DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE RIPHAGEN
[Translation]
1. To my great regret 1find myselfunable to concur in the decision of
the Court, and 1wish to avail myself of my right under Article 57 of the
Statute to state the reasons for my dissent.
2. In my opinion the legal reasoning followed by the Court fails to
appreciate the very nature of the rules of customary public international
law applicable in the instant case.
The Belgian State has asserted that the Spanish State is internationally
responsible for the treatment which the administrative and judicial
authorities of Spain afforded to a private non-Spanish Company, the
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited. The Court has
recognized that:
"When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or
foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to
extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations
concerning the treatment to be afforded them." (Paragraph 33.)
Nevertheless, the Court has refused to examine whether the treatment
afforded to Barcelona Traction by the administrative and judicial
authorities of Spain was or was not in conformity with Spain's inter-
national obligations, since:
". .. the possession by the Belgian Government of a right of
protection is a prerequisite for the examination of these problems.
Since no jus standi before the Court has been established ..."
(paragraph 102).
In other words, Spain does indeed have international obligations with
respect to the treatment afforded to Barcelona Traction, but those
obligations are, it is said, not obligations towardsBelgiurn.
Throughout its Judgment, the Court has in view the hypothesis that
a greater or lesser part of Barcelona Traction's shares was, during the
whole of the relevant period, in the hands of Belgiannationals, whether
natural or juristic persons. This hypothesis is contested; the question,
which is not dealt with in the Judgment, will be reverted to below.
On the basis of this hypothesis, and without drawing any distinction
according to the size and nature of this participation by Belgian natural
or juristic persons in the capital and management of the Barcelona
Traction Company, the outcome for the Court is that the BelgianStatehas no right at the international level capable of being infringed by
the conduct of the Spanish authorities towards the Barcelona Traction
Company.
This conclusion is based solely on considerations concerning what the
Court calls (paragraph 38)the nature and interrelation of the rights of the
company and the rights of the shareholders undermunicipallaw. It is by
examining rules of municipal law which are to a great extent common to
those legislative systems which recognize the institution of companies
limited by shares that the Court reaches the conclusion that, under
municipal law, the rightsof the shareholders are not affected by measures
taken against the company. It follows, according to the Judgment, that
the State of which the shareholders in a company are nationals has also
no right that might be injured on the international plane by measures
taken by another State against the said company.
3. It is in making the rights and obligations of States under customary
public internationallaw depend purely and simplyon the rules of municipal
law concerning the rights and obligations of private persons in their
relations interse, that the Judgment seems to me to fail to appreciate the
nature of the rules of customary international law, including the rules of
international law concerning the rights and obligations of States in the
field known as "the treatment of aliens".
It is, however, well established that international responsibility is a
responsibility of State to State, and that consequently, the conditions
under which the international responsibility of a State arises, as well as
the conditions under which another State is entitled to require reparation
for an injury caused to it, are in principle completely independent of the
content of the municipal law of the States in question.
"Diplomatic protection and protection by means of international
judicial proceedings constitute measures for the defence of the rights
of the State. As the Permanent Court of International Justice has
said and has repe@ed,'bytaking up the case of one of its subjects and
by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial pro-
ceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights-
itsright to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law' (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 12, and Series AJB,
Nos. 20-21, p. 17)." (Nottebohm (Second Phase), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1955,p. 24) [my italics].
"It is a principle of international law that the reparation of a
wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage
which the nationals of the injured State have suffered as a result of
the act which is contrary to international law. This is even the most
usual form of reparation; it is the form selected by Germany in this
case and the admissibility of it has not been disputed. The reparation
due by one State to another does not however change its character
by reason of the fact that it takes the form of an indemnity for the calculation of which the damage suffered by a private person is
taken asthe measure. Therulesof law governing thereparationare the
rules of internationallaw inforce between thetwo States concerned,
and not the law governingrelations between the State which has
committeda wrongfulact and the individualwhohassuffered damage.
Rights or interestsof an individuai the violation owhichrights causes
damageare always in a drfferentplane to rights belongingto a State,
which rights may also be infringed by the same act. The damage
sufferedby an individual isnevertherefore identical in kind withthat
which will be suffered by a State; it can only afford a convenient
scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State." (Judg-
ment No. 13of the P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No. 17,pp. 27-28) (my.italics).
4. This complete separation between. the rules of customary inter-
national law concerning responsibilityfor the treatment of aliens, and the
rules and principles of municipal law, is much more than a mere legal
construct permitting of the substitution of legal relations between States
for the legal relations between the government and the private citizen or
between private citizens inter se.
It reflects a reality of international life: it determines the very content
of the rights and obligations of States on the international plane.
It is in fact indisputable that the State has a realnterest in the devel-
opment of its international commerce, of which investment in foreign
undertakings and the establishment of undertakings in foreign countries
constitute manifestations.Thus, apart from countries which practise the
system of State trading, international economic relations are in general
heavilycontrolled bythepublicauthorities. Furthermore, thisinternational
commercial activity of a State necessarily affects the economy, and thus
the public interest, of the receiving State; it normally also involves
contacts with the municipal legalsystemand with the public authorities of
that State. It is thus genuinely a matter of ensuring a proper balance
between the interests of States, a traditional task of the rules of public
international law.
This task is fundamentally different from that laid upon the rules of
municipal law, and in particular municipal private law. The consider-
ations which determine the choice of a particular system of municipal
private law with respect to what the Court has called "the nature and
interrelation" of "the rights of the corporate entity and its shareholders"
are completely foreign to the problems whichare the eoncern of the rules
of public international law relating to responsibility for the treatment of
aliens.
5. It is true that international commercial activitiesare to a very large
extent carried on under municipal law forms (acquisition of ownership,
contracts, concessions, collection of rates and taxes). But it is not the
legal relationships of municipal law resulting therefrom-the relation-
shipsbetweenprivate persons inter seor between a public authority and a private person-with which customary international law is concerned.
The latter does not tend in any way to unify the different municipal legal
orders, even partially or indirectly, into a common legal order applicable
to cases of diversity of citizenship.
The international responsibility of a State is not based upon rules of
any such common legal order; nor is the right of the State which asserts
such responsibility derived from the rights which a private person would
obtain under such a common legal order. The approach of the rules of
customary international law is completely different; they are concerned
rather with the activity, as such, of the persons carrying on the inter-
national commerce of a State, on the onehand, and the public authorities
of the receiving State, on the other, as well as with the interrelation of
those activities. That is why international responsibility for the treatment
of aliens isessentially a responsibility for "denial of justice" lato sensu.
That is also why the State which relies upon such responsibility does not
represent the injured person but is asserting its own interest in that
person's activities in international commerce. That is why, finally, it is
indispensable, for the determination of the existence or inexistence of
international responsibility on the part of one State towards another
State in a specific case, to take into considerational1the activities, as a
whole, of the public authorities of the State whose responsibility has been
alleged, as well asl1the injured private person's activities, as a whole, in
international commerce.
6. The notion of "international commerce" must not be given a
purely economic interpretation. In actual fact, customary international
law protects the interest which a State has in its international comrn-rce
because international commerce in the broad sense of the term is of
interest to the entire international community. As Sohn and Blxter
rightly remark in their commentary on the Draft Convention on the
International Responsibility ofStates for Injuriesto Aliens: "The law of
State responsibility is directed to the maintenance of freedom of com-
munications and of movement between nations."
On the same lines, customary international law recognizes-in partic-
ular since the Second World War-respect for fundamental human
freedoms as an interest of the international community. In fact, even
before and between the two World Wars the idea of the protection of
"human rights" by public international law was never absent from
international decisions concerning the responsibility of States for the
treatment of aliens. Here, as in the protection of international commerce,
it is not a matter of creating a common legal order determining the legal
relationships between the public authorities and private persons or
between private persons inter se, but of "checking" the application of
the municipal legal order in order to sanction the unlawful use of force,
arbitrary discrimination and usurpation of jurisdiction, which violate a
human being's "right to existence". Here, as in the protection of inter-national commerce, the different methods adopted by the municipal law
of different countries are irrelevant to the attainment of the objectives
of the rules of customary international law.
7. At this point 1must make a digression. The Judgment seems to be
based on the idea of a "reference" by the rules of international law to the
rules of municipal law. It is stated, in particular, in paragraph 38 of the
Judgment that "international law has had to recognize the corporate
entity as an institution created by States in a domain essentially within
their domestic jurisdiction. This in turn requires that, whenever legal
issues arise concerning the rights of States with regard to the treatment
of companies and shareholders, as to which rights international law has
not established its own rules, it has to refer to the relevant rules of muni-
cipal law". The legislative technique of reference or renvoi from one rule
of law to another rule of law, or to the results of its application, is an
operation well known in legal science. So far as international law in
particular is concerned, this technique is of frequent application in the
written rules of law, i.e., in treaties. Thus, several treaties, when defining
the obligations of the Contracting Parties, contain a reference to the
municipal law of a specific State. This is, for example, the case with
treaties concerning conflict of laws and reciprocal judicial assistance,
including the recognition and execution of foreigri judgments. But this
kind of renvoi is wholly unrelated to the situation with which the present
case is concerned.
In the firstplace, inthe BarcelonaTractioncaseit is a matter of applying
the rules of general customary international law. A renvoi by such rules
to the municipal law of a specific State would seem a priori to be im-
probable. Furthermore, the present case does not concern the recognition
of, or the effect to be given to, the decisions, judicial and otherwise, of
the Spanish authorities, within the framework of the legal system of
another State. On the contrary, it is a matter of determining whether
those decisions constitute a denial of justice in the broad meaning of the
term, i.e., unlawful use of force, arbitrary discrimination, or a usurpation
ofjurisdiction, amounting to infringement of the rights of another State.
In this domain there cannotbe a "renvoi" to the rules of municipal law
of the State whose international responsibility is alleged, nor, moreover,
to the municipallaw of any other State, nor to any "common rules" that
might be derived from a comparative law study of different national
legislations.
8. The distinction of principle drawn by the present Judgment be-
tween-
(a) the obligations of a State "when [it]admits into its territory foreign
investments or foreign nationals, whether natural orjuristic persons"
(paragraph 33), obligations "arising .. . in the field of diplomatic
protection" (ibid.); (b) the obligations of a State resulting from "the outlawing of acts of
aggression7'(paragraph 34) ;
(c) the obligations of a State resulting "from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person" (paragraph 34);
and
(d) the protection of the economic interests resulting from investments
made by a foreigner (paragraph 87);
seems very artificial and cannot in any case justify the essential legal
consequences which the Judgment attaches to this distinction.
In the first place, it seems impossible to make any distinction between
categories (a) and (d). The present Judgment even observes (paragraph
37), and rightly, that the institution known as the diplomatic protection
of foreigners has "from its origins [been]closelylinked with international
commerce". How then can it on the one hand recognize that "when a
State admits into its territory foreign investments ... it ... assumes
obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them" (paragraph 33
of the Judgment) and, on the other, deny to the State whose nationals
have made such investments al1 protection at the international level
apart from "treaty stipulations" (paragraph 90 of the Judgment)? It is
true, as the Court says (paragraph 87), that "when a State admits into
its territory foreign investments ... it.. . does not thereby become an
insurer of that part of another State's wealth which those investments
represent". No one has ever employed such a formula to define the
obligations of the receiving State. It is in any event not the basis upon
which Belgium bases its claims against Spain in the present case! The
problem of the extent of the protection which the rules of international
law give to the interest of a State is one question, the determination of
the State or States whose interest is protected is another.
Nor is this all. In al1 the cases enumerated above, general public
international law protects the rights of States by imposing obligations
on other States, for the good reason that it is an essential interest of
the international community as a whole that such rights should be
respected.
It is true, from the moral point of view, that it is difficult to compare
the gravity of an infringement of the territorial integrity and political
independence of a State with that of an infringement of the fundamental
freedoms of the human person, or with that of an injury to international
commerce lato sensu.
Nevertheless, from the legal point of view, in each of these three cases
it is aatter of State interests protected by the imposition of obligations
on other States. Obviously, the details of the protection are different in
each of the three cases, both with respect to the definition of the in-
fringements prohibited-i.e., the extent of the protection-and with
respect to the designation of the State or States entitled to apply, or
demand the application of, sanctions in the event of such conduct. It is to this latter context that the question of thjus standiof a State
relates.
The Judgment seems to draw a distinction between obligations of a
State erga omnes, obligations of a State which exist towards certain
other States under general international law, and obligations of a State
which only exist towards a State with which it has entered into "treaty
stipulations". This distinction can of course be drawn. But it is still
difficult to hold that this distinction would necessarily correspond to an
a priori classification in accordance with the nature of the interests
protected by such obligations, a classification which isalready in itself a
fairly doubtful one.
In other words, it seems impossible to Say a priorithat the economic
interests of a Statecan be protected through obligations on other States
only by virtue of "treaty stipulations", just as it would obviously have
been incorrect to Saythat every State has jus standi in cases where the
territorial integrity or the political independence of another State is
infringed, otherwise than by armed attack, or in cases where the national
of another State is the victim of a violation of his individual freedoms.
9. No one denies, moreover, that a State's jus standi under the rules
of customary international law concerning the treatment of aliens
depends on the existence of a link between such State and the situation
that has been adversely affected in the case in question by the conduct
of another State.
In this connection it should be noted that in those matters governed
by customary public international law it is a prioriimprobable that there
will be watertight divisions between the solutions adopted for the various
theoretically separate elements of which this legal rule is made up. It is
the interrelation between the conduct imputed to a State and the conduct
imputed to another State which is the subject of the rules of customary
international law, manifesting itself in the creation of "obligations" and
"rights" of States in their mutual relations. In these circumstances, it is
impossible, in particular, totally to disregard the nature and effectof this
interrelation in the actual case in question when determining the "res-
ponsibility" of the one State and the 'yus standi" of the other.
10. This is one more reason for not attaching too much importance
to the highly abstract and theoretical distinction between "rights" and
"mere interests" which seemsto form the sole basis of the reasoning in
the Jude"ent.
This distinction is only meaningful withinthe framework of a concrete
body of known and undisputed rules of law.
When such a body of rules is under analysis, it can be observed, a
posteriori,that a failure to comply with an obligation may entai1certain
injurious consequences for certain interests, without the possessor of
those interests being empowered by this body of rules of law to demand
reparation from the party which has failed to fulfil this obligation. Theconclusion can then be drawn therefrom that the victim had indeed a
"mere interest" but not a "right" that was violated.
This is in fact the conclusion which theJudgment draws when analysing
the rules of municipalprivate law with respect to the legal situation of
shareholders with regard to acts directed against the Company.
But in the case decided by the Judgment it is a matter neither of the
obligations of the Spanish authorities on the level of municipal law nor
of the legal opportunities which the shareholders might have of asserting
that responsibility, by asking for the cancellation of the measures taken,
or for compensation.
It concerns, on the contrary, quite another body of rules, namely the
rules of customary public international law concerning the obligations
and the rights of States in their mutual relations.
Now these two bodies of rules answer quite different requirements;
their objects and purposes are different; they have developed in different
contexts.
The body of rules of customary public international law concerning
the treatment of aliens draws its inspiration, as we have seen, from the
interest of .the international community in respect for the fundamental
freedoms of the human person as well as in respect for the freedom of
international commerce.
It is in relation tothese two principles that both the obligations and
the rights of States in their mutual relations fa11to be determined.
In the instant case it isabove al1the second of these two principles that
is involved.
11. In order to be able to describe a concrete activity in international
commerce as forming part of the international commerce of a specific
State, it is obviously necessary that there be a link between that activity
and that State. That link can only be established through the medium
of one or more of three elements of the State: its nationals, its territory
and its government. Where the international commercial activity takes
the form of a natural person's establishing himself abroad, it is traditio-
nally the nationality of that natural person which determines the link
between that activity and a specific State. Furthermore, right from the
beginning of the developmentof international commerce it will be found
that the State has concerned itself with the treatment accorded by other
States to "its" products, i.e., products originating in its territory, as well
as to "its" ships,i.e., ships upon which its government has conferred the
right to fly the national flag. (Sometimes the various manifestations of
international commercial activity were not clearly distinguished. A typical
example of this is afforded by the treaties the interpretation of which
was in question in the Court's Judgment of 27 July 1952 (Rights of
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1952,p. 176.)Those treaties, dating from the turn of the century,
were aimed primarily at preventing any differential treatment by a State
of the nationals of the other States parties to the said treaties. But the Court did not hesitate to interpret the treaties as also prohibiting any
discrimination in favour of the importation of goods comingfrom the
territoryof one of those States (I.C.J. Reports 1952, pp. 183-186),thus
recognizingthat the treaties in question had as their object the protection
of al1the international commercial activities of each Contracting State.)
The techniques of international commerce have developed since then,
in particular with the entry on the scene of limited companies as a legal
form for the organization of private economic activities.
For purposes of the determination of the link between an international
commercial activity and a particular State, this development poses two
distinct problems, the one relating to the relationship between the activity
and a person, and the other relating to the relationship between that
person and a State.
In fact, in "classic" cases of diplomatic protection the interest of a
State in "its" international commerce merges with its interest in the
welfare of itsnationals,natural persons, both in respect of their personal
safety and fundamental freedoms and in respect of their power to admi-
nister their property and their right to drawprofitstherefrom.
The elements of "the undertaking" are thus united in one single
indivisible natural person, and that person's appurtenance to a specific
State does not normally pose any problems.
The employment of the legal form of the limited company (with its
own legalpersonality, in private municipal law) complicatesthe situation.
12. In the first place, it isard to recognize that a limited company
as such can have persona1 safety or fundamental freedoms. (We may
leave aside the question of whether under municipal law the company
as such might complain of an infringement of the persona1 safety or
fundamental freedoms of the natural persons which "represent" it.)
It is thus solely a matter of the undertaking's "economic" interests:
its activities and its property. Now in reality the legal form of the limited
companylends itselfto fairly variedkinds of organization ofthe economic
interests of the undertaking. There is the type of company in which
legal personality corresponds to economic independence of the under-
taking; the administration of the undertaking is in the hands of in-
dependent directors and the profits are in principle appropriated to the
undertaking itself, i.e., generally re-invested (after the deduction, in
suitable cases, of a certain remuneration for the capital already invested).
But there is also the type of company which is in reality a form of or-
ganization for CO-operationin an undertaking by shareholders who not
only furnish the capital but also effectivelyadminister the undertaking
and draw the profits themselves.Finally, there is a third type of company,
in which the undertaking is integrated into another more extensive
undertaking, belonging to another company which dominates it. Ob-
viously these are types of companies (corresponding to different types ofshareholders), and not categories separated by water-tight divisions. Of
course, the municipal private law applicable to these three types of
company is generally the same. On the other hand, in the field of muni-
cipal tax law, several countries recognize the fundamental difference
between these three types by affording them different treatment.
On the plane of customary international law,i.e., both in order to
determine what is affected by the conduct of a State towards a limited
company, and in order to determine the link between what is affected
and another State, it seems a priori necessary to take account of the
reality of the differencesbetween these three types of companies. As has
already been pointed out, international law is concerned with the rights
and obligations of States in their mutual relations and not with the
municipal law relations between the company and other private persons,
nor even with the municipal law relations between the company, its
shareholders and officers, and the public authorities of a State.
Thenature of rights, like that of obligations, isdifferent in international
law, because such obligations and rights correspond to the specific
requirements of the international community. It is consequently not
possible to regard the company's legal personality under municipal law
as an exclusive touchstone.
One can neither regard the company as always being the only entity
affected by any measure whatsoever directed-on the plane of municipal
law-against the company, nor always equate the company, purely and
simply, with a natural person so far as concerns its "nationality", Le., its
link with a specificState.
Both these matters are moreover recognized in international juris-
prudence and practice.
Of course thisjurisprudence and practice are not uniform. On the one
hand, they are often inspired by adhoc considerations; on the other, they
do not take sufficient account of the variety of cases thatcan arise.
Nevertheless, they do show a sufficient degree of recognition of the
inapplicabilty of the legal fiction of municipal private law on the plane of
public international law. The company's juristic personality is not by any
means the last word either on the obligations or on the rights of States in
the matter of the "treatment of aliens".
The Judgment recognizes this, moreover, when examining ". .. other
grounds on which it is conceivable that the submission by the Belgian
Government of a claim. .. may be justified" (paragraph 55). However,
the Judgment seems to persist in regarding such other grounds as the
application of transposition on to the plane of international law of the
rules of municipal law concerning the status of a company and its share-
holders (paragraph 56).
It has already been explained above why this approach seems contrary
to the very nature and function of the rules of customary public inter-
national law. It is not the rights and the obligations of the shareholdersthat are in issue in the present case, but the obligations and the rights of
States; itis not only a question of different legalpersonae but also of a
different subject-matter.
