Dissenting opinion of Judge Tarazi (translation) | INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

DISSEN'TING OPINION OF JUDGE TARAZI

(Translation]

Having perused theApplication instituting proceedings which the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America filed on 29 November 1979,read
the Mernorial filed by it on 15 January 1980 and listened to the oral
arguments during the heanngs of 18,19and 20March 1980,the Court had
before it aseries of facts, hstorical developments and legal arguments
which were to lead to its delivering a Judgment of, in my view,cardinal
importance. 1concu:rredin the findings of the Judgment concerning the
necessityofcornpliaricebytheGovernment ofthe IslamicRepublic of Iran
with the obligations incumbent upon it under the Vienna Conventions of
1961 and 1963 on, irespectively,Diplomatic and Consular Relations. 1

nevertheless found !;ornedifficulty, arising on the one hand from the
situation which has dlevelopedin Iran sincetheoverthrow of the régimeof
which the former Shah was the symbol, and on the other hand from the
conduct of the applkant State both before and after the events of 4 No-
vember 1979,in deciding and declanng only that the Government of the
IslamicF ,public of Iran wasresponsible vis-à-visthat of the United States
ofAmerica whle neglectingtopoint out at the sametimethat thelatter had
also incurred resporisibility, to antent remaining to be determined,
vis-à-vis the Government of Iran.
My intention here is to indicate, with as brief explanations as possible,
thereasonsfor my attitude and position. To that end 1willhave toconsider
the following points:

1. The pnnciple of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions
and of the irnrnunitjr enjoyed by their member;
2. The factors wliich enter into the assessment in principle of the
responsibility incurred by the Government of the Islarnic Republic of
Iran ;
3. The actions uridertaken by the United States Government both

before and after the seisinof the Court which werecapable of affecting the
course of the proceedings.

1. THE~NVIOLABILI O?'DIPLOMATI ACND CONSULAM RISSION SND THE
IMMIJNITE YNJOYED BY THEIRMEMBERS

1entirelyconcurred in thereasoning oftheJudgment on thispoint. 1was
pleased to notethat theJudgrnent took particular account of the traditions
of Islam, which contnbuted along with others to the elaboration of the
niles of contemporary publicinternational lawon diplomatic and consular
inviolability and imnunity. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF (DISSO. P.TARAZI) 59

In a course of lectures which he gave in 1937at the Hague Academy of
International Law on the subject of "Islam and jus gentium", Professor
Ahmed Rechid of the Istanbul law faculty gave the following account of
the inviolability of the envoy in Muslim law :

"In Arabia, the person of the ambassador had alwaysbeen regarded
as sacred. Muhiimmad consecrated this inviolability. Never were
ambassadors to Muhammad or to his successors molested. One day,
the envoy of a foreign nation, at an audience granted to him by the
Prophet, was so bold asto use insulting language. Muhammad said to
hm :'If you were not an envoy 1would have you put to death.' The

author of the 'Siyer' which relates ths incident draws from it the
conclusion that there is an obligation to respect theperson of ambas-
sadors."

Ahmed Rechid adds further on :
"The Prophet always treated the envoys of foreign nations with

consideration and great affability. He used to shower gifts upon them
and recommended hiscompanionsto followhisexample, saying :'Do
the same as 1' l."'
In a work entitled ~rnternationa law,published by the Institute of State
and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the following is to be
read on the conduct in the Middle Ages of the Arabs, the bearers of the

Islamic faith :

"The Arab States, which played an important part in international
relations in the Middle Ages (from the 7th century) had well-de-
veloped conceptions regardingthe LawofNations, closelylinked with
religious precepts.
The Arabs recognised the inviolability of Ambassadors and the
need for the fulfilment of treaty obligations. They resorted to arbi-
tration to settle iinternational disputes and considered the observance
of definite rules of law necessary in time of war ('theblood of women,
children and old men shall not besmirch your victory')."

