Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup

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050-19700205-JUD-01-06-EN
Parent Document Number
050-19700205-JUD-01-00-EN
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SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE JESSUP

1. 1agree with the majority of the Courtthat the Belgian claim must be
dismissed, but slnce1reach that conclusion by different lines of reasoning,

I feel it is incumbent on me to explain what my reasons are.
2. I regret that the Court has not considered it appropriate to include
in its Judgment a wider range of legal considerations. For my part, 1share
the view ofthe late Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, "that there are com-
pelling considerations of international justice and of development of
international law whichfavour a full measure of exhaustiveness ofjudicial
pronouncements of international tribunals" (Lauterpacht, The Develop-
ment of International Law by the International Court, Revised Edition,
1958,Chapter 3, p. 37). Sir Hersch went on to Say(at p. 39):

"The administration ofjustice within the State can afford to rely on
purely formal and procedural grounds. It can also afford to dis-

regard the susceptibilities of either of the parties by ignoring such of
its arguments as are not indispensable to the decision. This cannot
properly be done in international relations, where the parties are
sovereign States, upon whose will the jurisdiction of the Court
depends in the long run, and where it is of importance that justice
should not only be done but that it should also appear to have been
done."
3. Six months after he wrote the Preface to that important book,
Judge Lauterpacht put his preachment into practice in his separate
opinion in the Certain Norwegian Loans case, wherein he wrote (I.C.J.
Reports 1957,p. 9 at p. 36) :

"In my opinion, a Party to proceedings before the Court is entitled
to expect that its Judgment shall give as accurate a picture as pos-
sible of the basic aspects of the legal position adopted by that Party.
Moreover, I believethat it is in accordance with the true function of
the Court to give an answer to the two principal jurisdictional ques-
tions which have divided the Parties over a long period of years and
which are of considerable interest for international law. There may
be force and attraction in the view that among a number of possible
solutions a court of law ought to select that which is most simple,
most concise and most expeditious. However, in my opinion such
considerations are not, for this Court, the only legitimate factor in
the situation." 4. In Interhandel (I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6), the Court had before it
four preliminary objections advanced by the United States. (One notes in

passing that Interhandel, like BarcelonaTraction, was a case involving a
holding Company and complicated corporate stock interests.) In its
Judgment, the Court found it appropriate to record its view on al1four
preliminary objections. By nine votes to six, the Court upheld the third
preliminary objection to the effect that Switzerland had not exhausted
the local remedies available to it in the United States.Since the case was
disposed of on this ground, it could be argued that the Court should not
have ruled in its Judgment on the other three preliminary objections.
However, the Court held: by ten votes to five, that it rejected the first
preliminary objection; unanimously, that it rejected the second pre-
liminary objection; by ten votes to five, that it was not necessary to
adjudicate on part (a) of the fourth preliminary objection; by fourteen
votes to one, that it rejected part (b) of the fourth preliminary objection.
Judge SirPercy Spender, in hisseparate opinion, and President Klaestad
and Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in their dissenting opinions, felt it

necessary also to deal with part (a) of the fourth preliminary objection
on which the Court declined to rule, because that objection dealt with the
important issue of the self-servingor automatic reservation of the United
States to its declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court.

5. In the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December
1906(I.C.J. Reports 1960,p. 192),Judge Moreno Quintana in his declara-
tion (p. 217) stated that while he was in agreement with the decision, he
believed that a number of "legal questions which are of particular con-
Cern. ..should have been dealt with in the first place". He listed the
questions which he had in mind and on which the judgment failed to pro-
nounce.
6. In the Temple of Preah Vihearcase (I.C.J. Reports 1961,p. 17), the
Court in its Judgment said that the reasons it gave for upholding its
jurisdiction made it unnecessary to consider Cambodia's other basis for
asserting jurisdiction or Thailand's objection to that basis. In the joint

declaration of Judges Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Tanaka (pp. 36, 38),
one reads:

"As regards the second preliminary objection of Thailand-
whilst we are fully in agreement with the view expressed by Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht in the South West Africa-Voting Procedure
case (I.C.J. Reports 1955, at pp. 90-93) to the effect that the Court
ought not to refrain from pronouncing on issues that a party has
argued as central to its case, merely on the ground thatthese are not
essential to the substantive decision of the Court-yet we feel that
this view isscarcely applicable to issues of jurisdiction (nor did Sir
Hersch imply otherwise). In the present case, Thailand's second preliminary objection was of course fully argued by the Parties. But

once the Court, by rejecting the first preliminary objection, has
found that it has jurisdiction to go into the merits of the dispute. ..
the matter is, strictly, concluded, and a finding, whether for or
against Thailand, on her second preliminary objection, could add
nothing material to the conclusion, already arrived at,that the Court
is competent."

7. In Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Pre-
liminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 4, Judge Tanaka in his
separate opinion said (at p. 65):

"The more important function of the Court as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations is to be found not only in the settlement
of concrete disputes, but also in its reasoning, through which it may
contribute to the development of international law."

8. One of the great jurists of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, Judge Anzilotti, also shared the Lauterpacht philosophy of the
nature of the international judicial process, as is shown in his dissenting
opinion in Diversion ofWaterfrom theMeuse(P.C.I.J., SeriesAIB, No. 70,
p. 4at 45):
"The operative clause of the judgment merely rejects the sub-
missions of the principal claim and of the Counter-claim. In my
opinion, in a suit the main object of which was to obtain the inter-
pretation of a treaty with reference to certain concrete facts, and in
which both the Applicant and the Respondent presented submis-
sionsindicating, in regard to each point, the interpretation whichthey
respectively wished to see adopted by the Court, the latter should

not have confined itself to a mere rejection of the submissions of the
Applicant: it should also have expressed its opinion on the submis-
sions of the Respondent; and, in any case, it should have declared
what it considered to be the correct interpretation of the Treaty.
It is from the standpoint of this conception of the functions of the
Court in the present suit that the following observations have been
drawn up."
9. The specificsituations in each of the cases citedcan be distinguished
from the situation in the instant case, but al1of the quoted extracts are
pervaded by a certain "conception of the functions of the Court" which
1 share but which the Court does not accept. Article 59 of the Statute
indeed provides: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except

between the parties and in respect of that particular case." But the in-
fluence of the Court's decisions is wider than their binding force.

The instant case, however,presents its own particularity. In its decision
in 1964the Court joined to the merits two of Spain's preliminary objec-tions. Whatever the legal interpretation of the character of those prelim-
inary objections at this stage of the proceedings, it remains true that the
Belgianclaim must be dismissedifeither of the objections is wellfounded.
Since one of them is sustained by the Court (and on different grounds in
this opinion), it can be said that the Court would reach out too far if it
made ajudicial finding on the basic question of the existence ofa denial of
justice-an issue which it has decided Belgium has no right to bring
before the Court. Under these circumstances, 1 agree that it would be
excessive for a separate opinion to analyse and pass upon the volu-

minous proceedings before the Spanish administrative and judicial
authorities. There are situations in which the logical must yield to the
practical; this is such a situation.

1 associate myself with Judge Gros' allusion, in paragraph 28 of his
separate opinion, to the problem of the exhaustion of local remedies.
1 would also observe that the procedural processes of the Court
happily facilitate an informa1 but nonetheless fruitful division of labour
when some judges feel obliged to file separate opinions. Having had the
benefit of a preview of the separate opinions of Judges Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice and Gros, 1 feel content to leave to their opinions, and to
other separate opinions as well,the amplification of certainjuridical con-
siderations which 1 do not treat, even as they have been willing to rely

on some of my factual summaries. In neither case does it necessarily
follow that 1 or they reach the same conclusions on each point of law or
fact.

10. In adjudicating upon the BarcelonaTraction case the Court must
apply rules from one of the most controversial branches of international

law. The subject of the responsibility of States for injuries to aliens
(otherwise referred to as the diplomatic protection of nationals), evokes
in many current writings recollections of political abuses in past eras '.
The Court is not involved here in any conflict between great capital-
exportingStates and States in course of development. Belgium and Spain
are States which, in those terms, belong in the same grouping. 1 do not
agree with the Spanish contention on 20 May 1969 that Belgium was
merely trying to get the Court to internationalize a private litigation, but
it is true that basically the conflict was between a powerful Spanish
financial group and a comparable non-Spanish group. This case cannot
be said to evoke problems of "neo-colonialism".

abuses, more than two decades ago: A Modern Law of Nations, 1947, Chapter V.such
Happily, the days of "gun-boat diplomacy" are ndw lost in limbo. Moreover, the Court is not here in the least concerned with such
provocative problems as State sovereignty over natural resources or the
rules applicable to compensation in case of nationalizations or expro-
priations. Professor F. V. Garcia Amador, in his sixth report as Special
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on State responsibility
(Yearbook of theInternationalLaw Commission,1961,Vol.II,p. 2at p. 46),
set forth an admirable attitude:

". ..his purpose was to take into account the profound changes
which are occurring in international law, in so faras they are capable
of affecting the traditional ideas and principles relating to respon-
sibility.The only reason why, in this endeavour, he rejected notions
or opinions for which acceptance is being sought in Ourtime, is that
he firmly believes that any notion or opinion which postulates ex-
treme positions-whatever may be the underlying purpose or motive

-is incompatible and irreconcilable with the idea of securing the
recognition and adequate legal protection of al1 the legitimate in-
terests involved. That has been the policy followed by the Commis-
sion hitherto and no doubt will continue to be its policy in the
future."
11. The institution "of the right to give diplomatic protection to
nationals abroad was recognized in. ..the Vienna Convention on

Diplomatic Relations, 1961", as Mr. Gros (as he then was) reminded the
sub-committee of the International Law Commission (Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1963,Vol. II, p. 230). The institution of
the right to give diplomatic protection is surely not obsolete although new
procedures are emerging.

With reference to diplomatic protection of corporate interests, the
customary international law began to change in the latter half of the
nineteenth century '. As Jennings writes, in somewhat picturesque and
Kiplingesque language :

"It is small wonder that difficulties arise when 19th century pre-
cedents about outrageous behaviour towards aliens residing in
outlandish parts are sought to be pressed into service to yield
principles apposite to sophisticated programmes of international
investment." (121 Hague Recueil 1967,II, p. 473.)

Since the critical date in this case is 1948, developments in the law

l Paul De Visschersees the changedevelopingafterthe decision in the Rudencase
in 1870; 102 Hazue Recueil 1961, II,pp. 467-468. and procedures during the ensuing last two decades are not controlling.

12. Any court's application of a rule of law to a particular case,
involves an interpretation of the rule. Historical and logical and tele-
ological tools may be used by the judge, consciously or unconsciously. If
the Court in the instant case had decided to include more factors in its
Judgment, it could have clarified the traditional system in the light of
clearer understandings of business practices and forms of corporate

organization, as these werealready welldeveloped two decades ago when
the events called into question in this case transpired. Legal norms ap-
plicable to those events should not be swept aside on the assumption that
they have already become mere cobwebs in the attics of legal history.
Corporations today and tomorrow may well utilize other methods of
financing and controlling foreign enterprises, and governments will have
adapted or willadapt their own lawsand practices to meet the realities of
the economic factors which affect the general interests of the State. The
"law of international economic development" will mature. Thus joint
business ventures, State guarantees of foreign investment, the use of
international organizations such as the IBRD and UNDP, may in the

course of time relegate the case of Barcelona Traction to the status now
occupied by Delagoa Bay-a precedent to be cited by advocates if
helpful to the pleading of a cause, but not a guiding element in the life of
the international business community.

Nevertheless, the Court has the duty to settle a specificdispute between

Belgium and Spain which arose out of Spain's exercisingjurisdiction
over a complex of foreign corporate enterprises.
13. There is a trend in the direction of extending the jurisdictional
power of the State to deal with foreign enterprises which have contact
with the State's territorial domain; ".. .al1 that can be required of a
State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law
places upon itsjurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercisejuris-
diction rests in its sovereignty l. But what are the limits placed by inter-
national law?Do the courts of the United States, for example, go too far
in applying its anti-trust laws to foreign enterprises, following the state-
ment of principle by Judge Hand in Alcoa 2?But that principle isaccepted

in at least six other countries 3. Are the jurisdictional limits on national
jurisdiction exceeded in the cases dealing with product liability of a
l Lotus, Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.Z.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 19.
148 Fed. 2d 416 (1946).Cf.Jessup, TransnationalLaw, 1956, pp. 73ff.
Drachsler, "American Parent and Alien Subsidiary: International Anti-trust
Problems of the Multinational Corporation", Bulletinof the Section of International"giant octopus corporation" with multiple subsidiaries abroad? Rules
valid enough for inter-state conflicts within the constitutional system of
the United States, may be improper when placing a burden on inter-

national commerce l.The Committee on International Law of the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York concluded that ". ..the
extension of the regulatory and penal provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 .. .to foreign corporations which have neither listed
securities in the United States nor publicly offered securities within the
United States is a violation of international law 2".

14. In States having different types of economic and financialproblems,
international law has become increasingly permissive of actions involving
nationalizations. In place of what used to be denounced as illegal ex-
propriation, the issues now turn largely on the measure of compensation,
since even the famous General Assembly Resolution on Permanent
SovereigntyOver Natural Resources 3,provides that compensation is due.

To whom, in such cases is compensation due? If in the anti-trust,
product-liability and other situations, the corporate veil is freely pierced
to assert the State's jurisdictional power, why should it not also be
pierced to determine the State's responsibility to the interests actually
injured by action damaging to a foreign enterprise? In the instant case,

Spain asserted its power to deal with Barcelona Traction's subsidiaries in
Spain, disregarding the Canadian nationality of Ebro and others. The
equitable balance of legal interests permits Belgium to pierce the veil of
the Canadian "charter of convenience" and to assert the real interests of
the shareholders-assuming of course that their continuous Belgian
character is established. In so far as there has been an increase in the
permissible limits of the exerciseof Stateauthority over foreign corporate

enterprises, there must be an accompanying realistic liberalisation of
rules identifying the State or States which may, in case of abuse, invoke
the right of diplomatic protection.

15. The legal rights which are vindicated through the international

and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association, July 1964, pp. 29 and 48,
and authorities there cited.
l Mecsas, "Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations in Product Liability
Actions: Forum Non Conveniens and Due Process Limitations on In Personam
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations", 50 Corne11Law Quarterly, p. 551 at
p. 563 (1965). Cf. Arnerican Law Institute,Restatement of the Law, Second,-
Conflict of Laws, TitlC (1967 ed.).
The Record of the Association, Vol. 21, No. 4, April 1966, p. 240 at p. 252.
G.A. 1803 (XVII), 14 Decernber 1962. Cf. Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty
Over Oil Resources (1966), p. 30.procedure of diplomatic protection, are not identical with rights derived
from the applicable municipal law; the rights are on different planes.
There are situations in which no right under municipal law existsbecause

that law does not provide or permit legalaction to enforce the claim, but
international law does afford a remedy.The obvious cases are those where
an injury is inflicted by a State instrumentality or agent which is immune
from suit. If, for example, a naval vesselof State A negligently rams and
sinksa merchant vesselof State B, and the law of State A does not permit
any legal action against the State or its instrumentality, State B, on the
international plane, may press a claimfor damages on behalf of the vessel
which possessesits nationality l.Of course if there are no local remedies,
the international rule for exhaustion of such remedies is not applicable

and a State may incur international liability for the very reason that there
is no local remedy 2. Although statutes now ptovide in many countries a
cause of action for damages caused by the death of a person, no such
cause of action existed at common law. The subject was discussed by
Umpire Parker in the Lusitanc iases ((1923) VI1 U.N.R.I.A.A., pp. 32,
34ff.),in holding that international law and practice support the presenta-
tion ofclaimsofheirs and widows(wherethe nationality requirements are
met), irrespective of the question whether under the law of the State

charged with responsibility for wrongful death, the heir or widow has a
right to damages.

16. In connection with the instant case, the question arises from the
argument that there can be no international right to damages for share-
holders indirectly injured by damage to the Company in which they

hold shares, since no such right is generally established in municipal law.
Much reliance is placed upon the proposition that under most systemsof
municipal law, shareholders have no rights in or to the assets of the
corporation until after it is dissolved or wound up. Shareholders' suits
are indeed provided by law in the United States and somwhat less
extensivelyin Great Britain. In the United States "The derivative stock-
holder-plaintiff is not only a nominal plaintiff, but at thesame time a real

awarded damages to the owners of the British collier Confdence, which had been run
down by the United States frigate ConstitutIIIMoore, International Arbitrations,
3063. Cf. The Lindisfarne, in the United States-Great Britain Claims Commission
under the 1910 Treaty,VI U.N.R.Z.A.A., 21.

SOin Ruden's case and in Johnson's case, in the United States-Peruvian Claims
Commission 1870,awards were made to the claimants when a circular of the Minister
of Justice forbade the judges to receive suits of the type in question. Moore, Inter-
national Arbitrations,l. III,pp. 1653 and 1656.party in interest. He sues not solely upon a corporate cause of action but

also upon his own cause of action". See Koessler, "The Stockholder's
Suit: A Comparative View", 46ColumbiaLawReview1946,pages 238and
242. The provisions for shareholder suits in the European countries
seem to be somewhat less favourable to the shareholder. But the trend in
France is toward more protection of shareholders, as Judge Gros points
out in paragraph 11 of his separate opinion.

17. Although the concept of corporate personality is a creature of
municipal law, none of the theories evolved in that frame of reference can
be relied on universally to explain the legal relations surrounding that
"technical legal device".

"Gierke's theory was based upon Germanic village communities,
medieval guilds and similar truly corporate entities. But such a

theory hardly fits the modern holding Company. .. The result is
that those who administer the law, whether as judges, revenue
authorities, or as administrators, in civilian and common law
systems alike [and I would add in the international law system]have
had to discard al1known theories of corporate personality, and to
relativise the conception ofjuristic personality, respecting it for some
purposes [lx,disregardingit for others, in accordance with the nature

ofthe problem before them." (Friedmann, Legal Theory,5th ed. 1967,
pp. 522-523.See also p. 571.)

I would paraphrase and adapt a dictum from a recent decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in an anti-trust case:the International
Court of Justice in the instant case is "not bound by formal conceptions
of" corporation law. "We mustlook at theeconomic reality of the relevant

transactions" and identify "the overwhelminglydominant feature" 2.The
overwhelmingly dominant feature in the affairs of Barcelona Traction
was not the fact of incorporation in Canada, but the controlling influence

l Thus, for exarnple, where a corporation carriesaopurely commercial activity,
internationallaw does not "pierce the veil" to grant it the sovereign imrnunity
attaching to the State by which it is wholly owned and rnanaged; see Harvard
Foreign States, 1932, Art. 12, p. 641.on Cornpetence of Courts in Regard ro
Mr. Justice Marshall delivering the opinion of the Court in United States v.
The Concentroted Phosphate Export Assn. Inc. et al.,S.9Ct. p. 361 at pp. 366-367,
1968. Cf. the statement of a leading mernber of the New York Bar: "To give any
degree of reality to the treatment, in legal terms, of thefor the settlement of
international economicdisputes, one must examine the internationalrnmunity, its
ernerging organizations, its dynamics, and relationships among its greatly expanded
mernbership." (Spofford, "Third Party Judgment and International Econornic
Transactions", 113 Hague Recueil 1964, III, pp. 121-123.) of far-flung international financial interests manifested in the Sofina
grouping.

It may wellbe that the new structures of international enterprise willbe

increasingly important l,but any glance at the world-wide picture today
shows chat non-governmental corporations still have a major role to
play 2.That is why so many new States, and the United Nations itself,
encourage the investment of private capital 3.

The Right to Extend DiplornaticProtection
to Corporate Enterprises

18. The decision of the Court, in this case, is based on the legal con-
clusionthat onlyCanadahad aright to presenta diplomatic claimonbehalf

of Barcelona Traction which was a Company of Canadian nationality.
My own conclusion is that, for reasons which 1shall explain, Canada did
not have, in this case,a right to claim on behalf of Barcelona Traction. As
a matter of general international law, it is also my conclusion that a
State, under certain circumstances, has a right to present a diplomatic
claim on behalf of shareholders who are its nationals. As a matter of

proof of fact, 1find that Belgium did not succeed in proving the Belgian
nationality, between the critical dates, of those natural and juristic
persons on whose behalf it sought to claim. The Belgian claim must
therefore be rejected.

