Dissenting opinion of President Jennings

Document Number
080-19920626-JUD-01-02-EN
Parent Document Number
080-19920626-JUD-01-00-EN
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Bilingual Document File

DISSENTING OPINION
OF PRESIDENT SIR ROBERT JENNINGS

1very much regret that 1am unable to agree with the decision of the
Court rejecting Australia's preliminary objection based on the circum-
stancethat New Zealand and the United Kingdom are not alsoparties to

the proceedings (see (1) (g)of para. 72 of the Judgment). My difficulties
with this part ofthe Judgment maybe stated verybriefly.
This preliminary objection raises an important issue concerning the
consensual basis of the Court's jurisdiction where the legal interests of
third Statesare involved in a case. Articles 62and 63 of the Court's Sta-
tute,whichallowforintervention, showthat theparties to a casemayhave
their claims adjudicated by the Court, even when the legal interests of
third States maybe affected bythe Court's decision.There is,however,a
limittothe exerciseofjurisdiction inacaseaffectingthe legalinterestsofa
third State, and that limit is where,cording tothe well-knownformula
ofthe caseofthe Monetav GoldRemoved from Romein1943(Preliminary
Question),thethird State's"legalinterestswould not onlybe affectedbya
decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision"
(Z.CJ.. Reports1954,p. 32).

That the legal interests of New Zealand and the United Kingdom

willformthe very subject-matter of any decision in Nauru's case against
Australia is surely manifest. The Mandate for Nauru was in 1920con-
ferred upon "His Britannic Majesty" ;theTrusteeship Agreementof 1947
designated
"The Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom (hereinafter called 'the Administering Authority') as

the joint Authority which will exercise the administration of the
Territory";
NewZealand and the United Kingdom weretwo ofthethree membersof
the BritishPhosphateCommissioners; and theywerebothjoint parties to
the Canberra Agreement of 1967.This is to mention only the salient
instancesoftheinextricable involvementofthe legalinterestsofthosetwo
Statesin this matter.

Moreover,one must contemplate the situation that must arise if,on the
merits,thereshouldbeanyquestion ofassessingthereparation that might
be due from Australia (see para. 48 of the Judgment). If the obligations
fromwhichthe liabilityarisesare held to besolidary(jointand several)so
that Australia isliableforthe whole,orwhether,alternatively,Australiais
held liable onlyfor someproportion ofthe wholesum, it is clearin eithercase that the Court will unavoidably and simultaneously be making a
decision in respect ofthe legalinterests ofthose two other States.

For these reasons it seemetthat the Australian preliminary objec-
tion inthisatter is wellfounded, and that the Court iswithout jurisdic-
tion in this case.

(Signe d)Y. JENNINGS.

Bilingual Content

DISSENTING OPINION
OF PRESIDENT SIR ROBERT JENNINGS

1very much regret that 1am unable to agree with the decision of the
Court rejecting Australia's preliminary objection based on the circum-
stancethat New Zealand and the United Kingdom are not alsoparties to

the proceedings (see (1) (g)of para. 72 of the Judgment). My difficulties
with this part ofthe Judgment maybe stated verybriefly.
This preliminary objection raises an important issue concerning the
consensual basis of the Court's jurisdiction where the legal interests of
third Statesare involved in a case. Articles 62and 63 of the Court's Sta-
tute,whichallowforintervention, showthat theparties to a casemayhave
their claims adjudicated by the Court, even when the legal interests of
third States maybe affected bythe Court's decision.There is,however,a
limittothe exerciseofjurisdiction inacaseaffectingthe legalinterestsofa
third State, and that limit is where,cording tothe well-knownformula
ofthe caseofthe Monetav GoldRemoved from Romein1943(Preliminary
Question),thethird State's"legalinterestswould not onlybe affectedbya
decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision"
(Z.CJ.. Reports1954,p. 32).

That the legal interests of New Zealand and the United Kingdom

willformthe very subject-matter of any decision in Nauru's case against
Australia is surely manifest. The Mandate for Nauru was in 1920con-
ferred upon "His Britannic Majesty" ;theTrusteeship Agreementof 1947
designated
"The Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United
Kingdom (hereinafter called 'the Administering Authority') as

the joint Authority which will exercise the administration of the
Territory";
NewZealand and the United Kingdom weretwo ofthethree membersof
the BritishPhosphateCommissioners; and theywerebothjoint parties to
the Canberra Agreement of 1967.This is to mention only the salient
instancesoftheinextricable involvementofthe legalinterestsofthosetwo
Statesin this matter.