The deductions ma,deby the Court from the fact that theGovernment of
the Islamic Republic of Iran had violated its binding international obli-
gations to the United States of America with regard to diplomatic invio-

' Ahmed Rechid, "L'1:ilamet ledroit desgens", 60Recueildes coursde I'Academiede
droit international. 1937, p. 421 f.lability and irnrnunity have led it to declare the former responsible by
reason of acts of bot11omission and commission.
1find this approach inadequate. It is not right to proclaim the respon-
sibility of the Iranian (Governmentunlessitsexamination is first preceded
by an appropriate stu.dyof the historical facts antedating the seizure by

Islamic students of the United States Embassy in Tehran on 4 November
1979.In that respect, it is a matter for deep regret that the Iranian Gov-
ernment refused to appear before the Court. Nevertheless, it emergesfrom
the two identical communications addressed to the Court by the Iranian
Minister for Foreign Affairs on 9 November 1979and 16March 1980that
the Government of thi:Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the present
proceedings are onlyamarginal aspect ofawiderdispute dividingIranand
the United States sincethe Shah wasin 1953restored to the thronethanks
to the intrigues of the (ZIAand the United StatesGovernment continued to
meddle in Iran's interna1 affairs.

In spite, and perhaps because of the absence,of the Government of Iran
from the proceedings, it behoved the Court to elucidate this particular
point before pronouncingon the responsibility of the Iranian State. That
responsibility ought to have been qualified as relative and not abso-
lute.
1recognize that the Court made alaudable effort in that direction. This,
however, reniained insufficient. It has been argued that more would mean

examining deeds of a political nature whch lay outside the framework of
the Court's powers. EIutis it possible to ignore historical developments
which have direct repercussions on legal conflicts ?The Permanent Court
of International Justice well clarified this point when in its Judgment of
7 June 1932 (Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex), it
stated :

"The era of the Napoleonic Wars preceding the Hundred Days was
brought to an end by the treaties concluded at Paris on May 30th,
1814,between France, on the one hand, and Austria, Great Britain,
Prussia and Russia respectively, on the other." (P.C.I.J., SeriesAIB,
No. 46, 1932, p. 115.)

One could therefori: have devoted some attention to the events of 1953
with a viewto gauging to what extent the assertion of the Iranian Minister
for Foreign Affairs was plausible. On this essential question, 1have been
able to glean some iripression from a source that does not look with any
favourable eye upon ,theIslamic Revolution of Iran. In his work entitled
The Full of the Shah, Mr. Fereydoun Hoveyda, the brother of the ex-
sovereign's former Prime Minister, Mr. Abbas Amir Hoveyda, who was
condemned to death and executed after the ex-sovereign left Iran, says :

"Some Iraniari observers were sceptical, considering that foreign
interests were pulling the strings:top-ranking non-British companies
on the world market werepushing for a break of the contract with the DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF (DISS .P. TARAZI) 61

AIOC [Anglo-Iranian Oil Company]. Be that as it may, when the
nationalist uproar grew, the Iranian ruling class and various foreign
powers got the wind up and turned to the Shah again. It was then
that the CIA floated the idea of a coup d'état,and in 1953Kermit
Roosevelt visited 'Tehranto examine the possibilities and find a likely
candidate. He foiund his man in General Zahedi, and the plotters
staged the departlire of the Shah after havinghim signadecreenarning
Zahedi prime millister. He used CIA money to buy the services of
Shaban-bi-mokh (literally Shaban the Scatterbrain), the master of a

famous 'Zurkhank' (a traditional gymnastics club), in order to recruit
a commando squad of 'civilians'to act in concert with the army. The
operation begun .inAugust 1953did not take more than a day, and
then the Shah made a triumphal return. And the verypeople who had
followed Mossadeq right up to the eleventh hour scurried to the
airport and pros1:rated themselves before the sovereign to kiss his
boots !

In spite of the facts, wluch have been disclosed by the Americans
themselves, the Shah was pleased to consider the 1953 coup as a
'popular revolution' which gave him the mandate of the people. And

apparently he endledup bybelieving hisown propaganda. Already the
sovereign was showing a tendency to bend the truth ;it was to inten-
sify to the point of cutting him right off from the realities of the
country l."

Thus, in the eyes of'the present Iranian leaders, the power of the Shah
had lacked al1legitimacy or legality ever since the overthrow of Dr. Mos-
sadegh in 1953.This point should have been examined carefully, because
these same leaders Saythat they are firmly convinced that the Shah would
not have been able ito maintain himself upon the throne without the
backing given him by the Government of the United States of

America.
This opinion concords with the reflections of Dr. Henry Kissinger, the
former Secretary of State of the United States of America. In his work
entitled The WhiteHouse Years, Dr. Kissinger states that :

"Under the Shah's leadership the land bridge between Asia and
Europe, so often the hinge of world history, was pro-American and
pro-West beyoncl any challenge. Alone among the countries of the
region - Israel a:side- Iran made friendship with the United States
the startingpoint of itsforeignpolicy. That it wasbased on acold-eyed
assessment that .a threat to Iran would most likely come from the