The Record ofActual Diplomatic Representations

19. If a State extends its diplomatic protection to a corporation to
which it has granted a "charter of convenience" while at the same time

l See Friedmann et al., International Financial Aid, 1966; Kirdar, The Structure of
United Nations Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries, 1966.
See Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, 1964, Chap. 14;
Hyde, "Economic Development Agreements", 105 Hague Recueil 1962,1, p. 271.

Blough, "The Furtherance of Economic Development", International Organi-
zation, 1965, Vol. XIX, p. 562, and especially, Dirk Stikker's report to UNCTAD
on "The Role of private enterprise in investment and promotion of exports in
developing countries" (1968), UN Doc. TDl351Rev.1, and "Panel on Foreign
Investment in Developing Countries", Amsterdam, 16-20 February, 1969, E/4654,
ST/ECA/ 117. similar diplomatic assistance is being extended by another State whose
nationals hold 100 per cent. of the shares, the situation might be con-
sidered analogous to cases of dual nationality of natural persons '.In
those cases, international jurisprudence supports the principle that
preference should be given to the "real and effectivenationality", as was
held by this Court in the Nottebohm, Second Phase, Judgment (I.C.J.
Reports 1955,pp. 4,22), which will be discussedlater in this opinion.

If Canada could be considered the State of the "real and effective
nationality" of Barcelona Traction and if Canada assumed and main-
tained the role of Barcelona Traction's diplomatic protector, such facts
would militate against the Belgian posture that Belgium was the State

entitled to press theclaim. The arguments of the Parties followed some
such theory; Counsel for Spain called it an "essential point" and exam-
ined at length the record of Canadian diplomatic activity in the case (20
June 1969). The lack or failure of Canadian diplomatic protection is
distinctly relevant to an analysis of the so-called "exceptions" to the
alleged general rule that only the State of which the company has the
nationality is entitled to claim on its behalf. Such "exceptions" will be
discussed later. The facts relative to the positions as claimant Govern-
ments of Canada and Belgium-and of Great Britain and the United
States as well-must accordingly be taken into account. The record
throws light on the nature and extent of the several national interests.

In the instant case, Spain was at one time confronted by diplomatic
representations of Great Britain, Canada, the United Statesand Belgium.

But at that stage of multiple diplomatic activity, specificclaims fordam-
ages were not being advanced; Spain was being asked to take steps to
halt what were considered to be destructive actions against Barcelona
Traction. Spain'sreplies in the early stagesrested on the proposition that
the Government could not interfere with the normal functioning of the
Spanish courts.

Great Britain
20. The first British Note was dated 23 February 1948and asserted an
interest due to the dismissal of high-ranking British officersin the Barce-
lona Traction company and to the position of bondholders "resident in
the United Kingdom". (A.P.O. (1960), Vol. III, pp. 193 ff. for this and
subsequent démarches, except as otherwise noted.) In the next British
Note, of 27 March, there was support for the Canadian representations

Theanalogymay be drawneven though the nationalityof shareholdersis not the
test of the nationality of a corporation forpurposes of internationallaw.

172 "on behalf ofthe United Kingdom bondholders". On 28 September 1951,
the British Note speaks on behalf of the protection of (unidentified)
"shareholders and bondholders". Thereafter, aside from correspondence
about the failure of Spain to reply to the British Notes and about the
committee of experts and its report in 1951,the British position seemed
to be merely one of supporting Canada. Throughout this period, Canada
had no embassy in Madrid and its notes were transmitted through the

British Embassy. But the Receiver and Manager of Barcelona Traction,
in a memorandum submitted to the Supreme Court of Ontario, on 24
December 1951,reported a conference with British Treasury officials in
London on the preceding 25 July, during which Mr. Eggers, a represen-
tative of the Treasury, "stated that Great Britain had taken no action
independent of Canada. He insinuated that the British had merely fol-
lowed the Canadian lead which we know to be untrue". (Emphasis sup-
plied.) (Receivership Docs., Vol. 5, p. 772.) The basis for this last con-
clusion is not clear.

Canada

21. The aid of the Canadian Government was originally requested by
National Trust, as trustee for certain Barcelona bond issues, which made
representations to the Canadian Government when it learned of the
developments in Spain following the bankruptcy judgment of 12February
1948. Counsel for National Trust informed the Supreme Court of
Ontario that :

"The Government of Canada as a result of such representations
made a demarche to the Government of Spain through appropriate
diplomatic channels with regard to the matter ... '" (Receivership
Docs., Vol. 1,p. 16.A memorandum in ibid., Vol.4, p. 585,indicates
that Barcelona Traction joined National Trust in its representations.)

22. The first Canadian Note-like the first Belgian Note and the
second British Note-was dated 27 March 1948.(The Belgian Note will

be cited later to A.M., Vol. IV, Annex 250.) Canada made an officia1
protest, alleging a denial of justice to Barcelona Traction, Ebro and
National Trust, because of a lack of proper notice and an absence of
jurisdiction under the principles of private international law. Passing
over some of the Canadian notes, one finds that on 21 July 1949 a long

l This statement was made by Counsel on 9 July 1948 in connection with
National Trust's application fthe appointment of areceiver and manager, an
application which was grantedy the Courton 15July 1948.

173note of protest alleges discrimination against Canadian interests and
against "foreign investments in Spain"; the emphasis is on Ebro, a
Canadian corporation.

23. In February of 1950, there was close collaboration between the
Canadian and Belgian Governments; they proposed to urge the Spanish
Government to agree to the appointment of a committee of experts
composed of representatives of Spain, Canada and Belgium to study

certain financial aspects of the Barcelona case. The Governments of
Great Britain and of the United States were also consulted by Canada
and it was planned that those governments would support the démarche.
Canadian drafts of the proposed note to Spain were submitted to the three
other Governments. Throughout, Canada stressed its appreciation of the
large financialinterest of Belgian nationals in Barcelona Traction. A text
provisionally approved, stated that the Governments of the United
Kingdom and of the United States "are interested in this matter as it
relates to the security of foreign investments generally". The phrasing of
the quoted clause was suggested by the United States. Before the final
text could be CO-ordinatedwith al1the four Governments, the Spanish

Government took the initiative by a Note of 16 March 1950 to the
British Embassy in Madrid, proposing a similar commission, but com-
posed of Spanish, Canadian and British representatives; Belgium was
omitted l.

24. There is some question whether the Canadian and British participa-
tion in the Tripartite Committee of Experts in 1950-1951 should be
considered as an aspect of diplomatic protection. The Receiver and
Manager on 16 November 1950 sent a memorandum to the Ontario

Court informing him that the Canadian Department of External Affairs
had asked him to put up $20,000 to cover the fees and expenses of Mr.
Norman, the Canadian member of the Commission. The Receiver and
Manager asked for authority to pay that amount and said:

"It is my opinion that the intervention of the Government of
Canada in this matter has been of the utmost importance and that
the continued support of the Government of Canada is essential if
the integrity of the portfolioeld by the plaintiff [National Trust] is
to be restored and the properties presentlyunder seizure in Spain are
to be recovered." (Receivership Docs., Vol. 4, p. 585.)

l The documentation is in A.R., Annexes 37 and 38. Mr. Heineman, the directing
that the Canadian Note was about to be delivered with the support of the othernt
three Governments; telegram Heineman to Brosens in Buenos Aires, 24 February
1950, 0. & S., New Docs. 1964, App. 8. In its pleading, Spain took the position, on 20 June 1969,that when the
Canadian and British members of the Committee joined in signing an
Agreed Minute which supported the Spanish contention that foreign
exchange had been denied to Barcelona Traction because the Company
refused to furnish the information demanded by the Spanish authorities,
this was an indication that theCanadian Government was satisfied that
there was no basis for Barcelona's complaints. However, Mr. Glassco,
the Receiver and Manager, informed the Ontario Court through his
memorandum of 24 December 1951that he had attended a conference in
the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa together with representa-
tives of National Trust and Barcelona Traction. He said they-

"... were advised that the Canadian and British Governments had
signed the Agreed Minute in order to prevent the issuance of a
much stronger unilateral statement by the Spanish Government;
that the statements in the Agreed Minute with respect to foreign
exchange had been agreed with a view to saving the face of the
Spanish Government as regards the non-provision of foreign ex-
change to the subsidiaries of the defendant [Barcelona Traction] in
the past; and that the Canadian and British Governments hoped

that the atmosphere created by the Agreed Minute would be such
that the private interests concerned could work out a settlement of
their differences in the expectation that auitable modus operandi
for the future could be achieved with the Spanish Government".
(Ibid V.ol. 5, p. 756.)
25. The next Canadian Note of 26 July 1951 reflects a continuing
Canadian interest sinceit objects to the issuance of new share certificates
of the subsidiaries which "would be to render valuelessthe previously is-
sued shares". Ebro, National Trust and Barcelona Traction bondholders
are mentioned. The Canadian Note of 28 September 1951stresses both
Ebro and Barcelona Traction and says Canada "feels bound to renew its
representations ...for the protection of the interests of these compa-
nies". A long Note of 22 December 1951invokes Canadian rights under
a treaty between the United Kingdom and Spain concerning respect for
corporate personality and offersto arbitrate that issue.The Note reserves
the "right to make any claim under international law which may be open
to it ifthe sale of theetstakes place on the 4thJanuary, 1952,sinceit is
advised that this would constitute a denial of justice". In this Note,
Barcelona Traction, Ebro, Catalonian Land, International Utilities and

National Trust as trustee for the bonds, are al1 mentioned. (A.C.M.,
Vol. VI, Annex 1, No. 28 '.)

l Consequent upon certain enquiries and observations from the Bench, Belgium

175 175 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. JESSUP)

26. On 12February 1952,the BelgianAmbassador in Madrid reported
a conversation with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Artajo,
in which thelatter told him that the SpanishConsul in Ottawahad talked
about the Barcelona case with the Canadian Secretary of State for
External Affairs who said: (tr.) "The Canadian interests in this case are
so small that it interests us very little." Such a view does not seem to be
quite in linewith the Canadian Note of 21April1952 which wasproduced
as a new document by Belgiumin May 1964.TheNote repeats the Cana-

dian view of the mistreatment of the companies in Spain, especially
Ebro; invokes again the treaty of 1922and willingnessto resort to arbitra-
tion; but concludes that no further exchange of Notes was apt to help
reach a settlement and that private negotiations might be the best way to
a solution. In sending a copy of this Note to the Belgian Ambassador in
Ottawa, the Canadian Government noted that it was much shorter than
a draft which had previously been shown to the Belgian Government-
there was no use reiterating legal arguments.K. J. Burbridge to Vicomte
du Parc, 7 May 1952.)It was not until 10 May 1969that Mr. Artajo, in
a letter in reply to an enquiry from the Spanish Agent in the Barcelona
Tractioncase before this Court, flatly denied the accuracy of the Belgian

Ambassador's report. (Spanish New Docs., 16May 1969,Vol. III, p. 18.)
The lapse of time in securing such a denial was not explained.

27. Canada's further activity in the case was moderate. On 15 Feb-
ruary 1955,Mr. Arthur Dean, American attorney for Sidro, suggestedto
Wilmers in Brussels that it would be helpful if Canada would join in a
démarche in Madrid, although he doubted whether Canada could be

convinced that they had sufficientinterest other than in the rights of the
Canadian trustee for the bonds. (0. & S., New Docs., 1964,App. 13.)
Canada had by this time established its ownembassyin Madrid and it ap-
pears that the Canadian Secretasyof State for External Affairshad paid a
persona1 cal1 on the Foreign Office in Madrid in connection with the
Barcelona casein 1954(A.C.M., Vol. VI, p. 109).On 21 March 1955the
Canadian Government had commended Mr. Dean's visit, saying that
Canada "continues, of course, to be deeply interested in the affair of
Barcelona Traction". (A.C.M.,Chap. II, Ann. 1,Doc. No. 30.) On 1July
1955,Mr. Deanwrote at lengthto Mr. Pearson,Canadian SecretaryofState
for External Affairs,reporting on his visit in Madrid. He hopedanadian

Ambassador Pope would be instructed tojoin in energeticrepresentations

produced additional documentation in 1964 and in 1969e.g.,Distr. 64/72 and
64/74 and 1969New Docs. 42-45.

176 to Foreign Minister Artajo. (New Docs., 1964.)Mr. Pearson replied on
19 July that Canada believed that the best hope lay inprivate negotia-
tions.

"The Canadian Government has not been prepared actually to
intervene in this matter or to make representations to the Spanish
Government as to the measures which ought to be taken toward a
settlement."
The requested instructions to Ambassador Pope would not be sent.

(~bid .n)1957, Belgiuminformed Canada that they intended to resort
to the International Court of Justice. The Canadian official merely ex-
pressed his appreciation for the courtesy of keeping him informed.
Belgium similarlynotified Ottawa in 1964and 1965.(Belgian NewDocs.,
Nos. 42 et seq.)

Finally, further questions from the Bench were conveyed by the
Belgian Ambassador in Ottawa on 23 June 1969, to the Canadian
Secretary of State for External Affairs, who replied on the following day
that the correspondence which had passed between the Canadian and
Spanish Governments was in the dossier before the Court and was self-
explanatory.
"As was suggestedin a communication of 21April 1952,the Govern-
ment of Canada was of the opinion that there was little chance of

settling this dispute by means of additional diplomatic representa-
tions. The Government of Canada has acted accordingly." (My
trans., New Docs. Nos. 44-45.)
It isa fair conclusion that Canadian diplomatic protection of Barcelona
Traction ceased in April 1952.

United States
28. Apparently the first diplomatic démarche by the United States
Government on behalf of Barcelona Traction was a Note from the
Chargéin Madrid to Foreign Minister Artajo on 22 July 1949.The Note
stated that:

". ..the Government of the United States lends its support to and
is in concurrence with the Note of 21 July 1949,submitted to your
Ministry by the British Embassy on behalf of the Canadian Govern-
ment, the Note in question relating to the treatment which has been
and iscurrently being accorded to the Canadian company, Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, a company in which
American citizens have interests...
The treatment which had been accorded this company, in which foreign capital is so heavily invested, has had an adverse effect in
foreign banking and investment circles ..." (A.P.O., 1960,Vol. III,
p. 247.)
Attention has already been called to the CO-operationof the United
States with Canada in February 1950, where American interests were
described as arising from "the security of foreign investments generaliy".

In June and July 1951,the United States Embassy requested complete
copies ofthe reports of the Spanish experts on the international tripartite
cornmittee and "reiterates its deep interest in the issues involved in the
case of the Barcelona Traction Company. .." (ibid., pp. 249 and 251).
It seemsthat the United States Secretary of Commerce, when in Madrid

in October 1954,brought up with some officialsof the Spanish Govern-
ment the possibility of that Government's intervention in the judicial
proceedings; he was told this was hardly possible. (Spanish New Docs.,
1969, Vol. III, p. 174.)

29. In 1955, United States Ambassador John Lodge in Madrid lent
his assistanceto Mr. Arthur Dean in connection with his efforts on behalf
of Sidro. An office memorandum of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,30 March 1955,recorded that Ambassador Lodge had phoned to
support Mr. Dean's request for an interview with Minister for Foreign
Affairs Artajo.
"The United States Ambassador stressed the extraordinary interest
-he insisted that it be put that way-which the State Department
attributes to a rapid and satisfactory solution of thatmatter about
which the aforesaid Department continues to be concerned. He

suggests the opportuneness of a solution by direct negotiations
between the parties." (Loc. cit.)

The interview was granted-the request having been supported by the
Canadian Embassy also-and Mr. Dean in writing to Mr. Artajo to
express his thanks, stated:

"Our inability to arrive at an appropriate settlement of this matter
is naturally a matter of very great concern to the management and
shareholders of Sofina,in which there is now a substantial American
interest..." (Spanish New Docs., 1969,Vol. III, p. 178.)

Mr. Dean informed Mr. Lester Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State
for External Affairs, about his visits as already noted.
30. But despite the warmth of Ambassador Lodge's messageto the
Spanish Foreign Office,it is clear that the interest of the United States
was ofa general nature and that its supportdidnot amount to diplomatic
protection of the Barcelona Traction Company or of any identified shareholders in that company or in Sidro or in Sofina. In a cable of
15 February 1955,before the visits to Madrid which have just been de-
scribed, Mr. Dean advised Wilmers, President of Barcelona Traction
and then in Brussels, that he had-

". .. received request from our Department [SC. Department of
State] suggesting they have never considered operating company
in question [SC. Barcelona Traction] American and have treated
this matter not as a protection case but on more general grounds
of principle regardingtreatment and encouragement of international
investment and would appreciate extent to which U.S. capital now
participating in company". (0. & S., New Docs. 1964,App. 13.)

Itis not known what information was given to the State Department
concerning the extent of the United States capital participation at that
time l.It seems clear from the record that the placing of Barcelona
Traction shares in thenames of American nominees did not require any
investment of United Statescapital. But Mr. Dean apparently represented

both Sidro and Sofina and on 1 February 1955he informed the Spanish
Ambassador in Washington that Sofina was "the majority common
shareholder" in Barceiona Traction, and informed the Spanish Foreign
Minister that there was a"substantial American interest" in Sofina. (The
letter to the Ambassador is in the New Documents presented by Spain
on 16 March 1964.)

31. There were referencesby Spain to Amitas, a Delaware corporation
which financed the National Trust receivership, as if it represented a
United States interest, but the real interest there seems to have been
Belgian. The Canadian Receiver and Manager of National Trust bor-

rowed at least $980,000 from Amitas by selling to Amitas Receiver's
5 per cent. certificates. In his request to the Ontario Court for authoriza-
tion to borrow the first $100,000 on 25 August 1949,the Receiver and
Manager referred to this-

"American Intercontinental Trade & Service Company (Amitas)
Inc., a Delaware corporation which is understood to be associated
or affiliated with a Belgian corporation which holds bonds and the
majority of the outstanding shares"
of Barcelona Traction. (ReceivershipDocs., Vol. 2, p. 273.) On 3 August

he had written to the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board about
l As indicated elsewhere, the evidence offered concerning certifications and
paymentsof coupons does not seempersuasivedespitethe argumentof counsel for
Belgium on 8 July 1969 citing A.M., Vol. 1, Annexes 18 and 20, pp. 133 and 142.the anticipated dollar transaction, and made a more definite statement.
He stated that Amitas is-

"controlled, 1 believe wholly owned, by the Belgian interests, com-
monly referred to as 'Sofina',who are the majority owners of the
equity stock of the Barcelona Company and who also hold a sub-
stantial quantity of its bonds".

He explains that if his receivership is successful, he will have plenty of
United States dollars to repay the loan but:
"Looking at the darkest side of the picture, should the portfolio
prove unsaleable, the position would simply be that Amitas would

be unable to collect anything upon the Receiver's certificates as
there is no personal liability attached thereto." (Ibid., p. 277. The
last receiver'srequest to the Court for authority to borrow, which is
recorded in the Receivership Documents filed with this Court by
Spain, was on 19 March 1963;Vol. 8, p. 1356.)

This evidence supports the Belgian assertion that the Receiver was
financed by Sofina, but of course there wereAmerican interests in Sofina.

The Receiverin his numerous requests didnot refer to nominees or to the
trust agreement of Sidro with Securitas which will be discussed later in
this opinion.
32. On 25 May 1967,the Belgian Embassy in Washington enquired of
the United States Department of State whether the first United States
Note of 22 July 1949, concerning American interests in Barcelona
Traction, had in mind Americans interested as owners or beneficial
owners of shares or whether it included also American citizens acting as
trustees or nominees for third persons not having American nationality.
The State Department's reply of 5 June 1967stated that the 1949Note
was inspired by questions of principle relative to the equitable treatment
of Foreign investments in order to preserve the confidence of foreign
investors in the security of their investments in Spain. The interests of
American citizens which were mentioned in the 1949Note, referred only
to those who had rights of property or beneficial ownership in the com-
pany. (Belgian New Doc. 5 presented 7 April 1969.)