13. That is also why it does not seemjustifiable to disregard as irrel-
evant the international practice and jurisprudence which relate to
measures taken with respect to enemy property and nationalizations
(paragraphs 59 to 62 of the Judgment). On the contrary, these are two
phenomena at the international levelwhich directly concern international
commerce as well as the links between an international commercial
activity and a specificState. The measures taken with regard to enemy
property havethe twofold purpose ofexcluding enemycontrol of manage-
ment from the national economy, and of confiscating enemyproperty by
way of reparations. It is highly significant that in connection with this
twofold objective the distinct personality of the company does not con-
stitute an obstacle to the recognition of the true state of affairs. But how
then can the link between an activity, and private property, and a State be
accepted when it is a matter of measures to be taken against that State,
and the existence of such a link be disregarded, as a matter of principle,
when it is a matter of the rights of that State?
In the case of the nationalization of undertakings belonging to a com-
pany it is obviously a question of measures of another nature. Neverthe-
less, here again many international agreements concluded in order to
resolvethe consequences of those measures recognizethat such measures
-which put an end to an international commercial activity-do not
affect only the State whose "nationality" the company as a distinct
person is deemed to possess.
In both cases-measures against enemy property and measures of
nationalization-it isa question of an interference-for different reasons
-with an international commercial activity taken as a whole; the object
and the purpose of such measures concern the undertaking as such, even
though they obviously affect the ownership of, and other rights over,
individual items of property.
14. It is from this point of view-an interference with the foreign
undertaking rather than with an isolated right belonging to a foreign
private person-that one must also consider the cases in which inter-
nationaljurisprudence and practice have recognizeda Stateother than the
one under whose municipal law the company was formed as having an
interest which is legallyprotected by the rules of international law. Such
cases are in particular those in which the company had gone into liquida-
tion, or was "practically defunct", in consequence of measurestaken by
the State whose international responsibility was in question. Thus they
were cases in whichthe company had been forced to suspend or to cease
its activities: in other words, in which the undertaking as such was
affected. Writers have sometimes attempted to explain such cases by
seeingin them an application of the notion ofmunicipalprivate lawto the
effectthat on liquidation of a company the shareholders take back their share of the company's property (see, for example, Reuter, Droit inter-
nationalpublic, 1958,p. 166).
But this explanation isunsatisfactory. On the levelof municipal private
law, it is not the company'sgoing into liquidation which causesa right to
arise for each shareholder, namely a right to a part of the company's
property: it is onlyat the endof the liquidation that any surplusthere may
be is distributed among the shareholders. Furthermore, the liquidation
was always subsequentto the measures taken by the State which washeld
responsible on the international plane, so that those measures could not
have infringedthe rights of the shareholders on the municipal private law
plane.
These two arguments remain valid afortiori in cases in whichthe com-
pany, without having gone into liquidation, was "dormant", "practically
defunct" or "destroyed". The Judgment (paragraphs 64-68), while re-
cognizing "special circumstances for which the general rule" [Le., the
rule that only the State under the municipal law of whichthe company
was formed would have jus standi]"might not take effect" (paragraph 64)
admits the existenceof a special circumstance in the present context only
where "the corporateentity of the company has ceased to exist" and has
"become incapable inlaw of defending its own rights and the interests of
the shareholders" (paragraph 66).In so doing, the Judgment consequently
rejects any exception based upon the company'sgoing into liquidation or
becoming entirely paralysed (paragraph 65) on account of the rneasures
with respectto whichthe international responsibility ofa State isasserted.
The Judgment thus once again makes the extent of the international
obligations and rights of States dependent on the rules of municipal
private law concerning the status of companies. The Judgment observes
(paragraph 66)that "only inthe event of the legal demise of the company
are the shareholders deprived of the possibility of a remedy available
through the company". The Judgment does not explain how in such a
case, after the legaldemise of the company, the action of a government
other than "the company's government" might be compatible with the
rule of continuity! In reality, the legally protected interest of such other
State, and consequently also the obligations towards it of the State which
took the measures of which complaint is made must exist on the inter-
national plane before and independently of the company's demise on the
plane of municipal law, a demise which is but one of the possible sub-
sequent consequences of those measures.
15. The Judgment observes (paragraph 65) ". ..that from the eco-
nomic viewpoint the company [Le.,Barcelona Traction]has been entirely
paralyzed" and that it "has been deprived of al1its Spanish sources of
income".
It is indisputable that the measures taken by the Spanish authorities
affectedthe undertaking as such. The essential point is thus the existence
or non-existence of a link between the undertaking and the Belgian State
sufficientfor it to be considered on the international plane that thenter- BARCELONATRACTION (DISS. OP. RIPHAGEN) 346
national commerce of the latter State is affected by those measures. It is
thus the second question referred to above which is raised by the entry
upon the scene of limited companies in international commerce: that of
the link between what is affected by the conduct of a State, and another
State. In this connection too it seems impossible to disregard the dif-
ference between the three types of companies and shareholders referred to
above.
16. So far as concerns the international commerce of a State which
takes place through the medium of naturalpersons, it is undisputed, asthe
Judgment recalls (paragraph 36), that in principle it is the bond of
nationality between the State and the individual which counts. There are,
however, exceptions to this general rule. On the one hand, as the Court
recalled in its Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949(I.C.J. Reports 1949,
p. 181):
". ..there are important exceptions to the rule, for there are cases
in which protection may be exercised by a State on behalf of persons
not having its nationality".
These are, in particular, cases of "functional" protection (members of
the crew of a vesse1flying the flag of the State; members of the armed
forces of a State; agent of the United Nations); the protection of the
activity as a whole, linked as such with a State, extends to persons who
participate in that whole, irrespective of their nationality.
On the other hand, the bond of nationality between the State and the
individual is not always sufficient.In the Nottebohm case the Court held
that Liechtenstein wasnot entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohm
as against Guatemala, on the basis of a negative answer to the question-
". ..whether the factual connection between Nottebohm and
Liechtenstein in the period preceding, contemporaneous with and
following his naturalization appears to be sufficiently close, so pre-
ponderant in relation to any connection which may have existed
between him and any other State, that it is possible to regard the
nationality conferred upon him as real and effective. .." (I.C.J.
Reports 1955, p. 24).
Here again a "functional" approach may be observed. Mr. Notte-
bohm's naturalization not having in any way altered his activities as a
whole (what the Court calls his "manner of life", ibid.,p. 26),Guatemala's
alleged injury to this "undertaking" was not regarded as affecting, on the
international plane, a legally protectedinterest of Liechtenstein.
17. A true bond of nationality, such as exists between a State and its
nationals who are natural persons, is obviously inconceivable for juristic
persons as such. In order to assimilate a limited Companyto a national
who is a natural person it is consequently necessary to have recourse toother connecting factors. In this connection, from an abstract point of
view, three courses are open:
(a) to take account of the nationality of the natural persons to whom
the company "belongs" ;
(b) to take account of the fact that juristic personality was "conferred"
on the company by the authorities of a particular State;
(c) to take account of the fact that the company, as an economic entity,
is "implanted" in the territory of a particular State.
In the practice of States, including treaties concluded between two or
more States, and in international jurisprudence, sometimes one and some-
times another of these courses is adopted, or the connecting factors
deriving from two or al1 three of these approaches are combined or
balanced against one another.
18. This is explained by the fact that the three solutions correspond
more or less to the three different types of companies and shareholders.
If, forexample, it is a matter of a company al1of whose shares are held by
two or three natural persons, who have thus combined their capital in an
undertaking which they manage themselves, it seems quite natural to
refer to the well-known views expressed by Max Huber in his Report of
1 May 1925in the case concerning British Property inSpanish Morocco:
". ..the protection of individuals covers al1their legitimateinterests.
The fact that those interests happen to be more or less closely con-
nected with those of a corporate legal entity cannot ipsofacto deprive
them of the protection which they would otherwise be given by
virtue of belonging to a protected person" (U.N.R.I.A.A., Vol. II,
p. 661).
"International law which, in this field, draws its inspiration essen-
tially from the principles of equity, has not laid down any forma1
criterion for the granting or refusingdiplomaticprotection to national
interests linked to interests belonging to persons of differentnation-
alities" (ibid., p. 729).
These considerations apply also in cases in which corporate personality
has been conferred on a company by the municipal lawof the State whose
responsibility is asserted, even though the company has been implanted
in the territory of that State.
Moreover, the connecting factor under (b) above (the fact that the
company was granted juristic personality by the authorities of a partic-
ular State) corresponds rather to the type of company whose undertaking
is independent, and whose shares are scattered among persons who have
nothing to do with the management of the undertaking, but simply
receive such dividends as are declared, or make profits by the purchase
and sale of those shares on the market.
In reality this connecting factor is, in a certain sense,comparable to thelink between a State and a ship to which that State has granted the right
to fly its national flag. It loses much of its meaning when the incorpora-
tion of a company under the municipal law of a State is effected without
any activeintervention by the public authorities of that State and does not
require the establishment of any real bond between the company and the
territory or nationals of that State.
Thus it is understandable that in State practice and in international
jurisprudence this connecting factor does not play a preponderant part
unless there are other links between the company and the State in which
it has been incorporated, as, for example, the fact that the administrative
control of the company is actually exercised in the territory of that State.
(In certain treaties eventhe nationality ofthe natural persons who manage
a company is a factor in determining the link between a State and that
company. According to information given by Foighel in Nationalization
and Compensation, 1963, p. 235, this is the case in a treaty, with an
attached aide-mémoire,of 27 September 1948 between Switzerland and
Yugoslavia.)
Finally, the connecting factor mentioned in (c) above (the fact that
the company, as an economic entity, has been implanted in the territory
of a particular State) reflects the recognition of the growing importance
of the economy-and therefore of its undertakings-for the very existence
of the State. From this point of view the State in whose territory a com-
pany has been implanted is necessarily interested in the expansion of that
company's business abroad, whether through isolated activities, or
through the establishment of subsidiary companies, or through holdings
in other companies which it controls and whose business activityforms am
integral partof its own.
In sum, this connecting factor has its application most particularly
in cases involving the third type of shareholder and company mentioned
above.
19. In the context of the application of the rules of customary interna-
tional lawrelating to responsibility as regards the treatment of aliens, the
relative importance of the three connecting factors should be judged
not only by taking into account the type of company and shareholders in
question in the given case, but also in relation to the nature of the injury
which the conduct complained of on the part of the State whose respon-
sibility is alleged is said to have done to the international commercial
activity. It is clear that in this respectjury to an isolated piece of pro-
perty belonging to a company cannot be put on the same plane as an
injury to the very personality of the company or an injury to the whole of
the activity of that company in the State whose responsibility is alleged.
The present Judgment seems to deny the relevance, so far as the jus
standi of an applicant State is concerned, of the distinctions drawn above
concerning the nature of the injury, the type of company and share-
holders in question, and the nature and relative importance of the pos-
sible forms of connection between a State and a company. Only the dis-tinction in private municipal law between the rights of a company and
the direct rights of the shareholder, as well as the separate corporate
personality ofthe company under the municipal law ofthe State in which
it was incorporated, are recognized as relevant in the Judgment. It is true
that the Judgment does-though without laying down the conditions
under which a given State, other than the one according to whose muni-
cipal law the company was incorporated, may havejus standi-examine
various "special circumstances" and possible "grounds" which might
lead to the non-application of the simple and strict rule which it lays
down. But in point of fact those special circumstances and reasons are
always expressed by the Judgment in relation to the separate personality
of the company under municipal law. Thus the Judgment considers "the
case of the company having ceased to exist" (paragraphs 64-68) solely
from the point of view of legal existence under municipal law, without
taking any account of the object of the company, which is the under-
taking.
The other possibility dealt with in the Judgment (paragraphs 69-84)is
"that of thelack of capacity of the company'snational State to act on its
behalf".
Here again the Judgment reaches the conclusion that the creation of a
corporate entity bythe municipal lawofaparticular Stateisalonerelevant,
without however explaining how such a formality can of itself give rise,
on the plane of international law, to a legally protected interest of that
State in the business of the company.
The Judgment does of course mention (paragraph 71) certain other
factors, but in the first placethose factors are partly formalities whch
necessarilyfollow from the incorporation of the company in accordance
with the rules of the relevant private municipal law, and in the second
place they do not carry much weight in comparison with the relationship
of the company with other States. Furthermore, it appears from para-
graph 70 of the Judgment that the Court does not in any way consider
them to be legally relevant.
20. The reasoning followed in the Judgment logically leads to the
theory that a State whose nationals make investments abroad in the
legal form of the incorporation of a company according to the rules of
the municipal law of a foreign State, or in the form of holdings in the
capital of such a company, Ioses its interest in the treatment given to
those investments.
TEistheory, based on the distinction betweenthe "rights" of the com-
pany and the "mere interests" of the shareholders, is necessarilyapplic-
able also in cases where it is a question of the treatment given by the
State under whose municipal law the company was incorporated.
The reasoning set forth in paragraphs 85-90of the Judgment does not
admit of any exception.
21. The following paragraphs of the Judgment do however seem to
envisage the possibility of appeal being made to "considerations ofequity" so as to permit international law to "be applied reasonably".
These considerations seem to be that in the case of a foreign investment
some foreign government ought to exist which can exercise diplomatic
protection. Such a consideration seems, however, contrary to the very
nature of the rules of customary international law, according to which in
exercisingdiplomatic protection a State is asserting its ownrights. There
isthus no question of finding some government or other which can act as
the shareholder's "claims agent".
Such a system would, moreover, not ensure any improvement in the
shareholder's position, having regard to the complete freedom of every
government to accede or to refuse the shareholder's request for protec-
tion, as well as to pass on or not to pass on to him any compensation it
may receive.
If then international practice and jurisprudence admit action by the
State whose nationals have invested their capital in a company formed
under the municipal law of another State in the event of unlawful conduct
by that latter State, its because they recognize the existenceof a legally
protected interest of the first State in that company's activities, an in-
terest which is by no means destroyed by the formation of the company
or participationtherein, and which also does not devolve upon the State
where the company was formed.
22. It followsfrom the foregoing that conduct by a State which, on the
plane of municipal law, affects a company's property, personality or
undertaking can, on the plane of international law, infringe a legally
protected interest of a State other than that under the municipal law of
which the company was incorporated. This also means that, in certain
circumstances,the same conduct by a State may affect the legally pro-
tected interests of two or more States.
Such a legal situation is by no means excluded by the rules of inter-
national law. It suffices in this connection to refer to the Advisory
Opinion of 11April 1949(Reparationfor Injuries Sufferedin the Service
of the UnitedNations, I.C.J. Reports 1949,p. 174).
The present Judgment (paragraphs 96 and 97)seems, however, to seek
to exclude the possibility of concurrent diplomatic claims on account of
the complications to which this gives rise.
In this connection it should be noticed, first that one must not ex-
aggerate the number of cases in which a company is truly international,
in the sensethat connecting factors of equal importanceexist with several
States.
In a verygreat number of casesthe three connecting factors mentioned
above connect the company with one State only. That is precisely why
international practice has generally accepted diplomatic protection on
the part of the State under whose municipal law the company was in-
corporated.
Furthermore, concurrent claims,eventhough emanating from differentStates, always have the same object, that is to say, to prevent, bring to
and end, or have corrected by restitutio in integrumthe unlawful acts of
another State.
It is only at the stage of monetary compensation in lieu of restitutio in
integrum that it is necessary to determine the amount to be paid to each
State. In its Advisory Opinion referred to above, the Court observed in
this connection :
"International tribunals are already familiar with the problem of a
claim in which two or more national States are interested, and they
know hoy to protect the defendant State in such a case." (I.C.J.
Reports 1949, p. 186.)
Consequently it does not seem that the possibility of concurrent
claims-which, moreover, occurred at the diplomatic stage of the present
case-creates that "atmosphere of confusion and insecurity" to which
reference is made in paragraph 96 of the Judgment. If there are com-
plications they are not insurmountable; they are moreover the con-
sequence of the ever-increasing interdependence of States in the modern
world, a fact to which no international tribunal can close its eyes.
The same observation holds good for the complications that would
result from a settlement reached between the State responsible and one
of the other interested States (paragraph 97 of the Judgment). Such a
settlement, like any other treaty, could bind only those States which con-
cluded it. In international practice governments are well aware of how
to accommodate themselves to this legal rule! In any event, if the State
under whose municipal law a company was incorporated concluded a
settlement with the State responsible for an unlawful act towards that
company, providing for a set-off against the indemnity of any claims
which the latter State might have against the former, it would manifestly
be unjust to regard such a settlement of the affair as excluding a claim on
account of the same unlawful act on the part of a third State which had a
legal interest in the company's activities by virtue of other connecting
factors.
The rule of res inter alios actaand the rule that a State by taking up
the case of one of its nationals is asserting its own rights, both follow
from the very structure of customary public international law.
23. Barcelona Traction clearly belongs to the third type of company
described above, i.e., the type of company whose undertaking is inte-
grated into another undertaking, that of the Sidro company, the chief
shareholder in which is a further company, Sofina.
The links between Sidro and Sofina have not been made completely
clear (it appears that Sidro was also a shareholder in Sofina).
Nevertheless, throughout the relevant period, the connecting factors between both these companies and Belgium were such that it can hardly
be denied that a sufficientbond exists between the undertaking of these
companies and the Belgian State. It is true that the Parties to the dispute
disagree as to the precise percentages of Sofina shares that were held by
natural orjuristic persons ofarious nationalities. But it does not appear
to be contested that Sofina alwayshad a number of Belgian shareholders
and that the company's other shares were scattered among persons of
various nationalities. (One of the counsel for Spain spoke o". ..Amer-
ican, British, French, Dutch, Spanish, Swissand other holdings" (hearing
of 22 July 1969).)There is not sufficientevidence for it to be supposed
that Sidro and Sofinawere companies whose undertaking was integrated
into another undertaking having links with a State other than Belgium,
nor, moreover, for it to be supposed that those companies belonged to
the first type, that ofompanie; effectively run by their shareholders,
natural persons of a nationality other than Belgian. In these circum-
stances, the connecting factors of the incorporation of these companies
under Belgian law, and their implantation within Belgian territory, are
sufficient to create the bond between these companies and Belgium
which is necessaryto justify a legallyprotected interest on the part of the
Belgian Statein Barcelona Traction's undertaking.
24. It has nevertheless been centended that this bond, an essential
element in which is Sidro's controlling holding in Barcelona Traction,
acquired a few years after the First World War, was broken by the fact
that the Barcelona Traction shares belonging to Sidro werethe subject of
certain contracts entered into on the approach and at theoutbreak of the
Second World War.
During that period, Sidro formed in the United States a Company
called Securitas Ltd., as wellas the partnership of Charles Gordon& Co.
Contracts were entered into between Sidro and Securitas and between
Securitas and Charles Gordon & Co. It is not disputed that Securitas
Limited. as well as the firm of Charles Gordon & Co.. were in realitv
mere alier egos of Sidro-Sofina, nor that the whole purpose of the operai-
ation was preciselyto ensure that Sidro'seffectiveshare in the capital and
management of Barcelona Traction might continuedespite the occupation
of Belgian territory by the German armed forces, and without being
hampered by such measures as the allied States might take in the context
of their wartime legislation with respect to property belonging to
companies resident in enemy-occupied territory. Nor is it disputed that
this objective was in fact attained. This type of operations well known
in those European countries which were occupied by German forces
during the Second World War, as well as in Allied countries, such as the
United Statesand Canada, wherethe principal officersofcompanies in the
European countries in question found a refuge which enabled them to
continue to run those companies' affairs. The authorities of the Allied
host-countries, moreover, generally afforded the CO-operationnecessaryfor the achievement of the operation's purpose. In these circumstances,
the events summarized above cannot be regarded, on theplane of inter-
national law,as having broken the bond between the Belgian State and the
Barcelona Traction undertaking. Once again, this conclusion is in-
dependent of the relationships of municipal private law.
It consequently applies both to the period during which Securitas
acted as custodian of the shares belonging to Sidro, and to the period
during which it was trustee. In both capacities Securitas was, in the
words of Spanish counsel, nothing but an "American version of Sidro".
Securitas was formed, and the trust relationship between Sidro and
Securitas was created, in order to escape the consequences of the occu-
pation of Belgian territory. The trust relationship came to an end after
the war, just as, for thatmatter, Securitas disappeared. The precise date
of the end of this perioddoes not seem to be ofcrucial importance in the
present context, since the trust relationship was never intended to have
and never had the effect of transferring to someone else the position
which Sidro occupied in Barcelona Traction.
25. So far as concerns the registration of the Barcelona Traction
shares belonging to Sidro in the nam? of Charles Gordon & Co. (sub-
sequently Newman & Co.), it is sufficient to note that these two firms
were never more than nominees of Sidro and Securitas. Even on the level
of the applicable municipal private law, it is recognized that such nom-
inees are no more than agents for the true shareholders. On the inter-
national level, the fact that a nominee is registered as a shareholder in
the company's officialregister is of no relevance to the question of who is
affected by measures taken by a State against the Company.
26. It has been observed above that in the context of the application
of the rules of customary international law concerning international
responsibility for the treatment of aliensthere are no water-tight divisions
between the legal problems raised by such application. In ascertaining
whether in a specific case the conduct of State A injures a legally pro-
tected interest of state B, one cannot wholly separate the considerations
relating to the four elements of the question, namely:(1)the character of
State A's conduct; (2) the nature of the injury; (3)the nature of the
interest injured; and (4) the link between that interest and State B.