SovietUnion, incombination with radical Arab states, isonly another
way of saying that the Shah's view of the realities of world politics

' Fereydoun Hoveyda (trans. Roger Liddell), The Fullof the Shah, London, 1979,
pp. 92 f. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR ST4FF (DISSO. P.TARAZI) 62

paralleled our own. Iran's influence was always on our side ; its

resources reinforctedours even in some distant enterprises - in aiding
South Vietnam a.t the time of the 1973 Pans Agreement, helping
Western Europe in its economic crisis in the 1970s,supporting mod-
erates in Africa against Soviet-Cuban encroachment .. .In the 1973
Middle East war, forexample, Iran was the only country borderingthe
SovietUnion not topermit the Sovietsuse of itsairspace - incontrast
to several NATO allies. The Shah ... refueled our fleets without
question. He never used his control of oil to bring political pressure ;
he neverjoined ariyoil embargoagainstthe West or Israel. Iran under
the Shah, in short, was one of America's best, most important, and
most loyal friends in the world. The least we owe him is not retro-

spectively to vilify the actions that eight American Presidents -
including the present incumbent - gratefully welcomed l."

It is in these words that Dr. Kissinger himself describes the links which
existed between the piresenceof the Shah at the head of the Iranian State
and the exigencies of American worldwide and Middle-East strategy.
These links do not in any wayjustify the occupation of the Embassy. But
they should be placed in the balance when the responsibility incurred by
the Iranian Governmirnt falls to be weighed.
Furthermore, the ex-Shah, when in Mexico, was authonzed to enter
United Statesterritory. The United Statesauthorities wereperfectly aware
that thisauthorization mighthave untoward consequences.They neverthe-

lessgranted it, thus committing a serious fault which the Court could have
taken into consideration. In what has become a classic work, entitled
Traitéthéorique et pratiquede la responsabilité civiledélictuelleet contrac-
tuelle,the brothers Henri, Léonand Jean Mazeaud write :
"If the sole cause of the injury is an act of the complainant, the

defendant should always be absolved, for it was not his fault if harm
wasdone. Heisthus entitled to relyon thecomplainant's act, whatever
it be. Here it should be pointed out that the question whether the
complainant's acf.contained an element of fault does not even arise.
The defendant isabsolved because it was not hisact which washeld to
be the cause of the injury. In reality, he relieson thecomplainant's act
solely in order to establish the absence of any causal connection
between his own act and the harm done *."

Similarly, before rleaching the point of declaring the Iranian State

H. Kissinger, The White House Years, London, 1979,p. 1262.
H., L. and J. Mazeaud, Traité théoriqetpratique de la responsabilité civiledélic-
ruelleet contractuelle,Torne II,6th ed., Paris, 1970,p. 552. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF (DISS. P.TARAZI) 63

responsible, one shoulti take into considerationthe circumstances inwhich
the facts complained of occurred. In doing so, one must bear in mind the
essential point that Iran is at present traversing aperiod of revolution. It is
no longer valid to assessthe obligations of the Iranian Statein accordance
with the criteria whch werecurrent before the departure of the Shah.This

corresponds to the essence of the theory recognized in French adrninis-
trative law with regard to the influence of war on the obligations of the
Stateand public bodie:~.In its Judgment of 30 March 1916 (Compagnie du
gaz de Bordeaux) the French Conseil d'Etat confirmed the pnnciple of the
collapse of the econorny of contracts on account of war'.This principle
was endorsed by the gireatFrenchjunst Maurice Hauriou, in his theory of
the unforeseen 2.
With thisessential factor added to those already mentioned, the respon-
sibility of the Governinent of the Islarnic Republic of Iran ought to have
been envisaged in the context of the revolution which took place in that
country and brought aibout,as it were, a break with a past condemned as

oppressive. Thus it would in my view be unjust to lay al1the facts com-
plained of at the door of the Iranian Govemment without subjectingthe
circumstances in whii:h those acts took place to the least preliminary
examination.