33. The first Belgian Note concerning the Barcelona Traction case is
dated 27 March 1948(A.M., Vol. IV, Annex 250). The Note stresses the
importance of Belgian interests in Barcelona Traction by asserting that
Sidro owns more than 70 per cent. of the shares of Barcelona Traction
and other Belgian individuals own enough to bring the total to 80 per cent. In addition, the Belgian State had 50,000 shares of Sidro received
as a capital tax, and 40 to 45 per cent. of the First Mortgage bonds of
Barcelona Traction were also held by Belgians. Like the British Govern-
ment, the BelgianGovernment notes that some of the higher ranks of the
personnel of the companies have been discharged, especiallyMr. William
Menschaert, a Belgiannational, President and solelegalrepresentative of
Ebro in Spain. The proceedings in Spain are summarized and declared
improper or illegal.The note concludes with the statement that there has
been a series of denials of justice which cannot help but gravely injure
legitimate Belgianinterests in the companies involved. The Spanish reply
as usual indicated that the Government could not interferewiththe courts.

The next Belgian Note on 22 July 1949 touched on the refusal of
foreign exchange, reviewed the further steps in the Spanish proceedings

and repeated that the denial ofjustice continued to injure very important
Belgian interests (ibid., Annex 252). Spain sent a reasoned rebuttal on
26 September 1949but did not challenge Belgium'sright to speak for the
Belgianinterests (ibid.,Annex 253).

34. As already noted, in February 1950 Belgium was actively co-
operating with Canada on the project for establishing a tripartite com-
mittee of experts. When this démarchewas frustrated by the Spanish
proposal, Belgium vigorously objected to being left offthe Committee of
Experts. Belgium's next diplomatic protest was on 13 July 1951 (ibid.,
Annex 254). Stress was laid on the effectof the measures in Spain on the
Belgianinvestors. It was said that in equity, note should be taken of the
interest of Barcelona Traction in Ebro and of the interest of Sidro in
Barcelona;the interest of the Belgianinvestors in Sidro wasgiven at 40 to
45 per cent., without counting the participation of Sofina which was 35
per cent. After there had been some conversations on the subject, the
Belgian Note of 7 November 1951 again stressed their concern in the
protection of very important Belgian interests and enclosed a memoran-
dum on Spanish law (ibid., Annex 256).

35. The Spanish reply of 14 November 1951now insisted that diplo-
matic intervention in the Barce2ona Traction case was the exclusive
function ofthe Canadian and British Governments, whoserepresentatives
had been asked tojoin in the expert committee to examinethe question of
the refusal of foreign exchange (ibid., Annex 257). Belgium replied on
6 December, discussing the merits of the matter and asserting that the
importance of the Belgian interests in the capital of Barcelona Traction
justified Belgiumbeing represented on the Comrnittee of Experts. On the
same date, Belgiumproposed arbitration under the treaty of 19July 1927;the issue would be the damage to Belgian interests caused by the bank-
ruptcy of Barcelona(ibid.,Annex258).The Spanish reply of22December
1951argued that Belgiumhad not complied with the 1927treaty since it
had not presented a formal claim, had not proved the Belgiannationality
of the shareholders in a Canadian company, and had not shown that
Belgianinterests had been injured by an illegal act on the part of Spain
(ibid.,Annex 259).Belgiumreplied in rebuttal on 31 December 1951,and
Spaincountered on 3 January 1952(ibid., Annexes 260and 261). At this
stagethe issue concerning the right of Belgiumto interpose in connection
with a Canadian company, cornes sharply into focus.

36. A Belgian Note of 21 March 1955, indicating the possibility of

private negotiations which were then in train, and mentioning the visits
of Mr. Dean, is not printed in the Annexes to the Belgian Memorial but
as Annex 66,DocumentNo. 2, of the 1963PreliminaryObjections. Then,
on 31 December 1956,Belgiumsent a long Note summarizing the whole
affair (A.M., Vol. IV, Annex 262). On 16 May 1957,a further Belgian
Note refers to certain persona1 conversations of their Ambassador in
Madrid and broaches the possibility of a judicial settlement' (ibid.,
Annex 263). The Spanish Note of 10 June 1957 and the Belgian
Note of 8 July deal extensively with the question of the right of
Belgium to act in this case (ibid., Annexes264 and 265).The last Note
puts more stresson the 50,000shares held by the Belgian Stateand sum-
marizes again the extent of the interestsof Sidro. It seemsunnecessary to
followthe ensuing correspondence which involvesthe actual Application
to this Court, the discontinuance and the new Application of 1962.

37. It is hard to explain the apparent reluctance of the applicant
Government to place this entire record before the Court in a composite
and coherent form especiallyin view oftheir recent initiative in eliciting
the information from the Government of the United States as noted
above. But the conclusion emerges that although in 1948the Canadian
Government, like the other three Governments involved, was disturbed
by the judicial proceedings which overtook Barcelona Traction in Spain,
the chiefCanadian interest was in the securities of which National Tmst
was trustee and that when the bonds were paid off after the assets were
soldin Spain, Canadian interest declined.Thiswasthe conclusionreached
by counselfor Belgiumin his pleadingin 1964.(Oral Proceedings, 13May
1964.)It must be borne in mind that the securities pledged under the
Barcelona Traction Prior Lien and First Mortgage bonds held by
National Tmst Co., Ltd., as trustee, included bonds and shares of Ebro
and of Catalonian Land Co., Ltd., and other subsidiaries. Of Ebro, for

example, there were some £11 million face value, of bonds and some
300,000shares of stock. (In another connection, it isinteresting that many
of the shares had blank powers of attorney attached to the certificates.See Receivership Documents, Vol. 1, p. 54.) But Canada apparently had
no deep abiding interest either in Canadian shareholdings in Barcelona

Traction, for they were not large, or in the Company itself which (at
least after the payment of the bonds) was linked to Canada only by the
"charter of convenience" and the receivership proceedings '.The latter
were not of a nature to stimulate Canadian diplomatic action, although,
under the supervision of the Ontario court, the Receiver and Manager
took an active part in trying to promote a settlement through negotiations
of the private interests involved. (See Receivership Documents, Vol. 5,
p. 774.) 1 do not find it credible that Canada can be considered to be
competing with Belgiumin diplomaticprotection ofthe interests clustered
around Barcelona Traction.

The interests of the United States and Great Britain were those of
governments of States which contain great financial capitals-New York
and London. Neither of them pressed claims on behalf of specificpersons
whether natural or juristic. Both Governments have a general interest in
the welfare of international "banking and investment circles" which are

closely linked with their national economies.

Belgium remains the only identifiable claimant against Spain in con-
nection with the bankruptcy of the Barcelona Traction Company.
If,under international law, a State is not entitled to extend its diplo-
matic protection to large shareholder interests of its nationals in circum-
stances such as those in the instant case, none of the equity interests in
the Barcelona Traction enterprise would be entitled to diplomatic pro-
tection. 1 do not believe international law requires that such a con-
clusion be reached.

38. There is no question that, under international law, a State has in
general a right toextend its diplomaticprotection to a corporation which
has its nationality, or national character as it is more properly called.
The proposition raises two questions:

(1) What are the tests to determine the national character of a corpora-
tion?
(2) Assuming the appropriate tests are met, must that national char-

Belgian counsel's argument on 30 June 1969 about the "violation of Canadian
sovereignty" and interference withthe functions of the receiver as a Canadian
"public authority" does not seem to reflect the actual thinking of the Canadian
Government. 183 BARCELONATRACTION (SEP.OP. JESSUP)

acter be "real and effective" as shown by the "link" between the corpora-
tion andthe State, just as, in the Nottebohmcase, this Court decided that
a certain claim to nationality is not enough in al1situations to justify a
State in extending its diplomatic protection to a natural person?

39. There are two standard tests of the "nationality" of a corporation.
The place of incorporation is the test generally favoured in the legal
systems of the common law, while the siègesocial is more generally
accepted in the civil law systems. (See Kronstein, "The Nationality of
International Enterprises", 52 Columbia Law Review (1952), p. 983.)
There is respectable authority for requiring that both tests be met l.

It is not possibleto speak ofa singlerule for al1purposes.The tests used
in private international law have their own character, as wellbrought out
by Caflisch, "La nationalité des sociétés commercialesen droit inter-
national privé", Annuaire suissede droit international, Vol. XXIV, 1967,
page 119.
Commercial treaties and claims conventions often contain their own
definitions of which companies shall be considered to have thenationality
of a State forpurposes of the treaty. (Cf. Walker, "Provisions on Com-

panies in United States Commercial Treaties", 50 American Journal of
International Law, 1956, p. 373; Wilson, United States Commercial
Treaties and International Law, 1960; and, for a more comprehensive
survey, Ginther, "Nationality of Corporations", Osterreichische Zeit-
schrijt fur OffentlichesRecht, Vol. XVI, 1966,p. 28 at pp. 31-59.) The
tests used for such purposes may be quite different-even in the practice
of the same State-from the tests used for other purposes. For example,
the "control" test was widely used to determine the enemy character of
property during war, but it is not established in international law as a

general test of the nationality of a corporation 2. On the other hand,
controlmay constitutethe essentiallink which, whenjoined to nationality,
givesthe Statethe right to extenddiplomaticprotection to thecorporation.
It isafamiliar fact that the laws of certain Statesprovide favourable con-
ditions for companies incorporating therein, especially in relation to
taxation. Canada is one such State, Liechtenstein is another. In the
United States, many companies find it advantageous, for various reasons,
to incorporate in Delaware or New Jersey 3.Charters secured for such

reasons may be called "charters of convenience".

40. The Judgment of the Court in Nottebohm, SecondPhase, in 1955

l There is ample coverage of the literaturein the excellent study by Ginther,
op. cit., infra.
See the observations of the Permanent Courtof International Justiceon the
control testin Certain German Znterests Polis h pper Silesia (Series A, No. 7,
at p. 70).
on Business within theTerritory",30 Harvard Law Review, 1917, p. 676. whoCarry(I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 4), has been widely discussed in the subsequent

literature of international law, particularly with reference to the so-called
"link theory" by which the effectiveness of nationality may be tested l.

It has been argued that the doctrine is equally applicable in the case of
ships flying "flags of convenience" and in relation to the diplomatic
protection of corporations. 1 have maintained the view that it should

apply in both those situations 2.
41. In the instant case the Partiesdid notdebate the applicability of the
link principle to the Barcelona Traction Company, but they werecertainly
aware of the question. The Spanish side stated:

". .. the Spanish Government never disputed the effectivecharacter
of Barcelona Traction's Canadian nationality, because a number of
factors were present which were sufficientproof of the existence of a
real link between the Company and the economic life of Canada".
(P.O., 1963,p. 190.)

Counsel for Belgiumargued on4July 1969that "if the Canadian Govern-
ment had been able to espouse in international judicial proceedings the

cause of Barcelona Traction, its action could have been challenged on the
ground of the lack of sufficient true Canadian interest". Counsel for
Spain responded directly to this remark on 21 July.
42. 1am in full agreement with the proposition that the decisions of the
International Court of Justice should not be based upon a legal rule or
principle which has not been considered by the parties 3-indeed, 1
believe that the failure to heed that proposition is the only criticism

which can properly be directed at the Court's decision in Nottebohm.
When, however, both Parties have revealed a full awareness of the fact
that the "link" principle might be applied to test the national quaiity of
Barcelona Traction, the fact that they did not choose to develop their
arguments on the ground of legal principle, rather than of fact, cannot
operate to prevent the Court from dealing with the principle. Of course

l The wide range of unfavourable comments is refiected in the text and citations
in Grossen, "Nationalité et protection diplomatique", lus et Lex, Festgabe zum
70. Geburtstag von Max Gutzwiller, 1959, p. 489. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, 1966, has a full treatment at pp. 323 ff. His position is generally
favourable to the Court's judgment.

Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea", 59 Columbia
Law Review, 1959, pp. 234, 256. Meyers, The Nationality of Ships, 1967,fully covers
the question offlags of convenience, and the applicability of the rule to corporations
is treated in Harris, "The Protection of Companies in International Law in the Light
of the Nottebohm Case", 18 Internationaland Comparative Law Quarterly, April 1969,
p. 2The proposition has been admirably expounded in Carsten Smith, The Re-
lation Between Proceedings and Premises, a Study in International Law,62. the question whether the link principle does apply to juristic persons ia
question of international law andjura novit curia.The implication in the
pleading of Belgian counsel just cited, intimated a conclusion that the
link principle does apply to juristic persons.

It is indeed true thatsince Spain admitted that Canada had a right to
extend diplomatic protection to Barcelona Traction, it may be argued
that Spain is estopped to deny such a right although the elements of true
estoppel may be lacking and such estoppel could be claimed (if at all) by
Canada and not by Belgium. Aside from the fact that 1believe thejuris-
prudence of the Court has tended to rely too heavily on estoppel or
preclusion, the question posed here is in the first place a question of the
Court's finding a rule of law. The Court in its Judgment does not accept
the application of the link theory to juristic persons. Since 1have reached
the conclusion that the existence of a link between a corporation holding
a "charter of convenience" and the State granting the charter, is the key
to the diplomatic protection of multinational corporate interests, 1 can-

not avoid the problems of law and fact on any such basis as the applica-
tion of the doctrine of estoppel in this particular case.

43. Tthas also been argued that the Court should not passjudgment on
the question whether there existed the necessarylink between Canada and
Barcelona Traction without hearing argument on behalf of Canada.
Canada might have sought to intervene in theinstant caseunder Article 62
of the Statute, but it did not do so. It is said that after judgment is
pronounced in this case of Belgium v. Spain, Canada might find some
jurisdictional ground to found an application to institute a case of
Canada v. Spain. It is known that no such jurisdictional ground now
exists. It seemsquite unreal to suppose that Spain would now agree with
Canada upon a compromissubmitting to the Court a Canadian claim on
behalf of Barcelona Traction, thus exposing Spain to the new hazard of
being required to pay some two hundred millions of dollars of damages.
But if the Court were properly seised of an application by Canada, it

would have to take cognizance of the fact that following Article 59 of the
Statute, "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case". Had theCourt endorsed
the application of the link principle to juristic persons, in its present
decision in BeIgium v. Spain, Canada could have argued against that
conclusion in the hypothetical case of Canada v. Spain, or might have
relied on Spanish admissions that Canada was entitled to protect the
Company. The "Link" Concept
44. It seemsto be widelythought that the "link" concept in connection
with the nationality of claims, originated in the International Court of
Justice's Judgment in Nottebohm. 1 do not agree that in that instance the

Court created a new rule of law. Indeed the underlying principle was
already wellestablished in connection with diplomatic claims on behalf of
corporations. To look for the link between a corporation and a State is
merelyanother exampleof what isnowthe familiar practice of "lifting the
veil". See,for example Cohn and Simitis "'Lifting the Veil'in the Com-
pany Laws ofthe European Continent", 12Internationaland Comparative
Law Quarterly (1963), page 189; Drachsler in Report of the Section of
International and ComparativeLaw of the American Bar Association, July
1964, page 29. The practice of such States as the United States and
Switzerland had already given weight to the proposition that a corpora-
tion would not be protected solely because it was incorporated in the
State, i.e., had the State's nationality; some other link was required and
that link usually was related to the ownership of shares. Such abstention,
being as it were "against interest", has special probative value '.

Three years after the decision in Nottebohm, the Italian-United States
Conciliation Commission, under the presidence of the late Professor
Sauser Hall, in the Flegenheimercase stated:
"The right of challenge of the international court, authorizing it to
determine whether, behind the nationality certificate or the acts of
naturalisation produced, the right to citizenship was regularly
acquired, is inconformity with the very broadrule of efectivity which
dominates the law of nationals entirely and allows the court to
fulfill its legal function andremove the inconveniences specified."

(Emphasis supplied.) (53 American Journal of International Law,
1959,p. 944.)
That the link concept represents a general principle of law and not
merelyan adhocrule for the decision ofa particular case,isindicated also
by its applicability to the test of the nationality of ships which fly "flags
of convenience". These maritime situations are comparable to the cor-
porate situations just discussed since they involve corporate decisions to
register their shipsunder the flagsof States which offerspecialadvantages
in connection with tax, labour and other laws.

45. The Judgment in Nottebohm, Second Phase, was pronounced on
6 April 1955. At that time, the International Law Commission, which
w-s preparing its projects on the law of the sea, had not yet developed

' State practice isnoted infra, paras. seq.tthe concept of a "genuine link" as a requisite for the recognition of the
nationality of a ship. But the link theory was thereafter activelyargued in
the Commission and at length in the Geneva Conference of 1958on the
Law of the Sea. Article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas was
adopted in the following terms: ,

"Each State shall fixthe conditions for the grant of its nationality
to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right
to flyits flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they
are entitled to fly.heremust exist a genuinelink between the State
and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social mat-
ters over ships flyingits flag." (Emphasis supplied.)

46. In 1959,governments weresubmitting to the InternationalCourt of
Justice viewson the Constitution oftheMaritime Safety Committee of the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization case. The in-
fluence of the link concept was apparent. (Meyers, The Nationality of
Ships, 1967,pp. 227ff.)When the Court gave its Advisory Opinion on the
above case in 1960,it clearly confined itself to a particular question of
treaty interpretation and declined to examine general customary law on
"a genuinelink". (I.C.J. Reports 1960,p. 171.)It made a passingreference
to Article 5 of the "unratzjiedGeneva Convention on the High Seas". In
his dissenting opinion, Judge MorenoQuintana said that the provision in
Article 5-

"... by which international law establishes an obligation binding
in national law, constitutes at the present time the opinio &ris
gentium on the matter". (Ibid., p. 178.)

The Nottebohm case itself was not discitssed at length in connection
with the law of the sea in the International Law Commission but Dr.
Garcia Amador, Special Reporter for the International Law Commission
on State Responsibility, in his Sixth Report, noted that he had added a
paragraph to his earlier draft "inorder to incorporate the rule laid down
by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case". (Yearbook
of the International Law Commission, 1961, Vol. II, p. 53; see Article 23
of his revised draft at p. 49.) Although the "link" concept was much
discussedat the Geneva Conference, only a fewgovernments or delegates
referred to the Nottebohm case (Meyers, op. cit., pp. 269 ff.).Four
States-Netherlands, Norway, Liberia and the United Kingdom-in
their pleadings in theConstitutionoftheMaritime Safety Committeeof the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization case made some
reference to the Court's statements in Nottebohm, Second Phase, about
"unilateral acts" of States. (I.C.J. Pleadings,pp. 357-359; 365-366;374; 188 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEPO . P. JESSUP)

404-405.) Theimportant point is that there wasgrowing recognition of the

rule that if a State wishes to have its "unilateral acts" recognized and
given effectby other States, those acts must conform to the principles and
rules of international law. If a State confers its nationality on a person
who has no genuine link with it, another State may not need to recognize
the person as such national. Such nationality has been styled "a citizen-

ship of convenience" '.If a State purports to confer its nationality on
ships by allowing them to flyits flag,without assuring that they meet such
tests as management, ownership, jurisdiction and control, other States
are not bound to recognize the asserted nationality of the ship 2. As a
matter ofprinciple and logic-supported byState practice-a comparable
rule is applicable to corporations. A State may, by extendingdiplomatic

protection to a corporation, hold out that corporation as having its
"nationality", becausethe Statehad granted it itscharter of incorporation.
But if in fact there is no "genuine link" between the corporation and the
State in question, the State to which diplomaticrepresentations are made
may, on that ground reject them. Perhaps one makes here an analogy to

stateless persons but the stateless individual has nothing behind him and
cannot be protected until the present imperfect law of human rights is
fully developed 3. On the other hand, the corporation which has a
nominal connection with a State of incorporation but whose shares are
al1owned by nationals of another State in which latter State the actual

management and control of the Companyare carried on, has behind it the
shareholders who represent the real interest. No rule of law, no principle,
forbids that latter State to extend its diplomatic protection to those
interests.