27. In this connection it is important to notice that in the present case
itis not only a question of an injury to property belonging to the com-
pany, nor again of a limitation placed upon the free conduct of the
company's affairs by its principal officers,but of aninjury to the under-
taking as such, whichhas passed in itsentirety into the hands of a Spanish
group. One cannot ignore this fact in determining the jus standi of
Belgium, whose interest is founded on the very fact that the Barcelona
Traction undertaking is integrated into that of companies having im-
portant connecting factors with that State.
28. Furthermore, the character of the conduct of the Spanish State ofwhich Belgium complains is also not unrelated to the question of Bel-
gium's jus standi. An essential element in the Belgian claim is its conten-
tion that in the circumstances of the case the injury to the undertaking
was the result of Spanish measures which necessarilyexceeded the limits
which international law imposes on the jurisdiction of any State. The
character of such conduct is such as to influencethe determination of the
States entitled to demand reparation for the damage suffered by them in
consequence of such measures.
It is certainly not merely bilateral relations that are insue in such a
case, since a State's obligation to keep within the limits of itsjurisdiction
on the international plane is, without any doubt, an obligation erga
omnes.
So far as this aspect of the case is concerned, two observations are
relevant.
In the first place, it indisputable that in the present case it is not a
matter of a nationalization of the electricity producing and distributing
undertakings in Spain.
It is not the Spanish legislative or executive authorities which have
placed Barcelona Traction's subsidiary companies' public utiiity under-
taking in the hands of the State; it is the Spanish judicial authorities
which, through a bankruptcy adjudication followed by a forced sale, have
placed the property of the parent company, Barcelona Traction, in the
hands of other private persons.
In the second place, it is also not a matter in the present case of a
judgment by a municipal court deciding a dispute between two private
persons, or ordering a simple measure of forced execution. It emerges
clearly from the facts that the bankruptcy petition and everything which
followed it had as theirpurpose and their effectthe reorganization of the
Barcelona Traction undertaking in such a way that that undertaking
passed from the control of Barcelona Traction's Belgian shareholders
into the control of a group of Spanish persons who had for that purpose
acquired a nurnber of bonds issued by that company.
This purpose was attained and this effect achieved by means of a
threefold operation, intended, as it were, to remove Barcelona Traction,
its property and its relations with its bondholders, into Spain. First, on
the non-payment of debts of the BarcelonaTraction Companywas based
the taking of possession of the property and the "normalization" of
the subsidiary companiesin Spain (see paragraphs 13 and 14 of the
Judgment). Secondly, new share certificates in the subsidiary companies
were created in Spain, cancelling the certificates which belonged to
Barcelona Traction and were situated outside Spain, and it was decided
that the head office of Ebro and of Catalonian Land (two subsidiary
companies of Barcelona Traction, incorporated under Canadian law)
should thenceforth be at Barcelona and no longer at Toronto. (See
paragraph 17 of the Judgment.) Thirdly, the bankruptcy decree was made on a petition by certain holders of Barcelona Traction bonds on the
grounds of the non-payment of interest (see paragraph 13 of the Judg-
ment). Now, Barcelona Traction, the parent company, was a company
incorporated and having its head office-under its byelaws-in Canada.
Al1its property, consisting essentially of shares in subsidiary companies,
was in Canada, deposited with National Trust of Toronto as security for
outstanding bonds. The bonds which were in question in the bankruptcy
proceedings were expressed in pounds sterling, and had from the time of
their issue been subject to a trust (containing a "no-action clause")
administered in Canada by National Trust, a company incorporated in
Canada. The non-payment of the interest on the said bonds had, more-
over, led to compromises being effected, before the petition in bank-
ruptcy, and under the supervision of the Canadian courts, between
Barcelona Traction, the trustee, and the general body of bondholders.
These circumstances, which are relevant to the limits on the juris-
diction of the Spanish State, cannot be ignored when it comes to the
question of whether the Belgian State has jus standi in the present case,
and this essentially for two reasons. The rules of customary public
international lawregarding international responsibility for the "treatment
of aliens" have developed precisely in consequence of the fact that the
"aliens" in question find themselves within the jurisdiction of another
State;afortiori then, they give legal protection against measures which
exceedthe limits of thejurisdiction ofsuch a State. In addition, it must be
recognized that in the instant case the measures taken by the Spanish
judicial authorities against Barcelona Traction were only able to achieve
their desired effect as a result of the fact that Barcelona Traction's
subsidiary companiespossessed important installations within Spanish
territory. In these circumstances, it seemsobvious that account must also
be taken of thefact that Barcelona Traction itself is, as it were, only a
"subsidiary company" of Sidro/Sofina, companies which can be assimi-
lated to Belgian nationals.
29. The limits which international law imposes on the jurisdiction of
a State are also relevant to another aspect ofthe case,namelythe question
known as "the exhaustion of local remedies". Here again it appears to be
inadmissible to separate completelythe differentelements of the question
of the international responsibility of a State towards another State. The
Court, moreover, recognized this, it would seem, in its Judgment of
24 July 1964on the preliminary objections raised by Spain. Everything
whichtook place within the Spanish municipal legalsystem,including the
remedies sought and those which were not sought, pertains to the facts
relevant to the weighing-up of Spain's obligationsas wellas of Belgium's
rights.
The right of a State, on the international plane, to respect for its
international commerce implies an obligation on the part of its national
by whose interposition such international commerce is carried on to
accept the jurisdiction of the host State by making proper use of themeans for defending his interests which the municipal legal system of
that State places at his disposal. Even then, it is necessary that such
jurisdiction should exist on the international plane! Here again the
fundamental differenceemergesbetween the rights and obligations of the
individual on the plane of municipal law and the rights ofthe State on the
international plane.
Finally, the limits which international law imposes on the jurisdiction
of the State are also of vital importance for the context within which the
responsibility of the Statefor the acts of itsudicial authorities should be
assessed. When it is a question of acts overstepping such limits, it is the
result of the act, ratherthan the intention, or the error of the court in the
application of the rules of its municipal law, which is to be taken into
account.
30. In its Judgment of 24 July 1964,the Court decided the questions
relating to its jurisdiction. From this point of view, there was conse-
quently nothing to prevent the Court's examiningthe merits of the case,
that is to Say, the rights and obligations of the States parties to the
dispute by virtue of the rules of customary international law.
It is true that the legal notion of the conditions for the admissibility of
a claim also finds a place in the rules of law relating to the procedure
before an international tribunal. Nevertheless, an extensive application
of this notion has a tendency to reduce the efficacity of international
adjudication, as well as to confer on the norms of international law a
rigidity which is incompatible with their function in the community of
States.
The 1964Judgment, which joined the preliminary objections relating
to jus standi and the exhaustion of local remedies to the merits, did so
for reasons which laid stress first on the legal ties between the questions
raised and the actual rights and obligationsof States in the matter of the
treatment of foreigners, and secondly on the need to elucidate certain
questions of fact. Accordingly, the 1964Judgment seems to be based on
the considerations set forth above.
The present Judgment, on the other hand, confines itself to rejecting
the Belgian Government's claim on the sole basis that "no jus standi
before the Court has been established" (paragraph 102of the Judgment),
a conclusion which, in its turn, seems to be derived exclusively from
legal considerations regarding the distinct personality of companies in
municipal private law, al1of which considerations might have been put
forward in 1964.
1have in this dissenting opinion set forth the legalreasons which have
led me to the conclusion that the Court ought to examine and pronounce
upon what it calls the other aspects of the case, and in particular on the
question of whether or not the conduct of the Spanish authorities was
unlawful.
Since, on the one hand, the Court, for the reasons stated in the Judg-
ment, has not wished to examine those questions of law, and, on theother, the questions offact in dispute between the Parties to the case
have not been subjected to examination by the Court, it does not seem
to methat a dissenting opinion ought by itselfto accomplish a task which,
according to that opinion itself,ncumbent on the Court.
(Signed) W. RIPHAGEN.
OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. RIPHAGEN
1. A mon grand regret il ne m'estpas possiblede m'associer à l'arrêtde
la Cour et je désirefaire usage du droit que me confèrel'article 57 du
Statut pour indiquer les raisons de mon dissentiment.
2. A mon avisleraisonnement juridique suivipar la Cour méconnaît la
nature même desrèglesdedroit international public coutumier applicables
dans l'espèce.
L'Etat belgeinvoque la responsabilitéinternationale de 1'Etatespagnol
pour le traitement que les autorités administratives et.judiciaires espa-
gnoles ont accordé à une sociétéprivée non espagnole l, Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light and Power Company, Limited. La Cour reconnaît que :
«Dèslors qu'un Etat admet sur son territoire des investissements
étrangers ou des ressortissants étrangers, personnes physiques ou
morales, il est tenu de leur accorder la protection de la loi et assume
certaines obligations quantà leur traitement))(par. 33).
Toutefois la Cour refuse d'examiner si le traitement accordé par les
autoritésadministratives etjudiciaires espagnolesà la Barcelona Traction
était conforme ou non aux obligations internationales de l'Espagne, at-
tendu que
«la possession par le Gouvernement belge d'un droit de protection
constitue une condition préalable à l'examen de ces problèmes.
Attendu que la qualité pour agir devant la Cour n'a pas été démon-
trée...»(par. 102).
En d'autres termes, il existe bien des obligations internationales de
l'Espagne relatives au traitement accordé à la Barcelona Traction mais
ces obligations ne seraient pas des obligationsà l'égardde la Belgique.
Dans tout son arrêt la Courenvisagel'hypothèsequ'une partie plus ou
moins grande des actions de la Barcelona Traction était,pendant toute la
période pertinente, dans les mains de ressortissants belges, personnes
physiques ou morales. Cette hypothèse estcontestée;il sera revenu plus
loin sur cette question qui n'a pas éttraitée dansl'arrêt.
Sur la base de cette hypothèse, etsansfaire aucune distinction suivant
l'ampleur et la nature de cette participation de personnes physiques ou
morales belgesau capital et à la gestion de la société BarcelonTraction,
la Cour arrive au résultatque I'Etat belgen'aurait aucun droit sur leplan DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE RIPHAGEN
[Translation]
1. To my great regret 1find myselfunable to concur in the decision of
the Court, and 1wish to avail myself of my right under Article 57 of the
Statute to state the reasons for my dissent.
2. In my opinion the legal reasoning followed by the Court fails to
appreciate the very nature of the rules of customary public international
law applicable in the instant case.
The Belgian State has asserted that the Spanish State is internationally
responsible for the treatment which the administrative and judicial
authorities of Spain afforded to a private non-Spanish Company, the
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited. The Court has
recognized that:
"When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or
foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to
extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations
concerning the treatment to be afforded them." (Paragraph 33.)
Nevertheless, the Court has refused to examine whether the treatment
afforded to Barcelona Traction by the administrative and judicial
authorities of Spain was or was not in conformity with Spain's inter-
national obligations, since:
". .. the possession by the Belgian Government of a right of
protection is a prerequisite for the examination of these problems.
Since no jus standi before the Court has been established ..."
(paragraph 102).
In other words, Spain does indeed have international obligations with
respect to the treatment afforded to Barcelona Traction, but those
obligations are, it is said, not obligations towardsBelgiurn.
Throughout its Judgment, the Court has in view the hypothesis that
a greater or lesser part of Barcelona Traction's shares was, during the
whole of the relevant period, in the hands of Belgiannationals, whether
natural or juristic persons. This hypothesis is contested; the question,
which is not dealt with in the Judgment, will be reverted to below.
On the basis of this hypothesis, and without drawing any distinction
according to the size and nature of this participation by Belgian natural
or juristic persons in the capital and management of the Barcelona
Traction Company, the outcome for the Court is that the Belgianinternational qui puisse êtreviolépar le comportement des autorités
espagnoles à l'égardde la société BarcelonaTraction.
Ce résultatest fondé uniquement sur des considérationsrelatives à ce
que la Cour appelle (par. 38) la nature et l'interaction des droits de la
société etdes droits des actionnaires dans l'ordre interne. C'esten exami-
nant des règlesde droit interne qui sont dans une large mesure commu-
nes aux systèmeslégislatifsadmettant comme institution la société dont
le capital est représentépar des actions que la Cour arrive à la conclusion
que, dans l'ordre juridique interne, lesdroits des actionnaires ne sont pas
affectéspar des mesures prises contre la société. Il s'ensuit, d'après l'ar-
rêt, que 1'Etatdont les actionnaires d'une société sont les ressortissants,
n'a pas non plus un droit qui pourrait êtreIésé sur le plan international,
par des mesures prises par un autre Etat contre ladite société.
3. C'est en faisant dépendre, purement et simplement, les droits et les
obligations des Etats sur le plan du droit internationalpublic coutumier
des règlesdu droit internerelatives aux droits et obligations despersonnes
privéesdans leurs relations mutuelles, que l'arrêtme semble méconnaître
la nature des règlesdu droit international coutumier y compris les règles
du droit international relativesauxdroits et obligations des Etats dans la
matière dite «du traitement des étrangers ».
Il est, toutefois, constant que la responsabilité internationale est une
responsabilité d'Etat à Etat et que, par conséquent, les conditions dans
lesquelles la responsabilitéinternationale d'un Etat est engagéeainsi que
les conditions dans lesquellesun autre Etat est habilité àexigerune répa-
ration du préjudicequi lui est causé,sont en principe complètementin-
dépendantesdu contenu du droit interne desdits Etats.
«La protection diplomatique et la protection par la voie judiciaire
internationale constituent une mesure de défense desdroits de l'Etat.
Commel'a dit et répété la CourpermanentedeJusticeinternationale,
«en prenant fait et cause pour l'un des siens, en mettant en mouve-
ment, en sa faveur,l'action diplomatiqueou l'action judiciaire inter-
nationale, cet Etat fait,vrai dire, valoir sonpropre droit,ledroit qu'il
a de faire respecter, en la personne de ses ressortissants, le droit
international )(C.P.J.I. sérieA no 2, p. 12 et sérieAIB n'"O-21,
p. 17)1(affaireNottebohm,deuxiemephase,arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil1955,
p. 24) [lesitaliquessont de nous].
((11est un principe de droit international que la réparation d'un
tort peut consister en une indemnitécorrespondant au dommage que
lesressortissants de1'EtatIésé ont subipar suitede l'actecontraire au
droit international. C'est mêmela forme de réparation laplus usitée;
l'Allemagne l'a choisie en l'espèce,et son admissibilitén'est pascon-
testée. Maisla réparation due à un Etat par un autre Etat ne change
pas de nature par le fait qu'elleprend la forme d'une indemnitépour
le montant de laquelle le dommage subipar un particulier fournira laStatehas no right at the international level capable of being infringed by
the conduct of the Spanish authorities towards the Barcelona Traction
Company.
This conclusion is based solely on considerations concerning what the
Court calls (paragraph 38)the nature and interrelation of the rights of the
company and the rights of the shareholders undermunicipallaw. It is by
examining rules of municipal law which are to a great extent common to
those legislative systems which recognize the institution of companies
limited by shares that the Court reaches the conclusion that, under
municipal law, the rightsof the shareholders are not affected by measures
taken against the company. It follows, according to the Judgment, that
the State of which the shareholders in a company are nationals has also
no right that might be injured on the international plane by measures
taken by another State against the said company.
3. It is in making the rights and obligations of States under customary
public internationallaw depend purely and simplyon the rules of municipal
law concerning the rights and obligations of private persons in their
relations interse, that the Judgment seems to me to fail to appreciate the
nature of the rules of customary international law, including the rules of
international law concerning the rights and obligations of States in the
field known as "the treatment of aliens".
It is, however, well established that international responsibility is a
responsibility of State to State, and that consequently, the conditions
under which the international responsibility of a State arises, as well as
the conditions under which another State is entitled to require reparation
for an injury caused to it, are in principle completely independent of the
content of the municipal law of the States in question.
"Diplomatic protection and protection by means of international
judicial proceedings constitute measures for the defence of the rights
of the State. As the Permanent Court of International Justice has
said and has repe@ed,'bytaking up the case of one of its subjects and
by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial pro-
ceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights-
itsright to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law' (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 12, and Series AJB,
Nos. 20-21, p. 17)." (Nottebohm (Second Phase), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1955,p. 24) [my italics].
"It is a principle of international law that the reparation of a
wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage
which the nationals of the injured State have suffered as a result of
the act which is contrary to international law. This is even the most
usual form of reparation; it is the form selected by Germany in this
case and the admissibility of it has not been disputed. The reparation
due by one State to another does not however change its character
by reason of the fact that it takes the form of an indemnity for the 336 BARCELONA TRACTION (OP. DlSS.RIPHAGEN)
mesure. Les règles de droit qui déterminentla réparation sont les
règlesdedroit internationalen vigueurentrelesdeux Etats en question,
et nonpas le droitquirégitles rapportsentre I'Etat qui aurait commis
un tort et le particulier qui aurait subi le dommage. Les droits ou
intérêtdsont la violation causeun dommage à un particulier se trou-
vent toujourssur unautreplan quelesdroitsde I'Etatauxquels le même
actepeut égalementporter atteinte. Le dommage subi par le particu-
liern'est donc jamais identique en substance avec celui que 1'Etat
subira; il ne peut que fournir une mesure convenablede la réparation
due à1'Etat )(affaire de l'Usinede Chorzbw,fond, arrêtno13, 1928,
C.P.J. sZ.ieA no17, p. 27-28)[lesitaliques sont de nous].
4. Cette séparationcomplète entre les règles du droit international
coutumier en matière de responsabilitépour le traitement des étrangers
d'une part et les règleset principes du droit interne d'autre part est
beaucoup plus qu'une pure construction juridique, permettant la substi-
tution de rapports juridiques entre Etats aux rapports juridiques entre
l'administration et le particulier ou entre particuliers.
Elle traduit une réalité de lavie internationale: elle déterminele con-
tenu même desdroits et obligations des Etats sur le plan international.
En effet,il est incontestable que'Etatporte un intérêrtéelau dévelop-
pement de son commerce international dont l'investissement dans les
entreprises étrangèreset l'établissement d'entreprises à l'étranger sont
quelques-unes desmanifestations. Aussi endehors despays quipratiquent
le systèmedu commerce d'Etat les relations économiquesinternationales
sont en généralfortement contrôléespar les autoritéspubliques. D'autre
part, cette activité du commerce international d'un Etat affecte néces-
sairement l'économie,donc les intérêtspublics, de 1'Etat d'accueil; elle
comporte normalement aussi descontacts avecl'ordrejuridique interne et
les autorités publiques de cet Etat.Il s'agit donc bien d'assurer un juste
équilibreentre les intérêtsdes Etats, tâche traditionnelle des règles du
droit international public.
Cette tâche est fondamentalement différentede celle qui incombe aux
règlesdudroit interne et notamment du droit privéinterne. Lesconsidéra-
tions qui déterminentle choix d'un systèmeparticulier de droit privé in-
terne en matière de ce que la Cour appelle (la nature et l'interaction des
droits de la sociétéet des droits des actionnaires )Isont complètement
étrangères auxproblèmes qui préoccupent les règlesdu droit interna-
tional public en matière de responsabilité pour le traitement des étran-
gers.
5. Certes, l'activitédu commerce international s'effectue,dans une très
large mesure, dans les formes du droit interne (acquisition de propri$té,
contrats, concessions, perception de taxes et impôts). Mais ce ne sont pas
les rapports juridiques de droit interne qui en résulten- rapports entre
personnes privéesou entre une autorité publique et une personne pri- calculation of which the damage suffered by a private person is
taken asthe measure. Therulesof law governing thereparationare the
rules of internationallaw inforce between thetwo States concerned,
and not the law governingrelations between the State which has
committeda wrongfulact and the individualwhohassuffered damage.
Rights or interestsof an individuai the violation owhichrights causes
damageare always in a drfferentplane to rights belongingto a State,
which rights may also be infringed by the same act. The damage
sufferedby an individual isnevertherefore identical in kind withthat
which will be suffered by a State; it can only afford a convenient
scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State." (Judg-
ment No. 13of the P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No. 17,pp. 27-28) (my.italics).
4. This complete separation between. the rules of customary inter-
national law concerning responsibilityfor the treatment of aliens, and the
rules and principles of municipal law, is much more than a mere legal
construct permitting of the substitution of legal relations between States
for the legal relations between the government and the private citizen or
between private citizens inter se.
It reflects a reality of international life: it determines the very content
of the rights and obligations of States on the international plane.
It is in fact indisputable that the State has a realnterest in the devel-
opment of its international commerce, of which investment in foreign
undertakings and the establishment of undertakings in foreign countries
constitute manifestations.Thus, apart from countries which practise the
system of State trading, international economic relations are in general
heavilycontrolled bythepublicauthorities. Furthermore, thisinternational
commercial activity of a State necessarily affects the economy, and thus
the public interest, of the receiving State; it normally also involves
contacts with the municipal legalsystemand with the public authorities of
that State. It is thus genuinely a matter of ensuring a proper balance
between the interests of States, a traditional task of the rules of public
international law.
