SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE VAN WYK
GENERAG LROUND SOR DISMISSINA GPPLICANTS S'UBMISSIONS
1agree that the claim should be disrnissed and 1agree with the reasons
stated in the Judgment. There are however severalfurther and alternative
grounds for dismissing the claim; and although 1 fully share the view
of those members of the Court who, while agreeing that these grounds
exist ho!d that once a court has found a general ground of a fundamental
character for dismissing a claim, neither it, nor any judge, should
proceed to state what its judgment, or his opinion, would have been
had such ground not existed, 1 nonetheless believe that it would be
unrealistic in the particular circumstances of this case if at least one
judge did not deal with some of those further and alternative grounds
from the standpoint which 1 adopt. Before doing so, however, 1 wish
to make a few observations with regard to the Judgment.
2. It is true that a greatal of the reasoning of the present Judgment
is in conflict with the reasoning of the 1962 Judgment with regard
to the first three preliminary objections (particularly the second)-
so much so that the inescapable inference is that in 1962 the Court
assumed a jurisdiction it does not possess-but these considerations
cannot in any way preclude the Court from now basing its judgment
on the merits on its present reasoning. The Court is not bound to
perpetuate faulty reasoning, and nothing contained in the 1962Judgment
could constitute a decision of any issue which is part of the merits of
the claim.
3.The mere fact that a provision confers competence on a court to
adjudicate upon disputes relating to certain matters at the instance of
particular States, obviously cannot have the effect of conferring sub-
stantive legal rights or interests in respect of such matters on suc11
States. Thus, for example, the acceptance of this Court's jurisdiction
by the Netherlands-which is typical of several acceptances-is,with
exceptions therein indicated, "in relation to any other State... in all
disputes ...". This acceptance confers competence on this Court to
adjudicate, at the instance of any State complying with the prescribed
conditions, upon any dispute between such a State and the Netherlands.
This would include any dispute relating to the interpretation or appli-
cation of the provisions of any treaty. But whether such a State has
a legal right orinterest in the subject-matter of any such dispute, Le.,
a right or interest upon which a judgment in its favour could be based,
65 is a completely different matter. The answer to such a question is not
to be found in this acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, but depends
on the interpretation placed by the Court on the provisions of the
particular treaty upon which the claim is based. Such an issue is not
part of the jurisdictional issue, but constitutes an integral part of the
merits of the dispute, which can only be resolved after the Court has
upheld the right of the Applicant to seise it. These two matters, i.e., the
jurisdictional and the merits, cannot be dealt with simultaneously.
If any State should contend that the acceptance of the Court's juris-
diction by the Netherlands confers on it substantive legal rights or
interkts in respect of any particular matter, the Court will first decide
whethehit has jurisdiction in terms of the acceptance of jurisdiction
by theNetherlands; and, only afterhavingfound that it has the necessary
competence, will it consider the merits of such a contention.
Some confusion has resulted in this case from the fact that the
same provision on which the Court's jurisdiction is founded is also
alleged to constitute the source of the Applicants' substantive legal
rights on which their claim is based. It should be appreciated that
where a provision is alleged to serve such a dual purpose, only the
jurisdictional aspect thereof can be considered at the preliminary
objection stage. The existence of substantive legal rights is part of
the merits, and must accordingly be determined at the merits stage of a
case, and this is so, even if the interpretation of a jurisdictional clause
is involved. It follows that if in 1962 this Court, per incuriam o,r for
any other reason, dealt with the Applicants' alleged substantive rights
or interests, its statements with regard thereto cannot now prejudice its
decision at this-the merits-stage.
4. The question of Applicants' legal right or interest in the claim
not only arises generally-as happens at the merits stage of every case
of this kind-but actually constitutes an important sub-issue for several
specific submissions of the Applicants. The issue raised in their Sub-
mission No. 1 is whether the Mandate is still in force, and one of the
questions bearing on ths is the legal effect of Article 7 (2), particularly
whether it conferred any substantive legal rights or interests on members
of the League l.Another issue included in the merits (by Applicants'
Submissions Nos. 3 and 4) is on what basis, if any, Article 2 (2) of the
Mandate was intended to be justiciable, and here again the aforesaid
question arises.
5. There is no substancein the contention that the Court is precluded
from considering whether the Applicants have a legal right or interest
in the claim merely because this issue was not specificallyraised in the
Respondents' submissions. Evenif Respondentdid not raise that question
the Court would nonetheless be bound to determine whether the Appli-
cants have a legal right or interest in the claim before considering the
l See, e.g., Counter-Memorial,Book II, ChapV, Part B.
66ultimate merits; but in any event this issue is embraced by the Respon-
dent's submissions. In the Counter-Memorial, the Rejoinder and the
oral proceedings the Respondent disputed not only the Applicants' legal
right or interest in respect of the specific submissions referred to above,
but did so also in regard to the claim generzlly '.In the final submissions
the Respondent expressly claimed that upon the basis of the statements
of fact and law set forth in the pleadiilgj and oral proceedings the
Applicants' submissions should be adjudged and declared unfounded,
and that no declaration be made as claimed by the Applicants. In these
circumstances no reasonable person could have been unaware of what
the submissions were intended to convey.
6. As already stated the 1962 Judgment could not decide any issue
forming part of the merits. This conclusioii is not only in accordance
with general principles and the rules of this Court, but also flows from
the 1962Judgment itself.
7. Reference has already been made to Article 62, paragraph 3, of
the Rules of this Court which provides in express terms that on the
filing of preliminary objections the proceedings on the merits sliall be
suspended. In tliese cases there was actually an Order dated 5 December
1961formally recording that by virtue of these provisions the proceedings
on the merits were suspended.
The basic consideration that a preliminary objection is not intended
to, and is not capable of giving rise to a binding judgment on the issues
of merits involved, has been recognized in several decisions-see
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, page 10;
and in the Polislz Upper Silesia case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, page 15,
this principle was formulated as follows:
"... the Court cannot . .. in any way prejudice its future decision
on the merits"
and-
"Even if this enquiry involves touching upon subjects belonging
to the merits of the case ...nothing which the Court says in the
present judgment can be regarded as restricting its entire freedom
to estimate the value of any arguments by either side on the same
subjects during the proceedings on the merits."
It is in any eventhighly improbable that the Court could have intended
to make any decisions on the merits when dealing with an interlocutory
matter relating tojurisdiction. A court of law cannot be presumed to have
intended to disregard its own rules and well-established principles oflaw.
On 13 April 1965 Respondent's Counsel made the following submission:
6'...by reason of the considerations arising from the limited scope of Article 7
(2) of theMandate,or of the lapse of that Article, the conclusion is arrived at that
al1the claims are inadmissible and the result would again be rejection ..al1
the Applicants'... submissions."70 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
Moreover, ex facie the Court's 1962 Judgment, it did not intend
deciding any part of the merits, for the aforesaid Order recording the
suspension of the proceedings on the merits is actually quoted in that
Judgment.
It will be observed that the Court's conclusion and the operative part
of the 1962 Judgment respectively state that "the Court is competent
to hear the dispute on the merits", and that it "hds that it has juris-
diction to adjudicateupon the merits of the dispute". The word "dispute"
obviouslymeantthe issuesas encompassed in the Applicants' submissions
as set out in full in the Judgrnent at pagrs 324-326.
8. While it is true that the Court remarked in the course of its Judg-
ment that "the Mandate as a whole is still in force", this remark could
not possibly have been intended to constitute a decision of any of the
issues embraced by Submission No. 1 or 2 or any other part of the
merits. The preliminary objections were argued on the assumption
that the Mandate was still in force ',and even a preliminary finding
on this matter wzs therefore not necessary. Moreover, the Court could
not have intended saying that ail the original provisions of the Mandate
were still in force, albeit in an amended form, because not only did it
carefully avoid dealing with the issue whether Article 6 still applied,
but a great deal of its reasoning on Article 7 suggests that, had it been
called upon to decide whether Article 6 still applied, as is contended in
the Applicants' Submission No. 2, it would have held that it had ceased
to apply 2.
At no stage did the Court in 1962specificallydeal with the problems
arising from the disappearance of the League's supervisory organs;
and no reference is made at any stage to the suggestion that after April
1946supervisory functions were to be exercised by the United Nations.
Al1 refefknces to administrative supervision were omitted from the
quotations from the 1950Opinion 3.
The Court must have realized in 1962 that if the Applicants' first
submission failed, al1 the submissions had to be dismissed. It could
not have intended that if this happcned any part of its Judgment should
have any further application; otherwise one would have the absurd
Preliminary Objections, pp. 299, 359; Oral Proceedings 1962, pp. 4, 16-17,
49: 52-54, 336-337; Counter-Memorial, Book.II,p. 166. The following statement
at page 332 of the 1962 Judgment is accordingly not correct: "The Respondent
contends that it [the Mandate] is not in for.." Also incorrect is the statement
just been quoted): "It is argued that the rights and obligations under the Mandate
in relation to the administration of the Territory of South West Africa being of
an objective character still e..s."(The rest of the sentence also constituans
incorrect representation of Respondent's argument, but in another respect.)
See paragraphs 46 to 49 of the Chapter of this opinion dedigwith Submis-
sions 2, 7 and 8.
3 Compare quotation at pp. 333and 334 of the 1962Judgment with full statement
in 1950 Opinion, p. 136.result that a party who has in the final judgment been held to have no
legal right or interest in a claim nonetheless has, by virtue of an inter-
locutory decision, a judgment in its favour in respect of that claim or
part thereof.
9. Inasmuch as the voting in 1962was eight to seven it follows that,
apart from al1 other considerations, no statement not made with the
approval of ail the eight majority judges and not intended by al1those
judges to constitute a decision could have effect as a decision of the
Court.
It is therefore relevant to observe that it appears from the separate
opinions of Judges Bustamante, Jessup and Sir Louis Mbanefo that
none of them intended deciding any part of the merits.
10. Judge Jessup's opinion speaks for itself:
"But if the challenge to the existence of a 'dispute' in its legal
sense is raised in a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of a
tribunal, the question is how deeply the Court must probe into the
facts and law in order to determine whether there is a 'dispute'.
Suppose, for example, State A alleges in a diplornatic note to
State B that State B has violated a commercial treaty of 1880
between A and B. B in reply affirms that the treaty is no longer
in force.After futile negotiations,A submits the case to an inter-
national court in accordance with the terms of a treaty for pacific
settlement concluded by B with A. This treaty for pacific settlement
contains the ordinary provision that the parties agree that disputes
concerning legal rights may be submitted to an international
court by either party. B contends that the court has no jurisdiction
since there is no 'dispute' within the meaning of the treaty for
pacific settlement because A bases its contention on a treaty which
is no longer in force. The adjudication of the question whether
the treaty is in force and therefore whether A's case rested upon
a legal right, is a question for the merits and not a question to be
settled on a plea to the jurisdiction. B in effect admits there is a
'dispute' but asserts that A's substantive position is unsound.
It may be possible to imagine a case where the allegation of a
legal right was so obviously absurd and frivolous that the Court
would dismiss the application on a plea to the jurisdiction, but
such a situation would be rare. In any event, it is not the situation
in the instant cases.
In the instant cases, it is helpful to look first at the second
characteristic of the 'dispute' which has been noted above, i.e.,
that it must relate to the interpretation or the application of the
provisions of the Mandate. 1 do not see how it can be seriously
contended that this condition is not ful6lled since it is sufficient
basis for the jurisdiction of the Court if any of Applicants' con-
tentions are so related. On the face of those contentions, and 72 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
before the Court has examined them on their merits, the Court
must find that, assumingthere is a 'dispute', its one which relates
to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Man-
date."
The fact that the learned judge, after having made these remarks, made
some observations on the merits of the dispute is irrelevant, because
he could not possibly have intended to decide an issue which he had
just stated could only be dealt with at the merits stage of the cases.
11. That Sir Louis Mbanefo had no intention of deciding any part
of the merits appears from the first paragraph of his separate opinion:
"1 agree generally with the reasons given in the Judgment of
the Court, but 1feel that a great deal of the argument on the first
three Preliminary Objections in the Judgrnent goes to the merits
of the case. The Court is concerned essentially at this stage with
the question of jurisdiction. The way in which the claims of the
Applicants and the Preliminary Objections of the Respondent are
framed make it difficult for the Court to avoid touching on the
merits of the case. But that notwithstanding, 1 feel that emphasis
should be on a line of reasoning that deals essentially with the
issue of jurisdiction; and the opinion which 1now give is intended
to supplementthe reasoning of the Court on the First, Second and
Third Preliminary Objections."
12. There is at least one further reason which, apart from those
advanced in the Judgment, wouldjustify a conclusion that the Applicants
have no legal right or interest in the claim, namely that, whatever rights
the Applicants may have had under the provisions of the Mandate,
these lapsed on the dissolution of the League. On that date, either
the whole Mandate lapsed or at least those provisions, including Ar-
ticle7, which depended on the existence of the League ceased to apply;
and, in any event, Applicants could not retain any rights held by them
as members of the League after terminating such membership. In either
event all the submissions, including Submission No. 1,must be dismissed.
It is common cause that Article 7 can no longer apply, and Applicants
can no longer hold any rights they may have had as members of the
League, unless the words "Member of the League of Nations" in the
Mandate are given a meaning which includes ex-members of the League
who were members at the time of its dissolution. In 1962 the Court
advanced three reasons for not giving these words their ordinary and
natural meaning l.The first two are in direct conflict with the reasoning
of the present Judgment; the third depends on the validity of the first
It seems unavoidable that before rejecting these reasons al1 possible sources
of evidence on which they could have been based should be examined.
70two, and is in any event unfounded. 1 shall attempt to avoid as far as
possible a repetition of what -is already stated in the Judgment.
13. The first of these reasons is recorded in the second paragraph on
page 336 of the 1962Judgment which commences as follows:
"In the first place judicial protection of the sacred trust in each
Mandate was an essential feature of the mandates system."
This statement is bare assertion for which no support is to be found
in the relevant instruments, in theavaz~xpréparatoires i, the subsequent
conduct of the Parties, or in any other possible source of evidence. The
truth is ihat the concept ofjudicial protection of the sacred trust did not
exist, and this explains why nothing to that effect was said either before
or after the signing of the Covenant or the adoption of the Council
resolutions which embodied the various instrumeilts of mandate.
This paragraph of the 1962 Judgment then proceeded as follows:
"The essence of this system, as conceived by its authors and
embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
consisted, as stated earlier, of two features: a Mandate conferred
upon a Power as 'a sacred trust of civilization' and the 'securities
for the performance of this trust'. While the faithful discharge
of the trust was assigned to the Mandatory Power alone, the duty
and the right of ensuring the performance of this trust were given
to the League with its Council, the Assembly, the Permanent
Mandates Commission and al1 its Members within the limits of
their respective authority, power and functions, as constituting
administrative supervision, and the Permanent Court was to
adjudicate and determine anydispute within the meaning of Article 7
of the Mandate. The administrative supervision by the League
constituted a normal security to ensure full performance by the
Mandatory of the 'sacred trust' toward the inhabitants of the
mandated territory, but the specially assigned role of the Court
was even more essential, since it was to serve as the final bulwark
of protection by recourse to the Court against possible abuse or
breaches of the Mandate."
In this passage the Court apparently overlooked the fact that Article 22
of the Covenant required in express terms that "securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant", and
that there is not a word in the Covenant to suggest that either the
individual members of the League or the Court were to play any part
with regard to the performance of the trust. There is in any event nQ
evidence to be found anywhere to support the statement that the rights
and duties of ensuring the performance of the trust were-in addition
to the rights and duties given to the organs of the League-conferred
on al1 the members of the League. It follows that the suggestion that
individual members of the League were given powers of administrative
supervision over the mandatories is unfounded. The simple truth is that
7174 SOUTH WESTA~ICA (SEP O.P.VAN WYK)
the authors of Articie 22 did not conceive of any role for the Court
with regard to the mandates system, and that is why the Court is not
mentioned in Article 22 of the Covenant.
13(a). As already stated, the Court was mentioned for the firsttime
in connection with the mandates some time after the signing of the
Covenant, when a compromissory clause was proposed for the 'B'
mandates. But neither at that stage nor at any other stage was there
any suggestion to the effect that the Court should be assigned the role
of ensuring performance of the sacred trust, or that it should serve as
a final bulwark of protection thereof; not a word to this effect, or wlzich
may possibly be interpretedas suggesting anything of the kind, was said
at any time by anybody. On the contrary, what was said at the time
reveals that it was thought that thepurpose of the compromissory clause
was to provide for disputes relating to national riglts being referred
to the Court l.
13(b). If the Court had been intended to fulfil this special role of
protection of the sacred trust, a provision to that effect would have
been embodied in the Covenant, and it would not have been left to the
Council to include this "super security" in the mandate declarations.
There could have been no certainty that al1the members of the Council-
including the mandatories-would have approved such a provision, and
without the requisite unanimity the Council could not function. More-
over, the Councii's powers were confined to defining the "degree of
authority, administration and controi'' of the mandatory, and it could
have had no power to add to the securities for the performance of the
sacred trust since these securities had to be embodied in the Covenant.
Furthermore, even supposing that this important provision relating to
the Court's specialrole had been intentionally omitted fromthe Covenant
because it was thought that it would be included in the instruments of
mandate, one would have expected that at the time the Covenant was
signed some reference to this would have been made. But the facts are
that, at the time, the Court was not even mentioned in the discussions.
It is perhaps relevant to record that the day before the Versailles Peace
Treaty (which included the Covenant) was signed, Le., on 27 June 1919,
the draft mandates were before the Council of Four, but nobody sug-
gested that inasmuch as the Covenant, which was to be signed the next
day,did not provide for thejudicial protection of the sacred trust, a provi-
sion to that effect should be inserted into the mandates. In fact on the
very day the PeaceTreaty wassignedthe Milner Commissionmet inParis,
and yet nobody suggested the inclusion of any provision relating to the
Court. It is significant that on thissame day the minorities treaty with
l To the facts recorded by Judge Sir Percy Spender and Judge Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice in their joint dissenting opinion, South West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
pp. 556-557, 1 wish to add that before Lord Milner made the remark refetoed
in the second paragraph of page7, Lord Cecil had observed that there would be
some advantage in withdrawing questions ofrsona1 claims by nationals from the
sphere of diplomacy-seeRecueil des Actes de la Conference de la Paix, Vol. VI A,
PP. 348-349.
72 Poland was signed, and this treaty contained a compromissory clause
coupled with the "deeming" clause which became a feature of the
minorities treaties, but nobody suggested that any similar provision
should be inserted in the mandates.
13(c). Judge Jessup attached some importance in his 1962opinion to
the compromissory clauses in the minorities treaties, particularly in
order to establish that in 1920 a State could acquire a legal interest
in matters not affecting its own material interests l. That this is so is
not disputed, but the learned judge overlooked the difference in the
wording of the minorities treaties and the mandates. In the first place
the minorities treaties contained a deeming clause which provided
that a difference of opinion arising out of the provisions of the treaty
"shall be held to be a dispute of an international character"; secondly,
the right of invoking the Court's jurisdiction was limited to the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers and to other members of the Council of
the League, and, thirdly, the provision contained no requirement such
as the mandates relating to the settlement of the dispute. It should be
borne in mind that the minorities treaties were imposed on the defeated
nations and new States by the Great Powers. It is incredible that these
Powers would have limited the grant of substantive legal rights in the
case of these defeated nations and new States to a few States only, but
should have voluntarily granted in respect of mandates such rights
against themselves to al1the members of the League. Judge Jessup rightly
remarked in his Modern Luw of Nations, 1959, page 89:
"But the minorities treaties were obnoxious largely because they
carried the stigma of imposition upon small States by the great
powers, who were unwilling to accept like obligations in their own
territories."
14. The second reason advanced in the 1962Judgment for not giving
the words "Members of the League" their ordinary meaning was that:
"In the second place, besides the essentiality ofjudicial protection
for the sacred trust and for the rights of Member States under the
Mandates, and the lack of capacity on the part of the League or
the Council to invoke such protection, the right to implead the
Mandatory Power before the Permanent Court was specially and
expressly conferred on the Members of the League, evidently
because it was the most reliable procedure of ensuring protection
Further arguments on this issue advanced by Judge Jessup are dealt with in
the Counter-Memorial, Book II,Chapter V B; I do not consider it necessary to deal
with them in this opinion.
73 by the Court, whatevw might happen to or arise from the machinery
of admiriistrative supervision."
But the fact is that at the time of the establishment of the mandates
system the possibility of something happening to the machinery for
administrative supervisioil was not discussed or mentioned at all, and
was clearly not even contemplated. The above-cited reasoning of the
1962 Judgment is accordingly also neither warranted nor substantiated
by the facts.
15. The third reason given by the 1962Judgment was that at the final
session of the Leagüe in April 1946 an agreement was entered into
between al1the members of the League to continuethe different nîandates
as far as was practically feasible or operable, and therefore tomaintain
the rights of members of the League itself. The agreement referred to is
inferred from this 1946 "dissolution resolution" and "the whole set of
surrounding circumstances which preceded, and prevailed at the session".
Not only is the alleged general agreement based on inference, but the
preservation of the alleged rights of League members individually in
respect of Mandates is in turn inferred from this tacit agreement.
In essence these conclusions seem to rest on the proposition that
the dissolution resolution was adopted "precisely with a view of averting
. ..the literal objections derived from the words 'another Member of
the League of Nations' ". But this proposition is, with respect, another
bare assertion. The facts are that the rights of members of the League,
or the possible consequences flowing from the meaning of the words
"another Member of the League of Nations", were not discussed or
mentioned, expressly or impliedly, ciirectlyor indirectly, either before or
after the adoption of the said resolution. Nor does the resolution itself
make reference to any such matter. There is no evidence of any intention
to enter into any agreement relative thereto.
15(a). In myviewthere is no substance in any of the reasonsadvanced
by the Court in 1962 for piacing "no reliance" on the natural and
ordinary meaning of the words "another Member of the League of
Nations" in Article 7, and for holding that ex-members of the League
retained after the dissolutionsuch rights as they may have had as mem-
bers of the League.
Judges Bustamante, Jessup and Mbanefo followed in some respects a
somewhat different line of reasoning.
16. Judge Jessup first considered the meaning of "Members of the
League" inArticle 7 of the MandateforRuanda-Urundi held by Belgium.
After pointing out that in this Article Belgium agreed to the so-called
Open Door Principle which, inter ali~~f,orbade Belgium to discriminate
iii favour of her own nationals and against the nationals of other "Mem-
bers of the League", the learned Judge remarks:
"It is not apparent why it would be reasonable to Saythat while
74 it would have been a violation of Belgium's contractual obligation
so to discriminate against a French citizen in the matter of a
concession on 18 April 1946, the day before the dissolution of
the League, Belgium would have been free so to discriminate on
20 April 1946. On the contrary, if Belgium had so discriminated
on 20 April France could properly (if diplornatic negotiations
failed to result in a settlement) have seizedthe Court of this dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Mandate,
relying on Article 13 of the Mandate for Ruanda-Urundi (which
contains a compromissory clause identical with that in Article 7
of the Mandate for South West Africa), and on Article 37 of the
Statute to which both Belgium and France are parties."
The Judge thereupon concludes that if his aforesaid conclusion is sound,
the provisions of Article5 of the Mandate for South West Africa which
required the Respondent to allow al1 missionaries, nationals of any
State Member of the League of Nations to enter into and reside in the
Territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling, could not have
ceasedto apply on the dissolution of the League. He thereupon concludes
that the reference to "another Member of the League" in the Mandates
was "descriptive of a class" and not "an imperative condition".
The learned Judge thus bases a great deal of his reasoning on the
conclusion reached by him on the meaning of "Members of the League"
in the Ruanda-Urundi Mandate. But this conclusion is based on hardly
any reasoning at all. Al1we have is the Judge's statement that it is not
apparent to him why a contrary result would be "reasonable". He offers
no reason why such a result would be unreasonable.
There is no evidence to justify an inference that the authors of the
mandates system intended that a State which has ceased to be a member
of the League should retain rights conferred on it as a member of the
League, and there is nothing unreasonable in a conclusion that a State
which has lost the qualification entitling it to the enjoyment of a right,
has lost that right. Whenever a right is terminated it would be possible
to say that what would have constituted a violation of an obligation
on the one day would be permissible the following day, but this is no
reason for saying that the right has not come to an end. Instans estfinis
unius temporisetprincipium alterius.If France had resigned as a member
of the League on 19April 1946,she would no longer have been entitled
to claim any rights under Article 7 of the Ruanda-Urundi Mandate on
20 April 1946. The fact that she still could have done so on 18 April
1946 is entirely irrelevant. The same consequence must have flowed
fronl the termination of membership of the League on 19April 1946as
would have followed had membership been terminated the day before,
or ten years sooner.
In my opinion there is no cogency in the reasons advanced by the
learned Judge for his finding that the words "Members of the League"
75were descriptive. His first reason is that it was fondly hoped that the
League system would become universal. 1 fail to see what bearing this
hope had on the meaning of these words. Had this hope been fulfilled
the words "Members of the League" would have become syiionymous
with "all States" as long as al1States remained members of the League,
but even then "Members of the League" could only have meant members
of the League.
The maxim cessante ratione legis, cessut ipso lex is completely mis-
applied by the learned Judge. It is invoked by him to change the pro-
visions of an instrument: to amend Article 7 of the Mandate by sub-
stituting "ex-member of the League which was a member at the dissolu-
tion of the League" for "Member of the League". The maxim simply
means that where the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases,
and it in no way justifies an interpretation imposing on a State an
obligation it did not agree to. There is in any event no justification
for the view that the authors of the mandates system intended that
the privileges of ex-members should continue after the dissolution of
the League. Provision was made for the amendment of the Covenant
and the mandates by the organs of the League, and there was accordingly
no need for any agreement, express or implied, as to what would happen
in the event of the dissolution of the League. Had the issue been raised,
the answer would probably have been that it was left to the organs of
the League and the mandatories concerned to take such steps as were
considered reasonable in the light of circumstances prevailing at the
time of such dissolution; but it certainly cannot be said that al1the parties
would have agreed that the rights of States who were members immedi-
ately prior to the dissolution of the League would continue after its
dissolution.
1must confess that 1am unable to understand the Judge's "frustration"
argument. 1 know of no legal principle which requires that a provision
should continue to apply after the conditions for its application have
ceased to exist, simply because it would be capable of being complied
with if those conditions did still exist or are ignored.
Equally erroneous is Judge Jessup's following approach:
"If the Mandatory claimed the right to Iimit the privileges to
missionaries who were nationals of States which were Members of
the League when the League came to an end, the claim would be
reasonableand it would avoid any charge that there was imposed
on the Mandatory an obligation more onerous than that which it
had originally assumed." (Italics added).
If the learned Judge's view that the expression "Member of the League"
was descriptive iç correct, there would appear to be no reason for
lirniting the privileges conferred on "Members of the League" to States
which were members on the dissolution of the League. This passage-
76 and other passages-suggest that the learned Judge thinks that as long
as the League existed the words "Member of the League" had their
ordinary meaning, but that on the dissolution of the League they became
descriptive of States who were members at its dissolution. This means
that the same words had different meanings at different periods of time.
The learned Judge appears to have lost sight of the elementary principle
that al1rights and duties under an agreement are determined in accor-
dance with the intention of the parties at the time the agreement is entered
into. No party can "claim" rights or privileges not properly derivable
from the agreement, and nobody other than a legislature can "impose"
duties not agreed to.
The opinion of Judge Jessup further advances the argument that if
the elements of the mandates which related to the welfare of the in-
habitants survived the League, then the rights of missionaries under
Article 5 and the rights of the inhabitants to their services should
also have survived the League despite the technical requirement that
these missionaries had to be nationals of members of the League. The
learned Judge appears to be confusing the Respondent's duties towards
the inhabitants under the provisions of the Mandate and the rights
conferred on States, members of the League. In any event the survival
of those rights, which depended on the existence of members of the
League, depends on the meaning of the words "Member of the League";
andthe problem arising in regard thereto is exactlythe same as that which
arises in regard to Article 7. The solution given to it is not made any
more valid by first interpreting Article 5, or provisions of other mandates
in which the words "Members of the League" appear, as applying to
ex-members of the League.
The learned Judge appears to revert to his descriptive test in the
following passage:
"After all, these 'Members of the League' were not just concepts,
'ghosts seen in the law, elusive to the grasp'. They were actual
States or self-governing entities whose names could be recited.
The names of the original Members were listed in the Annex to
the Covenant, but it was not a fixed group; it fluctuated as new
Members were admitted or as old Members terminated their
memberships. Yet at any givenmoment-as for example the moment
of the dissolution of the League-the Mandatory would always
have been able to draw up, by names, a list of the States included
in the descriptive term 'Member of the League'."
Rights are conferred by the constitution of a Companyon its members.
These members are not "ghosts seen in the law, elusive to the grasp".
They are actual persons, whose names could be recited. The names of
the original members appear on a list, but it is not a fixed group; it
fluctuates as new members are admitted or as old members terminate
77 their membership. At any givcn mornerit-as for example the moment
before the dissolution of the company-it would always be possible to
draw up, by names, a list of those included in the descriptive term
"member of the company". This, however, affoxds no reason for saying
that the expression "member of the company" is descriptive in the
sense that the rights conferred on members, qua members, continue on
termination of membership whether during the lifetime of the company
or on its dissolution and liquidation. Whenever it is desired to confer
any rights on ex-members of a company, express provisions to that
effect are required.
17. Judge Bustamante came to the conclusion that rights conferred
on members of the League were not limited to the lifetime of the League
but extended to the whole duration of the Mandate l.The Mandate
does not state that the rights and duties of members will survive their
membership of the League. On the contras. their rights and duties were
held as "Members of the League", and this obviously means that on the
termination of their membership their rights and duties as men~bersalso
terminated. The possibility of the Mandate surviving the League was
not contemplated, and there is no justification for inferring that, had
it been considered, al1 the parties, including the Respondent, would
have acknowledged that in such a case the rights and duties of members-
whatever they were-would continue despite their loss of membership.
The learned Judge concedes that the rights of States which voluntarily
resigned or were ejected from the League, terminated on the termination
of their membership; but he contends that the dissolution of the League
was not tlze result of a voluntary act of its members. He arrives at this
conclusion by having regard "to the historical facts which determined
the disappearance of the League of Nations". These facts are (according
to the learned Judge): (a) that the League was already "greatly
weakened" beforethe SecondWorld War, (b) that it remained "paralysed"
for the whole of the war, (ci that the results of the conflict "completely
upset international realities" by profoundly modifying the former
conformation and distribution of States on which the League of Nations
had been based, (d) that the League was already "dead" when it was
dissolved, (e) that Articles 77, 79 and 80 of the Charter established
the "compulsory character" for the transformation of former mandates
into modernized tutelary systems. The expressions "weakened", "para-
lysed" and "dead" have no known legal connotation in the context
in which they are used, but whatever their meanings may be, the fact
is that the League of Nations was still in existence as a legal entity,
and its members still had the qualification and the rights and duties
of members of the League, up to the time of its dissolution. They were
It will be recalled that the suofthe Mandate was assumed.
78consequently not powerless. Equally the Charter could have provided
for the compulsory transformation of former Mandates into trusteeship
agreements, or to use the Judge's words "en régimes tutélaires moderni-
sés"--see International Status of South WestAfrica, I.C.J. Reports 1950,
page 140, where it was held that "the Charter does not impose on the
Union an obligation to place South-West Africa under the Trusteeship
System".
In any event, even if the provisions of the Charter provided for such
compulsory transformation, they were voluntarily agreed to by the
members of the League. One cannot voluntarily agree to enter into an
agreement and then after having done so contend that it (the latter)
was not voluntarily entered into because of the prior agre, Ornent.
The members of the League voluntarily dissolved the machinery
created for the supervision of the Mandatory, and voluntarily terminated
their qualifications as members which was a sine qua non to their holding
rights and duties under the Mandate, and members of this Court have
no right to disregard the legal effects of these voluntary acts, however
much they may dislike them.
18. Sir Louis Mbanefo thought that the rights and obligations em-
bodied in the Mandate "became as it were maintained at the level on
which they were on the dissolution of the League".
The reason advanced for this conclusion is that the purpose of the
Mandate has not yet been achieved. There is no principle of law to the
effect that parties to an instrument cannot lose their rights and obliga-
tions until thepurpose of the instrument in question has been achieved;
nor is there any principle that, if parties voluntarily terminate their
qualifications necessary for holding certain rights and obligations, such
rights and obligations are nonetheless maintained "at the level" they
were on the date of the loss of such qualification.
19. In al1the articles of the Covenant except Articles 2, 9, 21 and 24
the words "Member(s) of the League" are used. In terms of Article 3
the Assembly consists of representatives of "Members of the League",
and "each Member of the League" was given one vote. Article 4 provided
for the election of "four other Members of the League" to the Council.
Article 6 imposed the obligation to contribute to the expenses of the
Secretariat on "the Members of the League". Article 7 dealt with the
diplomatic privileges of representatives of "Members of the League".
Articles 8, 12 and 15 imposed various obligations on "Members of the
League". Article 22 dealt with equal opportunities for trade and com-
merce of "other Members of the League". Article 1 (1) provided which
States would be the original "Members of the League". Article 1 (3)
provided that any "Member of the League" could withdraw after giving
two years' notice. Article 16 (4) provided for declaring a "Member of
the League" to be no longer a "Member of the League". It is clear that
the expression "Member of the League" was used to mean a State which
ï!)82 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
in fact was a member of the League at the time of the application of the
particular provision in which it appears.
Any interpretation of this expression in any of these provisions to
the effectthat States which hadnever been or had ceased to be members
of the League are included would be ridiculous and there appears to be
no sound reason for not giving it thesame meaning it had in the Cove-
nant, wherever it occurs in the instrument of mandate.
Article 6 of the Mandate
(Applicants' Submissions Nos.2, 7and8)
1. At the outset 1 wish to repeat that Article 7 (2) of the Mandate
Declaration is the only provision upon which the jurisdiction of this
Court could in these cases be founded. The said Article limits such
jurisdiction to disputes relating to the interpretation or application of
the provisions of the Mandate; i.e., the provisions contained in the
Mandate Declaration. It follows that provisions of other instruments
may only be considered if they have been incorporated into, or have
bearing onthe legal effectof the provisions of the Mandate Declaration.
Thus, for example, Article 22 of the Covenant is only relevant when
considered inconjunction with the provisions ofthe Mandate Declaration.
Divorced therefrom it has no relevanceinthese proceedings.
2. In my 1962opinion1 1came to the conclusion that Article 6 of the
Mandate ceased to apply on the dissolution of the League. 1 adhere
to that opinion.
My reasoris for holding that Articl6 of the Mandate Declaration,
and also Article 22, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League, no
longer apply are briefly se' forth in the following paragraphs.
3. The obligation imposed on the Respondent by Article 22, para-
graph 7, ofthe Covenant and Article6 oftheMandate Declaration wasan
obligation to report to a particular body, viz., the Council of the
League.
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League provided that to certain
colonies and territories, which included German South West Africa,
there should be applied the principle that the well-being and develop-
Judgmenton PreliminaryObjections(Z.C.J.Reports 1962, pp. 575-662).ment of the peoples of such colonies and territories formed a sacred
trust of civilization, "and that securities for the performance of this
trust should be embodied in this Covenant". The Article then continued
to state that the best method of giving practical egect to this principle
was that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to certain
advanced nations, and that this tutelage should be exercised by such
nations as "mandatories on behaIf of the League".
The only securities embodied in the Covenant relative to reporting
and accounting by the mandatory are be to found in paragraphs 7 and 9
of Article 22, and they read as follows:
"7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to
the Councilan annual report in reference to the territory committed
to its charge." (Italics added.)
"9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive
and examinethe annual reports ofthe Mandatories and to advise the
Council on al1matters relating to the observance of the mandates."
(Italicsadded.)
And in the relevant Mandate Declaration the only reference to re-
porting and accounting isto be foundin Article 6,whichreads asfollows:
"The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of
Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, con-
taining full information with regard to the territory, and indicating
the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed under
Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5." (Italics added.)
Thisduty to make a report to the satisfaction of the Council is herein-
after referred to as the Mandatory's duty to report and account. and
the corresponding rights of the Council in that regard are referred to
as the Council's powers of supervision.
4. Article 6 of the Mandate Declaration, and paragraphs 7 and 9 of
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, depended for their operation
on the existenceof the League of Nations, inasmuch as without a League
in existence there could not be a Council of the League. The League
was dissolved in 1946and the aforesaid provisions accordingly must as
from that date have ceased to apply unless some other body, such as,
for example, the General Assembly of the United Nations, was sub-
stituted for the Councilof the League as the body to which the Respon-
dent had to report and account.
Such substitution could have come about only if:
(a) there exists a principle or rule of international law which provides
for such substitution to take effect automatically-i.e., without
any question of consent on Respondent's part, or
(b) the Respondent consented to such substitution.
Itisnowcommon cause that there isno principle or rule ofinternational law which couid have brought about such an automatic succession1.
There is certainly no principle to be found in any legal system to the
effectthat, where the creators of a trust (or anything in the nature of a
trust) also create an organ to supervise the administration of that trust,
and they themselves thereafter dissolve suck organ without substituting
another, a court of law may effect such substitution.
The only issue to be determined, therefore, is whether Respondent
ever consented to such a substitution. It is common cause that no agree-
ment to which Respondent was a party contains any express provision
effectingsuch substitution.
The issue, therefore, really involves an enquiry as to whether Respon-
dent tacitly agreed to such a substitution-i.e., whether any agreement
to which Respondent was a party contains an implied term to that
effect, or whether Respondent by its conduct tacitly consented to such
a substitution.
In this regard only three possibilities arise for practical consideration,
viz.:
(i) whether the mandate instrument must be interpreted as embodying
an implied term to the effect that Respondent would upon the
dissolution of the League become obliged to report and account
to another body such as, for example, the General Assembly of the
United Nations;
(ii) whether, if the mandate instrument does not contain such an
implied term, the Charter of the United Nations embodies such
a term ;
(iii) whether, in the absence of any such implied term in the afore-
mentioned instruments, Respondent at the time of the creation
of the United Nations and the dissolution of the League, or there-
after, by its conduct tacitly consented to such a substitution.
1 shall deal separately with these three matters but, before doing so, 1
wish to restate certain basic principles of interpretation concerning
the reading of implied terms into an agreement.
5. The universally accepted basic principle of interpretation, applic-
able in municipal law and international law alike, is that in the interpre-
tation of al1contracts, statutes and instruments one should endeavour
to determine the true intention of their authors. An implied term may
be read into an agreement only if there arises from the agreement itself,
l Although the Applicants in earlier stages of the proceedings used such ex-
pressionsas "automatic succession", "doctrine of succession" and "principle of
succession" (Observations on Preliminary Objections, pp. 429,3 and 445; and
see also Oral Argument on Preliminary Objections, p. 302), they intimated in the
oral proceedingson the merits that such terminology was il1chosen, and they stated
or succession aliunde the Mandate". Not one of the members of the Couine1962devolution
relied on any principle or rule of succession.and the circumstances under which it was entered into, a necessary
inference that, although a suggested term was not incorporated in the
agreement in so many words, the parties must have had a common
intention that it should apply. A term should only be implied if the
evidencereveals that the parties in fact intended it to apply, or if itan
confidently be said that had it been suggested to them at the time they
would haveacknowledged that it fellwithin the scope of their agreement.
It follows that a term cannot be implied if it goes beyond the declared
scole and object of an instrument, or would involve radical changes or
additions thereto, or would do violence to clear and unambiguous
express provisions thereof, or if it is inconsistent with the admissible
extraneous evidence relating to the intention of any of the parties.
It is not suEcient to find the intention of some of the parties; a term
can only be implied if it reflects the intention of al1the parties. See
South West Africa cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962,pages 576-591.
6. 1now proceed to consider whether the Mandate Declaration, read
with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, contains any such implied
term, i.e., that011 the demise of the League an organ or organs of a
future international organization would be vested with the powers of
the organs of the League with regard to mandates, and that the manda-
tory would be obliged to report and account to such an organ or organs.
(a) Would such an implied term do violenceto clear and unambiguous
express provisions of the Covenant and the Mandate Declaration?
The answer is in the affirmative.In terms of paragraphs 7and 9 of Article
22of the Covenant and Article 6of the Mandatethe Respondent accepted
an obligation to render annual reports to the Council of the League.
The words of these provisions are capable of one construction only.
They are clear and unarnbiguous. The Council of the League was an
organ of the League specifically provided for by the Covenant, which
deJineditsfunctions and prescribed its procedures.Thus Article 4 of the
Covenant provided :
"1. The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of
four other Members of the League. These four Members of the
League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its
discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the
four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Re-
presentatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be rnembers
of the Council.
2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council
may name additional Members of the Leaguewhose Representatives
shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like
approval may increase the number of Members of the League to
be selected bythe Assembly for representation onthe Council. 2bis. The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules
dealing with the election of the non-permanent members of the
Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term
of officeand the conditions of re-eligibility.
3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may
require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the League, or at
such other place as rnay be decided upon.
4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within
the sphere of action of the League or affectingthe peace ofthe world.
5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council
shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any
meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially
affecting the interests of that Member of the League.
6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League
represented on the Council slzallhave one vote, and may have not
more than one Representative." (Italics added.)
And Article 5 (1) of the Covenant provided that,
"Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant
or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting
of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of
al1the Members of the League representedat the meeting." (Italics
added.)
Al1 these provisions were incorporated by reference in Article 22,
paragraphs 7 and 9, of the Covenant, and in Article 6 of the Mandate
Declaration. The obligation to report and account was conhed by
clear and unambiguous language to the Council of the League and did
not include an obligation to report and account to any other body. The
addition of a new security not embodied in the Covenant and having
the effect of substituting an organ of another institution for the Council
ofthe Leaguewouldundoubtedlyconstituteradical changesand additions
to both the Covenant andthe Mandate Declaration.
(b) Moreover, such an implied term would go beyond the declared
scope and object of the instruments in question. It is true that the general
object of the parties was that the principle should be applied "that the
well-being and development7' of the peoples of South West Africa
"should form a sacred trust of civilization"; but their object was also
that thispurpose should be achieved in a particular manner, i.e., within
the framework of Article 22 of the Covenant. The object was, in a sense,
to definethe international status of South West Africa, to create an inter-
national régime;but an iniegralpart of the definition of the régime,was
supervisionby the Councilof the League. This appears clear not only from
the very provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, but alsofromthe tra-
vaux préparatoires, which reveal that the general provisions would not
have beenagreed to had the Article not contained the specificprovisions
relating to the methods devised to givepractical effectthereto. President
Wilson reflected the attitude of the parties at the time when he said: 87 SOUTH WEST AFRICA(SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
"no one should accept the scheme unless he was shown how it was
going to work l."
It was with considerablereluctance that the Respondent, New Zealand
and Australia agreed to the mandates system devised in Article 22 of
the Covenant. On what possible basis can it now be said that their
object was to create an international régime whichimposed upon them
obligations other than those specifically agreed to by them?
Indeed, it was in order to avoid a stalemate that the Respondent
and other States were prepared to accept Article 22 of the Covenant as
a compromise. The contemporary statements of the South African
Prime Minister and others leave no room for doubt that they were
agreeing to supervision by the Council of the League only, and not to
that ofanyorgan ofany otherinstitution. For Australia and NewZealand,
Article 22 "represented the maximum of their conces~ion"~,and South
Africa agreed thereto because, in the words of General Botha, "the
League of Nations would consist mostly of the same people who were
present there that day, who understood the position. .
(c) The fact that Article 22 was the result of a compromise is in
itself, apart from al1 other considerations, sufficient reason for not
reading into the instruments in question, by way of implication, that
the Respondent and other mandatories had agreed to obligations of
reporting and accounting which they were not asked to agree to, and
which would have exceededwhat was required to effectthe compromise.
In these circumstances it cannot be said that the suggested implied
term was contemplated, or that al1 or any of the parties would have
agreedthatit fell within theambit of their general intent had the matter
been raised when the Covenant of the League and the Mandate Decla-
ration were agreed to.
(d) The possibility of the dissolution of the League at some future
date was not contemplated at the time, and there would, therefore, not
have been any agreement or intention as to what would happen to the
Mandate in such an event. Had it been suggested at the time that pro-
vision should be made for such an eventuality the reaction would proba-
bly have been that, inasmuch as specificprovision had been made for
the amendment of both the Covenant and the Mandate Declarations
by, or with the consent of, the organs of the League, it should be left to
those organs and the respective Mandatories to do what they considered
to be in the best interests of1concerned in the circumstancesprevailing
at the time of such dissolution.
The possibility that the Leaguewould at some future date be dissolved
by its members without providing for supervision of the administration
of mandates was definitelynot foreseen by its founders, and it is impossi-
ble to determinewhat the unanimous reaction, if any, would have been
l Foreign ReIations of the United States: The Paris Peace ConfeVol. III,.
pp. 788-789.
Ibid., pp. 801-802.
85 had such a possibility been raised. The probability is that their reaction
would have been that if they, as Members of the League, were ever to
dissolve the League without providing for the transfer of its powers
to another organization, those provisions which depended on the
existenceof the Leaguewould simplyceaseto apply. In the circumstances
that would obviously have been their intention. It can, however, be said
with certainty that the reaction of some of the parties, including the
Respondent, would have been that they were not agreeing to any auto-
matic transfer of the supervisory powers of the League to the organs of
an unknown future international organization. They would at least
kst have required assurances with regard to the constitution of such
an organization before agreeing to any such automatic substitution.
Had they been told that the constitution of this future international
organization would not retain the unanimity rule of the League, there
can be no reason to suppose that their consent would nevertheless have
been given.
(e) It has been suggested that inasmuch as the League of Nations
during its lifetime constituted, or represented, what may be called the
"organized international community" (at times expressions such as
"family ofnations7'or "civilizednations ofthe world wereusedinstead),
and inasmuch as this community is now regarded as being constituted,
or represented, by the United Nations Organization, the League should
be equated with the United Nations, and thus the way is paved for
substituting an organ of the United Nations for the Council of the
League as the supervisory body with respect to mandates l.
The fallacies inreasoning along the line of the so-called "organized
international community", with the object of establishing a contention
that the mandate instrument embodied an implied term such as afore-
stated, are legion. It disregards firstly the fact that, although the ex-
pression "organized international community" and the other expressions
mentioned may in certain contexts serve some useful purpose as being
descriptive of a collectivity of States, they have no legal significance
whatever. In particular such expressions are not to be understood as
conveying that outside or independently of actual international organi-
The contentions advanced by the Applicants on the basis of their so-called
stage in the course of the proceedings Applicantslied on an implication to be
read into the Mandate Declaration, which by itself, and without any question of
further consent on Respondent's part, caused the United Nations Organization to
be substituted for the League as the supervisory body in respect of mandates
(vide Reply, p. 320). For the presen1am concerned with the "organized inter-
national community" theory only in thisense. 1 shall revert later to the different
form which the argument took during the oral proceedings. It is, however, in my
view,not without significancethat in the ultimate event Applicants found it impossi-
ble to maintain the theory in its above sense, and in particular that they no longer
fresh consent on the Respondent's part.isory organs occurred or could occur without89 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
zations, constituted by agreement, there exists a legal persona, or an
entity of legal significance, known as "the organized international
community", etc. Such a notion would be entirely fallacious and mis-
leading. Furthemore, the reasoning in question'either disregards the
legalprinciple that a party cannot be bound by a suggestedterm to which
it did not agree, or it disregards the fact that the Respondent agreed
to the supervision of a particular body only, viz.,the Council of the
League-an organ composed in a particular manner and regulated by
definite and binding rules of procedure-and not to the supervision of
an organ of any other body, and would, in any event, almost certainly
not have agreed to the supervision of an organ such as the General
Assembly of the United Nations had it been asked to do so. It entirely
disregards the important differencesbetween the League and the United
Nations, particularly the procedural provisions relating to the functioning
of their organs, and it disregards the clearroof afforded by a mass of
evidence that the parties to the relevant instruments neither intended
nor contemplated such a result. The truth is that the authors of the
mandates system did not contemplate the possibility that the League
would cease to constitute or represent what in a sense may be regarded
as the "organized international community" or "the family of nations"
or "the civilized nations of the world"; and the question whether the
League's functions would be transferred to some future organization
constituting or representing what couldthen be described as the "orga-
nized international community", "the family ofnations" or "the civilized
nations of the world" did therefore not arise. If it should have arisen,
the Respondent and many other States would clearly not have conceded
that they were agreeing to supervision at some unknown date in the
future by some unknown body with an unknown constitution.
(f) In this connection the differences betweenthe League of Nations
and the United Nations Organization, referred toabove, are ofparticular
significance.1 shall deal with them later. At this stage 1 only wish to
emphasize one of them. The obligation to report and account to the
Council of the League was substantially different from what an obli-
gation would be to report and account to any organ of the United
Nations. Byexpressprovision in the Covenant, the Council of the League
of Nations had, in respect of its functions concerning mandates, to be
assisted by the Permanent Mandates Commission, which was a body of
independent experts; whereas there is no corresponding body in the
United Nations. The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, like
al1other organs ofthat institution, consists of government representatives
of member States. Moreover, whereas the unanimity rule prevailed in
the Council of the League, the General Assembly of the United Nations
can arrive at its decisions by a bare majority, or in important matters
by a two-thirds majority, while in the Security Council seven votes
87(including those of the fivepermanent members) out of 11are sufficient l.
This difference was acknowledged by this Court in South West Africa-
VotingProcedure, Advisory Opinion of 7 June 1955 in the following
passage :
"The voting system is related to the composition and functions
of the organ. It forms one of the characteristics of the constitution
of the organ. Taking decisions by a two-thirds majority vote or by a
simplemajority vote is one of the distinguishing features of the Gene-
ral Assembly, while the unanimity rule was one of the distinguishing
features of the Council of the League of Nations. These two systems
are characteristic of different organs, and one system cannot be
substituted for the other without constitutional amendment. To
transplant upon the General Assembly the unanimity rule of the
Council of the League would not be simply the introduction of a
procedure but would amount to a disregard of one of the charac-
teristics of the General Assembly. Consequently the question of
conformity of the voting system of the General Assembly with that
of the Council of the League of Nations presents insurmountable
difficulties of a juridical nature'."
(g) It is significant that no State which was a party to the Covenant
of the League-or any other State for that matter-at any material
time alleged that the mandate instrument must be interpreted as em-
bodying an implied term to the effect that Respondent would upon the
dissolution of the League become obliged to report and account to
another body, such as, for example, the General Assembly of the United
Nations. During the discussions concerning the future of the mandates
by the founders of the United Nations in the years 1945-1946,and by
the Members of the League at its final session in April 1946,there was
ample opportunity, and every incentive, for representatives to refer to
such an agreement, if one existed. As I shall show later it was common
cause at the time of the dissolution of the League that no provision had
been made in any instrument for the transfer of the League's activities
relative to the mandates to the United Nations.
7. A finding that the functions of the Council of the League, under
the Mandate Declaration, as read with Article 22 of the Covenant of
the League, became vested in the organs of the United Nations by virtue
of an implied provision in the said instruments would go beyond their
declared scopè and object, would involve radical changes thereto, and
would not only do violence to their clear and expresslanguage but would
amount to a total disregard of the evidence relating to the common
l Since the recent increase in the membership of the Security Councilthe require-
ment is nine votes (including those of the fivepermanent Members) o15.of
Z.C.J. Repo~rs1955, p75.
88 91 SOUTHWEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
intention of the parties. Such a finding would impose an obligation on
the Respondent to which it did not agree, and to which it would not
have agreed had it been asked to do so. It would constitute legislation
by the Court disguised as interpretation. No court, including this Court,
has the power to make a party's obligations different from, or mure
onerous than, those to which he has consented. Judicis est jus dicere,
nondare.
8. Inthe preceding paragraphs 1have dealt with the question whether
there can be read into the Mandate Declaration an implied term which
by itself brought about the result that iipon the dissolution of the League
an organ or organs of the United Nations were substituted as the super-
visory authority in respect of mandates and that Respondent became
obliged to report and account to such an organ or organs. It may be
convenient at this stage to dea! very briefly also with a related matter,
to the extent that it also concerns the interpretation of the mandzte
instrument, and that is the suggestion that the obligatioii undertaken
by Respondent in Article 6 of the Mandate was not an obligation to
submit to the specific supervision of particular League organs, but an
obligation to submit to "international supervision" generally, Le., an
obligation of "international accountability" l. Many of the reasoiis
which 1 have mentioned as running counter to the proposition that an
implied term of the nature and content aforestated must be read into
the Mandate Declaration also militate agaimt the suggestion that the
Mandatory's obligation was one of "international accountability".
Not only would such a reading of the Mandate Declaration, and of
Article 22 of the Covenant, do violence to the clear and unambiguous
provisions of the said instruments, but it would in effect go beyond the
declared scope and object of such instruments. It would, moreover,
be in conflict with the probabilities and the events and surrounding
circumstances at the time of the frarning of Article 22 of the Covenant
and the Mandate Declaration.
Itis also significant that for more than 25 years after the creation of
the mandates system the authors thereof did not consider that the
mandatories had bound themselves to "international supervision"
generally (as opposed to supervision by the Council of the League),
This contention was one of the links in the proposition into which Applicants
finally transformed their "organized international cornmunity" theory in the oral
proceedings on the merits. The contention is now to the effect: (a) that inasmuch
as Respondent's obligation was one of "international accountability" this obligation
could not, and was not, terminated as a result of the dissolution of the League
could have had was that the said obligation would have become inoperative forLeague
lack of a supervisory organ, unless a new supervisory organ was appointed to
which the Mandatory would be obliged, through fresh consent on its part, to
report and account, and that Respondent in fact gave the necessary consent to
the substitution of the General Assembly of the United Nations as such new super-
visory organ(C.R. 6512,pp. 40-60 and C.R. 65/30, pp. 52-53.) and the possibility that this could be the meaning of the Mandate Decla-
rations, as read with the Covenant, did not even occur to a single repre-
sentative of any State during that period. There is accordingly no justi-
fication for transforming,under the guise of interpretation, the obligation
to report and account to the Council of the League into an obligation
to submit to "international supervision", or to supervision by "the
international community" or the "family of nations" or the "civilized
nations of the world", and thus to impose on Respondent an obligation
to which it did not agree.
9. The next question is whether the Charter of the United Nations
contains an implied term which effected a substitution of any of the
organs of the said institution as the supervisory body, in the place of
the Council of the League.
(a) The United Nations is not, and was not intended to br, the
League of Nations under another nzme. It is a new international organi-
zation which came into existence six months before the League was
dissolved. Some, but not al], the members of the League were founder
members of the United Nations. Two of the major powers in the United
Nations, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., were not
members of the League at its dissolution. The United States of America
never wasamember of the Leagueandthe U.S.S.R. wasexpelledfrom the
League in December 1939.Both these States were opposed to any notion
that the United Nations was to be the League under a different name,
or was to be an automatic successor to the League's assets, obligations,
functions or activities. The discussions in the Preparatory Commission
of the United Nations, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations pursuant to the Preparatory Commission's
recommendations, andthe forma1treaties concluded between the League
and the United Nations, as well as statementsmade by member States on
numerous occasions, provide conclusive proof that there was no auto-
matic succession. Had it beerzthe intention of the parties to the Charter
to transfer the functions of the Council of the League with respect to
mandates to an organ of the United Nations, such intention would have
beenexpressed inpositive terms. Although the mandates were specifically
referred to in the Charter of the United Nations, there is no reference
in any of the provisions of the Charter, or in any of the discussions at the
time of the drafting of the Charter, to any intended transfer.
(b) There can be no question but that the authors of the Charter
must have realized that upon the dissolution of the League the provisions
in the mandate instruments concerning reporting and accounting would
become inoperative unless some arrangement was made to substitute a
new supervisory organ to which the mandatories would be obliged to
report and account; just as thesaid members realized that the dissolution
of the Permanent Court of International Justice would render inoperable
clauses in treaties or conventions providing for adjudication of disputes
by the Permanent Court. But, whereas by Article 37 of the Statute ofthe Court expressprovision was made for substituting this Court for the
Permanent Court in al1treaties and conventions in force l,there is no
corresponding provision substituting any organs of the United Nations
for the Council of the League in respect of the supervision of mandates.
Had it been intended that one or other of the organs of the United
Nations should take the place of the Council of the League relative to
the supervision of mandates, such a provision would undoubtedly have
been inserted in the Charter.
(c) Apart from the sacred trust referred to in Chapter XI of the
Charter, the founders of the United Nations contemplated only one
form of trusteeship, namely that provided for in Chapters XII and XIII,
and there was no contemplation of any organs of the United Nations
supervising mandates concurrently with the existence of the trusteeship
system 2.Article 77(1)of theCharter provides that the trusteeship system
shall apply, inter alia, to such territories "now Iield under Mandate"
as may be placed under the system by means of trusteeship agreements,
and it must therefore follow that the trusteeship system could not auto-
matically apply to a mandated territory. To place a mandated territory
under the trusteeship system a forma1 agreement had to be concluded.
(d) 1 now proceed to consider Article 80 (1) of the Charter, and in
particular its legal effectrelative to Artic6eof the Mandate Declaration.
Article 80 (1) reads as follows:
"Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agree-
ments, made under Articles 77, 79 and 81, placing each territory
under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been
concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself
to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any States or any
peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which
Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties."
The ordinary grammatical meaning of the words commencing with
"nothing in this Chapter" is that Chapter XII should not be construed
as in or of itself (i)ltering in any manner the rights whatsoever of any
States, or (ii)altering in any manner the rights whatsoever of any peoples,
or (iii) altering in any manner the terms of existing international instru-
At one stage in the proceedings the Applicants advanced a contention that
Article 37 of thetatute of the Court was redundant inasmuch as, in their submis-
sion, the new Court would, by reason of a principle of automatic succession,
have become vested with the powers of the old Court in respect of treaties and
(Observations on Preliminary Objections, pp. 443-444). This Court in the 19627.
Judgment on the Preliminary Objections did not accept the Applicants'tomatic
succession argument. The argument was not repeated in the subsequent proceedings,
and is in my view without substance.
Vide in this regard the Advisory Opinion of 1950 at p. 140.ments to which members of the United Nations may respectively be
parties. It is common cause that the Mandate Declarations were inter-
national instruments, and the aforesaid provision accordingly directs
in express terms that Article 80 (which Article is part of Chapter XII)
should not be construed in or of itself as altering in any mannerthe terms
of existing mandate declarations. Apart from any other considerations,
this clear and unequivocal instruction bars any interpretation of Article
80 (1) which would have the effect of amending Article 6 of the Mandate
Declaration for South West Africa by substituting an organ of the
United Nations as the supervisory body in the place of the Council of
the League. This is in itself a complete answer to those who contend
that Article 80 (1) was intended to safeguard the protection afforded
to the peoples of the mandated territories by the provisions relative to
supervision of the mandates until such time as trusteeship agreements
were concluded. The truth is that the Article does not provide for, or
'pre-suppose", the continuation of rights where such rights would
otherwise have terminated either bv reason of the wrovisions of the
instrument containing them, or for some other valid reason. It merely
safeguards rights in the sense that Chapter XII must not be construed
as by itself changing any rights.
It is true that this Court, in effect, construed Article 80 (1) in 1950in
InternationaI Status of South West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1950, page 128
at 133, as affording support for its conclusion that the functions of the
organs of the League had been transferred to the General Assembly of
the United Nations, and that Respondent's former duty to account
to the organs of the League had been converted into a duty to account
to the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, careful further
attention was given to this Article during the hearing of deliberations
on the preliminary objections in 1962.Inthe result not one of the judges
in 1962 placed any reliance on the Article for the purposes of their
opinions and judgment, and some of the minority opinionsdemonstrated
very forcibly that it would be fallacious to regard the Article as affording
support for any suggested transfer, devolution or "carry-over" of
functions from the League and its Members to the United Nations and
its Members. See Soutlz West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1962, e.g., at pages
516, 615, and 646-650. In view of these developments one would have
thought that no argument in support of the Applicants' contentions
would again be sought to be based on Article 80 (1) '.
l With regard to the significance and effect of the Article the Applicants them-
selves have adopted a vacillating attitude. In their Mernorials Applicants placed
strong reliance on Article 80 (1) without stating what the effect of the Article
was (Memorials, p. 88). In the preliminary objections proceedings in 1962 they
contended that the Court in its 1950 Opinion had interpreted Article 80(1) as
having a positive character of safeguarding and maintaining rights, and they
asked the Court to reaffirm the 1950 Opinion. (Oral Proceedings on the Preliminary
Applicants,subinitted that the said Article did not establish, constitute or maintain Article 80 (1) is clear and unambiguous. But even if it were not so,
the relevant facts preceding the framing of the Charter as well as the
subsequent conduct of the parties concerned, would sufficiently demon-
stratethe impossibility of inferring any implied term of "presupposition"
to the effect that the General Assembly of the United Nations was
substituted for the organs of the League in the mandate declarations.
The discussions at the time of the drafting of Article 80 (1) reveal
no evidence that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the
Article does not express the true common intention of the parties. On
the contrary, they reveal that the Article states exactly what it was
intended to state.
The representative of the United States stated in unequivocal terms
that the proposed Article, which later became Article 80 (l), was not
intended to increase or diminish any rights, and the final report of the
Committee made it clear that the Article was not to be interpreted as
altering the provisions of the mandates. Respondent had by then already
intimated its claim that the Mandate for South West Africa should be
terminated and that the territory should be incorporated as part of the
Union of South Africa. This intimation was made at the San Francisco
conference "so that South Africa may not afterwards be held to have
acquiesced in the continuance of the mandate or the inclusion of the
territory in any form of trusteeship under the new international organi-
zation" l. The provisions of Article 6 could not survive the League
unless they were amended by substituting some other supervisory
authority forthe Leagueto which Respondent had to report and account,
and there is no evidencein the Charter, or in its history, of any intention
to thus amend the said Article, or of any supposition that such amend-
ment would automatically result from the provisions of any of the
instruments in question.
The suggestion that Article 80 (1) served to confirm the understanding
of the authors of the Charter that certain rights, including those under
mandate, did continue to exist, has no bearing on the question in issue.
Of course the authors of the Charter must have realized at the time when
Article 80 (1) was drafted that rights under the Mandate were then in
existence.But that was nearly a year before the dissolution of the League;
and the Article does not, and was not intended to, reflect any under-
standing as to what would happen after the dissolution of the League
with regard to mandates not converted to trusteeship.
10. 1now proceed to examinethe conduct ofthe Respondent and other
States subsequent to the drafting of the Charter, and 1 do so with the
any rights, but merely served to "confirm the understanding of the authors of
the Charter that certain rights, includingse under mandates, did continue to
exist". This of course affords no help at1 in the problem under discussion, as
1slaCommittee 1114on 11 May 1945. following purposes in mind; Jirstly, to ascertain whether such conduct
reveals any evidence that the parties to the Covenant of the League or
the Mandate Declaration ever thought at any material time that these
instruments provided for the substitution of an organ such as the General
Assemblyofthe United Nations, for the Council of the League in Article
6 of the Mandate Declaration; secondy, to ascertain whether there is
any evidence of any understanding on the part of the authors of the
Charter of the United Nations that any of the provisions of the Charter
had brought about such a substitution and, thirdly, to ascertain whether
the Respondent in any other manner tacitly consented to such a substi-
tutionl.
11. As already stated, the United Nations was not an automatic
successor in law of the League. It was, inter alia, for this reason that
towards the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference a Preparatory
Commission was established which was required, inter alia, to formulate
recomrnendations concerning "the possible transferof certainfunctiopzs,
activities and assets of the League of Nations which it may be considered
desirable for the new organizationto take over on terms to be arr~nged".
(Italics added.)
As is shown in the next succeedingparagraphs, an examination of the
discussions and recommendations of this Preparatory Commission
reveals that its members (each founder Member of the United Nations
wasrepresented thereon) werenot under the impression that theCovenant
of the League, orthe Mandate Declarations, orthe Charter of the United
Nations, or any other instrument, had the effect of transferring the
functions of the Council of the League relative to mandates to any of
the organs of the United Nations. The examination further reveals that
Respondent did not, by conduct or otherwise, agree to such a sub-
stitution.
12. In the interimarrangements by which the Preparatory Commission
was set up provision was made for an executivecommittee which would
exercise the powers and functions of the Commission when the Com-
mission was not iil session. The Executive Committee, for the purpose
of its functions, set up ten sub-committees. The terms of reference of
Committee 4 of the Executive Committee included the following:
"It should study the questions arising if the mandates system
were to be wound up and examine the feasibility of providing for
such interim arrangements as may be possible, pending the
establishment of the Trusteeship Council 2."
Committee 4, after lengthy deliberation, recommended to the Executive
This enquiry will encompass both the question whether Respondent consented
to a new obligation of accountability in the place of the obligation provided for
in Article6 of the Mandate and the question whether, assuming, for purposes of
argument, thatApplicants are correct in their contention regarding "international
accountability" (as to which see para. supra), Respondent consented to a sub-
stitution of a new supervisory organ inorder to render the original obligation
operDOC.PC/EX/113/Rev. 1, 12 Nov. 1945, p. 113. Committee, and the latter body in turn recommended to the Preparatory
Commission, that there should be established a temporary trusteeship
committee to exercisecertain functions in connection with the conclusion
of trusteeship agreements and the administration of trust territories.
The recommendation contemplated that, until such time as the Trustee-
ship Councilcould come into being, the temporary trusteeship committee
would undertake the functions of the said Council regarding the super-
vision of territories submitted to the trusteeship system.In its report
the Executive Committee made no provision for the supervision of
mandates not brought under trusteeship. The only function proposed
for the temporary trusteeship committee relative to mandates was to-
"advise the General Assembly on any matters that might arise with
regard to the transfer to the United Nations of any functions and
responsibilities hitherto exercised under the mandate system".
Accordicg to a further recommendation of the Executive Committee the
tenure of the temporary trusteeship committee would cease when the
Trusteeship Council could itself begin to function.
When the recommendations of the ExecutiveCommittee werediscussed
in the Preparatory Commission certain States took up the attitude that
the establishment of the proposed temporary trusteeship committee
would be unconstitutional. Various counter-proposals were made,
including proposals for the appointment of an ad hoc committee of the
General Assembly instead of a temporary trusteeship committee.
Afterlengthydiscussionsit wasdecidedthatno recommendation should
be made for the creation of any temporary organ. The Preparatory
Commission merely recommended that the General Assembly of the
United Nations should cal1 on the States administering mandated
territories to undertake practical steps, in concert with the other States
directly concerned, for the implementation of Article 79 of the Charter.
This proposa1 was accepted by the General Assembly and was embodied
il1its resolution XI of 9 February 1946.
13. What is of importance in the present ecquiry, is that throughout
the discussions in the Preparatory Commission no State at any time
suggested that the Mandate Declaration or the Charter made provision
for the substitution of any organ of the United Nations, or any other
organ, as the supervisory body in respect of mandates in the place of
the Council of the League, or that Respondent or any other mandatory
had in any other manner consented to such a substitution. That was so
despite the facts that-
(a) Respondent had earlier in the same year made the statement men-
tioned in paragraph 9 (d), supra, regarding possible termination
of the Mandate and possible incorporation of South West Africa
as part of the Union of South Africa, which intimation, as stated
above, was made for the very reason that "South Africa may not
Doc. PC/EX/113/Re 1,12 Nov. 1945,p. 58.
95 afterwards be held to have acquiesced in the continuance of the
Mandate or the inclusion of the territory in any form oftrusteeship
under the new international organization" l,and
(b) that, as 1willshow hereinafter, attention was drawn to the fact that,
in the absence of any specificarrangement to that end, there would,
after the dissolution of the League, be no powers of supervision in
respect of mandated territories not submitted to trusteeship.
It is significant that, with one exception to be dealt with hereinafter,
not one ofthe mandatories evencontemplatedthat theproposedtemporary
trusteeship committee, or any other organ of the United Nations, should
have supervisory functions in respect of mandates not converted to
trusteeship.
It is clear that the Executive Committee did not intend the temporary
trusteeship committee to have such functions. The intention was that
the said committee would merely "advise the General Assembly on any
matters that might arise with regard to the transfer to the United Nations
of any functions and responsibilities hitherto exercisedunder the man-
dates system".
14. At the limewhenthe recommendations ofthe ExecutiveCommittee
were under discussion in the Preparatory Commission, the United States
of America filed a written proposal for amendment of the proposed
functions of the temporary trusteeship committee.
This document (PC/TC/Il) drew attention to the fact that the report
of the Executive Committee made no provision for any organ of the
United Nations to carry out the functions of the Permanent Mandates
Commission, and suggested that-
"In order to provide a continuity between the mandate system
and the trusteeship system, to permit the mandatory powers to
discharge their obligations, and to further the transfer of mandated
territories to trusteeship, the temporary trusteeship committee (or
suchacommitteeas isestablished to perform its functions) and later,
the Trusteeship Council should be speczjîcallyempoweredto receive
the reports which the mandatory powers are now obligated to
make to the Permanent Mandates Commission." (Italics added.)
It was accordingly recommended that the powers of the temporary
trusteeship committee (or such committee as was established to perform
its functions) should be enlarged so thatsuch committee could-
"... undertake, following the dissolution of the League of Nations
and the Permanent Mandates Commission, to receive and examine
reports submitted by mandatory powers with respect to such
Statement by Respondent's representative at the San Francisco Conference
on 11 May 1945.
96 territories under mandate as have not been placed under the trus-
teeship system by means of trusteeship agreements, and until such
time as the Trusteeship Council is established, whereupon the
Council will perform a similar function."
The United States of America, therefore, realized that unless specific
provision was made to vest an organ or organs of the United Nations
with powers of supervision over mandates there would, as from the
dissolution of the League, be no supervision in respect of mandated
territories not submitted to trusteeship: and it sought to provide for
such supervisionby recommendingthat until suchtime asthe Trusteeship
Council could startto function a temporary body should "be specifically
empowered" to exercisesupervisorypowers over mandatesnot converted
to trusteeship, and that the Trusteeship Council itself should "be specifi-
cally empowered" to perform a similar function once it came to be
established.
It is significantthat, although this document was duly fXedon record
and placed on the agenda of the Preparatory Commission, the matter
wasnever raised bythe United Statesin debate, and no reference was at
any time made to it in any of the discussions.
It seems to me only reasonable to infer that the United States must,
after the filing of the said document, have come to realize that the re-
spective mandatories were not prepared to accept supervision by the
United Nations of the administration of their mandated territories,
Saveand except for the case where a mandatory specificallyagreed to
place its mandated territory under the trusteeship system of the United
Nations.
In this regard it is interesting to note what attitude was adopted by
the different mandatories.
(a) The United Kingdom, although supporting the proposa1 of the
Executive Committee for the establishment of a temporary trustee-
ship committee l-a proposal which did not contemplate that the
said committee would have any supervisory functions in respect of
mandates not converted to trusteeship-also expressed itself in
favour of the alternative proposal for the establishment of an
ad hoccommittee,but suggestedthat the only functions which such
an ad hoc committee should have relative to mandates should be-
"... to advise the General Assembly on any matters that
might arise with regard to the transfer to the United Nations
of any functions and responsibilities hitherto exercised under
the mandates system 27'.
The United Kingdom therefore intended the same lirnited role for
the proposed adhoc committeerelative to mandates asdid the Execu-
tive Committeeinits proposa1fora temporarytrusteeship committee.
lPC/TC/25.. 4 and PC/TC/4 p. 7. (b) Australia supported the recommendation of the Executive Com-
mittee for the establishment of a temporary trusteeship committee
without making any suggestion that the ExecutiveCommittee should
have provided for wider powers for the proposed temporary trustee-
ship committee so as to enable it also to supervise mandates not
converted to trusteeship l.
(c) Belgium expressed misgivings with regard to the establishment
of a temporary body and made proposals which intended to avoid
the establishment of any temporary or provisional body 2.
(d) New Zealand supported the proposa1 made by Yugoslavia, which
included the appointment of an ad hoc body, subject, inter alia,
to the amendments suggested by the United Kingdom (as to which
see paragraph (a) above) but "hesitated to agree that a temporary
cornmittee of any kind was necessary 3".
(e) France recommended the establishment of an ad lzoc cornmittee
which was intended to have no mission other than that of helping
to bring about as quickly as possible the establishment of the
Trusteeship Council. This proposed body would have had no
supervisory functions in respect of trust territories and would
have had no function relative to mandates other than-
".. . to advise the Assembly on any matters arising out of
the transfer to the United Nations of those functions and
responsibilities which originated either in the mandates system,
or in other international agreements or instruments 4".
(f) South Africa, through its representative, Mr. Nicholls, took up
the attitude that if there was doubt as to whether the establish-
ment of the proposed temporary trusteeship comrnittee was con-
stitutional or not legal judgment should be sought. Mr. Nicholls
stated further that-
".. .on the question of expediency, it seemed reasonable to
create an interim body as the Mandates Commission was now
in abeyance and countries holding mandates should have a
body to which to report 5".
It has been suggested that in making this statement Mr. Nicholls
acknowledged that there was an obligation on the mandatory powers to
subject their administration of the mandated territories to the super-
vision of the United Nations. In the first place, Mr. Nicholls did not
say that the mandatories would be obliged to report to an interim body.
He merely suggested that there should be a body to which they could
report. In the second place, his statement must be read in proper context
l PC/TC/2, pp. 2-3 and 5.
PC/TC/24 and PC/TC/32, p. 25.
PC/TC/32, p. 25.
* PCITCi33.101 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
and against the surrounding circumstances, of which the following are
of major importance.
(i) The statement made by the South African representative earlier
in that very year at the San Francisco Conference when he warned
that South Africashould not "afterwards be held to have acquiesced
ia the continuation of the Mandate or the inclusion of the terri-
tory in any form of trusteeship under the new international organ-
ization".
(ii) The statement made by Mr. Nicholls himself shortly thereafter
in the Fourth Committee of the Preparatory Commission shortly
after his first-mentioned statement, when he said that he-
".. .reserved the position of his delegation until the meeting
of the General Assembly because his country found itself
in an unusual position. The Mandated Territory of South
West Africa was already a self-governing country, and last
year its legislature had passed a resolution asking for ad-
mission into the Union. His Government had replied that
acceptance of this proposa1 was impossible owing to their
obligationsunder the Mandate. The position remained open
and his Delegation could not record its vote on the present
occasion if by so doing it would imply that South West Africa
was not free to determine its own destiny. His Government
would, however, do everything in its power to implement the
Charter."
(iii) A further statement made by Mr. Nicholls only a few days later
in a Plenary Meeting of the Preparatory Commission when he
again stated a reservation and said that:
"South Africa considered that it had fully discharged the
obligations laid upon it by the Allies, under the Covenant
of the League of Nations, on the advancement towards self-
government of the territories under Mandate."
Having regard to these three statements-one made a few months
before Mr. Nicholls addressed theFourth Cornmittee of the Preparatory
Commission on 29 November 1945,and the two later statements made
by Mr. Nicholls himself shortly thereafter-it cannot be contended
that, in saying that "countries holding mandates should have a body to
which to report", Mr. Nicholls intended his remarks to apply to
territories such as South West Africa in respect of which the mandatory
had clearly intirnated that it was not prepared to have the territory
included in any form of trusteeshipunder the United Nations. It would
rather seem that Mr. Nicholls intended his remarks to apply to those
territories in respect of which the mandatories were willing to enter
into trusteeship agreements but in respect of which there would be no
supervisory organ until the Trusteeship Council came into being.
In any event, regard being had to the attitudes adopted by the man-datories in the Preparatory Commission, including Respondent, as
well as the views expressed by other States at the time, there is no
justification whatever for the suggestion that there was general agree-
ment that the mandated territories should be under international
supervision and tliat the mandatory powers wanted that supervision to
be carried out by an interim or temporary body prior to the establish-
ment of the Trusteeship Council '. The events in the Preparatory
Commission show the very opposite, both as regards the attitudes of
the mandatory powers (as set out above) and as regards the general
agreement between the States concerned. It was realized tlîat unless
some specific arrangement was made to vest the United Nations with
supervisory powers over mandates not converted to trusteeship, there
would be no supervision of such mandates after the dissolution of the
League. Nevertheless, although it was at one stage suggested by the
United States of America that such arrangements should be made, the
suggestion was not raised for discussion, and nothing at al1was done
to confer supervisorÿ powers with respect to mandates iiot converted
to trusteeship on any organs of the United Nations, or any other body.
The general understanding must therefore have been that there would
be no supervision of mandates not converted to trusteeship.
15. When the Preparatory Commission's report was considered at the
First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly in the period
January-February 1946, the mandatories each stated their respective
intentions with regard to the future of the territories under mandate.
Australia, New Zealand and Belgium stated intentions to negotiate
trusteeship agreements in respect of the mandated territories admin-
istered by them.
The United Kingdom intimated that in respect of Transjordan it
intended to take steps for establishing thesaid territory as a sovereign
independent State. With regard to Palestine it was considered necessary
to await the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry
before putting forward any proposals. And in respect of Tanganyika,
the Cameroons and Togoland it was stated that the United Kingdom
would proceed forthwith to enter into negotiations for placing these
territories under the trusteeship system; but it was made clear that its
willingness to place these territories under the trusteeship system de-
pended upon it being able to negotiate satisfactory terms.
France intimated its preparedness to study the terms of agreements
by which the trusteeship régimecould be "defined" in respect of Togo-
land and the Cameroons. In respect of the Mandated Territory of
South West Africa, Respondent's representative stated its attitude in
the following terms:
"Under these circumstances, the Union Government considers
that it is incumbent upon it, as indeed upon al1 other mandatory
powers, to consult the people of the mandated territory regarding
l C.R. 65/27, p. 46.
1O0 the form which their own future government should take, since
they are the people chiefly concerned. Arrangements are now in
train for such consultations to take place and, until they have
been concluded, the Soutlz African Governmentmust reserve its
position concerningtheficture of tlzemandate, together with its right
of full liberty of action, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 80
of the Charter.
From what 1 have said 1 hope it will be clear that South West
Africa occupies a special position in relation to the Union which
differentiates that territory from any other under a C Mandate.
This special position should be given full consideration in deter-
mining the future status of the territory. South Africa is, never-
theless, properly conscious of her obligations under the Charter.
1 can give every assurance that any decision taken in regard to
the future of the mandate will be characterized by a full sense of
Our responsibility, as a signatory of the Charter, to implement its
provisions, in consultation with and with the approval of the local
inhabitants, in the manner best suited to the promotion of their
material and moral well-being." (Italics added.)
And a few days later:
"Referring to the text of Article 77, he said that under the
Charter the transfer of the mandates régime to the trusteeship
system was not obligatory. According to paragraph 1 of Article 80,
no rights would be altered until individual trusteeship agreements
were concluded. It was wrong to assume that paragraph 2 of this
Article invalidated paragraph 1.The position of the Union of South
Africa was in conformity with this legal interpretation.
He explained the special relationship between the Union and
the territory under its mandate, referring to the advanced stage
of self-government enjoyed by South West Africa, and commenting
on the resolution of the Legislature of South West Africa calling
for amalgamation with the Union. There would be no attempt
to draw up an agreement until the freely expressed will of both
the European and native populations had been ascertained. When
that had been done, the decision of the Union would be submitted
to the General Assembly for judgment."
None of the statements made by the mandatories on this occasion
can be interpreted as evidencing an understanding that, in the case
of mandated territories in respect of which no trusteeship agreements
were concluded, the United Nations, or any of its organs, would, after
101 the dissolution of the League, have powers of supervision, or that
the mandatories were prepared to submit to such supervision. Nor can
it fairly be said that the Respondent's statement that it would submit
the question of incorporationof South West Africa to the judgment of
the General Assembly constituted a request to the United Nations to
assume the supervisory functions of the Council of the League. In my
opinion, it was obviously no more than an intimation of Respondent's
desire of obtaining the approval of an important political act by the
newly formed and important international organization. It must have
been apparent to al1concerned that, whatever the legal position might
be, unilateral incorporation of South West Africa by the Respondent
without consulting the United Nations could have led to serious criticism
and harmful political results. This intimation was motivated solely
by political wisdom and was not intended to have, nor was it understood
to have, any bearing on the Respondent's obligations under Article 6
of the Mandate. This will become more apparent when subsequent
events are considered.
16. Of major significance in the present enquiry are the texts of
certain resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations early in 1946, either with specific reference to mandates, or
applicable,inter alia, to mandates.
In its resolutionXI of 9 February 1946, the General Assembly ex-
pressed regret that the Trusteeship Council could not be brought into
being at that session, and proceeded to state thatt-
" Welcomesthe declarations, made by certain Statesadministering
territories now held under Mandate, of an intention to negotiate
trusteeship agreements in respect of some of those territories and,
in respect of Transjordan, to establish its independence.
Invites the States administering territories now held under
mandate to undertake practical steps, in concert with the States
directly concerned, for the implementation of Article 79 of the
Charter (which provides for the conclusion of agreements on the
terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the
trusteeship system)in order to submit these agreements for approval,
preferably not later than during the second part of the first session
of the General Assembly."
Save for minor textual changes this resolution followed the precise
wording of the draft resolution proposed by the Preparatory Commis-
sion l, and it is significant that, like the draft, it makes no mention
whatsoever regarding the future of mandated territories in respect of
which no trusteeship agreements would come about.
Videpara. 12, supra.
102 General Assembly resolution XIV of 12 February 1946 dealt with
the "Transfer of certain functions, activities and assets of the League
of Nations". In its operative part this resolution, inter alia, contained
the following declaration:
"The General Assembly declares that the United Nations is
willing in principle and subject to the provisions of this resolution
and of the Charter of the United Nations, to assume the exercise
of certain functions and powers previously entrusted to the League
of Nations, and adopts the following decisions, set forth in A, B
and C below."
Sections A and B dealt with functions pertaining to the Secretariat and
Functions and Powers of a Technical and Non-Political Nature.
Section C read as follows:
"Functions and Powers under Treaties, International Conventions,
Agreements and otlzer Instruments lzaving a Political Character.
The General Assembly will itself examine, or will submit to
the appropriate organ of the United Nations, any requestfrom the
parties that the United Nations should assume the exercise of
functions or powers entrusted to the League of Nations by treaties,
international conventions, agreements and other instruments having
a political characte..." (Italics added.)
Inasmuch as the mandate declarations were instruments having a
political character, this section of the resolution was applicable to
mandates. And it is the only resolution of the General Assembly in
whichprovision was made for the possible transfer to the United Nations
or its organs of the League's functions relative to mandates.
The part of the resolution in question is of considerable significance
because it negatives the possibility of an implied agreement existing
at that time in terms whereof the Respondent's obligations under the
Mandate to report and account to the Council of the League would be
transformed into an obligation to report and account to the United
Nations. Judge Read aptly remarked, in Inte~.nationalStatus of South
West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1950, page 172: "The very existence of this
express provision, however makes it impossible to justify succession
based upon implication."
Insofar as this resolution was intended to provide a method for
transferring to the United Nations supervisory powers in respect of
mandates, such a transfer could, in terms of the resolution itself,
effectivelycome about only by way of a specific request on the part
of a mandatory and a decision by the United Nations to assume the
function in question; and such an assumption had to be "subject to
the provisions of, inter alia, the Charter".
Any assumption by the United Nations of supervisory powers in
respect of mandates would have brought about a new or amended treaty
obligation on the part of the Mandatory or mandatories concerned.
It follows that any such assumption by the United Nations of super-
103visory functions in respect of a particular mandate pursuant to the
request of the mandatory concerned had, in order to be valid and
effective, to be registered in terms of Article 102of the Charter. Failing
such registration the arrangement could in terms of Article 103 not be
invoked before any organ of the United Nations.
It is sufficient to Say that Respondent never requested the United
Nations to assume the exercise of the functions or powers entrusted
to the League by Article 6 of the Mandate for South West Africa, and
that those functions were neither expressly transferred to the United
Nations nor assumed by that organization at any material time.
17. 1 deal next with the events at the final session of the League
of Nations. It has been argued that the declarations made by the several
mandatories at the final session of the League constituted undertakings
or "pledges" to submit their administration of the mandated territories
to the supervision of the United Nations until the conclusion of other
agreed arrangements, and that the final resolution of the League of
18April 1946constituted an international agreement or treaty recording
such undertakings or "pledges" l.
In this regard strong reliance has been placed on the 1950 Advisory
Opinion of this Court and on the Judgment of fivejudges of this Court
in the 1962 Judgment on the Preliminary Objections. It accordingly
seems necessary to make a detailed examination of the events at the
final session of the League, of the League resolution of 18 April 1946
and of al1other relevant facts, as well as a careful analysis of the said
Opinion and Judgment. 1 shall deal first with the events at the final
League session.
18. In pursuance of informa1 discussions between mernbers of the
League most directly concerned with mandates, the representatives
Applicants' argument, which was based on what they termed "Preparatory
Commission procedures and the system of pledges",can be briefly stated as follows:
(a) there was general agreement that the mandated territories should be under
international supervision;
(b) the mandatory powers, including Responcient, wanted that supervision to
be carried out by an interim or temporary body prior to the establishment of
the Trusteeship Council,i.e., the proposed Temporary TrusteeshiCommittee;
(c) other governments feared that this procedure would lead to delay in the
establishment of the tmsteeship system and pressed for pledges by the manda-
tory powers to place their territories under the trusteeship system;
(d) by way of a compromise it was agreed that pledges would be made, but not
pledges would be toe carry out al1 the obligations of the mandate, including
the obligation to submit to international supervision;
(e) the said pledges were duly made at the final session of the League.
Thepart of the argument set forth in paras. (a) to (d), supra, has been dealt with
in paras. 12-16, above.
104of mandatory powers, in addressing the final plenary meeting of the
Assembly of the League, made statements indicating the intentions
of their governments with regard to their respectivemandated territones.
On 9 April 1946, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the
Respondent made their statements.
The representative of the United Kingdom, after having mentioned
that Iraq and Transjordan had already become independent sovereign
States, and after repeating his Government's intention of placing
Tanganyika, Togoland and the Cameroons under trusteeship, subject
to the negotiation of satisfactory terms, stated:
"The future of Palestine cannot be decided until the Anglo-
American Committee of Enquiry have rendered their report but
until the three African territories (Tanganyika, Togoland and the
Cameroons) have actually been placed under trusteeship and until
fresh arrangements have been reached in regard to Palestine-
whatever those arrangements may be-it is the intention of His
Majesty's Government inthe UnitedKingdomto continueto administer
these territories in accordance witlz the general principles of the
existing mandates." (Italics added.)
Respondent's representative made the following statement :
"It is the intention of the Union Government, at the forth-
coming session of the United Nations General Assembly in New
York, to formulate its case for according South West Africa a status
under which it would be internationally recognized as an integral
part of the Union. As the Assembly will know, it is already
administered under the terms of the mandate as an integral part
of the Union. In the meantime the Union will continue to admin-
ister the territory scrupulouslyinaccordancewiththeobligationsof the
mandate, for the advancement andpromotion of the interest of the
inhabitants, as she hasone during the past six years when meetings
of the Mandates Commission could not be held.
The disappearance of those organs of the League concerned
with the supervision of mandates, primarily the Mandates Com-
mission and the League Council, will necessarily preclude complete
compliance with the letter of the mandate. The Union Government
will nevertheless regard the dissolutionof the League as in no way
diminishing itsobligations under the mandate, which it will continue
to discharge withthefull andproper appreciationof its responsibilities
until such time as other arrangements are agreed upon concerning
the future status of theerritory."
19. After the above statements had been made the representative of
China, Dr. Liang, raised the question of the future of mandates in
the First Committee on the afternoon of 9 April 1946.At that time the
Committee was considering a draft resolution concerning assumption
105 by the United Nations of League functions and powers arising out of
agreements of a technical and non-political character. Dr. Liang wished
to propose for discussion the following draft resolution which he read
out:
"The Assembly,
Considering that the Trusteeship Council has not yet been
constituted and that al1 mandated territories under the League
have not been transferred into territoriesunder trusteeship;
Considering that the League's function of supervising mandated
territories should be transferred to the United Nations, in order
to avoid a period of interregnum in the supervisionof the mandatory
regime in these territories.
Recommends that the mandatory powers as well as those ad-
ministering ex-enemy mandated territories shall continue to submit
annual reports to the United Nations and to submit to inspection by
the same until the Trusteeship Council shall have been constituted."
(Italics added.)
1 pause here to remark that if it had been thought that the provisions
of the Covenant of the League and the Mandate Declarations, or the
Charter of the United Nations, or any provision in any other instru-
ment, or any statements made by the Respondent had the effect of
amending the mandatory's obligation to report and account by substi-
tutingin theMandate Declaration an organ of the United Nations for the
Council of the League, Dr. Liang's proposed resolution would have been
unnecessary. If it was thought that provision had already been made
(in the Covenant of the League, in the Mandate Declarations, or in the
Charter, or elsewhere) for the transfer of the League's supervisory
functions to the United Nations, there would have been no need for
a resolution "that the League's function of supervising mandated terri-
tories should be transferred to the United Nations". Likewise, if it was
thought that provision had already been made (in the Covenant of the
League, in the Mandates, in the Charter, or elsewhere)that mandatories
should render the annual reports previously subrnitted to the League
Council to the United Nations, there would have been no point in a
recornmendation that "the mandatorypowers . ..shall continue to submit
annual reports to the United Nations".
The truth is that not a single member of the League nor a single
Member of the United Nations at that stage thought that they were
parties to any agreement which compelled the Respondent, or any
other mandatory power to report and account to the General Assembly
of the United Nations as the supervisory body in respect of mandates
not converted to trusteeship. If there had been the requisite tacit meeting
of minds to bring about an implied agreement to the said effect, one
would have expected that the States which are now alleged to have
been parties to such an agreement would have been aware thereof and
106109 SOUTHWEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
would have made some reference thereto. It cannot be denied that at
the final sessionof the League it was common cause among al1concerned
that no such agreement existed (whether in the provisions of the Cove-
nant, the mandates, the Charter, or elsewhere) and it does not seem
possible that a court of law could today, in the face ofthese incontro-
vertible facts, find to the contrary.
20. When Dr. Liang had read his draft resolution the chairman ruled
that the proposal was not relevant to the matter then under discussion,
namely the assumption by the United Nations of League functions and
powers of a technical and non-political character. The proposa1 was,
therefore, not debated.
Following this incident informal discussions were renewed, the
Chinese delegation participating therein. In the meantime further
statements were made by the representatives of France, New Zealand,
Belgium and Australia.
These statements were to the same effect as those made by the re-
presentatives of the United Kingdom and South Africa from which
extracts have been quoted by me. Not one of them contained even a
suggestion that the mandatories concerned would after the dissolution
of the League report and account to, or otherwise submit to the super-
vision of, the United Nations or any of its organs with regard to the
administration of their respective mandated territories. In effect each
of the said statements merely intimated the intention of the mandatory
concerned to continue with its administration of its mandated territory
as before. And as 1 shall show later, the Australian statement intimated
a clear contemplation that the mandate provisions for reporting and
accounting would lapse.
21. The outcome of the informal discussions which had meanwhile
taken place was that Dr. Liang on 12April 1946introduced a new draft
resolution, which had been settled in consultation and agreement by
al1countries interested in mandates. In proposing the newdraft resolution
Dr. Liang-
". . recalled that he had already drawn the attention of the Com-
mittee to the complicated problems arising in regard to mandates
from the transfer of functions from the League to the United
Nations. The United Nations Charter in Chapters XII and XII1
established a system of trusteeship based largely upon the principles
of the mandates system, but the functions of the League in that
respect were not transferred automatically to the United Nations.
The Assembly should therefore take steps to secure the continued
application of the principles of the mandates system. As Professor
Bailey had pointed out to the Assembly on the previous day, the
League would wish to be assured as to the future of mandated
territories. The matter had also been referred to by Lord Cecil
and other delegates.
It was gratifying to the Chinese delegation, as representing a country which had always stood for the principle of trusteeship,
that al1 the mandatory powers had announced their intention to
administer the territories under their control in accordance with
their obligationsunder the mandates system until other arrangements
were agreed upon.It was to be hoped that the future arrangements
to be made with regard to these territories would apply, in full the
principle of trusteeship underlying the mandates system." (Italics
added.)
The new Chinese draft contained what eventually became the League
Assembly's resolution concerning mandates in the following form:
"The Assembly :
Recalling that Article 22 of the Covenant applies to certain
territories placedunder mandate the principle that the well-being
and development of peoples not yet able to stand alone in the
strenuous conditions of the modern world form a sacred trust of
civilizatio:
1. Expresses its satisfaction with the manner in which the organs
of the League have performed the functions entrusted to them
with respect to the mandates system and iri particular pays
tribute to the work accomplished by the Mandates Commission;
2. Recalls the role of the League in assisting Iraq to progress
from its statusunder an 'A'mandate to a condition of complete
independence, welcomes the termination of the mandated status
of Syria, the Lebanon and Transjordan, which have, since the
last session of the Assembly, become independent members of
the world community ;
3. Recognizes that, on the termination of the League's existence,
its functions with respect to the mandated territories will come
to an end, but notes that ChaptersXI, XII and XIII of the Charter
of the United Nations embody principles correspondingto those
declared in Article22 of the Covenant of the League;
4. Takes note of the expressed intentions of the members of the
League now administering territories under mandate to continue
fo administer them for the well-being and developmentof the
peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained
in the respective mandates until other arrangements have been
agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory
powers." (Italics added.)
This resolution was adopted unanimously, the Egyptian delegate
abstaining from the vote by reason of a reservation of his Government
in regard to the Mandate for Palestine.
22. On the same day (18 April 1946)the Assembly of the League also
adopted other resolutions, including one in respect of certain parts of
the United Nations General Assembly resolution 14 of 12 February
(erroneously described as dated 16February), but significantly adopted
108 111 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
no resolution relative to section C thereof concerningthe transfer to the
United Nations of powers under treaties, international conventions,
agreements and other instruments having a political character l.
It appears to be an inescapable conclusion that the League Assembly
took note of section C of the said resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly, but did not consider it necessary for the League to
pass any resolution in respect thereof.
1 have already mentioned that, as applied to mandates, this section
meant that the United Nations would not assume any powers entrusted
to the League by a particular mandate declaration unless it received
a request to do so from the mandatory concerned.
Had the Members of the United Nations (ail but seven of the 36
members of the League who attended its April session in 1946 were
founder Members of the United Nations) thought that the League
resolution of 18 April 1946 concerning mandates in any way made
provision for the transfer to the United Nations of supervisory powers
in respect of mandates, without any formal request in that regard being
directed to the United Nations by any of the mandatories, they would
have realized that the League resolution ran counter to the resolution of
the United Nations General Assembly of 12 February. And it is un-
believable that this matter would then not have been raised and debated
in the League Assembly and subsequently in the General Assembly of
the United Nations. The General Assembly would then either have
adhered to their resolution of 12 February, or would have altered it to
bring it into conformity with the League resolution. Nothing of the kind
ever happened, and one is therefore compelled to conclude that the
League resolution was not considered to be inconsistent with the reso-
lution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Had the first draft proposa1by China been adopted by the League the
position would have been different. This draft proposal was directly
opposed to the aforesaid United Nations resolution concerningthe trans-
fer of political functions. Whereas the latter provided, interalia, for the
ad hoc assumption by the United Nations, at the request of the party
concerned, of the functions entrusted to the League under a mandate
declaration, the firsthinese draft resolution envisageda general transfer
of these functions without any request by the parties concerned.
23. A League resolution requiredunanimous support,and it is obvious
that Dr. Liang's original draft resolution would not have been carried.
Respondent's representative could not, and would not, have supported
this proposal, as Respondent had repeatedlystated that the Mandate for
l Videpara. 16, supra.
109 South West Africa should be terminated, and that Respondent was
averse to the inclusion of the territory in any form of trusteeship under
the United Nations. Nor would the proposa1 have had the support of
the representative for Egypt. But the best proof of al1that it would not
have succeeded is the fact that it was not proceeded with, and that in its
place came a watered-down resolution omitting those provisions which
related to the transfer to the UnitedNations of thefunctions of theLeague
with regardto mandates,and to the suggested obligationof the mandatories
to report and accountto the UnitedNations.
If the purpose of the final League resolution was to record, or to
incorporate, an agreement in terms of which the mandatories were
to submit annual reports to the United Nations, and to submit to the
supervision of the United Nations, the provisions of the original Chinese
draft would have been retained as expressing the intention of the parties.
The fact that the expressprovisions in the firsthinese draft were deleted,
can, in the circumstances, lead to no other conclusion than that no agree-
ment embodying such provisions was arrived at. Any suggestion that the
parties deliberately refrained from retaining the expressprovisions of the
original Chinesedraft becausetheypreferred atacit agreement toan express
one in regard to this important matter, would be so nonsensical as not
to merit any consideration. The omission of the said provisions in the
later draft and in the resolution constitutes conclusive proof that that
meeting of minds which was necessary to bring about an agreement
concerning the transfer to the United Nations of supervisory powers in
respect of mandates was lacking.
In this regard 1respectfully wish to associate myself with the following
remarks by Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in their 1962
joint opinion :
"The contrast between the original Chinese draft and the one
eventually adopted constitutes an additional reason why we find it
impossible to accept the view ... that the functions of the League
Council in respect of mandates had passed to the United Nations;
for this was the very thing which the originalChinese draft proposed
but which was not adopted."
24. A finding that the League resolution of 18 April 1946 relating to
mandates constituted treaties defining the future obligations of the
mandatories cannot bejustified. It was not more than it purported to be:
a resolution of a moribund League. The only "agreement" that existed
was consensus as to the terms of the resolution. Two of its paragraphs
(3 and 4) are relied upon for the contention that it constituted an agree-
ment defining themandatories' obligations with respect to their mandates.
In paragraph 3 the Assembly "recognizes" that on the dissolution of the
League its functions with respect to mandated territories "will come
to an end". This was a legal fact which really required no recognition.
The Assembly further "notes" the existence in the Charter ofthe UnitedNations of "principles" corresponding "to those of Article 22 of the
League Covenant". This "noting" cannot alter obligations, and what
strikes one forcibly is that nothing issaid about transfer to the United
Nations oftheLeague'sfunctions with respectto mandates. In paragraph 4
the Assembly "takes note" of the expressed intentions of members of
the League administering mandated territories-"to continue toadminis-
ter them for the well-beingand development of the peoples concerned in
accordance with the obligations contained in the respective mandates"
until other arrangements have been agreed upon between the United
Nations and the respective mandatory powers. Here again 1 fail to see
on what legal principles one can base a conclusion that a recording
in the League Assembly's resolution that it "takes note" of "expressed
intentions" constitutes a treaty which gives the "expressed intentions"
the force and efIect of legal obligations.
25. The Board of Liquidation of the League (which consisted of
representatives ofnine ex-members of the League) were required by the
League on its dissolution "to have regard in the performance of its task
to al1 the relevant decisions of the League Assembly taken at its last
session". The Board evidently did not regard the aforesaid League
resolution of 18 April 1946 as embodying international agreements
transferring the supervisory functions of the League to the United
Nations. In fact, the Board quoted the said resolution in its final report,
and then continued to state:
"The mandates system inaugurated by the League has thus
been brought to a close but the Board is glad to be able to record
that the experience gained by the Secretariat in thismatter has not
been lost, the United Nations having taken over with the small
remaining staff the mandates section archives which should afford
valuable guidance to those concerned with the administration of
the trusteeship system set up by the Charter of that organization."
This report was sent to every ex-member of the League who was present
at its final meeting, and there no record that any State ever questioned
the correctness of this statement in the report of the Board. If any party
to the League resolution in question had thought that it constituted a
binding international agreement that in respect of mandated territories
not converted to trusteeship the mandates system would continue to
operate, with the United Nations as the supervisory authority, then
their silence in these circumstances is inexplicable.
26. 1 have already drawn attention to the fact that, in terms of reso-
lution 14of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the assumption
by the United Nations of any functions of the League was to be subject,
inter alin, to the provisions of the Charter, and that any agreement in
terms of which the United Nations assumed the supervisory functions
111of the League relative to mandates would accordingly have had to be
registered in terms of Article 102of the Charter.
In this regard one should bear in mind that a unilateral declaration
by a State which has been accepted by another constitutes an international
agreement in terms of Article 102 of the Charter. If the declarations of
the mandatories together with the resolution of the League Assembly
of 18 April 1946were considered to constitute international agreements
-which is in effect what Applicants contend-it is inconceivable that
no steps should have been taken to effectthe necessary registration. This
is the more significant when one has regard to the carefully worded
agreements relative to the transfer to the United Nations of assets and
certain other functions of the League entered into between the United
Nations and the aforesaid Board of Liquidation pursuant to resolutions
of the Assembly of the League of 18 April 1946, which agreements
were dulyregistered and published in the United Nations Treaties Series.
In these circumstances, there can be no doubt that if it had been con-
sidered that the declarations of the mandatories together with the
League resolution concerning mandates constituted international
agreements in terms whereof the mandatories' obligations to report
and account to the Council of the League were transformed into obli-
gations to report and account to an organ of the United Nations, proper
steps would have been taken to have the necessary registrations effected
in accordance with the provisions of Article 102.
It has been suggested that no registration was effected because the
evidence of the agreements was contained in so many statements that
registration would not have been practicable. It is, however, inconceiv-
able that no attempt would have been made in such a case to reduce
the agreements to a registerable form. 1 know of no reason why the
States concerned should deliberately have refrained from taking such
steps, when they knew that in terms of Article 103 such agreements,
if not registered, could not be invoked before any organs of the United
Nations. It has been suggested that Applicants' reliance on this sug-
gested "treaty" does not amount to "invoking" it before this Court
(which, of course, is an organ of the United Nations). 1 do not agree
with this contention; but it is, in any event, no answer to the point
that if the States concerned thought that they were entering into a treaty
they would not have done so in such an ineffectiveand obscure manner.
Hall, in Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, page 273, com-
mented as follows on this League resolution:
"The significance of this resolution of the League Assembly
becomes clearer when it is realized that for many months the most
elaborate discussions had been taking place between the govern-
ments as to the exact procedure to be adopted in making the transi-
tion between the League and the United Nations. It was the function
of the Preparatory Commission and committees succeeding it to
112 make recommendations on the transfer of functions, activities,
and assets of the League. Al1 the assets of the League had been
carefully tabulated. Al1 its rights and obligations that could be
bequeathed to the United Nations and which the latter desired
to take over were provided for in agreements that were made.
But in the case of mandates, the League died without a testa-
ment."
See also South West Africa cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pages 651-652.
27. It has also been suggested that the reason for not drafting a
conventional treaty was that it was thought that al1 mandates would
be placed under the international trusteeship system within a relatively
short time. If this statement were correct, it would equally be a reason
for not entering into any agreement at al1 as regards reporting to the
United Nations. But the statement is not correct. There is no evidence
in support thereof. On the contrary, the mandatories were not obliged
to enter into trusteeship agreements, and the members of the League
knew that a trusteeship agreement could only be concluded if the man-
datory power concerned and the United Nations could agree on the
terms thereof. The representative of the United Kingdom, for example,
had stated clearly that the willingness of the United Kingdom to place
its African mandated territoriesunder the trusteehhip system depended
upon its being able to negotiate satisfactory terms. And with regard
to South West Africa the Members of the League knew that Respondent
was claiming incorporation, and that Respondent had no intention of
placing South West Africa under the trusteeship system.
28. From what has been stated in the preceding paragraphs it follows
that there is no justification for the suggestion that the Leagueresolu-
tion in question constitutes a treaty in terms whereof the supervisory
functions of the Council of the League in regard to mandates were
transferred to the United Nations and the mandatories' obligations
to report and account to the Council of the League were transformed
into obligations to report and account to the United Nations. But even
if the resolutioncan at al1be regarded as being in the nature of a treaty,
it cannot have the effects aforestated. It cannot embody more than the
expressed intentions of the parties. At most it would (on the assumption
that it is a treaty) constitute an agreement that the mandatories would
continue to administer the territories for the well-being and develop-
ment of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations
contained in the respective mandates. The aforesaid resolution does
not refer to any undertaking to continue to report and account. As 1
have indicated this omission was not accidental but deliberate.
Not a single mandatory stated that it would continue to comply
with the provisions relating to reporting and accounting. They could
not have done so as they knew that those provisions depended for their
fullilment on the existence of the League of Nations. Had they under-
taken to comply with those obligations after dissolution of the League they would have stated the respects in which they thought the provi-
sions of the mandates were being amended or superseded. The decla-
rations of intention to continue to administer the mandated territories
were of a general nature: "in accordance with the general principles
of existing mandates" (United Kingdom), "to pursue the execution of
the mission entrusted to it by the League of Nations" (France), "in
accordance with the terms of the mandate for the promotion of the
well-being and advancement of the inhabitants" (New Zealand), "in
accordance with the provisions of the mandates, for the protection
and advancement of the inhabitants" (Australia). The delegate of the
Respondent, after stating its intention of applying to the United Nations
for international recognition of South West Africa as an integral part
of the Union of South Africa, proceeded to express an intention on
Respondent's part to continue to comply with its obligations under
the mandate after the dissolution of the League. The words he used
(see paragraph 18 above) made it clear that these were the obligations
concerning administration, which did not depend on the existence of
the League for their fulfilment. The statement said in terms that the
Respondent would continue to administer the Territory scrupulously
in accordance with the obligations of the Mandate as she had done
during the six years when meetings of the Mandates Commission could
not be held. It is common cause that during those years there was no
reporting or accounting to the Council of the League. The statement
made express mention of the fact that the disappearance ofthose organs
of the League concerned with the supervision of mandates, primarily
the Mandates Commission and the League Council, would necessarily
preclude complete compliancewith the letter of the mandate. It did not
Say, and no fair interpretation can give it the effect of saying, that the
Respondent was agreeable that the supervisoryfunctions of the Council
of the League and the Mandates Commission be transferred to the
organs of the United Nations. As 1 shall show later, the subsequent
conduct of Respondent, and of al1the members of the League present
at its final session, leaves no room for any doubt that they did not
consider that the Respondent's statement and/or the League's resolu-
tion constituted an agreement in terms whereof Respondent became
obliged to report and account to the United Nations as the supervisory
body in respect of the Mandate for South West Africa. Nor can any such
agreement be spelled out from the declarations made by the other
mandatories.
29. The Australian representativemade it clear that after the disso-
lution of the League it would be impossible to continue the mandates
system in its entirety. Had the suggestedtransfer of the League Council's
functions been contemplated, the Australian representative would
simply have said that the supervisory functions of the League Council
were being transferred to the organs of the United Nations.117 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
The Australian representative also referred to the explicit international
obligation laid down in Chapter XI of the Charter, being the duty of
transmitting information as provided for in Article 73 (e) of the Charter,
and said that there would be no gap, no interregnum to provide for.
In this regard it is significant that the League resolution "notes" that
Chapters XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter of the United Nations embody
principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League. If the Members of the League thought that Chapter XI
did not apply to territories under mandate surely no reference would
have been made thereto in the resolution.
It does not matter whether Members were right or wrong in their
assumption that Chapter XI applied to the mandates. They may well
have been wrong. The important fact, however, is that they or at least
some of them thought it did.
If it was thought that the duty to reportunder Article 22 of the Cove-
nant and the Mandate Declaration would continue to exîst after the
dissolution of the League, no reference would have been made to Chap-
ter XI of the Charter. The duty of transmitting information under
Chapter XI is a much more restricted and less onerous one than that
of reporting and accounting under the mandates. It would therefore
not have been considered to be applicable to mandates, after the disso-
lution of the League, unless the contemplation was that the duty of
reporting and accounting under the mandates had lapsed. The contem-
plation could not have been that there would be in operation two over-
lapping sacred trusts in respect of each mandated territory, both super-
vised by the United Nations, to which each mandatory had to render
two reports, one in terms of the Mandate Declaration and the other
in terms of Chapter XI. It was obviously thought by at least some of
the delegates that Chapter XI would indeed supersede the more onerous
reporting provisions of the Covenant and the Mandate Declaration,
by reason of the lapse of such provision, until "other arrangements"
were agreed to between the United Nations and the mandatory powers
concerned. Such other arrangements could have included, inter alia,
a trusteeship agreement, or the "assumption" by the United Nations,
in terms of its Assembly'sresolution XIV of 12February 1946,of super-
vision in pursuance of a request to that end, or approval of incorporation
by the mandatory of the mandated territory l.
Whether Chapter XI applies to South West Africa is not one of the issues in
this case, and in any event this Court has no jurisdictione compromissory
refrain from expressing myiew on the question whether the said Chapter appliesly
or not, and shall similarly remainent on the further question that would arise
if it applies, namely whether the United Nations organs' disregard of its provisions
is tantamount to a breach or repudiation which entitles members affected thereby
to refuse to comply with the reporting provisions of the Chapter. 30. The United Kingdom's intention was expressed as being "to
continue to administer these territories in accordance with the general
principles of the existing mandates". That this statement, in itself, or
as read with the League Assembly's resolution, did not embrace, and
was not understood to embrace, an agreement substituting an obligation
to report and account to the United Nations for the obligation to report
and account to the Council of the League, appears, apart from the
other considerations already mentioned, from the report and delibera-
tions of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine l.
Allbuttwo of the members of this Committee were Members of the
League at the time of its dissolution, and were parties to the aforesaid
resolution of the League, and al1were founder Members of the United
Nations. If the resolution in question was thought by these States to
have had the effect of obliging mandatories to report and account to
the United Nations, they would not have stated in their report con-
cerning Palestine that on the dissolution of the League there was no
international authority to which the mandatory power might "submit
reports and generally account for the exercise of its responsibilities in
accordance with the terms of the mandate". The report states that the
mandatory's representative had this in mind when speaking of ad-
ministration "in accordance with the general principles" of the mandate
at the final League session. The report further states in terms that "the
most the mandatory could now do.. .would be to carry out its ad-
ministration in the spirit of the mandate. ..".In a special note to the
report, the representative of India remarked, inter alia, that:
"There are no means by which the international obligations
in regard to the mandatescan be discharged by the United Nations."
These States could not possibly have thought that the supervisory
functions of the Council of the League had been transferred to the
United Nations, whether by the provisions of the Mandate and the
Covenant of the League, by the Charter of the United Nations, by
the League resolution in question, by the declarations of intention
by the mandatories, or by any other statement or instrument.
31. As will be indicated later, the aforesaid views of the above States
reflected the general views of the Members of the United Nations,
which included practically al1 States who were original Members of
the League as well as the States present at the dissolution of the
League. On what possible grounds coiild this Court now find the exist-
ence of tacit agreements, of which the States who are supposed to
have been the parties thereto were unaware when practical situations
Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.ia,
116 arose in which agreements would have been invoked had they existed?
The fact that the United Nations eventually assumed responsibility
for the division of Palestineis of no significance at all. It was done at
the request of, and with the approval of, Great Britain, and accordingly
has no bearing on the issue in this case, viz.w,hether the Respondent
has been a party to any agreement in terms whereof the United Nations
was substituted for the Council of the League in Articleof the Mandate
Declaration.
32. 1 proceed to deal next with events subsequent to the dissolution
of the League.
Pursuant to an undertaking given earlier in that year, Respondent
in November 1946 submitted to the United Nations, for its approval,
theproposal to incorporate South West Africa into the Union of South
Africa. This proposa1 was rejected by the United Nations. It has been
submitted that by so doing Respondent clearly recognized the United
Nations as the international body competent to supervisethe administra-
tion of the Territory.
In my opinion there is no substance in this contention.
1have already indicated that Respondent's intimation that it intended
making such a request to the United Nations did not mean, and was
not intended nor understood to mean, that the United Nations was
acknowledged to have supervisory powers in respect of the Mandate.
It is sirnilarly clear-awill appear from a consideration of subsequent
events-that the request itself was neither intended, nor understood,
to have such an effect.It was no more than an attempt to obtain the ap-
proval of the United Nations to an important political act. There are
several instances where comparable requests were made to the United
Nations, but no one ever suggested that such requests constituted im-
plied consent to the substitution of the United Nations as the super-
visory authority in respect of mandates not converted to trusteeship.
Field-Marshal Smuts, when dealing with the incorporation proposa1
in the Fourth Cornmittee of the United Nations, stated that:
"It would not be possible for the Union Government as a former
mandatory to submit a trusteeship agreement in conflict with the
clearly expressed wishes of the inhabitants. The Assembly should
recognize that the implementation of the wishes of the population
was the course prescribed by the Charter and dictated by the in-
terests of the inhabitants themselves. If, however, the Assembly
did not agree that the clear wishes of the inhabitants should be
implemented, the Union Government could take no other course
than to abide by the declaration it had made to the last Assembly
of the League of Nations to the effect that it would continue to
C.R. 65/28, pp. 37 and 48.
117 administer the Territory as heretofore as an integral part of the
Union, and to do so in the spirit of the principles laid down in
the Mandate.
In particular the Union would, in accordance wlithArticle 73,
paragraph (e) of the Charter, transmit regularly to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations 'for information purposes, subject
tosuch limitations as security and constitutional regulations might
require statistical and other information of a technical nature
relating to economic, social and educational conditions' in South
West Africa."
It will be noted that this statement was made only seven months after
the League resolution of 18 April 1946,and yet at that time (and for a
period of more than a year thereafter) not a single State contended that
Respondent was obliged to report to the United Nations, not under
Article 73 of the Charter, but under the provisions of the Mandate
Declaration. This was the first time after the dissolution of the League
that the Respondent had occasion to refer to its intentions with regard
to South West Africa, and if any State had been induced to believe that
the Respondent had agreed to such an amendment of the Mandate
Declaration, Respondent's statement would surely have been challenged.
The irresistible inference is that not a single Member of the United
Nations who had been a party to the League resolution, and who was
present when Field-Marshal Smuts made this statement could have
thought that the League resolution constituted an agreement obliging
the Respondent and other mandatories to account to the United Nations
as the supervisory authority in the place of the Council of the League.
Similarly no State could have beenunder the impression that the request
for approval of the incorporation of South West Africa constituted an
acknowledgement that the United Nations had been vested with such
powers, by any process whatsoever.
33. During 1947South West Africa was on several occasionsthe sub-
ject of discussion in the various organs of the United Nations-the
Fourth Committee, the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly.
Respondent's representatives repeatedly made statements which could
have left no doubt that Respondent's attitude was that, in the absence
of a trusteeship agreement, the United Nations would have no super-
visory jurisdiction over South West Africa, and that Respondent was
under no duty to report and account to the United Nations in compliance
with the obligations assumed under the Mandate.
In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated
23 July 1947, Respondent referred to a resolution of the House of
Assembly of the South Africa Parliament which, inter alia, recorded that
the rights and powers of the League of Nations relative to mandates had
not been transferred to the United Nations. The validity of this statement
was not questioned. The aforesaid resolution also expressed the opinion
that the Territory should be represented in the Union Parliament and
118that the South African Government should continue to render reports
"as it had done heretofore under the Mandate". The quoted words
require some consideration. As at that stage, no report had yet been
rendered to the United Nations by the South African Government l.
The word "heretofore" must therefore have referred to reporting in the
time of the League.
Consequently the words "under the Mandate" inerely reflected the
facts that previous reporting to the League liad occurred under the
Mandate. The resolution did not say that reporting to the United
Nations should occur under the Mandate. That would in any event
have been an impossibility, at least to the extent that the Mandate
required reporting to the Council of the League to its satisfaction.
There is also no justification for reading the resolution as urging that
the reporting should in any other sense occur "under the Mandate",
e.g., in the seiise of accounting for performance by the mandatories
of the substantive obligations prescribed in the mandates. The reasonable
reading, and the one most in accordance with the probable intent of
the House, is that the resolution merely urged an act of reporting, and
did not express any view or desire as to the form and context of the
suggested reporting. This is so particularly in view of the fact that
Field-Marshal Smuts, who as Prime Minister was leader of the majority
party in the House of Assembly, had only five months prior to the
resolution informed the Fourth Committee of the United Nations that
the reporting would consist merely of trai~smission, for information
purposes, of statistical and other technical information in accordance
with Article 73 (e) of the Charter. If the House had intended to go
against the Prime Minister on this point, one would have expected it
to have said so explicitly.
However, be that as it may, it shouldbe remembered that the resolution
by itself has no legal significance: it is a recommendation to the Gov-
ernment (i.e., the Mandatory) and not an act or utterance by the
Government. The important question is therefore how the Government
understood the resolution and what it conveyed to the United Nations
on the point in question in the letter of 23 July 1947. The letter
left no room for doubt: it stated explicitly that the Union Govern-
ment had "already undertaken to submit reports on their administra-
tion for the information of the United Nations" (italics added). This was
unmistakably a reference to Field-Marshal Smuts' above-quoted state-
ment to the Fourth Committee in November 1946, regarding trans-
mission of information in accordance with Article 73 (e). The letter
The date of submission of the only rewastSeptember 1947.
119did not intimate that any different kind of reports would be submitted.
On 25 September 1947, Respondent's representative in the Fourth
Cornmittee repeated Respondent's previous assurance that it would
continue to maintain the status quo, to administer the Territory in
the spirit of the Mandate, and to transmit to the United Nations for
its information an annual report on its administration of the Territory.
Two days later he explained-in response to a request by the representa-
tive of Denmark for amplification of the letter of 23 July 1947, which
was then before the Committee-that-
"... the annual report whicl-ihis Government would submit on
South West Africa would contain the same type of information
on the Terrirory as is required for non-self-governing territories
under Article 73 (e) of the Charter. It was the assumption of his
Government, he said, that the report would not be considered
by the Trusteeship Council and would not be dealt with as if a
trusteeship agreement had in fact been concluded. He further
explained that, since the League of Nations had ceased to exist,
the right to submit petitions could no longer be exercised, since
that right presupposes a jurisdiction which would only exist where
thereis a right oj'control of supervision and inthe view of the Union
of South Africa no suchjurisdiction is vested in the United Nations
with regard to South West Africa." (Italics added.)
Here again, there is no answer to the argument that, had it been
considered that the Respondent was obliged to report and account to
the United Nations, i.e., that supervisory functions of the League
had been transferred to the United Nations, somebody would have
challenged Respondent's contention that the United Nations had no
right of control or supervision with regard to the administration of
South West Africa. Thefact is that izot a single State did so. Denmark
attended the final session of the League, and so did 30 other States
who were Members of the United Nations in 1947. Once again 1 must
emphasize that these facts constitute weighty evidencethat as at 27 Sep-
tember 1947the Respondent was not considered to be obliged in terms
of any undertaking, agreement, or instrument to accept the supervision
of the United Nations in respect of its administration of South West
Africa or to account under the provisions of the Mandate to any organ
of the United Nations.
34. No less than 41 Member States addressed one or more of the
organs of the United Nations during 1947on the matter of South West
Africa. Of these 41 States, 38 States were founder Members of the
United Nations and 20 were represented at the final session of the
League Assembly in April 1946.Not one of these States (nor any other
State) during that year alleged, or even suggested, that there existed an
120 agreement, express or implied, whereby the supervisory powers of the
Council of the League over mandates were transferred to the United
Nations, or whereby Respondent became obliged to report and account
to the United Nations as the supervisory authority in respect of man-
dates. On the contrary, at least 14 States-ten of whom had attended
the final meeting of the League-acknowledged that in the absence
of a trusteeship agreement the United Nations would have no super-
visory powers in respect of South West Africa. It is an accepted rule
that when controversy arises as to whether a party to an agreement
has assumed a particular obligation, resort may be had to the subsequent
conduct of the parties. The weight to be attached to such conduct
must necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case. Where
for a relatively lengthy period after the execution of an agreement,
al1the parties by conduct accept the position that the agreement does
not embody a particular obligation, then such conduct must bear
considerable weight in a determination whether that obligation exists
or not. If in addition it is at least doubtful whether the events relied
upon were intended to constitute an agreement at al], and if in any
event the alleged "agreement" does not contain any reference to the
suggested obligation, not on account of any inadvertence but because
it was deliberately omitted after being expressly raised, the inference
that no such obligation was imposed is inescapable.
Both Applicant States are ex-members of the League of Nations.
Their representatives and those of practically al1 other ex-members
of the Leaguewho became Members of the United Nations, were present
at meetings of the United Nations organs during 1946and 1947 when
the Respondent and many other States (including ex-members of the
League)-repeatedly asserted that Respondent was under no obligation
to report and account to the United Nations in respect of its administra-
tion of South West Africa. Not a single State challengedthese assertions.
If the Applicants or any other ex-members of the League thought that
the Mandate, or any other instrument, or the events at the dissolution
of the League, or the events subsequent thereto, imposed such an
obligation on the Respondent, they would and should have said so.
Their failure to speak affords conclusive proof of their acquiescence
in Respondent's statements. Their duty to speak was even stronger if-
as Applicants now contend-each ex-member of the League was meant
to be an upper-guardian of the inhabitants of the Territory, each
entrusted with the right and duty to demand and enforce compliance
by the Respondent with al1 its obligations under the Mandate Declar-
ation. The cumulative weight of the evidence so far examined is over-
whelming, and the inescapable inference is that not a single Member
of the United Nations, nor a single State who was a Member of the
League of Nations at its dissolution, was under the impression in, or
at any time prior to, 1947 that any agreement had been concluded
whereby the League Council's authority had been transferred to the
United Nations, or whereby the Respondent becam? obliged to account
to the United Nations, with regard to its administration of South West
Africa. On the contrary, they either expressly or tacitly agreed that no
such agreement was ever entered into.
35. The view tlîat the League Council's supervisory powers had not
been transferred to the United Nations was not expressed with reference
to South West Africa alone. In respect of other mandated territories
also similar views were expressed from time to time up to 1948 by
representatives of member States in the United Nations.
In this regard reference has already been made to the United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine. In its report the Committee recom-
mended that the Mandate for Palestine be terminated at the earliest
practicable date and expressed, inter alfa, the following unanimous
comment :
"Following the Second World War, the establishment of the
United Nations in 1945 and the dissolution of the League of
Nations the following year opened a new phase in the history of
the mandatory régime.The mandatory power in the absence of
the League and its Permanent Mandates Commission, had no
internationalauthority to whichit might submit reportsand generally
account for the exercise of its responsibilities in accordance with
the terms of the Mandate. Having this in mind, at the final session
of the League Assembly the United Kingdom representative declared
that Palestine would be administered 'inaccordance withthe general
principles' of the existing Mandate until 'fresh arrangements had
been reached'." (Italics added.)
In a subsequent debate in the Security Council regarding Palestine
the representative of the United States of America stated that:
"The record seems to be entirely clear that the United Nations
did not take over the League of Nations mandates system."
With regard to the Mandate for Western Samoa, the representative
of New Zealand stated in the Fourth Committee on 22 November 1946
that if acceptable terms could not be negotiated for the placing of this
territoryunder the trusteeship system-
". . New Zealand would have to carry on [its administration of
the Territory] without the privilege of the supervision by the United
Nations, which it desired".
122 A statement very much to the same effectwas made by the representa-
tive of the Soviet Union when a draft trusteeship agreement for the
former Japanese Mandated Islands was discussed in the Security Council
during April 1947.
36. It was only as from the end of 1948 that certain States (five in
number) voiced a contradiction to the view repeatedly expressed up
to that time, namely that the United Nations had no supervisory powers
in respect of mandates not converted to trusteeship.
Not one of the dissenting States, however, based their contentions
on implied or tacit agreement. Some relied on Article 80 (1) of the
Charter, and others considered that the United Nations had replaced
the League as the "organized international community", or as the
"civilized and organized international collectivity", without explaining
by what principle of law the supervisory powers of the League became
vested in the United Nations.
In the same year Respondent, while submitting to the United Nations
certain information in amplification of the report which it had lodged
in the previous year-
". .. re-iterate[d] that the transmission to the United Nations
of information on South West Africa, in the form of annual report
or any other form, is on a voluntary basisand is for purposes of
information only. They have on several occasions made it clear tlzat
they recognize no obligation to transmit this information to the
United Nations, but in view of the wide-spread interest in the
administration of the Territory, and in accordance with normal
democraticpractice, they are willing and anxious to make available
to the world such factsand figuresas are readily at their dispo..."
(Italics added.)
At no time thereafter did Respondent, either expressly or by impli-
cation, acknowledge that it was under any obligation to report and
account to the United Nations in respect of its administration of South
West Africa. On the contrary, it persisted in the attitude that the United
Nations had no supervisory powers in respect of its administration of
theTerritoryand; in fact, for reasons set out in atter dated 11July 1949,
refused to submit any further reports to the United Nations, not even
reports for information purposes.
37. The aforegoing analysis of historical events can lead to only
one conclusion and that is that the supervisory powers of the League
Council were not transferred to the United Nations either by express
or by tacit consent of Respondent, or in any other manner.
This conclusion is in conflict with the majority opinion of this Court
in International Status of South West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1950, and
it has been suggested that it is also in conflict with the reasoning in
one passage in the majority judgment (fivejudges) in South West Africa
cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962. A careful examination of the said opinion
123and judgment is therefore necessary, and 1 will in the succeeding para-
graphs proceed to make such an examination.
38. In the 1950 Advisory Opinion the Court recognized that the
supervisory functions of the League with regard to mandated territories
not placed under the trusteeship system "were neither expressly
transferred to the United Nations nor expressly assumed by that or-
ganization". From this it must follow that the Court's finding that
such transfer did take place could, in the absence of any international
principle or rule of succession, have been based only on a tacit or
implied agreement. There does not appear to be any dispute that a
term can be implied only if the admissible evidence reveals that it was
contemplated by the parties, in the sensethat they either actually intended
it to operate, or would all, had their attention been directed thereto,
have acknowledged that it fell within the scope of their agreement.
It has been suggested that the Opinion of 1950rests on the principle of
effectiveness.This principle embodies the rule that treaties, etc.,
". .. are to be interpreted with reference to their declared or
apparent objects and purposes; and particular provisions are to be
interpreted so as to give them their fullest weight and effect con-
sistent with the normal sense of the words and with other parts
of the text, and insuch a way that a .season and a meaning can be
attributed to every part of the text".
(See article by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in the British Year Book of Inter-
national Law, 1957, XXXIII, p. 33.) The principle of effectivenesscan
never be divorced from the basic object of interpretation, viz.,to find
the true common intention of the parties, and it cannot operate to give
an agreement a higher degree of efficacy than was intended by the
parties. It cannot, therefore, be invoked to justify a result whichis not
in harmony with the intention of the parties as expressed by the words
used by them, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances and
other admissible evidence. See Lord McNair's The Law of Treaties,
1961, page 484, and otlier authorities quoted in South West Africa
cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pages 582-584.
39. The Court in 1950, after stating that the object of the Mandate
far exceeded that of contractual relations regulated by "mandate" in
national law, and that the Mandate was created as an international
institution with an international object (p. 132), for the Respondent to
claim rights derived from the Mandate while denying the obligations
thereunder could not be justified (p. 133).We have been urged to inter-
pret this statement as meaning that, because the Respondent claims
rights in respect of South West Africa, therefore al1 its obligations
under the Mandate, including those under Article 6, must still be in
force, and that therefore the Assembly of the United Nations must be
deemed to have been substituted for the Council of the League as the
124 supervisory autl-iority.If this is what the Court's statement was iiltended
to convey, it is obviously wrong. On what basis in law can a claim to
rights by the Respondent today have any effect on the legal situation
resulting from events which occurred in 1920and 1945-1946?
If the Respondent's rights and obligations under the Mandate in
law lapsed on the dissolution of the League, a subsequent claim by
the Respondent that it has rights under the Mandate cannot revive
either the rights or the obligations that have lapsed. In any event, the
Respondent does not claim any rights under the Mandate Declaration,
which it contends has lapsed.
Respondent bases its claim to adrninister the Territory on the events
which preceded the Mandate, and on the fact that it has at al1material
times been in de facto control of the Territory. If the Mandate has
lapsed this Court has neither the right, nor the duty, to decide upon
the validity of the Respondent's aforesaid contentions and 1 shall
accordingly not express any opinion on the correctness thereof or
otherwise. It isonly in the alternative that Respondent says that if the
Mandate should be held to be in force, it would have rights and obliga-
tions under the Mandate, but that these would no longer include an
obligation of report and accountability. If the true position should
indeed be that the Mandate is still in force, eitherbecause Respondent
can be said to claim rights thereunder or for any other reason, that
would still afford no justification for a Court to amend the mandate
provisions by imposing on the Respondent obligations to which it did
not agree, and which, in any event, are more onerous than those imposed
by the Mandate Declaration.
40. A study of the 1950 Opinion shows that the Court first found
that, since the administrative provisions of the Mandate (Articles 2 to 5)
did not depend for their fulfilment on the existence of the League, they
have survived the League (p. 133). The Court next considered the
procedural provisions of the Mandate (Articles 6 and 7), which in the
Court's viewdepended for their fulfXmentonthe existenceof the League.
After remarking that the authors of the Covenant considered that the
performance of the sacred trust required international supervision, and
that the authors of the Charter had in mind the same necessity when
they created the international trusteeship system the Court found that
the necessity for international supervision remained after the dissolution
of the League, and that-
". ..it cannot be admitted that the obligation to submit to super-
vision has disappeared merely because the supervisory organ has
ceased to exist, when the United Nations has another international
organ performing similar, though not identical, supervisory func-
tions" (p. 136).
It is difficult to perceive on what legal principles the Court based
125 its conclusion that it "could not be admitted" that international super-
vision had disappeared. Throughout its Opinion the Court purported
to be searching for the common intention of the parties to the Covenant,
the Mandate Declaration and the Charter, and 1 think it is fair to say
that what the Court intended to convey was that it inferred that the
parties to the Mandate and the Charter had a common intention that
"international supervision" of the administration of the mandated
territories should continue after the dissolution of the League, and that
inasmuch as the Assembly of the United Nations was competent to
perform the functions of the Council of the League, the parties must,
in the light of the evidence then before the Court, be assumed to have
intended that the General Assembly should in future perform the said
functions, and that the Respondent is therefore now obliged to report
and account to this organ of the United Nations. If the Court did not
find such a common intention, the only alternative is that it must have
decidedto legislate,whichwould mean that it exceeded its authority. This
Court's function is laid down in Article 38 of its Statute, which requires
it to decide disputes submitted to it in accordance with international
law, and international law does not authorize the Court to legislate.
In this regard1 wish to repeat what 1 said in South WestAfrica cases,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, page 591 :
"The rules of construction authorize what has been termed the
'teleological approach' only to the limited extent indicated above.
This approach, in its more extreme form, assumes that this Court
has the power to disregard or amend the terms of an instrument
in order to achieve an object, or presumed object, albeit in a manner
different from that provided for and intended by the parties; but
this approach disregards the basic rule that the purpose of construc-
tion is to determine the common intention of the parties and in
any event it has not been recognized by this Court or its predecessor.
No court has the power to make a party's obligations different
from, or more onerous than, what it has agreed to. If this Court
has the power to disregard or amend the provisions of a treaty
or convention, it has legislative powers and such powers have not
been entrusted to it by its Statute or any of the sources of inter-
national law referred to in Article 38 of itsStatute. As Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice rightly remarks in the article in the British Year Book
of International Law, 1957, XXXIII, quoted above, at page 208:
'The Court has shown plainly that, in its view, the performance
of such a function cannot properly form part of the interpretative
process'."
Ttcannot,be assumed that members of this high tribunal would delibera-
tely ignore the elementary and basic principle that the intention of the
parties must rule, and 1 shall accordingly, as already stated, assume
that the Court in 1950 based its conclusion on what it considered to
have been the common intention of the parties. But, in doing so, the
Court, in my opinion, arrived at a wrong conclusion, mainly because
126it did not have regard to al1 the relevant facts, many of which were
apparently not brought to its attention. Before dealing with the facts
to which the Court did not have any or proper regard in 1950, 1 wish
to refer to one or two further aspects of the 1950Opinion.
40 (a). In 1950the Court relied exclusively(p. 137) on Article 10of
the Charter of the United Nations for its finding of competence on
the part of the Assembly to supervise Mandates; but there can be
no doubt that neither this Article or any other article of the Mandate
contains any provision to this effect. The provisions of Article 10 are
confined to matters which are already within the scope of tlîe Charter;
they do not bring any new matters within it-see my dissenting opinion
of 1962, pages 652-653. In any event as will appear more fully infra,
this Court's jurisdiction is confined in this case to disputes relating
to the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Mandate
for South West Africa, and the Charter of the United Nations is not
a part of that Mandate.
41. In its 1950 Opinion, the Court, as 1 have already stated, first
found that the administrative provisions of the Mandate survived the
League because they (unlike the so-called procedural provisions) did
not depend for their fulfilment on the existence of the League (p. 133).
It thereupon, in effect, held that because the administrative provisions
were still in force, therefore the necessity for the procedural provisions
remained (p. 136). But inasmuch as the latter provisions stipulated for
reporting and accounting to the Council of the League, they could not
after the dissolution of the League be operable in their original form,
the League Council having ceased to exist.
They could therefore only have survived the League if they were
amended by the substitution of some organ to function in the place of
the defunct Council of the League.
The Court, having found that Article 6 must have survived the
League, therefore had to find that it survived in an amended form,
i.e., that the Assembly of the United Nations had been substituted for
the Council of the League (p. 136). If this analysis of the Court's rea-
soning is correct, it would seem, with respect, to expose a fallacy. When
deciding that the administrative provisions had survived the League,
theCourt proceeded on the assumption that they could surviveseparately
from the procedural provisions which depended on the existence of
the League for their fulfilment. This must be so, for the Court reached
its conclusion in regard to the survival of the administrative provisions
without having devoted any discussion at al1to the problems pertaining
to survival or otherwise of the procedural provisions. But when it came
to consider whether Article 6 had survived, the Court seems to have
held, in effect, that the administrative provisions could not survive
without Article 6, and that inasmuch as it had already found that the
administrative provisions still applied, it found that Article 6 must
therefore also have survived. In other words the Court seems to have
127130 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
relied on two irreconcilable premises, viz., by assuming severability
for the purposes of the first step in its reasoning, and by assuming
inseverability of the same provisions for the purposes of the second
step, which depended upon the first. On the premise of inseverability,
the question whether the administrative provisions survived would
depend on the question whether Article 6 had been appropriately
amended so as to secure itssurvival.
Having reasoned along this line the Court then found what it regarded
as confirmation of the conclusion that Article 6 had survived in an
amended form, i.e., with the Council of the League being replaced by
the General Assembly of the United Nations as the supervisory body.
Such an amendment could, however, have come about only with
the consent of the Respondent, and the evidence establishes that not
only was there no agreement that the mandatory's duty to report and
account to the Council ofthe Leaguewould become a duty to report to an
organ of the United Nations, but, that, on the contrary, it was common
cause atal1material timesthatno such change had taken place.
If the provisions of Article6 were so essential that without them the
rest of the mandate provisions could not exist, then the disappearance
of Article 6 must mean that the whole Mandate has lapsed. On the other
hand, if thesaid other provisions can still apply even though Article 6
has lapsed,then the disappearance of Article 6 can have no bearing on
the survival or otherwise of theaid other provisions.
42. Apart from what has been stated above, the Court referred to no
specificevidence which can justify a finding that the Respondent agreed
to an obligation to submit to the supervision and control of the General
Assembly of the United Nations and to render annual reports to it. The
Court, however, found "confirmation" for what it termed "these general
considerations" in Article 80 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations,
and in the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of
18 April 1946, of which the Court said that it "presupposed that the
supervisory functions exercised by the League, would be taken over by
the United Nations". 1 have already dealt with the said Article and the
said resolution, and have shown that neither can serve as support for the
Court's conclusion.