47. It is true that the Court in the Constitutionof the Maritime Safety

l Uebersee Finanz-Korporation A.G., Liestal, Switzerland, Plaintif, Fritz von
Opel, Zntervener-Plaintiff v. Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General, et al., 133 F.
Supp. 615, 619 (1955), affd. 244 F. 2d 789 (1957). This case, decided by the United
International Courtrof Justice inNottebohm, also involved a consideration of thee
validity of the naturalizationof a Gerrnan in Liechtenstein during the Second
World War. The question was in part whether the intervener was an innocent
stockholder in a Company vested by the Alien Property Custodian as enemy alien
property. The United States Court did not cite the Nottebohm case.
There are, however, situations in which national courtstill find it appropriate
to recognize "the law of the flag"; seeCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 83 S. Ct. (U.S.) 671 (1963).
And query whether the terrn "man" in "The Rights of Man" includes a cor-
poration!
The Court's decision in Nottebohm, Secondphase, has been criticized as creatinga
new group of apatrides; see Bindschedler-Robert, "Laprotection diplomatique des
sociétés et des actionnaires",Revue de la Sociétédes juristes bernois, Vol. 100,
1964, p. 141.Committee of theInter-GovernmentalMaritime Consultative Organization
case, as a matter of treaty interpretation, and taking into account the
travauxpréparatoires,stated that :
". ..it is unlikely that it was contemplated [in drafting the Conven-
tion which established IMCO] that the test should be the nationality
of stock-holders and of others having beneficial interests in every
merchant ship; facts which would be difficultto catalogue, to ascer-
tain and t,omeasure. To take into account the names and nationali-
ties of the owners or shareholders of shipping companies would ...
'introduce an unnecessarily complicated criterion' ... On the other
hand, the criterion of registered tonnage is practical, certain and

capable of easy application." (I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 169.)

It would be unsound to transpose some of these words from their con-
text, where persuasive reasons are set out for the particular issue before
the Court, to support an argument that it is not practical to ascertain the
existence of preponderant, majority or substantial stock interests in
corporations. In particular it will be shown that in at least certain cases,
international law does not exclude the protection of shareholders on the
ground that it is difficult to identify them, e.g., in the case where inter-
national law permits the protection of foreign shareholdersin a corpora-
tion which is the victim of unlawful destructive acts performed by the

State of incorporation. Nor can the rule which permits the protection of
shareholders in certain circumstances be discarded because Company
management may sometimes find it inconvenient to reveal the exact
position in regard to the ultimate ownership of the shares.

48. One of the reasons for the rule on continuity of nationality of
claims is the avoidance of assignments of claims by nationals of a small
State to nationals of a powerful State. If a powerful State should seek to
attract corporations to incorporate under its laws so that it could claim
them as its nationals even though the corporations had no further con-
nection with that State, this Court should not "regard itself as bound by
the unilateral act" of that State. The same conclusion must be reached
when less powerful States attract the incorporation of companies or the
registration of ships by providing "charters of convenience" or "flags of
convenience".

It has been noted that Canada is one of the States which attracts the
incorporation of companiesthrough favourable tax laws,etc. Counsel for
Spain called attention to the fact that a corporation called the San
Antonio Land Company was incorporated in Toronto in the sameyear-
1911-as Barcelona Traction by Mr. Pearson, "the promoter and first
president ofBarcelonaTraction". Theidentity of someofthe personalities

in the two companies, as well as their London agents, was stressed. The 190 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP.OP. JESSUP)

business of the Land Company was carried on in Texas. Counselquoted
from the report of the Special Master of the Federal District Court in
New York l:
"Tt is perfectly clear that the Toronto office, the Board of

Directors, etc, was maintained only in pursuance of the require-
ments of the statutory existence of the corporation under the laws
of the Dominion of Canada. Theeffectivecontrolof theaffairsof'the
corporationplainly waslodged elsewherethaninTorontoand followed
the peregrinations of Dr. Pearson, the master mind 2." (Hearing of
27 May 1969.)
49. The evidence showsthat counsel for Spain was correct in asserting

that the situation in Barcelona Traction was parallel. Throughout, one
finds that the important decisions, the vital planning, was done by such
persons as Heineman, Wilmers, Speciael, Hubbard and Lawton, whose
instructions issued from Great Britain, the United States and Belgium
and Spain itself, but rarely if ever from Canada. The general meetings of
shareholders held in Toronto seem to have been proforma affairs. It is
true that in 1948a "Receiver and Manager" of Barcelona Traction was
appointed in Canada and operated out ofToronto, but sincethe operating
companies in Spain had passed into the control of the bankruptcy offi-

cials there, the Receiver and Manager could merely try to encourage a
settlement; he did not have the power to make a settlement.

Counsel for Belgium, in the same pleading in which he rebutted some
of the Spanishcontentions about the San Antonio LandCo. case, quoted
from a judgment of Mr. Justice Roxburgh in the English High Court of
Justice, the following passage which strongly confirms the fact that
Barcelona Traction's management was not centred in Toronto:

"Barcelona was a holding and not an operating Company. Sterling
was its life blood. It also borrowed pesetas but it had littleerest in
Canadian dollars. London was its financial seat. .. .There were in
Canada, sofar as 1know, or rather sofar as 1have been told, nothing
but a registered office ofundisclosed size with a staff of undisclosed
dimensions, and share registers."

l The natureof the litigation in question is not relevantto the point being dis-
cussed here.
The rebuttalof counsel for Belgium,on 27 June 1969, while correctlypointing
to some errorsin the Spanish analysis of the San Antonio Land Co. case, did not
affectthe point here underconsideration.Counsel noted that on the final point the judge had not had discovery,

but counsel did not deny the truth of the judge's comment.

It is truethat Roxburgh J. was dealing with a period of time anterior to
the bankruptcy proceedings in Spain, but 1find nothing in the record to
suggest that there was later a material change whereby the principal
power centre of Barcelona Traction was located in Toronto l.

50. There are three situations in which there is wide agreement that

a State may extend its diplomatic protection to shareholders who are its
nationals, although the compacy whose shares they hold has the nation-
ality of another State. These three situations are sometimes considered
"exceptions" to a general rule allowing protection of the corporation
itself.

51. The first of these situations is where the corporation has been
incorporated in the State which inflicts the injury on it without legal
justification. and where the shareholders are of another nationality.
It is insuch situations that one finds the widest agreement that a State
may extend diplomaticprotection to shareholders who are its nationals 2.
The rationale seems to be based largely on equitable considerations and

In the same court proceeding, the testimony of MT. Hubbard, Chairman or
President of Barcelona Traction during several years, is not wholly clear. He testified
that al1 meetings of the Directors of the Company were held in Canada; that he
attended some but not al1 such meetings; that neither he nor his predecessor or
successor as President or Chairman was resident in Canada; that Mr. Speçiael, as
President may have gone to Canada from New York to attend some directors'
meetings; it was not necessary for the President or Chairman of the Board to
preside over directors' meetings. (According to the Company law of Canada, it
seems that the directors present may elect a chairman of the meeting if neither the
President nor vice-president is present; Fraser and Stewart, Handbook on Canadian
Company Law, Fifth Ed. 1960, p. 134.) Mr. Hubbard indicated that some decisions
were made in London, with notice to the office in Toronto and that in other cases
"instructions came from Canada". Mr. Hubbard testified that "There was a very
to a list submitted to the Court in the same proceeding) the only one appearingrding
in the Iist of registered shareholders in 1948 (A.M., Ann. 2) held one share. (The
records of the Court proceedings are in A.C.M., Vol. 1, Annex 13, especially
Document No. 6.) This was a Mr. Merry who is listed as Secretary of the Company
(but not a director) in 1918. (A.P.O., Ann. 22, Doc. No. 2. This is the only extract
from minutes of directors' meetings which lists those present, so far as 1 have been
able to ascertain; thredirectors were present.)

The Respondent here shares in this agreement. Bindschedler-Robert (op. ci?.,
p. 174),writing in 1964,considered that this viewwas being accepted in international
law. She cites the well-reasoned and well-documented study by Kiss, "La protection

192 the result is so reasonable it has been accepted in State practice. Judge
Charles De Visscher says this result is required by "des considérations
impérieuses de justice". ("De la protection diplomatique des action-
naires d'une société contre 1'Etatsous la législation duquelcette société
s'est constituée", 61 Revue de droit internationalet de législationcom-
parée, 1934,p. 624.) By hypothesis, the respondent State has committed

an unlawful act from which injury results. The corporation itself cannot
seek redress and therefore the State whose nationals own the shares may
protect them ut singuli. The equities are particularly striking when the
respondent State admits foreign investment only on condition that the
investors form a corporation under its law. These points are clearlymade
byPetrén,109HagueRecueil,1963,II, pages 506 and 510.Petrén referswith
approval to the earlier lectures by Paul De Visscher, 102HagueRecueil,
1961, T,page 399; see especially pages 478-479.

Judge Wellington Koo, in his separate opinion in this Barcelonacase
in 1964asserted emphatically:

". ..the original simple rule of protection of a company by its
national State has been found inadequate and State practice, treaty
regulation and international arbitral decisions have corne to recog-

nize the right of a State to intervene on behalf of its nationals,
shareholders of a company which has been injured by the State of
its own nationality, that is to say, a State where it has been incorpo-
rated according to its laws and therefore is regarded as having
assumed its nationality" (I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 58).

Judge Wellington Koo considered it immaterial whether this rule should

or should not be considered as an "exception".
52. It is curious that this "exception" should have been so widely
accepted since it ignores the traditional rule that a State is not guilty of
a breach of international law for injuring one of its own nationals. It
rebuts also the notion that an injury to a corporation is not a direct

diplomatique des actionnaires dans la jurisprudence et la pratinternationale",
in La personalité morale et ses limites (1960), p. 179. Kiss indeed cites abundant
Ch. De Visscher, Sibert, Ralston, Fitzrnaurice, Pinto, Paul De Visscher, Perry,d,
Séfériades,Jones, Guggenheim, Battagliani,Bindschedler, but query whether al1
these carry their conclusion as far as does Kiss. See also in support of the broader
rule allowing protection of shareholders, Agrawala, "State Protectiof Share-
holders' Interests in Foreign CorporationThe Solicitor's Quarterly, 1962, p. 13;
Nial, "Problems of Private International Law", 101 Hague Recueil, 1960, III,
p. 259. injury to the shareholders.Moreover, if the foreign shareholders may be
protected insuch a situation, it is also necessary to choose one horn of a
dilemma: either one admits that the right of the shareholders existed at
the moment when the injury was done to the corporation, which means
that the rights of shareholders may be damaged by an injury to the
corporation, or, if that right came into existence subsequently, then one
ignores the rule of international law that a claim must be national in
origin.Moreover,the admission ofthis "exception" negates theargument,
sometimes advanced against the diplomatic protection of shareholders,
to the effectthat such claims expose an accused State to a vast variety of
claims on behalf of persons of whose existence it was ignorant. Since
customary practice has, however, accepted this "exception", other argu-
ments against protection of shareholders are correspondingly weakened,
especially since the doctrine in question generally does not insist that the
life of the corporation must have been extinguished so that it could be
said the shareholdershad acquired a direct right to the assets.

53. The second situation in which it is widely agreed that a State may

claim on behalf of its shareholders in a foreign corporation, is where
the State of incorporation has liquidated or wound up the corporation
after the injury was inflicted by some third State.

This situation differs from that just considered in that the respondent
Statehas committedits unlawful act (let us Saytotal confiscation) against
a foreign corporation. Here some doctrine would Say that ordinarily
State A, the State ofincorporation, should bethe oneto extend diplomatic
protection. But by hypothesis the corporate life has been extinguished by
State A, so that-just asin the first situation-a claim can not be pressed
for the corporation. Brownlie states the situation as follows:

"Where the State under the law of which the company is incorpo-
rated terminates the existence of the company in law, or other
circumstances make the company practically defunct, the share-
holders remain as the interests affected by government act: inter-
vention on their behalf would seem to be justified in such a case."
(Brownlie, Principles ofPublic InternationalLaw, 1966,p. 401.)

Here it may be said that after liquidation and payment of creditors,
the shareholders-under an applicable system of municipal law-have a
property interest in the assets and for that reason may be protected. But
at the time of the unlawful act ("confiscation") they did not have such a
property interest and therefore under the rule of continuity the claim did
not have in origin the appropriate nationality on that basis. 194 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP.OP. JESSUP)

54. But Brownlie equates the case of the termination of the existence
of the company with the case where it is "practically defunct". This is a
term which was used by the British Government in the Delagoa Bay case
and used a good deal by the Parties in their pleading in the instant case.
Its exactmeaning is not clear but Barcelona Traction did have some lifein
Canada even after the practical annihilation in Spain. From 1948on it
was under a receivership, but the "appointment of a receiverand manager
over the assets and business of a company does not dissolve or an-
nihilate the company ..." (Kerr, OntheLaw andPractice as to Receivers,
13th ed. by Walton, 1963, p. 232). As already noted, the Receiver and
Manager of Barcelona Traction concerned himself only with promoting
negotiations for a settlement between the private parties; none of the
public utility enterprises in Spain were under his direction or within his

control; and he had to borrow the money for his operations from an
affiliate or subsidiary of the Belgian company, Sidro.

Itistrue that after 1948there was some trading in Barcelona Traction
shares on the Brussels Bourse (Verbatim Record for 7 July 1969), and
according to Moody's Manualof Investments,for years ranging from 1952
to 1967,there were sales in New York, Canada and London. No infor-
mation is available to make it possible to say whether the transactions
were merely speculative, but it may be noted that in 1961,when the first
Belgian application was withdrawn from this Court in expectation of a
private negotiated settlement, the quoted price was somewhat higher.

55. It is true that so faras Canadian law is concerned, the shareholders
had not yet acquired a direct right to the assets but since1do not base my
conclusion on this factor, 1 do not pursue it further.
56. 1also find it unnecessary to consider in detail what isconsidered the
third "exception" where shareholders may admittedly be protected,
namely where the injury is inflicted directly on the shareholders and not
indirectly through damage to the company.

* *

57. It is now possible to turn to the question which is crucial for the
instant case, namely whether the three situations just mentioned are the
only ones in which international law permits a State to extend diplo-
matic protection to shareholders who are its nationals.

1 find no evidence or reasoning which precludes such protection in
other situations, but the questioncan be answered only by analysing the
fundamental principles underlying the right of diplomatic protection. The Basic Principleof State "Interest"

58. In this opinion traditional language has been used, for example in
speaking of injuries to a corporation as such, but this is really a bit of
anthropomorphism since, as Sir Edward Coke remarked, corporations
"have no souls" (case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Rep. 32) and as stated by
more recent jurists, the corporation "is not a thing. It is a method."
(Douglas and Shanks, "Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary
Corporations", 39 Yale Law Journal, 1929,pp. 193, 194.)That corpora-
tions have a nationality, is a legalfiction'. In legal principle and practice,
the situation is that in relations with other States, a State is entitled to
treat a corporation as ifit were one of its nationals, provided the corpora-

tion is connected with it by certain links.

"Indeed, it is at least arguable that al1cases of apparent protection
of corporations are in reality cases of protection of the shareholding
interest of nationals of the protecting State." (Clive Parry, "Some
Considerations upon the Protection of Individuals in International
Law", 90 Hague Recueil, 1956,II, p. 657at p. 704.)

It is customary also to speak about "claims of individuals" or "of
natural persons" and about "corporate claims" or "claims of corpora-
tions". Such language is convenient, but it conceals the fact that in inter-
national relations, the claimsin question are always the claims of a State,
not of a natural or juristic person. A citizen has no right to diplomatic
protection; it is wholly within the discretion of the government whether

it will or will notextend its diplomatic protection.
59. A State takes up a claim against another State when it considers
that its own interests have been affected.As the Court said in Nottebohm,
Second Phase(p. 24) "Diplomatic protection and protection by means of
international judicialeproceedings constitute measures for the defence of
the rights of the State". In Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (P.C.Z.J.,
Series A, No. 2, p. 12) the Court identified the State's "own rights" as
"its right to ensure in the person of its subject respect for the rules of
international law". Almost the identical words were repeated by the
Court in Pamvezys-Saldutiskis Railway (P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 76,
p. 16), although in this latter case the Court went on to elaborate the

importance of "the bond of nationality".

l "Legal fiction", according to Morris Cohen, "is the mask that progress must
Wear to pass the faithful but blear-eyed watchers of our ancient legal treasures. But
novation, they work havoc in the form ofntellectual confusion." Quoted in Trans-
national Law, p. 70. In explaining the basis for a State'sright to give diplomatic protection,
the rather simplistic notion that a State was injured when an injury was
inflicted abroad upon the least of its nationals, has come to be superseded
by the realization of the national economic importance of foreign invest-
ments as State interests.

This is one reason why it is not now pertinent to stress the differencein
municipal law between private "rights" and "interests", as Judge Gros

shows so clearly in his separate opinion.

". .. States protect their corporations chiefly on the basis of the
real national interest and not, in fact, on the basis of nationality.
In such a situation, it seems necessary to allow the State of the
nationality of these shareholders to present their claims to the limit
of their interest in the cor~oration... .
Since the protection of national interest in foreign corporations
is based on protecting an economic or pecuniary interest, it matters
little whether theparty in whose behalf the protection isexercisedisa
shareholder or a bondholder, or even if the national interest is held

indirectly; e.g., if a national corporation controls another corpora-
tion whichholds bonds or shares in a third corporation sustaining an
injury." (Khalid A. Al-Shawi, The Role of the CorporateEntity in
InternationalLaw, 1957,pp. 55 and 59.)

"In three countries-Italy, Britain and France-al1 proposals for
foreign investment must clear government agencies before they can be
carried sut, whether or not government sources of credit are used ...
The Government of Japan, through the Ministry of Finance (and when
required, through such additional agencies as the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Investment and the Ministry of Agriculture), must
approve al1foreign investments ..." (Friedmann and Kalmanoff, Joint

International BusinessVentures, 1961,pp. 188and 190.)

60. No survey of State practice can, strictly speaking, be comprehen-
sive and the-practice of a single State may Vary from time to time-
perhaps depending on whether it is in the position of plaintiff or defen-
dant. However, 1am not seeking to marshal al1the evidence necessary to
establish a rule of customary international law. Having indicated the
underlying principles and the bases of the international law regarding
diplomatic protection of nationals and national interests, 1need only cite
some examples to show that these conclusions are not unsupported by
State practice and doctrine.

61. The primacy of the general economic interests of the State in
protecting private investments abroad, and the minimizing of any one es- sential testjustifying diplomatic protection, are strikingly brought out in
the message of the Swiss Conseil fédéralof 29 October 1948to the As-
semblée fédéralec,oncerning the negotiation of agreements with Yugo-
slavia on trade, payments, and a global settlement of Swiss claims for
nationalized property :

"Article 5 indicates what must be considered as Swiss assets,

holdings or claims. This question presents no difficulty when the
assets belong to natural persons; in that case the nationality of the
owner or creditor servesas the criterion. So far ascorporate persons
and companies are concerned, theseat, which must bein Switzerlahd,
has not been made the only test, but the question is also raised as to
whether there is a substantial Swiss interest in the corporate person
or company. In most cases the substantial Swiss interest will be
shown to exist when the effectivemajority of the capital is in Swiss
hands. If there is no such majority, it is the minority exerting a
decisiveinfluenceon the company which isto be taken into account;
this is particularly easy to discern when there is a compact minority
on one side and a scattered majority on the other. The composition
of the board of directors and senior management may also be a
determining factor when it belongs to them to shape the will of the
corporate person and decide on its behalf. Lastly, in certain cases
the creditors ought not to be ~~verlookedeither, for they too may

exert a certain influence on the undertaking. But it is always neces-
sary to consider the real circumstances and not trust in purely legal
constructions, whose sole aim may be to dissimulate the true facts."
(Feuille fédéraledo la Confédération suisse1 ,00' année 1948, Vol.
III, p. 672 at 686. [Translationfrom Frenchby the Registry.])

62. In its note of 20 April 1938to the Mexican Government, in regard
to the case of Mexican Eagle Oil Company, a Mexican corporation, the

British Government said:
"But the fact remains that the majority of shareholders who are
the ultimate sufferers from the action of the Mexican Government
are British, and the undertaking in question is essentially a British
interest.
For this reason alone His Majesty's Government have the right
.. .to protest against an action which they regard as unjustified."
(8 Whiteman Digest of InternationalLaw, p. 1273.)

In a section of the British Digestof InternationalLaw, entitled "Protection
of British Interests in Foreign-Incorporated Companies", one finds a
number of passages in which the stress is on the British "interests"
rather than on the nationality of the company. (See Vol. 5, Part VI,
pp. 535 ff.) 63. In regard to the practice of the United States, it has already been
noted that that Government maintains that it is entitled under inter-
national law to pratect substantial Arnerican shareholder-interests in
foreign corporations and that it declinesto protect American companies
in which the substantial interest is alien-owned. Thus, in 1912, the
Department of State declined to make representations on behalf of an
American Company in which Americans owned only $100 worth of
shares out of a total of $450,000. (V. Hackworth, Digest of International
Law, p. 845.) In 1965, the same Department informed an American

embassy: ". ..the Government of the United States has the right under
principles of international law to intervene or espouse a claim on behalf
of nationals of the United States who own a substantial interest in a
corporation organized under the laws of. .. [a foreign country]". (8
Whiteman Digest, p. 1272.)