This task is fundamentally different from that laid upon the rules of
municipal law, and in particular municipal private law. The consider-
ations which determine the choice of a particular system of municipal
private law with respect to what the Court has called "the nature and
interrelation" of "the rights of the corporate entity and its shareholders"
are completely foreign to the problems whichare the eoncern of the rules
of public international law relating to responsibility for the treatment of
aliens.
5. It is true that international commercial activitiesare to a very large
extent carried on under municipal law forms (acquisition of ownership,
contracts, concessions, collection of rates and taxes). But it is not the
legal relationships of municipal law resulting therefrom-the relation-
shipsbetweenprivate persons inter seor between a public authority and avée-qui intéressentledroit international coutumier. Celui-cinetend nul-
lement àunifier,même partiellementou indirectement, lesdifférentsordres
juridiques internes dans un ordrejuridique commun applicable aux cas de
diversitéde nationalité 1)(diversityof citizenship).
La responsabilité internationale d'un Etat n'est point baséesur des
règlesd'un tel ordre juridique commun; le droit de 1'Etatinvoquant cette
responsabilitén'est non plus dérivédes droits qui résulteraientpour une
personne privéed'un tel ordre juridique commun. L'approche des règles
du droit international coutumier est complètement différente;elles s'in-
téressentplutôt àl'activité,entant que telle, des personnesfaisant le com-
merce international d'un Etat, d'une part, des autorités publiques de
1'Etat d'accueil d'autre part, ainsi qu'à l'interaction de ces activités.
C'est pourquoi la responsabilité internationale pour le traitement des
étrangersest essentiellement une responsabilité pour ((dénide justice B
lato sensu. C'est aussi pourquoi 1'Etatqui invoque cette responsabiliténe
représente pas la personne léséemais fait valoir son propre intérêt à
l'activitéde cette personne dans le commerce international. C'est pour-
quoi, finalement, il est indispensable, dans la détermination del'existence
ou de l'inexistenced'une responsabilité internationaled'un Etat vis-à-vis
d'un autre Etat dans un cas concret, de prendre en considérationl'ensem-
ble desactivités desautorités publiques de1'Etatdontla responsabilité est
mise en cause, ainsi que l'ensemblede l'activitédans le commerce inter-
national de la personne privéeIésée.
6. 11ne faut pas donner à la notion du ((commerceinternational ))une
interprétation purement économique. A vrai dire, le droit international
coutumier protègel'intérêqtu'un Ëtat porte à soncommerceinternational
parce que le commerce international au sens large de l'expression, pré-
sente un intérêp tour la communautéinternationale tout entière.Comme
le remarquent à juste titre Sohn et Baxter dans leur commentaire au
Draft Convention on the InternationalResponsibility of Statesfor Injuries
to Aliens: ((Ledroit relatif à la responsabilitédes Etats vise au maintien
de la liberté de communication et de mouvement entre les nations. ))
[Traduction dz!Greigè.]
Dans le même sens, ledroit international coutumier reconnaît - sur-
tout depuis la seconde guerre mondiale - le respect des libertésfonda-
mentales de l'homme commeun intérêt de la communautéinternationale.
En effet, mêmeavant et entre les deux guerres mondiales, l'idéed'une
protection, par le droit international public, des udroits de l'homme »
n'étaitjamais absente dans la jurisprudence internationale relative à la
responsabilité desEtats pour le traitement des étrangers.Ici comme dans
la protection du commerce international, il s'agit non pas de créerun
ordre juridique commun, déterminant les rapports juridiques entre les
autoritéspubliques et la personne privéeou entre les personnes privées,
mais de ((contrôler ))l'application de l'ordre juridique interne pour sanc-
tionner les ((voiesde fait ))les discriminations arbitraires et l'usurpation
de compétence,qui violent le ((droit à l'existence))de la personne hu- private person-with which customary international law is concerned.
The latter does not tend in any way to unify the different municipal legal
orders, even partially or indirectly, into a common legal order applicable
to cases of diversity of citizenship.
The international responsibility of a State is not based upon rules of
any such common legal order; nor is the right of the State which asserts
such responsibility derived from the rights which a private person would
obtain under such a common legal order. The approach of the rules of
customary international law is completely different; they are concerned
rather with the activity, as such, of the persons carrying on the inter-
national commerce of a State, on the onehand, and the public authorities
of the receiving State, on the other, as well as with the interrelation of
those activities. That is why international responsibility for the treatment
of aliens isessentially a responsibility for "denial of justice" lato sensu.
That is also why the State which relies upon such responsibility does not
represent the injured person but is asserting its own interest in that
person's activities in international commerce. That is why, finally, it is
indispensable, for the determination of the existence or inexistence of
international responsibility on the part of one State towards another
State in a specific case, to take into considerational1the activities, as a
whole, of the public authorities of the State whose responsibility has been
alleged, as well asl1the injured private person's activities, as a whole, in
international commerce.
6. The notion of "international commerce" must not be given a
purely economic interpretation. In actual fact, customary international
law protects the interest which a State has in its international comrn-rce
because international commerce in the broad sense of the term is of
interest to the entire international community. As Sohn and Blxter
rightly remark in their commentary on the Draft Convention on the
International Responsibility ofStates for Injuriesto Aliens: "The law of
State responsibility is directed to the maintenance of freedom of com-
munications and of movement between nations."
On the same lines, customary international law recognizes-in partic-
ular since the Second World War-respect for fundamental human
freedoms as an interest of the international community. In fact, even
before and between the two World Wars the idea of the protection of
"human rights" by public international law was never absent from
international decisions concerning the responsibility of States for the
treatment of aliens. Here, as in the protection of international commerce,
it is not a matter of creating a common legal order determining the legal
relationships between the public authorities and private persons or
between private persons inter se, but of "checking" the application of
the municipal legal order in order to sanction the unlawful use of force,
arbitrary discrimination and usurpation of jurisdiction, which violate a
human being's "right to existence". Here, as in the protection of inter-338 BARCELONA TRACTION(OP. DISS. RIPHAGEN)
maine. Ici, comme dans la protection du commerce international, les
modalités différentesdu droit interne des différents paysne sont point
pertinentes pour la réalisation des objectifs des règlesdu droit inter-
national coutumier.
7. Ici, il faut ouvrir une parenthèse. L'arrêtsemble se baser sur l'idée
d'une ((référence )par les règlesdu droit international aux règlesde droit
interne. Il est dit notamment au paragraphe 38 de l'arrêtque ((ledroit
international a dû reconnaître dans la sociétéanonyme une institution
crééepar les Etats en un domaine qui relève essentiellement de leur
compétence nationale. Cette reconnaissance nécessite que le droit
international se réfèreaux règlespertinentes de droit interne, chaque fois
que se posent des questions juridiques relatives aux droits des Etats qui
concernent le traitement des sociétés et des actionnaires et à propos des-
quels le droit international n'a pasfixéses propres règles ».La technique
législativede la référenceou du renvoi d'une règlede droit à une autre
règlede droit, ou au résultat de son application, est en effet bien connue
dans la sciencejuridique. Pour ce qui concerne plus particulièrement le
droit international, cette technique est d'application fréquente dans les
règlesde droit écrites,c'est-à-dire dans les traités.Ainsi plusieurs traités,
en définissantles obligations des parties contractantes, font référenceau
droit interne d'unEtat déterminéC .'est, par exemple, le cas des traitésen
matière de conflits des lois et en matièred'entraide judiciaire, y compris
la reconnaissance et l'exécution desjugementsétrangers.Mais ce phéno-
mène du renvoi est complètement étranger à la situation dont il s'agit
dans le cas actuel.
Tout d'abord il s'agitdans l'affairede la Barcelona Traction de l'appli-
cation des règlesde droit international coutumiergénéralL . e renvoi de
telles règlesau droit interne d'un Etat déterminéparait à priori peu pro-
bable. D'autre part, la présente affairene concerne point la reconnais-
sance ou l'effetà donner aux décisions,judiciaireset autres, des autorités
espagnoles, dans le cadre du systèmejuridique d'un autre Etat. Au con-
traire, il s'agitde déterminersi cesdécisionsconstituent un dénidejustice
dans le sens large des mots, c'est-à-dire, une ((voie de fait»,une discrimi-
nation arbitraire ou une usurpation dejuridiction, qui porte atteinte aux
droits d'un autre Etat. Dans ce domaine il ne peut y avoir un ((renvoi »
aux règlesde droit interne de 1'Etatdont la responsabilitéinternationale
est mise en cause, ni d'ailleurs au droit interne d'un autre Etat, ni aux
((règlescommunes ))qui pourraient se dégagerd'une étude de droit com-
parédes différentes législations nationales.
8. La distinction de principe faite par l'arrêtprésententre
a) les obligations de 1'Etat «dèslors qu'[il]admet sur son territoire des
investissements étrangers ou des ressortissants étrangers, personnes
physiques ou morales s (par. 33), obligations « qui naissent ...dans
le cadre de la protection diplomatique ))(ibid.);national commerce, the different methods adopted by the municipal law
of different countries are irrelevant to the attainment of the objectives
of the rules of customary international law.
7. At this point 1must make a digression. The Judgment seems to be
based on the idea of a "reference" by the rules of international law to the
rules of municipal law. It is stated, in particular, in paragraph 38 of the
Judgment that "international law has had to recognize the corporate
entity as an institution created by States in a domain essentially within
their domestic jurisdiction. This in turn requires that, whenever legal
issues arise concerning the rights of States with regard to the treatment
of companies and shareholders, as to which rights international law has
not established its own rules, it has to refer to the relevant rules of muni-
cipal law". The legislative technique of reference or renvoi from one rule
of law to another rule of law, or to the results of its application, is an
operation well known in legal science. So far as international law in
particular is concerned, this technique is of frequent application in the
written rules of law, i.e., in treaties. Thus, several treaties, when defining
the obligations of the Contracting Parties, contain a reference to the
municipal law of a specific State. This is, for example, the case with
treaties concerning conflict of laws and reciprocal judicial assistance,
including the recognition and execution of foreigri judgments. But this
kind of renvoi is wholly unrelated to the situation with which the present
case is concerned.
In the firstplace, inthe BarcelonaTractioncaseit is a matter of applying
the rules of general customary international law. A renvoi by such rules
to the municipal law of a specific State would seem a priori to be im-
probable. Furthermore, the present case does not concern the recognition
of, or the effect to be given to, the decisions, judicial and otherwise, of
the Spanish authorities, within the framework of the legal system of
another State. On the contrary, it is a matter of determining whether
those decisions constitute a denial of justice in the broad meaning of the
term, i.e., unlawful use of force, arbitrary discrimination, or a usurpation
ofjurisdiction, amounting to infringement of the rights of another State.
In this domain there cannotbe a "renvoi" to the rules of municipal law
of the State whose international responsibility is alleged, nor, moreover,
to the municipallaw of any other State, nor to any "common rules" that
might be derived from a comparative law study of different national
legislations.
8. The distinction of principle drawn by the present Judgment be-
tween-
(a) the obligations of a State "when [it]admits into its territory foreign
investments or foreign nationals, whether natural orjuristic persons"
(paragraph 33), obligations "arising .. . in the field of diplomatic
protection" (ibid.); b) les obligations de 1'Etat résultant de «la mise hors la loi des actes
d'agression » (par. 34);
c) les obligations de 1'Etat résultant «des principes et des règles con-
cernant les droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine »(par. 34);
d) la protection des intérêts économiques résultant dle'investissement
fait par un étranger (par. 87);
paraît bien artificielle et ne peut en aucun cas justifier les conséquences
juridiques essentiellesque l'arrêtattache à cette distinction.
Tout d'abord il semble impossible de distinguer les catégories a) et d).
Le présentarrêtmêmefait observer àjuste titre (par. 37)que l'institution
dénomméeprotection diplomatique des étrangers est ((étroitementliée
dèsson origine au commerce international ».Comment donc reconnaître
d'une part que «dèslors qu'un Etat admet sur sonterritoire des investisse-
ments étrangers ...il...assume certaines obligations quant à leur traite-
ment » (par. 33 de l'arrêt)et nier d'autre partà 1'Etatdont les ressortis-
sants ont fait de tels investissements toute protection sur le plan inter-
national endehors des (stipulations conventionnelles »(par. 90de l'arrêt)?
Certes, comme la Cour l'indique (par. 87) «dèslors qu'un Etat admet sur
son territoire des investissements ...étrangers, il...ne devient pas l'as-
sureur des ressources d'un autre Etat que ces investissements représen-
tent n.Personne n'ajamais employé pareilleformule pour définirles obli-
gations de 1'Etat d'accueil. Ce n'est en tout cas pas la base sur laquelle
la Belgique fonde sesréclamationscontre l'Espagne dans le cas d'espèce!
Le problème de l'étenduede la protection que les règlesdu droit inter-
national assurent a l'intérêt d'uEntat est une question, la désignationdu
ou des Etats dont l'intérêe tst protégé en estune autre.
Mais il y a plus. Dans tous les cas énuméréc si-dessus, le droit inter-
national public général protège led sroits des Etats en imposant des obli-
gations aux autres Etats pour la bonne raison que c'estun intérêt primor-
dial de la communauté internationale tout entière que ces droits soient
respectés.
Certes, sur le plan moral, il est difficilede comparer la gravité d'une
atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politiqued'un Etat à
celle d'une atteinte aux libertés fondamentales de la personne humaine
ou à celle d'une atteinte au commerce international lato sensu.
Mais cela n'empêche pasque, sur le plan juridique, il s'agit dans les
trois cas d'intérêtsde 1'Etatprotégéspar l'imposition d'obligations aux
autres Etats. Evidemment les modalitésde la protection sont différentes
dans les trois cas, aussi bien quantà la définition desatteintes prohibées
- c'est-à-dire l'étenduede la protection - qu'à l'égardde 18désigna-
tion du ou des Etats habilités à appliquer ou à exiger l'application des
sanctions en cas d'atteinte. (b) the obligations of a State resulting from "the outlawing of acts of
aggression7'(paragraph 34) ;
(c) the obligations of a State resulting "from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of the human person" (paragraph 34);
and
(d) the protection of the economic interests resulting from investments
made by a foreigner (paragraph 87);
seems very artificial and cannot in any case justify the essential legal
consequences which the Judgment attaches to this distinction.
In the first place, it seems impossible to make any distinction between
categories (a) and (d). The present Judgment even observes (paragraph
37), and rightly, that the institution known as the diplomatic protection
of foreigners has "from its origins [been]closelylinked with international
commerce". How then can it on the one hand recognize that "when a
State admits into its territory foreign investments ... it ... assumes
obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them" (paragraph 33
of the Judgment) and, on the other, deny to the State whose nationals
have made such investments al1 protection at the international level
apart from "treaty stipulations" (paragraph 90 of the Judgment)? It is
true, as the Court says (paragraph 87), that "when a State admits into
its territory foreign investments ... it.. . does not thereby become an
insurer of that part of another State's wealth which those investments
represent". No one has ever employed such a formula to define the
obligations of the receiving State. It is in any event not the basis upon
which Belgium bases its claims against Spain in the present case! The
problem of the extent of the protection which the rules of international
law give to the interest of a State is one question, the determination of
the State or States whose interest is protected is another.
Nor is this all. In al1 the cases enumerated above, general public
international law protects the rights of States by imposing obligations
on other States, for the good reason that it is an essential interest of
the international community as a whole that such rights should be
respected.
It is true, from the moral point of view, that it is difficult to compare
the gravity of an infringement of the territorial integrity and political
independence of a State with that of an infringement of the fundamental
freedoms of the human person, or with that of an injury to international
commerce lato sensu.
Nevertheless, from the legal point of view, in each of these three cases
it is aatter of State interests protected by the imposition of obligations
on other States. Obviously, the details of the protection are different in
each of the three cases, both with respect to the definition of the in-
fringements prohibited-i.e., the extent of the protection-and with
respect to the designation of the State or States entitled to apply, or
demand the application of, sanctions in the event of such conduct. C'est de ce dernier ordre d'idéesque relèvela question de la ((qualité
pour agir » d'un Etat.
L'arrêtsemble faire une distinction entre les obligations d'un Etat
erga omnes,les obligations d'un Etat qui existent envers certains autres
Etats d'après le droit international généralet des obligations d'un Etat
qui n'existent envers un autre Etat qu'en raison de ((stipulations con-
ventionnelles)). On peut, certes, faire cette distinction. Encore est-il
difficiled'admettre que cette distinction correspondrait nécessairement à
une classification à priori suivant la nature des intérêtp srotégéspar ces
obligations, classification qui est déjàen soi assez douteuse.
En d'autres termes il parait impossible de dire à priori que les intérêts
économiques de 1'Etat ne pourraient êtreprotégéspar des obligations
d'autres Etats qu'en vertu de ((stipulations conventionnelles )),comme il
serait d'ailleurs manifestement faux de dire qu'il existe une qualitéd'agir
pour chaque Etat au cas où l'intégrité territorialeou l'indépendancepoli-
tique d'un autre Etat est atteinte autrement que par une attaque armée
ou au cas où un ressortissant d'un autre Etat est victime d'une violation
de ses libertésindividuelles.
9. Personne ne nie d'ailleurs que la qualité d'agird'un Etat dans le
cadre des règlesdu droit international coutumier relatives au traitement
des étrangers dépend del'existenced'un lienentre cet Etat et la situation
atteinte dans le cas d'espècepar le comportement d'un autre Etat.
A cet égardil convient de remarquer que dans les matièresrégiespar
le droit international public coutumier il est à priori peu probable qu'il
existedes cloisons étanchesentre les solutions adoptéespour lesdifférents
éléments théoriquementséparésdont est composée la règle de droit.
C'estl'interaction entre lecomportementimputé à un Etat et lecomporte-
ment imputé à un autre Etat qui fait l'objet des règlesde droit inter-
national coutumier se manifestant dans la créationd'«obligations » et de
« droits))des Etats dans leurs relations mutuelles. Dans ces conditions on
ne peut notamment pas faire totalement abstraction de la nature et de
l'effetde cette interaction dans lecas concret en déterminantla (responsa-
bilité» de l'un et la((qualitéd'agir ))de l'autre Etat.
10. C'est une raison de plus de ne pas attacher trop d'importance a la
distinction fort abstraite et théoriqueentre ((droits » et((simples intérêt s)
qui semble êtrela seule base du raisonnement de l'arrêt.
Cette distinction n'a de sensque dans lecadre d'un ensembleconcret de
règlesde droit connues et incontestées.
En analysant un tel ensemble de règles onpeut constater à posteriori
que le manquement à une obligation peut entraîner certaines conséquen-
ces dommageables pour certains intérêts, sans quele détenteur de ces
intérêts soit habilitép ,ar cet ensemble de règlesde droit, à exiger une
réparationde celui qui a manqué à cette obligation. Alors on peut en tirer It is to this latter context that the question of thjus standiof a State
relates.
The Judgment seems to draw a distinction between obligations of a
State erga omnes, obligations of a State which exist towards certain
other States under general international law, and obligations of a State
which only exist towards a State with which it has entered into "treaty
stipulations". This distinction can of course be drawn. But it is still
difficult to hold that this distinction would necessarily correspond to an
a priori classification in accordance with the nature of the interests
protected by such obligations, a classification which isalready in itself a
fairly doubtful one.
In other words, it seems impossible to Say a priorithat the economic
interests of a Statecan be protected through obligations on other States
only by virtue of "treaty stipulations", just as it would obviously have
been incorrect to Saythat every State has jus standi in cases where the
territorial integrity or the political independence of another State is
infringed, otherwise than by armed attack, or in cases where the national
of another State is the victim of a violation of his individual freedoms.
9. No one denies, moreover, that a State's jus standi under the rules
of customary international law concerning the treatment of aliens
depends on the existence of a link between such State and the situation
that has been adversely affected in the case in question by the conduct
of another State.
In this connection it should be noted that in those matters governed
by customary public international law it is a prioriimprobable that there
will be watertight divisions between the solutions adopted for the various
theoretically separate elements of which this legal rule is made up. It is
the interrelation between the conduct imputed to a State and the conduct
imputed to another State which is the subject of the rules of customary
international law, manifesting itself in the creation of "obligations" and
"rights" of States in their mutual relations. In these circumstances, it is
impossible, in particular, totally to disregard the nature and effectof this
interrelation in the actual case in question when determining the "res-
ponsibility" of the one State and the 'yus standi" of the other.
10. This is one more reason for not attaching too much importance
to the highly abstract and theoretical distinction between "rights" and
"mere interests" which seemsto form the sole basis of the reasoning in
the Jude"ent.
This distinction is only meaningful withinthe framework of a concrete
body of known and undisputed rules of law.