43. Whether due to the fact that al1the relevant information was not
placed before the Court, or whether due to an oversight on its part,
it is nonetheless clear that the Court did not have regard to the signifi-
cance of some important events which occurred during the period
1945-1947. Thus the 1950Opinion makes no referenceto the first Chinese
proposal with regard to mandates, which proposal was not proceeded
with, and the only inference thatcan be drawn from this omission isthat
128the Court was either unaware thereof or did not appreciate its vast
significance.Nor is any reference made in the Opinion to the discussions
and proceedings in the Preparatory Commission, which reveal the
absence of any presupposition that the United Nations would automatic-
ally, and without specific provision, become heir to the supemisory
powers of the League, or that the Respondent's duty to account to the
Leaguewould become a duty to account to the United Nations. Similarly,
there is no reference in the Opinion to the proposa1 made by the United
States of America to the Preparatory Commission that specificprovision
should be made for vesting certain organs of the United Nations with
supervisorypowers in respect of mandates not converted to trusteeship,
or to the fact that theproposal was dropped and not even raised in the
discussions before the Preparatory Commission. Nor is there any
reference in the Opinion to the report of the Liquidation Committee
of the League.
The Opinion also contains no reference to the findings of the United
Nations Committee on Palestine, which so clearly reveal that there was
no agreement to the effectthat an organ or organs of the United Nations
would after the dissolution of the League perform the functions of the
League Council in respect of mandates, and in particular that the duty
to report and account to the Council of the League had not been con-
verted into a duty to report and account to any organ of the United
Nations. The Court also made no reference to the numerous statements
by the Respondent and a largenumber of Members ofthe United Nations
(most of them also ex-members of the League) in the years following
the dissolution of the League to the effect that the Respondent was not
under a duty to report and account to the United Nations as a supervisory
authority in respect of mandates.
43 (a). The Court, in referring to the Respondent's letter of 23 July
1947,stated that this letter drew attention to a resolution of the Union
Parliament (in fact it was a resolution of theHouse of Assembly only)
in which it requested "that the Government should continue to render
reports to the United Nations Organization as it has done heretofore
under the Mandate". The Courtfound that this declaration constituted-
"... recognition by the Union Government of the continuance
of its obligations under the Mandate and not a mere indication
of the future conduct of that Government. Interpretations placed
upon legal instruments by the parties to them, though not conclusive
as to their meaning, have considerable probative value when they
contain recognition by a party of its own obligations under an
instrument. .."
1 am aware that the above remarks were made by the Court when
it was consideringthe question whether the substantive or administrative
129 132 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
provisions of the Mandate had survived the dissolution of the League.
It would, however, appear from the minority opinions of 1956,in which
several judges participated who had been parties to the 1950 Opinion,
that the Court in 1950 was under the impression that the Respondent
had undertaken to report to the United Nations in compliance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the Mandate. It therefore seems asif the Court
in 1950 overlooked the fact that Respondent's undertaking to report
was not intended to be in compliance of Article 6, but was limited to
reports of the kindprovidedfor in Article73 of the Charter, a fact which
isapparent from the wording ofthe very letter itself,in which, asindicated
above, mention is made of Respondent's undertaking to "submit reports
on their administration for the information of the United Nations".
The Court also apparently did not appreciate that the resolution referred
to in the letter was not a resolution of Respondent's Parliament but a
resolution of only one of the Houses of Parliament, and that it had no
legal effect otherhan that of a recommendation to the Union Govern-
ment, i.e., the Mandatory, as to what should be done in future. As 1have
shown above, when the letter is read with the statements which were
made by Respondent's representatives at the United Nations, both
before and after the date of the letter, it becomes explicitly clear that
Respondent was neither agreeing to submit to the supervision of the
United Nations nor offering to supply any information, other than
information of the nature contemplated in Article 73 of the Charter.
1 may add that if the aforesaid resolution is analysed with a view to
ascertaining what the contemplation of the House of Assembly was
regarding obligations under the Mandate, it seems evident that the
following paragraph thereof should not be ignored:
"Whereas the League of Nations has since ceased to exist and
was not empowered by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles or
of the Covenant to transfer its rights and powers in regard to South
West Africa to the United Nations Organization, or to any other
international organization or body, and did not in fact do so."
(Italics added.)
44. Not only were cogent reasons advanced in 1950 by Sir Arnold
McNair and Judge Read for dissenting from the majority judges in
respect of this issue, but the majority opinion has elicited strong criticism
from highly qualified publicists.refer in this regard to George Schwar-
zenberger,International Law (3rd ed.), Volume 1,pages 101-102; Manley
O. Hudson, "The Twenty-ninth Year of the World Court", in American
Journal of International Law, Volume 45, pages 1-36at pages 13-15;and
Joseph Nisot, "The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice on the International Status of South West Africa", in Soutlz
African Law Journal, Volume 68, Part 3 (August 1951),pages 274-285.
In my opinion there is, for the reasons which1have advanced, complete
justification for such criticism.
130 45. Although the soundness of the Court's 1950 Opinion in regard
to Article 6 of the Mandate Declaration did not necessarily require
decision when the preliminary objections of the Respondent were
considered by this Court in 1962, it was certainly a fundamental issue
in respect of the main one of the alternative contentions advanced by the
Applicants, i.e., the contention, not acceded to by any member of the
Court, of a succession by the United Nations and its Members of the
functions of the League and its members regarding mandates. Conse-
quently severaljudges expressed views on the matter. Inajoint dissenting
opinion Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzrnaurice remarked:
"... we think that the view expressed by the Court in its 1950
Opinion, to the effect that the supervisory functions of the former
League Council passed to the Assembly of the United Nations
whiclî was entitled to exercise them, was definitely wrong". (See
South West Africa cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 532, footnote 2.)
The said judges based their conclusion, inter alia, on two facts which
were not before the Court in 1950, namely firstly, the content of the
proposa1 of the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission
of the United Nations, which proposa1 was rejected, and, secondly,
the fact that the Chinese representative was compelled to amend his
original draft resolution by omittingl1reference to reporting by manda-
tories to the United Nations.
The effect of the opinion of Judge Bustamante in 1962is that in the
absence of a trusteeshipagreement,the United Nations could not exercise
control over South West Africa. Sir Louis Mbanefo's opinion also
appears to support the view that administrative supervision of the
Mandate had disappeared on the dissolution of the League. He quoted
with approval an extract from the separate opinion of Judge Read in
Status of South West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 19.50, page 165, which
includedthe followingpassage:
"The disappearance of the obligations included in the first and
the second classes would bring the mandates system to an end.
The disappearance ofthe régimeof report, accountability, supervision
and modification, througlzthe Council and the Permanent Mandates
Commission, might weaken tlze mandates system; but it would not
bring it to an end. As a matter of fact, the record shows that the
paralysis ofthoseagenciesduringthe six waryears hadno detrimental
efSect upon the maintenance of the well-being and development of
thepeoples." (Italics added.)
And Sir Louis Mbanefo came to the conclusion that on the dissolution
of the League-
"... rights and obligations embodied in it [the Mandate] were
131 134 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
maintained at the level at which they were on the dissolution of
the League".
The obligation to report to a non-existing Council of the League could
not be "maintained" at any level.
46. It has been submitted that some passages in the Judgment of the
Court in South West Africa cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962, could be inter-
preted as supporting the Court's majority opinion of 1950in regard to
the transfer to the United Nations of the supervisory powers of the
League in respect of mandates. There are, however, no express findings
to this effect, and the impression gained from the Judgment as a whole
is that as far as possible this issue was deliberately avoided, and that the
Court did not intend expressingany opinionthereanent.What is,however,
of considerable significance is that both the conclusion and reasoning
inthe said Judgment regarding the survival of the compromissory clause
in Article 7 of the Mandate Declaration support the view that transfer
of supervisory powers did not take place.
The reasoning of the 1962 Judgment compels one to infer that the
Court thought that, as a result of the dissolution of the League, Article 6
of the Mandate no longer applies.
Reference has already been made to the three reasons advanced in the
said Judgment for holding that the words "Member of the League of
Nations" in Article 7 (2) of the Mandate have since, and by reason of
the dissolution of the League, come to mean, for the purposes of the
said Article, ex-member of the League. The first reason was that, inas-
much as a mandatory could during the lifetime of the League by the
exercise of its rightsder the unanimity rule, have frustrated the wishes
of the Council of the League relative to the administration of the man-
dated territory, the role of the Court was a very essential one.
With regard to this suggested essentiality of the adjudication clause,
the Court's attention had been drawn to the fact that three ofthe trustee-
ship agreements concluded in respect of former mandated territories
do not contain any compromissory clause, and the argument had been
advanced that the Members of the United Nations (and they included
practicallyal1the ex-members of the League) could therefore not have
considered the adjudication clause to be an essentialprovision.
The Judgment deals as follows with this argument:
"The point is drawn that what was essential the moment before
was no longer essential the moment after, and yet the principles
under the mandates system corresponded to those under the trustee-
ship system. This argument apparently overlooks one important
difference in the structure and working of the two systems andloses
its whole point when it is noted that under Article 18 of the Charter
of the United Nations, 'decisions of the General Assembly on
important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the
132 members present and voting', whereasthe unanimity rule prevailed
in the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations under
the Covenant. Thus legally valid decisions can be taken by the
General Assembly of the United Nations and the Trusteeship
Council under Chapter XII1 of the Charter without the concurrence
of the trustee State, and the necessity for invoking the Permanent
Court for judicial protection which prevailed under the mandates
systemis dispensed with under the Charter.
For the reasons stated, the First and Second Objections must be
dismissed."
The effect of this statement is that the adjudication clause is not an
essential provision in the trusteeship systeminasmuch as the unanimity
rule which applied to proceedings of the Council of the League does not
apply to the organs of the United Nations, with the result that the
General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations
can take valid decisions without the concurrence of the trustee State.
The authors of the Judgment considered the adjudication clause to be
essential only aslong as the unanimityrule applied to the organ entrusted
with administrative supervision, or if such organ should for some
reason or another cease to function. If it should be held that Article 6
of the Mandate was amended by the substitution ofthe General Assembly
of the United Nations (functioning with an ordinary two-thirds majority)
for the Council of the League, there would be no real differencebetween
the administrative supervison of the mandated territory and that of a
State under the trusteeship system; which of course would mean-in
terms of the Court's 1962 reasoning-that the reasons advanced for
regarding the adjudication clause as an essential clause of the Mandate
would no longer apply, and that the construction placed by the Court
on the words "another Member of the League" in Article 7 (2) of the
Mandate would not be justified. In other words, the adjudication clause
could have survived on the grounds ofits essentialityonlyiftheunanimity
rule which applied to the proceedings of the League Council also applies
to the proceedings of the Assemblyof the United Nations when that body
is concernedwith the administration of the Mandate, or if administrative
supervision as provided for in the Mandate has come to an end. In this
Court's Advisory Opinion of 1955,it was held that the unanimity rule
cannot apply in any proceedings of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, and this view was confirmed by the 1962Judgment. If the said
Opinion is sound, then a findingthat the supervisory powers ofthe Coun-
cil of the League were transferred to the General Assembly of the
United Nations would be in conflict with the reasoning in the 1962
Judgment.
The inescapable conclusion accordingly is that the reasoning of the
1962Judgment cannot be reconciled with a contention that the super-
visory functions of the Council of the League became vested in the
General Assembly of the United Nations.
133 47. There is also another aspect of the reasoning of the 1962Judgment
which negatives the possibility of the General Assembly of the United
Nations having succeeded to the supervisory functions of the League
Council. The Court relied upon what it found to be an agreement among
the members of the League in April 1946to continue the mandates "as
far as it was practically feasible oroperable with reference to the obli-
gations of the mandatory powers". It was held that the purpose of this
agreement was to make up for the "imperfections as far as was practic-
able" and "to maintain the status quo as far as possible in regard to the
mandates". At page 341 of the Judgment the agreement is described as
follows :
"It is clear fromthe foregoing account that there was a unanimous
agreement among al1 the Member States present at the Assembly
meeting that the Mandates should be continued to be exercised in
accordance with the obligations therein defined although the disso-
lution of the League, in the words of the representative of South
Africa ut the meeting, 'willnecessarily precludecomplete compliance
with the letter of the Mandate', i.e. notwithstanding thefact that some
organs of the League like the Council and the Permanent Mandates
Commission would be missing. In other words the common under-
standing of the Member States in the Assembly-including the
Mandatory Powers-in passing the said resolution, was to continue
the Mandates, however imperfect the wlzolesystem would be after
the League's dissolution, and as much as it would be operable,
until other arrangements were agreed upon by the Mandatory
Powers with the United Nations concerning their respective Man-
dates." (Italics added.)
Had the Court considered that Article 6 of the Mandate had been
amended by the substitution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations for the Council of the League, the above-quoted expression
would not have been used. There would have been no "imperfections"
which could only be made up for "as far as was practicable". The
agreement to continue "as much as ... would be operable" must have
presupposed that Article 6 would not be operable, because if it were
operable and if, as the Court had held, Article 7 still applied, there would
have been nothing that could not be operable and the words "as much
as .. .would be operable" would have been meaningless. In any event,
the purpose could not have been "to maintain the status quo" and at the
same time to brincwabout radical amendments. There could be no auestion
of maintaining the status quo if the supervisory powers were transferred
to a body the membership of which was not the same as that of the
League, and which functioned in a manner substantially different from
that which applied in the League Council. The status quo could not be
maintained if by the suggested substitution Respondent's rights under
the unanimity rule would be abolished.
48. As 1 have already mentioned, the Court did not base its finding on anyprinciple of succession.The Court based itsfinding onits interpre-
tation of the mandate instrument and on acts which it considered consti-
tuted an agreement to the effect that the expression "Member of the
League" in Article 7 of the Mandate Declaration should be construed
as meaning "ex-Members of the League, who were Members at the time
ofits dissolution". Inher words, it found that the rights of the members
of the League under the Mandate were not transferred to the members
of the United Nations, but that States which weremembers of the League
at its dissolution retained their rights to invoke the adjudication clause
in Article 7 of the Mandate. Ifhis viewis Sound,it could surely not have
been the intention of the parties that the administrative supervision
provided for in Article 6 of the Mandate would be transferred to the
United Nations, because if such a transfer took place it would mean
that States which are not members of the United Nations, and which
would therefore have no Sayin the "administrative supervision", would
nonetheless have competence in the "judicial supernision", and that,
likewise, many States entitled to take part in the "administrative super-
vision" would have no competence in the "judicial supervision". Such
an anomalous result could not possibly have been contemplated by the
Court. For the above reasons the 1962Judgment cannot be reconciled
with a contention that the supervisory powers of the Council of the
League were transferred to the United Nations.
49. My conclusion, therefore, is that Respondent is not under any
obligation to report and account to the United Nations relative to its
administration of South West Africa. Article 6 of the Mandate Decla-
ration and the corresponding provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League ceased to apply on the dissolution of the League.Appli-
cants' Submissions2, 7and 8 should accordingly be dismissed.
50. It has been suggested that the Respondent is estopped from
denying an obligation to report and account to the United Nations.
In my opinion it is not estopped. Not only has Respondent atl1material
timesconsistentlydenied suchan obligation, but also no State has at any
material time alleged that it was induced by Respondent's word or
conduct into thinking that the Respondent had acknowledged such an
obligation. The Applicants cannot suggest anything of the kind,ecause
they would not be able to reconcile such a suggestion with their silence
and acquiescence during 1945, 1946,1947and 1948.
ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTE RF THE UNITED NATIONS
1. It may be contended that if Article 6 of the Mandate ceased to
apply, the reporting provisions of Article 73 of the Charter of the
United Nations (although far more limited in scope and effect) now
apply to the territory of South West Africa. This raises two major
135 questions: firstly, whether this matter is part of the Applicants' claim,
i.e., has it been referred to the Court for decision by the Applicants,
and secondly, whether the Respondent has consented to the Court's
jurisdiction in respect thereof l.
2. The Applicants not only deliberately did not refer this issue to
the Court, but strenuously contended that Article 73 has no application
as far as South West Africa is concerned.
3. In their Applications they alleged that-
". .. the Union has violated, and continues to violate Article 6
of the Mandate, by its failure to render to the General Assembly
of the United Nations annual reports containing information with
regard to the territory and indicating the measures it has taken
to carry out its obligations under the Mandate".
Submissions B, C and J in the Applications equally leave no room for
any doubt that the claim was based on Article 6 of the Mandate as read
with Article 22 of the Covenant. In the Memorials the Applicants
relied solely on this Court's 1950 Opinion, which held that Article 6
of the Mandate survived the dissolution of the League, but that the
applicability of Article 73 was irrelevant-despite the fact that argument
thereon was heard. Submissions 2 and 7 of the Memorials, and as
Tially drafted, similarly leave no room for any doubt that the claim
embraced by them was based on Article 6 of the Mandate. In the Reply
Applicants' contention was definedas follows :"Respondent's obligation,
as stated in Article 6 of the Mandate, is in effect, and Respondent is
accountable thereunder to the United Nations, as 'the organized inter-
national community' ".It was stated in express terms that "Applicants'
submissionsdo not allege violations by Respondent of such obligations"
(Le., obligations under Article 73 of the Charter). In the oral proceedings,
Applicants were at great pains to demonstrate that they did not rely on
Article 73 (e), and emphasized that the claim was based on Article 6
A judge is of course at al1 times free to express his views on a matter falling
outside the competence of the Court if he considers it relevant to an issue validly
under consideration, but such views are obviously obiter dicta. 1find it unnecessary
(as in 1962) to make even an obiter statement on this complicated matter which
has not been argued asan issue by either Party. If the matter was relevant it would
have been necessary toconsider the dificulties raised by Dr. Steyn in his argument
before this Court in950(Status of South West Afiica, I.C.J. Pleadings, pp. 273-317),
United Nations organschof the applicability of Article 73 to South West Africa, the
the alleged abuse of the provisions of this Article by the Assembly of the United
Nations referred to by Respondent's counsel during the oral proceedings, etc. It
would furthermore entai1 a consideration of the alleged non-compliance by the
United States with the provisions of this Article with regard to Pacific Islands
which were formerly subject to a League of Nations mandate held by Japan, and
which have not been placed under a trusteeship agreement.of the Mandate. They consistently resisted any suggestionthat Article 73
(e)might be applicable.
4. It has been repeatedly laid down by this Court that only matters
raised in the final submissions of the parties will be considered and that
the Court will abstain from deciding issues not raised insuch submis-
sions. The Court certainly has no power to depart from a submission
in order to decide an issue not included therein and not intended to be
so included.
5. In any event this Court has no jurisdiction to pronounce on this
issue. The only provision on which jurisdiction could be based is
Article 7 (2) of the Mandate Declaration, and this limits the Court's
jurisdiction to disputes between the Respondent and another member
of the League relating to the interpretation and application of the
provisions of the Mandate which cannot be settled by negotiation.
The Respondent has never had any dispute with the Applicants relating
to the interpretation or application of the provisions of Article 73;
there has accordingly never been any attempt to settle such dispute,
and these provisions are in any event provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations, and not provisions of the Mandate. Even if Article 73
should apply to South West Africa, it does not therefore become a
provision of the Mandate, just as the provisions of any other instrument
entered into by the Respondent with regard to South West Africa could
not be regarded as provisions of the Mandate. The preamble of the
Mandate tells us what its provisions are.
6. In any event, Article 73 conferred no legal rights or interest on
Applicants, andfor the reasonsmutatis mutandis stated in the Judgment,
they would have no legal right or interest in any claim based on this
Article.
THE ALLEGEB DREACH ESARTICLE 2, 4AND 7 (1)
Even if Article 7 (2) as well as the provisions of the conduct clauses
of the Mandate are still in force and even if the Applicants have sub-
stantive legal rights in respect thereof their submissions relating to
alleged breaches of Articles 2,4 and 7 (1) should nonetheless, in my
opinion, be dismissed for reasons which I am about to state.
The main cornplaints relate to Article (2) and they will be considered
first. Article 2 (2)
(Submissions 3 and 4)
History of the Submissions
1. Article 2 of the Mandate reads as follows :
"The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and
legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an
integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply
the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to
such local modifications as circumstances may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the
territory subject to the present Mandate."
For a full appreciation of the issues before the Court regarding
alleged contraventions of this Article, it will be necessary to give some
consideration to the history of Applicants' relevant submissions, starting
with the Applications.
2. In cornpliance with Article 32 (2) ofthe Rules of Court, Applicants
stated the precise nature of their claims relative to Article 2 (2) of the
Mandate Declaration in paragraphs E, F and G of the submissions
included in their Applications. In effect these clairns were based on
allegations:
(a) that the Respondent had failed to achieve the results contemplated
by Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Mandate;
(b) that the Respondent had "practised apartheid, i.e., [had] distin-
guished as to race, colour, national or tribal origin, in establish-
ing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the territory"; and
(c) that the Respondent had adopted and applied legislation, regula-
tions, proclamations and administrative decrees which were, by
their terms and their application, arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust
and detrimental to human dignity.
3. In the Memorials the relevant submissions were drafted rather
differently. After setting out the facts and the legal contentions upon
which the Applicants relied, the following summaries appeared in
paragraphs 189and 190of Chapter V:
"189. As the Applicants have previously pointed out, the policy
and practice of apartheid has shaped the Mandatory's behavior
and permeates the factual record. The meaning of apartheid in the
Territory has already been explained hereinabove. The explanation
warrants repeating. Under apartheid the status, rights, duties, op
138 portunities and burdens of the population are fixed and allocated
arbitrarily on the basis of race,olor and tribe, without any regard
for the actual needs and capacities of the groups and individuals
affected. Under apartheid, the rights and interests of the great
majority of the people of the Territory are subordinated to the
desires and conveniences of a minority. We here speak of apartheid,
as we have throughout this Memorial, as a fact and not as a word,
as a practice and not as an abstraction. Apartheid, as it actually
is and as it actually lias been in the life of the people of the Territory,
isa process by which the Mandatory excludes the 'Natives' of the
Territory from any significant participation in the life of the
Territory, except in so far as the Mandatory finds it necessary to
use the 'Natives' asan indispensable source of common labor or
menial service.
190. Deliberately, systematically and consistently, the Mandatory
has discriminated against the 'Native' population of South West
Africa, which constitutes overwhelmingly the larger part of the
population of the Territory. In so doing, the Mandatory has not
only failed to promote 'to the utmost' the material and moral
well-being,the social progress and the development of the people of
South West Africa, but it has failed to 'promote such well-being
and social progress in any significant degree whatever. To the
contrary, the Mandatory has thwarted the well-being, the social
progress and the development of the people of South West Africa
throughout varied aspects of their lives; in agriculture; in industry,
industrial employment, and labor relations; in government,
whether territorial, local or tribal, and whether at the political or
administrative levels; in respect of security of the preson, rights
of residence and freedom of movement; and in education. The
grim past and present reality in the condition of the 'Natives' is
unrelieved by promise of future amelioration. The Mandatory
offers no horizon of hope to the 'Native' population." (Memorials,
pp. 161-162.) [Then follows a summary of the specific matters
dealt with in the Memorials.]
Then followed subrnissions which included the following:
"3. the Union, in the respect set forth in Chapter V of this
Memorial and summarized in Paragraphs 189 and 190 thereof,
has practised apartheid, i.e., has distinguished as to race, color,
national or tribal origin in establishing the rights and duties of
the inhabitants of the Territory; that such practice is in violation
of its obligations as stated in Articlef the Mandate and Article 22
of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and that the Union
has the duty forthwith to cease the practice of apartheid in the
Territory;
4. the Union, by virtue of the economic, political, social and
educational policies applied within the Territory, which are described
139 in detail in Chapter V of this Memorial and summarized at Para-
graph 190thereof, has failed to promote to the utmost the material
and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the
Territory; that its failure to do so is in violation of its obligations
as stated in the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate and
Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the Union has the duty forth-
with to cease its violations as aforesaid and to take al1practicable
action to fulfilits duties under such Articles."
It will be noted that the submissions as formulated in the Memorials
were narrower than those in the Applications. In the Memorials Appli-
cants' whole case amounted and was confmed to an allegation of
deliberate oppression, which had been only one of several elements
relied upon in the Applications. In view of subsequent developments
this featuredoes not, however, appear of any great significance,and it is
merely noted in passing.
4. In its Counter-Memorial the Respondent dealt in detail with
Applicants' allegations, many of which were denied including those
contained in paragraphs 189and 190of Chapter V of the Memorials.
5. Apparently in an attempt to limit the factual enquiry which wouid
have been necessitated by the conflicting averments in the Memorials
and Counter-Memorial, Applicants in the Reply added a further cause
of action, which rested on an alleged norm of non-discrimination or
non-separation, defined as follows at page 274 of the Reply:
"In the following analysis of the relevant legal iiorms, the terms
'non-discrimination' or 'non-separation' are used in their prevalent
and customary sense: stated .negatively, the terms refer to the
absence of governmental policies or .actions which allot status,
rights, duties, privileges or burdens on the basis of membership
in a group, class or race rather than on the basis of individual
merit, capacity or potential: stated affirmatively, the terms refer to
governmental policies and actions the objective of which is to
protect equality of opportunity and equal protection of the laws to
individual persons as such."
They also relied upon an undefined concept referred to as "standards",
but, in view of later definition and explanation of Applicants' case in
this regard, it is not necessary to analyse the relevant parts of the Reply.
The nature of the standards ultimately relied upon by Applicants will be
considered hereafter.
6. Despite the introduction of the new cause of action based 011
the alleged "norm of non-discrimination or non-separation" and the
undefined standards, Applicants in their Replypersisted with contentions
which could be reconciled only with a case based on alleged oppression
140(vide,e.g., Reply, pp. 53-55).The position at the commencement of the
oral proceedings then was that Applicants' submissions were in the form
stated in the Memorials and quoted above (in which allegations of
oppressive conduct featured prominently) but in addition some reliance
was placed on the existence of the alleged "norm of non-discrimination
or non-separation" and undefined standards.
7. In the course of the oral proceedings Applicants' case was further
defined and narrowed down. It is not necessary or desirable to trace
in detail the manner in which this happened. However, some reference
has to be made to the main aspects of the process by which Applicants'
case came to be narrowed down.
The first aspect to which attention should be directed is that, by
agreement between the Parties, the extent of the factual dispute between
them was first whittled down, and subsequently reduced to negligible
proportions.
The virtual elimination of disputes as to fact occurred gradually
over a period, but there would appear to have been two main steps,
the record of each of which may usefully be quoted. The kst was an
agreement reached between the Parties prior to the commencement of
the oral proceedings, which agreement was communicated to the Court
in the following terms:
"South West AfricaCases
AgreementRegarding Factual Averments
Subject to reserving their right to contest the relevance of facts
containedin Respondent's pleadings,including the oral proceedings,
Applicants agree that such facts-as distinct from inferences which
may be drawn therefrom-are not contested except as otherwise
indicated, specifically or by implication, in Applicants' Written
Pleadings or in the oral proceedings.
This agreement pertains also to factual averments in respect of
which no documentary proof has been I?led, including statements
made upon Departmental Information.
Any denial of averments made in the Rejoinder will be intimated
byApplicants at the earliestconvenient stage in the oral proceedings."
The further intimation foreshadowed in this agreement was given
by Applicants' Agent on 27 April 1965.The effect thereof was that no
averments or denials offact by Respondent werecontested by Applicants.
For convenience 1 quote the relevant passage in the oral proceedings.
It reads as follows:
"Al1 facts set forth in this record, which upon the Applicants,
theory of the case are relevant to its contentions of law, are un-
disputed. There have been certain immaterial, in Our submission,
141 allegations of fact, data or other materials which have been contro-
verted by the Respondent and such controversion has been accepted
by the Applicants and those facts arenot reliedupon. The Applicants
have gone further in order to obviate any plausible or reasonable
basis for an objection that the Applicants have not painted the
whole picture in their own written pleadings. The Applicants have
advised Respondent as well as this honourable Court that al1and
any averments of fact in Respondent's written pleadings will be and
are accepted as true,unless specificallydenied. And the Applicants
have not found it necessaryand do not find it necessaryto controvert
any such averments of fact. Hence, for the purposes of these pro-
ceedings,such averments of fact, although made by Respondent in a
copious and unusually voluminous record, may be treated as if in-
corporated by referenceinto the Applicants' pleadings." (C.R. 65/22,
at p. 39.)
The effect ofthese admissions was to reduce and to alter the content
and ambit of the dispute(s) between the Parties. The admissions consti-
tute pro tanto a settlement of the dispute or disputes of which they
fomed a part. 1know of no reason in law, logic or justice why fulleffect
should not be givento them.
8. But the change in Applicants' case was not confined to the ad-
missions to which reference has just been made. Amongst the most
vigorously contested factual averments in the Memorials and Reply
were those constituting or bearing upon the allegations that Respondent's
policies were oppressive in intent or effect-allegations which were
incorporated by reference in Submissions 3 and 4. It was therefore
logically impossible for Applicants to accept as correct Respondent's
averments or denials of fact whilst persisting in submissions based upon
contestedallegations of oppression.The logic of this situation (frequently
commented on by Respondent's Counsel) eventually compelled Appli-
cants to amend their Submissions 3 and 4 so as to delete al1references
to paragraphs 189 and 190 of Chapter V of the Memorials (in which
the disputed allegations of oppressive conduct appear with particular
vigour) as well as references to the said Chapter V generally, and to
make it clear that Applicants relied solely on the alleged "norm of
non-discrimination or non-separation" as defined at page 274 of the
Reply (quoted above) as well as on "standards" l.As regards the latter,
1pointed out above that they had not been defined in the Reply. In the
course of the oral proceedings, Applicants' Agent rendered it clear that
the "standards" on which he relied were rules legally enforceableagainst
Respondent in its capacity as Mandatory, and having exactly the same
content as the "norm", i.e., as defined at page 274 of the Reply. 1 shall
later deal with the differences between the concepts of "norm" and
Text of amended submissions is given in para. 10 below.
142"standards". At present 1would emphasize only that as regards content
they were alleged to be identical.
9. Both prior to the amendment of Applicants' submissions, and
subsequently, Applicants made it clear that their whole case as regards
alleged contraventions of Article 2 (2) was based on the existence of the
alleged norm or standards of non-discrimination or non-separation.
This occurred in the course of argument on the inspection proposa1 as
well as on the merits, in reply to questions from the Court as well as to
comment by Respondent's counsel. Applicants' final attitude was that
there existed no dispute of fact between the Parties,inasmuch as Appli-
cants had accepted al1 Respondent's averments and denials, and had
stated clearlytheir whole case was based on the existence of the alleged
norm or standards. In the words of the Applicants' Agent:
"The issuebefore the Court, accordingly, is whetber the processes
of the organized international community have or have not eventu-
ated in international standards or an international legal norm,
or both." (C.R. 65/31, p. 32.)
Whereas the Applicants originally defined apartheid as constituting
wilful oppression and unjust discrimination, they ultimately emphasized
that it was merely used in thesensedefinedin Submission 3.
10. The actual amendment of Applicants' SubmissionsNos. 3 and 4,
bringing them into conformity with the earlier admissions of fact and
informal definitions of Applicants' case, occurred on 19 May 1965,just
before Applicants' Agent rested their case. The amended submissions
read as follows:
"Upon the basis of allegations of fact, and statements of law set
forth in the written pleadings and oral proceedings herein, may it
please the Court to adjudge and declare, whether the Government
of the Republic of South Africa is present or absent, that:
........................
3. Respondent, by laws and regulations, and officia1methods
and measures, which are set out in the pleadingsherein,has practised
apartheid,i.e., has distinguishedas to race, colour, national or tribal
origin in establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of
the Territory; that such practice is in violation of its obligations
143 as stated in Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations; and that Respondent has the duty forth-
with to cease the practice of apartheid in the Territory :
4. Respondent, by virtue of economic, political, social and
educational policies applied within the Territory, by means of
laws and regulations, and officia1methods and measures, which
are set out in the pleadings herein, has, in the light of applicable
international standards or international legal norm, or both, failed
to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and
social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory; that its failure
to do so is in violation of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of
the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that Respondent
has the duty forthwith to cease its violations as aforesaid and to
take al1practicable action to fulfil its duties under such Articles."
(C.R. 65/35, 19May 1965,pp. 69-70.)
In addition the following "forma1 .. .and explanatory comments
with respect toithe foregoing submissions" werepresented to the Court:
"(a) The response to the question addressed to the Applicants
by the honourable President during the course of the proceedings
of 28 April 1965,C.R. 65/25, page 31, is hereby reaffirmed in the
following respects, in particular :
1. The formulation of Submission 4 is not intended in any
manner to suggest an alternative basis upon which the Applicants
make or rest their case, other than the basis which the Applicants
present in Submission No. 3 itself (referenceis made to the verbatim
record 65/24, 30 April, p. 11);the distinction betweenSubmissions3
and 4 being verbal only, for reasons which have been set out in the
cited section of the verbatim record.
2. The reference in Submission 4 to 'applicable international
standards or international legal norm, or both' is intended to refer
to such standards and legal norm, or both, in the sense as described
and defined in the Reply at page 274, and solely and exclusivelyas
there described and defined." (C.R. 65/35, 19May 1965,pp. 71-72.)
11. It will be observed that al1 references to Chapter V of the Me-
morials, and in particular paragraphs 189 and 190 thereof, have been
deleted. Submission 4, however, even without these references could
still have been interpreted as a general allegation that the Respondent's
policies, etc., fail to promote to the utmost the material and moral
well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory. To
avoid this possibility the Applicants resorted to two methods. The first
was to qualify the general allegation of failure to promote well-being
and progress to the utmost by the words "in the light of the applicable
internationalstandards or international legal norm or both". The secondmethod was to add the forma1interpretations and explanatory comments,
so as to make it abundantly clear that Submission 4 did not rest upon
an alternative basis to that of Submission 3, and that both Submissions
rested exclusively on the norm or standards defined at page 274 of the
Reply.
12. If one now compares the final submissions with the original
statement of the precise nature of Applicants' claimsin the Applications,
it appears that the claims based upon allegations of arbitrary, unreason-
able, and unjust actions, and on conduct detrimental to human dignity,
have disappeared from the final submissions. The same applies to claims
based on allegations that Respondent had in fact failed to achieve the
results contemplated by Article 2 (2) of the Mandate. Indeed it appears
quite clearly that the allegation of failure on the part of the Respondent
to perform its duties has been narrowed down to breaches of an alleged
international norm and/or standards as defined at page 274 of the
Reply. As I have noted, the amended submissions in al1these respects
correspond entirely with informa1 explanations repeatedly given by
Applicants' Agent during the course of the oral proceedings. 1shall deal
more fullywiththe legaleffectofthe amended submissionspresently.
Legal Principles Applicable to the Interpretation of Submissions
13. Rule 42 requires that a Memorial shall contain a statement of the
relevant facts, statements of law, and the submissions.These submissions
define the issues which the Court is asked to determine, i.e., they state
concisely and precisely the conclusions the Court is asked to draw from
the facts and the law, and the reliefasked for.
Just as in municipal systems, where the statement of claim (which
broadly corresponds to the submissions) may omit an issue included
in the writ (which broadly corresponds to the Application commencing
an action in this Court), so also in proceedings in this Court submissions
may omit issues mentioned in the Application. Such an omission consti-
tutes an abandonment of whatever is omitted, and cannot constitute a
part of the issues before the Court.
It followstherefore, that only matters included in the final submissions
will be considered, i.e., the Court will abstain from deciding issues not
raised insuch submissions.
14. Where two or more parties have decided to refer a particular
dispute to the Court, and the submissions or special agreement fail to
145define such dispute satisfactorily, it would appear that the Court may
depart from the strict wording of the submissions or special agreement
in order to decide the true issueswhich the parties intended to refer to it.
Such action on the part of the Court of course postulates that there
exists an actual intention of the parties which is not properly expressed
in the submissions or special agreement. In the present case the proceed-
ings are before the Court, not by ad hoc agreement between the Parties,
but by Application in terms of a general compromissory clause, viz.,
Article 7 (2) of the Mandate. Consequently there can be no question of
the existence of any common desire or intention on the part of both
Parties to place a particular issue before the Court-it isthe Applicants
alone which invoke the Court's jurisdiction and the Court can at most
enquire as to which issues they (Le., the Applicants) wish to refer to it.
It is of course obvious that a party is not compelled to invoke the
assistance of the Court for each and every dispute which would be cog-
nizable by it.
Where a particular provision in an instrument may be breached in
more than one respect, the Applicant is not bound to allege that it was
breached in al1 these possible respects. The Applicant may choose to
allege a breach in one respect only, and deliberately formulate its sub-
missions accordingly. Such a formulation would narrow the issue, and
this Court would have no power to enquire whether some of the evidence
placedbeforeitmight or might not constitute proof ofa breach in a respect
not allegedinthe submissions.Thisis the more so when the Court knows
that such other respect was deliberately deleted from the submissions,
and for this reason al1the evidence relative thereto that could have been
placed before it has not been produced. If, e.g., Submission 5 was the
only submission relative to Article 2, this Court would have had no
authority to enquire into,Say,the issuesraised inthe original Submissions
3 and 4, even if it has competence to deal with such issues if properly
raised.
15. Where the particular respect in which a provision is alleged to
have been breached is pin-pointed in the submissions, such particulari-
zation has the effect of narrowing the issues. Such particulars do not
constitute the reasons for the allegation that the provision has been
breached, but they serve to qualify or circumscribe such allegation
so as to reduce the issue to breaches falling within the ambit of such
qualification or circumscription. In other words such particulars are
still bare averments by the parties presenting them, their purpose and
effectbeing, interalia, to indicate a precise limit to the factual allegations
which the other party or parties are called upon to meet. They must be
distinguished from arguments. Arguments do not define the alleged
breach, but advance reasons why the Court should hold that a breach
has occurred in the respects alleged in the submissions. Arguments
consequently go beyond bare assertions. They provide the logical links
between premises and conclusions-often the suggested links between
facts (admitted, established or alleged) and the conclusions averred
in the submissions. The Court is not bound by the arguments of the
146parties insupport ofthe averred conclusions in their submissions,whether
such arguments are advanced of outside of the formulation of the
submissions, but it is bound to confine itself to the dispute as par-
ticularizedtherein. It is onlyarguments, as distinct from particulars which
narrow the issue, that the Court may disregard when construing the
submissions. This is also the reason for the rule that the parties cannot
force the Court to choose between two suggested interpretations of an
instrument, since obviously the Court may find both interpretations
unacceptable. However, this power of the Court is relevant only in so
far as its interpretation may be alink in reasoning leading to acceptance
of the submissions of either of the parties, or, possibly to a result of
non possurnuswith reference to the submissions and issues before it.
The Court is not entitled to proceed from its own interpretation to the
making of an order not requested by either party.
16. In short, in a case like the present (assuming jurisdiction and
admissibility), the Applicants are entitled to place any dispute falling
within a defined category before the Court. To ascertain the nature of
the dispute, reference must prima facie be had to the submissions. The
Court may, in my view, depart from the submissions only where it is
satisfiedthat they do not accurately reflectthe intention of the Applicants,
and where, in addition, the Court is satisfied that the Respondent had
adequate knowledge or notice of the actual case sought to be made by
the Applicants. It goes without saying that no court would decide an
issue against a party who has not had proper and fair notice thereof.
17. If a question arises as to the actual intendment of the Applicants,
or the sense in which Applicants' submissions were understood by the
Respondent, the Court must in my view necessarily have regard, inter
alia,to the statements of the respectiveparties. Of course, theCourt isnot
bound by the parties' interpretation of the submissions. But where
clarifications are incorporated in the final submissions asormal explan-
ations and definitions they must be regarded as part and parce1thereof.
There also appears to be no reason why, in the case of any doubt
as to the true meaning of a submission, the Court, or a member thereof,
should not obtain an explanation by means of a question directed to the
party concerned. In fact Article 52 of the Rules expressly authorizes
the Court or a judge to ask for explanations, and there is no proviso
excepting submissions from this provision. If the Court is not to have
any regard to such explanations, there would be no point in putting
any questions.
Where submissions are amended the Court, in construing such
amended submissions,may, in case of doubt, have regard to the history
of the case that led to or culminated in such amendments.
147 150 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
18. Applying the above principle, I now turn to a consideration of
the meaning and effectofApplicants' amended SubmissionsNos. 3 and 4.
The Meaning and Legal Eflec of Submissions Nos. 3 and 4
19 (a). It may be convenient to preface my discussion of this topic
with some general remarks about the provisions of Article 2 (2), and
the type of issueswhich could arise thereunder. For theurposes of these
remarks 1 shall assume, contrary to the view expressed above, that the
Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on alleged contraventions of the
Article. An applicant may, hypothetically, ask the Court todecide as a
fact that a particular policy or measure does not promote well-being
and progress, or is likely to harm well-beingand progress. Thisoes not
appear to me to be the type of issue which could properly be determined
by a court of law, or which the authors of the mandates system could
haveintended to be referable to a court of law. But, be that as it may,
such an issue would at the very least necessitate a very full enquiry into
the facts and circumstances pertaining to the policy or measure, or its
field of operation.
(b) Alternatively, an applicant may ask the Court to hold that no
attempt whatever has been made to promote well-being and progress,
or that the mandatory's policies were directed towards some ulterior
purpose. In my view, if the Court were to have jurisdiction at al1 in
respect of alleged violations of Article 2 (2) of the Mandate, its powers
would be limited to investigating only questions such as these. The
Mandate conferred on Respondent "full power of administration and
legislatioii over the Territory subject to the present Mandate as an
integral portion of the Union of South Africa", and provided that
Respondent might "apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the
Territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may
require."
(c) These widepowers were ofcourse limited by the general objectives
of the Mandate. However, these objectiveswere embodied in expressions
such as "the well-being and development of the inhabitants", and
"promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social
progress of the inhabitants". The effect ofhese provisions is-and this
interpretation isconked by the French text-that the Respondent
was placed under a duty to do its best to achieve the aforesaid objectives
having regard to the resources available in the Territory and the realities
as they existed both in South Africa and in the Territory, the latter
having been contemplated as forming, or as capable of being treated as,
"an integral portion" of the former.
(d) Quite clearly the granr oi such extensive powers of government,
coupled with such a broadly stated trust purpose, had the effect of
vesting in the Mandatory a discretion to determine the methods and
measures whereby it would endeavour to give effect to the trust. Such
148 a discretion is, indeed, a normal incident of powers of government.
Thus in Lighthouses case between France and Greece, Judgment, 1934,
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 62, page 22, the Court remarked that:
". .. any grant of legislative powers generally implies the grant of
a discretionaryright to judge how far their exercise rnay benecessary
orurgent; .. .It is a question of appreciating political considerations
and conditions of fact, a task which the Government, as the body
possessing the requisite knowledge of the political situation is
alom quallfied to undertake." (Italics added.)
Similar conclusions were reached, specifically with reference to 'C'
mandates generally, and South West Africa in particular, by emiiient
lawyers and commentators on the mandates system (vide Counter-
Memorial, Book IV, pp. 387-389 and Rejoinder, Vol. 1, pp. 176-177,
where reference is made to comments by Chief Justice Latham of Aus-
tralia, M. Orts, Lord Hailey, Quincy Wright and Norman Bentwich).
(e) The essence of a discretionary power is that the holder of the
power is entitled by law to choose between two or more alternative
courses of conduct. When he so chooses, he does no more than he is
entitled to, and a court of law, unless specifically granted powers of
appeal, cannot interfere merely because it does not agreewith the decision
of the person exercisingthe discretion. Inthe absence of specialprovision,
a court of law is not an appellate authority over the holder of such a
power, and the court cannot substitute its own decision for his. The
most a court of law could do by virtue of its normal powers is to enquire
whether the acts in question were illegal; and it follows from the very
nature of a discretionary power that an act is not illegal merely because
a court considers that, had it been the holder of the power, it would
have acted differently.
(f) Illegal conduct by the holder of a discretionary power occurs
where he does not exercise his power at all, or where he exercises the
power in a manner contrary to expressorimpliedlimitations, prohibitions
or injunctions relating to such power. These limitations, prohibitions or
injunctions rnay take a variety of forms. There may, for instance, be
provisions regarding procedure or form, or limitations regarding the
subject-matter to which the power relates or regarding the objects for
which the power rnay be exercised. Failure to comply with such limiting
or regulatory provisions rnay of course occur in complete good faith
(e.g., by reason of a wrong interpretatioil of the provisions of the instru-
ment) or it rnay be due to improper motives or some other form of bad
faith.
(g) In the case of the Mandate, the limitations upon the Mandatory's
powers were laid down in Articles 3,4 and 5 of the Mandate Declaration
(with which we are not concerned at the moment) and in Article 2 (2)
thereof. Thelatter Article in effectlays down the objective to be pursued
by the Mandatory. It follows, therefore, that an exercise of the Man-
149datory's discretion would be declared illegal in terms of Article 2 (2)
only where the Mandatory did not pursue the authorized purpose. Such
a failure on the part of the Mandatory could, in practice, hardly arise
from a bona fide misinterpretation of the Mandate. It is consequently
difficult to imagine a case where a purported exercise of discretion by
the Mandatory could contravene Article 2 (2) unless some element of
bad faith were present. However, be that as it may, it seems clear that
if the Mandatory as a fact attempts to achieve the prescribed result, its
conduct could not be illegal merely because a particular method selected
by it in the exercise ofits discretion is not successful,or not as successful
as another would have been. Of course, failure to adapt or discontinue
an unsuccessful policy might well be some evidence of failure to exercise
a proper discretion, but that is another matter.
(h) An improper purpose or motive rnay be proved in a number of
ways, such as by direct statements of the person concerned. However,
a more frequent source of proof is circumstantial evidence, including the
nature of the act itself. If an actis so unreasonable that no reasonable
person placed in the position of the holder of the power would have
performed it, one may deduce that such act was motivated by some im-
proper motive or consideration. Of course, such a conclusion can only
be arrived at after considering al1relevant facts including the purported
purposes and effects of the act in question.
In a simple case the actual effectof a measure mayconstitute sufficient
proof of an improper purpose. In the present case,however,the purposes
to be achieved are the promotion of the material and moral well-being
and social progress of peoples consisting of various ethnic groups
differingwidelyin many important respects, andthe methods adopted by
the Mandatory were varied and complex. In these circumstances there is
no practical method of determining whether or not the prescribed
purposes have been achieved over any given period.
(i) Where a measure is part of an inter-related group of measures,
such measure should obviously not be considered in vacuo but with
due regard to its context. This context is affected, in the present case,
by the circumstance that South West Africa was expected by the authors
of the Mandate to be administered as an integral portion of South
Africa. Consequently any appraisal of a measure applying to South
West Africa must have regard to the over-al1 realities and exigencies
of a largely integrated economy and administration.
(j) In the above discussion 1considered various possible cases which
an applicant might seek to institute under Article 2 (2) of the Mandate.
1distinguished between the instances where the Mandatory is sought to
150 be called to task for failing to achieve the result of promoting well-
being and progress, and where the allegation is that it is not properly
exercisinga discretion to pursue the objective of well-beingand progress.
1 concluded that, if the Court could have dealt with the matter at all, the
latter case was the only one which could possibly be brought. 1 would
also add that this indeed appears to have been the type of case set out in
the Memorials, viz.o ,ne based on allegations that Respondent had
deliberately misused its powers for the purpose of oppression.
One further possiblecase under Article 2 (2)stillremains-an applicant
could conceivably adopt the attitude that the concept of promotion
of well-beingand progress had been authoritatively definedin one or more
respects in a manner binding on Respondent and on the Court.
20. As now worded, the final submissions restrict the issues to a case
falling within the Iast-mentioned category. Thus Applicants contend
that conduct contrary to their nom and standards is, by a legal fiction,
to be deemedincapable of promoting well-beingand progress. Applicants
have indeed rendered it clear that they do not rely on any of the other
conceivable causes of action mentioned above. There is no allegation
of omission, i.e., of a failure to exercisepowers. This was emphasized by
Applicants' Agent who repeatedly stated that the Applicants' case was
not basedon complaints that too fewhouses, schools, hospitals, irrigation
schemes, roads, etc., were built. Furthermore, the final submissions
as now worded do not allege improper purposes, wilful oppression,
arbitrary orunreasonable conduct, or unfair discrimination, nor do they
allege that Respondent's policies in fact failed to promote the material
and moral well-being or social progress of the inhabitants. Applicants'
Agent repeatedly stated that these were not the issues submitted to this
Court, that the dispute between the Parties was a legal one, which did
not require the Court to investigate either the Respondent's purposes,
motives, state of mind or the effects of its policies. The Court was not
asked to weigh the beneficial effect of a measure against the hardships
imposed by that or another measure. Such references as were made in
the Applications and the original submissions to improper purposes
and harmful effects of Respondent's policies were later deliberately
omitted. Similarly such references as were made in the original sub-
missions to unreasonable, unjust and arbitrary conduct, deliberate
oppression, etc., were intentionally deleted from the final submissions.
If regard is had to the history of the matter, particularly the oral pro-
ceedings, and Applicailts' apparent desire to avoid at al1costs an exami-
nation of the facts by this Court, the reason for these amendments
becomes clear. In any event, the numerous statements by the Applicants'
Agent, and particularly his explanations in reply to questions by members
of the Court at about the time the amendments weremade, leaveno room
for any doubt that the Applicants did not intend to raise, in their final
submissions, any issue relating to breaches of Articl2 (2) on the grounds 154 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VANWYK)
of alleged unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair conduct, deliberate oppres-
sion, ialajîdes or any other improper purposes or unsatisfactory results.
The submissions were therefore subjectivelyintended to include no more
than their clear and unambiguous language conveys, Le., that this Court
should hold that a policy which allots rights, burdens, status, privileges
and duties on the basis of membership in a group, class or race, rather
than on the basis of individual merit, capacity or potential, is illegal in
terms of Article 2 (2) of the Mandate.
21. The effect of the submissions, read together with Applicants'
forma1 definitions and explanations, is consequently that the norm
and standards upon whicli the Applicants rely are contended to be
absolute rules of law in terms of which measures which distinguish
in the manner described are per se invalid, no matter what the facts
and circumstances may be. Such policies of differentiation (Le., dis-
crimination or separation as defined) are in Applicants' Agent's own
words "impermissible ... at al1times, under al1circumstances, and in al1
places". The alleged norm and standards apply, according to Applicants'
Agent, irrespective of whether or not the policies in question in fact
promote the progress and well-being of the population as a whole. For
this reason he contended that no evidence relative to purpose, motive,
effect, etc., would be relevant or admissible.
22. Respondent has never disputed that its policies do in important
respects allot rights, duties, etc., on the basis of membership in the
various ethnic groups in the Territory, and has indeed contended that
the circumstances in the Territory are such as to render such policies
desirable if not inevitable. Nothing need now be said about the merits
of Respondent's policies. For present purposes it is important to note
only that if the norm or standard as defined at page 274 of the Reply
did exist and were applicable to South West Africa, at least a substantial
number of Respondent's measures or policies would be in conflict
therewith. The effect of this is that the issue before the Court, which
is presented as being whether Respondent's policies violated Article 2 (2)
of the Mandate, in reality turns only on whether Respondent is bound
to conform to the alleged norm or standards in its administration of
the Territory.
23. The phrase "in the light of applicable international standards
or international legal norm" in Submission No. 4 is not part of the
argumentation of the case. It was inserted with the deliberate object of
152modifying and pin-pointing the issue, and constitutes an integral and
vital part of the definition of the dispute submitted to this Court. In
Applicants' Agent's own words it constitutes the "heart and core" of
Applicants' case, on which they stand or fall.
The Court'sJurisdictionRelative to tlzeAmended Submissions3 and 4
24. 1 have now paved the way to demonstrate further reasons for
dismissing Submissions 3 and 4.
25. As demonstrated above, the dispute embraced in the final sub-
missions relates solely to the question whether or not a norm and/or
standards of non-discrimination or non-separation exist and are appli-
cable to the Mandate. As 1have already noted, this issue was first raised
during the Reply, and was elevated to the position of the soleissue some
time after the commencement of the oral proceedings. No averment
has ever been made by Applicants that this issue was at any time the
subject of negotiation between the Parties prior to institution of pro-
ceedings, or that it could not be settled by negotiation. Indeed, the
record creates the impression that Applicants themselves did not at
any stage prior to the preparation of the Reply contemplate the possi-
bility of the existence of such a norm and/or standards-an impression
which is strengthened, not only by the fact that the norm was evidently
raised in the Reply in an attempt to escape the factual enquiry necessary
for a determination of the dispute originally raised, but also by the
consideration that among the alleged sources of the norm are found a
number of instruments which came about after the institution of these
proceedings. (Vide, e.g., some of the United Nations resolutions quoted
in the Reply at p. 284; the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
quoted in the Reply, pp. 285-286; the Draft Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, quoted in the Reply, p. 286; the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Al1 Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, quoted in the Reply at pp. 286-288 and the Draft Inter-
national Convention on the Eiimination of Al1 Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, quoted in the Reply, pp. 288-289.) Alternatively, if we
assume that Applicants had at an early stage,e.g., when filingthe Appli-
cations in commencement of this action, considered the possibility of
basing a claim on the alleged existence of the norm or standards, they
refrained from setting out such a claim in the Mernorials in the manner
required by Article 42 of the Rules of Court, and thereby prevented
the jurisdictional questions pertaining to such a claim from being
raised and considered at the preliminary objections stage. In either
event it is clear that the dispute has not beeii shown to be one which,
in the words of Article 7 (2) of the Mandate. "cannot be settled by
negotiation". Consequently, for this reason also, the Court in my view
has no jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by Submissions 3
and 4.
153 26. 1 now turn to a further jurisdictional question which arises in
regard to this part of the case. Article(2)limits the Court's jurisdiction
to disputes "relating to the interpretation or the application of the
provisions of the Mandate". It would consequently not be enough for
Applicants to show that the alleged norm or standards exist, and are
binding on Respondent. Before the Court could make any order it
would have to be satisfied in addition that the norm or standards have
some bearing on the provisions of the Mandate. It may be helpful
therefore to consider whether any rule having the content of Applicants'
alleged norm or standard can at al1be read into the Mandate. In this
regard 1 wish to mention the fol-lowing considerations:
(a) If it was intended that differentiation on the basis of membership
of a group, class or race should be prohibited, express language
to that effect would have been used in the Mandate.
(b) The very contrary is the position-the Mandate expressly authorized
differentiation on thesaid basis in the provisions relating to military
training and the supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages.
(c) The Mandate furthermore authorized the application of Respon-
dent's existing laws to the Territory. It was generally known at
the time that policies of differentiation were applied in the Union
of South Africa, substantially similar to those employed in the
Territory.
(d) Policies of differentiation were being applied when the Mandate
came into force in comparable territories by several of the more
important members of the League.
(e) The conduct of al1the parties to the Mandate at al1material times
reveals that there was general acquiescence in the policy of differ-
entiation.
(i) Practically al1the speciJicpolicies objected to in the Mernorials
were applied in South West Africa during the lifetitne of the
League. Many of these policies were expressly approved by
the League organs. At no time was any objection made on
the grounds of a norm or standards as now contended for
by the Applicants.
(ii) Policies of differentiation (many of them similar to those
applied by the Respondent) wereapplied throughoutthe lifetime
of the League by other mandatories. No objection was raised
on the grounds now advanced by the Applicants. As will be shown, the undisputed statements in Respondent's
pleadings and the uncontradicted evidence of the expert witnesses
strongly support the policy of differentiation: these witnesses al1
agree that, if the alleged norm or standards were to be applied,
the promotion of weI1-being and social progress would not be
advanced. This underlines the unlikelihood that the Mandate
would at its inception have included such implied provisions, and
shows that the subsequent incorporation thereof into the Mandate
would have constituted a material amendment thereto.
27. It has not been, and in my view could not be, suggested that the
Mandate has been amended to include the norm or standards relied
upon by Applicants. It is clear that no amendment could have been
effected without the consent of the Respondent, and it is common cause
that Respondent has always vigorously resisted the imposition upon
it of any rule of the sort relied upon by Applicants. It follows, therefore,
that even if the alleged norm or standards were to exist, this Court
would have no jurisdiction to consider alleged violations thereof, in-
asmuch as they do not constitute provisions of the Mandate.
28. In attempting to establish jurisdiction, Applicants contended,
lïrstly, that the alleged standards were binding on Respondent by
reason of an implied agreement in the Mandate itself, in terms of which
the Mandatory was bound to submit to standards laid down by the
supervisory authority. This contention, if accepted, would partly solve
Applicants' jurisdictional problems, but, for reasons to be dealt with
later, it is in my view completely unsound.
29. As regards their norm contention, Applicants argued tlîat Re-
spondent was under an obligation in terms of the Mandate to govern
in accordance with law, and that consequently any legal norm binding
upon Respondent as the administering authority in respect of South
West Africa would be enforceable under Article 7 (2) of the Mandate.
The argument rests on fallacy. The Mandate carried within itself
no obligations other than those expressly or impliedly falling within its
terms. Any other legal norms, rules or obligations that might be binding
upon Respondent, as the governing authority in respect of South West
Africa, would be so binding because of the particular considerations
from which their binding legal force was derived, and not by reason
of any provision, express or implied, of the Mandate. Such norms,
rules or obligations might conceivably be derived from municipal
law, custornary international law, or treaty, and a violation ofsuch a
norm, rule or obligation would be unlawful not because of the provisions
of the Mandate, but because of the relevant municipal law, international
customary law or treaty. The point seems so axiomatic as hardly to
155warrant discussion. If, for example, a ship belonging to a foreign govern-
ment were to be damaged in a South West African harbour, and a
dispute should arise in regard to possible liability on the part ofRe-
spondent as the harbour authority, such a dispute could surely not be
said to relate to the interpretation or application of the provisions
of the Mandate. The same would apply to a dispute arising under,
Say, a commercial treaty between Respondent, as governing authority
for South West Africa, and another State or States. It should be remem-
bered that such a treaty could quite conceivably have been eiltered
into with a State or States that were not parties to the Mandate+.g.,
the United States of America, which never became a member of the
League. Even as regards disputes between Respondent and another
member of the League of Nations, Article 7 (2) clearly envisâged a
distinction between those disputes concerning the provisions of the
Mandate and those concerning some other norm, rule or obligation.
If this were not so, the words "relating to the interpretation or applica-
tion of the provisions of the Mandate" in Article 7 (2) would have
been redundant and meaningless. Those words were clearly intended
to have a limiting effect on the disputes which would be justiciable
under Article 7 (2). And if Applicants' contention were correct, they
would have no limiting effect atall, and should be regarded as pro non
scripto.
Consequently it is evident that no rule or obligation could be justi-.
ciable under Article 7 (2) unless it was specificallyrendered a provision
of the Mandate, either by the legal processes whereby the Mandate
came into existence or by legal processes of amendment of the Mandate.
30. In a final attempt to establish jurisdiction, Applicants relied on
the League resolution of 18 April 1946 as rendering Chapters XI, XII
and XII1 of the United Nations Charter relevant to the interpretation
of the Mandate. This contention also bears on the merits of Applicants'
case, and can be dealt with more conveniently at a later stage. At present
it will sufficeto Saythat none of Applicants' arguments have convinced
me that this Court has jurisdiction to determine the issue raised by the
reformulated Submissions 3 and 4, and for this reason alone 1 think
these Submissions should be dismissed.
31. 1 do not wish to rest my opinion on these jurisdictional points
only. 1 shall consequently now turn to an examination of the sources
suggested for the norm and standards in order to determinetheir validity
or otherwise.
At the commencement it might b'econvenient to clarify a matter of
terminology. 1 pointed out earlier that in Applicants' usage of the
terms, the norm and the standards were legally enforceable rules both
156possessing an identical content, Le., as definedat page 274of the Reply l.
The sole difference between the two concepts was that standards were
said to be binding only on Respondent as Mandatory, whereas the norm
was said to be binding on al1States, including Respondent in its capacity
as a sovereign State. Bearing in mind the suggested distinction between
the two types of rules, I now turn to the sources alleged to have given
rise to them.
The Sources of the Standards
32. 1shall deal with the allegedsources ofthestandards first, and there-
after with the alleged sources of the norm, including sources which
are said to be common to both the standards and the norm.
33. The Applicants contended firstly that the Mandate provides by
implication that the organized international community in general, and
the competent supervisory organ referred to in Article 6 of the Mandate
Declaration in particular, were empowered to enact legal rules relative
to the administration of the Territory (called "standards" by the Ap-
plicants) to which the Respolident was obliged to give effect. Secondly,
the Applicants contended that, inasmuch as the Respondent was a
Member of the United Nations Organization and the International
Labour Organisation, it was not only bound by the constitutions of
these institutions but also by "the authoritative interpretation thereof"
by the organs of these institutions, and that, therefore, the provisions
of the constitutions of these institutions, thus interpreted, constituted
standards binding on the Respondent in its administration of South
West Africa. The Applicants further contended that in any eveiit the
legal effect of the League resolution of 18 April 1946, which referred
to Chapters XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter, is that the Mandate "must
be read in the light of the Charter".
(a) The Supervisory Authority under Article 6
34. It is of course basic to Applicants' argument regarding the alleged
standard-creating competence of the supervisory authority that there
still exists an authority vested with supervisory powers in respect of
South West Africa as a mandated territory. In an earlier part of this
opinion 1 expressed the view that Article 6 of the Mandate hqd lapsed
on the dissolution of the League and that Respondent was no longer
subject to any duty of accountability to any autkority whatsoever.
If this view is correct, it would by itself dispose of 'Applicants' con-
giventexplicit definitions of the sense in which they use thern. To adopt other defi-
nitions would be tantamount to changing the case the Respondent was called upon
to meet.tention with which 1 am dealing at present. The same result may, how-
ever, also be reached in different ways. In this regard the question arises
whether any supervisory authority in respect of Mandates ever possessed
competence to impose binding rules of conduct upon the Mandatory.
To this enquiry I now turn.
(i) TlzeCouncilof the League
35. I shall commence by first considering whether the supervisory
organ referred to in Article 6 of the Mandate itself was clothed with
competence to establish such legal rules. (It would appear that if the
specific supervisory autiîority was not assigned such competence, the
whole basis of the Applicants' further submission relative to the com-
petence of the organized international community in general also col-
lapses.)
What strikrs one forcibly when examining the provisions of the Cove-
nant and the mandate instrument, is that no express provision in support
of Applicants' contentions is to be found therein. If it was indeed the
intention of the authors of these instruments that the League Council
would have the legislative powers now contended for by the Applicants
they would have said so in clear and unmistakable terms. In those ex-
ceptional cases where a decision of the Council had a law-creating effect,
i.e., could bind members of the League who had not assellied thereto,
explicit language was used. See, e.g., Articles 5 and 15 of the Covenant.
In addition, al1 decisions relative to mandate administration required
unanimity, and if indeed, as assumed by theCourtin 1962,theMandatory
was given the right to vote where its Mandate was concerned (a matter
to which 1 alluded above), no unanimity could be obtained without its
CO-operation. It follows that the Mandatory would then not have
been bound by any resolutions not acceptable to it.
36. Bethat as it may, anexamination of the scheme set outin Article 22
of the Covenant by itself reveals the untenability of Applicants' conten-
tions. Paragraph 2 States in terms that the "best method" of giving prac-
tical effect to the principle that the well-being and development of the
peoples of the territories concerned form a sacred trust of civilization,
is that the tutelage of such peoples slzould be entrusted to advanced
nations, who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their
geographical position could best undertake this responsibility. This
tutelage was entrusted to certain couiltries as mandatories on behalf
of the League: it was not entrusted to the League. The tutelage became
the responsibility of the mandatory. In the case of South West Africa,
paragraph 6 of Article 22 provided in express terms that it "can best be
administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions
of its territory". The only qualification of this wide statement was that
such administration was to be subject to the safeguards mentioned in
the interests of the indigenous population, i.e., provisions relating to
158freedom of conscience and religion, the slave trade, arms traffic, liquor
traffic, military training of Natives, etc. If it was intended that the-
cil of the League could without the Respondent's concurrence prescribe
the standards upon which the legislative measures applicable to the
Territory should be based, the Respondent's legislative and administra-
tive powers would hardly have Geenexpressed in such wide and unquali-
fied terms.
37. This conclusion is confirmed by the events which took place
before and during the drafting of the Covenant. Earlier proposals that
the League itself should be vested with complete authority and control
and that it should be entitled to govern the territories which eventually
became mandated territories by delegating its powers to States or "or-
ganized agencies", were abandoned, and the final outcome was that
the League's functions were to be limited to examining the mandatories'
annual reports with a view to ascertaining whether they had performed
their duties, and to assist anddvise them. No right or duty wasconferred
upon the League to prescribefrom time to time standards binding upon
the mandatories in general, or upon any particular mandatory.
The supervisory powers of the Council were accordingly stated in
the following terms in Article 22, paragraph 7, of the Covenant: "In
every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council
an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge."
This can clearly not be read asproviding that the Council was empowered
to lay down legislativelyi.e., without the mandatory's consent) standards
binding on the mandatory. It is true that, in terms of paragraph 8 of
Article 22, the Council was authorized to define the degree of authority,
control or administration to be exercised by the mandatory. But this
power is not relevant to the present discussion since it was obviously
intended to be exercised only once, i.e., for the purposes of framing the
mandate instruments. That this is so, appears not only from the pro-
visions in paragraph 8, which made the Council's function in this respect
dependent on whether or not such degree of authority, etc., had not
previously been agreed upon by the members of the League, but also
from the mandate declarations themselves which in effect provided
that the mandates would not be amended without the consent of the
mandatory and the Council. Paragraph 9 of Article 22 provided for
the creation of a "permanent Commission" which was to advise the
Council on al1 matters relating to the "observance" of the mandates.
If it was intended that the Council would have legislative powers in
respect of the mandates, the functions of this expert commission would
not have been confined to advising on the "observance" of the mandates,
but would also haverelated to the enactment and amendment ofstandards
from time to time.
38. An examination of the provisions of the Mandate Declaration
leads to the same conclusion. This Declaration could not amend Arti-
cle22 of the Covenant, and must therefore always be read subject thereto. Full power of legislation and administration, subject only to the pro-
visions of the Mandate, was granted to the Respondent. No such power
was vested in the Council of the League. The obligation to promote
well-being and progress to the best of its abiiity, having regard to the
resources available to it, was imposed on the Mandatory; and the Man-
date provided that the Mandatory would have the discretionary powers
required for the effectivedischarge ofsuch an obligation. These powers
were in no way fettered by an obligation to comply with standards
imposed by the organs of the League.
It will be recalled that the Mandate was issued as a forma1 act of
the League Council. If the Council had thought that it could lawfully
prescribe standards from time to time it would not have been necessary
to include the provisions of Articles 3 to5 in the Mandate. The Council
could then, if it so desired, have prescribed these provisions as standards,
which it could have amended, repealed or added to from time to time
without the Mandatory's consent.
39. The Hymans report-it was issued even prior to the completion
of the Mandate Declarations-in dealing with the obligations falling
upon the League of Nations under the terms of Article 22 of the Cove-
nant, made no reference to a contemplation that the supervisory organs
of the League would lay down binding standards of government upon
the mandatories. On the contrary itstated, interalia, that "the Mandatory
will enjoy in my judgment a full exercise of sovereignty in so far as
such exercise is consistent with the carrying out of the obligations in
paragraphs 5 and 6". Under a section headed "The extent of the League
right of control", one also finds no reference to this alleged legislative
power. On the contrary it was emphasized that the Council's power
was limited to ascertaining whether the mandatory had remainec!within
the limits ofits powersunder Article 22 ofthe Covenant andthe Mandate
Declaration, and whether good use had been made of such powers.
40. The conclusion that the Council possessed no competence to lay
down binding standards is confirmed by an examination of the view
which the League organs themselves took of their powers. At no time
did they claim the power to lay down general rules in the nature of the
standards contended for by the Applicants. On the contrary, the generally
accepted view of their functions was that they consisted of CO-operation
with the mandatories and of determining how far the principles of the
Covenant and the mandates had been truly applied. See Quincy Wright,
Mandates Under theLeague of Nations, 1930,page 197. Bentwich, page
1 16,states:
"The Commission. ..has been at pains to make it clear that
it is not concerned itself, and that the Council of the League is
not concerned, with the administration of the Mandated territory,
which is the exclusive function of the Mandatory power."
41. For the above reasons, 1 find that the Council had no power t0
160lay down binding standards for the administration of the mandates.
(ii) The Permanent Mandates Commission
42. 1now proceed to examine a specificcontention of the Applicants,
namely that the Permanent Mandates Commission had established
certain standards which are binding on the Respondent. They allege
that these standards are reflectedin pronouncements of general principles
or were "developed through continuous application of general criteria
to concrete factual situations". The truth is that the Mandates Com-
mission had no legislative powers. Indeed, it possessed no independent
powers at al]. Its function was limited to advising the Council. It is true
that an interpretation of the mandate by the Permanent Mandates
Commission which was accepted by the Council became a precedent
to which a prudent mandatory would have had due regard; but this
is somethi~g quite different from saying that such a precedent became
binding law which had to be applied by each and every mandatory,
irrespective of its particular circumstances.
The nature of the twofold task of the Commission was contrasted
by Quincy Wright as follows:
"In supervising the mandates the Commission has felt obliged
to limit its criticism by law. It does not censure the mandatory
unless the latter's orders or their application are infinite conflict
with the mandate or other authoritative text, but if such a conflict
is reported by the Commission and the report is adopted by the
Council the mandatory is bound to recognize it. It becomes an
authoritative interpretation of the latter's obligations. .
In CO-operating with the mandatories, however, though the
League's powers are more limited, the scope of its suggestions is
infinitely wider. It has not coiîsidered itself limited by authoritative
documents but has formulated standards of good administration
from the widest sources, and suggested whatever practical steps
it deems expedient to give them effect. Such suggestions, how-
ever, even when endorsed by the Council, never have more than
the character of advice. The Mandatory is free to differ from them
though if based on an adequate understanding of the situation he
will do well to consider them."
It is true that the Commission laid down certain standards for its
own guidance but these standards were standards in the ordinary sense
of the word-not standards in the sense of legal rules. Quincy Wright
States at page 220:
"The Commission has found it necessary to establish certain
standards for its own use on full realisation that tliese are in no
sense binding but subject to modification by experience." In any event, although the Mandates Commission on one occasion,
and individual members thereof on a few occasions, appeared to have
been critical of certain aspects of some of the Respondent's policies of
differentiation, the over-al1impression gained from a detailed study of
the Mandatory's andthe Commission's reports isnot only that the general
principles of the Respondent's policies were not objected to by the Com-
mission, but that in basic and important respects they were actually
approved of. However, the point that 1wish to stress at the moment is
that neither the Mandates Commission nor the Council of the League
ever attempted to lay down any standards which purported to constitute
legal rules binding on the mandatories. No doubt they would have been
extremelysurprised to hear it suggested tliat they possessed such powers.
'(iii) The GeneralAssembly of the UnitedNations
43. If the League organs could not lay down standards in the sense
contended for by the Applicants, it follows that, even if the Geiieral
Assembly of the United Nations has been substituted for those organs,
it similarly has no such power. Indeed, as far as 1am aware, it has never
been suggested that the United Nations possesses wider powers in re-
spect of the Mandate for South West Africa than those formerly held
by the organs of the League.
Thus this Court in 1950expressed the opinion that the United Nations
had supervisory powers under the Mandate relative to the Respondent's
administration of South West Africa, but held that the degree of super-
vision should ilot exceed that wliich applied under the mandates system,
and should conform as far as possible to the procedure followed in this
respect by the Council of the League of Nations. This was interpreted
in 1955 by this Court (p. 72) "to relate to substantive supervision",
and "to the measui-eand means of supervision", and meant that "the
General Assembly should not adopt such methods of supervision or
impose such conditions.. . as are inconsistent with the terms of the
Mandate or with a proper degree of supervision measured by the stan-
dards and the metlzods applied by the Council of the League".
At page 74 of the 1955Opinion it was repeated that the 1950Opinion
"must be interpreted as relating to substantive matters".
In 1956, in his separate opinion, Judge Winiarski said: "1 believe
that the maintenance of the previously exisiing situation constitutes the
dominant theme of the Opinion and that the decisive test is to be found
in what was formerly done" (p. 33).
Judge Klaestad in liis separaie opinion iii 1955, at pages 87 and 88,
stated expressly that decisions of the United Nations organs concerning
reports and petitions relating to South West Africa have no binding
force. It should be borne in mind that this statement was made on the
assumption that the United Nations had succeeded to the powers ofthe League relative to the Mandate. It also appears from the Opinion
of the Court in 1955that, on its view of the 1950Opinion, the authority
of the General Assembly to take decisions in respect of reports and
petitions concerning South West Africa was derived from Article 10
of the Charter. This section authorizes the General Assembly to make
recomrnendationsand nothing more.
44. It is also significant that no legislative powers were given to the
supervisory organs of the United Nations in respect of trust territories.
See Kelson, Law of the UnitedNations, page 630. This also appears from
Judge Lauterpacht's separate opinion in 1955, page 116.
Several examples are given in the aforesaid Opinion of States ad-
ministering trust territories who asserted their right not to accept re-
commendations of the General Assembly or of the Trusteeship Council.
It seems unlikely that the authors of the Charter would have granted
lesser powers to the United Nations relative to trusteeship territories
than had been held by the League relative to mandates-or that in the
case of the one mandate not converted to trusteeship the United Nations
should have greater powers than in respect of trusteeships.
(b)The Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation
45. The next contention to be considered is to the effect that by
becoming a Member of the United Nations Organization and the
International Labour Organisation, the Respondent as Mandatory be-
came bound to give effectto the standards embodied in the constitutions
of these Organizations as interpreted by their respective organs. As
regards the United Nations Charter, Applicants relied mainly on
Article 56 read with Article 55(c). Assuming that these Articles created
legal rights and/or obligations (a matter which is not free from doubt)
it seems clear to me that they do not contain the standards relied upon
by Applicants. The combined effect of the two Articles (in respects
relevant to the present enquiry) is that Members of the Organization
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in CO-operation
with the Organization to achieve universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for al1without distinction
as to race, sex, language or religion. It is to be noted that these Articles
deal with distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion only in one
context, viz., the context of "human rights and fundamental freedoms".
At the same time the Charter does not purport to lay down or define
these rights and freedoms, and, as is well known, subsequent attempts
at drafting comprehensive and legally effective instruments for this
purpose have not proved successful. In the result the whole concept
of "human rights and fundamental freedoms" is as yet an undefined
and uncertain one with no clear content. It is not, however, necessary
163to consider this matter any further, since what is abundantly clear is
that Articles 55 (c) and 56 cannot operate beyond the field of respect
for, and observance of, "human rights and fundamental freedoms",
whatever such concepts might inean. The Articles do not in terms
deal with the subject of allotments of rights, burdens, privileges, etc.,
and they certainly do not, either in their wording or effect, prohibit al1
such allotments on the basis of race, sex, language, religion, group or
class. That thisis so, appears not only from the provisions of the Articles
themselves, but from the Charter as a whole. Thus Article 73 of the
Charter, dealing with "territories whose peaples have not yet attained
a full measure of self-government", prescribes "due respect for the
cultures of the peoples concerned" and that "due account should be
taken of the political aspiratioiis of the peoples" and that they should
be assisted in the development of their "free political institutionsccord-
ing to the particular circumstances of each Territory and itspeoples and
its varying stages of advancement". Article 55 must be read with due
regard to the provisions of Article 73 referred to above, and can ac-
cordi,?gly not be iaterpreted to mean that a governing authority is
prohibited from having regard to the political aspiratioris of different
peoples inhabiting parts of the same territory, orto their varying stages
of advancement, in selecticg the criteria or measures to be adopted in
promoting their well-beingand sxial progress. On thecontrary, Article 55
itself incorporates the principle of "self-detrrmination of peoples" as
one of its main objects.
46. Much the ssme situation exists with regard to the Constitution
of the 1,lternational Labour Organisation. The provision there relied
upon (C.R. 65/34at p. 57)was the following passage fromthe Declaration
of Philadelphia which read :
". .. al1 human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have
the right topursue both their material well-being and their spiritual
development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic
security and equal opportunity ...".
Here again the wording does not support the existence of a general
prohibition of the allotment of rights, burdens, privileges, etc., on
the basis of group, class or race. And this conclusion is strengthened
by the express sanctioning of such differential allotments, at least in
certain spheres, in the following passage from the same instrument:
"The Conference affirms that the principles set forth in this
Declaration are fully applicable to al1peoples everywhere and that,
while the manner of their application must be determined with
due regard to the stage of social and economic development reached
by each people, their progressive application to peoples who
are still dependent, as well as to those who have already achieved
self-government, is a matter of concern to the whole civilised
world."
This passage clearly indicates that the Declaration of Philadelphia did not purport to establish, and cannot even be reconciled with a
standard of the content relied upon by Applicants.
47. Possibly because they realized that the wording of these instru-
ments did not support their thesis, Applicants relied mainly upon
so-called "interpretations" of the instruments by the organs of the
respective organizations. This was so particularly with reference to
the United Nations Charter. Since the whole question of the weight
and effect of resolutions and reports of agencies and organs of the
United Nations has a wider relevance than purely with reference to
so-called standards, it might be better to postpone a fuller discussion
thereof to a later stage. At the present juncture 1 shall consequently
confine myself to one aspect, viz., that no such resolution or report
could lawfully add to or subtract from the meaning of the Charter in
such a way as to bind the Court, which must necessarily give its own
interpretation of any texts relevant to its judgment. Indeed, in the
case of the International Labour Organisation Constitution this principle
was expressly laid down in the following words of Article 37:
"Any question or dispute relating to the interpretation of this
Part of the present treaty or of any subsequentconvention concluded
by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this part of the
present treaty shall be referred forecision to the Permanent Court
of International Justice."
48. It is necessary to revert briefly at this stage to aatter already
dealt with, viz., the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain disputes
regard.ing alleged violations of the standards and/or norm. 1 expressed
the view earlier in this Opinion that the Court would have no such
jurisdiction inasmuch as such as dispute would not be one "relating to
the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate".
It will be recalled that Applicants sought to overcome their difficulties
in this regard, interalia, by arguing that the Mandate itself contained
an implied provision empowering the supervisory authority to lay down
standards binding upon the Mandatory. 1 have given my reasons for
regarding this contention as untenable, but even if it were sound, it
provides no basis upon which alleged violations of the Constitution
of the International Labour Organisation or of pronouncements of
its organs could become justiciable in terms of Article 7 (2) of the
Mandate. It surely cannot be said that the International Labour Or-
ganisation is in anysense a supervisory authorityin respect of mandates.
49. It may also be convenient at this stage to deal with the merits
of a further contention advanced by the Applicants which relates mainly
to the question of jurisdiction, to which reference was made earlier
in this Opinion. The contention is that the provisions of the Charter
referred to in the League resolution on 18 April 1946 must, by reason
of such reference, be regarded as being in pari materia with Article 2
165 of the Mandate, and consequently relevant to its interpretation. Now
as regards interpretation stricto sensu, Le., the ascertainment of the
meaning of a document, this contention is clearly untenable. 1 cannot
see how the United Nations Charter, executed in 1945, could throw
any light on the intentions of the authors of the Mandate, a document
executed in 1920. What is possible, of course, is that the parties in
1946 could have agreed to attach a particular meaning to the earlier
document, irrespective of what the intentions of the parties to such
an earlier document might have been. It is clear, however, that the
aforesaid resolution embodied no such agreement. It did no more than
to note that Chapters XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter embodied "prin-
ciples" "corresponding" to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant.
It did not purport to attach an agreed meaning to the mandates, and,
indeed, it could hardly do so with the blanket reference to Chapters XI,
XII and XIII-Chapters which deal with classes of territories differing
among themselves and from the mandated territories.
In passing it may be noted that this resolution, even if relevant in the
sense contended for by Applicants, cannot serve to render applicable
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, since these Articles are found in
Chapter IX of the Charter, and not in Chapters XI, XII or XIII, which
were the Chapters referred to in the resolution.
The Sources of the AllegedNorm
50. 1 now proceed to consider the Applicants' submission that the
rule of non-discrimination or non-separation had ripened into a legal
norm binding even upon sovereign States. 1 have already expressed
my view that, even if such a norm were to have been created, this Court
would not possessjurisdiction to determine disputes as to its observance.
However, it may be as well also to consider the merits of Applicants'
contentions in this regard.
Applicants contended that the norm had its origin in each or al1
of the sources of international law enumerated in Article 38 (1) of the
Statute of this Court. 1 propose dealing with the various paragraphs
of the Article in turn.
(a) Article8 (1) (a)
51. The contention is that this paragraph, which authorizes this Court
to apply international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States, has
relevance, inasmuch as "the provisions of the United Nations Charter
and the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation as
interpreted by these organizations respectively bind the Respondent".
In essence, therefore, the argument is the same as dealt with above
in regard to standards. There 1 expressed the view, which is equally
applicable in the present context, that the instruments concerned cannot
166be interpreted to lay down the rule relied upon by Applicants, that the
organs of the organizations do not have the power to lay down such
a rule by way of "interpretation", and that in any event, this Court
has no jurisdiction to determine disputes arising from alleged violations
of these instruments.
At the later stage 1will deal somewhat more fully with United Nations
resolutions and reports and will give my reasons for concluding that
these pronouncements in fact did not even purport to lay down rules
or standards of the content relied upon by the Applicants.
(b) Article 38 (1) (b)
52. The next contention relies on the provisions of Article 38 (1) (b)
and is to the effect that through the collectiveprocesses of the organized
international community, including mainly the resolutions of the
United Nations relative to discrimination, and particularly those con-
demning the policies pursued by the Respondent in South West Africa
and in the Republic of South Africa, there has arisen a norm of customary
international law of the content contended for by Applicants. In this
connection Applicants did not contend that they could satisfy the
traditional tests applied by this Court in determining the existence or
otherwise of "international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law"; and indeed, it is clear that they could not. Applicants
did not even attempt to show any practice by States in accordance with
the alleged norm, but relied on statements of States relating, not to the
practice of those or other States, but to criticism of the Respondent's
policies. More attention will be given to this topic later, but at present
1 would like to mention that Applicants did not even seek to show that
such criticism was in some way related to the creation, or existence,
of a norm with a content as relied upon by them.
Indeed, the evidence before the Court, with which 1 shall deal later,
showed that the alleged norm played no role at al1in the United Nations
activities relied upon.
53. Evidence as to actual State practice in regard to differential
allotments of rights, privileges, burdens, etc., was indeed presented
to the Court, but by the Respondent. In this regard reference may be
made particularly to Professor Possony, who, after a long and careful
survey of officia1measures and methods throughout the world, con-
cluded :
"Mr. President, from what 1 have indicated to the Court with
relation to the practice al1 over the world, there is no general
observance of such a rule or norm."
Professor Possony7s review and conclusion were not challenged and
certainly not in the least shaken in cross-examination.
54. As 1 have said, Applicants did not seek to apply the traditional
167rules regarding the generation of customary law. On the contrary
Applicants' contention involved the novel proposition that the organs
of the United Nations possessed some sort of legislative competence
whereby they could bind a dissenting minority. It is clear from the
provisions of the Charter that no such competence exists, and in my
view it would be entirely wrong to import it under the guise of a novel
and untenable interpretation of Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of
this Court.
55. In an alternative contention the Applicants suggested that even
if the Respondent's opposition to the attempted imposition of a norm
may prevent the norm being binding on the Respondent as a sovereign
State, such opposition has no relevance to applicability of the norm
to South West Africa. This contention is in my viewdevoid of substance.
The authorities are agreed that no treaty can apply to South West
Africa without the Respondent's consent, and it follows that since
acquiescence is a prerequisite to the creation of a new norm, it is the
Respondent's acquiescence that is required in so far as South West
Africa is concerned.
(c) Article 38 (1) (c)
56. The Applicants next invoked the provisions of Article 38 (1) (c)
to justify their alleged norm, which they contended should be distilled
from the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
The first fallacy in this contention is that this subsection does not
authorize the application of the laws of civilized nations, it limits the
Court to "the general principles of law" of these nations. It certainly
does not mean that by legislating on particular domestic matters a
majority of civilized nations could compel a minority to introduce
similar legislation. If, for example, every State but one were to enact
a law prohibiting the manufacture of atomic weapons, or enforcing
the enfranchisement of women, the remaining State would not be
obliged to bring its laws into conformity with the rest. In any event,
the evidence of ProfessorPossony, Professor van den Haag and Professor
Manning proves that such a rule is not universally observed, and that
laws and official practices to the contrary exist in a large number of
States, including the Applicants'. The fact that neither of the Applicant
States observes this alleged norm or standards in their respective coun-
tries indeed reveals the artificiality of their cases.
(d) Article 38 (1) (d)
57. Although the Applicants also purported to rely on the provisions
of Article 38 (1) (d) as a source of their norm, they did not refer to a
single judgment, opinion or author confirming the existence thereof.Reports and Resolutions of United Nations Organsand Agencies
58. Since the first introduction of the alleged norm of non-discri-
mination or non-separation in the Reply, Applicants have relied heavily
on reports and resolutions of United Nations organs and agencies.
In their final argument these pronouncements indeed constituted the
very basis of their case-they were the method whereby standards
were said to be created, and provided the raw material for the attempted
invocation of Article 38 (1) (a) and 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the
Court as providing the sources of the norin. For the reasons 1 have
given, 1 find that these various pronouncements cannot in law create
any rules of conduct binding upon Respondent. In addition, as 1 have
noted, the United Nations reports and resolutions did not purport
to apply or create any norm of the content relied upon by Applicants.
1 would, in concluding this part of my opinion, elaborate somewhat
on this aspect, dealing particularly with the resolutions relatingpecifi-
cally to South Africa and South West Africa.
59. The detailed and uncontradicted evidenceplaced before this Court
reveals that these resolutions were mainly the result of concerted action,
by a large number of African States, assisted by many others, designed
to bring about the immediate independence of South West Africa
as a single unit to be governed by the indigenous peoples on the basis
of universal adult franchise.Inasmuch as the Respondent's administra-
tion stands in the way of this objective, schemes were evolved in an
attempt to have it terminated. Hence these proceedings, brought nomi-
nally by the Applicants only, but in fact by al1 these African States.
As part of their campaign to achieve their aforesaid objective these
States worked in close collaboration with certain so-called petitioners
from South West Africa at the United Nations.
60. These petitioners have at al1 times asserted that they represent
the Natives of South West Africa-assertions which were apparently
generally believed at the United Nations. The uncontradicted evidence
placed before us, however, reveals that their claims are false. Some
of the organizations which some of them allegedly represent exist on
paper only, and apart from the representatives of the Herero nation
they do not represent the majority of any one of these Native groups.
Even those who claim to represent the Herero nation do not always
correctly represent the views of those people. Thus, whereas the Herero
leaders in South West Africa apparently favour a system of regionalism
whereby the Territory is to be divided on a federal basis between certain
groups (but excluding the White group), some petitioners at the United
Nations create the impression that what is desired by these people is
that the Territory should be governed as a single unit.
A large number of petitions and statements by these petitioners,
169 containing numerous false and grossly distorted allegations relative
to the Respondent's policies and practices in South West Africa, have
been placed before the organs of the United Nations from time to
tirne. The cumulative picture painted by them is one of oppression
of the worst possible kind including genocide, slavery, concentration
camps; that Respondent's policies were rooted in concepts of racial
superiority and in racial hatred and animosity; that the best lands
were being taken from Natives and given to White farmers, the Natives
being driven to the desert or herded like animals; that education for
the Natives either did not exist or merely prepared them for slavery;
that there was large-scale militarization of the Territory and terrori-
zation of the Natives, etc. Unfortunately these falsehoods were ap-
parently accepted as true by a large number of States who voted in
favour of the resolutions condemning Respondent's policies. Often
these alleged acts were included in the term apartheid, and it seems
clear that when Respondent's policies of apartheid were condemned
it was in the belief that the petitions had painted a true picrure. (One
need merely have regard to the hundreds of false statements in the
Applicants' Memorials-statements proved and admitted to be false-
to appreciate the prcportions of the technique that has been applied.)
These resolutions patently did not purport to condemn Respondent's
policies merely because rights, duties, status and privileges were allotted
on the basis of membership of a group, class or race rather than on the
basis of individual merit or capacity, as is sufficiently shown by the
briefest reference to the relevant debates. It accordingly follows that
there could not have been any intention of either creating, applying or
confirming a norm or standards such as are contended for by the
Applicants. Furthermore, even if these resolutions could for any purpose
be regarded as laying down rules, their value is nii inasmuch as they
are demonstrably based on untruths and gross distortions.
61. Even the resolutions dealing with the institution of these present
proceedings against the Respondent did not mention this alleged norm
or standards. The case to be brought against the Respondent was one
of wilful oppression, and this was in truth the case originally stated
against the Respondent in the Applications and the Memoriais. As
noted above, the case based on the breach of a norm or standards as
defined by the Applicants first made its appearance, in the Applicants'
Reply, and was embodied in the Applicants' submissions only shortly
before their Agent closed his case. If the United Nations had intended
to create, apply or confirm such a norm or standards it seems strange
that the Members of the United Nations including Applicants were
unaware thereof at al1material times.
62. For al1the reasons 1 have set out above, it is my view that this
Courthas no jurisdiction to entertain Applicants' case as now formulated,
and that, in any event, it is unsound. The Effect of the Alleged Norm or Standards
Introductory
1. 1 now proceed to consider what effect the application of the
alleged norm or standards would have on the well-being and progress
of the inhabitants of South West Africa. If, as the Respondent contends,
the effect would be manifestly detrimental to al1concerned, this would
be an additional factor militating against the proposition that cornpliance
with such a norm or standards forms part of Respondent's obligations
under the Mandate.
My treatment of this subject will inevitably have to touch upon
important and indeed fundamental aspects of Respondent's policies
originally described by Applicants as unfair, arbitrary, unjust or wilfully
oppressive, and therefore also upon certain of the items in Applicants'
so-called catalogue. In the course of the discussion some light will be
thrown on the question whether it would have been possible for Appli-
cants to substantiate their original charges, had they attempted to do so.
However, this would be merely incidental to my purpose, which is
solely to consider the probable effect of the application of the suggested
norm or standards I.
The History of the Territory and Its Peoples
2. The effect of any policies applied or suggested for application in
South West Africa cannot be appreciated without a thorough know-
ledge of the salient facts concerning the Territory, its history and its
peoples.
Itis not possible to deal with these matters in detail in this opinion
but some reference to the more important facts seems unavoidable.
3. South West Africa is a vast territory of 317,727 square miles, but
in 1920its total population was probably less than 250,000. At present
the population is just above 500,000. The Namib desert stretches along
its entire coast-line and constitutes more than 15 per cent. of the total
land area. The bulk of the rest is semi-desert and subject to severe peri-
odical droughts. Only a relatively small area in the north-eastern part
has a high rainfall. Large portions of the Territory were never occupied
In view of the fundamental change in Applicants' case to which 1have referred
earlier, the original charges are no longer submitted to the Court for adjudication.
It is therefore unnecessary todeal with them or to discuss systematically each
and every measure of differentiation in the light of the original charges. As a
result of Applicants' admission ofal1 the facts set out in Respondent's pleadings,
it seems that the original charges would have had toil quite obviously in respect
of Respondent's policies as a whole, and also quite obviously in respect of a con-
siderable number of the specific measures referred to. In the case of any specific
measures inrespect of which such result might not be obvious, it would be impossible
for the Court to adjudicate on the original charges with fairness and accuracy,
inasmuch as the amendment of Applicants' submissions had the natural result
questions of fact which would have been relevant foruch purpose.g fully al1 theby any of the indigenous groups. They had no means of sinking boreholes
or building dams, and were accordingly confined to areas where water
was naturally available. Their numbers were in any event so limited in
some parts that there was no need to occupy large areas. In the circum-
stances, coupled with the effect of ravaging interna1 wars during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, considerable portions of the
Territory were vacant lands when the Mandate commenced.
4. At the inception of the Mandate the inhabitants of the Territory
consisted of at least nine major population groups, occupying, to a
large extent, distinct portions of the Territory, and differing widely
as to physical appearance, ethnic stock, culture, language and general
level of development. These groups (and even some sub-divisions of
these groups) have at al1 material times considered themselves to be,
and were generally regarded as, separate peoples or national groups.
The European or White group (mainly of German and South African
origin) was by far the most advanced. The remaining groups were al1
non-White and were, with the exception of a few individuals, entirely
illiterate and primitive. Constant warfare between some of these groups
had resulted in indelible hatreds. The main non-White groups were:
(i) the Eastern Caprivi peoples;
(ii) the Okavango peoples;
(iii) the Ovambo ;
(iv) the Bushmen;
(v) the Dama (also known as Bergdama or Bergdamara or Damara of
the Hills or Klipkaffir);
(vi) the Nama (also known as Khoi or Hottentots);
(vii) the Herero (also known as Cattle Damara, or Damara of the
Plains);
(viii) the Rehoboth Basters and the Coloured group.
Groups (iv) and (vi) are Khoisan (colour brown), No. (viii) are half-
caste groups, mainly mixture between White and non-White (light
coloured), and al1the others are Negroid.
5. It is due entirely to circumstances over which they had no control
that the members of these national groups came to be the subjects of
a single mandate.
Thenorthern areas (whichwere never under effectiveGerman control)
resemble four different countries, viz.,the Kaokoveld, Ovamboland,
the Okavango and the curious appendage known as the Eastern Caprivi.
Each of them is inhabited, from historic times to this day, by its own
people or peoples. The peoples of the Eastern Caprivi are ethnically
related to those of Zambia and Bechuanaland. They have no ethnic
relationship with any of the other peoples of South West Africa, have
172never had anything in common with them, and are geographically
separated from them by hitherto inaccessible swamps. Ovamboland is
inhabited by a group of ethnically related tribes speaking, however, at
least two different languages and various dialects. They form 45 per
cent. of the total population of South West Africa. The Okavango and
the Kaokoveld are each inhabited by smaller groups of ethnically related
tribes. But whereas the Okavango group is ethnically linked with the
Ovambo, the Kaokoveld group forms part of the Herero people, who
immigrated from central Africa towards the end of the eighteenth
century, and are ethnically, linguistically and in their social organization
entirely distinct fromal1other groups or peoples in South West Africa.
6. Save for the Bushmen, who are in a sense dispersed al1 over the
wilds of South West Africa, the other non-White groups live in various
portions of the central and southern parts of the Territory-the parts
which were patrolled by the German police and for that reason came to
be known asthe PoliceZone. Thesegroups include sectionsofthe Herero,
who were as from about 1830 engaged in almost continua1 warfare
with various sections of the Nama, until the advent of German rule in
the 1880s, and even thereafter. They include also the Bergdamara, yet
another distinct Negroid group, who had arrived very early but were
subsequently enslaved by the Nama and later also by the Herero, and
who in course of time adopted the Nama language. The Rehoboth
Basters arrived in the Territory from the Cape Province in about 1870
and settled in the Rehoboth Gebiet, where they governed themselves.
Wars by which the German régimewas marred, shattered the tribal
organizations and economics of the Herero and the Nama, and reduced
their numbers by 1912to less than 20,000 and less than 15,000respec-
tively. 1refer later to efforts of the South African Government to restore
their tribal organizations and to settle them, and also theDamara, in
reserves or homelands.
7. Apart from the activities of a few explorers, missionaries, hunters,
traders, etc., theadvent of the White man to South West Africa was
delayed untillate in the nineteenth century.
In 1870 Walvis Bay and a small surrounding area became British
territory. It became part of the Cape Province, and as such became
part of the Union of South Africa. At present it is part of the Republic
of South Africa but is administered as part of South West Africa.
The German reign over other portions of South West Africa com-
menced in 1884and lasted till 1915.
During this period European soldiers, farmers, technicians, miners,
traders and missionaries came to the central and southern portions of
the Territory (the Police Zone) with the result that when the Mandate
came into existence the White population was about 20,000. In 1913
173 White farmers owned 134,000 square miles of land, and in addition
very large areas were held by companies owned by Whites. A modern
economy was developed by the White population, resting mainly on
diamond mining, and to some extent onlivestock farming, though progress
in the latter field had been limited. An extensive railway system was
provided, which was during the First World War (after the conquest of
the Territory)joined to that of South Africa.The revenueof the Territory,
also largely dependent on the production of diamonds, was prior to
the Mandate never sufficientto pay the costs of administration.
8. It seems obvious that it must have been realized by al1concerned
that in determining its policies relating to the administration of the
Territory the Respondent would have due regard to the realities of the
situation. These realities include the existence of the four distinct
northern territories and peoples. The Respondent did not create these
separate homelands, or the distinct nationalities living in them; they
were there at al1material times. In regard to the Police Zone the realities
included the facts that the tribal economies of the Native peoples had
been shattered, but that the Natives, undeveloped and illiterate, lacked
the skills required for modern economic and administrative activities.
They included also the under-populated state of the Police Zone, and
the existence of the European population and the struggling modern
economy established by it. The Territory, vast, mostly undeveloped, and
poor, needed White leadership and initiative.
White immigrants were needed to maintain law and order, to manage
and administer the mines, railways, harbours, hospitals and the civil
service. Moreover, additional sources of income were desperately
needed, and at that time the only practical way in which this could be
obtained was through the introduction of more White capital, initiative
and entrepreneurial skill. In particular the skill and initiative of pro-
gressive farmers were badly needed. The only role the Natives could
initially play in the money economy was by providing unskilled labour.
Policies of differentiation such as, e.g., separate schools, separate
residential areas, reserves for the different ethnic groups, influx control,
etc., were applied by the Germans, and were being applied by the
Respondent in the Territory at the time the Mandate came into existence.
The vast differences between the different groups made this both natural
and inevitable.
9. The way has now been paved for giving more specificconsideration
to some of the major aspects and implications of the policies and mea-
sures actually applied by Respondent after accepting the Mandate. 1
propose to do so under the \b-headings which follow. White Immigration
10. As has been indicated above, the resources of the Territory at the
commencement of the Mandate were inadequate to pay for its adminis-
tration. Circumstances compelled the Respondent to concentrate upon
development of the modern economy already operative inside the Police
Zone in order to obtain funds forthe development of the whole Territory.
There was no alternative, if stagnation was to be avoided. As was stressed
by Professor Krogh in his expert evidence before this Court, the Re-
spondent only recently became a capital exporting country, and when
the Mandate was conferred upon it there could have been no contem-
plation that it would be expected to provide funds on a substantial
scale for the development of the Territory. Nor were any international
funds available for the purpose. The character of the rather limited
natural resources of the Police Zone, and the problems attached to
economic development thereof, were such as to require modern tech-
nology and entrepreneurshipfar beyond the capabilities of the indigenous
inhabitants, considering their under-developed state and the indications
provided by their past records of achievement. Add to these circum-
stances the shattered condition of the tribal economies and the under-
populated state of the Police Zone, and a policy of White immigration
will be seen to have been natural and almost inevitable.
11. Such a policy was certainly foreseen by the powers concerned. The
British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in introducing the Peace
Treaty to the House of Commons on 3 July 1919,stated, inter alia:
"There is no doubt at al1that South West Africa will become an
integral part of the Federation of South Africa. Zt will be colonized
by people from South Africa. You could not have done anything
elseI." (Italics added).
12. In these circumstances White farmers were encouraged to settle
in the Police Zone area, and most Crown land not required for Native
reserves was sold to these immigrants. The result was that within the
first years of the administration 4,885,000 hectares of land were allocated
to White farmers.
Scientific attention was given to agricultural development and to
overcoming the various problems set by the natural conditions: e.g.,
the provision of water, where possible, through the drilling of boreholes
and through appropriate forms of storage; the combating of stock
diseases through methods such as inoculation, dipping, quarantine
measures, selective breeding, etc.; the establishment of worthwhile
farming in the very arid southern parts, through development, by research
and scientific breeding, of a specially adapted strain of Persian Lamb
(Karakul), producing an exceptionally high-grade type of pelt, etc.
And thus the basis was laid for the development of a more diversified
economy, as came about after the Second World War, when the fishing
Temperley, History of the Peace ConfereVol. VI, p. 502.
175industry was added (also through application of a high degree of tech-
nology) to the Territory's sources of production. Al1 this naturally
stimulated growth in commercial and professional activity, as well as
in various minor forms of secondary industry, with the result of constant
increases in the sources of revenue for the administration of the Territory
and particularly for the upliftment and advancement of the indigenous
peoples and the development of their homelands.
13. The fruits of the policy, particularly the benefits accruing to
the non-White peoples, are spectacularly demonstrated by the extensive
plans for further development as proposed by the Odendaal Commission
and already in the course of implementation by the South African
Government. But the fact is that no less important, though perhaps less
spectacular, fruits and benefits have been enjoyed by the non-White
peoples over al1 the years of progression to the present stage, as will
appear in due course.
The achievement of the progress has taken time, having been delayed
and set back through various factors such as the general economic
depression of the early 1930s, exceptionally severe periodical droughts,
the Second World War, etc. But it is generally accepted, significantly,
that had it not been for the policy of encouraging White immigration
and stimulating the growth of a modern farming industry, the Territory
would have been reduced to irreparable bankruptcy during the world
depression, when hardly any income was derived from mining.
14. The policy in question was applied with full knowledge of the
organs of the League, who raised no objection thereto. And 1may also
refer to the confirmation yielded by two independent investigations,
viz.,by the van Zyl Judicial Commission in 1936and by Lord Haileyin
1946, of the soundness of, and virtually inevitable necessity for, the
policy. (See quotations in Counter-Memorial, Book IV, pp. 420-421.)
Recognition of the Diversity in the Non-White Populatioiz
15. 1 have referred above to the diversity of non-White ethnic or
national groups in the Territory; to the differences between them as
regards language, culture, political, social and economic organization,
ways of life and standards of development; and to the extent to which
they traditionally lived as distinct nationalentities in separate portions
of the Territory.These matters form part of the admitted facts of record.
They may sound commonplace when merely referred to in terms of
broad generality; but they were made to live by the more detailed de-
scriptions and illustrations given by the expert witnesses, particularly
Dr. Eiselen, Professor Bruwer, Professor Logan and Mr. Pepler, in
their uncontested testimony.
16. That the various groups wish to maintain their separate identity
and to develop as distinct national entities is not only another one of
the admitted facts, but was demonstrated so clearly by the above wit-
176 179 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
nesses, particularly Professor Bruwer, who had made special investi-
gations as a member ofthe Odendaal Commission, and also by Mr. Dahl-
mann, who described the futile attempts that had been made within
the modern political movements with a view to crossing the ethnic
barriers.
17. In the light ofthese realities it is small wonder that expert after
expert stressed the positive values involved in the various cultures
and group solidarities, and the importance of granting due recognition
thereto in any attempts at promoting the well-being of the individuals
comprising the groups.
South African experts emphasized these matters on the basis of
thorough knowledge and experience gained in southern Africa itself,
particularly in South Africa and in South West Africa. Their conclusions
were very forcibly confirmed by experts from other parts of the world-
i.e., by Professor Logan, on the basis of thorough field research in
South West Africa itself, and by Professors Possony, van den Haag and
Manning, on the basis of knowledge and experience gained by mankind
al1 over the world. Particularly the last-mentioned witnesses gave
examples of the tragic consequences that had resulted in so many
instances, in al1parts of the world, from overlooking the importance
of such matters.
18. The above considerations show that also this aspect of the policies
which have actually been pursued by the South African Government
sincethe inception of the Mandate flowednaturally and almost inevitably
from the facts with which it found itself confronted. It did not create
the diversity or the sociological phenomena concerned; these matters
existed as realities which required recognition if attempts at promotion
of well-beingand progress were to stand any chance of successat al].
Implications of White Immigration andPopulation Diversity
19. Respondent's policy of encouraging the pre-Mandate White
community to remain in the Territory, and of encouraging White immi-
gration, gave recognition to the White group as an established part of
the population of South West Africa. This was entirely within the pro-
visions and contemplation of the Mandate. Having remained and come
at the special invitation of the Mandatory, with the concurrence of the
international supervisory organs, and having admirably fulfilled its
intended function of developing a modern economy in the Territory
for the benefit of the whole population, the White group undoubtedly
has a moral right to remain and to be treated with at least the same
consideration as any other group. The implications of this aspect of the
situation required to be recognized by the Mandatory from the very
inception of the Mandate, whileit was encouraging the people concerned
to remain and to come, and while those people were settling about the
task intended for them. 20. The implications were of considerable importance. For illustration
1 shall mention some that come readily to mind.
Had policies of separation and differentiation not been applied by
the Respondent, the probability is that many of the White people who
were already in the Territory would not have remained, and the badly
needed immigrants would not have come. White technicians, professional
people, farmers,miners, etc., would not have immigrated to the Territory
unless they knew that their children would receive an education com-
parable to that obtainable elsewhere, and unless they could maintain
their standard of living.There can be no doubtthat cultural background
and language problems would have made it completely impracticable
to place White children and the children of the indigenous groups
in the same schools. The evidence shows that where such differences
exist both groups would suffer if they attended the same schools.
Without additional teachers the children of the immigrants could
not be taught. Unless White teachers-and only White teachers were
available-were offered remuneration commensurate with what they
could earn elsewhere, their services could not have been obtained.
21. In al1the above respects the circumstances and needs of the in-
digenous groups were vastly different. They were at a stage of develop-
ment where it was necessary to begin to instil in them some realization
of the desirability of having education at all, in theense as known to
Western civilization. The problem of their initial hostility and apathy
towards education was aggravated by factors such as nomadic habits
and scattered populations, the vastness of the Territory and its low
density of population, the large number of languages, the poverty of
the Territory, the shortage of teachers and the difficultiesencountered
in trainingsuitable teachers.
The approach of educationalists-not only in regard to South West
Africa, but generally in regard to the similar problems of African edu-
cation everywhere-was that under such circumstances there were
certain prerequisites before much progress along the lines of forma1
education could be expected. One of these was that mission societies
should be encouraged to inculcate some appreciation of Christian and
civilized principles and standards in the indigenous communities, and
in connection therewith to foster some interest in education. Another
was that wage-earning employment could in itself be regarded as an
educational process, stimulatinginterest in forma1education particularly
because of the utilitarian values thereof. A further factor was that
Native languages required study and developrnentinto written languages
in order to servethe requirements of mother-tongue education, especially
for the veryYoung.
Due to the language factor and the shortage of teachers generally,
it was inevitable that teachers in Native education would mainly have
to be Natives. Training sufficient Native teachers to a satisfactory
178level unavoidably took a long time. Furthermore, the absence of direct
contributions of any substance by Native communities to the costs
of education, and the struggle of the territorial economy for a long time
to balance its budget, were factors which tended to limit the funds
available for Native education. In the circumstances, and considering
the vast differences in social and economic levels between the White
community and the various Native communities, it would have been
most inappropriate to insist on exact parity as between these com-
munities, e.g., in the quality of school buildings or in salaries paid to
teachers. Such a reauirement would have introduced a further artificial
and unnecessary ret&ding factor inthe pursuit ofthe objectiveofbringing
education as soon as possible to as large a number of Native children
as possible, and the sufferers would have been the Native communities
themselves. The comparisons, in order to be appropriate, should not
be with levels in the White community, but with comparable things
in the particular Native community (or other African communities).
Thus the quality of school buildings should compare favourably with
other buildings utilized by that particular community and to which it
is accustomed. Teachers' salaries again should compare favourably
with salaries, wages or income commanded by other members of the
same community in comparable forms of employment or activity.
As Dr. van Zyl pointed out, Native teachers often enjoy very valuable
privileges, e.g., subsidized housing, not accorded to White teachers.
The levels concerned could and should, of course, rise with time, as
they have in factdone, considerably, up to the present. But this should
be in keeping with the general advancement of the particular group,
otherwise interna1 balances become disturbed.
22. In brief, the point is that with the advent of the White group
the Native groups did not cease to be indigenous African comrnunities,
comparable with similar communities elsewhere. The mere fact that
there was now a White community living beside them, did not mean
that their needs and circumstances had come to be identical with those
of the White community. On the contrary, this brief discussion with
regard to education provides a very clear illustration of the vast dif-
ferences, confronting the Mandatory, in the social and economic cir-
cumstances and standards of development of the White group, on the
one hand, and the various indigenous groups on the other, of the resul-
tant vast differences in their respective needs, and of the necessity to
minister to each group in accordance with its particular needs. In other
words, the discussion demonstrates how inevitable it was for the Man-
datory to differentiate if it were to seek the well-being and progress
of al1concerned.
23. The same result emerges from a consideration of other aspects
of life, of whichwish to mention very brieflythe political and the eco-
nomic spheres.
179 In the political sphere, the members of the White group were derived
from countries inwhich they had been accustomed to share in the process
of parliamentary self-government. Where they now formed a com-
munity with interests of its own in the Police Zone of South West Africa,
it was a natural need on their part to enjoy a measure of such self-
government within that Territory, on an appropriate, quasi-provincial
basis, as was in fact extended to them in 1925. The Native groups had
no tradition, experience or knowledge of parliamentary governrnent,
and.at that stage no interest in it (as was the case throughout Africa).
Each group (save for the Bushmen) had its own traditional political
institutions, each with considerable intrinsic value. The need of each
group was to have such institutions respected-and in the case of the
southern groups restored-and to have them suitably developed and
adapted in course of time, under the control and guidance of the Man-
datory, in accordance with changed circumstances and with advance-
ment within the group itself. Again this was exactly the purport of the
policies applied by the Mandatory.
24. In the economic sphere the needs of the groups again differed
substantially, and in many respects were diametrically opposed. This
necessitated reciprocal protections in order to ensure what Professor
Krogh so aptly described as "social peace", a factor which is obviously
essential for economic progress.
The indigenous groups required certain fundamental protections
against the capital, the know-how and the exploiting ability, of the
White man engaged in private enterprise. This meant the reservation
of homelands for their exclusive ownership, use and occupation-save
in so far as a small number of White rnrn might br required to assist
them, for such time as might be nxessary, in essential services. It meant
also the reservation of preferential opportunities for them in com-
merce and industries within these homelands and even within Native
towns in the White area. It mrant control over recruitment of labour,
labour contracts and conditions of service. Eventually it came to mean
also legislation compelling employers of Native labour in the urban
areas to combine with the local authorities and the central administra-
tion in the provision of fit and proper housing for their employees on
a subsidized basis, in properly planned townships. In addition to such
protections the indigenous groups needed assistance of varying kinds
within their respective homslands, with a view to advancing and im-
proving their subsistence economies and to transforming them gradually
into money economies. Mr. Pepler in his testimony gave a very vivid
description of the tremendous variation in the needs of the various
groups in these respects, depending on their customs, their stages of
development and their local circumstanoes; and he emphasized the
necessity of adapting one's methods in each case to the needs and the
peculiarities of the particulargroup. Members of the White group engaged in entrepreneurial activities
needed fairly obvious protections against vagrancy, trespassing and
similar or attendant activities on the part of members of an under-
developed Native population.
Others, required for employment in skilled or semi-skilled capacities,
could onlybe attractedupon wagesand conditions ofemploymentkeeping
Pace with those available elsewhere. The importance of competitive
remuneration has been stressed by numerous authorities. It is not sur-
prising that in certain limited fields of employment some of these em-
ployees demanded and were given special privileges, protecting them
against the danger of eventual competition from members of non-
White groups who might be offering their services at lower levels of
remuneration.
Respondent's LandPoZicy
25. Basic to the implementation of the above policies has been Res-
pondent's land policy, of which the main feature is the provision of
separate areas of land for each of the population groups mentioned
above. This policy was approved of by the Permanent Mandates Com-
mission, which was-
"... of opinion that the soundness ofthe viewswhichhave prompted
the Administration to adopt a system of segregation of Natives in
reserves will become increasingly apparent if there is no doubt
that, in the future, the Administration will have at its disposa1
fertile land for the growing needs of the population and that the
reserves will be enlarged in proportion to the progressive increase
in the population".
The undisputed facts show that provision of sufficient land to the
indigenous groups has indeed been the concern of the Mandatory,
and that there has in course of time been extensive increases in the
reservations in their favour, both outside and inside the Police Zone.
26. Outside the Police Zone large areas of land were unoccupied at
the inception of the Mandate. This is not surprising if regard is had
to the relatively small population of this vast area at the time and the
fact that the Natives could not augment their water supplies by sinking
boreholes and building dams. As the populations of the different groups
increased substantial increases were made in the land reserved.
In Ovamboland the Natives at the inception of the Mandate occupied
only about one-half of the area which was later proclaimed as a Native
reserve for the Ovambo people. Similarly a very much larger area than
the strip along the Okavango River, originally occupied by the Oka-
vango tribes, has been reserved for this group. In the Kaokoveld the
area originally setaside for the tribes of this region has been increased
from 418,500 hectares to more than 5,500,000 hectares. In the Caprivi
181 184 SOUTH WST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
500,000 hectares were added in 1939 to the area originally occupied
by the Caprivians. An area of 350,433hectares setsidein 1952for Native
occupation is to be added in part to Ovamboland and in part to the
Okavango. There has been no reduction in the extent of land included
in the reserves in the northern territories outside the Police Zone. On
the conlrary, these areas have been increased considerably as appears
from what has been said above and as appears more fully from the
review and tables provided in the Odendaal Commission Report of the
availability of land in thearious non-European home areas. (Report,
pp. 67-71.)
27. Inside the Police Zone, as I have mentioned, the Herero and
the Nama had shortly before the inception of the Mandate been re-
duced in numbers to less than 20,000 and less than 15,000respectively.
Tribal economies had been shattered, and in 1913approximately 80 per
cent. of the total non-White adult male population in the Police Zone
were employed as wage-earners in the modern economy established by
the White group.
In the case of the Herero, the German régimehad confiscated al1
tribal lands and abolished al1 chieftainships, and had prohibited them
from owning cattle. They were, after a century of warfare, dispersed
over the Territory, and their traditional institutions, founded basically
on the possession of cattle, were largely broken up.
The Nama were also largely dispersed, although some groups were
permitted by the Germans to use defined pieces of land and to keep
limited numbers of cattle.
The Damara were released from their bondage to the Herero and the
Nama after the 1904-1907wars. A Damara reserve was established at
Okombahe, where some of them settled.
On the assumption of the Mandate Respondent found it desirable
to restore, as far as possible the tribal life and social organizations of
the various Native groups in the Police Zone. This policy was clearly
in accordance with the wishesand best interests of the groups concerned,
and nobody doubted its wisdom. For this reason it was considered
necessaryto establish reservesfor the Herero, as wellasthe other groups,
and to extend such reserves from time to time as circumstances might
require. Fromthe above-mentioned reviewin the Odendaal Commission
Report, it will be seen that the reservations in favour of Native groups
(i.e., excludingthe Rehoboth Gebiet for the Basters, to which there have
been no additions) were increased from a total of about 1 million hec-
tares to a total of over 6 million.
28. The Odendaal Commission has recommended further very sub-
stantial increases in the Native reserves, both inside and outside the
Police Zone, together with certain consolidations in the Police Zone.
The proposals have been accepted in principle by the South African
Government, and full implementation is awaiting the decision in this
case. The over-al1gain is about 50 per cent. (from 21,600,000 hectares
to 32,600,000hectares). In the Police Zone where more than 3,400,000
hectares presently owned or occupied by White persons are being
182 185 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
acquired for the purpose, the total increase will be more than 110 per
cent.
29. The present land allocations involve that about 45 per cent. of
the Territory's total land area is occupied by White farmers, whereas
the reserves amount to about 27 per cent. This ratio, as well as the exact
areas of allocation, has been the product of the historical and economic
considerations dealt with earlier in this opinion. This situation is not
intended to be a permanent one, as is shown by the Odendaal Com-
mission's recommendations above referred to. The adjustments now
proposed will make the total area of the reserves nearly as large as the
area of White occupation. It must of course be borne in mind that the
areas occupied by the Natives in the north have far superior possibilities
for agriculture. Only 20 per cent. of the present European farming
area receives an annual rainfall of 400 or more millimetres, which is
the minimum for dry-land farming, whereas the figure for the non-
White areas is 48 per cent. The area of the land in the latter areas, re-
ceiving an annual average rainfall exceeding 500 millimetres, is nearly
two-and-a-half times larger than the corresponding White areas. The
livestock-carrying capacity of the northern and north-eastern regions
is eight or lesshectares per largestockunit, whereas inthe areas occupied
by European farmers the capacity decreases progressively from north
to south from nine to 45 hectares per large stock unit. Seventy per cent.
of the total non-European population, and only 20 per cent. of the
Whites, are to be found in the most favourable region.
It must further be borne in mind that because of the superior use
made by the Whitegroup ofthe land available to it, and of the economic
opportunities presented thereby, very large numbers of non-White
persons in fact make a livelihood within the White area, either aswage-
earners or in business or professional occupations. This is likely to be
the case for a long time to corne, whether such non-White persons will
be living in their reserved homelands or in the White area.
30. It will also be recalled that Mr. Pepler informed the Court,
on the basis of scientific surveys and assessments made by his depart-
ment, that far more people and far more stock could be accommodated
in the various existing reserves than are found there today and that the
existing reserves plus the proposed extensions made ample provision
for present population numbers purely as farmers, quite apart from the
additional prospects offered in regard to the secondary sector of the
economy.
31. Of course the carrying capacities of the reserves depend not only
on their size and natural endowments, but also on improvements effec-
ted by man where possible. In this respect much has been done by
183 Respondent, with resultant substantial increases in the number and
quality of the stock. The steps taken by Respondent included the de-
velopment of water supplies by sinking hundreds of boreholes and wells
and building dams, the combating of stock diseases, and the improve-
ment of the quality of the stock by selective breeding and the intro-
duction of well-bred bulls and rams.
The population is being guided to greater productivity by means
of education and a gradua1 adaptation of their traditional economic
practices and socialinstitutions. Crop rotation andsuitable crop varieties
are introduced. Experts visit the reserves, andl1advice is free. Breeding
stock is sold to the inhabitants of the reserves at cost or even below
cost.
32. The Odendaal Commission Report, and the South African
Government's reaction thereto, envisage further large-scale improve-
ment schemes in the non-White homelands, some of which are already
well under way. Reference may be made to the Government White
Paper on the Commission's recommendations, as reprinted in the Sup-
plement to the Counter-Memorial, especially to the following:
(a) Pages 12-13 (paragraph 7) regarding a large-scale water and elec-
tricity scheme for Ovamboland and various smaller schemes for
other homelands;
(b) Pages 13-15 (Paragraph 8, particularly sub-paragraphs (a) (ii)
and (b)) regarding roads and air services;
(c) Page 16 (paragraph 9 (b)) regarding mining;
(d) Pages 16-17 (paragraph 10) regarding industries;
(e) Page 17 (paragraph 11) regarding agriculture.
33. In regard to al1additions and improvements to Native reserves,
as dealt withabove (paragraphs 26-32), it will be observed that they are
part of the fruits that have been and are being enjoyed by the peoples
in question from the Respondent's basic policyof stimulating a modern
economy in the Police Zone through White enterprise.
One should bear in mind that, whereas members of the White group
have to pay for their farms, al1additions to the Native reserves (with
the exception of one farm) have been on a gratuitous basis. By far the
greatestamount spent on improvements in the Native reserves is derived
from public monies, whereas European owners of private farms pay
for their own improvements. The Natives pay no taxes other than to
their Native trust funds, which are used exclusively for their benefit.
In times of drought every possible kind of assistance is given to the
inhabitants of the reserves. Al1reasonable steps are taken to save stock
losses and grazing is made available. Food is subsidized, and free issues
184of food are supplied to the aged and incapacitated, to hospitals and to
schools.
Progress and Development in the Application of Respondent'sPolicies
34. The period after the SecondWorld War, particularly asfromabout
1950 until today, saw marked progress in and as a result of the ap-
plication of Respondent's policies, and also certain adaptations in the
policiesthemselvesinthe light of changed circumstances. I wish to devote
very brief attention to these developments, in the political, economic
and educational spheres, and in general.
35. In the political sphere, there is in operation in every Native home-
land (except that of the Bushmen) a form of self-government practised
with Respondent's encouragement and approval. The details differ
from people to people, the important consideration being to allow to
each people the system derived from its traditions. In some systems
there are hereditary chiefs together with elected headmen, in others
councils of elected headmen. Elections or appointments are made
through traditional processes. Respondent, while retaining ultimate
control and seeking to afford guidance to progress, interferes as little
as possible either with elections or appointments or with acts of self-
government.
In the light of awakened interest, in African communities generally,
as regards national development towards self-determination or in-
dependence, it is Respondent's policy to utilize the traditional systems
as a basis for further development and modernization, with the co-
operation of the groups concerned, especially by the introduction of
more dernocratic elements, and so to pave the way for each people
to develop by evolution to a stage where it can determine its own future
destiny.
The soundness of such an approach was fully endorsed by the Oden-
daal Commission, who made proposals for practical implementation
thereof. The proposals noted above in regard to extension and consoli-
dation of the various homelands, and their further economic develop-
ment, are all, apart from their intrinsic merits, designed to contribute
to the effective and fair implementation of the policy of separate free-
doms.
Specifically in the political sphere the Commission recommended,
in respect of each such territory, the establishment of a separate citizen-
ship and general franchise, and a parliamentary system of government,
combining elected representatives with the existing governing bodies.
The proposals envisage a gradual taking over of powers from the South
African Government, and a gradual Africanization of the civil service
in each case.
The basic consideration is that each group, including the White
185 group, will govern itself only, and that domination of one group by
another will be avoided. On reaching maturity each group may decide
for itself whether it wishes to stand on its own legs or to enter into some
political or economic or other ties with another group or groups. Possi-
bilities are endless, but South African political leaders have indicated
preference for a possible organization operating on the lines of a com-
monwealth or common market, Le., on a basis of consent as between
equals and not a basis of majority rule. This idea offers prospects for
regional CO-operationin southern Africa over an even wider area than
the Republic and South West Africa.
36. In regard to the economic sphere, reference has already been made
to the progress achievedin regard to development of the homelands, and
to thefurther projects now under way.
As regards other aspects of economic well-being and progress, the
evidence and admitted facts show that the earnings of Natives in the
Territory compare favourably with al1 other comparable countries.
It is also significant that Applicants had to concede that they were not
allegingthat the Respondent had not built enough houses, schools, roads,
hospitals, irrigation schemes, etc.
Another noteworthy aspect of economic progress is that which has
flowed from the policy of giving preference to members of a group in
regard to economic opportunities within the homeland of that group,
and to Natives in general within Native townships in the White area.
These protected opportunities must be of enormous value. Just as the
best land in Native homelands would soon pass into White ownership
if that had not been forbidden by law, very few, if any, Natives couid
probably, as at the present stage, compete successfully with White men
in regard to exploitation of commercial, industrial and professional
opportunities within the homelands and townships. By the poiicy of
protection and specialencouragement, however, e.g., through the waiving
of prescribed licence fees,the administration has succeededin establishing
hundreds of Native businessmen in their areas and townships; numerous
teams of specially trained Native artisans are engaged upon the develop-
ment and building projects under way in the homelands and townships;
Native teachers in 1963 numbered over 1,200, and increasing numbers
of Natives are employed by the Government in their own areas as
inspectors, secretaries, clerks, etc.
37. In the sphere of education, marked progress was made in regard to
Native education as from 1950 onwards. School enrolment figures more
than doubled themselves between 1950 and 1962-from 22,659 at the
earlier date to 47,088 at the later. In 1963 there was a further increase
186 to 49,297. The 1962figure was estimated by the Odendaal Commission
to represent about 46per cent. of the over-allpossible school population.
The estimate for the present time is about 52 per cent. The Odendaal
Commission recommendations set their target at an increase to 60 per
cent. inal1Nativehomelands by 1970.These attendance figurescompare
more than favourably with those in other African States. The 1960
figure(40per cent. of the over-al1possible schoolpopulation) represented
9.2 per cent. of the total Native population in the Territory: the corre-
sponding percentage for Ethiopia (in 1961) was 0.910 and for Liberia
(also in 1961)4.421. For the African States as a whole, the proportion
of school-agepopulation at school in 1961wasgivenby a UnitedNations
publication as 16 per cent. In individual States the percentage ranged
from less than 2 percent. to "nearly 60 per cent." And "in the majority
of cases, the proportion of children out of school exceeds 80 per cent."
(Unesco/ED/180, p. 5.)
There is in South West Africa still an unsatisfactory falling off in
attendance figures in higher standards, but the situation is improving.
It may be expected to improve yet further upon implementation of the
Odendaal proposals. These involve the taking over of Native education
in South West Africa by the Bantu Education Department of the Re-
public, and the application by it of the methods of the Bantu education
system which have been such a triumphant success in the Republic, as
described to this Court by Dr. van Zyl in his evidence l. Further the
proposals involve more advanced and greater numbers of schools,
hostel facilitiesand facilitiesfor the training of teachers. The Commission
estimated that expenditure on the buildings alone would, in the case of
thenon-Whitegroups, amount to R3,500,000over the firstfiveyears.
38. In general the picture of South West Africa emerging from the
admittedfacts and theuncontested testimony is one of orderly, evolution-
ary progress, with the ovenvhelming majority of the inhabitants, White
and non-White, manifesting their support for Respondent's policies
in ever-increasing measure. In the case of the non-White peoples this
was demonstrated, intea rliaby the enthusiasm evoked by a recent visit,
at their own request, of leaders of a number of groups to the Republic
of South Africa, in order to seedevelopments in the Transkei and other
l The information he gave included the following: In 1964 nearly 2 million
Bantu children were at school, being over 80 per cent. of the school-age population,
and nearly 32,000 Bantu teachers, including school principals, were employed.
There were at present 55 Bantu school inspectors and 170Bantu assistant inspectors.
At the end of 1965about 1,300 Bantu candidates were expected to write the official
White and Coloured persons) of whom about 800 were expected to pass. Fors for
the Junior Certificate (two years lower) the candidate figure was 12,000, of whom,
7,000 to 8,000 were expected to pass. examples of application of the policy of separate development in the
Republic.
ResuIts of Applying the Alleged Norm or Standnrds
39. Against the background of what has been set out above, it seems
self-evident that application of the suggested norm or standards in
South West Africa is likely to prove disastrous, as was indeed empha-
tically stated in evidence by one expert after another.
40. In the political sphere which is largely the key to well-being in
al1 spheres, application of the norm or standards would mean that
Respondent is obliged to treat the Territory as an integrated unit, to be
governed by a central parliament elected on the basis of a system that
will ultimately be one man one vote.
Mr. Cilliein his evidence pointed outthat this would mean domination
by the Ovambos, forming 45 per cent. of the population, or by ruthless
men exploiting their numerical preponderance; the domination would
mean submergence of the most developed minority groups-the White,
the Coloured and the Rehoboth groups-as well as the least developed
ones-the Bushmen and the tribes of the Kaokoveld.
"It means to these people, as it means to the Whites, that they
are being forced to commit a form of national suicide, and that
prospect evokes al1 the forces of resistance that you would expect
in any nation in similar circumstances." (C.R. 65/61, p. 101.)
Later he said pointedly: "It would mean chaos" (C.R. 65/61, p. 146).
One need merely have regard to chaotic conditions existing ordevelop-
ing in numerous African countries, where several relatively under-
developed nations constitute one political State, to realize that if the
Applicants' policy is appliedunder present circumstances the inevitable
result would indeed be retrogression and chaos. The sad histories of
numerous African States, e.g., the former Trust Territory Ruanda-
Urundi (now Rwanda and Burundi), the former French Cameroons,
Algeria, Ghana, the Congo, the Sudan, Kenya, Zanzibar,Togo, Nigeria,
the Central African Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and
other States-such as Cyprus-speak for themselves.
When universal franchise is introduced into a fairly homogeneous
Societythere is a reasonable prospect of success, even where the general
standard of development of the electorate is fairly low. But whenvarious
national groups differing widely as to physical appearance, ethnic
stock, culture, language, and standards of development are being
integrated into the same political system, failure seems to be inevitable.
The tensions, uncertainties and disharmonies which arise from attempts
at assimilation of peoples with gross dissimilarities are strong enough
188to doom to failure any schemes that the ingenuity of man may devise.
One should bear in mind that these separate groups existed at all
material times. The Respondent did.not create them. There is no justifi-
cation for forcing people to live together who have no desire to live to-
gether, when it is possible to avoid it. There is no justification for forcing
different communities to be dissolved into one integrated political unit,
when they are opposed thereto, and when one knows that retrogression,
chaos and sufferingwill result therefrom.
41. In the economic sphere, the first important consideration is the
effect that would come from application of the norm or standards in
the political sphere. The White group would either depart or be drawn
into endless strife, possibly hostilities. Either event would either collapse
or cripple the economy.
But application of the norm or standards in the economic sphere
itself would directly bring about similar results. It would mean doing
away with the various reciprocal protections, and with the special
advantages, to which 1 have referred above. The effects, especially for
the indigenous groups, seem obvious.
1quote Professor Krogh:
".. .under the circumstances 1 have sketched to you, and bearing
in mind these diverse social and economic conditions in South
West Africa, 1 have little doubt in saying that it would lead to the
rapid deterioration of the material and economic welfare of the
majority of the population, and by this 1 particularly refer to the
non-White population groups. 1 can also see that they will not
tolerate this and that this might verywell lead to social strife, that
would in fact arrest the economic development of South West
Africa, which 1 think is an exceptional example in Africa .. ."
(C.R. 65/65, pp. 44-45.)
He was strongly supported by others. Professor Logan's diagnosis
of the effects of removal of the controls included "the subjugation or
almost obliteration of some of the existing tribal groups", also "violent
antagonism and frequently ... warfare". He expected that "the economy
... would, to a large extent fa11apart" and that "a rather chaotic situ-
ation would develop" (C.R. 65/58,pp. 46-47).And Mr. Pepler predicted:
"... it will be a very tragic day for the Native peoples" (C.R. 65/69,
p. 62).
42. In the educational sphere, Dr. van Zyl and Professor Eiselen,
who are undoubtedly experts in this field, described to the Court the
advantages of the system of differentiation. They demonstrated that
where a school for aparticular community is governedby the community,
theinterest of the communityin the school and in education is stimulated.
They described the advantages of mother-tongue as a medium of in-
189struction. It seems clear beyond any doubt that today it is generally
accepted that this method of teaching is the best. Dr. van Zyl emphasized
that the vernacular was of the utmost importance in bridging the gap
between the home and the school and that it led to parents displaying
a greater interest in the education of their children. In his opinion the
use ofthe mother-tongue was the best wayto ensurethat pupils understood
what they were being taught. Furthermoreit promoted original thinking.
Experiments had shown that pupils taught through the medium of their
own language performed better at school, in al1subjects, than pupils who
were taught through a foreign medium.
If a system of joint schooling were introduced, mother-tongue in-
struction would become impossible, and al1 the advantages attached
thereto, and to the system as a whole, would be lost. In any event it is
common cause that had such a system been attempted it would have
failed. The undisputed evidence is that by having the present system
the Respondent is acting in accordance with the wishes of the vast
majority of the population of the Territory.
Dr. van Zyl's conclusion was:
"The differences among the population groups in background,
language, tradition and culture are so big that the people do not
mix socially, with the result that integrated schools are almost
inconceivable. From what 1 know of the people, there cannot be
peaceful integration in the field of education and any attempt
to enforce integration will cause the collapse of the educational
services."
43. On the admitted and uncontroverted facts the above conclusions
are so indisputable that it is small wonder that Applicants' Agent,
towards the end of the proceedings, refrained from an attempt at con-
testing them. Instead he attempted to evade them by suggesting that they
were not directed at the contents, properly understood, of the norm or
standards on which he was relying. He became inconsistent on the
question whether the norm or standards did involve one integrated
political systemwith universal adult suffrage, but in the end he conceded
that such was the "target for achievement". In the economic sphere he
seemed to suggest that protective and preferential measures in favour
of the non-White groups were permissible, but that such measures
in favour of the White group were per se impermissible as constituting
"racial discrimination", a concept which he did not attempt to define.
Nor did he attempt to explain how such a distinction could be said to
be contained in the norm or standards as formally defined and incor-
porated in Applicants' amended submissions, or to relate to any of
the alleged sources of the norm or standards. In regard to educa-
tion he avoided the question of integrated schools, contenting him-
190self with a somewhat obscure subtlety about compulsory education.
Al11 need say about these manoeuvres is that they are not attractive,
either as to their merit or their timing, and that they do not advance
the Applicants' cause: they have rather the opposite effect. The case is
concerned with a nom or standards as set out in the definitionformally
incorporated in the amended submissions. The case cannot now be
considered as if it were concerned with something else. The attempt
to do so appears to be an acknowledgement that the norm or standards,
as contemplated in the amended submissions have been shown to be
non-existent.
44. These considerations lead to the inevitable conclusion that there
was not only no need for the creation of the alleged norm or standards,
but that, had they been appliedin South WestAfrica,the purpose of the
Mandate would have been defeated.
Conclusion
45. In al1these circumstancesthere can be no doubt that the alleged
norm or standards do not existand in any event do not apply to Article 2
(2) of the Mandate Declaration for South West Africa.
Article 2 (1) of the Mandate
(ApplicantsySubmissionNo. 5)
1. Applicants' Final Submission No. 5, as amended on 19 May 1965,
reads as follows:
"5. Respondent, by word and by action, has treated the Territory
in a manner inconsistent with the international status of the Terri-
tory, and has thereby impeded opportunities for self-determination
by the inhabitants of the Territory; that such treatment is in vio-
lation of Respondent's obligations as stated in the first paragraph
of Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; that
Respondent has the duty forthwith to cease such action and refrain
from similar action in the future; and that Respondent has the
duty to accord full faith and respect to the international status
of theTerritory."
It will be observed that the submission, on its own, is completely
vague, inasmuch as the "word" and "action" relied upon are not
identified at al]. The only possible clue to identification is to be found
in the preamble to al1the submissions, which contains the words "upon
the basis of allegations of fact, and the statements of law set forth in
the written pleadings and oral proceedings herein". These words are
also very wide and vague. They raise the problem of selecting from the
voluminous pleadings and records of the oral proceedings that which
was intended to be relied upon as constituting the "word" and the
"action" spoken of in the submissions.
191 2. In the original version of this submission, as set out in the Me-
morials, the words "by word and by action" were followed immediately
by the words "in the respects setorth in Chapter VI11of this Memorial".
Those "respects" were easily identifiable. They consisted offour enumer-
ated officia1actions plus an alleged motive or intent on Respondent's
part to incorporate the Territory of South West Africa unilaterally into
the Union (now Republic) of South Africa. The contention was that
the four actions, read in the light of the alleged intent, constituted the
alleged violation of the obligations in question (Memorials, p. 195).
In view of the fact that the final submission no longer contains a
specific reference to these "respects set forth in Chapter VI11 of [the]
Memorial[s]", the question arises whether they were inte ,ded to form
part of the final submission. For reasons which 1 shall itLdicatelater, 1
am satisfiedthat, on a true analysis of events during the oral proceedings,
this question is to be answered in the negative and that Applicants have
indeed, for understandable reasons, abandoned reliance upon the said
actions and the said alleged intent. However, 1 do not wish to confine
myself to that conclusion for disposing of the said actions and alleged
intent as suggested grounds for acceding to the submission. As a matter
of merit they clearly do not, in my opinion, support the submission,
for reasons which 1proceed to state briefly.
3. The four actions relied upon in the Memorials were:
(a)"General conferral" of South African citizenship upon inhabitants
of South West Africa.