3. THEACTIONS UNI)ERTAKEB NEFORE AND AFTER THE SEISIN OF THE
COURTWHICHWERECAPABLE OF AFFECTING THE COURSE OF THE PRO-
CEEDINGS

The Govemment of the United States of America referred its dispute
with Iran to the Court on 29 November 1979.It iscertain that the Court's
jurisdiction isnot automatic. The Court possessesonly suchjurisdiction as
is conferred upon it. Two essential consequences flow from this :

(a) any State is free to ignore the possibility of the judicial solution of a
dispute, either by omitting to refer it to the International Court of
Justice, or by refiusingto submit to the Court's jurisdiction, to the
extent that the circumstances of the case enable it so to refus;
(b) however, once a State presents itself before the Court asan applicant
and requests it to direct the respondent State to submit to the law, the

option it possessed before the institution of proceedings disappears.
The wholedossier of the dispute at issueisaken in hand by the Court.
The applicant State must refrain from taking any decisions on the
planes of eitherdomestic or international law which could have the
effect of impeding the proper administration of justice.

Conseil d'Etat,30 Miuch 1916,Recueil Sirey, 1916,PartIII,pp. 17ff
MauriceHauriou,note tojudgment in question(ibid.) Yet, even before tuming to the Court, the Government of the United
States of America had already decided to freeze the Iranian assets in
United States dollars lodged in United States banks or their branches
abroad.
Subsequently,just when the Court wasembarlungupon itsdeliberation
prior to the Judgment it wasto adopt, the President of theUnited States of
America, on 7 April 1980,announced a seriesof measures he had decided
to take which were closely connected with the case before the Court.
Having regard to the normal exercise of the Court's powers, the most
important of these rrieasures was unquestionably the thrd, whereby he
ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to :

"make a forma1 inventory of the assets of the Iranian Government
which were frozen by my previous order and also make a census or
inventory of the outstanding claims of American citizens and cor-
porations against the Government of Iran. This accounting of claims
will aid in designing a program against Iran for the hostages, the hos-
tage families and other United States claimants."
The President adde:d : "We are now preparing legislation which willbe

introduced in the Congress to facilitate processing and paying of these
claims."
This, in my view,constituted an encroachment on the functions of the
Court, for until the Court has ruled upon the principle of reparation the
applicant State is not entitled to consider that its submissions, or part of
them, have already been accepted and recognizedaswell founded.What is
more, the decision of the United States President to propose the adoption
by Congress of legiilation granting victims the possibility of receiving
compensation out of the Iranian assets frozen in the United States, when
the action before the Court has not yet been exhausted, raises the problem
of a conflict between ,therules of municipal lawand those of international
law. Were the legislatiioncontemplated to be passed, the conflict would be
settled to the detriment of the latter.
However, it was th,emilitary operation of 24 April 1980which was the
gravest encroachmeni.upon the Court's exerciseof its power to declare the
lawin respect of the dispute laid before it. Thisoperation wascalled off by
the President of the United States for technical reasons. It is not my
intention to characteiize that operation or to make any legal value-judg-
ment in its respect, but only to allude to it in connection with the case

before the Court. 1rriust say that it was not conducive to facilitating the
judicial settlement of the dispute.
In his report to thieSecurity Council of 25 April 1980, Mr. Donald
McHenry, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America,
stated that the military operation of 24 April 1980had been undertaken
pursuant to Article 51of the Charter of the United Nations. Yet Article 51
provides for the eventuality of that kind of operation only "if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations". One can only
wonder, therefore, whether an armed attack attributable to the Iranian DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF (DISS .P. TARAZI) 65

Government has been committedagainst the territory oftheUnited States,
apart from its Embassy and Consulates in Iran.
To sum up my position, 1 would like to mention the following
points :

(a) 1 consider that the Court has jurisdiction to decide the present case
only under the provisions of the Vienna Conventions of 1961and 1963
on, respectively, 1)iplomatic and Consular Relations. Any direct or
indirect reference to the 1955Treaty between the United States and
Iran or to the 1973Convention is, from my point of view, unaccept-
able.

(6) 1consider that the Iranian Government has violated its obligations
under the two VierinaConventions mentioned above. 1concur in those
parts of the operative paragraph which deal with this question.
(c) On the other hanLd,1 could not support the idea that the Iranian
Government shouild be declared responsible unless the Court also
found :

(i) that the responsibility in question isrelative and not absolute,that
it must straiglntway be qualified in accordance with the criteria
which 1 have put fonvard and others which may be envisaged ;
(ii) that theGovernment of theUnited States of America, by reason of
its conduct both before and after the institution of proceedings,
has equally incurred responsibility.

(SigneS d.)TARAZI.