When such a body of rules is under analysis, it can be observed, a
posteriori,that a failure to comply with an obligation may entai1certain
injurious consequences for certain interests, without the possessor of
those interests being empowered by this body of rules of law to demand
reparation from the party which has failed to fulfil this obligation. The341 BARCELONA TRACTION (OP. DISSRIPHAGEN)
la conclusion que la victime avait bien un ((simpleintérêt mais non pas
un «droit» qui était violé.
C'est en effet la conclusion que l'arrêttire en analysant les règlesdu
droit privé internerelatives à la position juridique des actionnaires à
l'égard d'actes dirigécsontre la société.
Mais dans l'affaire que l'arrêt trancheil ne s'agit nides obligations
des autorités espagnoles sur le plan du droit interne ni des possibilités
juridiques qu'auraient les actionnaires d'invoquer cette responsabilitéen
demandant l'annulation des mesures prises ou une indemnisation.
Il s'agit au contraire d'un tout autre ensemble de règles,à savoir les
règles du droit international public coutumier relatives aux obligations
et aux droits des Etats dans leurs relations mutuelles.
Or, ces deux ensembles de règlesrépondent à des exigencestout à fait
différentes;leurs objets et leurs buts sont différents; ils sesont développés
dans des milieux différents.
L'ensemble desrèglesde droit international public coutumierenmatière
de traitement des étrangers s'inspire, comme nous l'avons vu, de l'intérêt
de la communautéinternationale au res~ectdeslibertésfondamentales de
la personne humaine ainsi qu'au respectde la liberté ducommerce inter-
national.
C'esten fonction de ces deux principes qu'il faut détermineraussi bien
les obligations que les droits des Etats dans leurs rapports mutuels. Dans
l'affaire actuelle c'est surtout le second de ces deux principes qui est en
cause.
11. Pour ouv voiraualifier une activité concrètedans lecommerceinter-
national comme faisant partie du commerce international d'un Etat
déterminé,il faut évidemmentqu'il existe un lien entre l'activitéet cet
Etat. Ce lien ne peut s'établirque par l'intermédiairede l'un ou plusieurs
des trois élémentsde 1'Etat: les ressortissants, le territoire et le gouverne-
ment. Quand l'activitédu commerce international se fait par l'établisse-
ment d'une personne physique à l'étranger c'est traditionnellement la
nationalité de cette personne physique qui déterminele lien entre cette
activitéet un Etat déterminé.D'autre part on trouve dès le début du
développement du commerce international que 1'Etat s'intéresse au
traitement réservépar les autres Etats à ((se» produits, c'est-à-dire les
produits originaires de son territoire, ainsi, qu'à»navires, c'est-à-dire
les navires investis par son gouvernement du droit de battre le pavillon
national. (Parfois les différentesmanifestations de l'activitédu commerce
international n'étaientpas nettement distinguées.Un exemple typique en
est donné par les traitésdont l'interprétation étaiten cause dans l'arrêt
de la Cour du 27 juillet 1952 (affaire des Droits des ressortissants des
Etats-Unis d'Amériqueau Maroc, arrêt, C.Z. RJ.cueil 1952, p. 176.) Ces
traités,datant du tournant du siècle,visaient en premier lieu empêcher
tout traitement différentielpar un Etat des ressortissants des autres Etats
partiesauxdits traités.Mais la Cour n'a pas hésitàinterprétercestraitésconclusion can then be drawn therefrom that the victim had indeed a
"mere interest" but not a "right" that was violated.
This is in fact the conclusion which theJudgment draws when analysing
the rules of municipalprivate law with respect to the legal situation of
shareholders with regard to acts directed against the Company.
But in the case decided by the Judgment it is a matter neither of the
obligations of the Spanish authorities on the level of municipal law nor
of the legal opportunities which the shareholders might have of asserting
that responsibility, by asking for the cancellation of the measures taken,
or for compensation.
It concerns, on the contrary, quite another body of rules, namely the
rules of customary public international law concerning the obligations
and the rights of States in their mutual relations.
Now these two bodies of rules answer quite different requirements;
their objects and purposes are different; they have developed in different
contexts.
The body of rules of customary public international law concerning
the treatment of aliens draws its inspiration, as we have seen, from the
interest of .the international community in respect for the fundamental
freedoms of the human person as well as in respect for the freedom of
international commerce.
It is in relation tothese two principles that both the obligations and
the rights of States in their mutual relations fa11to be determined.
In the instant case it isabove al1the second of these two principles that
is involved.
11. In order to be able to describe a concrete activity in international
commerce as forming part of the international commerce of a specific
State, it is obviously necessary that there be a link between that activity
and that State. That link can only be established through the medium
of one or more of three elements of the State: its nationals, its territory
and its government. Where the international commercial activity takes
the form of a natural person's establishing himself abroad, it is traditio-
nally the nationality of that natural person which determines the link
between that activity and a specific State. Furthermore, right from the
beginning of the developmentof international commerce it will be found
that the State has concerned itself with the treatment accorded by other
States to "its" products, i.e., products originating in its territory, as well
as to "its" ships,i.e., ships upon which its government has conferred the
right to fly the national flag. (Sometimes the various manifestations of
international commercial activity were not clearly distinguished. A typical
example of this is afforded by the treaties the interpretation of which
was in question in the Court's Judgment of 27 July 1952 (Rights of
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1952,p. 176.)Those treaties, dating from the turn of the century,
were aimed primarily at preventing any differential treatment by a State
of the nationals of the other States parties to the said treaties. But the comme interdisant égalementtoute discrimination en faveur de I'importa-
tion de marchandisesen provenance duterritoire d'un de ces Etats (C.Z.J.
Recueil 1952, p. 183 à 186), reconnaissant ainsi que les traités en cause
avaient pour objet la protection de l'ensemble des activitésdu commerce
international de chaque Etat contractant.)
Les techniques du commerce international se sont développées depuis
lors, notamment avec l'entrée en scène des société anonymes comme
formejuridique de l'organisation de l'activité économique privée.
Pour la détermination du lien entre une activitédu commerce inter-
national et un Etat particulier ce développement pose deux problèmes
distincts,l'un relatif au rapport entre l'activitéet une personne, l'autre
relatif au rapport entre cette personne et un Etat.
En effet,dans les cas classiques )de la protection diplomatique, I'inté-
rêtque 1'Etat porte à ((son ))commerce international se confond avec
l'intérêt qu'pilorte au bien-êtrede sesessortissants,personnes physiques,
aussi bien pour ce qui concerne leur intégritphysique et leurs libertés
fondamentales, que pour ce qui concerne leur pouvoir de gérerleurs
biens ainsi que leur droit d'en tirer desprojits.
Les élémentsde ([l'entreprise ))se trouvent réunis dans une seule et
même personne physiqueet indivisible, et l'appartenance de cette per-
sonne à un Etat déterminéne pose normalement pas de problèmes.
L'emploide la formejuridique de la société anonyme (ayant Sur le plan
du droit privéinterne une personnalité juridique propre) complique la
situation.
12. Tout d'abord on peut difficilement admettre qu'une sociétéano-
nyme en tant que telle puisse avoir une intégritéphysique ou des libertés
fondamentales. (On peut laisser de côté la question de savoir si, sur le
plan du droit interne, la société en tantque telle pouvait seplaindre d'une
atteinteà l'intégrité physiqueu auxlibertésfondamentales despersonnes
physiques qui la ((représentent)).)Il s'agit donc seulement des intérêts
((économiques sde l'entreprise: son activitéet ses biens. Or, en réalité,la
formejuridique de la sociétéanonyme se prête à des organisations assez
divergentes des intérêts économiques de I'entreprise. Il y a le type de
sociétépour laquelle la personnalitéjuridique correspond àune indépen-
dance économiquedeI'entreprise; la gestion de l'entreprise setrouvedans
les mains des administrateurs indépendants et les profits sont en principe
affectés à I'entreprise elle-même, c'est-à-dire généralement réinvestis
(déductionfaite, le cas échéant,d'une certaine rémunérationdes capitaux
déjàinvestis). Mais il y a aussi le type de sociétéqui est en réalité une
formed'organisation de la coopérationdans une entreprised'actionnaires
qui non seulement fournissent le capital mais assurent effectivement la
gestion de l'entreprise pour en tirer des profits pour eux-mêmes.Il y a
enfin un troisièmetype de sociétédont l'entreprise est intégréedans une
autre entreprise plus vaste, appartenantà une autre sociétéqui la donine.
Evidemment il s'agit ici de types de sociétés(correspondant à des types Court did not hesitate to interpret the treaties as also prohibiting any
discrimination in favour of the importation of goods comingfrom the
territoryof one of those States (I.C.J. Reports 1952, pp. 183-186),thus
recognizingthat the treaties in question had as their object the protection
of al1the international commercial activities of each Contracting State.)
The techniques of international commerce have developed since then,
in particular with the entry on the scene of limited companies as a legal
form for the organization of private economic activities.
For purposes of the determination of the link between an international
commercial activity and a particular State, this development poses two
distinct problems, the one relating to the relationship between the activity
and a person, and the other relating to the relationship between that
person and a State.
In fact, in "classic" cases of diplomatic protection the interest of a
State in "its" international commerce merges with its interest in the
welfare of itsnationals,natural persons, both in respect of their personal
safety and fundamental freedoms and in respect of their power to admi-
nister their property and their right to drawprofitstherefrom.
The elements of "the undertaking" are thus united in one single
indivisible natural person, and that person's appurtenance to a specific
State does not normally pose any problems.
The employment of the legal form of the limited company (with its
own legalpersonality, in private municipal law) complicatesthe situation.
12. In the first place, it isard to recognize that a limited company
as such can have persona1 safety or fundamental freedoms. (We may
leave aside the question of whether under municipal law the company
as such might complain of an infringement of the persona1 safety or
fundamental freedoms of the natural persons which "represent" it.)
It is thus solely a matter of the undertaking's "economic" interests:
its activities and its property. Now in reality the legal form of the limited
companylends itselfto fairly variedkinds of organization ofthe economic
interests of the undertaking. There is the type of company in which
legal personality corresponds to economic independence of the under-
taking; the administration of the undertaking is in the hands of in-
dependent directors and the profits are in principle appropriated to the
undertaking itself, i.e., generally re-invested (after the deduction, in
suitable cases, of a certain remuneration for the capital already invested).
But there is also the type of company which is in reality a form of or-
ganization for CO-operationin an undertaking by shareholders who not
only furnish the capital but also effectivelyadminister the undertaking
and draw the profits themselves.Finally, there is a third type of company,
in which the undertaking is integrated into another more extensive
undertaking, belonging to another company which dominates it. Ob-
viously these are types of companies (corresponding to different types of 343 BARCELONA TRACTION (OP.DISS. RIPHAGEN)
d'actionnaires différents)et non de catégories séparéep sar des cloisons
étanches.Bien entendu pour les trois types de sociétés le régimd eu droit
priviénterne est généralementle même.D'autre part, sur le plan du droit
fiscal interne, plusieurs pays reconnaissent la différence fondamentale
entre ces trois types en leur donnant un traitement différent.
Sur le plan du droit internationalcoutlcmier,c'est-à-dire aussi bienpour
déterminer ce qui est affectépar le comportement d'un Etat vis-à-vis
d'une société anonyme que pour déterminerle lien entre ce qui est affecté
et un autre Etat, il parait nécessairede tenir compte de la réalité des
différencesentre ces trois types de sociétés. Eneffet, comme on l'a déjà
fait remarquer, sur le plan du droit international il s'agit desdroits et des
obligations des Etats dans leurs rapports mutuels et non pas des rapports
de droit interne entre la sociétéet d'autres personnes privéesni même
des rapports de droit interne entre la société,ses actionnaires et ses
dirigeants, et les autorités publiques d'un Etat.
La nature des droits comme celle des obligations est différentedans
le droit international, parce que ces obligations et ces droits corres-
pondent aux exigences spécifiquesde la communauté internationale.
Il n'est donc pas possible de s'en tenir simplement à la personnalité
juridique de la sociétésur le plan du droit interne.
On ne peut ni considérer la société commeétant toujours la seule
qui soit affectéepar une mesure quelconque dirigée - sur le plan du
droit interne - contre la société, ni assimilertoujours purement et
simplement la société àune personne physique pour ce qui concerne sa
((nationalit))c'est-à-dire son lien avec un Etat déterminé.
L'un et l'autre sont d'ailleurs reconnus dans la jurisprudence et la
pratique internationales.
Bien entendu cette jurisprudence et cette pratique ne sont pas cons-
tantes. D'une part, elles se sont souvent inspirées de considérations
ad hoc; d'autre part, elles ne tiennent pas suffisamment compte de la
variétédes cas qui peuvent se présenter.
Toujours est-il qu'elles marquent à un degré suffisantla reconnais-
sance de l'inapplicabilité de la fiction juridique du droit privé interne
sur le plan du droit international public. La personnalité morale de la
sociétén'est point le dernier mot ni pour les obligations ni pour les
droits des Etats en matière de ((traitement des étrangers ».
L'arrêtle reconnaît d'ailleurs en examinant ((divers autres motifs
pour lesquels on pourrait concevoir que le Gouvernement belge soit
justifiéà présenter une demande ..» (par. 55). Toutefois, l'arrêtsemble
persister à considérerces autres motifs comme l'application de la trans-
position, sur le plan du droit international, des règles du droit interne
relatives au statut de la sociétéet de ses actionnaires (par.56).
On a déjà exposé ci-dessuspourquoi cette manière de voir paraît
contraire à la nature et aux fonctions mêmesdes règlesdu droit inter-
national public coutumier. Ce ne sont pas les droits et obligations desshareholders), and not categories separated by water-tight divisions. Of
course, the municipal private law applicable to these three types of
company is generally the same. On the other hand, in the field of muni-
cipal tax law, several countries recognize the fundamental difference
between these three types by affording them different treatment.
On the plane of customary international law,i.e., both in order to
determine what is affected by the conduct of a State towards a limited
company, and in order to determine the link between what is affected
and another State, it seems a priori necessary to take account of the
reality of the differencesbetween these three types of companies. As has
already been pointed out, international law is concerned with the rights
and obligations of States in their mutual relations and not with the
municipal law relations between the company and other private persons,
nor even with the municipal law relations between the company, its
shareholders and officers, and the public authorities of a State.
Thenature of rights, like that of obligations, isdifferent in international
law, because such obligations and rights correspond to the specific
requirements of the international community. It is consequently not
possible to regard the company's legal personality under municipal law
as an exclusive touchstone.
One can neither regard the company as always being the only entity
affected by any measure whatsoever directed-on the plane of municipal
law-against the company, nor always equate the company, purely and
simply, with a natural person so far as concerns its "nationality", Le., its
link with a specificState.
Both these matters are moreover recognized in international juris-
prudence and practice.
Of course thisjurisprudence and practice are not uniform. On the one
hand, they are often inspired by adhoc considerations; on the other, they
do not take sufficient account of the variety of cases thatcan arise.
Nevertheless, they do show a sufficient degree of recognition of the
inapplicabilty of the legal fiction of municipal private law on the plane of
public international law. The company's juristic personality is not by any
means the last word either on the obligations or on the rights of States in
the matter of the "treatment of aliens".
The Judgment recognizes this, moreover, when examining ". .. other
grounds on which it is conceivable that the submission by the Belgian
Government of a claim. .. may be justified" (paragraph 55). However,
the Judgment seems to persist in regarding such other grounds as the
application of transposition on to the plane of international law of the
rules of municipal law concerning the status of a company and its share-
holders (paragraph 56).
It has already been explained above why this approach seems contrary
to the very nature and function of the rules of customary public inter-
national law. It is not the rights and the obligations of the shareholders actionnaires qui sont en cause dzns l'affaireactuelle, mais les obligations
et les droits des Etats; il ne s'agit pas seulement de sujets de droit diffé-
rents mais aussi d'une matièredifférente.
13. C'est aussipourquoi il ne paraît pas justifié d'écarter comme non
pertinentes la pratique et la jurisprudence internationales en matière de
mesures prises à l'égard des biens ennemis ainsi qu'enmatièrede nationa-
lisations (par.59 à 62 de l'arrêt).Au contraire, il s'agit là de deux phé-
nomènes sur leplan internationalqui ont trait directement au commerce
international ainsi qu'aux liensentre une activité du commerce interna-
tional et un Etat déterminé.En effet, les mesures prises à l'égard des
biens ennemis ont le double objectif d'éliminer l'élément ennem dins la
gestion de l'économienationale et de confisquer les biens ennemis à titre
de réparation. Il est hautement significatifque dans le cadre de ce double
objectif la personnalité distincte de la sociéténe fasse pas obstacle à la
reconnaissance des réalités.Mais comment donc pourrait-on d'une part
accepter le lien entre une activitéet des biens privés etun Etat quand il
s'agit de mesures à prendre contre cet Etat et, d'autre part, méconnaître
par principe l'existence d'un tel lien quand il s'agit des droits de cet
Etat?
Dans le cas des nationalisations d'entreprises appartenant à une
société ils'a-it évidemment de mesures d'unautre caractère. Toutefois.
ici encore, bien des accords internationaux conclus pour réglerles suites
de ces mesures reconnaissent que celles-ci - qui mettent fin à une acti-
vité du commerce international - n'affectent pas seulement 1'Etat
dont la société comme personne distincte estcenséeposséderla «natio-
nalité n.
Dans les deux cas - mesures contre les biens ennemis et mesures
de nationalisation - il s'agit d'une atteinte- pour des motifs diffé-
rents - àune activitédu commerce international prise comme ensemble;
l'objet et le but de ces mesures concernent l'entreprise entant que telle,
bien qu'elles affectent évidemmentla propriétéet d'autres droits sur
des biens isolés.
14. C'est de ce point de vue - atteinte à l'entreprise étrangère plutôt
qu'à un droit isoléappartenant à une personne privéeétrangère - qu'il
faut aussi considérerles cas où la jurisprudence et la pratique interna-
tionales ont reconnu un intérêt juridiquement protégé palres règlesdu
droit international à un Etat autre que celui suivant le droit interne
duquel la sociétéétait constituée.Ce sont notamment les cas où la
sociétéétait entrée en liquidation ou était ((pratiquement défunte » à
la suite des mesures prises par 1'Etatdont la responsabilitéinternationale
étaitmise en cause. 11s'agissait alors des cas où la sociétéétaitforcée
de suspendre ou de cesser ses activités, end'autres termes, où i'entre-
prise en tant que telle étaitaffectée.Dans la doctrine on a parfois essayé
d'expliquer ces cas en y voyant l'application dela notion du droit privé
interne suivant laquelle en cas de liquidation d'une sociétéles action-
naires reprennent la partie des biens de la sociétéqui est la leurthat are in issue in the present case, but the obligations and the rights of
States; itis not only a question of different legalpersonae but also of a
different subject-matter.
13. That is also why it does not seemjustifiable to disregard as irrel-
evant the international practice and jurisprudence which relate to
measures taken with respect to enemy property and nationalizations
(paragraphs 59 to 62 of the Judgment). On the contrary, these are two
phenomena at the international levelwhich directly concern international
commerce as well as the links between an international commercial
activity and a specificState. The measures taken with regard to enemy
property havethe twofold purpose ofexcluding enemycontrol of manage-
ment from the national economy, and of confiscating enemyproperty by
way of reparations. It is highly significant that in connection with this
twofold objective the distinct personality of the company does not con-
stitute an obstacle to the recognition of the true state of affairs. But how
then can the link between an activity, and private property, and a State be
accepted when it is a matter of measures to be taken against that State,
and the existence of such a link be disregarded, as a matter of principle,
when it is a matter of the rights of that State?
In the case of the nationalization of undertakings belonging to a com-
pany it is obviously a question of measures of another nature. Neverthe-
less, here again many international agreements concluded in order to
resolvethe consequences of those measures recognizethat such measures
-which put an end to an international commercial activity-do not
affect only the State whose "nationality" the company as a distinct
person is deemed to possess.
In both cases-measures against enemy property and measures of
nationalization-it isa question of an interference-for different reasons
-with an international commercial activity taken as a whole; the object
and the purpose of such measures concern the undertaking as such, even
though they obviously affect the ownership of, and other rights over,
individual items of property.
14. It is from this point of view-an interference with the foreign
undertaking rather than with an isolated right belonging to a foreign
private person-that one must also consider the cases in which inter-
nationaljurisprudence and practice have recognizeda Stateother than the
one under whose municipal law the company was formed as having an
interest which is legallyprotected by the rules of international law. Such
cases are in particular those in which the company had gone into liquida-
tion, or was "practically defunct", in consequence of measurestaken by
the State whose international responsibility was in question. Thus they
were cases in whichthe company had been forced to suspend or to cease
its activities: in other words, in which the undertaking as such was
affected. Writers have sometimes attempted to explain such cases by
seeingin them an application of the notion ofmunicipalprivate lawto the
effectthat on liquidation of a company the shareholders take back their(ainsi par exemple Reuter: Droit international public, 1958, p. 166).