(b) Inclusion of representatives from South West Africa in the South
African parliament.
(c)Administrative separation of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel from the
rest of South West Africa.
(d) The vesting of South West Africa Native Reserve Land in the
South African Native Trust, and the transfer of administration of
Native affairsto the South African Minister of Bantu Administration
and Development.
In my viewit is unquestionable that these administrative and legislative
provisions prima facie did not go beyond an exercise of the "full power
of administration and legislation" vested in Respondent, including
the right to administer theTerritory "as an integral portion of the Union
of South Africa". And this is probably the reason why the original
submission relied, as indicated above, on Respondent's alleged motive
or intent as rendering illegal actions which might othenvise be un-
objectionable l.
aforegoingactions, read in the light of the Union's avowed intent, the Union has
violated, and is violat..."(Italics added.) (Footnote continuedoverleaf.)
192 4. A question of primary importance is therefore whether the alleged
motive or intent was established as a fact. It can hardly be doubted that
the answer is in the negative.
In the first instance, this pointis really disposed of by Applicants'
admissions of fact to which 1 referred when dealing with Submissions
Nos. 3 and 4. These admissions related also to disputed facts concerned
with Submission No. 5. Indeed, that the admission was intended to
embrace also such facts, appears clearly from a statement by Applicants'
Agent in which he referred to-
"... the facts with respect both to militarization and annexation,
as disputed by the Respondent, and as subsequently accepted by
the Applicants for purposes of these proceedings".
Respondent had, in its pleadings, drawn very sharp issue with the
allegation of an intent or purpose or motive to incorporatethe Territory.
It directly denied the existence of such an intent, etc., and, indeed,
expressed an intention of continuing to administer the Territory as if
the sacred trust provisions of the Mandate were still in force. Detailed
expositions and analyses of fact were offeredin support of the denial.
In my view there can be no doubt that the issue thus drawn was
one of fact. In the oft-quoted words of Bowen, L.J.: "The state of a
man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion." (Edgington
v. Fitzmaurice(1885), 29 Ch.D. 459 at p. 483.) It seems clear therefore
that Applicants' admissions wouldon ordinary principles have embraced
also this dispute.
However, it is not necessary to speculate, since Applicants them-
selves rendered it abundantly clear that they regarded Respondent's
state of mind as a fact, and that they must therefore have intended
Respondent's version of this fact to fa11within the compass of their
admissions. This may be illustrated by two quotations. On 27 April,
Applicants' Agent referred to :
"Respondent's apparent misconception that any of the Appli-
cants' reasons, or arguments, reflect their assumption that state of
mind, motive or purpose is something other than a fact."
In reply to this "misconception" the learned Agent then continued:
"Many situations of course are known to the law in which
motive, or intent, is not merely a relevant fact but, indeed, may
be a decisive one . ..Further discussion of so elementary a matter
as to whether motive, or state of mind, is a fact, and provable as
such, would be a waste of the Court's time."
Note also the sentence at page 186: "Motive is an important indicator since it
sheds light upon the significance of individual actions, which might otherwise
seem ambiguous."
193 On 18 May, i.e., the second last day of Applicants' argument, their
Agent confirmed this attitude. He is recorded as saying-
". .. the subjective analysis is, as the Respondent has properly
pointed out, one which is susceptible of factual determination; as
the Respondent has said repeatedly, it is possible for courts to
ascertain states of mind; facts are determinable in terms of states
of mind. In certain types of legal problems-delicts, crimes-the
state of mind is indeed the crucially relevant fact that determines
the character of the crime. Tlierefore there is no question but that
a state of mind is determinable as a fact. However, as applied to
the objective of the Mandate, the state of mind with which the
Respondent approaches its task, whilea fact,nevertheless does not
appear to the Applicants to be a fact whiclî is determinative of the
purposes of the Mandate itself ..."
Thislast quotation conîirms agzin that the very purpose of the admissions
wasto avoid thefurther evidential enquiry that might have been necessary
had the dispute, inter alia, as to intent, persisted.
5. However, even if there may be any doubt as to the intended ambit
of Applicants' admissions in the above respect, it is abundantly clear
from the record that no question of any improper state of mind on
Respondent's part could in any event have remained once the more
tangiblefacts set out by Respondent were accepted as true. Respondent's
expositions included a whole chapter of relevant statements and facts
that had not been mentioned in the Memorials, some not in this context
and some not at al1(see Book VI11of the Counter-Memorial, section C,
Chapter II, pp. 94-105).They included also evidence as to actual benefits
received by the inhabitants from the ineasures complained of (ibid.,
Chapters IV-VII, pp. 114-156; Rejoinder, Vol. II, pp. 454-457). Al1 of
this material requires to be considered before any inference as to state
of mind can be drawn. And upon such consideration there remains
not even a suspicion that Respondent might be embued with the intent
or motive to incorporate South West Africâ unilaterally intothe Republic
and that consequently its repeated denials of such an intent or motive
are to be disbelieved. On the contrary, to mention only oneconsideration,
in the light of the admitted fact that Respondent is pursuing a policy
aimed at separate self-determination for the various population groups
of South West Africa, it is difficult to see what practical purpose could,
from Respondent's point of view, be served by an iiiterim attempt at
interim incorporation of the Territory into the Republic.
6. The firm conclusion from the admissions and the eventually
undisputed facts is therefore that Respondent was not motivated by,
and indeed did not have, any intention or motive to annex or incorporate
the Territory, and that the measures complained of were not only
intended for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Territory, but, in fact,
operated to their benefit.
194 This being so, Applicants' case as originally presented became
insupportable. As 1 have said earlier, the acts complained of fell prima
facie within the ambit of Respondent's powers of legislation and ad-
ministration. If it is admitted or established thatese acts were intended
to promote the well-being of the inhabitants and did so in fact, it seems
to me that Respondent cannot be held to have acted illegally in any
respect.
7. A contention to the contrary was advanced by Applicants for
the first time in their Reply (p.357), on an alternative basis. The sub-
mission was that the acts referred to in the Memorials constituted
"ipso ,facto, and without regard to Respondent's motive or purpose,
a violationof Respondent's obligationto respect the separate international
status of the Territory". Before dealing with issues raised by this con-
tention, 1 would point out that even if it were correct, the effect of
Applicants' above-mentioned admissions would at least be to reduce
their complaints to insignificant technicalities of which it may rightly
be said that de minimis non curat lex. As an illustration of what 1have
in mind, 1 may refer to Applicants' complaint regarding the general
conferment of South African citizenship on the inhabitants of the
Territory. If such conferment were shown to have been a step in a
deliberate scheme of piecemeal incorporation involving also an obstacle
to the political advancement of the inhabitants of the Territory, it would
have been a serious matter and would certainly have been regarded
as such by this Court. However, once it is accepted, as it now is, that
no such scheme exists and that the measure was introduced for the
advantage of the inhabitants, who have, as a fact, received only benefit
and no detriment whatsoever therefrom (and particularly no detriment
to their political advancement or detriment to the international status
of the Territory)1 cannot see what the practical significance would be
of a finding that technically it was wrong of Respondent to introduce
such a measure. This is, however, in passing-my own view is that the
suggestion of a per se violation of the Territory's international status
is not only immaterial from a practical point of view, but also untenable
in law, as1shall show more particularly in respect of each of the actions
in question.
8. The first of the four actions was termed in the Memorials "the
general conferral of Union citizenship upon the inhabitants of the
Territory". The relevant measure in this regard was Act 44 of 1949
which had the effectof extending South African citizenship to al1persons
born in South West Africa after a certain date. Theredoes not appear to
be any prohibition on such conferment in the Mandate, as indeed the
express authorization to administer the Territory "as an integral portion
of the Union of South Africa" and to "apply the laws of the Union of
South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as
circumstances may require" would, in my view, suggest that it would be
permissible if properly done for the benefit of the inhabitants and not
for an ulteriorpurpose. 198 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
9. Applicants, indeed, did not base their case in this regard on an
interpretation of the provisions of the Mandate. On the contrary, they
relied solely on the terms of a resoluticn of the Council of the League
of Nations dated 23 April 1923. It is clear that any resolution of the
League Council relating to the legal effect of the mandates is entitled
to great weight. On the other hand it must not be forgotten that the
Council did not possess legislative competence. Al1 obligations sought
to be imposed on the Mandatory must in the final analysis rest upon
the provisions of the Mandate.
10. Turning now to the terms of the Council resolution, 1 would
point out that it does not appear to oppose the introduction of joint
nationality as such-indeed it specificallyauthorized voluntary nation-
alization of individual inhabitants of mandated territories by the
mandatory power. The Council's main concern appears to have been
rather that inhabitants of mandated territories should not be completely
assimilatedwith the population of the mandatory power. "Assimilation"
was the crucial matter dealt with in the report of Marquis Theodoli
which formed the basis of discussions in the Permanent Mandates
Commission (Reply, p. 359). The same concept, although not by that
name, was the burden of the Commission's proposa1No. III and the
reasoning in support of it (Counter-Memorial, Book VIII, p. 115) and
also of the opening paragraph of the Council's resolution, which reads:
"The status of the Native inhabitants of a Mandated territory is
distinct from that of the nationals of the mandatory Power and
cannot be identified therewith by any process having general
application." (Counter-Memorial, Book VIIT, p. 116.)
If this is the correct interpretation of the resolution, it would in my view
not be transgressed by general nationalization by the mandatory of the
inhabitants of the mandated territory unless such inhabitants thereby
lost their separate status. In my view, Act 44 of 1949did not result in
any such loss. It did not purport to abolish or reduce the rights of the
Native inhabitants of the Territory; their status as inhabitants of a
mandated territory remained and is not shared by the inhabitants of
South Africa. Repeal of Act 44 of 1949would not add anything to the
rights of inhabitants of the Territory.
11. If1 am wrong in my above-stated view, and if the Council re-
solution should be read as intending to impose an absolute prohibition
on the general nationalization of the inhabitants of mandated territories,
irrespective of whethersuch inhabitants thereby lost their separate status
or not, 1 regret to say that 1 do not regard it as a correct statement of
the legal position. In my view no such provision was expressed, or can
be implied in the Mandate. On either viewof the meaning of the Council
resolution 1 accordingly find that Act 44 of 1949does not per se con-
stitute a violation ofthe separateinternationalstatus ofSouthWestAfrica.
196 12. The second action raised in the Memorials, was the inclusion in
terms of Act 23 of 1949 of representatives from South West Africa in
the South African Parliament. In the Memorials the objection taken
to this measure was stated to be that it-
"... isnot only part of a plan to incorporate the Territory politically,
but also excludes 'natives' from the processes of self-government".
(Memorials, p. 193.)
The "plan to incorporate the Territory politically" has fallen by the
wayside and no more need be said about it. As regards the so-called
exclusion of the Natives from the processes of self-government, the Appli-
cants appear to have identified themselves with criticism in a report by
the Cornmittee on South West Africa to the effect that "the existing
arrangements. ..have excluded either the consultation or the represeiita-
tion of the largest section of the population. ..".
It will become apparent that charges or comment to this effect extend
beyond the per se effect of the legislation, and necessitate enquiry into
the whole political framework of which the legislation forms part.
Expositions on this subject were given by Respondent in its pleading
relative to Applicants' Submissions Nos. 3 and 4, and the facts thus
presented were eventually accepted as true by the Applicants. These
facts were further supplemented in uncontroverted testimony of expert
witnesses. From these admitted facts it appeared clearly that the above-
quoted comments of the Applicants and of the Committee on South
West Africa were not justified. The mere absence of representation of
non-White groups in the political institutions designed solely for the
White group, does not mean that the non-White groups are excluded
either from consultation or from processes of self-government. The fact
is that Respondent's system, with a view to the best interests of al1the
population groups concerned, makes distinct and separate provision for
the consultation, self-government and political development of each
group, in a manner best suited to the needs and circumstances of each
group. Once this is accepted, and acceptance, in my view, follows in-
evitably from the Applicants' admission, the averments and comment
under discussion will be seen to be unfounded.
It has also been suggested that the arrangements operate to the
detriment of the non-Whites, inasmuch as the interests of the White
part of the population are likely to be better served, e.g., if it came to
a partition of the Territory. This suggestion extends even further beyond
a case resting on theper se aspects of the particular legislation. Indeed,
a moment's reflection will show that it is completely out of place in the
present context. A complaint that the political institutions of the White
section of the population are more effectivethan those of other sections
197would not appear to have any relevance to alleged violations of the
separate international status of the Territory, with which 1 am dealing
at present. It could have a bearing, if at all, only on that part of the case
dealing with the alleged failure on the part of Respondent to promote
well-being and progress in the political sphere, i.e., Applicants' Submis-
sions Nos. 3 and 4. As 1 have shown when dealing with these sub-
missions, Applicants no longer attempt to establish a case on the basis
of unfairness towards, or oppression of, the non-European population
of the Territory, and could in any event in my view not have succeeded
with such case. Had the suggestion under discussion been advanced in
the pleadings as an averment in support of any of their submissions,
and persisted in during the oral proceedings, there would doubtlessly
have been much closer investigation into the relative effectiveness of the
arrangements for the White group and of those for the non-White
groups. In such an investigation due regard would have had to be paid
to the fact that the whole system is a developing, evolutionary one, and
that, as Mr. Cillie stressed in his evidence-
". .. as political organs and economic and social institutions
develop among the various non-White peoples ... Less and less
it is going to be in Southern Africa a matter of unilateral decisions
and arrangements. It stands to reason that, as children grow up and
develop a will of their own, their wishes have to be taken into
account in the affairs of the family and that is what we are driving
at."
In the circumstances 1need to Saynothing further about the suggestion
here.
13. Al1that remains then is the question whether the representation
of inhabitants cf South West Africa in the South African Parliament
is indeed per se an infringement of the Mandate, and, in particular,
of the separate international status of the Territory. As 1 have said
before, Article 22 of the Covenant and the mandate instrument autho-
rized the administration of the Territory as an integral part of South
Africa. There is no express provision precluding the Respondent from
allowing representatives from South West Africa in its Parliament,
and there is no justification for reading an implied term to this effect
into either ofthese instruments. Such a term cannot be said to be neces-
sary in the sense that one can confidently Say that had it been raised
at the time the parties would have conceded that it fell witliin the ambit
of their agreement. On the contrary, the addition of such a term would
constitute a radical alteration of the provisions of the Mandate and the
Covenant.
Moreover, the conduct of the parties at the time of the drafting of
the Covenant and at al1 material times thereafter, confirrn that there
could not have existed any common intention of precluding the Re-
spondent from allowing representatives of South West Africa in its
Parliament. When introducing the Peace Treaty in the House of Commons on
3 July 1919, Lloyd George emphasized that "South West Africa will
become part of the Federation of South Africa".
14. In 1923General Smuts informed the Permanent Mandates Com-
mission of the probability that the White inhabitants of the Territory
would be given representation in the Respondent's Parliament. If any
State thought that such representation in Respondent's Parliament
impeded "opportunity of self-determination" or was "inconsistent with
the international status of the territory" a voice ofrotest should and
would have been heard.
15. In later years the representation of South West Africa in the
South African Parliament was raised before and discussed in the United
Nations on a number of occasions. At al1 times the United Nations
contained a larger number of Members who had also been foundation
Members of the League. It is significant, therefore, thatnone of them
expressed the view that the Covenant or the Mandate precluded the
Respondent from allowing representatives elected by voters in South
West Africa in its Parliament.
Thus, on 11 April 1947, the House of Assembly of Respondent's
Parliament adopted a resolution reading, intearlia, as follows:
"Therefore this House is of opinion that the territory should be
represented in the parliament of the Union as an integral portion
thereof, and requests the Government to introduce legislation, after
consultation with the inhabitants of the territory providing for its
representation in the Union Parliament. .."
This resolution was brought to the attention of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations by letter in 1947, and in this communication it
was also stated that Respondent would maintain the status quo and
would continue to administer the Territory in the spirit of the Mandate.
Nobody expressed a view that this undertaking was inconsistent with
the resolution. When the Respondent's representative expressed the
view in the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947that such
representation in Respondent's Parliament was not the same as in-
corporation and would not constitute a violation of any provision
of the Mandate, not a single State challenged the soundness of this
statement. In 1948the Respondent's representative in the Fourth Com-
mittee explained the provision of the proposed legislation whereby the
Territory would be represented in the Respondent's Parliament, and
again emphasized that the proposed arrangement would not constitute
incorporation, and again nobody suggested that such representation
would be inconsistent with the international status of the Territory or
would in any other way breach the provisions of the Mandate. Neither
of the Applicants have offered any explanation for their failure to
challenge the Respondent's contentions on these occasions.
When later on 26 November 1948 the Respondent's representative
repeated its previous assurances that the measures designed to establish
199 parliamentary representation in theTerritorydid not mean the Territory's
incorporation or absorption into South Africa, the General Assembly
actually recorded in a resolution that it took note-
". .. of the assurance given by the representative of the Union
of South Africa that the proposed new arrangement for closer
association of South West Africa with the Union does not mean
incorporation and will not mean absorption of the Territory by
the Administering Authority".
Again not a single State challenged the correctness of Respondent's
statement.
16. In 1949,Act 23 of 1949was transmitted to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. It was only at the end of the debate of theourth
Session of the Fourth Committee that one of the delegates proposed
an amendment to certain draft resolutions to the effect that the said
Act constituted a violation of the United Nations Charter. It will be
observed that even at this stagethere was no suggestion that it constituted
a violation of the Mandate or the Covenant. In any event, this resolution
was defeated. A similar resolution was defeated in 1950. The above
attitude of States confirms my view that there is no substance in this
charge.
17. The third complaint upon which the Applicants based their
aforesaid submission is that the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel-hereafter
referred to as the Caprivi-is administered separately from the rest of
the Territory.
A proper appreciation of this issue necessitates some knowledge of
the geographical features of this area. Tt is east of longitude 21° and
forms part of a strip of land acquired by the German Government in
1890as a zone of free access to the Zambesi River. It is long and narrow
and forms the north-eastern part of the Territory. In the rainy season
a large area becomes a huge swamp with the result that is is impossible
to approachit from the remainder of the Territory. Itis mainly inhabited
by two tribes which have never had any connections with the other
Native groups in South West Africa.
An attempt between the years 1929and 1939to administer the Caprivi
as a part of South West Africa failed-it appeared clearly that it was
in the interests of the area to have it administered directly by Respondent.
This conclusion was reported to the Permanent Mandates Commission
who stated the following:
"The Commission learned from the annual report that owing
to the difficulty of satisfactorily controlling the eastern part of the
Caprivi Zipfel, it is contemplatingmaking over the control of this
area to the Union Department of Native Affairs. It noted the
statements of the accredited representative to the effect that the
officer administering the area in question would work i~i close
200 CO-operationwith the Mandatory Government which would be
acting for the Administration of South West Africa and that infor-
mation regarding that part of the territory would be included in
the annual reports as hitherto.
The Commissionholds the viewthat the administrativearrangement
contemplated calls for no observations on its part provided al1 the
provisions of the Mandate are properly applied in the eastern
portion of the Caprivi Zipfel." (Italics added.)
18. Applicants sought to support this contention relative to the
Caprivi by arguing that-
". ..[elven if problems of accessibility make administrative sepa-
ration expedient, it is incumbent upon Respondent to take other
steps to preserve the territorial integrity of the Mandated Territory
as a whole, and to develop the 'sense of territorial consciousness
among al1the inhabitants' which is required by the United Nations.
Such a responsibility is implicit in the undertaking of the Mandate
itself." (Reply, p.63.)
Such an obligation could exist, if at all, only aspart of the Mandatory's
general duty to promote the political well-being and progress of the
inhabitants of the Territory. But, as such, it has no relevance, in my
view, to the present discussion of alleged infringements of the inter-
national status of the Territory. In any event, it is clear to me that no
such obligation was everimposed by the Mandate, or even bythe United
Nations in respect of dependent territories generally, as is apparently
contended by Applicants.
19. In view of the above circumstances 1have no hesitation in holding
thatthe administrative separation of the Caprivi was a perfectlylegitimate
exercise of Respondent's governmental powers.
20. The fourth complaint relates to the transfer of the Administration
of Native Affairs from the Administrator to the Minister of Bantu
Administration and Development, and to the vesting of South West
African Native Reserve land in the South African Native Trust. In
this regard also it must be kept in mind that it is no longer contended
that these measures were actuated by any improper motive, or that
they have had any undesirable effect on well-being or progress. That
being so, there can, in my view, be no reason why Respondent should
not determine which official or agency should exercise or administer
particular functions or assets relating to the Territory. It could hardly
be suggested that Respondent is under an obligation to entrust al1
functions regarding the administration of South West Africa only to
those of its officials who are statio-ned in Windhoek to the exclusion
of officials stationed in the Republic itself. Nevertheless that would
appear to be the effect of this contention, which should in my view, be
rejected.
21. To sum up, once it was admitted by the Applicants that the various
actions referred to in Chapter VI11of the Memorials were not motivated
201by any plan to annex or incorporate the Territory, the whole basis of
Applicants' original casefell away. The alternative contention that these
acts "constitute per se, and without regard to Respondent's purpose or
motive, a violation of Respondent's obligation to respect the separate
international legal status of the Territory" (Reply, p. 354)reduced Appli-
cants' chargeat best (for them) to a mere technicality and at worst to
a completely untenable proposition.
22. It was probably the realization that their original charges were
insupportable that induced Applicants ultimately to abandon them, as
in my viewthey clearlydid. In comingto this conclusion 1fullyappreciate
that a failure by a party to refer in the oral proceedings to particular
contentions or arguments raised in the written pleadings, does not
necessarilyamount to an abandonment of such contentions or arguments.
However, in the present case there are a number of additional consider-
ations which in my viewcompel the aforesaid conclusion. Most of these
considerations have been dealt with before and it will not be necessary
to do more than refer briefly to them again. Firstly, it is significant that
in Submission No. 5 as originally drafted there appeared specific refer-
ences to the actions complained of, which references were deliberately
deleted in the amended submission. This in itself suggests that the
original grounds of action are no longer relied upon, a suggestionwhich
is strengthened by the consideration that the case as originally framed
could no longer succeed after Applicants had admitted that an essential
element thereof-the intent to incorporate-did not exist.
When attempting to ascertain positively what case was sought to be
made in the amended submission, which, as 1 noted above, is now
completely vague as to the conduct complained of, the obvious starting
point seems to me the Applicants' final oral argument in which they
purported to explain their case. Reference to such oral argument shows
that Applicants at that stage did not only fail to advance any argument
in support of their original charges, but emphasized that their sole and
only case rested on an entirely different basis. They commenced their
discussjon by expressing an intention of disposing of Submission NO. 5
"in, the context of the requirement of administrative supervision".
They then elucidated their contention in support of their Submission
No. 5 in, inter alia, the following passages:
".. .turning to the question of annexation, administrative super-
vision is hereagain seen to be of the essence. Respondent's refusal
to submit to administrative supervision, indeed, is an underlying
element of the Applicants' complaintin this regard (Italics added.)
In the absence of such accountability, Respondent's function of
administration would cease to be international.205 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
That is the essenceofour contention in this regard. (Italics added.)
The absence, the denial, or the rejection of international super-
vision, alters the international statusof the Territory; it deprives
it of that character. This isthe basisof our submission inthisregard."
(Italics addttd.)
and, finally-
"With respect to the Submission 6 (sic), relating to annexation,
the refusal and denial of submission to international administrative
supervision impairs the international status of the Territory."
In other words, Applicants repeatedly emphasized that their sole
contention was that refusal to submit to international supervision was
in itself an actnconsistent with the international status of the Territory.
This attitude is in line with the features1 have mentioned above, al1of
which, cumulati~vely.satisfy me that Applicants did not intend in their
amended submiission to pursue the charges originally raised in the
Memorials, or the alternative thereto first raised in the Reply. They
intended to limit their case to the one contention mentioned above,
to the exclusion lofal1others. Consequently 1now turn to a consideration
of the merits of the sole contention ultimately relied upon.
23. In the first place, its effect now is that Submission No. 5 amounts
merely to a paraphrase of Submissions Nos. 2, 7 and 8. Consequently
there appears little purpose in retaining it as a separate submission.
But in any event, it seems to me a complete non sequitur to argue that
Respondent has treated the Territory in a manner inconsistent with the
international status of the Territory and has impeded opportunities for
self-determination by the inhabitants of the Territory merely because
Respondent has :refusedto submit to international supervision. The one
question relates to the merits of Respondent's actions and policies,
the other purely to supervision thereof. It follows, therefore, that even
if Respondent were obliged to submit to United Nations supervision
(which in my view is not the case) mere failure to do so would not be
an act contrary to the separate international status of the Territory.
Article 4 of the Mandate
(Applican:s7SubmissionNo. 6)
1. Article 4 of the Mandate provided as follows:
"The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes
of interna1 police and the local defence of the territory, shall be
prohibited. ITurthermore, no military or naval bases shall be es-
tablished or fortifications erected in the territory."
203 2. In its original form Applicants' Submission No. 6 read as follows:
"The Union, by virtue of the acts described in Chapter VI1
herein, has established military bases within theTerritory in violation
of its obligations as stated in Article of the Mandate and Article 22
of the Covenant; that the Union has the duty forthwith to remove
al1such military bases froni within the Territory; andthat the Union
has the duty to refrain from the establishment of military bases
within the 'Territory." (Memorials, p. 198.)
3. The installations described in Chapter VI1 of the Memorials,
which were alleged to constitute military bases within the meaning of
Article 4 of the: Mandate, were the following:
(a) an alleged military landing ground in the Swakopmund district
of South West Africa;
(b) an alleged military camp or military air base at Ohopoho in the
Kaokoveld area of South West Africa;
(c) the supply and maintenance facilities of the Regiment Windhoek.
The reason advanced by Applicants in their Memorials for contending
that these institutions were military bases, was that "[alrmed installations
not related to pcoliceprotection or interna1 security fa11within the class
of 'military bases' or 'fortifications'...". (Memorials. p. 181.)
4. The facts relative to the aforementioned facilities are set forth in
the Respondent's pleadings and are,as willbe shown later, not in dispute.
For the purposes of this opinion 1shall briefly restate the material facts
concerning each of the said facilities.
(a) The Alleged Military Landiwg Ground in the Swakopmund District of
South West .frica
The allegatiori in the Applicants' Memorials, based on "information
and belief", was that the military landing ground in question was situated
in the Swakoprnund district within the Mandated Territory of South
West Africa. This allegation was not correct. The said landing ground
is not situated within the territorial boundaries of South West Africa,
but falls in the area of the Port and Settlement of Walvis Bay which,
although administered for practical purposes as if it were part of the
Territory of South West Africa, is in fact a part of the Republic of South
Africa l.Although Applicants accepted this "geographical explanation",
they advanced the contention in their Reply that Walvis Bay must,
"in a military sense, be considered to be in South West Africa,
inasmuch a:$it is completely surrounded by territory subject to the
l It appears that Applicants based their allegation on a statement contaiind
a report of thc Committee on South West Africa. It would seem that the Committee,
apparently unaware of the true factual and legal position, was misled by a ref-
erence in Governnient Notice No. 636 of 1958 (SA) to the farm Rooikop, on which
the landing grounal is situated, as falling within the magisterial district of Swakop-
mund-a correct statement at the time, but only in so far as the said administra-
tive arrangement is concerned. Mandate and necessarily depends thereon for essential services,
transport, communications and supplies, including water".
1 quote this statement at this stage in view of the factual allegations
contained therein.
Even if these factual allegations were correct, there would be no legal
justification for considering Walvis Bay, "in a military sense" to be
"in South West Africa". The Applicants did not mention any legal
principle, nor am 1aware of any legal principle, which could under such
circumstances constitute one territory part of another, whether "in a
military sense" or in any other sense. Tt is, however, not necessary to
pursue this enquiry any further inasmuch as the factual allegations
upon which Applicants based their contention were not correct. A
reference to any reliable map will immediately show that the area of
Walvis Bay is not "completely surrounded by territory subject to the
Mandate". It is approachable from the sea without entering or crossing
any part of the Mandated Territory. With regard to the other factual
allegations contained in Applicants' above-quoted statement Respondent
denied that Walvis Bay "necessarily depends [on South West Africa]
for essential services, transport, communications and supplies,including
water", and explained that, although use is made of certain services
provided from South West Africa, such as road and rail transport,
telephone and postal communications, Walvis Bay is not "necessarily"
dependent thereon. Nor does it obtain its water supply from the Terri-
tory.
1 have already mentioned that Applicants, during the course of the
oral proceedings, intimated a generalacceptance by them of Respondent's
statements of fact in the pleadings. This acceptance, as1will show later,
applied also to the facts relative to their chargesconcerningmilitarization.
In the result the whole factual basis upon which Applicants sought to
found their contention that Walvis Bay must "in a military sense" be
considered "to be in South West Africa", has fallen away.
(b) The Alleged Military Camp or Military Air Base at Ohopoho in the
Kaokoveld Area of South West Africa
This facility is one of a few landing strips at various places in South
West Africa which are mainly used for administrative purposes but
also occasionally and intermittently for the landing of military aircraft.
These strips are natural surface strips which have simply been cleared
of vegetation and other obstructions. They are completely unmanned,
provide no maintenance or service facilities, and can only be used for
the landing of light aircraft.
(c) The Supply and Maintenance Facilities of the Regiment Windhoek
The Regiment Windhoek is a Citizen Force unit composed of civilians
who undergo peacetime military training for certain limited periods.
205Each trainee is enlisted for a period of four years and during that time
he undergoes three periods of training. In his first year of enlistment the
recruit attends a training course for a period of nine months at one or
other military training institution in the Republic of South Africa.
Over the last three years of his enlistment the trainee attends two training
courses of three weeks each at a training camp at Windhoek in South
West Africa. The said two periods of three weeks each is the only training
which members of the Regiment Windhoek receivein South West Africa
itself and, save when attending the training course aforementioned, the
members of the Regiment carry on their ordinary civilian occupations
and have no peacetime military obligations, except that they may be
called up if needed for purposes of restoring or maintaining lawand order.
The complement of the Regiment varies from year to year inasmuch
as in every year new recruits are enlisted and trained men discharged.
In 1963the complement was 20 officers and 221 other ranks. The Com-
manding Officer of the Regiment is not a professional soldier of the
permanent force, but, like the trainees, a member of the Citizen Force
and is predominantly occupied with his normal civil occupation.
At the training camp at Windhoek there are some houses occupied
by members of the South West Africa Command l;for the rest the camp
has ablution and cooking facilities only, sleeping accommodation for
trainees being provided during every training course by the pitching
of tents. The Regiment Windhoek is equipped with light reconnaissance
vehicles,Le., armoured cars '.It only remains to be said thatthe members
of the Regiment Windhoek are al1European inhabitants of South West
Africa, there being no military training whatsoever of Natives in the
Territory.
5. 1 have already stated that the facts as set out above are not in
dispute. That is so inasmuch as Applicants, during the course of the oral
proceedings, admitted as true al1 the factual statements contained in
Respondent's pleadings. And, as 1noted when dealing with Applicants'
complaints regarding piecemeal annexation (Submission No. 5), their
admission was specifically confirmed also with reference to the part
of the case concerning militarization. In this regard Applicants' Agent
referred to ". ..the facts with respect. ..to militarization ... as disputed
by the Respondent, and as subsequently accepted by the Applicants for
purposes of these proceedings . ..". Not only were the facts, as afore-
stated, relative to the landing strip at Ohopoho and the Regiment
Windhoek, admitted by the ~~~licaits, but they were confirmed in every
l The South West Africa Command is a military administrative organ for,
inter alia, the Regiment Windhoek, with headquarters at Windhoek. It consists
of a small permanent force staff, the complement of which in 1964 was three
officers and seven other ranks.
See in this regard the evidence of General Marshall: he found in the hangar
at Windhoek: 12 small armoured cars ("ferrets"which he described asrecomais-
terialand half of them out of commission; 16 miscellaneous vehicles,jeeps, trailers,
trucks, etc.; six-pounder gun used for ceremonial purposes.
206respect by General Marshall. General Marshall was not asked to testify
as to any military facilities at Walvis Bay, which, as 1 have said, falls
outside the mandated territory.
6. The question then arises whether, on the facts as aforestated, the
three facilities referred to in the Memorials are military bases within the
meaning of that expression in Article 4 of the Mandate.
1 would Say that obviously and as a matter of common sense the
answer is in the negative. However, in view of the contrary contentions
at one stage advanced by Applicants, 1 may add that this answer is
confirmed by dictionary meanings and expert opinion.
The following definitions of the term "military base" are found in the
dictionaries:
(a) Webster's CompleteDictionary of the English Language(1880)
Base (military) "A tract of country protected by fortifications, or
by natural advantages, from which the operations
of an army proceed."
(b) Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language
(Second Edition)
Base (military and naval) "The locality on which a force relies for
supplies (base of supplies) or from which it initiates
operations (base of operations); as, a submarine
base."
(c) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition)
Base (military) "The line or place relied upon as a stronghold and
magazine, and from which the operations of a
campaign are conducted."
(d) Gaynor, The New Military and Naval Dictionary (1951)
Base "A locality from which operations are projected or
supported; the term may be preceded by a descrip-
tive word such as 'air' or 'submarine', to indicate
its primary purpose."
(e) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English(1958)
Base (mil.) "Town or other area in rear of an army where drafts,
stores, hospitals, etc., are concentrated (also [base]
of operations)."
(f) Funk andWagnallsNew Standard Dictionaryfor theEnglishLanguage
(1961)
Base (mil.) "A place or region constituting a basis of operations
or a point from which supplies and reinforcements
[sic] may be drawn; a base of supply."
It seems to me that there is a common feature in al1these definitions,
207210 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
namely that a base is something utilized by a force or an army for the
purposes of operations or a campaign.
If 1 am correct in my reading of these definitions it follows, in my
opinion, that a place cannot be said to be maintained as a rnilitary or
naval base unless itsurpose is utilization by a force or an army for oper-
ations or a campaign, actual or prospective.
7. If the aforestated test is applied to the admitted facts relative to the
facilities in question, not one of them would fa11within the dictionary
definitions of "military base". 1 of course exclude the military landing
ground at Walvis Bay. As 1 have already pointed out, it falls outside
the mandated territory, and the relevant facts thereof were not investi-
gated. There is no basis, legal or factual, for a contention that it must be
considered to be in South West Africa, whether "in a military sense"
or any other sense. In so far asthe two remaining facilitiesare concerned
neither the landing strip at Ohopoho nor the supply and maintenance
facilities of the Regiment Windhoek qualify, in terms of the dictionary
definitions, as military bases.
Thiswas also the expert opinion of GeneralMarshall, who, Applicants'
Agent conceded, was "indeed a recognized military authority and widely
read as such in Ournative country".
General Marshall testified that he had visited South West Africa on
two occasions during 1965 and had given particular attention to the
facilities in question. He described his findings with regard to these
installations in detail and concluded that neither of them could, in his
opinion, be regarded as a military base.
8. Another reason why 1 consider that the said facilities cannot be
regarded as military bases, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Man-
date, is that thesaid Article itself does not prohibit, but on the contrary
by implication permits, the training of the European inhabitants of the
Territory aswellasthetraining oftheNatives for certain limited purposes,
i.e., forinternal police and local defence.It must have been contemplated
that there would be training of inhabitants of the Territory at least
for internal police and local defencepurposes and, which is a necessary
corollary, that there would be facilities foruch training. It is, therefore,
inconceivable that the prohibition against military bases in Article 4
was intended to extend to ordinary training facilities such as those
provided for members of the Regiment Windhoek or to facilities such
as the landing strips at Ohopoho and elsewhere, which are used mainly
for administrative purposes but occasionally also by military aircraft,
inter alia, for the training of air force personnel.
9. As 1 have mentioned, Applicants in their pleadings advanced
arguments contrary to the above conclusions.
At one stage they suggestedthat the facilitiesin question were military
bases inasmuch as they were, according to Applicants, not intended
for "police protection or internal security"l.
There is no substance in this contention, which appears to have been
l Memorials,pp. 182-183.
708based on a misinterpretation of the sentence in Article 4 which deals
with the military training of Natives.Inasmuch as there is no training of
Natives in South West Africa, the qualificafion which Applicants sought
to apply in their Memorials relative to the establishment of military
bases was misplaced.And,in any event, there is no evidence that the fa-
cilities in question were intended for, or are used for, any military pur-
poses other than for interna1police andthe local defenceofthe Territory.
At another stage the Applicants submitted that only Natives could
lawfully be trained for police and local defence purposes, and they even
went so far as to suggest that Article 4 would have been violated unless
Respondent could confirm "that there [is] not in the entire territory a
single soldier orsailor on the active list"l.1do not intend to deal with
these arguments, which in my opinion are, to say the least, fanciful and
baseless. Suffice it to say that neither the Mandate for South West
Africa, nor any other mandate, prohibited the military training of non-
Natives, and there is undisputed evidence before the Court that a large
number of non-Natives were in fact trained and used in the forces
stationed in the other African mandated territories during the lifetime
of the League.
10. Before proceeding to deal with a further contention advanced
by Applicants in the oral proceedings, 1wish to draw attention to certain
factual allegations which wereintroduced by Applicants for the first time
in their Reply.
Under a heading "Military Activity in General" Applicants for the
first time charged in their Reply that Respondent had-
"... created a situation where there is the equivalent of a series of
military bases or potential military bases in the Territory or at
worst, where the Territory iself and its 'White' inhabitants have
become armed and CO-ordinatedto the extent that the Territory
has been transformed into a 'military base' within the meaning
3nd intent of the Covenant and the Mandate".
In my viewit isimpermissiblefor an Applicant to introduce an entirely
new complaint of this kind in its Reply. The procedure of this Court
requires that the Applicants' cause of action should be set out in the
Application and Memorial. This requirement is not a mere procedural
technicality-if new causes of action are allowed to be introduced at
later stages of the proceedings it becomes impossible for the parties
to deal fullytherewith prior to the conclusion of the written proceedings.
Each party should have the opportunities contemplated in the Rules
of Court for dealing with the contentions of the other party. The Court
itself is, to put it at its lowest, inconvenienced if, as happened in the
present case, there is at the commencement of the oral proceedings no
certainty as to the areas of agreement or dispute between the parties.
In my view such a situation militates against the proper administration
Reply, p. 340.
209ofjustice, and should not be countenanced. In the present case it would
seem, in view of what is stated hereinafter, that Applicants did not in
the oral proceedings persist in this omnibus charge. They certainly made
no mention of it or of the factual allegations embodied therein. There is,
however, no certainty in this regard in view of the vague and unparticu-
larized manner in which Applicants finallyreformulated their Submission
No. 6-also a matter to which reference is made hereinafter. Whatever
the position may be in this regard, it is clear on the evidence that there
could be no merit in the charge. At the conclusion ofhis evidenceGeneral
Marshall wasaskedwhethertherewas anythingwhich hesawinSouth West
Africa which, in his opinion, could be regarded as a military base, or
whether the territory as such could be regarded as a military base.
His reply was: "My answer is no. May 1add that the Territory is less
militarized and more under-armed than any territory of its size 1 have
ever seen in the world."
The witness's conclusions were not attacked by Applicants, either
in cross-examination or in comment on the evidence, and, of course, no
evidence whatsoever had been led by the Applicants. In my view, there
can be no reason for not accepting General Marshall's evidence and
opinions. Indeed, Applicants' Agent himself referred to the "first-hand
authentic and undoubtedly correct factual statement" concerning what
General Marshall saw on his inspection.
Il. The only contention advanced by Applicants in the oral pro-
ceedings relative to their charges regarding militarization was to the
effect that modern military science had progressed to the stage where
the Territory could be effectivelymilitarized within a short period, and
that, in the absence of administrative supervision, Respondent must
consequently be deemed to be guilty of a violation of Article 4 of the
Mandate. It was apparently in pursuance of this new contention that
Applicants' Submission No. 6 was amended to read as follows:
"Respondent has established military bases within the Territory
in violation of its obligations as stated in Article of the Mandate
and Article 22 of the Covenant; that Respondent has the duty
forthwith to remove al1such military bases from within the Territory
and that Respondent has the duty to refrain from the establishment
of military bases within the Territory."
It will be noted that (similarly to the position in respect of Applicants'
reformulated Submission No. 5) the reformulated Submission No. 6
omits specific identification of any acts or installations. It is true that
the reformulated submissions were al1 made "upon the basis of alle-
gations of fact and statements of law set forth in the written pleadings
and oralproceedings herein". It is, however, not clearwhich ofthe charges
the Applicants are persisting in, particularly in view of the fact that
their charges in the pleadings included a charge, dealt with in paragraph
10, supra, to the effectthat the whole of South West Africa had become
210 transformed into a military base. And if, as Applicants explained in
the oral proceedings, the basis oftheir complaint islack of administrative
supervision, what criterion is there fcr determining whether any of
the particular installations or facilitiesreferred to in the pleadings, or any
otherinstallationsor facilitiesinthe Territory, are orare notmilitary bases?
In any event, if we have regard to the informa1 statement by Appli-
cants' Agent in the oral proceedings as to what the Applicants' case
really is, the complaint appears to be that Respondent would, in the
absence of international supervision, be able to militarize the Territory
without anybody being aware thereof. This line of argument clearly
provides no support for a contention that "Respondent has established
military bases within the Territory", nordoes it in fact suggest any other
violation of Article4 of the Mandate.
12. For the reasons aforestatcd, 1 find that there is no substance in
Applicants' charges relative to Article 4 of the Mandate.
The Alleged Duty to Transmit Petitions
(Applicants' Submission No. 8)
1. 1 have already expressed the view that, apart from other grounds,
this submission should be dismissed also on the ground that Article 6 of
the Mandate Declaration, which provided for the duty to report and
account, no longer applies. However, even if Article6 were still in force,
the result would, in so far as Submission No. 8is concerned,in my view,
be the same. Neither Article 6, nor any other provision of the Mandate,
required the Mandatory to transmit petitions to the Council or any
other organ ofthe League.The procedure of submittingpetitions through
the mandatories arose as a result of rules of procedure drafted by the
Council in 1923. (League of Nations, OfJicialJournal, 1923 (No. 3),
p. 300.) It is clear that these rules could not impose on the mandatories
an obligation not provided for in the Mandate Declarations or in Article
22 of the Covenant. And, indeed, the said rules did not purport to do
so. These rules were designed for the protection of the mandatories
against frivolous or one-sidedpetitions by ensuring that the mandatories
would have an opportunity of commenting on them before they were
considered by the League. For this reason the rules provided that pe-
titions emanating from the inhabitants of a mandated territory were not
to be sent direct to the Council, but were to be transmitted throughthe
mandatory concerned; thus enabling the mandatory to attach such
comments as it might think desirable. And in respect of petitions ema-
nating from any source other than the inhabitants themselves, the
mandatory was to be asked for its comment before such petitions were
considered by the Permanent Mandates Commission.
These rules of procedure were therefore not intended to impose obli-
gations on the mandatories but rather to provide them with the oppor-
tunity of making timely comments on the allegations made in petitions
to the League.
211 However, even if the Council's rules of procedure could in some way
or another have given riseto an obligation onthe part ofthe mandatories,
such an obligation could, in any event, not be described as an obligation
embodied in the "provisions of the Mandate". It follows that the Court
would, in any event, not have jurisdiction in terms of Article 7 (2) of
the Mandate to entertain disputes regarding the alleged violation of
such an obligation.
2. In my view these are additional reasons why Applicants'.Submission
No. 8 should be dismissed.
Article 7, Paragraph1, of the Mandate
(Applicants' Submission No. 9)
1. Little need be said about Submission No. 9. As in the case of
Applicants' SubmissionsNos. 5 and 6, which have been dealt with above,
Submission No. 9 initially particularized Respondent's alleged conduct
which was contended to be in confiict with Article 7 (1) of the Mandate.
In the Memorials, Submission No. 9 read a follows:
". .. the Union, by virtue of the acts described in Chapters V, VI,
VI1 and VI11of this Memorial coupled with its intent as recounted
herein, has attempted to modify substantially the terms of the
Mandate, without the consent of the United Nations; that such
attempt is in violation of its duties as stated in Article 7 of the Man-
date and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the consent of the
United Nations is a necessary prerequisite and condition precedent
to attempts onthe part of the Union directly or indirectly to modify
the terms of the Mandate".
2. Also in respect of this submission, Applicants were forced to
effect an amendment as a result of their admission of al1the facts as
set forth in Respondent's pleadings. These admitted facts disproved
the allegationsupon which the submission was based, and the Applicants
accordingly deleted al1the referencesmade in the submissionas originally
formulated to the acts described in Chapters V, VI, VI1 and VI11of the
Memorials as well as references to Respondent's alleged intent. In the
result also this submission has become so vague as to be meaningless.
It follows that, in my view, no declaration can be made as requested in
this submission.
3. There are, however, also other grounds for reaching the same
conclusion. On the dissolution of the League of Nations, Article 7 (l),
in my view, lapsed in the same way, and for substantially the same
reasons, as Article 6, with which 1 dealt above. It follows that, even if
the Mandate were still in existence as an institution, Article7 (1) would
no longer be in force. In my view no agreement has been concluded.
Neither the United Nations nor any one of its organs has stepped into
the shoes ofthe LeagueCouncilas theauthority whoseconsentis required
far modification of the terms of the Mandate.
212 4. In conclusion, 1 may add that Applicants in their final address
to this Court relied solely on Respondent's refusa1 to submit to inter-
national supervision as a ground for contending that a declaration should
be made in terms of Submission No.9. My viewin this respect is similar
tothat which1 have expressedwith regard to other submissionsin support
of which thesame contention was advanced, namely that, even if Appli-
cants would be entitled to a declaration in terms of their Submission
No. 2, that would not, in my view,justify a declaration that Respondent
has violated other provisions of the Mandate, forexample, that Res-
pondent has attempted to modify the terms of the Mandate in contra-
vention of Article 7 (1) thereof.
(Signe J.)T.VAN WYK.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE VAN WYK
GENERAG LROUND SOR DISMISSINA GPPLICANTS S'UBMISSIONS
1agree that the claim should be disrnissed and 1agree with the reasons
stated in the Judgment. There are however severalfurther and alternative
grounds for dismissing the claim; and although 1 fully share the view
of those members of the Court who, while agreeing that these grounds
exist ho!d that once a court has found a general ground of a fundamental
character for dismissing a claim, neither it, nor any judge, should
proceed to state what its judgment, or his opinion, would have been
had such ground not existed, 1 nonetheless believe that it would be
unrealistic in the particular circumstances of this case if at least one
judge did not deal with some of those further and alternative grounds
from the standpoint which 1 adopt. Before doing so, however, 1 wish
to make a few observations with regard to the Judgment.
2. It is true that a greatal of the reasoning of the present Judgment
is in conflict with the reasoning of the 1962 Judgment with regard
to the first three preliminary objections (particularly the second)-
so much so that the inescapable inference is that in 1962 the Court
assumed a jurisdiction it does not possess-but these considerations
cannot in any way preclude the Court from now basing its judgment
on the merits on its present reasoning. The Court is not bound to
perpetuate faulty reasoning, and nothing contained in the 1962Judgment
could constitute a decision of any issue which is part of the merits of
the claim.
3.The mere fact that a provision confers competence on a court to
adjudicate upon disputes relating to certain matters at the instance of
particular States, obviously cannot have the effect of conferring sub-
stantive legal rights or interests in respect of such matters on suc11
States. Thus, for example, the acceptance of this Court's jurisdiction
by the Netherlands-which is typical of several acceptances-is,with
exceptions therein indicated, "in relation to any other State... in all
disputes ...". This acceptance confers competence on this Court to
adjudicate, at the instance of any State complying with the prescribed
conditions, upon any dispute between such a State and the Netherlands.
This would include any dispute relating to the interpretation or appli-
cation of the provisions of any treaty. But whether such a State has
a legal right orinterest in the subject-matter of any such dispute, Le.,
a right or interest upon which a judgment in its favour could be based,
65 OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. VAN WYK
jTraduction]
MOTIFS GÉNÉRAUX APPELANT LE REJET DES CONCLUSIONS
DES DEMANDEURS
Je cûnviens que la demande doit être rejetéeet souscris aux motifs
énoncés dansl'arrêt. Il est toutefois divers autres motifs subsidiaires
appelant le rejet de la demande; certes, je partage entièrement les vues
de ceux des membres de la Cour qui, tout en convenant de l'existence
de ces motifs, considèrent que, lorsqu'un tribunal a trouvé un motif
généralde caractère fondamental pour rejeter une demande, il n'appar-
tient pas au tribunal de préciser quelaurait été son arrêtn ,i à un juge
d'indiquer quelle aurait étéson opinion, au cas où un tel motif n'aurait
pas existé;jz n'en suis pas moins convaincu que, dans les circonstan-
ces particulières de la présente affaire,il ne serait guère réalisteque cer-
tains des motifs subsidiaires ne soient pas examinésdu point de vue que
j'adopte ici, par un juge au moins. Avant de procéder à cet examen, je
voudrais toutefois formuler quelques observations au sujet de l'arrêt.
2. Il est exact que nombre de motifs énoncésdans le présent arrêt
sont en contradiction avec les motifs retenus dans l'arrêt de1962 au
sujet des trois premières exceptions préliminaireset notamment de la
deuxième, et cela à tel point que l'on est forcé de conclure qu'en 1962
la Cour s'est arrogé une compétence qu'elle n'avait pas; ces considé-
rations ne sauraient toutefois nullement empêcherla Cour d'étayerson
arrêtau fond sur les motifs qu'elle invoque aujourd'hui. La Cour n'est
pas tenue de persister dans un raisonnement erroné et aucun élément
de l'arrêtde 1962ne saurait c~nstituer une décisionà l'égardd'une ques-
tion, quelle qu'elle soit, relevant du fond de la demande.
3. Le simple fait qu'une dispasition donne compétence à un tribunal
pour statuer, àla demande de certains Etats, sur des différendsportant
sur telles ou telles qurstions ne saurait manifestement avoir pour con-
séquence deconférer à ces Etats au fond desdroits ou intérêts juridiques
au regard de ces questions. Ainsi, l'acceptation par les Pays-Bas de la
juridiction de la Cour - acceptation qui est caractéristique de celle
qui a étédonnéepar divers autres Etats - vise, sous certaines réserves
expressémentindiquées, la juridiction ((vis-à-visde tout Etat...sur tous
les différend...))Cette acceptation donne à la Cour compétencepour
statuer,à la demande de tout Etat respectant les conditions énoncées,
sur tout différend s'élevantntre cet Etat et les Pays-Bas, et notamment
sur tout différend relatià l'interprétation ou àl'application des dispo-
sitions d'un traité quelconque. C'est une autre question que de savoir
si1'Etat en cause a un droit ou intérêtjuridiqueau regard de l'objet de
65 is a completely different matter. The answer to such a question is not
to be found in this acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, but depends
on the interpretation placed by the Court on the provisions of the
particular treaty upon which the claim is based. Such an issue is not
part of the jurisdictional issue, but constitutes an integral part of the
merits of the dispute, which can only be resolved after the Court has
upheld the right of the Applicant to seise it. These two matters, i.e., the
jurisdictional and the merits, cannot be dealt with simultaneously.
If any State should contend that the acceptance of the Court's juris-
diction by the Netherlands confers on it substantive legal rights or
interkts in respect of any particular matter, the Court will first decide
whethehit has jurisdiction in terms of the acceptance of jurisdiction
by theNetherlands; and, only afterhavingfound that it has the necessary
competence, will it consider the merits of such a contention.
Some confusion has resulted in this case from the fact that the
same provision on which the Court's jurisdiction is founded is also
alleged to constitute the source of the Applicants' substantive legal
rights on which their claim is based. It should be appreciated that
where a provision is alleged to serve such a dual purpose, only the
jurisdictional aspect thereof can be considered at the preliminary
objection stage. The existence of substantive legal rights is part of
the merits, and must accordingly be determined at the merits stage of a
case, and this is so, even if the interpretation of a jurisdictional clause
is involved. It follows that if in 1962 this Court, per incuriam o,r for
any other reason, dealt with the Applicants' alleged substantive rights
or interests, its statements with regard thereto cannot now prejudice its
decision at this-the merits-stage.
4. The question of Applicants' legal right or interest in the claim
not only arises generally-as happens at the merits stage of every case
of this kind-but actually constitutes an important sub-issue for several
specific submissions of the Applicants. The issue raised in their Sub-
mission No. 1 is whether the Mandate is still in force, and one of the
questions bearing on ths is the legal effect of Article 7 (2), particularly
whether it conferred any substantive legal rights or interests on members
of the League l.Another issue included in the merits (by Applicants'
Submissions Nos. 3 and 4) is on what basis, if any, Article 2 (2) of the
Mandate was intended to be justiciable, and here again the aforesaid
question arises.
5. There is no substancein the contention that the Court is precluded
from considering whether the Applicants have a legal right or interest
in the claim merely because this issue was not specificallyraised in the
Respondents' submissions. Evenif Respondentdid not raise that question
the Court would nonetheless be bound to determine whether the Appli-
cants have a legal right or interest in the claim before considering the
l See, e.g., Counter-Memorial,Book II, ChapV, Part B.
66 tout différendde cette nature, c'est-à-dire un droit ou intérêtsur lequel
un arrêt pourrait être rendu en sa faveur. La réponse à cette dernière
question ne réside pas dans l'acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour
mais dépend de la maaière dont la Cour interprète les dispositions du
traité sur lequel la demande est fondée. Cela ne relèvepas de la compé-
tence mais du fond du différend, lequel ne peut être tranchéqu'après
que la Cour a confirmé ledroit du demandeur de la saisir. La compé-
tence et le fond ne sauraient être traités simultanément.
Si un Etat alléguaitque l'acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour par
les Pays-Bas lui confère au fond des droits ou intérêts juridiquesau
regard d'une question donnée, la Cour se prononcerait tout d'abord
sur sa compétence aux termes de la déclaration d'acceptation; et ce
n'est qu'après s'êtrereconnue compétente qu'elle examinerait cette
allégation au fond.
Ce qui a quelque peu compliqué les choses en l'espèce, c'estque la
disposition établissant la compétencede la Cour est égalementinvoquée
par les demandeurs comme la source des droits touchant au fond sur
lesquels ils appuient leur demande. Il conviendrait de reconnaître
que, lorsque l'on allègue qu'une disposition revêtun double aspect,
seul son aspect juridictionnel peut êtreexaminéau stade des exceptions
préliminaires. L'existencede droits touchant au fond relèvedu fond de
l'affaire et doit par conséquent êtredéterminéeau stade du fond, même
si cela nécessitel'interprétation de la clause juridictionnelle.l s'ensuit
que, si la Cour a en 1962,pev incuriam ou pour toute autre raison, trai-
té des prétendus droits ou intérêts des demandeurstouchant au fond
les déclarations qu'elle a faitesàleur sujet ne sauraient préjuger sa dé-
cision au présent stade, qui est celui du fond.
4. La question du droit ou intérêt juridiquedes demandeurs au re-
gard de la demande ne se pose pas seulement d'une manière générale,
comme c'est le cas pour l'examen au fond de toute affaire de ce genre,
mais elle constitue en fait un problème subsidiaire concernant plusieurs
des conclusions des demandeurs. Le point soulevé par leur conclusion
no 1est de savoir si le Mandat est toujours en vigueur et l'une des ques-
tions qui se pose à ce propos est de savoir quel est l'effetjuridique du
deuxième alinéade l'article 7 et en particulier s'il a conféréaux Mem-
bres de la S.d.N. des droits ou intérêts juridiquestouchant au fond.
Un autre point de fond, soulevépar les conclusions nos 3 et 4 des de-
mandeurs, est de savoir si le deuxième alinéa de l'article 2 du Mandat
a étéconçu comme pouvant faire l'objet d'un recours judiciaire et sur
quelle base; la question susmentionnée se pose encore à ce propos.
5. La thèse selon laquelle la Cour serait empêchéede rechercher si
les demandeurs ont un droit ou intérêt juridiqueau regard de la deman-
de pour le seul motif que ce point n'a pas étéexpressément soulevédans
les conclusions du défendeur est dénuée de fondement.Même si le dé-
fendeur n'avait pas soulevé cepoint, la Cour serait tenue de décidersi
les demandeurs ont un droit ou intérêt juridiqueau regard de la deman-
Voir par exemple le contre-mémoire, liII,chapitre V, partie B.ultimate merits; but in any event this issue is embraced by the Respon-
dent's submissions. In the Counter-Memorial, the Rejoinder and the
oral proceedings the Respondent disputed not only the Applicants' legal
right or interest in respect of the specific submissions referred to above,
but did so also in regard to the claim generzlly '.In the final submissions
the Respondent expressly claimed that upon the basis of the statements
of fact and law set forth in the pleadiilgj and oral proceedings the
Applicants' submissions should be adjudged and declared unfounded,
and that no declaration be made as claimed by the Applicants. In these
circumstances no reasonable person could have been unaware of what
the submissions were intended to convey.
6. As already stated the 1962 Judgment could not decide any issue
forming part of the merits. This conclusioii is not only in accordance
with general principles and the rules of this Court, but also flows from
the 1962Judgment itself.
7. Reference has already been made to Article 62, paragraph 3, of
the Rules of this Court which provides in express terms that on the
filing of preliminary objections the proceedings on the merits sliall be
suspended. In tliese cases there was actually an Order dated 5 December
1961formally recording that by virtue of these provisions the proceedings
on the merits were suspended.
The basic consideration that a preliminary objection is not intended
to, and is not capable of giving rise to a binding judgment on the issues
of merits involved, has been recognized in several decisions-see
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, page 10;
and in the Polislz Upper Silesia case, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, page 15,
this principle was formulated as follows:
"... the Court cannot . .. in any way prejudice its future decision
on the merits"
and-
"Even if this enquiry involves touching upon subjects belonging
to the merits of the case ...nothing which the Court says in the
present judgment can be regarded as restricting its entire freedom
to estimate the value of any arguments by either side on the same
subjects during the proceedings on the merits."
It is in any eventhighly improbable that the Court could have intended
to make any decisions on the merits when dealing with an interlocutory
matter relating tojurisdiction. A court of law cannot be presumed to have
intended to disregard its own rules and well-established principles oflaw.
On 13 April 1965 Respondent's Counsel made the following submission:
6'...by reason of the considerations arising from the limited scope of Article 7
(2) of theMandate,or of the lapse of that Article, the conclusion is arrived at that
al1the claims are inadmissible and the result would again be rejection ..al1
the Applicants'... submissions."de avant d'examiner les questions relevant irréductiblement du fond;
mais de toute manière le défendeur a soulevédans ses conclusions le
point dont il s'agit. Dans le contre-mémoire,dansla duplique et au cours
de la procédure orale, le défendeur a contestéle droit ou intérêt juri-
dique des demandeurs non seulement au regard des conclusions men-
tionnées ci-dessus, mais aussi au regard de la demande en général l.
Dans ses conclusions finales, le défendeur aexpressément invitéla Cour,
vu les considérations de fait et de droit énoncéesdans les écritures et
les plaidoiries,à dire et juger que les conclusions des demandeurs sont
sans fondement et à nefaire aucune des déclarations proposéespar les
demandeurs. Dans ces conditions, aucune personne raisonnable ne pou-
vait ignorer ce que les conclusions étaient censées exprimer.
6. Comme je l'ai déjàsignalé,l'arrêtde 1962ne pouvait trancher au-
cune question relevant du fond. Non seulement cette conclusion est
conforme aux principes générauxet au Règlement de la Cour, mais
elle découle enoutre de l'arrêtde 1962 lui-même.
7. On s'est déjà référé à l'article 62, paragraphe 3, du Règlement,
qui dispose expressémentque, dès réceptionde l'acte introductif de l'ex-
ception, la procédure sur le fond est suspendue. En l'espèce,uneordon-
nance en date du 5 décembre 1961 a officiellement confirméqu'en ver-
tu de ces dispositions la procédure sur le fond étaitsuspendue.
Le principe fondamental selon lequel une exception préliminaire
ne doit, ni ne peut entraîner une décisionobligatoire sur les questions
de fond en cause a été confirmé dans plusieurs arrêts;voir affaire des
Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine (C.P.J.I. série A no 2, p. 10)
et affaire relative à Certains intérêts allemandsen Haute-Silésiepolo-
naire (C.P.J.I. sérieA no 6, p. 15) où ce principe a été énoncé comme
suit:
((La Cour ne saurait ...préjuger en rien de sa décisionfuture sur
le fond 1)
et:
Quand même cet examendevrait l'amener à effleurer des su-
jets appartenant au fond de l'affaire ...rien de ce qu'elle dit dans
le présent arrêtne saurait limiter sa complète liberté d'apprécia-
tion, lors des débats sur le fond, des argucents éventuellement
apportés de part et d'autre sur ces mêmessujets. 1)
Il est en tout cas hautement improbable que la Cour ait entendu sta-
tuer sur le fond en traitznt d'une question interlocutoire relative à la
compétence. On ne saurait présumer qu'un tribunal a voulu enfrein-
dre son propre règlement et des principes juridiques bien établis.
Le 13 avril 1965 le conseil du défendeur a formulé la conclusion suivante:
7 du Mandat ou la caducité de cet article amèneraient à conclure que toutes
les demandes sont irrecevables; le résultat serait donccore le rejet ...
toutes les conclusions des demandeur)J.
6770 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
Moreover, ex facie the Court's 1962 Judgment, it did not intend
deciding any part of the merits, for the aforesaid Order recording the
suspension of the proceedings on the merits is actually quoted in that
Judgment.
It will be observed that the Court's conclusion and the operative part
of the 1962 Judgment respectively state that "the Court is competent
to hear the dispute on the merits", and that it "hds that it has juris-
diction to adjudicateupon the merits of the dispute". The word "dispute"
obviouslymeantthe issuesas encompassed in the Applicants' submissions
as set out in full in the Judgrnent at pagrs 324-326.
8. While it is true that the Court remarked in the course of its Judg-
ment that "the Mandate as a whole is still in force", this remark could
not possibly have been intended to constitute a decision of any of the
issues embraced by Submission No. 1 or 2 or any other part of the
merits. The preliminary objections were argued on the assumption
that the Mandate was still in force ',and even a preliminary finding
on this matter wzs therefore not necessary. Moreover, the Court could
not have intended saying that ail the original provisions of the Mandate
were still in force, albeit in an amended form, because not only did it
carefully avoid dealing with the issue whether Article 6 still applied,
but a great deal of its reasoning on Article 7 suggests that, had it been
called upon to decide whether Article 6 still applied, as is contended in
the Applicants' Submission No. 2, it would have held that it had ceased
to apply 2.
At no stage did the Court in 1962specificallydeal with the problems
arising from the disappearance of the League's supervisory organs;
and no reference is made at any stage to the suggestion that after April
1946supervisory functions were to be exercised by the United Nations.
Al1 refefknces to administrative supervision were omitted from the
quotations from the 1950Opinion 3.
The Court must have realized in 1962 that if the Applicants' first
submission failed, al1 the submissions had to be dismissed. It could
not have intended that if this happcned any part of its Judgment should
have any further application; otherwise one would have the absurd
Preliminary Objections, pp. 299, 359; Oral Proceedings 1962, pp. 4, 16-17,
49: 52-54, 336-337; Counter-Memorial, Book.II,p. 166. The following statement
at page 332 of the 1962 Judgment is accordingly not correct: "The Respondent
contends that it [the Mandate] is not in for.." Also incorrect is the statement
just been quoted): "It is argued that the rights and obligations under the Mandate
in relation to the administration of the Territory of South West Africa being of
an objective character still e..s."(The rest of the sentence also constituans
incorrect representation of Respondent's argument, but in another respect.)
See paragraphs 46 to 49 of the Chapter of this opinion dedigwith Submis-
sions 2, 7 and 8.
3 Compare quotation at pp. 333and 334 of the 1962Judgment with full statement
in 1950 Opinion, p. 136. En outre, à considérerl'arrêtrendu en 1962, on se rend compte qu'il
n'a pas étédans les intentions de la Cour de se prononcer sur une par-
tie quelconque du fond, puisque l'ordonnance ci-dessus mentionnée
constatant la suspension de la procédure sur le fond est effectivement
citée dans cet arrêt.
011 remarquera que, dans la conclusion et dans le dispositif de l'ar-
rêtde 1962, il est respectivement affirméque ((la Cour est compétente
pour connaître du différendau fand ))et qu'((elle est compétente pour
statuer sur le fond du différend ».Le terme ((différend ))désignede toute
évidence lesquestions comprises dans les conclusions des demandeurs,
qui sont intégralement reproduites aux pages 324-326 de l'arrêt.
8. Dans le corps de l'arrêtla Cour a, il est vrai, constaté que «le
Mandat, dans son ensemble, demeure en vigueur », mais cette obser-
vation n'était certainement pas censéetrancher l'une quelconque des
questions envisagéesdans les conclusions nos 1 ou 2, ni aucune autre
partie du fond. Les exceptions préliminaires ont étéplaidées en par-
tant de l'hypothèse que le Mandat demeure en vigueur l;cette question
n'appelait donc aucune décision, même préliminaireA . u surplus, il
n'a pu être dansles intentions de la Cour d'affirmer que toutes les dis-
positions initiales du Mandat sont toujours en vigueur, quoique sous
une forme amendée, car non seulement elle a soigneusement évitéde
traiter du point de savoir si l'article 6 est toujours applicable, mais il
ressort d'une bonne partie de son raisonnement sur l'article 7 que, si
elle avait étéinvitée à dire que l'article 6 est toujours applicable, comme
les demandeurs le soutiennent dans leur conclusion no 2, elle aurait pro-
noncé qu'il n'en estrien 2.
A aucun stade, la Cour n'a expressémenttraité en 1962 des pro-
blèmes découlant de la disparition des organes de surveillance de la So-
ciétédes Nations; à aucun stade, elle n'a fait allusion à la thèse selon
laquelle, depuis avril 1946, les fonctions de surveillance doivent être
ex2rcéespar les Nations Unies. Toutes références à la surveillance ad-
ministrative ont étéomises des citations extraites de l'avis de 1950 3.
La Cour a dû se rendre compte en 1962 que, si la première conclu-
sion des demandeurs tombait, toutes les autres conclusions devraient
êtrerejetées. Elle n'a pu certainement envisager qu'une partie quel-
conque de son arrêtdemeurerait en pareil cas applicable, car cela serait
52-54, 336-337; contre-mémoire, livII,p. 166. La déclaration suivante, qui figure
à la page 332 de i'arrêtde 1962, n'est donc pas exactLe défendeur prétendqu'il
[le Mandat] n'est pas en vigue..)Tout aussi inexacte est la phrase qui suit irnmé-
diatement la précédenteet qui d'ailleurs la contredatIl affirme que les droits et
obligations prévuspar le Mandat en ce qui concerne l'administration du territoire
du Sud-Quest faricain, ayant un caractère objectif, existent encore),(Le reste
de la phrase donne lui aussi une interprétation inexacte de la thèse du défendeur,
mais à un autre égard.)
Voir les paragraphes 46-49 de la section de la présente opinion relative aux
conclusions nos 2, 7, et 8.
Comparer les passages cités aux pages 333 et 334 de Parrêtde 1962 avec le
texte intégral de la page 136 de l'avis de 1950.
68result that a party who has in the final judgment been held to have no
legal right or interest in a claim nonetheless has, by virtue of an inter-
locutory decision, a judgment in its favour in respect of that claim or
part thereof.
9. Inasmuch as the voting in 1962was eight to seven it follows that,
apart from al1 other considerations, no statement not made with the
approval of ail the eight majority judges and not intended by al1those
judges to constitute a decision could have effect as a decision of the
Court.
It is therefore relevant to observe that it appears from the separate
opinions of Judges Bustamante, Jessup and Sir Louis Mbanefo that
none of them intended deciding any part of the merits.
10. Judge Jessup's opinion speaks for itself:
"But if the challenge to the existence of a 'dispute' in its legal
sense is raised in a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of a
tribunal, the question is how deeply the Court must probe into the
facts and law in order to determine whether there is a 'dispute'.
Suppose, for example, State A alleges in a diplornatic note to
State B that State B has violated a commercial treaty of 1880
between A and B. B in reply affirms that the treaty is no longer
in force.After futile negotiations,A submits the case to an inter-
national court in accordance with the terms of a treaty for pacific
settlement concluded by B with A. This treaty for pacific settlement
contains the ordinary provision that the parties agree that disputes
concerning legal rights may be submitted to an international
court by either party. B contends that the court has no jurisdiction
since there is no 'dispute' within the meaning of the treaty for
pacific settlement because A bases its contention on a treaty which
is no longer in force. The adjudication of the question whether
the treaty is in force and therefore whether A's case rested upon
a legal right, is a question for the merits and not a question to be
settled on a plea to the jurisdiction. B in effect admits there is a
'dispute' but asserts that A's substantive position is unsound.
It may be possible to imagine a case where the allegation of a
legal right was so obviously absurd and frivolous that the Court
would dismiss the application on a plea to the jurisdiction, but
such a situation would be rare. In any event, it is not the situation
in the instant cases.
In the instant cases, it is helpful to look first at the second
characteristic of the 'dispute' which has been noted above, i.e.,
that it must relate to the interpretation or the application of the
provisions of the Mandate. 1 do not see how it can be seriously
contended that this condition is not ful6lled since it is sufficient
basis for the jurisdiction of the Court if any of Applicants' con-
tentions are so related. On the face of those contentions, andrevenu à admettre un résultat absurde: la partie à laquelle un arrêt
définitif dénietout droit ou intérêt juridiqueau regard d'une demande
bénéficieraitnéanmoins, en vertu d'une décision interlocutoire, d'un
arrêten sa faveur sur tout ou partie de la demande.
9. L'arrêt de1962 ayant été rendupar huit voix contre sept, il s'en-
suit, toutes les autres considérations mises à part, qu'une partie quel-
conque decetarrêtnepeut avoir force de décisionque si les huit juges de
la majorité l'ont approuvée etont voulu qu'elle constitue une décision
de la Cour.
Il convient donc de remarquer qu'il ressort des opinions individuelles
de M. Bustamante, de M. Jessup et de sir Louis Mbanefo qu'aucun
d'entre eux n'a eu l'intention de se prononcer sur une partie quel-
conque du fond.
10. L'opinion de M. Jessup est très nette:
(Mais. si l'on met en cause l'existence d'un ((différend ))au sens
juridique du mot dans une exception préliminaire à la compétence
d'un tribunal, la question est de savoir dans quelle mesure ce
tribunal doit sonder les faits et le droit en vue de déterminer s'il
y a un différend ».
Supposons par exemple qu'un Etat A prétend, dans une note
diplomatique à un Etat B, que cet Etat B a violéun traitécommer-
cial conclu en 1880 entre A et B. B répond que le traité n'est plus
en vigueur. Après de vaines négociations, A soumet l'affaire à
une cour internationale conformément aux termes d'un traité de
règlement pacifique conclu entre A et B. Ce traité de règlement
pacifique contient la disposition ordinaire selon laquelle les parties
conviennent que les différends relatifsà des droits juridiques pour-
ront êtresoumis par l'une ou l'autre d'entre elles à un tribunal
international.B prétend que le tribunal n'est pas compétent puis-
qu'il n'y a pas(différend )au sens du traité de règlement pacifique,
car A fonde sa demande sur un traité qui n'est plus en vigueur.
Le jugement sur la question de savoir si le traité est en vigueur
et si par conséquent la demande présentéepar A est fondée en
droit relève du fond et non pas d'une exception d'incompétence.
En fait, B admet qu'il y a un ((différend))mais il soutient que le
point de vue de A quant au fond est erroné. Il est possible d'ima-
giner une affaire où la prétention à un droit serait si évidemment
vaine et absurde que la Cour rejetterait la requêtepour défaut de
compétence, mais une telle situation ne peut se présenter que
rarement. De toute façon ce n'est pas le cas ici.
En l'espèce,il est utile d'examiner tout d'abord la seconde carac-
téristique du ((différend))notée plus haut, à savoir que le «diffé-
rend)) doit êtrerelatif à l'interprétation ou à l'application des
dispositions du Mandat. Je ne vois pas comment on peut prétendre
sérieusement que pareille condition n'est pas remplie, puisqu'il
suffit pour établirla compétencede la Cour qu'une des allégations
des demandeurs réponde à cette caractéristique. Sur la base de 72 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
before the Court has examined them on their merits, the Court
must find that, assumingthere is a 'dispute', its one which relates
to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Man-
date."
The fact that the learned judge, after having made these remarks, made
some observations on the merits of the dispute is irrelevant, because
he could not possibly have intended to decide an issue which he had
just stated could only be dealt with at the merits stage of the cases.
11. That Sir Louis Mbanefo had no intention of deciding any part
of the merits appears from the first paragraph of his separate opinion:
"1 agree generally with the reasons given in the Judgment of
the Court, but 1feel that a great deal of the argument on the first
three Preliminary Objections in the Judgrnent goes to the merits
of the case. The Court is concerned essentially at this stage with
the question of jurisdiction. The way in which the claims of the
Applicants and the Preliminary Objections of the Respondent are
framed make it difficult for the Court to avoid touching on the
merits of the case. But that notwithstanding, 1 feel that emphasis
should be on a line of reasoning that deals essentially with the
issue of jurisdiction; and the opinion which 1now give is intended
to supplementthe reasoning of the Court on the First, Second and
Third Preliminary Objections."
12. There is at least one further reason which, apart from those
advanced in the Judgment, wouldjustify a conclusion that the Applicants
have no legal right or interest in the claim, namely that, whatever rights
the Applicants may have had under the provisions of the Mandate,
these lapsed on the dissolution of the League. On that date, either
the whole Mandate lapsed or at least those provisions, including Ar-
ticle7, which depended on the existence of the League ceased to apply;
and, in any event, Applicants could not retain any rights held by them
as members of the League after terminating such membership. In either
event all the submissions, including Submission No. 1,must be dismissed.
It is common cause that Article 7 can no longer apply, and Applicants
can no longer hold any rights they may have had as members of the
League, unless the words "Member of the League of Nations" in the
Mandate are given a meaning which includes ex-members of the League
who were members at the time of its dissolution. In 1962 the Court
advanced three reasons for not giving these words their ordinary and
natural meaning l.The first two are in direct conflict with the reasoning
of the present Judgment; the third depends on the validity of the first
It seems unavoidable that before rejecting these reasons al1 possible sources
of evidence on which they could have been based should be examined.
70 ces allégations et avant de les avoir examinéesau fond, la Cour
doit s'assurer, à supposer qu'il y ait un ((différend I),que celui-ci
est bien relatifà l'interprétation ou à l'application des dispositions
du Mandat. ))
Si, après avoir ainsi précisésa pensée,l'éminent jugea formuléquelques
observations quant au fond du différend, cela estsans pertinence car il
n'a pu avoir l'intention de se prononcer sur une question dont il venait
de dire qu'elle ne pouvait être traitéequ'au stade du fond.
11. Que sir Louis Mbanefo n'ait eu nulle intention de se prononcer
sur une partie quelconque du fond, cela ressort du premier paragraphe
de son opinion individuelle :
«Je suis d'accord en général avec lesraisons exposées dans
l'arrêt dr la Cour, mais j'ai l'impression qu'une grande partie
de l'argumentation de l'arrêt touchant les trois premières excep-
tions prélimiiiaires concerne le fond du différend. La Cour, au
stade actuel, est essentiellement saisie de la question de compétence.
La forme sous laquelle les requêtesdes demandeurs et les exceptions
préliminaires du défendeur sont présentéesrendent malaisé, pour
la Cour, d'éviterd'aborder le fond de l'affaire. J'estimenonobstant
qu'il convient de mettre surtout en relief les élémentsde l'argumen-
tation se rapportant essentiellement à la question de compétence;
et l'opinion queje donne ici a pour but de compléterle raisonnement
de la Cour relatif aux première, deuxième,et troisième exceptions
préliminaires. ))
12. En dehors des motifs développésdans le présent arrêt,il en est
au moins un autre qui amène à conclure que les demandeurs n'ont
aucun droit ou intérêt juridiqueau regard de la demande; quelques
droits que les demandeurs aient possédésen vertu des dispositions du
Mandat, ces droits sont devenus caducs à la dissolution de la Société
des Nations. A cette date, le Mandat est devenu caduc dan'sson ensemble,
ou du moins celles de ses dispositions qui dépendaient de l'existence
de la Société desNations, en particulier son article 7, ont cessé d'être
applicables; et, en tout cas, dès lors qu'ils n'étaientplus Membres de la
Société desNations, les demandeurs n'ont pu conserver les droits qu'ils
avaient eus en cette qualité. De toute façon, toutes les conclusions, et
notamment la conclusion no 1, doivent êtrerejetées.
Il est admis que l'article 7 n'est applicable, et que les demandeurs ne
peuvent détenir les droits qu'ils avaient comme Membres de la Société
des Nations, que si les termes ((Membresde la Société desNations 11
sont interprétésdans le Mandat comme visant les anciens Membres de
l'organisation qui avaient cette qualité à la date de sa dissolution. En
1962,la Cour a fait valoir trois motifs pour ne pas donner à ces termes
leur sens ordinaire et naturel l.Les deux premiers sont en contradiction
formelle avec le raisonnement du présentarrêt.Le troisième, qui dépend
l Avant de rejeter ces motifs, il paraît inévitable d'examiner tous les moyens
de preuve sur lesqilelon a pu les fonder.two, and is in any event unfounded. 1 shall attempt to avoid as far as
possible a repetition of what -is already stated in the Judgment.
13. The first of these reasons is recorded in the second paragraph on
page 336 of the 1962Judgment which commences as follows:
"In the first place judicial protection of the sacred trust in each
Mandate was an essential feature of the mandates system."
This statement is bare assertion for which no support is to be found
in the relevant instruments, in theavaz~xpréparatoires i, the subsequent
conduct of the Parties, or in any other possible source of evidence. The
truth is ihat the concept ofjudicial protection of the sacred trust did not
exist, and this explains why nothing to that effect was said either before
or after the signing of the Covenant or the adoption of the Council
resolutions which embodied the various instrumeilts of mandate.
This paragraph of the 1962 Judgment then proceeded as follows:
"The essence of this system, as conceived by its authors and
embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
consisted, as stated earlier, of two features: a Mandate conferred
upon a Power as 'a sacred trust of civilization' and the 'securities
for the performance of this trust'. While the faithful discharge
of the trust was assigned to the Mandatory Power alone, the duty
and the right of ensuring the performance of this trust were given
to the League with its Council, the Assembly, the Permanent
Mandates Commission and al1 its Members within the limits of
their respective authority, power and functions, as constituting
administrative supervision, and the Permanent Court was to
adjudicate and determine anydispute within the meaning of Article 7
of the Mandate. The administrative supervision by the League
constituted a normal security to ensure full performance by the
Mandatory of the 'sacred trust' toward the inhabitants of the
mandated territory, but the specially assigned role of the Court
was even more essential, since it was to serve as the final bulwark
of protection by recourse to the Court against possible abuse or
breaches of the Mandate."
In this passage the Court apparently overlooked the fact that Article 22
of the Covenant required in express terms that "securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant", and
that there is not a word in the Covenant to suggest that either the
individual members of the League or the Court were to play any part
with regard to the performance of the trust. There is in any event nQ
evidence to be found anywhere to support the statement that the rights
and duties of ensuring the performance of the trust were-in addition
to the rights and duties given to the organs of the League-conferred
on al1 the members of the League. It follows that the suggestion that
individual members of the League were given powers of administrative
supervision over the mandatories is unfounded. The simple truth is that
71des deux premiers, est en tout cas mal fondé.Je chercherai à éviterautant
que possible de répéterce qui est déjàdit dans le présentarrêt.
13. Le premier motif est énoncéau deuxième alinéade la page 336
de l'arrêt de1962. Cet alinéacommence ainsi:
((En premier lieu, la protection judiciaire de la mission sacrée
contenue dans chaque Mandat constituait un aspect essentiel du
système des Mandats. ))
C'est là une assertion gratuite qui n'est appuyéeni par les documents
pertinents, ni par les travaux préparatoires, ni par le comportement
ultérieur des Parties, ni par aucun autre moyen de preuve éventuel.
En fait, la notion de protection judiciaire de la mission sacréen'a jamais
existéet c'est ce qui explique pourquoi rien n'a jamais étédit en ce
sens, ni avant ni aprèsla signature du Pacte, ni avant ni après l'adoption
des résolutionsdu Conseil contenant les divers actes de Mandat.
Le même alinéa de l'arrêt de1962continue comme suit:
«Tel que ses auteurs l'avait conçu et inscrit dans l'article 22
du Pacte de la Société desNations, ce système, comme il a déjà
étédit, présentait essentiellement deux traits principaux: un Mandat
conféré à une Puissance à titre de (mission sacréede civilisation »
et a des garanties pour l'accomplissement de cette mission ». Si
l'exécution fidèlede cette mission étaitassignéeà la seule Puissance
mandataire, le devoir et le droit d'en assurer l'accomplissement
étaientconfiés à la Sociétédes Nations, avec son Conseil, 1'Assem-
blée,la Commission permanente des Mandats et tous ses Membres
dans les limites de leur autorité, de leur pouvoir et de leursfonctions
respectifs, ce qui constituait la surveillance administrative, et la
Cour permanente devait juger et trancher tout différend au sens
de l'article7 du Mandat. La surveillance administrative exercée
par la Sociétédes Nations représentait une garantie normale visant
à assurer la pleine exécution par le Mandataire de sa cmission
sacrée» à l'endroit des habitants du territoire sous Mandat, mais
le rôle spécialement imparti à la Cour était encore plus essentiel
puisqu'elle devait servir d'ultime moyen de protection par voie de
recours judiciaire contre tous abus ou violations possibles du
Mandat. ))
Dans ce passage, la Cour a apparemment oublié que, selon les termes
exprèsde l'article 22du Pacte, il convenait (d'incorporer dans leprésent
Pacte des garanties pour l'accomplissement de cette mission)) et que
rien dans le Pacte ne donnait à entendre qu'un rôle quelconque quant
à l'accomplissement de Ia mission ait étéattribué aux Membres de la
Sociétédes Nations individuellement ou à la Cour. On ne trouve en
tout cas nulle part depreuve que les droits et lesdevoirs relatifsaccom-
plissement de la mission aient étéconférés à tous les Membres de la
Société desNations et non point seulement à ses organes. La thèse
selon laquelle les Etats Membres auraient reçu à titre individuel des
pouvoirs de surveillance administrative à l'égard des Mandataires est
donc sans fondement. La vérité estque les auteurs de l'article 22 n'ont74 SOUTH WESTA~ICA (SEP O.P.VAN WYK)
the authors of Articie 22 did not conceive of any role for the Court
with regard to the mandates system, and that is why the Court is not
mentioned in Article 22 of the Covenant.
13(a). As already stated, the Court was mentioned for the firsttime
in connection with the mandates some time after the signing of the
Covenant, when a compromissory clause was proposed for the 'B'
mandates. But neither at that stage nor at any other stage was there
any suggestion to the effect that the Court should be assigned the role
of ensuring performance of the sacred trust, or that it should serve as
a final bulwark of protection thereof; not a word to this effect, or wlzich
may possibly be interpretedas suggesting anything of the kind, was said
at any time by anybody. On the contrary, what was said at the time
reveals that it was thought that thepurpose of the compromissory clause
was to provide for disputes relating to national riglts being referred
to the Court l.
13(b). If the Court had been intended to fulfil this special role of
protection of the sacred trust, a provision to that effect would have
been embodied in the Covenant, and it would not have been left to the
Council to include this "super security" in the mandate declarations.
There could have been no certainty that al1the members of the Council-
including the mandatories-would have approved such a provision, and
without the requisite unanimity the Council could not function. More-
over, the Councii's powers were confined to defining the "degree of
authority, administration and controi'' of the mandatory, and it could
have had no power to add to the securities for the performance of the
sacred trust since these securities had to be embodied in the Covenant.
Furthermore, even supposing that this important provision relating to
the Court's specialrole had been intentionally omitted fromthe Covenant
because it was thought that it would be included in the instruments of
mandate, one would have expected that at the time the Covenant was
signed some reference to this would have been made. But the facts are
that, at the time, the Court was not even mentioned in the discussions.
It is perhaps relevant to record that the day before the Versailles Peace
Treaty (which included the Covenant) was signed, Le., on 27 June 1919,
the draft mandates were before the Council of Four, but nobody sug-
gested that inasmuch as the Covenant, which was to be signed the next
day,did not provide for thejudicial protection of the sacred trust, a provi-
sion to that effect should be inserted into the mandates. In fact on the
very day the PeaceTreaty wassignedthe Milner Commissionmet inParis,
and yet nobody suggested the inclusion of any provision relating to the
Court. It is significant that on thissame day the minorities treaty with
l To the facts recorded by Judge Sir Percy Spender and Judge Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice in their joint dissenting opinion, South West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
pp. 556-557, 1 wish to add that before Lord Milner made the remark refetoed
in the second paragraph of page7, Lord Cecil had observed that there would be
some advantage in withdrawing questions ofrsona1 claims by nationals from the
sphere of diplomacy-seeRecueil des Actes de la Conference de la Paix, Vol. VI A,
PP. 348-349.
72prévuaucun rôle pour la Cour en matière de Mandats, ce qui explique
pourquoi ils ne l'ont pas mentionnée dans cet article.
13a). Comme je l'ai déjàindiqué,c'est quzlque temps aprèsla signa-
ture du Pacte, lorsqu'une clause compromissoire a étéproposéepour les
Mandats B, que la Cour a étémentionnée pour la première fois au
sujet des Mandats. Toutefois, ni à ce stade, ni à aucun autre, on n'a
dit que la Cour dût se voir attribuer le rôle de veilleraccomplissement
de la mission sacréede civilisation, ni qu'elle dût constituer un ultime
moyen de protection de cette mission; personne n'a prononcé à aucun
moment une seule parole ence sens, ni une seule parole susceptibled'être
interprétéeen ce sens.Bien au contraire, ce qu'on a dità l'époqueprouve
que le but de la clause compromissoire était de faire soumettre à la
Cour les différends relatifsaux droits nationaux l.
13b). Si l'on avait voulu confier à la Cour ce rôle particulier de
protection de la mission sacréede civilisation, on aurait insérédans le
Pacte une disposition en ce sens et on n'aurait pas laisséau Conseil le
soin d'inclure cette «super-garantie ))dans les déclarations de Mandat.
On ne ~ouvait avoir aucune certitude aue tous les membres du Conseil.
y compris les Mandataires, approuveraient pareille disposition et, à
défaut de l'unanimité requise, le Conseil ne pouvait fonctionner. En
outre, ses pouvoirs étant limités à la définition du ((degréd'autorité,
de contrôle ou d'administration)) du Mandataire, le Conseil n'était
pas habilité à accroître les garanties d'accomplissement de la mission
sacrée, lesquelles devaient être incorporéesdans le Pacte. Enfin, à
supposer mêmeque les auteurs du Pacte aient omis à dessein cette
importante disposition relative au rôle particulier de la Cour, pensant
qu'elle serait incluse dans les actes de Mandat, il aurait été normal
qu'on en fasse mention au moment de la signature du Pacte. En réalité,
la Cour n'a même pasétéévoquéedans les débats de cette période. Il
convient peut-être de rappeler que, la veille de la signature du traité
de paix de Versailles, qui englobait le Pacte. c'est-à-dire lejuin 1919,
le Conseil des Quatre a étésaisi de projets de Mandats; or nul n'a dit
que, puisque le Pacte, qui devait êtresignélu lendemain, ne prévoyait
pas de protection judiciaire de la mission sacréede civilisation, il con-
venait d'inclure une disposition en ce sens dans les Mandats. En fait, le
jour mêmede la signature du traité de paix, la Commission Milner
s'estréuniz àParis mais personne n'a proposél'inc!usion d'une disposition
relative à la Cour. Il est significatif que ce mêmejour a été signé un
traité de minorités avecla Pologne: cet instrument contenait une clause
Aux faits notés par sir Percy Spender et sir Gerald Fitzrnauric~ dans leur opi-
nion dissidentecorninune (affaires du Sud-Ouest afvicain, C.I.J. Recueil 1962,
p. 556-557), je voudrais ajouter que, avant que lord Milner ait formu16 i'observa-
tion mentionnée au deuxième alinéade la page 557, lord Cecil avait fait remarquer
clu'il y aurait avantage à ce que les questions touchant aux griefs personnels des
de lu Conféretlcede la Pai.~, vol. VI A, p. 348-349.evoir Recueil des Actes Poland was signed, and this treaty contained a compromissory clause
coupled with the "deeming" clause which became a feature of the
minorities treaties, but nobody suggested that any similar provision
should be inserted in the mandates.
13(c). Judge Jessup attached some importance in his 1962opinion to
the compromissory clauses in the minorities treaties, particularly in
order to establish that in 1920 a State could acquire a legal interest
in matters not affecting its own material interests l. That this is so is
not disputed, but the learned judge overlooked the difference in the
wording of the minorities treaties and the mandates. In the first place
the minorities treaties contained a deeming clause which provided
that a difference of opinion arising out of the provisions of the treaty
"shall be held to be a dispute of an international character"; secondly,
the right of invoking the Court's jurisdiction was limited to the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers and to other members of the Council of
the League, and, thirdly, the provision contained no requirement such
as the mandates relating to the settlement of the dispute. It should be
borne in mind that the minorities treaties were imposed on the defeated
nations and new States by the Great Powers. It is incredible that these
Powers would have limited the grant of substantive legal rights in the
case of these defeated nations and new States to a few States only, but
should have voluntarily granted in respect of mandates such rights
against themselves to al1the members of the League. Judge Jessup rightly
remarked in his Modern Luw of Nations, 1959, page 89:
"But the minorities treaties were obnoxious largely because they
carried the stigma of imposition upon small States by the great
powers, who were unwilling to accept like obligations in their own
territories."
14. The second reason advanced in the 1962Judgment for not giving
the words "Members of the League" their ordinary meaning was that:
"In the second place, besides the essentiality ofjudicial protection
for the sacred trust and for the rights of Member States under the
Mandates, and the lack of capacity on the part of the League or
the Council to invoke such protection, the right to implead the
Mandatory Power before the Permanent Court was specially and
expressly conferred on the Members of the League, evidently
because it was the most reliable procedure of ensuring protection
Further arguments on this issue advanced by Judge Jessup are dealt with in
the Counter-Memorial, Book II,Chapter V B; I do not consider it necessary to deal
with them in this opinion.
73compromissoire liée à la clause dite de l'assimilatior?qui est devenue
un élémentcaractéristique des traités de minorités, mais nul n'a dit
qu'une disposition analogue dût êtreinséréedans les Mandats.
13c). Dans son opinion de 1962, M. Jessup attribue quelque impor-
tance aux clauses compromissoires des traités de minorités,notamment
afin d'établir qu'en 1920 un Etat pouvait acquérir un intérêt juridique
dans des questions n'affectant pas ses intérêts concretspropres l.Nul
ne conteste qu'il en soit ainsi, mais l'éminent jugene tient pas compt-:
des différencesde rédaction entre les traitésde minoritéset les Mandats.
En premier lieu, les traités de minorités contenaient uneclause d'assimi-
lation énonçant qu'une divergence d'opinion sur les dispositions du
traité serait ((considéréecomme un différendayant un caractère inter-
national)); en deuxième lieu, le droit d'invoquer la juridiction de la
Cour yétaitlimitéaux PrincipalesPuissances alliéeset associéesainsiqu'à
d'autres membres du Conseil de la Société des Nations; en troisième lieu,
la clause ne contenait aucune prescription relative au règlement du
différendcomparable à celle des Mandats. Il convient de se souvenir
que les traités de minoritésont étéimposéspar les grandes Puissances
aux nations vaincues et aux nouveaux Etats. Il est invraisemblable qu'à
l'égard de ces nations vaincues et de ces nouveaux Etats les grandes
Puissances se soient bornées à accorder des droits touchant au fond à
un petit nombre d'Etats et qu'en matière de Mandats elles aient volon-
tairement octroyélesmêmesdroitscontre elles-mêmes à tous les Membres
de la Sociétédes Nations. M. Jessup a fait observer àjuste titre dans son
ouvrage Modern Law of Nations, 1959,page 89:
((Mais ce qui rendait les traités de minorités odieux, c'est en
grande partie qu'ils étaient entachés de conditions imposées à de
petits Etats par les grandes Puissances, guère disposéesquant à
ellesà se soumettre a des obligations semblables relatives à leur
propre territoire.)
14. Le deuxièmemotif retenu par l'arrêtde 1962pour ne pas donner
aux termes ((Membres de la Société desNations » leur sens ordinaire
est le suivant:
«En deuxièmelieu, outre que la protection judiciaire étaitessen-
tielle pour la mission sacrée et pour les droits appartenant aux
Etats Membres en vertu des Mandats et que ni la Société des
Nations ni le Conseil n'avait qualité pour l'invoquer, le droit
de citer la Puissance mandataire devant la Cour permanente était
conféréspécialement et expressément aux Membres de la Société
des Nations, évidemment parce qu'il était aussi le moyen le plus
A ce sujeM. Jessup a avancé d'autres arguments dont il est traité dans le con-
le cadre de la présente opinion.. Je ne crois pas nécessairede les examiner dans
73 by the Court, whatevw might happen to or arise from the machinery
of admiriistrative supervision."
But the fact is that at the time of the establishment of the mandates
system the possibility of something happening to the machinery for
administrative supervisioil was not discussed or mentioned at all, and
was clearly not even contemplated. The above-cited reasoning of the
1962 Judgment is accordingly also neither warranted nor substantiated
by the facts.
15. The third reason given by the 1962Judgment was that at the final
session of the Leagüe in April 1946 an agreement was entered into
between al1the members of the League to continuethe different nîandates
as far as was practically feasible or operable, and therefore tomaintain
the rights of members of the League itself. The agreement referred to is
inferred from this 1946 "dissolution resolution" and "the whole set of
surrounding circumstances which preceded, and prevailed at the session".
Not only is the alleged general agreement based on inference, but the
preservation of the alleged rights of League members individually in
respect of Mandates is in turn inferred from this tacit agreement.
In essence these conclusions seem to rest on the proposition that
the dissolution resolution was adopted "precisely with a view of averting
. ..the literal objections derived from the words 'another Member of
the League of Nations' ". But this proposition is, with respect, another
bare assertion. The facts are that the rights of members of the League,
or the possible consequences flowing from the meaning of the words
"another Member of the League of Nations", were not discussed or
mentioned, expressly or impliedly, ciirectlyor indirectly, either before or
after the adoption of the said resolution. Nor does the resolution itself
make reference to any such matter. There is no evidence of any intention
to enter into any agreement relative thereto.
15(a). In myviewthere is no substance in any of the reasonsadvanced
by the Court in 1962 for piacing "no reliance" on the natural and
ordinary meaning of the words "another Member of the League of
Nations" in Article 7, and for holding that ex-members of the League
retained after the dissolutionsuch rights as they may have had as mem-
bers of the League.
Judges Bustamante, Jessup and Mbanefo followed in some respects a
somewhat different line of reasoning.
16. Judge Jessup first considered the meaning of "Members of the
League" inArticle 7 of the MandateforRuanda-Urundi held by Belgium.
After pointing out that in this Article Belgium agreed to the so-called
Open Door Principle which, inter ali~~f,orbade Belgium to discriminate
iii favour of her own nationals and against the nationals of other "Mem-
bers of the League", the learned Judge remarks:
"It is not apparent why it would be reasonable to Saythat while
74 sûr de rendre la protection judiciaire effective, quoi qu'il pût ad-
venir du système de surveiliance administrative ou survenir à
son sujet.))
En rtalité, lors de la création du système des Mandats, la possibilité
que quelque chose advienne en matière de surveillance administrative
n'a été niexaminée,ni mentionnée et, de toute évidence,elle n'a même
pas étéenvisagée.Le raisonnement ci-dessus, extrait de l'arrêtde 1962,
n'est donc ni justifié ni étayépar les faits.
15. Le troisième motif énoncédans l'arrêtde 1962 est qu'à la der-
nière session de la Société desNations, tenue en avril 1946, il y a eu
un accord entre tous les Membres de l'organisation en vue de continuer
les différents Mandats dans toute la mesure possible ou praticable et
de maintenir par conséquent les droits des Etats Membres. Cet accord
serait prouvé par la résolution de 1946 sur la dissolution et par ctout
l'ensemble descirconstances contemporaines qui ont précédé et dominé
la session». Non seulement ce prétendu accord général est lefruit d'une
déduction, mais le maintien des prétendus droits des Membres de la
Sociétédes Nations au regard des Mandats est lui-même déduit de
cet accord tacite.
Pareilles déductions semblent essentiellement fondées sur la propo-
sition selon laquelle la résolution relative la dissolution a étéadoptée
((précisémen t en vue d'écarter «les objections littérales tenant à la
formule ((unautre Membre dela Société desNations ».Je me permettrai
de dire qu'il y a là une autre assertion gratuite. En fait, ni avant ni
après l'adoption de la résolution, on n'a examinéou mentionné, que ce
soit expressément ou implicitement, directement ou indirectement,
les droits des Membres de la Société desNations ou les conséquences
éventuellesde la signification des mots ((unautre Membre de la Société
des Nations)). Le texte même de la résolution n'y fait pas allusion
non plus. Rien ne prouve une intention de conclure un accord à ce
sujet.
15 a). Je considère comme sans fondement les motifs invoqués
par la Cour en 1962 pour ((ne pas accorder crédit » au sens naturel et
ordinaire des termes de l'article 7 ((un autre Membre de la Société des
Nations)) et Dour soutenir aue les anciens Membres de la Société des
Nations ont conservé après sa dissolution les droits qu'ils avaient en
cette aualité.
Le raisonnement de M. Bustamante, de M. Jessup et de sir Louis
Mbanefo était à certains égards légèrement différent.
16. M. Jessup a tout d'abord examiné le sensdes termes ((Membres
dela Société des Nations »à l'article 7 du Mandat sur le Ruanda-Urundi.
Après avoir signalé que, par cet article, la Belgique avait accepté le
principe dit de la porte ouverte, qui lui interdisait entre autres toute
discrimination en faveur de ses propres ressortissants et au détriment
de ceux de tout autre Membre de la Société, l'éminent juga epoursuivi:
«On voit mal comment on pourrait affirmer que, si lefait d'établir
74 it would have been a violation of Belgium's contractual obligation
so to discriminate against a French citizen in the matter of a
concession on 18 April 1946, the day before the dissolution of
the League, Belgium would have been free so to discriminate on
20 April 1946. On the contrary, if Belgium had so discriminated
on 20 April France could properly (if diplornatic negotiations
failed to result in a settlement) have seizedthe Court of this dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Mandate,
relying on Article 13 of the Mandate for Ruanda-Urundi (which
contains a compromissory clause identical with that in Article 7
of the Mandate for South West Africa), and on Article 37 of the
Statute to which both Belgium and France are parties."
The Judge thereupon concludes that if his aforesaid conclusion is sound,
the provisions of Article5 of the Mandate for South West Africa which
required the Respondent to allow al1 missionaries, nationals of any
State Member of the League of Nations to enter into and reside in the
Territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling, could not have
ceasedto apply on the dissolution of the League. He thereupon concludes
that the reference to "another Member of the League" in the Mandates
was "descriptive of a class" and not "an imperative condition".
The learned Judge thus bases a great deal of his reasoning on the
conclusion reached by him on the meaning of "Members of the League"
in the Ruanda-Urundi Mandate. But this conclusion is based on hardly
any reasoning at all. Al1we have is the Judge's statement that it is not
apparent to him why a contrary result would be "reasonable". He offers
no reason why such a result would be unreasonable.
There is no evidence to justify an inference that the authors of the
mandates system intended that a State which has ceased to be a member
of the League should retain rights conferred on it as a member of the
League, and there is nothing unreasonable in a conclusion that a State
which has lost the qualification entitling it to the enjoyment of a right,
has lost that right. Whenever a right is terminated it would be possible
to say that what would have constituted a violation of an obligation
on the one day would be permissible the following day, but this is no
reason for saying that the right has not come to an end. Instans estfinis
unius temporisetprincipium alterius.If France had resigned as a member
of the League on 19April 1946,she would no longer have been entitled
to claim any rights under Article 7 of the Ruanda-Urundi Mandate on
20 April 1946. The fact that she still could have done so on 18 April
1946 is entirely irrelevant. The same consequence must have flowed
fronl the termination of membership of the League on 19April 1946as
would have followed had membership been terminated the day before,
or ten years sooner.
In my opinion there is no cogency in the reasons advanced by the
learned Judge for his finding that the words "Members of the League"
75 une discrimination à l'encontre d'un citoyen français dans une
affaire de concession le 18 avril 1946, c'est-à-dire le jour qui a
précédé la dissolution de la Société desNations, constituait une
violation des obligations contractuelles de la Belgique, cet Etat
aurait eu toute licence d'imposer pareille discrimination le 20 avril
1946.Au contraire, sila Belgiqueavait procédé à cette discrimination
le 20 avril, la France aurait étéen droit (au cas où des négociations
diplomatiques n'auraient pu aboutir à un règlement) de saisir
la Cour de ce différend relatif à l'interprétation ou à l'application
du Mandat en s'appuyant sur l'article 13du Mandatpour le Ruanda-
Urundi (qui contient une clause compromissoire semblable à celle
de l'article du Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain) et sur l'article 37
du Statut, auquel la France et la Belgique sont parties. ))
L'éminent juge ena déduit que, si son raisonnement étaitbien fondé,
les dispositions de l'article5 du Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain,
aux termes desquelles le défendeur esttenu d'assurer à tous les mission-
naires, sujets ou citoyens de tout Membre de la Société desNations,
la facultéde pénétreret de résiderdans le territoire dans le but d'exercer
leur ministère, n'ont pu cesser d'être applicableslorsque la Société
des Nations a étédissoute. Et de conclure que la référencefaite dans
les Mandats à ((un autre Membre de la Société desNations)) était
(descriptived'une classe))mais ne posait pas une ((conditionimpérative )).
L'éminent juge a donc fondé en grande partie son raisonnement
sur la conclusion à laquelle il est parvenu quant au sens de l'expression
((Membresde la Société desNations » dans le Mandat sur le Ruanda-
Urundi. Mais on ne saurait guère prétendre que cette conclusion pro-
cède d'un raisonnement. Tout au plus l'éminent jugenous dit-il qu'il
voit mal comment on pourrait raisonnablement affirmer le contraire.
Il ne précisepas pourquoi.
Rien ne prouve ni ne permet de conclure que les auteurs du système
des Mandats ont envisagéde conserver à un Etat ayant cesséd'être
Membre de la Sociétédes Nations les droits qui lui auraient étéconférés
en cette qualitéet je ne vois pas pourquoi il serait déraisonnabled'af-
firmer qu'un Etat perd un droit s'iln'a plusla qualitéqui lui permettait
d'en jouir. Chaque fois qu'un droit devient caduc, on peut dire que ce
qui aurait constituéun certain jour la violation d'une obligation devient
licite le lendemain, mais ce n'est pas une raison pour prétendre que le
droit ne s'est pas éteint. Instans est jînis unius temporis et principium
alterius.Si la France a renoncé à sa qualitéde Membre de la Société
des Nations le 19 avril 1946,elle ne remplissait plus le 20 avril 1946les
conditions requises pour invoquer des droits en vertu de l'article 7
du Mandat sur le Ruanda-Urundi. Le fait qu'elle aurait encore pu le
faire le 18 avril 1946 est sans pertinence. Que sa qualité de Membre
de la Société desNations ait pris fin le 19 avril 1946, la veille ou dix
ans auparavant, les conséquences ont éténécessairement les mêmes.
A mon avis, les raisons que l'éminent jugeinvoque pour conclure
que l'expression «Membres de la Société des Nations ))avait un caractère
75were descriptive. His first reason is that it was fondly hoped that the
League system would become universal. 1 fail to see what bearing this
hope had on the meaning of these words. Had this hope been fulfilled
the words "Members of the League" would have become syiionymous
with "all States" as long as al1States remained members of the League,
but even then "Members of the League" could only have meant members
of the League.
The maxim cessante ratione legis, cessut ipso lex is completely mis-
applied by the learned Judge. It is invoked by him to change the pro-
visions of an instrument: to amend Article 7 of the Mandate by sub-
stituting "ex-member of the League which was a member at the dissolu-
tion of the League" for "Member of the League". The maxim simply
means that where the reason for a law ceases, the law itself ceases,
and it in no way justifies an interpretation imposing on a State an
obligation it did not agree to. There is in any event no justification
for the view that the authors of the mandates system intended that
the privileges of ex-members should continue after the dissolution of
the League. Provision was made for the amendment of the Covenant
and the mandates by the organs of the League, and there was accordingly
no need for any agreement, express or implied, as to what would happen
in the event of the dissolution of the League. Had the issue been raised,
the answer would probably have been that it was left to the organs of
the League and the mandatories concerned to take such steps as were
considered reasonable in the light of circumstances prevailing at the
time of such dissolution; but it certainly cannot be said that al1the parties
would have agreed that the rights of States who were members immedi-
ately prior to the dissolution of the League would continue after its
dissolution.
1must confess that 1am unable to understand the Judge's "frustration"
argument. 1 know of no legal principle which requires that a provision
should continue to apply after the conditions for its application have
ceased to exist, simply because it would be capable of being complied
with if those conditions did still exist or are ignored.
Equally erroneous is Judge Jessup's following approach:
"If the Mandatory claimed the right to Iimit the privileges to
missionaries who were nationals of States which were Members of
the League when the League came to an end, the claim would be
reasonableand it would avoid any charge that there was imposed
on the Mandatory an obligation more onerous than that which it
had originally assumed." (Italics added).
If the learned Judge's view that the expression "Member of the League"
was descriptive iç correct, there would appear to be no reason for
lirniting the privileges conferred on "Members of the League" to States
which were members on the dissolution of the League. This passage-
76descriptif ne sont nullement convaincantes. La première raison qu'il
donne est que l'on espéraitbien que le systèmede la Société desNations
deviendrait universel. Je ne vois pas quelle incidence cela peut avoir
sur le sens des termeS.en question. Si cet espoir s'était réalisé, letermes
(1Membres de la Sociétédes Nations ))auraient étésynonymes de tous
les Etats aussi longtemps que tous les Etats seraient demeurésMembres
de l'organisation. Mais, mêmedans ce cas, les termes (Membres de la
Société desNations )n'auraient pu signifier que Membres de la Société.
La maxime cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex est appliquée par
l'éminent juge d'une manière tout à fait erronée. II l'invoque pour
justifier la modification des dispositions d'un instrument, ou plus pré-
cisément l'amendement de l'article 7 du Mandat par la substitution
des mots ancien Membre de la Sociétédes Nations qui en étaitMembre
à sa dissolution aux termes ((Membre de la Sociétédes Nations D. Or.
cette maxime veut tout simplement dire qu'une loi devient caduque
lorsqu'elle perd sa raison d'être;elle ne saurait justifier une interpréta-
tion tendant à imposer à un Etat une obligation à laquelle il n'a pas
souscrit. Rien en tout cas n'autorise à penser que les auteurs du système
des Mandats ont prévu lemaintien des privilèges des anciens Membres
après la dissolution de la Société desNations. Puisque des dispositions
avaient étéprises en vue de l'amendement du Pacte et des Mandats
par les organes de la Société desNations, il n'était pas nécessairede
conclure un accord exprès ou implicite pour le cas où l'organisation
serait dissoute. Si la question avait étésoulevée,la réponse aurait pro-
bablement étéqu'il appartiendrait aux organes de la Société desNations
et aux Mandataires intéressésde prendre les mesures qu'ils jugeraient
raisonnables en fonction des circonstances du moment; mais on ne
peut certainement pas affirmer que toutes les parties seraient convenues
que les droits des Etats Membres de l'organisation immédiatement
avant sa dissolution survivraient à cet événement.
Je dois avouer mon incapacité à comprendre l'argument de la (1frustra-
tion ))dont M. Jessup fait état. A ma connaissance, aucun principe
juridique n'impose qu'une disposition demeure applicable lorsque les
conditions de son application ont cessé d'exister, pour le seul motif
qu'il serait possible de respecter cette disposition si lesdites conditions
existaient toujours ou s'il n'en était pas tenu compte.
Une autre remarque de M. Jessup est tout aussi erronée:
((Sile Mandataire avait réclaméle droit de limiter les privilèges
aux missionnaires ressortissants des Etats Membres de la Société
des Nations au moment de sa dissolution, cette prétention aurait
été raisonnableet aurait évitéqu'on ne prétendit que le Mandataire
s'était vu inqposerune obligation plus lourde que celle qu'il avait
assumée à l'origine.)(Les italiques sont de nous.)
Si le point de vue de l'éminent jugesur le caractère descriptif de i'ex-
pression (Membre de la Société desNations )étaitexact, il n'y aurait,
semble-t-il, aucune raison de ne reconnaître les privilèges conférésaux
((Membres de la Société desNations )qu'aux seuls Etats qui en étaient and other passages-suggest that the learned Judge thinks that as long
as the League existed the words "Member of the League" had their
ordinary meaning, but that on the dissolution of the League they became
descriptive of States who were members at its dissolution. This means
that the same words had different meanings at different periods of time.
The learned Judge appears to have lost sight of the elementary principle
that al1rights and duties under an agreement are determined in accor-
dance with the intention of the parties at the time the agreement is entered
into. No party can "claim" rights or privileges not properly derivable
from the agreement, and nobody other than a legislature can "impose"
duties not agreed to.
The opinion of Judge Jessup further advances the argument that if
the elements of the mandates which related to the welfare of the in-
habitants survived the League, then the rights of missionaries under
Article 5 and the rights of the inhabitants to their services should
also have survived the League despite the technical requirement that
these missionaries had to be nationals of members of the League. The
learned Judge appears to be confusing the Respondent's duties towards
the inhabitants under the provisions of the Mandate and the rights
conferred on States, members of the League. In any event the survival
of those rights, which depended on the existence of members of the
League, depends on the meaning of the words "Member of the League";
andthe problem arising in regard thereto is exactlythe same as that which
arises in regard to Article 7. The solution given to it is not made any
more valid by first interpreting Article 5, or provisions of other mandates
in which the words "Members of the League" appear, as applying to
ex-members of the League.
The learned Judge appears to revert to his descriptive test in the
following passage:
"After all, these 'Members of the League' were not just concepts,
'ghosts seen in the law, elusive to the grasp'. They were actual
States or self-governing entities whose names could be recited.
The names of the original Members were listed in the Annex to
the Covenant, but it was not a fixed group; it fluctuated as new
Members were admitted or as old Members terminated their
memberships. Yet at any givenmoment-as for example the moment
of the dissolution of the League-the Mandatory would always
have been able to draw up, by names, a list of the States included
in the descriptive term 'Member of the League'."
Rights are conferred by the constitution of a Companyon its members.
These members are not "ghosts seen in the law, elusive to the grasp".
They are actual persons, whose names could be recited. The names of
the original members appear on a list, but it is not a fixed group; it
fluctuates as new members are admitted or as old members terminate
77 Membres à sa dissolution. On peut déduire de ce passage, et d'autres
encore, qu'aux yeux de l'éminent juge lestermes ((Membres de la Société
des Nations »ont gardé leur sens ordinaire aussi longtemps que I'or-
ganisation a existémais qu'à partir de la dissolution de l'organisation
ils ont décritles Etats qui en étaient Membresà cette date. Cela voudrait
dire que les mêmestermes auraient eu un sens différent suivant les
époques. L'éminentjuge semble avoir perdu de vue ce principe élémen-
taire que tous les droits et devoirs découlant d'un accord sont déter-
minéspar l'intention des parties à la date de la conclusion de l'accord.
Aucune partie ne saurait ((réclamer ))des droits ou des privilèges qui
ne puissent être légitimement déduits de l'accord et seul un organe
législatif peut«imposer » des obligations n'ayant pas fait l'objet d'un
accord.
Dans son opinion, M. Jessup prétend en outre que, si les dispositions
des Mandats relatives au bien-être deshabitants ont survécu à la Société
des Nations, les droits reconnus aux missionnaires par l'article 5 et les
droits des habitants de recourir à leur ministère doivent également
subsister, en dépit de la condition faite auxdits missionnaires d'être
ressortissantsd7Etats Membres. L'éminent jugesemble confondre les
devoirs à l'égard deshabitants imposéspar les dispositions du Mandat
et les droits conférésaux Etats Membres de la Sociétédes Nations.
Quoi qu'il en soit, le maintien en vigueur de ces droits, qui dépendaient
de l'existenced'Etats Membres, est fonction du sens des termes «Mem-
bres de la Sociétédes Nations »; le problème qui se pose àcet égardest
exactement le mêmeque pour l'article 7. Si l'on commence par inter-
préter l'article5, ou les clauses d'autres Mandats contenant les mots
((Membresde la Société desNations »,comme s'appliquant aux anciens
Membres de I'organisation, cela ne rend pas la solution plus valable
pour autant.
Dans le passage suivant, l'éminent juge semble revenir à son critère
de la qualification descriptive
((Aprèstout, les (Membres de la Société desNations »n'étaient
pas seulement des concepts, «des spectres errant emmi le droit
et échappant à toute étreinte)). C'étaient des Etats réels ou des
entités autonomes dont on pouvait donner les noms. Ceux des
Membres originaires de la Sociétéfiguraient en annexe au Pacte,
mais il ne s'agissait pasà d'un groupe figé; sa composition a varié
à mesure que de nouveaux Membres étaient admis au sein de la
Société ouque d'anciens Membres s'en retiraient. A tout moment
cependant - par exemple au moment de la dissolution de la So-
ciété- le Mandataire pouvait établirla liste nominative des Etats
répondant àla description de «Membres de la Société desNations. ))
C'est le fait de constituer une scciétéqui confère des droits à ses
membres. Ceux-ci ne sont pas «des spectres errant emmi le droit et
échappant à toute étreinte1)Ce sont des êtresréels,dont on peut donner
les noms. Les noms des membres originaires figurent sur une liste,
mais il ne s'agit paslà d'un groupe figé;sa composition varie à mesure their membership. At any givcn mornerit-as for example the moment
before the dissolution of the company-it would always be possible to
draw up, by names, a list of those included in the descriptive term
"member of the company". This, however, affoxds no reason for saying
that the expression "member of the company" is descriptive in the
sense that the rights conferred on members, qua members, continue on
termination of membership whether during the lifetime of the company
or on its dissolution and liquidation. Whenever it is desired to confer
any rights on ex-members of a company, express provisions to that
effect are required.
17. Judge Bustamante came to the conclusion that rights conferred
on members of the League were not limited to the lifetime of the League
but extended to the whole duration of the Mandate l.The Mandate
does not state that the rights and duties of members will survive their
membership of the League. On the contras. their rights and duties were
held as "Members of the League", and this obviously means that on the
termination of their membership their rights and duties as men~bersalso
terminated. The possibility of the Mandate surviving the League was
not contemplated, and there is no justification for inferring that, had
it been considered, al1 the parties, including the Respondent, would
have acknowledged that in such a case the rights and duties of members-
whatever they were-would continue despite their loss of membership.
The learned Judge concedes that the rights of States which voluntarily
resigned or were ejected from the League, terminated on the termination
of their membership; but he contends that the dissolution of the League
was not tlze result of a voluntary act of its members. He arrives at this
conclusion by having regard "to the historical facts which determined
the disappearance of the League of Nations". These facts are (according
to the learned Judge): (a) that the League was already "greatly
weakened" beforethe SecondWorld War, (b) that it remained "paralysed"
for the whole of the war, (ci that the results of the conflict "completely
upset international realities" by profoundly modifying the former
conformation and distribution of States on which the League of Nations
had been based, (d) that the League was already "dead" when it was
dissolved, (e) that Articles 77, 79 and 80 of the Charter established
the "compulsory character" for the transformation of former mandates
into modernized tutelary systems. The expressions "weakened", "para-
lysed" and "dead" have no known legal connotation in the context
in which they are used, but whatever their meanings may be, the fact
is that the League of Nations was still in existence as a legal entity,
and its members still had the qualification and the rights and duties
of members of the League, up to the time of its dissolution. They were
It will be recalled that the suofthe Mandate was assumed.
78 que de nouveaux membres sont admis au sein de la sociétéou que
d'anciens membres s'en retirent. A tout moment, par exemple à la
veille de la dissolution de la société, il est possible d'établir la liste no-
minative de ceux qui répondent à la description de ((membres de la
société».On ne saurait toutefois en conclure que l'expression ((membres
de la société»a un caractère descriptif en ce sens que les droits c~nférés
aux membres en cette qualitésurvivent à leur appartenance à la société,
que cette appartenance prenne fin durant l'existence de la sociétéou
lors de sa dissolution et de sa liquidation. Lorsque l'on veut attribuer
des droits aux anciens membres d'une société,on doit prévoir desdis-
positions expressesà cet effet.
17. M. Bustamante est arrivé à la conclusion que les droits conférés
aux Membres de la Société desNations ne leur étaient pas seulement
accordéspour la duréede celle-ci,mais pour toute la duréedu Mandat l.
Or, le Mandat n'énonçait pas que les droits et devoirs des Membres
dussent survivre à leur appartenance à l'organisation. Au contraire,
ces droitset devoirs étaientliés leur qualitéde « Membres de la Société
des Nations »,ce qui signifiait manifestement que, lorsque leur apparte-
nance à celle-ciprendrait fin, leurs droits et devoirs de Membres s'étein-
draient en mêmetemps. L'idéeque le Mandat pût survivre à la Société
des Nations n'a pas étéenvisagéeet rien ne permet d'affirmer que, si
elle l'avait été,toutes les parties, et notamment le défendeur, auraient
reconnu qu'en pareil cas les Etats Membres - quels qu'ils fussent -
conserveraient leurs droits et devoirs bien qu'ils eussent perdu leur
qualité de Membres.
L'éminent juge concèdeque les droits des Etats ayant volontaire-
ment démissionnéou ayant été expulsés de la Société desNations,
ont pris fin lorsque ceux-ci ont cesséd'être Membresde l'organisation;
mais il soutient que la dissolution de la Société desNations n'a pas
été lerésultatd'un acte volontairede ses Membres. Cette conclusion lui
est inspirée par «les faits historiques qui ont déterminéla disparition
de la Société desNations ».Ces faits sont à ses yeux: a) que la Société
des Nations était déjà((trèsébranlée » avant la deuxième guerre mon-
diale, b) qu'elle était restée ((paralysée))pendant toute la durée du
conflit, c) que les résultats du conflit avaient ((entièrementbouleversé
la réalitéinternationale» en modifiant d'une façon profonde l'ancienne
conformation et l'ancienne distribution des Etats sur lesquelles la
Société desNations avait étéfondée, d) que la Société desNations
était déjà((morte » lorsqu'elle a étédissoute, e) que les articles 77, 79
et 80 de la Charte des Nations Unies avaient établi le ((caractèreobliga-
toire» de la transformation des anciens Mandats en régimestutélaires
modernisés. Lesmots cébranlée ».coaralvsée » et morte » n'ont aucune
, L d
signification juridique connue dans ce contexte mais, quel qu'en soit
le sens, le fait demeure que la Société desNations existait toujours en
tant qu'entitéjuridique et que ses Membres ont conservé la qualité
On serappellera quele maintien evigueur duMandat était admis par hypo-
thèse.
78consequently not powerless. Equally the Charter could have provided
for the compulsory transformation of former Mandates into trusteeship
agreements, or to use the Judge's words "en régimes tutélaires moderni-
sés"--see International Status of South WestAfrica, I.C.J. Reports 1950,
page 140, where it was held that "the Charter does not impose on the
Union an obligation to place South-West Africa under the Trusteeship
System".
In any event, even if the provisions of the Charter provided for such
compulsory transformation, they were voluntarily agreed to by the
members of the League. One cannot voluntarily agree to enter into an
agreement and then after having done so contend that it (the latter)
was not voluntarily entered into because of the prior agre, Ornent.
The members of the League voluntarily dissolved the machinery
created for the supervision of the Mandatory, and voluntarily terminated
their qualifications as members which was a sine qua non to their holding
rights and duties under the Mandate, and members of this Court have
no right to disregard the legal effects of these voluntary acts, however
much they may dislike them.
18. Sir Louis Mbanefo thought that the rights and obligations em-
bodied in the Mandate "became as it were maintained at the level on
which they were on the dissolution of the League".
The reason advanced for this conclusion is that the purpose of the
Mandate has not yet been achieved. There is no principle of law to the
effect that parties to an instrument cannot lose their rights and obliga-
tions until thepurpose of the instrument in question has been achieved;
nor is there any principle that, if parties voluntarily terminate their
qualifications necessary for holding certain rights and obligations, such
rights and obligations are nonetheless maintained "at the level" they
were on the date of the loss of such qualification.
19. In al1the articles of the Covenant except Articles 2, 9, 21 and 24
the words "Member(s) of the League" are used. In terms of Article 3
the Assembly consists of representatives of "Members of the League",
and "each Member of the League" was given one vote. Article 4 provided
for the election of "four other Members of the League" to the Council.
Article 6 imposed the obligation to contribute to the expenses of the
Secretariat on "the Members of the League". Article 7 dealt with the
diplomatic privileges of representatives of "Members of the League".
Articles 8, 12 and 15 imposed various obligations on "Members of the
League". Article 22 dealt with equal opportunities for trade and com-
merce of "other Members of the League". Article 1 (1) provided which
States would be the original "Members of the League". Article 1 (3)
provided that any "Member of the League" could withdraw after giving
two years' notice. Article 16 (4) provided for declaring a "Member of
the League" to be no longer a "Member of the League". It is clear that
the expression "Member of the League" was used to mean a State which
ï!) SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP.IND. VAN WYK) 81
ainsi que les droits et devoirs de Membres de la Société desNations
jusqu'à la date de sa dissolution. En conséquence ils n'étaientpas sans
pouvoirs. De même,la Charte aurait pu prévoir la trailsformation
obligatoire des anciens Mandatsen accords de tutelle ou, pour reprendre
les termes de M. Bustamante, «en régimes tutélaires modernisés »;
or, l'avis consultatif sur le Statut international du Sud-Ouest africain
(C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 140) a constaté que «la Charte n'impose pas
à l'Union l'obligation de placer le Sud-Ouest africain sous le régime
de tutelle.
En tout cas, même siles dispositions de la Charte ont prévu cette
transformation obligatoire, les Membres de la Société desNations y
ont volontairement souscrit. On ne saurait volontairement consentir
à conclure un accord et affirmer, après l'avoir fait, qu'on n'y a pas
souscrit volontairement en raison d'un accord antérieur.
Les Membres de la Société desNations ont volontairement dissous
le dispositif créépour la surveillance du Mandataire et ils ont mis
volontairement fin à leur qualité de Membres, condition sine qua non
des droits et devoirs qu'ils détenaient envertu du Mandat; les membres
de la Cour n'ont pas le droit de négliger lesconséquences juridiques
de ces actes volontaires, quelque aversion qu'elles leur inspirent.
18. Sir Louis Mbanefo a estiméque les droits et obligations énoncés
dans le Mandat «ont été,en quelque sorte, maintenus au niveau qu'ils
avaient atteint lors de la dissolution de la Société)).
A l'appui de cette conclusion, il a fait valoir que l'objectif du Mandat
n'avait pas encore étéatteint. Or, aucun principe de droit ne dispose
que les parties à un acte ne sauraient perdre leurs droits et obligations
tant que l'objectifde cet acte n'a pas étéatteint; il n'existepas davantage
de principe en vertu duquel, si des parties mettent volontairement
fin aux qualifications qui leur sont nécessaires pour avoir certains
droits et obligations, ceux-ci sont néanmoins maintenus «au niveau »
qu'ils avaient atteint à la date à laquelle lesdites qualifications ont
disparu.
19. Tous les articles du Pacte,à l'exception des articles2, 9, 21 et 24,
contenaient les termes (Membre(s) de la Société 1)Aux termes de l'ar-
ticle 3, l'Assemblée secomposait de représentants des ((Membresde
la Société »et ((chaque Membre de la Société »ne disposait que d'une
voix. L'article 4 prévoyaitque ((quatre autres Membres de la Société 1)
seraient désignéspour faire partie du Conseil. L'article 6 obligeait
«les Membres de la Société) à) contribuer aux dépensesdu Secrétariat.
L'article 7 traitait des privilèges diplomatiques des représentants des
((Membres de la Société ».Les articles 8, 12 et 15 imposaient diverses
obligations aux ((Membresde la Société 1)L'article 22 traitait des con-
ditions d'égalitépour les échangeset le commerce qui devaient être
assuréesaux ((autres Membres de la Société ».L'article 1, paragraphe 1,
définissaitles Etats ((Membres originaires de la Société ))L'article 1,
paragraphe 3, disposait que tout ((Membrede la Société » pourrait s'en
retirer après un préavisde deux ans. L'article 16, paragraphe 4, envi-
sageait la possibilité d'exclure«de la Sociététout Membre qui »,etc.
7982 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
in fact was a member of the League at the time of the application of the
particular provision in which it appears.
Any interpretation of this expression in any of these provisions to
the effectthat States which hadnever been or had ceased to be members
of the League are included would be ridiculous and there appears to be
no sound reason for not giving it thesame meaning it had in the Cove-
nant, wherever it occurs in the instrument of mandate.
Article 6 of the Mandate
(Applicants' Submissions Nos.2, 7and8)
1. At the outset 1 wish to repeat that Article 7 (2) of the Mandate
Declaration is the only provision upon which the jurisdiction of this
Court could in these cases be founded. The said Article limits such
jurisdiction to disputes relating to the interpretation or application of
the provisions of the Mandate; i.e., the provisions contained in the
Mandate Declaration. It follows that provisions of other instruments
may only be considered if they have been incorporated into, or have
bearing onthe legal effectof the provisions of the Mandate Declaration.
Thus, for example, Article 22 of the Covenant is only relevant when
considered inconjunction with the provisions ofthe Mandate Declaration.
Divorced therefrom it has no relevanceinthese proceedings.
2. In my 1962opinion1 1came to the conclusion that Article 6 of the
Mandate ceased to apply on the dissolution of the League. 1 adhere
to that opinion.
My reasoris for holding that Articl6 of the Mandate Declaration,
and also Article 22, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League, no
longer apply are briefly se' forth in the following paragraphs.
3. The obligation imposed on the Respondent by Article 22, para-
graph 7, ofthe Covenant and Article6 oftheMandate Declaration wasan
obligation to report to a particular body, viz., the Council of the
League.
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League provided that to certain
colonies and territories, which included German South West Africa,
there should be applied the principle that the well-being and develop-
Judgmenton PreliminaryObjections(Z.C.J.Reports 1962, pp. 575-662).11est évident que l'expression ((Membrede la Société »désignaittout
Etat qui serait effectivement Membre de la Société desNations à la
date à laquelle s'appliquerait la disposition où cette expression appa-
raissait.
Il serait ridicule d'interpréter ladite expression dans les dispositions
susrnei~tionnéescomme s'étendantaux Etats n'ayant jamais été Membres
de la Société desNations, ou ayant cesséde l'être, eton ne voit aucune
raison valable de ne pas lui donner dans toutes les dispositions de l'acte
de Mandat où on la rencontre le mêmesens que dans le Pacte.
Article 6 du Mandat
(Conclusions no", 7 et 8 des demandeurs)
1. Je tiens tout d'abord à redire que ledeuxièmealinéa de l'article7
de la déclaration de Mandat est la seule disposition sur laquelle il soit
possible en l'espèce de fonder la compétence de la Cour. Cet alinéa
limite la compétence aux différends relatifs à l'interprétation ou à
l'application des dispositions du Mandat, c'est-à-dire des dispositions
contenues dans la déclaration de Mandat. Il s'ensuit qu'on ne peut
tenir compte des dispositions d'autres instruments que si elles ont été
incorporées dans les dispositions de 12.déclaration de Mandat ou si
elles ont un effet juridique sur ces dispositions. Ainsi, par exemple,
l'article 22 du Pacte n'est pertinent que s'il est examiné conjointement
avec les dispositions de la déclaration de Mandat. Séparéde ces dis-
positions, il est sans pertinence en l'espèce.
2. Dans mon opinion de 1962 l,j'ai aboutià la conclusion que l'ar-
ticle 6 du Mandat a cesséd'êtreapplicable lors de la dissolution de la
Société desNations. Je maintiens cette conclusion.
Les raisons pour lesquellesje soutiens que l'article 6 de la déclaration
de Mandat ainsi que l'article 22, paragraphe 7, du Pacte ne sont plus
applicables sont brièvement énoncéesdans les paragraphes ci-après.
3. L'obligation imposéeau défendeurpar l'article 22, paragraphe 7,
du Pacte et par l'article 6 de la déclarationde Mandat étaitcelle de faire
rapport à un organe déterminé, à savoir le Conseil de la Sociétédes
Nations.
L'article22du Pacteénonçaitqu'il fallaitappliquer à certaines colonies
età certains territoires, dont le Sud-Ouest africain allemand, le principe
selon lequel le bien-êtreet le développement des peuples deces colonies
l Arrêt de1962 relatif aux exceptions préliminaires, opinion indi575-elle, p.
662.
80ment of the peoples of such colonies and territories formed a sacred
trust of civilization, "and that securities for the performance of this
trust should be embodied in this Covenant". The Article then continued
to state that the best method of giving practical egect to this principle
was that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to certain
advanced nations, and that this tutelage should be exercised by such
nations as "mandatories on behaIf of the League".
The only securities embodied in the Covenant relative to reporting
and accounting by the mandatory are be to found in paragraphs 7 and 9
of Article 22, and they read as follows:
"7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to
the Councilan annual report in reference to the territory committed
to its charge." (Italics added.)
"9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive
and examinethe annual reports ofthe Mandatories and to advise the
Council on al1matters relating to the observance of the mandates."
(Italicsadded.)
And in the relevant Mandate Declaration the only reference to re-
porting and accounting isto be foundin Article 6,whichreads asfollows:
"The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of
Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, con-
taining full information with regard to the territory, and indicating
the measures taken to carry out the obligations assumed under
Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5." (Italics added.)
Thisduty to make a report to the satisfaction of the Council is herein-
after referred to as the Mandatory's duty to report and account. and
the corresponding rights of the Council in that regard are referred to
as the Council's powers of supervision.
4. Article 6 of the Mandate Declaration, and paragraphs 7 and 9 of
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, depended for their operation
on the existenceof the League of Nations, inasmuch as without a League
in existence there could not be a Council of the League. The League
was dissolved in 1946and the aforesaid provisions accordingly must as
from that date have ceased to apply unless some other body, such as,
for example, the General Assembly of the United Nations, was sub-
stituted for the Councilof the League as the body to which the Respon-
dent had to report and account.
Such substitution could have come about only if:
(a) there exists a principle or rule of international law which provides
for such substitution to take effect automatically-i.e., without
any question of consent on Respondent's part, or
(b) the Respondent consented to such substitution.
Itisnowcommon cause that there isno principle or rule ofinternationalet territoires formaient une mission sacréede civilisation et qu'il con-
venait ((d'incorporer dans le présent Pacte des garanties pour l'ac-
complissement de cette mission 1).L'article indiquait ensuite que la
meilleure méthode de réaliserpratiquement ce principe était de confier
la tutelle de ces peuples à certaines nations développées,qui agiraient
«en qualité deMandataires et au nom de la Société )).
Les seules garanties contenues dans le Pacte en ce qui concerne
l'obligation du Mandataire de faire rapport et de rendre compte se
trouvaient aux paragraphes 7 et 9 de l'article 22 et étaient libellées
comme suit:
((7.Dans tous les cas le Mandataire doit envoyer au Conseil
un rapport annuel concernant les territoires dont il a la charge. »
(Les italiques sont de nous.)
((9. Une commission permanente sera chargée de recevoir et
d'examiner les rapports annuels des Mandataires et de donner au
Conseil son avis sur toutes questions relatives à l'exécution des
Mandats. )(Les italiques sont de nous.)
De plus, dans la déclaration de Mandat pertinente, la seule référence
à l'obligation defaire rapport et de rendre compte setrouvait à l'article 6,
qui étaitainsi conçu :
((Le Mandataire devra envoyer au Conseil de la Société desNa-
tions un rapport annuel satisfaisant le Conseilet contenant toute
information intéressant le Territoire et indiquant les mesures
prises pour assurer les engagements pris suivant les articles 2, 3,
4, 5.))(Les italiques sont de nous.)
Je désignerai ci-aprèsl'obligation d'adresser un ((rapport ... satis-
faisant le Conseil )par l'expression I'obligation du Mandataire de faire
rapport et de rendre compte et les droits correspondants du Conseil
à cet égard par l'expression les pouvoirs de surveillance du Conseil.
4. L'application de l'article 6 de la déclaration de Mandat et des
paragraphes 7 et 9 de l'article 22 du Pacte dépendait de l'existence de
la Sociétédes Nations, sans laquelle le Conseil ne pouvait pas exister
non plus. La Sociétédes Nations ayant été dissoute en1946, les dis-
positions précitéesont cesséd'être applicables à partir de cette date,
à moins qu'un autre organisme, comme par exemplel'Assemblée générale
des Nations Unies, n'ait étésubstitué au Conseil de la Sociétédes
Nations en tant qu'organisme auquel le défendeur devait faire rapport
et rendre compte.
Cette substitution n'a pu se produire que:
a) s'il existe un principe ou une règle de droit international en vertu
desquels cette substitution a pris effet automatiquement, c'est-à-dire
sans que la question du consentement du défendeur se pose, ou
b) si le défendeur a consenti à ladite substitution.
Il est maintenant admis par les Parties qu'il n'existe ni principe ni law which couid have brought about such an automatic succession1.
There is certainly no principle to be found in any legal system to the
effectthat, where the creators of a trust (or anything in the nature of a
trust) also create an organ to supervise the administration of that trust,
and they themselves thereafter dissolve suck organ without substituting
another, a court of law may effect such substitution.
The only issue to be determined, therefore, is whether Respondent
ever consented to such a substitution. It is common cause that no agree-
ment to which Respondent was a party contains any express provision
effectingsuch substitution.
The issue, therefore, really involves an enquiry as to whether Respon-
dent tacitly agreed to such a substitution-i.e., whether any agreement
to which Respondent was a party contains an implied term to that
effect, or whether Respondent by its conduct tacitly consented to such
a substitution.
In this regard only three possibilities arise for practical consideration,
viz.:
(i) whether the mandate instrument must be interpreted as embodying
an implied term to the effect that Respondent would upon the
dissolution of the League become obliged to report and account
to another body such as, for example, the General Assembly of the
United Nations;
(ii) whether, if the mandate instrument does not contain such an
implied term, the Charter of the United Nations embodies such
a term ;
(iii) whether, in the absence of any such implied term in the afore-
mentioned instruments, Respondent at the time of the creation
of the United Nations and the dissolution of the League, or there-
after, by its conduct tacitly consented to such a substitution.
1 shall deal separately with these three matters but, before doing so, 1
wish to restate certain basic principles of interpretation concerning
the reading of implied terms into an agreement.