Bilingual Content

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. TARAZI

L'examen de la requête introductived'instance que le Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique déposale 29 novembre 1979,la lecture du
mémoireque celui-ci communiqua le 15janvier 1980 et l'audition des
plaidoiries au cours des audiences des 18, 19et 20 mars 1980ont placéla
Cour devant une sériede fait;, de développements historiqueset d'argu-
mentsjuridiques qui devaient l'amener à rendre un arrêt revêtant , mon
sens, une importance capitale. J'ai étéd'accord avec les conclusions de
l'arrêtquiont traità la nécessité,our leGouvernement dela République

islamique d'Iran, de se soumettre aux obligations qui lui incombent, en
vertu des conventions de Vienne de 1961 et de 1963 sur les relations
diplomatiques et consulaires. J'ai toutefois éprouvé certainesdifficultés,
découlant tant de la situation qui s'estformée enIran après lerenverse-
ment du régimedont l'ancienChah étaitlesymbole,quedu comportement
de 1'Etatdemandeur antérieurement et postérieurementaux événements
du 4 novembre 1979, à dire et déclarer quele Gouvernement de la Répu-
blique islamique d'Iran étaitseul responsable envers celui des Etats-Unis
d'Amériquetout en omettant de souligner en même tempsque celui-ci
avait également engagésa responsabilité,pour une part qui resterait à
déterminer, à l'égarddu Gouvernement iranien.
Mon intention est de mentionner, en les commentant aussi brièvement
que possible, lesraisons de mon attitude et de ma position. Je devrai, pour
ce faire, envisager les points suivant:

1. Le principe de l'inviolabilitédes missions diplomatiques et consu-
laires et de l'immunitédont jouissent leurs membres ;
2. Les éléments quientrent enjeu dans l'évaluation,en principe, de la
responsabilité encouruepar le Gouvernement de la Républiqueislamique
d'Iran ;
3. Les actions entreprises par le Gouvernement américaintant anté-
rieurement que postérieurement à la saisinede la Cour et pouvant affecter
le déroulement de l'instance.

J'ai, sur ce point, entièrement souscrit aux motifs de l'arrêt.l m'est
agréablede constater que celui-ci a particulièrement tenu compte des
traditions de l'Islam qui ont concouru avec d'autresà la formulation des
règlesdu droit international public contemporain en matièred'inviolabi-
litéet d'immunité diplomatiques et consulaires. DISSEN'TING OPINION OF JUDGE TARAZI

(Translation]

Having perused theApplication instituting proceedings which the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America filed on 29 November 1979,read
the Mernorial filed by it on 15 January 1980 and listened to the oral
arguments during the heanngs of 18,19and 20March 1980,the Court had
before it aseries of facts, hstorical developments and legal arguments
which were to lead to its delivering a Judgment of, in my view,cardinal
importance. 1concu:rredin the findings of the Judgment concerning the
necessityofcornpliaricebytheGovernment ofthe IslamicRepublic of Iran
with the obligations incumbent upon it under the Vienna Conventions of
1961 and 1963 on, irespectively,Diplomatic and Consular Relations. 1

nevertheless found !;ornedifficulty, arising on the one hand from the
situation which has dlevelopedin Iran sincetheoverthrow of the régimeof
which the former Shah was the symbol, and on the other hand from the
conduct of the applkant State both before and after the events of 4 No-
vember 1979,in deciding and declanng only that the Government of the
IslamicF ,public of Iran wasresponsible vis-à-visthat of the United States
ofAmerica whle neglectingtopoint out at the sametimethat thelatter had
also incurred resporisibility, to antent remaining to be determined,
vis-à-vis the Government of Iran.
My intention here is to indicate, with as brief explanations as possible,
thereasonsfor my attitude and position. To that end 1willhave toconsider
the following points:

1. The pnnciple of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular missions
and of the irnrnunitjr enjoyed by their member;
2. The factors wliich enter into the assessment in principle of the
responsibility incurred by the Government of the Islarnic Republic of
Iran ;
3. The actions uridertaken by the United States Government both

before and after the seisinof the Court which werecapable of affecting the
course of the proceedings.