The Restatement of Foreign ~elations Law of the American Law
Institute (1965)in Section 173 provides that a State is liable for damage
to alien stockholder interests in a corporation of a third State if "a
significant portion of the stock" is alien-owned, the corporation fails to
obtain reparation, for reasons which the shareholders can not control,
and the corporation has not waived or settled its claim.

"In international law, as in the domestic law of the United
States, there has been a gradually increasing tendency to disregard
the separate corporate entity when necessary to avoid injustice.
Originally the United States, like Great Britain, refused to intervene
on behalf of its national shareholders in a foreign corporation .. .
Since late in the 19th century, a number of such claims have been
presented to and allowed by international tribunals. In most of

these, the international responsibility of the State with respect to the
injury to the alien shareholder as such was not squarely presented as
a question of international law, since this point was settled by the
terms of the international agreement establishing the tribunal or by
the compromisunder which the case was submitted to it .. .[citing
Delagoa Bay]. However, the practice of providing for such cases in
international arbitration agreements has apparently corne to be
regarded as a reflection ofcustomary international law, and it now
seems to be recognized that, at least under some circumstances, the
State is responsible for the injury to alien shareholders owning a
significantinterest in the injured corporation." (Reporter's Notes to
S. 172; cf. II, Hyde, p. 904.)

64. In the Hannevigcase, Norway espoused against the United States,
the claim of Hannevig, a Norwegian national, on theground that hehad a

199substantial interest in certain American corporations alleged to have
been damaged by action of the United States Government. (The case is
described in 32 American Journalof IntrrnationalLaw, 1938,p. 142.)The
United States did not assert the American character of the corporations
as a basis for resisting thelaim.

65. This section of the opinion may close with the words of Judge
Huber in the familiar Ziat, Ben Kiranclaim:

"International law, which in this field, is in the main based on
principles of equity, has laid down no forma1criterion for granting
or refusing diplomatic protection to national interests bound up
with interests belonging to persons of different nationalities." (8

Whiteman Digest, p. 1283.)

The Question of Double orMultiple Protection
66. Counsel for the Respondent made numerous statements to the
effect that diplomatic protection could never be extended by more than
one State in any one case. Such an argument is advanced against the
possibility that more than one large shareholding interest might be

protected, it being alleged that if the State of which the Companyhas the
nationality is the only State entitled to extend diplomatic protection,
impermissible double protection would be avoided. That position is not
correct sincethere are various situations in which international law recog-
nizes the right of more than one State to interpose in connection with the
same allegedly wrongful act.
67. In an ordinary case of dual nationality, both of those States of
which claimant is a national may extend protection although in case of
conflict an international tribunal may apply the doctrine of effective
nationality. This Court said in the Reparationfor Injuries Sufered in the
Service of the United Nations case: "International Tribunals are already
familiar with the problem of a claim in which two or more national
States are interested, and they know how to protect the defendant State in
such a case." (I.C.J. Reports 1949,pp. 174, 186.)In tha,tcase, the Court
was asked by the General Assembly to consider, and it did consider,
whether a claim might be brought both by the State of which the injured
person was a national and by the United Nations. The Court said that
"there is no rule of law ... which compels either the State or the Or-

ganization to refrain from bringing an international claim". The General
Assembly thereafter recognized that two claims might be presented, and
authorized the Secretary-General to negotiate agreements to reconcile
action by the United Nations with the rights of the State of which the
victim was a national. (UN General Assembly Res. 365(IV), 1Dec. 1949,
para. 2.) 68. The situation is not so simple when one considers the condition of
artificial or juristic persons. International law has not developed a clear
mle of dual nationality for such entities although different criteria are
employed for determining nationality. Respondent indicated that a
company rnay have dual nationality because both criteria are acceptable
(Preliminary Objections, 1963,p. 191),but it insisted only one of the two
States rnay make a claim. Yet in caseswhich are now very commcn in the
commercial life of the world, the corporation rnay have various links
with more than one State-links just as real as those which rnay connect a
natural person with two different States whose nationality he possesses.
International law cannot be oblivious to these corporate links. As already
indicated above, they include the place of incorporation, the place of
management, the place of operation (probably including employment of
labour and payment of taxes), the nationality of the persons (natural or
artificial) who exercise ccntrol, whether through the board of directors
and management, or through stock interests, which not infrequently rnay
exercisecontrol even when a relatively small minority.

69. 1shall not go over al1the cases but merely note the double orjoint
diplomatic interposition in Delagoa, Mexican EagIeand Tlahualilo.(Cf.
Paul De Visscher, 102Hague Recueil,1961,1, pp. 477-478.)In the case of
Barcelona Traction, diplomatic representations, someperhaps only in the
nature of good offices, were made by Canada, the United Kingdom,
United States of America and Belgium.

In the case of two different but simultaneous justifiable diplomatic
interpositions regarding the same alleged wrongful act, the Respondent
can eliminate one claimant by showing that a full settlement had been
reached with the other. If, in this case, Spain made a settlement with
Canada for Barcelona Traction, the Belgian claim for the shareholders
might be considered moot.

70. With al1 respect to the Court, 1 must point out the irrational

results of applying a rule which would provide that only the State in
which a company is incorporated rnay extend diplomatic protection in
case of damage inflicted under circumstances in which the State inflicting
the damage incurs liability under international law, as illustrated by the
organization of the Iranian Oil Consortium. In September 1954an agree-
ment was concluded between eight oil companies on the one side and, on
the other side, the Government of Iran and the Government-owned
National Iranian Oil Company;it was ratified by the Iranian Parliament. The agreement gives to the Consortium the exclusiverights in a defined
area for the production, refining and processing of crude oil and naturai
gas, together with other facilities. The eight participating oil companies
include the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, now British Petroleum
Company, which participates to the extent of 40 per cent.; fiveAmerican
oil companies also having 40 per cent.; the one Dutch company having
14per cent. and the French company having 6 per cent. To carry out the
operations, the Consortium caused to beincorporated in the Netherlands,
two Dutch companies, one a Producingcompany and the other a Refining

company. Al1the shares of the Dutch Producing company and of the
Refiningcompany are ownedby an Englishholding company, Iranian Oil
Participants Limited, with officesin London. The shares of the "Holding
Company" are owned by the members of the Consortium in the percen-
tages indicated above '. The two operating companies were incorporated
in the Netherlands because of the liberal provisions of its commercial
code whch permit the companies to have their head officesand board of
directors and management overseas, in this case, in Iran. The code also
permits "one-man" companies, whichmakes it possiblefor al1their shares

to be held by the "Holding Company" in London. Fortunately, the Iran-
ian Oil Consortium agreement was so skilfully drawn in a CO-operative
spirit, that one does not anticipate the likelihood of any diplomatic
clairns, quite aside from the fact that the agreement includes notable ar-
rangements for arbitration of any disputes 2.But should there be any
question in thefuture of representations by any government, it would be
absurd to maintain that the Netherlands Government would be the sole
government entitled to make such representations. Nor would it seem
rational to assign an exclusive role to the British Government on the
ground that the Holding Company was incorporated in Great Britain

and has its officein London. Perhaps a stronger link between the enter-
prise and Great Britain would be the extent of British Government
participation in holding shares in British Petroleum.

' Actually, in 1955 nine independent American companies were admitted to
participate and each of the original American participating companies surrendered
1percent. of their shareholdings to the newgroup. For the purposes of this illustrative
Iranian Oil Services Ltd. This account of the organization of the companies is company,
based upon "History and Constitution of Iranian Oil Participants and Iranian Oil
Services",a talk byMr. J. Addison, General Manager of Iranian Oil Participants
Ltd. to Staff Information Meeting, Tehran, 21 August 1961.

See "The Oil Agreement Between Iran and the International Oil Consortium:
The Law Controlling", by Abolbashar Farmanfarma, of the Tehran Bar, in 34
Texas Law Review, 1955,p. 259. 71. The Court could logically have begun its analysis of the case by
examining the proof of the nationality of the physical or juristic persons
whom Belgiumasserts the right to protect. If it found that such nationality
was not proved, the Belgianclaimmust be dismissed without regard to the
rule concerning the diplomatic protection of shareholders in a corpora-

tion chartered in a third State.

72. The burden of proof was clearly on the Applicant to prove the
Belgian nationality of the shareholders on whose behalf Belgium claims.
The Belgianargument (7 May 1969)that Spain was estopped or precluded
from contesting the Belgian character of Sidro and Sofina, is not per-
suasive.

TheContinuity Rule

73. The two dates on which the nationality had to be proved, are
determined by the rule of continuity. As the term implies, the rule requires
that the nationality remain unchanged between those two dates. Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice makes a forceful argument against any "too rigid and
sweeping" application of the continuity rule, but 1believe his illustrative
situation in paragraph 62 of his separate opinion may be covered by
another rule deriving from the law of State succession, and on that basis
would escape the application of the continuity rule for international

claims which 1 consider to be generally binding-specialia generalibu~
derogant .

74. Although the phraseology varies, there is general agreement on the
principle that the claim must be national in origin, that is toaythat the
person or persons alleged to have been injured must have had the na-
tionality of the claimant State on the date when the wrongful injury was
inflicted. One might well admit that there is a certain artificiality in the
whole notion since it rests basically on the Vatelian fiction, but 1do not
think the Court can change a long established practice on this matter.
(But cf. 1932Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, Vol. 37, pp. 479
K.,and Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, 1947, p. 116.)

75. There was a fleeting attempt by Belgium to identify the origin of
the claim as the refusa1 of foreign exchange, which indeed started the
toboggan down the slide in terms of the Belgian contentions. (See espe-
cially the statement by counsel for Belgium on 18April 1969: "Belgium

rests its case on the illegality in international law of Mr. Suanzes's
rulings in Octoberand December 1946and the circumstances surrounding
them.")
This position was abandoned (it would have weakened the Belgian
case in terms of the continuityrule), and throughout much of the written
pleadings and oral argument it seems to have been taken for granted 203 BARCELONATRACTION (SEP.OP.JESSUP)

that the critical date, when the injury complained of was inflicted, was
that of the Reus decree declaring Barcelona Traction bankrupt, namely
12 February 1948 l.1 think the Court is entitled to accept that date, at
least to thextent of sayingthat if the claim wasnot Belgianon that date,
the claim must be dismissed.

76. The terminal date under the continuity rule is more controversial.
Historically, many international claims have been settled through the

diplomatic channel and never werepresented to an international tribunal.
In many mixed claims commissions, claims were heard long after the
events complained of because the commissions were established ad hoc
after a certain number of claims had accumulated. For a moderate
example, the British-American Mixed Claims Commissions established
under a treaty concluded in 1910,decided in 1920a claim based on events
which took place in 1898. (VI, U.N.R.I.A.A., p. 42.) This diplomatic
practice supported the view that the nationality of the claim had to be
proved up to the time when it was espousedby the State. Thereafter, it
was argued, the claim could be regarded as statal and,for the purposes of

the continuity rule, the status of the individual on whose behalf the claim
was made, became immaterial.

Now the first Belgian representation in regard to the bankruptcy
proceedings involving Barcelona Traction, was dated 27 March 1948
(A.M., Vol. IV, Annex 250). But in its Note of 22 December 1951(ibid.,
Annex 259), Spain maintained that Belgium had not then as yet made a
forma1 claim. This was denied by Belgium (Annex 260), which insisted
that its diplomatic protest of March 1948should be considered a forma1

claim. In any event, at that period Belgium seemsto have claimed on
behalf of the Barcelona Traction Company and not the Belgian share-
holders.
77. However, when a case is brought before a permanent tribunal such
as the International Court of Justice, the date of the application takes the
place of the first diplomatic representation 2.Counsel for Belgium on
4 July 1969made a persuasive argument in favour of choosing that as the
date required by the continuity rule although 1 do not agree that the
Court is driven to making new law no matter what terminal date it

In its final submissions on 15July 1969 under headVI, Belgium asserted:

Traction's capital was in Belgian hands on the critical dates of 12 February 1948
and14 June1962 andso remainedcontinuouslybetweenthose dates.."(Emphasis
supplied.) The same assertion was amplified under heading V.

See Institut de droit international, Annuaire, 1965, Vol. II, p. 270. selects. Counsel for Spain on the other hand, insisted on 21 July 1969
that the critical moment for the terminal date should be when the terms

of the dispute were clearly defined whichcould only be after the respon-
dent State had indicated its position. 1find slight precedent for this view
and see no logic in it l. 1 therefore conclude that the terminal date for
compliance with the continuity rule is 19June 1962,thedate of the "new"
Application.

Piercing theVeil of Sidro and Sofina

78. Belgiumconcededthat to prove the nationality of Sidro and Sofina
it should go, and had gone, beyond the simple facts of State of corpora-
tion and sèigesocial. It stated that in strict law it was not necessary to go
beyond that but-

"it has always admitted-basing itself on the constant practice of
States-that a government is only justified in taking up the claim of
a company lZ1if the latter's nationality be real and effective. For
this reason, the Belgian Government has made a point, from its very
first pleadings, of showing that three-quarters of Sidro's shares

belonged to Belgian shareholders on the two crucial dates (1948and
1962).On account of the size of the participation in Sidro's capital
of another Belgian company, Sofina, the Belgian Government has
taken a further step; it has shown that on the same dates Belgian
shareholders had an even larger holding in Sofina than in Sidro."
(Reply, Part III, Sec. 1013,p. 738.)

In the next section Belgium States that it is not obliged to show that
Sidro's sharesare, for the major part, Belgian owned but has nevertheless
done so particularly in Annex 133to the Reply.

79. In the light of this statement in its written pleading, the Court is
justified in deciding whether Belgium succeeded in its attempt to prove

the nationality of the alleged Belgian shareholders in Sidro and Sofina,
in other words, to pierce the corporate veils of these two Belgian com-
panies. T repeat that share-ownership is not a test of corporate nationality

l Nevertheless, there is some support for the view that nationality must be
continuous to the date of the Court's judgment; see the convenient summary in
Roëd, "Bankruptcy and the Espousal of Private Claims under International Law"
in Legal Essays-A Tribute to Frede Castberg, 1963, pp. 307-309.
The "company" in question is Sidro as shareholder in Barcelona Traction.
Washington, stated that he represented "Sofina, the majority common shareholder"
in Barcelona Traction. [Footnoteadded.] in thebroad sense,but, as Belgiumstates,a test of whetherthe nationality
is "real and effective". Belgium in effect thus accepts the application to
corporations of the Nottebohm link principle. But there are other
Belgian statements in the oral argument which seemto modify that posi-
tion and which object to the Spanish demand for proof of Belgianshare-
holding in the two Belgian companies.

80. If, as 1 maintain, Canada was not legally competent to protect
Barcelona Traction because of the absence of a link (such absence being
in part proved by the extent of foreign shareholding) l, then Belgium by
the same token would not be legally competent to protect Sidro unless
the presence of a link is established. This is the challenge which Belgium

seems to have accepted. Apparently Belgium was willing to have the
link tested entirely bythe extent of shareholdings and not by other factors.
This may be due to inability to prove that the international controlling
group was associated with or operated out of Belgium. Here again there
is an illustration of the fact that the rule which permits claims to be
submitted on behalf of shareholders places a heavy burden of proof on

the claimant State, especially in the case of great international holding
companies whose focus of power can not easily be proved especiallyover
a period of years. There is added difficulty in time of war when many
steps, some of them devious, but quite justifiable, need to be taken to
avoid enemy appropriation or exploitation and also characterization as
enemyby alliedor friendly States.As Berlehas abundantly demonstrated,
the centre or focus of power is not necessarily to be identified by the

location of the largest number of shares 2.Counselfor Belgiumrecognized
this fact in stating, on 13 May 1969, that Sofina was, at one period,
controlled by about 8 per cent. of the shareholdings. The place of in-
, corporation, whence the promoters of an enterprise secure a "charter of
convenience", has lost its significanceas evidenceofthe real identification

l In al1the analyses of the nationality of shareholders, very little emphasis is put
on any Canadian holdings. On 1 April 1962, out of 1,798,854 issued shares of
Barcelona Traction 41,294 wereheld in Canada. The Canadian shareholders included
57 individuals (of whom 20 held less than 5shares each) and 43 Canadian companies
of which one, Houston & Co., held 30,225 shares. In the "U.S.A. Section", 11,
not counting Newman & Co., held over 1,000 shares each. 15shareholders holding a
total of2,387 shares, had addresses in Belgium. Of these, 7 held only 1 share each;
in at least some of these cases they seem to have been simply qualifying shares
(A.M., Annex 10).

"... it is just possible that in talking the language of 'ownership' in relation to
the flow of national capital, we are talking the language of history rather the
language of reality"(Berle, Power Without Property (Eng. ed. 1960), p. 45).
This is true because, as Judge Tanaka has pointed out, anonymity brings about
the separation of management from the ownership. (Cf. Morphologie des groupes
financiers, Centre de recherche et d'informatiosocio-politiques, 1962, pp. 9 and
60, and Meyssan, Les droits des actionnaires et des autres porteurs de titres dans les
sociétés anonymes,1962, pp. 9-10.) of a holding company. Moreover, the siège socialin terms of an office,
etc.,can be merely a façade.

81. There is, to be sure, a certain logic in taking the position that if
international law permits a State to protect a shareholder interest, the
State should be able to protect a single shareholder and would not have
to prove that a substantial percentage of the shares were held by its
nationals. This seemsto be the Swisspractice but not that of the United
States and there is very little support in the doctrine for pushing logic to
such extremes. Nor does the claimant State in the instant case rely on
any such principle-quite the contrary. Law is constantly balancing
conflicting interests. The British-American Claims Commission, under
the Presidency ofHenri Fromageot, in 1923inthe Eastern Extensioncase,
declared that "the function of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of
opposing rights and interests by applying ... the corollaries of general
principles". (VI, U.N.R.Z.A.A.,pp. 112, 114.)It is such reasoning which
supports Dunn's allocationof risktheoryinthe law of State responsibility.

1have elsewherepointed out as a transnational illustration, the power of
a single shareholder to induce a great corporation to change its policies.
But the international protection of broad State interests of an economic
and financial character does not require permitting a State to protect, let
us say, a holder of just one of the hundreds of millions of shares of a
company like A.T. & T.

82. It must be realized how different in character are various corpora-
tions. Holding companies like BarcelonaTraction are very differentfrom,
let us say,the Ford Motor Company or the Du Pont Company. In these
two examples,regardless of foreign holdingsor interests ofthe companies,
and regardless of the number of their shares which may be held by
foreign interests, the location of plant, the employment of labour and
the payment of taxes are al1factors, in addition to place of incorporation
and of policy making, identifying the companies as "American". Gener-
alizations clustered around the word "corporation" or "company" are
therefore dangerous.

83. If one looks at the link ofmanagement-brains, the citizenship ofan

individual is not conclusive. If a "Nottebohm" were the sole managing
and controlling personality in a company, this would not prove that the
company wasidentifiedwith Liechtenstein,for purposes ofthe application
of rules of international law. Nor is apparent residence conclusive;com-
pare the arguments of the Parties about the residence of Juan March atcertain periods, and the challenges to evidence produced to prove resi-
dence. From the point of view of explaining the reasons for diplomatic
protection, it may be significant that the controlling power group has,
for onereason or another, strong political influence with a certaingovern-
ment. Spain's invocation of old press reports of scandalous connections
between Belgian Government officials and personalities connected with

Sidro or Sofina, suggested this element.

84. There are, of course, abundant precedents for protection of bond-
holders-1 refer to the holders of corporate bonds and not the holders of
government bonds which raise entirely different legal (and political)
problems, as Drago clearly showed. In the instant case, there was at
certain times, as already noted, stress by Great Britain and by Canada
upon the interests of bondholders. As a characterization of the claim as
Belgian, bondholding does not seem to be significant.