5. The universally accepted basic principle of interpretation, applic-
able in municipal law and international law alike, is that in the interpre-
tation of al1contracts, statutes and instruments one should endeavour
to determine the true intention of their authors. An implied term may
be read into an agreement only if there arises from the agreement itself,
l Although the Applicants in earlier stages of the proceedings used such ex-
pressionsas "automatic succession", "doctrine of succession" and "principle of
succession" (Observations on Preliminary Objections, pp. 429,3 and 445; and
see also Oral Argument on Preliminary Objections, p. 302), they intimated in the
oral proceedingson the merits that such terminology was il1chosen, and they stated
or succession aliunde the Mandate". Not one of the members of the Couine1962devolution
relied on any principle or rule of succession.règle de droit international qui puisse avoir provoqué une succession
automatique de ce genre l.Il est certain qu'il n'existedans aucun système
juridique un principe en vertu duquel, au cas où les fondateurs d'un
trust (ou de quelque chose ayant le caractère d'un trust) auraient égale-
ment crééun orgailisme chargé d'en surveiller l'administration et au-
raient ensuite dissous cet organisme sans le remplacer par un autre,
un tribunal pourrait effectuer lui-mêmela substitution.
La seule question à trancher est donc celle de savoir si le défendeur
a jamais consenti à une telle substitution. Il est généralement admis
qu'aucun accord auquel le défendeur estpartie ne contient une disposi-
tion expresse en ce sens.
Il faut donc en fait examiner la question de savoir si le défendeur a
tacitement consenti à la substitution, c'est-à-dire s'il existe un accord
auquel il soit partie et qui contienne une disposition implicite à cet
effet ou si son comportement permet de conclure à son consentement
tacite.
A cet égardil n'y a pratiquement que trois possibilités à considérer:
i) l'acte de Mandat doit-il être interprété comme contenant une dis-
position implicite selon laquelle le défendeur serait obligé,depuis
la dissolution de la Société des Nations,de faire rapport et de ren-
dre compte à un autre organisme tel que par exemple l'Assemblée
générale desNations Unies?
ii) au cas où l'acte de Mandat ne contiendrait pas une telle disposition
implicite, la Charte des Nations Unies en contient-elle une?
iii) en l'absence de cette disposition implicite dans les instruments sus-
mentionnés, le défendeur, au moment de la création des Nations
Unies et de la dissolution de la Société desNations ou par la suite,
a-t-il par son comportement consenti tacitement à la substitution?
Je traiterai ces trois questions séparément, maisje voudrais d'abord rap-
peler certains principes fondamentauxd'interprétation concernant l'exis-
tence de dispositions implicites dans un accord.
5. Le principe d'interprétation fondamental, universellement recon-
nu et applicable en droit interne comme en droit international, est que,
pour l'interprétation de tous contrats, de toutes lois et de tous instru-
ments, on doit s'efforcerde déterminerla véritableintention des auteurs.
On ne peut conclure à l'existence d'une disposition implicite dans un
Bien qu'aux premiers stades de l'instance les demandeurs aient employé cer-
taines expressions comme (succession automatiaue ».([théoriede la successio1)
et «principe de la succession ,(observations sir ies exceptions préliminaires,
p.429, 433 et 445; voir égalementprocédure orale sur les exceptions préliminaires,
p. 302), ils ont donné àëntendre-aucous de la procédure ode s& le fond que
cette terminologie était malencontreuse et ils ont dit catégoriquement qu'ils n'in-
voquaient aucun «principe juridique internationgénéralde dévolution ou de
succession en dehors des Mandats)(C.R. 6.512,p. 56). En 1962 aucun membre de
la Cour n'a invoqué un principe ni une règle de succession quelconque.and the circumstances under which it was entered into, a necessary
inference that, although a suggested term was not incorporated in the
agreement in so many words, the parties must have had a common
intention that it should apply. A term should only be implied if the
evidencereveals that the parties in fact intended it to apply, or if itan
confidently be said that had it been suggested to them at the time they
would haveacknowledged that it fellwithin the scope of their agreement.
It follows that a term cannot be implied if it goes beyond the declared
scole and object of an instrument, or would involve radical changes or
additions thereto, or would do violence to clear and unambiguous
express provisions thereof, or if it is inconsistent with the admissible
extraneous evidence relating to the intention of any of the parties.
It is not suEcient to find the intention of some of the parties; a term
can only be implied if it reflects the intention of al1the parties. See
South West Africa cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962,pages 576-591.
6. 1now proceed to consider whether the Mandate Declaration, read
with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, contains any such implied
term, i.e., that011 the demise of the League an organ or organs of a
future international organization would be vested with the powers of
the organs of the League with regard to mandates, and that the manda-
tory would be obliged to report and account to such an organ or organs.
(a) Would such an implied term do violenceto clear and unambiguous
express provisions of the Covenant and the Mandate Declaration?
The answer is in the affirmative.In terms of paragraphs 7and 9 of Article
22of the Covenant and Article 6of the Mandatethe Respondent accepted
an obligation to render annual reports to the Council of the League.
The words of these provisions are capable of one construction only.
They are clear and unarnbiguous. The Council of the League was an
organ of the League specifically provided for by the Covenant, which
deJineditsfunctions and prescribed its procedures.Thus Article 4 of the
Covenant provided :
"1. The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of
four other Members of the League. These four Members of the
League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its
discretion. Until the appointment of the Representatives of the
four Members of the League first selected by the Assembly, Re-
presentatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be rnembers
of the Council.
2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council
may name additional Members of the Leaguewhose Representatives
shall always be members of the Council; the Council with like
approval may increase the number of Members of the League to
be selected bythe Assembly for representation onthe Council.accord que s'il résulte nécessairement de l'accord lui-même et des cir-
constances dans lesquelles il a été concluque, bien que cette disposition
n'y ait pas été insérée en termes exprès, l'intenticnmmune des parties
a étéqu'elle s'applique. On ne peut admettre une disposition implicite
que s'ilexiste une preuve que les parties ont eu en fait l'intention qu'elle
s'applique ou si l'on peut affirmer que, au cas où cette disposition leur
aurait été suggérée à l'époque, lesparties auraient reconnu qu'elle en-
trait dans le cadre de leur accord.Il s'ensuit qu'on ne saurait admettre
une disposition implicite si elle dépassela portéeet l'objet explicitesde
l'accord, si elle entraîne des modifications radicales ou des additions,
si elle viole lesdispositions expresses, claires et non équivoquesde cet
instrument ou si elle n'est pas conforme aux moyens de preuve exté-
rieurs admissibles quant à l'intention de l'une quelconque des parties.
Il ne suffitpas de décelerl'intention de certaines des parties; une dispo-
sition ne peut êtredéduiteque si elle correspond à l'intention de toutes
les parties. Voir affaires du Sud-Ouest africain, C.I.J. Recueil 1962,
p. 576-591.
6. Je vais maintenant examiner la question de savoir si la déclaration
de Mandat, lue conjointement avec l'article 22 du Pacte, contient une
disposition implicite tendant, après la disparition de la Société desNa-
tions, à confier les pouvoirs de ses organes en matière de Mandats à
un ou plusieurs organes d'une future organisation internationale et à
obliger le Mandataire à faire rapport età rendre compte à cet organe
ou à ces organes.
a) Une telledisposition impliciteirait-elàl'encontre des dispositions
expresses, claires et non équivoques,du Pacte et de la déclaration de
Mandat? Il convient de répondrepar l'affirmative. Aux termes despara-
graphes 7 et 9 de l'article 22 du Pacte et de l'article 6 du Mandat,
le défendeur a accepté l'obligation de fournir des rapports annuels
au Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations. Il n'y a qu'une seule façon
d'interpréter les termes de ces dispositions, qui sont clairs et précis.
Le Conseilétaitun organe de laSociété expressémentprévudans le Pacte,
qui a de3ni sesfonctions et déterminé ses procédureA s.insi l'article 4 du
Pacte énonçait :
(1. Le Conseil se compose de Représentants des Principales
Puissances alliées et associées, ainsique de Représentantsde quatre
autres Membres de la Société.Ces quatre Membres de la Société
sdnt désignéslibremenptar l'Assembléeet aux époques qu'illui plaît
de choisir. Jusqu'à la première désignationpar l'Assemblée, les
Représentants de la Belgique, du Brésil,de l'Espagne et de la
Grèce sont membres du Conseil.
2. Avec l'approbation de la majoritéde l'Assemblée,le Conseil
peut désignerd'autres Membres de la Sociétédont la représenta-
tion sera désormaispermanente au Conseil. Il peut, avec la même
approbation, augmenter le nombre des Membres de la Société
qui seront choisis par l'Assembléepour êtrereprésentés au Conseil.
83 2bis. The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules
dealing with the election of the non-permanent members of the
Council, and particularly such regulations as relate to their term
of officeand the conditions of re-eligibility.
3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may
require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the League, or at
such other place as rnay be decided upon.
4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within
the sphere of action of the League or affectingthe peace ofthe world.
5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council
shall be invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any
meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially
affecting the interests of that Member of the League.
6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League
represented on the Council slzallhave one vote, and may have not
more than one Representative." (Italics added.)
And Article 5 (1) of the Covenant provided that,
"Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant
or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting
of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of
al1the Members of the League representedat the meeting." (Italics
added.)
Al1 these provisions were incorporated by reference in Article 22,
paragraphs 7 and 9, of the Covenant, and in Article 6 of the Mandate
Declaration. The obligation to report and account was conhed by
clear and unambiguous language to the Council of the League and did
not include an obligation to report and account to any other body. The
addition of a new security not embodied in the Covenant and having
the effect of substituting an organ of another institution for the Council
ofthe Leaguewouldundoubtedlyconstituteradical changesand additions
to both the Covenant andthe Mandate Declaration.
(b) Moreover, such an implied term would go beyond the declared
scope and object of the instruments in question. It is true that the general
object of the parties was that the principle should be applied "that the
well-being and development7' of the peoples of South West Africa
"should form a sacred trust of civilization"; but their object was also
that thispurpose should be achieved in a particular manner, i.e., within
the framework of Article 22 of the Covenant. The object was, in a sense,
to definethe international status of South West Africa, to create an inter-
national régime;but an iniegralpart of the definition of the régime,was
supervisionby the Councilof the League. This appears clear not only from
the very provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, but alsofromthe tra-
vaux préparatoires, which reveal that the general provisions would not
have beenagreed to had the Article not contained the specificprovisions
relating to the methods devised to givepractical effectthereto. President
Wilson reflected the attitude of the parties at the time when he said: SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP.IND. VAN WYK) 86
2 bis. L'Assembléefixe à la majorité des deux tiers les règles
concernant les élections des membresnon permanents du Conseil
et, en particulier, celles concernant la duréede leur mandat et les
conditions de rééligibilité.
3. Le Conseil se réunit quand les circonstances le demandent,
et au moins une fois par an, au siègede la Sociétéou en tel autre
lieu qui pourra êtredésigné.
4. Le Conseil connaît de toute question rentrant dans la sphère
d'activitéde la Sociétéou affectant la paix du monde.
5. Tout Membre de la Société qui n'est pas représentéau Conseil
est invité à y envoyer siégerun Représentantlorsqu'une question
qui l'intéresse particulièrement est portée devant le Conseil.
6. ChaqueMembre de la Sociétéreprésenté au Conseilne dispose
que d'une voix et n'a qu'un Représentant. ))(Les italiques sont
de nous.)
En outre, le paragraphe 1de l'article 5 du Pacte était ainsiconçu:
«Sauf disposition expressémentcontraire du présent Pacte ou
des clauses du présentTraité, les décisions de l'Assembléeou du
Conseilsont prisesà l'unanimitédes Membres de la Société représen-
tésà la réunion ). (Les italiques sont de nous.)
Toutes ces dispositions ont été incorporéespar voie de référence
dans l'article 22, paragraphes 7 et 9, du Pacte et dans l'article 6dela dé-
claration de Mandat. L'obligation de faire rapport et de rendre compte
existait exclusivement à l'égard du Conseil et il n'était pas question
d'une obligation de fairerapport et de rendre compte à un autre organe.
Ajouter une nouvelle garantie non mentionnéedans le Pacte et ayant
pour effet de remplacer le Conseil de la Société desNations par un or-
gane d'une autre institution reviendrait sans aucun doute à apporter
des changements radicaux et des additions tant au Pacte qu'à la décla-
ration de Mandat.
b) En outre, une telle clause implicite dépasseraitla portéeet le but
explicites des instruments en question. 11est vrai que le but général
des parties était l'application du principe selon lequel«le bien-êtreet
le développement 1des peuples du Sud-Ouest africain ((formentune mis-
sion sacréede civilisation»;mais leur intention était également d'attein-
dre ce but d'une façon particulière, à savoir dans le cadre de l'article
22 du Pacte. Le but étaitdans un certain sens de déterminerle statut
international du Sud-Ouest africain, de créerun régimeinternational;
mais la surveillancepar le Conseil faisait partie intégrante de la défi-
nition du régime.Cela ressort nettement non seulement des dispositions
mêmesde l'article 22 du Pacte, mais aussi des travaux préparatoires qui
montrent que les dispositions générales n'auraientpas étéacceptées
si l'article n'avaitpas renfermé des dispositions spéciales relativesaux
méthodesadoptéespour leur donner effet sur le plan pratique. Le pré-
sident Wilson a bien traduit l'attitude des parties à l'époque lorsqu'il
84 87 SOUTH WEST AFRICA(SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
"no one should accept the scheme unless he was shown how it was
going to work l."
It was with considerablereluctance that the Respondent, New Zealand
and Australia agreed to the mandates system devised in Article 22 of
the Covenant. On what possible basis can it now be said that their
object was to create an international régime whichimposed upon them
obligations other than those specifically agreed to by them?
Indeed, it was in order to avoid a stalemate that the Respondent
and other States were prepared to accept Article 22 of the Covenant as
a compromise. The contemporary statements of the South African
Prime Minister and others leave no room for doubt that they were
agreeing to supervision by the Council of the League only, and not to
that ofanyorgan ofany otherinstitution. For Australia and NewZealand,
Article 22 "represented the maximum of their conces~ion"~,and South
Africa agreed thereto because, in the words of General Botha, "the
League of Nations would consist mostly of the same people who were
present there that day, who understood the position. .
(c) The fact that Article 22 was the result of a compromise is in
itself, apart from al1 other considerations, sufficient reason for not
reading into the instruments in question, by way of implication, that
the Respondent and other mandatories had agreed to obligations of
reporting and accounting which they were not asked to agree to, and
which would have exceededwhat was required to effectthe compromise.
In these circumstances it cannot be said that the suggested implied
term was contemplated, or that al1 or any of the parties would have
agreedthatit fell within theambit of their general intent had the matter
been raised when the Covenant of the League and the Mandate Decla-
ration were agreed to.
(d) The possibility of the dissolution of the League at some future
date was not contemplated at the time, and there would, therefore, not
have been any agreement or intention as to what would happen to the
Mandate in such an event. Had it been suggested at the time that pro-
vision should be made for such an eventuality the reaction would proba-
bly have been that, inasmuch as specificprovision had been made for
the amendment of both the Covenant and the Mandate Declarations
by, or with the consent of, the organs of the League, it should be left to
those organs and the respective Mandatories to do what they considered
to be in the best interests of1concerned in the circumstancesprevailing
at the time of such dissolution.
The possibility that the Leaguewould at some future date be dissolved
by its members without providing for supervision of the administration
of mandates was definitelynot foreseen by its founders, and it is impossi-
ble to determinewhat the unanimous reaction, if any, would have been
l Foreign ReIations of the United States: The Paris Peace ConfeVol. III,.
pp. 788-789.
Ibid., pp. 801-802.
85a dit: ((Personfie ne doit accepter le système à moins qu'on ne lui ait
montré comment il va fonctionner l»
C'està contrecŒur que le défendeur, la Nouvelle-Zélande et 1'Aus-
tralie ont accepté le systèmedes Mandats tel qu'il étaitdéfinidans l'ar-
ticle22 du Pacte. Quel argument pourrait-on maintenant invoquer pour
dire que leur intention a été decréerun régimeinternational leur impo-
sant des obligations autres que celles qu'ils ont expressément acceptées?
En fait c'est pour éviterd'aboutir à une impasse que le défendeur et
d'autres Etats ont décidé d'accepter l'article du Pacte àtitre de com-
promis. Les déclarations faites à l'époque par le premier ministre de
l'Afrique du Sud et par d'autres personnes ne permettent pas de douter
qu'ils acceptaient uniquement la surveillancedu Conseil de la Société
des Nations et non celle d'un autre organe ou d'une autre institution.
Pour l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande, l'article 22 ((représentait le
maximum de leurs concessions '1)et l'Afrique du Sud a accepté cet
article parce que, pour reprendre les termes du généralBotha, ((la So-
ciété desNations serait principalement composée des mêmespersonnes
qui étaient présentes cejour-là, qui comprenaient la situation ... »
c) Le fait que l'article 22 a étéle résultat d'un compromis empêche
à lui seul, toutes autres considérations miseà part, de déduireimplici-
tement des instruments en question que le défendeuret les autres Man-
dataires aient accepté des obligations de faire rapport et de rendre
compte qu'on ne leur demandait pas d'accepter et qui auraient été
au-delà des conditions nécessaires au compromis.
Dans ces conditions, il est impossible de dire qu'une disposition im-
plicite en ce sens ait étéenvisagée,ou que la totalité ou certaines des
parties auraient admis qu'elle entrait dans le cadre généralde leurs
intentions si la question avait étésoulevéeau moment de l'acceptation
du Pacte et de la déclaration de Mandat.
d) L'éventualitéd'une dissolution de la Sociétédes Nations n'a pas
été envisagéeà l'époqueet il n'a donc pu y avoir aucun accord ni aucune
intention quant à ce qui adviendrait du Mandat en l'occurrence. Si
l'on avait suggéré à l'époque qu'il fallait prendre des dispositions en
vue d'une telle éventualité,la réaction aurait probablement été que,
des dispositions spécialesayant étéprises en vue de la modification du
Pacte et des déclarations de Mandat par les organes de la Sociétéou
avec leur consentement, il fallait laisseres organes et aux divers Man-
dataires le soin de faire ce qui,leur avis, servirait le mieux les intérêts
de tous les intéressésdans les conditions qui existeraient au moment de
la dissolution.
Les fondateurs de la Société desNations n'ont certainement pas pré-
vu qu'elle pourrait un jour êtredissoute par ses Membres sans que des
dispositions soient prises en vue de la surveillance de l'administration
des Mandats; il est impossible de savoir s'il y aurait eu une réaction
l Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Confevol. III,
p.*7Ibid.p. 800.
Ibid.p. 801-802.
85 had such a possibility been raised. The probability is that their reaction
would have been that if they, as Members of the League, were ever to
dissolve the League without providing for the transfer of its powers
to another organization, those provisions which depended on the
existenceof the Leaguewould simplyceaseto apply. In the circumstances
that would obviously have been their intention. It can, however, be said
with certainty that the reaction of some of the parties, including the
Respondent, would have been that they were not agreeing to any auto-
matic transfer of the supervisory powers of the League to the organs of
an unknown future international organization. They would at least
kst have required assurances with regard to the constitution of such
an organization before agreeing to any such automatic substitution.
Had they been told that the constitution of this future international
organization would not retain the unanimity rule of the League, there
can be no reason to suppose that their consent would nevertheless have
been given.
(e) It has been suggested that inasmuch as the League of Nations
during its lifetime constituted, or represented, what may be called the
"organized international community" (at times expressions such as
"family ofnations7'or "civilizednations ofthe world wereusedinstead),
and inasmuch as this community is now regarded as being constituted,
or represented, by the United Nations Organization, the League should
be equated with the United Nations, and thus the way is paved for
substituting an organ of the United Nations for the Council of the
League as the supervisory body with respect to mandates l.
The fallacies inreasoning along the line of the so-called "organized
international community", with the object of establishing a contention
that the mandate instrument embodied an implied term such as afore-
stated, are legion. It disregards firstly the fact that, although the ex-
pression "organized international community" and the other expressions
mentioned may in certain contexts serve some useful purpose as being
descriptive of a collectivity of States, they have no legal significance
whatever. In particular such expressions are not to be understood as
conveying that outside or independently of actual international organi-
The contentions advanced by the Applicants on the basis of their so-called
stage in the course of the proceedings Applicantslied on an implication to be
read into the Mandate Declaration, which by itself, and without any question of
further consent on Respondent's part, caused the United Nations Organization to
be substituted for the League as the supervisory body in respect of mandates
(vide Reply, p. 320). For the presen1am concerned with the "organized inter-
national community" theory only in thisense. 1 shall revert later to the different
form which the argument took during the oral proceedings. It is, however, in my
view,not without significancethat in the ultimate event Applicants found it impossi-
ble to maintain the theory in its above sense, and in particular that they no longer
fresh consent on the Respondent's part.isory organs occurred or could occur without unanime des Etats Membres au cas où la question aurait étéposéeet
quelle aurait été cette réaction. Ils auraient probablement considéré
que, s'ils dissolvaient un jour la Société desNations, en leur qualité
de Membres de celle-ci, sansprendre de dispositions concernant le trans-
fert de ses pouvoirs à une autre organisation, les dispositions dépendant
de l'existence de l'organisation cesseraient tout simplement d'êtreap-
plicables. Vu les circonstances, telle aurait évidemment été leurinten-
tion. On peut cependant dire avec certitude que la réaction de certains
des Membres, et notamment du défendeur, aurait étéqu'ils n'accepte-
raient pas le transfert automatique des pouvoirs de surveillance de la
Société desNations aux organes d'une future organisation internatio-
nale inconnue. Avant d'accepter cette substitution automatique, ils
auraient exigéau moins des assurances quant à la constitution de la
future organisation internationale. Si on leur avait dit que la règle de
l'unanimitépratiquée par la Sociétédes Nations n'y serait pas retenue,
il n'y a aucune raison de supposer qu'ils auraient donnéleur consente-
ment.
e) On a dit que, puisque la Sociétédes Nations constituait ou repré-
sentait au cours de son existence ce qu'on peut appeler la communauté
internationale organisée(expression qui a parfois été remplacéepar
cellesde famille desnationsou de nations civilisées du monde) et que cette
communauté est maintenant considéréecomme constituée ou repré-
sentée par l'Organisation des Nations Unies, cette dernière doit être
mise sur le mêmeplan que la Société desNations, ce qui ouvre la voie
à la substitution d'un organe des Nations Unies au Conseil de la So-
ciétéaux fins de la surveillance des Mandats l.
Les sophismes de l'argumentation tendant à s'appuyer sur la notion
de ((communauté internationale organisée » pour établir la thèse selon
laquelle l'acte de Mandat renfermait la disposition implicite ci-dessus
mentionnée sont légion.Tout d'abord, on ne tient pas compte du fait
que, bien qu'elles puissent, dans certains contextes, avoir quelque utilité
pour décrire une collectivité d7Etats, l'expression ((communauté inter-
nationale organisée » et les autres expressions mentionnées n'ont aucune
signification juridique. En particulier, elles ne doivent pas être interpré-
tées comme voulant dire qu'il existe, en dehors ou indépendamment
l Dans l'argumentation qu'ils ont formulée sur la base de ce qu'ils appellent
la athéorie de la communauté internationalorganisée»,les demandeurs n'ont pas
toujours suivi la même ligne. A un certain stade de l'instance, ils ont invoqué
une disposition implicite de la déclaration de Mandat, qui entraînerait, par elle-
mêmeet sans qu'il soit question d'un nouveau consentement du défendeur, la sub-
gane de surveillance des Mandats (voir réplique, p.20). Pour le moment, j'exa-r-
minerai la théorie de la «communauté internationale organis»euniquement dans
ce sens. Je reviendrai plus tard sur l'autre forme prise par la même argumentation
au cours de la procédurerab. Cependant, à mon avis, il n'est pas sans importance
que les demandeurs se soient trouvés au stade final dans l'impossibilité de mainte-
nir la théorie sous sa forme première et en particulier qu'ils n'aient plus soutenu
qu'une substitution des organes de surveillance s'est produite ou pouvait se pro-
duire sans un nouveau consentement du défendeur.89 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
zations, constituted by agreement, there exists a legal persona, or an
entity of legal significance, known as "the organized international
community", etc. Such a notion would be entirely fallacious and mis-
leading. Furthemore, the reasoning in question'either disregards the
legalprinciple that a party cannot be bound by a suggestedterm to which
it did not agree, or it disregards the fact that the Respondent agreed
to the supervision of a particular body only, viz.,the Council of the
League-an organ composed in a particular manner and regulated by
definite and binding rules of procedure-and not to the supervision of
an organ of any other body, and would, in any event, almost certainly
not have agreed to the supervision of an organ such as the General
Assembly of the United Nations had it been asked to do so. It entirely
disregards the important differencesbetween the League and the United
Nations, particularly the procedural provisions relating to the functioning
of their organs, and it disregards the clearroof afforded by a mass of
evidence that the parties to the relevant instruments neither intended
nor contemplated such a result. The truth is that the authors of the
mandates system did not contemplate the possibility that the League
would cease to constitute or represent what in a sense may be regarded
as the "organized international community" or "the family of nations"
or "the civilized nations of the world"; and the question whether the
League's functions would be transferred to some future organization
constituting or representing what couldthen be described as the "orga-
nized international community", "the family ofnations" or "the civilized
nations of the world" did therefore not arise. If it should have arisen,
the Respondent and many other States would clearly not have conceded
that they were agreeing to supervision at some unknown date in the
future by some unknown body with an unknown constitution.
(f) In this connection the differences betweenthe League of Nations
and the United Nations Organization, referred toabove, are ofparticular
significance.1 shall deal with them later. At this stage 1 only wish to
emphasize one of them. The obligation to report and account to the
Council of the League was substantially different from what an obli-
gation would be to report and account to any organ of the United
Nations. Byexpressprovision in the Covenant, the Council of the League
of Nations had, in respect of its functions concerning mandates, to be
assisted by the Permanent Mandates Commission, which was a body of
independent experts; whereas there is no corresponding body in the
United Nations. The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, like
al1other organs ofthat institution, consists of government representatives
of member States. Moreover, whereas the unanimity rule prevailed in
the Council of the League, the General Assembly of the United Nations
can arrive at its decisions by a bare majority, or in important matters
by a two-thirds majority, while in the Security Council seven votes
87 desvéritablesorganisations internationales constituéespar voie d'accord,
une personne juridique, ou une entitéayant une signification juridique,
connue sous l'appellation de cccommunauté internationale organisée »,
etc. Une telle notion serait absolument fallacieuse et induirait en erreur.
En outre, l'argumentation en question ne tient compte ni du principe
juridique selon lequel une partie ne peut êtreliéepar une disposition
implicitequ'elle n'a pas acceptéen,i du fait que le défendeura unique-
ment acceptéla surveillance d'un organe déterminéayant une certaine
composition et des règlesde procédurepréciseset obligatoires, à savoir
le Conseil de la SociétédesNations, et non celled'un organe d'une autre
institution, et que de toute façon il n'aurait presque certainement pas
accepté la surveillance d'un organe tel que l'Assembléegénéraledes
Nations Unies si on le lui avait demandé. Cette argumentation ne tient
aucun compte des différencesconsidérables qui existent entre la Société
des Nations et l'organisation des Nations Unies, notamment en ce qui
concerne la procédure de fonctionnement de leurs organes; elle ne
tient pas compte non plus de la preuve évidente,abondamment confir-
mée,que les parties aux instruments pertinents n'avaientpas l'intention
d'aboutir à un tel résultatet qu'elles nel'ontpas envisagé.En fait les au-
teurs du systèmedes Mandats n'ont pas envisagéque la Société des Na-
tions pourrait cesser de constituer ou de représenter ce qu'en un cer-
tain sens on peut considérer comme la cccommunautéinternationale
organisée))la ((familledesnations »ou les ((nationsciviliséesdu monde »;
en conséquencela question de savoir si les fonctions de la Sociétédes
Nations seraient transférées à une future organisation constituant ou
représentant à son tour ce que l'on pourrait considérer comme la
« communauté internationale organisée »,la « famille des nations » ou
les ((nationsciviliséesdu monde »,ne s'estpas posée.Si elle s'étaitposée,
le défendeur et beaucoup d'autres Etats n'auraient certainement pas
admis qu'ils acceptaient une surveillance à exercer dans l'avenir, à une
date inconnue, par un organisme inconnu ayant une constitution
inconnue.
f) A cet égard, les différencessusmentionnées entre la Sociétédes
Nations et l'organisation des Nations Unies revêtent une importance
particulière. J'en parlerai plus tard. Je me contenterai ici d'en souligner
une seule. L'obligation de faire rapport et de rendre compte au Conseil
de la Sociétédes Nationset celle de faire rapport et de rendre compte à
un organe quelconque des Nations Unies ont un caractère essentielle-
ment différent.Aux termes des dispositions expresses du Pacte, le Con-
seil de la Sociétédes Nations devait, en ce qui concernait ses fonctions
relatives aux Mandats, êtreassistépar la Commission permanente des
Mandats, oi-ganecomposé d'expertsindépendants; or il n'existe aucun
organe correspondant dans l'organisation des Nations Unies. Le Con-
seil de tutelle des Nations Unies, comme tout autre organe de cette
institution, est composé de représentants des gouvernements des Etats
Membres. En outre, tandis que la règle de l'unanimité était appliquée
au Conseil de la Société des Nations, l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations
Unies peut prendre ses décisions à la majoritésimple ou, en ce qui con-
87(including those of the fivepermanent members) out of 11are sufficient l.
This difference was acknowledged by this Court in South West Africa-
VotingProcedure, Advisory Opinion of 7 June 1955 in the following
passage :
"The voting system is related to the composition and functions
of the organ. It forms one of the characteristics of the constitution
of the organ. Taking decisions by a two-thirds majority vote or by a
simplemajority vote is one of the distinguishing features of the Gene-
ral Assembly, while the unanimity rule was one of the distinguishing
features of the Council of the League of Nations. These two systems
are characteristic of different organs, and one system cannot be
substituted for the other without constitutional amendment. To
transplant upon the General Assembly the unanimity rule of the
Council of the League would not be simply the introduction of a
procedure but would amount to a disregard of one of the charac-
teristics of the General Assembly. Consequently the question of
conformity of the voting system of the General Assembly with that
of the Council of the League of Nations presents insurmountable
difficulties of a juridical nature'."
(g) It is significant that no State which was a party to the Covenant
of the League-or any other State for that matter-at any material
time alleged that the mandate instrument must be interpreted as em-
bodying an implied term to the effect that Respondent would upon the
dissolution of the League become obliged to report and account to
another body, such as, for example, the General Assembly of the United
Nations. During the discussions concerning the future of the mandates
by the founders of the United Nations in the years 1945-1946,and by
the Members of the League at its final session in April 1946,there was
ample opportunity, and every incentive, for representatives to refer to
such an agreement, if one existed. As I shall show later it was common
cause at the time of the dissolution of the League that no provision had
been made in any instrument for the transfer of the League's activities
relative to the mandates to the United Nations.
7. A finding that the functions of the Council of the League, under
the Mandate Declaration, as read with Article 22 of the Covenant of
the League, became vested in the organs of the United Nations by virtue
of an implied provision in the said instruments would go beyond their
declared scopè and object, would involve radical changes thereto, and
would not only do violence to their clear and expresslanguage but would
amount to a total disregard of the evidence relating to the common
l Since the recent increase in the membership of the Security Councilthe require-
ment is nine votes (including those of the fivepermanent Members) o15.of
Z.C.J. Repo~rs1955, p75.
88cerne les questions importantes, à la majoritédes deux tiers et, au Con-
seil de sécurité,il suffit de sept voix (y coinpris celles des cinq membres
permanents) sur onze l.La Cour a reconnu cette différencedans le pas-
sage suivant de son avis consultatif du 7 juin 1955 sur la Procédure de
vote applicableaux questions touchant les rapports et pétitions relatifs
au territoire du Sud-Ouest africain:
((Lesystèmede vote est lié à la composition et aux fonctions de
cet organe. 11est l'une des caractéristiques de la constitution de
l'organe. Prendre des décisions à la majorité des deux tiers ou à
la majorité simple est l'un des traits distinctifs de l'Assemblée
générale,tandis que la règlede l'unanimité étaitl'un destraits dis-
tinctifs du Conseil de la Société desNations. Ces deux systèmes
caractérisent des organes différentset, sans un amendement cons-
titutionnel,l'on ne peut substituer un système à l'autre. Transpo-
ser à l'Assemblée générallea règle de l'unanimité du Conseil de
la Sociétédes Nations, ce ne serait pas simplement y introduire
une procédure, ce serait méconnaître une des caractéristiques de
l'Assemblée générale P.ar conséquent,la question de la conformité
du systèmede vote de l'Assemblée générale avec celu diu Conseil
de la Société desNations présente des difficultésinsurmontables
de nature juridique 2.))
g) Il est significatif qu'aucun Etat partie au Pacte de la Société des
Nations - ni d'ailleurs aucun autre Etat - n'ait soutenu à aucun
moment pertinent que l'acte de Mandat dût être interprété comme
renfermant une disposition implicite selon laquelle le défendeur, à la
dissolution de la Société,aurait étéobligéde faire rapport et de rendre
compte à un autre organe, comme par exemple l'Assemblée généraledes
Nations Unies. Au cours des discussions sur l'avenir des Mandats
auxquelles ont pris part les fondateurs de l'organisation des Nations
Unies en 1945-1946et les Membres de la Société desNations réunis
pour leur dernière session en avril 1946, les déléguéa suraient eu de
nombreuses occasions et toutes sortes de raisons de faire étatd'un tel
accord si celui-ci avait existé.Comme je le montrerai plus loin, il a été
généralementadmis au moment de la dissolution qu'il n'existait dans
aucun instrument une disposition prévoyantle transfert àl'organisation
des Nations Unies des activitésde la Société desNations relatives aux
Mandats.
7. Si la Cour prononçait que les fonctions du Conseil de la Société
des Nations ont ététransféréesaux organes des Nations Unies en vertu
d'une disposition implicite de la déclaration de Mandat, lue conjoin-
tement avec l'article 22 du Pacte, cela dépasserait la portée et l'objet
de ces instruments; cela reviendrait à les changer radicalement; non
seulement cela serait contraireà leurs termes clairs et précis maisencore
cela reviendrait à ignorer complètement les éléments de preuve relatifs
l Depuis I'augmentation récente du nombre des membres du Conseil de sécurité
il fAvis consultatif de 1955, p. 75.s cinq membres permanentssur quinze. 91 SOUTHWEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
intention of the parties. Such a finding would impose an obligation on
the Respondent to which it did not agree, and to which it would not
have agreed had it been asked to do so. It would constitute legislation
by the Court disguised as interpretation. No court, including this Court,
has the power to make a party's obligations different from, or mure
onerous than, those to which he has consented. Judicis est jus dicere,
nondare.
8. Inthe preceding paragraphs 1have dealt with the question whether
there can be read into the Mandate Declaration an implied term which
by itself brought about the result that iipon the dissolution of the League
an organ or organs of the United Nations were substituted as the super-
visory authority in respect of mandates and that Respondent became
obliged to report and account to such an organ or organs. It may be
convenient at this stage to dea! very briefly also with a related matter,
to the extent that it also concerns the interpretation of the mandzte
instrument, and that is the suggestion that the obligatioii undertaken
by Respondent in Article 6 of the Mandate was not an obligation to
submit to the specific supervision of particular League organs, but an
obligation to submit to "international supervision" generally, Le., an
obligation of "international accountability" l. Many of the reasoiis
which 1 have mentioned as running counter to the proposition that an
implied term of the nature and content aforestated must be read into
the Mandate Declaration also militate agaimt the suggestion that the
Mandatory's obligation was one of "international accountability".
Not only would such a reading of the Mandate Declaration, and of
Article 22 of the Covenant, do violence to the clear and unambiguous
provisions of the said instruments, but it would in effect go beyond the
declared scope and object of such instruments. It would, moreover,
be in conflict with the probabilities and the events and surrounding
circumstances at the time of the frarning of Article 22 of the Covenant
and the Mandate Declaration.
Itis also significant that for more than 25 years after the creation of
the mandates system the authors thereof did not consider that the
mandatories had bound themselves to "international supervision"
generally (as opposed to supervision by the Council of the League),
This contention was one of the links in the proposition into which Applicants
finally transformed their "organized international cornmunity" theory in the oral
proceedings on the merits. The contention is now to the effect: (a) that inasmuch
as Respondent's obligation was one of "international accountability" this obligation
could not, and was not, terminated as a result of the dissolution of the League
could have had was that the said obligation would have become inoperative forLeague
lack of a supervisory organ, unless a new supervisory organ was appointed to
which the Mandatory would be obliged, through fresh consent on its part, to
report and account, and that Respondent in fact gave the necessary consent to
the substitution of the General Assembly of the United Nations as such new super-
visory organ(C.R. 6512,pp. 40-60 and C.R. 65/30, pp. 52-53.) à l'intention commune des Parties. Une telle conclusion imposerait au
défendeur une obligation à laquelle il n'a pas souscrit et à laquelle il
aurait refusé de souscrire si on le lui avait dcmandé. Sous prétexte
d'interprétation, la Cour s'arrogerait un rôle législatif.Aucun tribunal,
pas mêmela Cour, ne saurait modifier ou accroître les obligations
assuméespar les parties. Judicis est jus dicere, non dure.
8. Dans les paragraphes qui précèdent,j'ai examiné la question de
savoir si l'on peut conclure à l'existence, dans la déclaration de Mandat,
d'une disposition implicite par l'effetde laquelle un ou plusieurs organes
des Nations Unies auraient remplacé la Sociétédes Nations depuis sa
dissolution, en tant qu'autorité de surveillance en matière de Mandats,
et en vertu de laquelle le défendeur serait obligéde faire rapport et de
rendre compte à cet organe ou à ces organes. Il sera peut-êtreutile de
parler ici très brièvement d'une question connexe, puisqu'elle concerne
également l'interprétation de l'acte de Mandat; il s'agit de l'assertion
selon laquelle l'obligation assuméepar le défendeuren vertu de l'article 6
du Mandat ne serait pas l'obligation de se soumettre à la surveillance de
certains organes déterminésde la Société desNations, mais l'obligation
de se soumettre d'une façon générale à la ((surveillanceinternationale )),
c'est-à-dire l'obligation de ((rendre compte sur le plan international ))l.
Plusieurs motifs dont j'ai fait état pour rejeter la proposition selon
laquelle on doit trouver dans la déclaration de Mandat une disposition
implicite de la nature et de la teneur précitées, militent égalemenc tontre
la thèse d'après laquelle l'obligation du Mandataire était de ((rendre
compte sur le plan international ))Non seulement pareille interprétation
de la déclaration de Mandat et de l'article 22 du Pacte serait contraire
aux dispositions claires et non équivoques desdits instruments, mais elle
outrepasserait en fait leur portée et leur objet explicite. En outre, elle
serait peu vraisemblable et elle serait incompatible avec les circonstances
dans lesquelles l'article22 du Pacte et la déclaration de Mandat ont été
établis.
Il est également significatif que, pendant les vingt-cinq années ou
plus qui ont suivi la création du système des Mandats, ses auteurs
n'aient pas considéréque les Mandataires se fussent soumis à une
((surveillance internationale » de caractère général(par opposition à
l Cet argument a constitué l'une des étapes du processus de transformation que
les demandeurs ont fait subirà leur théorie de la «communauté internationale
organisées au cours de la procédure orale sur le fond.l se présente maintenant
comme suit: a) étant donnéque l'obligation du défendeur était de ((rendre compte
lution de la Sociétédes Nations; loin d'avoir prisne,lle existe toujours; b) leo-
seul effet qu'a pu avoir cette dissolution a étéde rendre l'obligation inapplicable
en raison de l'absence d'un organe de surveillance,moins qu'on ait désignéun
nouvel organe de surveillance auquel le Mandataire serait obligé, en vertu d'un
nouveau consentement de sa part, de faire rapport et de rendre compte; or le
défendeur a effectivement donné le consentement nécessaireà la substitution de
l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies à la Société desNations en tant que nouvel
organe de surveillance(C.R. 6512, p. 40-60 et C.R. 65/30, p. 52-53).
89 and the possibility that this could be the meaning of the Mandate Decla-
rations, as read with the Covenant, did not even occur to a single repre-
sentative of any State during that period. There is accordingly no justi-
fication for transforming,under the guise of interpretation, the obligation
to report and account to the Council of the League into an obligation
to submit to "international supervision", or to supervision by "the
international community" or the "family of nations" or the "civilized
nations of the world", and thus to impose on Respondent an obligation
to which it did not agree.
9. The next question is whether the Charter of the United Nations
contains an implied term which effected a substitution of any of the
organs of the said institution as the supervisory body, in the place of
the Council of the League.
(a) The United Nations is not, and was not intended to br, the
League of Nations under another nzme. It is a new international organi-
zation which came into existence six months before the League was
dissolved. Some, but not al], the members of the League were founder
members of the United Nations. Two of the major powers in the United
Nations, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., were not
members of the League at its dissolution. The United States of America
never wasamember of the Leagueandthe U.S.S.R. wasexpelledfrom the
League in December 1939.Both these States were opposed to any notion
that the United Nations was to be the League under a different name,
or was to be an automatic successor to the League's assets, obligations,
functions or activities. The discussions in the Preparatory Commission
of the United Nations, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly
of the United Nations pursuant to the Preparatory Commission's
recommendations, andthe forma1treaties concluded between the League
and the United Nations, as well as statementsmade by member States on
numerous occasions, provide conclusive proof that there was no auto-
matic succession. Had it beerzthe intention of the parties to the Charter
to transfer the functions of the Council of the League with respect to
mandates to an organ of the United Nations, such intention would have
beenexpressed inpositive terms. Although the mandates were specifically
referred to in the Charter of the United Nations, there is no reference
in any of the provisions of the Charter, or in any of the discussions at the
time of the drafting of the Charter, to any intended transfer.
(b) There can be no question but that the authors of the Charter
must have realized that upon the dissolution of the League the provisions
in the mandate instruments concerning reporting and accounting would
become inoperative unless some arrangement was made to substitute a
new supervisory organ to which the mandatories would be obliged to
report and account; just as thesaid members realized that the dissolution
of the Permanent Court of International Justice would render inoperable
clauses in treaties or conventions providing for adjudication of disputes
by the Permanent Court. But, whereas by Article 37 of the Statute of une surveillance par le Conseil) et qu'aucun représentant d'aucun Etat
n'ait envisagéau cours de cette période que telle pourrait êtrela signi-
fication des déclarations de Mandat lues conjointement avec le Pacte.
Aucune interprétation n'autorise donc à transformer l'obligation de
faire rapport et de rendre compte au Conseil de la Société desNations
en une obligation de se soumettre à la ccsurveillanceinternationale)),
ou à la surveillance de ((la communauté internationale s,de la ((famille
des nations )ou des ((nations civiliséesdu monde », et à imposer ainsi
au défendeur une obligation qu'il n'a pas assumée.
9. J'en viens à la question de savoir si la Charte des Nations Unies
contient une disposition implicite entraînant la substitution d'un organe
des Nations Unies au Conseil de la SociétédesNations en tant qu'organe
de surveillance.
a) L'Organisation des Nations Unies n'est pas, et n'était pasdestinée
à être,la Sociétédes Nations sous un autre nom. C'est une nouvelle
organisation internationale qui a été crééesix mois avant la dissolution
de la Société desNations. Certains Membres de celle-ci, mais pas tous,
ont été Membres fondateurs de l'organisation des Nations Unies.
Deux des principales Puissances des Nations Unies, les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique et l'U.R.S.S., n'étaient pas membres de la Société des
Nations au moment de sa dissolution. Les Etats-Unis d'Amériquen'en
ont jamais étémembres et l'U.R.S.S. en a étéexclue en décembre1939.
Ces Etats étaient l'un et l'autre hostilàsl'idéeque l'organisation des
Nations Unies pût êtrela Société desNations sous un nom différent
ou hériter automatiquement de ses avoirs, obligations, fonctions ou
activités. Les discussions tenues à la Commission préparatoire des
Nations Unies, les résolutions adoptées par l'Assemblée générale des
Nations Unies sur recommandation de la Commission préparatoire et
les traités formels conclus entre les deux organisations, ainsi que les
déclarations des Etats Membres en diverses occasions, constituent une
preuve évidente de l'absence de succession automatique. Si les parties
à la Charte avaient voulu transférerlesfonctions du Conseil de laSociété
des Nations en matièrede Mandats à un organe desNations Unies, cette
intention aurait étéexpriméeen termes positifs. Bien que les Mandats
soient expressément mentionnésdans la Charte des Nations Unies, on
ne trouve ni dans les dispositions de la Charte ni dans les discussions
qui ont eu lieu au moment de sa rédaction aucune preuve qu'un transfert
ait étéenvisagé.
b) Il est évident que les auteurs de la Charte ont dû s'apercevoir
qu'à la dissolution de la Société desNations les dispositions des actes
de Mandat relatives à l'obligation de faire rapport et de rendre compte
deviendraient inapplicables, à moins que n'ait étéconclu quelque
arrangement prévoyant l'institution d'un nouvel organe de surveillance
auquel les Mandataires seraient tenus de faire rapport et de rendre
compte, de même qu'ilsse sont aperçus que la dissolution de la Cour
permanente de Justice internationale rendrait inapplicables les clauses
des traités ou conventions prévoyant le règlement des différendspar la
90the Court expressprovision was made for substituting this Court for the
Permanent Court in al1treaties and conventions in force l,there is no
corresponding provision substituting any organs of the United Nations
for the Council of the League in respect of the supervision of mandates.
Had it been intended that one or other of the organs of the United
Nations should take the place of the Council of the League relative to
the supervision of mandates, such a provision would undoubtedly have
been inserted in the Charter.
(c) Apart from the sacred trust referred to in Chapter XI of the
Charter, the founders of the United Nations contemplated only one
form of trusteeship, namely that provided for in Chapters XII and XIII,
and there was no contemplation of any organs of the United Nations
supervising mandates concurrently with the existence of the trusteeship
system 2.Article 77(1)of theCharter provides that the trusteeship system
shall apply, inter alia, to such territories "now Iield under Mandate"
as may be placed under the system by means of trusteeship agreements,
and it must therefore follow that the trusteeship system could not auto-
matically apply to a mandated territory. To place a mandated territory
under the trusteeship system a forma1 agreement had to be concluded.
(d) 1 now proceed to consider Article 80 (1) of the Charter, and in
particular its legal effectrelative to Artic6eof the Mandate Declaration.
Article 80 (1) reads as follows:
"Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agree-
ments, made under Articles 77, 79 and 81, placing each territory
under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been
concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself
to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any States or any
peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which
Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties."
The ordinary grammatical meaning of the words commencing with
"nothing in this Chapter" is that Chapter XII should not be construed
as in or of itself (i)ltering in any manner the rights whatsoever of any
States, or (ii)altering in any manner the rights whatsoever of any peoples,
or (iii) altering in any manner the terms of existing international instru-
At one stage in the proceedings the Applicants advanced a contention that
Article 37 of thetatute of the Court was redundant inasmuch as, in their submis-
sion, the new Court would, by reason of a principle of automatic succession,
have become vested with the powers of the old Court in respect of treaties and
(Observations on Preliminary Objections, pp. 443-444). This Court in the 19627.
Judgment on the Preliminary Objections did not accept the Applicants'tomatic
succession argument. The argument was not repeated in the subsequent proceedings,
and is in my view without substance.
Vide in this regard the Advisory Opinion of 1950 at p. 140. Cour permanente. Et cependant, alors que l'article 37 du Statut de la
Cour prévoitexpressémentla substitution de la Cour actuelle à la Cour
permanente dans tous les traités ou conventions en vigueur l,il n'existe
aucune dispositioncorrespondante prévoyant leremplacementdu Conseil
de la Société des Nations par un organe quelconque des Nations Unies
en matière de surveillance des Mandats. Si l'on avait voulu que tel ou
tel organe des Nations Unies prît la place du Conseil en matière de
surveillance des Mandats, on aurait certainement inséré dansla Charte
une disposition à cet effet.
c) En dehors de la mission sacréede civilisation dont il est question
au chapitre XI de la Charte, les fondateurs des Nations Unies n'ont
envisagéqu'une seule forme de tutelle, celie qui est prévue aux cha-
pitres XII et XIII; ilsn'ont pas envisagéqu'une surveillance des Man-
dats par un organe des Nations Unies puisse exister àcôtédu régimede
tutelle2.L'article 77, paragraphe 1, de la Charte disposait que le régime
de tutelle s'appliquerait notamment aux territoires ((actuellementsous
Mandat ))qui pourraient êtreplacéssous ce régimeau moyen d'accords
de tutelle; il s'ensuivait nécessairementquele régimede tutelle ne pouvait
s'appliquer automatiquement à un territoire sous Mandat. Pour placer
un territoire sous Mandat sous le régimede tutelle, il fallait conclure un
accord formel.
d) J'en arrive maintenant à l'examen de l'article 80, paragraphe 1,
de la Charte, et notamment de ses effetsjuridiques en ce qui concerne
l'article de la déclaration de Mandat. L'article 80, paragraphe 1, est
ainsi conçu:
((A l'exception de ce qui peut être convenu dans les accords
particuliers de tutelie conclus conformément aux articles 77, 79 et
81 et plaçant chaque territoire sous le régimede tutelle, et jusqu'à
ce que ces accords aient été conclus, aucune disposition du présent
chapitre neserainterprétéecomme modifiant directement ou indirec-
tement en aucune manière les droits quelconquesd'aucun Etat ou
d'aucun peuple ou les dispositionsd'actes internationaux en vigueur
auxquels des Membres de l'organisation peuvent être parties. »
Le sens grammatical ordinaire de la proposition commençant par les
mots ((aucune disposition du présent chapitre )est que le chapitre XII
ne doit pas être intreprété comme modifiant en aucune manière, ni en
lui-mêmeni de lui-même, i)les droits quelconques d'aucun Etat, ii) les
droits quelconques d'aucun peuple, iii) les dispositions d'actes inter-
A un certain stade de la procédure,les demandeurs ont fait valoir que l'article
37 du Statut de la Cour est superflu, puisqu'à leur avis, mêmesans cet article, la nou-
velle Cour se serait vu conférer,en vertu du principe de la succession automatique,
les pouvoirs de l'ancienne Cour, pour ce qui est des traités ou conventions en vi-
gueur (observations sur les exceptions préliminaires,p. 443-444). La Cour dans son
arrêtde 1962 relatif aux exceptions préliminairesn'a pas accepté l'argument de la
succession automatique avancé par les demandeurs. Cet argument n'a pas été
repris par la suite et il est à mon avis sans fondement.
Voir à ce sujet l'avis consultatif de 1950, p. 140.ments to which members of the United Nations may respectively be
parties. It is common cause that the Mandate Declarations were inter-
national instruments, and the aforesaid provision accordingly directs
in express terms that Article 80 (which Article is part of Chapter XII)
should not be construed in or of itself as altering in any mannerthe terms
of existing mandate declarations. Apart from any other considerations,
this clear and unequivocal instruction bars any interpretation of Article
80 (1) which would have the effect of amending Article 6 of the Mandate
Declaration for South West Africa by substituting an organ of the
United Nations as the supervisory body in the place of the Council of
the League. This is in itself a complete answer to those who contend
that Article 80 (1) was intended to safeguard the protection afforded
to the peoples of the mandated territories by the provisions relative to
supervision of the mandates until such time as trusteeship agreements
were concluded. The truth is that the Article does not provide for, or
'pre-suppose", the continuation of rights where such rights would
otherwise have terminated either bv reason of the wrovisions of the
instrument containing them, or for some other valid reason. It merely
safeguards rights in the sense that Chapter XII must not be construed
as by itself changing any rights.
It is true that this Court, in effect, construed Article 80 (1) in 1950in
InternationaI Status of South West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1950, page 128
at 133, as affording support for its conclusion that the functions of the
organs of the League had been transferred to the General Assembly of
the United Nations, and that Respondent's former duty to account
to the organs of the League had been converted into a duty to account
to the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, careful further
attention was given to this Article during the hearing of deliberations
on the preliminary objections in 1962.Inthe result not one of the judges
in 1962 placed any reliance on the Article for the purposes of their
opinions and judgment, and some of the minority opinionsdemonstrated
very forcibly that it would be fallacious to regard the Article as affording
support for any suggested transfer, devolution or "carry-over" of
functions from the League and its Members to the United Nations and
its Members. See Soutlz West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1962, e.g., at pages
516, 615, and 646-650. In view of these developments one would have
thought that no argument in support of the Applicants' contentions
would again be sought to be based on Article 80 (1) '.
l With regard to the significance and effect of the Article the Applicants them-
selves have adopted a vacillating attitude. In their Mernorials Applicants placed
strong reliance on Article 80 (1) without stating what the effect of the Article
was (Memorials, p. 88). In the preliminary objections proceedings in 1962 they
contended that the Court in its 1950 Opinion had interpreted Article 80(1) as
having a positive character of safeguarding and maintaining rights, and they
asked the Court to reaffirm the 1950 Opinion. (Oral Proceedings on the Preliminary
Applicants,subinitted that the said Article did not establish, constitute or maintainnationaux en vigueur, auxquels des Membres des Nations Unies pou-
vaient êtreparties. Comme ilest généralemena tdmis que les déclarations
de Mandat sont des actes internationaux, il ressort expressémentde la
disposition précitéeque l'article 80 (qui fait partie du chapitre XII) ne
doit pas être interprété comme modifiant en aucune manière, ni en lui-
mêmeni de lui-même,les dispositions des déclarations de Mandat
existantes. Toute autre considération mise à part, cette disposition
claire et non équivoque excluttoute interprétation de l'article 80, para-
graphe 1, qui aurait pour effet de modifier l'article 6 de la déclaration
de Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain en substituant un organe des
Nations Unies au Conseil de la Société desNations en tant qu'organe
de surveillance. C'est là en soi une réponsedécisiveà quiconque prétend
que l'article 80, paragraphe 1, est destinéà sauvegarder jusqu'à la con-
clusion d'accords de tutelle la protection assuréeaux peuples des terri-
toires sous Mandat par les dispositions relatives à la surveillance des
Mandats. A vrai dire cet article ne prévoitpas ou ne ((présupposepas »
la continuation des droits devant normalement s'éteindre soit enraison
des dispositions de l'instrument où ils sont énoncés,soit pour toute
autre raison valable.Il se borneà sauvegarder des droits en ce sens que
le chapitre XII ne doit pas être interprétécomme modifiant en soi
aucun de ces droits.
Il est vrai qu'en 1950,dans son avis consultatif sur le Statut internatio-
nal du Sud-Ouest africain (C.I.J. Recueil 1950,p. 128 et 133),la Cour a
interprétél'article 80, paragraphe 1, comme appuyant sa conclusion
que les fonctions des organes de la Société desNations avaient été
transférées à l'Assembléegénérale desNations Unies et que l'ancienne
obligation du défendeur derendre compte aux organes de la Sociétédes
Nations s'était transformée enune obligation de rendre compte à
l'Assemblée générale desNations Unies. Cependant cet article a de
nouveau étéexaminé avec soinau cours des audiences de 1962 sur les
exceptions préliminaires; mais finalement ni l'arrêt, niles opinions ne
l'ont utiliséen ce sens et certaines des opinions de la minorité ont dé-
montréde façon convaincante que ce serait une erreur que de leconsidérer
comme venant à l'appui de la thèsedu transfert, de la dévolutionou de
la ((continuation ))des fonctions de la Société desNations et de ses
Membres en faveur de l'organisation des Nations Unies et de ses Mem-
bres. Voir affaires du Sud-Ouest africain (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 516,
615 et 646-650). Dans ces conditions on se serait attendu à ce que les
demandeurs renoncent à invoquer l'article 80, paragraphe 1, à l'appui
de leurs allégationsl.
En ce qui concerne la portée et I'effet de l'article 80, paragraphe 1, l'attitude
des demandeurs eux-mêmesa varié.Dans les mémoires, ilsnt attachéune grande
importance sans indiquequel en était I'effetjuridique (mémoires, p.n 1962,
au cours de la procédure relative aux exceptions préliminaires, ils ont soutenu que
la Cour dans son avis de 1950 avait interprété l'articleragraphe 1, comme
ayant I'effet positif de sauvegarder et de maintenir des droits et ils ont demandé
la Cour de confirmer son avis de 1950 (procédure orale sur les exceptions préli-
demandeurs ont dit que cet article n'établit, ne constitue, ni ne maintient aucun Article 80 (1) is clear and unambiguous. But even if it were not so,
the relevant facts preceding the framing of the Charter as well as the
subsequent conduct of the parties concerned, would sufficiently demon-
stratethe impossibility of inferring any implied term of "presupposition"
to the effect that the General Assembly of the United Nations was
substituted for the organs of the League in the mandate declarations.
The discussions at the time of the drafting of Article 80 (1) reveal
no evidence that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the
Article does not express the true common intention of the parties. On
the contrary, they reveal that the Article states exactly what it was
intended to state.
The representative of the United States stated in unequivocal terms
that the proposed Article, which later became Article 80 (l), was not
intended to increase or diminish any rights, and the final report of the
Committee made it clear that the Article was not to be interpreted as
altering the provisions of the mandates. Respondent had by then already
intimated its claim that the Mandate for South West Africa should be
terminated and that the territory should be incorporated as part of the
Union of South Africa. This intimation was made at the San Francisco
conference "so that South Africa may not afterwards be held to have
acquiesced in the continuance of the mandate or the inclusion of the
territory in any form of trusteeship under the new international organi-
zation" l. The provisions of Article 6 could not survive the League
unless they were amended by substituting some other supervisory
authority forthe Leagueto which Respondent had to report and account,
and there is no evidencein the Charter, or in its history, of any intention
to thus amend the said Article, or of any supposition that such amend-
ment would automatically result from the provisions of any of the
instruments in question.
The suggestion that Article 80 (1) served to confirm the understanding
of the authors of the Charter that certain rights, including those under
mandate, did continue to exist, has no bearing on the question in issue.
Of course the authors of the Charter must have realized at the time when
Article 80 (1) was drafted that rights under the Mandate were then in
existence.But that was nearly a year before the dissolution of the League;
and the Article does not, and was not intended to, reflect any under-
standing as to what would happen after the dissolution of the League
with regard to mandates not converted to trusteeship.
10. 1now proceed to examinethe conduct ofthe Respondent and other
States subsequent to the drafting of the Charter, and 1 do so with the
any rights, but merely served to "confirm the understanding of the authors of
the Charter that certain rights, includingse under mandates, did continue to
exist". This of course affords no help at1 in the problem under discussion, as
1slaCommittee 1114on 11 May 1945. L'article 80,paragraphe 1, est clair et sans ambiguïté. Mêmes'il ne
l'était pas, les faits pertinents qui ont précédé l'établissemend te la
Charte, ainsi que le comportement ultérieur des parties intéressées,
suffiraientà démontrer qu'il est impossible d'y trouver implicitement
une ccprésupposition » selon laquelle l'Assemblée générale des Nations
Unies aurait été substituée aux organes de la Sociétédes Nations dans
les déclarations de Mandat.
Lesdiscussions qui ont eu lieu au moment dela rédaction de I'article 80,
paragraphe 1, ne fournissent aucune preuve que le sens naturel et ordi-
naire des termes de cet article n'exprime pas véritablement l'intention
commune des parties. Elles révèlentau contraire que l'article dit bien
ce au'on voulait lui faire dire.
Le représentantdes Etats-Unis a déclaré en termes non équivoquesque
l'article proposé, qui devait devenir plus tard l'article 80, paragraphe1,
n'était destiné ni à accroître ni à diminuer aucun droit et le rapport
final du Comité a indiqué clairement qu'il ne fallait pas l'interpréter
comme modifiant les dispositions des Mandats. A cette époque le
défendeur avait déjà réclaméque le Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain
prenne fin et que le territoire soit incorporé à l'Union sud-africaine.
Cette demande avait été faite à la conférence de San Francisco «afin
que l'Union sud-africaine ne puisse êtreconsidérée plustard comme
ayant acceptéque le Mandat continue ou que le Territoire soit compris
dans un systèmede tutelle quelconque établi par une nouvelle organisa-
tion internationale l». Les dispositions de l'article 6 ne pouvaient
survivre à la Société desNations que si elles étaientmodifiéesde façon
que la Sociétésoit remplacée par une autre autorité de surveillance à
laquelle le défendeur devrait faire rapport et rendre compte; or, il n'y
a aucune preuve dans la Charte ni dans ses travaux préparatoires qu'il
y ait eu une intention quelconque de modifier ainsi ledit article, ni aucune
supposition que cette modification résultait automatiquement des
dispositions de l'un quelconque des instruments de Mandat.
L'allégation selon laquelle l'article 80, paragraphe 1, servirait à
confirmer l'opinion des auteurs de la Charte que certains droits, et
notamment ceux aui découlaient des Mandats. continuaient à exister
est en 170ccurrenc;sans fondement. Certes les auteurs de la Charte on
dû se rendre compte, au moment de la rédaction de l'article 80, para-
graphe 1,qu'il existaitalors des droits découlantdes Mandats. Cependant
c'était près d'unan avant la dissolution de la Société desNations et
l'article n'a pas fait état et n'était pas censéfaire état d'une opinion
quelconque quant à ce qui adviendrait, après la dissolution, des Mandats
qui n'auraient pas étéconvertis en accords de tutelle.
10.Je vais maintenant examiner le comportement du défendeur et
d'autres Etats après la rédaction de la Charte et je le ferai en vue de
droit, mais sert uniquemenaà confirmer l'opinion des auteurs de la Charte, pour
qui certains droitsnotamment ceux qui découlent des Mandats, continuent à
exister, en dépit de la dissolution de la Sociétédes a.Comme je le montre-
rai, cela ne facilite bien entendu nullement la solution du problème considéré.
Comité 1114, 11 mai 1945. following purposes in mind; Jirstly, to ascertain whether such conduct
reveals any evidence that the parties to the Covenant of the League or
the Mandate Declaration ever thought at any material time that these
instruments provided for the substitution of an organ such as the General
Assemblyofthe United Nations, for the Council of the League in Article
6 of the Mandate Declaration; secondy, to ascertain whether there is
any evidence of any understanding on the part of the authors of the
Charter of the United Nations that any of the provisions of the Charter
had brought about such a substitution and, thirdly, to ascertain whether
the Respondent in any other manner tacitly consented to such a substi-
tutionl.
11. As already stated, the United Nations was not an automatic
successor in law of the League. It was, inter alia, for this reason that
towards the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference a Preparatory
Commission was established which was required, inter alia, to formulate
recomrnendations concerning "the possible transferof certainfunctiopzs,
activities and assets of the League of Nations which it may be considered
desirable for the new organizationto take over on terms to be arr~nged".
(Italics added.)
As is shown in the next succeedingparagraphs, an examination of the
discussions and recommendations of this Preparatory Commission
reveals that its members (each founder Member of the United Nations
wasrepresented thereon) werenot under the impression that theCovenant
of the League, orthe Mandate Declarations, orthe Charter of the United
Nations, or any other instrument, had the effect of transferring the
functions of the Council of the League relative to mandates to any of
the organs of the United Nations. The examination further reveals that
Respondent did not, by conduct or otherwise, agree to such a sub-
stitution.
12. In the interimarrangements by which the Preparatory Commission
was set up provision was made for an executivecommittee which would
exercise the powers and functions of the Commission when the Com-
mission was not iil session. The Executive Committee, for the purpose
of its functions, set up ten sub-committees. The terms of reference of
Committee 4 of the Executive Committee included the following:
"It should study the questions arising if the mandates system
were to be wound up and examine the feasibility of providing for
such interim arrangements as may be possible, pending the
establishment of the Trusteeship Council 2."
Committee 4, after lengthy deliberation, recommended to the Executive
This enquiry will encompass both the question whether Respondent consented
to a new obligation of accountability in the place of the obligation provided for
in Article6 of the Mandate and the question whether, assuming, for purposes of
argument, thatApplicants are correct in their contention regarding "international
accountability" (as to which see para. supra), Respondent consented to a sub-
stitution of a new supervisory organ inorder to render the original obligation
operDOC.PC/EX/113/Rev. 1, 12 Nov. 1945, p. 113. déterminer: premièrement, si ce comportement prouve en quoi que ce
soit que les parties au Pacte ou à la déclaration de Mandat ont jamais
pensé à un moment quelconque que ces instruments prévoyaient la
substitution d'un organe tel que l'Assemblée générale des Nations
Unies au Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations aux fins de l'article 6 de la
déclarationde Mandat; deuxièmement, s'ilexiste une preuve quelconque-
que les auteurs de la Charte des Nations Unies soient convenus que l'une
quelconque des dispositions de la Charte entraînait une telle substitu-
tion; troisièmement,si le défendeur a d'une manière quelconque consenti
tacitement à cette substitutionl.
11. Comme il a déjà étéindiqué, l'organisation des Nations Unies
n'était pasen droit le successeur automatique de la Société desNations.
C'est notamment pour cette raison qu'a étécréée versla fin de la con-
férencede San Francisco une commission préparatoire chargéenotam-
ment de formuler des recommandations «sur le transfert éventuel des
fonctions, activités et avoirs de la Sociétédes Nations qu'il pourra
sembler utile de confier à la nouvelle organisation dans des conditions
à$xer ». (Les italiques sont de nous.)
Comme il est démontrédans les paragraphes qui suivent, il ressort
des discussions et des recommandations de la Commission préparatoire
que ses membres (chacun des Membres fondateurs de l'organisation
des Nations Unies y était représenté) nepensaient pas que le Pacte
de la Sociétédes Nations, les déclarations de Mandat, la Charte des
Nations Unies ou tout autre instrument eussent pour effet de transférer
les fonctions du Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations relatives aux Mandats
à l'un quelconque des organes des Nations Unies. Il ressort en outre
de ces discussions et recommandations aue le défendeur n'a acce~té
la substitution ni par son comportement, ni d'aucune autre manière.
12. Les arrangements provisoires en vertu desquels la Commission
préparatoire a étécrééeprévoyaientla constitution d'un comitéexécutif
qui exercerait les pouvoirs et les fonctions de la Commission lorsque
celle-ci ne siégeaitpas. En vue de s'acquitter de ses fonctions, le Comité
exécutifa constituédix sous-comités.Le mandat du comité4 du Comité
exécutifprévoyaitnotamment:
((11étudiera les questions que posera la liquidation éventuelle
du régimedes Mandats et examinera la possibilité d'adopter des
dispositions provisoires pour la période qui précéderala cons-
titution du Conseil de tutelle 2.»
Après de longues délibérations,ce comité4 a recommandé au Comité
Cette étude portera à la fois sur la question de savoir si le défendeura consenti
à une nouvelle obligation de rendre compte au lieu de l'obligation prévueà l'article
6 du Mandat et sur la question de savoir si, en supposant aux ûns de I'argumenta-
tion que l'allégation des demandeurs concernant ((l'obligation de rendre compte
sur le plan internatio»soit correcte (voir par. 8 ci-dessus), le défendeur a con-
senti à la substitution d'un nouvel organsurveillancàl'ancien afin d'assurer
l'application de l'obligation originale.
DOC.PC/EX/113/Rev. 1, 12 novembre 1945, p. 113. Committee, and the latter body in turn recommended to the Preparatory
Commission, that there should be established a temporary trusteeship
committee to exercisecertain functions in connection with the conclusion
of trusteeship agreements and the administration of trust territories.
The recommendation contemplated that, until such time as the Trustee-
ship Councilcould come into being, the temporary trusteeship committee
would undertake the functions of the said Council regarding the super-
vision of territories submitted to the trusteeship system.In its report
the Executive Committee made no provision for the supervision of
mandates not brought under trusteeship. The only function proposed
for the temporary trusteeship committee relative to mandates was to-
"advise the General Assembly on any matters that might arise with
regard to the transfer to the United Nations of any functions and
responsibilities hitherto exercised under the mandate system".
Accordicg to a further recommendation of the Executive Committee the
tenure of the temporary trusteeship committee would cease when the
Trusteeship Council could itself begin to function.
When the recommendations of the ExecutiveCommittee werediscussed
in the Preparatory Commission certain States took up the attitude that
the establishment of the proposed temporary trusteeship committee
would be unconstitutional. Various counter-proposals were made,
including proposals for the appointment of an ad hoc committee of the
General Assembly instead of a temporary trusteeship committee.
Afterlengthydiscussionsit wasdecidedthatno recommendation should
be made for the creation of any temporary organ. The Preparatory
Commission merely recommended that the General Assembly of the
United Nations should cal1 on the States administering mandated
territories to undertake practical steps, in concert with the other States
directly concerned, for the implementation of Article 79 of the Charter.
This proposa1 was accepted by the General Assembly and was embodied
il1its resolution XI of 9 February 1946.
13. What is of importance in the present ecquiry, is that throughout
the discussions in the Preparatory Commission no State at any time
suggested that the Mandate Declaration or the Charter made provision
for the substitution of any organ of the United Nations, or any other
organ, as the supervisory body in respect of mandates in the place of
the Council of the League, or that Respondent or any other mandatory
had in any other manner consented to such a substitution. That was so
despite the facts that-
(a) Respondent had earlier in the same year made the statement men-
tioned in paragraph 9 (d), supra, regarding possible termination
of the Mandate and possible incorporation of South West Africa
as part of the Union of South Africa, which intimation, as stated
above, was made for the very reason that "South Africa may not
Doc. PC/EX/113/Re 1,12 Nov. 1945,p. 58.
95 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 97
exécutif,et ce dernier a recommandé à son tour à la Commission pré-
paratoire, la création d'un comitétemporaire de tutelle qui exercerait
certaines fonctions liées la conclusion des accords de tutelle et à
l'administration des territoires sous tutelle. La recommandation pré-
voyait qu'en attendant la création du Conseil de tutelle le comité tem-
poraire de tutelle exercerait les fonctionsudit conseil relativeà la
surveillance des territoires soumis au régime de tutelll.Le rapport
du Comité exécutif ne prévoyait aucune disposition concernant la
surveillance des territoires sous Mandat qui ne seraient pas placés
sous tutelle. La seulefonction que l'on se proposait de confier au comité
temporaire de tutelle en ce qui concerne les Mandats étaitla suivante:
«Donner des avis à l'Assemblée généralseur les questions que
pourrait soulever le transfert l'Organisation des Nations Unies
de toutes fonctions ou responsabilités assumées jusqu'ici envertu
du régime desMandats. »
Aux termes d'une autre recommandation du Comitéexécutif,le mandat
du comité temporaire de tutelle devait prendre fin lorsque le Conseil
de tutelle pourrait lui-même commencer àfonctionner.
Lors de la discussion des recommandations du Comitéexécutifpar
la Commission préparatoire, certains Etats ont soutenu que la création
du comité temporaire de tutelle proposé serait inconstitutionnelle.
Différentescontreprcpositions ont é:é présentées,tendant notamment
à constituer au lieu àe ce comité temporaire un comitéspécialde l'As-
semblée générale.
Après de longs débats, il a étédécidéqu'aucune recommandation
ne serait faite en vue de la création d'un organe temporaire. La Com-
mission préparatoire s'estbornéeà recommander à l'Assemblée générale
des Nations Unies d'inviter les Etats administrant des territoires sous
Mandat à prendre, de concert avec les autres Etats directement inté-
ressés, des mesurespratiques pour la mise en application de l'article
de la Charte. L'Assembléegénéralea adopté cette proposition et l'a
incorporée dans sa résolution XI en date du 9 février 1946.
13. Ce qui importe dans la présenteétude,c'est que, pendant toutes
les discussions qui ont eu lieu à la Commission préparatoire, aucun
Etat n'a jamais laisséentendre que la déclaration de Mandat ou la
Charte eussent prévu le remplacement du Conseil de la Société des
Nations par un organe des Nations Unies ou par aucun autre organe
aux fins de la surveillance des Mandats, ou que le défendeurou aucun
autre Mandataire eût d'une façon quelconque consenti à une telle
substitution. Et cela,
a) bien que le défendeurait fait la mêmeannée, à une date antérieure,
la déclaration mentionnéeau paragraphe 9 d) ci-dessus concernant
la possibilitéde mettre fin au Mandat et d'incorporer le Sud-Ouest
africainà l'Union sud-africaine en tant que partie intégrante, dé-
claration qui, comme il a été ditci-dessus, était faite ((afin que
Doc. PC/EX/113/Rev. 1, 12 novembre 1945, p. 58.
95 afterwards be held to have acquiesced in the continuance of the
Mandate or the inclusion of the territory in any form oftrusteeship
under the new international organization" l,and
(b) that, as 1willshow hereinafter, attention was drawn to the fact that,
in the absence of any specificarrangement to that end, there would,
after the dissolution of the League, be no powers of supervision in
respect of mandated territories not submitted to trusteeship.
It is significant that, with one exception to be dealt with hereinafter,
not one ofthe mandatories evencontemplatedthat theproposedtemporary
trusteeship committee, or any other organ of the United Nations, should
have supervisory functions in respect of mandates not converted to
trusteeship.
It is clear that the Executive Committee did not intend the temporary
trusteeship committee to have such functions. The intention was that
the said committee would merely "advise the General Assembly on any
matters that might arise with regard to the transfer to the United Nations
of any functions and responsibilities hitherto exercisedunder the man-
dates system".
14. At the limewhenthe recommendations ofthe ExecutiveCommittee
were under discussion in the Preparatory Commission, the United States
of America filed a written proposal for amendment of the proposed
functions of the temporary trusteeship committee.
This document (PC/TC/Il) drew attention to the fact that the report
of the Executive Committee made no provision for any organ of the
United Nations to carry out the functions of the Permanent Mandates
Commission, and suggested that-
"In order to provide a continuity between the mandate system
and the trusteeship system, to permit the mandatory powers to
discharge their obligations, and to further the transfer of mandated
territories to trusteeship, the temporary trusteeship committee (or
suchacommitteeas isestablished to perform its functions) and later,
the Trusteeship Council should be speczjîcallyempoweredto receive
the reports which the mandatory powers are now obligated to
make to the Permanent Mandates Commission." (Italics added.)
It was accordingly recommended that the powers of the temporary
trusteeship committee (or such committee as was established to perform
its functions) should be enlarged so thatsuch committee could-
"... undertake, following the dissolution of the League of Nations
and the Permanent Mandates Commission, to receive and examine
reports submitted by mandatory powers with respect to such
Statement by Respondent's representative at the San Francisco Conference
on 11 May 1945.
96 l'Union sud-africaine ne puisse êtreconsidéréeplus tard comme
ayant acceptéque le ~andat continue ou que le Territoire soit com-
pris dans un système de tutelle quelconque établi par une nouvelle
organisation internationale l)i;
b) bien que, comnneje le montrerai plus loin, on ait insistésur le fait
qu'en l'absence d'un arrangement spécial à cet effet il n'y aurait,
après la dissolution de la SociStédes Nations, aucun pouvoir de
surveillanceà ll'égarddes territoires sous Mandat non soumis au
régimede tutelle.
Il est significatif quà,une seule exception près dont il sera question
plus loin, aucun Nfandataire n'ait même envisagé que le comitétempo-
raire de tutelle proposé ouaucun autre organe des Nations Unies puisse
êtredoté de fonctions de surveillance sur les territoires sous Mandat
non transformés en territoires sous tutelle.
II est évidentque:le Comitéexécutifn'avait pas l'intention de conférer
pareilles fonctions au comité temporaire de tutelle. L'intention était
que ce comité se borne à ((donner des avis à l'Assembléegénéralesur
les questions que pourrait soulever le transfert à l'organisation des
Nations Unies de t.outes fonctions ou responsabilités assuméesjusqu'ici
en vertu du régimedes Mandats ».
14. A l'ipoque où la Commission préparatoire examinait les re-
commandations du Comité exécutif, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique ont
présentépar écrit une proposition tendant à modifier les fonctions
que l'on proposail: de confier au comité temporaire de tutelle.
Dans ce document (PC/TC/l I), les Etats-Unis attiraient l'attention
sur le fait que le rapport du Comitéexécutifne prévoyait pasde confier
les fonctions de la Commission permanente des Mandats à un organe
des Nations Unies; et formulaient la proposition suivante:
((Afin d'assurer dans une certaine mesure la continuité entre
le système deii Mandats et le système de la tutelle, de permettre
aux Puissances mandataires de s'acquitter de leurs obligations et
de faciliter le transfert des territoires sous Mandat au régimede
tutelle, le Comitéprovisoire de tutelle (ou tel autre comitéque l'on
créerapour remplir ses fonctions) et, plus tard, le Conseil de tutelle
devrait avoirlo.xprcssémenq tualit éour recevoir les rapports que
les Puissances mandataires ont maintenant l'obligation de faire
à la Commissiion permanente des Mandats. ))(Les italiques sont
de nous.)
Ils recommandailent en conséquenced'élargir lespouvoirs du comité
temporaire de tutelle (ou du comité qui serait créépour exercer ses
fonctions), de façon que ce comité puisse:
((recevoiret examiner après la dissolution de la Sociétédes Nations
et de la Comnnission permanente des Mandats les rapports soumis
par les Puissances mandataires en ce qui concerne les territoires
lDéclaration du représentant du défendeur à la conférence de San Francisco.
11 mai 1945. territories under mandate as have not been placed under the trus-
teeship system by means of trusteeship agreements, and until such
time as the Trusteeship Council is established, whereupon the
Council will perform a similar function."
The United States of America, therefore, realized that unless specific
provision was made to vest an organ or organs of the United Nations
with powers of supervision over mandates there would, as from the
dissolution of the League, be no supervision in respect of mandated
territories not submitted to trusteeship: and it sought to provide for
such supervisionby recommendingthat until suchtime asthe Trusteeship
Council could startto function a temporary body should "be specifically
empowered" to exercisesupervisorypowers over mandatesnot converted
to trusteeship, and that the Trusteeship Council itself should "be specifi-
cally empowered" to perform a similar function once it came to be
established.
It is significantthat, although this document was duly fXedon record
and placed on the agenda of the Preparatory Commission, the matter
wasnever raised bythe United Statesin debate, and no reference was at
any time made to it in any of the discussions.
It seems to me only reasonable to infer that the United States must,
after the filing of the said document, have come to realize that the re-
spective mandatories were not prepared to accept supervision by the
United Nations of the administration of their mandated territories,
Saveand except for the case where a mandatory specificallyagreed to
place its mandated territory under the trusteeship system of the United
Nations.
In this regard it is interesting to note what attitude was adopted by
the different mandatories.
(a) The United Kingdom, although supporting the proposa1 of the
Executive Committee for the establishment of a temporary trustee-
ship committee l-a proposal which did not contemplate that the
said committee would have any supervisory functions in respect of
mandates not converted to trusteeship-also expressed itself in
favour of the alternative proposal for the establishment of an
ad hoccommittee,but suggestedthat the only functions which such
an ad hoc committee should have relative to mandates should be-
"... to advise the General Assembly on any matters that
might arise with regard to the transfer to the United Nations
of any functions and responsibilities hitherto exercised under
the mandates system 27'.
The United Kingdom therefore intended the same lirnited role for
the proposed adhoc committeerelative to mandates asdid the Execu-
tive Committeeinits proposa1fora temporarytrusteeship committee.
lPC/TC/25.. 4 and PC/TC/4 p. 7. sous Mandat qui n'auraient pas étéplacéssous le régimede tutelle,
en vertu d'accords de tutelle, etusqu'à ce que le Conseil de tutelle
soit constitué, celui-ci devantà ce moment remplir une fonction
analogue ».
Les Etats-Unis serendaient donc compte que, à moins de prendre des
dispositions visant àconférer à un organe ou à des organes des Nations
Unies des pouvoirs de surveillance sur les Mandats, les territoires sous
Mandat nnn placéssous tutelle ne seraient plus soumis à aucune sur-
veillance à dater de la dissolution de la Société desNations et ils cher-
chaient à assurer cette surveillance en recommandant qu'un organe
temporaire ait, en attendant que le Conseil de tutelle puisse commencer
à fonctionner, ((expressément qualité)) pour exercer des pouvoirs de
surveillance sur lesterritaires sous Mandat qui n'auraient pas étéplacés
sous le régimede tutelle et que le Conseil de tutelle lui-mêmeait, lors-
qu'il serait constitué,(expressémentqualité ))pour remplir une fonction
analogue.
Il est significatif que, bien que ce document ait été dûment présenté
et inscrità l'ordre du jour de la Commission préparatoire, la question
n'ait jamais étésoulevéepar les Etats-Unis et qu'elle n'ait jamais été
mentionnée en séance.
Il me semble raisonnable de penser qu'après avoir présentéleur
document les Etats-Unis ont dû se rendre compte que les Mandataires
n'étaient disposés à accepter la surveillance de l'administration de leurs
territoires sous Mandat par les Nations Unies qu'au cas où ils consen-
tiraient expressément à placer ces territoires sous le régimede tutelle.
A cet égard, il est intéressant de noter l'attitude adoptée par les
différentsMandataires.
a) Le Royaume-Uni, tout en appuyant la proposition du Comité
exécutif relativeà la création d'un comité temporaire de tutelle
- proposition qui n'envisageait pour ledit comité aucune fonction
de surveillance à l'égard desMandats non transformés en accords
de tutelle -, s'est également déclaré en faveur de la proposition
subsidiaire relativeàla création d'un comitéspécial,mais a proposé
que les seules fonctions de ce comitéspécialen matière de Mandats
consistent à:
((conseiller l'Assemblée générale en toutes questions qui pour-
raient seposerà propos du transfertà l'Organisation detoutes les
fonctions et responsabilités assumées jusqu'alors en vertu du
système des Mandats )).
Le Royaume-Uni voulait donc donner au comité spécial envisagé
un rôle aussi restreint en matière de Mandats, que celui que le
Comitéexécutifavait proposé pour le comité temporaire de tutelle. (b) Australia supported the recommendation of the Executive Com-
mittee for the establishment of a temporary trusteeship committee
without making any suggestion that the ExecutiveCommittee should
have provided for wider powers for the proposed temporary trustee-
ship committee so as to enable it also to supervise mandates not
converted to trusteeship l.
(c) Belgium expressed misgivings with regard to the establishment
of a temporary body and made proposals which intended to avoid
the establishment of any temporary or provisional body 2.
(d) New Zealand supported the proposa1 made by Yugoslavia, which
included the appointment of an ad hoc body, subject, inter alia,
to the amendments suggested by the United Kingdom (as to which
see paragraph (a) above) but "hesitated to agree that a temporary
cornmittee of any kind was necessary 3".
(e) France recommended the establishment of an ad lzoc cornmittee
which was intended to have no mission other than that of helping
to bring about as quickly as possible the establishment of the
Trusteeship Council. This proposed body would have had no
supervisory functions in respect of trust territories and would
have had no function relative to mandates other than-
".. . to advise the Assembly on any matters arising out of
the transfer to the United Nations of those functions and
responsibilities which originated either in the mandates system,
or in other international agreements or instruments 4".
(f) South Africa, through its representative, Mr. Nicholls, took up
the attitude that if there was doubt as to whether the establish-
ment of the proposed temporary trusteeship comrnittee was con-
stitutional or not legal judgment should be sought. Mr. Nicholls
stated further that-
".. .on the question of expediency, it seemed reasonable to
create an interim body as the Mandates Commission was now
in abeyance and countries holding mandates should have a
body to which to report 5".
It has been suggested that in making this statement Mr. Nicholls
acknowledged that there was an obligation on the mandatory powers to
subject their administration of the mandated territories to the super-
vision of the United Nations. In the first place, Mr. Nicholls did not
say that the mandatories would be obliged to report to an interim body.
He merely suggested that there should be a body to which they could
report. In the second place, his statement must be read in proper context
l PC/TC/2, pp. 2-3 and 5.
PC/TC/24 and PC/TC/32, p. 25.
PC/TC/32, p. 25.
* PCITCi33.b) L'Australie a appuyéla recommandation du Comitéexécutif relative
à la création d'un comité temporairede tutelle, sans suggérerque
le Comité exécutifaurait dû prévcir pour le comitétemporaire de
tutelle envisagé despouvoirs plus larges, afin de lui permettre d'as-
surer en outre la surveillance des Mandats nontransformésen accords
de tutellel.
c) La Belgique a exprimédes doutes quant à la création d'un organe
temporaire et a fait des propositions destinéesàéviterla constitution
d'un organe temporaire ou provisoire 2.
d) La Nouvelle-Zélande a appuyé la proposition de la Yougoslavie
dans laquelle il étaitquestion de la constitution d'un organe spécial,
sous réservenotamment des amendements présentéspar le Royaume-
Uni (voir par. a) ci-dessus), mais elle hésitait à admettre qu'un
comité temporaire fût nécessaire 3.
e) La France a recommandéla création d'un comitéspécialqui n'aurait
d'autre mission que de permettre de créer le plus tôt possible le
Conseil de tutelle. L'organe proposé n'aurait aucune fonction de
surveillance sur les territoires sous tutelle et n'aurait aucune autre
fonction en matière de Mandats que
«de donner des avis à l'Assembléesur les questions que soulève
le transfert à l'organisation des Nations Unies des fonctions
et responsabilités qui ont leur source soit dans le régime des
Mandats, soit dans des accords ou actes internationaux an-
térieurs ]).
f) L'Afrique du Sud, par l'intermédiaire de son représentant M. Ni-
cholls, a soutenu que, s'il y avait quelque doute quant à la constitu-
tionnalitédu comitétemporaire detutelle proposé, il fallait demander
un avis juridique. M. Nicholls a ajouté:
((ilsemble raisonnable de créerun organisme provisoire puisque
la Commission permanente des Mandats est en sommeil et
que les pays mandataires devraient avoir un organisme auquef
ils puissent soumettre leurs rapports 5».
On a prétendu que,par cette déclaration, M. Nicholls a reconnu que
les Puissances mandataires étaient dans l'obligation de soumettre à la
surveillance des Nations Unies l'administration de leurs territoires
sous Mandat. Or, en premier lieu, M. Nicholls n'a pas dit que les Man-
dataires seraient obligésde faire rapport à un organe provisoire; il a
simplement suggéréla nécessitéd'un organe auquel ils puissent faire
rapport. En second lieu, sa déclaration doit êtreinterprétéedans son101 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
and against the surrounding circumstances, of which the following are
of major importance.
(i) The statement made by the South African representative earlier
in that very year at the San Francisco Conference when he warned
that South Africashould not "afterwards be held to have acquiesced
ia the continuation of the Mandate or the inclusion of the terri-
tory in any form of trusteeship under the new international organ-
ization".
(ii) The statement made by Mr. Nicholls himself shortly thereafter
in the Fourth Committee of the Preparatory Commission shortly
after his first-mentioned statement, when he said that he-
".. .reserved the position of his delegation until the meeting
of the General Assembly because his country found itself
in an unusual position. The Mandated Territory of South
West Africa was already a self-governing country, and last
year its legislature had passed a resolution asking for ad-
mission into the Union. His Government had replied that
acceptance of this proposa1 was impossible owing to their
obligationsunder the Mandate. The position remained open
and his Delegation could not record its vote on the present
occasion if by so doing it would imply that South West Africa
was not free to determine its own destiny. His Government
would, however, do everything in its power to implement the
Charter."
(iii) A further statement made by Mr. Nicholls only a few days later
in a Plenary Meeting of the Preparatory Commission when he
again stated a reservation and said that:
"South Africa considered that it had fully discharged the
obligations laid upon it by the Allies, under the Covenant
of the League of Nations, on the advancement towards self-
government of the territories under Mandate."
Having regard to these three statements-one made a few months
before Mr. Nicholls addressed theFourth Cornmittee of the Preparatory
Commission on 29 November 1945,and the two later statements made
by Mr. Nicholls himself shortly thereafter-it cannot be contended
that, in saying that "countries holding mandates should have a body to
which to report", Mr. Nicholls intended his remarks to apply to
territories such as South West Africa in respect of which the mandatory
had clearly intirnated that it was not prepared to have the territory
included in any form of trusteeshipunder the United Nations. It would
rather seem that Mr. Nicholls intended his remarks to apply to those
territories in respect of which the mandatories were willing to enter
into trusteeship agreements but in respect of which there would be no
supervisory organ until the Trusteeship Council came into being.
In any event, regard being had to the attitudes adopted by the man- contexte, compte tenu des circonstances qui existaient alors et dont
les suivantes revêtent une importance particulière:
i) La mêmeannée, à la conférence de SanFrancisco, le représentant
de l'Afrique du Sud avait déjà fait une déclaration dans laquelle
il avait indiqué que l'Afriquedu Sud ne devrait pas être((considérée
plus tard comme ayant accepté que le Mandat continue ou que le
Territoire soit compris dans un systèmede tutelle quelconque établi
par une nouvelle organisation internationale ».
ii) Peu après sa déclaration susmentionnée, M. Nicholls a lui-même
déclaré devant le comité4 de la Commission préparatoire:
(([réserver]l'attitude de sa délégation jusqu'à la réunion de
l'Assemblée générale,du fait que l'Union sud-africaine se
trouve dans une situation insolite. Le territoire sous Mandat
du Sud-Ouestafricain est d'ores et déjà unpays qui se gouverne
lui-même,et l'an dernier, son parlement a adoptéune résolution
par laquelle il demandait àêtre admis dans l'Union. Le Gouver-
nement sud-africain a répondu qu'il lui était impossible d'ac-
cepter cette proposition en raison des obligations que lui im-
pose le Mandat. La question reste ouverte et la délégation sud-
africaine ne saurait, dans la circonstance actuelle, émettre un
vote si elle devait ainsi donner à entendre que le Sud-Ouest
africain n'est pas libre de statuer sur son propre sort. Sous
bénéficede ces déclarations, il tientà ajouter que son gouver-
nement fera tout en son pouvoir pour donner effet aux dis-
positions de la Charte. »
iii) Quelquesjours plus tard, au cours d'une séance plénière dlea Com-
mission préparatoire,M. Nicholis, formulant de nouveau une réserve,
a dit:
cl'Afrique du Sud estime qu'elle a complètement satisfait
aux obligations qui lui avaient étéimposées par les Alliés
en vertu du Pacte de la Société desNations au sujet de l'avan-
cement des populations sous Mandat vers l'autonomie ».
Compte tenu de ces trois déclarations - l'une faite quelques mois
avantque M. Nicholls prenne la parole devantle comité4 de la Commis-
sion préparatoire, le 29 novembre 1945, et les deux dernières faites
peu après par M. Nicholls lui-même - il est impossible de soutenir
qu'en disant que «les pays mandataires devraient avoir un organisme
auquel ils puissent soumettre leurs rapports »,M. Nicholls ait entendu
viser le cas de territoires tels que le Sud-Ouest africain, dont le Man-
dataire avait clairement indiqué qu'iln'étaitpas disposéà le voir placer
sous une tutelle quelconque des Nations Unies. Il semble plutôt que
M. Nicholls ait conçu sa remarque comme s'appliquant aux territoires
pour lesquels les Mandataires étaient prêts à conclure des accords de
tutelle, mais pour lesquels il ne devait y avoir aucun organe de surveil-
lance avant l'installation du Conseil de tutelle.
De toute façon, étant donné l'attitude adoptée à la Commission
99datories in the Preparatory Commission, including Respondent, as
well as the views expressed by other States at the time, there is no
justification whatever for the suggestion that there was general agree-
ment that the mandated territories should be under international
supervision and tliat the mandatory powers wanted that supervision to
be carried out by an interim or temporary body prior to the establish-
ment of the Trusteeship Council '. The events in the Preparatory
Commission show the very opposite, both as regards the attitudes of
the mandatory powers (as set out above) and as regards the general
agreement between the States concerned. It was realized tlîat unless
some specific arrangement was made to vest the United Nations with
supervisory powers over mandates not converted to trusteeship, there
would be no supervision of such mandates after the dissolution of the
League. Nevertheless, although it was at one stage suggested by the
United States of America that such arrangements should be made, the
suggestion was not raised for discussion, and nothing at al1was done
to confer supervisorÿ powers with respect to mandates iiot converted
to trusteeship on any organs of the United Nations, or any other body.
The general understanding must therefore have been that there would
be no supervision of mandates not converted to trusteeship.
15. When the Preparatory Commission's report was considered at the
First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly in the period
January-February 1946, the mandatories each stated their respective
intentions with regard to the future of the territories under mandate.
Australia, New Zealand and Belgium stated intentions to negotiate
trusteeship agreements in respect of the mandated territories admin-
istered by them.
The United Kingdom intimated that in respect of Transjordan it
intended to take steps for establishing thesaid territory as a sovereign
independent State. With regard to Palestine it was considered necessary
to await the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry
before putting forward any proposals. And in respect of Tanganyika,
the Cameroons and Togoland it was stated that the United Kingdom
would proceed forthwith to enter into negotiations for placing these
territories under the trusteeship system; but it was made clear that its
willingness to place these territories under the trusteeship system de-
pended upon it being able to negotiate satisfactory terms.
France intimated its preparedness to study the terms of agreements
by which the trusteeship régimecould be "defined" in respect of Togo-
land and the Cameroons. In respect of the Mandated Territory of
South West Africa, Respondent's representative stated its attitude in
the following terms:
"Under these circumstances, the Union Government considers
that it is incumbent upon it, as indeed upon al1 other mandatory
powers, to consult the people of the mandated territory regarding
l C.R. 65/27, p. 46.
1O0préparatoire par les Mandataires et notamment par le défendeur et
étant donnéles vues exprimées à cette époquepar d'autres Etats, rien
ne permet d'affirmer que l'on s'accordait d'une manière général e
reconnaître que les territoires sous Mandat devraient êtresoumis au
contrôle international, ni que les Puissances mandataires voulaient
que ce contrôle fût effectuépar un organisme provisoire en attendant
la créationdu Conseil de tutelle l.Les débatsde la Commission prépa-
ratoire prouvent exactement le contraire, tant en ce qui concerne l'at-
titude des Puissances mandataires (voir ci-dessus) que l'accord général
entre les Etats intéressés.On se rendait compte que, si aucun arrange-
ment n'était expressément conclu en vue de confére arux Nations Unies
des pouvoirs de surveillance quant aux Mandats non transformés en
accords de tutelle, ces Mandats ne seraient soumisà aucune surveillance
après la dissolution de la Société des Nations.Cependant, bien que
les Etats-Unis aient proposé à un certain stade la conclusion de tels
arrangements, cette proposition n'a pas été discutée et rienn'a été
faitpour conférerà des organesdesNations Uniesoud'unautre organisme
des pouvoirs de surveillance quant aux Mandats non transformés en
accords de tutelle. Si donc il y a eu un accord général, celaa étépour
qu'il n'y eût aucune surveillance quant aux Mandats non transformés
en accords de tutelle.
15. Lorsque l'Assemblée généralae examinéle rapport de la Com-
mission préparatoire, au cours de la première partie de sa première
session, en janvier-février946, tous les Mandataires ont fait connaître
leurs intentions quant à l'avenir de leurs territoires sous Mandat.
L'Australie, la Nouvelle-Zélande et la Belgique ont annoncé leur
intention de négocier des accords de tutelle concernant les territoires
sous Mandat dont elles assuraient l'administration.
Le Royaume-Uni a indiquéqu'il se proposait de prendre des mesures
pour faire de la Transjordanie un Etat souverain indépendant. En ce
qui concernait la Palestine, il jugeait nécessaired'attendre le rapport
de la commission d'enquête anglo-américaine avant de formuler des
propositions. Pour ce qui étaitdu Tanganyika, du Cameroun et du Togo,
il comptait entamer immédiatement des négociationsen vue de les
placer sous le régime de tutelle, mais iltenaità souligner que cette in-
tention était subordonnée à la possibilité d'obtenir desconditions
satisfaisantes.
La France s'est déclarée prête à étudier les termes de l'accord qui
((définiraitle régimede tutelle dans le cas du Togo et du Cameroun.
S'agissant du territoire sous Mandat du Sud-Ouest africain, le repré-
sentant du défendeura définicomme suit la position de son gouver-
nement :
((Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement de YUnion estime
qu'il lui incombeà lui-même, ainsi qu'àtoutes les autres Puissances
mandataires, de consulter la population du territoire sous Mandat the form which their own future government should take, since
they are the people chiefly concerned. Arrangements are now in
train for such consultations to take place and, until they have
been concluded, the Soutlz African Governmentmust reserve its
position concerningtheficture of tlzemandate, together with its right
of full liberty of action, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 80
of the Charter.
From what 1 have said 1 hope it will be clear that South West
Africa occupies a special position in relation to the Union which
differentiates that territory from any other under a C Mandate.
This special position should be given full consideration in deter-
mining the future status of the territory. South Africa is, never-
theless, properly conscious of her obligations under the Charter.
1 can give every assurance that any decision taken in regard to
the future of the mandate will be characterized by a full sense of
Our responsibility, as a signatory of the Charter, to implement its
provisions, in consultation with and with the approval of the local
inhabitants, in the manner best suited to the promotion of their
material and moral well-being." (Italics added.)
And a few days later:
"Referring to the text of Article 77, he said that under the
Charter the transfer of the mandates régime to the trusteeship
system was not obligatory. According to paragraph 1 of Article 80,
no rights would be altered until individual trusteeship agreements
were concluded. It was wrong to assume that paragraph 2 of this
Article invalidated paragraph 1.The position of the Union of South
Africa was in conformity with this legal interpretation.
He explained the special relationship between the Union and
the territory under its mandate, referring to the advanced stage
of self-government enjoyed by South West Africa, and commenting
on the resolution of the Legislature of South West Africa calling
for amalgamation with the Union. There would be no attempt
to draw up an agreement until the freely expressed will of both
the European and native populations had been ascertained. When
that had been done, the decision of the Union would be submitted
to the General Assembly for judgment."
None of the statements made by the mandatories on this occasion
can be interpreted as evidencing an understanding that, in the case
of mandated territories in respect of which no trusteeship agreements
were concluded, the United Nations, or any of its organs, would, after
101 au sujet de la forme que devrait revêtirson futur gouvernement,
en effet, c'est cette population qui est principalement intéressée
à cette question. Des mesures sont actuellement en cours d'appli-
cation en vue de telles consultations; et aussi longtemps que celles-
ci n'auront pas été achevées, le Gouvernement de l'Union sud-
africaine se voit obligé deréserver saposition concernant l'avenir
du Mandat, en mêmetemps que son droit à une entière liberté
d'action, comme le prévoit le paragraphe 1 de l'article 80 de la
Charte.
De ces explications, il ressort clairement, j'espère, que le Sud-
Ouest africain se trouve, par rapport à l'Union, dans une position
spéciale qui place le Territoire dans une situation différente de
celle de tout autre Mandat C. Il conviendra de tenir compte, à
tous égards, de cette position spéciale lorsqu'on déterminera le
statut futur du Territoire. L'Afrique du Sud n'en est pas moins
nettement consciente des obligations que lui impose la Charte et
je peux donner l'assurance absolue que toute décision qui sera
prise au sujet de l'avenir du Mandat le sera par un gouvernement
profondément pénétré de la responsabilité qui lui incombe en tant
que signataire de la Charte, celle de donner suite aux dispositions
de cet instrument international, après consultation et avec l'ap-
probation des populations locales, de la manière propre à assurer
le mieux le développement de leur bien-être matérielet moral. ))
(Les italiques sont de nous.)
Et quelques jours plus tard:
«Se référantau texte de l'article 77 fiedélégué de l'Union sud-
africaine] déclareque la Charte ne rend pas obligatoire le transfert
du régime des Mandats au régime de tutelle. En vertu du para-
graphe 1 de l'article 80, aucun droit ne sera modifié jusqu'au mo-
ment où les différentsaccords de tutelle seront conclus.Il est faux
desupposer que le paragraphe 2de cet article annule le paragraphe 1.
La thèse de l'Union sud-africaine est conforme à cette interpréta-
tion juridique.
Après avoir précisé lecaractère particulier des rapports qui
existent entre l'Union et le territoire sous Mandat, souligné le
degré avancéd'autonomie dont jouit le Sud-Ouest africain, et
développéla résolution de l'Assemblée législativedu Sud-Ouest
africain qui demande que ce Territoire soit admis dans l'Union,
il déclare qu'aucune tentative ne sera faite en vue d'élaborer un
accord, avant que ne soit librement expriméela volontédes popu-
lations européenne et indigène. Quand cette volonté sera connue,
l'Union soumettra sa décision au jugement de l'Assemblée géné-
rale.))
Aucune des déclarations faites par les Mandataires à cette occasion
ne peut être interprétéecomme prouvant qu'il y ait eu un accord en
vertu duquel l'organisation des Nations Unies ou l'un quelconque
de ses organes aurait eu, après la dissolution de la Société desNations,
101 the dissolution of the League, have powers of supervision, or that
the mandatories were prepared to submit to such supervision. Nor can
it fairly be said that the Respondent's statement that it would submit
the question of incorporationof South West Africa to the judgment of
the General Assembly constituted a request to the United Nations to
assume the supervisory functions of the Council of the League. In my
opinion, it was obviously no more than an intimation of Respondent's
desire of obtaining the approval of an important political act by the
newly formed and important international organization. It must have
been apparent to al1concerned that, whatever the legal position might
be, unilateral incorporation of South West Africa by the Respondent
without consulting the United Nations could have led to serious criticism
and harmful political results. This intimation was motivated solely
by political wisdom and was not intended to have, nor was it understood
to have, any bearing on the Respondent's obligations under Article 6
of the Mandate. This will become more apparent when subsequent
events are considered.
16. Of major significance in the present enquiry are the texts of
certain resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations early in 1946, either with specific reference to mandates, or
applicable,inter alia, to mandates.
In its resolutionXI of 9 February 1946, the General Assembly ex-
pressed regret that the Trusteeship Council could not be brought into
being at that session, and proceeded to state thatt-
" Welcomesthe declarations, made by certain Statesadministering
territories now held under Mandate, of an intention to negotiate
trusteeship agreements in respect of some of those territories and,
in respect of Transjordan, to establish its independence.
Invites the States administering territories now held under
mandate to undertake practical steps, in concert with the States
directly concerned, for the implementation of Article 79 of the
Charter (which provides for the conclusion of agreements on the
terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the
trusteeship system)in order to submit these agreements for approval,
preferably not later than during the second part of the first session
of the General Assembly."
Save for minor textual changes this resolution followed the precise
wording of the draft resolution proposed by the Preparatory Commis-
sion l, and it is significant that, like the draft, it makes no mention
whatsoever regarding the future of mandated territories in respect of
which no trusteeship agreements would come about.
Videpara. 12, supra.
102 des pouvoirs de surveillance sur les territoires sous Mandat qui n'au-
raient pas fait l'objet d'un accord de tutelle, ou en vertu duquel les
Mandataires auraient accepté de se soumettre à pareille surveillance.
On n'est pas davantage fondé à dire que la déclaration du défendeur
selon laquelle iloilmettrait la question de l'incorporationdu Sud-Ouest
africain au jugement de l'Assemblée générala e constitué une requête
adressée à l'organisation des Nations Unies pour qu'elle assume les
fonctions de surveillance du Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations. A mon
avis, il n'y avaitlà de toute évidencequ'une expression de la volonté
du défendeur d'obtenir l'approbation d'un important acte politique
par la nouvelle et. importante organisation internationale. Tous les
intéressés sesont certainement rendu compte que, quelle que fût la
situation en droit, l'incorporation unilatérale du Sud-Ouest africain
par le défendeur sans consulter les Nations Unies pourrait entraîner
de sérieuses critiques et des résultats politiques regrettables. Cette
déclaration n'a été qu'une manifestation desagesse politique; elle n'était
pas destinée à avoir une influence quelconque sur les obligations du
défendeur aux ternies de l'article 6 du Mandat et elle n'a pas étécon-
sidéréecomme telle. Cela apparaît encore plus nettement lorsqu'on
examine les événementsqui ont suivi.
16. Aux fins de la présente étude, lestextes de certaines résolutions
adoptéespar l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies au débutde 1946,
soit qu'elles se réfèrentexpressément aux Mandats, soit qu'elles leur
soient applicables entre autres, prennent une importance considérable.
Dans sa résolution XI en date du 9 février1946,l'Assemblée générale
a expriméle regret que le Conseil de tutelle ne puisse être créé à cette
session et elle a ajouté ce qui suit: .
[L'Assemblée générale ccAccueille avec satisfaction les déclara-
tions faites par certains Etats administrant des territoires actuelle-
ment sous Mandat, de leur intention de négocierdes accords de
tutelle pour c~crtainsde ces territoires, et en ce qui concerne la
Transjordanie d'établir son indépendance.
Invite les Etats qui administrent des territoires en vertu d'un
Mandat, à prendre de concert avec les autres Etats directement
intéressés,les mesures nécessairespour la mise en application de
l'article 79 de la Charte (qui prévoit la conclusion d'accords sur
les termes du régimede tutelle, pour chacun des territoires à placer
sous ce régime:)en vue de soumettre ces accords pour approbation,
de préférence,au plus tard, pendant la deuxième partie de la pre-
mière session de l'Assembléegénérale. »
A l'exception de quelques changements de forme sans importance cette
résolution reprena.it exactement les termes du projet de résolution
proposé par la Commission préparatoire et il est significatif que ni
la résolution ni le projet n'aient rien dit de l'avenir des territoires sous
Mandat qui ne feraient pas l'objet d'un accord de tutelle.
' Voir par. 12 ci-dessus.
102 General Assembly resolution XIV of 12 February 1946 dealt with
the "Transfer of certain functions, activities and assets of the League
of Nations". In its operative part this resolution, inter alia, contained
the following declaration:
"The General Assembly declares that the United Nations is
willing in principle and subject to the provisions of this resolution
and of the Charter of the United Nations, to assume the exercise
of certain functions and powers previously entrusted to the League
of Nations, and adopts the following decisions, set forth in A, B
and C below."
Sections A and B dealt with functions pertaining to the Secretariat and
Functions and Powers of a Technical and Non-Political Nature.
Section C read as follows:
"Functions and Powers under Treaties, International Conventions,
Agreements and otlzer Instruments lzaving a Political Character.
The General Assembly will itself examine, or will submit to
the appropriate organ of the United Nations, any requestfrom the
parties that the United Nations should assume the exercise of
functions or powers entrusted to the League of Nations by treaties,
international conventions, agreements and other instruments having
a political characte..." (Italics added.)
Inasmuch as the mandate declarations were instruments having a
political character, this section of the resolution was applicable to
mandates. And it is the only resolution of the General Assembly in
whichprovision was made for the possible transfer to the United Nations
or its organs of the League's functions relative to mandates.
The part of the resolution in question is of considerable significance
because it negatives the possibility of an implied agreement existing
at that time in terms whereof the Respondent's obligations under the
Mandate to report and account to the Council of the League would be
transformed into an obligation to report and account to the United
Nations. Judge Read aptly remarked, in Inte~.nationalStatus of South
West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1950, page 172: "The very existence of this
express provision, however makes it impossible to justify succession
based upon implication."
Insofar as this resolution was intended to provide a method for
transferring to the United Nations supervisory powers in respect of
mandates, such a transfer could, in terms of the resolution itself,
effectivelycome about only by way of a specific request on the part
of a mandatory and a decision by the United Nations to assume the
function in question; and such an assumption had to be "subject to
the provisions of, inter alia, the Charter".
Any assumption by the United Nations of supervisory powers in
respect of mandates would have brought about a new or amended treaty
obligation on the part of the Mandatory or mandatories concerned.
It follows that any such assumption by the United Nations of super-
103 La résolutionXIV de l'Assemblée générale ed nate du 12février1946
a trait au ((Transfertde certaines fonctions et activitéset certains avoirs
de la Société desNations ». Le dispositif de cette résolution contient
notamment la déclaration suivante:
((L'Assemblée générale déclare qu'en princip et sous réserve
des dispositions de la présente résolution et dela Charte, l'organi-
sation est prêteà assumer certaines fonctions et certains pouvoirs
précédemmentconfiés à la Société desNations, et elle adopte les
décisions énoncées ci-dessoua sux paragraphes A, B et C. ))
Les paragraphes A et B serapportent aux fonctions de secrétariatet aux
fonctions et aux pouvoirs de nature technique et non politique.
Le paragraphe C est ainsi conçu:
((Fonctionset pouvoirs résultantde traités,conventions, accords
et autres instruments internationaux de caractère politique.
L'Assemblée générale étudierealle-mêmeou soumettra à l'or-
gane compétent des Nations Unies toute demande émanantdes
parties et tendant à ce que l'organisation assume les fonctions
ou pouvoirs confiés à la Société desNations par des traités, con-
ventions, accords et autres instruments internationaux de caractère
politique.» (Les italiques sont de nous.)
Les déclarationsde Mandat étantdes instruments de caractère politique,
cette partie de la résolution leur est applicable.l n'existe pas d'autre
résolution de l'Assemblée généralequi contienne des dispositions
relatives au transfert éventuel desfonctions de la Société desNations
en matière de Mandats aux Nations Unies ou à ses organes.
La partie de résolution que je viens de citer revêtune importance
considérable parce qu'elle élimine toute possibilité, à cette époque,
d'accord implicite en vue de transformer l'obligation de faire rapport
et de rendre compte au Conseil de la Société desNations assumée
par le défendeuren vertu du Mandat en une obligation de faire rapport
et de rendre compte à l'organisation des Nations Unies. M. Read a
très justement fait observer (Statut international du Sud-Ouest africain,
avis consultatif,.I.J. Recueil 1950,p. 172):((L'existencemêmede cette
disposition expresserend toutefois impossible dejustifier une succession
par voie de conséquencelogique. ))
En tant que la résolution était destinée à définir une méthode per-
mettant de transférer à l'organisation des Nations Unies des pouvoirs
de surveillance sur les Mandats, ce transfert ne pouvait, aux termes
mêmesde la résolution, être effectué qu'au moyen d'une requête
spéciale présentépear le Mandataire et d'une décisionde l'organisation
des Nations Unies d'assumer la fonction en question, et cela ((sous
réservenotamment des dispositions de la Charte n.
L'exercice par les Nations Unies de pouvoirs de surveillance sur les
Mandats aurait entraînéuneobligation co~~tractuellnouvelleou modifiée
pour le ou les Mandataires en cause.
11s'ensiiit que tout arrangement conférant aux Nations Unies desvisory functions in respect of a particular mandate pursuant to the
request of the mandatory concerned had, in order to be valid and
effective, to be registered in terms of Article 102of the Charter. Failing
such registration the arrangement could in terms of Article 103 not be
invoked before any organ of the United Nations.
It is sufficient to Say that Respondent never requested the United
Nations to assume the exercise of the functions or powers entrusted
to the League by Article 6 of the Mandate for South West Africa, and
that those functions were neither expressly transferred to the United
Nations nor assumed by that organization at any material time.
17. 1 deal next with the events at the final session of the League
of Nations. It has been argued that the declarations made by the several
mandatories at the final session of the League constituted undertakings
or "pledges" to submit their administration of the mandated territories
to the supervision of the United Nations until the conclusion of other
agreed arrangements, and that the final resolution of the League of
18April 1946constituted an international agreement or treaty recording
such undertakings or "pledges" l.
In this regard strong reliance has been placed on the 1950 Advisory
Opinion of this Court and on the Judgment of fivejudges of this Court
in the 1962 Judgment on the Preliminary Objections. It accordingly
seems necessary to make a detailed examination of the events at the
final session of the League, of the League resolution of 18 April 1946
and of al1other relevant facts, as well as a careful analysis of the said
Opinion and Judgment. 1 shall deal first with the events at the final
League session.
18. In pursuance of informa1 discussions between mernbers of the
League most directly concerned with mandates, the representatives
Applicants' argument, which was based on what they termed "Preparatory
Commission procedures and the system of pledges",can be briefly stated as follows:
(a) there was general agreement that the mandated territories should be under
international supervision;
(b) the mandatory powers, including Responcient, wanted that supervision to
be carried out by an interim or temporary body prior to the establishment of
the Trusteeship Council,i.e., the proposed Temporary TrusteeshiCommittee;
(c) other governments feared that this procedure would lead to delay in the
establishment of the tmsteeship system and pressed for pledges by the manda-
tory powers to place their territories under the trusteeship system;
(d) by way of a compromise it was agreed that pledges would be made, but not
pledges would be toe carry out al1 the obligations of the mandate, including
the obligation to submit to international supervision;
(e) the said pledges were duly made at the final session of the League.
Thepart of the argument set forth in paras. (a) to (d), supra, has been dealt with
in paras. 12-16, above.
104fonctions de surveillance sur un certain Mandat à la suited'une demande
du Mandataire intéressédoit, pour être valableet effectif, avoir été
enregistré aux termes de l'article 102 de la Charte. Faute de quoi, l'ar-
rangement ne peut, aux termes de cet article, être invoqué devant aucun
organe des Nations Unies.
Il suffitde dire que le défendeur n'a jamais demandé à l'organisation
des Nations Unies d'assumer les fonctions ou pouvoirs exercéspar la
Société desNations en vertu de l'article 6 du Mandat pour le Sud-
Ouest africain et aue ces fonctions n'ont éténi exwessémenttransférées
aux Nations Unies, ni assuméespar cette organisation à aucun moment.
17. J'en arrive maintenant à ce qui s'est passélors de la dernière
session de la Sociétédes Nations. On a prétendu que les déclarations
faites par plusieurs Mandataires à cette dernière session ont constitué
des promesses ou des cengagements » de soumettre l'administration
de leurs territoires sous Mandat à la surveillance des Nations Unies,
jusqu'à ce que d'autres arrangements soient conclus d'un commun
accord, et que la résolution finale adoptéepar la Sociétédes Nations
le 18avril 1946a constitué un accord ou traitéinternational enregistrant
ces promesses ou ces « engagements » l.
A cet égard, on s'est essentiellement fondé sur l'avis consultatif
donnépar la Cour en 1950et sur l'arrêt relatif aux exceptionsprélimi-
naires rendu par cinq membres de la Cour en 1962. Il semble donc
nécessaire de procéder à un examen détaillédes événementsqui se
sont produits à la dernière session de la Sociétédes Nations, de la
résolution adoptéepar cette organisation le 18 avril 1946 et de tous
les autres faits pertinents, ainsi qu'à une analyse minutieuse de l'avis
consultatif et de l'arrêten question. Je parlerai tout d'abord de ce qui
s'est passé à la dernière session de la Sociétédes Nations.
18. A la suite de discussions officieuses entre les Etats Membres les
plus directement intéressés à la question des Mandats, les représentants
l La thèse des demandeurs, fondée sur ce qu'ils ont appelé les «procédures
de la Commission préparatoire e..la méthode des engagementsa,peut êtrebriè-
vement résumée, commesuit:
a) Il était généralementadmis que les territoires sous Mandat devaient êtresou-
mis à une surveillance internationale;
b) Les Puissances mandataires y compris le défendeur voulaient qu'en attendant
provisoire ou temporaire, à savoir le comité temporaire de tutelle proposé;ane
c) D'autres gouvernements, craignant que cette procédure n'entraîne un retard
dans l'établissement du régimede tutelle, ont demandé instamment aux Puis-
sances mandataires de prendre l'engagement de placer leurs territoires sous le
régime de tutelle;
d) A titre decompromis, il a convenu que les Puissances mandataires prendraient
certains engagements; elles ne s'engageaient pas à placer les territoires sous
Mandat sous le régimede tutelle mais à exécutertoutes les obligations du Man-
dat et notamment l'obligation de sesoumettàune surveillance internationale;
e) Lesdits engagements ont été dûment souscritsà la dernière session de la Société
des Nations.
Les points énoncésaux paragraphes a) d) ont étéévoquésaux paragraphes 12-16
ci-dessus.of mandatory powers, in addressing the final plenary meeting of the
Assembly of the League, made statements indicating the intentions
of their governments with regard to their respectivemandated territones.
On 9 April 1946, the representatives of the United Kingdom and the
Respondent made their statements.
The representative of the United Kingdom, after having mentioned
that Iraq and Transjordan had already become independent sovereign
States, and after repeating his Government's intention of placing
Tanganyika, Togoland and the Cameroons under trusteeship, subject
to the negotiation of satisfactory terms, stated:
"The future of Palestine cannot be decided until the Anglo-
American Committee of Enquiry have rendered their report but
until the three African territories (Tanganyika, Togoland and the
Cameroons) have actually been placed under trusteeship and until
fresh arrangements have been reached in regard to Palestine-
whatever those arrangements may be-it is the intention of His
Majesty's Government inthe UnitedKingdomto continueto administer
these territories in accordance witlz the general principles of the
existing mandates." (Italics added.)
Respondent's representative made the following statement :
"It is the intention of the Union Government, at the forth-
coming session of the United Nations General Assembly in New
York, to formulate its case for according South West Africa a status
under which it would be internationally recognized as an integral
part of the Union. As the Assembly will know, it is already
administered under the terms of the mandate as an integral part
of the Union. In the meantime the Union will continue to admin-
ister the territory scrupulouslyinaccordancewiththeobligationsof the
mandate, for the advancement andpromotion of the interest of the
inhabitants, as she hasone during the past six years when meetings
of the Mandates Commission could not be held.
The disappearance of those organs of the League concerned
with the supervision of mandates, primarily the Mandates Com-
mission and the League Council, will necessarily preclude complete
compliance with the letter of the mandate. The Union Government
will nevertheless regard the dissolutionof the League as in no way
diminishing itsobligations under the mandate, which it will continue
to discharge withthefull andproper appreciationof its responsibilities
until such time as other arrangements are agreed upon concerning
the future status of theerritory."
19. After the above statements had been made the representative of
China, Dr. Liang, raised the question of the future of mandates in
the First Committee on the afternoon of 9 April 1946.At that time the
Committee was considering a draft resolution concerning assumption
105des Puissances mandataires, prenant la parole à la dernière session plé-
nièrede l'Assembléede la Société des Nations, ont exposé lesintentions
de leur gouvernement quant aux territoires sous Mandat dont ils avaient
la charge. C'est le 9 avril 1946 que les représentants du Royaume-Uni
et du demandeur ont fait leurs déclarations.
Le représentant du Royaume-Uni, après avoir signaléque l'Irak et
la Transjordanie étaient d'ores et déjà devenus des Etats souverains
indépendants et après avoir rappelé l'intention de son gouvernement
de placer le Tanganyika, le Togo et le Cameroun sous le régimede tutelle
à condition que les modalitésde cette tutelle aient fait l'objet de négo-
ciations satisfaisantes, a déclaré:
((L'avenir de la Palestine ne saurait être décidéavant que la
Commission d'enquêteanglo-américaine n'aitdéposéson rapport,
mais tant que les trois territoires africains n'auront pas étéplacés
effectivement sous tutelle et tant que de nouveaux arrangements
quels qu'ils puissent êtrene seront pas intervenus en ce qui concer-
ne la Palestine,l est dansl'intentionde Sa Majestédansle Royaume-
Uni de continuer à administrer ces territoires conformémentaux
principes généraux dem s andats existants.)(Les italiqnes sont de
nous.)
Le représentant du défendeur a fait la déclaration suivante:
((11est dans l'intention du Gouvernement de l'Union sud-afri-
caine d'exposer,à la prochaine session des Nations Unies à New
York, les raisons pour lesquelles il conviendrait d'accorder au Sud-
Ouest africain un statut aux termes duquel ce Territoire serait
reconnu internationalement comme formant partie intégrante de
l'Union. Ce Territoire est dèsmaintenant, l'Assembléene l'ignore
pas, administré, auxtermesdu Mandat,en tant que partie intégrante
de l'Union. Dans l'intervalle, l'Union sud-africaine continuera à
l'administrer en se conformant scrupuleusement aux obligations du
Mandat, afin d'assurer le progrès, et de sauvegarder les intérêse
ses habitants, comme elle l'a fait pendant les six dernières années
durant lesquelles laCommission des Mandats n'a pu se réunir.
La disparition des organes de la Société desNations qui s'occu-
pent du contrôle des Mandats, à savoir, en premier lieu, la Com-
mission des Mandats et le Conseil de la Société, empêchera évidem-
ment de se conformerentièrement à la lettre du Mandat. Le Gouver-
nement de l'Union se fera, cependant, un devoir de considérer que
la disparition dela Sociétédes Nations ne diminue en rien les obliga-
tions qui découlentdu Mandat; il continuerà s'enacquitter enpleine
conscienceet avec lejuste sentiment de ses responsabilités,squ'au
moment oud'autres arrangementsauront été conclusq , uant au statut
futur de ceTerritoire.>
19. Après les déclarations susmentionnées, M. Liang, représentant
de la Chine, a soulevéla question de l'avenir desMandats à une séance
de la Première Commission tenue dans l'après-mididu 9 avril 1946.La
Commission examinait alorsun projet de résolutionconcernant la prise by the United Nations of League functions and powers arising out of
agreements of a technical and non-political character. Dr. Liang wished
to propose for discussion the following draft resolution which he read
out:
"The Assembly,
Considering that the Trusteeship Council has not yet been
constituted and that al1 mandated territories under the League
have not been transferred into territoriesunder trusteeship;
Considering that the League's function of supervising mandated
territories should be transferred to the United Nations, in order
to avoid a period of interregnum in the supervisionof the mandatory
regime in these territories.
Recommends that the mandatory powers as well as those ad-
ministering ex-enemy mandated territories shall continue to submit
annual reports to the United Nations and to submit to inspection by
the same until the Trusteeship Council shall have been constituted."
(Italics added.)
1 pause here to remark that if it had been thought that the provisions
of the Covenant of the League and the Mandate Declarations, or the
Charter of the United Nations, or any provision in any other instru-
ment, or any statements made by the Respondent had the effect of
amending the mandatory's obligation to report and account by substi-
tutingin theMandate Declaration an organ of the United Nations for the
Council of the League, Dr. Liang's proposed resolution would have been
unnecessary. If it was thought that provision had already been made
(in the Covenant of the League, in the Mandate Declarations, or in the
Charter, or elsewhere) for the transfer of the League's supervisory
functions to the United Nations, there would have been no need for
a resolution "that the League's function of supervising mandated terri-
tories should be transferred to the United Nations". Likewise, if it was
thought that provision had already been made (in the Covenant of the
League, in the Mandates, in the Charter, or elsewhere)that mandatories
should render the annual reports previously subrnitted to the League
Council to the United Nations, there would have been no point in a
recornmendation that "the mandatorypowers . ..shall continue to submit
annual reports to the United Nations".
The truth is that not a single member of the League nor a single
Member of the United Nations at that stage thought that they were
parties to any agreement which compelled the Respondent, or any
other mandatory power to report and account to the General Assembly
of the United Nations as the supervisory body in respect of mandates
not converted to trusteeship. If there had been the requisite tacit meeting
of minds to bring about an implied agreement to the said effect, one
would have expected that the States which are now alleged to have
been parties to such an agreement would have been aware thereof and
106 en charge par l'Organisation des Nations Unies des fonctions et pouvoirs
exercéspar la Société desNations en vertu d'accords de caractère tech-
nique et non politique. M. Liang souhaitait soumettre à la discussion
de ses collèguesle projet de résolution ci-après, dont il a donnélecture:
((L'Assemblée,
Considérant que le Conseil de tutelle n'avait pas encore été
constitué et que tous les territoires sous Mandat de la Société des
Nations n'ont pas encore ététransformés en territoires sous tutelle;
Considérant qu'il y aurait lieu, ajn d'évitertoute interruption
dans la surveillancedu régime desMandats dans ces territoires, de
transférerà l'organisation des Nations Unies les fonctions assu-
mées à cet égard par la Société desNations;
Recommande que les Puissances mandataires ainsi que les
Puissances administrant des territoires sous Mandat ex-ennemis
continuent à présenteraux Nations Unies des rapports annuels et
acceptent que ces territoires soient inspectép sar l'organisation,
jusqu'au moment où le Conseil de tutelle aura été constitué ».
(Les italiques sont de nous.)
Je m'interromps ici pour faire observer que, si l'on avait penséque les
dispositions du Pacte et des déclarations de Mandat, celles de la Charte,
ou celles d'un autre instrument ou les déclarations du défendeur,avaient
pour effet de modifier l'obligation du Mandataire de faire rapport et
de rendre compte moyennant la substitution dans la déclaration de
Mandat, du Conseil de la SociétédesNations par un organe des Nations
Unies, la résolution proposéepar M. Liang n'aurait pas éténécessaire.
Si l'on avait pensé que des dispositions avaient déjà étéprises dans
le Pacte, dans les déclarations de Mandat, dans la Charte ou ailleurs,
envue du transfert aux Nations Uniesdes fonctions de surveillance de la
Sociétédes Nations, il aurait étéinutile de présenter une résolution
visant à transférerà l'organisation des Nations Unies lesfonctions assu-
mées à cet égardpar la Société des Nations.De même,si l'on avait jugé
que des dispositions avaient déjà été prisedans le Pacte, dans les Man-
dats, dans la Charte ou ailleurs, pour que les Mandataires présentent
à l'Organisation des Nations Unies les rapports annuels qu'ils soumet-
taient auparavant à la Sociétédes Nations, il n'y aurait eu aucune rai-
son de faire une recommandation tendant à ce que ((les Puissances
mandataires ...continuent à présenteraux Natio~r Unies des rapports
annuels ».
En fait, aucun Membre de la Société desNations ou des Nations
Unies n'a estimé à l'époque qu'il fût partie à un accord obligeant le
défendeur ou toute autre Puissance mandataire à faire rapport et à
rendre compte à l'Assemblée générale deN s ations Unies, en tant qu'or-
gane chargé de la surveillance des Mandats non transformés en accords
de tutelle. Si la communauté de vues nécessairepour qu'il y eût un ac-
accord taciteà cette fin avait implicitement existé, les Etats que l'on dit
aujourd'hui parties à cet accord l'auraient sans doute su et y auraient
fait allusion.Il est indéniable qu'à la dernière session de la Société
106109 SOUTHWEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
would have made some reference thereto. It cannot be denied that at
the final sessionof the League it was common cause among al1concerned
that no such agreement existed (whether in the provisions of the Cove-
nant, the mandates, the Charter, or elsewhere) and it does not seem
possible that a court of law could today, in the face ofthese incontro-
vertible facts, find to the contrary.
20. When Dr. Liang had read his draft resolution the chairman ruled
that the proposal was not relevant to the matter then under discussion,
namely the assumption by the United Nations of League functions and
powers of a technical and non-political character. The proposa1 was,
therefore, not debated.
Following this incident informal discussions were renewed, the
Chinese delegation participating therein. In the meantime further
statements were made by the representatives of France, New Zealand,
Belgium and Australia.
These statements were to the same effect as those made by the re-
presentatives of the United Kingdom and South Africa from which
extracts have been quoted by me. Not one of them contained even a
suggestion that the mandatories concerned would after the dissolution
of the League report and account to, or otherwise submit to the super-
vision of, the United Nations or any of its organs with regard to the
administration of their respective mandated territories. In effect each
of the said statements merely intimated the intention of the mandatory
concerned to continue with its administration of its mandated territory
as before. And as 1 shall show later, the Australian statement intimated
a clear contemplation that the mandate provisions for reporting and
accounting would lapse.
21. The outcome of the informal discussions which had meanwhile
taken place was that Dr. Liang on 12April 1946introduced a new draft
resolution, which had been settled in consultation and agreement by
al1countries interested in mandates. In proposing the newdraft resolution
Dr. Liang-
". . recalled that he had already drawn the attention of the Com-
mittee to the complicated problems arising in regard to mandates
from the transfer of functions from the League to the United
Nations. The United Nations Charter in Chapters XII and XII1
established a system of trusteeship based largely upon the principles
of the mandates system, but the functions of the League in that
respect were not transferred automatically to the United Nations.
The Assembly should therefore take steps to secure the continued
application of the principles of the mandates system. As Professor
Bailey had pointed out to the Assembly on the previous day, the
League would wish to be assured as to the future of mandated
territories. The matter had also been referred to by Lord Cecil
and other delegates.
It was gratifying to the Chinese delegation, as representing ades Nations il était généralementadmis par tous les intéressés qu'il
n'existait aucun accord de ce genre dans les dispositions du Pacte, ni
dans les Mandats, ni dans la Charte, ni ailleurs, et il semble impossible
qu'un tribunal puisse aujourd'hui, face à ces faits indiscutables, dire
le contraire.
20. Aprèsla lecture par M. Liang de son projet de résolution,le pré-
sident a décidéquela proposition n'étaitpas pertinente quant au point
examiné, àsavoir la prise en charge par les Nations Unies des fonctions
et des pouvoirs de caractère technique et non politique de la Société
des Nations. La proposition n'a donc pas étédiscutée.
A la suite de cet incident, les conversations officieuses ont repris,
avec la participation de la délégation chinoise.Pendant ce temps les
représentants de la France, de la Nouvelle-Zélande,de la Belgique et
de l'Australie ont fait de nouvelles déclarations.
Ces déclarations allaient dans le même sensque celles qui avaient
étéfaites par les représentantsdu Royaume-Uni et de l'Afrique du Sud
et dont j'ai cité des extraits.ucune d'entre elles ne laissait le moins
du monde entendre qu'après la dissolution de la Société desNations
les Mandataires intéressésferaient rapport et rendraient compte aux
Nations Unies ou à un de leurs organes ou se soumettraient à leur sur-
veillance quant à l'administration de leurs territoires sous Mandat.
En fait, les Mandataire: dont il s'a~it se sont bornésà proclamer leur
intention de continuerà administrzrieursterritoires sous Mandat comme
auparavant. De plus, comme je le montrerai plus loin, l'Australie a
clairement indiquéqu'à son avis les dispositions du Mandat relatives
à l'obligation de faire rapport et de rendre compte deviendraient ca-
duques.
21. A la suite des discussions officieuses, M. Liang a présentéle
12 avril 1946 un nouveau projet derésolutionétablienconsultation avec
tous les pays intéressésà la question des Mandats et en accord avec
eux. En proposant ce nouveau projet de résolutionM. Liang a rappelé
qu'il avait
((déjàattirél'attention de la Commission sur les problèmes compli-
qués quesoulèvent les Mandats, du fait du transfert de fonctions
dela Sociétédes Nations aux Nations Unies. La Charte des Nations
Unies, aux chapitres XII et XIII, a établi système de tutelle
fondé,en grande partie, sur les principes du système desMandats,
mais les fonctions pertinentes de la Sociétn'ontpas été transmises
automatiquement aux Nations Unies. L'Assemblée devrait donc
prendre des mesures pour assurer la continuité d'application des
principes du système des Mandats. Comme le professeur Bailey
l'a signaléla veille à l'Assemblée,la Sociétédes Nations désire
êtresûre de l'avenir desterritoires sous Mandat. Lord Cecilet d'au-
tres déléguéo snt aussi fait allusionà cette question.
C'estavec une vive satisfaction que la délégation chinoise,repré-
107 country which had always stood for the principle of trusteeship,
that al1 the mandatory powers had announced their intention to
administer the territories under their control in accordance with
their obligationsunder the mandates system until other arrangements
were agreed upon.It was to be hoped that the future arrangements
to be made with regard to these territories would apply, in full the
principle of trusteeship underlying the mandates system." (Italics
added.)
The new Chinese draft contained what eventually became the League
Assembly's resolution concerning mandates in the following form:
"The Assembly :
Recalling that Article 22 of the Covenant applies to certain
territories placedunder mandate the principle that the well-being
and development of peoples not yet able to stand alone in the
strenuous conditions of the modern world form a sacred trust of
civilizatio:
1. Expresses its satisfaction with the manner in which the organs
of the League have performed the functions entrusted to them
with respect to the mandates system and iri particular pays
tribute to the work accomplished by the Mandates Commission;
2. Recalls the role of the League in assisting Iraq to progress
from its statusunder an 'A'mandate to a condition of complete
independence, welcomes the termination of the mandated status
of Syria, the Lebanon and Transjordan, which have, since the
last session of the Assembly, become independent members of
the world community ;
3. Recognizes that, on the termination of the League's existence,
its functions with respect to the mandated territories will come
to an end, but notes that ChaptersXI, XII and XIII of the Charter
of the United Nations embody principles correspondingto those
declared in Article22 of the Covenant of the League;
4. Takes note of the expressed intentions of the members of the
League now administering territories under mandate to continue
fo administer them for the well-being and developmentof the
peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained
in the respective mandates until other arrangements have been
agreed between the United Nations and the respective mandatory
powers." (Italics added.)
This resolution was adopted unanimously, the Egyptian delegate
abstaining from the vote by reason of a reservation of his Government
in regard to the Mandate for Palestine.
22. On the same day (18 April 1946)the Assembly of the League also
adopted other resolutions, including one in respect of certain parts of
the United Nations General Assembly resolution 14 of 12 February
(erroneously described as dated 16February), but significantly adopted
108 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 110
sentant un pays qui a toujours préconiséle principe de la tutelle,
constate que toutes les Puissances mandataires ont annoncé leur
intention d'administrer lesterritoires dont ellesont la garde suivant
les règlesdusystèmedes Mandats,jusqu'à ce qued'autresdispositions
aient étéadoptées.II faut espérer que les arrangements qui seront
pris au sujet de ces territoires uppliquerontintégralement le principe
de la tutelle qui eàtla base du systèmedes Mandats. 1(Les italiques
sont de nous.)
Le nouveau projet chinois allait devenir sous la forme suivante la
résolution de l'Assemblée de la Sociétédes Nations relative aux
Mandats:
(L'Assemblée:
Rappelant que l'article 22 du Pacte applique à certains terri-
toires placéssous Mandat le principe que le bien-êtreet le déve-
loppement des peuples non encore capables de se diriger eux-
mêmesdans les conditions particulièrement difficiles du monde
moderne forment une mission sacréede civilisation:
1. Exprime sa satisfaction pour la manière dont les divers organes
de la Sociétédes Nations ont rempli les fonctions qui leur
étaient confiées pour l'application du système des Mandats
et rend tout particulièrement hommage à l'Œuvre accomplie
par la Commission permanente des Mandats;
2. Rappelle quela Sociétédes Nations a aidél'Irak à passer de son
statut de territoire sous Mandat A à l'entière indépendance;
se féliciteque, depuis la dernière session de l'Assemblée,la Syrie,
le Liban et la Transjordanie aient cessé d'êtredes territoires
sous Mandat pour devenir des membres indépendants de la
communauté internationale;
3. Reconnaît que la dissolution de la Sociétédes Nations mettra
fin àses fonctions en ce aui concerne les territoires sousMandat.
maisnotequedesprincipescorrespondant à ceux quedéclare l'article
22 du Pacte sont incorporés dansles chapitres XI, XII et XIII
de la Charte des Nations Unies;
4. Note que les Membres de la Sociétéadministrant actuellement
des territoires sous Mandat ont exprimé leur intention de conti-
nuer à les administrer, en vue du bien-êtreet du développement
des peuples intéressésc ,onformémentaux obligations contenues
dans les divers Mandats, jusqu'à ce que de nouveaux arrange-
ments soient pris entre les Nations Unies et les diverses Puis-
sances mandataires. »(Les italiques sont de nous.)
Cette résolution a été adoptée à l'unanimité, le représentant de
1'Egypte s'étant abstenu en raison d'une réserveformuléepar son gou-
vernement au sujet di1 Mandat pour la Palestine.
22. Le mêmejour, 18avril 1946,l'Assembléede la Société desNations
a encore adopté d'autres résolutions, dont l'une avait traità certaines
parties de la résolutionXIV de l'Assemblée générald ees Nations Unies
en date du 12 février(pour laquelle on avait indiqué par erreur la date
108 111 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
no resolution relative to section C thereof concerningthe transfer to the
United Nations of powers under treaties, international conventions,
agreements and other instruments having a political character l.
It appears to be an inescapable conclusion that the League Assembly
took note of section C of the said resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly, but did not consider it necessary for the League to
pass any resolution in respect thereof.
1 have already mentioned that, as applied to mandates, this section
meant that the United Nations would not assume any powers entrusted
to the League by a particular mandate declaration unless it received
a request to do so from the mandatory concerned.