1. THE~NVIOLABILI O?'DIPLOMATI ACND CONSULAM RISSION SND THE
IMMIJNITE YNJOYED BY THEIRMEMBERS

1entirelyconcurred in thereasoning oftheJudgment on thispoint. 1was
pleased to notethat theJudgrnent took particular account of the traditions
of Islam, which contnbuted along with others to the elaboration of the
niles of contemporary publicinternational lawon diplomatic and consular
inviolability and imnunity.59 PERSONNEL DIPLOMATIQUE ET CONSULAIRE (OP.DISST . ARAZI)

Dans uncours qu'ilfit àl'Académiededroit international de La Hayeen
1937sur <L'Islam et le droit des gens O,Ahmed Rechid, professeur à la
facultéde droitd'Istanbul, a ainsi caractérisé l'inviolabilité de l'envoyéen
droit musulman :

<<En Arabie, la personne de l'ambassadeur fut de tout temps
considéréecomme sacrée. Mahomet a consacré cette inviolabilité.
Jamais les ambassadeurs envoyésauprèsde Mahomet ou de ses suc-
cesseurs n'ont étémolestés.Un jour, l'envoyé d'unenation étrangère
s'était permis, aucours de l'audience que lui avait accordée le Pro-

phète, de proférer desparoles outrageantes. Mahomet lui dit :<(Situ
n'étaisun envoyé,je t'aurais faitmettre à mort. ))L'auteur du <(Siyer ))
qui rapporte ce fait en conclut à l'obligation de respecter I'ambassa-
deur.

Ahmed Rechid ajoute plus loin :

<(Le Prophète a toujours traité les envoyésdes nations étrangères
avec égardset avec la plus grande affabilité. Il avait coutume de les
combler decadeaux, et recommandait à sescompagnons de suivreson

exemple en leur disant : <Agissez de mêmeaprès moi '.
Dans un ouvrage publiépar l'Institutde I'Etatet du droit de l'Académie
des sciences de l'URSS sousle titre International Law,on lit ce qui suit sur

le comportement des Arabes, porteurs de la foi musulmane, au Moyen
Age :
[Traduction]

((Les Etats arabes,qui ontjoué unrôle important au Moyen Age (à
partir du VIIe siècle)dans les relations internationales, avaient des
conceptions très évoluéeseé t troitementliées a despréceptesreligieux

au sujet du droit des gens.
Les Arabes reconnaissaient l'inviolabilité desambassadeurs et la
nécessitéde respecter les obligations conventionnelles. Ils avaient
recours à l'arbitrage pour réglerles différends internationaux et esti-
maient nécessaire d'observerdes règlesprécisesen temps de guerre
(Gle sang des femmes, des enfants et des vieillards ne souillera pas
votre victoire O).))

La Cour, en partant du fait que le Gouvernement de la République
islamique d'Iran avait violélesobligationsinternationales qui le liaient en
matière d'inviolabilitéet d'immunitédiplomatique à l'égardde celui des

droitinternutionul. 1937-11,t. 60, p. 421 et 422.ecueildes coursde I'Acudémiede DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF (DISSO. P.TARAZI) 59

In a course of lectures which he gave in 1937at the Hague Academy of
International Law on the subject of "Islam and jus gentium", Professor
Ahmed Rechid of the Istanbul law faculty gave the following account of
the inviolability of the envoy in Muslim law :

"In Arabia, the person of the ambassador had alwaysbeen regarded
as sacred. Muhiimmad consecrated this inviolability. Never were
ambassadors to Muhammad or to his successors molested. One day,
the envoy of a foreign nation, at an audience granted to him by the
Prophet, was so bold asto use insulting language. Muhammad said to
hm :'If you were not an envoy 1would have you put to death.' The

author of the 'Siyer' which relates ths incident draws from it the
conclusion that there is an obligation to respect theperson of ambas-
sadors."

Ahmed Rechid adds further on :
"The Prophet always treated the envoys of foreign nations with

consideration and great affability. He used to shower gifts upon them
and recommended hiscompanionsto followhisexample, saying :'Do
the same as 1' l."'
In a work entitled ~rnternationa law,published by the Institute of State
and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the following is to be
read on the conduct in the Middle Ages of the Arabs, the bearers of the

Islamic faith :

"The Arab States, which played an important part in international
relations in the Middle Ages (from the 7th century) had well-de-
veloped conceptions regardingthe LawofNations, closelylinked with
religious precepts.
The Arabs recognised the inviolability of Ambassadors and the
need for the fulfilment of treaty obligations. They resorted to arbi-
tration to settle iinternational disputes and considered the observance
of definite rules of law necessary in time of war ('theblood of women,
children and old men shall not besmirch your victory')."

The deductions ma,deby the Court from the fact that theGovernment of
the Islamic Republic of Iran had violated its binding international obli-
gations to the United States of America with regard to diplomatic invio-

' Ahmed Rechid, "L'1:ilamet ledroit desgens", 60Recueildes coursde I'Academiede
droit international. 1937, p. 421 f.60 PERSONNEL DIPLOMATIQUE ET CONSULAIRE (OP. DISS TARAZI)

Etats-Unis d'Amérique,en est arrivée à le déclarer responsabletant pour
omission que pour action.

