal Convention precludesthe evaluation of the objection
of the United States as a defence on the merits; it also prohibits the
Court from stating, as it does, that the objection "does much more than
'touch[ing]upon subjectsbelongingto the merits of the case' "(Judgment,
para. 49) or that it is" 'inextricably interwoven' withthe merits" (ibid.).
Because this is so, the third conclusion of the dispositif of the Judg-
ment seemsto run counter to the jurisprudence of the Court concerningtion de l'article79 du Règlementde la Cour dans sa version résultant de
la revision de 1972.Depuis lors et sauf dans un cas (affaire des Activités
militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua
c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J.
Recueil 1984, p. 392)'la Cour a toujours statué sur les exceptions préli-
minaires dans la premièrephase de la procédure; elle a en effet penché
pour une interprétationrestrictive de la notion d'exception «non exclu-
sivementpréliminaire))en vue de parvenir, selon une procéduresimple, à
une décisionrapide sur les exceptions (ibid.,fond, arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil
1986, p. 29 et suiv.).
L'arrêtcherche à justifier la décision prisesous le point 3 en décla-
rant qu'accueillir l'exception préliminaire desEtats-Unis aurait signifié
prendre «une décisionétablissantqueles droits revendiquéspar la Libye
aux termes de la convention de Montréal sont incompatibles avec les
obligations découlant pour elle des résolutionsdu Conseil de sécurité))
(par. 49). Il ajoute qu'accueillir l'exceptionsoulevéepar le défendeur
aurait constituéune ((décisionfaisant prévaloirces obligations sur ces
droits par lejeu des articles 25 et 103de laharte» (ibid.). Cela pourrait
être exact,mais est sans intérêetn ce qui concerne la décision à prendre
actuellementsur l'exceptionpréliminairedesEtats-Unis. En effet, définirle
sens et leseffets des résolutionsdu Conseil de sécurité et comparer ces
résolutionsavec lesdemandes dela Libye présentéea su titre de la conven-
tion de Montréal n'implique en aucune manière prendre partie sur les
droits et obligations de la Libye en vertu de la convention.
La circonstance qu'accueillir l'exceptionpréliminairedes Etats-Unis
aurait mis un terme à l'affaire n'est pas davantage un argument à l'en-
contre du caractère exclusivementpréliminairede l'exception; mettre un
terme àune affaireest lebut de toute exceptionpréliminaire.Il en est ainsi
pour ce qui est des exceptions du type de celletraitéeau point 3 du dis-
positif. La Cour a dans le passé eu l'occasionde se pencher sur de telles
exceptions et les a examinéesindépendammentdu fond; elle a même
statuésurcesexceptionsavant de s'interrogersurla compétenceet la rece-
vabilité (affairesdesEssais nucléaires(Australie c. France), arrêt,C.I.J.
Recueil 1974, p. 259-272, et des Essais nucléaires(Nouvelle-Zélande
c. France), arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 457-478).A cet égardon doit
aussinoter que sile Conseilde sécurité abrogeaitpour l'avenirlesmesures
prescrites par les résolutions748 (1992) et 883 (1993) la position des
Parties sous l'empirede la convention resterait ce qu'elleest, inchangée.
La décisionpriseau point 3 du dispositifva enfin àl'encontrede l'objet
et du but de l'article 79 du Règlementde la Cour et créeun précédent
dangereux pour l'application future de cette disposition,pour les motifs
exposésci-après.
Lorsque la Cour a adopté en 1972le texte qui devait devenir par la
suite l'article 79, elle l'afait pour des raisons de simplificationprocédu-
raleet debonne administrationdela justice. La Cour et lesparties étaient
invitéesà éliminerles questions préliminairesde compétenceet de rece-
vabilitéde mêmeque les autres exceptionspréliminairesavant d'entamerthe application of Article 79 of the Rules of Court since their 1972revi-
sion. The Court, with one exception (Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 392),
has always dealt with preliminaryobjectionsin the first phase of the pro-
ceedings and has indeed favoured a restrictive interpretation of the
notion "not exclusivelypreliminary" in the interest of speedy and eco-
nomical disposa1of the objections (ibid.,Merits, Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports
1986, pp. 29 ff.).
The Judgrnent seeks to justify its third conclusion by declaring that
accepting the preliminary objection of the United States would have
meant taking "a decision establishing that the rights claimed by Libya
under the Montreal Convention are incompatible with its obligations
under the Security Council resolutions" (para. 49). It adds that accept-
ance of the objection raised by the Respondent would have constituted
"a decision that those obligations prevail over those rights by virtue of
Articles 25 and 103of the Charter" (ibid.). This might be true, but it is
beside the point for the decision to be taken now on the preliminary
objection of the United States. Definingthe meaning and the effectof the
resolutions of the Council and comparing those resolutions with the sub-
missions of Libya regarding the Montreal Convention in no way means
taking position on the rights and obligations of Libya under the Conven-
tion.
That acceptance of the preliminary objection of the United States
would have brought the case to an end is also not in itself an argument
against its exclusivelypreliminary character: the ending of a case is the
intention of every preliminary objection. This is so in the case of objec-
tions of the kind of those dealt with in the third conclusion of the dis-
positif. The Court has in the past had occasion to deal with such objec-
tions and has considered them separate from the merits; it dealt with
them even before turning to jurisdiction and admissibility (Nuclear Tests
cases (Australia v. France), Judgment, Z.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 259-272,
and (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, 1.C.J. Reports 1974, pp. 457-
478). In this connection it has also to be pointed out that if the Council
terminated, with effect ex nunc, the measures prescribed by resolutions
748 (1992)and 883 (1993),the position of the Parties under the Conven-
tion would still exist, unchanged.