Had the Members of the United Nations (ail but seven of the 36
members of the League who attended its April session in 1946 were
founder Members of the United Nations) thought that the League
resolution of 18 April 1946 concerning mandates in any way made
provision for the transfer to the United Nations of supervisory powers
in respect of mandates, without any formal request in that regard being
directed to the United Nations by any of the mandatories, they would
have realized that the League resolution ran counter to the resolution of
the United Nations General Assembly of 12 February. And it is un-
believable that this matter would then not have been raised and debated
in the League Assembly and subsequently in the General Assembly of
the United Nations. The General Assembly would then either have
adhered to their resolution of 12 February, or would have altered it to
bring it into conformity with the League resolution. Nothing of the kind
ever happened, and one is therefore compelled to conclude that the
League resolution was not considered to be inconsistent with the reso-
lution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Had the first draft proposa1by China been adopted by the League the
position would have been different. This draft proposal was directly
opposed to the aforesaid United Nations resolution concerningthe trans-
fer of political functions. Whereas the latter provided, interalia, for the
ad hoc assumption by the United Nations, at the request of the party
concerned, of the functions entrusted to the League under a mandate
declaration, the firsthinese draft resolution envisageda general transfer
of these functions without any request by the parties concerned.
23. A League resolution requiredunanimous support,and it is obvious
that Dr. Liang's original draft resolution would not have been carried.
Respondent's representative could not, and would not, have supported
this proposal, as Respondent had repeatedlystated that the Mandate for
l Videpara. 16, supra.
109du 16février); il est toutefois significatif qu'elle n'ait pas adopté de ré-
solution relative au paragraphe C de ladite résolution de l'Assemblée
générale,qui concernait le transferà l'Organisation des Nations Unies
des pouvoirs découlant des traités, conventions internationales, accords
et autres instruments de caractère politiquel.
Il semble qu'il faille nécessairement en conclure que l'Assemblée
de la Sociétédes Nations a pris note du paragraphe C de la résolution
de l'Assemblée générald ees Nations Unies mais n'a pas jugé nécessaire
d'adopter une résolution à ce sujet.
J'ai déjà dit qu'appliqué aux Mandats ce paragraphe signifiait que
l'organisation des Nations Unies n'assumerait aucun des pouvoirs
dévolus à la Sociétédes Nations en vertu d'une déclaration de Mandat,
à moins d'être saisiepar le Mandataire intéressé d'unedemande à cet
effet.
Si les Membres des Nations Unies (les trente-six Membres de la
Sociétédes Nations qui assistaientà la session d'avril 1946étaienttous,
sauf sept, Membres originaires de l'organisation des Nations Unies)
avaient penséque la résolution de la Sociétéen date du 18 avril 1946
concernant les Mandats prévoyait d'une façon quelconque le transfert
aux Nations Unies des pouvoirs de surveillance sur les Mandats, sans
qu'aucun Mandataire ne saisisse les Nations Unies d'une demande
formelle à ce sujet, ils se seraient rendu compte que la résolution de la
Sociétédes Nations allait à l'encontre de la résolution de l'Assemblée
généraledes Nations Unies du 12 février.Dans ce cas, la question au-
rait certainement étésoulevéeet discutée à l'Assembléede la Société
des Nations et plus tard à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies.
Cette dernière aurait alors maintenu sa résolution du 12févrierou l'au-
rait modifiéepour la rendre conforme à la résolution dela Sociétédes
Nations. Comme il ne s'est jamais passé riende semblable, on doit en
conclure que la résolution de la Sociétédes Nations n'a pas étéconsi-
déréecomme incompatible avec la résolution de l'Assemblée générale
des Nations Unies.
Si la Sociétédes Nations avait adoptéle premier projet de résolution
présentépar la Chine, la situation aurait étédifférente.Ce projet était
directement opposé à la résolution des Nations Unies concernant le
transfert des fonctions politiques. Alors que cette dernière résolution
prévoyait notamment une reprise éventuelle par l'Organisation des
Nations Unies, à la demande de la partie intéressédee,s fonctions con-
fiéesà la Sociétédes Nations en vertu d'une déclaration de Mandat,
le premier projet de résolution chinois envisageait un transfert général
de ces fonctions, sans que les parties intéresséesaient eà en faire la
demande.
23. Toute résolutionde la Sociétédes Nations devant être approuvée
à l'unanimité, il estévidentque le projet de résolution initialement pro-
posépar M. Liang n'aurait pas été adoptéL. e représentant du défendeur
ne pouvait pas appuyer, et n'aurait pas appuyé, cetteproposition, étant
l Voir par. 16 ci-dessus.
109 South West Africa should be terminated, and that Respondent was
averse to the inclusion of the territory in any form of trusteeship under
the United Nations. Nor would the proposa1 have had the support of
the representative for Egypt. But the best proof of al1that it would not
have succeeded is the fact that it was not proceeded with, and that in its
place came a watered-down resolution omitting those provisions which
related to the transfer to the UnitedNations of thefunctions of theLeague
with regardto mandates,and to the suggested obligationof the mandatories
to report and accountto the UnitedNations.
If the purpose of the final League resolution was to record, or to
incorporate, an agreement in terms of which the mandatories were
to submit annual reports to the United Nations, and to submit to the
supervision of the United Nations, the provisions of the original Chinese
draft would have been retained as expressing the intention of the parties.
The fact that the expressprovisions in the firsthinese draft were deleted,
can, in the circumstances, lead to no other conclusion than that no agree-
ment embodying such provisions was arrived at. Any suggestion that the
parties deliberately refrained from retaining the expressprovisions of the
original Chinesedraft becausetheypreferred atacit agreement toan express
one in regard to this important matter, would be so nonsensical as not
to merit any consideration. The omission of the said provisions in the
later draft and in the resolution constitutes conclusive proof that that
meeting of minds which was necessary to bring about an agreement
concerning the transfer to the United Nations of supervisory powers in
respect of mandates was lacking.
In this regard 1respectfully wish to associate myself with the following
remarks by Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in their 1962
joint opinion :
"The contrast between the original Chinese draft and the one
eventually adopted constitutes an additional reason why we find it
impossible to accept the view ... that the functions of the League
Council in respect of mandates had passed to the United Nations;
for this was the very thing which the originalChinese draft proposed
but which was not adopted."
24. A finding that the League resolution of 18 April 1946 relating to
mandates constituted treaties defining the future obligations of the
mandatories cannot bejustified. It was not more than it purported to be:
a resolution of a moribund League. The only "agreement" that existed
was consensus as to the terms of the resolution. Two of its paragraphs
(3 and 4) are relied upon for the contention that it constituted an agree-
ment defining themandatories' obligations with respect to their mandates.
In paragraph 3 the Assembly "recognizes" that on the dissolution of the
League its functions with respect to mandated territories "will come
to an end". This was a legal fact which really required no recognition.
The Assembly further "notes" the existence in the Charter ofthe United SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 112
donné que le défendeur, d'une part, avait déclaré à maintes reprises
qu'il fallait mettre fin au Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain et, d'autre
part, était opposé ce que le territoire soit placésous un régimede tu-
telle exercépar l'Organisation desNations Unies. La proposition n'aurait
pas eu non plus l'appui du représentant de 1'Egypte.Mais la meilleure
preuve qu'elle n'aurait pas été adoptéec ,'est qu'ellea étéabandonnée
pour une résolution plus anodine qui ne contenait pas les dispositions
touchant soit au transfert aux Nations Unies desfonctions de la Société
des Nations relatives aux Mandats, soit à la prétendue obligationdes
Mandataires de faire rapport et de rendre compte à l'organisation des
Nations Unies.
Si la résolution finale de la Société desNations avait eu pour objet
d'entériner ou d'incorporer un accord aux termes duquel les Manda-
taires devaient présenter des rapports annuels aux Nations Unies et se
soumettre a leur surveillance, les dispositions du projet chinois initial
auraient étéretenues comme exprimant l'intention des parties. Le
fait que les dispositions expresses du premier projet chinois aient été
omises ne peut en l'occurrence conduire qu'à une seule conclusion, à
savoir qu'aucun accord n'a étéconclu au sujet de ces dispositions.
Prétendre que les parties se seraient délibérémena tbstenues de retenir
les dispositions expresses du projet chinois initial, parce qu'elles préfé-
raient un accord tacite à un accord explicite sur une question de cette
importance, serait tellement absurde que cela ne méritepas d'être exa-
miné. L'omission desdites dispositions dans le projet ultérieur et dans
la résolution prouve bien que la communauté de vues nécessairepour
aboutir à un accord concernant le transfert aux Nations Unies de pou-
voirs de surveillance sur les Mandats faisait défaut.
A cet égard,je voudrais respectueusement m'associer aux remarques
suivantes qui ont étéformuléespar sir Percy Spender et sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice dans leur opinion commune de 1962:
«La différenceentre le projet chinois original et la résolution
finalement adoptée constitue à nos yeux une raison de plus de
ne pas accepter l'opinion...selon laquelle les fonctions du Conseil
de la Sociétéen ce qui concerne les Mandats seraient passéesaux
Nations Unies, car c'était exactementce que proposait le projet
chinois original qui n'a pas été adopté. »
24. Il est impossible de dire que la résolutiondela Sociétdes Nations
en date du 18avril 1946relative aux Mandats constitue un traitédéfinis-
sant les futures obligations des Mandataires. Cette résolution n'est pas
autre chose que ce qu'elle était destinée à être:la résolution d'une
Sociétémoribonde. Le seul accord qui ait existéétait une entente sur
les dispositions de la résolution. Deux de ses paragraphes (3 et 4) sont
invoqués à l'appui de la thèse selon laquelle cette résolution constitue
un accord définissant les obligations des Mandataires en matière de
Mandats. Au paragraphe 3, l'Assemblée((reconnaît 1que la dissolution
de la Société desNations ((mettra fin ))aux fonctions de la Sociétédes
Nations en ce qui concerne les territoires sous Mandat. C'est là un faitNations of "principles" corresponding "to those of Article 22 of the
League Covenant". This "noting" cannot alter obligations, and what
strikes one forcibly is that nothing issaid about transfer to the United
Nations oftheLeague'sfunctions with respectto mandates. In paragraph 4
the Assembly "takes note" of the expressed intentions of members of
the League administering mandated territories-"to continue toadminis-
ter them for the well-beingand development of the peoples concerned in
accordance with the obligations contained in the respective mandates"
until other arrangements have been agreed upon between the United
Nations and the respective mandatory powers. Here again 1 fail to see
on what legal principles one can base a conclusion that a recording
in the League Assembly's resolution that it "takes note" of "expressed
intentions" constitutes a treaty which gives the "expressed intentions"
the force and efIect of legal obligations.
25. The Board of Liquidation of the League (which consisted of
representatives ofnine ex-members of the League) were required by the
League on its dissolution "to have regard in the performance of its task
to al1 the relevant decisions of the League Assembly taken at its last
session". The Board evidently did not regard the aforesaid League
resolution of 18 April 1946 as embodying international agreements
transferring the supervisory functions of the League to the United
Nations. In fact, the Board quoted the said resolution in its final report,
and then continued to state:
"The mandates system inaugurated by the League has thus
been brought to a close but the Board is glad to be able to record
that the experience gained by the Secretariat in thismatter has not
been lost, the United Nations having taken over with the small
remaining staff the mandates section archives which should afford
valuable guidance to those concerned with the administration of
the trusteeship system set up by the Charter of that organization."
This report was sent to every ex-member of the League who was present
at its final meeting, and there no record that any State ever questioned
the correctness of this statement in the report of the Board. If any party
to the League resolution in question had thought that it constituted a
binding international agreement that in respect of mandated territories
not converted to trusteeship the mandates system would continue to
operate, with the United Nations as the supervisory authority, then
their silence in these circumstances is inexplicable.
26. 1 have already drawn attention to the fact that, in terms of reso-
lution 14of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the assumption
by the United Nations of any functions of the League was to be subject,
inter alin, to the provisions of the Charter, and that any agreement in
terms of which the United Nations assumed the supervisory functions
111 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 113
juridique qui n'avait vraiment pas besoin d'êtrereconnu. Ensuit l'As-
semblée ((note» l'existence dans la Charte des Nations Unies de «prin-
cipes» correspondant «à ceux qu'énonce l'article 22du Pacte ». Le fait
de ((noter1ne saurait modifier des obligations et ce qui frappe tout par-
ticulièrement c'est qu'iln'est pas question du transfertàl'Organisation
des Nations Unies des fonctions de la Société desNations en matière
de Mandats. Au paragraphe 4, l'Assemblée((note » que les Membres
de la Société desNations administrant des territoires sous Mandat
ont expriméleur intention «de continuer à les administrer, en vue du
bien-êtreet du développement des peuples intéressésconformément
aux obligations contenues dans les divers Mandats )jusqu'à ce que de
nouveaux arrangements soient pris entre les Nations Unies et les diver-
ses Puissances mandataires. Encore une fois, je ne vois pas sur quel
principe juridique on peut se fonder pour conclure que le fait de men-
tionner dans la résolution que l'Assembléede la Société desNations
((note» les intentions expriméesconstitue un traité donnant à ces in-
tentions la force et l'effet d'obligations juridiques.
25. A sa dissolution, la Société desNations a demandé à son Comité
de liquidation, qui étaitcomposéde représentantsde neuf de ses anciens
membres, de tenir compte dans l'accomplissement de satâche de toutes
les décisionspertinentes prises par l'Assembléeà sa dernière session.Il
est évidentque le Comitt n? pensa't pas que la résolutionde la Société
des Nations en date du 18 avri! 1346 contînt un accord international
transférent auxNations Unies les fonctions de surveillance de la Société
des Nations. En fait le Comité,après avoir citéladite résolution dans
son rapport final, a ajouté:
«Le système des Mandats créépar la Société desNations a
pris fin, mais le Comitéest heureux de pouvoir noter que i'expé-
rience acquise par le Secrétariat dans ce domaine n'a pas été
perdue, l'organisation des Nations Unies ayant gardé lepersonnel
réduit encoreen fonction dans la Section des Mandats et repris
les archives de cette dernière,ce qui pourra êtred'une grande valeur
pour ceux qui sont chargésde l'administration du systèmede tutelle
instituépar la Charte de cette Organisation.))
Ce rapport a étécommuniqué à chacun des anciens Membres de la
Société des Nations qui assistaientà la dernière sessionet rien n'indique
qu'un Etat ait jamais contesté l'exactitude du passage ci-dessus. Si
l'une des parties à la résolution a pensé que celle-ci constituait un
accord international de caractère obligatoireen vertu duquel le système
des Mandats continuerait à fonctionner pour les territoires sous Mandat
non placés sousle régimede tutelle, les Nations Unies étantl'autorité
de surveillance, son silence, dans ces conditions, est inexplicable.
26. J7aidéjàrelevéqu'aux termes de la résolution XIVde l'Assemblée
générale desNations Unies, la prise en charge par les Nations Unies
d'une fonction quelconque de la Société desNations était soumise
entre autres aux dispositions de la Charte et que tout accord aux termes
duquel les Nations Unies auraient assuméles fonctions de surveillance
111of the League relative to mandates would accordingly have had to be
registered in terms of Article 102of the Charter.
In this regard one should bear in mind that a unilateral declaration
by a State which has been accepted by another constitutes an international
agreement in terms of Article 102 of the Charter. If the declarations of
the mandatories together with the resolution of the League Assembly
of 18 April 1946were considered to constitute international agreements
-which is in effect what Applicants contend-it is inconceivable that
no steps should have been taken to effectthe necessary registration. This
is the more significant when one has regard to the carefully worded
agreements relative to the transfer to the United Nations of assets and
certain other functions of the League entered into between the United
Nations and the aforesaid Board of Liquidation pursuant to resolutions
of the Assembly of the League of 18 April 1946, which agreements
were dulyregistered and published in the United Nations Treaties Series.
In these circumstances, there can be no doubt that if it had been con-
sidered that the declarations of the mandatories together with the
League resolution concerning mandates constituted international
agreements in terms whereof the mandatories' obligations to report
and account to the Council of the League were transformed into obli-
gations to report and account to an organ of the United Nations, proper
steps would have been taken to have the necessary registrations effected
in accordance with the provisions of Article 102.
It has been suggested that no registration was effected because the
evidence of the agreements was contained in so many statements that
registration would not have been practicable. It is, however, inconceiv-
able that no attempt would have been made in such a case to reduce
the agreements to a registerable form. 1 know of no reason why the
States concerned should deliberately have refrained from taking such
steps, when they knew that in terms of Article 103 such agreements,
if not registered, could not be invoked before any organs of the United
Nations. It has been suggested that Applicants' reliance on this sug-
gested "treaty" does not amount to "invoking" it before this Court
(which, of course, is an organ of the United Nations). 1 do not agree
with this contention; but it is, in any event, no answer to the point
that if the States concerned thought that they were entering into a treaty
they would not have done so in such an ineffectiveand obscure manner.
Hall, in Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, page 273, com-
mented as follows on this League resolution:
"The significance of this resolution of the League Assembly
becomes clearer when it is realized that for many months the most
elaborate discussions had been taking place between the govern-
ments as to the exact procedure to be adopted in making the transi-
tion between the League and the United Nations. It was the function
of the Preparatory Commission and committees succeeding it to
112de la Société relativesaux Mandats aurait dû en conséquence être
enregistréconformément à l'article 102de la Charte.
A cet égard, il ne faut pas oublier qu'une déclaration unilatérale
faite par un Etat et acceptéepar un autre constitue un accord inter-
national aux termes de l'article 102 de la Charte. Si les déclarations
des Mandataires, ainsi que la résolution de l'Assembléede la Société
des Nations en date du 18avril 1946,ont étéconsidérées comme consti-
tuant un accord international - ce que soutiennent en fait les deman-
deurs -, il est inconcevable qu'aucune mesure n'ait étéprise en vue
de procéder à l'enregistrement nécessaire.Ce fait revêt encore plus
d'importance si l'on tient compte du soin apporté à la rédaction des
accords relatifs au transfert aux Nations Unies des avoirs et de certaines
autres fonctions de la Société desNations, qui ont étéconclus entre les
Nations Unies et le Comité de liquidation suite aux résolutions de
l'Assembléede la Société desNations en date du 18 avril 1946 et qui
ont été dûmentenregistrés et publiés dans le Recueil des traités des
Nations Unies. Dans ces conditions, il ne fait aucun doute que, si l'on
avait estiméque les déclarations des Mandataires, ainsi que les réso-
lutions de la Société desNations relatives aux Mandats, constituaient
un accord international aux termes duquel les obligations des Manda-
taires de faire rapport et de rendre compte au Conseil de la Société
des Nations étaient transformées en obligations de faire rapport et
de rendre compte à un organe des Nations Unies, des mesures appro-
priées auraient étéprises pour procéder à l'enregistrement nécessaire
aux termes de l'article 102.
On a prétenduque l'enregistrement n'apas eu lieu parce que l'accord
était consigné dans un si grand nombre de déclarations qu'il aurait
étéimpossible de l'enregistrer. Si tel est le cas, il est inconcevable que
rien n'ait étfait pour présenterces accords sous une forme enregistrable.
Je ne vois pas pourquoi les Etats intéressésse seraient délibérément
abstenus de prendre de telles mesures, alors qu'ils savaient qu'aux
termes de l'article 102 l'accord, s'il n'étaitpas enregistré, nepourrait
êtreinvoqué devant aucun organe des Nations Unies. On a soutenu
que, si les demandeurs se fondent sur ce ((traité», cela ne signifie pas
qu'ils l'«invoquent)) devant la Cour (qui est naturellement un organe
des Nations Unies). Je ne suis pas d'accord avec cette allégation qui,
de toute manière, ne répond pas à l'argument selon lequel, si les Etats
intéressésavaient entendu conclure un traité, ils ne l'auraient pas fait
d'une manière aussiinefficaceet aussi obscure.
Hall, dans son ouvrage Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship,
page 273, a formulé le commentaire suivant sur la résolution de la
Société desNations dont il s'agit:
«La portéede cette résolution de la S.d.N. devient plus claire si
l'on songe que les discussions les plus approfondies s'étaientpour-
suivies pendant plusieurs mois entre les gouvernements quant à
la procédure exacte à adopter pour assurer la transition entre la
S.d.N. et les Nations Unies. La Commission préparatoire et les
comités qui lui ont succédéavaient pour fonction de faire des make recommendations on the transfer of functions, activities,
and assets of the League. Al1 the assets of the League had been
carefully tabulated. Al1 its rights and obligations that could be
bequeathed to the United Nations and which the latter desired
to take over were provided for in agreements that were made.
But in the case of mandates, the League died without a testa-
ment."
See also South West Africa cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pages 651-652.
27. It has also been suggested that the reason for not drafting a
conventional treaty was that it was thought that al1 mandates would
be placed under the international trusteeship system within a relatively
short time. If this statement were correct, it would equally be a reason
for not entering into any agreement at al1 as regards reporting to the
United Nations. But the statement is not correct. There is no evidence
in support thereof. On the contrary, the mandatories were not obliged
to enter into trusteeship agreements, and the members of the League
knew that a trusteeship agreement could only be concluded if the man-
datory power concerned and the United Nations could agree on the
terms thereof. The representative of the United Kingdom, for example,
had stated clearly that the willingness of the United Kingdom to place
its African mandated territoriesunder the trusteehhip system depended
upon its being able to negotiate satisfactory terms. And with regard
to South West Africa the Members of the League knew that Respondent
was claiming incorporation, and that Respondent had no intention of
placing South West Africa under the trusteeship system.
28. From what has been stated in the preceding paragraphs it follows
that there is no justification for the suggestion that the Leagueresolu-
tion in question constitutes a treaty in terms whereof the supervisory
functions of the Council of the League in regard to mandates were
transferred to the United Nations and the mandatories' obligations
to report and account to the Council of the League were transformed
into obligations to report and account to the United Nations. But even
if the resolutioncan at al1be regarded as being in the nature of a treaty,
it cannot have the effects aforestated. It cannot embody more than the
expressed intentions of the parties. At most it would (on the assumption
that it is a treaty) constitute an agreement that the mandatories would
continue to administer the territories for the well-being and develop-
ment of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations
contained in the respective mandates. The aforesaid resolution does
not refer to any undertaking to continue to report and account. As 1
have indicated this omission was not accidental but deliberate.
Not a single mandatory stated that it would continue to comply
with the provisions relating to reporting and accounting. They could
not have done so as they knew that those provisions depended for their
fullilment on the existence of the League of Nations. Had they under-
taken to comply with those obligations after dissolution of the League recommandations au sujet du transfert des fonctions, des activités
et des avoirs de la S.d.N. Tous les avoirs de celle-ci avaient été
soigneusement inventoriés; tous ses droits et obligations qui pou-
vaient êtreconférésaux Nations Unies et que cette dernière désirait
reprendre étaient prévus dans les accords qui ont étépassés.Mais,
dans le cas des Mandats, la S.d.N. est morte sans testament. ))
Voir également affaires du Sud-Ouest africain, C.I.J. Recueil 1962,
pages 651-652.
27. On a également soutenu que, si l'on n'a pas établi de contrat
en bonne et due forme, c'est que l'on estimait que tous les Mandats
seraient placés sous le régime international de tutelle dans un délai
relativement court. Si cela est exact, il y aurait eu un autre motif de
ne pas conclure d'accord quant à l'obligation de faire rapport aux
Nations Unies. Mais cela n'est pas exact. Rien ne prouve cette assertion.
Bisn au contraire, les Mandataires n'étaient pas obligés de conclure
des accords de tutelle et les Membres de la Sociétédes Nations savaient
qu'un accord de tutelle ne pouvait être conclu que si la Puissance
mandataire intéresséeet les Nations Unies parvenaient à s'entendre
sur ses conditions. Le représentant du Royaume-Uni, par exemple,
a clairement indiqué que son gouvernement était disposé à placer sous
le régime de tutelle ses territoires africains sous Mandat, à condition
qu'il puisse obtenir des conditions satisfaisantes. Quant au Sud-Ouest
africain, les Membres de la Sociétédes Nations savaient que le défendeur
en demandait l'incorporation et n'avaitaucunement l'intention deleplacer
sous le régimede tutelle.
28. Il ressort des paragraphes qui précèdent que rien ne justifie
l'allégation selon laquellela résolution de la Société desNations consti-
tue un traitéaux termes duquel les fonctions de surveillance du Conseil
de la Sociétédes Nations en matière de Mandats ont ététransférées
aux Nations Unies et les obligations des Mandataires de faire rapport
et de rendre compte au Conseil transformées en obligations de faire
rapport et de rendre compte aux Nations Unies. Mêmesi cette réso-
lution peut êtreconsidéréecomme ayant le caractère d'un traité, elle
ne saurait avoir eu les effets précités. Elle nepeut renfermer autre chose
que les intentions expriméespar les parties. Tout au plusconstitue-t-elle
(en supposant qu'il s'agisse d'un traité)un accord tendant à ce que les
Mandataires continuent à administrer les territoires en vue du bien-être
etdu développement despeuples intéresséc sonformément auxobligations
contenues dans les divers Mandats. La résolution ne fait état d'aucun
engagement de continuer de faire rapport et de rendre compte. Comme
je l'ai indiqué, cette omission n'a pas étéaccidentelle, mais inten-
tionnelle.
Aucun des Mandataires n'a déclaréqu'il continuerait à appliquer les
dispositions relatives l'obligation de faire rapport et de rendre compte.
Ils n'auraient pas pu le faire, sachant que ces dispositions dépendaient
quant à leur exécution de l'existence de la Société desNations. S'ils
s'étaient engagés assumer cesobligationsaprès la dissolution del'organi-
113 they would have stated the respects in which they thought the provi-
sions of the mandates were being amended or superseded. The decla-
rations of intention to continue to administer the mandated territories
were of a general nature: "in accordance with the general principles
of existing mandates" (United Kingdom), "to pursue the execution of
the mission entrusted to it by the League of Nations" (France), "in
accordance with the terms of the mandate for the promotion of the
well-being and advancement of the inhabitants" (New Zealand), "in
accordance with the provisions of the mandates, for the protection
and advancement of the inhabitants" (Australia). The delegate of the
Respondent, after stating its intention of applying to the United Nations
for international recognition of South West Africa as an integral part
of the Union of South Africa, proceeded to express an intention on
Respondent's part to continue to comply with its obligations under
the mandate after the dissolution of the League. The words he used
(see paragraph 18 above) made it clear that these were the obligations
concerning administration, which did not depend on the existence of
the League for their fulfilment. The statement said in terms that the
Respondent would continue to administer the Territory scrupulously
in accordance with the obligations of the Mandate as she had done
during the six years when meetings of the Mandates Commission could
not be held. It is common cause that during those years there was no
reporting or accounting to the Council of the League. The statement
made express mention of the fact that the disappearance ofthose organs
of the League concerned with the supervision of mandates, primarily
the Mandates Commission and the League Council, would necessarily
preclude complete compliancewith the letter of the mandate. It did not
Say, and no fair interpretation can give it the effect of saying, that the
Respondent was agreeable that the supervisoryfunctions of the Council
of the League and the Mandates Commission be transferred to the
organs of the United Nations. As 1 shall show later, the subsequent
conduct of Respondent, and of al1the members of the League present
at its final session, leaves no room for any doubt that they did not
consider that the Respondent's statement and/or the League's resolu-
tion constituted an agreement in terms whereof Respondent became
obliged to report and account to the United Nations as the supervisory
body in respect of the Mandate for South West Africa. Nor can any such
agreement be spelled out from the declarations made by the other
mandatories.
29. The Australian representativemade it clear that after the disso-
lution of the League it would be impossible to continue the mandates
system in its entirety. Had the suggestedtransfer of the League Council's
functions been contemplated, the Australian representative would
simply have said that the supervisory functions of the League Council
were being transferred to the organs of the United Nations. sation, ils auraient signaléles points sur lesquels ils pensaient que les
dispositions des Mandats étaient modifiéesou remplacées. Les décla-
rations concernant leur intention de continuer à administrer les terri-
toires sous Mandat ont eu un caractère général: ((conformémentaux
principes généraux des Mandats existants ))(Royaume-Uni), ((pour-
suivre l'exécutionde la mission qui lui a étéconfiéepar la Sociétédes
Nations ))(France), ccconformément aux termes du Mandat, en vue
d'assurer le bien-êtreet le progrès des habitants 1)(Nouvelle-Zélande),
((conformémentaux dispositions de ces Mandats, en vue de pourvoir
à la protection et au développement des habitants » (Australie). Le
représentantdu défendeur,après avoirindiquéson intention de demander
aux Nations Unies que le Sud-Ouest africain soit reconnu sur le plan
international comme formant partie intégrante de l'Union sud-africaine,
a exprimé l'intention du défendeur de continuer après la dissolution
de la Société desNations à assumer les obligations qui lui incombaient
en vertu du Mandat. Il ressort nettement des termes employés (voir
par. 18ci-dessus)qu'il s'agissait des obligations enmatière d'administra-
tion, dont l'exécution nedépendait pas de l'existence de la Sociétédes
Nations. Dans cette déclaration, il étaitdit textuellement que le défen-
deur continuerait à administrer le territoire en se conformant scrupu-
leusement aux obligations du Mandat, comme il l'avait fait pendant
les six dernières années durant lesquellelsa Comnzission des Mandats
n'avait pu se réunirIl est admis qu'au cours de ces annéesle défendeur
n'a nifait rapport ni rendu compte au Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations.
La déclaration signalait expressément que la disparition des organes
de la Société desNations chargés de la surveillance des Mandats,
principalement la Commission permanente des Mandats et le Conseil,
empêcherait nécessairementle Mandataire de se conformer entièrement
à la lettre du Mandat. Elle ne disait pas, et aucune interprétation
équitable ne pourrait lui faire dire, que le défendeur consentait à ce
que les fonctions de surveillance du Conseil de la Société desNations
et de la Commission permanente des Mandats soient transféréesaux
organes des Nations Unies. Comme je le montrerai plus loin, l'attitude
adoptée ultérieurement par le défendeur et par tous les Membres de
la Société desNations présents à sa dernière session indique nettement
qu'ils ne considéraient pas que la déclaration du défendeur et/ou la
résolution de la Société desNations constituent un accord aux termes
duquel le défendeur est obligéde faire rapport et de rendre compte aux
Nations Unies en tant qu'organe de surveillance à l'égarddu Mandat
pour le Sud-Ouest africain. De même,il est impossible de déceler le
moindre accord de ce genre dans les déclarations faites par les autres
Mandataires.
29. Le représentant del'Australie a nettement indiqué qu'après la
dissolution de la Sociétédes Nations il serait impossible de continuer
à appliquer intégralement le systèmedesMandats. Sile prétendu transfert
des fonctions du Conseil avait étéenvisagé, lereprésentant de l'Australie
aurait tout simplement dit que les fonctions de surveillance du Conseil
dela Sociétédes Nations étaienttransféréesauxorganes desNations Unies.
114117 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
The Australian representative also referred to the explicit international
obligation laid down in Chapter XI of the Charter, being the duty of
transmitting information as provided for in Article 73 (e) of the Charter,
and said that there would be no gap, no interregnum to provide for.
In this regard it is significant that the League resolution "notes" that
Chapters XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter of the United Nations embody
principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League. If the Members of the League thought that Chapter XI
did not apply to territories under mandate surely no reference would
have been made thereto in the resolution.
It does not matter whether Members were right or wrong in their
assumption that Chapter XI applied to the mandates. They may well
have been wrong. The important fact, however, is that they or at least
some of them thought it did.
If it was thought that the duty to reportunder Article 22 of the Cove-
nant and the Mandate Declaration would continue to exîst after the
dissolution of the League, no reference would have been made to Chap-
ter XI of the Charter. The duty of transmitting information under
Chapter XI is a much more restricted and less onerous one than that
of reporting and accounting under the mandates. It would therefore
not have been considered to be applicable to mandates, after the disso-
lution of the League, unless the contemplation was that the duty of
reporting and accounting under the mandates had lapsed. The contem-
plation could not have been that there would be in operation two over-
lapping sacred trusts in respect of each mandated territory, both super-
vised by the United Nations, to which each mandatory had to render
two reports, one in terms of the Mandate Declaration and the other
in terms of Chapter XI. It was obviously thought by at least some of
the delegates that Chapter XI would indeed supersede the more onerous
reporting provisions of the Covenant and the Mandate Declaration,
by reason of the lapse of such provision, until "other arrangements"
were agreed to between the United Nations and the mandatory powers
concerned. Such other arrangements could have included, inter alia,
a trusteeship agreement, or the "assumption" by the United Nations,
in terms of its Assembly'sresolution XIV of 12February 1946,of super-
vision in pursuance of a request to that end, or approval of incorporation
by the mandatory of the mandated territory l.
Whether Chapter XI applies to South West Africa is not one of the issues in
this case, and in any event this Court has no jurisdictione compromissory
refrain from expressing myiew on the question whether the said Chapter appliesly
or not, and shall similarly remainent on the further question that would arise
if it applies, namely whether the United Nations organs' disregard of its provisions
is tantamount to a breach or repudiation which entitles members affected thereby
to refuse to comply with the reporting provisions of the Chapter. Le représentant de l'Australie a égalementfait état de l'obligation
internationale expressément énoncée au chapitre XI de la Charte, à
savoir l'obligation de communiquer des renseignements prévue à l'ar-
ticle73 e), et il a dit qu'il n'y aurait aucun vide,aucun interrègnàcom-
bler entre les deux régimes. A cet égard,il est significatifque la Société
des Nations ait ((noté » dans sa résolutionque des principes correspon-
dant à ceux qu'énonce l'article 22du Pacte sont incorporésdans les cha-
pitres XI, XII et XII1 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Siles Membres
de la Société desNations avaient estiméque le chapitre XI ne s'appli-
quait pas aux territoires sous Mandat, ils n'auraient certainement pas
mentionnéce chapitre dans la résolution.
Peu importe que les Membres de la Société aient eu tort ou raison de
penser que le chapitre XI s'applique aux Mandats. Il est fort possible
qu'ils aient eu tort. Ce qui importe c'est que les Etats Membres, ou
tout au moins certains d'entre eux, aient eu cette pensée.
Si1'011avait estiméque l'obligation de faire rapport en vertu de l'ar-
ticle 22 du Pacte et de la déclaration de Mandat continuerait à exister
après la dissolution de la Société desNations, on n'aurait pas mentionné
le chapitre XI de la Charte. L'obligation de communiquer des renseigne-
ments en vertu du chapitre XI est une obligation bien plus restreinte
etbeaucoupmoinsétenduequecelledefairerapport etderendrecompte en
vertu desMandats. Ellen'aurait doncpasété considérée comme applicable
aux Mandats aprèsla dissolution dela SociétédeN s ations, sil'on n'avait
pas tenu pour caduque l'obligation de faire rapport et de rendre compte
en vertu du Mandat. Il est impossible que l'on ait envisagé l'existence
pour chaque territoire sous Mandat de deux missions sacréesfaisant
double emploi et contrôléestoutes deux par l'organisation des Nations
Unies, à laquelle chaque Mandataire aurait dû présenter deuxrapports,
l'un aux termes de la déclaration de Mandat et l'autre aux termes du
chapitre XI. Il est clair que, dans l'esprit de certains des représentants
tout au moins, le chapitre XI remplaçait en fait les dispositions du
Pacte et de la déclarationde Mandat - qui imposaient une obligation
plus étendue de faire rapport, mais étaient devenues caduques - en
attendant que ((de nouveaux arrangements » soient conclus entre les
Nations Unies et les Puissances mandataires intéressées. Cesnouveaux
arrangements pouvaient consister notamment en un accord de tutelle,
ou, aux termes de la résolution XIV del'Assemblée générad lu 12février
1946, en la «prise en charge »de la surveillance2ar les Nations Unies
à la suite d'une demande présentée à cette fin,ou encoreen l'approbation
de l'incorporation du territoire sous Mandat par le Mandataire l.
La question de savoir si le chapXIrs'applique au Sud-Ouest africain ne se
pose pas en l'espèceet de toute façon, aux termes de la clause compromissoire du
Mandat, la Cour n'est pas compétente pour se prononcerce sujet. Je m'abstien-
drai donc de donner mon avis sur la question de savoir si ce chapitre s'applique
ou non et j'observerai également silence sur l'autre question qui se poserait au!
cas où ce chapitre s'appliquerait, celle de savoir si le fait que les organes des Nations
permettant auxnMembres dont les intérêtssont affectésde refuser d'appliquer les
dispositionsudit chapitre relatives à l'obligation de rendre compte. 30. The United Kingdom's intention was expressed as being "to
continue to administer these territories in accordance with the general
principles of the existing mandates". That this statement, in itself, or
as read with the League Assembly's resolution, did not embrace, and
was not understood to embrace, an agreement substituting an obligation
to report and account to the United Nations for the obligation to report
and account to the Council of the League, appears, apart from the
other considerations already mentioned, from the report and delibera-
tions of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine l.
Allbuttwo of the members of this Committee were Members of the
League at the time of its dissolution, and were parties to the aforesaid
resolution of the League, and al1were founder Members of the United
Nations. If the resolution in question was thought by these States to
have had the effect of obliging mandatories to report and account to
the United Nations, they would not have stated in their report con-
cerning Palestine that on the dissolution of the League there was no
international authority to which the mandatory power might "submit
reports and generally account for the exercise of its responsibilities in
accordance with the terms of the mandate". The report states that the
mandatory's representative had this in mind when speaking of ad-
ministration "in accordance with the general principles" of the mandate
at the final League session. The report further states in terms that "the
most the mandatory could now do.. .would be to carry out its ad-
ministration in the spirit of the mandate. ..".In a special note to the
report, the representative of India remarked, inter alia, that:
"There are no means by which the international obligations
in regard to the mandatescan be discharged by the United Nations."
These States could not possibly have thought that the supervisory
functions of the Council of the League had been transferred to the
United Nations, whether by the provisions of the Mandate and the
Covenant of the League, by the Charter of the United Nations, by
the League resolution in question, by the declarations of intention
by the mandatories, or by any other statement or instrument.
31. As will be indicated later, the aforesaid views of the above States
reflected the general views of the Members of the United Nations,
which included practically al1 States who were original Members of
the League as well as the States present at the dissolution of the
League. On what possible grounds coiild this Court now find the exist-
ence of tacit agreements, of which the States who are supposed to
have been the parties thereto were unaware when practical situations
Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.ia,
116 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 118
30. Le Royaume-Uni a exprimé son intention en disant qu'il conti-
nuerait ((à administrer ces territoires, conformément aux principes
générauxdes Mandats existants ». Le fait que cette déclaration, en elle-
mêmeou lue conjointement avec la résolution de l'Assembléede la
Sociétédes Nations, n'indiquait pas, et n'était pas considérée comme
indiquant, un accord aux termes duquel l'obligation de faire rapport
et de rendre compte au Conseil de la Société desNations serait rem-
placéepar une obligation de faire rapport et de rendre compte à l'orga-
nisation des Nations Unies ressort, toute autre considération déjà
mentionnée mise à part, du rapport et des délibérations dela Com-
mission spécialedes Nations Unies pour la Palestine I.
Tous les Etats membres de cette Commission, à l'exception de deux,
avaient été Membres dela Société desNations au moment de sa disso-
lution et étaient partiesà sa résolutionprécitéeet tous étaient Membres
originaires des Nations Unies. S'ils avaient estimé que la résolution en
question avait pour effet d'obliger les Mandataires à faire rapport et
àrendre compte aux Nations Unies, ilsn'auraient pas déclaré dans leur
rapport sur la Palestine qu'a la dissolution de la Société desNations
il n'y avait pas ((d'autoritéinternationale qui la Puissance mandataire
pût présenter des rapports et rendre compte de la façon dont elle s'était
acquittéedes tâches que lui imposait le Mandat ».Le rapport indiquait
que c'était cela que le représentant du Mandataire avait à l'esprit,
lorsque, à la dernière session de la Société desNations, il avait parlé
d'administrer les territoires conformément aux principes généraux » du
Mandat. Il était dit ensuite textuellement dans le rapport que cla Puis-
sance mandataire pourrait ...tout au plus ...poursuivre son administra-
tion dans l'esprit du Mandat ...))Dans un mémorandum spécialannexé
au rapport, le représentant de l'Inde a notamment fait observer:
(Il n'existe aucun moyen pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies
de s'acquitter des obligations internationales relatives au Mandat. ))
Il est impossible que cesEtats aient penséque lesfonctionsde surveillance
du Conseil de la Société des Nations avaient été transférées aux Nations
Unies en vertu des dispositions du Mandat et du Pacte, de la Charte,
de laditerésolution de la Sociétédes Nations, desdéclarationsd'intention
des Mandataires ou d'autres déclarations ou instruments.
31. Comme je l'indiquerai plus loin, les vues ci-dessus, exprimées
par les Etats en question, traduisaient l'opinion généraledes Membres
des Nations Unies, donc de presque tous les Etats qui avaient été
Membres de la Société desNations à l'origine ou au moment de sa
dissolution. Quels motifs la Cour pourrait-elle invoquer maintenant
pour dire qu'il existait des accords tacites, alors que les Etats présumés
y avoir été partiesles ont ignorés lorsqu'ils ont eu à faire face à des
l Les membres de la Commission étaient l'Australie, le CanaleGuatemala,
l'Inde, l'Iran, les Pays-Bas, le Pérou, la Suède, la Tchécoslovaquie, l'Uruguay
et la Yougoslavie.
116 arose in which agreements would have been invoked had they existed?
The fact that the United Nations eventually assumed responsibility
for the division of Palestineis of no significance at all. It was done at
the request of, and with the approval of, Great Britain, and accordingly
has no bearing on the issue in this case, viz.w,hether the Respondent
has been a party to any agreement in terms whereof the United Nations
was substituted for the Council of the League in Articleof the Mandate
Declaration.
32. 1 proceed to deal next with events subsequent to the dissolution
of the League.
Pursuant to an undertaking given earlier in that year, Respondent
in November 1946 submitted to the United Nations, for its approval,
theproposal to incorporate South West Africa into the Union of South
Africa. This proposa1 was rejected by the United Nations. It has been
submitted that by so doing Respondent clearly recognized the United
Nations as the international body competent to supervisethe administra-
tion of the Territory.
In my opinion there is no substance in this contention.
1have already indicated that Respondent's intimation that it intended
making such a request to the United Nations did not mean, and was
not intended nor understood to mean, that the United Nations was
acknowledged to have supervisory powers in respect of the Mandate.
It is sirnilarly clear-awill appear from a consideration of subsequent
events-that the request itself was neither intended, nor understood,
to have such an effect.It was no more than an attempt to obtain the ap-
proval of the United Nations to an important political act. There are
several instances where comparable requests were made to the United
Nations, but no one ever suggested that such requests constituted im-
plied consent to the substitution of the United Nations as the super-
visory authority in respect of mandates not converted to trusteeship.
Field-Marshal Smuts, when dealing with the incorporation proposa1
in the Fourth Cornmittee of the United Nations, stated that:
"It would not be possible for the Union Government as a former
mandatory to submit a trusteeship agreement in conflict with the
clearly expressed wishes of the inhabitants. The Assembly should
recognize that the implementation of the wishes of the population
was the course prescribed by the Charter and dictated by the in-
terests of the inhabitants themselves. If, however, the Assembly
did not agree that the clear wishes of the inhabitants should be
implemented, the Union Government could take no other course
than to abide by the declaration it had made to the last Assembly
of the League of Nations to the effect that it would continue to
C.R. 65/28, pp. 37 and 48.
117situations d'ordre pratique à l'occasion desquelles ils auraient pu les
invoquer s'ilsavaient existé?
Le fait que les Nations Unies aient assumépar la suite la responsabilité
du partage de la Palestine est sans importance. Cela a étéfait à la
requête dela Grande-Bretagne et avec son approbation et n'a donc
aucun rapport avec la question qui se pose en l'espèceet qui est de savoir
si le défendeura été partià un accord aux termes duquel l'Organisation
des Nations Unies a été substituéeau Conseil de la Société desNations
à l'article 6 de la déclarationde Mandat.
32. J'en arrivemaintenant aux événementsqui ont suivi la dissolution
de la Société desNations.
Comme suite à la déclaration qu'il avait faite un peu plus tôt dans
la mêmeannée, le défendeur a présenté à l'approbation des Nations
Unies en novembre 1946 une proposition tendant à l'incorporation
du Sud-Ouest africain dans l'Union sud-africaine. Les Nations Unies
ont rejetécette proposition. On a prétendu qu'en la présentant le dé-
fendeur a nettement reconnu que les Nations Unies sont l'organe in-
ternational compétent pour contrôler l'administration du territoire l.
A mon avis cette thèse est dénuée detout fondement.
J'ai déjà indiqué que la déclaration du défendeur selonlaquelle il
avait l'intention de présenter une demande en ce sens aux Nations
Unies ne signifiait pas, et n'étaitpas destinàesignifier nà être inter-
prétéecomme signifiant, qu'il reconnaissaitàl'organisation des Nations
Unies des pouvoirs de surveillance sur le Mandat. Il est également clair
- comme on le verra en examinant les événementsqui ont suivi -
que la demande elle-même n'était destinée n ài avoir un tel effet nà
êtreconsidéréecomme ayant un tel effet. Ce n'étaitautre chose qu'une
tentative pour obtenir l'approbation d'un important acte politique
par les Nations Unies. Celles-ci ont été à plusieurs reprises saisies de
demandes analogues, mais personne n'a jamais donné à entendre que
de telles demandes constituaient un consentement implicite à une prise
en charge par l'organisation des fonctions de surveillance sur les Man-
dats non transformés en accords de tutelle. Le maréchal Smuts parlant
de la proposition d'incorporation devant la Quatrième Commission
des Nations Unies a déclaré:
cComme ancienne Puissance mandataire, le Gouvernement de
l'Union ne peut pas soumettre un accord de tutelle en opposition
avec les vŒux clairement exprimés des habitants. L'Assemblée
doit reconnaître que la réalisation des vŒux de la population
est une solution conforme à la Charte, édictée aussipar l'intérêt
des habitants eux-mêmes.Toutefois, si l'Assemblée n'estpas d'avis
que les vŒux des habitants doivent êtresuivis, le Gouvernement
de l'Union ne peut adopter d'autre voie que de s'enteniràla décla-
ration qu'il a faite devant la dernière Assembléede la Société des
Nations, à savoir qu'il continuera, comme jusqu'ici, à administrer
C.R. 65/28, p. 37et48.
117 administer the Territory as heretofore as an integral part of the
Union, and to do so in the spirit of the principles laid down in
the Mandate.
In particular the Union would, in accordance wlithArticle 73,
paragraph (e) of the Charter, transmit regularly to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations 'for information purposes, subject
tosuch limitations as security and constitutional regulations might
require statistical and other information of a technical nature
relating to economic, social and educational conditions' in South
West Africa."
It will be noted that this statement was made only seven months after
the League resolution of 18 April 1946,and yet at that time (and for a
period of more than a year thereafter) not a single State contended that
Respondent was obliged to report to the United Nations, not under
Article 73 of the Charter, but under the provisions of the Mandate
Declaration. This was the first time after the dissolution of the League
that the Respondent had occasion to refer to its intentions with regard
to South West Africa, and if any State had been induced to believe that
the Respondent had agreed to such an amendment of the Mandate
Declaration, Respondent's statement would surely have been challenged.
The irresistible inference is that not a single Member of the United
Nations who had been a party to the League resolution, and who was
present when Field-Marshal Smuts made this statement could have
thought that the League resolution constituted an agreement obliging
the Respondent and other mandatories to account to the United Nations
as the supervisory authority in the place of the Council of the League.
Similarly no State could have beenunder the impression that the request
for approval of the incorporation of South West Africa constituted an
acknowledgement that the United Nations had been vested with such
powers, by any process whatsoever.
33. During 1947South West Africa was on several occasionsthe sub-
ject of discussion in the various organs of the United Nations-the
Fourth Committee, the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly.
Respondent's representatives repeatedly made statements which could
have left no doubt that Respondent's attitude was that, in the absence
of a trusteeship agreement, the United Nations would have no super-
visory jurisdiction over South West Africa, and that Respondent was
under no duty to report and account to the United Nations in compliance
with the obligations assumed under the Mandate.
In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated
23 July 1947, Respondent referred to a resolution of the House of
Assembly of the South Africa Parliament which, inter alia, recorded that
the rights and powers of the League of Nations relative to mandates had
not been transferred to the United Nations. The validity of this statement
was not questioned. The aforesaid resolution also expressed the opinion
that the Territory should be represented in the Union Parliament and
118 le Territoire comme partie intégrante de l'union, cela dans l'esprit
des principes énoncésdans le Mandat.
En particulier, l'Union transmettrait régulièrement et confor-
mément à l'article 73 e) de la Charte, au Secrétaire généraldes
Nations Unies, cpour information et sous réserve des exigences
de la sécuritéet des considérations d'ordre constitutionnel, des
renseignements statistiques et autres de nature technique relatifs
aux conditions écoilomiques, sociales et de l'instruction » dans
le Sud-Ouest africain.»
On remarquera que cette déclaration a été faite septmois seulement
après l'adoption de la résolution de la Sociétédes Nations en date du
18avril 1946et pourtant, ni à cette époqueni pendant plus d'un an qui
a suivi, il ne s'est pas trouvéun seul Etat pour prétendre que le défen-
deur fût obligéde faire rapport aux Nations Unies en vertu des dispo-
sitions de la déclaration de Mandat et non pas de l'article 73 de la
Charte. C'était la première fois depuis la dissolution de la Sociétédes
Nations que le défendeur avait l'occasion d'exprimer ses intentions au
sujet du Sud-Ouest africain et, si un Etat avait étéportéàcroire que le
défendeur avait consenti à une telle modification de la déclaration de
Mandat, la déclaration du défendeuraurait certainement étécontestée.
On doit donc en conclure qu'aucun des Membres des Nations Unies
qui avaient été partiesà la résolution de la Sociétédes Nations et qui
étaient présents lorsque le maréchal Smuts a fait cette déclaration n'a
pu penser que ladite résolutionconstituait un accord obligeant le défen-
deur et les autres Mandataires à rendre compte aux Nations Unies en
tant qu'autorité de surveillance remplaçant le Conseil de la Société
des Nations. De même,aucun Etat n'a pu avoir l'impression que le dé-
fendeur, en présentant une demande visant à faire approuver l'incor-
poration du Sud-Ouest africain, avait reconnu que les Nations Unies
étaient, d'une manière quelconque, investies de tels pouvoirs.
33. En 1947le Sud-Ouest africain a fait en plusieurs occasions I'ob-
jet dedébatsdevant lesdifférentsorganesdes Nations Unies,la Quatrième
Commission, le Conseil de tutelle et l'Assemblée générale. Les repré-
sentants du défendeur ont fait à maintes reprises des déclarations qui
n'ont pu laisser subsister aucun doute quant à l'attitude du défendeur
qui estimait qu'en l'absence d'accordde tutelle les Nations Unies n'a-
vaient aucun pouvoir de surveillance sur le Sud-Ouest africain et que
pour sa part il n'étaitnullement obligédefairerapportet derendrecompte
aux Nations Unies en vertu des obligations découlant du Mandat.
Dans une lettre adressée au Secrétaire général desNations Unies
le 23 juillet 1947, le défendeur a citéune résolution adoptée par la
House of Assembly du Parlement de l'Union qui indiquait notamment
que les droits et pouvoirs de la Sociétédes Nations relatifs aux Man-
dats n'avaient pas ététransférés auxNations Unies. La validitéde cette
déclaration n'a pas étécontestée. Dans cette résolution, la House of
Assembly exprimait également l'avisque le territoire devrait êtrerepré-that the South African Government should continue to render reports
"as it had done heretofore under the Mandate". The quoted words
require some consideration. As at that stage, no report had yet been
rendered to the United Nations by the South African Government l.
The word "heretofore" must therefore have referred to reporting in the
time of the League.
Consequently the words "under the Mandate" inerely reflected the
facts that previous reporting to the League liad occurred under the
Mandate. The resolution did not say that reporting to the United
Nations should occur under the Mandate. That would in any event
have been an impossibility, at least to the extent that the Mandate
required reporting to the Council of the League to its satisfaction.
There is also no justification for reading the resolution as urging that
the reporting should in any other sense occur "under the Mandate",
e.g., in the seiise of accounting for performance by the mandatories
of the substantive obligations prescribed in the mandates. The reasonable
reading, and the one most in accordance with the probable intent of
the House, is that the resolution merely urged an act of reporting, and
did not express any view or desire as to the form and context of the
suggested reporting. This is so particularly in view of the fact that
Field-Marshal Smuts, who as Prime Minister was leader of the majority
party in the House of Assembly, had only five months prior to the
resolution informed the Fourth Committee of the United Nations that
the reporting would consist merely of trai~smission, for information
purposes, of statistical and other technical information in accordance
with Article 73 (e) of the Charter. If the House had intended to go
against the Prime Minister on this point, one would have expected it
to have said so explicitly.
However, be that as it may, it shouldbe remembered that the resolution
by itself has no legal significance: it is a recommendation to the Gov-
ernment (i.e., the Mandatory) and not an act or utterance by the
Government. The important question is therefore how the Government
understood the resolution and what it conveyed to the United Nations
on the point in question in the letter of 23 July 1947. The letter
left no room for doubt: it stated explicitly that the Union Govern-
ment had "already undertaken to submit reports on their administra-
tion for the information of the United Nations" (italics added). This was
unmistakably a reference to Field-Marshal Smuts' above-quoted state-
ment to the Fourth Committee in November 1946, regarding trans-
mission of information in accordance with Article 73 (e). The letter
The date of submission of the only rewastSeptember 1947.
119 sentéau Parlement et que le Gouvernement sud-africain devrait conti-
nuer à faire rapport ((comme il [l'avait]fait jusqu'ici suivant les termes
du Mandat ))Les mots entre guillemets demandent à êtreexaminés.
Comme à ce stade le Gouvernement sud-africain n'avait encore pré-
senté aucun rapport aux Nations Unies l,le mot «jusquYic i devait
s'appliquer aux rapports présentésà l'époqueoù la Société des Nations
existait.
En conséquenceles mots ((suivant les termes du Mandat ))se rappor-
taient simplement au fait que des rapports avaient antérieurementété
adressés à la Société desNations conformémentaux termes du Mandat.
II n'étaitpas dit dans la résolutionque des rapports dussent êtreadres-
sés auxNations Unies süivant Ies termes du Mandat. Cela aurait été
de tout façon une impossibilité,tout au moins dans la mesure où le
Mandat prévoyaitque le Mandataire devait envoyer au Conseil de la
Sociétédes Nations un rapport satisfaisant le Conseil. On n'est pas
davantage fondé à interpréter la résolution demandant que la com-
munication des rapports ait lieu ((suivant les termes du Mandat » en
prenant cette expression dans un autre sens, à savoir: le Mandataire
doit rendre compte de la façon dont il s'acquitte des obligations de fond
prévuesdans le Mandat. L'interprétation raisonnable,celle qui répond
le mieux à l'intention probable de la House of Assembly,est que la ré-
solution demandait seulelnent la p-ésentation d'un rapport et qu'elle
n'exprimait aucune O )inion et ne .ormulait aucun souhait quant à la
forme et au contexte de cette présentation. Ce qui le prouve c'est tout
particulièrement que le maréchal Smuts,qui en qualité de premier mi-
nistre était chef du parti majoritaire de la House of Assembly, avait
informé la Quatrième Commission des Nations Unies cinq mois à
peine avant l'adoption de la résolution que le rapport ne serait qu'une
,communication, à des fins d'information, de renseignements statistiques
et autresde nature technique conformément à l'article 73e) de la Charte.
Si la House of Assembly avait eu l'intention de contredire le premier
ministre sur ce point, il est permis de croire qu'elle l'aurait fait en
termes explicites.
Quoi qu'il en soit, il ne faut pas oublier que la résolution n'avait en
elle-mêmeaucune valeur juridique: il s'agissait d'une recommandation
adressée au gouvernement, c'est-à-dire au Mandataire, et non d'un
acte ou d'une déclaration émanantdu gouvernement. L'important est
donc de savoir comment le gouvernement a interprété cetterésolution
et ce qu'il a fait savoir aux Nations Unies sur le point en question
dans sa lettre du 23 juillet 1947. Cette lettre ne laisse subsister aucun
doute: elleindiql~eexpressémentque le Gouvernement de l'Union avait
«déjàentrepris de &mettre aux Nations Unies,pour leur information,
des rapports sur son administration))(les italiques sont de nous). C'était
là de toute évidence une référence à la déclaration susmentionnée
faite par le maréchal Smutsdevant la Quatrième Commission en no-
Le seul rapport qui ait étéprésentédate de septembre 1947.
119did not intimate that any different kind of reports would be submitted.
On 25 September 1947, Respondent's representative in the Fourth
Cornmittee repeated Respondent's previous assurance that it would
continue to maintain the status quo, to administer the Territory in
the spirit of the Mandate, and to transmit to the United Nations for
its information an annual report on its administration of the Territory.
Two days later he explained-in response to a request by the representa-
tive of Denmark for amplification of the letter of 23 July 1947, which
was then before the Committee-that-
"... the annual report whicl-ihis Government would submit on
South West Africa would contain the same type of information
on the Terrirory as is required for non-self-governing territories
under Article 73 (e) of the Charter. It was the assumption of his
Government, he said, that the report would not be considered
by the Trusteeship Council and would not be dealt with as if a
trusteeship agreement had in fact been concluded. He further
explained that, since the League of Nations had ceased to exist,
the right to submit petitions could no longer be exercised, since
that right presupposes a jurisdiction which would only exist where
thereis a right oj'control of supervision and inthe view of the Union
of South Africa no suchjurisdiction is vested in the United Nations
with regard to South West Africa." (Italics added.)
Here again, there is no answer to the argument that, had it been
considered that the Respondent was obliged to report and account to
the United Nations, i.e., that supervisory functions of the League
had been transferred to the United Nations, somebody would have
challenged Respondent's contention that the United Nations had no
right of control or supervision with regard to the administration of
South West Africa. Thefact is that izot a single State did so. Denmark
attended the final session of the League, and so did 30 other States
who were Members of the United Nations in 1947. Once again 1 must
emphasize that these facts constitute weighty evidencethat as at 27 Sep-
tember 1947the Respondent was not considered to be obliged in terms
of any undertaking, agreement, or instrument to accept the supervision
of the United Nations in respect of its administration of South West
Africa or to account under the provisions of the Mandate to any organ
of the United Nations.
34. No less than 41 Member States addressed one or more of the
organs of the United Nations during 1947on the matter of South West
Africa. Of these 41 States, 38 States were founder Members of the
United Nations and 20 were represented at the final session of the
League Assembly in April 1946.Not one of these States (nor any other
State) during that year alleged, or even suggested, that there existed an
120vembre 1946 au sujet de la communication des renseignements requis
par l'article 73). La lettre n'annonçait pas la présentation de rapports
d'un genre différent.
Le 25 septembre 1947,le défendeura, par la voix de son représentant,
réitéré devanlta Quatrième Commission sesassurancesantérieuresselon
lesquelles il continueraià maintenir le statu quoà administrer le terri-
toire dans l'esprit du Mandat et à transmettre aux Nations Unies pour
leur information un rapport annuel sur l'administration du territoire.
Deux jours plus tard, répondant à une demande d'explications du re-
présentant du Danemark au sujet de la lettre du 23 juillet 1947dont la
Commission avait étésaisie, le représentant du défendeur a précisé
«que son gouvernement transmettrait, sur le Sud-Ouest africain,
un rapport annuel contenant le genre de renseignements requis
par l'article73 e) de la Charte, pour les territoires nonautonomes.
Son gouvernement présumait, dit-il, que ce rapport ne serait pas
examinépar le Conseil de tutelle et ne serait pas traité comme si
un accord de tutelle avait étéeffectivement conclu. Il a, en outre,
expliquéque, du fait de la disparition de la Sociétédes Nations,
le droit de présenter des pétitionsn'existait plus; ce droit suppose
en effet l'existence d'unejuridiction dont l'existence est subordon-
née à celle d'un droit de contrôle ou de surveillance;or, de l'avis de
l'Union sud-africaine, l'Organisation des Nations Uniesn'est pas
investie d'un droit de cette naturel'égarddu Sud-Ouest africain. »
(Les italiques sont de nous.)
Là encore, il n'y arien qui permette de réfuter l'argumentselon lequel,
si on avait estiméque le défendeur étaitobligéde faire rapport et de
rendre compte aux Nations Unies ou, en d'autres terines, que les fonc-
tions de surveillance de la Société desNations avaient été transférées
aux Nations Unies, quelqu'un aurait protesté contre l'assertion du dé-
fendeur d'aprèslaquelle l'Organisation des Nations Unies n'avait aucun
droit de contrôle ou de surveillance sur l'administratior, du Sud-Ouest
africain. Enfait, aucun Etat n'aprotesté.Le représentant du Danemark
assistaità la dernière session de la Société desNations, ainsi que les
représentants de trente autres Etats qui étaient Membres des Nations
Unies en 1947. Je dois souligner encore une fois que ces faits consti-
tuent une preuve sérieusequ'au 27 septembre 1947 on ne considérait
pas que le défendeurfût obligé,aux termes d'un engagement, d'un ac-
cord ou d'un instrument quelconque, d'accepter la surveillance des
Nations Unies sur son administration du Sud-Ouest africain ou de
rendre compte à un organe des Nations Unies en vertu des dispositions
du Mandat.
34. En 1947 pas moins de quarante et un Etats Membres ont pris
la parole devant l'un ou l'autre des organes des Nations Unies sur la
question du Sud-Ouest africain. Sur ces quarante et un Etats, trente-
huit étaient Membres originaires des Nations Unies et vingt avaient
étéreprésentés à la dernière session de l'Assembléede la Sociétédes
Nations en avril 1946.Aucun de ces Etats, ni aucun autre Etat, n'a pré- agreement, express or implied, whereby the supervisory powers of the
Council of the League over mandates were transferred to the United
Nations, or whereby Respondent became obliged to report and account
to the United Nations as the supervisory authority in respect of man-
dates. On the contrary, at least 14 States-ten of whom had attended
the final meeting of the League-acknowledged that in the absence
of a trusteeship agreement the United Nations would have no super-
visory powers in respect of South West Africa. It is an accepted rule
that when controversy arises as to whether a party to an agreement
has assumed a particular obligation, resort may be had to the subsequent
conduct of the parties. The weight to be attached to such conduct
must necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case. Where
for a relatively lengthy period after the execution of an agreement,
al1the parties by conduct accept the position that the agreement does
not embody a particular obligation, then such conduct must bear
considerable weight in a determination whether that obligation exists
or not. If in addition it is at least doubtful whether the events relied
upon were intended to constitute an agreement at al], and if in any
event the alleged "agreement" does not contain any reference to the
suggested obligation, not on account of any inadvertence but because
it was deliberately omitted after being expressly raised, the inference
that no such obligation was imposed is inescapable.
Both Applicant States are ex-members of the League of Nations.
Their representatives and those of practically al1 other ex-members
of the Leaguewho became Members of the United Nations, were present
at meetings of the United Nations organs during 1946and 1947 when
the Respondent and many other States (including ex-members of the
League)-repeatedly asserted that Respondent was under no obligation
to report and account to the United Nations in respect of its administra-
tion of South West Africa. Not a single State challengedthese assertions.
If the Applicants or any other ex-members of the League thought that
the Mandate, or any other instrument, or the events at the dissolution
of the League, or the events subsequent thereto, imposed such an
obligation on the Respondent, they would and should have said so.
Their failure to speak affords conclusive proof of their acquiescence
in Respondent's statements. Their duty to speak was even stronger if-
as Applicants now contend-each ex-member of the League was meant
to be an upper-guardian of the inhabitants of the Territory, each
entrusted with the right and duty to demand and enforce compliance
by the Respondent with al1 its obligations under the Mandate Declar-
ation.tendu ou même laisséentendre, au cours de cette année, qu'il existait
un accord exprèsou tacite aux termes duquel les pouvoirs de surveillance
du Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations sur les Mandats étaient transfé-
résaux Nations Unies ou que le défendeur était dèslcrs obligéde faire
rapport et de rendre compte aux Nations Unies en tant qu'autorité
de surveillance en matière de Mandats. Au contraire quatorze Etats
au moins - dont dix avaient participé à la dernière session de la
Sociétédes Nations - ont reconnu qu'en l'absence d'un accord de
tutelle les Nations Unies n'avaient aucun pouvoir de surveillance à
l'égard du Sud-Ouest africain. C'est une règle généralementadmise
que, lorsqu'une controverse s'élèvequant au point de savoir si une
partie à un accord a assumé une certaine obligation, on peut s'en
rapporter au comportement ultérieur des parties. L'importance à at-
tribuer à ce comportement dépend nécessairement des circonstances
particulièresà chaque cas d'espèce. Si, pendant une période relative-
ment longue après l'entrée en vigueur d'un accord, toutesles parties
ont accepté par leur comportement l'idée que l'accord ne renferme
pas une certaine obligation, ce comportement joue nécessairement un
rôle important lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer si l'obligation existe. Si
en outre il est pour le moins douteux qu'on ait voulu donner aux faits
invoquésla valeur d'un accord et si de toute façon le prétendu accord
ne se réfèrepas à ladite obligation, non point par suite d'une inadver-
tance, mais de propos délibéré et après examen de la question, il faut
nécessairement en conclure qu'aucune obligation de ce genre n'a été
imposée.
Les deux Etats demandeurs sont d'anciens Membres de la Société
des Nations. Leurs représentants et les représentants de presque tous
les autres anciens Membres de la Sociétédes Nations devenus Membres
des Nations Unies ont assisté aux réunions des organes des Nations
Unies de 1946et 1947,au cours desquelles le défendeur - et beaucoup
d'autres Etats (y compris d'anciens Membres de la Société desNations)
- ont affirmé à maintes reprises que le défendeur n'étaitpas obligéde
faire rapport et de rendre compte-aux Nations Unies quant à son ad-
ministration du Sud-Ouest africain. Pas un seul Etat n'a contesté ces
assertions. Si les demandeurs ou l'un quelccnque des anciens Membres
de la Sociétédes Nations avaient penséque le Mandat, ou tout autre
instrument, ou les événementsqui se sont produits à la dissolution de
la Société,ou ceux qui ont suivi cette dissolution, imposaient pareille
obligation au défendeur, ils l'auraient dit et ils auraient dû le dire.
Le fait qu'ils n'aient pas parlé prouve de façon concluante qu'ils ont
approuvé les déclarations du défendeur. Leur devoir de parler était
encore plus impérieux si,comme les demandeurs le soutiennent main-
tenant, chacun des anciens Membres de la Sociétédes Nations était
appelé à exercer des fonctions de super-tuteur à l'égarddes habitants
du territoire, chacun ayant le droit et le devoir d'exiger et d'assurer
l'exécutionpar le défendeur de toutes les obligations lui incombant en
vertu de la déclaration de Mandat. The cumulative weight of the evidence so far examined is over-
whelming, and the inescapable inference is that not a single Member
of the United Nations, nor a single State who was a Member of the
League of Nations at its dissolution, was under the impression in, or
at any time prior to, 1947 that any agreement had been concluded
whereby the League Council's authority had been transferred to the
United Nations, or whereby the Respondent becam? obliged to account
to the United Nations, with regard to its administration of South West
Africa. On the contrary, they either expressly or tacitly agreed that no
such agreement was ever entered into.
35. The view tlîat the League Council's supervisory powers had not
been transferred to the United Nations was not expressed with reference
to South West Africa alone. In respect of other mandated territories
also similar views were expressed from time to time up to 1948 by
representatives of member States in the United Nations.
In this regard reference has already been made to the United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine. In its report the Committee recom-
mended that the Mandate for Palestine be terminated at the earliest
practicable date and expressed, inter alfa, the following unanimous
comment :
"Following the Second World War, the establishment of the
United Nations in 1945 and the dissolution of the League of
Nations the following year opened a new phase in the history of
the mandatory régime.The mandatory power in the absence of
the League and its Permanent Mandates Commission, had no
internationalauthority to whichit might submit reportsand generally
account for the exercise of its responsibilities in accordance with
the terms of the Mandate. Having this in mind, at the final session
of the League Assembly the United Kingdom representative declared
that Palestine would be administered 'inaccordance withthe general
principles' of the existing Mandate until 'fresh arrangements had
been reached'." (Italics added.)
In a subsequent debate in the Security Council regarding Palestine
the representative of the United States of America stated that:
"The record seems to be entirely clear that the United Nations
did not take over the League of Nations mandates system."
With regard to the Mandate for Western Samoa, the representative
of New Zealand stated in the Fourth Committee on 22 November 1946
that if acceptable terms could not be negotiated for the placing of this
territoryunder the trusteeship system-
". . New Zealand would have to carry on [its administration of
the Territory] without the privilege of the supervision by the United
Nations, which it desired".
122 Les preuves que je viens d'accumuler sont extrêmement convain-
cantes et on doit inévitablement en conclure qu'aucun Membre des
Nations Unies, ni de la Sociétédes hTationsau moment de sa dissolution,
n'a jamais eu l'impression, ni en 1947,ni avant cette date, qu'ily ait eu
un accord prévoyant que l'autoritédu Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations
était transféréeaux Nations Unies ou que le défendeur était obligéde
rendre compte aux Nations Unies de son administration du Sud-Ouest
africain. Au contraire, ces Etats sont convenus expressémentou tacite-
ment qu'aucun accord de ce genre n'avait jamais étéconclus.
35. L'opinion selon laquelle les pouvoirs de surveillance du Conseil
de la Société desNations n'ont pas été transféréa sux Nations Unies
n'a pas étéexpriméeuniquement au sujet du Sud-Ouest africain. Jus-
qu'en 1948des représentants des Etats Membres ont exprimé à plusieurs
reprises devant les Nations Unies des vues semblables s'agissant des
territoires sous Mandat.
A ce sujet, il a déjàété question de la Commission spéciale des
Nations Unies pour la Palestine. Dans son rapport cette Commission
a recommandé que le Mandat pour la Palestine prenne fin le plus tôt
possible et elle a notamment formulé àl'unanimitéles observations sui-
vantes :
((Aprèsla seconde guerre mondiale, la création des Nations Unies
en 1945et la dissolution de la Sociétédes Nations l'année suivante
inaugurèrent une nouvelle phase du régimedu Mandat. La Société
des Nations et sa Commission permanente des Mandats n'existant
plus,il n'y avait pas d'autoritéinternationalà qui lapuissanceman-
dataire pût présenterdes rapports et rendre compte de la façon dont
elle s'étaitacquittée des tâches que lui imposait le Mandat. C'est
pourquoi, lors de la session finale de l'Assembléede la Société des
Nations, le représentantdu Royaume-Uni déclaraque la Palestine
serait administrée «conformémentaux principes générau xdu Man-
dat existant (tant que de nouveaux arrangements ne seraient pas
intervenus.» (Les italiques sont de nous.)
Plus tard, au cours d'une séancedu Conseil de sécurité consacrée à
la Palestine, le représentant des Etats-Unis a déclaré:
((11nous semble clairement établi que l'Organisation des Nations
Unies n'a pas repris le système des Mandats de la Sociétédes
Nations. ))
En ce qui concerne le Mandat pour le Samoa occidental, le représen-
tant de la Nouvelle-Zélande n déclaréle 22 novembre 1946 devant la
Quatrième Commission que, s'il était impossible de négocierdans des
conditions satisfaisantes en vue de placer ce territoire sous le régime
de tutelle
((la Nouvelle-Zélande se verrait dans l'obligation de poursuivre
cette tâche [l'administration du Territoire] sans l'appui désirédes
Nations Unies ». A statement very much to the same effectwas made by the representa-
tive of the Soviet Union when a draft trusteeship agreement for the
former Japanese Mandated Islands was discussed in the Security Council
during April 1947.
36. It was only as from the end of 1948 that certain States (five in
number) voiced a contradiction to the view repeatedly expressed up
to that time, namely that the United Nations had no supervisory powers
in respect of mandates not converted to trusteeship.
Not one of the dissenting States, however, based their contentions
on implied or tacit agreement. Some relied on Article 80 (1) of the
Charter, and others considered that the United Nations had replaced
the League as the "organized international community", or as the
"civilized and organized international collectivity", without explaining
by what principle of law the supervisory powers of the League became
vested in the United Nations.
In the same year Respondent, while submitting to the United Nations
certain information in amplification of the report which it had lodged
in the previous year-
". .. re-iterate[d] that the transmission to the United Nations
of information on South West Africa, in the form of annual report
or any other form, is on a voluntary basisand is for purposes of
information only. They have on several occasions made it clear tlzat
they recognize no obligation to transmit this information to the
United Nations, but in view of the wide-spread interest in the
administration of the Territory, and in accordance with normal
democraticpractice, they are willing and anxious to make available
to the world such factsand figuresas are readily at their dispo..."
(Italics added.)
At no time thereafter did Respondent, either expressly or by impli-
cation, acknowledge that it was under any obligation to report and
account to the United Nations in respect of its administration of South
West Africa. On the contrary, it persisted in the attitude that the United
Nations had no supervisory powers in respect of its administration of
theTerritoryand; in fact, for reasons set out in atter dated 11July 1949,
refused to submit any further reports to the United Nations, not even
reports for information purposes.
37. The aforegoing analysis of historical events can lead to only
one conclusion and that is that the supervisory powers of the League
Council were not transferred to the United Nations either by express
or by tacit consent of Respondent, or in any other manner.
This conclusion is in conflict with the majority opinion of this Court
in International Status of South West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 1950, and
it has been suggested that it is also in conflict with the reasoning in
one passage in the majority judgment (fivejudges) in South West Africa
cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962. A careful examination of the said opinion
123 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 125
Une déclaration à peu prèsdans le mêmesensa été faitepar le repré-
sentant de l'Union soviétique en 1947, lors de la discussion devant le
Conseil de sécuritéd'un projetd'accord de tutelle pour les îles antérieu-
rement sous Mandat japonais.
36. Ce n'est qu'àpartir de la fin de 1948que certains Etats (au nom-
bre de cinq) ont contredit la thèseexpriméerépétéejusqu'àcette époque,
à savoir que les Nations Unies n'avaient aucun pouvoir de surveillance
sur les Mandats non transformés en accords de tutelle.
Pas un decesEtats dissidentsn'acependant fondésesallégationssurun
accord impliciteou tacite. Certains ont invoquél'article 80, paragraphe
de la Charte et d'autres ont estimé que l'organisation des Nations
Unies avait remplacéla Société desNations en tant que ((communauté
internationale organisée» ou en tant que «collectivité internationale
civiliséeet organisée,sans expliquer en vertu de quel principe de droit
les pouvoirs de surveillance de la Société desNations étaientpassés à
l'organisation des Nations Unies.
La mêmeannéele défendeur,présentant aux Nations Unies certains
renseignements destinés à compléterle rapport qu'il avait soumis l'an-
néeprécédente,a déclaré:
((que, lorsqu'il transmetà l'Organisation des Nations Unies des
renseignements sur le Sud-Ouest africain, sous forme d'un rapport
annuel ou sous toute autre forme, il agitde son propre gréet aux
seulesJins d'information. A plu~ieursreprises, il a indiqué clairement
qu'ilnese considèrepascomme tenude transmettreces renseignements
à l'Organisation des Nations Unies,mais que, en raison du grand
intérêtporté à l'administration du Territoire, et conformément à
la pratique démocratique normale, il est désireuxet soucieux de
porter à la connaissance du monde les faits et les chiffres dont il
dispose déjà..» (Les italiques sont de nous.)
A aucun moment par la suite le défendeurn'a reconnu soit expressé-
ment soit implicitement qu'il fût dans l'obligation de faire rapport et
de rendre compte aux Nations Unies quant à son administration du Sud-
Ouest africain. Au contraire, il a continué à soutenir que les Nations
Unies n'avaient aucun pouvoir de surveillance sur l'administration
du territoire et en fait, pour les raisons exposéesdans une lettre du
11 juillet 1949, il a refusé de présenterd'autres rapports aux Nations
Unies, ne serait-ce qu'aux fins d'information.
37. L'analyse ci-dessusdes faits historiques ne peut conduire qu'à
une seule conclusion, à savoir que les pouvoirs de surveillance du
Conseil de la Société desNations n'ont ététransférés à l'Organisation
des Nations Unies ni par consentement exprès ou tacite du défendeur,
ni d'aucune autre manière.
Cette conclusion est contraire à l'opinion énoncéepar la majorité
de la Cour dans son avis consultatif sur leStatut international du Sud-
Ouest africain (C.I.J. Recueil1950) et on a dit qu'elle étaitégalement
contraire aux motifs invoqués par la majorité (cinq juges) dans un
passage de l'arrêt relatifaux affaires du Sud-Ouest africain (C.T.J.and judgment is therefore necessary, and 1 will in the succeeding para-
graphs proceed to make such an examination.
38. In the 1950 Advisory Opinion the Court recognized that the
supervisory functions of the League with regard to mandated territories
not placed under the trusteeship system "were neither expressly
transferred to the United Nations nor expressly assumed by that or-
ganization". From this it must follow that the Court's finding that
such transfer did take place could, in the absence of any international
principle or rule of succession, have been based only on a tacit or
implied agreement. There does not appear to be any dispute that a
term can be implied only if the admissible evidence reveals that it was
contemplated by the parties, in the sensethat they either actually intended
it to operate, or would all, had their attention been directed thereto,
have acknowledged that it fell within the scope of their agreement.
It has been suggested that the Opinion of 1950rests on the principle of
effectiveness.This principle embodies the rule that treaties, etc.,
". .. are to be interpreted with reference to their declared or
apparent objects and purposes; and particular provisions are to be
interpreted so as to give them their fullest weight and effect con-
sistent with the normal sense of the words and with other parts
of the text, and insuch a way that a .season and a meaning can be
attributed to every part of the text".
(See article by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in the British Year Book of Inter-
national Law, 1957, XXXIII, p. 33.) The principle of effectivenesscan
never be divorced from the basic object of interpretation, viz.,to find
the true common intention of the parties, and it cannot operate to give
an agreement a higher degree of efficacy than was intended by the
parties. It cannot, therefore, be invoked to justify a result whichis not
in harmony with the intention of the parties as expressed by the words
used by them, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances and
other admissible evidence. See Lord McNair's The Law of Treaties,
1961, page 484, and otlier authorities quoted in South West Africa
cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pages 582-584.
39. The Court in 1950, after stating that the object of the Mandate
far exceeded that of contractual relations regulated by "mandate" in
national law, and that the Mandate was created as an international
institution with an international object (p. 132), for the Respondent to
claim rights derived from the Mandate while denying the obligations
thereunder could not be justified (p. 133).We have been urged to inter-
pret this statement as meaning that, because the Respondent claims
rights in respect of South West Africa, therefore al1 its obligations
under the Mandate, including those under Article 6, must still be in
force, and that therefore the Assembly of the United Nations must be
deemed to have been substituted for the Council of the League as the
124Recueil 1962). Il est donc nécessaire d'examiner avec soin cet avis
consultatif et cet arrêtet c'est ce que je me propose de faire dans les
paragraphes qui suivent.
38. Dans son avis consultatif de 1950, la Cour a reconnu que les
fonctions de surveillance de la Société desNations sur les territoires
sous Mandat non placéssous le régimede tutelle ((n'ont éténi trans-
férées expressémentaux Nations Unies, ni assumées expressémentpar
cette organisation ». Il s'ensuit donc nécessairement que, en l'absence
de tout principe international ou de toute règle internationale de suc-
cession, la conclusion de la Cour selon laquelle ce transfert a eu lieu
ne pouvait être fondéeque sur un accord tacite ou implicite. Personne
ne semble contester que l'existence d'une disposition implicite ne peut
êtreconstatéeque si des preuves admissibles révèlentque cette disposi-
tion a étéprévuepar les parties, en ce sens que leur intention était ef-
fectivement qu'elle s'applique ou que, si on avait attiré leur attention
sur cette disposition, elles auraient toutes reconnu qu'elle entrait dans
le cadre de leur accord. On a dit que l'avis de 1950 était fondé sur le
principe de l'effet utile. Ce principe est que les traités, etc.
((doivent être interprétés compte tenude leurs buts et de leurs
intentions déclaréesou apparentes; on doit interpréter leurs dis-
positions particulières de façon à leur donner toute l'importance
et tout l'effet compatibles avec le sens normal des mots et avec
les autres parties du texte et de façonpouvoir attribuer une raison
et une significationà chaque partie du texte 1).
(Voir l'article de sir Gerald Fitzmaurice dans le British Year Book of
International Law, 1957, vol. XXXIII, p. 33.) Le principe de l'effet
utile ne peut jamais être séparédu but fondamental de l'interprétation
qui est de dégagerla véritable intention commune des parties et il ne
peut jouer pour donner à un accord un effet plus étendu que celui
que voulaient lui donner les parties. Il ne peut donc être invoquépour
justifier un résultat qui ne soit pas en harmonie avec l'intention des
parties telle qu'elle ressort expressément des termes utilisés par elles,
compte tenu des conditions existantes et des autres élémentsde preuve
admissibles. Voir lord McNair, The Law of Treaties, 1961, page 484,
et d'autres autorités citéesdans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain (C.I.J.
Recueil 1962, p. 582-584).
39. En 1950 la Cour, après avoir déclaréque le but du Mandat
dépassait de beaucoup celui des rapports contractuels régis par un
((mandat » en droit interne et que le Mandat avait étécréécomme
une institution internationaleàlaquelle étaitassignéun but international
(p. 132), a fait observer que rien ne permet au défendeur de conserver
des droits dérivésdu Mandat tout en répudiant les obligations qui en
découlent(p. 133). On nous a proposé d'interpréterce passage de l'avis
comme signifiant que, puisque le défendeur revendique des droits à
l'égarddu Sud-Ouest africain, toutes ses obligations découlant du Man-
dat et notamment de l'article 6 demeurent nécessairement en vigueur
et qu'en conséquenceil faut considérer que l'Assemblée générale des
124 supervisory autl-iority.If this is what the Court's statement was iiltended
to convey, it is obviously wrong. On what basis in law can a claim to
rights by the Respondent today have any effect on the legal situation
resulting from events which occurred in 1920and 1945-1946?
If the Respondent's rights and obligations under the Mandate in
law lapsed on the dissolution of the League, a subsequent claim by
the Respondent that it has rights under the Mandate cannot revive
either the rights or the obligations that have lapsed. In any event, the
Respondent does not claim any rights under the Mandate Declaration,
which it contends has lapsed.
Respondent bases its claim to adrninister the Territory on the events
which preceded the Mandate, and on the fact that it has at al1material
times been in de facto control of the Territory. If the Mandate has
lapsed this Court has neither the right, nor the duty, to decide upon
the validity of the Respondent's aforesaid contentions and 1 shall
accordingly not express any opinion on the correctness thereof or
otherwise. It isonly in the alternative that Respondent says that if the
Mandate should be held to be in force, it would have rights and obliga-
tions under the Mandate, but that these would no longer include an
obligation of report and accountability. If the true position should
indeed be that the Mandate is still in force, eitherbecause Respondent
can be said to claim rights thereunder or for any other reason, that
would still afford no justification for a Court to amend the mandate
provisions by imposing on the Respondent obligations to which it did
not agree, and which, in any event, are more onerous than those imposed
by the Mandate Declaration.
40. A study of the 1950 Opinion shows that the Court first found
that, since the administrative provisions of the Mandate (Articles 2 to 5)
did not depend for their fulfilment on the existence of the League, they
have survived the League (p. 133). The Court next considered the
procedural provisions of the Mandate (Articles 6 and 7), which in the
Court's viewdepended for their fulfXmentonthe existenceof the League.
After remarking that the authors of the Covenant considered that the
performance of the sacred trust required international supervision, and
that the authors of the Charter had in mind the same necessity when
they created the international trusteeship system the Court found that
the necessity for international supervision remained after the dissolution
of the League, and that-
". ..it cannot be admitted that the obligation to submit to super-
vision has disappeared merely because the supervisory organ has
ceased to exist, when the United Nations has another international
organ performing similar, though not identical, supervisory func-
tions" (p. 136).
It is difficult to perceive on what legal principles the Court based
125Nations Unies a remplacéle Conseil de la Société desNations en tant
qu'autorité de surveillance. Si telle est l'idéeque la Cour a voulu ex-
primer, elle est évidemment fausse. Quelles règlesde droit peut-on
invoquer pour dire que, si le défendeur revendique aujourd'hui des
droits, cela a un effet sur la situation juridique résultant d'événements
qui se sont produits en 1920et en 1945-1946?
Si les droits et les obligations du défendeur découlanten droit du
Mandat ont pris fin à la dissolution de la Société desNations, le dé-
fendeur ne saurait, en revendiquant ultérieurement des droits en vertu
du Mandat, faire revivre les droits et obligations devenus caducs. Mais
de toute manière, le défendeur ne revendiqueaucun droit en vertu
de la déclaration de Mandat qui, d'après lui, est devenue caduque.
Le défendeur revendique le droit d'administrer le territoire en se
fondant sur les événementsqui ont précédé l'institutiondu Mandat
et sur cette circonstance qu'il a exercépendant toute la période pertinente
un contrôle de fait sur le territoire. Si le Mandat est devenu caduc, la
Cour n'a nile droit ni le devoir de se prononcer sur la validité des alléga-
tions précitéesdu défendeuret je ne formulerai en conséquenceaucune
opinion quant à l'exactitude de ces allégations. C'est seulementà titre
subsidiaire que le défendeur affirme que, au cas où le Mandat serait
considéré comme encore envigueur, il en decoulerait pour lui des droits
et des obligations qui ne comprendraient toutefois pas l'obligation de
faire rapport et de rendre compte. S'il était vrai que le Mandat reste
en vigueur, soit parce qu'on peut dire que le défendeur revendiquedes
droits en vertu de celui-ci, soit pour toute autre raison, la Cour n'en
serait pas fondée pour autant à modifier les dispositions du Mandat
en imposant au défendeurdes obligations qu'il n'a pas assuméeset qui
de toute façon sont plus étenduesque celles que lui imposait la déclara-
tion de Mandat.
40. L'analyse de l'avis de 1950 révèleque la Cour a tout d'abord
estiméque, leur exécution nedépendantpas de l'existence de la Société
des Nations, les dispositions administratives du Mandat (articles 2-5)
ont survécu à cette Société(p. 133). La Cour a ensuite examinéles
dispositions du Mandat relatives à la procédure (articles 6 et7), dont
l'exécutiondépendait,selon elle, de l'existencede la Sociétdes Nations.
Après avoir fait observer que les auteurs du Pacte avaient pensé que
l'accomplissement de la mission sacréede civilisation exigeait une sur-
veillance internationale et que les auteurs de la Charte avaient eu la
mêmepréoccupation lorsqu7ils avaient organisé le régimeinternational
de tutelle, la Cour a dit que la nécessd'une telle surveillance subsistait
en dépit dela dissolution de la Sociétéet qu'on
((ne saurait admettre que l'obligation de se soumettre à la sur-
veillance aurait disparu pour la simple raison que cet organe de
contrôle a cesséd'exister, alors que les Nations Unies offrent un
autre organe international chargé de fonctions analogues encore
que non identiques » (p. 136).
Il est difficile de voir sur quels principes juridiques la Cour a fondé
125 its conclusion that it "could not be admitted" that international super-
vision had disappeared. Throughout its Opinion the Court purported
to be searching for the common intention of the parties to the Covenant,
the Mandate Declaration and the Charter, and 1 think it is fair to say
that what the Court intended to convey was that it inferred that the
parties to the Mandate and the Charter had a common intention that
"international supervision" of the administration of the mandated
territories should continue after the dissolution of the League, and that
inasmuch as the Assembly of the United Nations was competent to
perform the functions of the Council of the League, the parties must,
in the light of the evidence then before the Court, be assumed to have
intended that the General Assembly should in future perform the said
functions, and that the Respondent is therefore now obliged to report
and account to this organ of the United Nations. If the Court did not
find such a common intention, the only alternative is that it must have
decidedto legislate,whichwould mean that it exceeded its authority. This
Court's function is laid down in Article 38 of its Statute, which requires
it to decide disputes submitted to it in accordance with international
law, and international law does not authorize the Court to legislate.
In this regard1 wish to repeat what 1 said in South WestAfrica cases,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, page 591 :
"The rules of construction authorize what has been termed the
'teleological approach' only to the limited extent indicated above.
This approach, in its more extreme form, assumes that this Court
has the power to disregard or amend the terms of an instrument
in order to achieve an object, or presumed object, albeit in a manner
different from that provided for and intended by the parties; but
this approach disregards the basic rule that the purpose of construc-
tion is to determine the common intention of the parties and in
any event it has not been recognized by this Court or its predecessor.
No court has the power to make a party's obligations different
from, or more onerous than, what it has agreed to. If this Court
has the power to disregard or amend the provisions of a treaty
or convention, it has legislative powers and such powers have not
been entrusted to it by its Statute or any of the sources of inter-
national law referred to in Article 38 of itsStatute. As Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice rightly remarks in the article in the British Year Book
of International Law, 1957, XXXIII, quoted above, at page 208:
'The Court has shown plainly that, in its view, the performance
of such a function cannot properly form part of the interpretative
process'."
Ttcannot,be assumed that members of this high tribunal would delibera-
tely ignore the elementary and basic principle that the intention of the
parties must rule, and 1 shall accordingly, as already stated, assume
that the Court in 1950 based its conclusion on what it considered to
have been the common intention of the parties. But, in doing so, the
Court, in my opinion, arrived at a wrong conclusion, mainly because
126 sa conclusion selon laquelle(on ne saurait admettre1)que la surveillance
internationale ait pris fin. D'un boutà l'autre de l'avis, la Cour s'est
efforcéede rechercher l'intention commune des parties au Pacte, à la
déclaration de Mandat et à la Charte; je crois qu'elle a en fait voulu
dire d'une part que l'intention commune desparties au Mandat et à la
Charte avait étéque la ((surveillance international»de l'administration
desterritoires sous Mandat sepoursuive aprèsla dissolution de la Société
des Nations et d'autre part que, l'Assembléegénérale desNations
Unies étant compétente pour assumer les fonctions du Conseil de la
Société desNations, les moyens de preuve soumis à la Cour permet-
taient de conclure que les parties avaient eu l'intention que l'Assemblée
générale assumedans l'avenir lesdites fonctions et qu'en conséquence
le défendeurétaitdésormaistenu de faire rapport et de rendre compte
à cetorganedes Nations Unies. SilaCour n'apas conclu à cette intention
commune, la seule hypothèse possible est qu'ellea décidéde légiférer,
ce qui voudrait dire qu'elle a outrepassé ses pouvoirs. Les fonctions
de la Cour sont énoncées à l'article 38 de son Statut qui lui prescrit de
régler conformémentau droit international les différends quilui sont
soumis; or le droit international n'autorise pas la Cour à légiférer.
A cet égard je voudrais répétec re que j'ai dit dans les affaires du
Sud-Ouest africain (C.Z. RJ.cueil 1962, p. 591):
«Les règles d'interprétation ne permettent le recours à ce que
l'on a appeléla méthodetéléologiqueque dans les limites décrites
ci-dessus. Sous sa forme extrême, cetteméthode implique que la
Cour est habilitée à ignorer ou à modifier les termes d'une con-
vention afin d'atteindre un objectif, réelou supposé, maisce d'une
autre façon que celle qui a été prescriteet voulue par les parties.
Cette méthode contredit pourtant le principe fondamental selon
lequel l'interprétation doit tendre à établir l'intention commune
des parties et n'a de toute manière étéconsacrée nipar cette Cour
ni par celle qui l'a précédée. Aucutnribunal ne peut modifier ou
accroître les obligations assuméespar les parties. Si la Cour était
fondée à s'écarter des dispositionsd'un traité ou d'une convention
ou à les modifier, elle exercerait des fonctions législativesque ne
lui reconnaissent en fait ni son Statut ni l'une quelconque des
sources de droit international mentionnées à l'article 38 de son
Statut. Ainsi que sir Gerald Fitzmaurice l'a justement relevédans
son article, déjà cité,du British Year Book of International Law,
1957,vol.XXXIII, page 208 :(La Cour a clairement établique I'ac-
cornplissement d'une telle fonction ne peutà son avis rentrer dans
le cadre normal de l'interprétation.1)
On ne peut supposer que les membres d'un tribunal aussi éminent
aient délibérémenitgnoré leprincipe élémentaire etfondamental selon
lequel l'intention des parties doit être déterminanteet, en conséquence,
je supposerai, comme je l'ai déjà dit, qu'en 1950 la Cour a fondé sa
conclusion sur ce qu'elle jugeait avoir étél'intention commune des
parties. Ce faisant, la Cour a cependant abouti.à mon avis, à une con-it did not have regard to al1 the relevant facts, many of which were
apparently not brought to its attention. Before dealing with the facts
to which the Court did not have any or proper regard in 1950, 1 wish
to refer to one or two further aspects of the 1950Opinion.
40 (a). In 1950the Court relied exclusively(p. 137) on Article 10of
the Charter of the United Nations for its finding of competence on
the part of the Assembly to supervise Mandates; but there can be
no doubt that neither this Article or any other article of the Mandate
contains any provision to this effect. The provisions of Article 10 are
confined to matters which are already within the scope of tlîe Charter;
they do not bring any new matters within it-see my dissenting opinion
of 1962, pages 652-653. In any event as will appear more fully infra,
this Court's jurisdiction is confined in this case to disputes relating
to the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Mandate
for South West Africa, and the Charter of the United Nations is not
a part of that Mandate.
41. In its 1950 Opinion, the Court, as 1 have already stated, first
found that the administrative provisions of the Mandate survived the
League because they (unlike the so-called procedural provisions) did
not depend for their fulfilment on the existence of the League (p. 133).
It thereupon, in effect, held that because the administrative provisions
were still in force, therefore the necessity for the procedural provisions
remained (p. 136). But inasmuch as the latter provisions stipulated for
reporting and accounting to the Council of the League, they could not
after the dissolution of the League be operable in their original form,
the League Council having ceased to exist.
They could therefore only have survived the League if they were
amended by the substitution of some organ to function in the place of
the defunct Council of the League.
The Court, having found that Article 6 must have survived the
League, therefore had to find that it survived in an amended form,
i.e., that the Assembly of the United Nations had been substituted for
the Council of the League (p. 136). If this analysis of the Court's rea-
soning is correct, it would seem, with respect, to expose a fallacy. When
deciding that the administrative provisions had survived the League,
theCourt proceeded on the assumption that they could surviveseparately
from the procedural provisions which depended on the existence of
the League for their fulfilment. This must be so, for the Court reached
its conclusion in regard to the survival of the administrative provisions
without having devoted any discussion at al1to the problems pertaining
to survival or otherwise of the procedural provisions. But when it came
to consider whether Article 6 had survived, the Court seems to have
held, in effect, that the administrative provisions could not survive
without Article 6, and that inasmuch as it had already found that the
administrative provisions still applied, it found that Article 6 must
therefore also have survived. In other words the Court seems to have
127 clusion erronée, principalement parce qu'elle n'a pas tenu compte de
tous les faits pertinents dont beaucoup n'ont apparemment pas été
portés à son attention. Avant d'examiner les faits que la Cour n'a pas
pris en considération ou dont elle n'a pas suffisamment tenu compte
en 1950,je voudrais parler d'un ou deux autres aspects de l'avisde 1950.
40 a). En 1950, la Cour s'est exclusivement fondée (p. 137) sur
l'article 10 de la Charte des Nations Unies pour établirla compétence
de l'Assembléegénéraleen matièrede surveillance des Mandats; mais il
ne saurait faire aucun doute que ni cet article, ni aucun article du Man-
dat ne contient de disposition cet effet. Les dispositions de l'article 10
ont uniquement trait à des questions rentrant déjàdans le cadre de la
Charte; elles n'y incorporent rien de nouveau (voir mon opinion dissi-
dente de 1962,p. 652-653).Comme je le montrerai ci-après,la compé-
tence de la Cour est limitée enl'espèceaux différends relatifs I'inter-
prétation ou à l'application des dispositions du Mandat pour le Sud-
Ouest africain et la Charte des Nations Unies ne fait pas partie de ce
Mandat.
41. Dans son avis de 1950,la Cour, commeje l'ai déjàindiqué, atout
d'abord déclaréque les dispositions administratives du Mandat avaient
survécu à la Société desNations parce que, contrairement au cas des
dispositions dites de procédure, leur exécution ne dépendait pas de
l'existencede la Société (p.133). Ensuite elle a dit en fait que, puisque
les dispositions administratives restaient en vigueur, la nécessité des
dispositions de procédure subsistait(p. 136). Cependant, comme ces
dernières dispositions prévoyaientque le Mandataire ferait rapport et
rendrait compte au Conseil déla Société des Nations, ellesne pouvaient
plus s'appliquer sous leur forme originale depuis la dissolution de la
Société des Nations, puisque le Conseil avait cesséd'exister.
Elles ne pouvaient donc avoir survécu à la Société desNations que
si elles avaient étémodifiéesen ce sens que le Conseil, qui n'existait
plus, étaitremplacépar un organe fonctionnant à sa place.
Ayant jugé que l'article 6 avait nécessairement survécu à la Société
des Nations, la Cour devait considérer qu'ilavait survécu sous une
forme modifiée, à savoir que l'Assembléegénérale desNations Unies
avait remplacéle Conseil de la Société desNations (p. 136). Si cette
analyse du raisonnement de la Cour est exacte,je me permettrai respec-
tueusement de faire observer qu'il sembley avoir là une erreur d'inter-
prétation. En décidant queles dispositions administratives avaient sur-
vécu à la Société desNations, la Cour est partie de l'hypothèseque ces
dispositions pouvaient demeurer en vigueur indépendamment des dis-
positions de procédure dont l'exécution dépendait del'existence de la
Société.11faut bien qu'il en ait étéainsi, puisque la Cour a abouti à
sa conclusion relative au maintien en vigueur des dispositions administra-
tives sans avoir examinéles problèmes touchant la survivance ou la
non-survivance des dispositions de procédure. Cependant, lorsque la
question s'estposéede savoir si l'article 6 avait survécu,la Cour semble
avoir estimé en fait que les dispositions administratives ne pouvaient
demeurer en vigueur sans l'article 6 et que,isqu'elle avait déjà estimé130 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
relied on two irreconcilable premises, viz., by assuming severability
for the purposes of the first step in its reasoning, and by assuming
inseverability of the same provisions for the purposes of the second
step, which depended upon the first. On the premise of inseverability,
the question whether the administrative provisions survived would
depend on the question whether Article 6 had been appropriately
amended so as to secure itssurvival.
Having reasoned along this line the Court then found what it regarded
as confirmation of the conclusion that Article 6 had survived in an
amended form, i.e., with the Council of the League being replaced by
the General Assembly of the United Nations as the supervisory body.
Such an amendment could, however, have come about only with
the consent of the Respondent, and the evidence establishes that not
only was there no agreement that the mandatory's duty to report and
account to the Council ofthe Leaguewould become a duty to report to an
organ of the United Nations, but, that, on the contrary, it was common
cause atal1material timesthatno such change had taken place.
If the provisions of Article6 were so essential that without them the
rest of the mandate provisions could not exist, then the disappearance
of Article 6 must mean that the whole Mandate has lapsed. On the other
hand, if thesaid other provisions can still apply even though Article 6
has lapsed,then the disappearance of Article 6 can have no bearing on
the survival or otherwise of theaid other provisions.
42. Apart from what has been stated above, the Court referred to no
specificevidence which can justify a finding that the Respondent agreed
to an obligation to submit to the supervision and control of the General
Assembly of the United Nations and to render annual reports to it. The
Court, however, found "confirmation" for what it termed "these general
considerations" in Article 80 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations,
and in the resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations of
18 April 1946, of which the Court said that it "presupposed that the
supervisory functions exercised by the League, would be taken over by
the United Nations". 1 have already dealt with the said Article and the
said resolution, and have shown that neither can serve as support for the
Court's conclusion.
43. Whether due to the fact that al1the relevant information was not
placed before the Court, or whether due to an oversight on its part,
it is nonetheless clear that the Court did not have regard to the signifi-
cance of some important events which occurred during the period
1945-1947. Thus the 1950Opinion makes no referenceto the first Chinese
proposal with regard to mandates, which proposal was not proceeded
with, and the only inference thatcan be drawn from this omission isthat
128que cesdispositionsétaientencoreapplicables,ils'ensuivait nécessairement
que l'article 6avait également survécu. nd'autrestermes, la Cour semble
s'êtrefondéesur deuxprémissesinconciliables,enadmettant, d'une part la
divisibilité des deux catégoriesde dispositions aux fins de la première
étape de son raisonnement et d'autre part leur non-divisibilité aux
fins de la seconde étape,qui dépendait de la première. Pour ce qui est
de la prémissede non-divisibilité,la question de savoir si les dispositions
administratives avaient survécudépendaitdu point de savoir si l'article 6
avait étédûment modifiéen vue de rester en vigueur.
Par ce raisonnement, la Cour a trouvéce qu'elle a considérécomme la
confirmation de la conclusion selon laquelle l'article 6 avait survécu
sous une forme modifiée, l'Assemblée générald ees Nations Unies
remplaçant le Conseil de la Société desNations en tant qu'organe de
surveillance.
Pareille modification n'a pu cependant intervenir qu'avec le consente-
ment du défendeur,or, il est prouvéque non seulement il n'y a aucun eu
d'accord transformant l'obligation du Mandataire de faire rapport et
de rendre compte au Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations en une obligation
de faire rapport à un organe des Nations Unies, mais qu'au contraire
il a étégénéralementadmis pendant toute la périodepertinente qu'aucun
changement de ce genre ne s'étaitproduit.
Si les dispositions de l'article 6 étaientsi essentielles que, sans elles,
les autres dispositions du Mandat ne pouvaient exister, la disparition
de l'article devait entraîner la caducitédu Mandat dans son ensemble.
D'autre part, si les autres dispositions étaient encore applicables bien
que l'article 6 fût devenu caduc, la disparition de l'article 6 ne pouvait
avoir aucun effet sur le maintien en vigueur ou la caducité des autres
dispositions.
42. En dehors de ce que j'ai indiquéci-dessus, la Cour n'a mentionné
aucune preuve précisejustifiantla conclusion selon laquelle le défendeur
aurait acceptéune obligation de se soumettre à la surveillance et au
contrôlede l'Assemblée générale de Nsations Unies et delui soumettre des
rapports annuels. La Cour cependant a trouvé une ((confirmation » de
ce qu'elle appelait «ces considérations générales))dans l'article 80,
paragraphe 1,de la Charte des Nations Unies ainsi quedans la résolution
de l'Assembléede la Société desNations du 18 avril 1946,dont la Cour
a dit qu'elle «présuppose que les fonctions de surveillance exercées
par la Société desNations seraient reprises par les Nations Unies ».
J'ai déjà parléde cet article et de cette résolution et j'ai montré que
ni l'un ni l'autre ne pouvaient servir à appuyer la conclusion de la
Cour.
43. Il est évidentque la Cour, soit parce qu'elle ne disposait pas de
tous les renseignements pertinents, soit par inadvertance, n'a pas tenu
compte de la portée de certains événementsimportants qui se sont
produits au cours de la période 1945-1947.Ainsi l'avis consultatif de
1950 ne mentionnait pas la première proposition chinoise relative aux
Mandats, proposition à laquelle il n'avait pas été donné suite;on doit
nécessairement enconclure que la Cour ignorait cette proposition outhe Court was either unaware thereof or did not appreciate its vast
significance.Nor is any reference made in the Opinion to the discussions
and proceedings in the Preparatory Commission, which reveal the
absence of any presupposition that the United Nations would automatic-
ally, and without specific provision, become heir to the supemisory
powers of the League, or that the Respondent's duty to account to the
Leaguewould become a duty to account to the United Nations. Similarly,
there is no reference in the Opinion to the proposa1 made by the United
States of America to the Preparatory Commission that specificprovision
should be made for vesting certain organs of the United Nations with
supervisorypowers in respect of mandates not converted to trusteeship,
or to the fact that theproposal was dropped and not even raised in the
discussions before the Preparatory Commission. Nor is there any
reference in the Opinion to the report of the Liquidation Committee
of the League.
The Opinion also contains no reference to the findings of the United
Nations Committee on Palestine, which so clearly reveal that there was
no agreement to the effectthat an organ or organs of the United Nations
would after the dissolution of the League perform the functions of the
League Council in respect of mandates, and in particular that the duty
to report and account to the Council of the League had not been con-
verted into a duty to report and account to any organ of the United
Nations. The Court also made no reference to the numerous statements
by the Respondent and a largenumber of Members ofthe United Nations
(most of them also ex-members of the League) in the years following
the dissolution of the League to the effect that the Respondent was not
under a duty to report and account to the United Nations as a supervisory
authority in respect of mandates.
43 (a). The Court, in referring to the Respondent's letter of 23 July
1947,stated that this letter drew attention to a resolution of the Union
Parliament (in fact it was a resolution of theHouse of Assembly only)
in which it requested "that the Government should continue to render
reports to the United Nations Organization as it has done heretofore
under the Mandate". The Courtfound that this declaration constituted-
"... recognition by the Union Government of the continuance
of its obligations under the Mandate and not a mere indication
of the future conduct of that Government. Interpretations placed
upon legal instruments by the parties to them, though not conclusive
as to their meaning, have considerable probative value when they
contain recognition by a party of its own obligations under an
instrument. .."
1 am aware that the above remarks were made by the Court when
it was consideringthe question whether the substantive or administrative
129ne s'est pas rendu compte de sa considérable importance. D'autre part,
l'avis ne mentionnait pas les discussions et délibérationsde la Com-
mission préparatoirequi révèlent l'absencede toute présupposition selon
laquelle les Nations Unies se seraient vu transférerautomatiquement et
sans disposition expresse les pouvoirs de surveillance de la Sociétédes
Nations ou selon laquelle l'obligation du défendeurde rendre compte
à la Sociétédes Nations serait devenue une obligation de rendre compte
aux Nations Unies. De même,on ne trouvait dans l'avisaucune allusion
au fait que les Etats-Unis d'Amériqueavaient soumis à la Commission
préparatoire une proposition tendant à ce qu'une disposition spéciale
fût prise pour confierà certains organes des Nations Unies des pouvoirs
dz surveillance sur les Mandats non transformés en accords de tutelle,
et que cette proposition avait été abandonnée sans avoir été discutée
devant la Commission préparatoire. L'avis ne mentionnait pas non
plus le rapport du Comitéde liquidation de la Sociétédes Nations.
11n'était pas non plus question dans l'avis des conclusions de la
Commission des Nations Unies pour la Palestine d'où il ressort si
nettement qu'il n'y avait aucun accord prévoyant qu'un organe ou
plusieurs organes des Nations Unies exerceraient après la dissolution
de la Sociétédes Nations les fonctions de son Conseil en matière de
Mandats, et en particulier que l'obligation de faire rapport et de rendre
compte à ce Conseil n'avait pas ététransformée en une obligation de
faire rapport et de rendre compteà un organe des Nations Unies. Enfin
la Cour n'a pas rappeléqu'au cours des annéesayantsuivi la dissolution
de la Sociétédes Nations le défendeuret bon nombre de Membres des
Nations Unies (dont la plupart étaient également anciens Membresde
la Sociétédes Nations) avaient déclaré en maintes occasionsque le
défendeur n'était pas dans l'obligation de faire rapport et de rendre
compte à l'organisation des Nations Unies en tant qu'autorité desur-
veillance sur les Mandats.
43a). Se référant àla lettre du défendeuren date du 23juillet 1947,
la Cour a déclaréque cette lettre attirait l'attention sur une résolution
du Parlement de l'Union (en fait il s'agissait d'une résolution de la
seule House of Assembly)par laquelle le Gouvernement étaitinvité à
continuer (à soumettre des rapports à l'Organisation des Nations Unies
comme il l'avait fait jusqu'ici en vertu du Mandat ».La Cour a estimé
que cette déclarationconstituait:
«la reconnaissance par le Gouvernement de l'Union de la conti-
nuation de ses obligations en vertu du Mandat et non une simple
indication quant à la conduite future de ce Gouvernement. L'inter-
prétation d'instruments juridiques donnée par les parties elles-
mêmes, si elle n'estpas concluante pour en déterminer le sens,
jouit néanmoinsd'une grande valeur probante quand cette interpré-
tation contient la reconnaissance par l'une des parties de ses obli-
gations en vertu d'un instrument..))
Je n'ignore pas que la Cour a formuléles observations ci-dessusalors
qu'elle examinait la question de savoir si les dispositions administratives 132 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
provisions of the Mandate had survived the dissolution of the League.
It would, however, appear from the minority opinions of 1956,in which
several judges participated who had been parties to the 1950 Opinion,
that the Court in 1950 was under the impression that the Respondent
had undertaken to report to the United Nations in compliance with the
provisions of Article 6 of the Mandate. It therefore seems asif the Court
in 1950 overlooked the fact that Respondent's undertaking to report
was not intended to be in compliance of Article 6, but was limited to
reports of the kindprovidedfor in Article73 of the Charter, a fact which
isapparent from the wording ofthe very letter itself,in which, asindicated
above, mention is made of Respondent's undertaking to "submit reports
on their administration for the information of the United Nations".
The Court also apparently did not appreciate that the resolution referred
to in the letter was not a resolution of Respondent's Parliament but a
resolution of only one of the Houses of Parliament, and that it had no
legal effect otherhan that of a recommendation to the Union Govern-
ment, i.e., the Mandatory, as to what should be done in future. As 1have
shown above, when the letter is read with the statements which were
made by Respondent's representatives at the United Nations, both
before and after the date of the letter, it becomes explicitly clear that
Respondent was neither agreeing to submit to the supervision of the
United Nations nor offering to supply any information, other than
information of the nature contemplated in Article 73 of the Charter.
1 may add that if the aforesaid resolution is analysed with a view to
ascertaining what the contemplation of the House of Assembly was
regarding obligations under the Mandate, it seems evident that the
following paragraph thereof should not be ignored:
"Whereas the League of Nations has since ceased to exist and
was not empowered by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles or
of the Covenant to transfer its rights and powers in regard to South
West Africa to the United Nations Organization, or to any other
international organization or body, and did not in fact do so."
(Italics added.)
44. Not only were cogent reasons advanced in 1950 by Sir Arnold
McNair and Judge Read for dissenting from the majority judges in
respect of this issue, but the majority opinion has elicited strong criticism
from highly qualified publicists.refer in this regard to George Schwar-
zenberger,International Law (3rd ed.), Volume 1,pages 101-102; Manley
O. Hudson, "The Twenty-ninth Year of the World Court", in American
Journal of International Law, Volume 45, pages 1-36at pages 13-15;and
Joseph Nisot, "The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice on the International Status of South West Africa", in Soutlz
African Law Journal, Volume 68, Part 3 (August 1951),pages 274-285.
In my opinion there is, for the reasons which1have advanced, complete
justification for such criticism.
130ou dispositions de fond du Mandat avaient survécu à la dissolution de
la Sociétédes Nations. Il semble cependant ressortir des opinions
minoritaires de 1956auxquelles ont participé plusieurs juges qui étaient
parties à l'avis de 1950, que la Cour avait en 1950 l'impression que le
défendeur s'était engagé à faire rapport à l'Organisation des Nations
Unies en application des dispositions de l'article6 du Mandat. La Cour
a donc, semble-t-il, perdu de vue en 1950 que le défendeur n'avait pas
pris d'engagement de faire rapport en application de l'article 6 et qu'il
s'agissait seulement de rapports du genre de ceux qui étaient prévus à
l'article 73 de la Charte: c'est ce aui ressortait des termes de la lettre
elle-mêmedans laquelle, comme indiqué ci-dessus, il était question de
l'engagement du défendeur de ((soumettre aux Nations Unies, pour leur
information, des rapports sur son administration ))La Cour apparem-
ment ne s'est pas non plus rendu compte que la résolution mentionnée
dans la lettre émanait non du Parlement du défendeur, mais d'une de
ses chambres et qu'elle n'avait d'autre effet juridique que celui d'une
recommandation adressée au Gouvernement de l'Union. à savoir au
Mandataire, quant à ce qu'il conviendrait de faire dans l'avenir. Comme
je l'ai montré ci-dessus, lorsqu'on lit la lettre conjointement avec les
déclarations faites devant les Nations Unies par les représentants du
défendeur tant avant qu'après réceptionde ladite lettre, il devient par-
faitement clair que le défendeur n'acceptait pas de se soumettre à la
surveillance des Nations Unies, pas plus qu'il n'offrait de fournir des
renseignements autres que ceux qui étaient prévus à l'article 73 de la
Charte. Je dois ajouter que, si l'on analyse la résolution en question en
vue de déterminer quelle était l'intention de la House of Assembly eu
égardaux obligations découlant du Mandat, il semble évident qu'on ne
peut en ignorer le paragraphe suivant:
((Attendu que la Société desNations a, depuis, cessé d'exister
et n'avait pas qualité, aux termes du traitéde Versailles ou du Pacte
de la Sociétédes Nations, pour transférer ses droits et pouvoirs
quant au Sud-Ouest africain à l'Organisation des Nations Unies
ou à toute autre organisation ou organisme international, et qu'en
fait elle n'a pas pris de décisionà cet égard;))(Les italiques sont de
nous.)
44. Non seulement sir Arnold McNair et M. Read ont donnéen 1950
des motifs valables pour expliquer qu'ils n'étaient pas d'accord à cet
égardavec les juges de la majorité, mais l'avis de la majorité a suscité
de vives critiques de la part d'auteurs hautement qualifiés.Je citerai à
ce sujet: George Schwarzenberger, International Law, 3e édition, vol. 1,
p. 101-102; Manley O. Hudson, «The Twenty-ninth Year of the World
Court ))American Journal of International Law, vol. 45, p. 13-15; et
Joseph Nisot, ((The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice on the International Status of South West Africa ))South African
Law Journal, vol. 68, 3e partie, août 1951, p. 274-285. Pour les raisons
que j'ai indiquées, cescritiques sont à mon avis pleinement justifiées. 45. Although the soundness of the Court's 1950 Opinion in regard
to Article 6 of the Mandate Declaration did not necessarily require
decision when the preliminary objections of the Respondent were
considered by this Court in 1962, it was certainly a fundamental issue
in respect of the main one of the alternative contentions advanced by the
Applicants, i.e., the contention, not acceded to by any member of the
Court, of a succession by the United Nations and its Members of the
functions of the League and its members regarding mandates. Conse-
quently severaljudges expressed views on the matter. Inajoint dissenting
opinion Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzrnaurice remarked:
"... we think that the view expressed by the Court in its 1950
Opinion, to the effect that the supervisory functions of the former
League Council passed to the Assembly of the United Nations
whiclî was entitled to exercise them, was definitely wrong". (See
South West Africa cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 532, footnote 2.)
The said judges based their conclusion, inter alia, on two facts which
were not before the Court in 1950, namely firstly, the content of the
proposa1 of the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission
of the United Nations, which proposa1 was rejected, and, secondly,
the fact that the Chinese representative was compelled to amend his
original draft resolution by omittingl1reference to reporting by manda-
tories to the United Nations.
The effect of the opinion of Judge Bustamante in 1962is that in the
absence of a trusteeshipagreement,the United Nations could not exercise
control over South West Africa. Sir Louis Mbanefo's opinion also
appears to support the view that administrative supervision of the
Mandate had disappeared on the dissolution of the League. He quoted
with approval an extract from the separate opinion of Judge Read in
Status of South West Africa, I.C.J. Reports 19.50, page 165, which
includedthe followingpassage:
"The disappearance of the obligations included in the first and
the second classes would bring the mandates system to an end.
The disappearance ofthe régimeof report, accountability, supervision
and modification, througlzthe Council and the Permanent Mandates
Commission, might weaken tlze mandates system; but it would not
bring it to an end. As a matter of fact, the record shows that the
paralysis ofthoseagenciesduringthe six waryears hadno detrimental
efSect upon the maintenance of the well-being and development of
thepeoples." (Italics added.)
And Sir Louis Mbanefo came to the conclusion that on the dissolution
of the League-
"... rights and obligations embodied in it [the Mandate] were
131 45. Lorsqu'en 1962la Cour a examiné les exceptions préliminaires
du défendeur, il n'étaitpas indispensable pour elle de se prononcer
sur le bien-fondéde l'avis exprimépar la Cour en 1950au sujet de l'arti-
cle 6 de la déclarationde Mandat; toutefois cettequestion a certainement
pris une importance fondamentale au regard de la principale des thèses
subsidiaires formulées par les demandeurs, à savoir celle qui n'a été
acceptéepar aucun membre de la Cour et qui concerne la prise en charge
par l'organisation des Nations Unies et ses Membres des fonctions de
la Sociétédes Nations et de ses Membres en matière de Mandats. En
conséquenceplusieurs juges ont donné leur avis à ce sujet. Dans leur
opinion dissidente commune, sir Percy Spender et sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice ont fait observer :
((nous pensons que l'opinion expriméepar la Cour dans son avis
consultatif de 1950, d'après laquelle les fonctions de surveillance
de l'ancien Conseil de la Société deNations sont passées à1'Assem-
blée desNations Unies qui avait le droit de les exercer, étaitcer-
certainement erronée)).(Voir affaires du Sud-Ouest africain,C.I.J.
Recueil 1962,p. 532,note 2.)
Cesjuges ont notamment fondé leurs conclusions sur deux faits dont la
Cour n'avait pas étésaisie en 1950: premièrement, la teneur de la pro-
position du Comitéexécutifde la Commission préparatoire des Nations
Unies, proposition qui avait étérejetéeet, deuxièmement,le fait que le
représentant de la Chine avait été obligé de modifier son projet de
résolution initial de façon à supprimer toute mention de l'obligation
pour les Mandataires de faire rapport aux Nations Unies.
Dans son opinion de 1962,M. Bustamante a estiméquefaute d'accord
de tutelle les Nations Unies ne peuvent exercer un contrôle sur le Sud-
Ouest africain. Dans son opinion, sir Louis Mbanefo a paru également
appuyer l'idéeselon laquelle la surveillance administrative du Mandat
a pris fin à la dissolution de la Société desNations. 11 a cité, en
l'approuvant, un extrait de l'opinion individuellejointe par M. Read à
l'avis consultatif sur le Statut international du Sud-Ouest africain (C.I.J.
Recueil1950,page 165),oùl'ontrouve notamment lepassage suivant:
((La disparition des obligations qui font partie de la première
et de la seconde classe mettrait fin au système des Mandats. La
disparition du système des rapports, de la responsabilitéde la sur-
veillance et de la modification, qui fonctionnait par l'organe du
Conseil de la Société desNations et de la Commission permanente
des Mandats, affaiblirait le système des Mandats mais n'y mettrait
pas Jin. Les faits ont' d'ailleurs démontré quela paralysie de ces
institutions au cours des six annéesde guerre n'a pas eu d'effet
nuisible sur le maintien du bien-êtreet l'évolutiondes populations))
(Les italiques sont de nous.)
Et sir Louis Mbanefo d',aboutir à la conclusion qu'à la dissolution de la
Société des Nations:
([lesdroits et obligations qu...étaient fixés[dans le Mandat] ont
131 134 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
maintained at the level at which they were on the dissolution of
the League".
The obligation to report to a non-existing Council of the League could
not be "maintained" at any level.
46. It has been submitted that some passages in the Judgment of the
Court in South West Africa cases, I.C.J. Reports 1962, could be inter-
preted as supporting the Court's majority opinion of 1950in regard to
the transfer to the United Nations of the supervisory powers of the
League in respect of mandates. There are, however, no express findings
to this effect, and the impression gained from the Judgment as a whole
is that as far as possible this issue was deliberately avoided, and that the
Court did not intend expressingany opinionthereanent.What is,however,
of considerable significance is that both the conclusion and reasoning
inthe said Judgment regarding the survival of the compromissory clause
in Article 7 of the Mandate Declaration support the view that transfer
of supervisory powers did not take place.
The reasoning of the 1962 Judgment compels one to infer that the
Court thought that, as a result of the dissolution of the League, Article 6
of the Mandate no longer applies.
Reference has already been made to the three reasons advanced in the
said Judgment for holding that the words "Member of the League of
Nations" in Article 7 (2) of the Mandate have since, and by reason of
the dissolution of the League, come to mean, for the purposes of the
said Article, ex-member of the League. The first reason was that, inas-
much as a mandatory could during the lifetime of the League by the
exercise of its rightsder the unanimity rule, have frustrated the wishes
of the Council of the League relative to the administration of the man-
dated territory, the role of the Court was a very essential one.
With regard to this suggested essentiality of the adjudication clause,
the Court's attention had been drawn to the fact that three ofthe trustee-
ship agreements concluded in respect of former mandated territories
do not contain any compromissory clause, and the argument had been
advanced that the Members of the United Nations (and they included
practicallyal1the ex-members of the League) could therefore not have
considered the adjudication clause to be an essentialprovision.
The Judgment deals as follows with this argument:
"The point is drawn that what was essential the moment before
was no longer essential the moment after, and yet the principles
under the mandates system corresponded to those under the trustee-
ship system. This argument apparently overlooks one important
difference in the structure and working of the two systems andloses
its whole point when it is noted that under Article 18 of the Charter
of the United Nations, 'decisions of the General Assembly on
important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the
132 été, enquelque sorte, maintenus au niveau qu'ils avaient atteint
lors de la dissolution de la Socié».
L'obligation de faire rapport à un Conseil de la Société desNations
non existant ne pouvait être((maintenue » à aucun niveau.
46. On a soutenu que certains passages de l'arrêt rendupar la Cour
dans les affaires du Sud-Ouest africain (C.I.J. Recueil 1962) peuvent
êtreinterprétés comme appuyant l'avis exprimépar la majorité de la
Cour en 1950 quant au transfert à l'organisation des Nations Unies
des pouvoirs de surveillance de la Société desNations en matière de
Mandats. On ne trouve cependant aucune conclusion expresse en ce
sens et l'impression qui se dégagede l'arrêtdans son ensemble est que,
danstoute la mesure du possible, la Cour a délibérément évitdé 'aborder
cette question, n'ayant nullement l'intention d'exprimer une opinion
à ce sujet. Ce qui revêtcependant une importance considérable c'est
que le dispositif comme les motifs de l'arrêt appuient,en ce qui concerne
le maintien en vigueur de la clause compromissoire de l'article 7 de la
déclaration de Mandat, la thèse selon laquelle il n'y a eu aucun transfert
des pouvoirs de surveillance.
Les motifs del'arrêt de 1962obligent àconclure que la Cour a estimé
qu'en raison de la dissolution de la Sociétédes Nations l'article 6 du
Mandat n'étaitplus applicable.
J'ai déjàmentionnéles trois motifs retenus dans l'arrêtpour soutenir
que, du fait dela dissolution dela SociétédesNations, lesmots((Membre
de la Société desNations)) figurant au deuxième alinéa de l'article 7
du Mandat, signifient maintenant aux fins dudit article ((ancien Membre
de la Société».Le premier de ces motifs était que,puisqu'un Mandataire
pouvait au cours de l'existence de la Société desNations s'opposer aux
vŒux du Conseil quant à l'administration du territoire sous Mandat,
en exerçant ses droits découlant de la règle de l'unanimité, le rôle de
la Cour était capital.
En ce qui concerne ce prétendu caractère essentiel de la clause de
règlement judiciaire, on avait attiré l'attention de la Cour sur le fait
que trois des accords de tutelle conclus au sujet d'anciens territoires
sous Mandat ne contiennent pas de clause compromissoire; on en
avait déduit que les Membres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
(qui comprenait presque tous les anciens Membres de la Société des
Nations) n'avaient pu considérerla clause de règlementjudiciaire comme
constituant un élément essentiel.
Voici ce qu'on lit dans l'arrêt ce sujet:
«On a souligné que ce qui était essentiel à un moment donné
cessait de l'êtreensuite; or, les principes'sur lesquels se fondait le
système des Mandats correspondent à ceux qui sont à la base du
régimede tutelle. Cet argument négligeapparemment une différence
importantedans la structureet le fonctionnement des deux systèmes
et il perd touteautorité sil'on sesouvientqu'aux termes del'article
de la Charte des Nations Unies: «les décisions de l'Assemblée
généralesur les questions importantes sont prises à la majorité
132 members present and voting', whereasthe unanimity rule prevailed
in the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations under
the Covenant. Thus legally valid decisions can be taken by the
General Assembly of the United Nations and the Trusteeship
Council under Chapter XII1 of the Charter without the concurrence
of the trustee State, and the necessity for invoking the Permanent
Court for judicial protection which prevailed under the mandates
systemis dispensed with under the Charter.
For the reasons stated, the First and Second Objections must be
dismissed."
The effect of this statement is that the adjudication clause is not an
essential provision in the trusteeship systeminasmuch as the unanimity
rule which applied to proceedings of the Council of the League does not
apply to the organs of the United Nations, with the result that the
General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations
can take valid decisions without the concurrence of the trustee State.
The authors of the Judgment considered the adjudication clause to be
essential only aslong as the unanimityrule applied to the organ entrusted
with administrative supervision, or if such organ should for some
reason or another cease to function. If it should be held that Article 6
of the Mandate was amended by the substitution ofthe General Assembly
of the United Nations (functioning with an ordinary two-thirds majority)
for the Council of the League, there would be no real differencebetween
the administrative supervison of the mandated territory and that of a
State under the trusteeship system; which of course would mean-in
terms of the Court's 1962 reasoning-that the reasons advanced for
regarding the adjudication clause as an essential clause of the Mandate
would no longer apply, and that the construction placed by the Court
on the words "another Member of the League" in Article 7 (2) of the
Mandate would not be justified. In other words, the adjudication clause
could have survived on the grounds ofits essentialityonlyiftheunanimity
rule which applied to the proceedings of the League Council also applies
to the proceedings of the Assemblyof the United Nations when that body
is concernedwith the administration of the Mandate, or if administrative
supervision as provided for in the Mandate has come to an end. In this
Court's Advisory Opinion of 1955,it was held that the unanimity rule
cannot apply in any proceedings of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, and this view was confirmed by the 1962Judgment. If the said
Opinion is sound, then a findingthat the supervisory powers ofthe Coun-
cil of the League were transferred to the General Assembly of the
United Nations would be in conflict with the reasoning in the 1962
Judgment.
The inescapable conclusion accordingly is that the reasoning of the
1962Judgment cannot be reconciled with a contention that the super-
visory functions of the Council of the League became vested in the
General Assembly of the United Nations.
133 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 135
desdeuxtiers des Membres présentset votant »,alors qu'en vertu du
Pacte, la règle de I'unanimité prévalaiatu Conseil età l'Assemblée
de la Société desNations. Ainsi, des décisionsjuridiquement vala-
bles peuvent êtreprises par l'Assemblée générale de Nsations Unies
et par le Conseil de tutelle en vertu du chapitreXII1 de la Charte
sans l'assentiment de 1'Etatchargéde la tutelle et, dans le cadre
de la Charte, la nécessité, prévuear le système desMandats, de re-
courirà la protection judiciaire de la Courpermanente, n'existeplus.
Pour les motifs qui viennent d'être énoncés l,s première et
deuxième exceptions doiventêtrerejetées. »
11ressort de ce passage que la clause de règlement judiciaire n'est pas
un élément essentieldu régime de tutelle, car la règle de l'unanimité
qui s'appliquait au sein du Conseil de la Société deNations ne s'appli-
que pas dans les organes des Nations Unies, si bien que l'Assemblée
générale etle Conseil de tutelle peuvent prendre des décisions valables
sans l'assentiment de 1'Etat qui administre le territoire sous tutelle.
Les auteurs de l'arrêtont estiméque la clause de règlement judiciaire
n'a un caractère essentielque si la règle de I'unanimité s'applique à
l'organe chargé dela surveillance administrative ou si cet organe a
cesséde fonctionner pour une raison ou pour une autre. Si l'on devait
admettre que l'article 6 du Mandat a étémodifié, ence sens que l'As-
semblée générale deN s ations Unies (fonctionnant avec une majorité
ordinaire des deux tiers) a remplacéle Conseil de la SociétédesNations,
il n'y aurait pas de véritabledifférenceentre la surveillance administra-
tive du territoire sous Mandat et celle d'un Etat placé sousle régime
de tutelle; ce qui voudrait dire bien entendu- d'aprèsle raisonnement
tenu par la Cour en 1962 - que les motifs invoquéspour considérer
la clause de règlementjudiciaire comme un élément essentiedlu Mandat
ne seraient plus valables et que l'interprétation par la Cour des mots
«un autre Membre de la Société des Nations ))figurant au deuxième ali-
néade l'article 7 du Mandat ne serait pas justifiée.En d'autres termes,
la clause de règlement judiciaire ne peut avoir survécudu fait de son
caractère essentiel que si la règlede l'unanimité quis'appliquait au sein
du Conseil de la Société desNations s'applique égalementau sein de
l'Assembléedes Nations Unies lorsque cet organisme s'occupe de l'ad-
ministration du Mandat ou si la surveillance administrative prévuepar
le Mandat a pris fin. Dans son avis consultatif de 1955,la Coura estimé
que la règlede I'unanimité nepeut jamais s'appliquer au sein de l'As-
semblée générale deN s ations Unies et ces vues ont été confirméep sar
l'arrêtde 1962.Sicet avis consultatif est bienfondé,il est contraire aux
motifs énoncésdans l'arrêtde 1962de dire que les pouvoirs de surveil-
lance du Conseil de la Société desNations ont été transférés à 1'Assem-
bléegénérale desNations Unies.
La conclusion qui s'impose est que les motifs de l'arrêtde 1962sont
incompatibles avec l'allégation selon laquelle les fonctions de surveil-
lance du Conseil de la Sociétédes Nations seraient passéesà l'Assemblée
générale desNations Unies.
133 47. There is also another aspect of the reasoning of the 1962Judgment
which negatives the possibility of the General Assembly of the United
Nations having succeeded to the supervisory functions of the League
Council. The Court relied upon what it found to be an agreement among
the members of the League in April 1946to continue the mandates "as
far as it was practically feasible oroperable with reference to the obli-
gations of the mandatory powers". It was held that the purpose of this
agreement was to make up for the "imperfections as far as was practic-
able" and "to maintain the status quo as far as possible in regard to the
mandates". At page 341 of the Judgment the agreement is described as
follows :
"It is clear fromthe foregoing account that there was a unanimous
agreement among al1 the Member States present at the Assembly
meeting that the Mandates should be continued to be exercised in
accordance with the obligations therein defined although the disso-
lution of the League, in the words of the representative of South
Africa ut the meeting, 'willnecessarily precludecomplete compliance
with the letter of the Mandate', i.e. notwithstanding thefact that some
organs of the League like the Council and the Permanent Mandates
Commission would be missing. In other words the common under-
standing of the Member States in the Assembly-including the
Mandatory Powers-in passing the said resolution, was to continue
the Mandates, however imperfect the wlzolesystem would be after
the League's dissolution, and as much as it would be operable,
until other arrangements were agreed upon by the Mandatory
Powers with the United Nations concerning their respective Man-
dates." (Italics added.)
Had the Court considered that Article 6 of the Mandate had been
amended by the substitution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations for the Council of the League, the above-quoted expression
would not have been used. There would have been no "imperfections"
which could only be made up for "as far as was practicable". The
agreement to continue "as much as ... would be operable" must have
presupposed that Article 6 would not be operable, because if it were
operable and if, as the Court had held, Article 7 still applied, there would
have been nothing that could not be operable and the words "as much
as .. .would be operable" would have been meaningless. In any event,
the purpose could not have been "to maintain the status quo" and at the
same time to brincwabout radical amendments. There could be no auestion
of maintaining the status quo if the supervisory powers were transferred
to a body the membership of which was not the same as that of the
League, and which functioned in a manner substantially different from
that which applied in the League Council. The status quo could not be
maintained if by the suggested substitution Respondent's rights under
the unanimity rule would be abolished.
48. As 1 have already mentioned, the Court did not base its finding 47. Un autre élémentencore du raisonnement de l'arrêt de 1962
contredit la thèsed'aprèslaquelle l'Assemblée générale de Nsations Unies
aurait pris en charge les fonctions desurveillance du Conseil dela Société
des Nations. La Cour s'est fondée sur ce qui constituait, à son avis, un
accord intervenu entre les Membres de la Sociétédes Nations en avril
1946 en vue de maintenir les Mandats ((dans toute la mesure possible
et praticable, en ce qui concerne les obligations des Puissances manda-
taires))La Cour a dit que cet accord avait pour objet de (suppléeraux
lacunes dans toute la mesure du possible » et de «maintenir danstoute la
mesure du possible le statu quo à l'égard desMandats ».A la page 341
de l'arrêt,elle a définil'accord en ces termes:
«11ressort de ce qui précède qu'il existaitun accord unanime
entre tous les Etats Membres présents à la séance de l'Assemblée
pour que les Mandats continuassent d'êtreexercésconformément
aux obligations définiesdans ces Mandats, bien que,pour reprendre
les termes dont s'est servià cette séancele représentant del'Afrique
du Sud, la dissolution de laSociétédes Nations (([empêcheraité ]vi-
demment de se conformer entièrement à la lettre du Mandat », c'est-
à-dire nonobstantlefait que certains organes de laSociété, telsque
le Conseil et la Commission permanente des Mandats, feraient
ciéfaut.En d'autres termes, il étaitentendu à l'Assembléeentre les
Etats Membres - y compris les Puissances mandataires, au moment
de passer la résolution, que les :vIandats continueraient, malgré
les lacunes que présenteraitl'ensemble du système après la dissolu-
tion de la Sociétédes Nations et autant qu'ilserait possible,jusqu'à
ce que de nouveaux arrangements fussent pris entre les Puissances
mandataires et les Nations Unies à propos des divers Mandats. ))
(Les italiques sont de nous.)
Si la Cour avait estiméque l'article 6 du Mandat avait étémodifiépar
la substitution de l'Assemblée générale deN s ations Unies au Conseil
de la Société desNations, elle n'aurait pas utilisé lestermes repris ci-
dessus. II n'y aurait pas eu de «lacunes ))auxquelles on n'aurait pu sup-
pléer que adans toute la mesure du possible ».L'accord consistant à
continuer « autant qu'il serait possible )) présupposait nécessairement
que l'article 6 n'était pas applicable, parce que, s'il l'avait étéet si,
comme l'a soutenu la Cour, l'article 7 l'aurait étéaussi, il n'y aurait
rien eu que d'applicable et les mots ((autant qu'il serait possible))
n'auraient eu aucun sens. De toute façon, l'intention n'a pu êtrede
((maintenir le statu quo » et en même temps de procéder à des mcdifi-
cations radicales. Il ne pouvait être questionde maintenir le statu quo
si les pouvoirs de surveillance étaient transférés à un organe dont la
composition était différente de celle de la Société desNations et qui
fonctionnnait selon les règles essentiellement différentes.Le statu quo
ne pouvait êtremaintenu si, en raison de cette prétendue substitution,
les droits du défendeur découlant de la règle de l'unanimité étaient
abolis.