Cette manièrede voir ne me paraît pas adéquate.La responsabilitédu
Gouvernement iranien ne saurait êtreproclamée si son examen n'est
précédé d'un étudeappropriéedes faits historiques antérieurs à la saisie,
par lesétudiantsislamiques, de l'ambassade des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à
Téhéranle 4 novembre 1979.Il est tout à fait regrettable,àcet égard,de
constater que le Gouvernement iranien a refusé decomparaître devant la
Cour. Il résulte,cependant, des deux communications identiques qui ont
étéadressées à celle-cipar le ministre iranien des affaires étrangères,les
9 novembre 1979et 16mars 1980,que leGouvernement de la République
islamique d'Iran considère que l'instance en cours ne constitue qu'un

aspect marginald'un différendplus largequioppose l'Iranaux Etats-Unis,
depuis qu'en 1953leChah aété rétablisur letrône grâceauxintrigues dela
CIA et que le Gouvernement américaina continuéde s'immiscerdans les
affaires intérieuresde l'Iran.
En dépitdel'absencedu Gouvernement iranien au coursdelaprocédure
et peut-êtrea cause de cette absence, la Cour se devait d'élucidercepoint
particulier avant de se prononcer sur la responsabilitéde 1'Etatiranien.
Cette responsabilité aurait dû êtrequalifiéede relative et non pas d'ab-
solue.
Je reconnais que la Cour a fait un effort louable dans cette direction. Il
est, cependant, demeuré insuffisant. On a soutenu qu'il s'agissaitd'exa-

miner des agissements d'ordre politique qui dépassaient lecadre des pou-
voirsde laCour. Maispeut-on négligerdesdéveloppements historiquesqui
ont une incidencedirecte sur desconflitsjuridiques? La Cour permanente
de Justice internationale avait bien clarifié cepoint en affirmant dans son
arrêtdu 7juin 1932(affaire des Zonesfranchesde la Savoieet du Pays de
Gex) ce qui suit :

<L'èredes guerres napoléoniennes précédantles Cent-Jours se
termina par les traitésconclus a Paris, le 30mai 1814,entre la France,
d'une part, et, de l'autre, respectivement l'Autriche, la Grande-

Bretagne, la Prusse et la Russie. )>(C.P.J.1.sérieA/ B no 46, 1932,
p. 115.)
Ilétaitdoncpossible de sepencher quelquepeu surlesévénements qus ie
sont déroulésen1953pour mesurer ledegrédeplausibilitédel'affirmation
du ministre des affaires étrangèresde l'Iran. En me renseignant auprès
d'unesourcequi n'estpasfavorable alarévolution islamiqueiranienne,j'ai

pu me former une idée surcette question essentielle. Dans son ouvrage
intituléLa chutedu Shah,M. Fereydoun Hoveyda, frèrede l'ancien pre-
mier ministre de l'ex-souverain,Abbas Arnir Hoveyda, condamné à mort
et exécutéaprès le départde l'ex-souverain, dit :

<Certains observateurs iraniens se montraient sceptiques et esti-
maient que les étrangers tiraient les ficelles : les compagnies non
anglaises,portéesau premier plan du marchémondialpétrolier,pous-lability and irnrnunity have led it to declare the former responsible by
reason of acts of bot11omission and commission.
1find this approach inadequate. It is not right to proclaim the respon-
sibility of the Iranian (Governmentunlessitsexamination is first preceded
by an appropriate stu.dyof the historical facts antedating the seizure by

Islamic students of the United States Embassy in Tehran on 4 November
1979.In that respect, it is a matter for deep regret that the Iranian Gov-
ernment refused to appear before the Court. Nevertheless, it emergesfrom
the two identical communications addressed to the Court by the Iranian
Minister for Foreign Affairs on 9 November 1979and 16March 1980that
the Government of thi:Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the present
proceedings are onlyamarginal aspect ofawiderdispute dividingIranand
the United States sincethe Shah wasin 1953restored to the thronethanks
to the intrigues of the (ZIAand the United StatesGovernment continued to
meddle in Iran's interna1 affairs.