Mais cette explication ne peut pas satisfaire. Sur le plan du droit
privéinterne ce n'est pas l'entréeenliquidation quifait naîtreun droit de
chaque actionnaire sur une partie des biens de la société:c'est seulement
à la Jin de la liquidation qu'un reliquat d'actif éventuel est distribué
parmi les actionnaires. D'autre part, la liquidation étaittoujours posté-
rieure aux mesures de 1'Etattenu pour responsable sur le plan interna-
tional de sorte que ces mesures n'ont pas pu porter atteinte aux droits
des actionnaires sur le plan du droit privéinterne.
Ces deux arguments valent encore à fortiori au cas où la société,sans
être entréeen liquidation, était ((tombéeen sommeil ))((pratiquement
défunte ))ou ((détruite)).L'arrêt(par. 64 à 68), tout en reconnaissant
des ((circonstances spécialesoù la règle générale [c'est-à-dire la règle
selon laquelle seul 1'Etat suivant le droit interne duquel la sociétéétait
constituée aurait qualité d'agiij..pourrait ne pas avoir effet » (par. 64)
n'accepte dans le contexte actuel kistence d'une circonstance spéciale
qu'au cas où ela sociétéa disparu comme personne morale » et était
((devenue juridiquement incapable de dé?endreses propres droits [et]
les intérztsde ses actionnaires » (par. 66). Ce faisant l'arrêt rejettedonc
toute exception fondée sur l'entrée enliquidation de la sociétéou sa
paralysie entière (par. 65) à cause des mesures à l'égard desquellesla
responsabilité internationale d'un Etat est invoquée.
Encore une fois l'arrêtfait donc dépendre l'étendue desobligations
et des droits internationaux des Etats des règlesdu droit privéinterne
relatives au statut des sociétés.L'arrêtconstate (par. 66) que ((seulela
disparition delasociétéen droit prive lesactionnaires de la possibilitéd'un
recours par l'intermédiairede la société )).11n'est pas expliquédans l'ar-
rêt comment alors, aprèsla disparition juridique de la société,l'action
d'un autre gouvernement que «le gouvernement de la société ))puisse
êtrecompatible avec la règle de la continuité! En réalité,l'intérêt juri-
diquement protégé decet autre Etat, donc aussi les obligations vis-à-vis
de 1'Etat qui a pris les mesures incriminées,doivent exister sur le plan
international, avant la disparition et indépendamment de la disparition
de la sociétésur le plan du droit interne, disparition qui n'est qu'une
des conséqueces ultérieures possibles de ces mesures.
15. L'arrêt constate(par. 65) ccqu'elle [c'est-à-direla Barcelona Trac-
tion] a été entièrementparalyséeau point de vue économique [et qu']elle
a étéprivéede toutes ses sources de revenus en Espagne 1).
Il est incontestable que les mesures prises par les autorités espagnoles
ont porté atteinte à l'entreprise en tant que telle. Le point essentiel est
donc l'existence ou l'inexistence d'un lien entre l'entreprise et 1'Etat
belge, suffisantpour considérer surle plan international que le commerce share of the company's property (see, for example, Reuter, Droit inter-
nationalpublic, 1958,p. 166).
But this explanation isunsatisfactory. On the levelof municipal private
law, it is not the company'sgoing into liquidation which causesa right to
arise for each shareholder, namely a right to a part of the company's
property: it is onlyat the endof the liquidation that any surplusthere may
be is distributed among the shareholders. Furthermore, the liquidation
was always subsequentto the measures taken by the State which washeld
responsible on the international plane, so that those measures could not
have infringedthe rights of the shareholders on the municipal private law
plane.
These two arguments remain valid afortiori in cases in whichthe com-
pany, without having gone into liquidation, was "dormant", "practically
defunct" or "destroyed". The Judgment (paragraphs 64-68), while re-
cognizing "special circumstances for which the general rule" [Le., the
rule that only the State under the municipal law of whichthe company
was formed would have jus standi]"might not take effect" (paragraph 64)
admits the existenceof a special circumstance in the present context only
where "the corporateentity of the company has ceased to exist" and has
"become incapable inlaw of defending its own rights and the interests of
the shareholders" (paragraph 66).In so doing, the Judgment consequently
rejects any exception based upon the company'sgoing into liquidation or
becoming entirely paralysed (paragraph 65) on account of the rneasures
with respectto whichthe international responsibility ofa State isasserted.
The Judgment thus once again makes the extent of the international
obligations and rights of States dependent on the rules of municipal
private law concerning the status of companies. The Judgment observes
(paragraph 66)that "only inthe event of the legal demise of the company
are the shareholders deprived of the possibility of a remedy available
through the company". The Judgment does not explain how in such a
case, after the legaldemise of the company, the action of a government
other than "the company's government" might be compatible with the
rule of continuity! In reality, the legally protected interest of such other
State, and consequently also the obligations towards it of the State which
took the measures of which complaint is made must exist on the inter-
national plane before and independently of the company's demise on the
plane of municipal law, a demise which is but one of the possible sub-
sequent consequences of those measures.
15. The Judgment observes (paragraph 65) ". ..that from the eco-
nomic viewpoint the company [Le.,Barcelona Traction]has been entirely
paralyzed" and that it "has been deprived of al1its Spanish sources of
income".
It is indisputable that the measures taken by the Spanish authorities
affectedthe undertaking as such. The essential point is thus the existence
or non-existence of a link between the undertaking and the Belgian State
sufficientfor it to be considered on the international plane that thenter- international de cet Etat est affectépar ces mesures. C'est donc la se-
conde question, mentionnée ci-dessus, que pose l'entrée enscène des
sociétés anonymesdans le commerce international, celle du lien entre
ce qui est affectépar le comportement d'un Etat, et un autre Etat. A
cet égardaussi il paraît impossible de faire abstraction de la différence
entre les trois types de sociétés etd'actionnaires mentionnés ci-dessus.
16. Pour ce qui concerne le commerce international d'un Etat qui se
fait par l'intermédiaire de personnes physiques il est constant, comme
le rappelle l'arrêt (par.361, que c'est en principe le lien de nationalité
entre 1'Etat et l'individu qui compte. Il y a toutefois des exceptions à
cette règle générale.D'une part, comme la Cour l'a rappelé dans son
avis consultatif du 11 avril1949 (C.I.J. Recueil 1949,p. 181):
((cette règle comporte d'importantes exceptions, car il existe des
css dans lesquels la protection peut êtreexercéepar un Etat au
profit de personnes qui n'ont pas sa nationalité)).
IIs'agit notamment des cas de protection ((fonctionnelle )(membres
de l'équipaged'un navire battant le pavillon de 1'Etat; membres des
forces armées d'un Etat; agent de l'ONU); la protection de l'activité
comme ensemble, lié en tant que tel à un Etat, s'étendaux personnes
qui participent à cet ensemble indépendamment de leur nationalité.
D'autre part, le lien de nationalité entre 1'Etat et l'individu n'est pas
toujours suffisant. Dans l'affaire Nottebohm, la Cour a jugé que le
Liechtenstein n'étaitpas fondé à étendresa protection à Nottebohm à
l'égarddu Guatemala sur la base d'une réponse négative à la question
de savoir
«si le rattachement de fait existant entre Nottebohm et le Liechten-
stein à l'époqueprécédant,entourant et suivant sa naturalisation
apparaît comme suffisamment étroit, comme si prépondérantpar
rapport au rattachement pouvant exister entre lui et tel ou tel autre
Etat qu'il permette de considérer la nationalité à lui conférée
comme effective ..))(C.I.J. Recueil 1955,p. 24).
Ici encore on remarque une approche cfonctionnelle». La naturalisa-
tion de M. Nottebohm n'ayant en fait rien changé à ses activités prises
comme un ensemble (ce que la Cour appelle son ((genre de vie »(ibid.,
p. 26)), l'atteinte alléguéeau Guatelmala à cette ((entreprise)) n'était
pas considérée comme affectantsur le plan international un intérêt juri-
diquement protégédu Liechtenstein.
17. Un vrai lien de nationalité, tel qu'il existe entre un Etat et ses
ressortissznts, personnes physiques, ne peut évidemment pas se conce-
voir pour les personnes morales en tant que telles. Pour assimiler une
sociétéanonyme à un ressortissant, personne physique, il faut donc BARCELONATRACTION (DISS. OP. RIPHAGEN) 346
national commerce of the latter State is affected by those measures. It is
thus the second question referred to above which is raised by the entry
upon the scene of limited companies in international commerce: that of
the link between what is affected by the conduct of a State, and another
State. In this connection too it seems impossible to disregard the dif-
ference between the three types of companies and shareholders referred to
above.
16. So far as concerns the international commerce of a State which
takes place through the medium of naturalpersons, it is undisputed, asthe
Judgment recalls (paragraph 36), that in principle it is the bond of
nationality between the State and the individual which counts. There are,
however, exceptions to this general rule. On the one hand, as the Court
recalled in its Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949(I.C.J. Reports 1949,
p. 181):
". ..there are important exceptions to the rule, for there are cases
in which protection may be exercised by a State on behalf of persons
not having its nationality".
These are, in particular, cases of "functional" protection (members of
the crew of a vesse1flying the flag of the State; members of the armed
forces of a State; agent of the United Nations); the protection of the
activity as a whole, linked as such with a State, extends to persons who
participate in that whole, irrespective of their nationality.
On the other hand, the bond of nationality between the State and the
individual is not always sufficient.In the Nottebohm case the Court held
that Liechtenstein wasnot entitled to extend its protection to Nottebohm
as against Guatemala, on the basis of a negative answer to the question-
". ..whether the factual connection between Nottebohm and
Liechtenstein in the period preceding, contemporaneous with and
following his naturalization appears to be sufficiently close, so pre-
ponderant in relation to any connection which may have existed
between him and any other State, that it is possible to regard the
nationality conferred upon him as real and effective. .." (I.C.J.
Reports 1955, p. 24).
Here again a "functional" approach may be observed. Mr. Notte-
bohm's naturalization not having in any way altered his activities as a
whole (what the Court calls his "manner of life", ibid.,p. 26),Guatemala's
alleged injury to this "undertaking" was not regarded as affecting, on the
international plane, a legally protectedinterest of Liechtenstein.
17. A true bond of nationality, such as exists between a State and its
nationals who are natural persons, is obviously inconceivable for juristic
persons as such. In order to assimilate a limited Companyto a national
who is a natural person it is consequently necessary to have recourse to avoir recours à d'autres points de rattachement. A cet égard,du point de
vue abstrait, trois voies s'ouvrent:
a) tenir compte de la nationalité des personnes physiques auxquelles
appartient ))la société;
b) tenir compte du fait que la personnalité juridique a été((conféré e
à la sociétépar les autoritésd'un Etat déterminé;
c) tenir compte du fait que la société, commeentité économique, est
((implantée )sur le territoire d'un Etat déterminé.
Dans la pratique des Etats, y compris les traités conclus entre deux
ou plusieurs Etats et dans la jurisprudence internationale, on suit tantôt
l'unetantôt l'autre deces voies, ou bien on combine - on met en balance
respectivement - des points de rattachement relevant de deux ou trois
de ces solutions.
18. Ceci s'explique par le fait que les trois solutions correspondent
grosso modo aux trois types différents de sociétés etd'actionnaires. En
effet, s'ils'agit par exemple d'une sociétédont toutes les actions se trou-
vent dans les mains de deux ou trois personnes physiques, qui de cette
façon ont combiné leurs capitaux dans une entreprise qu'elles dirigent
elles-mêmes, ilparaît tout à fait naturel de s'inspirer des considérations
bien connues, que Max Huber a expriméesdans son rapport du 1" mai
1925dans l'affaire desBiens britanniquesau Maroc espagnol:
«la protection des individus couvre tous leurs droits légitimes.
Le fait que ces intérêtsse trouvent en connexité plus ou moins
étroite avec ceux d'une entité juridique morale, ne saurait ipso
facto les priver de la protection qui leur reviendrait autrement en
tant qu'appartenant à une personlie protégée » (Nations Unies,
Recueil des sentences arbitrales,vol. II, p. 661).
((Le droit international qui, dans ce domaine, s'inspire essentielle-
ment des principes de l'équité,n'a établiaucun critère formel pour
accorder ou refuser la protection diplomatique à des intérêts na-
tionaux liés à des intérêtsappartenant à des personnes de nationa-
lités différentes)(ibid., p. 729).
Ces considérations s'appliquent aussi dans le cas où la personnalité
morale de la sociétéa étéconféréepar le droit i~terne de 1'Etat dont
la responsabilité est invoquée etceci mêmequand la sociétéest implantée
sur le territoireudit Etat.
D'autre part le point de rattachement sous b) ci-dessus (le fait que la
personnalitéjuridique a étéconférée à la sociétépar les autorités d'un
Etat déterminé)correspond plutôt au type de sociétédont l'entreprise
est indépendante et dont les actions sont disperséesdans les mains de
personnes qui ne s'occupent point de la gestion de l'entreprise mais se
bornent à encaisser les dividendes éventuels ou à réaliserdes profits par
l'achat et la vente de ces actions en bourse.
En réalitécepoint de rattachement est dans un certain senscomparableother connecting factors. In this connection, from an abstract point of
view, three courses are open:
(a) to take account of the nationality of the natural persons to whom
the company "belongs" ;
(b) to take account of the fact that juristic personality was "conferred"
on the company by the authorities of a particular State;
(c) to take account of the fact that the company, as an economic entity,
is "implanted" in the territory of a particular State.
In the practice of States, including treaties concluded between two or
more States, and in international jurisprudence, sometimes one and some-
times another of these courses is adopted, or the connecting factors
deriving from two or al1 three of these approaches are combined or
balanced against one another.
18. This is explained by the fact that the three solutions correspond
more or less to the three different types of companies and shareholders.
If, forexample, it is a matter of a company al1of whose shares are held by
two or three natural persons, who have thus combined their capital in an
undertaking which they manage themselves, it seems quite natural to
refer to the well-known views expressed by Max Huber in his Report of
1 May 1925in the case concerning British Property inSpanish Morocco:
". ..the protection of individuals covers al1their legitimateinterests.
The fact that those interests happen to be more or less closely con-
nected with those of a corporate legal entity cannot ipsofacto deprive
them of the protection which they would otherwise be given by
virtue of belonging to a protected person" (U.N.R.I.A.A., Vol. II,
p. 661).
"International law which, in this field, draws its inspiration essen-
tially from the principles of equity, has not laid down any forma1
criterion for the granting or refusingdiplomaticprotection to national
interests linked to interests belonging to persons of differentnation-
alities" (ibid., p. 729).
These considerations apply also in cases in which corporate personality
has been conferred on a company by the municipal lawof the State whose
responsibility is asserted, even though the company has been implanted
in the territory of that State.
Moreover, the connecting factor under (b) above (the fact that the
company was granted juristic personality by the authorities of a partic-
ular State) corresponds rather to the type of company whose undertaking
is independent, and whose shares are scattered among persons who have
nothing to do with the management of the undertaking, but simply
receive such dividends as are declared, or make profits by the purchase
and sale of those shares on the market.
In reality this connecting factor is, in a certain sense,comparable to the au lien qui unit un Etat et un navire auquel cet Etal a conféréle droit de
battre le pavillon national. II perd beaucoup de son sens à partir du
moment où la constitution d'une société suivant le droit interne d'un
Etat s'effectue sans aucune intervention active desautoritéspubliques de
cet Etat et ne requiert l'établissementd'aucun lien reélentre la société
et le territoire ou les ressortissantst Etat.
Aussi est-il compréhensible quedans la pratique des Etats et dans la
jurisprudence internationale ce point de rattachement ne joue pas un
rôle prépondérant à moins qu'il n'y ait d'autres liens entre la sociétéet
1'Etatoù elle a étéconstituée, commepar exemple le fait que la direction
de la société opèreeffectivement sur le territoire de cet Etat. (Dans cer-
tains traités mêmela nationalité des personnes physiques qui dirigent
la sociétéest un facteur pour déterminerle lien entre un Etat et une so-
ciété.D'après les indications données par Foighel: Nationalization and
~om~ensation, 1963,p. 235, ceci est notamment le cas dans un traité
accompagné d'un aide-mémoiredu 27 septembre 1948entre la Suisse et
la Yougoslavie.)
Finalement, le point de rattachement mentionné sous c) ci-dessus
(le fait que la société,comme entité économique, est implantée sur
le territoire d'un Etat déterminé)répond à la reconnaissance de I'im-
portance croissante de l'économie,donc de ses entreprises, pour l'exis-
tence mêmede 1'Etat.De ce point de vue 1'Etatdans le territoire duquel
une sociétéest implantée est nécessairementintéresséau rayonnement
de l'entreprise de cette sociétà l'étranger quece soit par des activités
isoléesou par l'établissement de filiaou par la participationà d'autres
sociétés qu'elledomine et dont l'entreprise estintégréedans la sienne.
Bref, ce point de rattachement trouve son application surtout dans le
cas où il s'agit du troisième type d'actionnaire et de société mentionné
ci-dessus.
19. Dans le cadre de l'application des règles du droit international
coutumier relatives à la responsabilité en matière de traitement des
étrangers. l'importance relative des trois points de rattachement doit
être appréciée nos neulement compte tenu du type de sociétéet d'action-
naires en cause dans le cas d'espèce, mais aussi enfonction de la nature
de l'atteinte que le comportement incriminé de1'Etatdont la responsabi-
litéest invoquée aurait portée à l'activitédu commerce international.
Il est évident qu'àcet égard l'atteinteà un bien isoléde la sociéténe
saurait êtremise sur lemêmeplan qu'une atteinte à la personnalitémême
de la sociétéou une atteinte à l'ensemble de l'activité de cette société
dans 1'Etatdont la responsabilitéest invoquée.
L'arrêtprésentsemble nier la pertinence, pour la question de la qua-
lité d'agird'un Etat demandeur, des distinctions faites ci-dessus relatives
à la nature de l'atteinte, le type de sociétéet d'actionnaires en cause
et le caractère et l'importance relative des formes de rattachement possi-
ble entre un Etat et une société. Seules,la distinction du droit privélink between a State and a ship to which that State has granted the right
to fly its national flag. It loses much of its meaning when the incorpora-
tion of a company under the municipal law of a State is effected without
any activeintervention by the public authorities of that State and does not
require the establishment of any real bond between the company and the
territory or nationals of that State.
Thus it is understandable that in State practice and in international
jurisprudence this connecting factor does not play a preponderant part
unless there are other links between the company and the State in which
it has been incorporated, as, for example, the fact that the administrative
control of the company is actually exercised in the territory of that State.
(In certain treaties eventhe nationality ofthe natural persons who manage
a company is a factor in determining the link between a State and that
company. According to information given by Foighel in Nationalization
and Compensation, 1963, p. 235, this is the case in a treaty, with an
attached aide-mémoire,of 27 September 1948 between Switzerland and
Yugoslavia.)
Finally, the connecting factor mentioned in (c) above (the fact that
the company, as an economic entity, has been implanted in the territory
of a particular State) reflects the recognition of the growing importance
of the economy-and therefore of its undertakings-for the very existence
of the State. From this point of view the State in whose territory a com-
pany has been implanted is necessarily interested in the expansion of that
company's business abroad, whether through isolated activities, or
through the establishment of subsidiary companies, or through holdings
in other companies which it controls and whose business activityforms am
integral partof its own.
In sum, this connecting factor has its application most particularly
in cases involving the third type of shareholder and company mentioned
above.
19. In the context of the application of the rules of customary interna-
tional lawrelating to responsibility as regards the treatment of aliens, the
relative importance of the three connecting factors should be judged
not only by taking into account the type of company and shareholders in
question in the given case, but also in relation to the nature of the injury
which the conduct complained of on the part of the State whose respon-
sibility is alleged is said to have done to the international commercial
activity. It is clear that in this respectjury to an isolated piece of pro-
perty belonging to a company cannot be put on the same plane as an
injury to the very personality of the company or an injury to the whole of
the activity of that company in the State whose responsibility is alleged.
The present Judgment seems to deny the relevance, so far as the jus
standi of an applicant State is concerned, of the distinctions drawn above
concerning the nature of the injury, the type of company and share-
holders in question, and the nature and relative importance of the pos-
sible forms of connection between a State and a company. Only the dis-interne entre les droits de la sociétéet les droits propres de l'actionnaire,
ainsi que la personnalité morale distincte de la sociétésuivant le droit
interne de 1'Etatoù elle est constituée,sont reconnues comme pertinen-
tes dans l'arrêt.Certes, I'arrêt, sans toutefoisse prononcer sur les condi-
tions dans lesquelles un Etat déterminéautre que celui suivant le droit
interne duquel la sociétéétait constituée, peut avoir la qualité d'agir,
examine diverses ((circonstances spéciales » et ((motifs 11possibles qui
pourraient conduire à la non-application de la règle simple et stricte
qu'il énonce.Mais, en réalité,ces circonstances spécialeset ces motifs
sont conçus par I'arrêttoujours en fonction de la personnalité distincte
de la sociétésur le plan du droit interne. C'est ainsi que I'arrêt examine
ale cas où la sociétéaurait cesséd'exister (par. 64 à 68) uniquement
sous l'angle de l'existence juridique sur le plan du droit interne, sans
tenir aucun compte de la finalitéde la sociétéqui est l'entreprise.