48. Comme je l'ai déjà dit, la Cour n'a pas fondé sa conclusion sur on anyprinciple of succession.The Court based itsfinding onits interpre-
tation of the mandate instrument and on acts which it considered consti-
tuted an agreement to the effect that the expression "Member of the
League" in Article 7 of the Mandate Declaration should be construed
as meaning "ex-Members of the League, who were Members at the time
ofits dissolution". Inher words, it found that the rights of the members
of the League under the Mandate were not transferred to the members
of the United Nations, but that States which weremembers of the League
at its dissolution retained their rights to invoke the adjudication clause
in Article 7 of the Mandate. Ifhis viewis Sound,it could surely not have
been the intention of the parties that the administrative supervision
provided for in Article 6 of the Mandate would be transferred to the
United Nations, because if such a transfer took place it would mean
that States which are not members of the United Nations, and which
would therefore have no Sayin the "administrative supervision", would
nonetheless have competence in the "judicial supernision", and that,
likewise, many States entitled to take part in the "administrative super-
vision" would have no competence in the "judicial supervision". Such
an anomalous result could not possibly have been contemplated by the
Court. For the above reasons the 1962Judgment cannot be reconciled
with a contention that the supervisory powers of the Council of the
League were transferred to the United Nations.
49. My conclusion, therefore, is that Respondent is not under any
obligation to report and account to the United Nations relative to its
administration of South West Africa. Article 6 of the Mandate Decla-
ration and the corresponding provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League ceased to apply on the dissolution of the League.Appli-
cants' Submissions2, 7and 8 should accordingly be dismissed.
50. It has been suggested that the Respondent is estopped from
denying an obligation to report and account to the United Nations.
In my opinion it is not estopped. Not only has Respondent atl1material
timesconsistentlydenied suchan obligation, but also no State has at any
material time alleged that it was induced by Respondent's word or
conduct into thinking that the Respondent had acknowledged such an
obligation. The Applicants cannot suggest anything of the kind,ecause
they would not be able to reconcile such a suggestion with their silence
and acquiescence during 1945, 1946,1947and 1948.
ARTICLE 73 OF THE CHARTE RF THE UNITED NATIONS
1. It may be contended that if Article 6 of the Mandate ceased to
apply, the reporting provisions of Article 73 of the Charter of the
United Nations (although far more limited in scope and effect) now
apply to the territory of South West Africa. This raises two major
135 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 137
un principe de succession. Elle l'a fondéesur son interprétation du texte
du Mandat et sur des actes qui, à son avis, ont constitué un accord en
vertu duquel l'expression ((Membre de la Société desNations ))devait
être interprétéeàl'article 7 dela déclarationdeMandat comme signifiant
les anciens Membres de la Société desNations qui en étaient Membres
au moment de sa dissolution ». En d'autres termes, la Cour a estiméque
les droits des Membres de la Société desNations découlant du Mandat
n'ont pas été transféréa sux Membres de l'organisation des Nations
Unies mais que les Etats qui étaient Membres de la Société desNations
à sa dissolution ont conservéle droit d'invoquer la clause de règlement
judiciaire de l'article 7 du Mandat. Si cette opinion est bien fondée,
il est impossible que l'intention des Parties ait été quela surveillance
administrative prévue àl'article 6 du Mandat fût transféréeauxNations
Unies, parce que, si ce transfert avait eu lieu, cela signifierait que des
Etats non membres des Nations Unies et n'ayant par conséquentpas voix
au chapitre en matière de csurveillance administrative » seraient ce-
pendant compétents en ce qui concerne la «surveillance judiciaire))et
que, de même,beaucoup d7Etats habilitésàparticiperà la (surveillance
administrative » seraient exclus de la «surveillance judiciaire».Il est
impossible que la Cour ait envisagéun résultat aussi singulier. Pour les
motifs qui précèdent, l'arrêtde 1962 est incompatible avec la thèse
selon laquelle les pouvoirs de surveillance du Conseil de la Société des
Nations auraient été transférés à l'organisation des Nations Unies.
49. Je conclurai donc que le défendeurn'est pas dans l'obligation de
faire rapport et de rendre compte aux Nations Unies quant à son admi-
nistration du Sud-Ouest africain. L'article6 de la déclarationde Mandat
et les dispositions correspondantes de l'article 22 du Pacte ont cessé
de s'appliquer à la dissolution dela Sociétédes Nations. Les conclusions
nos2, 7 et 8 des demandeurs doivent en conséquence êtrerejetées.
50. On a suggéréque le défendeur est empêchép ,ar voie d'estoppel,
de contester l'obligation de faire rapport et de rendre compteà l'organi-
sation des Nations Unies. A mon avis il ne l'est pas. Non seulement le
défendeur n'a pas cessé à tous moments pertinents de contester cette
obligation, mais en outre aucun Etat n'a prétendu à aucun moment
pertinent que les paroles ou le comportement du défendeur l'amenaient
à penser que celui-ci avait reconnu une telle obligation. Les demandeurs
ne sauraient avancer aucun argument de ce genre, faute de pouvoir le
concilier avec le silence qu'ils ont observé et le consentement qu'ils
ont expriméau cours des années 1945, 1946, 1947et 1948.
1. On pourrait dire que, si l'article 6 du Mandat a cesséd'être appli-
cable, les dispositions de l'article 73 de la Charte des Nations Unies
prévoyant l'obligation de faire rapport s'appliquent maintenant au
territoire du Sud-Ouest africain, bien qu'elles soient d'une portée et
135 questions: firstly, whether this matter is part of the Applicants' claim,
i.e., has it been referred to the Court for decision by the Applicants,
and secondly, whether the Respondent has consented to the Court's
jurisdiction in respect thereof l.
2. The Applicants not only deliberately did not refer this issue to
the Court, but strenuously contended that Article 73 has no application
as far as South West Africa is concerned.
3. In their Applications they alleged that-
". .. the Union has violated, and continues to violate Article 6
of the Mandate, by its failure to render to the General Assembly
of the United Nations annual reports containing information with
regard to the territory and indicating the measures it has taken
to carry out its obligations under the Mandate".
Submissions B, C and J in the Applications equally leave no room for
any doubt that the claim was based on Article 6 of the Mandate as read
with Article 22 of the Covenant. In the Memorials the Applicants
relied solely on this Court's 1950 Opinion, which held that Article 6
of the Mandate survived the dissolution of the League, but that the
applicability of Article 73 was irrelevant-despite the fact that argument
thereon was heard. Submissions 2 and 7 of the Memorials, and as
Tially drafted, similarly leave no room for any doubt that the claim
embraced by them was based on Article 6 of the Mandate. In the Reply
Applicants' contention was definedas follows :"Respondent's obligation,
as stated in Article 6 of the Mandate, is in effect, and Respondent is
accountable thereunder to the United Nations, as 'the organized inter-
national community' ".It was stated in express terms that "Applicants'
submissionsdo not allege violations by Respondent of such obligations"
(Le., obligations under Article 73 of the Charter). In the oral proceedings,
Applicants were at great pains to demonstrate that they did not rely on
Article 73 (e), and emphasized that the claim was based on Article 6
A judge is of course at al1 times free to express his views on a matter falling
outside the competence of the Court if he considers it relevant to an issue validly
under consideration, but such views are obviously obiter dicta. 1find it unnecessary
(as in 1962) to make even an obiter statement on this complicated matter which
has not been argued asan issue by either Party. If the matter was relevant it would
have been necessary toconsider the dificulties raised by Dr. Steyn in his argument
before this Court in950(Status of South West Afiica, I.C.J. Pleadings, pp. 273-317),
United Nations organschof the applicability of Article 73 to South West Africa, the
the alleged abuse of the provisions of this Article by the Assembly of the United
Nations referred to by Respondent's counsel during the oral proceedings, etc. It
would furthermore entai1 a consideration of the alleged non-compliance by the
United States with the provisions of this Article with regard to Pacific Islands
which were formerly subject to a League of Nations mandate held by Japan, and
which have not been placed under a trusteeship agreement.d'un effet beaucoup plus limités.Cela soulèverait deux questions essen-
tielles: en premier lieu, ce point entre-t-il dans le cadre de la requête
des demandeurs ou, en d'autres termes, la Cour en a-telle étésaisie
pour décision par les demandeurs? En second lieu, le défendeur a-t-il
reconnu la compétence dela Cour à cet égard? l
2. Non seulement les demandeurs se sont à dessein gardés de saisir
la Cour de cette question, mais ils n'ont pas cessé d'affirmerque l'ar-
ticle73 ne s'applique pas au Sud-Ouest africain.
3. Dans les requêtes, ilsont soutenu que
«l'Union a violé et continue à violer l'article 6 du Mandat en
s'abstenant de fournir à l'Assembléegénérale desNations Unies
les rapports annuels contenant des informations relatives au terri-
toire et indiquant les mesures qu'elle a prises pour mener à bien ses
obligations aux termes du Mandat ».
Les conclusions B, C et J formulées dans les requêtes établissentau
mêmetitre que la demande était fondée sur l'article 6 du Mandat lu
conjointement avec l'article 22 du Pacte. Dans les mémoires, lesdeman-
deurs ont uniquement fait fond sur l'avis de 1950,dans lequel la Cour
a soutenu que l'article 6 du Mandat avait survécu à la dissolution de la
Société desNations, mais que l'article 73 n'étaitpas applicable en l'es-
pèce - bien qu'un exposéeût étéfait à ce sujet. Les conclusions nos2
et 7, telles qu'elles figurent dans les mémoires et dans les conclusions
finales, attestent égalementque la demande était fondée sur l'article 6
du Mandat. Dans la réplique, la thèse cies demandeurs a étédéfinie
comme suit: (L'obligation du défendeurénoncée à l'article 6 du Mandat
est en vigueur et le défendeur est tenu, en vertu de cette obligation, de
rendre compte aux Nations Unies en tant que ((communautéinternatio-
nale organisée. » Il y étaitexpressément affirméque (dans leurs conclu-
sions les demandeurs n'accusentpas le défendeur d'avoir violé ces obli-
gations », c'est-à-dire les obligations découlant de l'article 73 de la
Charte. Au cours de la procédure orale, les demandeurs se sontdonné
l Il va de soi qu'un juge a à tout moment la faculté d'exprimer ses vues sur une
question ne relevant pas de la compétence de la Cour, s'il estime que cette question
se rapporteà un point valablement en cause; mais de telles vues ne peuvent évidem-
ment êtreexpriméesque de manière incidente. Tout comme en 1962,je juge inutile
de me prononcer, ne serait-ce que de cette manière, sur une question aussi complexe
que ni l'une ni l'autre des Parties n'a présentéecomme étant en litige. Si elle avait
étépertinente, il aurait fallu examiner les difficultés évoquéespar M. Steyn dans
l'exposé qu'ila fait devant la Cour en(Statut du Sud-Ouest africain, C.Z.J. Mé-
rnoives, p. 273-317) et étudier des problèmes tels que l'effet juridique du refus
au Sud-Ouest africain ou l'abus de dispositions de cet article qu'aurait commisicle
l'Assemblée des Nations Unies d'après les plaidoiries des conseils du défendeur.
11aurait aussi fallu examiner la violation des dispositions decet articlequ'auraient
commise les Etats-Unisà l'égarddes îles du Pacifique dont la Société desNations
avait autrefois confiéle Mandat au Japon et qui n'ont pas fait l'objet d'un accord
de tutelle.
136of the Mandate. They consistently resisted any suggestionthat Article 73
(e)might be applicable.
4. It has been repeatedly laid down by this Court that only matters
raised in the final submissions of the parties will be considered and that
the Court will abstain from deciding issues not raised insuch submis-
sions. The Court certainly has no power to depart from a submission
in order to decide an issue not included therein and not intended to be
so included.
5. In any event this Court has no jurisdiction to pronounce on this
issue. The only provision on which jurisdiction could be based is
Article 7 (2) of the Mandate Declaration, and this limits the Court's
jurisdiction to disputes between the Respondent and another member
of the League relating to the interpretation and application of the
provisions of the Mandate which cannot be settled by negotiation.
The Respondent has never had any dispute with the Applicants relating
to the interpretation or application of the provisions of Article 73;
there has accordingly never been any attempt to settle such dispute,
and these provisions are in any event provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations, and not provisions of the Mandate. Even if Article 73
should apply to South West Africa, it does not therefore become a
provision of the Mandate, just as the provisions of any other instrument
entered into by the Respondent with regard to South West Africa could
not be regarded as provisions of the Mandate. The preamble of the
Mandate tells us what its provisions are.
6. In any event, Article 73 conferred no legal rights or interest on
Applicants, andfor the reasonsmutatis mutandis stated in the Judgment,
they would have no legal right or interest in any claim based on this
Article.
THE ALLEGEB DREACH ESARTICLE 2, 4AND 7 (1)
Even if Article 7 (2) as well as the provisions of the conduct clauses
of the Mandate are still in force and even if the Applicants have sub-
stantive legal rights in respect thereof their submissions relating to
alleged breaches of Articles 2,4 and 7 (1) should nonetheless, in my
opinion, be dismissed for reasons which I am about to state.
The main cornplaints relate to Article (2) and they will be considered
first.beaucoup de peine pour démontrer qu'ils ne s'appuyaient pas sur
l'article 73e) et ils ont souligné que leur demande était fondée sur
l'article 6 du Mandat. Ils ont constamment repoussétoute suggestion
selon laquelle l'article 73 pourrait êtreapplicable.
4. La Cour a souligné à maintes reprises qu'elle ne doit prendre en
considération que les questions soulevéesdans les conclusions finales
des parties et qu'elle doit s'abstenir de se prononcer sur des questions
non soulevéesdans ces conclusions. La Cour n'est certainement pas
habilitéeà s'écarter d'une conclusion,en vue de trancher une question
que l'on n'y a pas incluse et que l'on ne voulait pas inclure.
5. Quoi qu'il en soit, la Cour n'a pas compétencepour se prononcer
sur la question dont il s'agit. La seule disposition pouvant établir sa
compétence estle deuxième alinéade l'article 7 de la déclaration du
Mandat; or cette disposition limite la juridiction de la Cour aux diffé-
rends qui viendraient à s'éleverentre le défendeuret un autre Membre
de la Société desNations, relatifs à l'interprétation ouà l'application
des dispositions du Mandat, et qui ne soient pas susceptibles d'être
régléspar des négociations. Le défendeur n'a jamais eule moindre
différendavec les demandeurs au sujet de l'interprétationou de l'appli-
cation des dispositions de l'article 73; aucune tentative n'a donc jamais
éqé faite pour r6glerun tel différend etil s'agitdetoute manièrede dispo-
sitions de la Charte des Nations Unies et non du Mandat. Quand même
f'article 73 serait applicable au Sud-Ouest africain, il n'en deviendrait
pas pour autant une disposition du Mandat, pas plus que les dispositions
de tdut autre1instrument conclu par le défendeurau sujet du Sud-Ouest
africain ne sauraientêtreconsidéréescomme des dispositionsdu Mandat.
Le préambuledu Mandat indique en quoi consistent ses dispositions.
6. De toute façon, l'article 73 n'a conféréaucun droit ou intérêt
juridique aux demandeurs et, pour les motifs énoncésdans l'arrêt
mutatis mutandis,ilsn'auraient aucun droit ou intérêtjuridiqueau regard
d'une demande fondéesur cet article.
Quand bien mêmele deuxième alinéa de l'article 7 et les dispositions
du Mandat relatives à la gestion seraient toujours en vigueur et quand
bien même lesdemandeurs auraient à cet égard desdroits touchant au
fond, leurs conclusions relativeà de prétendues violations des articles2,
4 et 7, premier alinéa,n'en devraient pas moinsà mon avis, êtrerejetées
pour les motifs que je vais exposer.
Comme les principaux griefs formulés avaient trait au deuxième
alinéade l'article, c'estpar là que je commencerai mon examen. Article 2 (2)
(Submissions 3 and 4)
History of the Submissions
1. Article 2 of the Mandate reads as follows :
"The Mandatory shall have full power of administration and
legislation over the territory subject to the present Mandate as an
integral portion of the Union of South Africa, and may apply
the laws of the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to
such local modifications as circumstances may require.
The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the
territory subject to the present Mandate."
For a full appreciation of the issues before the Court regarding
alleged contraventions of this Article, it will be necessary to give some
consideration to the history of Applicants' relevant submissions, starting
with the Applications.
2. In cornpliance with Article 32 (2) ofthe Rules of Court, Applicants
stated the precise nature of their claims relative to Article 2 (2) of the
Mandate Declaration in paragraphs E, F and G of the submissions
included in their Applications. In effect these clairns were based on
allegations:
(a) that the Respondent had failed to achieve the results contemplated
by Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Mandate;
(b) that the Respondent had "practised apartheid, i.e., [had] distin-
guished as to race, colour, national or tribal origin, in establish-
ing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of the territory"; and
(c) that the Respondent had adopted and applied legislation, regula-
tions, proclamations and administrative decrees which were, by
their terms and their application, arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust
and detrimental to human dignity.
3. In the Memorials the relevant submissions were drafted rather
differently. After setting out the facts and the legal contentions upon
which the Applicants relied, the following summaries appeared in
paragraphs 189and 190of Chapter V:
"189. As the Applicants have previously pointed out, the policy
and practice of apartheid has shaped the Mandatory's behavior
and permeates the factual record. The meaning of apartheid in the
Territory has already been explained hereinabove. The explanation
warrants repeating. Under apartheid the status, rights, duties, op
138 Article 2, deuxième alinéa
(Conclusions no" et 4)
Historique des conclusions
1. L'article 2 du Mandat se lit comme suit:
((Le Mandataire aura pleins pouvoirs d'administration et de
législation sur le territoire faisant l'objet du mandat. Ce territoire
sera administré selon la législation du Mandataire comme partie
intégrante de son territoire. Le Mandataire est en conséquence
autorisé à appliquer aux régions soumises au mandat la législation
de l'Union de l'Afrique du Sud, sous réserve des modifications
nécessitéespar les conditions locales.
Le Mandataire accroîtra, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir,
le bien-êtrematérielet moral ainsi que le progrès socialdes habitants
du territoire soumis au présentmandat. ))
Pour bien saisir les questions qui ont étéposées à la Cour en ce qui
concerne les prétendues infractions aux dispositions de cet article, il
faut étudierquelque peu l'historique desconclusions pertinentes déposées
par les demandeurs, en remontant tout d'abord aux requêtes.
2. Conformément à l'article 32, paragraphe 2, du Règlement de la
Cour, les demandeurs ont donnéaux paragraphes E, F et G des conclu-
sions formulées dans leurs requêtes l'indication précise de l'objet des
demandes concernant le deuxième alinéade l'article 2 de la déclaration
deMandat. Enfait, cesdemandes sefondaient sur lesallégationsci-après :
a) le défendeur n'a pas atteint les objectifs définisau deuxième alinéa
de l'article 2 du Mandat;
b) le défendeur a ((pratiqué l'apartheid, c'est-à-dire ...a établi une
distinction fondée sur la race, la couleur, l'origine nationale ou
tribale, [lorsqu'il] a fixéles droits et devoirs des habitants du Terri-
toire»;
c) le défendeur a adopté et appliqué une législation, des règlements,
des proclamations et des ordonnances administratives qui, par leurs
termes et dans leur application, étaient arbitraires, déraisonnables,
injustes et contrairesàla dignitéhumaine.
3. Dans les mémoires, les conclusions correspondantes ont été
rédigéesde façon assez différente. Après avoir exposé les faits et les
thèsesjuridiques sur lesquelles ils sefondaient, les demandeurs ont donné,
aux paragraphes 189 et 190 du chapitre V, les résumés ci-après:
«189. Comme les demandeurs l'ont déjà souligné,le principe
et la pratique de l'apartheid ont modelé le comportement du
Mandataire et dominent tous les aspects du dossier. Ce que l'apart-
heid représentedans le Territoire a déjà étéexpliqué;il y a pourtant
lieu d'y revenir. Sous le régime de l'apartheid, la condition, les
138 portunities and burdens of the population are fixed and allocated
arbitrarily on the basis of race,olor and tribe, without any regard
for the actual needs and capacities of the groups and individuals
affected. Under apartheid, the rights and interests of the great
majority of the people of the Territory are subordinated to the
desires and conveniences of a minority. We here speak of apartheid,
as we have throughout this Memorial, as a fact and not as a word,
as a practice and not as an abstraction. Apartheid, as it actually
is and as it actually lias been in the life of the people of the Territory,
isa process by which the Mandatory excludes the 'Natives' of the
Territory from any significant participation in the life of the
Territory, except in so far as the Mandatory finds it necessary to
use the 'Natives' asan indispensable source of common labor or
menial service.
190. Deliberately, systematically and consistently, the Mandatory
has discriminated against the 'Native' population of South West
Africa, which constitutes overwhelmingly the larger part of the
population of the Territory. In so doing, the Mandatory has not
only failed to promote 'to the utmost' the material and moral
well-being,the social progress and the development of the people of
South West Africa, but it has failed to 'promote such well-being
and social progress in any significant degree whatever. To the
contrary, the Mandatory has thwarted the well-being, the social
progress and the development of the people of South West Africa
throughout varied aspects of their lives; in agriculture; in industry,
industrial employment, and labor relations; in government,
whether territorial, local or tribal, and whether at the political or
administrative levels; in respect of security of the preson, rights
of residence and freedom of movement; and in education. The
grim past and present reality in the condition of the 'Natives' is
unrelieved by promise of future amelioration. The Mandatory
offers no horizon of hope to the 'Native' population." (Memorials,
pp. 161-162.) [Then follows a summary of the specific matters
dealt with in the Memorials.]
Then followed subrnissions which included the following:
"3. the Union, in the respect set forth in Chapter V of this
Memorial and summarized in Paragraphs 189 and 190 thereof,
has practised apartheid, i.e., has distinguished as to race, color,
national or tribal origin in establishing the rights and duties of
the inhabitants of the Territory; that such practice is in violation
of its obligations as stated in Articlef the Mandate and Article 22
of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and that the Union
has the duty forthwith to cease the practice of apartheid in the
Territory;
4. the Union, by virtue of the economic, political, social and
educational policies applied within the Territory, which are described
139 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 141
droits, les devoirs, les perspectives et les charges de la population
sont fixéset répartis arbitrairement d'après la race, la couleur et
la tribu sans aucun égardpour les besoins et les aptitudes véritables
des groupes et des individus affectés.Sous le régimede l'apartheid,
les droits et les intérêtsde la grande majorité des populations du
Territoire sont subordonnés aux désirs et aux commodités d'une
minorité. L'apartheid dont nous parlons ici, comme tout au long
de ce mémoire, est un fait, ce n'est pas un mot, c'est une réalité,
etnonune abstraction. L'apartheid, dans sa réalité passée et actuelle,
représente pour les populations du Territoire un processus par
lequel le Mandataire exclut les ((indigènes ))de toute participation
importante dans l'existence du Territoire si ce n'est dans la mesure
où il voit en eux la source de la main-d'Œuvre commune ou servile
qui lui est indispensable.
190. Le Mandataire a délibérément, systématiquemene tt uni-
formément exercéune discrimination à l'encontre de la population
((indigène))du Sud-Ouest africain qui constitue l'immense majorité
de la population du Territoire. Ce faisant, le Mandataire n'a pas
seulement failli à son devoir d'accroître «par tous les moyens en
son pouvoir 1)le bien-être matérielet moral, le progrès social et le
développement dela population du Sud-Ouest africain, mais encore
il n'a accru ce bien-êtreet ce progrès socia: dans aucune mesure
appréciable. Il a, au contraire, entravé le bien-être, le progrès
social et le développement dela population du Sud-Ouest africain
dans divers aspects de son existence: en matière d'agriculture,
d'industrie; dans les emplois industriels et les relations du travail;
en matière d'administration ((territoriale n,locale ou tribale; sur le
plan politique comme sur le plan administratif; en ce qui touche
la sécurité personnelle, lesdroits de résidence et la liberté de dé-
placement comme en matière d'enseignement. Le triste passéet la
réaliténe s'éclairent,quant à la condition des ((indigènes »,d'aucune
promesse d'amélioration future. Le Mandataire n'offre à cette
population aucun espoir d'un avenir meilleur. 1)(Mémoires, p. 161-
162.) [On trouve ensuite un résumé desquestions qui sont traitées
dans les mémoires.]
Viennent ensuite des conclusions parmi lesquelles figurent celles-ci:
(3. L'Union, danstoutes les circonstances cxposéesau chapitre V
du présent mémoireet résuméesdans les paragraphes 189 et 190
dudit mémoire, a pratiqué l'apartheid, c'est-à-dire qu'elle a établi
une discriminationfondée sur la race, la couleur, l'origine nationale
ou tribale, lorsqu'elle a fixéles droits et devoirs des habitants du
Territoire; ...cette pratique constitue une violation de l'article 2
du Mandat et de l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société desNations;
et...l'Union a le devoir de cesser sur-le-champ d'appliquer l'apart-
heid dans le Territoire;
4. Par l'effet des principes économiques, politiques, sociaux et
éducatifs appliquésdans leTerritoire et décritsen détailau chapitrev in detail in Chapter V of this Memorial and summarized at Para-
graph 190thereof, has failed to promote to the utmost the material
and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the
Territory; that its failure to do so is in violation of its obligations
as stated in the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate and
Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the Union has the duty forth-
with to cease its violations as aforesaid and to take al1practicable
action to fulfilits duties under such Articles."
It will be noted that the submissions as formulated in the Memorials
were narrower than those in the Applications. In the Memorials Appli-
cants' whole case amounted and was confmed to an allegation of
deliberate oppression, which had been only one of several elements
relied upon in the Applications. In view of subsequent developments
this featuredoes not, however, appear of any great significance,and it is
merely noted in passing.
4. In its Counter-Memorial the Respondent dealt in detail with
Applicants' allegations, many of which were denied including those
contained in paragraphs 189and 190of Chapter V of the Memorials.
5. Apparently in an attempt to limit the factual enquiry which wouid
have been necessitated by the conflicting averments in the Memorials
and Counter-Memorial, Applicants in the Reply added a further cause
of action, which rested on an alleged norm of non-discrimination or
non-separation, defined as follows at page 274 of the Reply:
"In the following analysis of the relevant legal iiorms, the terms
'non-discrimination' or 'non-separation' are used in their prevalent
and customary sense: stated .negatively, the terms refer to the
absence of governmental policies or .actions which allot status,
rights, duties, privileges or burdens on the basis of membership
in a group, class or race rather than on the basis of individual
merit, capacity or potential: stated affirmatively, the terms refer to
governmental policies and actions the objective of which is to
protect equality of opportunity and equal protection of the laws to
individual persons as such."
They also relied upon an undefined concept referred to as "standards",
but, in view of later definition and explanation of Applicants' case in
this regard, it is not necessary to analyse the relevant parts of the Reply.
The nature of the standards ultimately relied upon by Applicants will be
considered hereafter.
6. Despite the introduction of the new cause of action based 011
the alleged "norm of non-discrimination or non-separation" and the
undefined standards, Applicants in their Replypersisted with contentions
which could be reconciled only with a case based on alleged oppression
140 du présentmémoire,puis résumésau paragraphe 190dudit mémoire,
l'Union n'a pas accru par tous les moyens en son pouvoir le bien-
être matérielet moral ainsi que le progrès social des habitants du
Territoire; ..cette carence constitueune violation de ses obligations
telles qu'elles figurent au second alinéa de l'article 2 du Mandat
et à l'article 22 du Pacte; et...l'Union a le devoir de mettre sur-le-
champ un terme aux violations indiquées ci-avant et de prendre
toutes les mesures possibles pour remplir ses obligations aux termes
desdits articles;..»
On constatera que les conclusions énoncéesdans les mémoiresétaient
plus restreintes que celles qui figuraient dans les requêtes. Dans les
mémoires, l'accusation se ramenait exclusivement à une allégation
d'oppression délibéréel,aquelle ne constituait auparavant que l'un des
élémentssur lesquels se fondaient les requêtes. Toutefois, étant donné
la suite des événements, cefait ne revêtpas une très grande importance
et je me contenterai de le noter en passant.
4. Dans son contre-mémoire, le défendeur aétudiédemanière détaillée
les allégations des demandeurs, contestant un grand nombre d'entre
elles, notamment celles qui figurent aux paragraphes 189 et 190 du
chapitre V des mémoires.
5. Soucieux apparemment de limiter l'enquêtesur les faits qu'aurait
rendue indispensable le caractère contradictoire des déclarations res-
pectueusement présentéesdans les mémoireset dans le contre-mémoire,
les demandeurs ont recouru dans leur réplique à un nouveau motif,
fondé sur une prétendue norme de non-discrimination ou de non-
séparation, définiecomme suit à la page 274 de la réplique:
((Dans l'analyse ci-après des [normes] juridiques pertinentes,
les termes (non-discrimination ))ou (non-séparation ))sont utilisés
dans leur sens habituel et généralementadmis: sous une forme
négative, ces termes indiquent l'absence d'une politique ou d'une
action gouveriîementale répartissant le statut, les droits, les devoirs,
les privilèges ou les charges, compte tenu de l'appartenance à un
groupe, à une classe ou à une race et non compte tenu du mérite,
des capacités ou des aptitudes des individus; sous une forme
affirmative, ces termes désignent la politique et l'action gouverne-
mentale qui ont pour objet d'assurer aux individus en tant que tels
l'égalitédes possibilités et une protection égaledevant la loi. »
Les demandeurs ont aussi argué dela notion non définiede ((standards »,
mais, eu égard à la définition età l'explication que les demandeurs en
ont donné par la suite, il n'y a pas lieu d'analyser les passages pertinents
de la réplique.J'étudierai plus loinlanature des ((standards )sur lesquels
les demandeurs se sont fondésen définitive.
6. Bien qu'ils aient introduit un nouveau motif fondé sur cette
prétendue ((norme de non-discrimination ou de non-séparation )et sur
ces ((standards » non définis,les demandeurs ont continué dans leur
réplique à soutenir des thèses qui n'étaient compatibles qu'avec une
140(vide,e.g., Reply, pp. 53-55).The position at the commencement of the
oral proceedings then was that Applicants' submissions were in the form
stated in the Memorials and quoted above (in which allegations of
oppressive conduct featured prominently) but in addition some reliance
was placed on the existence of the alleged "norm of non-discrimination
or non-separation" and undefined standards.
7. In the course of the oral proceedings Applicants' case was further
defined and narrowed down. It is not necessary or desirable to trace
in detail the manner in which this happened. However, some reference
has to be made to the main aspects of the process by which Applicants'
case came to be narrowed down.
The first aspect to which attention should be directed is that, by
agreement between the Parties, the extent of the factual dispute between
them was first whittled down, and subsequently reduced to negligible
proportions.
The virtual elimination of disputes as to fact occurred gradually
over a period, but there would appear to have been two main steps,
the record of each of which may usefully be quoted. The kst was an
agreement reached between the Parties prior to the commencement of
the oral proceedings, which agreement was communicated to the Court
in the following terms:
"South West AfricaCases
AgreementRegarding Factual Averments
Subject to reserving their right to contest the relevance of facts
containedin Respondent's pleadings,including the oral proceedings,
Applicants agree that such facts-as distinct from inferences which
may be drawn therefrom-are not contested except as otherwise
indicated, specifically or by implication, in Applicants' Written
Pleadings or in the oral proceedings.
This agreement pertains also to factual averments in respect of
which no documentary proof has been I?led, including statements
made upon Departmental Information.
Any denial of averments made in the Rejoinder will be intimated
byApplicants at the earliestconvenient stage in the oral proceedings."
The further intimation foreshadowed in this agreement was given
by Applicants' Agent on 27 April 1965.The effect thereof was that no
averments or denials offact by Respondent werecontested by Applicants.
For convenience 1 quote the relevant passage in the oral proceedings.
It reads as follows:
"Al1 facts set forth in this record, which upon the Applicants,
theory of the case are relevant to its contentions of law, are un-
disputed. There have been certain immaterial, in Our submission,
141 accusation d'oppression (voir par exemple réplique, p.53-55).Au début
de la procédure orale, la situation était donc celle-ci: les conclusions
des demandeurs se présentaient sous la forme qu'elles avaient dans les
mémoires, telles que nous les avons citées ci-dessus (les allégations
relativesà des mesures d'oppression y tenaient une place essentielle),
mais en outre les demandeurs arguaient dans une certaine mesure de
l'existence d'une prétendue ((norme de non-discrimination ou de non-
séparation »et de ((standards ))non définis.
7. Au cours de la procédure orale, les demandeurs ont donné de
leur accusation une définition plus préciseet plus limitée. Il n'est ni
indispensable ni même opportun d'examiner de manière détaillée
comment cela s'est produit. Il convient toutefois d'évoquer les étapes
principales du processus par lequel les demandeurs ont restreint leur
accusation.
Le premier point qu'il y a lieu de relever est celui-ci:à la suite d'un
accord entre les Parties, le différendsur les faits qui existait entre elles
s'est d'abord amenuisé,pour n'avoir plus ensuite qu'une portée négli-
geable.
Cette élimination, finalement à peu près totale, des contestations
relatives aux faits a étéprogressive mais il y a eu, semble-t-il, à cet
égarddeux étapesimportantes, qu'il peut êtreutile de noter ici. Tout
d'abord, avant le début de la procédure orale, un accord est intervenu
entre les Parties, dont la teneur a été communiquée à la Cour dans les
termes suivants :
<(Afaires du Sud-Ouest Africain
Accord concernantles allégationsdefait
Sous réservede leur droit de contester la pertinence des faits
exposésdans les écrituresou plaidoiries du défendeur,les deman-
deurs reconnaissent que ces faits - par opposition aux conclusions
que l'on peut en tirer - ne sont pas contestés, sauf indication en
sens contrairerésultant implicitement ou explicitement des écritures
ou plaidoiries des demandeurs.
Le présent accord s'étendaux allégations de fait au sujet des-
quelles il n'a pas été déposé de preuve documentaire, y compris
celles qui sont fondées sur des renseignements fournis par le
département.
S'ils désirent contester des faits mentionnés dans la duplique,
les demandeurs le feront le plus tôt possible au cours de leurs
plaidoiries.1)
L'agent des demandeurs a préciséle 27 avril 1965 ce qui d'après
l'accord restait à indiquer. Il en résultait que les demandeurs ne con-
testaient pas les faits alléguésou niéspar le défendeur. Pour plus de
commodité,je citerai le pertinent de la plaidoirie:
«Tous les faits repris dans ce dossier, lesquels, d'aprèsla thèse
des demandeurs, intéressent leurs arguments de droit, sont incon-
testés.Certaines allégationsde fait, et autres donnéesou indications,
141 allegations of fact, data or other materials which have been contro-
verted by the Respondent and such controversion has been accepted
by the Applicants and those facts arenot reliedupon. The Applicants
have gone further in order to obviate any plausible or reasonable
basis for an objection that the Applicants have not painted the
whole picture in their own written pleadings. The Applicants have
advised Respondent as well as this honourable Court that al1and
any averments of fact in Respondent's written pleadings will be and
are accepted as true,unless specificallydenied. And the Applicants
have not found it necessaryand do not find it necessaryto controvert
any such averments of fact. Hence, for the purposes of these pro-
ceedings,such averments of fact, although made by Respondent in a
copious and unusually voluminous record, may be treated as if in-
corporated by referenceinto the Applicants' pleadings." (C.R. 65/22,
at p. 39.)
The effect ofthese admissions was to reduce and to alter the content
and ambit of the dispute(s) between the Parties. The admissions consti-
tute pro tanto a settlement of the dispute or disputes of which they
fomed a part. 1know of no reason in law, logic or justice why fulleffect
should not be givento them.
8. But the change in Applicants' case was not confined to the ad-
missions to which reference has just been made. Amongst the most
vigorously contested factual averments in the Memorials and Reply
were those constituting or bearing upon the allegations that Respondent's
policies were oppressive in intent or effect-allegations which were
incorporated by reference in Submissions 3 and 4. It was therefore
logically impossible for Applicants to accept as correct Respondent's
averments or denials of fact whilst persisting in submissions based upon
contestedallegations of oppression.The logic of this situation (frequently
commented on by Respondent's Counsel) eventually compelled Appli-
cants to amend their Submissions 3 and 4 so as to delete al1references
to paragraphs 189 and 190 of Chapter V of the Memorials (in which
the disputed allegations of oppressive conduct appear with particular
vigour) as well as references to the said Chapter V generally, and to
make it clear that Applicants relied solely on the alleged "norm of
non-discrimination or non-separation" as defined at page 274 of the
Reply (quoted above) as well as on "standards" l.As regards the latter,
1pointed out above that they had not been defined in the Reply. In the
course of the oral proceedings, Applicants' Agent rendered it clear that
the "standards" on which he relied were rules legally enforceableagainst
Respondent in its capacity as Mandatory, and having exactly the same
content as the "norm", i.e., as defined at page 274 of the Reply. 1 shall
later deal with the differences between the concepts of "norm" and
Text of amended submissions is given in para. 10 below.
142 à notre avis peu importantes, ont été contreditespar le défendeur;
les demandeurs ont accepté la contradiction et ne tiennent plus
compte de ces faits-là. Les demandeurs sont même allésplus loin
pour pallier toute objection plausible ou raisonnablement fondée
qui donnerait à penser qu'ils n'ont pas dans leurs écritures brossé
un tableau complet de la situation. Les demandeurs ont en effet
avisé ledéfendeur, ainsi que la Cour, qu'à moins d'une objection
expresse, ils admettaient comme vrai tout l'ensemble de faits
présentépar le défendeur dans ses écritures. Et les demandeurs
n'ont pas jugé nécessaire, et ne jugent toujours pas nécessaire, de
contredire ces allégations de fait. Si bien qu'aux fins de la présente
procédure, on peut considérer que ces allégations de fait, qui
constituent pourtant chez le défendeurun dossier copieux, étonnam-
ment volumineux, sont implicitement incorporées aux pièces des
demandeurs eux-mêmes. » (C.R. 65/22, p. 39.)
Ces acquiescements relatifs aux faits ont eu pour effet de réduire et
de modifier la teneur et la portée du différend(ou des différends)entre
les Parties. Ils constituent pour ce qui les concerne un règlement partiel
du différendou des différendsdont ilsfaisaient partie. Je ne vois endroit,
en logique ou en équité aucune raison de ne pas leur donner plein
effet.
8. Mais la transformation de la thèse des demandeurs ne s'est pas
limitéeaux acquiescements dont je viens de faire état. Parmi les alléga-
tions de fait avancéesdans les mémoireset dans la réplique qui ont été
le plus vigoureusement contestées, figuraient celles qui concernaient la
prétendue application par le défendeur de mesures rendues oppressives
soit par leur intention soir par leurs effets; orcesallégationssetrouvaient
incorporées par voie de référenceaux conclusioils nos 3 et 4. Il était
donc logiquement impossible pour les demandeurs d'accepter comme
exactes, sur le plan des faits, les assertions ou les dénégationsémanant
du défendeur et de s'en tenir en mêmetemps à des conclusions fondées
sur des allégations d'oppression contestéespar le défendeur.La logique
de cette situation, qui a appeléde nombreuses observations de la part
des conseils du défendeur, a finalement contraint les demandeurs à
modifier leurs conclusions nos 3 et 4, c'est-à-dire à supprimer toute
référenceaux paragraphes 189 et 190 du chapitre V des mémoires, où
les allégations contestées relativesà des mesures d'oppression étaient
présentéesavec un relief tout particulier, ainsi que toute référence
généraleaudit chapitre V, et à montrer clairement qu'ils se fondaient
exclusivement sur la prétendue ((norme de non-discrimination ou de
non-séparation » telle qu'elle est définià la page 274 de la réplique
(citée ci-dessus) ainsi que sur les ((standards1l. En ce qui concerne
ces derniers, j'ai fait observer plus haut qu'ils n'avaient pas étédéfinis
dansla réplique.Au cours de la procédure orale, l'agent desdemandeurs
l On trouvera le texte des conclusions revisees au par. 10 ci-après."standards". At present 1would emphasize only that as regards content
they were alleged to be identical.
9. Both prior to the amendment of Applicants' submissions, and
subsequently, Applicants made it clear that their whole case as regards
alleged contraventions of Article 2 (2) was based on the existence of the
alleged norm or standards of non-discrimination or non-separation.
This occurred in the course of argument on the inspection proposa1 as
well as on the merits, in reply to questions from the Court as well as to
comment by Respondent's counsel. Applicants' final attitude was that
there existed no dispute of fact between the Parties,inasmuch as Appli-
cants had accepted al1 Respondent's averments and denials, and had
stated clearlytheir whole case was based on the existence of the alleged
norm or standards. In the words of the Applicants' Agent:
"The issuebefore the Court, accordingly, is whetber the processes
of the organized international community have or have not eventu-
ated in international standards or an international legal norm,
or both." (C.R. 65/31, p. 32.)
Whereas the Applicants originally defined apartheid as constituting
wilful oppression and unjust discrimination, they ultimately emphasized
that it was merely used in thesensedefinedin Submission 3.
10. The actual amendment of Applicants' SubmissionsNos. 3 and 4,
bringing them into conformity with the earlier admissions of fact and
informal definitions of Applicants' case, occurred on 19 May 1965,just
before Applicants' Agent rested their case. The amended submissions
read as follows:
"Upon the basis of allegations of fact, and statements of law set
forth in the written pleadings and oral proceedings herein, may it
please the Court to adjudge and declare, whether the Government
of the Republic of South Africa is present or absent, that:
........................
3. Respondent, by laws and regulations, and officia1methods
and measures, which are set out in the pleadingsherein,has practised
apartheid,i.e., has distinguishedas to race, colour, national or tribal
origin in establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of
the Territory; that such practice is in violation of its obligations
143 SUD-OUESTAFRICAIN(OP.IND. VAN WYK) 145
a montré queles ((standards » sur lesquels il se fondait étaientdes règles
juridiquement applicables à l'encontre du défendeur en sa qualité de
Mandataire et ayant exactement la mêmeteneur que la ((norme » telle
que celle-ci est définie à la page 274 de la réplique.Je m'arrêterai plus
loin sur ce qui distingue la notion de norme » de celle de ccstandard B.
Pour le moment, je me bornerai à souligner que, du point de vue de la
teneur, on a soutenu l'identitéde ces deux notions.
9. Mais, que ce soit avant d'avoir modifiéleurs conclusions ou après,
les demandeurs ont bien montré qu'en ce qui concerne les prétendues
infractions au deuxième alinéa de l'article 2, ils fondaient toute leur
thèsesur l'existencedela prétenduenorme ou des prétendus((standards ))
de non-discrimination ou de non-séparation. Cela est apparu tant au
cours des discussions sur la proposition de descente sur les lieux qu'à
propos des plaidoiries sur le fond, tant dans les réponses aux questions
émanant de la Cour que dans les réponses aux observations des conseils
du défendeur. Enfin de compte, la position des demandeurs a étéqu'il
n'y avait pas de différendsur les faits entre les Parties, dans la mesure
où ils avaient accepté toutes les allégations et toutes les dénégations
du défendeur et avaient précisénettement qu'ils fondaient toute leur
thèsesur l'existencedela prétendue normeou des prétendus « standards )).
Comme l'a dit l'agent desdemandeurs:
((Le problème qui se pose à la Cour, par suite, est de savoir
si les processus de la communauté internationale organisée ont,
ou non, fini par constituer des ((standards e internationaux ou une
norme juridique internationale, ou bien les deux choses à la fois.))
(C.R. 65/31, p. 32.)
Alors que les demandeurs ont initialement définil'apartheid comme
un régime d'oppression voulue et de discrimination injuste, ils ont
finalement soulignéque ceterme étaituniquement utiliséau sens indiqué
dans la conclusion no 3.
10. Cen'estque le 19mai 1965,juste avantque l'agent desdemandeurs
ne termine l'exposé deson argumentation, que les demandeurs ont
véritablement modifiéleurs conclusions nos 3 et 4, pour les rendre
conformes aux acquiescements par lesquels ils avaient antérieurement
reconnu les faits et aux définitionsqu'ils avaient officieusementdonnées
de leur thèse. Les conclusionsreviséessont ainsi conçues:
((Vules allégationsde fait et les considérationsde droit énoncées
dans les écritureset les plaidoiries, plaise à la Cour dire et juger,
tant en présence qu'en l'absencedu Gouvernement de la République
sud-africaine, que :
. ... .. ... ... .. ... .. .-m ..
3. Par les lois et règlementset par les méthodeset actes officiels
décritsdans les écritures,le défendeura pratiqué l'apartheid, c'est-
à-dire qu'il a établiune distinction fondée sur la race, la couleur,
l'origine nationale ou tribale, lorsqu'il a fixéles droits et devoirs
des habitants du Territoire; que cette pratique constitue une vio-
143 as stated in Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations; and that Respondent has the duty forth-
with to cease the practice of apartheid in the Territory :
4. Respondent, by virtue of economic, political, social and
educational policies applied within the Territory, by means of
laws and regulations, and officia1methods and measures, which
are set out in the pleadings herein, has, in the light of applicable
international standards or international legal norm, or both, failed
to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and
social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory; that its failure
to do so is in violation of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of
the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that Respondent
has the duty forthwith to cease its violations as aforesaid and to
take al1practicable action to fulfil its duties under such Articles."
(C.R. 65/35, 19May 1965,pp. 69-70.)
In addition the following "forma1 .. .and explanatory comments
with respect toithe foregoing submissions" werepresented to the Court:
"(a) The response to the question addressed to the Applicants
by the honourable President during the course of the proceedings
of 28 April 1965,C.R. 65/25, page 31, is hereby reaffirmed in the
following respects, in particular :
1. The formulation of Submission 4 is not intended in any
manner to suggest an alternative basis upon which the Applicants
make or rest their case, other than the basis which the Applicants
present in Submission No. 3 itself (referenceis made to the verbatim
record 65/24, 30 April, p. 11);the distinction betweenSubmissions3
and 4 being verbal only, for reasons which have been set out in the
cited section of the verbatim record.
2. The reference in Submission 4 to 'applicable international
standards or international legal norm, or both' is intended to refer
to such standards and legal norm, or both, in the sense as described
and defined in the Reply at page 274, and solely and exclusivelyas
there described and defined." (C.R. 65/35, 19May 1965,pp. 71-72.)
11. It will be observed that al1 references to Chapter V of the Me-
morials, and in particular paragraphs 189 and 190 thereof, have been
deleted. Submission 4, however, even without these references could
still have been interpreted as a general allegation that the Respondent's
policies, etc., fail to promote to the utmost the material and moral
well-being and social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory. To
avoid this possibility the Applicants resorted to two methods. The first
was to qualify the general allegation of failure to promote well-being
and progress to the utmost by the words "in the light of the applicable
internationalstandards or international legal norm or both". The second lation de ses obligations telles qu'elles figurent à l'article 2 du
Mandat et à l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société desNations; et que
le défendeura le devoir de cesser sur-le-champ de pratiquer l'apart-
heiddans le Territoire;
4. Par l'effet des principes économiques, politiques, sociauxet
éducatifs appliqués dans le Territoire, par les lois et règlements
et par les méthodes et actes officiels décritsdans les écritures, le
défendeur, au regard des standards » internationaux applicables
ou de la norme juridique internationale applicable ou de ces deux
critèreà la fois, n'a pas accru, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir,
le bien-êtrematérielet moral ainsi quele progrès social deshabitants
du Territoire; que cette carence constitue une violation de ses
obligations telles qu'elles figurentà l'article 2 du Mandat et à
l'article 22 du Pacte; et que le défendeur a le devoir de mettre
sur-le-champ un terme aux violations indiquées ci-avant etde pren-
dre toutes les mesures possibles pour remplir ses obligations aux
termes desdits articles»(C.R. 65/35, 19mai 1965,p. 69-70.)
En outre, la Cour s'est entendu présenter des((observations explica-
tives...et officiell...àpropos des conclusions )que l'on venait d'énon-
cer:
((a) Nous réaffirmonsla réponsequi a étédonnée à la question
adresséeaux demandeurs par l'éminentPrésidentlors de l'audience
du 28 avril 1965 (C.R. 65/25, p. 31) en particulier sur les points
suivants:
1. La conclusion no 4 n'est nullement formulée de manière à
proposer une base subsidiaire sur laquelle les demandeurs appuie-
raient leur thèse,autre que celle sur laquelle repose la conclusion
no 3 (voir C.R. 65/24, 30 avril 1965,p. 11); la distinction entre la
conclusion no 3 et la conclusion no4 est purement verbale pour des
raisons qui ont étéexposéesdans le passage citédu compte rendu.
2. La mention qui estfaite dansla conclusion no4des (standards ))
internationaux applicables ou de la norme juridique internationale
applicable ou de ces deux critèresà la fois renvoieà la description
et à la définitionqui se trouvent dans le réplique à la page 274
à l'exclusion detoute autre description et définition» (C.R. 65/35,
19mai 1965,p. 71-72.)
11. Il y a lieu de noter que toutes les référencesau chapitre V des
mémoires,et notamment aux paragraphes 189et 190,ont été supprimées.
La conclusion no 4 toutefois, même en l'absencede ces références,
aurait encore pu s'interpréter comme une allégation d'ordre général,
d'après laquelle, par l'effet des principes, etc., qu'il a appliqués, le
défendeura failli à son devoir d'accroître par tous les moyens en son
pouvoir le bien-être matériee lt moral et le progrès socialdes habitants
du territoire. Pour éviter cela, les demandeurs ont recouru à deux
méthodes. La premièrea consisté à nuancer l'allégationd'ordre général
d'après laquelle ledéfendeur aurait failli à son devoir d'accroître lemethod was to add the forma1interpretations and explanatory comments,
so as to make it abundantly clear that Submission 4 did not rest upon
an alternative basis to that of Submission 3, and that both Submissions
rested exclusively on the norm or standards defined at page 274 of the
Reply.
12. If one now compares the final submissions with the original
statement of the precise nature of Applicants' claimsin the Applications,
it appears that the claims based upon allegations of arbitrary, unreason-
able, and unjust actions, and on conduct detrimental to human dignity,
have disappeared from the final submissions. The same applies to claims
based on allegations that Respondent had in fact failed to achieve the
results contemplated by Article 2 (2) of the Mandate. Indeed it appears
quite clearly that the allegation of failure on the part of the Respondent
to perform its duties has been narrowed down to breaches of an alleged
international norm and/or standards as defined at page 274 of the
Reply. As I have noted, the amended submissions in al1these respects
correspond entirely with informa1 explanations repeatedly given by
Applicants' Agent during the course of the oral proceedings. 1shall deal
more fullywiththe legaleffectofthe amended submissionspresently.
Legal Principles Applicable to the Interpretation of Submissions
13. Rule 42 requires that a Memorial shall contain a statement of the
relevant facts, statements of law, and the submissions.These submissions
define the issues which the Court is asked to determine, i.e., they state
concisely and precisely the conclusions the Court is asked to draw from
the facts and the law, and the reliefasked for.
Just as in municipal systems, where the statement of claim (which
broadly corresponds to the submissions) may omit an issue included
in the writ (which broadly corresponds to the Application commencing
an action in this Court), so also in proceedings in this Court submissions
may omit issues mentioned in the Application. Such an omission consti-
tutes an abandonment of whatever is omitted, and cannot constitute a
part of the issues before the Court.
It followstherefore, that only matters included in the final submissions
will be considered, i.e., the Court will abstain from deciding issues not
raised insuch submissions.
14. Where two or more parties have decided to refer a particular
dispute to the Court, and the submissions or special agreement fail to
145bien-êtreet le progrès par tous les moyens en son pouvoir,en ajoutant
les mots (au regard des ((standards )internationaux applicables ou de
la norme juridique internationale applicable ou de ces deux critères
à la foisD.La seconde méthode a consisté à donner des interprétations
officielles et des observations explicatives, pour ne laisser subsister
aucun doute possible sur le fait que la conclusion no 4 n'aurait pas un
caractère subsidiaire par rapport à la conclusion no 3 et que ces deux
conclusions reposaient exclusivement sur la norme ou les standards »
définisà la page 274 de la réplique.
12. Sil'on compare, à présent,les conclusions finales avecla première
indication précisede l'objet des demandes qui figurait dans les requêtes,
on constate que les demandes fondées sur des allégations relatives
à des mesures arbitraires, déraisonnables et injustes età un comporte-
ment contraire à la dignité humaine ont disparu du texte définitif.Il
en va de mêmedes demandes fondées surl'allégationd'après laquellele
défendeur n'aurait pas atteint les objectifs définisau deuxième alinéa
de l'article 2 du Mandat. Il apparaît fort clairement du reste que,
lorsqu'on soutient que le défendeura failli à ses devoirs, on se contente
désormais d'invoquer les violations d'une prétendue norme etlou de
((standards)) internationaux tels qu'ils sont définis à la page 274
de la réplique. Comme je l'ai fait observer, sur tous ces points les
conclusions reviséescorrespondent parfaitement aux explications offi-
cieusement fournies à maintes reprises par l'agent des demandeurs au
cours de la procédure orale. Je vais examiner de façon plus détaillée
l'effetjuridique de ces conclusions revisées.
PrincQesjuridiques applicables à l'interprétation des conclusions
13. Aux termes de l'article 42 du Règlementde la Cour, un mémoire
contientun exposédesfaits sur lesquelsla demande est fondée,unexposé
de droit et les conclusions. Ces conclusions définissent lesquestions que
la Cour estinvitée àtrancher, c'est-à-direqu'ellesénoncentavecconcision
etprécisionlesconclusions que la Cour est invitée à tirer des faits et du
droit, ainsi que la réparation demandée.
Dans les systèmesdedroit interne, il arriveque l'exposéde la demande,
qui correspond en gros aux conclusions, ne mentionne pas une question
indiquéedans l'acte introductif de l'instance, lequel correspond en gros
aux requêtesintroductives d'instance devant la Cour internationale;
de même,dans une affaire qui sedérouledevantla Cour, on peut omettre
dans les conclusions certaines questions ayant figurédans la requête.
Cela constitue un abandon des éléments ainsi omis,qui ne peuvent
donc plus faire partie des questions que la Cour doit trancher.
Par voie de conséquence, seules les questions formulées dans les
conclusions finales sont soumises à l'examen de la Cour - autrement
dit, la Cour doit s'abstenir de trancher des questions qui ne sont pas
soulevéesdans ces conclusions.
14. Lorsque deux parties - ou davantage - ont décidéde porter
un différenddevant la Cour et que les conclusions ou le compromis
145define such dispute satisfactorily, it would appear that the Court may
depart from the strict wording of the submissions or special agreement
in order to decide the true issueswhich the parties intended to refer to it.
Such action on the part of the Court of course postulates that there
exists an actual intention of the parties which is not properly expressed
in the submissions or special agreement. In the present case the proceed-
ings are before the Court, not by ad hoc agreement between the Parties,
but by Application in terms of a general compromissory clause, viz.,
Article 7 (2) of the Mandate. Consequently there can be no question of
the existence of any common desire or intention on the part of both
Parties to place a particular issue before the Court-it isthe Applicants
alone which invoke the Court's jurisdiction and the Court can at most
enquire as to which issues they (Le., the Applicants) wish to refer to it.
It is of course obvious that a party is not compelled to invoke the
assistance of the Court for each and every dispute which would be cog-
nizable by it.
Where a particular provision in an instrument may be breached in
more than one respect, the Applicant is not bound to allege that it was
breached in al1 these possible respects. The Applicant may choose to
allege a breach in one respect only, and deliberately formulate its sub-
missions accordingly. Such a formulation would narrow the issue, and
this Court would have no power to enquire whether some of the evidence
placedbeforeitmight or might not constitute proof ofa breach in a respect
not allegedinthe submissions.Thisis the more so when the Court knows
that such other respect was deliberately deleted from the submissions,
and for this reason al1the evidence relative thereto that could have been
placed before it has not been produced. If, e.g., Submission 5 was the
only submission relative to Article 2, this Court would have had no
authority to enquire into,Say,the issuesraised inthe original Submissions
3 and 4, even if it has competence to deal with such issues if properly
raised.
15. Where the particular respect in which a provision is alleged to
have been breached is pin-pointed in the submissions, such particulari-
zation has the effect of narrowing the issues. Such particulars do not
constitute the reasons for the allegation that the provision has been
breached, but they serve to qualify or circumscribe such allegation
so as to reduce the issue to breaches falling within the ambit of such
qualification or circumscription. In other words such particulars are
still bare averments by the parties presenting them, their purpose and
effectbeing, interalia, to indicate a precise limit to the factual allegations
which the other party or parties are called upon to meet. They must be
distinguished from arguments. Arguments do not define the alleged
breach, but advance reasons why the Court should hold that a breach
has occurred in the respects alleged in the submissions. Arguments
consequently go beyond bare assertions. They provide the logical links
between premises and conclusions-often the suggested links between
facts (admitted, established or alleged) and the conclusions averred
in the submissions. The Court is not bound by the arguments of the
146n'ont pas défini ce différendde façon satisfaisante, la Cour peut, semble-
t-il, ne pas s'en tenir strictement au libellé desconclusions ou du com-
promis pour déterminer les questions que les parties voulaient vérita-
blement lui déférer.Pareille action de la part de la Cour implique bien
entendu qu'il existe véritablement chez les parties une intention qui
n'estpas formuléecommeil convient dans les conclusions ou le compro-
mis. La présente instance a étéintroduite non pas en vertu d'un com-
promis entre les Parties, mais par une requête déposée conformément
à une clause compromissoire générale, à savoir le deuxième alinéade
l'article du Mandat. On ne saurait donc parler d'un désircommun ou
d'une intention commune des Parties de porter une question déterminée
devant la Cour; ce sont les demandeurs seuls qui invoquent la juridiction
delaCour, et celle-cipeut tout au plus chercher déterminerles questions
que les demandeurs eux-mêmesveulent lui soumettre. Il est évident
qu'une partie n'est pas tenue d'invoquer la juridiction de la Cour pour
tous les différendsdont celle-ci serait habilitéeonnaître.
Si une disposition donnéed'un instrument peut faire l'objet de viola-
tions à plusieurs égards, ledemandeur n'est pas tenu d'alléguer qu'il
y a eu violation à tous égards. Il peut ne faire état que d'un type de
violation et formuler délibérémentses conclusions en conséquence.
Une telle formulation limite le problème et la Cour n'est pas fondée
à rechercher si certains des élémentsde preuve présentéspeuvent dé-
montrer ou non qu'il y a eu violation sur un point non mentionné
dans les conclusions. La Cour est encore moins en mesure de le faire
lorsqu'elle sait que ce point a étédélibérémentomis des conclusions
et que, par suite, tous les moyens de preuve qui auraient pu êtreproduits
à ce sujet ne l'ont pas été.Si, par exemple, la conclusion no 5 avait été
la seule conclusion relative l'article 2, la Cour n'aurait pas été habilitée
à examiner, dirons-nous, les questions soulevéesdans les conclusions
initialesnos 3 et 4, alors même qu'elleaurait eu compétence pour le
faire si ces questions avaient été dûmentsoulevées.
15. Quand on précisenettement dans les conclusions le point parti-
culier sur lequel une disposition est censéeavoir étéviolée, on limite
par là même lesquestions qui se posent. Ces précisions neconstituent
pas les motifs pour lesquels des violations sont alléguées,mais elles
permettent de nuancer ou de circonscrire ces allégations de sorte que
les questions ne portent plus désormais que sur les violations qui cor-
respondent aux allégations ainsi nuancéesou circonscrites. En d'autres
termes, ces précisions ne sont encore que de simples assertions émanant
des parties qui les présentent, leur objet et leur effet étant notamment
de délimiter nettement les allégations de fait auxquelles l'autre partie
ou les autres parties sont appelées à répondre. Il y a donc lieu de les
distinguer de l'argumentation. L'argumentation ne définitpas la violation
dont il est fait état; elle fournit les motifs pour lesquels la Cour doit
constater qu'il y a eu violation sur les points énoncésdans les conclu-
sions. L'argumentation va donc au-delà des assertions pures et simples.
Elle constitue le lien logique entre les prémisseset les conclusions -
c'est-à-dire souvent le moyen proposé pour relier les faits, qu'ils soient
146parties insupport ofthe averred conclusions in their submissions,whether
such arguments are advanced of outside of the formulation of the
submissions, but it is bound to confine itself to the dispute as par-
ticularizedtherein. It is onlyarguments, as distinct from particulars which
narrow the issue, that the Court may disregard when construing the
submissions. This is also the reason for the rule that the parties cannot
force the Court to choose between two suggested interpretations of an
instrument, since obviously the Court may find both interpretations
unacceptable. However, this power of the Court is relevant only in so
far as its interpretation may be alink in reasoning leading to acceptance
of the submissions of either of the parties, or, possibly to a result of
non possurnuswith reference to the submissions and issues before it.
The Court is not entitled to proceed from its own interpretation to the
making of an order not requested by either party.
16. In short, in a case like the present (assuming jurisdiction and
admissibility), the Applicants are entitled to place any dispute falling
within a defined category before the Court. To ascertain the nature of
the dispute, reference must prima facie be had to the submissions. The
Court may, in my view, depart from the submissions only where it is
satisfiedthat they do not accurately reflectthe intention of the Applicants,
and where, in addition, the Court is satisfied that the Respondent had
adequate knowledge or notice of the actual case sought to be made by
the Applicants. It goes without saying that no court would decide an
issue against a party who has not had proper and fair notice thereof.
17. If a question arises as to the actual intendment of the Applicants,
or the sense in which Applicants' submissions were understood by the
Respondent, the Court must in my view necessarily have regard, inter
alia,to the statements of the respectiveparties. Of course, theCourt isnot
bound by the parties' interpretation of the submissions. But where
clarifications are incorporated in the final submissions asormal explan-
ations and definitions they must be regarded as part and parce1thereof.
There also appears to be no reason why, in the case of any doubt
as to the true meaning of a submission, the Court, or a member thereof,
should not obtain an explanation by means of a question directed to the
party concerned. In fact Article 52 of the Rules expressly authorizes
the Court or a judge to ask for explanations, and there is no proviso
excepting submissions from this provision. If the Court is not to have
any regard to such explanations, there would be no point in putting
any questions.
Where submissions are amended the Court, in construing such
amended submissions,may, in case of doubt, have regard to the history
of the case that led to or culminated in such amendments.
147admis, établisou prétendus, et les conclusions telles qu'elles sont finale-
ment énoncées.La Cour n'est pas liéepar l'argumentation que les parties
présentent à l'appui de ce qu'énoncent leurs conclusions - que cette
argumentation se situe ou non dans le cadre des conclusions ainsi
énoncées - mais elle est tenue de se limiter au différendtel que les
conclusions le précisent. C'est uniquement de l'argumentation, par
opposition aux précisions qui limitent la question posée, que la Cour
peut ne pas tenir compte lorsqu'elle interprète les conclusions. C'est
aussi la raison pour laquelle il est de règle que les parties ne puissent
pas contraindre la Cour à choisir entre deux interprétations d'un instru-
ment, puisque la Cour pourrait évidemment juger les deux interpré-
tations inacceotables. Toutefois ce ouv voirconféré à la Cour n'est
pertinent que dans la mesure où l'interprétation de la Cour peut consti-
tuer un chaînon dans le raisonnement aui l'amène à acceoter les conclu-
sions de l'une ou l'autre des parties, ou éventuellement à rendre un
verdict de non possumus eu égardaux conclusions et aux questions dont
elleest saisie.LaCour n'est pas habilitéeàprendre, à partir de sa propre
interprétation, une décisionqu'aucune des parties ne lui a demandée.
16. Bref, dans une instance comme celle-ci (en supposant la Cour
compétente et la demande recevable), les demandeurs sont habilités à
saisir la Cour de n'importe quel différend relevant d'une catégorie
déterminée.Pour établirla nature du différend,il faut sereporter d'abord
aux conclusions. La Cour ne Deut.à mon avis. s'écarter desconclusions
A ,
que lorsqu'elle est sûre que celles-ci ne rendent pas exactement compte
de l'intention des demandeurs et au'en outre le défendeur a eu suffisam-
ment connaissance ou a étésuffisamment informé de la thèse que les
demandeurs veulent véritablement soutenir. Il va sans dire au'aucun
tribunal ne statuerait à l'encontre d'une partie qui n'aurait pas été
dûment et équitablement informéede la thèse de l'adversaire.
17. S'il s'élèveun doute quant à l'intention véritabledes demandeurs
ou quant au sens que le défendeur aattribuéaux conclusions des deman-
deurs, la Cour doit àmon avis tenir nécessairementcompte, notamment,
des déclarations des parties. Bien entendu, la Cour n'est pas liéepar
l'interprétation que les parties donnent des conclusions. Mais, lorsque
des éclaircissementssont incorporés aux conclusions définitives, à titre
d'explications et de définitions officielles, il faut les tenir pour partie
intégrante de ces conclusions.
11n'y a pas non plus de raison, semble-t-il, pour que, au cas où il
s'élèverait lemoindre doute sur le sens véritable d'une conclusion, la
Cour ou l'un de ses membres ne puisse obtenir d'explication au moyen
d'une question posée à la partie intéressée.Du reste, l'article 52 du
Règlement autorise expressément la Cour, ou les juges, à demander
des éclaircissementset il n'est fait aucune exceptionette règles'agissant
des conclusions. Si la Cour ne devait pas tenir le moindre compte de
ces éclaircissements, ilserait vain de poser les questions.
Lorsque des conclusions sont modifiées,la Cour peut, en les interpré-
tant, tenir compte, s'il s'élèun doute, des raisons qui, dans le déroule-
ment de l'affaire, expliquent ou entraînent ces modifications. 150 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
18. Applying the above principle, I now turn to a consideration of
the meaning and effectofApplicants' amended SubmissionsNos. 3 and 4.
The Meaning and Legal Eflec of Submissions Nos. 3 and 4
19 (a). It may be convenient to preface my discussion of this topic
with some general remarks about the provisions of Article 2 (2), and
the type of issueswhich could arise thereunder. For theurposes of these
remarks 1 shall assume, contrary to the view expressed above, that the
Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on alleged contraventions of the
Article. An applicant may, hypothetically, ask the Court todecide as a
fact that a particular policy or measure does not promote well-being
and progress, or is likely to harm well-beingand progress. Thisoes not
appear to me to be the type of issue which could properly be determined
by a court of law, or which the authors of the mandates system could
haveintended to be referable to a court of law. But, be that as it may,
such an issue would at the very least necessitate a very full enquiry into
the facts and circumstances pertaining to the policy or measure, or its
field of operation.
(b) Alternatively, an applicant may ask the Court to hold that no
attempt whatever has been made to promote well-being and progress,
or that the mandatory's policies were directed towards some ulterior
purpose. In my view, if the Court were to have jurisdiction at al1 in
respect of alleged violations of Article 2 (2) of the Mandate, its powers
would be limited to investigating only questions such as these. The
Mandate conferred on Respondent "full power of administration and
legislatioii over the Territory subject to the present Mandate as an
integral portion of the Union of South Africa", and provided that
Respondent might "apply the laws of the Union of South Africa to the
Territory, subject to such local modifications as circumstances may
require."
(c) These widepowers were ofcourse limited by the general objectives
of the Mandate. However, these objectiveswere embodied in expressions
such as "the well-being and development of the inhabitants", and
"promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social
progress of the inhabitants". The effect ofhese provisions is-and this
interpretation isconked by the French text-that the Respondent
was placed under a duty to do its best to achieve the aforesaid objectives
having regard to the resources available in the Territory and the realities
as they existed both in South Africa and in the Territory, the latter
having been contemplated as forming, or as capable of being treated as,
"an integral portion" of the former.
(d) Quite clearly the granr oi such extensive powers of government,
coupled with such a broadly stated trust purpose, had the effect of
vesting in the Mandatory a discretion to determine the methods and
measures whereby it would endeavour to give effect to the trust. Such
148 18. Appliquant le principe ci-dessus, j'en viens à examiner le sens et
l'effet des conclusions reviséesnos 3 et 4 des demandeurs.
Sens et effètjuridique des conclusionsno" et 4
19 a). 11convient, en guise d'introduction sur ce point, de formuler
quelques observations d'ordre généralsur les dispositions du deuxième
alinéa de l'article2 et sur le genre de questions qui peuvent se poser à
ce titre. Aux fins des observations qui suivent, je partirai de l'hypothèse,
contraire aux vues exposées plus haut, que la Cour est compétente
pour statuer sur les violations dont les dispositions de cet article auraient
fait l'objet. On peut envisager le cas où un demandeur prierait la Cour
de déclarer qu'en fait une mesure ou une politique donnée ne favorise
pas le bien-être etle progrès ou est de nature à nuire au bien-être etau
progrès. Cela ne me paraît pas êtrele type de question qu'un tribunal
puisse êtrenormalement appelé à trancher, ni le type de question que les
auteurs du systèmedes Mandats aient pu vouloir renvoyer à un tribunal.
Quoi qu'il en soit, pareille question exigerait tout au moins une enquête
extrêmement précisesur les faits et les circonstances touchant à cette
mesure ou à cette politique ou bien à son domaine d'application.
b) Autre possibilité, un demandeur pourrait prier la Cour de dire
qu'aucun effort n'a étéfait pour accroître le bien-être et le progrès
ou que la politique du Mandataire avait un objectif inavoué. A mon
avis, au cas où la Cour aurait la moindre compétenceen ce qui concerne
de prétendues violations du deuxième alinéade l'article 2 du Mandat,
ses pouvoirs se limiteraient à l'examen de questions de ce genre. Le
Mandat a conféréau défendeur ((pleins pouvoirs d'administration et
de législationsur le territoire faisant l'objet du Mandat [et] ce territoire
[devait être]administré ...comme partie intégrante de son territoire »;
le Mandat stipulait aussi que le défendeurétait ((autoriséà appliquer aux
régions soumisesau Mandatla législation del'union de l'Afrique du Sud
sous réserve des modifications nécessitéespar les conditions locales 1).
c) Ces pouvoirs étendus étaientnaturellement limitéspar les objectifs
générauxdu Mandat. Toutefois, ces objectifs étaient définispar des
expressions telles que «le bien-être etle développement [des] peuples »,
et par l'obligation d'accroître, ((par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, le
bien-être matérielet moral ainsi que le progrès social des habitants 1).
Ces dispositions avaient pour effet - mon interprétation est confirmée
par le texte français - d'imposer au défendeur le devoir de faire de
son mieux pour atteindre lesobjectifsprécités,comptetenu desressources
disponibles dans le territoire et de la situation concrète, telle qu'elle
existaità la fois en Afrique du Sud et dans le territoire, ce dernier étant
censéconstituer ou censépouvoir constituer, aux fins de l'administration,
une ((partie intégrante))de l'Afrique du Sud.
d) Visiblement, l'octroi de pouvoirs d'administration aussi étendus,
associés àune mission aussilargement définie,avait pour effetde conférer
au Mandataire le pouvoir discrétionnaire de décider lui-même des
méthodes et des mesures par lesquelles il s'efforcerait de remplir sa a discretion is, indeed, a normal incident of powers of government.
Thus in Lighthouses case between France and Greece, Judgment, 1934,
P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 62, page 22, the Court remarked that:
". .. any grant of legislative powers generally implies the grant of
a discretionaryright to judge how far their exercise rnay benecessary
orurgent; .. .It is a question of appreciating political considerations
and conditions of fact, a task which the Government, as the body
possessing the requisite knowledge of the political situation is
alom quallfied to undertake." (Italics added.)
Similar conclusions were reached, specifically with reference to 'C'
mandates generally, and South West Africa in particular, by emiiient
lawyers and commentators on the mandates system (vide Counter-
Memorial, Book IV, pp. 387-389 and Rejoinder, Vol. 1, pp. 176-177,
where reference is made to comments by Chief Justice Latham of Aus-
tralia, M. Orts, Lord Hailey, Quincy Wright and Norman Bentwich).
(e) The essence of a discretionary power is that the holder of the
power is entitled by law to choose between two or more alternative
courses of conduct. When he so chooses, he does no more than he is
entitled to, and a court of law, unless specifically granted powers of
appeal, cannot interfere merely because it does not agreewith the decision
of the person exercisingthe discretion. Inthe absence of specialprovision,
a court of law is not an appellate authority over the holder of such a
power, and the court cannot substitute its own decision for his. The
most a court of law could do by virtue of its normal powers is to enquire
whether the acts in question were illegal; and it follows from the very
nature of a discretionary power that an act is not illegal merely because
a court considers that, had it been the holder of the power, it would
have acted differently.
(f) Illegal conduct by the holder of a discretionary power occurs
where he does not exercise his power at all, or where he exercises the
power in a manner contrary to expressorimpliedlimitations, prohibitions
or injunctions relating to such power. These limitations, prohibitions or
injunctions rnay take a variety of forms. There may, for instance, be
provisions regarding procedure or form, or limitations regarding the
subject-matter to which the power relates or regarding the objects for
which the power rnay be exercised. Failure to comply with such limiting
or regulatory provisions rnay of course occur in complete good faith
(e.g., by reason of a wrong interpretatioil of the provisions of the instru-
ment) or it rnay be due to improper motives or some other form of bad
faith.
(g) In the case of the Mandate, the limitations upon the Mandatory's
powers were laid down in Articles 3,4 and 5 of the Mandate Declaration
(with which we are not concerned at the moment) and in Article 2 (2)
thereof. Thelatter Article in effectlays down the objective to be pursued
by the Mandatory. It follows, therefore, that an exercise of the Man-
149mission. Ce pouvoir discrétionnaire va d'ailleurs normalement de pair
avec les pouvoirs d'administration. C'est ainsi qu'en l'Affaire franco-
helléniquedes phares, arrêt,1934, C.P.J.I. sérieAIB no 62, page 22, la
Cour fait observer:
((toute attribution législativecomporte généralementla faculté dis-
crétionnaired'apprécierla nécessitéet l'urgence de son exercice; ...
Il s'agit de l'appréciation d'éléments de politiqet de faià laquelle
seul le gouvernement possédant une connaissance suffisante de la
situation politique, est mêmede procéder. ))(Les italiques sont de
nous.)
C'est à des conclusions analogues, notamment en ce qui concerne les
Mandats C en général etle Sud-Ouest africain en particulier, qu'ont
abouti les juristes et commentateurs éminentsqui ont traité du système
des Mandats (voir contre-mémoire, livre IV, p. 387-389 et duplique,
vol.1, p. 176-177, où sont citées des observations de M. Latham, Chief
Justice d'Australie, de M. M.Orts, de lord Hailey, de M. Quincy Wright
et de M. Norman Bentwich).
e) L'essence mêmed'un pouvoir discrétionnaire est que son titulaire
a le droit de choisir entre deux ou plusieurs lignes de conduite possibles.
En opérant ce choix, il ne fait qu'user de son pouvoir et, à moins de se
voir accorder des pouvoirs d'appel à cet effet, un tribunal ne saurait in-
tervenir pour le seulmotif qu'il n'approuve pas la décisiondeceluiquiexer-
ce aussi son pouvoir discrétionnaire. En l'absence de disposition spéciale
à cet effet, un tribunal ne constitue pas une autorité d'appel par rapport
au titulaire du pouvoir discrétionnaireet ne saurait substituer sa décision
à la sienne. Tout ce que ses attributions normales autorisent un tribunal
à faire est de chercherà déterminer si les actes en question sont ou non
illicites et il découle de la nature mêmed'un pouvoir discrétionnaire
qu'un acte n'est pas illicite uniquement parce qu'un tribunal estime
qu'à la place du détenteur de ce pouvoir il eût agi différemment.
,f) Le titulaire d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire agit illicitement lorsqu'il
n'exerce pas ce pouvoir ou lorsqu'il l'exerce d'une manière incompatible
avec les restrictions, interdictions ou obligations expresses ou implicites
qu'il comporte. Ces restrictions, interdictions ou obligations peuvent
êtreextrêmement variées. Il peut s'agir, par exemple, de dispositions de
procédure ou de forme, de restrictions concernant ce qui fait l'objet
mêmedu pouvoir en question ou les fins en vue desquelles ce pouvoir
peut être exercé. L'inobservation de ces dispositions restrictives ou
réglementaires peut évidemment êtrecompatible avec la plus parfaite
bonne foi (dans le cas, par exemple, où l'on a mal interprétéles clauses
de l'instrument) ou bien elle peut être due à des mobiles illicites ouà
quelque autre forme de mauvaise foi.
g) Dans le cas du Mandat, les restrictions imposées aux pouvoirs du
Mandataire sont énoncéesaux articles 3, 4 et 5 de la déclaration de
Mandat, dont je ne m'occupe pas pour le moment, et au deuxième
alinéade l'article2 du mêmeMandat. C'est dans ce dernier article que
se trouve définil'objectif que le Mandataire doit atteindre. Par suite,
149datory's discretion would be declared illegal in terms of Article 2 (2)
only where the Mandatory did not pursue the authorized purpose. Such
a failure on the part of the Mandatory could, in practice, hardly arise
from a bona fide misinterpretation of the Mandate. It is consequently
difficult to imagine a case where a purported exercise of discretion by
the Mandatory could contravene Article 2 (2) unless some element of
bad faith were present. However, be that as it may, it seems clear that
if the Mandatory as a fact attempts to achieve the prescribed result, its
conduct could not be illegal merely because a particular method selected
by it in the exercise ofits discretion is not successful,or not as successful
as another would have been. Of course, failure to adapt or discontinue
an unsuccessful policy might well be some evidence of failure to exercise
a proper discretion, but that is another matter.
(h) An improper purpose or motive rnay be proved in a number of
ways, such as by direct statements of the person concerned. However,
a more frequent source of proof is circumstantial evidence, including the
nature of the act itself. If an actis so unreasonable that no reasonable
person placed in the position of the holder of the power would have
performed it, one may deduce that such act was motivated by some im-
proper motive or consideration. Of course, such a conclusion can only
be arrived at after considering al1relevant facts including the purported
purposes and effects of the act in question.
In a simple case the actual effectof a measure mayconstitute sufficient
proof of an improper purpose. In the present case,however,the purposes
to be achieved are the promotion of the material and moral well-being
and social progress of peoples consisting of various ethnic groups
differingwidelyin many important respects, andthe methods adopted by
the Mandatory were varied and complex. In these circumstances there is
no practical method of determining whether or not the prescribed
purposes have been achieved over any given period.
(i) Where a measure is part of an inter-related group of measures,
such measure should obviously not be considered in vacuo but with
due regard to its context. This context is affected, in the present case,
by the circumstance that South West Africa was expected by the authors
of the Mandate to be administered as an integral portion of South
Africa. Consequently any appraisal of a measure applying to South
West Africa must have regard to the over-al1 realities and exigencies
of a largely integrated economy and administration.
(j) In the above discussion 1considered various possible cases which
an applicant might seek to institute under Article 2 (2) of the Mandate.
1distinguished between the instances where the Mandatory is sought to
150l'exercicedu pouvoir discrétionnairedu Mandataire ne saurait êtredéclaré
illicite au regard du deuxièmealinéade l'article 2 qu'au cas où le Manda-
taire ne poursuivrait pas l'objectif autorisé.Pareille carence dela part du
Mandataire ne pourrait guèredansla pratique s'expliquer par une erreur
de bonne foi dans l'interprétation du Mandat. 11est donc difficiled'ima-
giner le cas où, dans l'exercicede son pouvoir discrétionnaire, le Manda-
taire contreviendrait aux dispositions du deuxième alinéade l'article 2,
sans qu'intervienne une certaine mauvaise foi. Quoi qu'il en soit, il
semble que, si leMandataire s'efforceeffectivementdeparvenir au résultat
prescrit, son comportement ne saurait êtreillicite pour le seul motif
qu'une méthode choisie par lui dans l'exercice de son pouvoir discré-
tionnaire, ne serait pas couronnée de succès ou n'aurait pas tout le
succès qu'une autre aurait pu avoir. Naturellement le fait de ne pas
modifier ou de ne pas interrompre une politique qui n'a pas le succès
voulu peut témoigner de l'incapacitéd'exercer comme il convient le
pouvoir discrétionnaire dont il s'agit, mais c'est là une autre question.
h) On peut faire la preuve d'un objectif ou d'un mobile illicite de
plusieurs façons, notamment en produisant des déclarationsqui émanent
directement de la personne visée.Toutefois, on tient compte plus fré-
quemment de preuves indirectes, notamment de la nature de l'acte
lui-même.Si un acte donné est à ce point déraisonnable qu'aucune
personne raisonnable n'aurait agi comme le détenteur du pouvoir l'a
fait, on peut en conclure que cet acte s'explique par un motif ou une
considération illicites. Bien entendu, il n'est possibled'aboutir pareille
conclusion qu'après avoir examinétous les faits pertinents, notamment
les intentions auxquelles a répondu l'acte en question et les effets qu'on
a voulu lui faire produire.
En une affaire simple, l'effet concret d'une mesure peut constituer
une preuve suffisante d'un mobile illicite. En la présente instance ce-
pendant, les objectifs consistentàaccroître le bien-être matérielet moral
et le progrès social de populations formées dedivers groupes ethniques
profondément différents les uns des autres sur de nombreux points
importants et le Mandataire a adopté à cette fin des méthodes variées
et complexes. Dans ces conditions, il n'y a pas en pratique de méthode
qui permette de déterminer si les objectifs prescrits ont étéatteints ou
non au cours d'une période donnée.
i) Quand une mesure fait partie d'un ensemble de mesures inter-
dépendantes, il ne faut naturellement pas la considérer dans l'abstrait
mais compte tenu de son contexte. En l'espèce, ce contexte se ressent
de ce que-les auteurs du Mandat comptaient voir administrer le Sud-
Ouest africain comme partie intégrante de l'Afrique du Sud. En con-
séquence, dèslors qu'on veut savoir ce que vaut une mesure appliquée
au Sud-Ouest africain, il faut prendre en considération dans leur en-
semble les réalitéset les exigences d'une économieet d'une administra-
tion fortement intégrées.
j) J'ai envisagé ci-dessus les diverses thèsesqu'un demandeur pour-
rait vouloir soutenir au titre du deuxièmealinéa del'article du Mandat.
J'ai fait une distinction entre le cas où l'on invite le Mandataire à ré- be called to task for failing to achieve the result of promoting well-
being and progress, and where the allegation is that it is not properly
exercisinga discretion to pursue the objective of well-beingand progress.
1 concluded that, if the Court could have dealt with the matter at all, the
latter case was the only one which could possibly be brought. 1 would
also add that this indeed appears to have been the type of case set out in
the Memorials, viz.o ,ne based on allegations that Respondent had
deliberately misused its powers for the purpose of oppression.
One further possiblecase under Article 2 (2)stillremains-an applicant
could conceivably adopt the attitude that the concept of promotion
of well-beingand progress had been authoritatively definedin one or more
respects in a manner binding on Respondent and on the Court.
20. As now worded, the final submissions restrict the issues to a case
falling within the Iast-mentioned category. Thus Applicants contend
that conduct contrary to their nom and standards is, by a legal fiction,
to be deemedincapable of promoting well-beingand progress. Applicants
have indeed rendered it clear that they do not rely on any of the other
conceivable causes of action mentioned above. There is no allegation
of omission, i.e., of a failure to exercisepowers. This was emphasized by
Applicants' Agent who repeatedly stated that the Applicants' case was
not basedon complaints that too fewhouses, schools, hospitals, irrigation
schemes, roads, etc., were built. Furthermore, the final submissions
as now worded do not allege improper purposes, wilful oppression,
arbitrary orunreasonable conduct, or unfair discrimination, nor do they
allege that Respondent's policies in fact failed to promote the material
and moral well-being or social progress of the inhabitants. Applicants'
Agent repeatedly stated that these were not the issues submitted to this
Court, that the dispute between the Parties was a legal one, which did
not require the Court to investigate either the Respondent's purposes,
motives, state of mind or the effects of its policies. The Court was not
asked to weigh the beneficial effect of a measure against the hardships
imposed by that or another measure. Such references as were made in
the Applications and the original submissions to improper purposes
and harmful effects of Respondent's policies were later deliberately
omitted. Similarly such references as were made in the original sub-
missions to unreasonable, unjust and arbitrary conduct, deliberate
oppression, etc., were intentionally deleted from the final submissions.
If regard is had to the history of the matter, particularly the oral pro-
ceedings, and Applicailts' apparent desire to avoid at al1costs an exami-
nation of the facts by this Court, the reason for these amendments
becomes clear. In any event, the numerous statements by the Applicants'
Agent, and particularly his explanations in reply to questions by members
of the Court at about the time the amendments weremade, leaveno room
for any doubt that the Applicants did not intend to raise, in their final
submissions, any issue relating to breaches of Articl2 (2) on the groundspondre du défaut de réalisation de l'objectif consistant à accroître le
bien-êtreet le progrès des habitants, et le cas où l'on soutient que le
Mandataire n'exerce pas comme il convient le pouvoir à lui conféré
pour atteindre ledit objectif. J'en ai conclu que, au cas où la Cour
aurait étéhabilitée à connaître de la question, c'est uniquement sur
la deuxième thèse qu'elle aurait pu statuer. C'est du reste une thèse
de ce genre - fondée sur des allégations d'après lesquelles le dé-
fendeur aurait délibérémentmal utilisé ses pouvoirs dans un des-
sein d'oppression - que l'on a, semble-t-il, voulu formuler dans les
mémoires.
Mais une autre thèsepeut encore êtresoutenue au sujet du deuxième
alinéa del'article2: on peut concevoir qu'un demandeur prétende que
la notion d'accroissement du bien-êtreet de développement du progrès
sur un point ou plusieurs points a reçu une définition faisant autorité
d'une manière qui lie le défendeur comme la Cour.
20. Sous leur nouvelle forme, les conclusions finales restreignent le
problème de telle sorte que la thèse soutenue entre dans cette dernière
catégorie. En effet, les demandeurs affirment qu'un comportement con-
traire à la norme et aux ccstandards)) est nécessairement, de par une
fiction juridique, incapable d'accroître le bien-êtreet le progrès. Ils ont
d'ailleurs montré clairement qu'ils ne se fondent sur aucun des autres
motifs concevables mentionnésci-dessus. Ils n'allèguentpas une carence,
un défaut d'exercice de pouvoirs. L'agent des demandeurs l'a souligné,
en déclarant à maintes reprises que les demandeurs ne se plaignaient pas
que l'on construisît trop peu delogements, d'écoles,d'hôpitaux, deroutes,
que 1'01mît en Œuvre trop peu de projets d'irrigation, etc. Les nouvelles
conclusions finales ne font pas non plus état de mobiles illicites, d'op-
pression intentionnelle, de comportement arbitraire ou déraisonnable, ni
de discrimination injuste; on n'y prétend pas davantage que la politi-
que du défendeurn'a pas accru le bien-êtrematérielet moral etle progrès
social des habitants. L'agent des demandeurs n'a cesséde dire que telles
n'étaient pasles questions soumises àla Couret que le différendentre les
Parties était d'ordre juridique et n'exigeait pas d'enquêtede la part de la
Cour sur les objectifs, les mobiles ou l'étatd'esprit du défendeur ou sur
les effets de sa politique. On ne demande pas à la Cour de jauger les
avantages qu'une mesure donnée peut offrir par rapport aux consé-
quences néfastes qu'ellepourrait avoir, ou que d'autres mesures pour-
raient avoir. Toutes les indications relatives aux objectifs illicites et aux
effets néfastes de la politique du défendeur qui figuraient dans les rz-
auêteset les conclusionsinitiales ont étéDarla suite délibérémenotmises.
De même,toutes ies allusionà un comportement déraisonnable, injuste
et arbitraire,une oppression délibérée e,tc., figurant dans les conclusions
initiales ont été intentionnellement suppriméesdans les conclusions
finales. Sil'on tient compte du déroulement de l'affaire, notamment de la
procédure orale, et du désirtrès net des demandeurs d'éviter à tout prix
que la Cour examine les faits, la raison de ces modifications devient très
claire. De toute façon, les nombreuses délcarations de l'agent desdeman-
deurs, et notamment les réponses qu'il a données aux questions des 154 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VANWYK)
of alleged unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair conduct, deliberate oppres-
sion, ialajîdes or any other improper purposes or unsatisfactory results.
The submissions were therefore subjectivelyintended to include no more
than their clear and unambiguous language conveys, Le., that this Court
should hold that a policy which allots rights, burdens, status, privileges
and duties on the basis of membership in a group, class or race, rather
than on the basis of individual merit, capacity or potential, is illegal in
terms of Article 2 (2) of the Mandate.
21. The effect of the submissions, read together with Applicants'
forma1 definitions and explanations, is consequently that the norm
and standards upon whicli the Applicants rely are contended to be
absolute rules of law in terms of which measures which distinguish
in the manner described are per se invalid, no matter what the facts
and circumstances may be. Such policies of differentiation (Le., dis-
crimination or separation as defined) are in Applicants' Agent's own
words "impermissible ... at al1times, under al1circumstances, and in al1
places". The alleged norm and standards apply, according to Applicants'
Agent, irrespective of whether or not the policies in question in fact
promote the progress and well-being of the population as a whole. For
this reason he contended that no evidence relative to purpose, motive,
effect, etc., would be relevant or admissible.
22. Respondent has never disputed that its policies do in important
respects allot rights, duties, etc., on the basis of membership in the
various ethnic groups in the Territory, and has indeed contended that
the circumstances in the Territory are such as to render such policies
desirable if not inevitable. Nothing need now be said about the merits
of Respondent's policies. For present purposes it is important to note
only that if the norm or standard as defined at page 274 of the Reply
did exist and were applicable to South West Africa, at least a substantial
number of Respondent's measures or policies would be in conflict
therewith. The effect of this is that the issue before the Court, which
is presented as being whether Respondent's policies violated Article 2 (2)
of the Mandate, in reality turns only on whether Respondent is bound
to conform to the alleged norm or standards in its administration of
the Territory.
23. The phrase "in the light of applicable international standards
or international legal norm" in Submission No. 4 is not part of the
argumentation of the case. It was inserted with the deliberate object of
152membres de la Cour au moment où ces modifications ont étéfaites, ne
permettent pas de douter que les demandeurs ont voulu éviterdans leurs
conclusions finales toute question relative à des violations du deuxième
alinéade l'article2à raison d'un comportement déraisonnable, arbitraire
ou injuste, d'oppression délibéréed ,e mauvaise foi, d'autres objectifs
illicites ou encore de résultats peu satisfaisants. Les conclusions ne
veulent donc subjectivement rien dire d'autre que ce que leurs termes
clairs et sans équivoque font entendre, à savoir que la Cour est invitée à
déclarer qu'une politique qui répartit les droits, les charges, le statut,
les privilèges et les devoirs d'après l'appartenance à un groupe, une
classe ou une race, plutôt que d'après le mérite, les capacitésou les
aptitudes individuelles, est illicite au regard du deuxième alinéa de
l'article2.
21. Les conclusions, accompagnées des définitionset des explications
données officiellement par les demandeurs, ont donc l'effet suivant:
il est soutenu que la norme et les ((standards )invoquéspar les deman-
deurs sont des règlesde droit absolues au regard desquelles des mesures
établissant une distinction de la façon qui a étédécrite ci-dessussont
automatiquement dépourvues de validité, indépendamment des faits
et des circonstances. Une telle politique de différenciation (c'est-à-dire
de discrimination ou de séparation, telles qu'elles sont définies)est,
d'après les termes mêmesde l'agent des demandeurs ((interdite ...à
tout moment, en toutes circonstances, et en tous lieux)).La prétendue
norme et les prétendus (standards 1doivent s'appliquer, d'après l'agent
des demandeurs, que la politique en cause favorise ou non, dans la
réalité,le progrès et le bien-êtrede l'ensemble de la population. C'est
pour cela qu'il a soutenu qu'aucun élémentde preuve relatif au but,
au mobile, aux effets, etc., n'était pertinent ni recevable.
22. Le défendeur n'ajamais contesté que sa politique consiste, dans
des domaines importants, à attribuer les droits, devoirs, etc., d'après
l'appartenance à l'un ou l'autre des divers groupes ethniques du terri-
toire et il a mêmesoutenu aue la situation dans le territoire était de
nature à rendre pareille politique opportune, sinon inévitable. Il n'y a
pas lieu d'en dire à présent davantage sur la valeur de la politique du
défendeur.Aux fins qui nous occupent, il importe de noter seulement
que, au cas où la norme ou le ((standard D,tels qn'ils sont définisà la
page 274 de la réplique, existeraient vraiment et seraient applicables
au Sud-Ouest africain, un bon nombre au moins des mesures ou des
méthodes du défendeur seraient incompatibles avec. cette norme ou
ce ((standard ». De ce fait, la question dont la Cour est saisie et qu'on
lui présente comme consistant à savoir si la politique du défendeur
viole ou non le deuxième alinéade l'article 2 du Mandat revient donc
en réalitéuniquement à savoir sile défendeur estounon tenu de respecter
cette prétendue norme ou ce prétendu ((standard )dans son administra-
tion du Territoire.
23. Le membre de phrase ((au regard des (standards ))internationaux
applicables ou de la norme juridique internationale applicable)) qui
figure dans la conclusion no 4 ne fzit pas partie de l'argumentation.modifying and pin-pointing the issue, and constitutes an integral and
vital part of the definition of the dispute submitted to this Court. In
Applicants' Agent's own words it constitutes the "heart and core" of
Applicants' case, on which they stand or fall.
The Court'sJurisdictionRelative to tlzeAmended Submissions3 and 4
24. 1 have now paved the way to demonstrate further reasons for
dismissing Submissions 3 and 4.
25. As demonstrated above, the dispute embraced in the final sub-
missions relates solely to the question whether or not a norm and/or
standards of non-discrimination or non-separation exist and are appli-
cable to the Mandate. As 1have already noted, this issue was first raised
during the Reply, and was elevated to the position of the soleissue some
time after the commencement of the oral proceedings. No averment
has ever been made by Applicants that this issue was at any time the
subject of negotiation between the Parties prior to institution of pro-
ceedings, or that it could not be settled by negotiation. Indeed, the
record creates the impression that Applicants themselves did not at
any stage prior to the preparation of the Reply contemplate the possi-
bility of the existence of such a norm and/or standards-an impression
which is strengthened, not only by the fact that the norm was evidently
raised in the Reply in an attempt to escape the factual enquiry necessary
for a determination of the dispute originally raised, but also by the
consideration that among the alleged sources of the norm are found a
number of instruments which came about after the institution of these
proceedings. (Vide, e.g., some of the United Nations resolutions quoted
in the Reply at p. 284; the Draft Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
quoted in the Reply, pp. 285-286; the Draft Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, quoted in the Reply, p. 286; the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Al1 Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, quoted in the Reply at pp. 286-288 and the Draft Inter-
national Convention on the Eiimination of Al1 Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, quoted in the Reply, pp. 288-289.) Alternatively, if we
assume that Applicants had at an early stage,e.g., when filingthe Appli-
cations in commencement of this action, considered the possibility of
basing a claim on the alleged existence of the norm or standards, they
refrained from setting out such a claim in the Mernorials in the manner
required by Article 42 of the Rules of Court, and thereby prevented
the jurisdictional questions pertaining to such a claim from being
raised and considered at the preliminary objections stage. In either
event it is clear that the dispute has not beeii shown to be one which,
in the words of Article 7 (2) of the Mandate. "cannot be settled by
negotiation". Consequently, for this reason also, the Court in my view
has no jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by Submissions 3
and 4.
153Il a étéinsérédans cette conclusion avec l'intention délibéréde modifier
et de préciserla question; il fait partie intégrante de la définitiondu
différendportédevant la Cour et en représenteun point capital. Comme
l'a dit l'agent desdemandeurs, il s'agitlà du ((cŒur 1)mêmede la thèse
des demandeurs et c'estcela qui doit déterminer saréussiteou son échec.
Compétencede la Cour relativement aux conclusionsno" et 4 revisées
24. Je suis maintenant en mesure de prouver qu'il estd'autres motifs
pour rejeter les conclusions noS3 et 4.
25. Comme je l'ai montréplus haut, le différend défind ians les con-
clusions finales porte exclusivement sur la question de savoir s'il existe
ou non une norme et/ou des ((standards )de non-discrimination ou de
non-séparation applicables au Mandat. Comme je l'ai déjà signalé,
cette question a étésoulevéepour la première fois dans la répliqueet,
peu après le début de la procédure orale, on est arrivé à la présenter
comme la question unique. Les demandeurs n'ont jamais dit que cette
question avait fait à un moment quelconque l'objet de négociations
entre les Parties avant l'introduction de l'instance, ni qu'ellen'était
pas susceptible d'être réglé paer des négociations. D'ailleurs, le dossier
donne l'impression que les demandeurs eux-mêmes n'ont à aucun mo-
ment avant la préparation de leur réplique envisagé l'éventualitd ée
l'existence d'une tellenorme et/ou de tels ((standards))cette impression
est renforcéenon seulement par le fait qu'on a évidemment mis er.jeu
la norme dans la répliquepour essayer d'échapper à l'enquête surles
faits qui eût étéindispensable pour trancher le différend tel qu'ilavait
étéinitialement défini,mais aussi par le fait que, parmi les prétendues
sources de la norme, on trouve un certain nombre d'instruments éla-
borés après l'introduction de l'instance (voir, par exemple, certaines
résolutionsdes Nations Unies citéesdans la réplique,p. 284; le projet
de pacte relatif aux droits civils et politiques citédans la réplique,
p. 285-286; le projet de pacte relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux
et culturels, citédans la réplique, p. 286; la déclaration des Nations
Unies sur l'éliminationde toutes les formes de discrimination raciale,
citéedans la réplique, p.286-288 et le projet de convention interna-
tionale sur l'éliminationde toutes les formes de discrimination raciale
cité dans la réplique, p. 288-289). D'autre part, si nous tenons pour
acquis que les demandeurs avaient très tôt, c'est-à-dire au moment
du dépôt des requêtes introductivesd'instance, envisagéla possibilité
de fonder leur demande sur la prétendueexistence de cette norme ou
de ces ((standards »,nous voyons qu'ils sesont abstenus de présenter
cette thèse dans leurs mémoires sousla forme requise par l'article 42
du Règlement de la Cour, empêchantainsi que ne fussent poséeset
examinéesau stade des exceptions préliminaires lesquestions de com-
pétenceque pouvait susciter cette demande. Dans les deux cas, il est
clair qu'il n'apas étdémontré quele différendn'est pas, pour reprendre
les termes du deuxième alinéade l'article 7 du Mandat, ((susceptible
153 26. 1 now turn to a further jurisdictional question which arises in
regard to this part of the case. Article(2)limits the Court's jurisdiction
to disputes "relating to the interpretation or the application of the
provisions of the Mandate". It would consequently not be enough for
Applicants to show that the alleged norm or standards exist, and are
binding on Respondent. Before the Court could make any order it
would have to be satisfied in addition that the norm or standards have
some bearing on the provisions of the Mandate. It may be helpful
therefore to consider whether any rule having the content of Applicants'
alleged norm or standard can at al1be read into the Mandate. In this
regard 1 wish to mention the fol-lowing considerations:
(a) If it was intended that differentiation on the basis of membership
of a group, class or race should be prohibited, express language
to that effect would have been used in the Mandate.
(b) The very contrary is the position-the Mandate expressly authorized
differentiation on thesaid basis in the provisions relating to military
training and the supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages.
(c) The Mandate furthermore authorized the application of Respon-
dent's existing laws to the Territory. It was generally known at
the time that policies of differentiation were applied in the Union
of South Africa, substantially similar to those employed in the
Territory.
(d) Policies of differentiation were being applied when the Mandate
came into force in comparable territories by several of the more
important members of the League.
(e) The conduct of al1the parties to the Mandate at al1material times
reveals that there was general acquiescence in the policy of differ-
entiation.
(i) Practically al1the speciJicpolicies objected to in the Mernorials
were applied in South West Africa during the lifetitne of the
League. Many of these policies were expressly approved by
the League organs. At no time was any objection made on
the grounds of a norm or standards as now contended for
by the Applicants.
(ii) Policies of differentiation (many of them similar to those
applied by the Respondent) wereapplied throughoutthe lifetime
of the League by other mandatories. No objection was raised
on the grounds now advanced by the Applicants.d'êtreréglépar des négociations)).Par conséquent, pour cette raison
aussi,j'estime que la Cour n'a pas compétencepour examiner lesquestions
soulevéespar les conclusions nos 3 et 4.
26. J'en viens à une autre question relative à la compétence qui se
pose à propos de cet aspect-ci de l'affaire. Lesdispositions du deuxième
alinéa de l'article7 limitent la compétence de la Cour aux différends
crelatifsà l'interprétation ouà l'application des dispositions du Man-
dat ».Il ne suffirait donc pas que les demandeurs démontrent que la
prétendue norme ou les prétendus standards » existent et s'imposent
au défendeur. Avant de pouvoir prendre une décision,la Cour devrait
en outre s'être assurée quela norme ou 12s ((standards ))ont quelque
lien avec15sdispositions du Mandat. Il peut donc êtreutile de rechercher
si l'on peut conclure à l'existence dans le Mandat d'une règle ayant
la teneur de la prétendue norme ou des prétendus (standards »des de-
mandeurs. A cet égard,je tiens à relevzr les points suivants:
a) Si l'on avait voulu interdire toute différenciation fondée sur I'ap-
partenance à un groupe, à une classe ou à une race, on l'aurait
dit expressément dans le Mandat.
b) En fait c'est précisément lecontraire que l'on constat- le Mandat
a expressément autorisé une différenciation sur cette base dans les
dispositions relatives à l'instruction militaire et à la fourniture
de spiritueux et de boissons alcooliques.
c) En outre, le Mandat a autorisé l'appiication au territoir de la
législationexistante du défendeur.Or, personne n'ignoraità l'époque
que l'Union sud-africaine appliquait sur son propre territoire une
politique de différenciation analogue pour l'essentielà celle qui a
été ensuitepratiquée dans le territoire.
d) Au moment où le Mandat est entré en vigueur, plusieurs Etats
Membres de la Société desNations, parmi les plus importants,
appliquaient une politique de différenciation dans des territoires
comparables.
e) Le comportement de toutes les parties au Mandat pendant toute
la période pertinente indique une acceptation généraliséede la
politique de différenciation.
i) Presque toutes les mesures spécijiquement critiquées dansles
mémoiresétaient appliquéea su Sud-Ouest fricain à l'époquede
la Société des Nations.Les organes de la Société desNations
ont expressément donné leur approbation à un grand nombre
d'entre elles. 11n'a jamais étésoulevéla moindre objection à
raison d'une norme ou de ((standards » tels que ceux dont les
demandeurs font désormais état.
ii) D'autres Mandataires ont appliqué pendant toute la période
dela Société desNations des politiques de différenciationsouvent
analogues à celles que pratique le défendeur. 11 n'a pas été
soulevé d'objections pour les motifs présentésaujourd'hui par
les demandeurs. As will be shown, the undisputed statements in Respondent's
pleadings and the uncontradicted evidence of the expert witnesses
strongly support the policy of differentiation: these witnesses al1
agree that, if the alleged norm or standards were to be applied,
the promotion of weI1-being and social progress would not be
advanced. This underlines the unlikelihood that the Mandate
would at its inception have included such implied provisions, and
shows that the subsequent incorporation thereof into the Mandate
would have constituted a material amendment thereto.
27. It has not been, and in my view could not be, suggested that the
Mandate has been amended to include the norm or standards relied
upon by Applicants. It is clear that no amendment could have been
effected without the consent of the Respondent, and it is common cause
that Respondent has always vigorously resisted the imposition upon
it of any rule of the sort relied upon by Applicants. It follows, therefore,
that even if the alleged norm or standards were to exist, this Court
would have no jurisdiction to consider alleged violations thereof, in-
asmuch as they do not constitute provisions of the Mandate.
28. In attempting to establish jurisdiction, Applicants contended,
lïrstly, that the alleged standards were binding on Respondent by
reason of an implied agreement in the Mandate itself, in terms of which
the Mandatory was bound to submit to standards laid down by the
supervisory authority. This contention, if accepted, would partly solve
Applicants' jurisdictional problems, but, for reasons to be dealt with
later, it is in my view completely unsound.
29. As regards their norm contention, Applicants argued tlîat Re-
spondent was under an obligation in terms of the Mandate to govern
in accordance with law, and that consequently any legal norm binding
upon Respondent as the administering authority in respect of South
West Africa would be enforceable under Article 7 (2) of the Mandate.
The argument rests on fallacy. The Mandate carried within itself
no obligations other than those expressly or impliedly falling within its
terms. Any other legal norms, rules or obligations that might be binding
upon Respondent, as the governing authority in respect of South West
Africa, would be so binding because of the particular considerations
from which their binding legal force was derived, and not by reason
of any provision, express or implied, of the Mandate. Such norms,
rules or obligations might conceivably be derived from municipal
law, custornary international law, or treaty, and a violation ofsuch a
norm, rule or obligation would be unlawful not because of the provisions
of the Mandate, but because of the relevant municipal law, international
customary law or treaty. The point seems so axiomatic as hardly to
155 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 157
f) Comme nous le montrerons, les déclarations non contestées du
défendeur dans ses écritures et les témoignages non contredits des
experts, ont été très favorables à la politique de différenciation:
les témoins ont tous étéd'accord pour déclarer que, au cas où la
prétendue norme ou les prétendus (standards 1)seraient appliqués,
l'accroissement du bien-êtreet du progrès social n'en serait pas plus
prononcé. Cela montre combien il est peu plausible que le Mandat
ait implicitement contenu dès le départ pareilles dispositions et
montre aussi que l'introduction ultérieure de telles dispositions
dans le Mandat aurait constitué une modification sensible de ce
dernier.
27. On n'a pas dit et, à mon avis, on ne saurait dire que le Mandat
aitétémodifiéde façon àcontenir désormaisla norme ou les ((standards ))
dont les demandeurs font état. Il est clair qu'aucune modification
n'aurait pu être apportéeau Mandat sans le consentement du défen-
deur et 1'01-sait que celui-ci a toujours vigoureusement refusé de se
voir imposer une règle comme celle sur laquelle les demandeurs se
fondent. Par suite, mêmesi la norme ou les standards ))alléguésexis-
taient, la Cour ne serait pas compétente pour statuer sur de prétendues
violations de cette norme ou de ces (standards ))car ceux-ci ne consti-
tuent pas des dispositions du Mandat.
28. Pour s'efforcer d'établir la compétence de la Cour, les deman-
deurs ont soutenu tout d'abord que les prétendus (standards ))s'impo-
saient au défendeur en raison d'un accord implicite dans le Mandat
lui-même,en vertu duquel le Mandataire serait tenu de respecter les
(standards » énoncéspar l'autorité de surveillance. Cette thèse, si elle
devait êtreacceptée,résoudrait en partie les problèmes de compétence
auxquels les demandeurs se heurtent mais, pour des raisons que j'expo-
serai plus loin, elle està mon avis parfaitement erronée.
29. En ce qui concerne la norme qu'ils invoquent, les demandeurs
ont soutenu que le défendeur avait aux termes du Mandat l'obligation
d'administrer le territoire conformément au droit et que par conséquent
toute norme juridique liant le défendeur en sa qualité d'autorité admi-
nistrante pour le Sud-Ouest africain devait êtrenécessairement appli-
cable en vertu du deuxième alinéa de l'article 7 du Mandat.
L'argument repose sur une erreur. En soi, le Mandat ne contient
pas d'autres obligations que celles qui correspon,!ent expressément ou
implicitement à ses dispositions. Toutes autres normes, règles ou obli-
gations juridiques pouvant lier le défendeur en qualité d'autorité ad-
ministrante du Sud-Ouest africain n'auraient force obligatoire qu'à
raison des considérations particulières dont elles tireraient précisément
leur effetjuridique obligatoire et non pas à raison d'une disposition ex-
presse ou implicite du Mandat. Ces normes, règlesou obligations pour-
raient résulterdu droit interne, du droit international coutumier ou d'un
traité; ce n'est donc pas à raison des dispositions du Mandat mais à
raison du droit interne, du droit international coutumier ou du traité
pertinent qu'il serait illicite de les violer. Tout cela est d'une tellevi-
155warrant discussion. If, for example, a ship belonging to a foreign govern-
ment were to be damaged in a South West African harbour, and a
dispute should arise in regard to possible liability on the part ofRe-
spondent as the harbour authority, such a dispute could surely not be
said to relate to the interpretation or application of the provisions
of the Mandate. The same would apply to a dispute arising under,
Say, a commercial treaty between Respondent, as governing authority
for South West Africa, and another State or States. It should be remem-
bered that such a treaty could quite conceivably have been eiltered
into with a State or States that were not parties to the Mandate+.g.,
the United States of America, which never became a member of the
League. Even as regards disputes between Respondent and another
member of the League of Nations, Article 7 (2) clearly envisâged a
distinction between those disputes concerning the provisions of the
Mandate and those concerning some other norm, rule or obligation.
If this were not so, the words "relating to the interpretation or applica-
tion of the provisions of the Mandate" in Article 7 (2) would have
been redundant and meaningless. Those words were clearly intended
to have a limiting effect on the disputes which would be justiciable
under Article 7 (2). And if Applicants' contention were correct, they
would have no limiting effect atall, and should be regarded as pro non
scripto.
Consequently it is evident that no rule or obligation could be justi-.
ciable under Article 7 (2) unless it was specificallyrendered a provision
of the Mandate, either by the legal processes whereby the Mandate
came into existence or by legal processes of amendment of the Mandate.
30. In a final attempt to establish jurisdiction, Applicants relied on
the League resolution of 18 April 1946 as rendering Chapters XI, XII
and XII1 of the United Nations Charter relevant to the interpretation
of the Mandate. This contention also bears on the merits of Applicants'
case, and can be dealt with more conveniently at a later stage. At present
it will sufficeto Saythat none of Applicants' arguments have convinced
me that this Court has jurisdiction to determine the issue raised by the
reformulated Submissions 3 and 4, and for this reason alone 1 think
these Submissions should be dismissed.
31. 1 do not wish to rest my opinion on these jurisdictional points
only. 1 shall consequently now turn to an examination of the sources
suggested for the norm and standards in order to determinetheir validity
or otherwise.
At the commencement it might b'econvenient to clarify a matter of
terminology. 1 pointed out earlier that in Applicants' usage of the
terms, the norm and the standards were legally enforceable rules both
156dence qu'il n'y a guère lieu d'en discuter. Si par exemple un navire ap-
partenant à un gouvernement étranger devait subir des dommages dans
un port du Sud-Ouest africain et s'il s'élevaitun différendsur l'éventu-
elle responsabilité du défendeur en qualitéd'autorité portuaire, on ne
pourrait certainement pas y voir un différend relatifà l'interprétation
ou à l'application des dispositions du Mandat. 11en irait de mêmepour
un différend concernant, par exemple, des dispositions d'un traité de
commerce conclu entre le défendeur en qualité d'autorité administrante
pour le Sud-Ouest africain et un ou plusieurs autres Etats.Il ne faut pas
oublier que pareil traité pourrait très bien avoir étéconclu avec un ou
plusieurs Etats non parties au Mandat - par exemple les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique,qui n'ont jamais appartenu à la Sociétédes Nations. Même
en ce qui concerne les différends venant à s'éleverentre le défendeur et
un autre Membre de la SociétédesNations, il est clair que les dispositions
du deuxième alinéa de l'article 7 établissent une distinction entre les
différends relatifs aux dispositions du Mandat et les différends relatifs
à quelque autre norme, règleou obligation. Si tel n'étaitpas le cas, les
mots ((relatifà l'interprétation ou à l'application des dispositions du
Mandat n seraient, au deuxième alinéa de l'article7, superflus et dénués
de sens. On a visiblement cherché par ce membre de phrase à limiter les
différendspouvant faire l'objet d'un recoursjudiciaire en vertu du deuxiè-
me alinéa de l'article 7. Or, si la thèse des demandeurs était justifiée,
ces termes n'auraient aucun effet limitatif et devraient êtreconsidérés
comme non écrits.
Par suite, il est évident qu'aucune règleou obligation ne saurait faire
l'objet d'un recours judiciaire au titre du deuxième alinéade l'article 7,
à moins qu'on en ait fait expressément une disposition du Mandat,
que ce soit par les processusjuridiques qui ont donnénaissance au Man-
dat ou par les processus juridiques de modification du Mandat.
30. Dans un dernier effort pour faire la preuve de la compétence de
la Cour, les demandeurs ont fait état de la résolution de la Société des
Nations adoptéele 18 avril 1946et qui, selon eux, rendrait les chapitres
XI, XII et XIXI de la Charte des Nations Unies pertinents en matière
d'interprétation du Mandat. Cette thèse, qui intéresse aussi l'examen
au fond de l'argumentation des demandeurs, pourra êtreétudiée plus
utilement par la suite. Qu'il me suffise de dire ici qu'aucun argument
des demandeurs ne m'a convaincu de la compétence de la Cour pour
trancher la question soulevéepar les conclusionsnoS3 et 4 sous leur nou-
velle forme; ne serait-ce que pour ce motif, j'estime que ces conclusions
sont à rejeter.
31. Je ne voudrais pas fonder mon opinion sur de simples questions
de procédure. C'est pourquoi j'examinerai les sources que l'on a voulu
donner à la norme et aux <standards N,en vue d'établirsi elles sont va-
lables ou non.
Je crois qu'ily a lieu de donner tout de suite une précision d'ordre
terminologique. J'ai fait observer plus haut que, pour les demandeurs,
la norme et les ((standards » sont des règlesjuridiquement obligatoires
156possessing an identical content, Le., as definedat page 274of the Reply l.
The sole difference between the two concepts was that standards were
said to be binding only on Respondent as Mandatory, whereas the norm
was said to be binding on al1States, including Respondent in its capacity
as a sovereign State. Bearing in mind the suggested distinction between
the two types of rules, I now turn to the sources alleged to have given
rise to them.
The Sources of the Standards
32. 1shall deal with the allegedsources ofthestandards first, and there-
after with the alleged sources of the norm, including sources which
are said to be common to both the standards and the norm.
33. The Applicants contended firstly that the Mandate provides by
implication that the organized international community in general, and
the competent supervisory organ referred to in Article 6 of the Mandate
Declaration in particular, were empowered to enact legal rules relative
to the administration of the Territory (called "standards" by the Ap-
plicants) to which the Respolident was obliged to give effect. Secondly,
the Applicants contended that, inasmuch as the Respondent was a
Member of the United Nations Organization and the International
Labour Organisation, it was not only bound by the constitutions of
these institutions but also by "the authoritative interpretation thereof"
by the organs of these institutions, and that, therefore, the provisions
of the constitutions of these institutions, thus interpreted, constituted
standards binding on the Respondent in its administration of South
West Africa. The Applicants further contended that in any eveiit the
legal effect of the League resolution of 18 April 1946, which referred
to Chapters XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter, is that the Mandate "must
be read in the light of the Charter".
(a) The Supervisory Authority under Article 6
34. It is of course basic to Applicants' argument regarding the alleged
standard-creating competence of the supervisory authority that there
still exists an authority vested with supervisory powers in respect of
South West Africa as a mandated territory. In an earlier part of this
opinion 1 expressed the view that Article 6 of the Mandate hqd lapsed
on the dissolution of the League and that Respondent was no longer
subject to any duty of accountability to any autkority whatsoever.
If this view is correct, it would by itself dispose of 'Applicants' con-
giventexplicit definitions of the sense in which they use thern. To adopt other defi-
nitions would be tantamount to changing the case the Respondent was called upon
to meet. ayant une teneur identique, à savoir la teneur définie à la page 274 de
la réplique l. La seule différence entre les deux notions est que les
cstandards » sont censés s'imposer uniquement au défendeur en sa
qualitéde Mandataire, tandis que la norme est censée s'imposer à tous
les Etats,y compris le défendeuren sa qualitéd'Etat souverain. Compte
tenu de la distinction que l'on a voulu faire entre ces deux types de
règles,j'en viens à présent aux sources dont elles découleraient.
Sources des «standards ))
32. Je traiterai tout d'abord des sources dont découleraientles (stan-
dards 1)pour passer ensuite aux sources qui seraient à l'origine de la
norme, sans omettre les sources prétendues communes aux (standards ))
et à la norme.
33. Les demandeurs ont soutenu en premier lieu qu'il résulte impli-
citement du Mandat que la communauté internationale organisée en
général,et l'organe de surveillance compétent mentionné à l'article 6
de la déclaration de Mandat, en particulier, sont habilités à établir en
ce qui concerne l'administration du territoire des règlesjuridiques; ces
règles, que le défendeur serait tenu de mettre à exécution,sont appelées
par les demandeurs des ((standards ». Les demandeurs ont prétendu en
second lieu que le défendeur, en tant que Membre de l'organisation
des Nations Unies et de l'organisation internationale du Travail, n'est
pas seulement liépar les statuts de ces institutioiis, mais égalementpar
((l'interprétation faisant autorité)) qu'en donnent leurs organes; par
conséquent, les dispositions des statuts de ces institutions, ainsi inter-
prétées,constituent des «standards »que le défendeur serait tenu d'ap-
pliquer dans son administration du Sud-Ouest africain. Les demandeurs
ont affirméen outre que, de toute façon, la résol~itionde la Société
des Nations en date du 18 avril 1946 qui se réfèreaux chapitres XI,
XII et XII1 de la Charte a pour effet juridique d'obliger à interpréter
le Mandat compte tenu des dispositions de la Charte.
a) Autoritéde surveillance aux termes de l'article 6
34. Un élémentfondamental de l'argumentation des demandeurs
concernant la prétendue aptitude qu'aurait l'autorité de surveillance
à créer des((standards »est qu'il existeencore une autorité investie de
pouvoirs de surveillance à l'égard du Sud-Ouest africain en tant que
territoire sous Mandat. Dans une autre partie de la présente opinion,
j'ai déjàsoutenu que I'article 6 du Mandat étaitdevenu caduc à la dis-
solution de la Société desNations et quele défendeurn'avait plusaucune
obligation de rendre compte à quelque autorité que ce soit. Si ces vues
l Il est inutile d'envisager d'autres définitions des usta1et des normes.
Les demandeurs ont défini avec précisionle sens dans lequel ils utilisent ces termes.
Adopter d'autres définitions reviendraitmodifier la thèse que le défendeur a
étéinvitéà réfuter.tention with which 1 am dealing at present. The same result may, how-
ever, also be reached in different ways. In this regard the question arises
whether any supervisory authority in respect of Mandates ever possessed
competence to impose binding rules of conduct upon the Mandatory.
To this enquiry I now turn.
(i) TlzeCouncilof the League
35. I shall commence by first considering whether the supervisory
organ referred to in Article 6 of the Mandate itself was clothed with
competence to establish such legal rules. (It would appear that if the
specific supervisory autiîority was not assigned such competence, the
whole basis of the Applicants' further submission relative to the com-
petence of the organized international community in general also col-
lapses.)
What strikrs one forcibly when examining the provisions of the Cove-
nant and the mandate instrument, is that no express provision in support
of Applicants' contentions is to be found therein. If it was indeed the
intention of the authors of these instruments that the League Council
would have the legislative powers now contended for by the Applicants
they would have said so in clear and unmistakable terms. In those ex-
ceptional cases where a decision of the Council had a law-creating effect,
i.e., could bind members of the League who had not assellied thereto,
explicit language was used. See, e.g., Articles 5 and 15 of the Covenant.
In addition, al1 decisions relative to mandate administration required
unanimity, and if indeed, as assumed by theCourtin 1962,theMandatory
was given the right to vote where its Mandate was concerned (a matter
to which 1 alluded above), no unanimity could be obtained without its
CO-operation. It follows that the Mandatory would then not have
been bound by any resolutions not acceptable to it.
36. Bethat as it may, anexamination of the scheme set outin Article 22
of the Covenant by itself reveals the untenability of Applicants' conten-
tions. Paragraph 2 States in terms that the "best method" of giving prac-
tical effect to the principle that the well-being and development of the
peoples of the territories concerned form a sacred trust of civilization,
is that the tutelage of such peoples slzould be entrusted to advanced
nations, who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their
geographical position could best undertake this responsibility. This
tutelage was entrusted to certain couiltries as mandatories on behalf
of the League: it was not entrusted to the League. The tutelage became
the responsibility of the mandatory. In the case of South West Africa,
paragraph 6 of Article 22 provided in express terms that it "can best be
administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions
of its territory". The only qualification of this wide statement was that
such administration was to be subject to the safeguards mentioned in
the interests of the indigenous population, i.e., provisions relating to
158sont correctes, elles suffisent pour réfuter l'allégation desdemandeurs
dont il est question ici. Il est possible toutefois d'arriver au même
résultat par d'autres moyens. A cet étard, on peut se demander si une
autorité chargéede la surveillance des Mandats a jamais eu compétence
pour imposer au Mandataire des règles de conduite obligatoires. C'est
de cette question que je vais m'occuper maintenant.
i)Le Conseil de la Société des Nations
35. Je commencerai par examiner si l'organe de surveillance mention-
né à l'article 6 du Mandat était habilité à établir de telles règles de
droit. (II semblerait que, si l'autoritéde surveillance déterminéne s'est
pas vu attribuer pareil compétence, la conclusion des demandeurs
reiaiive à la compétence de la communauté internationale organisée
en givzérals'effondre complètement.)
Ce qui frappe lorsqu'on examine les dispositions du Pacte et du
Mandat, c'est qu'on n'y trouve aucune disposition expresse qui étaierait
les allégations des demandeurs. Si les auteurs de ces instruments avaient
vraiment eu l'intention d'attribuer au Conseil les pouvoirs dont font
maintenant état les demandeurs, ils l'auraient certainement dit en ter-
mes clairs et non équivoques.Dans les cas exceptionnels où une décision
du Conseil créaitdu droit, c'est-à-dire où elle devenait obligatoire même
pour les Membres de la Société desNations qui ne s'étaientpas pronon-
césen sa faveur, cela était indiquéde façon explicite (voir par exemple
les articles5 et 15 du Pacte). En outre, toutes les décisions relatives
a l'administration d'un Mandat exigeaient l'unanimité; si, comme la
Cour l'a supposé en 1962, le Mandataire avait effectivement le droit
de voter lorsqu'il s'agissait de son Mandat - question à laquelle j'ai
déjàfait allusion plus haut -, il étaitinlpossible d'obtenir l'unanimité
sans sa coopération. II s'ensuit que le Mandataire ne pouvait êtrelié
par une résolution qu'il ne jugeait pas acceptable.
36. Quoi qu'il en soit, un examen du systèmeétabli à l'article 22 du
Pacte révèleque les affirmations des demandeurs sont insoutenables.
Le paragraphe 2 indiquait expressément que la meilleure méthodede
réaliserpratiquement le principe selon lequel le bien-être etle dévelop-
pement des peuples vivant sur les territoires en question formaient une
mission sacrée de civilisation était de confier la tutelle de ces peuples
aux nations développéeq sui, en raison de leurs ressources, de leur expé-
rience ou de leur position géographique, étaient le mieux à même d'as-
sumer cette responsabiliJ. Cette tutelle a étéconfiée à certains pays en
qualitéde Mandataires au nom de la Société desNations: elle n'a pas
étéconfiée à la SociétédesNations. ka tutelle est devenue la responsabi-
lité du Mandataire. Appliqué au Sud-Ouest africain, le paragraphe 6
de l'article 22 disait expressément qu'ilne pouvait ((êtremieux adminis-
tré [...J que sous les lois du Mandataire. comme une partie intégrante
de son territoire1).Cette disposition si large n'était assortie que d'une
seule réserve: le territoire devait être administre compte tenu des ga-freedom of conscience and religion, the slave trade, arms traffic, liquor
traffic, military training of Natives, etc. If it was intended that the-
cil of the League could without the Respondent's concurrence prescribe
the standards upon which the legislative measures applicable to the
Territory should be based, the Respondent's legislative and administra-
tive powers would hardly have Geenexpressed in such wide and unquali-
fied terms.
37. This conclusion is confirmed by the events which took place
before and during the drafting of the Covenant. Earlier proposals that
the League itself should be vested with complete authority and control
and that it should be entitled to govern the territories which eventually
became mandated territories by delegating its powers to States or "or-
ganized agencies", were abandoned, and the final outcome was that
the League's functions were to be limited to examining the mandatories'
annual reports with a view to ascertaining whether they had performed
their duties, and to assist anddvise them. No right or duty wasconferred
upon the League to prescribefrom time to time standards binding upon
the mandatories in general, or upon any particular mandatory.
The supervisory powers of the Council were accordingly stated in
the following terms in Article 22, paragraph 7, of the Covenant: "In
every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council
an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge."
This can clearly not be read asproviding that the Council was empowered
to lay down legislativelyi.e., without the mandatory's consent) standards
binding on the mandatory. It is true that, in terms of paragraph 8 of
Article 22, the Council was authorized to define the degree of authority,
control or administration to be exercised by the mandatory. But this
power is not relevant to the present discussion since it was obviously
intended to be exercised only once, i.e., for the purposes of framing the
mandate instruments. That this is so, appears not only from the pro-
visions in paragraph 8, which made the Council's function in this respect
dependent on whether or not such degree of authority, etc., had not
previously been agreed upon by the members of the League, but also
from the mandate declarations themselves which in effect provided
that the mandates would not be amended without the consent of the
mandatory and the Council. Paragraph 9 of Article 22 provided for
the creation of a "permanent Commission" which was to advise the
Council on al1 matters relating to the "observance" of the mandates.
If it was intended that the Council would have legislative powers in
respect of the mandates, the functions of this expert commission would
not have been confined to advising on the "observance" of the mandates,
but would also haverelated to the enactment and amendment ofstandards
from time to time.
38. An examination of the provisions of the Mandate Declaration
leads to the same conclusion. This Declaration could not amend Arti-
cle22 of the Covenant, and must therefore always be read subject thereto.ranties prévues dans l'intérêt dela population indigène, c'est-à-dire
des clauses concernant la liberté de conscience et de religion, la traite
des esclaves, le trafic des armes et celui de l'alcool, l'instruction mili-
taire des indigènes, etc. Si l'on avait voulu que le Conseil prescrive,
sans le concours du défendeur,les ((standards 1sur lesquels auraient dû
se fonder les mesures législativesapplicables au territoire, i! est peu pro-
bable que les pouvoirs législatifs et administratifs du défendeur eussent
étéexprimésen termes si larges et avec si peu de réserves.
37. Les événementsqui ont eu lieu avant et pendant la rédaction du
Pacte confirment cette conclusion. Les propositions initiales selon
lesquelles la SociétédesNations elle-mêmedevait détenir toute autorité
et tout pouvoir de contrôle et êtrehabilitée à gouverner les territoires
devenus par la suite territoires sous Mandat, moyennant une délégation
de pouvoirs aux Etats ou ((institutions organisées »,ont étéabandonnés;
les fonctions de la Sociétéont étéen définitive limitées à l'examen des
rapports annuels des Mandataires, le but étant de vérifiers'ils s'étaient
acquittés de leurs obligations et aussi de les aider et de les conseiller.
La Société des Nations ne s'est vu ni conférerle droit ni imuoser le devoir
de prescrire le cas échéantdes (standards » liant les Mandataires en
généralou un Mandataire en particulier.
Les pouvoirs de surveillance du Conseil ont donc été précisés comme
suit au paragraphe 7 de l'article 22 du Pacte: c(Dans tous les cas le
Mandataire doit envoyer au Conseil un rapport annuel concernant
les territoires dont il a la charge.)Cela ne peut certainement pas s'in-
terpréter comme signifiant que le Conseil avait le droit d'établir entant
que législateur, c'est-à-dire sans le consentement du Mandataire, des
((standards » s'imposant au Mandataire. Il est vrai qu'aux termes du
paragraphe 8 de l'article 22 le Conseil était habilité à définirle degré
d'autorité, de contrôle ou d'administration à exercer par le Mandataire.
Mais cette faculté est sans pertinence, car elle devait manifestement
s'exercer une fois pour toutes - aux fins de la rédaction des actes de
Mandat. Qu'il en ait été ainsi ressort non seulement des dispositions
du paragraphe 8, d'après lesquelles le Conseil n'exercerait cette fonc-
tion que si le degréd'autorité, de contrôle, etc., n'avaient pas faitI'ob-
jet d'une convention antérieure entre Membres de la SociétédesNations,
mais également des déclarations de Mandat, qui stipulaient en fait que
les Mandats ne pourraient être modifiés sans le consentement du
Mandataire et du Conseil. Le paragraphe 9 de l'article 22, prévoyait
la création d'une ((commission permanente)) chargée de donner au
Conseil son avis sur toutes questions relativesà l'exécutiondes Mandats.
S'il avait étéprévu que le Conseil aurait des pouvoirs législatifs en
matière de Mandats, les fonctions de cette commission d'experts n'au-
raient pas consisté à donner simplement un avis sur l'exécution des
Mandats, elles auraient aussi porté sur l'adoption et la modification
éventuelles des «standards ».
38. Un examen des dispositions de la déclaration de Mandat conduit
à la mêmeconclusion. Cette déclaration n'a pas pu modifier l'article 22
du Pacte et doit donc toujours êtreinterprétée enfonction de celui-ci. Full power of legislation and administration, subject only to the pro-
visions of the Mandate, was granted to the Respondent. No such power
was vested in the Council of the League. The obligation to promote
well-being and progress to the best of its abiiity, having regard to the
resources available to it, was imposed on the Mandatory; and the Man-
date provided that the Mandatory would have the discretionary powers
required for the effectivedischarge ofsuch an obligation. These powers
were in no way fettered by an obligation to comply with standards
imposed by the organs of the League.
It will be recalled that the Mandate was issued as a forma1 act of
the League Council. If the Council had thought that it could lawfully
prescribe standards from time to time it would not have been necessary
to include the provisions of Articles 3 to5 in the Mandate. The Council
could then, if it so desired, have prescribed these provisions as standards,
which it could have amended, repealed or added to from time to time
without the Mandatory's consent.
39. The Hymans report-it was issued even prior to the completion
of the Mandate Declarations-in dealing with the obligations falling
upon the League of Nations under the terms of Article 22 of the Cove-
nant, made no reference to a contemplation that the supervisory organs
of the League would lay down binding standards of government upon
the mandatories. On the contrary itstated, interalia, that "the Mandatory
will enjoy in my judgment a full exercise of sovereignty in so far as
such exercise is consistent with the carrying out of the obligations in
paragraphs 5 and 6". Under a section headed "The extent of the League
right of control", one also finds no reference to this alleged legislative
power. On the contrary it was emphasized that the Council's power
was limited to ascertaining whether the mandatory had remainec!within
the limits ofits powersunder Article 22 ofthe Covenant andthe Mandate
Declaration, and whether good use had been made of such powers.
40. The conclusion that the Council possessed no competence to lay
down binding standards is confirmed by an examination of the view
which the League organs themselves took of their powers. At no time
did they claim the power to lay down general rules in the nature of the
standards contended for by the Applicants. On the contrary, the generally
accepted view of their functions was that they consisted of CO-operation
with the mandatories and of determining how far the principles of the
Covenant and the mandates had been truly applied. See Quincy Wright,
Mandates Under theLeague of Nations, 1930,page 197. Bentwich, page
1 16,states:
"The Commission. ..has been at pains to make it clear that
it is not concerned itself, and that the Council of the League is
not concerned, with the administration of the Mandated territory,
which is the exclusive function of the Mandatory power."
41. For the above reasons, 1 find that the Council had no power t0
160Le défendeur s'était vu accorderles pleins pouvoirs législatifs et admi-
nistratifs,à la seule condition de respecter les dispositions du Mandat.
Le Conseiln'étaitpas investi de tels pouvoirs. C'est au Mandataire qu'é-
tait imposée l'obligation d'accroîtrepar to;s les moyens en son pouvoir
le bien-être etle progrès, compte tenu des ressources dont il disposait;
le Mandat stipulait qu'il aurait les pouvoirs discrétionnaires nécessaires
pour s'acquitter efficacement de cette obligation. Ces pouvoirs n'étaient
nullement restreints par une obligation d'observer des ((standards))
imposés par les organes de la Société desNations.
On se souviendra que le Mandat a étépromulgué par un acte du
Conseil en bonne et due forme. Si le Conseil avait estimé avoir le droit
de prescrire des « standards »le cas échéant, iln'aurait pas été nécessaire
d'insérerdans le Mandat les dispositions des articles 3 à 5. En effet le
Conseil aurait pu, s'il l'avait désiré, énoncecres dispositions sous forme
de ((standards »,qu'il aurait été en mesure de modifier, d'abroger ou de
compléter le cas échéantsans le consentement du Mandataire.
39. Le rapport Hymans, qui a paru avant l'achèvement des décla-
rations de Mandat, traitait bien des obligations incombant à la Société
des Nations aux termes de l'article 22 du Pacte, mais ne mentionnait
pas que l'on eût envisagéla possibilitépour les organes de surveillance
de la Société desNations d'imposer aux Mandataires des ((standards ))
ayant force obligatoire en matière d'administration. Au contraire, il
indiquait notamment: ((la Puissance mandataire aura le plein exercice
de la5ouveraineté dans les limites où il est compatible avec l'exécution
des obligations imposées par les paragraphes 5 et 6 ».Dans la section
ayant pour titre (Etendue du droit de contrôle de la SociétédesNations )),
on ne trouve aucune mention de ce prétendu pouvoir législatif.Il était
soulignéau contraire que le Conseil pouvait simplement s'assurer que
le Mandataire était restédans les limites des pouvoirs fixés à l'article 22
du Pacte et dans la déclaration de Mandat et vérifiersi bon usage avait
étéfait de ces pouvoirs.
40. La conclusion selon laquelle le Conseil n'avait pas compétence
pour fixer des ((standards)) ayant force obligatoire se trouve confirmée
quand on examine l'opinion que les organes de la Société desNations
se faisaient de leurs propres pouvoirs. Ils n'ontà aucun moment préten-
du êtrehabilités à établirdes règlesgénéralesdu genre des ((standards ))
invoqués par les demandeurs. Au contraire, on a semblé considérer en
généralque leurs fonctions consistaient à assurer la coopération avec
les Mandataires et à déterminerjusqu'à quel point les principes du Pacte
et des Mandats avaient été réellement appliqués. Voir Quincy Wright,
Mandates UndertheLeague ofNations, 1930,page 197.Bentwich a déclaré
(p. 116):
((La Commission s'est donnébeaucoup de peine pour bien faire
comprendre que, pas plus que le Conseil de la Société desNations
elle ne s'occupe de l'administration du territoire sous Mandat qui
est la fonction exclusive de la puissance mandataire. 1)
41. Pour les motifs indiqués ci-dessus,j'estime que le Conseil n'avaitlay down binding standards for the administration of the mandates.
(ii) The Permanent Mandates Commission
42. 1now proceed to examine a specificcontention of the Applicants,
namely that the Permanent Mandates Commission had established
certain standards which are binding on the Respondent. They allege
that these standards are reflectedin pronouncements of general principles
or were "developed through continuous application of general criteria
to concrete factual situations". The truth is that the Mandates Com-
mission had no legislative powers. Indeed, it possessed no independent
powers at al]. Its function was limited to advising the Council. It is true
that an interpretation of the mandate by the Permanent Mandates
Commission which was accepted by the Council became a precedent
to which a prudent mandatory would have had due regard; but this
is somethi~g quite different from saying that such a precedent became
binding law which had to be applied by each and every mandatory,
irrespective of its particular circumstances.
The nature of the twofold task of the Commission was contrasted
by Quincy Wright as follows:
"In supervising the mandates the Commission has felt obliged
to limit its criticism by law. It does not censure the mandatory
unless the latter's orders or their application are infinite conflict
with the mandate or other authoritative text, but if such a conflict
is reported by the Commission and the report is adopted by the
Council the mandatory is bound to recognize it. It becomes an
authoritative interpretation of the latter's obligations. .
In CO-operating with the mandatories, however, though the
League's powers are more limited, the scope of its suggestions is
infinitely wider. It has not coiîsidered itself limited by authoritative
documents but has formulated standards of good administration
from the widest sources, and suggested whatever practical steps
it deems expedient to give them effect. Such suggestions, how-
ever, even when endorsed by the Council, never have more than
the character of advice. The Mandatory is free to differ from them
though if based on an adequate understanding of the situation he
will do well to consider them."