In spite, and perhaps because of the absence,of the Government of Iran
from the proceedings, it behoved the Court to elucidate this particular
point before pronouncingon the responsibility of the Iranian State. That
responsibility ought to have been qualified as relative and not abso-
lute.
1recognize that the Court made alaudable effort in that direction. This,
however, reniained insufficient. It has been argued that more would mean

examining deeds of a political nature whch lay outside the framework of
the Court's powers. EIutis it possible to ignore historical developments
which have direct repercussions on legal conflicts ?The Permanent Court
of International Justice well clarified this point when in its Judgment of
7 June 1932 (Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex), it
stated :

"The era of the Napoleonic Wars preceding the Hundred Days was
brought to an end by the treaties concluded at Paris on May 30th,
1814,between France, on the one hand, and Austria, Great Britain,
Prussia and Russia respectively, on the other." (P.C.I.J., SeriesAIB,
No. 46, 1932, p. 115.)

One could therefori: have devoted some attention to the events of 1953
with a viewto gauging to what extent the assertion of the Iranian Minister
for Foreign Affairs was plausible. On this essential question, 1have been
able to glean some iripression from a source that does not look with any
favourable eye upon ,theIslamic Revolution of Iran. In his work entitled
The Full of the Shah, Mr. Fereydoun Hoveyda, the brother of the ex-
sovereign's former Prime Minister, Mr. Abbas Amir Hoveyda, who was
condemned to death and executed after the ex-sovereign left Iran, says :

"Some Iraniari observers were sceptical, considering that foreign
interests were pulling the strings:top-ranking non-British companies
on the world market werepushing for a break of the contract with the saientà la rupture du contrat avecYAIOC.Quoi qu'ilen soit, comme
l'agitation prenait de l'ampleur, la classe dirigeante iranienne et les
puissances étrangères,apeurées,se tournèrent une fois de plus vers le
Shah. C'est alors que l'idéed'un coup d7Etat émergea au seinde la
CIA. Kermit Roosevelt serendit en 1953 à Téhéran,pour enétudierla
possibilitéet trouver un exécutantvalable. Son choix se porta sur le
généralZahedi.Lesconjurésmirent en scènele départdu Shah après

lui avoir fait signer un décret nommant Zahedi premier ministre.
Celui-ci, grâce aux fonds verséspar la CIA, recourut aux services de
Chaban-bi-mokh (littéralement : Chaban I'Ecerveié),maître d'un
célèbre <(Zourkhané (centre de gymnastique traditionnelle) afin de
recruter un commando de civils))pour agir aux côtésde l'armée.
L'opération déclenchéeen août 1953 ne demanda pas plus d'une
journée. Et le Shah rentra triomphalement. Et ceux-là mêmesqui
suivaient Mossadegh jusqu'aux dernières minutes accoururent à
l'aérodrome,se jetèrent à terre devant le souverain pour lui baiser

les bottes!
Malgré les faits, révélé psar les Américains eux-mêmesl,e Shah se
plut à considérer le coup d7Etat de 1953 comme une (<révolution
populaire qui leplébiscitait. Et,apparemment, il finit par y croire !
Déià le souverain montrait une tendance au travestissement du vrai.
qui devait aller en s'accusant jusqu'à le couper complètement des
réalitésdu pays l.

Ainsi donc, dans la penséedesdirigeantsiraniens actuels, lepouvoir du

Chahétait,depuislachute forcéedudocteur Mossadeghen 1953,dénuéde
légitimitéet de légalité.Ce point aurait dû faire l'objet d'un examen
attentif pour la raison que les mêmesdirigeants se disent fermement
convaincus que leChah n'aurait pu semaintenirsur le trône s'iln'avait pas
été appuyépar le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Cedernier point de vuerejoint lapenséede M. Henry Kissinger, ancien
secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.Dans son ouvrage intituléA
la Maison-Blanche,M. Kissinger affirme que :

Souslerègnedu shah, lepont terrestreentre l'Asieetl'Europe,qui
fut souvent la charnière de l'histoire du monde, étaitpro-américainet
pro-occidental sans conteste possible. L'Iran étaitle seul pays de la
région - Israël mis à part - à avoir fait de son amitié avec les
Etats-Unis le point de départ de sa politique étrangère.Le fait que
celle-ci fût baséesur la froide estimation que ce serait d'Union sovié-
tiqueet despays arabes extrémistesque viendrait trèsprobablement le
danger pour l'Iran n'estqu'une autre façon dedire que lepoint de vue

'Fereydoun Hoveyda, Lo .hure du Shah, Paris1980,p.141-142. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF (DISS .P. TARAZI) 61