Proof by Presumptions

85. In the attempt by Belgium to prove that Sofina's shares were held
by Belgians, at least in large part, there is a very extended analysis of
Belgian wartime legislation. The subject is covered in greatest detail in
Annex 133 of the Reply and in counsei's pleading on 13 May 1969. In

this line of argument it is explained thatnder the legislation in question,
various rules werelaid down concerning certifications and the declarations
of ownership of types of shares, whether held in Belgium or abroad. The
argument is to Saythe least devious and rests on a pyramid of presump-
tions. In Annex 133 to the Reply at page 769, it is said that the proof
adduced "rests on presumptions, but presumptions represent a mode of
proof recognized by al1legislative systems ...".Yet counsel for Belgium
on 17April wisely admonished the Court: "The Court will, 1trust, here
as elsewhere, reject any attempt to substitute allegations for proof or in-
sinuations for fact." It must also be noted that Belgian counsel admitted
on 4 July 1969that the certificates did not purport to establish continuity
of Belgian ownership. Moreover, there are faciletransitions asfrom broad
categories such as "non-enemy", which included "allied", to the partic-
ularity of "Belgian". 1 do not find the evidence at al1convincing.

In the pleading of Belgian counsel in 1964, it was stated on 15 April
that there is a presumption "that when a Company is established in aparticular State and enjoys the national character of that State, thcem-
pany is also owned and controlled by shareholders of the same nation-
ality". By this token, the controlling shareholders of Barcelona Traction
would have been Canadian. Counsel offered a further presumption that
sincethe shares of Sidro and Sofina "are traded principally in the Brussels
stock market", Belgian nationals own the shares in those companies.
[Ibid., p. 14.1It was further suggested that if shareholders give an address
in Belgium, they must be presumed to be Belgians. [Ibid., pp. 9-10.]

86. The Belgian Memorial filedin 1959after the first Application, was
more realistic in its appraisal of a submitted classification of ownership
of Barcelona Traction shares. The Memorial stated (at p. 19):

"It should be noted that the foregoing classification was,in almost
al1cases, established on the basis of the place of residence of the
person in whose name the shares were registered at that time.
Having regard to the Anglo-saxon custom of resorting to nominees
who are merely custodians of the securities, such a classificationdoes
not necessarily correspond to the place of residence of the real
owners of the securities. Sidro itself had its Barcelona Traction
shares registered in thename of an American nominee.
Furthermore, the place of residence may not correspond to the
nationality of the person concerned, but this is ofno great importance

in view of the small number of shares considered as Belgian apart
from those held by the Sidro company."
On 13 May 1969, Belgian counsel presented a long detailed list of
presumptions, largely based on the time and place of declaration and
certificationunder the Belgian wartime legislation. The information
does not seem, as claimed by counsel, to be "both exact and consistent".

On 7 May counsel for Belgium had argued from certain reports of
trading in Barcelona Traction bearer shares on the bourse in both Paris
and Brussels during 1961-1962.(The reports are in A.R., Annexes 131

and 132.)In Paris the shares were apparently unlisted and there was no
record of the number of shares bought and sold. In Brussels 44,264
shares were traded and counsel remarked: "True it cannot be said that
al1the purchasers were necessarily Belgianbut the likelihoodis that they
were." [Emphasis supplied.]

87. The actual Belgian position seemed to fa11back on that taken by
counsel on 7 May 1969in the following statement:
"After all, and this is a point of some importance, it is not neces-
sary for the Government of Belgium to satisfy the Court regarding the identity and Belgian nationality of every individual shareholder
whose rights and interests underlie the Belgian claim. According to
the doctrine recognized by this Court and generally accepted by
States, Belgium is presenting a claim for injury done to the State of
Belgium through wrongs inflicted upon its nationals. The Court
therefore, need do no more than estimate in proximate terms the
number of Belgian shareholders in Barcelona Traction."

Although he argued that the evidence is enough for the Court to find
that as of 14 June 1962 "at least 200,000 bearer shares in Barcelona
Traction were owned by Belgians other than Sidro", it was actually
left to the Court to make an approximate estimate. Al1of these presenta-
tions and others not noted here, do not sufficeto discharge the burden of
proof which rested on the Applicant.

88. One cannot deny that it is far from easy to trace the ownership of
bearer shares. In the Certain German Znterests in Polish Upper Silesia
case, the Polish Government argued that "no importance can be attached

to the possession of bearer securities, sinceit is impossible to ascertain in
whose hands they may be at a givenmoment". (P.C.Z.J.,Series A, No. 7,
p. 67.) The Court did not find it necessary to pursue this point. In the
instant case, Belgiumsaid that Spain was seekingto drive them with their
backs to the wall by demanding a probatio diabolicafor identification of
holders of bearer shares. But Belgium insistedthat in this instance it was
able to accomplish this almost impossible task. (Memorial, 1959,p. 17;
Reply, Part III, p. 156,and C.R. for 13 May 1969.) 1 am not convinced
that it succeeded l.

Apparently 341,326 bearer shares were in the trust account with

Securitas (to be discussedlater herein), after being deposited 31December
1939 (O.S., p. 203). Then 8,525 more bearer shares were deposited by
Sidro with Securitas-7,925 on 12 December 1939and 600 on 22 Feb-
ruary 1940-while 2,075 bearer shares were, for some reason, left in
Brussels. (Zbid.,pp. 203-204.)
When on 19April 1948,Sidro asked Securitas to send to Newman &
Co. various securities,it included in the lot to be sent 6,025bearer shares
and the coupons of 341,326bearer shares, but not the latter certificates
themselves. (App. 2 to Annex 11 of the Anexes to the Memorial.) In
January 1952, Sidro converted the 341,326 bearer shares then in its

The Belgian State in 1946 or 1947 possessed 10,000 sharesof Sofina and 50,000
shares of Sidro. The shares were acquiredin payment of a capital levy in 1946 but
were apparentlyheld by the State only brieflyand probably not after 31 December
in another context that Belgian counsel spoke, on 4 July 1969, of "the overallwas
claim, here put forwardby the Belgian Government,in respectof the injurydone to
the Belgian State by the unlawful acts for which Spain is responsible". possession to registered shares; they were registered in the name of
Newman & Co. (See ibid., Annexes 11 and 4.) 1 have not been able to
establish that none of these 341,326 bearer shares changed hands be-
tween 12 February 1948 and January 1952.
Itis alleged that 244,832additional bearer shares were owned by other
Belgians in February 1948. (M., Sec. 10.)It was claimed that on 14June
1962, 200,000 bearer shares were held by Belgians other than Sidro.
(O.S., p. 206). 1find no proof that these bearer shares were continuously
Belgian-owned (assuming the above allegations to be correct) between
1948and 1962.

89. In reply to a question from the Bench concerning the possible
effecton continuity ifshares weretransferred during the period 1948-1962,
counsel for Belgium said, on 4 July 1969,that if shares were sold to other
Belgians and then repurchased by Sidro, "the continuity requirement
would be satisfied". But "if the shares had been sold to, and then re-
purchased from, non-Belgian nationals, other than Spanish nationals, the
requirement might possibiy not have been satisfied...".The Spanish side

challenged this statement, and properly so, because one does not seewhy
this situation would differfrom counsel'sthird case. The third case he put
was where the shares had been sold to, and then repurchased from,
Spanish nationals; here he agreed the continuity requirement would not
have been satisfied. Counsel sought to justify his answer to his own
second case by various quotations to the effectthat the continuity rule is
artificial and should be re-examined. But he merely says that Belgium
"feels it right that the existence of this body oftical opinion should be
drawn to the attention of the Court". He did not, however, deny the
existence of the rule. When later he analysed his evidence of Belgian
holdings in 1948,he did not try to adduce proof that the shares did not
change hands between 1948 and 1962. It was in this context that he
rejected the Spanish suggestion that Belgium should prove in regard to
each shareholder that he was a Belgian and that he was a shareholder
during the critical period. Counsel said:

"It is a lengthy and expensiveprocedure to carry out the investiga-
tion proposed by the Government of Spain. It isjustifiable if there is
something to be distributed. [Sc.an award in this case.] It is not
justifiable otherwise."

He felt this was the more true because he considered that Belgium had
proved that there was at al1material times Belgian ownership of at least
200,000 shares aside from the Sidro holdings. None the less, the state-
ment is a damaging admission of Belgium's inability to identify the 211 BARCELONATRACTION(SEP. OP. JESSUP)

shareholders it sought to protect. The exhaustive effort to trace the
bearer shares would hardly have been necessary if Belgium had been
confident that the Court would be convinced that Sidro was the real
owner of the 1,012,688 registered Barcelona shares throughout the
critical period since so large a holding would presumably satisfy the
demand that Sidro be identified with Belgian interests. This may be
another slight indication that Belgian counsel were aware that they were,
for one reason or another, not in a position to prove when the Securitas
trust arrangement terminated. (See paragraph 96 below.)

Securitas as Trusteefor Sidro

90. On 6 September 1939 Sidro concluded a "custodian" contract
iyith Securitas Ltd. which was a United States corporation formed under
the laws of Delaware. (P. 722 of the Chayes Opinion, A.R., Ann. 125; so
stated also in A.O.S., Ann. II, p. 206. Other statements of fact here are
taken from the recital in Annex 3 of the Memorial unless otherwise
stated.) Itis said that this contract was concluded "foreseeing the danger
of war".. (The contract is in A.M., Ann. 3, App. 2.) Such a custodian
contract did not transfer the "real ownership" which was vested inSidro.

91. The recitals in Annex 3 of the Memorial do not mention the fact
(revealed later in A.O.S., Ann. 11, p. 207) that on the same date, 6 Sep-
tember 1939, Sidro made with Securitas a second contract which was a

trust agreement. It was further revealed that this trust agreement of 6
September 1939was replaced by anothertrust agreement on 27 February
1940,but it is said that the differences between the two trust agreements
are without relevance for this case! Itis said that the second agreement
merely took advantage of some new Belgian war legislation. The texts of
the trust agreementshave never been revealed throughout the pleadings.
But the existence of the trust agreement of 27 February is recorded in
Annex 3,page 36,to the Memorial, where it is described as completing the
measures for protection during the war. It is said that this trust agree-
ment was to enter into force when the Brussels area was occupied by the
enemy or when any other critical situation developed threatening the
normal operations of Sidro. It is further recited that the period of the
application of the trust agreement was indicated by a "suspense period"
which would cease sixmonths after the end of the critical period. Turning
again to Annex 11of the Observations and Submissions, at pages 207and
208, it is stated that when one of the "Operative Events" occurred, Securitas automatically became a trustee of Sidro's property outside
Belgium and especially of 341,326 bearer shares of Barcelona Traction.
The 1,012,688 registered shares were also already on deposit with
Securitas and its possession was transformed into "legal ownership"
when Securitas became trustee l. Securitas became the trustee in May
1940(ibid., p. 209).

Curiously enough, Mr. Mockridge, Belgium's Canadian expert, refers
to the agreement of 6 September 1939 as the "trust agreement" under
which Securitas "became Trustee rather than Custodian". (A.R., Ann.
126, p. 8). On the other hand, Professor Chayes, Belgium's American
expert, bases the trust onthe agreement of 27 February 1940and does not
reveal a familiarity with the earlier trust agreement of 6 September 1939.
92. Annex 17 to the Observations and Submissions is a certificate
without date signed by members ofthe committee named in application of

clause 9 of the trust deed of 27 February 1940,certifying, in conformity
with clause 4 (III) of the trust deed, that the state of danger which
threatened Sidro (citing clause 3 of the trust deed) had ceased to exist on
14 February 1946 (p. 230). (1 note that the Belgian Government had
returned to Brussels on 8 September 1944and Germany surrendered on
7 May 1945.) According to the report of Securitas to Sidro dated 24
September 1946 (op.cit.Ann. 18, p. 231; photocopy in A.R., Ann. 123),
the "suspense period" ended 14 August 1946, which was six months
after the certifieddate of the end of the danger; this is to be according

to Article 4 (III) of the trust deed. Securitas reports an inventory of what
they held in trust on that date. The letter says they hold the securities
subject to future instructions from Sidro. Thereis no flat statement that
they ceased at that moment to be trustee although this is implied. A
further letter of 17 April 1947(A.M., Ann. 3, App. 8) encloses a state-
ment of securities held for Sidro "in custody for your account" as of 31
December 1946. It was not until 19 April 1948 that Sidro instructed
Securitas to send the securities to Newman & Co. On 3 May 1948

Securitas wrote that they had delivered the securities and that this
operation closed Sidro's depositaccount with them (A.O.S., Anns. 19and
20). The lists showed 1,012,688shares registered in the name of Charles
Gordon & Co., and certificates (presumably of bearer shares?) 6,025.
On 7 June 1948, Newman & Co. wrote that the shares in the former

Securitas held for Sidro many securities other than and in addition to those of
Barcelona Traction.For example, of Mexican Light & Power Co. 6 per cent.
cumulative income debenture stockthey held shares to par value of,254,250,
registered in the name of the Midland Bank of Lasnominees, and to the value
the nominees in both instances holding for the account of Charles Gordo&inees,
Co. (A.O.S., Ann. 14, p. 219).group had been registered in their name and were in the Chase Safe
Deposit Co. in New York (ibid., Ann. 22).

93. Securitas was dissolved by legalaction in Delaware, 16September
1948(ibid., Annex 25, p. 258). An affidavit by Duncan, Alley and New-
man, al1directors or officersof Securitas, 30 October 1958,attesting this
fact, says they examined the books of Securitas and that it had held (in
addition to the registered shares) 341,326 bearer shares at Winchester
House, London, and 7,925 plus 600 bearer shares in Chase National
Bank, New York. Further, on 20 January 1947Securitas "delivered" to
Sidro 1,400of these bearer shares and on 25 February 1947,1,100of the
same. On 16 January 1947, the safe deposit box at Winchester House,
with contents, was "assigned" to Sofina. On 3 December 1947, in ac-
cordance with request of Sidro, the 341,326bearer shares were credited

by Sofina to Sidro's account (ibid An,nex 26).

94. Now title to bearer shares may be considered to pass by delivery
of the certificates,lessthe transferee is a nominee or other depositary,
for the trustee. It is not clear to mefrom the documents whether Securitas,
as trustee, did actually divestself of title to these bearer shares through
thesetransactions. It should be noted that the communications in question
were originally in Englishand the words quoted above-"delivered" and
"assigned"-are the actual terms used, which might or might not indicate
passage of title from the trustee. (See A.O.S., Ann. 25.)

95. Itis a vital matter to know whenthe trust ceasedto exist. Professor
Chayes, Belgium's Americanexpert, clearly points out why this is so; he
says that during the German occupation of Belgium-

"... Securitas acted as trustee of the property. As such, Securitas
held legal title to the property and could manage the property in its
own discretion, without regard to any instructions from Sidro.
Indeed, the whole point of the arrangement was to free Securitas
from the control of Sidro, since during the German occupation,
instructions might come from Belgiumwith respectto the shares that
were inimical to Sidro's true interests and to the allied cause.
Securitas was of course, bound to use its discretion for the benefit of
Sidro, the beneficiarynder the trust instrument. The trustee would
be liable if it abused its discretion or used its position to take
advantage of Sidro. And it had to account to Sidro, ultimately, for
dividends and other profits. Butubject to these general limitations, as trustee during the war Securitas had full authority over the

property" (A.R., Ann. 125,p. 707) '.

Chayes concludes that the trust had been terminated by 12 February
1948, but in proof of this statement he merely cites Annex 3 to the
Memorial, paragraph (g), where it is asserted that the trust ended on
14August 1946.It is apparent that he either never saw the trust deeds or
was not at liberty to disclose their exact terms.
96. Spain, in its Preliminary Objections in March 1963,pages 61-62,
remarked on the failure to produce the trust deeds. It also noted the
fragile character of the "proof" that the trust ended on 14August 1946.
It noted other documentary omissions by Belgium, some of which at
least were later supplied-but the trust deeds were not supplied. The

Belgianomission isespeciallyremarkable in Annex 11to the Observations
and Submissions, page 208, where it discussesthe two trust agreements of
6 September 1939and 27 February 1940and, as already noted, blandly
remarks that the differences between the two contracts are irrelevant for
the purposes of this case! The content of the trust agreements is described
but the text is not produced. In the Rejoinder (p. 951)Spainhammers the
point that, with al1its documentation, Belgiumhas not produced the text
of the trust agreements, adding a footnote that it was again calling at-
tention to this abnormality. The Rejoinder cites the Chayes opinionalong
the linesnoted above. It makes the soundpoint that sincethe personalities
acting for Sidro, Securitas and Sofina are essentially the same, their as-
sertions supporting each other are equivalent to self-servingdeclarations
which have little probative value.

In his pleading on 7 May 1969, counsel for Belgium dealt with the
question of nominees but did not discuss the trust. On 4 July, he brushed
aside the trust issue which had again been raised by counsel for Spain on
18 June. Nor do 1 find elsewhere in the Belgian oral arguments an at-
tempt to meet the Spanish criticism of the failure to produce the text of
the trust agreements.
In his final pleading of 21 July, counsel for Spain stressed the non-
production of the trust agreements, calling attention to the whole record
on this matter, ending with a reference to the opinion of Professor

Cbayes. In particular he remarked that the only transfer of shares which
Securitas made was that of 3 May 1948to Newman & Co.-two-and-a-

l Securitas evidently was not a "passive trustee" in the sense described by Judge
Augustus Hand in the San Antonio Land and Irrigation Co. case to which the Spanish
side attached such importance. (New Documents,Vol. III, p. 114.)half months after the critical date of the declaration of bankruptcy.

(This is in accord with A.M., Ann. 11,App. 2).

97. 1 fully agree with Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (in paragraph 58 of his
separate opinion) that this Court does not have any fully developed
practice on rules of evidence,but 1 believethat in the circumstances which
have been described it is proper to apply the common law rule which is to
the effectthat if a partyfails to produce on demand a relevant document
which is in its possession, there may be an inference that the document
"if brought, would have exposed facts unfavourable to the party. .." l.
Although it is true, as Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice emphasizes, that one
should givedue weightto the pressures engendered by the situation in the

Second World War, international law has long taken cognizance of
practices designed to thwart belligerents by concealing the truth; the
history of the law of neutral rights and duties, is full of examples. If
disclosure of the text of the trust deeds would have prejudiced some
governmental interest, Belgium could have pleaded this fact, as the
United Kingdom successfully pleaded "naval secrecy" in the Corfu
Channelcase, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pages 4, 32.

Article 48 of theRules of Court concerning documents submitted after
the close of the written proceedings, requires consent of the other party

or a special decision of the Court; in this instance, the other party asked
for the production of the trust document. Nor was the Court strict in the
instant case about applying the rule-witness the fact that over 4,000
pages of "new" documents wereintroduced by the two Parties during the
oral proceedings between 21 April and 8 July 1969.

98. The legal aspect of the trust situation whichis important is the one
which distinguishes it from the nominee situation. As Chayes points out,
during the trust, Securitas had not only legal title but full control, even
though the beneficial title was in Sidro. Accordingly Belgiancharacter of
the claim did not existduring the trust. But in the nominee situations, the

nominee is in the position of an agent and the legal title coincides with
the beneficial title in the principal even though he is not a registered
shareholder.

lWigmore, Evidenc ed ed. 1940,Vol. 2, secs. 285 and 291. Wigmore traces the
rule back to the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Status of "Nominees"

99. The requirements of linguistic simplicity necessitate the constant
use of the term "shareholder". The danger is that the reality behind the
term will be lost to sight through semantic insistence upon the term
itself'.To my mind, this defect faults the Spanish arguments concerning
nominees. The Spanish argument identifies in al1 situations, the real
"shareholders" with the names inscribed on the stock registers. See the

Counter-Memorial, Chapter VI, Sections 47 ff. and Rejoinder, Part III,
Chapter II, especially Subsection 2. The legal situation of nominees
reveals the fallacy of this approach, quite aside from the fact that the
names of holders of bearer shares do not appear on the register although
they are certainly "shareholders".

100. Under principles of private international law, the legal nature of
the right, title, ornterest of nominees in whose names Barcelona Traction
shares were registered, must be determined by either New York or Ca-

nadian law. Counsel for Belgium properly noted on 7 May 1969that the
principles governing the choice of law are not unfamiliar to the Court in
view of the Permanent Court's decisions in the Serbian and Brazilian
Loans cases, P.C.I.J., Series A, Nos. 20 and 21. Since according to the
unrebutted expert opinions of Chayes and Mockridge there is no material
differencebetweenthe two legal systems inthe matters here involved, they
need not be analyzed separately.