It is true that the Commission laid down certain standards for its
own guidance but these standards were standards in the ordinary sense
of the word-not standards in the sense of legal rules. Quincy Wright
States at page 220:
"The Commission has found it necessary to establish certain
standards for its own use on full realisation that tliese are in no
sense binding but subject to modification by experience." SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 163
pas le pouvoir d'établir des((standards » ayant force obligatoire en ma-
tière d'administration des Mandats.
ii) La Commissionpermanente des Mandats
42. J'en viensmaintenant à l'examen d'une allégation expresse des
demandeurs, à savoir que la Commission permanente des Mandats a
établicertains ((standards » ayant force obligatoire pour le défendeur.
Ils prétendentque ces ((standards »ont étéénoncéssous forme de prin-
cipes générauxou qu'ils ont été((misau point grâce àl'application con-
tinue de critères généraux àdes situations concrètes».En réalitéla Com-
mission des Mandats n'avait pas de pouvoirs législatifs. Elle ne possé-
dait mêmeaucun pouvoir indépendant. Sa fonction se limitait à donner
des avis au Conseil. Il est vrai qu'une interprétation du Mandat par la
Commission permanente des Mandats constituait, si elle étaitacceptée
par le Conseil, un précédentdont un Mandataire aviséne pouvait pas
manquer de tenir compte; mais il y a loin de là à affirmer qu'un précé-
dent de ce genre a pu s'imposer en droit à chaque Mandataire, quelle
qu'ait été sasituation particulière.
Dans le passage suivant, Quincy Wright a mis en évidencela nature
de la double tâche de la Commission:
(Lorsqu'elle surveille l'exécution desMandats, la Commission
se sent obligéeen droit de limiter ses critiques. Elle ne censure
pas le Mandataire, à moins que les ordonnances de ce dernier ou
leur application ne soient expressément en conflit avecle Mandat
ou un autre texte faisant autorité. Mais si la Commission dénonce
un conflit de ce genre et si son rapport est adoptépar le Conseil,
le Mandataire doit le reconnaître. Cette interprétation des obliga-
tions du Mandataire fait autorité ...
Mais lorsqu'elle coopère avecle Mandataire, bien que les pou-
voirs de la Société desNations soient plus limités,la portéede ses
suggestions est beaucoup plus vaste. Elle ne se considèrepas tenue
par un document qui fait autorité, mais formule des règlesde bonne
administration en faisant appel aux sources les plus diverses et
propose toutes les mesures pratiques qu'elle juge bon pour leur
donner effet. Toutefois, ces suggestions, lorsqu'elles sont sanction-
néespar le Conseil, n'ont jamais que le caractère d'unavis. Le Man-
dataire est libre de ne pas s'yrallier, encore que, si ellessont fondées
sur une connaissance suffisante de la situation, il fera bien de les
méditer.1)
11est vrai que la Commission a établi certains ((standards » à son
propre usage: mais il s'agissait de ccstandards » au sens ordinaire du
mot et non pas au sens de règles juridiques. Quincy Wright a déclaré
(p. 220):
(La Commission a jugé nécessaire d'établicrertains «standards 1)
à son propre usage, parfaitement consciente du fait qu'ils n'ont à
aucun égard force obligatoire mais qu'il sera possiblede les modi-
fier en fonction de l'expérience acquise. )) In any event, although the Mandates Commission on one occasion,
and individual members thereof on a few occasions, appeared to have
been critical of certain aspects of some of the Respondent's policies of
differentiation, the over-al1impression gained from a detailed study of
the Mandatory's andthe Commission's reports isnot only that the general
principles of the Respondent's policies were not objected to by the Com-
mission, but that in basic and important respects they were actually
approved of. However, the point that 1wish to stress at the moment is
that neither the Mandates Commission nor the Council of the League
ever attempted to lay down any standards which purported to constitute
legal rules binding on the mandatories. No doubt they would have been
extremelysurprised to hear it suggested tliat they possessed such powers.
'(iii) The GeneralAssembly of the UnitedNations
43. If the League organs could not lay down standards in the sense
contended for by the Applicants, it follows that, even if the Geiieral
Assembly of the United Nations has been substituted for those organs,
it similarly has no such power. Indeed, as far as 1am aware, it has never
been suggested that the United Nations possesses wider powers in re-
spect of the Mandate for South West Africa than those formerly held
by the organs of the League.
Thus this Court in 1950expressed the opinion that the United Nations
had supervisory powers under the Mandate relative to the Respondent's
administration of South West Africa, but held that the degree of super-
vision should ilot exceed that wliich applied under the mandates system,
and should conform as far as possible to the procedure followed in this
respect by the Council of the League of Nations. This was interpreted
in 1955 by this Court (p. 72) "to relate to substantive supervision",
and "to the measui-eand means of supervision", and meant that "the
General Assembly should not adopt such methods of supervision or
impose such conditions.. . as are inconsistent with the terms of the
Mandate or with a proper degree of supervision measured by the stan-
dards and the metlzods applied by the Council of the League".
At page 74 of the 1955Opinion it was repeated that the 1950Opinion
"must be interpreted as relating to substantive matters".
In 1956, in his separate opinion, Judge Winiarski said: "1 believe
that the maintenance of the previously exisiing situation constitutes the
dominant theme of the Opinion and that the decisive test is to be found
in what was formerly done" (p. 33).
Judge Klaestad in liis separaie opinion iii 1955, at pages 87 and 88,
stated expressly that decisions of the United Nations organs concerning
reports and petitions relating to South West Africa have no binding
force. It should be borne in mind that this statement was made on the
assumption that the United Nations had succeeded to the powers of De toute façon, bien que la Commission permanente des Mandats
ait paru en une occasion critiquer certains aspects de la politique de dif-
férenciation du défendeur et que certains de ses membres aient semblé
le faire à plusieurs reprises, l'impressiori générale quise dégage d'une
étude détaillée desrapports soumis par le Mandataire et des rapports
rédigéspar la Commission est non seulement que cette dernière n'a pas
soulevé d'objection contre les principes généraux de la politique du dé-
fendeur mais qu'elle en a mêmeapprouvé les élémentsfondamentaux.
Toutefois, ce que je voudrais souligner pour le moment, c'est que ni
la Comn~issionpermanente des Mandats ni le Conseil n'ont jamais es-
sayéde formuler des « standards » destinés à constituer des règlesjuri-
diques obligatoires pour les Mandataires. Ils auraient certainement été
très étonnésd'entendre dire qu'ils possédaient de tels pouvoirs.
iii)L'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies
43. S'il est vrai que les organes de la Société desNations n'ont pu
imposer des « standards 1)comme le prétendent les demandeurs, l'As-
sembléegénérale deN s ations Unies, mêmeau cas où elle aurait remplacé
ces organes, n'a pas davantage de pouvoir de ce genre. En fait, pour au-
tant que je le sache, on n'a jamais suggéré que les Nations Unies possé-
daient à l'égard du Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain des pouvoirs
plus étendus que ceux dont les organes de la SociétédesNations étaient
investis.
Ainsi la Cour a estimé en1950que les Nations Unies avaient en vertu
du Mandat des pouvoirs de surveillance quant à l'administration du
Sud-Ouest africain par le défendeur, mais que le degréde surveillance
ne devait pas dépassercelui qui étaitappliquédans le systèmedes Man-
dats et devait êtreautant que possible conforme à la procédure suivie
en la matière par le Conseil de la Société desNations. En 1955la Cour
a souligné(p. 72) que cela se rapportait ((àl'étendue dela surveillance
réelle» et «à la .mesureet aux moyens de surveillance ))et signifiait que
l'Assembléegénérale nesaurait adopter des méthodes desurveillance
ou imposer ...des conditions qui soient, les unes et les autres, incom-
patibles avec les termes du Mandat ou avec un degréde surveillance
approprié, mesuréd'après les normeset méthodesdu Conseil de13Société
des Nations. ))
A la page 74 de l'avis consultatif de 1955, la Cour a redit que son
avis de 1950 devait ((s'interprétercomme se rapprtant aux questions
de fond ».
M. Winiarski a dit, dans une déclaration jointe à l'avis de 1956:
aJe trouve ...que le maintien de la situation antérieurement existante
constitue la thèse maîtresse de l'avis et que c'est la pratique qui est
décisive.» (P. 33.)
M. Klaestad a expressément déclarédans son opinion individuelle
de 1955(p. 87-88) que les décisions des organes des Nations Unies tou-
chant les rapports et les pétitions relatifs au territoire du Sud-Ouest
africain n'étaient pas juridiquement obligatoires. On se rappellera que
cette déclaration reposait sur l'hypothèse selon laquelle les Nationsthe League relative to the Mandate. It also appears from the Opinion
of the Court in 1955that, on its view of the 1950Opinion, the authority
of the General Assembly to take decisions in respect of reports and
petitions concerning South West Africa was derived from Article 10
of the Charter. This section authorizes the General Assembly to make
recomrnendationsand nothing more.
44. It is also significant that no legislative powers were given to the
supervisory organs of the United Nations in respect of trust territories.
See Kelson, Law of the UnitedNations, page 630. This also appears from
Judge Lauterpacht's separate opinion in 1955, page 116.
Several examples are given in the aforesaid Opinion of States ad-
ministering trust territories who asserted their right not to accept re-
commendations of the General Assembly or of the Trusteeship Council.
It seems unlikely that the authors of the Charter would have granted
lesser powers to the United Nations relative to trusteeship territories
than had been held by the League relative to mandates-or that in the
case of the one mandate not converted to trusteeship the United Nations
should have greater powers than in respect of trusteeships.
(b)The Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation
45. The next contention to be considered is to the effect that by
becoming a Member of the United Nations Organization and the
International Labour Organisation, the Respondent as Mandatory be-
came bound to give effectto the standards embodied in the constitutions
of these Organizations as interpreted by their respective organs. As
regards the United Nations Charter, Applicants relied mainly on
Article 56 read with Article 55(c). Assuming that these Articles created
legal rights and/or obligations (a matter which is not free from doubt)
it seems clear to me that they do not contain the standards relied upon
by Applicants. The combined effect of the two Articles (in respects
relevant to the present enquiry) is that Members of the Organization
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in CO-operation
with the Organization to achieve universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for al1without distinction
as to race, sex, language or religion. It is to be noted that these Articles
deal with distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion only in one
context, viz., the context of "human rights and fundamental freedoms".
At the same time the Charter does not purport to lay down or define
these rights and freedoms, and, as is well known, subsequent attempts
at drafting comprehensive and legally effective instruments for this
purpose have not proved successful. In the result the whole concept
of "human rights and fundamental freedoms" is as yet an undefined
and uncertain one with no clear content. It is not, however, necessary
163Unies avaient hérité des pouvoirs de la Société desNations au regard
du Mandat. Il ressort égalementde l'avis consultatif de 1955 que, d'a-
prèsl'interprétationque la Cour a donnéede l'avis de 1950,les pouvoirs
de l'Assemblée générad lee prendre des décisionsconcernant les rapports
et pétitions relatifs au Sud-Ouest africain avaient leur source dans l'ar-
ticle 10 de la Charte. Cet article autorisel'Assembléegénérale àformuler
des recommandationset rien de plus.
44. Il est intéressantaussi de constater que les organes de surveillance
des Nations Unies ne se sont vu attribuer aucun pouvoir législatif à
l'égard desterritoires sous tutelle (voirKelson, Law of the UnitedNations,
p. 630). Cela ressort également de l'opinion individuelle déposéepar
M. Lauterpacht en 1955 (p. 116).
Dans l'avis susmentionné, on trouve plusieurs exemples d7Etats
administrant des territoires sous tutelle qui ont affirméleur droit de ne
pas accepter les recommandations de l'Assemblée généralo eu du Con-
seil de tutelle.Il semble peu probable que les auteurs de la Charte aient
octroyé aux Nations Unies en matière de tutelle des pouvoirs moins
étendusque ceux que possédaitla Société desNations dans le domaine
des Mandats, ou que les Nations Unies aient, dans le cas du seul Man-
dat qui n'ait pas été convertien territoire sous tutelle, des pouvoirs plus
vastes que pour les territoires sous tutelle eux-mêmes.
b) La Charte des Nations Unies et la Constitution de l'Organisation
internationale du Travail
45. Il convient maintenant d'examiner la thèse suivante: en devenant
Membre de l'organisation des Nations Unies et de l'organisation in-
ternationale du Travail, le défendeuren tant que Mandataire a assumé
l'obligation d'appliquer les (standards 1consacrésdans les actes consti-
tutifs de ces deux organisations, tels qu'ils sont interprétéspar leurs
organes respectifs. Dans le cas de la Charte des Nations Unies, les de-
mandeurs se sont surtout appuyés sur l'article 56, interprétéen fonc-
tion de l'article 55 c).En supposant que ces articles créent des droits
ou des obligations juridiques, ce dont on peut douter, il paraît clair
qu'ils ne contiennent pas les ((standards » invoquéspar les demandeurs.
L'effet combinéde ces deux articles est, sur les points qui nous intéres-
sent ici, que les Membres de l'organisation s'engagent à agir tant con-
jointement que séparémenten coopération avec ''Organisation en vue
d'assurer le respect universel et effectif des droits de l'homme et des li-
bertés fondamentales pour tous, sans distinction de race, de sexe, de
langue ou de religion. On notera que lesdits articles traitent de ces dis-
tinctions dans un seulcontexte, celui des« droits del'homme etdeslibertés
fondamentales »D'autre part, ilnesemblepas que la Charte vise àénoncer
ou à définir cesdroitset ceslibertéset,commeonlesaitbien, les tentatives
faites par la suite pour rédiger à cette fin des instruments complets et
juridiquement efficaces n'ont pas abouti. La notion mêmede ((droits
de l'homme ))et de ~~ibertésfondamentales » est donc encore mal défi-
nie, incertaine, et sa teneur n'est pas claire.l n'est toutefois pas néces-
163to consider this matter any further, since what is abundantly clear is
that Articles 55 (c) and 56 cannot operate beyond the field of respect
for, and observance of, "human rights and fundamental freedoms",
whatever such concepts might inean. The Articles do not in terms
deal with the subject of allotments of rights, burdens, privileges, etc.,
and they certainly do not, either in their wording or effect, prohibit al1
such allotments on the basis of race, sex, language, religion, group or
class. That thisis so, appears not only from the provisions of the Articles
themselves, but from the Charter as a whole. Thus Article 73 of the
Charter, dealing with "territories whose peaples have not yet attained
a full measure of self-government", prescribes "due respect for the
cultures of the peoples concerned" and that "due account should be
taken of the political aspiratioiis of the peoples" and that they should
be assisted in the development of their "free political institutionsccord-
ing to the particular circumstances of each Territory and itspeoples and
its varying stages of advancement". Article 55 must be read with due
regard to the provisions of Article 73 referred to above, and can ac-
cordi,?gly not be iaterpreted to mean that a governing authority is
prohibited from having regard to the political aspiratioris of different
peoples inhabiting parts of the same territory, orto their varying stages
of advancement, in selecticg the criteria or measures to be adopted in
promoting their well-beingand sxial progress. On thecontrary, Article 55
itself incorporates the principle of "self-detrrmination of peoples" as
one of its main objects.
46. Much the ssme situation exists with regard to the Constitution
of the 1,lternational Labour Organisation. The provision there relied
upon (C.R. 65/34at p. 57)was the following passage fromthe Declaration
of Philadelphia which read :
". .. al1 human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have
the right topursue both their material well-being and their spiritual
development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic
security and equal opportunity ...".
Here again the wording does not support the existence of a general
prohibition of the allotment of rights, burdens, privileges, etc., on
the basis of group, class or race. And this conclusion is strengthened
by the express sanctioning of such differential allotments, at least in
certain spheres, in the following passage from the same instrument:
"The Conference affirms that the principles set forth in this
Declaration are fully applicable to al1peoples everywhere and that,
while the manner of their application must be determined with
due regard to the stage of social and economic development reached
by each people, their progressive application to peoples who
are still dependent, as well as to those who have already achieved
self-government, is a matter of concern to the whole civilised
world."
This passage clearly indicates that the Declaration of Philadelphiasaire d'approfondir ce sujet, car ce qui est absolument clair, c'est que
les articles 55 c) et 56 ne sont pas applicables en dehors du domaine
du respect effectif(des droits de l'homme et des libertésfondamentales »,
quelle-que soit la signification de .ces notions. Ces articles ne traitent
pas de la question de la répartition des droits, charges, privilèges, etc.;
que l'on envisage leurs termes ou leur portée, ils n'interdisent certaine-
ment pas pareille répartition selon la race, le sexe, la langue, la religion,
le groupe ou la classe. Cela ressort non seulement des dispositions des
articles eux-mêmes mais ausside la Charte dans son ensemble. Ainsi,
l'article 73 de la Charte, qui traite des ((territoires dont les populations
ne s'administrent pas encore complètement elles-mêmes)), oblige à
respecter (la culture des populations en question ))et à tenir compte (des
aspirations politiques des populations 1)qu'il faut aider dans le dévelop-
pement de cleurs libres institutions politiques, dans la mesure appropriée
aux conditions particulières de chaque territoire et de ses populations
et à leurs degrésvariables de développemen t.On doit prendre en consi-
dération ces dispositions de l'article 73 lorsqu'il s'agit d'interpréter l'ar-
ticle 55; on voit alors que ce dernier ne saurait interdire à l'autorité
chargée du gouvernement de tenir compte des aspirations politiques
des diverses populations habitant diverses régions du mêmeterritoire
ou de leurs degrés variablesde développement dans le choix des critères
ou mesures à adopter en vue d'assurer le bien-êtreet le progrès social.
Au contraire, l'un des principaux élémentsde l'article 55 est le droit
des peuples ((à disposer d'eux-mêmes D.
46. Une situation très analogue se présentedans le cas de la Consti-
tution de l'organisation internationale du Travail. La disposition invo-
quée à cet égard(C.R. 65/34, p. 57) est le passage suivant de la Décla-
ration de Philadelphie :
cctous les êtres humains, quels que soient leur race, leur croyance
ou leur sexe, ont le droit de poursuivre leur progrès matériel et
leur développement spirituel dans la liberté et la dignité, dans la
sécuritééconomique et avec des chances égales ...»
Là encore les termes employésn'indiquent pas qu'il y ait une inter-
diction généralede répartir les droits, charges et privilèges, etc., selon
le groupe, la classe ou la race. Cette conclusion est corroborée par le
fait qu'une répartition différenciéeest expressémena tpprouvée,du moins
dans certains domaines, comme l'indique de passage suivant de la Dé-
claration:
((La Conférence affirme que les principes énoncésdans la pré-
sente Déclaration sont pleinement applicables à tous lespeuples du
monde, et que, si, dans les modalités de leur application, il doit
être dûment tenu compte du degré de développementsocial et éco-
nomique de chaque peuple, leur application progressive aux peuples
qui sont encore dépendants, aussi bien qu'à ceux qui ont atteint
le stade où ils se gouvernent eux-mêmes, intéresse l'ensemble
du monde civilisé. »
Cette phrase indique clairement que la Déclaration de Philadelphie ne did not purport to establish, and cannot even be reconciled with a
standard of the content relied upon by Applicants.
47. Possibly because they realized that the wording of these instru-
ments did not support their thesis, Applicants relied mainly upon
so-called "interpretations" of the instruments by the organs of the
respective organizations. This was so particularly with reference to
the United Nations Charter. Since the whole question of the weight
and effect of resolutions and reports of agencies and organs of the
United Nations has a wider relevance than purely with reference to
so-called standards, it might be better to postpone a fuller discussion
thereof to a later stage. At the present juncture 1 shall consequently
confine myself to one aspect, viz., that no such resolution or report
could lawfully add to or subtract from the meaning of the Charter in
such a way as to bind the Court, which must necessarily give its own
interpretation of any texts relevant to its judgment. Indeed, in the
case of the International Labour Organisation Constitution this principle
was expressly laid down in the following words of Article 37:
"Any question or dispute relating to the interpretation of this
Part of the present treaty or of any subsequentconvention concluded
by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of this part of the
present treaty shall be referred forecision to the Permanent Court
of International Justice."
48. It is necessary to revert briefly at this stage to aatter already
dealt with, viz., the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain disputes
regard.ing alleged violations of the standards and/or norm. 1 expressed
the view earlier in this Opinion that the Court would have no such
jurisdiction inasmuch as such as dispute would not be one "relating to
the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate".
It will be recalled that Applicants sought to overcome their difficulties
in this regard, interalia, by arguing that the Mandate itself contained
an implied provision empowering the supervisory authority to lay down
standards binding upon the Mandatory. 1 have given my reasons for
regarding this contention as untenable, but even if it were sound, it
provides no basis upon which alleged violations of the Constitution
of the International Labour Organisation or of pronouncements of
its organs could become justiciable in terms of Article 7 (2) of the
Mandate. It surely cannot be said that the International Labour Or-
ganisation is in anysense a supervisory authorityin respect of mandates.
49. It may also be convenient at this stage to deal with the merits
of a further contention advanced by the Applicants which relates mainly
to the question of jurisdiction, to which reference was made earlier
in this Opinion. The contention is that the provisions of the Charter
referred to in the League resolution on 18 April 1946 must, by reason
of such reference, be regarded as being in pari materia with Article 2
165 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 167
visait pasà établirun ((standard » ayant la teneur alléguéepar les deman-
deurs et qu'elle n'était mêmepas compatible avec un tel ((standard)).
47. Probablement parce qu'ils se sont rendu compte que les termes
de ces instruments n'étaientpas leur thèse, les demandeurs ont eu sur-
tout recours à de prétendues «interprétations» desdits instruments par
les organes des organisations en cause. Tel a été particulièrementle
cas pour la Charte des Nations Unies. Comme toute la question de I'au-
torité et de l'effet desrésolutions et rapports des institutions et organes
des Nations Unies est assez importante en soi pour qu'on nela considère
pas seulement à propos des prétendus (standards x,je crois préférable
d'en traiter demanièreplus détaillée à un stade ultérieur.Pour le moment,
je me contenterai de considérer un aspect de la question, à savoir qu'une
résolution ou un rapport de ce genre ne saurait légitimementajouter ou
soustraire quoi que ce soit à la Charte d'une manière qui lierait la Cour;
celle-ci doit nécessairementdonner sa propre interprétation de tout texte
entrant en ligne de compte aux fins d'une décision.Dans le cas de la
constitution de l'Organisation internationale du Travail, ce principe a
même été expressémen étnoncé à l'article 37 dans les termes suivants:
((Toutes questions ou difficultés relatives à l'interprétation dela
présentePartie du présentTraité et des conventions ultérieurement
conclues par les Membres, en vertu de ladite Partie, seront soumises
à l'appréciation de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale. ))
48. Il y a lieu de revenir ici brièvementsur une question déjàexaminée,
celle de savoir si la Cour a compétencepour connaître de différendsre-
latifs à de prétendues violations des ((standards ))et/ou de la norme.
J'ai déjà indiqué plushaut qu'à mon avis la Cour n'a pas cette compé-
tence car de tels différends neseraient pas relatifs«à l'interprétation ou
à l'application des dispositions du Mandat D.
On se rappellera que les demandeurs ont essayéde remédieraux diffi-
cultés qu'ilsrencontraient à cet égard en prétendant notamment que le
Mandat lui-mêmecontenaitune disposition implicite habilitant l'autorité
de surveillance à établir des ((standards v obligatoires pour le Manda-
taire. J'ai expliquépourquoi je considèrecette thèse commeinsoutenable;
pourtant, même si elleétaitfondée,on ne pourrait l'invoquer pour affir-
mer que les prétendues violations de la Constitution de l'organisation
internationale du Travail ou des décisionsde ses organes peuvent faire
l'objet d'un recours judiciaire aux termes du deuxième alinéa de l'ar-
ticle 7 du Mandat. On ne peut certainement pas dire que l'organisation
internationale du Travail constitue en quoi que ce soit une autorité de
surveillance à l'égard des Mandats.
49. Il conviendrait aussi eut-être à ce stade d'a~LLécier la valeur
d'une autre assertion des demandeurs qui se rapporte principalement
au problème de la compétence, problème dont il a déjà été question
dans la présenteopinion. Selon cette assertion, il y aurait lieu de consi-
dérerles dispositions de la Charte mentionnéesdans la résolution de la
Sociétédes Nations en date du 18 avril 1946 comme étant, du fait de of the Mandate, and consequently relevant to its interpretation. Now
as regards interpretation stricto sensu, Le., the ascertainment of the
meaning of a document, this contention is clearly untenable. 1 cannot
see how the United Nations Charter, executed in 1945, could throw
any light on the intentions of the authors of the Mandate, a document
executed in 1920. What is possible, of course, is that the parties in
1946 could have agreed to attach a particular meaning to the earlier
document, irrespective of what the intentions of the parties to such
an earlier document might have been. It is clear, however, that the
aforesaid resolution embodied no such agreement. It did no more than
to note that Chapters XI, XII and XII1 of the Charter embodied "prin-
ciples" "corresponding" to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant.
It did not purport to attach an agreed meaning to the mandates, and,
indeed, it could hardly do so with the blanket reference to Chapters XI,
XII and XIII-Chapters which deal with classes of territories differing
among themselves and from the mandated territories.
In passing it may be noted that this resolution, even if relevant in the
sense contended for by Applicants, cannot serve to render applicable
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, since these Articles are found in
Chapter IX of the Charter, and not in Chapters XI, XII or XIII, which
were the Chapters referred to in the resolution.
The Sources of the AllegedNorm
50. 1 now proceed to consider the Applicants' submission that the
rule of non-discrimination or non-separation had ripened into a legal
norm binding even upon sovereign States. 1 have already expressed
my view that, even if such a norm were to have been created, this Court
would not possessjurisdiction to determine disputes as to its observance.
However, it may be as well also to consider the merits of Applicants'
contentions in this regard.
Applicants contended that the norm had its origin in each or al1
of the sources of international law enumerated in Article 38 (1) of the
Statute of this Court. 1 propose dealing with the various paragraphs
of the Article in turn.
(a) Article8 (1) (a)
51. The contention is that this paragraph, which authorizes this Court
to apply international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States, has
relevance, inasmuch as "the provisions of the United Nations Charter
and the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation as
interpreted by these organizations respectively bind the Respondent".
In essence, therefore, the argument is the same as dealt with above
in regard to standards. There 1 expressed the view, which is equally
applicable in the present context, that the instruments concerned cannot
166 cette mention, inpari materia avec l'article 2 du Mandat et comme étant
par conséquent pertinentes quant à l'interprétation dudit article. Or,
s'agissant d'interpréterstricto sensu le document en question, c'est-à-
dire d'en dégagerla signification, cette thèseest évidemment indéfendable.
Je ne vois pas comment la Charte des Nations Unies qui date de 1945
pourrait éclaircir d'unefaçon quelconque les intentions des auteurs du
Mandat, document remontant à 1920. Ce qui aurait étépossible, bien
entendu, c'.estque les parties soient convenues en 1946 d'attribuer au
Mandat une certaine signification, indépendamment des intentions des
parties à l'instrument original. 11est clair toutefois que la résolution
susmentionnée n'a pas consacré un tel accord. Elle s'est contentée de
noter que des ((principescorrespondant » à ceux de l'article 22 du Pacte
étaient incorporésdans les chapitres XI, XII et XIII de la Charte. Elle
n'a donc pas cherché Aindiquer le sens qui aurait été attribué aux Man-
dats d'un commun accord, ce qu'une référence générala eux chapitres
XI, XII et XIII n'aurait d'ailleurs guère permis de faire, ces chapitres
traitant de catégories de territoires qui diffèrent entre eux et diffèrent
des territoires sous Mandat.
On notera en passant que, mêmesi cette résolution était pertinente
dans le sens indiqué par les demandeurs, elle ne pourrait rendre appli-
cables les articles 55 et 56 de la Charte qui se trouvent au chapitre IX
de la Charte et non aux chapitres XI, XII ou XIII, qui sont les chapitres
mentionnés dans ladite résolution.
Sources de la prétendue norme
50. J'examinerai maintenant la thèse des demandeurs selon laquelle
la règlede non-discrimination ou de non-séparation serait devenue une
norme juridique obligatoire mêmepour les Etats souverains. J'ai déjà
dit que, mêmesi pareille norme avait étécréée,la Cour n'aurait pas
compétencepour trancher les différends relatifs àson observation. Toute-
fois,je crois bon d'étudier aussila valeur des allégationsdes demandeurs
à cet égard.
Les demandeurs prétendent que la norme a son origine dans les
diverses sources de droit international énumérées à l'article 38, para-
graphe 1, du Statut de la Cour. Je me propose d'examiner l'un après
l'autre les divers alinéas de cet article.
a) Article 38, paragraphe 1 a)
51. Les demandeurs affirment que cet alinéa - qui autorise la Cour
à appliquer des conventions internationales, soit générales,soit spé-
ciales, établissant des règles expressémentreconnues par les Etats en
litige- est pertinent attendu que «les dispositions de la Charte des Na-
tions Unies et de la constitution de l'organisation internationale du
Travail telles qu'elles sont interprétéesrespectivement par ces organisa-
tions lient le défendeur )).
L'argument est donc essentiellement le mêmeque celui dont je viens
de traiterà propos des standards » en disant - et cela vaut également
dans le présent contexte -- que les instruments en question ne sauraient
166be interpreted to lay down the rule relied upon by Applicants, that the
organs of the organizations do not have the power to lay down such
a rule by way of "interpretation", and that in any event, this Court
has no jurisdiction to determine disputes arising from alleged violations
of these instruments.
At the later stage 1will deal somewhat more fully with United Nations
resolutions and reports and will give my reasons for concluding that
these pronouncements in fact did not even purport to lay down rules
or standards of the content relied upon by the Applicants.
(b) Article 38 (1) (b)
52. The next contention relies on the provisions of Article 38 (1) (b)
and is to the effect that through the collectiveprocesses of the organized
international community, including mainly the resolutions of the
United Nations relative to discrimination, and particularly those con-
demning the policies pursued by the Respondent in South West Africa
and in the Republic of South Africa, there has arisen a norm of customary
international law of the content contended for by Applicants. In this
connection Applicants did not contend that they could satisfy the
traditional tests applied by this Court in determining the existence or
otherwise of "international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law"; and indeed, it is clear that they could not. Applicants
did not even attempt to show any practice by States in accordance with
the alleged norm, but relied on statements of States relating, not to the
practice of those or other States, but to criticism of the Respondent's
policies. More attention will be given to this topic later, but at present
1 would like to mention that Applicants did not even seek to show that
such criticism was in some way related to the creation, or existence,
of a norm with a content as relied upon by them.
Indeed, the evidence before the Court, with which 1 shall deal later,
showed that the alleged norm played no role at al1in the United Nations
activities relied upon.
53. Evidence as to actual State practice in regard to differential
allotments of rights, privileges, burdens, etc., was indeed presented
to the Court, but by the Respondent. In this regard reference may be
made particularly to Professor Possony, who, after a long and careful
survey of officia1measures and methods throughout the world, con-
cluded :
"Mr. President, from what 1 have indicated to the Court with
relation to the practice al1 over the world, there is no general
observance of such a rule or norm."
Professor Possony7s review and conclusion were not challenged and
certainly not in the least shaken in cross-examination.
54. As 1 have said, Applicants did not seek to apply the traditional
167 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 169
êtreinterprétéscomme instituant la règleinvoquéepar les demandeurs,
que les organes des organisations en cause ne sont pas habilités à éta-
blir une telle règle par voie'~interprétation» et que de toute manière
la Cour n'a pas compétence pour trancher les différendssurvenus au
sujet de prétendues violations desdits instruments.
J'étudierai ci-aprèsde façon plus approfondie les résolutions et rap-
ports des Nations Unies et j'expliquerai pourquoi j'estime qu'en fait
ces documents n'ont mêmepas eu pour objet de fixer des règles ou
<(standards » ayant la teneur indiquée par les demandeurs.
b) Article 38, paragraphe 1 b)
52. Les demandeurs invoquent ensuite les dispositions de l'article
38, paragraphe 1 b), et affirment que lesprocessus collectifs de la cornrnu-
nauté internationale organisée - il s'agit surtout des résolutions des
Nations Unies relatives à la discrimination et en particulier de celles
qui condamnent la politique du défendeur au Sud-Ouest africain et
en Républiquesud-africaine - ont donnénaissance àune norme dedroit
international coutumier ayant la teneur alléguéepar les demandeurs.
A cet égard, les demandeurs n'ont pas prétendu pouvoir démontrer
que les critères traditionnels adoptés par la Cour pour déterminer
l'existence ou l'inexistence d'une ((coutume internationale comme
preuve d'une pratique générale acceptée commeétant le droit étaient
satisfaits; en fait, il est clair que c'était impossible.Les demandeurs
n'ont mêmepas essayéde prouver quelapratique des Etats était conforme
à la prétenduenorme; ils ont simplement invoquédes déclarationsfaites
par des Etats, qui ne concernaient ni leurpropre pratique ni celle d'autres
Etats mais critiquaient les politiques du défendeur. Je reviendrai plus
longuement sur ce sujet mais, pour le moment, je voudrais dire que les
demandeurs n'ont mêmepas cherché à montrer que ces critiques se
rapportaient d'une façon ou d'une autre à la création ou à l'existence
d'une norme ayant la teneur alléguéepar eux.
En effet, les élémentsde preuve dont la Cour a étésaisie et dont je
traiterai plus loin, montrent que la prétendue norme n'a joué aucun
rôle dans les activités des Nations Unies dont il a étéfait état.
53. On a bien présenté à la Cour des élémentsde preuve concernant
la pratique des Etats en matière de répartition différenciéedes droits,
privilèges,charges, etc., mais ils émanaient du défendeur. A cet égard,
on seréféreraen particulier àla dépositionde M. Possony qui, après une
longue et minutieuse étudedes mesures et méthodesofficiellespratiquées
dans le monde, a conclu:
(Monsieur le Président,étant donnéce que j'ai indiqué à la Cour
quant à la pratique dans le monde, il apparaît qu'une telle règle
ou norme n'est pas généralement appliquée. ))
L'exposéet la conclusion de M. Possony n'ont pas étécontestés; le
moins qu'on puisse dire est que le contre-interrogatoire ne les a pas
battus en brèche.
54. Comme je l'ai dit, les demandeurs n'ont pas cherché à appliquerrules regarding the generation of customary law. On the contrary
Applicants' contention involved the novel proposition that the organs
of the United Nations possessed some sort of legislative competence
whereby they could bind a dissenting minority. It is clear from the
provisions of the Charter that no such competence exists, and in my
view it would be entirely wrong to import it under the guise of a novel
and untenable interpretation of Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of
this Court.
55. In an alternative contention the Applicants suggested that even
if the Respondent's opposition to the attempted imposition of a norm
may prevent the norm being binding on the Respondent as a sovereign
State, such opposition has no relevance to applicability of the norm
to South West Africa. This contention is in my viewdevoid of substance.
The authorities are agreed that no treaty can apply to South West
Africa without the Respondent's consent, and it follows that since
acquiescence is a prerequisite to the creation of a new norm, it is the
Respondent's acquiescence that is required in so far as South West
Africa is concerned.
(c) Article 38 (1) (c)
56. The Applicants next invoked the provisions of Article 38 (1) (c)
to justify their alleged norm, which they contended should be distilled
from the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
The first fallacy in this contention is that this subsection does not
authorize the application of the laws of civilized nations, it limits the
Court to "the general principles of law" of these nations. It certainly
does not mean that by legislating on particular domestic matters a
majority of civilized nations could compel a minority to introduce
similar legislation. If, for example, every State but one were to enact
a law prohibiting the manufacture of atomic weapons, or enforcing
the enfranchisement of women, the remaining State would not be
obliged to bring its laws into conformity with the rest. In any event,
the evidence of ProfessorPossony, Professor van den Haag and Professor
Manning proves that such a rule is not universally observed, and that
laws and official practices to the contrary exist in a large number of
States, including the Applicants'. The fact that neither of the Applicant
States observes this alleged norm or standards in their respective coun-
tries indeed reveals the artificiality of their cases.
(d) Article 38 (1) (d)
57. Although the Applicants also purported to rely on the provisions
of Article 38 (1) (d) as a source of their norm, they did not refer to a
single judgment, opinion or author confirming the existence thereof.les règles traditionnelles concernant la création du droit coutumier.
Leur thèsesuppose au contraire une proposition fort nouvelle, à savoir
que les organes des Nations Unies possèdent une sorte dc compétence
législativequi leur permet d'adopter des mesurss pouvant s'imposer à
une minorité dissidente. Il ressort clairement des dispositions de la
Charte que pareille compétence n'existe pas et, à mon avis, on aurait
absolument tort de chercher à l'introduire au moyen d'une interpré-
tation nouvelle et insoutenable de l'article 38, paragraphe1bj, du Statut
de la Cour.
55. Subsidiairement, les demandeurs ont indiqué que, mêmesi le
défendeur, en refusant de se laisser imposer une normz, peut empêcher
que celle-ci ne le lie en tant qu'Etat souverain, cette opposition n'em-
pêchepas l'applicabilitéde la norme au Sud-Ouest africain. Cette thèse
est à mon avis sans aucun fondement. D'après les autorités, aucun
traité ne peut s'appliquer au Sud-Ouest africain sans l'assentiment du
défendeur et il s'ensuit que, le consentement étant une condition préa-
lable de la création d'une nouvelle norme, c'est le consentement du
défendeur qui est nécessaire pour autant qu'il s'agisse du Sud-Ouest
africain.
c) Article 38, paragraphe 1 c)
56. Les demandeurs ont ensuite fait état des dispositions de l'ar-
ticle 38,paragraphe 1c) pourjustifier la prétendue norme qui, selon eux,
doit se dégager des principesgénérauxde droit reconnus par les nations
civilisées. Le premier élémenttrompeur de leur argumentation vient
de ce que l'alinéa cj autorise la Cour à appliquer non pas les lois des
nations civilisées, mais plus restrictivement les ((principes généraux
de droit )de ces nations; il ne signifie donc certainement pas qu'en Iégi-
férant sur des questions internes données une majorité de nations civi-
lisées puisse forcer une minorité à adopter une législation similaire.
Si par exemple tous les Etats sauf un devaient adopter une loi interdi-
sant la fabrication d'armes nucléaires ou accordant le droit de vote
aux femmes, 1'Etat faisant exception ne serait pas obligé de prendre
des dispositions législatives semblables.De toute façon, les dépositions
de MM. Possony, van den Haag et Manning prouvent qu'une telle
règle n'est pas observée universellement et que dans de nombreux
Etats, notamment chez les demandeurs, il existe des lois et des pratiques
officielles en sens contraire. Le fait que les deux Etats demandeurs ne
respectent pas chez eux cette prétendue norme ou ces prétendus (stan-
dards ))révèlecertainement le caractère artificiel de leur thèse.
d) Article 38, paragraphe 1 d)
57. Les demandeurs ont également prétendu que les dispositions de
l'article 38, paragraphe1dj, constituaient une des sources de leur norme,
mais ils n'ont pas mentionné un seul arrêt,un seul avis ou un seul auteur
confirmant l'existence d'une telle norme.
168Reports and Resolutions of United Nations Organsand Agencies
58. Since the first introduction of the alleged norm of non-discri-
mination or non-separation in the Reply, Applicants have relied heavily
on reports and resolutions of United Nations organs and agencies.
In their final argument these pronouncements indeed constituted the
very basis of their case-they were the method whereby standards
were said to be created, and provided the raw material for the attempted
invocation of Article 38 (1) (a) and 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the
Court as providing the sources of the norin. For the reasons 1 have
given, 1 find that these various pronouncements cannot in law create
any rules of conduct binding upon Respondent. In addition, as 1 have
noted, the United Nations reports and resolutions did not purport
to apply or create any norm of the content relied upon by Applicants.
1 would, in concluding this part of my opinion, elaborate somewhat
on this aspect, dealing particularly with the resolutions relatingpecifi-
cally to South Africa and South West Africa.
59. The detailed and uncontradicted evidenceplaced before this Court
reveals that these resolutions were mainly the result of concerted action,
by a large number of African States, assisted by many others, designed
to bring about the immediate independence of South West Africa
as a single unit to be governed by the indigenous peoples on the basis
of universal adult franchise.Inasmuch as the Respondent's administra-
tion stands in the way of this objective, schemes were evolved in an
attempt to have it terminated. Hence these proceedings, brought nomi-
nally by the Applicants only, but in fact by al1 these African States.
As part of their campaign to achieve their aforesaid objective these
States worked in close collaboration with certain so-called petitioners
from South West Africa at the United Nations.
60. These petitioners have at al1 times asserted that they represent
the Natives of South West Africa-assertions which were apparently
generally believed at the United Nations. The uncontradicted evidence
placed before us, however, reveals that their claims are false. Some
of the organizations which some of them allegedly represent exist on
paper only, and apart from the representatives of the Herero nation
they do not represent the majority of any one of these Native groups.
Even those who claim to represent the Herero nation do not always
correctly represent the views of those people. Thus, whereas the Herero
leaders in South West Africa apparently favour a system of regionalism
whereby the Territory is to be divided on a federal basis between certain
groups (but excluding the White group), some petitioners at the United
Nations create the impression that what is desired by these people is
that the Territory should be governed as a single unit.
A large number of petitions and statements by these petitioners,
169Rapports et résolutionsdes organes et institutions des Nations Unies
58. Depuis qu'ils ont invoquépour la premièrefois dans leur réplique
la prétendue norme de non-discrimination ou de non-séparation, les
demandeurs ont longuement fait fond .sur les rapports et résolutions
des organes et institutions des Nations Unies. Dans leur argumentation
finale, ces rapports et résolutions formaient la base mêmede la thèse:
c'est grâce à leur adoption que les ((standards 1)auraient étécrééset
c'est en se fondant sur la ((matièrepremière» constituéepar eux que les
demandeurs ont cru pouvoir invoquer les alinéas a) et b) de l'article 38,
paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour comme prétendues sources de la
norme. Pour les raisons déjà indiquées, j'estimeque ces divers rapports
et résolutionsn'ont pas en droit créé desrèglesde conduite obligatoires
pour le défendeur. Enoutre, comme je l'ai noté,les rapports et résolu-
tions des Nations Unies n'avaient pas pour objet d'appliquer ou de
créerune norme ayant la teneur alléguéepar les demandeurs. Je vou-
drais, pour conclure cette partie de mon opinion, développer un peu
cet aspect du problème en m'occupant plus particulièrement des réso-
lutions qui se rapportent spécialement à l'Afrique du Sud et au Sud-
Ouest africain.
59. Les moyens de preuve détailléset non contestésqui ont étépré-
sentés à la Cour révèlentque les résolutions enquestion ont surtout été
le fruit d'une action concertée d'un grand nombre d'Etats africains,
aidéspar beaucoup d'autres pays, action visant à obtenir l'indépendance
immédiate du Sud-Ouest africain en tant qu'entité unique gouvernée
par les populations autochtones sur la base du suffrage universel des
adultes. Dans la mesure où l'administration du défendeur fait obstacle
à cet objectif, on a élaborédes plans pour y mettre fin. D'où la présente
instance, portée devant la Cour officiellementpar les seuls demandeurs
mais en fait par tous ces Etats africains. Dans le cadre de la campagne
ainsi menée, lesdits Etats ont étroitement collaboréavec certains soi-
disant pétitionnaires du Sud-Ouest africain aux Nations Unies.
60. Ces pétitionnaires n'ont cessé d'affirmer qu'ils représentaient
les indigènes du Sud-Ouest africain - affirmation qui semble avoir
étégénéralementadmise aux Nations Unies. Toutefois, les preuves non
contestées dont nous avons étésaisis révèlent lemal-fondé de leurs
prétentions. Certaines des organisations que quelques-uns d'entr- eux
disent représenter n'existent que sur le papier et, misà part les porte-
parole de la nation herero, ils ne représentent la majorité d'aucun
groupe indigène. Même ceux qui prétendent parler au nom de la nation
herero n'expriment pas toujours fidèlement les opinions de celle-ci.
Ainsi, alors que les chefs hereros au Sud-Ouest africain sont apparem-
ment favorables à un systèmede régionalisme envertu duquel le terri-
toire serait divisésur une base fédéraleentre plusieurs groupes, à l'ex-
clusion du groupe blanc, certains pétitionnaires aux Nations Unies
produisent l'impression que les Hereros voudraient voir le territoire
gouverné comme une seule entité.
Les organes des Nations Unies ont étésaisis d'un grand nombre de
169 containing numerous false and grossly distorted allegations relative
to the Respondent's policies and practices in South West Africa, have
been placed before the organs of the United Nations from time to
tirne. The cumulative picture painted by them is one of oppression
of the worst possible kind including genocide, slavery, concentration
camps; that Respondent's policies were rooted in concepts of racial
superiority and in racial hatred and animosity; that the best lands
were being taken from Natives and given to White farmers, the Natives
being driven to the desert or herded like animals; that education for
the Natives either did not exist or merely prepared them for slavery;
that there was large-scale militarization of the Territory and terrori-
zation of the Natives, etc. Unfortunately these falsehoods were ap-
parently accepted as true by a large number of States who voted in
favour of the resolutions condemning Respondent's policies. Often
these alleged acts were included in the term apartheid, and it seems
clear that when Respondent's policies of apartheid were condemned
it was in the belief that the petitions had painted a true picrure. (One
need merely have regard to the hundreds of false statements in the
Applicants' Memorials-statements proved and admitted to be false-
to appreciate the prcportions of the technique that has been applied.)
These resolutions patently did not purport to condemn Respondent's
policies merely because rights, duties, status and privileges were allotted
on the basis of membership of a group, class or race rather than on the
basis of individual merit or capacity, as is sufficiently shown by the
briefest reference to the relevant debates. It accordingly follows that
there could not have been any intention of either creating, applying or
confirming a norm or standards such as are contended for by the
Applicants. Furthermore, even if these resolutions could for any purpose
be regarded as laying down rules, their value is nii inasmuch as they
are demonstrably based on untruths and gross distortions.
61. Even the resolutions dealing with the institution of these present
proceedings against the Respondent did not mention this alleged norm
or standards. The case to be brought against the Respondent was one
of wilful oppression, and this was in truth the case originally stated
against the Respondent in the Applications and the Memoriais. As
noted above, the case based on the breach of a norm or standards as
defined by the Applicants first made its appearance, in the Applicants'
Reply, and was embodied in the Applicants' submissions only shortly
before their Agent closed his case. If the United Nations had intended
to create, apply or confirm such a norm or standards it seems strange
that the Members of the United Nations including Applicants were
unaware thereof at al1material times.
62. For al1the reasons 1 have set out above, it is my view that this
Courthas no jurisdiction to entertain Applicants' case as now formulated,
and that, in any event, it is unsound. pétitions et de déclarations de pétitionnaires qui sont pleines d'alléga-
tions fausses ou grossièrement déforméesconcernant la politique et
les méthodes du défendeur au Sud-Ouest africain. Ces pétitionnaires
ont fini par brosser un effroyable tableau d'oppression avec génocide,
esclavage, camps de concentration; ils disent que la politique du défen-
deur repose sur des notions de supérioritéraciale, de haine et d'animo-
sitéraciales; ils prétendent que l'on prend aux indigènesleurs meilleures
terres pour les donner aux exploitants agricoles blancs, que lesindigènes
sont reléguésdans le désert ou parqués comme des animaux; que I'en-
seignement n'existe pas pour les indigènesou qu'il nefait que les prépa-
rerà l'esclavage; que le territoire est intensémentmilitarisé, les indigènes
terrorisés, etc. Malheureusement, un grand nombre d'Etats, ajoutant
foi semble-t-il à ces mensonges, ont voté en faveur des résolutions
condamnant la politique du défendeur. Très souvent ces prétendus
agissements ont étéinclus dans le terme d'apartheid et, si l'on a condam-
né la politique d'apartheid du défendeur, c'est certainement dans la
conviction que le tableau brossédans les pétitions correspond à la réa-
lité.(Il suffit de considérer les centaines de déclarations erronées figu-
rant dans les mémoires,déclarations dont la fausseté a été prouvée et
admise, pour voir dans quelles proportions cette technique a étémise
en Œuvre.) Il est évidentque les résolutionsn'ont pas condamné la poli-
tique du défendeur simplement parce que les droits, les devoirs, le statut
ou les privilèges sont répartis selon l'appartenanceà un groupe, à une
classe ou à une race plutôt qu'en fonction du mérite ou des aptitudes
individuelles; un simple coup d'Œil aux comptes rendus des débats
le prouve. 11ne peut donc pas y avoir eu une intention quelconque de
créer, d'appliquer ou de confirmer une norme ou des ccstandards »du
type alléguépar les demandeurs. En outre, mêmesi l'on pouvait à quel-
que fin que ce soit considérer que les résolutions énoncentdes règles,
leur valeur serait nulle étant donnéqu'elles reposent, comme on peut
le démontrer, sur des contrevéritéset des déformations grossières.
61. Mêmeles résolutions qui ont trait à l'introduction de la présente
instance contre le défendeur ne mentionnent pas la prétendue norme
ou les prétendus cstandards ». L'accusation portée contre le défendeur
etait une accusation d'oppression intentionnelle et c'est bien ce qui
figuraità l'origine dans les requêteset les mémoires.Comme je l'ai indi-
quéplus haut, la thèsefondée surla violation d'une norme ou de «stan-
dards » tels qu'ils sont définispar les demandeurs n'a fait son apparition
que dans la réplique des demandeurs et ceux-ci l'ont introduite dans
leur conclusions peu de temps seulement avant que leur agent termine
sa plaidoirie. Si les Nations Unies ont eu l'intention de créer,d'appli-
quer ou de confirmer pareille norme ou pareils ((standards)), il est
curieux que les Membres des Nations Unies, et notamment les deman-
deurs, n'en aient à aucun moment étéconscients.
62. Pour tous les motifs que je viens d'indiquer, j'estime que la Cour
n'a pas compétence pour connaître de la thèse des demandeurs telle
qu'elle est maintenant formulée et que, de toute façon, cette thèse est
mal fondée. The Effect of the Alleged Norm or Standards
Introductory
1. 1 now proceed to consider what effect the application of the
alleged norm or standards would have on the well-being and progress
of the inhabitants of South West Africa. If, as the Respondent contends,
the effect would be manifestly detrimental to al1concerned, this would
be an additional factor militating against the proposition that cornpliance
with such a norm or standards forms part of Respondent's obligations
under the Mandate.
My treatment of this subject will inevitably have to touch upon
important and indeed fundamental aspects of Respondent's policies
originally described by Applicants as unfair, arbitrary, unjust or wilfully
oppressive, and therefore also upon certain of the items in Applicants'
so-called catalogue. In the course of the discussion some light will be
thrown on the question whether it would have been possible for Appli-
cants to substantiate their original charges, had they attempted to do so.
However, this would be merely incidental to my purpose, which is
solely to consider the probable effect of the application of the suggested
norm or standards I.
The History of the Territory and Its Peoples
2. The effect of any policies applied or suggested for application in
South West Africa cannot be appreciated without a thorough know-
ledge of the salient facts concerning the Territory, its history and its
peoples.
Itis not possible to deal with these matters in detail in this opinion
but some reference to the more important facts seems unavoidable.
3. South West Africa is a vast territory of 317,727 square miles, but
in 1920its total population was probably less than 250,000. At present
the population is just above 500,000. The Namib desert stretches along
its entire coast-line and constitutes more than 15 per cent. of the total
land area. The bulk of the rest is semi-desert and subject to severe peri-
odical droughts. Only a relatively small area in the north-eastern part
has a high rainfall. Large portions of the Territory were never occupied
In view of the fundamental change in Applicants' case to which 1have referred
earlier, the original charges are no longer submitted to the Court for adjudication.
It is therefore unnecessary todeal with them or to discuss systematically each
and every measure of differentiation in the light of the original charges. As a
result of Applicants' admission ofal1 the facts set out in Respondent's pleadings,
it seems that the original charges would have had toil quite obviously in respect
of Respondent's policies as a whole, and also quite obviously in respect of a con-
siderable number of the specific measures referred to. In the case of any specific
measures inrespect of which such result might not be obvious, it would be impossible
for the Court to adjudicate on the original charges with fairness and accuracy,
inasmuch as the amendment of Applicants' submissions had the natural result
questions of fact which would have been relevant foruch purpose.g fully al1 the EfSetde la norme ou des standards invoqués
Introduction
1. J'en viens maintenant à examiner l'effet que l'application de la
norme ou des ((standards » invoquésaurait sur le bien-être etle progrès
des habitants du Sud-Ouest africain. Si, comme le défendeurl'affirme,
cette application devrait manifestement porter préjudice à tous les inté-
ressés,nous aurions là un argument supplémentaire contre la thèse
selon laquelle le défendeur esttenu, dans le cadre des obligations décou-
lant du Mandat, de se conformer à la norme ou aux ((standards)).
En étudiant cette question, je devrai inévitablementaborder des as-
pects importants, voire fondamentaux, de la politique du défendeur,
initialement décritepar les demandeurs, comme inéquitable, arbitraire,
injuste ou intentionnellement oppressive et partant aussi certains des
points figurant dans ce qu'on a appeléleur liste ou catalogue. Chemin
faisant, j'apporterai quelques éclaircissementssur la question de savoir
si les demandeurs auraient pu prouver leurs accusations initiales, à
supposer qu'ils aient tenté de le faire. Mais je ne m'attarderai toutefois
pas longuement là-dessus, mon objet étantuniquement d'étudierI'effet
probable de l'application de la norme ou des ((standards » invoqués l.
Histoire du territoire et de ses populations
2. On ne saurait apprécierl'effet de la politique appliquéeou envi-
sagéedans le Sud-Ouest africain sans avoir une connaissance appro-
fondie des faits marquants qui caractérisent le territoire, son histoire
et ses populations.
S'iln'est pas possible d'examiner en détailces questions dans le cadre
de la présente opinion, il s'impose néanmoins de mentionner quelques-
uns des faits les plus importants.
3. Le Sud-Ouest africain est un vaste territoire de 823000 kilomètres
carrés,dont la population totale était probablement inférieure à 250000
âmes en 1920. A l'heure actuelle, cette population dépassetout juste
500000 habitants. Le désertdu Namib borde tout le littoral du terri-
toire et représente plus de15 pour cent de sa superficie totale. Le reste
est constitué pour la plus grande partie par un semi-désert, exposé à
de rigoureuses sécheressespériodiques. Seule une région relativement
En raison dela modification fondamentale intervenue dans la thèse des deman-
deurs, que j'ai mentionnée précédemment,la Cour n'est plus saisie des accusations
initiales aux fins d'un règlement judiciaire.t donc inutile de s'occuper de ces
accusations ou d'examiner systématiquement chaque mesure de différenciation
faits exposés par le défendeur dans ses pièces de procédure écrite, il semble bien
évident que les accusations initiales auraient inévitablement étédéclaréessans
fondement, tant en ce qui concerne la politique du défendeur considéréedans
son ensemble qu'en ce qui concerne un bon nombre des mesures mentionnées.
S'agissant des mesures pour lesquelles cela ne serait peut-être pas évident, la Cour se
trouverait dans'impossibilitéde statuersur les accusationsinitiales de manière équi-
table et juste car l'amendement apportépar les demandeurss conclusions a tout
naturellementamenéledéfendeuràs'abstenir d'examinerminutieusement, aucours de
la procédureora!e, toutes les questionsde fait qui auraient été pertinentesàcet égard.by any of the indigenous groups. They had no means of sinking boreholes
or building dams, and were accordingly confined to areas where water
was naturally available. Their numbers were in any event so limited in
some parts that there was no need to occupy large areas. In the circum-
stances, coupled with the effect of ravaging interna1 wars during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, considerable portions of the
Territory were vacant lands when the Mandate commenced.
4. At the inception of the Mandate the inhabitants of the Territory
consisted of at least nine major population groups, occupying, to a
large extent, distinct portions of the Territory, and differing widely
as to physical appearance, ethnic stock, culture, language and general
level of development. These groups (and even some sub-divisions of
these groups) have at al1 material times considered themselves to be,
and were generally regarded as, separate peoples or national groups.
The European or White group (mainly of German and South African
origin) was by far the most advanced. The remaining groups were al1
non-White and were, with the exception of a few individuals, entirely
illiterate and primitive. Constant warfare between some of these groups
had resulted in indelible hatreds. The main non-White groups were:
(i) the Eastern Caprivi peoples;
(ii) the Okavango peoples;
(iii) the Ovambo ;
(iv) the Bushmen;
(v) the Dama (also known as Bergdama or Bergdamara or Damara of
the Hills or Klipkaffir);
(vi) the Nama (also known as Khoi or Hottentots);
(vii) the Herero (also known as Cattle Damara, or Damara of the
Plains);
(viii) the Rehoboth Basters and the Coloured group.
Groups (iv) and (vi) are Khoisan (colour brown), No. (viii) are half-
caste groups, mainly mixture between White and non-White (light
coloured), and al1the others are Negroid.
5. It is due entirely to circumstances over which they had no control
that the members of these national groups came to be the subjects of
a single mandate.
Thenorthern areas (whichwere never under effectiveGerman control)
resemble four different countries, viz.,the Kaokoveld, Ovamboland,
the Okavango and the curious appendage known as the Eastern Caprivi.
Each of them is inhabited, from historic times to this day, by its own
people or peoples. The peoples of the Eastern Caprivi are ethnically
related to those of Zambia and Bechuanaland. They have no ethnic
relationship with any of the other peoples of South West Africa, have
172 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 174
peu étenduedans la partie nord-est du territoire bénéficiede précipita-
tions abondantes. De vastes secteurs du territoire n'ont jamais étéoccu-
péspar aucun des divers groupes indigènes. Comme ceux-ci n'avaient
nul moyen deforer des puits ou d'édifierdesbarrages, ils étaientconfinés
dans les régions où l'eau était naturellement disponible. Ils étaient de
toute manière tellement peu nombreux, dans certaines parties du terri-
toire, qu'ils n'éprouvaientpas la nécessid'occuper degrandes étendues.
Dans ces conditions, et si l'on tient compte en outre des conséquences
des luttes intestines qui ont ravagé le paysau cours duIXe et au début
du XXe siècle,de vastes zones du territoire étaient inoccupéeslorsque
le Mandat est entré en vigueur.
4. Lorsque le territoire a étéplacésous Mandat, ses habitants consti-
tuaient au moins neuf groupes principaux, occupant dans une large
mesure des parties distinctes du territoire et présentant de grandes diffé-
rences entre eux quant à l'aspect physique, à l'origine ethnique,à la
cuiture,à la langue et au degréd'évolution. Ces groupes, voirecertains
sous-groupes, n'ont cesséde se considérer,et ont d'une manière générale
étéconsidérés,comme des peuples ou des groupes ethniques distincts.
Le groupe européen ou groupe blanc, essentiellement d'origine alle-
mande et sud-africaine, était de loin le plus évolué.Les autres groupes
étaient exclusivement des groupes non blancs et, à de rares exceptions
près,totalement illettréset primitifs. Certains de ces groupes se livraient
des guerres continuelles qui avaient engendré des haines inexpiables.
Les principaux groupes non blancs étaient:
i) les populations du Caprivi oriental;
ii) les populations de'Okavango;
iii) les Ovambos;
iv) les Boschimans;
v) les Damas (également appelés Bergdamas ou Bergdamaras ou
Damaras des collines ou Klipkaffirs);
vi) lesNamas (également appelésKhois ou Hottentots);
vii) les Hereros (également appelés Damaras pasteurs ou Damaras
des plaines);
viii) les Basters de Rehoboth et le groupe des métis.
Les groupes iv) et vi) étaient khoisans (peau brune). Le groupe viii)
comprenait les métis, essentiellement de blancs et de non-blancs (peau
plus claire); quant aux autres groupes, ils étaient tous négroïdes.
5. Si les membres de ces groupes ethniques ont étérassemblésdans
le cadre d'un Mandat unique, cela tient uniquement à des circonstances
indépendantes de leur volonté.
Lesrégionsseptentrionales, sur lesquelles'Allemagne n'a jamais exer-
céde contrôle effectif, comprennent quatre pays différents, à savoir le
Kaokoveld, I'Ovamboland, I'Okavango et ce curieux appendice connu
sous le nom de Caprivi oriental. Chacun de ces pays a étédepuis I'épo-
que historique jusqu'à cejour habitépar sa ou ses propres populations.
Ethniquement, les populations du Caprivi oriental sont apparentées
à celles de la Zambie et du Betchouanaland. Elles n'ont aucun lien eth-never had anything in common with them, and are geographically
separated from them by hitherto inaccessible swamps. Ovamboland is
inhabited by a group of ethnically related tribes speaking, however, at
least two different languages and various dialects. They form 45 per
cent. of the total population of South West Africa. The Okavango and
the Kaokoveld are each inhabited by smaller groups of ethnically related
tribes. But whereas the Okavango group is ethnically linked with the
Ovambo, the Kaokoveld group forms part of the Herero people, who
immigrated from central Africa towards the end of the eighteenth
century, and are ethnically, linguistically and in their social organization
entirely distinct fromal1other groups or peoples in South West Africa.
6. Save for the Bushmen, who are in a sense dispersed al1 over the
wilds of South West Africa, the other non-White groups live in various
portions of the central and southern parts of the Territory-the parts
which were patrolled by the German police and for that reason came to
be known asthe PoliceZone. Thesegroups include sectionsofthe Herero,
who were as from about 1830 engaged in almost continua1 warfare
with various sections of the Nama, until the advent of German rule in
the 1880s, and even thereafter. They include also the Bergdamara, yet
another distinct Negroid group, who had arrived very early but were
subsequently enslaved by the Nama and later also by the Herero, and
who in course of time adopted the Nama language. The Rehoboth
Basters arrived in the Territory from the Cape Province in about 1870
and settled in the Rehoboth Gebiet, where they governed themselves.
Wars by which the German régimewas marred, shattered the tribal
organizations and economics of the Herero and the Nama, and reduced
their numbers by 1912to less than 20,000 and less than 15,000respec-
tively. 1refer later to efforts of the South African Government to restore
their tribal organizations and to settle them, and also theDamara, in
reserves or homelands.
7. Apart from the activities of a few explorers, missionaries, hunters,
traders, etc., theadvent of the White man to South West Africa was
delayed untillate in the nineteenth century.
In 1870 Walvis Bay and a small surrounding area became British
territory. It became part of the Cape Province, and as such became
part of the Union of South Africa. At present it is part of the Republic
of South Africa but is administered as part of South West Africa.
The German reign over other portions of South West Africa com-
menced in 1884and lasted till 1915.
During this period European soldiers, farmers, technicians, miners,
traders and missionaries came to the central and southern portions of
the Territory (the Police Zone) with the result that when the Mandate
came into existence the White population was about 20,000. In 1913
173 nique avec aucune autre des peuplades du Sud-Ouest africain, n'ont
jamais rien eu de commun avec elles et en sont, du point de vue géo-
graphique, isoléespar des marécagesencoreaujourd'hui infranchissables.
L'Ovamboland est habité par un groupe de tribus d'appartenance eth-
nique voisine, mais parlant au moins deux langues et plusieurs dialectes.
Ces tribus forment 45 pour cent de la population totale du Sud-Ouest
africain. L7Okavango et le Kaokoveld sont l'un et l'autre habités par
des groupes plus réduits de tribus ethniquement voisines. Mais alors
que le groupe okavango est ethniquement apparenté aux Ovambos, le
groupe du Kaokoveldfaitpartie du peuple herero, qui a émigré d'Afrique
centrale versla fin du XVIIIe siècleet qui, sous l'angle ethnique, linguis-
tique et social, diffèretotalement de tous les autres groupes ou peuples
du Sud-Ouest africain.
6. A l'exception des Boschimans, qui sont en quelque sorte dispersés
à travers tout le Sud-Ouest africain dans les régionsincultes, les autres
groupes non blancs vivent dans diverses parties des régions centrales
et méridionales du territoire, régions où la police allemande effectuait
des patrouilles, d'où leur appellation de((zonede police ».Ces groupes
comprennent des élémentshereros qui, à partir de 1830environ et jus-
qu'à l'établissement de la domination allemande entre 1880 et 1890,
voire aprèscettedate, furent presque constamment en guerre avec divers
éléments namas. On trouve en outre les Bergdamaras, autre groupe
négroïdedistinct, arrivé à une date très reculéemais réduit par la suite
en esclavage par les Namas et ultérieurement aussi par les Hereros, et
qui au cours des temps adopta la langue nama. Les Basters de Rehoboth
émigrèrent dela province du Cap aux environs de 1870 et s'établirent
dans le Rehoboth Gebiet (territoire de Rehoboth), où ils se gouver-
nèrent eux-mêmes.
Les guerres, qui ébranlèrent lerégimeallemand, brisèrent l'organisa-
tion tribale et l'économiedes Hereros et des Namas et réduisirent leur
nombre, vers 1912, à moins de 20 000 et 15000 respectivement. Je rela-
terai ultérieurement les efforts entrepris par le Gouvernement sud-afri-
cain pour rétablir leur organisation tribale et les installer, ainsi que
les Damaras, dans des réservesou foyers (homelands).
7. Si l'on fait exception de quelques rares explorateurs, missionnaires,
chasseurs, marchands, etc., les blancs n'apparurent que très tardive-
ment au Sud-Ouest africain au cours du XIXe siècle.
En 1870,Walvis Bay et une petite régionavoisinante devinrent terri-
toire britannique. Cette zone fut intégréeà la province du Cap et, en
tant que telle, devint partie intégrante de l'Union sud-africaine. A l'heure
actuelle, elle fait partie de la République sud-africaine, mais est admi-
nistrée dans le cadre du Sud-Ouest africain.
Dans les autres parties du Sud-Ouest africain, la domination alle-
mande a commencé en 1884 et a duréjusqu'en 1915.
Au cours de cette période, des militaires, agriculteurs, techniciens,
mineurs, marchands et missionnaires européens se rendirent dans les
parties centrale et méridionale du territoire (zone de police) de sorte
que, lorsque celui-ci passa sous Mandat, le chiffre de la population
173 White farmers owned 134,000 square miles of land, and in addition
very large areas were held by companies owned by Whites. A modern
economy was developed by the White population, resting mainly on
diamond mining, and to some extent onlivestock farming, though progress
in the latter field had been limited. An extensive railway system was
provided, which was during the First World War (after the conquest of
the Territory)joined to that of South Africa.The revenueof the Territory,
also largely dependent on the production of diamonds, was prior to
the Mandate never sufficientto pay the costs of administration.
8. It seems obvious that it must have been realized by al1concerned
that in determining its policies relating to the administration of the
Territory the Respondent would have due regard to the realities of the
situation. These realities include the existence of the four distinct
northern territories and peoples. The Respondent did not create these
separate homelands, or the distinct nationalities living in them; they
were there at al1material times. In regard to the Police Zone the realities
included the facts that the tribal economies of the Native peoples had
been shattered, but that the Natives, undeveloped and illiterate, lacked
the skills required for modern economic and administrative activities.
They included also the under-populated state of the Police Zone, and
the existence of the European population and the struggling modern
economy established by it. The Territory, vast, mostly undeveloped, and
poor, needed White leadership and initiative.
White immigrants were needed to maintain law and order, to manage
and administer the mines, railways, harbours, hospitals and the civil
service. Moreover, additional sources of income were desperately
needed, and at that time the only practical way in which this could be
obtained was through the introduction of more White capital, initiative
and entrepreneurial skill. In particular the skill and initiative of pro-
gressive farmers were badly needed. The only role the Natives could
initially play in the money economy was by providing unskilled labour.
Policies of differentiation such as, e.g., separate schools, separate
residential areas, reserves for the different ethnic groups, influx control,
etc., were applied by the Germans, and were being applied by the
Respondent in the Territory at the time the Mandate came into existence.
The vast differences between the different groups made this both natural
and inevitable.
9. The way has now been paved for giving more specificconsideration
to some of the major aspects and implications of the policies and mea-
sures actually applied by Respondent after accepting the Mandate. 1
propose to do so under the \b-headings which follow. blanche atteignait environ 20 000 personnes. En 1913, les agriculteurs
blancs possédaient 340000 kilomètres carrés de terres, de très vastes
superficies étant en outre détenuespar des sociétésappartenant à des
blancs. La population blanche créa une économie moderne, fondée
essentiellement sur l'exploitation des mines de diamant et, dans une
certaine mesure, sur l'élevage,quoique dans ce dernier domaine les
progrès aient étélimités. Un vaste réseau de voies ferréesfut créé et
relié,au cours de la première guerre mondiale, après la conquête du
territoire, celui de l'Afrique du Sud. Avant l'établissementdu Mandat,
les recettes du territoire, largement tributaires elles aussi de la produc-
tion de diamants, ne suffisaient jamais à couvrir les dépenses adminis-
tratives.
8. Tous les intéressésont évidemment dû se rendre compte qu'en
définissantla politique à appliquer pour l'administration du territoire
le défendeurtiendrait dûment compte de la situation. Or, la situation
voulait qu'il existât, dans le nord, quatre territoires et peuples distincts,
Ce n'est pas le défendeurqui a crééces foyers distincts, ni les nationa-
lités distinctesquiy vivent: ils ont existéde tout temps. Dans la zone
de police, la situation était quel'économietribale des peuples indigènes
avait étédévastéeet que, peu évolués et illettrésl,es indigènes n'avaient
pas les aptitudes techniques indispensables à la création d'une écono-
mie et d'une administration modernes. D'autre part, cette zone était
sous-peuplée et il y existait une population européenne luttant pour
affermir l'économiemoderne qu'elle avait créée. Vaste, essentiellement
sous-développéet pauvre, le territoire avait besoin de l'esprit de direc-
tion et d'initiative des blancs.
Il fallait des immigrants blancs pour assurer l'ordre, assurer la direc-
tion et la gestion des mines, des chemins de fer, des ports, des hôpitaux
et des administrations publiques. En outre, le besoin de sources de reve-
nus supplémentaires se faisait cruellement sentir et à cette époque le
seul moyen de se les assurer était d'importer toujours plus de capitaux
détenuspar des blancs, de recourir à l'esprit d'initiative et aux connais-
sances techniques des blancs. On avait surtout besoin de la compétence
et de l'initiative d'agriculteurs l'esprit progressiste. Le seul rôle que
les indigènes pouvaient initialement jouer dans le cadre de l'économie
monétaire consistait à fournir de la main-d'Œuvrenon qualifiée.
La politique de différenciation, concrétiséeotamment par des écoles
distinctes, des zones de résidence distinctes, des réservespour les divers
groupes ethniques, le contrôle des entrées,etc., avait été pratiquéepar
les Allemands et le défendeur l'aappliquée à son tour lorsque le terri-
toire a étéplacésous Mandat. Les grandes différencesqui existent entre
les divers groupes rendaient l'adoption d'une telle politique à la fois
naturelle et inévitable.
9. Ces explications liminaires données, nous pouvons maintenant
examiner de manière plus précise certains des aspects et des effets
principaux de la politique et des mesures que le défendeura effective-
ment mises en Œuvreaprès avoir acceptéle Mandat. Je me propose de
le faire dans les rubriques qui suivent. White Immigration
10. As has been indicated above, the resources of the Territory at the
commencement of the Mandate were inadequate to pay for its adminis-
tration. Circumstances compelled the Respondent to concentrate upon
development of the modern economy already operative inside the Police
Zone in order to obtain funds forthe development of the whole Territory.
There was no alternative, if stagnation was to be avoided. As was stressed
by Professor Krogh in his expert evidence before this Court, the Re-
spondent only recently became a capital exporting country, and when
the Mandate was conferred upon it there could have been no contem-
plation that it would be expected to provide funds on a substantial
scale for the development of the Territory. Nor were any international
funds available for the purpose. The character of the rather limited
natural resources of the Police Zone, and the problems attached to
economic development thereof, were such as to require modern tech-
nology and entrepreneurshipfar beyond the capabilities of the indigenous
inhabitants, considering their under-developed state and the indications
provided by their past records of achievement. Add to these circum-
stances the shattered condition of the tribal economies and the under-
populated state of the Police Zone, and a policy of White immigration
will be seen to have been natural and almost inevitable.
11. Such a policy was certainly foreseen by the powers concerned. The
British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in introducing the Peace
Treaty to the House of Commons on 3 July 1919,stated, inter alia:
"There is no doubt at al1that South West Africa will become an
integral part of the Federation of South Africa. Zt will be colonized
by people from South Africa. You could not have done anything
elseI." (Italics added).
12. In these circumstances White farmers were encouraged to settle
in the Police Zone area, and most Crown land not required for Native
reserves was sold to these immigrants. The result was that within the
first years of the administration 4,885,000 hectares of land were allocated
to White farmers.
Scientific attention was given to agricultural development and to
overcoming the various problems set by the natural conditions: e.g.,
the provision of water, where possible, through the drilling of boreholes
and through appropriate forms of storage; the combating of stock
diseases through methods such as inoculation, dipping, quarantine
measures, selective breeding, etc.; the establishment of worthwhile
farming in the very arid southern parts, through development, by research
and scientific breeding, of a specially adapted strain of Persian Lamb
(Karakul), producing an exceptionally high-grade type of pelt, etc.
And thus the basis was laid for the development of a more diversified
economy, as came about after the Second World War, when the fishing
Temperley, History of the Peace ConfereVol. VI, p. 502.
175Immigration blanche
10. Comme je l'ai signalé ci-dessus, les ressources du territoire, au
débutde la périodedu Mandat, ne suffisaient pas àcouvrir les dépenses
administratives. Les circonstances ont obligéle défendeur à concentrer
ses efforts sur le développementde l'économie moderne,qui fonctionnait
déjà à l'intérieurde la zone de police, afin de s'assurer les fonds néces-
saires pour la mise en valeur de l'ensemble du territoire. S'il voulait
éviterla stagnation, il n'avait pas le choix. Comme un expert, Krogh,
l'a soulignédans sa déposition devant la Cour, l'Afrique du Sud n'est
devenue que récemment un pays exportateur de capitaux. Lorsque le
Mandat lui a été confiéo , n ne pouvait nullement escompter qu'elle
affectedes fondsimportants à la mise en valeur du territoire. Il n'y avait
pas davantage de fonds internationaux disponibles à cet effet. Etant
donné la nature des ressources naturelles, plutôt limitées, de la zone
de police et les problèmes qu'y soulevaitle développementéconomique,
il fallait des techniques modernes et un esprit d'entreprise qui dépassaient
deloiilles aptitudes des indigènes, compte tenu de leur étatde sous-dé-
veloppement et des réalisations qu'on pouvait mettre à leur actif. Si
l'on songe en outre que l'économietribale était démantelée etla zone
de police sous-peuplée, on se rendra compte qu'une politique d'immi-
gration blanche n'était que naturelle, voire quasi inévitable.
11. Cette politique a certainement été prévuepar les Puissances inté-
ressées. En présentant le traité de paix à la Chambre des communes,
le 3 juillet 1919, M. Lloyd George, premier ministre britannique, a
déclarénotamment:
«Il ne fait pas le moindre doute que le Sud-Ouest africain devien-
dra partie intégrante de la Fédérationsud-africaine.I sera colonisé
par deshommesvenusd'AfriqueduSud. Il n'ya pas d'autre solution l.)>
(Les italiques sont de nous.)
12. Dans ces conditions, des agriculteurs blancs ont été encouragés
à s'établirdans la zone de police et la plupart des terres appartenantà
la Couronne et non indispensables pour la constitution de réserves
indigènesont étévendues à ces immigrants. C'est ainsi qu'au cours des
premières annéesd'administration, 4 885000 hectares ont étéattribués
à des agriculteurs blancs.
On s'est efforcé de développer scientifiquementl'agriculture et de
résoudre les divers problèmes découlant des conditions naturelles:
approvisionnement en eau, assuré chaque fois que cela était possible
par le forage de puits et la constitution de réservessous des formes
appropriées; lutte contre les épizooties, entreprise avec des méthodes
telles que la vaccination, les bains parasiticides, les mesures de quaran-
taine, la sélectionde reproducteurs, etc.; création d'exploitations ren-
tables dans les régionstrès arides du sud, rendue possible par la mise
au point, grâce à des recherches et à un élevage scientifique, d'une
variété spécialementadaptée de moutons persans (caraculs) donnant
des peaux--- qualité exceptionnelle, etc. Ainsi étaient posées les bases
Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, vol. VI, p. 502.
175industry was added (also through application of a high degree of tech-
nology) to the Territory's sources of production. Al1 this naturally
stimulated growth in commercial and professional activity, as well as
in various minor forms of secondary industry, with the result of constant
increases in the sources of revenue for the administration of the Territory
and particularly for the upliftment and advancement of the indigenous
peoples and the development of their homelands.
13. The fruits of the policy, particularly the benefits accruing to
the non-White peoples, are spectacularly demonstrated by the extensive
plans for further development as proposed by the Odendaal Commission
and already in the course of implementation by the South African
Government. But the fact is that no less important, though perhaps less
spectacular, fruits and benefits have been enjoyed by the non-White
peoples over al1 the years of progression to the present stage, as will
appear in due course.
The achievement of the progress has taken time, having been delayed
and set back through various factors such as the general economic
depression of the early 1930s, exceptionally severe periodical droughts,
the Second World War, etc. But it is generally accepted, significantly,
that had it not been for the policy of encouraging White immigration
and stimulating the growth of a modern farming industry, the Territory
would have been reduced to irreparable bankruptcy during the world
depression, when hardly any income was derived from mining.
14. The policy in question was applied with full knowledge of the
organs of the League, who raised no objection thereto. And 1may also
refer to the confirmation yielded by two independent investigations,
viz.,by the van Zyl Judicial Commission in 1936and by Lord Haileyin
1946, of the soundness of, and virtually inevitable necessity for, the
policy. (See quotations in Counter-Memorial, Book IV, pp. 420-421.)
Recognition of the Diversity in the Non-White Populatioiz
15. 1 have referred above to the diversity of non-White ethnic or
national groups in the Territory; to the differences between them as
regards language, culture, political, social and economic organization,
ways of life and standards of development; and to the extent to which
they traditionally lived as distinct nationalentities in separate portions
of the Territory.These matters form part of the admitted facts of record.
They may sound commonplace when merely referred to in terms of
broad generality; but they were made to live by the more detailed de-
scriptions and illustrations given by the expert witnesses, particularly
Dr. Eiselen, Professor Bruwer, Professor Logan and Mr. Pepler, in
their uncontested testimony.
16. That the various groups wish to maintain their separate identity
and to develop as distinct national entities is not only another one of
the admitted facts, but was demonstrated so clearly by the above wit-
176 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP.IND. VAN WYK) 178
d'une économieplus diversifiée,qui est devenue une réalitélorsqueaprès
la deuxième guerre mondiale la pêcheest venue s'ajouter, grâce aussi
à des techniques très perfectionnées, aux sources de production du terri-
toire. Toute cette évolution a évidemment stimuléles activitéscommer-
ciales et techniques, ainsi que l'expansion des diverses formes d'indus-
trie secondaire, et s'est traduite par une augmentation canstante des
recettes disponibles pour l'administration du territoire et notamment
par l'élévationdu niveau de vie et le progrès des populations indigènes,
ainsi que par le développement de leurs foyers (homelands).
13. Les fruits de cette p3litique, et notamment les avantages qu'elle
a apportés aux populations non blanches, sont illustrés de manière
spectaculaire par les vastes plans de développement proposés par la
Commission Odendaal, dont le Gouvernement sud-africain a déjà
entrepris la mise en Œuvre. Mais, chose non moins importante quoique
peut-êtremoins spectaculaire, les populations non blanches n'ont cessé
d'en tirer profit depuis le début, comme je le montrerai plus loin.
Les progrès ont exigédu temps, car ils ont étéentravés et retardés
par divers facteurs tels que la crise économiquegénéralesurvenue après
1930,des sécheressespériodiques exceptionnellement graves,la deuxième
guerre mondiale, etc. Mais il est généralementadmis - ce qui est
significatif que, sans la politique consistantà encourager l'immigra-
tion blanche età stimuler le développement d'une agriculture moderne,
le territoire auraitétéirrémédiablement acculé à la banqueroute au
cours de la crise mondiale, alors que l'exploitation minière nerapportait
pratiquement plus rien.
14. Cette politique a étéappliquéesans que les organes de la Société
des Nations, qui en étaient parfaitement informés, soulèventla moindre
objection. Je voudrais rappeler également que deux enquêtesindépen-
dantes,à savoir celle de la Commission judiciaire van Zyl en 1936 et
celle de lordHailey en 1346,ont confirméla justzsse et la nécessitéquasi
inéluctable de cette politique (voir citations dans le contre-mémoire,
livreIV, p. 420-421).
Reconnaissancede la diversitéde la population non blanche
15. J'ai mentionné ci-dessus la diversité des groupes ethniques ou
nationaux non blancs du territoire, les différencesde langue, de culture,
d'organisation politique, sociale et économique, de mode de vie et de
degré d'évolution qui les caractérisent: j'ai dit aussi à quel point ils
ont traditionnellement vécu en tant qu'entités ethniques distinctes,
dans des parties distinctes du territoire. Ces facteurs sont parmi les
faits reconnus du dossier. Ils font peut-êtrel'effet de lieux communs
lorsqu'on seborne à les évoquer entermestrèsgénéraux; maisles descrip-
tions et illustrations plus détaillées qu'enont donnéesles experts appelés
à témoigner et notamment MM. Eiselen, Bruwer, Logan et Pepler,
dont les dépositions n'ont pas étécontestées, les ont rendus vivants.
16. Le désir des groupes de conserver leur particularisme et de se
développer en tant qu'entités nationales distinctes ne constitue pas
seulement un autre des faits reconnus, mais a étédémontréfort claire-
176 179 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
nesses, particularly Professor Bruwer, who had made special investi-
gations as a member ofthe Odendaal Commission, and also by Mr. Dahl-
mann, who described the futile attempts that had been made within
the modern political movements with a view to crossing the ethnic
barriers.
17. In the light ofthese realities it is small wonder that expert after
expert stressed the positive values involved in the various cultures
and group solidarities, and the importance of granting due recognition
thereto in any attempts at promoting the well-being of the individuals
comprising the groups.
South African experts emphasized these matters on the basis of
thorough knowledge and experience gained in southern Africa itself,
particularly in South Africa and in South West Africa. Their conclusions
were very forcibly confirmed by experts from other parts of the world-
i.e., by Professor Logan, on the basis of thorough field research in
South West Africa itself, and by Professors Possony, van den Haag and
Manning, on the basis of knowledge and experience gained by mankind
al1 over the world. Particularly the last-mentioned witnesses gave
examples of the tragic consequences that had resulted in so many
instances, in al1parts of the world, from overlooking the importance
of such matters.
18. The above considerations show that also this aspect of the policies
which have actually been pursued by the South African Government
sincethe inception of the Mandate flowednaturally and almost inevitably
from the facts with which it found itself confronted. It did not create
the diversity or the sociological phenomena concerned; these matters
existed as realities which required recognition if attempts at promotion
of well-beingand progress were to stand any chance of successat al].
Implications of White Immigration andPopulation Diversity
19. Respondent's policy of encouraging the pre-Mandate White
community to remain in the Territory, and of encouraging White immi-
gration, gave recognition to the White group as an established part of
the population of South West Africa. This was entirely within the pro-
visions and contemplation of the Mandate. Having remained and come
at the special invitation of the Mandatory, with the concurrence of the
international supervisory organs, and having admirably fulfilled its
intended function of developing a modern economy in the Territory
for the benefit of the whole population, the White group undoubtedly
has a moral right to remain and to be treated with at least the same
consideration as any other group. The implications of this aspect of the
situation required to be recognized by the Mandatory from the very
inception of the Mandate, whileit was encouraging the people concerned
to remain and to come, and while those people were settling about the
task intended for them.ment par les témoins queje viens de citer, notamment par M. Bruwer
qui, comme membre de la Commission Odendaal, a fait des recherches
spéciales en la matière, ainsi que par M. Dahlmann, qui a décrit les
vaines tentatives faites au sein des mouvements politiques modernes
en vue de franchir les barrières ethniques.
17. Si l'on considère ces réalités,il n'est guèreétonnant que les ex-
perts aient souligné les uns après les autres les valeurs positives que
recouvrent les diverses cultures et la solidarité des divers groupes et
qu'ils aient signalécombien il importe d'en tenir dûment compte quand
on s'efforcede favoriser le bien-êtredes individus constituant cesgroupes.
Les experts sud-africains ont insisté sur ces points en se fondant
sur les connaissances et l'expérienceapprofondies acquises en Afrique
méridionale mêmeet notamment en Afrique du Sud et dans le Sud-
Ouest africain. Leurs conclusions ont ététrès vigoureusement con-
firméespar des experts venus d'autres régionsdu monde, par exemple
M. Logan, qui s'est inspiré de recherches approfondies effectuéessur
les lieux au Sud-Ouest africain même,et MM. Possony, van den Haag
et Manning, qui se sont fondés sur les connaissances et l'expérience
acquises dans le monde entier. Ces derniers ont en particulier fourni
des exemples des conséquences tragiques auxquelles on a si souvent
abouti danstoutes les régionsdu monde, lorsqu'on a négligé l'importance
de pareilles questions.
18. 11ressort des considérations ci-dessus que cet élémentde la poli-
tique pratiquée depuis l'acceptation du Mandat a étélui aussi la con-
séquence naturelle et quasi inévitable des faits en présence desquels
s'est trouvé le Gouvernement sud-africain. Ce n'est pas ce Gouverne-
ment qui a crééla diversitéou les phénomènessociologiques en cause;
c'étaientlà des réalités qu'ildevait admettre s'il voulait s'efforcer d'ac-
croître le bien-êtreet le progrès avec quelque chance de succès.
Conséquencesde l'immigration blanche et de la diversitéde la population
19. Ayant adopté pour politique d'encourager les blancs établis
dans le territoire avant le Mandat à y demeurer et de stimuler une
nouvelle immigration blanche, le défendeur a considéréque le groupe
blanc faisait partie intégrante de la population du Sud-Ouest africain.
Cette politique était entièrement en accord avec la lettre et l'esprit du
Mandat. Demeuré sur les lieux ou venu sur l'invitation spéciale du
Mandataire avecl'assentiment des organes de surveillance internationaux
et s'étant admirablement acquitté de la tâche qu'il devait accomplir -
à savoir créerune économie moderne dans le territoire au profit de la
population tout entière -, le groupe blanc a sans aucun doute le droit
moral de rester dans le pays et d'être traitéavec au moins la mêmecon-
sidérationque tout autre groupe. Le Mandataire se devait de reconnaître
les conséquencesde cet aspect de la situation, dèsson acceptation même
du Mandat, alors qu'il encourageait les personnesintéressévsà demeurer
dans le pays ouà y venir et alors que ces mêmespersonnes s'attaquaient
à la tâche qui leur était assignée. 20. The implications were of considerable importance. For illustration
1 shall mention some that come readily to mind.
Had policies of separation and differentiation not been applied by
the Respondent, the probability is that many of the White people who
were already in the Territory would not have remained, and the badly
needed immigrants would not have come. White technicians, professional
people, farmers,miners, etc., would not have immigrated to the Territory
unless they knew that their children would receive an education com-
parable to that obtainable elsewhere, and unless they could maintain
their standard of living.There can be no doubtthat cultural background
and language problems would have made it completely impracticable
to place White children and the children of the indigenous groups
in the same schools. The evidence shows that where such differences
exist both groups would suffer if they attended the same schools.
Without additional teachers the children of the immigrants could
not be taught. Unless White teachers-and only White teachers were
available-were offered remuneration commensurate with what they
could earn elsewhere, their services could not have been obtained.
21. In al1the above respects the circumstances and needs of the in-
digenous groups were vastly different. They were at a stage of develop-
ment where it was necessary to begin to instil in them some realization
of the desirability of having education at all, in theense as known to
Western civilization. The problem of their initial hostility and apathy
towards education was aggravated by factors such as nomadic habits
and scattered populations, the vastness of the Territory and its low
density of population, the large number of languages, the poverty of
the Territory, the shortage of teachers and the difficultiesencountered
in trainingsuitable teachers.
The approach of educationalists-not only in regard to South West
Africa, but generally in regard to the similar problems of African edu-
cation everywhere-was that under such circumstances there were
certain prerequisites before much progress along the lines of forma1
education could be expected. One of these was that mission societies
should be encouraged to inculcate some appreciation of Christian and
civilized principles and standards in the indigenous communities, and
in connection therewith to foster some interest in education. Another
was that wage-earning employment could in itself be regarded as an
educational process, stimulatinginterest in forma1education particularly
because of the utilitarian values thereof. A further factor was that
Native languages required study and developrnentinto written languages
in order to servethe requirements of mother-tongue education, especially
for the veryYoung.
Due to the language factor and the shortage of teachers generally,
it was inevitable that teachers in Native education would mainly have
to be Natives. Training sufficient Native teachers to a satisfactory
178 20. Ces conséquences sont fort importantes. Pour illustrer mon ex-
posé, j'en mentionnerai quelques-unes, qui viennent tout naturellement
à l'esprit.
Si le défendeur n'avait pas pratiqué une politique de séparation et
de différenciation, il estprobable que bon nombre des blancs résidant
déjàdans le territoire n'y seraient pas demeuréset que les immigrants
dont on avait tant besoin n'y seraient pas venus. Les techniciens, les
membres des professions libérales, les agriculteurs, les mineurs, etc.,
blancs n'auraient pas immigré dans le territoire s'ils n'avaient pas eu
l'assurance que leurs enfants y bénéficieraientd'une instruction com-
parable à celle qui pouvait leur êtredispenséeailleurs et qu'ils pourraient
y maintenir leur niveau de vie. 11ne fait aucun doute que, pour des
raisons de niveau culturel et de langue, il aurait étéabsolument im-
possible de mettre les enfants blancs et les enfants indigènes dans les
mêmes écoles1 .1est manifeste que, là où de telles différences existent,
la fréquentation des mêmes écoles nuit aux deux groupes.
Sans nouveaux enseignants, aucun enseignement n'aurait pu être
dispensé aux enfants des immigrants. Or, on ne pouvait s'assurer les
services d'enseignants blancs- et il n'y avait que ceux--à qu'en leur
offrant des traitements comparables à ceux qu'ils pouvaient obtenir
ailleurs.
21. Sur tous les points mentionnés ci-dessus, la situation et les be-
soins des groupes indigènes étaient fort différents. Ilsen étaientà un
stade de développement où il fallait commencer par les convaincre peu
à peu des bienfaits de l'instruction telle qu'on l'entend dans la civilisa-
tion occidentale. Leur hostilité et leur apathie initiales à cet égard
étaientaggravéespar des facteurs comme le nomadisme et la dispersion
du peuplement, l'étendue du territoire et sa faible densité humaine,
le grand nombre de langues parlées, la pauvreté du pays, la pénurie
d'enseignants et les difficultés auxquelles se heurtait la formation de
maîtres compétents.
Cela étant, les spécialistes de l'éducation estimaient- non seule-
ment d'ailleurs àpropos du Sud-Ouest africain, mais en ce qui concerne
d'une manière générale lesproblèmes analogues que l'éducationsoulève
partout en Afrique - que certaines conditions devaient être réalisées
avant de pouvoir espérerdes progrèsnotables sur le plan de l'instruction.
D'une part, il fallait encourager les sociétésde missionnaires à rendre
les collectivités indigènesplus sensibles aux principes et aux normes de
la civilisation chrétienneet, ce faisant,évelopperchez elles un certain
intérêtpour l'instruction. D'autre part, le travail rétribué pouvait
être considérécomme une méthode d'éducation tendant à stimuler
l'intérêtà l'égard de l'instruction en raison notamment de sa valeur
utilitaire. Enfin, il convenait d'étudier les langues indigèneset d'en faire
des langues écrites, afinde répondre aux besoins de l'enseignement dans
la langue maternelle, notamment pour les très jeunes enfants.
En raison des problèmes linguistiques et de la pénurie généraled'en-
seignants, les maîtres affectés l'instruction des indigènesne pouvaient
pas ne pas êtreindigènes pour la plupart. Or, il fallait inévitablement
178level unavoidably took a long time. Furthermore, the absence of direct
contributions of any substance by Native communities to the costs
of education, and the struggle of the territorial economy for a long time
to balance its budget, were factors which tended to limit the funds
available for Native education. In the circumstances, and considering
the vast differences in social and economic levels between the White
community and the various Native communities, it would have been
most inappropriate to insist on exact parity as between these com-
munities, e.g., in the quality of school buildings or in salaries paid to
teachers. Such a reauirement would have introduced a further artificial
and unnecessary ret&ding factor inthe pursuit ofthe objectiveofbringing
education as soon as possible to as large a number of Native children
as possible, and the sufferers would have been the Native communities
themselves. The comparisons, in order to be appropriate, should not
be with levels in the White community, but with comparable things
in the particular Native community (or other African communities).
Thus the quality of school buildings should compare favourably with
other buildings utilized by that particular community and to which it
is accustomed. Teachers' salaries again should compare favourably
with salaries, wages or income commanded by other members of the
same community in comparable forms of employment or activity.
As Dr. van Zyl pointed out, Native teachers often enjoy very valuable
privileges, e.g., subsidized housing, not accorded to White teachers.
The levels concerned could and should, of course, rise with time, as
they have in factdone, considerably, up to the present. But this should
be in keeping with the general advancement of the particular group,
otherwise interna1 balances become disturbed.
22. In brief, the point is that with the advent of the White group
the Native groups did not cease to be indigenous African comrnunities,
comparable with similar communities elsewhere. The mere fact that
there was now a White community living beside them, did not mean
that their needs and circumstances had come to be identical with those
of the White community. On the contrary, this brief discussion with
regard to education provides a very clear illustration of the vast dif-
ferences, confronting the Mandatory, in the social and economic cir-
cumstances and standards of development of the White group, on the
one hand, and the various indigenous groups on the other, of the resul-
tant vast differences in their respective needs, and of the necessity to
minister to each group in accordance with its particular needs. In other
words, the discussion demonstrates how inevitable it was for the Man-
datory to differentiate if it were to seek the well-being and progress
of al1concerned.
23. The same result emerges from a consideration of other aspects
of life, of whichwish to mention very brieflythe political and the eco-
nomic spheres.
179 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 181
beaucoup de temps pour donner une formation satisfaisante à un
nombre suffisant de professeurs indigènes. Comme enoutre les collecti-
vités indigènes ne pouvaient guère contribuer directement aux frais
d'éducation et que le territoire a eu pendant longtemps beaucoup de
peine à équilibrer son budget, les fonds disponibles pour l'éducation
des indigènes restaient limités.Dans ces conditions et compte tenu des
grandes différencesde niveau social et économique entre le groupe
blanc et lesgr-oupesindigènes, il aurait été parfaitementdéplacéd'in-
sister sur une égalité rigoureuseentre ces groupes en ce qui concernait
par exemple la qualitédes bâtiments scolaires ou les traitements versés
aux maîtres. Pareille exigence aurait artificiellement et inutilement
retardéla réalisation de l'objectifque l'on s'étaitfixé,voir dispenser
le plus tôt possible un enseignement au plus grand nombre possible
d'enfants indigèneset les collectivités indigèneselles-mêmesen auraient
pâti. Pour faire des comparaisons valables, il ne faut pas se référeà
tel ou tel niveau atteint dans le groupe blanc mais aux éléments com-
parables que l'on peut observer dans le groupe indigène en cause (ou
dans d'autres groupes africains). Ainsi, ce qu'il faut comparer, c'est
la qualitédes bâtiments scolaireset celledes autres installations qu'utilise
le groupe considéréet auxquelles il est habitué,la comparaison devant
êtreà l'avantage des premiers. De même,les traitements des enseignants
doivent êtrecomparés aux traitements, salaires ou revenus d'autres
membres du mêmegroupe exerçant des emplois ou des activités com-
parables. Comme M. van Zyl l'a signalé, les enseignants indigènes
jouissent fréquemment deprivilègestrès précieux,telsque des subventions
en matièrede logement, qui ne sont pas accordésaux professeurs blancs.
Il est évidentque les courbes peuvent êtreet doivent êtreascendantes,
comme cela a été nettementle cas jusqu'à l'heure actuelle.Il faut toute-
fois que cette élévation aille depair avec le progrès généralu groupe
en question, sinon son équilibre intérieur serait perturbé.
22. En somme, ce qu'il s'agit de comprendre, c'est que l'arrivée
du groupe blanc n'a pas empêché les groupes indigènes d'être des col-
lectivités africaines indigènescomparables aux collectivitésanalogues
existant ailleurs. Le seul fait qu'un groupe blanc vivait désormais à
leurs côtés ne signifiaitpas que leurs besoins et leur situation fussent
devenusles mêmesque pour ce groupe. Bien au contraire, ce bref examen
de la situation sur le plan de l'enseignement illustre très clairement les
grandes différencesavec lesquelles le Mandataire devait compter, en ce
qui concernait la situation économique et sociale etle degré d'évolution
du groupe blanc d'une part et des divers groupes indigènesde l'autre,
les grandes différencesqui en résultaientquantà leurs besoins respectifs
et la nécessitde s'occuper dechaque groupe en fonction de ses besoins
particuliers. En d'autres termes, le présent examenmontre combien il
étaitinévitableque le Mandataire établît une différenciations'ilvoulait
favoriser le bien-être etle progrès de tous les intéressés.
23. On en arrive à la mêmeconclusion lorsqu'on considère lesautres
aspects de l'existence- je me bornerai à mentionner très brièvement
les domaines de la politique et de l'économique. In the political sphere, the members of the White group were derived
from countries inwhich they had been accustomed to share in the process
of parliamentary self-government. Where they now formed a com-
munity with interests of its own in the Police Zone of South West Africa,
it was a natural need on their part to enjoy a measure of such self-
government within that Territory, on an appropriate, quasi-provincial
basis, as was in fact extended to them in 1925. The Native groups had
no tradition, experience or knowledge of parliamentary governrnent,
and.at that stage no interest in it (as was the case throughout Africa).
Each group (save for the Bushmen) had its own traditional political
institutions, each with considerable intrinsic value. The need of each
group was to have such institutions respected-and in the case of the
southern groups restored-and to have them suitably developed and
adapted in course of time, under the control and guidance of the Man-
datory, in accordance with changed circumstances and with advance-
ment within the group itself. Again this was exactly the purport of the
policies applied by the Mandatory.
24. In the economic sphere the needs of the groups again differed
substantially, and in many respects were diametrically opposed. This
necessitated reciprocal protections in order to ensure what Professor
Krogh so aptly described as "social peace", a factor which is obviously
essential for economic progress.
The indigenous groups required certain fundamental protections
against the capital, the know-how and the exploiting ability, of the
White man engaged in private enterprise. This meant the reservation
of homelands for their exclusive ownership, use and occupation-save
in so far as a small number of White rnrn might br required to assist
them, for such time as might be nxessary, in essential services. It meant
also the reservation of preferential opportunities for them in com-
merce and industries within these homelands and even within Native
towns in the White area. It mrant control over recruitment of labour,
labour contracts and conditions of service. Eventually it came to mean
also legislation compelling employers of Native labour in the urban
areas to combine with the local authorities and the central administra-
tion in the provision of fit and proper housing for their employees on
a subsidized basis, in properly planned townships. In addition to such
protections the indigenous groups needed assistance of varying kinds
within their respective homslands, with a view to advancing and im-
proving their subsistence economies and to transforming them gradually
into money economies. Mr. Pepler in his testimony gave a very vivid
description of the tremendous variation in the needs of the various
groups in these respects, depending on their customs, their stages of
development and their local circumstanoes; and he emphasized the
necessity of adapting one's methods in each case to the needs and the
peculiarities of the particulargroup. Sur le plan politique, les membres du groupe blanc étaient originaires
de pays où ils s'étaientaccoutumés à participer au gouvernement suivant
le systèmeparlementaire. Dans la zone de police du Sud-Ouest africain
où ils constituaient désormais une collectivitéayant des intérêts propres,
ils ont tout naturellement éprouvéle besoin de se gouverner jusqu'à
un certain point eux-mêmes,dans des conditions appropriées et prati-
quement comme s'ils constituaient une province, ce qui leur a étéac-
cordé en 1925.Les groupes indigènesquant à eux n'avaient ni tradition
ni expérienceni notion de régimeparlementaire, pour lequel ils ne té-
moignaient alorsaucunintérêt(il en allait de mêmedans toute l'Afrique).
Al'exception des Boschimans, les diversgroupes avaientleurs institutions
politiques traditionnelles propres, présentant toujours un grand intérêt
intrinsèque. Il fallait que ces institutions soient respect-es ou, en ce
qui concerne les groupes méridionaux, rétablies - et qu'elles soient
convenablement et progressivement développé~set adaptées sous le
contrôle et l'égidedu Mandataire, compte tenu de l'évolution de la
situation et des progrès réalisésdans le cadre de chaque groupe. Tel a
été précisément, là encore, le but de la politique du Mandataire.
24. Dans le domaine économiqueaussi, les besoins des divers groupes
différaient sensiblement et étaient à bien des égards diamétralement
opposés. Des protections réciproques étaientdonc indispensables afin
d'assurer ce que M. Krogh a si pertinemment appelé la ((paix sociale x,
facteur manifestement essentiel de progrès économique.
Les groupes indigènes avaient besoin de mesures de protection fon-
damentales contre les capitaux, les aptitudes techniques et l'expérience
des blancs du secteur privé. 11a donc fallu réserver à ces groupes des
foyers leur appartenant en propre, qu'ils seraient seuls à utiliser età
occuper, sauf dansla mesure où la présence d'unpetit nombre de blancs
pouvait être requisepour les aider, le temps nécessaire, à assurer les
services essentiels. Il a également fallu leur réserver titre préférentiel
des possibilités d'emploidans les activités commercialeset industrielles
de ces foyers et mêmedans les villes indigènes de la région blanche.
Il a fallu contrôler le recrutement de la main-d'Œuvre, lescontrats de
travail et les conditions d'empioi.Il a fallu ensuite adopter une législa-
tion obligeant les employeurs de main-d'Œuvre indigène desrégions
urbaines à collaborer avec les autorités locales et l'administration cen-
trale en vue d'assurer à leurs employés, moyennant subventions, des
logements satisfaisants dans des agglomérations convenablement amé-
nagées.Outre ce genre de protection, il s'est avéré indispensable dedis-
penser aux groupes indigènes une aide de toute nature, dans le cadre
de leurs foyers respectifs, en vue de faire progresser et d'améliorer
leur économie de subsistance et de la transformer progressivement en
économie monétaire.Au cours de sa déposition, M. Pepler a brossé
un tableau très suggestif de la grande diversité des besoins desgroupes
à cet égard,en fonction de leurs coutumes, du degré de développement
atteint et des conditions locales. a soulignéla nécessitéd'adapter dans
chaque cas les méthodesaux besoins et aux particularités du groupe en
cause.
180 Members of the White group engaged in entrepreneurial activities
needed fairly obvious protections against vagrancy, trespassing and
similar or attendant activities on the part of members of an under-
developed Native population.
Others, required for employment in skilled or semi-skilled capacities,
could onlybe attractedupon wagesand conditions ofemploymentkeeping
Pace with those available elsewhere. The importance of competitive
remuneration has been stressed by numerous authorities. It is not sur-
prising that in certain limited fields of employment some of these em-
ployees demanded and were given special privileges, protecting them
against the danger of eventual competition from members of non-
White groups who might be offering their services at lower levels of
remuneration.
Respondent's LandPoZicy
25. Basic to the implementation of the above policies has been Res-
pondent's land policy, of which the main feature is the provision of
separate areas of land for each of the population groups mentioned
above. This policy was approved of by the Permanent Mandates Com-
mission, which was-
"... of opinion that the soundness ofthe viewswhichhave prompted
the Administration to adopt a system of segregation of Natives in
reserves will become increasingly apparent if there is no doubt
that, in the future, the Administration will have at its disposa1
fertile land for the growing needs of the population and that the
reserves will be enlarged in proportion to the progressive increase
in the population".
The undisputed facts show that provision of sufficient land to the
indigenous groups has indeed been the concern of the Mandatory,
and that there has in course of time been extensive increases in the
reservations in their favour, both outside and inside the Police Zone.
26. Outside the Police Zone large areas of land were unoccupied at
the inception of the Mandate. This is not surprising if regard is had
to the relatively small population of this vast area at the time and the
fact that the Natives could not augment their water supplies by sinking
boreholes and building dams. As the populations of the different groups
increased substantial increases were made in the land reserved.
In Ovamboland the Natives at the inception of the Mandate occupied
only about one-half of the area which was later proclaimed as a Native
reserve for the Ovambo people. Similarly a very much larger area than
the strip along the Okavango River, originally occupied by the Oka-
vango tribes, has been reserved for this group. In the Kaokoveld the
area originally setaside for the tribes of this region has been increased
from 418,500 hectares to more than 5,500,000 hectares. In the Caprivi
181 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 183
De leur côté, les membresdu groupe blanc qui dirigeaient leur propre
exploitation ou entreprise éprouvaient,pour des raisons assez évidentes,
le besoin d'être protégécontre le vagabondage, la violation de la pro-
priété etautres dangers analogues que leur faisait courir une population
indigène insuffisamment développée.
Quant aux autres, dont on avait besoin pour exercer des emplois
spécialisésou semi-spécialisés,on ne pouvait les attirer qu'en leur
offrant des salaires et des conditions d'emploi comparables ce qui se
pratiquait ailleurs. Comme l'ont soulignéde nombreux experts, il im-
portait de respecter les lois de la concurrence en matière de rémuné-
ration. 11n'est pas surprenant que, dans quelques branches profession-
nelles, certains de ces employésaient exigé,et se soient vu accorder,
des privilègesspéciaux,les protégeant contre la concurrence éventuelle
de non-blancs, capables d'offrir les mêmes services un moindre prix.
Politiquefoncière du deyendeur
25. La politique foncière du défendeur, essentiellement caractérisée
par la constitution de régions distinctespour chacun des groupes eth-
niques précédemment énumérés, revu ênt importance fondamentale
pour l'application de la politique générale mentionnéeci-dessus. Cette
politique agraire a étéapprouvéeen ces termes par la Commission per-
manente des Mandats :
«le bien-fondé des préoccupationsqui ont déterminé l'instauration
dans ce territoire du systèmede cantonnement, apparaîtra pleine-
ment, si, dans l'avenir, il étaitpermis de constater que l'adminis-
tration dispose encore de terres fertiles en quantité suffisante pour
faire face aux besoins croissants de la population indigène et
qu'en fait les réservessont accrues à mesure de l'augmentation
progressive de cette population».
Les faits non contestésprouvent que le Mandataire s'est effective-
ment soucié d'assurer dessuperficies assez étenduesaux groupes indi-
gènes et qu'avec le temps les réservesont étésensiblement agrandies
en leur faveur, tantà l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur dlea zone de police.
26. En dehors de la zone de police, de vastes superficies étaient
inoccupéeslorsque le territoire a été placé sos andat. La chose n'est
pas surprenante si 1'011considère que cette vaste région était relative-
ment peu peuplée à l'époque et queles indigènes n'étaientpas en mesure
d'améliorerleur approvisionnement en eau en forant des puits et en
édifiant des barrages. Répcndant à l'accroissement démographique
des divers groupes le Mandataire a sensiblement étendu les réserves.
Lorsque le défendeura assuméle Mandat, les indigènesde I'Ovam-
boland n'occupaient que la moitié environde la région ultérieurement
proclamée réserve indigène du peuple ovambo. De même,on a réservé
aux tribus de I'Okavango une région bien plus vaste que le secteur
longeant l'okavango, initialement occupéepar elles. Dans le Kaoko-
veld, la zone réservéà l'origine aux tribus de cette régiona étéportée
de 418 500 hectares à plus de 5 500000 hectares. Au Caprivi, 500000 184 SOUTH WST AFRICA (SEP.OP. VAN WYK)
500,000 hectares were added in 1939 to the area originally occupied
by the Caprivians. An area of 350,433hectares setsidein 1952for Native
occupation is to be added in part to Ovamboland and in part to the
Okavango. There has been no reduction in the extent of land included
in the reserves in the northern territories outside the Police Zone. On
the conlrary, these areas have been increased considerably as appears
from what has been said above and as appears more fully from the
review and tables provided in the Odendaal Commission Report of the
availability of land in thearious non-European home areas. (Report,
pp. 67-71.)
27. Inside the Police Zone, as I have mentioned, the Herero and
the Nama had shortly before the inception of the Mandate been re-
duced in numbers to less than 20,000 and less than 15,000respectively.
Tribal economies had been shattered, and in 1913approximately 80 per
cent. of the total non-White adult male population in the Police Zone
were employed as wage-earners in the modern economy established by
the White group.
In the case of the Herero, the German régimehad confiscated al1
tribal lands and abolished al1 chieftainships, and had prohibited them
from owning cattle. They were, after a century of warfare, dispersed
over the Territory, and their traditional institutions, founded basically
on the possession of cattle, were largely broken up.
The Nama were also largely dispersed, although some groups were
permitted by the Germans to use defined pieces of land and to keep
limited numbers of cattle.
The Damara were released from their bondage to the Herero and the
Nama after the 1904-1907wars. A Damara reserve was established at
Okombahe, where some of them settled.
On the assumption of the Mandate Respondent found it desirable
to restore, as far as possible the tribal life and social organizations of
the various Native groups in the Police Zone. This policy was clearly
in accordance with the wishesand best interests of the groups concerned,
and nobody doubted its wisdom. For this reason it was considered
necessaryto establish reservesfor the Herero, as wellasthe other groups,
and to extend such reserves from time to time as circumstances might
require. Fromthe above-mentioned reviewin the Odendaal Commission
Report, it will be seen that the reservations in favour of Native groups
(i.e., excludingthe Rehoboth Gebiet for the Basters, to which there have
been no additions) were increased from a total of about 1 million hec-
tares to a total of over 6 million.
28. The Odendaal Commission has recommended further very sub-
stantial increases in the Native reserves, both inside and outside the
Police Zone, together with certain consolidations in the Police Zone.
The proposals have been accepted in principle by the South African
Government, and full implementation is awaiting the decision in this
case. The over-al1gain is about 50 per cent. (from 21,600,000 hectares
to 32,600,000hectares). In the Police Zone where more than 3,400,000
hectares presently owned or occupied by White persons are being
182hectares ont été ajoutésen 1939 àla régionqu'occupaient initialement
les indigènes. Une superficie de 350 433 hectares, réservéeen 1952 à
l'occupation indigène sera attribuée en partie à I'Ovamboland et en
partie à I'Okavango. La superficie des réserves desterritoires septen-
trionaux situésen dehors dela zone de police n'a subi aucune réduction.
Bien au contraire, ces régions ont étésensiblement étendues, comme
cela ressort de ce que j'ai signaléci-dessus et comme cela ressort encore
mieux de l'exposéet des tableaux que la Commission Odendaal a con-
sacrés,dans son rapport, aux terres disponibles dans les divers foyers
non européens (rapport de la Commission, p. 67-71).
27. A l'intérieurde la zone de police, comme je l'ai indiqué,le nom-
bre des Hereros et des Namas était tombé, peu de temps avant que le
territoire fût placé sous Mandat, à moins de 20 000 pour les premiers
et de 15000 pour les seconds. L'économie tribale avait été dévastéeet,
en 1913,80 pour cent environ du nombre total des hommes adultes non
blancs de la zone de police étaientemployéscomme salariésdans l'éco-
nomie moderne crééepar le groupe blanc.
En ce qui concerne les Hereros, le régimeallemand avait confisqué
toutes les terres tribales, abolitoutes les chefferiesetinterdit la possession
du bétail.Au terme d'un sièclede guerre, les Hereros étaient dispersés
à travers le territoire et leurs institutions traditionnelles, essentiellement
fondées sur la possession de bétail, en grande partie disloquées.
Les Namas étaient aussien grande partie dispersés,quoique les Alle-
mands eussent autorisé quelques groupes à exploiter certaines terres
et à conserver un cheptel limité.
Les guerres de 1904-1907 avaient libéréle Damaras de leur asservis-
sement aux Hereros et aux Namas. Une réserve avait étécrééepour
eux à Okombahe, où certains s'étaientétablis.
Lorsqu'il a accepté le Mandat, le défendeur a jugé souhaitable de
rétablir dansla mesure du possible la vie tribale ainsi que l'organisation
sociale des groupes indigènes de la zone de police. Cette politique était
de toute évidenceconforme aux désirset aux intérêtsdes groupes en
cause et nul ne doutait de sa sagesse. C'est pourquoi il a jugénéces-
saire de constituer des réservestant pour les Hereros que pour les autres
groupes et de les agrandir progressivement en fonction des circonstances.
11ressort du rapport de la Commission Odendaal, mentionné ci-dessus,
que les réserves crééeesn faveur des groupes indigènes - à l'exclusion
par conséquent du Rehoboth Gebiet des Basters, qui n'a fait l'objet
d'aucune mesure d'extension - ont été portées d'environ 0 100 000
d'hectares à plus de 6 000 000 d'hectares au total.
28. La Commission Odendaal a recommandé d'autres agrandisse-
ments très notables des réserves indigènes,tantà l'intérieur qu'àl'exté-
rieur de la zone de police, ainsi que certaines mesures de rendement
dans la zone de police. Ces propositions ont étéacceptéesen principe
par le Gouvernement sud-africain, lequel n'attend plus pour les mettre
pleinement en czuvre que la décisiontranchant la présenteaffaire. L'ac-
croissement généralde la superficie des réservessera d'environ 50 pour
cent (de 21 6QO000 hectares à 32 600000 hectares). Dans la zone de
182 185 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
acquired for the purpose, the total increase will be more than 110 per
cent.
29. The present land allocations involve that about 45 per cent. of
the Territory's total land area is occupied by White farmers, whereas
the reserves amount to about 27 per cent. This ratio, as well as the exact
areas of allocation, has been the product of the historical and economic
considerations dealt with earlier in this opinion. This situation is not
intended to be a permanent one, as is shown by the Odendaal Com-
mission's recommendations above referred to. The adjustments now
proposed will make the total area of the reserves nearly as large as the
area of White occupation. It must of course be borne in mind that the
areas occupied by the Natives in the north have far superior possibilities
for agriculture. Only 20 per cent. of the present European farming
area receives an annual rainfall of 400 or more millimetres, which is
the minimum for dry-land farming, whereas the figure for the non-
White areas is 48 per cent. The area of the land in the latter areas, re-
ceiving an annual average rainfall exceeding 500 millimetres, is nearly
two-and-a-half times larger than the corresponding White areas. The
livestock-carrying capacity of the northern and north-eastern regions
is eight or lesshectares per largestockunit, whereas inthe areas occupied
by European farmers the capacity decreases progressively from north
to south from nine to 45 hectares per large stock unit. Seventy per cent.
of the total non-European population, and only 20 per cent. of the
Whites, are to be found in the most favourable region.
It must further be borne in mind that because of the superior use
made by the Whitegroup ofthe land available to it, and of the economic
opportunities presented thereby, very large numbers of non-White
persons in fact make a livelihood within the White area, either aswage-
earners or in business or professional occupations. This is likely to be
the case for a long time to corne, whether such non-White persons will
be living in their reserved homelands or in the White area.
30. It will also be recalled that Mr. Pepler informed the Court,
on the basis of scientific surveys and assessments made by his depart-
ment, that far more people and far more stock could be accommodated
in the various existing reserves than are found there today and that the
existing reserves plus the proposed extensions made ample provision
for present population numbers purely as farmers, quite apart from the
additional prospects offered in regard to the secondary sector of the
economy.
31. Of course the carrying capacities of the reserves depend not only
on their size and natural endowments, but also on improvements effec-
ted by man where possible. In this respect much has been done by
183 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 185
police où plus de 3400000 hectares, actuellement possédésou occu-
péspar des blancs, sont en cours d'acquisitioàcet effet, l'accroissement
sera de plus de 110 pour cent.
29. Il ressort de la répartition actuelle des terres qu'environ 45 pour
cent de la superficie totale du territoire sont occupéspar des agricul-
teurs blancs, alors que les réserves représentent environ27 pour cent
de cette superficie. Ces pourcentages, ainsi que la localisation géogra-
phique des terres attribuées, s'expliquentpar les considérations histo-
riques et économiquesdont j'ai traité plus haut. La situation actuelle
n'est pas censée seperpétuer, comme le montrent les recommandations
de la Commission Odendaal mentionnéesci-dessus. Grâce aux ajuste-
ments envisagés,la superficietotale des réserves deviendra presqueégale
à celle de la région occupéepar les blancs. Il convient évidemmentde
se rappeler que les possibilitésoffertesl'agriculture sont de loin supé-
rieures dans les régions septentrionales occupéespar les indigènes. A
peine 20 pour cent de la région agricole actuellement exploitéepar les
européens bénéficientde précipitations annuelles de 400 millimètres
ou davantage, ce qui constitue un minimum pour le dryfarmingc, ontre
48 pour cent dans le cas des régionsnon blanches. La superficie qui,
dans ces dernières, reçoit des précipitations moyennes annuellesde
plus de 500 millimètres est prèsde deux fois et demie supérieure à la
superficie correspondante de la région blanche.Dans les régionsnord
et nord-est, l'élevagedu gros bétail demande au maximum 8 hectares
de pâturage par tête,alors que, dans les régions occupées par les agri-
culteurs européens,le rendement décroît progressivement du nord vers
le sud, la superficie de pâturage requise passant de 9 45 hectares par
tête. Enoutre 70 pour cent du total de la population non européenne,
contre 20 pour cent seulement des blancs, vivent dans la régionla plus
favorisée.
Il ne faut pas non plus oublier que, par suite de la meilleure exploi-
tation des terres par le groupe blanc et des débouchésque cela peut
créer,un trèsgrand nombre de non-blancs gagnent en fait leur vie dans
la région blanche, soit enqualité de salariés, soit dans le commerce,
soit dans d'autres branches professionnelles. Il en sera probablement
ainsi pendant longtemps, que ces non-blancs vivent dans les foyers
qui leur sont destinés oudans la région blanche.
30. On serappellera aussi queM. Pepler, se fondant sur des enquêtes
et des évaluations scientifiqueseffectuéespar son département, a in-
forméla Cour que les diverses réservesexistantes pourraient accueillir
bien plus de personnes et éleverbien plus de bétail quece n'est lecas
pour le moment et que les réserves actuelles, ainsique les terres qu'il
est envisagé d'yajouter, permettent largement à la population qui les
exploite de vivre exclusivement de l'agriculture, cela sans parler des
perspectives supplémentairesoffertes par le secteur secondaire de l'éco-
nomie.
31. Bien entendu, le rendement des pâturages dans les réservesdépend
non seulement des dimensions et de la qualité de ces dernières, mais
aussi des aménagementsapportés chaquefois que possible par l'homme. Respondent, with resultant substantial increases in the number and
quality of the stock. The steps taken by Respondent included the de-
velopment of water supplies by sinking hundreds of boreholes and wells
and building dams, the combating of stock diseases, and the improve-
ment of the quality of the stock by selective breeding and the intro-
duction of well-bred bulls and rams.
The population is being guided to greater productivity by means
of education and a gradua1 adaptation of their traditional economic
practices and socialinstitutions. Crop rotation andsuitable crop varieties
are introduced. Experts visit the reserves, andl1advice is free. Breeding
stock is sold to the inhabitants of the reserves at cost or even below
cost.
32. The Odendaal Commission Report, and the South African
Government's reaction thereto, envisage further large-scale improve-
ment schemes in the non-White homelands, some of which are already
well under way. Reference may be made to the Government White
Paper on the Commission's recommendations, as reprinted in the Sup-
plement to the Counter-Memorial, especially to the following:
(a) Pages 12-13 (paragraph 7) regarding a large-scale water and elec-
tricity scheme for Ovamboland and various smaller schemes for
other homelands;
(b) Pages 13-15 (Paragraph 8, particularly sub-paragraphs (a) (ii)
and (b)) regarding roads and air services;
(c) Page 16 (paragraph 9 (b)) regarding mining;
(d) Pages 16-17 (paragraph 10) regarding industries;
(e) Page 17 (paragraph 11) regarding agriculture.
33. In regard to al1additions and improvements to Native reserves,
as dealt withabove (paragraphs 26-32), it will be observed that they are
part of the fruits that have been and are being enjoyed by the peoples
in question from the Respondent's basic policyof stimulating a modern
economy in the Police Zone through White enterprise.
One should bear in mind that, whereas members of the White group
have to pay for their farms, al1additions to the Native reserves (with
the exception of one farm) have been on a gratuitous basis. By far the
greatestamount spent on improvements in the Native reserves is derived
from public monies, whereas European owners of private farms pay
for their own improvements. The Natives pay no taxes other than to
their Native trust funds, which are used exclusively for their benefit.
In times of drought every possible kind of assistance is given to the
inhabitants of the reserves. Al1reasonable steps are taken to save stock
losses and grazing is made available. Food is subsidized, and free issues
184 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 186
A cet égard,le défendeur a fait de gros efforts, qui se sont soldéspar
un accroissement notable du nombre de têtesde gros bétail et de la
qualité de celui-ci. Parmi les mesures prises on peut citer notamment
l'augmentation de l'approvisionnement en eau, grâce au forage d, cen-
taines de puits età la construction de barrages, la lutte contre les épi-
zooties et l'amélioration de la qualité du bétail, grâceà des reproduc-
teurs sélectionnés età l'importation de taureaux et de béliersde race.
On s'efforce d'inciter la population à accroître la productivité grâce
à l'enseignement et à une adaptation progressive dz ses pratiques éco-
nomiques et de ses institutions sociales traditionnelles. L'assolement
et la culture d'espèces appropriées sont introduits. Des experts se ren-
dent dans les réserveset donnent gratuitement des conseils. Des repro-
ducteurs sont vendus aux habitants des réservesau prix coûtant, voire
au-dessous de ce prix.
32. La Commission Odendaal dans son rapport et le Gouvernement
sud-africain,à la suite de ce rapport, envisagent pour les foyers non
blancs de nouveaux projets d'amélioration de grande envergure, dont
certains sont d'ores et déjàen cours de réalisation. On pourra se reporter
àcet effetau Livre blancconsacrépar leGouvernementaux recommanda-
tions de la Commission et reproduit dans le supplément au contre-
mémoireet notamment aux pages suivantes:
a) pages 12-13, paragraphe 7: vaste projet de fourniture d'eau et
d'électricitéà 170vamboland et divers projets de moindre envergure
pour d'autres foyers;
b) pages 13-15,paragraphe 8 et notamment alinéas a) ii) et b) :routes
et services aériens
c) page 16, paragraphe 9 b) :industries extractives;
d) pages 16-17,paragraphe 10 :industries;
e) page 17,paragraphe 11 :agriculture.
33. En ce qui concerne les adjonctions et améliorations relatives aux
réserves indigènesdont il est question ci-dessus (par. 26-32), on remar-
quera qu'elles font partie des avantages que les populations en cause
ont tirés ettirent actuellement dela politique pratiquée par le défendeur,
dont le principe est d'encourager l'économiemoderne dans la zone de
police grâce à l'esprit d'entreprise des blancs.
Il convient de se souvenir que, si les membres du groupe blanc doivent
acquitter le prix des exploitations qu'ils acquièrent,toutes les adjonctions
dont les réserves indigènes ont bénéficié ont été, à l'exception d'une
exploitation agricole, accordées à titre gracieux. Les dépenses afférentes
aux améliorations entreprises dans les réserves indigènessont imputées
pour la plus grande part sur les fonds publics, alors que les propriétaires
européensd'exploitations privées subviennent eux-mêmesaux frais des
améliorations qu'ils opèrent. Les indigènes ne paient d'impôts qu'aux
Native trustfunds exclusivement utilisés à leur profit.
En période de sécheresse, une aide est accordée aux habitants des
réserves soustoutes les formes possibles. Toutes les mesures qui s'impo-
sent sont prises pour épargner les pertes en bétail cependant que desof food are supplied to the aged and incapacitated, to hospitals and to
schools.
Progress and Development in the Application of Respondent'sPolicies
34. The period after the SecondWorld War, particularly asfromabout
1950 until today, saw marked progress in and as a result of the ap-
plication of Respondent's policies, and also certain adaptations in the
policiesthemselvesinthe light of changed circumstances. I wish to devote
very brief attention to these developments, in the political, economic
and educational spheres, and in general.
35. In the political sphere, there is in operation in every Native home-
land (except that of the Bushmen) a form of self-government practised
with Respondent's encouragement and approval. The details differ
from people to people, the important consideration being to allow to
each people the system derived from its traditions. In some systems
there are hereditary chiefs together with elected headmen, in others
councils of elected headmen. Elections or appointments are made
through traditional processes. Respondent, while retaining ultimate
control and seeking to afford guidance to progress, interferes as little
as possible either with elections or appointments or with acts of self-
government.
In the light of awakened interest, in African communities generally,
as regards national development towards self-determination or in-
dependence, it is Respondent's policy to utilize the traditional systems
as a basis for further development and modernization, with the co-
operation of the groups concerned, especially by the introduction of
more dernocratic elements, and so to pave the way for each people
to develop by evolution to a stage where it can determine its own future
destiny.
The soundness of such an approach was fully endorsed by the Oden-
daal Commission, who made proposals for practical implementation
thereof. The proposals noted above in regard to extension and consoli-
dation of the various homelands, and their further economic develop-
ment, are all, apart from their intrinsic merits, designed to contribute
to the effective and fair implementation of the policy of separate free-
doms.
Specifically in the political sphere the Commission recommended,
in respect of each such territory, the establishment of a separate citizen-
ship and general franchise, and a parliamentary system of government,
combining elected representatives with the existing governing bodies.
The proposals envisage a gradual taking over of powers from the South
African Government, and a gradual Africanization of the civil service
in each case.
The basic consideration is that each group, including the White
185 pâturages sont mis à la disposition des indigènes. Des subventions leur
sont octroyéespour l'achat de vivres et des distributions gratuites de
vivres sont organisées à l'intention des vieillards et des infirmes, des
hôpitaux et des écoles.
Progrèset évolution de lapolitique appliquépar le défendeur
34. Aprèsla seconde guerre mondiale, et notamment de 1950environ
jusqu'à cejour, la politique pratiquée par le défendeura été caractérisée
et s'est traduite par des progrès notables, tout en faisant l'objet de
certaines adaptations compte tenu de circonstances nouvelles. Je vais
exposer trèsbrièvementcetteévolutiondans les domaines de la politique,
de l'économieet de l'éducation, ainsi que sur le plan genéral.
35. Dans le domaine politique, chaque foyer indigène, à l'exception
de celui des Boschimans, bénéficied'une certaine forme d'autonomie,
qui est encouragéeet approuvéepar le défendeur.Les modalitésdiffèrent
d'une peuplade à l'autre, l'important est que 1'01ientà doter chacune
d'elles d'unrégimeconforme à sestraditions. Dans certainscas, des chefs
héréditaires partagentle pouvoir avec des notables élus,dans d'autres,
ce pouvoir est exercépar des conseils de notables élus.Les élections
et les nominations s'effectuent selon les méthodes traditionnelles. Le
défendeurgarde le dernier mot et s'efforce,par ses directives, d'orienter
les populations sur la voie du progrès, mais il intervient aussi peu que
possible dans les électionset nominations ou dans les décisions relevant
de l'administration locale.
En raison de l'intérêt croissant que, d'une manièregénérale,les
collectivités africainesmanifestent pour une évolution nationale tendant
vers l'autodétermination ou l'indépendance,la politique du défendeur
consiste à utiliser, avec la collaboration des groupes intéressés, les
régimestraditionnels comme base de développementet de modernisation
et à introduire notamment des éléments plus démocratiques,de manière
à ouvrir à chaque peuple la voie qui, par une évolutionprogressive, le
conduira au stade où il sera en mesure de prendre en main ses propres
destinées.
Le bien-fondé de cette méthode a étépleinement reconnc par la
Commission Odendaal, qui a formulé des propositions en vue de sa
mise en Œuvre. Lespropositions mentionnées ci-dessus et relatives à
l'extension et au remembrement des foyers, ainsi qu'à leur développe-
ment économique,sont toutes - leurs méritesintrinsèquesmis à part -
conçues de manière à faciliter l'application efficace et équitable de la
politique des ((libertésséparée».
Dans le domaine politique plus précisément,la Commission a re-
commandé,pour chacun de ces territoires, la créationd'une citoyenneté
distincte et la généralisationdu droit de vote ainsi que la mise sur pied
d'un régimeparlementaire associant des représentants élusaux organes
actuels de gouvernement. Elle prévoit dans chaque cas le transfert
progressif des pouvoirs actuellement exercéspar le Gouvernement sud-
africain et l'africanisation graduelle de la fonction publique.
Le principe essentiel est que chaque groupe, y compris le groupe
185 group, will govern itself only, and that domination of one group by
another will be avoided. On reaching maturity each group may decide
for itself whether it wishes to stand on its own legs or to enter into some
political or economic or other ties with another group or groups. Possi-
bilities are endless, but South African political leaders have indicated
preference for a possible organization operating on the lines of a com-
monwealth or common market, Le., on a basis of consent as between
equals and not a basis of majority rule. This idea offers prospects for
regional CO-operationin southern Africa over an even wider area than
the Republic and South West Africa.
36. In regard to the economic sphere, reference has already been made
to the progress achievedin regard to development of the homelands, and
to thefurther projects now under way.
As regards other aspects of economic well-being and progress, the
evidence and admitted facts show that the earnings of Natives in the
Territory compare favourably with al1 other comparable countries.
It is also significant that Applicants had to concede that they were not
allegingthat the Respondent had not built enough houses, schools, roads,
hospitals, irrigation schemes, etc.
Another noteworthy aspect of economic progress is that which has
flowed from the policy of giving preference to members of a group in
regard to economic opportunities within the homeland of that group,
and to Natives in general within Native townships in the White area.
These protected opportunities must be of enormous value. Just as the
best land in Native homelands would soon pass into White ownership
if that had not been forbidden by law, very few, if any, Natives couid
probably, as at the present stage, compete successfully with White men
in regard to exploitation of commercial, industrial and professional
opportunities within the homelands and townships. By the poiicy of
protection and specialencouragement, however, e.g., through the waiving
of prescribed licence fees,the administration has succeededin establishing
hundreds of Native businessmen in their areas and townships; numerous
teams of specially trained Native artisans are engaged upon the develop-
ment and building projects under way in the homelands and townships;
Native teachers in 1963 numbered over 1,200, and increasing numbers
of Natives are employed by the Government in their own areas as
inspectors, secretaries, clerks, etc.
37. In the sphere of education, marked progress was made in regard to
Native education as from 1950 onwards. School enrolment figures more
than doubled themselves between 1950 and 1962-from 22,659 at the
earlier date to 47,088 at the later. In 1963 there was a further increase
186blanc, n'administrera que lui-même etque la domination d'un groupe
par un autre sera évitée. rrivéau stade de la maturité, chaque groupe
pourra décider lui-même s'is louhaite voler de ses propres ailes ou
contracter des liens politiques, économiques ou autres avec un ou
plusieurs autres groupes. Les possibilités sont innombrables mais les
dirigeants politiques d'Afrique du Sud ont manifestéune préférenpour
une organisation qui fonctionnerait selon les principes d'uncommon-
wealth ou d'un marché commun, c'est-à-dire sur la base d'un accord
entre égaux et non passur celle de la domination de la majorité.Pareille
conception ouvre en Afrique méridionale des perspectives d'une co-
opérationrégionalequi déborderaitmême les frontièresde la République
sud-africaine et du Sud-Ouest africain.
36. Dans le domaine économique, j'ai déjà mentionné les progrès
réalisés ence qui concerne les foyers ainsi que les nouveaux projets en
cours de réalisation.
Quant aux autres aspects du bien-êtreet du progrès économiques,
les témoignages et les faits reconnus montrent que les revenus des
indigènes du territoire ne le cèdent en rien aux revenus des habitants
de tous les autres pays comparables. Fait égalementremarquable, les
demandeurs ont dû admettre qu'ils nesoutenaient pas que le défe~deur
n'avait pas construit suffisamment de logements, d'écoles,de routes,
d'hôpitaux, d'installations destinéesl'irrigation, etc.
En ce qui concerne le progrès économique,il y a lieu de noter encore
que la politique appliquée consiste, lorsqu'ila des débouchésdans le
foyer d'un groupe, à accorder la préférenceaux membres de ce groupe
età agir généralemendtemême pour lesindigènesdans lesagglomérations
indigènes dela région blanche.La protection accordée à cet égard revêt
certainement une importance énorme.De mêmeque les meilleuresterres
des foyers indigènes passeraient rapidement aux mains des blancs, si la
loi n'interdisait pasde telles cessions, de mêmetrèsrares seraient proba-
blement les indigènes, si tant est qu'ilen eût, qui à l'heure actuelle
pourraient soutenir la concurrence des blancs pour ce qui est d'exploiter
les débouchés qu'offrenlte commerce, l'industrie et les carrières libérales
dans les foyers et les agglomérations indigènes.Toutefois, grâce une
politique de protection et d'encouragement spécial, consistant par
exemple àne pas demander le paiement de la patente, l'administration
a réussi àfixer des centaines de négociants indigènesdans les régions
et agglomérations indigènes;de nombreuses équip-sd'artisans indigènes
ayant bénéficiéd'une formation spéciale travaillenà la réalisation des
projets de développement et deconstruction entrepris dans les foyers
et les agglomérations; en 1963, le nombre des enseignants indigènes
atteignait plus 1200 et un nombre croissant d'indigènessont employés
par le Gouvernement dans leur propre région,en qualitéd'inspecteurs,
de secrétaires, d'employéde bureau, etc.
37. Dans le domaine de l'enseignement, desprogrès notables ont été
réalisés depuis1950 en ce qui concerne l'instruction des indigènes.
Le nombre des élèvesinscrits dans les écolesa plus que doubléde 1950
à 1962,passant de 22 659 à 47 088. Grâce à un nouvel accroissement, to 49,297. The 1962figure was estimated by the Odendaal Commission
to represent about 46per cent. of the over-allpossible school population.
The estimate for the present time is about 52 per cent. The Odendaal
Commission recommendations set their target at an increase to 60 per
cent. inal1Nativehomelands by 1970.These attendance figurescompare
more than favourably with those in other African States. The 1960
figure(40per cent. of the over-al1possible schoolpopulation) represented
9.2 per cent. of the total Native population in the Territory: the corre-
sponding percentage for Ethiopia (in 1961) was 0.910 and for Liberia
(also in 1961)4.421. For the African States as a whole, the proportion
of school-agepopulation at school in 1961wasgivenby a UnitedNations
publication as 16 per cent. In individual States the percentage ranged
from less than 2 percent. to "nearly 60 per cent." And "in the majority
of cases, the proportion of children out of school exceeds 80 per cent."
(Unesco/ED/180, p. 5.)
There is in South West Africa still an unsatisfactory falling off in
attendance figures in higher standards, but the situation is improving.
It may be expected to improve yet further upon implementation of the
Odendaal proposals. These involve the taking over of Native education
in South West Africa by the Bantu Education Department of the Re-
public, and the application by it of the methods of the Bantu education
system which have been such a triumphant success in the Republic, as
described to this Court by Dr. van Zyl in his evidence l. Further the
proposals involve more advanced and greater numbers of schools,
hostel facilitiesand facilitiesfor the training of teachers. The Commission
estimated that expenditure on the buildings alone would, in the case of
thenon-Whitegroups, amount to R3,500,000over the firstfiveyears.