The third conclusion of the dispositifruns counter to the object and
purpose of Article 79 of the Rules of Court and sets a dangerous
precedent for the future handling of that provision for the following
reasons.
When the Court, in 1972, adopted the text which later became Ar-
ticle 79,it did so for reasons of procedural economy and of sound admin-
istration of justice. Court and parties were called upon to clear away
preliminary questions of jurisdiction and admissibility as well as other
preliminary objections before entering into lengthy and costly proceed-des procédureslongues et coûteuses sur le fond de l'affaire. Naturelle-
ment, une disposition a dû êtreprévuepour les exceptions qui ne pos-
sèdentpas, «dans les circonstances de l'affaire, un caractère exclusive-
ment préliminaire))(art. 79, par. 7). En vue de permettre la Cour de se
prononcer à cet égard,elle «peut, le cas échéant,inviter les partiesà
débattre tous points de fait et de droit, età produire tous moyens de
preuve qui ont traità la question)) (art. 79, par. 6). Mais l'interprétation
donnéepar la Cour à la notion d'exception«non exclusivementprélimi-
naire»dans la présenteaffaire est si large et sivague que la possibilitéde
retenir une exception préliminaireen est singulièrement réduite.De ce
fait l'arrêtva l'encontredes objectifspoursuivispar l'article79à savoir
la simplificationdes procéduresetla bonne administration de la justice.
Nous aimerions également déclarerque, bien qu'ayant votéen faveur
de la décision prise sousle point 1 du dispositif en ce qui concerne la
compétencede la Cour dans la présenteaffaire pour connaître des der-
nièresconclusionsprésentéea su fond par la Libyedans sa requêteet dans
son mémoire,nous l'avons fait dans les conditions préciséecsi-après.
Dans la version soumise à la Cour dans le mémoirede la Libye, ces
conclusions concernent une obligation juridique incombant, selon la
Libye, aux Etats-Unis
«de respecter le droit de la Libyà ce que [la convention de Mont-
réal]nesoit pas écartépar desmoyens qui seraient au demeurant en
contradiction aveclesprincipes dela Charte des Nations Unies et du
droit international générale caractèreimpératifqui prohibentl'uti-
lisation de la force et la violation de la souveraineté, de l'intégrité
territoriale, de l'égasouveraine des Etats et de leur indépendance
politique))(arrêt,par.33).
Nous reconnaissons qu'ilexisteun différendjuridique entre les Parties
sur ce point. Toutefois, ce différendn'entre dans les prévisionsdu para-
graphe 1de l'article14de la convention de Montréalet ne relèvepar suite
de la compétence dela Cour que si et dans la mesure où il est relatifà
l'interprétationet à l'application d'uneou de plusieurs dispositions de la
convention. Le différendn'entre pas dans les prévisionsdu paragraphe 1
de l'article 14et dans la compétencede la Cour s'ilest relatif'interpré-
tation età l'application du paragraphe 4 de l'article 2 de la Charte des
Nations Unies. Cela est préciséau paragraphe 35 de l'arrêt,mais ne l'est
pas de manière aussiexplicitedans le dispositif; c'estpourquoi nous sou-
haitons rendre notre position en la matièreparfaitement claire.
(Signé) Gilbert GUILLAUME.
(Signé) Carl-August FLEISCHHAUER.ings on the merits of a case. Of course, provision had to be made for
objections that did not possess "in the circumstances of the case, an
exclusivelypreliminarycharacter" (Art. 79,para. 7). In order to make the
necessary determinations the Court, "whenever necessary, may request
the parties to argue al1questions of law and fact, and to adduce al1evi-
dence, which bear on the issue" (Art. 79, para. 6). The interpretation
given bythe Court in the present case to the notion "not exclusively pre-
liminary character" is, however, so wide and so vague that the possibility
of acceptinga preliminaryobjection becomesseriouslyrestricted.Thereby
the Judgment acts counter to the procedural economy and the sound
administration of justice which it is theintent of Article 79 to achieve.
We would also like to state that we have voted in favour of the first
conclusion of the dispositif on jurisdiction of the Court over the case on
the following understanding relating to the last of the substantive sub-
missions presented by Libya in its Application and its Memorial.
In the version submitted to the Court in the Libyan Memorialthis sub-
mission concerns an alleged legal obligation of the United States
"to respect Libya's right not to have the [Montreal]Convention set
aside by means which would in any case be at variance with the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter and with the mandatory rules
of general international law prohibiting the use of force and the vio-
lation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, sovereign equality and
political independence of States" (Judgment, para. 33).
We recognize that there is a legal dispute between the Parties concern-
ing this point. That dispute, however, falls under Article 14,paragraph 1,
of the Montreal Convention and therefore within the jurisdiction of the
Court only if, and in so far as, it concernsthe interpretation and applica-
tion of one or more of the provisions of the Convention. The dispute
does not fa11under Article 14, paragraph 1, and the jurisdiction of the
Court if it concerns the interpretation and application of Article2, para-
graph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. That is spelledout in para-
graph 35 of the Judgment, but not so explicitly in the dispositif; that is
why we wish to make Ourposition on the matter quite clear.
(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME.
(Signed) Carl-August FLEISCHHAUER.
Joint declaration of Judges Guillaume and Fleischhauer (English Original Text)