Annex 125 of the Reply is the opinion of Professor Chayes, and An-

nex 126isthe opinion of Mr. Mockridge on the Canadian law. 1think it is
clear that under both New York and Canadian law, the nominee does not
have "real title", is not the "real owner" and that the one for whom the
nominee acts has al1the real elements of ownership 2.The limitations on
this statement are only those which relate to the rights of the corporation,
as for example, its right to deal with the registered owner in the payment
of dividends, etc. As has been shown, where shares are held by a trustee
under a trust instrument, the same conclusion cannot be drawn. The
distinction is clear in both opinions although Mockridge lays more stress
on cases wherethere is a "bare trust". There can be situations in which the

legal owner of even 97 per cent. of the shares may own something

l On this point counsel for Belgium, speaking on 4 July 1969, was absolutely
correct: "The questionis not who has the right to term himself 'shareholder' but, in
Professor Ago's own words, 'who in the last resort has a proper claim to the economic
law."nt of the ownership of a share'.so as to enjoy the protection of international
In opposition to the Belgian position on nominees, Spain invokes an opinion
from an eminent New York law firm-Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl.
(See C.M., Chap. VI, p. 675, and the text of the firm's letter of 28 February 1963in
Annex 65, Appendix 2, Preliminary Objections 1963). In my view, this opinion
does not controvert the essentiaof the Chayes opinion.worthless because, for example, of the beneficial interests of a usufruct
under German law-but this is not such a case. (Cf. the decision of the

United States District Court in theUeberseecase cited above, at p. 13of
that Court's opinion.)

101. Chayes in his conclusion on page 722 (loc.cit. says "1havethe
honor to conclude that neither Securitas, Ltd., Charles Gordon &
Company, Newman & Company ever had any property interest in the
Barcelona Traction shares, except for the period of the German oc-
cupation of Belgium during World War II, when Securitas, Ltd., held
them as Trustee". Mockridge (A.R., p. 732)agrees with Chayes except he
adds the period during which the shares were vested in the Canadian
Custodian of Enemy Property which period he saysterminated before the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. According to the Obser-

vations and Submissions (p. 204),they were deblocked 29April1947; this
fact is confirmed in the Reply, paragraph 994. When the shares werefirst
transferred to Charles Gordon & Co., there was attached (in accordance
with cabled instructions by Wilmers) a notice readin:

"We hereby certify that the within transfer does not involve a
change of ownership of the shares represented by the annexed
certificates ast is being made to Charles Gordon & Co. as nominee
of Ourdepositary therefore no transfer tax is exigible." (A.M., Vol. 1,

Ann. 3, App. 5, p. 50.)
This was on 11 September 1939 and Chayes stresses that there was
nothing inconsistent with the Securitas arrangement in the fact that
Sidro transferred direct to Gordon& Co. (A.R., Vol. II, Ann. 125,p. 5).
Chayes States on the same page that Sidro listed the shares registered in
Gordon's name with the United States authorities before the United
States entered the war but there is no documentary record of this listing.
But he says that Sidro reported the trust agreement with Securitas and
did not report Gordon as holding any interest.

102. 1find that it is of no legal consequence that the agents in whose

names the shares were registered were not listed publicly as professional
nominees. (So also inCanada; Mockridge, A.R., p. 729.)The practice of
registering shares in themes of nomineesis very common in the United
States as Chayes shows (ibid., pp. 708-709). Although nominees were
much used in time of war to cloak the identity of the real owner, they are
generally used in the United States-where bearer shares are not issued-
simplyto facilitate transactions in sharl.Somewhat comparably, when
shares are pledged with a bank as collateral for a loan, a stock power
endorsed in blank will be attached.

Under the name of"share warrants"bearershares may beissued in Canada

218 218 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP.OP. JESSUP)

103. Chayes noted (ibid., pp. 714 and 715) that unregistered owners
of shares may bring a shareholder's derivative suit, or under Delaware
and New York law, in case of voting against a merger, may demand an
appraisal of their shares and cash payment of the appraised value. In an

appraisal case the New York court said there was no justification for
interpreting the word "stockholder" in the statute as meaning "registered
stockholder" (ibid., p. 720). Mockridge shows that Canadian courts
interpreted the word "shareholder" in agreements, as being broader than
and not.limited to "registered shareholders" '.

Mockridge (ibid., p. 730) indicates that shares registered in Charles
Gordon & Co.'s name were vested in Canada although Charles Gordon &
Co. had United States nationality, because Sidro as beneficial owner was

"enemy" during the German occupation. He does not mention Securitas
in this context. In the Observations and Submissions (p. 199),it is said
that while the trust was still in force, Sidro declared the Barcelona Trac-
tion sharesunder Belgian law, although they were registered in the name
of Charles Gordon & Co.

104. The jurisprudence of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
of the United States is of interest, notwithstanding the fact that this is a
national body, operating in accordance with its statutory terms of

reference and with the terms of agreements with various governments 2.
For example, the Commission "denied recovery to a domestic [Le.,
United States] corporation with more than eighty per cent. of its stock
registered in the names of American citizens but beneficially owned by
aliens. (Claim of Westhold Corporation ...)" (Foreign Claims Settlement
Commissionof the UnitedStates, Decisions and Annotations, 1968,p. 20).
Thus neither place of incorporation nor majority of shares registered in
the names of American nominees, sufficedto make the claim "American".

In the Annotations one reads (at pp. 39-41):

"Beneficial interest.-Occasionally legal title is vested in one
person while the true owner is another. Normally such an arrange-

as in England, but they are not extensively used; Schlesinger, Comparative Law,
2nd Cf. Henn, Corporations, 1961, sec. 179: "Statutory references to shareholders
are not always clear as to whether they refer only to shareholders of record or also
to the beneficial owners of shares.bstantial amount of stock is held by brokers
in their ownames (known as 'street names') in behalf of their customers."

For the contrary Spanish view on theterest of this jurisprudence, see C.M.,
Chap. VI, Section 55. ment is unnecessary; but asthe Arndt decisionindicates, a 'cloaking'
of title was sometimes imperative in view of the discriminatory
measures that were practiced during World War II. Applying
settled rulesof internationallaw,the Commission held that beneficial
interest, as opposed to nominal or bare legal title, was controlling in
dekiding the question of ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]

A more common example of beneficial ownership is the case of
an agent who acquires title to property on behalf of his principal.. .

The technical, legalformin which title to property is held, and the
legal capacity to sue, constituting the so-called 'indicia of title,' must
be considered of secondary importance to the question whether the
interest for which espousal is sought is truly that of a United States
national. ...

A claim concerned an interest in a family fund or 'syndicate',
that owned shares of stock in a Swisscorporation, which assertedly
owned al1the outstanding shares of stock in a Yugoslav corporation.
It was stated that 18,949shares of stock held by the 'syndicate'in
Switzerland had been transferred to claimant in 1942,in recognition
of her undivided fractionalinterest inthe familyfund ...It appeared
that the various record entries of the transactions were designed

merely to cloak the shares of stock with ownership by a national of
the United States, adevicewhich was then considered best calculated
to safeguard the family interests. The Commission held that on the
date of loss claimant was not the owner of the 18,949 shares of
stock, but was the beneficial owner of only a 5.29% interest in the
family fund. (Claim of Antonia Hatvany, Docket No. Y-1063, Dec.
No. Y-910, Final Decision.)"

105. Belgium not having established the Belgian character of any
substantial number of shares throughout the critical period which the
continuity rule defines, might rely, and at times seemed to rely, on the
Belgian nationality of the group which shaped the will of the corporate
person and dictated its policies. This also may be a difficult task in the
case of great holding companies with many cross-holdings of shares,
whichcross-holdings, Belgiumstated, werepermissible under Belgian law.
The centre of power may be deliberately concealed, not only in time of
war, but for reasons of avoidance of taxation or of the application of
anti-trustlaws, or otherwise. The individuals who give instructions-forexample, in this case, Mr. Heineman and Mr. Wilmers-may be acting
for unidentified financial interests, although1 have no reason to suggest
that this was actually the case. Belgiumin the Reply (Ann. 127, Vol. II)

quotes from the report of the Spanish members of the International
Committee of Experts in 1950, passages attesting that Sidro controlled
Barcelona Traction and that Sofina controlled Sidro; and counsel stated
on 13 May 1969that at least in a certain period, Sofina "étaitcontrôlée
par des filiales". The Spanish arguments and Belgian explanations about
the alleged "Belgianization" and take-over bids in 1964 do not prove
what the situation was on 19June 1962.But whatever is the alleged basis
for the State interests which justify protection, that basis must be proved
just asmuch as ifthejustification wereto be found solelyin the continued
nationality of shareholders.

106. The influence of the Court's judgments is great, even though
Article 59 of the Statute declares that the decision"has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case". It may
be said that the new methods and institutions for foreign investments
which have been referred to earlier in this opinion, will overtake the
possible consequences of the rule which the Court now holds to be the
law. But not al1of the older business practices have been abandoned and
the managerial community of the commercial world might have to meet
the announced rule by new devices.If, for example, it is agreed that when
the Company has been wound up and has ceased to exist, the share-
holders, now having a direct right to the assets, may benefit from the
diplomaticprotection of the State of which they are nationals, it would be
quite feasible to secure the cancellation of the "charter of convenience"
which the corporation had obtained. But surely no economic, social or

political advantage would be gained if in a situation like that in the
instant case, the life of the Barcelona Traction Company had to be
officiallyended in Canada so that the principal shareholders, who are the
real parties in interest, could be protected diplomatically. And could it
be reasonably argued in such circumstances, that the United States
would be the State entitled to extend diplomatic protection because a
majority of the shares werefound to be registeredin the name of American
nominees? One is entitled to test the soundness of a principle by the
consequences which would flow from its application; the consequences
here would clearly be undesirable. With deference to the opinion of the
Court, 1 cannot agree that international law imposes such a solution of the problem which the BarcelonaTractioncase has laid before the Inter-
national Court of Justice*.

(Signed) Philip C. JESSUP.

* Since 1 have personally had occasion to correct misconceptions
about the "law's deiays" as a feature of the procedure inthe International
Court of Justice, 1, like Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, welcome the inclusion
in this Judgment of the Court of an indication of the fact that the fault
lies with governments of States and not with the Court or its Registry.
The Court has never been asked to treat a contested case or a request

for an advisory opinion by summary procedure, quite apart from the
possible use of the standing Chamber of Summary Procedure, but if the
governments concerned desired a prompt decision, the Court could meet
their request.

Bilingual Content

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE JESSUP

1. 1agree with the majority of the Courtthat the Belgian claim must be
dismissed, but slnce1reach that conclusion by different lines of reasoning,

I feel it is incumbent on me to explain what my reasons are.
2. I regret that the Court has not considered it appropriate to include
in its Judgment a wider range of legal considerations. For my part, 1share
the view ofthe late Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, "that there are com-
pelling considerations of international justice and of development of
international law whichfavour a full measure of exhaustiveness ofjudicial
pronouncements of international tribunals" (Lauterpacht, The Develop-
ment of International Law by the International Court, Revised Edition,
1958,Chapter 3, p. 37). Sir Hersch went on to Say(at p. 39):

"The administration ofjustice within the State can afford to rely on
purely formal and procedural grounds. It can also afford to dis-

regard the susceptibilities of either of the parties by ignoring such of
its arguments as are not indispensable to the decision. This cannot
properly be done in international relations, where the parties are
sovereign States, upon whose will the jurisdiction of the Court
depends in the long run, and where it is of importance that justice
should not only be done but that it should also appear to have been
done."
3. Six months after he wrote the Preface to that important book,
Judge Lauterpacht put his preachment into practice in his separate
opinion in the Certain Norwegian Loans case, wherein he wrote (I.C.J.
Reports 1957,p. 9 at p. 36) :

"In my opinion, a Party to proceedings before the Court is entitled
to expect that its Judgment shall give as accurate a picture as pos-
sible of the basic aspects of the legal position adopted by that Party.
Moreover, I believethat it is in accordance with the true function of
the Court to give an answer to the two principal jurisdictional ques-
tions which have divided the Parties over a long period of years and
which are of considerable interest for international law. There may
be force and attraction in the view that among a number of possible
solutions a court of law ought to select that which is most simple,
most concise and most expeditious. However, in my opinion such
considerations are not, for this Court, the only legitimate factor in
the situation." OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. JESSUP

[Traduction]

1. J'estime, avecla majorité de la Cour, que la demande belge doit
êtrerejetée, mais, commeje parviens à cette conclusion par un raisonne-
ment différent,je crois devoir expliquer les motifs qui me guident.
2. Je regrette que la Cour n'ait pas jugébon, dans son arrêt,de donner
à ses considérations juridiques un registre plus étendu. Pour ma part,
je partage l'avis de l'ancien juge sir Hersch Lauterpacht, selon lequel
((de puissantes considérations - tenant à la justice internationale et au
développementdu droit international - militent en faveur du caractère
entièrement exhaustif des prises de position judiciaires des trbiunaux
internationaux ))(Lauterpacht, The Development of InternationalLaw

by the International Court, éd. revisée, 1958, chap. 3, p. 37). A quoi
sir Hersch ajoutait (p. 39):
«Sur le plan interne on peut, pour administrer la justice, s'en tenir
à des motifs purement formels ou procéduraux. On peut aussi, sans
avoir à ménager les susceptibilitésde l'une ou l'autre partie, ne pas
tenir compte d'arguments qui ne sont pas indispensables pour la
décision.Il ne sied pas d'en user de mêmedans les relations inter-
nationales, où les parties sont des Etats souverains, dont la juridic-

tion de la Cour dépend à long terme, et où il importe, non seule-
ment que justice soit faite, mais aussi qu'elle paraisse avoir été
faite.
3. Six mois après avoir écrit la préface de cet important ouvrage,
sir Hersch Lauterpacht mit sesidéesen pratique dans son opinion indivi-
duelle en l'affaire relative Certains emprunts norvégienso ,ù il déclare
(C.I.J. Recueil 1957, p. 36):

«A mon avis, une partie devant la Cour est fondée à attendre que
l'arrêtreflète aussi exactement que possible les aspects fondamen-
taux de la position juridique prise par cette partie. Au surplus,
j'estime conforme au rôle véritablede la Cour de répondre aux deux
principales questions de compétence qui ont divisé les parties
pendant de longues annéeset qui présentent un intérêt considérable

pour le droit international.Il se peut qu'il y ait quelque chose de
convaincant et de séduisant dans l'opinion d'après laquelle, entre
plusieurs solutions possibles, un tribunal doit chosir la plus simple,
la plus concise et la plus rapide. Toutefois, j'estime que cela ne
saurait constituer, pour cette Cour, les seulesconsidérationslégitimes
en cause.» 4. In Interhandel (I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6), the Court had before it
four preliminary objections advanced by the United States. (One notes in

passing that Interhandel, like BarcelonaTraction, was a case involving a
holding Company and complicated corporate stock interests.) In its
Judgment, the Court found it appropriate to record its view on al1four
preliminary objections. By nine votes to six, the Court upheld the third
preliminary objection to the effect that Switzerland had not exhausted
the local remedies available to it in the United States.Since the case was
disposed of on this ground, it could be argued that the Court should not
have ruled in its Judgment on the other three preliminary objections.
However, the Court held: by ten votes to five, that it rejected the first
preliminary objection; unanimously, that it rejected the second pre-
liminary objection; by ten votes to five, that it was not necessary to
adjudicate on part (a) of the fourth preliminary objection; by fourteen
votes to one, that it rejected part (b) of the fourth preliminary objection.
Judge SirPercy Spender, in hisseparate opinion, and President Klaestad
and Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in their dissenting opinions, felt it

necessary also to deal with part (a) of the fourth preliminary objection
on which the Court declined to rule, because that objection dealt with the
important issue of the self-servingor automatic reservation of the United
States to its declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court.

5. In the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December
1906(I.C.J. Reports 1960,p. 192),Judge Moreno Quintana in his declara-
tion (p. 217) stated that while he was in agreement with the decision, he
believed that a number of "legal questions which are of particular con-
Cern. ..should have been dealt with in the first place". He listed the
questions which he had in mind and on which the judgment failed to pro-
nounce.
6. In the Temple of Preah Vihearcase (I.C.J. Reports 1961,p. 17), the
Court in its Judgment said that the reasons it gave for upholding its
jurisdiction made it unnecessary to consider Cambodia's other basis for
asserting jurisdiction or Thailand's objection to that basis. In the joint

declaration of Judges Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Tanaka (pp. 36, 38),
one reads:

"As regards the second preliminary objection of Thailand-
whilst we are fully in agreement with the view expressed by Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht in the South West Africa-Voting Procedure
case (I.C.J. Reports 1955, at pp. 90-93) to the effect that the Court
ought not to refrain from pronouncing on issues that a party has
argued as central to its case, merely on the ground thatthese are not
essential to the substantive decision of the Court-yet we feel that
this view isscarcely applicable to issues of jurisdiction (nor did Sir
Hersch imply otherwise). In the present case, Thailand's second 4. Dans I'affaire de l'lnterhandel(C.I.J. Recueil 1959, p. 6), la Cour

avait à examiner quatre exceptions préliminaires soulevéespar les
Etats-Unis. (On notera au passage que I'affaire de l'lnterhandelcomme
celle de la BarcelonaTraction, visait un holding et des problèmes com-
plexes de participations de sociétés.)Dans son arrêt,la Cour a cru de-
voir prendre position sur les quatre exceptions préliminaires. Par neuf
voix contre six, elle a retenu la troisième,à savoir que la Suisse n'avait
pas épuisé lesrecours internes qui lui étaient ouverts aux Etats-Unis.
Comme l'affaire était tranchée sur cettebase, on pourrait soutenir que
la Cour n'avait pas à se prononcer sur les trois autres exceptions pré-
liminaires. Elle a cependant rejetéla première, par dix voix contre cinq;
la deuxième à l'unanimité;elle a décidép , ar dix voix contre cinq, qu'elle
n'avait pas àse prononcer sur la partie a) de la quatrième,et elle a rejeté,
par quatorze voix contre une, la partie b) de cette quatrième exception
préliminaire.
Sir Percy Spender, dans son opinion individuelle, ainsi que le Prési-

dent Klaestad et sir Hersch Lauterpacht, dans leurs opinions dissidentes,
ontjugé nécessaire detraiter la partiea) de la quatrièmeexception prélimi-
naire sur laquelle la Cour n'avait pas statué, parce que cette exception
portait sur le point le plus important de la réservedite automatique
dont les Etats-Unis ont assorti leur déclaration d'acceptation de la
juridiction de la Cour.
5. Lors de I'affairede la Sentencearbitrale renduepar leroi d'Espagne
le 23 décembre1906 (C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 192) M. Moreno Quintana
a dit dans sa déclaration (p. 217) que, tout en souscrivant à la décision
prise, il estimait que «les questions de droit ...(présentant un intérêt
particulier)...auraient dû êtreabordéesen premier lieu ».Il a énuméré
les questions auxquelles il pensait et sur lesquelles la Cour, dans son
arrêt,ne se prononçait pas.
6. Dans I'affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar,(C.I.J. Recueil 1961,
p. 17)la Cour a indiquédans son arrêtqu'étantdonnéles raisons pour

lesquelles elle se déclarait compétenteil devenait inutile de procéder à
un examen de l'autre motif de compétenceinvoquépar le Cambodge ou
de l'exception soulevéepar la Thaïlande à cet égard.Dans leur déclara-
tion commune, sir Gerald Fitzmaurice et M. Tanaka ont dit notamment
ceci (p. 38):

«En ce qui concerne la seconde exception préliminaire de la
Thaïlande - tout en approuvant pleinement l'opinion énoncéepar
sir Hersch Lauterpacht dans I'affairedu Sud-Ouest africain-Pro-
cédure devote (C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p. 90-93) et d'après laquelle
la Cour ne doit pas éviterde se prononcer sur des questions dont
une des parties a fait le centre de son argumentation, pour la seule
raison que ces questions ne sont pas essentielles au dispositif de
l'arrêt-, nous estimons cependant que cette opinion n'est guère
applicable en matière decompétence(sir Hersch ne l'a d'ailleurs pas preliminary objection was of course fully argued by the Parties. But

once the Court, by rejecting the first preliminary objection, has
found that it has jurisdiction to go into the merits of the dispute. ..
the matter is, strictly, concluded, and a finding, whether for or
against Thailand, on her second preliminary objection, could add
nothing material to the conclusion, already arrived at,that the Court
is competent."