L'autre éventualité, traitéedans I'arrêt(par. 69 à 84) est celle ((où
1'Etat national de la sociétén'aurait pas qualité pour agir en faveur de
celle-ci».
Ici encore l'arrêt arriveau résultat queseule la créationde la person-
nalité morale par le droit interne d'un Etat déterminéest pertinente,
sans toutefois expliquer comment une telle formalitéen elle seule peut
faire naître, sur le plan du droit international, un intérêt juridiquement
protégé decet Etat aux affaires de la société.
Certes, l'arrêt mentionne (par. 71) certains autres éléments, mais
d'un? part, ces élémentssont en partie des formalités résultantnéces-
sairement de celle de la constitution de la sociétésuivant les règlesdu
droit privé interne, d'autre part ils n'ont pas beaucoup de poids, en
comparaison, avec les rapports de la société avecd'autres Etats. Il
résulte d'ailleursdu paragraphe 70 de I'arrêtque la Cour ne les considère
point comme juridiquement pertinents.
20. Le raisonnement suivi dans l'arrêt conduit logiquement à la
thèsequ'un Etat dont les ressortissants font des investissements à l'étran-
ger sous la forme juridique de la constitution d'une sociétésuivant les
règles du droit interne d'un Etat étranger, ou de la participation au
capital d'une telle société,perd son intérêtau traitement accordé à
ces investissements.
Cette thèse, baséesur la distinction entre les ((droits 1)de la société
et les ((simplesintérêts » des actionnaires est nécessairementapplicable
aussi dans le cas où il s'agit du traitement accordé par 1'Etat suivant le
droit interne duquel la sociétéa été constituée.
En effet, les motifs formulés auxparagraphes 85 à 90 de l'arrêtn'ad-
mettent aucune exception.
21. Toutefois, les paragraphes suivants de l'arrêt semblent envisager
la possibilitéde faire appel à des «considérations d'équité )Ipour per-tinction in private municipal law between the rights of a company and
the direct rights of the shareholder, as well as the separate corporate
personality ofthe company under the municipal law ofthe State in which
it was incorporated, are recognized as relevant in the Judgment. It is true
that the Judgment does-though without laying down the conditions
under which a given State, other than the one according to whose muni-
cipal law the company was incorporated, may havejus standi-examine
various "special circumstances" and possible "grounds" which might
lead to the non-application of the simple and strict rule which it lays
down. But in point of fact those special circumstances and reasons are
always expressed by the Judgment in relation to the separate personality
of the company under municipal law. Thus the Judgment considers "the
case of the company having ceased to exist" (paragraphs 64-68) solely
from the point of view of legal existence under municipal law, without
taking any account of the object of the company, which is the under-
taking.
The other possibility dealt with in the Judgment (paragraphs 69-84)is
"that of thelack of capacity of the company'snational State to act on its
behalf".
Here again the Judgment reaches the conclusion that the creation of a
corporate entity bythe municipal lawofaparticular Stateisalonerelevant,
without however explaining how such a formality can of itself give rise,
on the plane of international law, to a legally protected interest of that
State in the business of the company.
The Judgment does of course mention (paragraph 71) certain other
factors, but in the first placethose factors are partly formalities whch
necessarilyfollow from the incorporation of the company in accordance
with the rules of the relevant private municipal law, and in the second
place they do not carry much weight in comparison with the relationship
of the company with other States. Furthermore, it appears from para-
graph 70 of the Judgment that the Court does not in any way consider
them to be legally relevant.
20. The reasoning followed in the Judgment logically leads to the
theory that a State whose nationals make investments abroad in the
legal form of the incorporation of a company according to the rules of
the municipal law of a foreign State, or in the form of holdings in the
capital of such a company, Ioses its interest in the treatment given to
those investments.
TEistheory, based on the distinction betweenthe "rights" of the com-
pany and the "mere interests" of the shareholders, is necessarilyapplic-
able also in cases where it is a question of the treatment given by the
State under whose municipal law the company was incorporated.
The reasoning set forth in paragraphs 85-90of the Judgment does not
admit of any exception.
21. The following paragraphs of the Judgment do however seem to
envisage the possibility of appeal being made to "considerations of mettre «une application raisonnable » du droit international. Ces consi-
dérationssemblent êtreque dans le cas d'un investissementétranger,il
devrait existerngouvernement étrangerqui puisse exercerla protection
diplomatique. Une telle considération semble pourtant contraire à la
nature mêmedes règles du droit international coutumier, suivant les-
quelles, en exerçant la protection diplomatique,1'Etatdéfend sonpropre
droit. Il ne s'agit donc nullement de trouver un gouvernement quelcon-
que qui puisse agir comme claim'sagent de l'actionnaire.
Un tel système n'assurerait d'ailleurs aucune amélioration de la
position de l'actionnaire, étant donné laliberté complète detout gouver-
nement de donner suite ou non à la demande de protection de la part
l'actionnaire ainsique de le faire profiter ou non d'une réparationéven-
tuelle qu'il recevrait.
Si donc la pratique et la jurisprudence internationales admettent
l'action de 1'Etat dont les ressortissants ont investi leurs capitaux dans
une sociétéconstituée suivant le droit interne d'un autre Etat en cas de
comportement illicite de ce dernier Etat, c'est parce qu'elles reconnais-
sent un intérêjturidiquement protégédu premier Etat à l'activitéde
cette société,intérêt quin'est nullement anéanti par la constitution de
la sociétéou la participation dans celle-ci,ni dévolu1'Etatoù la société
s'est constituée.
22. Il résultede ce qui précèdeque le comportement d'un Etat qui,
sur le plan du droit interne, affecte un bien, la personnalitéou l'entre-
prise d'une société,peut, sur le plan du droit international, porter
atteinteà un intérêjturidiquement protégé d'un Etat autre que celui selon
le droit interne duquel la sociétéétait constituée. Cela implique aussi
que, dans certaines circonstances,le mêmecomportement d'un Etat
peut porter atteinte aux intérêtsjuridiquement protégésde deux ou
plusieurs Etats.
Une telle situation juridique n'est nullement exclue par les règlesdu
droit international.Il suffit ici de se référeà l'avis consultatif du 11
avril 1949 (Réparationdes dommages subisau service des Nations Unies,
C.Z.J.Recueil 1949,p. 174).
Le présent arrêt(par. 96 et 97) semble pourtant vouloir exclure la
possibilité de réclamations diplomatiques concurrentes, à cause des
complications auxquelles elle donne lieu.
A cet égardil convient de remarquer tout d'abord qu'il ne faut pas
exagérerle nombre des cas où une société est vraimentinternationale en
ce sens que des points de rattachement d'importanceégaleexistent avec
plusieurs Etats.
Dans un très grand nombre de cas les trois poiilts de rattachement
mentionnés ci-dessusrattachent la société à un seul Etat. C'est préci-
sément pourquoi la pratique internationale a généralement accepté
la protection diplomatique de la part de 1'Etat suivant le droit interne
duquel la sociétéa étéconstituée.
D'autre part les réclamations concurrentes, bien qu'émanant deequity" so as to permit international law to "be applied reasonably".
These considerations seem to be that in the case of a foreign investment
some foreign government ought to exist which can exercise diplomatic
protection. Such a consideration seems, however, contrary to the very
nature of the rules of customary international law, according to which in
exercisingdiplomatic protection a State is asserting its ownrights. There
isthus no question of finding some government or other which can act as
the shareholder's "claims agent".
Such a system would, moreover, not ensure any improvement in the
shareholder's position, having regard to the complete freedom of every
government to accede or to refuse the shareholder's request for protec-
tion, as well as to pass on or not to pass on to him any compensation it
may receive.
If then international practice and jurisprudence admit action by the
State whose nationals have invested their capital in a company formed
under the municipal law of another State in the event of unlawful conduct
by that latter State, its because they recognize the existenceof a legally
protected interest of the first State in that company's activities, an in-
terest which is by no means destroyed by the formation of the company
or participationtherein, and which also does not devolve upon the State
where the company was formed.
22. It followsfrom the foregoing that conduct by a State which, on the
plane of municipal law, affects a company's property, personality or
undertaking can, on the plane of international law, infringe a legally
protected interest of a State other than that under the municipal law of
which the company was incorporated. This also means that, in certain
circumstances,the same conduct by a State may affect the legally pro-
tected interests of two or more States.
Such a legal situation is by no means excluded by the rules of inter-
national law. It suffices in this connection to refer to the Advisory
Opinion of 11April 1949(Reparationfor Injuries Sufferedin the Service
of the UnitedNations, I.C.J. Reports 1949,p. 174).
The present Judgment (paragraphs 96 and 97)seems, however, to seek
to exclude the possibility of concurrent diplomatic claims on account of
the complications to which this gives rise.
In this connection it should be noticed, first that one must not ex-
aggerate the number of cases in which a company is truly international,
in the sensethat connecting factors of equal importanceexist with several
States.
In a verygreat number of casesthe three connecting factors mentioned
above connect the company with one State only. That is precisely why
international practice has generally accepted diplomatic protection on
the part of the State under whose municipal law the company was in-
corporated.
Furthermore, concurrent claims,eventhough emanating from different351 BARCELONA TRACTION (OP.DISS.RIPHAGEN)
différentsEtats, ont toujours le mêmeobjet, c'est-à-dire prévenir,faire
cesser ou faire corriger par une restitutio in integrum les actes illicites
d'un autre Etat.
Ce n'est qu'au stade de la réparation pécuniaire qui tient lieu d'une
restitutio in integrum qu'il est nécessairede déterminer le montant à
payer à chaque Etat. Dans son avis précitéla Cour a observé à cet
égard :
«Les tribunaux internationaux connaissent bien le problème que
pose une réclamation à laquelle sont intéressés deuxou plusieurs
Etats nationaux, et ils savent comment protéger, en pareil cas,
1'Etatdéfendeur »(C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 186).
Il ne semble donc pas que la possibilité de réclamationsconcurren-
tes - qui s'estd'ailleurs réaliséeu stade diplomatique dela présente af-
faire- créece «climat deconfusion etd'insécurité )dont ilest fait mention
au paragraphe 96 de l'arrêt.S'ily a des complications, elles ne sont pas
insurmontables; elles sont d'ailleurs le fruit de l'interdépendance tou-
jours croissante des Etats dans le monde moderne, fait devant lequel
une juridiction internationale ne saurait fermer les yeux.
La mêmeobservation vaut pour les complications qui résulteraient
d'un règlement intervenuentre 1'Etatresponsable et un des autres Etats
intéressés(par. 97 de l'arrêt).Un tel règlement, comme tout traité,
ne saurait lier que les Etats qui l'ont conclu. Dans la pratique interna-
tionale les gouvernements savent très bien s'accommoder de cette règle
juridique! En tout étatde cause si 1'Etat selon le droit interne duquel
une sociétéa été constituée concluait un règlement avec 1'Etat respon-
sable d'un acte illicite envers cette société prévoyanutne compensation
de l'indemnité avec des réclamations quelconques du dernierEtat
vis-à-vis du premier, il serait manifestement injuste de considérer un
tel règlement de l'affaire comme excluantune réclamationau sujet du
mêmeacte illicite de la part d'un troisièmeEtat juridiquement intéressé à
l'activitéde la sociétéau titre d'autres points de rattachement.
La règle de res inter alios acta et celle selon laquelle 1'Etaten prenant
fait et cause pour ses ressortissants défendses propres droits, sont toutes
lesdeuxla conséquencedela structure même dudroit international public
coutumier.
*
23. La Barcelona Traction appartient clairement au troisième typede
société décrit ci-dessus, c'est-à-dirlee type de sociétédont l'entreprise
est intégréedans une autre entreprise, celle de la IsociétéSidro, dont
le principal actionnaire est une autre sociétél,a Sofina.
Les liens entre la Sidro et la Sofina n'ont pas étécomplètement cla-
rifiés (ilparaît que la Sidro étaitaussi actionnaire de la Sofina).
Toutefois, pendant toute la périodepertinente, les points de rattache-States, always have the same object, that is to say, to prevent, bring to
and end, or have corrected by restitutio in integrumthe unlawful acts of
another State.
It is only at the stage of monetary compensation in lieu of restitutio in
integrum that it is necessary to determine the amount to be paid to each
State. In its Advisory Opinion referred to above, the Court observed in
this connection :
"International tribunals are already familiar with the problem of a
claim in which two or more national States are interested, and they
know hoy to protect the defendant State in such a case." (I.C.J.
Reports 1949, p. 186.)
Consequently it does not seem that the possibility of concurrent
claims-which, moreover, occurred at the diplomatic stage of the present
case-creates that "atmosphere of confusion and insecurity" to which
reference is made in paragraph 96 of the Judgment. If there are com-
plications they are not insurmountable; they are moreover the con-
sequence of the ever-increasing interdependence of States in the modern
world, a fact to which no international tribunal can close its eyes.
The same observation holds good for the complications that would
result from a settlement reached between the State responsible and one
of the other interested States (paragraph 97 of the Judgment). Such a
settlement, like any other treaty, could bind only those States which con-
cluded it. In international practice governments are well aware of how
to accommodate themselves to this legal rule! In any event, if the State
under whose municipal law a company was incorporated concluded a
settlement with the State responsible for an unlawful act towards that
company, providing for a set-off against the indemnity of any claims
which the latter State might have against the former, it would manifestly
be unjust to regard such a settlement of the affair as excluding a claim on
account of the same unlawful act on the part of a third State which had a
legal interest in the company's activities by virtue of other connecting
factors.
The rule of res inter alios actaand the rule that a State by taking up
the case of one of its nationals is asserting its own rights, both follow
from the very structure of customary public international law.
23. Barcelona Traction clearly belongs to the third type of company
described above, i.e., the type of company whose undertaking is inte-
grated into another undertaking, that of the Sidro company, the chief
shareholder in which is a further company, Sofina.
The links between Sidro and Sofina have not been made completely
clear (it appears that Sidro was also a shareholder in Sofina).
Nevertheless, throughout the relevant period, the connecting factors ment entre les deux sociétéset la Belgique ont ététels qu'on peut difficile-
ment nier qu'il existeun lien suffisant entre l'entreprise de ces sociétéset
1'Etat belge. Certes, les Parties au différend sont en désaccord sur les
pourcentages exacts des actions de la Sofina qui se trouvaient dans les
mains de personnes physiques ou morales de nationalités différentes.
Mais il ne semble pas être contesté quela Sofina avait toujours un certain
nombre d'actionnaires belges ni que les autres actions de cette société
étaientdisperséesparmi des personnes de nationalités différentes.(Un des
conseils de l'Espagne a parlé i(des participations américaine, anglaise,
française, hollandaise, espagnole, suisse et autres(audience du 22juillet
1969).)11n'existe pas d'indications suffisantes pour supposer que la Sidro
et la Sofina étaientdes sociétésdont l'entreprise avait des liens avec un
autre Etat quela Belgique,ni d'ailleurs pour supposer que cessociétés ap-
partenaient au premier type, celui des sociétés gérées effectivemepnatr les
actionnaires, personnes physiques d'une nationalité autre que belge.
Dans ces conditions, les points de rattachement que sont la constitution
de ces sociétéssuivant le droit belge d'une part et l'implantation de ces
sociétéssur le territoire belge d'autre part, sont suffisants pour créerle
lien entre ces sociétéset la Belgique qui est nécessairepour justifier un
intérêt juridiquement protégé de 1'Etat belge dans l'entreprise de la
Barcelona Traction.
24. Toutefois. on a fait valoir aue ce lien dont un élément essentiel
est la participation dominante de ia Sidro dans la Barcelona Traction,
assurée quelques annéesaprès la première guerre mondiale, étaitrompu
du fait que les actions Barcelona Traction appartenant à la Sidroont fait
l'objet de certains contrats passésàl'approche et au débutde la deuxième
guerre mondiale.
Au cours de cettepériode fut constituéepar la SidroauxEtats-Unis une
sociétéSecuritasLtd., ainsi qu'unpartnership, Charles Gordon & Co. Des
contrats furent conclus entre la Sidro et la Securitas et entre la Securitas
et Charles Gordon & Co. Il n'est pas contesté que la Securitas Ltd.,
ainsi que la firme Charles Gordon & Co. n'étaienten réalitéque des
alter ego de la Sidro-Sofina, ni que le but de toute l'opérationétaitjuste-
ment d'assurer que la participation effectivede la Sidro au capital et à la
gestion de la Barcelona Traction puisse continuer en dépit de l'occupation
du territoire belgepar lesforces arméesallemandes, sansêtregênép ear les
mesures que les Etats alliés devaientprendre dans le cadre de leur législa-
tion de guerre àl'égarddes biens appartenant aux sociétés résidantdans le
territoire occupépar l'ennemi. 11n'est non plus contesté que l'objectif
étaiten fait réalisé. e genred'opérationestbien connu despays européens
occupéspar les forces allemandes pendant la deuxièmeguerre mondiale
ainsi que des pays alliéscomme les Etats-Unis et le Canada où les diri-
geants des sociétésde ces pays européensont trouvéun refuge leur per-
mettant de continuer à gérerles affaires de ces sociétés.Les autorités des
pays alliés d'accueilont d'ailleurs généralementapporté la collaboration
nécessairepour que l'opération atteigne son but. Dans ces conditions, between both these companies and Belgium were such that it can hardly
be denied that a sufficientbond exists between the undertaking of these
companies and the Belgian State. It is true that the Parties to the dispute
disagree as to the precise percentages of Sofina shares that were held by
natural orjuristic persons ofarious nationalities. But it does not appear
to be contested that Sofina alwayshad a number of Belgian shareholders
and that the company's other shares were scattered among persons of
various nationalities. (One of the counsel for Spain spoke o". ..Amer-
ican, British, French, Dutch, Spanish, Swissand other holdings" (hearing
of 22 July 1969).)There is not sufficientevidence for it to be supposed
that Sidro and Sofinawere companies whose undertaking was integrated
into another undertaking having links with a State other than Belgium,
nor, moreover, for it to be supposed that those companies belonged to
the first type, that ofompanie; effectively run by their shareholders,
natural persons of a nationality other than Belgian. In these circum-
stances, the connecting factors of the incorporation of these companies
under Belgian law, and their implantation within Belgian territory, are
sufficient to create the bond between these companies and Belgium
which is necessaryto justify a legallyprotected interest on the part of the
Belgian Statein Barcelona Traction's undertaking.
24. It has nevertheless been centended that this bond, an essential
element in which is Sidro's controlling holding in Barcelona Traction,
acquired a few years after the First World War, was broken by the fact
that the Barcelona Traction shares belonging to Sidro werethe subject of
certain contracts entered into on the approach and at theoutbreak of the
Second World War.
During that period, Sidro formed in the United States a Company
called Securitas Ltd., as wellas the partnership of Charles Gordon& Co.
Contracts were entered into between Sidro and Securitas and between
Securitas and Charles Gordon & Co. It is not disputed that Securitas
Limited. as well as the firm of Charles Gordon & Co.. were in realitv
mere alier egos of Sidro-Sofina, nor that the whole purpose of the operai-
ation was preciselyto ensure that Sidro'seffectiveshare in the capital and
management of Barcelona Traction might continuedespite the occupation
of Belgian territory by the German armed forces, and without being
hampered by such measures as the allied States might take in the context
of their wartime legislation with respect to property belonging to
companies resident in enemy-occupied territory. Nor is it disputed that
this objective was in fact attained. This type of operations well known
in those European countries which were occupied by German forces
during the Second World War, as well as in Allied countries, such as the
United Statesand Canada, wherethe principal officersofcompanies in the
European countries in question found a refuge which enabled them to
continue to run those companies' affairs. The authorities of the Allied
host-countries, moreover, generally afforded the CO-operationnecessaryles événements résumés ci-dessus n peeuvent pas êtreconsidérés,sur le
plandudroit international, comme ayant rompu lelien entre 1'Etatbelgeet
l'entreprise de la Barcelona Traction. Cette conclusion est, encore une
fois, indépendante des rapports de droit privéinterne.
Cette conclusion s'applique donc aussi bien à la période pendant
laquelle la Securitas agissait comme custodiandes actions appartenant à
la Sidro qu'à la périodependant laquelle elle étaittrustee. En ces deux
qualités,la Securitas n'étaitautre - pour employer les termes d'un des
conseils espagnols - que ((Sidro version américaine ))La Securitas a été
constituéeet le rapport de trust entre la Sidro et la Securitas a étécréé
pour permettre d'échapper aux conséquences de l'occupation du ter-
ritoire belge. Le rapport de trusta pris finaprèsla guerre comme d'ailleurs
a disparu la Securitas. La date précisede la fin de cette périodene paraît
pas essentielle dans le contexte actuel, le rapport derust n'ayant jamais
été destiné à transférerà autrui la position qu'occupait la Sidro dans la
Barcelona Traction et n'ayant jamais eu pareil effet.