Moreover,one must contemplate the situation that must arise if,on the
merits,thereshouldbeanyquestion ofassessingthereparation that might
be due from Australia (see para. 48 of the Judgment). If the obligations
fromwhichthe liabilityarisesare held to besolidary(jointand several)so
that Australia isliableforthe whole,orwhether,alternatively,Australiais
held liable onlyfor someproportion ofthe wholesum, it is clearin either OPINION DISSIDENTE
DE SIR ROBERT JENNINGS, PRÉSIDENT

[Traduction]

Je regrette beaucoup de ne pas pouvoir approuver la décisionde la

Cour rejetantl'exceptionpréliminairedel'Australiefondéesurlefait que
la Nouvelle-Zélandeet le Royaume-Unine sont pas égalementparties à
l'instance(voiralinéa1 g)du paragraphe 72del'arrêt)L . esdifficultésque
mepose cette partie de l'arrêt peuvent êtreexposéestrès brièvement.
Cette exception préliminaire soulèveune questionimportante touchant
lefondementconsensuel delacompétencedelaCour lorsquedesintérêts
juridiques d'Etatstierssontenjeu dansune affaire.Lesarticles62et63du
Statut dela Cour, qui autorisent l'intervention,montrent que lesparties
une affaire peuvent fairejuger leurs prétentionspar la Cour, mêmelors-
que les intérêtsjuridiquesd'Etats tiers peuvent être affectésar la déci-
sion de celle-ci.Il y a toutefois une limite'exercicede la compétence
dans une affaire affectant les intérêtsjuridiques d'un Etat tiers, et cette
limite est que, pour reprendre la formule bien connue utiliséedans
l'affairedel'Ormonétairepris à Romeen1943(questionpréliminaire), les

intérêtsjuridiquesde[l'Etattiers]seraient non seulementtouchésparune
décision, mais constitueraient l'objetmêmede ladite décision)) (C.Z.J.
Recueil1954,p. 32).
Quelesintérêtsjuridiques dela Nouvelle-Zélandeetdu Royaume-Uni
constitueront l'objet même detoute décision dans l'affaireNauru contre
Australie est très certainement manifeste. Le mandat sur Nauru a été
conféré en 1920 à «Sa Majestébritannique)); l'accordde tutelle de 1947
désignait«conjointement ))

ales Gouvernements de l'Australie, de la Nouvelle-Zélandeet du
Royaume-Uni(ci-aprèsappelés ((l'autorité chargé dee l'administra-
tion)))..comme l'autorité qui exercera l'administrationdu Terri-
toire»;
la Nouvelle-Zélandeet le Royaume-Uni étaient deux des troismembres
des British Phosphate Commissioners; et ces pays étaient tous deux

partiesà l'accorddeCanberra de 1967.Il ne s'agitlà que desillustrations
les plus marquantes des liensinextricables des intérêtsjuridiquesde ces
deux Etats avecla présente affaire.
De plus, l'ondoit envisagerla situation qui existeranécessairementsi,
sur le fond, il était question d'évaluer la réparation pouvant êee par
l'Australie (voir paragraphe 48 de l'arrêt). Que les obligationsd'où
découlela responsabilité soientjugéessolidaires (joint and several),de
telle manièreque l'Australiesoit tenue de la totalitéde la réparation,ou
qu'àl'inverse ellenesoitjugéetenue que d'unepartie du montant total, ilcase that the Court will unavoidably and simultaneously be making a
decision in respect ofthe legalinterests ofthose two other States.

For these reasons it seemetthat the Australian preliminary objec-
tion inthisatter is wellfounded, and that the Court iswithout jurisdic-
tion in this case.

(Signe d)Y. JENNINGS.est clair que dans un cas comme dans l'autre laCour rendra inévitable-
mentetsimultanémentune décisionsurlesintérêtsjuridiques decesdeux
autres Etats.
Pour cesraisons,ilme semblequel'exceptionpréliminairede 1'Austra-
lie sur cepoint estbien fondée,et que la Cour n'estpas compétentedans
cetteaffaire.

(Signé)R.Y. JENNINGS.

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Dissenting opinion of President Jennings

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