38. In general the picture of South West Africa emerging from the
admittedfacts and theuncontested testimony is one of orderly, evolution-
ary progress, with the ovenvhelming majority of the inhabitants, White
and non-White, manifesting their support for Respondent's policies
in ever-increasing measure. In the case of the non-White peoples this
was demonstrated, intea rliaby the enthusiasm evoked by a recent visit,
at their own request, of leaders of a number of groups to the Republic
of South Africa, in order to seedevelopments in the Transkei and other
l The information he gave included the following: In 1964 nearly 2 million
Bantu children were at school, being over 80 per cent. of the school-age population,
and nearly 32,000 Bantu teachers, including school principals, were employed.
There were at present 55 Bantu school inspectors and 170Bantu assistant inspectors.
At the end of 1965about 1,300 Bantu candidates were expected to write the official
White and Coloured persons) of whom about 800 were expected to pass. Fors for
the Junior Certificate (two years lower) the candidate figure was 12,000, of whom,
7,000 to 8,000 were expected to pass. SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 189
ce chiffre a étéporté à 49 297 en 1963.Selon la Commission Odendaal,
le chiffre de 1962représenterait environ 46 pour cent de la population
totale d'âge scolaire. A l'heure actuelle, le taux de scolarisation serait
de l'ordre de 52 pour cent. Les recommandations de la Commission
Odendaal visent à porter ce taux à 60 pour cent dans tous les foyers
indigènespour 1970.De tels chiffressoutiennent plus qu'honorablement
la comparaison avec ceux qui ont étéatteints dans d'autres Etats afri-
cains. Le taux de 1960 (40 pour cent de la population d'âge scolaire)
représentait 9,2pour cent de la population indigènetotale du territoire,
alors queles tauxcorrespondants atteints en 1961enEthiopie et au Libéria
étaient respectivement de 0,910 et de 4,421. Pour les Etats africains
considérésdans leur ensemble, une publication des Nations Unies a
signaléque 16 pour cent de la population d'âge scolaire fréquentait
les écolesen 1961. Selon les Etats, ce pourcentage variait entre moins
de 2 pour cent et ((prèsde 60 pour cent ».((Dans la majoritédes cas, le
pourcentage des enfants ne fréquentant pas les écolesdépasse80 pour
cent 1)(Unesco/ED/180, p. 5).
Lesclasses supérieuresau Sud-Ouest africain voient encore les effectifs
accuser un fléchissement peusatisfaisant, mais la situation s'améliore.
Il est permis d'escompter de nouveaux progrès lorsque les propositions
Odendaal seront appliquées.Celles-ci prévoient que le département de
l'éducation bantouede la Républiqueprendra en charge l'enseignement
indigènedans le Sud-Ouest africain et y mettra en Œuvreles méthodes
du systèmed'éducation bantoue qui ont remporté dans la République
le succèstriomphal décrit à la Cour par M. van Zyl, au cours de sa
déposition l. La Commission prévoit en outre des écoles, logements
d'élèves etd'étudiants, moyens de formation d'enseignants plus nom-
breux et plus perfectionnés.La Commission a estiméque, pour les seuls
bâtiments, les dépenses s'élèveraiend t,ans le cas des groupes non blancs,
à 3 500000 rands au cours des 5 premières années.
38. D'une manière générale, lesfaits reconnus et les témoignages
non contestésfont apparaître le Sud-Ouest africain comme un pays qui
évolue progressivementet dans l'ordre et où la majorité écrasantedes
habitants, qu'ils soient blancs ou non blancs, manifeste dans une mesure
toujours croissante son appui à la politique du défendeur. En ce qui
concerne les populations non blanches, ce fait ressort notamment de
l'enthousiasme suscitéchezelles par la récente visite que,sur leur propre
demande, les dirigeants d'un certain nombre de zroupes ont effectuée
l M. van Zyl a notamment communiqué à la Cour les renseignements suivants:
En 1964, près de 2 000 000 d'enfants bantous, soit plus de 80 pour cent de la popu-
lation d'âge scolaire, fréquentaient les écoleset près deenseignants bantous,
et notamment des directeurs, étaient en fonctions.ompte actuellement 55 ins-
pecteurs scolaires bantous et 170 inspecteurs adjoints.fin de 1965, 1300 can-
didats bantous environ devaient se présenter l'examen officiel de fin d'études
(Matriculation ou Senior Certfficate) qui est le mêmeque pour les blancs et les
métis et on prévoyait environ 800 succès. Pour leor Certificate, que l'on passe
deux zns avant le Senior Certificate, le nombre des candidaétait de 12 000,
dont 7000 à 8000 devaient pouvoir réussir. examples of application of the policy of separate development in the
Republic.
ResuIts of Applying the Alleged Norm or Standnrds
39. Against the background of what has been set out above, it seems
self-evident that application of the suggested norm or standards in
South West Africa is likely to prove disastrous, as was indeed empha-
tically stated in evidence by one expert after another.
40. In the political sphere which is largely the key to well-being in
al1 spheres, application of the norm or standards would mean that
Respondent is obliged to treat the Territory as an integrated unit, to be
governed by a central parliament elected on the basis of a system that
will ultimately be one man one vote.
Mr. Cilliein his evidence pointed outthat this would mean domination
by the Ovambos, forming 45 per cent. of the population, or by ruthless
men exploiting their numerical preponderance; the domination would
mean submergence of the most developed minority groups-the White,
the Coloured and the Rehoboth groups-as well as the least developed
ones-the Bushmen and the tribes of the Kaokoveld.
"It means to these people, as it means to the Whites, that they
are being forced to commit a form of national suicide, and that
prospect evokes al1 the forces of resistance that you would expect
in any nation in similar circumstances." (C.R. 65/61, p. 101.)
Later he said pointedly: "It would mean chaos" (C.R. 65/61, p. 146).
One need merely have regard to chaotic conditions existing ordevelop-
ing in numerous African countries, where several relatively under-
developed nations constitute one political State, to realize that if the
Applicants' policy is appliedunder present circumstances the inevitable
result would indeed be retrogression and chaos. The sad histories of
numerous African States, e.g., the former Trust Territory Ruanda-
Urundi (now Rwanda and Burundi), the former French Cameroons,
Algeria, Ghana, the Congo, the Sudan, Kenya, Zanzibar,Togo, Nigeria,
the Central African Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and
other States-such as Cyprus-speak for themselves.
When universal franchise is introduced into a fairly homogeneous
Societythere is a reasonable prospect of success, even where the general
standard of development of the electorate is fairly low. But whenvarious
national groups differing widely as to physical appearance, ethnic
stock, culture, language, and standards of development are being
integrated into the same political system, failure seems to be inevitable.
The tensions, uncertainties and disharmonies which arise from attempts
at assimilation of peoples with gross dissimilarities are strong enough
188en République sud-africaine, afin de se rendre compte des progrès
accomplis au Transkei et de voir d'autres exemples de l'application de la
politique de développement séparé.
Conséquences del'application de la norme ou des ((standards 1)invoqués
39. Compte tenu de ce que je viens d'exposer, il semble évidentque
l'application au Sud-Ouest africain de la norme ou des ((standards ))
invoqués aurait probablement des conséquences désastreuses,comme
les experts l'ont en fait vigoureusement souligné l'un après l'autre dans
leurs dépositions.
40. Dans le domaine politique, qui commande dans une large mesure
le bien-êtredans tous les domaines, l'application de la norme ou des
((standards » obligerait le défendeur à traiter le territoire comme une
unitéintégrée, gouvernée par un parlement central élusur la base d'un
système qui en définitiveaccorderait a chacun une voix.
Dans sa déposition, M.Cillie a signaléque le pays passerait ainsi sous
la domination des Ovambos, qui constituent 45 pour cent de la popu-
lation totale, ou bien d'hommes sans scrupules qui exploiteraient leur
prépondérance numériqueD . ans ces conditions, les groupes minoritaires
les plus évolués,à savoir les blancs, les métiset les groupes du Rehoboth
Gebiet, tout comme les moins évolués, à savoir les Boschimans et les
tribus du Kaokoveld, seraient submergés.
(Ces peuples-là, comme les blancs, seraient contraints à une sorte
de suicide national et cette perspective met toujours en branle
toutes les forces de résistance auxquelles on peut s'attendre dans
n'importe quelle nation en pareil cas. »(C.R. 65/61bis, p. 101.)
Ultérieurement, M. Cillie a dit sansambages: «Cela signifierait le chao))
(C.R. 65/61, p. 146).
Il suffit de constater le désordre qui règne ou qui s'instaure dans de
nombreux pays africains dans lesquels plusieurs ethnies relativement
peu développées forment un Etat politique unique pour serendre compte
que si l'on devait dafis les conditions actuelles appliquer la politique
des demandeurs, on opérerait inévitablement un retour en arrière et
on aboutirait au chaos. La triste histoire de bon nombred'Etats africains,
comme l'ancien territoire sous Mandat du Ruanda-Urundi (maintenant
le Rwanda et le Burundi), l'ancien Cameroun français, l'Algérie,le
Ghana, le Congo, le Soudan, le Kenya, Zanzibar, le Togo, la Nigéria,
la Fédération deRhodésieet du Nyassaland, et d'autres Etats comme
Chypre est suffisamment éloquente.
Lorsque le suffrage universel est instauré dans une sociétépassable-
ment homogène, les chances de succèssont assez bonnes, mêmesi le
degré général d'évolutionde l'électorat est relativement bas. Mais,
lorsque divers groupesnationaux présentant de grandes différencesquant
à leur aspect physique, leur origine raciale, leur culture, leur langue et
leur degré d'évolutionsont intégrésdans un mêmesystème politique,
l'échec sembleinéluctable. Les tensions, incertitudes et discordances
qui se produisent quand on cherche à assimiler des populations fort
188to doom to failure any schemes that the ingenuity of man may devise.
One should bear in mind that these separate groups existed at all
material times. The Respondent did.not create them. There is no justifi-
cation for forcing people to live together who have no desire to live to-
gether, when it is possible to avoid it. There is no justification for forcing
different communities to be dissolved into one integrated political unit,
when they are opposed thereto, and when one knows that retrogression,
chaos and sufferingwill result therefrom.
41. In the economic sphere, the first important consideration is the
effect that would come from application of the norm or standards in
the political sphere. The White group would either depart or be drawn
into endless strife, possibly hostilities. Either event would either collapse
or cripple the economy.
But application of the norm or standards in the economic sphere
itself would directly bring about similar results. It would mean doing
away with the various reciprocal protections, and with the special
advantages, to which 1 have referred above. The effects, especially for
the indigenous groups, seem obvious.
1quote Professor Krogh:
".. .under the circumstances 1 have sketched to you, and bearing
in mind these diverse social and economic conditions in South
West Africa, 1 have little doubt in saying that it would lead to the
rapid deterioration of the material and economic welfare of the
majority of the population, and by this 1 particularly refer to the
non-White population groups. 1 can also see that they will not
tolerate this and that this might verywell lead to social strife, that
would in fact arrest the economic development of South West
Africa, which 1 think is an exceptional example in Africa .. ."
(C.R. 65/65, pp. 44-45.)
He was strongly supported by others. Professor Logan's diagnosis
of the effects of removal of the controls included "the subjugation or
almost obliteration of some of the existing tribal groups", also "violent
antagonism and frequently ... warfare". He expected that "the economy
... would, to a large extent fa11apart" and that "a rather chaotic situ-
ation would develop" (C.R. 65/58,pp. 46-47).And Mr. Pepler predicted:
"... it will be a very tragic day for the Native peoples" (C.R. 65/69,
p. 62).
42. In the educational sphere, Dr. van Zyl and Professor Eiselen,
who are undoubtedly experts in this field, described to the Court the
advantages of the system of differentiation. They demonstrated that
where a school for aparticular community is governedby the community,
theinterest of the communityin the school and in education is stimulated.
They described the advantages of mother-tongue as a medium of in-
189 dissemblables sont suffisamment puissantes pour condamner à l'échec
tous les projets que l'ingéniositéhumaine peut forger.
Il ne faut pas oublier que les groupes distincts du Sud-Ouest africain
ont toujours existé.Ce n'est pas le défendeurqui les a créés.Rien ne
saurait justifier que l'on force la vie commune des hommes n'éprou-
vant aucun désirde vivre ensemble, alors qu'il est possible de l'éviter.
Rien ne saurait justifier que l'on oblige descommunautés différentes à
se fondre en une unité politique intégrée,alors qu'elles y sont hostiles
et que l'on sait pertinemment que l'on opérera un retour en arrière
dans le chaos et la souffrance.
41. Sur le plan économique,il importe de considéreren tout premier
lieu les conséquencesqui résulteraient de l'application de la norme ou
des ((standards» dans le domaine politique. Le groupe blanc quitterait
le pays ou serait entraîné dans des luttes interminables, peut-êtredans
une guerre civile. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, l'économieserait soit ruinée,
soit paralysée.
L'application de la norme ou des ((standards)) en matière écono-
mique aboutirait immédiatement à des résultats analogues. Les diverses
protections réciproques et les avantages particuliers que j'ai évoqués
précédemment seraient abolis. Les conséquences, notamment pour
les groupes indigènes, paraissent évidentes.
Je citeM. Krogh:
((dans les circonstances que je vous ai indiquées et compte tenu
de la diversité desconditions sociales et économiquesau Sud-Ouest
africain, je n'hésite guère dire que cela conduirait à une baisse
rapide du bien-êtrematériel et économique de la majorité de la
population -je me réfèreparticulièrement à cet égard aux groupes
de populations non blancs. J'estime qu'ils ne toléreront pas cela.
Cela pourrait très bien mener à un conflit social et arrêteren fait
le développement économiquedu Sud-Ouest africain, lequel cons-
titue je crois un exemple exceptionnel en Afrique ..» (C.R. 65/65,
p. 44-45).
D'autres témoinsont fermement corroboréla dépositionde M. Krogh.
Analysant les conséquencesde la suppression des contrôles, M. Logan
a notamment mentionné a l'assujettissement ou peut-êtrel'élimination
de certains groupes tribaux existants », ainsi qu'«un violent antagonis-
me et des luttes fréquentes1)Il pensait que ((l'économie...s'effondrerait
dansune grande mesure » et qu'ilen résulterait«une situationchaotique))
(C.R. 65/58, p. 46-47). M. Pepler a déclaréde son côté qu'«une telle
norme aurait un effet tragique pour les populations indigènes » (C.R.
65/69, p. 62).
42. Dans le domaine de l'éducation, MM. van Zyl et Eiselen, qui
sont sans aucun doute experts en la matière, ont décrit à la Cour les
avantages que présentele système de différenciation.Ils ont démontré
que là où une école destinée à une certaine collectivitéest administrée
par cette dernière, l'intérêt ue la collectivité témoignepour l'école et
l'éducationse trouve stimulé.Ils ont décritles avantages que la languestruction. It seems clear beyond any doubt that today it is generally
accepted that this method of teaching is the best. Dr. van Zyl emphasized
that the vernacular was of the utmost importance in bridging the gap
between the home and the school and that it led to parents displaying
a greater interest in the education of their children. In his opinion the
use ofthe mother-tongue was the best wayto ensurethat pupils understood
what they were being taught. Furthermoreit promoted original thinking.
Experiments had shown that pupils taught through the medium of their
own language performed better at school, in al1subjects, than pupils who
were taught through a foreign medium.
If a system of joint schooling were introduced, mother-tongue in-
struction would become impossible, and al1 the advantages attached
thereto, and to the system as a whole, would be lost. In any event it is
common cause that had such a system been attempted it would have
failed. The undisputed evidence is that by having the present system
the Respondent is acting in accordance with the wishes of the vast
majority of the population of the Territory.
Dr. van Zyl's conclusion was:
"The differences among the population groups in background,
language, tradition and culture are so big that the people do not
mix socially, with the result that integrated schools are almost
inconceivable. From what 1 know of the people, there cannot be
peaceful integration in the field of education and any attempt
to enforce integration will cause the collapse of the educational
services."
43. On the admitted and uncontroverted facts the above conclusions
are so indisputable that it is small wonder that Applicants' Agent,
towards the end of the proceedings, refrained from an attempt at con-
testing them. Instead he attempted to evade them by suggesting that they
were not directed at the contents, properly understood, of the norm or
standards on which he was relying. He became inconsistent on the
question whether the norm or standards did involve one integrated
political systemwith universal adult suffrage, but in the end he conceded
that such was the "target for achievement". In the economic sphere he
seemed to suggest that protective and preferential measures in favour
of the non-White groups were permissible, but that such measures
in favour of the White group were per se impermissible as constituting
"racial discrimination", a concept which he did not attempt to define.
Nor did he attempt to explain how such a distinction could be said to
be contained in the norm or standards as formally defined and incor-
porated in Applicants' amended submissions, or to relate to any of
the alleged sources of the norm or standards. In regard to educa-
tion he avoided the question of integrated schools, contenting him-
190maternelle offre en tant que véhiculede l'instruction. De nos jours, il
est généralement admis,la chose ne semble pas faire le moindre doute,
que cette méthode d'enseignement est la meilleure. M. van Zyl a insisté
sur le fait que la langue vernaculaire joue un rôle essentiel en comblant
le fosséentre la maison et l'écoleet que son emploi amène les parents à
manifester un intérêt plusgrand pour l'instruction de leurs enfants.
A son avis, l'utilisation de la langue maternelle constitue le meilleur
moyen de mettre l'enseignement à la portée des élèves. Elledéveloppe
en outre leur aptitude à penser par eux-mêmes.Des expériences ont
montré que des élèvesinstruits dans leur propre langue réussissaient
mieux en classe dans toutes les matières que des élèvesinstruits par le
truchement d'une langue étrangère.
Si un régimed'enseignement intégréétait instauré, l'instruction dans
la langue maternelle deviendrait impossible; tous les avantages qu'elle
comporte, et que présente le système considérédans son ensemble,
seraient anéantis. En tout cas, il a été reconnu depart et d'autre que,
si l'on avait fait l'essai d'une tel régime,on aurait échoué.Les faits non
contestés prouvent qu'en appliquant le système actuel le défendeur agit
conformément aux vŒux de la grande majorité de la population du
territoire.
M. van Zyl a conclu:
((Lesdifférencesqui existent entre les divers groupes de la popu-
lation, quant à leur histoire, leur langue, leurs traditions et leur
culture sont si grandes que ces populations sont séparéespar un
cloisonnement social; il serait donc presque inconcevable de créer
des écolesintégrées. D'aprèsce que je sais de ces populations, je
pense qu'une intégration pacifique dans le domaine de l'enseigne-
ment est impossible et que toute tentative pour l'imposer entraîne-
rait l'effondrement de l'enseignement. »
43. Les conclusions ci-dessus se dégagent si irréfutablement des faits
admis et indiscutés qu'il n'estguèreétonnant que l'agent des demandeurs
se soit vers la fin de la procédure abstenu de toute tentative de contes-
tation. En revanche, il a essayéd'éluderces conclusions en donnant à
entendre qu'elles ne portaient pas sur la teneur véritablement comprise
de la norme ou des standards ))sur lesquels il se fondait. 11a varié
dans ses réponses àla question de savoir si la norme ou les ((standards »
impliquaient un système politique intégré, avec suffrage universel des
adultes, mais a finalement admis que tel était ((l'objectifà atteindre)).
Dans le domaine économique, il a semblé suggérerque des mesures de
protection et de préférenceen faveur des groupes non blancs pouvaient
êtreautorisées mais que de telles mesures en faveur du groupe blanc
étaient à priori intolérables comme constituant des cas de (discrimina-
tion raciale»,concept qu'il n'a pas tentéde définir.Il n'a pas davantage
essayé d'expliquer comment l'on peut affirmer que pareille distinction
est conforme à la norme ou aux ((standards »,tels qu'ils sont formelle-
ment définiset incorporés dans les conclusions reviséesdes demandeurs,
ou découlede l'une quelconque des prétendues sources de cette norme
190self with a somewhat obscure subtlety about compulsory education.
Al11 need say about these manoeuvres is that they are not attractive,
either as to their merit or their timing, and that they do not advance
the Applicants' cause: they have rather the opposite effect. The case is
concerned with a nom or standards as set out in the definitionformally
incorporated in the amended submissions. The case cannot now be
considered as if it were concerned with something else. The attempt
to do so appears to be an acknowledgement that the norm or standards,
as contemplated in the amended submissions have been shown to be
non-existent.
44. These considerations lead to the inevitable conclusion that there
was not only no need for the creation of the alleged norm or standards,
but that, had they been appliedin South WestAfrica,the purpose of the
Mandate would have been defeated.
Conclusion
45. In al1these circumstancesthere can be no doubt that the alleged
norm or standards do not existand in any event do not apply to Article 2
(2) of the Mandate Declaration for South West Africa.
Article 2 (1) of the Mandate
(ApplicantsySubmissionNo. 5)
1. Applicants' Final Submission No. 5, as amended on 19 May 1965,
reads as follows:
"5. Respondent, by word and by action, has treated the Territory
in a manner inconsistent with the international status of the Terri-
tory, and has thereby impeded opportunities for self-determination
by the inhabitants of the Territory; that such treatment is in vio-
lation of Respondent's obligations as stated in the first paragraph
of Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant; that
Respondent has the duty forthwith to cease such action and refrain
from similar action in the future; and that Respondent has the
duty to accord full faith and respect to the international status
of theTerritory."
It will be observed that the submission, on its own, is completely
vague, inasmuch as the "word" and "action" relied upon are not
identified at al]. The only possible clue to identification is to be found
in the preamble to al1the submissions, which contains the words "upon
the basis of allegations of fact, and the statements of law set forth in
the written pleadings and oral proceedings herein". These words are
also very wide and vague. They raise the problem of selecting from the
voluminous pleadings and records of the oral proceedings that which
was intended to be relied upon as constituting the "word" and the
"action" spoken of in the submissions.
191ou de ces ccstandards ». En ce qui concerne l'enseignement, il a éludé
la question des établissements intégrés,se contentant d'évoquerde
manière subtile et quelque peu obscure l'obligation scolaire.
Tout ce qu'il me reste à dire de ces manŒuvres, c'est qu'elles ne se
recommandentni par leur valeur ni par leur opportunité et qu'elles n7ap-
portent rien à la cause des demandeurs; au contraire. La thèse des
demandeurs concerne une norme ou des «standards» officiellement
définisdans les conclusions revisées.Ils ne sauraient maintenant pré-
tendre que leur thèseporte sur autre chose. En essayant de le faire, ils
semblent admettre qu'il a été démontré que Ia norme ou les ((standards 1)
envisagésdans le texte revisé desconclusions n'existent pas.
44. On en arrive ainsi inévitablement à conclure non seulement
qu'il n'étaitnullement nécessairede créerla norme ou les (standards ))
en question, mais que, encore s'ils avaient étéappliqués au Sud-Ouest
africain, ils seraient allés l'encontre de l'objet du Mandat.
Conclusion
45. Dans ces conditions, il ne saurait faire de doute que la norme ou
les ((standards» invoquésn'existent pas et, en tout cas, ne s'appliquent
pas au deuxièmealinéade l'article 2 de la déclaration de Mandat pour
le Sud-Ouest africain.
Article 2, premier alinéa,du Mandat
(Conclusion no 5 des demandeurs)
1. La conclusion finale no 5 des demandeurs, telle qu'elle a étéamen-
dée le 19 mai 1965, s'énoncecomme suit:
« 5. Le défendeurpar ses paroles et par ses actes, a agi à l'égard
du Territoire d'une manière incompatible avec le statut interna-
tional du Territoire et a entravé par là les chances qu'avaient les
habitants du Territoire de s'engagerdans la voie del'autodétermina-
tion; ...ces agissements constituent une violation des obligations
du défendeur telles qu'elles figurentau premier alinéade l'article 2
du Mandat et à l'article 22 du Pacte: ..le défendeur a le devoir
de mettre sur-le-champ un terme à ses agissements et de s'abstenir
dans l'avenir de pareils agissements; et ...le défendeur a le devoir
de respecter en toute bonne foile statut international du Territoire.)
On remarquera que cette conclusion, considérée isolément, esp tar-
faitement vague puisque les «paroles » et les «actes» invoquésne sont
nullement précisés.On ne trouve un semblant de précision que dans
le préambule à l'ensemble des conclusions, qui commence ainsi: «Vu
les allégationsde fait et les considérations.de droit énoncéesdans les
écritureset les plaidoiries)).Ces termes aussi sont très générauxet très
vagues. Le problèmeconsiste donc à choisir dans les volumineuses pièces
de procédure écrite et lesnombreux comptes rendus de plaidoiries les
éléments destinés à servir de fondement aux cparoles » et aux « actes))
mentionnés dans les conclusions. 2. In the original version of this submission, as set out in the Me-
morials, the words "by word and by action" were followed immediately
by the words "in the respects setorth in Chapter VI11of this Memorial".
Those "respects" were easily identifiable. They consisted offour enumer-
ated officia1actions plus an alleged motive or intent on Respondent's
part to incorporate the Territory of South West Africa unilaterally into
the Union (now Republic) of South Africa. The contention was that
the four actions, read in the light of the alleged intent, constituted the
alleged violation of the obligations in question (Memorials, p. 195).
In view of the fact that the final submission no longer contains a
specific reference to these "respects set forth in Chapter VI11 of [the]
Memorial[s]", the question arises whether they were inte ,ded to form
part of the final submission. For reasons which 1 shall itLdicatelater, 1
am satisfiedthat, on a true analysis of events during the oral proceedings,
this question is to be answered in the negative and that Applicants have
indeed, for understandable reasons, abandoned reliance upon the said
actions and the said alleged intent. However, 1 do not wish to confine
myself to that conclusion for disposing of the said actions and alleged
intent as suggested grounds for acceding to the submission. As a matter
of merit they clearly do not, in my opinion, support the submission,
for reasons which 1proceed to state briefly.
3. The four actions relied upon in the Memorials were:
(a)"General conferral" of South African citizenship upon inhabitants
of South West Africa.
(b) Inclusion of representatives from South West Africa in the South
African parliament.
(c)Administrative separation of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel from the
rest of South West Africa.
(d) The vesting of South West Africa Native Reserve Land in the
South African Native Trust, and the transfer of administration of
Native affairsto the South African Minister of Bantu Administration
and Development.
In my viewit is unquestionable that these administrative and legislative
provisions prima facie did not go beyond an exercise of the "full power
of administration and legislation" vested in Respondent, including
the right to administer theTerritory "as an integral portion of the Union
of South Africa". And this is probably the reason why the original
submission relied, as indicated above, on Respondent's alleged motive
or intent as rendering illegal actions which might othenvise be un-
objectionable l.
aforegoingactions, read in the light of the Union's avowed intent, the Union has
violated, and is violat..."(Italics added.) (Footnote continuedoverleaf.)
192 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 194
2. Dans la version initiale de cette conclusion, telle qu'elle est consi-
gnéedans les mémoires, les termes ((par les paroles et par les actes »
étaientimmédiatement suivis des termes ((dans toutes les circonstances
exposées au chapitre VI11 du présent mémoire ». Ces ccirconstances »
pouvaient êtrefacilement identifiées. Ils s'agissait en l'occurrence de
quatre actes officielsûment énumérés ainsique d'un mobile ou d'une
intention, à savoir que le défenderir aurait voulu incorporer par une
décision unilatérale le territoire du Sud-Ouest africain dans l'Union
(maintenant la République) sud-africaine. La thèse était que ces quatre
actes, compte tenu de l'intention présuméede l'Afrique du Sud, consti-
tuaient la violation alléguée desobligations en cause (mémoires,p.195).
Comme la conclusion finale ne mentionne plus expressément ces
((circonstances exposéesau chapitre VI11du mémoire »,la question se
pose de savoir si l'on a eu l'intention de les y faire figurer. Pour des
raisonsque je vais exposer, je suis convaincu qu'une analyse rigoureuse
des événementssurvenus au cours de la procédure orale oblige àrépondre
à cette question par la négativeet que les demandeurs ont en fait, pour
des raisons compréhensibles, renoncé à se fonder sur lesdits actes et
sur ladite intention présumée.Je ne voudrais toutefois pas m'appuyer
simplement sur cela pour dire que ces actes et cette intention ne sauraient
êtreconsidéréscomme des motifs de fairr droit à la conclusion. Du point
de vue du fond, ils ne corroborent manifestement pas, à mon avis, la
conclusion, pour des raisons que je vais exposer brièvement.
3. Les quatre actes sur lesquels les demandeurs se sont fondés dans
les mémoiresont consisté à:
a) ((conférer d'une manière généralisée)l)a citoyenneté sud-africaine
aux habitants du Sud-Ouest africain;
b) admettre au Parlement sud-africain des représentants du Sud-Ouest
africain;
c) séparer du point de vue administratif le Caprivi Zipfel oriental du
reste du Sud-Ouest africain;
d) confier l'administration des réservesindigènes du Sud-Ouest africain
au South African Native Trust, et transférer les affaires indigènes
au ministre de l'administration et du développementbantous.
A mon avis, il est incontestable qu'à première vue ces dispositions
administratives et législatives entraient parfaitement dans le cadre de
l'exercice des ((pleins pouvoirs d'administration et de législation))
conférésau défendeur,et notamment du droit d'administrer le territoire
«en tant que partie intégrante de l'Union sud-africaine)). C'est pro-
bablement pour cette raison que la conclusion initiale était fondée,
comme je l'ai signalé ci-dessus,sur le mobile ou l'intention imputés
au défendeur comme rendant illicites des actes qui, en leur absence,
seraient peut-être irréprochables l.
Voir l'énoncéde la conclusion lapage 195 des mémoires: KPar cesagisse-
ments envisagés compte tenu des intentions avouées de l'Union, celle-ci a violé
et viole encor...»(Les italiques sont de nous(Suite de la note page suivante.)
192 4. A question of primary importance is therefore whether the alleged
motive or intent was established as a fact. It can hardly be doubted that
the answer is in the negative.
In the first instance, this pointis really disposed of by Applicants'
admissions of fact to which 1 referred when dealing with Submissions
Nos. 3 and 4. These admissions related also to disputed facts concerned
with Submission No. 5. Indeed, that the admission was intended to
embrace also such facts, appears clearly from a statement by Applicants'
Agent in which he referred to-
"... the facts with respect both to militarization and annexation,
as disputed by the Respondent, and as subsequently accepted by
the Applicants for purposes of these proceedings".
Respondent had, in its pleadings, drawn very sharp issue with the
allegation of an intent or purpose or motive to incorporatethe Territory.
It directly denied the existence of such an intent, etc., and, indeed,
expressed an intention of continuing to administer the Territory as if
the sacred trust provisions of the Mandate were still in force. Detailed
expositions and analyses of fact were offeredin support of the denial.
In my view there can be no doubt that the issue thus drawn was
one of fact. In the oft-quoted words of Bowen, L.J.: "The state of a
man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion." (Edgington
v. Fitzmaurice(1885), 29 Ch.D. 459 at p. 483.) It seems clear therefore
that Applicants' admissions wouldon ordinary principles have embraced
also this dispute.
However, it is not necessary to speculate, since Applicants them-
selves rendered it abundantly clear that they regarded Respondent's
state of mind as a fact, and that they must therefore have intended
Respondent's version of this fact to fa11within the compass of their
admissions. This may be illustrated by two quotations. On 27 April,
Applicants' Agent referred to :
"Respondent's apparent misconception that any of the Appli-
cants' reasons, or arguments, reflect their assumption that state of
mind, motive or purpose is something other than a fact."
In reply to this "misconception" the learned Agent then continued:
"Many situations of course are known to the law in which
motive, or intent, is not merely a relevant fact but, indeed, may
be a decisive one . ..Further discussion of so elementary a matter
as to whether motive, or state of mind, is a fact, and provable as
such, would be a waste of the Court's time."
Note also the sentence at page 186: "Motive is an important indicator since it
sheds light upon the significance of individual actions, which might otherwise
seem ambiguous."
193 4. La question de savoir si le mobile ou le dessein alléguéa été établi
comme un fait revêtdonc une importance capitale. Il n'est guèredouteux
que la réponse à cette question soit négative.
En premier lieu, elle est tranchéepar les acquiescementsdes deman-
deurs, que j'ai mentionnés en examinant les conclusions nos 3 et 4.
Ces acquiescements ont porté égalementsur les faits contestés relatifs
à la conclusion no 5. Que l'on ait entendu englober tous ces faits, voilà
qui ressort clairement d'une déclaration de l'agent des demandeurs,
dans laquelle celui-ci mentionnait:
ccles faits concernant la militarisation et l'annexion, contestés
par le défendeuret admis ensuite par les demandeurs aux fins des
présents débats )).
Dans les piècesde procédure écrite, le défendeur avait trèsvivement
contesté l'allégation relative à son intention, à son mobile ou à son
dessein d'incorporer le territoire. Il a directement nié l'existence d'une
telle intention, etc., et manifesté celle de continuer à administrer le
territoire comme si les dispositions du Mandat relatives à la mission
sacréede civilisation étaient toujours en vigueur. Enfin, il a soumis des
exposéset analysesde faits détaillés à l'appui de sa dénégation.
A mon sens, il ne saurait faire de doute que la question ainsi posée
était une question de fait. Pour reprendre les paroles si souvent citées
de L. J. Bowen, ((L'étatd'esprit d'un homme est un fait au mêmetitre
que sa digestion. »(Edgingtonc. Fitzmaurice, 1885, 29 Ch. D., p. 483).
En conséquence,il paraît clair qu'en vertu des principes courants les
acquiescements des demandeurs ont égalementporté sur la contestation
dont il s'agit.
Toute conjecture est vaine cependant, puisque les demandeurs eux-
mêmesont précisétrès nettement qu'ils considéraient l'état d'espritdu
défendeur comme un fait; ils ont donc nécessairement estiméque la
version donnéede ce fait par le défendeurentrait dans le cadre de leurs
acquiescements. Je puis citer sur ce point deux extraits des demandeurs.
Le 27 avril, leur agent a déclaré:
((Le défendeur ...semble estimer, à tort, que tous le; motifs
et tous les arguments des demandeurs procèdent de leur idée que
l'état d'esprit, lemobile ou le but, sont autre choseque des faits.»
Pour dissiper cette erreur, l'éminent agenta alors poursuivi:
((Onconnaît évidemment endroit maintes situations où le mobile
ou l'intention sont non seulement des faits pertinents, mais encore
des faits décisifs.. Ce serait faire perdre son temps à la Cour
que de discuter plus avant d'une question aussi élémentaire que
celle de savoir si un mobile ou un état d'esprit est un fait et peut
être prouvé en tant que tel.))
Voir égalementla phrase suivante àla page «Le mobile fournit une indication
précieuse,car il éclairela signification de certains actes isolésqui, sans lui, pourraient
sembler ambigus.a On 18 May, i.e., the second last day of Applicants' argument, their
Agent confirmed this attitude. He is recorded as saying-
". .. the subjective analysis is, as the Respondent has properly
pointed out, one which is susceptible of factual determination; as
the Respondent has said repeatedly, it is possible for courts to
ascertain states of mind; facts are determinable in terms of states
of mind. In certain types of legal problems-delicts, crimes-the
state of mind is indeed the crucially relevant fact that determines
the character of the crime. Tlierefore there is no question but that
a state of mind is determinable as a fact. However, as applied to
the objective of the Mandate, the state of mind with which the
Respondent approaches its task, whilea fact,nevertheless does not
appear to the Applicants to be a fact whiclî is determinative of the
purposes of the Mandate itself ..."
Thislast quotation conîirms agzin that the very purpose of the admissions
wasto avoid thefurther evidential enquiry that might have been necessary
had the dispute, inter alia, as to intent, persisted.
5. However, even if there may be any doubt as to the intended ambit
of Applicants' admissions in the above respect, it is abundantly clear
from the record that no question of any improper state of mind on
Respondent's part could in any event have remained once the more
tangiblefacts set out by Respondent were accepted as true. Respondent's
expositions included a whole chapter of relevant statements and facts
that had not been mentioned in the Memorials, some not in this context
and some not at al1(see Book VI11of the Counter-Memorial, section C,
Chapter II, pp. 94-105).They included also evidence as to actual benefits
received by the inhabitants from the ineasures complained of (ibid.,
Chapters IV-VII, pp. 114-156; Rejoinder, Vol. II, pp. 454-457). Al1 of
this material requires to be considered before any inference as to state
of mind can be drawn. And upon such consideration there remains
not even a suspicion that Respondent might be embued with the intent
or motive to incorporate South West Africâ unilaterally intothe Republic
and that consequently its repeated denials of such an intent or motive
are to be disbelieved. On the contrary, to mention only oneconsideration,
in the light of the admitted fact that Respondent is pursuing a policy
aimed at separate self-determination for the various population groups
of South West Africa, it is difficult to see what practical purpose could,
from Respondent's point of view, be served by an iiiterim attempt at
interim incorporation of the Territory into the Republic.
6. The firm conclusion from the admissions and the eventually
undisputed facts is therefore that Respondent was not motivated by,
and indeed did not have, any intention or motive to annex or incorporate
the Territory, and that the measures complained of were not only
intended for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Territory, but, in fact,
operated to their benefit.
194 Le 18mai, c'est-à-dire l'avant-dernier jour de la plaidoirie des deman-
deurs, leur agent a confirmécette attitude. Il a déclaréau cours de cette
audience :
((l'analyse subjective est, comme le défendeur le fait remarquer à
juste titre, une analyse qui peut être fondéesur des faits; comme le
défendeur l'aaffirmé à plusieurs reprises, il est possible aux tribu-
naux de vérifierl'état d'esprit; les faits peuvent êtredéterminés
d'après des états d'esprit. Dans certains types de problèmes juridi-
ques - délits, crimes - l'état d'espritest même lefait pertinent
capital qui détermine le caractère du crime. Par conséquent, on
peut dire qu'un état d'esprit peut êtredéterminéen tant que fait.
Toutefois, s'appliquant à l'objectif du Mandat, l'étatd'esprit dans
lequel le défendeur aborde sa tâche, s'il constitue bien un fait,
n'apparaît néanmoins pas aux demandeurs comme un fait qui
puisse déterminerles buts du Mandat lui-même ...))
Cette dernière citation confirme une fois de plus que l'objet même
des acquiescements était d'éviterla nouvelle recherche de preuves qui
aurait pu se révéler nécessairesi la contestation portant notamment
sur l'intention, avait persisté.
5. Toutefois, même s'ilpeut y avoir quelque doute au sujet de la
portéequ'à cet égardles demandeurs pensaient donner à leurs acquiesce-
ments, il ressort amplement du dossier qu'il ne pouvait plus êtrequestion
d'attribuer au défendeur des mobiles illicites, dèslors que les faits plus
concrets exposéspar lui étaientacceptés comme véridiques. Le défendeur
a notamment consacré un chapitre entier à l'exposéde déclarations et
de faits pertinents qui n'avaient pas été mentionnésdans les mémoires
ou l'avaient étéhors de ce contexte (voir livre VI11du contre-mémoire,
sect. C, chap. II, p. 94-105).Le défendeur a égalementfourni des preuves
sur les avantages que leshabitants ont tirésen fait des mesures incriminées
(ibid.,chap. IV-VII, p. 114-156,duplique, vol. II, p. 454-457).Il convient
d'étudiertoute cette documentationavant de pouvoirformuler la moindre
conclusion au sujet de l'état d'esprit incriminé.Cet examen ne permet
plus de soupçonner le défendeur d'avoir voulu ou entendu incorporer
unilatéralement le Sud-Ouest africain dans la République et ne permet
plus, par conséquent, d'écarter commemensongères ses dénégations
répétées sur ce point. Bien au contraire - pour ne mentionner qu'une
seuleconsidération -, si l'on tient compte du faitîrlmisque le défendeur
applique une politique tendant à l'autodétermination séparéedes divers
groupes de population du Sud-Ouest africain, on voit difficilement
quel objectif il pourrait viser en pratique en tentant provisoirement
d'incorporer à titre transitoire le territoire dans la République.
6. On peut par conséquent nettement conclure des acquiescements et
des faits finalement incontestésque le défendeurn'a nullement agi avec
l'intention ou le dessein, qu'il n'avait d'ailleurs pas, d'annexer ou d'in-
corporer le territoire et que les mesures incriminées étaient non seule-
ment conçues au profit des habitants du territoire, mais leur ont en
fait étéprofitables. This being so, Applicants' case as originally presented became
insupportable. As 1 have said earlier, the acts complained of fell prima
facie within the ambit of Respondent's powers of legislation and ad-
ministration. If it is admitted or established thatese acts were intended
to promote the well-being of the inhabitants and did so in fact, it seems
to me that Respondent cannot be held to have acted illegally in any
respect.
7. A contention to the contrary was advanced by Applicants for
the first time in their Reply (p.357), on an alternative basis. The sub-
mission was that the acts referred to in the Memorials constituted
"ipso ,facto, and without regard to Respondent's motive or purpose,
a violationof Respondent's obligationto respect the separate international
status of the Territory". Before dealing with issues raised by this con-
tention, 1 would point out that even if it were correct, the effect of
Applicants' above-mentioned admissions would at least be to reduce
their complaints to insignificant technicalities of which it may rightly
be said that de minimis non curat lex. As an illustration of what 1have
in mind, 1 may refer to Applicants' complaint regarding the general
conferment of South African citizenship on the inhabitants of the
Territory. If such conferment were shown to have been a step in a
deliberate scheme of piecemeal incorporation involving also an obstacle
to the political advancement of the inhabitants of the Territory, it would
have been a serious matter and would certainly have been regarded
as such by this Court. However, once it is accepted, as it now is, that
no such scheme exists and that the measure was introduced for the
advantage of the inhabitants, who have, as a fact, received only benefit
and no detriment whatsoever therefrom (and particularly no detriment
to their political advancement or detriment to the international status
of the Territory)1 cannot see what the practical significance would be
of a finding that technically it was wrong of Respondent to introduce
such a measure. This is, however, in passing-my own view is that the
suggestion of a per se violation of the Territory's international status
is not only immaterial from a practical point of view, but also untenable
in law, as1shall show more particularly in respect of each of the actions
in question.
8. The first of the four actions was termed in the Memorials "the
general conferral of Union citizenship upon the inhabitants of the
Territory". The relevant measure in this regard was Act 44 of 1949
which had the effectof extending South African citizenship to al1persons
born in South West Africa after a certain date. Theredoes not appear to
be any prohibition on such conferment in the Mandate, as indeed the
express authorization to administer the Territory "as an integral portion
of the Union of South Africa" and to "apply the laws of the Union of
South Africa to the territory, subject to such local modifications as
circumstances may require" would, in my view, suggest that it would be
permissible if properly done for the benefit of the inhabitants and not
for an ulteriorpurpose. Dans ces conditions, la thèse des demandeurs, telle qu'elle a été
initialement exposée, est devenue insoutenable. Comme je l'ai indiqué
précédemment,les actes incriminés entraient, à première vue, dans le
cadre des pouvoirs de législation et d'administration du défendeur. S'il
est admis ou établi que ces actes tendaient à accroître le bien-être des
habitants et ont eu en fait ce résultat, ilme semble que l'on ne saurait re-
procher au défendeur d'avoiragi illégalement àquelque égardque ce soit.
7. Les demandeurs ontpour la premièrefois expriméun avis contraire,
à titre subsidiaire, dans leur réplique (p. 357). Ils y ont affirméque les
agissements mentionnés dans les mémoires constituaient cipso facto
et quel que soit le mobile ou le but du défendeur,une violationde I'obli-
gation du défendeur de respecterle statut international du Territoire)).
Avant d'examiner les problèmes soulevéspar cette assertion, je voudrais
souligner que, mêmesi elle se révélait exacte,les acquiescements sus-
mentionnés des demandeurs auraient au moins pour effet de ramener
leurs griefs à des aspects techniques insignifiants dont on pourrait
affirmerà juste titre que deminimisnon curatlex. Pour illustrer ma pensée,
je me référeraiaux griefs des demandeurs, relatifs à l'attribution géné-
ralisée de la citoyenneté sud-africaine aux habitants du territoire. S'il
avait étédémontré quepareille attribution entrait dans le cadre d'un
plan précis d'incorporation progressive, faisant en outre obstacle au
progrès politique des habitants du territoire, l'affaire aurait été graveet
aurait certainement été considérée comme telle par la Cour. Mais une
fois que l'on accepte, comme je le fais, qu'un tel plan n'existe point
et que la mesure en question a été appliquéeau profit des habitants,
qui n'en ont en fait retiré que des avantages sans subir le moindre
préjudice, notamment en ce qui concerne leur progrès politique ou le
statut international du territoire, je ne vois pas quel intérêtil aurait
dans la pratique à constater que, du point de vue formel, le défendeur
avait tort d'appliquer une telle mesure. C'est n'est toutefoislà qu'une
parenthèse, car pour ma part j'estime que faire état d'une violation
en soi du statut international du territoire non seulement ne présente
aucun intérêd tans la pratique, mais est égalementinsoutenable en droit,
comme je le préciserai à propos de chacun des actes en cause.
8. Le premier des quatre actes incriminés dans les mémoires est
((l'attribution généraliséede la citoyenneté de l'Union aux habitants
du territoire)). La disposition pertinenteà cet éprd est la loi no 44
de 1949, qui a eu pour effet d'attribuer la citoyenneté sud-africaine à
toutes les personnes néesdans le Sud-Ouest africain après une certaine
date. Non seulement le Mandat ne semble pas interdire une telle attri-
bution, mais en fait l'autorisation expresse qui a étédonnéeau défendeur
d'administrer le territoire«comme partie intégrante » de son territoire
etd'«appliquer aux régions soumisesau mandat la législationde l'Union
de l'Afrique du Sud, sous réserve des modifications nécessitéespar
les conditions locales)tend à indiquer,à mon avis, que cette attribution
est licite dans la mesure où elle est faite dans l'intérêt dsabitants et
non pas dans une intention coupable. 198 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
9. Applicants, indeed, did not base their case in this regard on an
interpretation of the provisions of the Mandate. On the contrary, they
relied solely on the terms of a resoluticn of the Council of the League
of Nations dated 23 April 1923. It is clear that any resolution of the
League Council relating to the legal effect of the mandates is entitled
to great weight. On the other hand it must not be forgotten that the
Council did not possess legislative competence. Al1 obligations sought
to be imposed on the Mandatory must in the final analysis rest upon
the provisions of the Mandate.
10. Turning now to the terms of the Council resolution, 1 would
point out that it does not appear to oppose the introduction of joint
nationality as such-indeed it specificallyauthorized voluntary nation-
alization of individual inhabitants of mandated territories by the
mandatory power. The Council's main concern appears to have been
rather that inhabitants of mandated territories should not be completely
assimilatedwith the population of the mandatory power. "Assimilation"
was the crucial matter dealt with in the report of Marquis Theodoli
which formed the basis of discussions in the Permanent Mandates
Commission (Reply, p. 359). The same concept, although not by that
name, was the burden of the Commission's proposa1No. III and the
reasoning in support of it (Counter-Memorial, Book VIII, p. 115) and
also of the opening paragraph of the Council's resolution, which reads:
"The status of the Native inhabitants of a Mandated territory is
distinct from that of the nationals of the mandatory Power and
cannot be identified therewith by any process having general
application." (Counter-Memorial, Book VIIT, p. 116.)
If this is the correct interpretation of the resolution, it would in my view
not be transgressed by general nationalization by the mandatory of the
inhabitants of the mandated territory unless such inhabitants thereby
lost their separate status. In my view, Act 44 of 1949did not result in
any such loss. It did not purport to abolish or reduce the rights of the
Native inhabitants of the Territory; their status as inhabitants of a
mandated territory remained and is not shared by the inhabitants of
South Africa. Repeal of Act 44 of 1949would not add anything to the
rights of inhabitants of the Territory.
11. If1 am wrong in my above-stated view, and if the Council re-
solution should be read as intending to impose an absolute prohibition
on the general nationalization of the inhabitants of mandated territories,
irrespective of whethersuch inhabitants thereby lost their separate status
or not, 1 regret to say that 1 do not regard it as a correct statement of
the legal position. In my view no such provision was expressed, or can
be implied in the Mandate. On either viewof the meaning of the Council
resolution 1 accordingly find that Act 44 of 1949does not per se con-
stitute a violation ofthe separateinternationalstatus ofSouthWestAfrica.
196 9. En fait, les demandeurs n'ont pas fondé leur thèse à cet égard
sur une interprétation des dispositions du Mandat. Bien au contraire,
ils se sont uniquement fondés sur les termes d'une résolution du Conseil
de la Société desNations en date du 23 avril 1923. Il est évident que
toute résolution de la Société desNations, relative à l'effet juridique
des Mandats, revêtla plus grande autorité. Mais il ne faut pas oublier
non plus que le Conseil n'avait aucune compétence législative.Toutes
les obligations que l'on prétend imposer au Mandataire doivent, en
dernière analyse, découler des dispositions du Mandat.
10. Considérant le libellé de la résolution du Conseil, je voudrais
souligner que non seulement elle ne semblait pas interdire l'introduction
d'une nationalité commune en tant que telle, mais qu'en outre elle
autorisait expressémentla naturalisation à titre individuel, par la Puis-
sance mandataire, des habitants des territoires sous Mandat qui en
feraient la demande. Le Conseil paraît plutôt avoir surtout cherché à
éviterque les habitants des territoires sous Mandat soient complètement
assimilésà la population de la Puissance mandataire. L'cc assimilation))
a constitué la question cruciale examinée dans le rapport du marquis
Theodoli, qui a servi de base aux discussions de la Commission perma-
nente des Mandats (réplique, p. 359). Le mêmeconcept, différemment
qualifié d'ailleurs, a inspiré la propositionno III de la Commission
et les motifs exposés à l'appui de cette proposition (contre-mémoire,
livre VIII, p.15), ainsi que le paragraphe I de la résolution du Conseil
aux termes duquel :
a Le statut des habitants indigènes d'un territoire sous mandat
est distinct de celui des nationaux de la Puissance mandataire et
ne saurait être assimilé à ce statut par aucune mesure de portée
générale.» (Contre-mémoire, livre VIII, p. 116.)
Si c'estlà l'interprétation correcte de la résolution, celle-àimon avis
ne serait pas violée du fait d'une naturalisation généralisée,par le
Mandataire, des habitants du territoire sous Mandat, à moins que ces
habitants n'aient perdu de ce fait leur statut distinct. A mon sens, la
loi no 44 de 1949 n'a pas entraîné une telle perte. Elle ne visait pas à
abolir ou à réduire les droits des habitants indigènes du territoire.
Ceux-ci ont conservé leur statut d'habitants d'un territoire sous Mandat,
que n'ont pas les habitants de l'Afrique du Sud. En abrogeant la loi
no44 de 1949,on n'ajouterait rien aux droits des habitants du territoire.
11. Si l'on considérait mes vues comme erronées et si l'on inter-
prétait la résolution du Conseil comme tendant à interdire catégorique-
ment la naturalisation généraliséedes habitants des territoires sous
Mandat, indépendamment de la question de savoir s'ils devaient de ce
fait perdre leur statut distinct ou non, je regrette de dire que la situation
juridique ne me paraîtrait pas correctement définie. Selon moi, nulle
disposition en ce sens ne se trouve dans le Mandat, ni expressément ni
implicitement. Par suite, que l'on comprenne la résolution du Conseil
d'une manière ou d'une autre, je pense que la loi no 44 de 1949ne cons-
196 12. The second action raised in the Memorials, was the inclusion in
terms of Act 23 of 1949 of representatives from South West Africa in
the South African Parliament. In the Memorials the objection taken
to this measure was stated to be that it-
"... isnot only part of a plan to incorporate the Territory politically,
but also excludes 'natives' from the processes of self-government".
(Memorials, p. 193.)
The "plan to incorporate the Territory politically" has fallen by the
wayside and no more need be said about it. As regards the so-called
exclusion of the Natives from the processes of self-government, the Appli-
cants appear to have identified themselves with criticism in a report by
the Cornmittee on South West Africa to the effect that "the existing
arrangements. ..have excluded either the consultation or the represeiita-
tion of the largest section of the population. ..".
It will become apparent that charges or comment to this effect extend
beyond the per se effect of the legislation, and necessitate enquiry into
the whole political framework of which the legislation forms part.
Expositions on this subject were given by Respondent in its pleading
relative to Applicants' Submissions Nos. 3 and 4, and the facts thus
presented were eventually accepted as true by the Applicants. These
facts were further supplemented in uncontroverted testimony of expert
witnesses. From these admitted facts it appeared clearly that the above-
quoted comments of the Applicants and of the Committee on South
West Africa were not justified. The mere absence of representation of
non-White groups in the political institutions designed solely for the
White group, does not mean that the non-White groups are excluded
either from consultation or from processes of self-government. The fact
is that Respondent's system, with a view to the best interests of al1the
population groups concerned, makes distinct and separate provision for
the consultation, self-government and political development of each
group, in a manner best suited to the needs and circumstances of each
group. Once this is accepted, and acceptance, in my view, follows in-
evitably from the Applicants' admission, the averments and comment
under discussion will be seen to be unfounded.
It has also been suggested that the arrangements operate to the
detriment of the non-Whites, inasmuch as the interests of the White
part of the population are likely to be better served, e.g., if it came to
a partition of the Territory. This suggestion extends even further beyond
a case resting on theper se aspects of the particular legislation. Indeed,
a moment's reflection will show that it is completely out of place in the
present context. A complaint that the political institutions of the White
section of the population are more effectivethan those of other sections
197titue pas en soi une violation du statut international distinct du Sud-
Ouest africain.
12. Le deuxième desactes mentionnés dans les mémoiresa étél'ad-
mission de représentantsdu Sud-Ouest africain au Parlement sud-africain
aux termes de la loi no 23 de 1949. Dans les mémoires, on a critiqué
cette mesure en disant qu'elle
«nefaitpas seulement partie d'un plan visant àincorporer politique-
ment le territoire, mais vise encoreà exclure les indigènes de toute
participation au gouvernement de leur pays ». (Mémoires,p. 193.)
Le «plan visant à incorporer politiquement le territoire »a étélaissé
de côtéen cours de route de sorte qu'il est inutile d'en parler davantage.
En ce qui concerne la prétendueexclusion des indigènesde toute parti-
cipation au gouvernement de leur pays, les demandeurs semblent avoir
adoptéles critiques expriméesdans un rapport du Comitédu Sud-Ouest
africain et aux termes desquelles ((les arrangements en vigueur ...ont
empêché la consultation ou la représentation de la majeure partie de la
population ..))
Il est manifeste que des accusations ou des observations de ce genre
vont bien au-delà de l'effetintrinsèque de la législationet appellent une
enquêtesur l'ensemble de la structure politique dont cette législationne
constitue qu'un aspect. Le défendeura traité dece point dans ses pièces
de procédureécrite à propos des conclusions nos3 et 4 des demandeurs
et les faits présentéà cette occasion ont étéfinalement acceptéscomme
véridiquespar les demandeurs. Ces faits ont en outre étéétayéspar les
témoignagesincontestés des experts appelés à déposer. Cesfaits admis
ont démontré clairement que les observations susmentionnées des
demandeurs et du Comitédu Sud-Ouest africain n'étaient Lasidstifiées.
Le simple fait qu'il n'y ait pas de représentantsdes groupes non blancs
dans les institutions politiques créées exclusivementpour le groupe
blanc ne signifie pas que les groupes non blancs soient exclus de toute
consultation ou participation à des organes autonomes de gouverne-
ment. En fait, pour favoriser au mieux les intérêtsde tous les groupes
de population en cause, le défendeurprévoit,dans le cadre du système
en vigueur, des dispositions distinctes et séparées en vue dela consul-
tation, de l'autonomie et du développementpolitique des divers groupes,
selon les modalitésles mieux adaptées aux besoins et à la situation de
chacun. Une fois que l'on acceptece fait - ce qui, à mon avis, découle
inévitablement des acquiescements des demandeurs - les allégations
et observations en question se révèlentsans fondement.
On a égalementaffirméque les arrangements pris portent préjudice
aux non-blancs, en ce sens que les intérêtsdu groupe blanc seraient
probablement favoriséssi l'on en arrivait par exemple à un partage du
territoire. Cette assertion dépasse encoreune thèsefondéesur les aspects
à priori de la législationen cause. En fait, il suffit d'un instant de ré-
flexion pour se rendre compte qu'elle est parfaitement déplacéedans le
présent contexte. Se plaindre de ce que les institutions politiques du
groupe ethnique blanc sont plus efficaces que les institutions d'autreswould not appear to have any relevance to alleged violations of the
separate international status of the Territory, with which 1 am dealing
at present. It could have a bearing, if at all, only on that part of the case
dealing with the alleged failure on the part of Respondent to promote
well-being and progress in the political sphere, i.e., Applicants' Submis-
sions Nos. 3 and 4. As 1 have shown when dealing with these sub-
missions, Applicants no longer attempt to establish a case on the basis
of unfairness towards, or oppression of, the non-European population
of the Territory, and could in any event in my view not have succeeded
with such case. Had the suggestion under discussion been advanced in
the pleadings as an averment in support of any of their submissions,
and persisted in during the oral proceedings, there would doubtlessly
have been much closer investigation into the relative effectiveness of the
arrangements for the White group and of those for the non-White
groups. In such an investigation due regard would have had to be paid
to the fact that the whole system is a developing, evolutionary one, and
that, as Mr. Cillie stressed in his evidence-
". .. as political organs and economic and social institutions
develop among the various non-White peoples ... Less and less
it is going to be in Southern Africa a matter of unilateral decisions
and arrangements. It stands to reason that, as children grow up and
develop a will of their own, their wishes have to be taken into
account in the affairs of the family and that is what we are driving
at."
In the circumstances 1need to Saynothing further about the suggestion
here.
13. Al1that remains then is the question whether the representation
of inhabitants cf South West Africa in the South African Parliament
is indeed per se an infringement of the Mandate, and, in particular,
of the separate international status of the Territory. As 1 have said
before, Article 22 of the Covenant and the mandate instrument autho-
rized the administration of the Territory as an integral part of South
Africa. There is no express provision precluding the Respondent from
allowing representatives from South West Africa in its Parliament,
and there is no justification for reading an implied term to this effect
into either ofthese instruments. Such a term cannot be said to be neces-
sary in the sense that one can confidently Say that had it been raised
at the time the parties would have conceded that it fell witliin the ambit
of their agreement. On the contrary, the addition of such a term would
constitute a radical alteration of the provisions of the Mandate and the
Covenant.
Moreover, the conduct of the parties at the time of the drafting of
the Covenant and at al1 material times thereafter, confirrn that there
could not have existed any common intention of precluding the Re-
spondent from allowing representatives of South West Africa in its
Parliament.groupes ne semble pas avoir le moindre rapport avec les prétendues
violations du statut international distinct du territoire. dont ie traite
présentement. Cela pourrait tout au plus se rapporter à la partie de
l'argumentation où l'on soutient que le défendeur a manqué à son devoir
d'accroître le bien-êtreet le progrès dans le domaine politique (conclu-
sions nos3 et 4 des demandeurs). Comme je l'ai démontréen examinant
ces conclusions, les demandeurs ne tentent plus de fonder leur thèse
sur l'existence d'une politique inéquitable ou oppressiveà l'égardde la
population non européenne du territoire et ils ne pourraient d'ailleurs,
à mon avis, obtenir gain de cause sur ce plan. Si l'affirmation dont je
fais état avait étéformulée dans les pièces de procédure écrite pour
appuyer l'une quelconque des conclusions et si elle avait étémaintenue
au cours de la procédure orale, l'efficacitérelative des dispositions
adoptées respectivement à l'intention du groupe blanc et des groupes
non blancs aurait sans doute fait l'objet d'une enquêteplus poussée.
Au cours d'une telle enquête,il aurait fallu tenir dûment compte du fait
que le système tout entier évolue progressivement et cela, comme
M. Cillie l'a signalé dans sa déposition,
(à mesure que les organes politiques et les institutions économiques
et sociales se développeront chez les divers peuples non blancs ...
Il s'agira de moins en moins en Afrique méridionale de prendre
des décisionset des dispositions sur un plan unilatéral.Il va de soi
qu'à mesure que les enfants grandissent et que leur personnalité
se développe, il faut tenir compte de leurs désirsdans les affaires
de la famille et c'està quoi nous voulons aboutir. ))
Cela étant,je n'ai rienà dire de plus ici au sujet de cette affirmation.
13. Il ne reste donc plus que la question de savoir si la représentation
des habitants du Sud-Ouest africain au Parlement sud-africain constitue
en soi une violation du Mandat et notamment du statut international
distinct du territoire. Comme je l'ai signalé précédemment, l'article 22
du Pacte et l'acte de Mandat ont autorisé le Mandataire à administrer
le territoire en tant que partie intégrante de l'Afrique du Sud. Nulle
disposition n'interdit expressément au défendeur d'admettre des re-
présentants du Sud-Ouest africain dans son Parlement et rien n'autorise
à voir une clause im~licite en ce sens dans l'un ou l'autre de ces instru-
ments. On ne saurait prétendre qu'une telle clause soit indispensable
car on ne peut affirmer que, si elle avait étéenvisagée à l'époque, les
parties en présenceauraient admis qu'elle entrait dans le cadre de leur
accord. Bien au contraire l'adjonction d'une clause à cet effet aurait
constitué une modification radicale des dispositions du Mandat et du
Pacte.
En outre le comportement des parties, à l'époque de la rédaction
du Pacte comme par la suite, confirme qu'elles ne peuvent pas avoir eu
l'intention commune d'empêcher le défendeurd'admettre des repré-
sentants du Sud-Ouest africain dans son Parlement. When introducing the Peace Treaty in the House of Commons on
3 July 1919, Lloyd George emphasized that "South West Africa will
become part of the Federation of South Africa".
14. In 1923General Smuts informed the Permanent Mandates Com-
mission of the probability that the White inhabitants of the Territory
would be given representation in the Respondent's Parliament. If any
State thought that such representation in Respondent's Parliament
impeded "opportunity of self-determination" or was "inconsistent with
the international status of the territory" a voice ofrotest should and
would have been heard.
15. In later years the representation of South West Africa in the
South African Parliament was raised before and discussed in the United
Nations on a number of occasions. At al1 times the United Nations
contained a larger number of Members who had also been foundation
Members of the League. It is significant, therefore, thatnone of them
expressed the view that the Covenant or the Mandate precluded the
Respondent from allowing representatives elected by voters in South
West Africa in its Parliament.
Thus, on 11 April 1947, the House of Assembly of Respondent's
Parliament adopted a resolution reading, intearlia, as follows:
"Therefore this House is of opinion that the territory should be
represented in the parliament of the Union as an integral portion
thereof, and requests the Government to introduce legislation, after
consultation with the inhabitants of the territory providing for its
representation in the Union Parliament. .."
This resolution was brought to the attention of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations by letter in 1947, and in this communication it
was also stated that Respondent would maintain the status quo and
would continue to administer the Territory in the spirit of the Mandate.
Nobody expressed a view that this undertaking was inconsistent with
the resolution. When the Respondent's representative expressed the
view in the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947that such
representation in Respondent's Parliament was not the same as in-
corporation and would not constitute a violation of any provision
of the Mandate, not a single State challenged the soundness of this
statement. In 1948the Respondent's representative in the Fourth Com-
mittee explained the provision of the proposed legislation whereby the
Territory would be represented in the Respondent's Parliament, and
again emphasized that the proposed arrangement would not constitute
incorporation, and again nobody suggested that such representation
would be inconsistent with the international status of the Territory or
would in any other way breach the provisions of the Mandate. Neither
of the Applicants have offered any explanation for their failure to
challenge the Respondent's contentions on these occasions.
When later on 26 November 1948 the Respondent's representative
repeated its previous assurances that the measures designed to establish
199 En présentant le traité de paix à la Chambre des communes, le 3juil-
let 1919, Lloyd George a souligné que ((le Sud-Ouest africain devien-
dra[it] partie intégrante de la Fédérationsud-africaine ».
14. En 1923 le généralSmuts a informé la Commission permanente
des Mandats que les blancs du territoire seraient probablement auto-
risésà se faire représenter au Parlement du défendeur. Siun Etat avait
estimé qu'une tellereprésentation au Parlement du défendeurentravait
((les chances qu'avaient les habitants ...de s'engager dans la voie de
l'autodétermination )ou était((incompatible avec le statut international
du Territoire )une protestation aurait dû êtreélevée et l'aurait effective-
ment été.
15. Ultérieurement, la question de la représentation du Sud-Ouest
africain au Parlement de l'Afrique du Sud a été à plusieurs reprises
soulevéeet examinéeaux Nations Unies. Chaque fois, les Nations Unies
comptaient un plus grand nombre de Membres qui avaient également
étéMembres fondateurs de la Société desNations. Il est par conséquent
significatif qu'aucun d'entre eux n'ait exprimé l'avisque le Pacte ou le
Mandat empêchaitle défendeur d'admettre en son Parlement des re-
présentants désignéspar les électeursdu Sud-Ouest africain.
Le 11 avril 1947,la House of Assembly du Parlement du défendeur a
adopté une résolution où il était dit entre autres:
((En conséquence la Chambre estime que le territoire doit être
représentéau Parlement de l'Union, comme faisant partie inté-
grante de l'Union, et invite le Gouvernement à déposer, après
avoir consulté les habitants du territoire, un projet de loi leur ac-
cordant une représentation au Parlement de l'Union ..))
Cette résolution a, la mêmeannée, été portée à la connaissance du
Secrétaire général deN s ations Unies par une lettre dans laquelle il était
en outre déclaréque le défendeurmaintiendrait le statu quo et continue-
rait à administrer le territoire dans l'esprit du Mandat. Personne n'a
alors exprimé l'avisque cette décisionfût incompatible avec la réso-
lution. Lorsqu'à l'Assemblée générale deN s ations Unies, en 1947, le
représentant du défendeura affirméque la représentation au Parlement
de son pays n'était pas synonyme d'incorporation et ne constituerait
pas une violation de l'une quelconque des dispositions du Mandat,
aucun Etat n'a contestéle bien-fondé de cette affirmation. En 1948, le
représentant du défendeur à la Quatrième Commission a exposé les
dispositions du projet de loi prévoyant la représentation du territoire
au Parlement du défendeur et soulignéune fois de plus que l'arrange-
ment prévu neconstituerait pas une incorporation. Là encore, il n'y a
eu personne pour prétendre que la représentation prévueserait incom-
patible avec le statut international du territoire ou violerait de quelque
autre manière les dispositions du Mandat. Ni l'un ni l'autre des de-
mandeurs n'a expliquépourquoi il n'a pas, en ces occasions, contesté
les dires du défendeur.
Lorsque ultérieurement, le 26 novembre 1948, le représentant du dé-
fendeur a de nouveau donné l'assurance que les mesures destinées à
199 parliamentary representation in theTerritorydid not mean the Territory's
incorporation or absorption into South Africa, the General Assembly
actually recorded in a resolution that it took note-
". .. of the assurance given by the representative of the Union
of South Africa that the proposed new arrangement for closer
association of South West Africa with the Union does not mean
incorporation and will not mean absorption of the Territory by
the Administering Authority".
Again not a single State challenged the correctness of Respondent's
statement.
16. In 1949,Act 23 of 1949was transmitted to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. It was only at the end of the debate of theourth
Session of the Fourth Committee that one of the delegates proposed
an amendment to certain draft resolutions to the effect that the said
Act constituted a violation of the United Nations Charter. It will be
observed that even at this stagethere was no suggestion that it constituted
a violation of the Mandate or the Covenant. In any event, this resolution
was defeated. A similar resolution was defeated in 1950. The above
attitude of States confirms my view that there is no substance in this
charge.
17. The third complaint upon which the Applicants based their
aforesaid submission is that the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel-hereafter
referred to as the Caprivi-is administered separately from the rest of
the Territory.
A proper appreciation of this issue necessitates some knowledge of
the geographical features of this area. Tt is east of longitude 21° and
forms part of a strip of land acquired by the German Government in
1890as a zone of free access to the Zambesi River. It is long and narrow
and forms the north-eastern part of the Territory. In the rainy season
a large area becomes a huge swamp with the result that is is impossible
to approachit from the remainder of the Territory. Itis mainly inhabited
by two tribes which have never had any connections with the other
Native groups in South West Africa.
An attempt between the years 1929and 1939to administer the Caprivi
as a part of South West Africa failed-it appeared clearly that it was
in the interests of the area to have it administered directly by Respondent.
This conclusion was reported to the Permanent Mandates Commission
who stated the following:
"The Commission learned from the annual report that owing
to the difficulty of satisfactorily controlling the eastern part of the
Caprivi Zipfel, it is contemplatingmaking over the control of this
area to the Union Department of Native Affairs. It noted the
statements of the accredited representative to the effect that the
officer administering the area in question would work i~i close
200 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 202
accorder une représentation parlementaire au territoire ne signifiaient
pas que celui-ci dût être incorporé à l'Afrique du Sud ni absorbé par
elle, l'Assemblée générala e effectivement consigné dans une résolution
qu'elle prenait acte
((del'assurance qui lui a été donnéepar le représentant de l'Union
sud-africaine que les nouvelles mesures proposéesen vue d'associer
plus étroitement le Sud-Ouest africain et l'Union sud-africaine ne
signifient pas l'incorporation du Territoire dans l'Union et ne signi-
fient pas que le Territoire sera absorbé par l'autorité de l'adminis-
tration)).
Là encore, aucun Etat n'a contesté l'exactitude des dires du défendeur.
16. En 1949, la loi no 23 de 1949 a été communiquéeau Secrétaire
généraldes Nations Unies. Ce n'est qu'à la fin des débatsdela quatrième
session de la Quatrième Commission que l'un des délégués a proposé
un amendement àcertains projets de résolution, amendement aux termes
duquel ladite loi constituait une violation de la Charte des Nations
Unies. On remarquera que, même à ce stade, il n'était nullement pré-
tendu que cette loi constituait une violation du Mandat ou du Pacte.
Quoi qu'il en soit, l'amendement a étérejeté.Une résolution analogue
a étérepoussée en 1950. Cette attitude me confirme dans l'opinion
que l'accusation dont il s'agit n'est nullement fondée.
17. Le troisième grief sur lequel les demandeurs ont fondé leur
conclusion susmentionnée est que le Caprivi Zipfel oriental, ci-après
appeléle Caprivi, est du point de vue administratif séparédu reste du
territoire.
Pour bien comprendre cette question, il faut avoir quelque notion
des caractéristiques géographiques de la région en cause. Celle-ci est
situéeau 21edegré delongitude est et fait partie d'une bande de territoire
acquise par le Gouvernement allemand en 1890 pour avoir libre accès
au Zambèze. De forme longue et étroite, le Caprivi constitue la partie
nord-est du territoire. A la saison des pluies, une bonne partie en est
transformée en un immense marécage, au point qu'il est impossible
d'y accéder à partir du reste du territoire. Le Caprivi est essentiellement
habité par deux tribus qui n'ont jamais eu de rapport avec les autres
groupes indigènes du Sud-Ouest africain.
La tentative qui a été faiteentre 1929 et 1939 pour administrer le
Caprivi dans le cadre du Sud-Ouest africain a échoué:il était donc de
toute évidencedans l'intérêd te la régiond'être administréedirectement
par le défendeur.Cette conclusion a été communiquée à la Commission
permanente des Mandats qui a déclaré:
«La Commission a appris par le rapport annuel qu'en raison
de la difficulté d'exercerun contrôle satisfaisant sur la partie orien-
tale du Caprivi Zipfel on envisage de confier le contrôle de cette
régionau département des affaires indigènes de l'Union. Elle prend
acte des déclarations, faites par le représentant accrédité,que le
fonctionnaire chargé d'administrer la région enquestion travaillera CO-operationwith the Mandatory Government which would be
acting for the Administration of South West Africa and that infor-
mation regarding that part of the territory would be included in
the annual reports as hitherto.
The Commissionholds the viewthat the administrativearrangement
contemplated calls for no observations on its part provided al1 the
provisions of the Mandate are properly applied in the eastern
portion of the Caprivi Zipfel." (Italics added.)
18. Applicants sought to support this contention relative to the
Caprivi by arguing that-
". ..[elven if problems of accessibility make administrative sepa-
ration expedient, it is incumbent upon Respondent to take other
steps to preserve the territorial integrity of the Mandated Territory
as a whole, and to develop the 'sense of territorial consciousness
among al1the inhabitants' which is required by the United Nations.
Such a responsibility is implicit in the undertaking of the Mandate
itself." (Reply, p.63.)
Such an obligation could exist, if at all, only aspart of the Mandatory's
general duty to promote the political well-being and progress of the
inhabitants of the Territory. But, as such, it has no relevance, in my
view, to the present discussion of alleged infringements of the inter-
national status of the Territory. In any event, it is clear to me that no
such obligation was everimposed by the Mandate, or even bythe United
Nations in respect of dependent territories generally, as is apparently
contended by Applicants.
19. In view of the above circumstances 1have no hesitation in holding
thatthe administrative separation of the Caprivi was a perfectlylegitimate
exercise of Respondent's governmental powers.
20. The fourth complaint relates to the transfer of the Administration
of Native Affairs from the Administrator to the Minister of Bantu
Administration and Development, and to the vesting of South West
African Native Reserve land in the South African Native Trust. In
this regard also it must be kept in mind that it is no longer contended
that these measures were actuated by any improper motive, or that
they have had any undesirable effect on well-being or progress. That
being so, there can, in my view, be no reason why Respondent should
not determine which official or agency should exercise or administer
particular functions or assets relating to the Territory. It could hardly
be suggested that Respondent is under an obligation to entrust al1
functions regarding the administration of South West Africa only to
those of its officials who are statio-ned in Windhoek to the exclusion
of officials stationed in the Republic itself. Nevertheless that would
appear to be the effect of this contention, which should in my view, be
rejected.
21. To sum up, once it was admitted by the Applicants that the various
actions referred to in Chapter VI11of the Memorials were not motivated
201 en collaboration étroite avec le gouvernement mandataire, qui agira
au nom de l'administration du Sud-Ouest africain et que des
renseignements relatifsàcette partie du Territoire figureront, comme
précédemment,dans les rapports annuels.
La Commission considère quel'arrangementadministratif envisagé
n'appelle aucune observationde sa part, à condition que toutes les
dispositions du Mandat soient convenablement appliquées dans la
partie orientale du Caprivi Zipfel.)(Les italiques sont de nous.)
18. Les demandeurs ont tentéd'appuyer cette argumentation relative
au Caprivi en faisant valoir que même
«si des difficultés d'accèsrendent plus pratique une séparation
administrative, il appartient au défendeur de prendre d'autres
mesures pour préserver l'intégritéterritoriale du territoire sous
Mandat dans son ensemble et favoriser, comme l'exigent lesNations
Unies, le(sens de la conscience territoriale chez tous les habitan)).
Une telle obligation est implicitement contenue dans le Mandat
lui-même. » (Réplique,p. 363.)
Cette obligation pourrait tout au plus découler du devoir général
incombant au Mandataire d'accroître en matière politique le bien-être
et le progrès des habitants du territoire. Mais, en tant que telle, elle
n'entre pas,à mon avis, dans le cadre de l'examen actuel des prétendues
violations du statut international du territoire. Quoi qu'il en soit, je
suis convaincu qu'aucune obligation de ce genre n'a jamais étéimposée
par le Mandat ni mêmepar les Nations Unies en ce qui concerne les
territoires dépendants en général,comme les demandeurs semblent le
soutenir.
19. Dans ces conditions, je n'hésiteraipas à affirmer qu'en décrétant
la séparation administrative du Caprivi le défendeurn'a fait qu'exercer
de manière parfaitement légitimeses pouvoirs d'administration.
20. Le quatrième grief concerne le transfert de l'administration des
affaires indigènes de l'administrateur au ministre de l'administration
et du développement bantous et la remise des réserves indigènesdu
Sud-Ouest africain au South African Native Trust (administration des
biens indigènes). A cet égard aussi, il convient de se souvenir que les
demandeurs ne prétendent plusqu'en adoptant ces mesures le défendeur
ait étémû par un mobile illicite ou que lesdites mesures ont eu des
conséquences peu souhaitables pour le bien-êtreet le progrès des habi-
tants. Dans ces conditions, je ne vois pas pourquoi le défendeur n'aurait
pas le droit de choisir le fonctionnaire ou l'organisme chargéd'exercer
certaines fonctions ou de gérer certains biens afférents au territoire.
On peut difficilement prétendre que le défendeur est tenu de confier
toutes les attributions relatives l'administration du Sud-Ouest africain
à ses seuls agents en poste à Windhoek, à l'exclusion des agents en
fonctions dans la République elle-même. Voilà néanmoins à quoi
aboutirait cette thèse, qui doità mon avis, êtrerejetée.
21. En résumé,dèslors que les demandeurs ont admis que les divers
actes mentionnés au chapitre VI11 des mémoiresne s'expliquaient par
201by any plan to annex or incorporate the Territory, the whole basis of
Applicants' original casefell away. The alternative contention that these
acts "constitute per se, and without regard to Respondent's purpose or
motive, a violation of Respondent's obligation to respect the separate
international legal status of the Territory" (Reply, p. 354)reduced Appli-
cants' chargeat best (for them) to a mere technicality and at worst to
a completely untenable proposition.
22. It was probably the realization that their original charges were
insupportable that induced Applicants ultimately to abandon them, as
in my viewthey clearlydid. In comingto this conclusion 1fullyappreciate
that a failure by a party to refer in the oral proceedings to particular
contentions or arguments raised in the written pleadings, does not
necessarilyamount to an abandonment of such contentions or arguments.
However, in the present case there are a number of additional consider-
ations which in my viewcompel the aforesaid conclusion. Most of these
considerations have been dealt with before and it will not be necessary
to do more than refer briefly to them again. Firstly, it is significant that
in Submission No. 5 as originally drafted there appeared specific refer-
ences to the actions complained of, which references were deliberately
deleted in the amended submission. This in itself suggests that the
original grounds of action are no longer relied upon, a suggestionwhich
is strengthened by the consideration that the case as originally framed
could no longer succeed after Applicants had admitted that an essential
element thereof-the intent to incorporate-did not exist.
When attempting to ascertain positively what case was sought to be
made in the amended submission, which, as 1 noted above, is now
completely vague as to the conduct complained of, the obvious starting
point seems to me the Applicants' final oral argument in which they
purported to explain their case. Reference to such oral argument shows
that Applicants at that stage did not only fail to advance any argument
in support of their original charges, but emphasized that their sole and
only case rested on an entirely different basis. They commenced their
discussjon by expressing an intention of disposing of Submission NO. 5
"in, the context of the requirement of administrative supervision".
They then elucidated their contention in support of their Submission
No. 5 in, inter alia, the following passages:
".. .turning to the question of annexation, administrative super-
vision is hereagain seen to be of the essence. Respondent's refusal
to submit to administrative supervision, indeed, is an underlying
element of the Applicants' complaintin this regard (Italics added.)
In the absence of such accountability, Respondent's function of
administration would cease to be international.aucun plan tendant à l'annexion ou à l'incorporation du territoire,
tout le fondement de leur thèse initiale s'est effondré. Eu égard à la
thèse subsidiaire selon laquelle ces actes cconstituent par eux-mêmes,
et quels que soient le but ou le mobile du défendeur, uile violation de
l'obligation du défendeur de respecter le statut international distinct
du Territoire »(réplique,p. 354), l'accusation des demandeurs se ramène
au mieux (en ce qui les concerne) à un élémentde pure technique et au
pire à une proposition totalement insoutenable.
22. C'est probablement lorsqu'ils se sont rendu compte que leurs
accusations initiales étaient insoutenables que les demandeurs ont
finalement décidéd'y renoncer, et c'est ce qu'ils ont manifestement fait
à mon avis. En concluant de la sorte, je sais très bien que lorsqu'une
partie négliged'évoquer au cours de la procédure orale des assertions
ou arguments qu'elle a mentionnés dans les pièces de la procédure
écrite, cela ne signifie nullement qu'elle renonce à ses assertions ou
arguments. Toutefois, dans l'affaire qui nous occupe, il existe un certain
nombre de considérations supplémentaires qui imposent à mon avis
ladite conclusion. La plupart de ces considérations ayant déjà étéexa-
minées,il me suffira de les rappeler brièvement. En premier lieu, il est
significatif que la conclusionno 5, dans son énoncéinitial, précisait les
actes incriminés,alors que ces précisionsont étédélibérément supprimées
du texte revisé.Cela tend à indiquer que les demandeurs ne se fondent
plus sur les motifs initiaux, indication encore plus nette si l'on considère
que, sous sa forme première, la thèse ne pouvait plus aboutir, dès lors
que les drmandeurs avaient admis qu'un de ses éléments essentiels -
l'intrntion d'incorporer le territoir- n'existait pas.
P~ur tenter de définir clairement la thès2 que les demandeurs ont
cherché à établir dans la conclusion reviséequi, comme je l'ai signalé
ci-dessus, est maintenant tout à fait vague quant au comportement
incrininé, il convient manifestement, me semble-t-il, de partir de la
plaidoirie finale des demandeurs au cours de laquelle ils ont essayé
d'exposer leur thèse. Lorsqu'on s'y reporte, on se rend compte qu'à ce
stade les demandeurs ont non seulement négligé d'avancer des arguments
à l'appui deleursaccusations initiales,mais ont en outre insistésur le fait
que leur seule et unique thèsereposait sur un fondementtotalement diffé-
rent. Ils ont commencépar exprimer l'intention de traiter de la conclu-
sion no 5 ((dans le cadre de l'obligation de surveillance administrative.))
Ils ont alors préciséleur argumentation à l'appui dela conclusion no 5
dans les passages suivants:
«si l'on considère la question de l'annexion, la surveillance ad-
ministrative prend là encore une importance fondamentale. Du
reste, le refus du défendeur dese prêter à un contrôle administratif
est l'élémenftondamental de l'accusation à cet égard.» (Les italiques
sont de nous.)
S'il n'y avait pas de responsabilité sur le plan international, la
fonction d'administration dévolueau défendeur cesserait d'avoir un
caractère international.
202205 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP. VAN WYK)
That is the essenceofour contention in this regard. (Italics added.)
The absence, the denial, or the rejection of international super-
vision, alters the international statusof the Territory; it deprives
it of that character. This isthe basisof our submission inthisregard."
(Italics addttd.)
and, finally-
"With respect to the Submission 6 (sic), relating to annexation,
the refusal and denial of submission to international administrative
supervision impairs the international status of the Territory."
In other words, Applicants repeatedly emphasized that their sole
contention was that refusal to submit to international supervision was
in itself an actnconsistent with the international status of the Territory.
This attitude is in line with the features1 have mentioned above, al1of
which, cumulati~vely.satisfy me that Applicants did not intend in their
amended submiission to pursue the charges originally raised in the
Memorials, or the alternative thereto first raised in the Reply. They
intended to limit their case to the one contention mentioned above,
to the exclusion lofal1others. Consequently 1now turn to a consideration
of the merits of the sole contention ultimately relied upon.
23. In the first place, its effect now is that Submission No. 5 amounts
merely to a paraphrase of Submissions Nos. 2, 7 and 8. Consequently
there appears little purpose in retaining it as a separate submission.
But in any event, it seems to me a complete non sequitur to argue that
Respondent has treated the Territory in a manner inconsistent with the
international status of the Territory and has impeded opportunities for
self-determination by the inhabitants of the Territory merely because
Respondent has :refusedto submit to international supervision. The one
question relates to the merits of Respondent's actions and policies,
the other purely to supervision thereof. It follows, therefore, that even
if Respondent were obliged to submit to United Nations supervision
(which in my view is not the case) mere failure to do so would not be
an act contrary to the separate international status of the Territory.
Article 4 of the Mandate
(Applican:s7SubmissionNo. 6)
1. Article 4 of the Mandate provided as follows:
"The military training of the natives, otherwise than for purposes
of interna1 police and the local defence of the territory, shall be
prohibited. ITurthermore, no military or naval bases shall be es-
tablished or fortifications erected in the territory."
203 Voilà l'essentielde notre thèsesur cepoint. (Les italiques sont de
nous.)
L'absence, le refus, le rejet, d'un contrôle international modifient
le statut international du Territoire, lui enlèventce caractère inter-
national. C'est le fond de notre thèsesur ce point. » (Les italiques
sont de nous.)
et finalement:
((En ce qui concerne notre conclusion no 6 (sic), relative à i'an-
nexion, le refus de seprêter àun contrôle administratif international
compromet le statut international du Territoire. ))
En d'autres termes, les demandeurs ont insisté à plusieurs reprises
sur le fait que leur seule argumentation consistaità affirmer que le refus
de se soumettre à un contrôle international constituait en soi un acte
incompatible avec le statut international du territoire. Cette attitude
est conforme aux élémentsque j'ai mentionnés ci-dessus et quj, pris
dans leur ensemble, me convainquent que les demandeurs n'avaient pas
l'intention de maintenir dans leur conclusion les accusationsinitialement
formulées dans les mémoires ni les accusations subsidiaires énoncées
pour la première fois dans la réplique. Ils voulaient limiter leur thèse
à la seule argumentation mentionnée ci-dessus, à l'exclusion de toutes
les autres. En conséquence, je vaismaintenant examiner quant au fond
la seule argumentation qu'ils aient finalement retenue.
23. En premier lieu, cette argumentation fait que la conclusion no 5
devient une simple paraphrase des conclusions nos2, 7 et 8. En consé-
quence, il ne semble guère y avoir d'intérêt à la conserver en tant que
conclusion distincte. Quoi qu'ilen soit, il me paraît parfaitement illogique
de prétendre que le défendeur a traité le territoire d'une manière in-
compatible avec son statut internationalet entravéleschances qu'avaient
les habitants de s'engagersur la voie de l'autodétermination, uniquement
parce qu'il a refuséde se soumettre à un contrôle international. L'une
des deux questions porte sur le fond des actes et politiques du défendeur
alors que l'autre n'a trait qu'à la surveillance.Il en résulte donc que,
mêmesi le défendeur étaitobligéde se soumettre à une surveillance des
Nations Unies, ce qui à mon avis n'est pas le cas, le seul fait de ne pas
s'ysoumettre ne constituerait pas un acte contraire austatut international
distinct du territoire.
Article 4 du Mandat
(Conclusionno6 des demandeurs)
1. L'article 4 du Mandat stipulait:
«L'instruction militaire des indigènessera interdite, sauf pour as-
surer la police locale et la défenselocale du Territoire. En outre,
aucune base militaire ou navale ne sera établie dans le Territoire,
ni aucune fortification))
203 2. In its original form Applicants' Submission No. 6 read as follows:
"The Union, by virtue of the acts described in Chapter VI1
herein, has established military bases within theTerritory in violation
of its obligations as stated in Article of the Mandate and Article 22
of the Covenant; that the Union has the duty forthwith to remove
al1such military bases froni within the Territory; andthat the Union
has the duty to refrain from the establishment of military bases
within the 'Territory." (Memorials, p. 198.)
3. The installations described in Chapter VI1 of the Memorials,
which were alleged to constitute military bases within the meaning of
Article 4 of the: Mandate, were the following:
(a) an alleged military landing ground in the Swakopmund district
of South West Africa;
(b) an alleged military camp or military air base at Ohopoho in the
Kaokoveld area of South West Africa;
(c) the supply and maintenance facilities of the Regiment Windhoek.
The reason advanced by Applicants in their Memorials for contending
that these institutions were military bases, was that "[alrmed installations
not related to pcoliceprotection or interna1 security fa11within the class
of 'military bases' or 'fortifications'...". (Memorials. p. 181.)
4. The facts relative to the aforementioned facilities are set forth in
the Respondent's pleadings and are,as willbe shown later, not in dispute.
For the purposes of this opinion 1shall briefly restate the material facts
concerning each of the said facilities.
(a) The Alleged Military Landiwg Ground in the Swakopmund District of
South West .frica
The allegatiori in the Applicants' Memorials, based on "information
and belief", was that the military landing ground in question was situated
in the Swakoprnund district within the Mandated Territory of South
West Africa. This allegation was not correct. The said landing ground
is not situated within the territorial boundaries of South West Africa,
but falls in the area of the Port and Settlement of Walvis Bay which,
although administered for practical purposes as if it were part of the
Territory of South West Africa, is in fact a part of the Republic of South
Africa l.Although Applicants accepted this "geographical explanation",
they advanced the contention in their Reply that Walvis Bay must,
"in a military sense, be considered to be in South West Africa,
inasmuch a:$it is completely surrounded by territory subject to the
l It appears that Applicants based their allegation on a statement contaiind
a report of thc Committee on South West Africa. It would seem that the Committee,
apparently unaware of the true factual and legal position, was misled by a ref-
erence in Governnient Notice No. 636 of 1958 (SA) to the farm Rooikop, on which
the landing grounal is situated, as falling within the magisterial district of Swakop-
mund-a correct statement at the time, but only in so far as the said administra-
tive arrangement is concerned. 2. Sous saforme initiale, la conclusion no6 des demandeurs énonçait:
((L'Union, par les mesures décrites au chapitre VI1 ci-avant,
a établi des bases militaires sur le Territoire en violation de ses
obligations telles qu'elles figurent à l'article 4 du Mandat et à
l'article 22 du Pacte; ...l'Union a le devoir de supprimer sur-le-
champ toutes les bases militaires établies sur le Territoire; et ...
l'Union a le devoir de s'abstenir d'établirdes bases militaires sur le
Territoire. ))(Mémoires,p. 198.)
3. Voici ceque lechapitre VI1des mémoires qualifiede bases militaires
au sens de l'article 4 du Mandat:
a) un terrain d'atterrissage militaire qui serait situédans le district de
Swakopmund (Sud-Ouest africain);
b) un prétendu camp militaire ou une prétendue base aériennemilitaire
à Ohopoho dans la régiondu Kaokoveld (Sud-Ouest africain);
c) les installations de matériel et d'intendance du régimentWindhoek.
Le motif queles demandeurs ont invoquédans leursrnémoirespour sou-
tenir qu'il s'agit de bases militaires est que (des installations militaires
ne concernant ni la police ni la sécurité interne tombentdansla catégorie
des ((bases militaires » ou des cfortificationsn...1)(Mémoires, p. 181).
4. Les faits relatifs aux installations susmentionnées sont exposéspar
le défendeur dans ses écritures et, comme nous le verrons, ils ne sont
pas contestés.Aux fins de la présenteopinion je passerai brièvement en
revue les faits concrets concernant chacune desdites installations.
a) Le terrain d'atterrissage militaire quiserait situédans le district de
Swakopmund (Sud-Ouest africain)
Dans leurs mémoires, lesdemandeurs ont affirmé((avoirconnaissance
et être convaincus ))que le terrain d'atterrissage militaire en question se
trouve situédans le district de Swakopmund dans les limites du territoire
sous Mandat du Sud-Ouest africain. Cette allégation n'est pas exacte.
Ledit terrain n'est pas situédans les limites territoriales du Sud-Ouest
africain mais dansla zone du port et de la colonie de Walvis Bay laquelle,
bien qu'administrée enpratique comme si elle faisait partie du territoire
du Sud-Ouest africain, appartient en réalité à la République d'Afrique
du Sud l.Les demandeurs ont acceptécette explication géographique ))
du défendeur, mais ont néanmoins soutenu dans leur réplique que
Walvis Bay doit,
cau sens militaire, êtreconsidérécomme dans » le Sud-Ouest
africain, pour autant que cette zone est complètement entourée par
l 11 semble que les demandeurs se soient fondés sur un passage de l'un des
rapports du Comité du Sud-Ouest africain. Le Comité, ignorant sans doute ce
qu'il en était exactement en fait et en droit, a dû être induit en erreur par l'avis
officiel sud-africain 636 de 1958 qui mentionnait l'exploitation Rooikop, où
se trouve situé ce terrain d'atterrissage, comme relevant administrativementdu
district de Swakopmund. Cela était exactà i'époque, mais seulement aux fins des
dispositions administrativesusdites. Mandate and necessarily depends thereon for essential services,
transport, communications and supplies, including water".
1 quote this statement at this stage in view of the factual allegations
contained therein.
Even if these factual allegations were correct, there would be no legal
justification for considering Walvis Bay, "in a military sense" to be
"in South West Africa". The Applicants did not mention any legal
principle, nor am 1aware of any legal principle, which could under such
circumstances constitute one territory part of another, whether "in a
military sense" or in any other sense. Tt is, however, not necessary to
pursue this enquiry any further inasmuch as the factual allegations
upon which Applicants based their contention were not correct. A
reference to any reliable map will immediately show that the area of
Walvis Bay is not "completely surrounded by territory subject to the
Mandate". It is approachable from the sea without entering or crossing
any part of the Mandated Territory. With regard to the other factual
allegations contained in Applicants' above-quoted statement Respondent
denied that Walvis Bay "necessarily depends [on South West Africa]
for essential services, transport, communications and supplies,including
water", and explained that, although use is made of certain services
provided from South West Africa, such as road and rail transport,
telephone and postal communications, Walvis Bay is not "necessarily"
dependent thereon. Nor does it obtain its water supply from the Terri-
tory.
1 have already mentioned that Applicants, during the course of the
oral proceedings, intimated a generalacceptance by them of Respondent's
statements of fact in the pleadings. This acceptance, as1will show later,
applied also to the facts relative to their chargesconcerningmilitarization.
In the result the whole factual basis upon which Applicants sought to
found their contention that Walvis Bay must "in a military sense" be
considered "to be in South West Africa", has fallen away.
(b) The Alleged Military Camp or Military Air Base at Ohopoho in the
Kaokoveld Area of South West Africa
This facility is one of a few landing strips at various places in South
West Africa which are mainly used for administrative purposes but
also occasionally and intermittently for the landing of military aircraft.
These strips are natural surface strips which have simply been cleared
of vegetation and other obstructions. They are completely unmanned,
provide no maintenance or service facilities, and can only be used for
the landing of light aircraft.
(c) The Supply and Maintenance Facilities of the Regiment Windhoek
The Regiment Windhoek is a Citizen Force unit composed of civilians
who undergo peacetime military training for certain limited periods.
205 le Territoire sous Mandat et en dépend nécessairement pour les
services essentiels, transports, moyens de communication et appro-
visionnements, en eau notzmment ».
Si je cite cette déclaration, c'est en raison des allégations de fait qu'elle
contient.
Mêmesi ces allégations defait étaientexactes, il ne serait pas justifié
en droit de considérer que Walvis Bay est, «au sens militaire, situé
((dans ))le Sud-Ouest africain 1)Les demandeurs n'ont fait état d'aucun
principe juridique, et je n'en connais pas non plus, qui puisse dans ces
conditions faire d'un territoire une partie intégrante d'un autre, que ce
soit ((au sens militaire ))ou en un autre sens. Il est cependant vain de
poursuivre cette recherche, puisque les allégations de fait sur lesquelles
les demandeurs se sont fondésne sont pas exactes. Il suffit de se reporter
à la moindre carte, pourvu qu'elle soit bonne, pour constater immédiate-
ment que la région de Walvis Bay n'est pas ((complètement entourée
par le territoire sous Mandat ».On peut y pénétrerpar mer sans passer
le moins du monde par le territoire sous Mandat. En ce qui concerne
les autres allégationsde fait figurant dans la déclaration sus-mentionnée
des demandeurs, le défendeur a niéque Walvis Bay ((dépendenécessaire-
ment [du Sud-Ouest africain] pour les services essentiels, transports,
moyens de communication et approvisionnements, en eau notamment ))
et il a expliqué que, tout en ayant recours au Sud-Ouest africain pour
certains services tels que les transports routiers et ferroviaires, le télé-
phone et la poste, Walvis Bay n'en dépend pas ((nécessairement ))Par
ailleurs Walvis Bay ne s'approvisionne pas en eau à partir du territoire.
J'ai déjà fait observer que les demandeurs ont indiqué au cours de
la procédure orale qu'ils acceptent d'une manière généraleles décla-
rationsde fait figurant dans les écritures dudéfendeur.Cette acceptation,
comme je le montrerai, vaut aussi pour lesfaits relatifs à leursaccusations
concernant la militarisation du territoire. Si bien qu'il ne reste plus rien
des faits sur lesquels les demandeurs ont voulu se fonder pour affirmer
que Walvis Bay doit (au sens militaire ))être considéré (comme ((dans »
le Sud-Ouest africain )).
b) Le prétendu campmilitaire, ou la prétendue base aériennm eilitaire
de Ohopoho dansla région du Kaokoveld (Sud-Ouest africain)
Il s'agit là d'un des terrains d'atterrissage peu nombreux qui sont
situésen divers endroits du Sud-Ouest africain et sont utilisés essentielle-
ment pour des besoins administratifs mais aussi, à l'occasion et de
façon intermittente, pour l'atterrissage d'appareils militaires. Ce sont
des pistes naturelles que l'on a simplement débroussaillées et débar-
rasséesde certains obstacles. Il n'existe sur ces terrains aucun personnel,
aucun service d'entretien, aucune installation et ils ne peuvent, servir
qu'à des appareils légers.
c) Les installationsde matérielet d'intendmce du régimentWindhoo.k
Le régiment Windhoek est une unité de réserve composée de civils
qui effectuent en temps de paix des périodesmilitaires. Chaque hommeEach trainee is enlisted for a period of four years and during that time
he undergoes three periods of training. In his first year of enlistment the
recruit attends a training course for a period of nine months at one or
other military training institution in the Republic of South Africa.
Over the last three years of his enlistment the trainee attends two training
courses of three weeks each at a training camp at Windhoek in South
West Africa. The said two periods of three weeks each is the only training
which members of the Regiment Windhoek receivein South West Africa
itself and, save when attending the training course aforementioned, the
members of the Regiment carry on their ordinary civilian occupations
and have no peacetime military obligations, except that they may be
called up if needed for purposes of restoring or maintaining lawand order.
The complement of the Regiment varies from year to year inasmuch
as in every year new recruits are enlisted and trained men discharged.
In 1963the complement was 20 officers and 221 other ranks. The Com-
manding Officer of the Regiment is not a professional soldier of the
permanent force, but, like the trainees, a member of the Citizen Force
and is predominantly occupied with his normal civil occupation.
At the training camp at Windhoek there are some houses occupied
by members of the South West Africa Command l;for the rest the camp
has ablution and cooking facilities only, sleeping accommodation for
trainees being provided during every training course by the pitching
of tents. The Regiment Windhoek is equipped with light reconnaissance
vehicles,Le., armoured cars '.It only remains to be said thatthe members
of the Regiment Windhoek are al1European inhabitants of South West
Africa, there being no military training whatsoever of Natives in the
Territory.
5. 1 have already stated that the facts as set out above are not in
dispute. That is so inasmuch as Applicants, during the course of the oral
proceedings, admitted as true al1 the factual statements contained in
Respondent's pleadings. And, as 1noted when dealing with Applicants'
complaints regarding piecemeal annexation (Submission No. 5), their
admission was specifically confirmed also with reference to the part
of the case concerning militarization. In this regard Applicants' Agent
referred to ". ..the facts with respect. ..to militarization ... as disputed
by the Respondent, and as subsequently accepted by the Applicants for
purposes of these proceedings . ..". Not only were the facts, as afore-
stated, relative to the landing strip at Ohopoho and the Regiment
Windhoek, admitted by the ~~~licaits, but they were confirmed in every
l The South West Africa Command is a military administrative organ for,
inter alia, the Regiment Windhoek, with headquarters at Windhoek. It consists
of a small permanent force staff, the complement of which in 1964 was three
officers and seven other ranks.
See in this regard the evidence of General Marshall: he found in the hangar
at Windhoek: 12 small armoured cars ("ferrets"which he described asrecomais-
terialand half of them out of commission; 16 miscellaneous vehicles,jeeps, trailers,
trucks, etc.; six-pounder gun used for ceremonial purposes.
206 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 208
est engagépour quatre années,au cours desquelles il effectue trois pé-
riodes. La première année, ileffectue une périodede neuf mois à l'une
ou l'autre des institutions d'entraînement militaire de la République
sud-africaine. Pendant les trois autres années,il effectue deux périodes
de trois semaines chacune, dans un camp d'entraînement de Windhoek
(Sud-Ouest africain). C'est uniquement pendant ces deux périodes de
trois semaines que les membres du régiment Windhoek suivent un
entraînement au Sud-Ouest africain même;en dehors des périodes, ils
continuent à vaquer à leurs occupations civiles normales et ils n'ont
en temps de paix aucune obligation militaire si ce n'est qu'ils peuvent
êtreappelés en cas de nécessité à contribuer au rétablissement ou au
maintien de l'ordre. L'effectifdu régiment varie d'uneannée à l'autre,
puisque tous les ans on engage de nouvelles recrues, tandis qu'on libère
les hommes ayant terminéleurentraînement. En 1963,le régimentcomp-
tait 20 officierset 221 hommes. L'officiercommandant le régiment n'est
pas un militaire de carrière de l'arméepermanente; tout comme les
autres engagés,c'est un réserviste,qui consacre la majeure partie de
son temps à ses occupations civiles.
Au camp d'entraînement de Windhoek, il existe quelques bâtiments
occupéspar des membres du South West Africa Command I; pour le
reste, le camp ne présente que des installations pour la toilette et la
cuisine et, pendant les périodesd'entraînement, les hommes y plantent
des tentes pour la nuit. Le régimentWindhoek est équipéde quelques
véhiculesde reconnaissance légers, c'est-à-dire de voitures blindées *.
A signaler enfin que les membres du régiment Windhoeksont tous des
résidents européens du Sud-Ouest africain, aucun indigène du terri-
toire ne subissant d'entraînement militaire.
5. J'ai déjà dit queles faits ci-dessus ne sont pas contestés.Au cours
de la procédure orale,les demandeurs ont en effet reconnu pour vraies
toutes les déclarationsde fait figurant dans les écrituresdu défendeur.
Comme je l'ai fait observer en étudiant les griefs formuléspar les de-
mandeurs concernant une annexion progressive (conclusion no 5), ils
ont expressément confirmé cette reconnaissance desfaits pour ce qui
est de la militarisation. Sur ce point, l'agent des demandeurs a parlé
des ((faits concernant la militarisation...contestéspar le défendeuret
admis ensuite par les demandeurs aux fins des présentsdébats ..» Non
seulement les faits susmentionnés relatifs au terrain d'atterrissage de
Ohopoho et au régiment Windhoekont étéreconnus pour vrais par les
demandeurs, mais encore ils ont été confirmés entous points par le
l Le South West Africa Command est un organisme administratimilitaire qui
s'occupe entre autres drégiment Windhoek et dont le siège està Windhoek.
L'effectif permanent est restreint et comprenaiticers et 7 hommes en 1964.
Voir à ce sujet la déposition du généralMarshall qui a dénombré dans un
hangar de Windhoek: 12 petites voitures blindées ferrequ'il a qualifiées de
véhicules de reconnaissance;voitures blindéMark 4 et 6 chars légers (vestiges
de la seconde guerre mondialdont la moitié hors d'état de marche); véhicles
divers, jeeps, remorques, camionnettes, etc.;ièce de batterie de six utilisée
à l'occasion de cérémonies.
206respect by General Marshall. General Marshall was not asked to testify
as to any military facilities at Walvis Bay, which, as 1 have said, falls
outside the mandated territory.
6. The question then arises whether, on the facts as aforestated, the
three facilities referred to in the Memorials are military bases within the
meaning of that expression in Article 4 of the Mandate.
1 would Say that obviously and as a matter of common sense the
answer is in the negative. However, in view of the contrary contentions
at one stage advanced by Applicants, 1 may add that this answer is
confirmed by dictionary meanings and expert opinion.
The following definitions of the term "military base" are found in the
dictionaries:
(a) Webster's CompleteDictionary of the English Language(1880)
Base (military) "A tract of country protected by fortifications, or
by natural advantages, from which the operations
of an army proceed."
(b) Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language
(Second Edition)
Base (military and naval) "The locality on which a force relies for
supplies (base of supplies) or from which it initiates
operations (base of operations); as, a submarine
base."
(c) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Third Edition)
Base (military) "The line or place relied upon as a stronghold and
magazine, and from which the operations of a
campaign are conducted."
(d) Gaynor, The New Military and Naval Dictionary (1951)
Base "A locality from which operations are projected or
supported; the term may be preceded by a descrip-
tive word such as 'air' or 'submarine', to indicate
its primary purpose."
(e) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English(1958)
Base (mil.) "Town or other area in rear of an army where drafts,
stores, hospitals, etc., are concentrated (also [base]
of operations)."
(f) Funk andWagnallsNew Standard Dictionaryfor theEnglishLanguage
(1961)
Base (mil.) "A place or region constituting a basis of operations
or a point from which supplies and reinforcements
[sic] may be drawn; a base of supply."
It seems to me that there is a common feature in al1these definitions,
207 SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN (OP. IND. VAN WYK) 209
général Marshall.Ce dernier n'a pas étéappelé à déposer sur les éven-
tuelles installations militaires de Walvis Bay, qui, comme je l'ai dit,
ne sont pas situéesdans le territoire sous Mandat.
6. La question se pose donc de savoir si, étantdonnéles faits susmen-
tionnés, les trois installations évoquéesdans les mémoires sont ou
non des bases militaires au sens de l'article4 du Mandat.
Je dirai qu'il semble évident qu'ilfaut répondre par la négative;
c'est une question de bon sens. Toutefois, comme les demandeurs ont
soutenu à un moment donné le contraire, j'ajouterai que la réponse
négativese trouve confirméepar les dictionnaires et par l'opinion des
experts.
Les dictionnairesdonnent de l'expression base militaire les définitions
ci-après:
a) Webster, Complete Dictionary of the English Language, 1880
Base (militaire): «zone protégéepar des fortifications ou des acci-
dents naturels sur laquelle une arméeappuie ses
mouvements stratégiques ».
b) Webster, New International Dictionary of the English Language,
2e édition
Base (militaire et navale): ((centre qu'une armée ou une flotte
utilise pour son ravitaillement (base de ravitail-
lement) ou à partir duquel elle effectue sesmouve-
ments (base d'opérations); exemple: base de
sous-marins)).
c) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3e édition
Base (militaire): ((ligne ou zone servant de position forte et de
centre de ravitaillement et à partir de laquelle
s'effectuent les opérations de campagne ».
d) Gaynor, The New Military and Naval Dictionary, 1951
Base: ((centreà partir duquel les opérations sont pro-
jetées ou sur lequel elles s'appuient; le terme
peut être précisé: base aérienne,base de sous-
marins, pour faire connaître son utilisation prin-
cipale 1).
e) The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1958
Base (militaire): ((villeou autre centre situéà l'arrièred'une armée,
où sont rassemblésles contingents, les magasins,
les hôpitaux, etc. (voir également base d'opéra-
tions)».
f) Funk-Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary for the English Language,
1961
Base (militaire): ((lieu ou zone constituant une base d'opérations
ou un centre à partir duquel on peut se ravitailler
et obtenir des renforts; base de ravitaillement ».
Il me semble que toutes ces définitionsont un trait commun, à savoir
207210 SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SEP. OP.VAN WYK)
namely that a base is something utilized by a force or an army for the
purposes of operations or a campaign.
If 1 am correct in my reading of these definitions it follows, in my
opinion, that a place cannot be said to be maintained as a rnilitary or
naval base unless itsurpose is utilization by a force or an army for oper-
ations or a campaign, actual or prospective.
7. If the aforestated test is applied to the admitted facts relative to the
facilities in question, not one of them would fa11within the dictionary
definitions of "military base". 1 of course exclude the military landing
ground at Walvis Bay. As 1 have already pointed out, it falls outside
the mandated territory, and the relevant facts thereof were not investi-
gated. There is no basis, legal or factual, for a contention that it must be
considered to be in South West Africa, whether "in a military sense"
or any other sense. In so far asthe two remaining facilitiesare concerned
neither the landing strip at Ohopoho nor the supply and maintenance
facilities of the Regiment Windhoek qualify, in terms of the dictionary
definitions, as military bases.
Thiswas also the expert opinion of GeneralMarshall, who, Applicants'
Agent conceded, was "indeed a recognized military authority and widely
read as such in Ournative country".
General Marshall testified that he had visited South West Africa on
two occasions during 1965 and had given particular attention to the
facilities in question. He described his findings with regard to these
installations in detail and concluded that neither of them could, in his
opinion, be regarded as a military base.
8. Another reason why 1 consider that the said facilities cannot be
regarded as military bases, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Man-
date, is that thesaid Article itself does not prohibit, but on the contrary
by implication permits, the training of the European inhabitants of the
Territory aswellasthetraining oftheNatives for certain limited purposes,
i.e., forinternal police and local defence.It must have been contemplated
that there would be training of inhabitants of the Territory at least
for internal police and local defencepurposes and, which is a necessary
corollary, that there would be facilities foruch training. It is, therefore,
inconceivable that the prohibition against military bases in Article 4
was intended to extend to ordinary training facilities such as those
provided for members of the Regiment Windhoek or to facilities such
as the landing strips at Ohopoho and elsewhere, which are used mainly
for administrative purposes but occasionally also by military aircraft,
inter alia, for the training of air force personnel.
9. As 1 have mentioned, Applicants in their pleadings advanced
arguments contrary to the above conclusions.
At one stage they suggestedthat the facilitiesin question were military
bases inasmuch as they were, according to Applicants, not intended
for "police protection or internal security"l.
There is no substance in this contention, which appears to have been
l Memorials,pp. 182-183.
708qu'une baseest quelque chose qui est utilisépar une arméeou uneflotte
en vue d'opérations ou d'une campagne.
Sije les interprète comme il convient, ellessignifieàtmon avis qu'un
endroit ne peut êtreconsidéré commeconstituant une base militaire
ou navale que s'il est destiné à servir à une armée ou à une flotte en
vue d'opérationsou d'une campagne en cours ou à l'étatde projet.
7. Or, si l'on met à l'épreuve de cetterègleles faits relatifs aux ins-
tallations en question, faits qui ont été reconnus, rien necorrespond
aux définitionsde la base militaire que donnent les dictionnaires. J'ex-
clus naturellement le terrain d'aviation militaire de Walvis Bay. Comme
je l'ai déjàdit, il est situéen dehors du territoire sous Mandat et les faits
pertinents n'ont en conséquencepas étéapprofondis. Rien, ni en droit,
ni en fait, ne permet de soutenir qu'il faille le considérer comme situé
dans le Sud-Ouest africain, que se soitcau sens militaire)ou en un autre
sens. En ce qui concerne les deux autres installations visées,ni la piste
d'atterrissage deOhopoho ni les installations de matériel et d'intendance
du régimentWindhoek ne correspondent aux définitions dela base mili-
taire que donnent les dictionnaires.
C'est dans le même sensqu'a témoigné un expertl,e généralMarshall,
qui, comme l'a reconnu l'agent des demandeurs, est «une autorité
militaire notoire...qu'on ...lit beaucoupà cetitre dans [son]pays natal».
Au cours de sa déposition, le généralMarshall a déclaré qu'ils'é-
tait rendu au Sud-Ouest africain à deux remises dans le courant de 1965
et s'étaittout particulièrement intéresséaux installations en question.
Après avoir décrit en détailce qu'il y avait vu, il a conclu qu'aucune
d'elles ne peut à son avis être tenuepour une base militaire.
8. Il est une autre raison pour laquelle j'estime que lesdites installa-
tions ne peuvent pas êtreconsidérées comme des bases militairesau
sens de l'article du Mandat: cet article n'interdit pas, maisau contraire
permet implicitement, tant l'instruction des habitants européens du
territoire que celle des indigènesà certaines fins limitées (assurerla po-
lice locale et la défenselocale). On a dû rév voirI'instruction des habi-
tants du territoire au moins akx fins de 1; police locale et de la défense
locale et, corollaire indispensable, la mise en place d'installaiions en
vue de cette instruction. Il est donc inconcevable que l'interdiction for-
mulée à l'article à l'encontre des bases militairesait été censése'éten-
dre à des installations d'instruction courantes comme celles du régiment
Windhoek ou à des installations du genre des pistes d'atterrissage de
Ohopoho ou d'ailleurs, quisont essentiellementaffectées àdesbesoins ad-
ministratifs et ne servent qu'occasionnellement àdes appareils militaires,
notamment pour l'instruction du personnel del'arméedel'air.
9. Comme je l'ai signalé,les demandeurs ont présentédans leurs
écritures desarguments contraires aux conclusions ci-dessus.
A un moment donné, ils ont laisséentendre que les installations en
question étaient des bases militairesdu fait qu'à leur avis elles n'étaient
destinéesni «à la protection de police ni [à la] sécuritéinterne l».
Cette thèse n'est pas fondée et s'appuie, semble-t-il, sur une erreur
Mémoires, p. 182-183.based on a misinterpretation of the sentence in Article 4 which deals
with the military training of Natives.Inasmuch as there is no training of
Natives in South West Africa, the qualificafion which Applicants sought
to apply in their Memorials relative to the establishment of military
bases was misplaced.And,in any event, there is no evidence that the fa-
cilities in question were intended for, or are used for, any military pur-
poses other than for interna1police andthe local defenceofthe Territory.
At another stage the Applicants submitted that only Natives could
lawfully be trained for police and local defence purposes, and they even
went so far as to suggest that Article 4 would have been violated unless
Respondent could confirm "that there [is] not in the entire territory a
single soldier orsailor on the active list"l.1do not intend to deal with
these arguments, which in my opinion are, to say the least, fanciful and
baseless. Suffice it to say that neither the Mandate for South West
Africa, nor any other mandate, prohibited the military training of non-
Natives, and there is undisputed evidence before the Court that a large
number of non-Natives were in fact trained and used in the forces
stationed in the other African mandated territories during the lifetime
of the League.
10. Before proceeding to deal with a further contention advanced
by Applicants in the oral proceedings, 1wish to draw attention to certain
factual allegations which wereintroduced by Applicants for the first time
in their Reply.
Under a heading "Military Activity in General" Applicants for the
first time charged in their Reply that Respondent had-
"... created a situation where there is the equivalent of a series of
military bases or potential military bases in the Territory or at
worst, where the Territory iself and its 'White' inhabitants have
become armed and CO-ordinatedto the extent that the Territory
has been transformed into a 'military base' within the meaning
3nd intent of the Covenant and the Mandate".
In my viewit isimpermissiblefor an Applicant to introduce an entirely
new complaint of this kind in its Reply. The procedure of this Court
requires that the Applicants' cause of action should be set out in the
Application and Memorial. This requirement is not a mere procedural
technicality-if new causes of action are allowed to be introduced at
later stages of the proceedings it becomes impossible for the parties
to deal fullytherewith prior to the conclusion of the written proceedings.
Each party should have the opportunities contemplated in the Rules
of Court for dealing with the contentions of the other party. The Court
itself is, to put it at its lowest, inconvenienced if, as happened in the
present case, there is at the commencement of the oral proceedings no
certainty as to the areas of agreement or dispute between the parties.
In my view such a situation militates against the proper administration
Reply, p. 340.
209 d'interprétationde la phrase de l'article 4 qui vise l'instruction militaire
des indigènes. Les indigènesne recevant pas d'instruction militaire au
Sud-Ouest africain, la thèse défenduepar les demandeurs dans leurs
mémoiresquant à la création de bases militaires est erronée.De toute
façon, rien ne prouve que les installations en question aient étéprévues
ou soient utiliséesà des fins militaires autres que la police locale et la
défense locale du territoire.
A un autre moment, les demandeurs ont déclaréque seuls des indi-
gènespeuvent licitement recevoir une instruction en vue d'assurer la
police locàle et la défense localeet ils ont étéjusqu'à laisser entendre
qu'ily aurait violation des dispositions de l'article 4 à moins que le
défendeurne puisse confirmer qu7«il n'existe pas sur tout le territoire
un seul soldat ou un seul marin militaire d'activeln. Je ne vais pas m'ar-
rêterà ces arguments, qui à mon avis, et c'est lemoins que j'en puisse
dire, relèventde l'imagination pure et sont infondés. Il me suffit de dire
que ni le Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain, ni aucun autre Mandat
n'a interdit de donner une instruction militaire à des non-indigènes;
la Cour sait, par des éléments de preuve incontestés, qu'un grand nom-
bre de non-indigènes ont précisément reçuune instruction et servi dans
les forces armées stationnées dans les autres territoires sous Mandat
d'Afrique pendant l'existence de la Société des Nations.
10. Avant d'en venir à une autre thèse que les demandeurs ont pré-
sentéeau cours de la procédure orale, je tiens à relever certaines allé-
gations de fait dont les demandeurs ont fait état pour la première fois
dans leur réplique.
Dans la réplique, sous la rubrique (Activitésmilitaires en généra l,
les demandeurs ont pour la première fois accuséle défendeur d'avoir:
((crééune situation telle que cela équivaut à une série de bases
militaires effectives ou virtuelles sur le Territoire ou, ce qui est
pis, [d'avoir]provoquéune situation telle que le Territoire lui-même
et ses habitants ((blancs))sont sous les armes et groupés en sorte
que le Territoire a ététransformé en une ((base militaire 1)au sens
du Pacte de la Société desNations et du Mandat ».
l'estime qu'un demandeur ne doit pas présenterun grief parfaitement
nouveiau de ce genre dans une réplique. La procédure de la Cour veut
que les demandes soient énoncéesdans la requêteet le mémoire. Il ne
s'agit paslà d'une'simple formalité de procédure: si l'on permet d'intro-
duire de nouvelles demandes à des stades ultérieurs de la procédure, il
devient impossible aux parties d'en tenir dûment compte avant la
clôture de la procédureécrite.Chacune des parties doit avoir les moyens
prévuspar le Règlementde la Cour de prendre dûment en considération
les thèses présentéespar la partie adverse. De son côté, la Cour se
trouve pour le moins gênée dans ses travaux lorsque, comme cela s'est
produit en l'espèce,on ne sait pas vraiment au début de la procédure
orale sur quels points les parties se trouvent d'accord ou bien en litige.
Je suis d'avis qu'une telle situation nuit la bonne administration de la
Réplique,p. 340.
209ofjustice, and should not be countenanced. In the present case it would
seem, in view of what is stated hereinafter, that Applicants did not in
the oral proceedings persist in this omnibus charge. They certainly made
no mention of it or of the factual allegations embodied therein. There is,
however, no certainty in this regard in view of the vague and unparticu-
larized manner in which Applicants finallyreformulated their Submission
No. 6-also a matter to which reference is made hereinafter. Whatever
the position may be in this regard, it is clear on the evidence that there
could be no merit in the charge. At the conclusion ofhis evidenceGeneral
Marshall wasaskedwhethertherewas anythingwhich hesawinSouth West
Africa which, in his opinion, could be regarded as a military base, or
whether the territory as such could be regarded as a military base.
His reply was: "My answer is no. May 1add that the Territory is less
militarized and more under-armed than any territory of its size 1 have
ever seen in the world."
The witness's conclusions were not attacked by Applicants, either
in cross-examination or in comment on the evidence, and, of course, no
evidence whatsoever had been led by the Applicants. In my view, there
can be no reason for not accepting General Marshall's evidence and
opinions. Indeed, Applicants' Agent himself referred to the "first-hand
authentic and undoubtedly correct factual statement" concerning what
General Marshall saw on his inspection.
Il. The only contention advanced by Applicants in the oral pro-
ceedings relative to their charges regarding militarization was to the
effect that modern military science had progressed to the stage where
the Territory could be effectivelymilitarized within a short period, and
that, in the absence of administrative supervision, Respondent must
consequently be deemed to be guilty of a violation of Article 4 of the
Mandate. It was apparently in pursuance of this new contention that
Applicants' Submission No. 6 was amended to read as follows:
"Respondent has established military bases within the Territory
in violation of its obligations as stated in Article of the Mandate
and Article 22 of the Covenant; that Respondent has the duty
forthwith to remove al1such military bases from within the Territory
and that Respondent has the duty to refrain from the establishment
of military bases within the Territory."
It will be noted that (similarly to the position in respect of Applicants'
reformulated Submission No. 5) the reformulated Submission No. 6
omits specific identification of any acts or installations. It is true that
the reformulated submissions were al1 made "upon the basis of alle-
gations of fact and statements of law set forth in the written pleadings
and oralproceedings herein". It is, however, not clearwhich ofthe charges
the Applicants are persisting in, particularly in view of the fact that
their charges in the pleadings included a charge, dealt with in paragraph
10, supra, to the effectthat the whole of South West Africa had become
210justice et ne doitpas êtreautorisée.Dans le cas présent, il semble,comme
on le verra ci-après,que les demandeurs n'ont pas, au cours de la pro-
cédureorale, maintenu le grief de caractère global dont je viens de faire
état. Ilsn'en ont en tout cas pas parlé,pas plus que des allégations de
fait sur lesquelles il se fonde. Mais il n'y a cependant aucune certitude
à cet égard,étant donnélelibellé vagueet peu précisque les demandeurs
ont finalement donné à leur conclusion no 6; j'y reviendrai aussi un
peu plus loin. Quoi qu'il en soit, il est clair d'après lesfaits que le grief
est infondé.A la fin de sa déposition on a demandéau généralMarshall
s'ilavait vu dans le Sud-Ouest africain quoique cefût qu'ilpût considérer
comme une base militaire, ou si le territoire lui-mêmepouvait être
considéré àson avis comme une base militaire.
Voici ce qu'il a dit:(Jerépondsnon. Puis-je ajouter que le Territoire
se trouve moins militarisé, davantage sous-armé qu'aucun autre terri-
toire de sa taille que j'aie jamais vu dans le monde.))
Les conclusions du témoin n'ont pas suscitéde critique de la part
des demandeurs que ce soit lors du contre-interrogatoire ou dans le
cadre de leurs observations sur les dépositions; ils n'ont bien entendu
produit pour leur part aucun élémentde fait. A mon avis, rien n'em-
pêche d'accepterpour véridique le témoignage et les avis du général
Marshall. Du reste, l'agent desdemandeurs lui-mêmea parlé de décla-
ration constatant de première main, authentiquement, de manière
indubitablement correcte » en parlant de ce que le généralMarshall
a relatéà la suite de son inspection.
11. La seule thèse présentéepar les demandeurs au cours de la pro-
cédure oralequant à leurs griefs touchant la militarisation du territoire
revenait à dire que la science militaire moderne a tellement progressé
que le territoire pourrait êtreeffectivement militariséen peu de temps
et qu'en l'absence de surveillance administrative le défendeur doit
êtrejugécoupable deviolation del'article 4 du Mandat. C'est, semble-t-il,
pour s'aligner sur cette nouvelle thèse que les demandeurs ont donné
une nouvelle forme à leur conclusion no 6, qui se lit comme suit:
((Le défendeur a établi des bases militaires sur le Territoire en
violation de ses obligations telles qu'elles figurentà l'article 4 du
Mandat et à l'article 22 du Pacte; ...le défendeur a le devoir de
supprimer sur-le-champ toutes les bases militaires établies sur le
Territoire; et...le défendeur a ledevoir de s'abstenir d'établir de
bases militaires sur le Territoire.
On constatera (et cela n'est pas sans rappeler le cas de la conclusion
no 5revisée)que la conclusion no6revisée ometde mentionner expressé-
ment le moindre acte ou la moindre installation. Certes les conclusions
reviséesont toutes étéformuléessur la base des ((allégationsde fait et
[des] considérations de droit énoncéesdans les écritures et les plaidoi-
ries».On ne voit toutefois pas bien quels sont les griefs que les deman-
deurs maintiennent, surtout si l'on se rappelle que dans leur écritures
leurs griefs consistaient notamment à soutenir, comme on l'a vu au
paragraphe 10ci-dessus, que l'ensemble du Sud-Ouest africain a été transformed into a military base. And if, as Applicants explained in
the oral proceedings, the basis oftheir complaint islack of administrative
supervision, what criterion is there fcr determining whether any of
the particular installations or facilitiesreferred to in the pleadings, or any
otherinstallationsor facilitiesinthe Territory, are orare notmilitary bases?
In any event, if we have regard to the informa1 statement by Appli-
cants' Agent in the oral proceedings as to what the Applicants' case
really is, the complaint appears to be that Respondent would, in the
absence of international supervision, be able to militarize the Territory
without anybody being aware thereof. This line of argument clearly
provides no support for a contention that "Respondent has established
military bases within the Territory", nordoes it in fact suggest any other
violation of Article4 of the Mandate.
12. For the reasons aforestatcd, 1 find that there is no substance in
Applicants' charges relative to Article 4 of the Mandate.
The Alleged Duty to Transmit Petitions
(Applicants' Submission No. 8)
1. 1 have already expressed the view that, apart from other grounds,
this submission should be dismissed also on the ground that Article 6 of
the Mandate Declaration, which provided for the duty to report and
account, no longer applies. However, even if Article6 were still in force,
the result would, in so far as Submission No. 8is concerned,in my view,
be the same. Neither Article 6, nor any other provision of the Mandate,
required the Mandatory to transmit petitions to the Council or any
other organ ofthe League.The procedure of submittingpetitions through
the mandatories arose as a result of rules of procedure drafted by the
Council in 1923. (League of Nations, OfJicialJournal, 1923 (No. 3),
p. 300.) It is clear that these rules could not impose on the mandatories
an obligation not provided for in the Mandate Declarations or in Article
22 of the Covenant. And, indeed, the said rules did not purport to do
so. These rules were designed for the protection of the mandatories
against frivolous or one-sidedpetitions by ensuring that the mandatories
would have an opportunity of commenting on them before they were
considered by the League. For this reason the rules provided that pe-
titions emanating from the inhabitants of a mandated territory were not
to be sent direct to the Council, but were to be transmitted throughthe
mandatory concerned; thus enabling the mandatory to attach such
comments as it might think desirable. And in respect of petitions ema-
nating from any source other than the inhabitants themselves, the
mandatory was to be asked for its comment before such petitions were
considered by the Permanent Mandates Commission.
These rules of procedure were therefore not intended to impose obli-
gations on the mandatories but rather to provide them with the oppor-
tunity of making timely comments on the allegations made in petitions
to the League.
211transformé en base militaire. Si, comme les demandeurs l'ont expliqué
en plaidoirie, ils se fondent sur l'absence de surveillance administrative,
quel critère permet alors de savoir si l'une quelconque des installations
mentionnées dans les écritures, ou n'importe quelle autre installation
du territoire, constitue ou non une base militaire?
De toute façon, si l'on considère les explications complémentaires
données par l'agent des demandeurs en plaidoirie sur la thèse de ses
clients, ceux-ci semblent faire grief au défendeur d'être à même,en
l'absence de surveillance internationale, de militariser le territoire sans
que quiconque s'en aperçoive. Cette argumentation n'étayeabsolument
pas la thèse d'après laquelle le défendeur aurait ((établi des bases mili-
taires sur le territoire)); elle ne permet pas non plus de conclureà la
moindre autre violation des dispositions de l'article du Mandat.
12. Pour les motifs ci-dessus indiqués, j'estime que les griefs des
demandeurs relativement à l'article 4 du Mandat étaient sans fondement.
Prétendue obligation de transmettre despétitions
(Conclusion no8 des demandeurs)
1. J'ai déjà dit qu'à mon avis, en dehors d'autres considérations,
cette conclusion està rejeter motif pris de ce que l'article 6 de la décla-
ration de Mandat, qui impose au Mandataire de faire rapport et de
rendre compte, n'est plus applicable. Toutefois, j'estime que, mêmesi
l'article6 était toujours en vigueur, cela ne changerait rien en ce qui
concerne la conclusion no 8. Ni l'article 6 ni aucune autre disposition du
Mandat n'imposaient au Mandataire de communiquer des pétitions au
Conseil ni à aucun autre organe de la Société desNations. La trans-
mission de pétitions par l'intermédiaire desMandataires n'a commencé
qu'avecl'élaboration du règlement intérieur du Conseil en 1923 (Société
des Nations, J.O., 1923,no 3, p. 300). Il est évidentque ce règlement ne
pouvait guère imposer aux Mandataires une obligation qui n'était
prévue nidans les déclarations de Mandat ni dans l'article 22 du Pacte.
Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas ce qu'il disait.visaià protégerles Mandataires
contre des pétitions insignifiantes ou partiales en leur garantissant la
possibilité de faire parvenir leurs observationssur ces pétitions avant
que celles-ci ne fussent examinées par la Société desNations. C'est
pourquoi le règlement prévoyait que les pétitions émanant d'habitants
d'un territoire sous Mandat ne devaient pas êtreciresséesdirectement au
Conseil, mais transmises par l'intermédiaire du Mandataire intéressé;
celui-ci avait ainsi la possibilitéd'yjoindre les observations qu'il jugeait
convenable. Quant aux pétitions émanant d'autres personnes que des
habitants du Territoire, le Mandataire devait êtreinvité à formuler
ses observations à leur égardavant que la Commission permanente des
Mandats ne les examinât.
Le règlement intérieur ne visait donc pas à imposer des obligations
aux Mandataires mais plutôt à leur donner le moyen de formuler les
observations voulues sur les allégations dont les pétitions envoyées
à la Société desNations pouvaient faire état. However, even if the Council's rules of procedure could in some way
or another have given riseto an obligation onthe part ofthe mandatories,
such an obligation could, in any event, not be described as an obligation
embodied in the "provisions of the Mandate". It follows that the Court
would, in any event, not have jurisdiction in terms of Article 7 (2) of
the Mandate to entertain disputes regarding the alleged violation of
such an obligation.
2. In my view these are additional reasons why Applicants'.Submission
No. 8 should be dismissed.
Article 7, Paragraph1, of the Mandate
(Applicants' Submission No. 9)
1. Little need be said about Submission No. 9. As in the case of
Applicants' SubmissionsNos. 5 and 6, which have been dealt with above,
Submission No. 9 initially particularized Respondent's alleged conduct
which was contended to be in confiict with Article 7 (1) of the Mandate.
In the Memorials, Submission No. 9 read a follows:
". .. the Union, by virtue of the acts described in Chapters V, VI,
VI1 and VI11of this Memorial coupled with its intent as recounted
herein, has attempted to modify substantially the terms of the
Mandate, without the consent of the United Nations; that such
attempt is in violation of its duties as stated in Article 7 of the Man-
date and Article 22 of the Covenant; and that the consent of the
United Nations is a necessary prerequisite and condition precedent
to attempts onthe part of the Union directly or indirectly to modify
the terms of the Mandate".
2. Also in respect of this submission, Applicants were forced to
effect an amendment as a result of their admission of al1the facts as
set forth in Respondent's pleadings. These admitted facts disproved
the allegationsupon which the submission was based, and the Applicants
accordingly deleted al1the referencesmade in the submissionas originally
formulated to the acts described in Chapters V, VI, VI1 and VI11of the
Memorials as well as references to Respondent's alleged intent. In the
result also this submission has become so vague as to be meaningless.
It follows that, in my view, no declaration can be made as requested in
this submission.
3. There are, however, also other grounds for reaching the same
conclusion. On the dissolution of the League of Nations, Article 7 (l),
in my view, lapsed in the same way, and for substantially the same
reasons, as Article 6, with which 1 dealt above. It follows that, even if
the Mandate were still in existence as an institution, Article7 (1) would
no longer be in force. In my view no agreement has been concluded.
Neither the United Nations nor any one of its organs has stepped into
the shoes ofthe LeagueCouncilas theauthority whoseconsentis required
far modification of the terms of the Mandate.
212 En tout cas, mêmesi le règlementintérieurdu Conseil avait pu d'une
manière ou d'une autre imposer une nouvelle obligation aux Manda-
taires, cette obligation n'aurait en aucun caspu êtrequalifiéed'obligation
contenue dans les dispositions du Mandat ».Par conséquent, la Cour
n'aurait de toute façon pas compétence au titre du deuxième alinéa
de l'article7 du Mandat pour trancher des différends relatifs à la pré-
tendue violation de ladite obligation.
2. Ce seraient là à mon avis des motifs supplémentaires pour rejeter
la conclusion no 8 des demandeurs.
Article 7,premier alinéa,du Mandat
(Conclusionno9 des demandeurs)
1. Il n'est guère besoin de s'attarder longuement sur la conclusion
no9. Comme les conclusions no5 et no6 étudiées ci-dessusl,a conclusion
no 9 précisait sous sa forme initiale le comportement du défendeur
qui était censéêtre incompatibleavec les dispositions du premier alinéa
de l'article 7 du Mandat. En effet, dans les mémoires, la conclusion
no9 se lisait comme suit:
((l'union, par ses agissements décrits aux chapitres V, VI, VI1
et VI11du présent mémoire,s'ajoutant à sesintentions telles qu'elles
sont exposées ci-avant, a tenté d'apporter aux dispositions du
Mandat des modifications de fond sans l'autorisation des Nations
Unies; ..cette tentative constitue une violation de ses obligations
telles au'ellesfigurentà l'article 7 du Mandat et à l'article 22 du
u
Pacte; et ...l'autorisation des Nations Unies est une condition
préalableindispensable à toute tentative de la part de l'Union de
modifier directement ou indirectement les dispositions du Mandat )).
2. Les demandeurs ont étécontraints de modifier cette conclusion
elle aussi, dèslors qu'ils ont reconnu pour vrais tous les faits énoncés
dans les écritures du défendeur. Les faits ainsi reconnus pour vrais
prouvant le caractère erronédes allégationssur lesquelles la conclusion
se fondait dans sa première version, les demandeurs en ont supprimé
toute allusion aux agissements décritsaux chapitres V, VI, VI1 et VI11
des mémoires et aux prétendues intentions du défendeur. De sorte
qu'en définitivecette conclusion est elle aussi devenue vague au point
de n'avoir plus de sens. J'estimepar conséquentimpossible de la retenir.
3. Il existe cependant d'autres motifs qui permettent d'aboutir au
mêmerésultat.Je considère qu'àla dissolution de la Société des Nations
le premier alinéa de l'article 7 est devenu caduc de la mêmefaçon et
essentiellement pour les mêmcsraisons que l'article 6 dont j'ai parlé
plus haut. Par suite, mêmesi le Mandat existait encore en tant qu'insti-
tution, le premier alinéade l'article7 ne serait plus en vigueur. J'estime
qu'aucun accord n'a étéconclu. Ni l'Organisation des Nations Unies
ni aucun de ses organes n'a pris la place du Conseil de la Sociétédes
Nations comme organisme dont l'autorisation est nécessairepour modi-
fier les dispositions du Mandat. 4. In conclusion, 1 may add that Applicants in their final address
to this Court relied solely on Respondent's refusa1 to submit to inter-
national supervision as a ground for contending that a declaration should
be made in terms of Submission No.9. My viewin this respect is similar
tothat which1 have expressedwith regard to other submissionsin support
of which thesame contention was advanced, namely that, even if Appli-
cants would be entitled to a declaration in terms of their Submission
No. 2, that would not, in my view,justify a declaration that Respondent
has violated other provisions of the Mandate, forexample, that Res-
pondent has attempted to modify the terms of the Mandate in contra-
vention of Article 7 (1) thereof.
(Signe J.)T.VAN WYK. 4. Pour conclure j'ajouterai que, dans leur exposé finaà la Cour,
les demandeurs ont exclusivement argué du refus du défendeur de se
soumettre à une surveillance internationale pour soutenirqu'il faut
statuer dans le sens indiquépar la conclusiono 9. J'ai sur ce point un
avis analogue à celui que j'ai exprimétouchant d'autres conclusions
à l'appui desquelles les demandeurs ont présentéla mêmethèse: même
si les demandeurs étaient fondéà se voir adjuger leur conclusion no 2,
je ne pense pas que cela autoriseraàtdéclarer quele défendeura violé
d'autres dispositions du Mandat, par exemple qu'il a tenté dele modifier
contrairement au premier alinéa de l'article
(Signé J.T. VAN WYK.
Separate Opinion of Judge van Wyk