25. Pour ce qui concerne l'inscription des actions de la Barcelona
Traction appartenant à la Sidro sous le nom de Charles Gordon & Co.
(plus tard, Newman & Co.), il suffitde remarquer que ces deux firmes ne
furent jamais plus que des nomineespour la Sidro et la Securitas. Même
sur le plan du droit privéinterne applicable il est reconnu que ces nomi-
nees ne sont que des agents des vrais actionnaires. Sur le plan internatio-
nal, le fait qu'un nomineeest inscrit comme actionnaire dans le registre
officielde la sociétén'a aucune pertinence pour la question de savoir ce
qui est affectépar des mesures prises par un Etat contre la société.
26. Il a étéconstaté ci-dessus que, dans le cadre de l'application des
règlesdu droit international coutumier relatives à la responsabilité inter-
nationale pour le traitement des étrangers, il n'existe pas de cloisons
étanches entre les problèmes juridiques que soulève cette application.
En déterminant si, dans un cas concret, le comportement d'un Etat A
porte atteinte àun intérêtjuridiquementprotégéd'un Etat B, on ne peut
pas séparer complètementlesconsidérationsrelatives aux quatre éléments
de la question,à savoir: 1)lecaractèredu comportement de 1'EtatA, 2) la
nature de l'atteinte, 3) la nature de l'intérttteint et 4) le lien entre cet
intérêett1'EtatB.
27. Dans ce contexte, il est important de noter que dans l'affaire
actuelle il s'agit non seulement d'une atteinteàun bien appartenant à la
société,et d'une limitation apportée à la libre gestion des affaires de la
sociétépar ses dirigeants, mais d'une atteinte à l'entreprise en tant que
telle, qui est entotalitépasséedans lesmains d'un groupe espagnol. On ne
saurait faire abstraction de ce faitn déterminant la qualitépour agir de
la Belgique,dont l'intérêetstjustement fondésur lefait que l'entreprise de
la Barcelona Traction est intégréedans cellede sociétésayant despoints de
rattachement importants avec cet Etat.
28. D'autre part, le caractère du comportement de 1'Etat espagnolfor the achievement of the operation's purpose. In these circumstances,
the events summarized above cannot be regarded, on theplane of inter-
national law,as having broken the bond between the Belgian State and the
Barcelona Traction undertaking. Once again, this conclusion is in-
dependent of the relationships of municipal private law.
It consequently applies both to the period during which Securitas
acted as custodian of the shares belonging to Sidro, and to the period
during which it was trustee. In both capacities Securitas was, in the
words of Spanish counsel, nothing but an "American version of Sidro".
Securitas was formed, and the trust relationship between Sidro and
Securitas was created, in order to escape the consequences of the occu-
pation of Belgian territory. The trust relationship came to an end after
the war, just as, for thatmatter, Securitas disappeared. The precise date
of the end of this perioddoes not seem to be ofcrucial importance in the
present context, since the trust relationship was never intended to have
and never had the effect of transferring to someone else the position
which Sidro occupied in Barcelona Traction.
25. So far as concerns the registration of the Barcelona Traction
shares belonging to Sidro in the nam? of Charles Gordon & Co. (sub-
sequently Newman & Co.), it is sufficient to note that these two firms
were never more than nominees of Sidro and Securitas. Even on the level
of the applicable municipal private law, it is recognized that such nom-
inees are no more than agents for the true shareholders. On the inter-
national level, the fact that a nominee is registered as a shareholder in
the company's officialregister is of no relevance to the question of who is
affected by measures taken by a State against the Company.
26. It has been observed above that in the context of the application
of the rules of customary international law concerning international
responsibility for the treatment of aliensthere are no water-tight divisions
between the legal problems raised by such application. In ascertaining
whether in a specific case the conduct of State A injures a legally pro-
tected interest of state B, one cannot wholly separate the considerations
relating to the four elements of the question, namely:(1)the character of
State A's conduct; (2) the nature of the injury; (3)the nature of the
interest injured; and (4) the link between that interest and State B.
27. In this connection it is important to notice that in the present case
itis not only a question of an injury to property belonging to the com-
pany, nor again of a limitation placed upon the free conduct of the
company's affairs by its principal officers,but of aninjury to the under-
taking as such, whichhas passed in itsentirety into the hands of a Spanish
group. One cannot ignore this fact in determining the jus standi of
Belgium, whose interest is founded on the very fact that the Barcelona
Traction undertaking is integrated into that of companies having im-
portant connecting factors with that State.
28. Furthermore, the character of the conduct of the Spanish State ofdont seplaint la Belgique n'estpas non plus sans rapport avec la question
dela qualité pour agir de la Belgique. Un élément essentiedle la demande
belge tient à ce que la Belgique soutient que, dans les circonstances de
I'affaire,l'atteinàel'entreprise étaitlerésultat demesures espagnoles qui
dépassaient nécessairementles limites que le droit international impose à
la juridiction de tout Etat. Le caractère d'un tel comportement est de
nature à influencerla détermination des Etats qui sont en droit de deman-
der une réparation pour lepréjudicesubi par eux en conséquencede telles
mesures.
En effet,ce ne sont certainement pas des relations bilatérales seulesqui
sont en cause dans un tel cas, l'obligation d'un Etat de se tenir dans les
bornes de sa juridiction sur le plan international étant sans doute une
obligation erga omnes.
En ce qui concerne cet aspect de l'affaire deuxobservations sont perti-
nentes.
En premier lieu il n'estpas contestable que dans le cas actuel il ne s'agit
point d'une nationalisation des entreprises de production et de distribu-
tion d'électricité en Espagne.
Ce ne sont pas les autorités législativesou exécutives espagnolesqui
ont agi pour placer l'entreprise de service public des sociétfilialesde la
Barcelona Traction dans les mains de 1'Etat; ce sont les autoritésjudi-
ciaires espagnoles qui, par une déclaration defaillite, suivie d'une vente
forcée,ont mislesbiens dela société mèrel,a Barcelona Traction, dans les
mains d'autres personnes privées.
En second lieu, il ne s'agit non plus dans l'affaire actuelle d'un juge-
ment d'un tribunal national tranchant un différendqui oppose deux per-
sonnes privéesou ordonnant une simple mesure d'exécution forcée.Il
résulte clairement desfaits que la requêteen faillite et tout ce qui s'ensui-
vait avait comme but et comme effetla réorganisation del'entreprise de la
Barcelona Traction de telle façon que cette entreprise passait du contrôle
exercépar des actionnaires belges de la Barcelona Traction au contrôle
exercépar un groupe de personnes espagnoles qui avaient acquis à cette
fin un certain nombre d'obligations émisespar cette société.
Ce but étaitatteint et cet effetréalipar une triple opération,destinée,
pour ainsi dire,à déplacerla Barcelona Traction, sesbiens et sesrapports
avec ses obligataires à l'étranger vers l'Espagne.Primo, sur le non-
paiement de dettes de la société Barcelona Traction fut baséela prise de
possession des biens et la (normalisation » des sociétés auxiliairesen
Espagne (voir par. 13et 14 de l'arrêt). Secundo, denouveaux titres des
sociétés auxiliairesfurent créés en Espagne,annulant les titres apparte-
nant à la Barcelona Traction et setrouvant hors d'Espagne, et il fut décidé
que le siègede 1'Ebroet de la Catalonian Land (deux sociétés auxiliaires
de la Barcelona Traction, constituées suivantle droit canadien) serait dé-
sormais à Barcelone et non plus à Toronto (voir par. 17 de l'arrêt).
Tertio, la déclaration de faillite fut prononcéepour non-paiement d'in-
térêts à la requêtede certains porteurs d'obligations de la Barcelonawhich Belgium complains is also not unrelated to the question of Bel-
gium's jus standi. An essential element in the Belgian claim is its conten-
tion that in the circumstances of the case the injury to the undertaking
was the result of Spanish measures which necessarilyexceeded the limits
which international law imposes on the jurisdiction of any State. The
character of such conduct is such as to influencethe determination of the
States entitled to demand reparation for the damage suffered by them in
consequence of such measures.
It is certainly not merely bilateral relations that are insue in such a
case, since a State's obligation to keep within the limits of itsjurisdiction
on the international plane is, without any doubt, an obligation erga
omnes.
So far as this aspect of the case is concerned, two observations are
relevant.
In the first place, it indisputable that in the present case it is not a
matter of a nationalization of the electricity producing and distributing
undertakings in Spain.
It is not the Spanish legislative or executive authorities which have
placed Barcelona Traction's subsidiary companies' public utiiity under-
taking in the hands of the State; it is the Spanish judicial authorities
which, through a bankruptcy adjudication followed by a forced sale, have
placed the property of the parent company, Barcelona Traction, in the
hands of other private persons.
In the second place, it is also not a matter in the present case of a
judgment by a municipal court deciding a dispute between two private
persons, or ordering a simple measure of forced execution. It emerges
clearly from the facts that the bankruptcy petition and everything which
followed it had as theirpurpose and their effectthe reorganization of the
Barcelona Traction undertaking in such a way that that undertaking
passed from the control of Barcelona Traction's Belgian shareholders
into the control of a group of Spanish persons who had for that purpose
acquired a nurnber of bonds issued by that company.
This purpose was attained and this effect achieved by means of a
threefold operation, intended, as it were, to remove Barcelona Traction,
its property and its relations with its bondholders, into Spain. First, on
the non-payment of debts of the BarcelonaTraction Companywas based
the taking of possession of the property and the "normalization" of
the subsidiary companiesin Spain (see paragraphs 13 and 14 of the
Judgment). Secondly, new share certificates in the subsidiary companies
were created in Spain, cancelling the certificates which belonged to
Barcelona Traction and were situated outside Spain, and it was decided
that the head office of Ebro and of Catalonian Land (two subsidiary
companies of Barcelona Traction, incorporated under Canadian law)
should thenceforth be at Barcelona and no longer at Toronto. (See
paragraph 17 of the Judgment.) Thirdly, the bankruptcy decree wasTraction (voir par. 13de l'arrêt).Or, la Barcelona Traction, société mère,
étaitune sociétéconstituée etayant son siègestatutaire au Canada. Tous
sesbiens, consistant essentiellement en actions des sociétés auxiliaires, se
trouvaient au Canada, remis en dépôt àla National Trust de Toronto en
garantie des obligations émises.Les obligations dont il s'agissait dans la
procédurede faillite étaientlibelléesen livres sterling et placées dèsleur
émission sous un régime de trust (comportant une no-action clause)
administréau Canada par la National Trust, sociétéconstituée au Ca-
nada. Le non-paiement des intérêts desdites obligations avait d'ailleurs
donnélieu à des arrangements conclus, avant la demande en faillite et
sous le contrôle des tribunaux canadiens, entre la Barcelona Traction, le
trustee et la masse des obligataires.
On ne peut pas faire abstraction de ces circonstances intéressant les
limites de la juridiction de 1'Etat espagnol quand il s'agit de savoir si
1'Etatbelge possède «la qualitépour agir » dans le cas actuel, et ceci es-
sentiellement pour deux raisons. Les règlesdu droit international public
coutumier relatives àla responsabilité internationale pour le ((traitement
desétrangers )sesont développéesprécisémed nt faitque les ((étrangers))
en cause se trouvent sous la juridiction d'un autre Etat; c'est donc à
fortiori qu'elles assurent -uneprotection juridique contre des mesures dé-
passant leslimites de lajuridiction de cet Etat. D'autre part, il faut recon-
naître que, dans lecas actuel, lesmesuresprises par lesautoritésjudiciaires
espagnoles contre la Barcelona Traction n'ont pu avoir l'effetvoulu que
par suite dufait que les sociétésauxiliairedse la Barcelona Traction pos-
sédaient d'importantes installations situées sur le territoire espagnol;
dans ces conditions, il paraît évident qu'ilFautaussi tenir compte dufait
que la Barcelona Traction elle-mêmen'est en quelque sorte qu'une
((sociétéauxiliaire» de la Sidro-Sofina, sociétésqu'on peut assimiler aux
ressortissants belges.
29. Les limites que le droit international impose à la juridiction d'un
Etat sont aussi pertinentes pour un autre aspect de l'affaire, à savoir la
question dite de ((l'épuisementdes recours internes ».Ici encore il paraît
inadmissible de séparercomplètement les différents élémend tse la ques-
tion de la responsabilité internationale d'un Etat envers un autre Etat.
La Cour l'a reconnu d'ailleurs, semble-t-il, dans son arrêtdu 24 juillet
1964 relatif aux exceptions préliminaires soulevéespar l'Espagne. En
effet, tout ce qui s'est passédans l'ordre juridique interne espagnol, y
compris les recours intentés et ceux qui ne l'ont pas étéa ,ppartient aux
faits pertinents pour l'appréciationaussi bien desobligations de l'Espagne
que des droits de la Belgique.
Le droit d'un Etat, sur le plan international,à ce que son commerce
international soit respecté impliquel'obligation de son ressortissant, par
l'intermédiaireduquel ce commerce international s'effectue, d'accepterla
juridiction de 1'Etatd'accueil enfaisant un usage normal des moyens de made on a petition by certain holders of Barcelona Traction bonds on the
grounds of the non-payment of interest (see paragraph 13 of the Judg-
ment). Now, Barcelona Traction, the parent company, was a company
incorporated and having its head office-under its byelaws-in Canada.
Al1its property, consisting essentially of shares in subsidiary companies,
was in Canada, deposited with National Trust of Toronto as security for
outstanding bonds. The bonds which were in question in the bankruptcy
proceedings were expressed in pounds sterling, and had from the time of
their issue been subject to a trust (containing a "no-action clause")
administered in Canada by National Trust, a company incorporated in
Canada. The non-payment of the interest on the said bonds had, more-
over, led to compromises being effected, before the petition in bank-
ruptcy, and under the supervision of the Canadian courts, between
Barcelona Traction, the trustee, and the general body of bondholders.
These circumstances, which are relevant to the limits on the juris-
diction of the Spanish State, cannot be ignored when it comes to the
question of whether the Belgian State has jus standi in the present case,
and this essentially for two reasons. The rules of customary public
international lawregarding international responsibility for the "treatment
of aliens" have developed precisely in consequence of the fact that the
"aliens" in question find themselves within the jurisdiction of another
State;afortiori then, they give legal protection against measures which
exceedthe limits of thejurisdiction ofsuch a State. In addition, it must be
recognized that in the instant case the measures taken by the Spanish
judicial authorities against Barcelona Traction were only able to achieve
their desired effect as a result of the fact that Barcelona Traction's
subsidiary companiespossessed important installations within Spanish
territory. In these circumstances, it seemsobvious that account must also
be taken of thefact that Barcelona Traction itself is, as it were, only a
"subsidiary company" of Sidro/Sofina, companies which can be assimi-
lated to Belgian nationals.
29. The limits which international law imposes on the jurisdiction of
a State are also relevant to another aspect ofthe case,namelythe question
known as "the exhaustion of local remedies". Here again it appears to be
inadmissible to separate completelythe differentelements of the question
of the international responsibility of a State towards another State. The
Court, moreover, recognized this, it would seem, in its Judgment of
24 July 1964on the preliminary objections raised by Spain. Everything
whichtook place within the Spanish municipal legalsystem,including the
remedies sought and those which were not sought, pertains to the facts
relevant to the weighing-up of Spain's obligationsas wellas of Belgium's
rights.
The right of a State, on the international plane, to respect for its
international commerce implies an obligation on the part of its national
by whose interposition such international commerce is carried on to
accept the jurisdiction of the host State by making proper use of the défensede ses intérêts que l'ordre juridique interne de cet Etat met à sa
disposition. Encore faut-il que cette juridiction existe sur le plan inter-
national! Sur ce point encore se manifeste la différencefondamentale
entre les droits et obligations de l'individu sur le plan du droit interne, et
le droit de1'Etatsur le plan international.
Enfin, les limites que le droit international imposeà la juridiction de
1'Etatsont aussi d'une importance capitale pour le cadre dans lequel doit
êtreappréciéela responsabilité de 1'Etatpour les actes de ses autorités
judiciaires. Quand il s'agit d'actes dépassantceslimites c'estle résultatde
l'acte plutôt que l'intention ou l'erreur du juge dans l'application des
règlesdu droit interne, qui entre en ligne de compte.
30. Dans son arrêt du24 juillet 1964la Cour a tranchéles questions
relatives à sa compétence.De ce point de vue rien ne s'opposait donc à
ce que la Cour examinât le fond de l'affaire, c'est-à-dire les droits et
obligations des Etats parties au différenden vertu des règles du droit
international coutumier.
Certes, la notion juridique des conditions mises à.la recevabilité d'une
demande trouve une place aussi dans les règles de droit relatives à la
procédure devantun tribunal international. Toutefois, une application
extensive de cette notion tend à réduirel'efficacitéde la justice interna-
tionale, ainsi qu'à donner aux normes du droit international une rigidité
incompatible avec leurs fonctions dans la communautédes Etats.
L'arrêtde 1964,joignant au fond les exceptions relatives à la qualité
pour agir et à l'épuisement des recours internes,le faisait par des motifs
qui mettaient l'accent d'unepart sur lesliensjuridiques entre lesquestions
soulevéesetles droits et obligationsmêmesdes Etats dans le domaine du
traitement des étrangers, d'autrepart sur la nécessitéd'élucider certaines
questions defait. Ainsil'arrêt de1964sembles'inspirer desconsidérations
relevéesci-dessus.
En revanche, l'arrêt présen steborne à rejeter la demande du Gouverne-
ment belge sur la seule base (que la qualité pour agir devant la Cour n'a
pas étédémontrée ))(par. 102 de l'arrêt), conclusionqui, à son tour,
semble êtretirée uniquementde considérations juridiques relatives à la
personnalité distincte dela société endroit privéinterne, considérations
qui, toutes, auraient pu êtreavancées en1964.
Dans la présente opinion dissidentej'ai exposé les motifs de droit qui
m'ont conduit à la conclusion que la Cour devrait examiner et sepronon-
cer sur ce qu'elleappelle les autres aspects de l'affaire, etnotamment sur
la question du caractère illicite ou non du comportement des autorités
espagnoles.
Etant donné,d'une part, que la Cour, pour les motifs exprimésdans
l'arrêt,n'a pas voulu examinerces questions de droit, et d'autre part, quemeans for defending his interests which the municipal legal system of
that State places at his disposal. Even then, it is necessary that such
jurisdiction should exist on the international plane! Here again the
fundamental differenceemergesbetween the rights and obligations of the
individual on the plane of municipal law and the rights ofthe State on the
international plane.
Finally, the limits which international law imposes on the jurisdiction
of the State are also of vital importance for the context within which the
responsibility of the Statefor the acts of itsudicial authorities should be
assessed. When it is a question of acts overstepping such limits, it is the
result of the act, ratherthan the intention, or the error of the court in the
application of the rules of its municipal law, which is to be taken into
account.
30. In its Judgment of 24 July 1964,the Court decided the questions
relating to its jurisdiction. From this point of view, there was conse-
quently nothing to prevent the Court's examiningthe merits of the case,
that is to Say, the rights and obligations of the States parties to the
dispute by virtue of the rules of customary international law.
It is true that the legal notion of the conditions for the admissibility of
a claim also finds a place in the rules of law relating to the procedure
before an international tribunal. Nevertheless, an extensive application
of this notion has a tendency to reduce the efficacity of international
adjudication, as well as to confer on the norms of international law a
rigidity which is incompatible with their function in the community of
States.
The 1964Judgment, which joined the preliminary objections relating
to jus standi and the exhaustion of local remedies to the merits, did so
for reasons which laid stress first on the legal ties between the questions
raised and the actual rights and obligationsof States in the matter of the
treatment of foreigners, and secondly on the need to elucidate certain
questions of fact. Accordingly, the 1964Judgment seems to be based on
the considerations set forth above.
The present Judgment, on the other hand, confines itself to rejecting
the Belgian Government's claim on the sole basis that "no jus standi
before the Court has been established" (paragraph 102of the Judgment),
a conclusion which, in its turn, seems to be derived exclusively from
legal considerations regarding the distinct personality of companies in
municipal private law, al1of which considerations might have been put
forward in 1964.
1have in this dissenting opinion set forth the legalreasons which have
led me to the conclusion that the Court ought to examine and pronounce
upon what it calls the other aspects of the case, and in particular on the
question of whether or not the conduct of the Spanish authorities was
unlawful.
Since, on the one hand, the Court, for the reasons stated in the Judg-
ment, has not wished to examine those questions of law, and, on theles questions dfaitcontroverséesentre les Parties au différend n'ontpas
fait l'objet d'un examen de laCour, il ne me paraît pas qu'une opinion
dissidente devrait,elle seule,accomplir la tâche qui incombe, selon cette
opinion même, à la Cour.
(SignéW ). RIPHAGEN.other, the questions offact in dispute between the Parties to the case
have not been subjected to examination by the Court, it does not seem
to methat a dissenting opinion ought by itselfto accomplish a task which,
according to that opinion itself,ncumbent on the Court.
(Signed) W. RIPHAGEN.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Riphagen (translation)