7. In Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Pre-
liminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 4, Judge Tanaka in his
separate opinion said (at p. 65):

"The more important function of the Court as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations is to be found not only in the settlement
of concrete disputes, but also in its reasoning, through which it may
contribute to the development of international law."

8. One of the great jurists of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, Judge Anzilotti, also shared the Lauterpacht philosophy of the
nature of the international judicial process, as is shown in his dissenting
opinion in Diversion ofWaterfrom theMeuse(P.C.I.J., SeriesAIB, No. 70,
p. 4at 45):
"The operative clause of the judgment merely rejects the sub-
missions of the principal claim and of the Counter-claim. In my
opinion, in a suit the main object of which was to obtain the inter-
pretation of a treaty with reference to certain concrete facts, and in
which both the Applicant and the Respondent presented submis-
sionsindicating, in regard to each point, the interpretation whichthey
respectively wished to see adopted by the Court, the latter should

not have confined itself to a mere rejection of the submissions of the
Applicant: it should also have expressed its opinion on the submis-
sions of the Respondent; and, in any case, it should have declared
what it considered to be the correct interpretation of the Treaty.
It is from the standpoint of this conception of the functions of the
Court in the present suit that the following observations have been
drawn up."
9. The specificsituations in each of the cases citedcan be distinguished
from the situation in the instant case, but al1of the quoted extracts are
pervaded by a certain "conception of the functions of the Court" which
1 share but which the Court does not accept. Article 59 of the Statute
indeed provides: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except

between the parties and in respect of that particular case." But the in-
fluence of the Court's decisions is wider than their binding force.

The instant case, however,presents its own particularity. In its decision
in 1964the Court joined to the merits two of Spain's preliminary objec- laisséentendre). En l'espèce,la seconde exception préliminaire de
la Thaïlande a évidemment étédiscutéeen détail par les parties.
Mais, dèslors que la Cour, rejetant la première exception prélimi-
naire, s'est déclaréecompétente pour connaître du fond du litige ...
l'affaire està strictement parler, réglée,et se prononcer pour ou
contre la seconde exception préliminaire de la Thaïlande ne pou-
vait rien ajouter d'important à la conclusion à laquelle la Cour
est déjàparvenue, à savoir qu'elle est compétente. ))

7. En l'affaire de la BarceIona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Lirnited, exceptions préliminaires(C.I.J. Recueil 1964, p. 4), M. Tanaka
a déclarédans son opinion individuelle (p. 65):

cLa fonction la plus importante de la Cour en qualité deprincipal
organe judiciaire des Nations Unies consiste non seulement à
réglerles différendsconcrets, mais aussi, par son raisonnement, à
contribuer au développement du droit international. ))

8. L'un des grands juristes de la Cour permanente de Justice interna-
tionale. M. Anzilotti, partageait également les idéesde Lauterpacht sur
la nature du processus judiciaire international, ainsi qu'il ressort de
son opinion dissidente dans l'affaire desPrises d'eau à la Meuse (C.P.J.I.
sérieAiB no70, p. 45):

cLe dispositif de l'arrêtse borne à rejeter les conclusions de la
demande principale et de la demande reconventionnelle. Selon moi,
dans un procèsqui avait principalement pour objet l'interprétation

d'un traité par rapport à certains faits concrets et dans lequel le
demandeur et le défendeur présentaient, sur chaque point, des
conclusions indiquant l'interprétation que chacun d'eux désirait
voir adopter par la Cour, celle-ci ne pouvait se limiter au simple
rejet des conclusions du demandeur: elle devait se prononcer
également sur les conclusions du défendeur et, en tout cas, dire
pour droit ce qu'elle jugeait êtrela bonne interprétation du traité.

Les observations qui suivent ont étérédigées enpartant de cette
manière de concevoir la tâche de la Cour dans la présenteaffaire. ))

9. Les situations caractérisant chacune des affaires susviséesse distin-

guent des circonstances de la présente espèce, maistous les passages
cités s'inspirent d'une certaine ((manière de concevoir la tâche de la
Cour » à laquelle je souscris, bien que la Cour ne l'accepte pas. Certes
l'article 59 du Statut prévoit que cla décisionde la Cour n'est obliga-
toire que pour les parties en litige et dans le cas qui a étédécidé».Mais
les décisionsde la Cour ont une influence qui dépasseles limites de leur
force obligatoire.

L'affaireactuelle présentetoutefois une particularité. Dans sa décision
de 1964, la Cour a joint au fond deux des exceptions préliminaires detions. Whatever the legal interpretation of the character of those prelim-
inary objections at this stage of the proceedings, it remains true that the
Belgianclaim must be dismissedifeither of the objections is wellfounded.
Since one of them is sustained by the Court (and on different grounds in
this opinion), it can be said that the Court would reach out too far if it
made ajudicial finding on the basic question of the existence ofa denial of
justice-an issue which it has decided Belgium has no right to bring
before the Court. Under these circumstances, 1 agree that it would be
excessive for a separate opinion to analyse and pass upon the volu-

minous proceedings before the Spanish administrative and judicial
authorities. There are situations in which the logical must yield to the
practical; this is such a situation.

1 associate myself with Judge Gros' allusion, in paragraph 28 of his
separate opinion, to the problem of the exhaustion of local remedies.
1 would also observe that the procedural processes of the Court
happily facilitate an informa1 but nonetheless fruitful division of labour
when some judges feel obliged to file separate opinions. Having had the
benefit of a preview of the separate opinions of Judges Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice and Gros, 1 feel content to leave to their opinions, and to
other separate opinions as well,the amplification of certainjuridical con-
siderations which 1 do not treat, even as they have been willing to rely

on some of my factual summaries. In neither case does it necessarily
follow that 1 or they reach the same conclusions on each point of law or
fact.

10. In adjudicating upon the BarcelonaTraction case the Court must
apply rules from one of the most controversial branches of international

law. The subject of the responsibility of States for injuries to aliens
(otherwise referred to as the diplomatic protection of nationals), evokes
in many current writings recollections of political abuses in past eras '.
The Court is not involved here in any conflict between great capital-
exportingStates and States in course of development. Belgium and Spain
are States which, in those terms, belong in the same grouping. 1 do not
agree with the Spanish contention on 20 May 1969 that Belgium was
merely trying to get the Court to internationalize a private litigation, but
it is true that basically the conflict was between a powerful Spanish
financial group and a comparable non-Spanish group. This case cannot
be said to evoke problems of "neo-colonialism".

abuses, more than two decades ago: A Modern Law of Nations, 1947, Chapter V.such
Happily, the days of "gun-boat diplomacy" are ndw lost in limbo.l'Espagne. Quelle que soit la façon dont on interprète juridiquement
la nature de ces exceptions préliminaires dans la présente phase de la
procédure, il reste que la requêtebelge doit êtrerejetée si l'une des

exceptions est fondée. Or, puisque l'une de ces exceptions est retenue
par la Cour (et, pour des motifs différents,par l'auteur de la présente
opinion), on peut penser que la Cour irait trop loin si elle prenait ju-
diciairement position sur la question fondamentale de l'existence d'un
dénide justice - dont, selon la décisionadoptée, la Belgique n'a pas
le droit de saisir la Cour. Cela étant,j'admets qu'il serait excessif dans
une opinion individuelle d'analyser la masse des données relatives aux
procéduresqui se sont dérouléesdevant les autorités administratives et

judiciaires espagnoles et de se prononcer à leur sujet. Il est des cas où
la logique doit céderdevant des considérations d'ordre pratique; nous
nous trouvons dans cette situation.
Je m'associe à M. Gros, qui a fait allusion au problème del'épuisement
des recours internes au paragraphe 28 de son opinion individuelle.
J'ajoute que la pratique de la Cour facilite heureusement une division
du travail qui n'a riend'officielmais n'en est pas moins fructueuse, dans
le cas où certains juges se sentent tenus de déposer desopinions indivi-
duelles. Ayant pu prendre connaissance à l'avance des opinions indivi-

duelles de sir Gerald Fitzmaurice et de M. Gros, je leur laisse volontiers,
ainsi qu'aux auteurs d'autres opinions individuelles, le soin de dévelop-
per certaines considérations juridiques que je n'ai pas traitées moi-
même,et, réciproquement, ils ont bien voulu, de leur côté, s'appuyer
sur les résumésque j'ai donnés de certains faits. Mais, ni dans leur cas,
ni dans le mien. il ne s'ensuit nécessairementaue nous aboutissions aux
mêmes conclusionssur chaque point de droit ou de fait.

10. Pour se prononcer sur l'affaire de la BarcelonaTraction, la Cour
doit appliquer des règlesrelevant de l'une des branches les plus contro-
versées du droit international. La question de 1a.responsabilité des
Etats en cas de dommages causés à des étrangers (autrement dit la
protection diplomatique des ressortissants) évoque d'après nombre

d'écrits contemporains le souvenir d'abus politiques commis à des
époquesrévolues l. Mais la Cour n'est pas ici en face d'un conflit entre
de grands Etats exportateurs de capitaux et des Etats en voie de déve-
loppement. La Belgique et l'Espagne sont des Etats qui, sur ce plan,
appartiennent au mêmegroupe. Je n'accepte pas l'assertion espagnole
du 20 mai 1969 selon laquelle la Belgique s'est simplement efforcée
d'amener la Cour à internationaliser un litige privé, mais il est vrai
qu'à la base le conflit oppose un puissant groupe financier espagnol et

l On voudra bien excuser l'auteur de rappeler au passage qu'il a décritet déploré
Heureusement, la ((diplomatie des canonnièr1se perd dans les brumes du passé.V.

165 Moreover, the Court is not here in the least concerned with such
provocative problems as State sovereignty over natural resources or the
rules applicable to compensation in case of nationalizations or expro-
priations. Professor F. V. Garcia Amador, in his sixth report as Special
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on State responsibility
(Yearbook of theInternationalLaw Commission,1961,Vol.II,p. 2at p. 46),
set forth an admirable attitude:

". ..his purpose was to take into account the profound changes
which are occurring in international law, in so faras they are capable
of affecting the traditional ideas and principles relating to respon-
sibility.The only reason why, in this endeavour, he rejected notions
or opinions for which acceptance is being sought in Ourtime, is that
he firmly believes that any notion or opinion which postulates ex-
treme positions-whatever may be the underlying purpose or motive

-is incompatible and irreconcilable with the idea of securing the
recognition and adequate legal protection of al1 the legitimate in-
terests involved. That has been the policy followed by the Commis-
sion hitherto and no doubt will continue to be its policy in the
future."
11. The institution "of the right to give diplomatic protection to
nationals abroad was recognized in. ..the Vienna Convention on

Diplomatic Relations, 1961", as Mr. Gros (as he then was) reminded the
sub-committee of the International Law Commission (Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1963,Vol. II, p. 230). The institution of
the right to give diplomatic protection is surely not obsolete although new
procedures are emerging.

With reference to diplomatic protection of corporate interests, the
customary international law began to change in the latter half of the
nineteenth century '. As Jennings writes, in somewhat picturesque and
Kiplingesque language :

"It is small wonder that difficulties arise when 19th century pre-
cedents about outrageous behaviour towards aliens residing in
outlandish parts are sought to be pressed into service to yield
principles apposite to sophisticated programmes of international
investment." (121 Hague Recueil 1967,II, p. 473.)

Since the critical date in this case is 1948, developments in the law

l Paul De Visschersees the changedevelopingafterthe decision in the Rudencase
in 1870; 102 Hazue Recueil 1961, II,pp. 467-468. un groupe non espagnolcomparable. On ne saurait donc direque l'affaire

mette en jeu des problèmes de (néo-colonialisme ».
De plus, en la présenteespèce.la Cour n'a nullement à se préoccuper
de problèmes aussi épineuxque la souverainetéd'un Etat sur les ressour-
ces naturelles ou les règles applicables au dédommagement en cas de
nationalisation ou d'expropriation. L'attitude adoptée par M. F. V.
Garcia Amador dans le sixièmerapport qu'il a rédigé enqualité de
rapporteur spécialde la Commission du droit international, àpropos de

la responsabilitédes Etats (Annuaire de laCommissiondu droit interna-
tional,1961,vol. II, p. 48) est digne de tous les éloges:
c( ...il a étudiéles profondes transformations qui se produisent
dans le droit international afin de déterminer de quelle manière et

dans quelle mesure elles peuvent influencer les concepts et principes
traditionnels en matière de responsabilité. Si,ce faisant, il a écarté
des orientations ou tendances qui tentent de se faire jour à notre
époque, c'est uniquement parce qu'il a la ferme conviction que
toute orientation ou tendance impliquant des positions extrêmesest,
quel que soit le but ou le motif auquel elle répond, incompatible et
inconciliable avec l'idée selon laquelleil faut assurer la reconnais-

sanceetla protectionjuridique adéquate de tous les intérêtlségitimes
en cause. Telle a étéjusqu'à présentet telle sera sans nul doute à
l'avenir, la politique de la Commission. ))
11. cLe droit d'accorder une protection diplomatique aux nationaux

à l'étrangerest reconnu par ...la Convention de Vienne de 1961sur les
relations diplomatiques »,comme M. Gros (qui n'était pas encorejuge
à la Cour) l'a rappelé à la sous-commission de la Commission du droit
international (Annuaire de laCommission du droit international,1963,
vol. II, p. 240). L'institution qu'est le droit d'accorder une protection
diplomatique n'est sûrement pas caduque, quoique de nouvelles procé-
dures fassent leur apparition.
Pour ce qui est de la protection diplomatique des intérêts des sociétés,

le droit international coutumier a commencé à changer pendant la se-
conde moitié duXIXe siècle l.Comme l'écritJennings dans un langage
assez pittoresque qui n'est pas sans rappeler Kipling:
KI1n'est pas surprenant que des difficultéssurgissent lorsque l'on
invoque des précédentsdu XIXe siècleconcernant des excèsindignes

commis à l'endroit d'étrangers résidantdans des contrées reculées
afin d'établirdes principes applicables à des programmes complexes
d'investissements internationaux. » (Recueil des cours de l'Académie
de droit internationalde La Haye, 1967, tome 121, vol. II, p. 473.)

Puisqu'en l'espècela date critique est 1948, l'évolutiondu droit et des

l Selon Paul De Visscher, cette modification se serait produite après la décision
relativeà l'affaire Ruden en 1870, Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit inter-
national dLa Haye, 1961, tome 102, vol. II, p. 467-468. and procedures during the ensuing last two decades are not controlling.

12. Any court's application of a rule of law to a particular case,
involves an interpretation of the rule. Historical and logical and tele-
ological tools may be used by the judge, consciously or unconsciously. If
the Court in the instant case had decided to include more factors in its
Judgment, it could have clarified the traditional system in the light of
clearer understandings of business practices and forms of corporate

organization, as these werealready welldeveloped two decades ago when
the events called into question in this case transpired. Legal norms ap-
plicable to those events should not be swept aside on the assumption that
they have already become mere cobwebs in the attics of legal history.
Corporations today and tomorrow may well utilize other methods of
financing and controlling foreign enterprises, and governments will have
adapted or willadapt their own lawsand practices to meet the realities of
the economic factors which affect the general interests of the State. The
"law of international economic development" will mature. Thus joint
business ventures, State guarantees of foreign investment, the use of
international organizations such as the IBRD and UNDP, may in the

course of time relegate the case of Barcelona Traction to the status now
occupied by Delagoa Bay-a precedent to be cited by advocates if
helpful to the pleading of a cause, but not a guiding element in the life of
the international business community.

Nevertheless, the Court has the duty to settle a specificdispute between

Belgium and Spain which arose out of Spain's exercisingjurisdiction
over a complex of foreign corporate enterprises.
13. There is a trend in the direction of extending the jurisdictional
power of the State to deal with foreign enterprises which have contact
with the State's territorial domain; ".. .al1 that can be required of a
State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law
places upon itsjurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercisejuris-
diction rests in its sovereignty l. But what are the limits placed by inter-
national law?Do the courts of the United States, for example, go too far
in applying its anti-trust laws to foreign enterprises, following the state-
ment of principle by Judge Hand in Alcoa 2?But that principle isaccepted

in at least six other countries 3. Are the jurisdictional limits on national
jurisdiction exceeded in the cases dealing with product liability of a
l Lotus, Judgment No. 9, 1927, P.C.Z.J., Series A, No. 10, p. 19.
148 Fed. 2d 416 (1946).Cf.Jessup, TransnationalLaw, 1956, pp. 73ff.
Drachsler, "American Parent and Alien Subsidiary: International Anti-trust
Problems of the Multinational Corporation", Bulletinof the Section of International procédures pendant les deux dernières décenniesne joue pas un rôle

déterminant.
12. Chaque fois qu'un tribunal applique une règlede droit à un cas
d'espèce,ilest amené à interpréter cetterègle.Pour cela,le juge peut faire
appel, consciemment ou inconsciemment, à des moyens historiques,
logiques ou téléologiques. Si,en l'affaire actuelle, la Cour avait décidé
de prendre en considération d'autres facteurs dans son arrêt,elle aurait
pu mieux éclairerle systèmetraditionnel grâce à une meilleure compré-
hension des pratiques commerciales et des formes que revêtla structure

des sociétés commerciales,car ces élémentsétaientdéjà bien développés
il y a deux décennies,quand se sontproduits les faits de la présentecause.
Il ne faudrait pas écarter péremptoirement les normes juridiques ap-
plicablesàcesfaits, sous prétextequ'ellesne seraient plus que des vestiges
poussiéreux n'intéressantque l'histoire du droit. Il se peut fort bien que
les sociétésd'aujourd'hui et de demain aient ou puissent avoir recours
à d'autres méthodes de financement et de contrôle des entreprises à
l'étrangeret que les gouvernements adaptent ou puissent adapter leurs

propres lois et leurs pratiques pour tenir compte de la réalitédes facteurs
économiques qui affectent les intérêtsgénérauxde 1'Etat. Le ((droit du
développementéconomique international » viendra à maturité. Les en-
treprises communes, les garanties accordées par 1'Etat aux investisse-
ments étrangers, le recours à des organisations internationales telles
que la BIRD et le PNUD, pourront ainsi, avec le temps, reléguer l'af-
faire de la BarcelonaTractionau rang qu'occupe actuellement cellede
la Delagoa Bay, c'est-à-dire à celui d'un précédentpouvant êtreinvo-

qué par des avocats quand il peut les aider à défendreune cause, mais
non d'un élémentpouvant guider la collectivité commerciale interna-
tionale dans son activité.
Il reste que la Cour doit à présent régler un litigeconcret qui s'est
élevé entre la Belgique et l'Espagne parce que cette dernière a exercésa
juridiction sur tout un complexe de sociétés étrangères.
13. Il existe une tendance à étendre lacompétence juridictionnelle de
1'Etataux entreprises étrangèresqui ont un point de contact quelconque

avec le domaine territorial de 1'Etat;cctout ce qu'on peut demander à
un Etat, c'est de ne pas dépasserles limites que le droit international
trace à sa compétence;en deçà de ceslimites, le titreà lajuridiction qu'il
exerce se trouve dans sa souveraineté l)).Mais quelles sont les limites
tracéespar le droit international? Par exemple, les tribunaux des Etats-
Unis vont-ils trop loin en appliquant les lois antitrust américainesaux
entreprises étrangères, après la déclarationde principe du juge Hand

dans l'affaireAlcoa 2? Mais ce principe est acceptédans au moins six
autres pays 3. Les limites de la compétencenationale en matière judi-

l 148 Fed.2d 416 (1946). Voir Jessup, Transnational Law, p.573 et suiv.
Drachsler,~American Parent and Alien Subsidiary: International Anti-trust
Problems of the Multinational Corporation)),ulletin of the Section of Inter-"giant octopus corporation" with multiple subsidiaries abroad? Rules
valid enough for inter-state conflicts within the constitutional system of
the United States, may be improper when placing a burden on inter-

national commerce l.The Committee on International Law of the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York concluded that ". ..the
extension of the regulatory and penal provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 .. .to foreign corporations which have neither listed
securities in the United States nor publicly offered securities within the
United States is a violation of international law 2".

14. In States having different types of economic and financialproblems,
international law has become increasingly permissive of actions involving
nationalizations. In place of what used to be denounced as illegal ex-
propriation, the issues now turn largely on the measure of compensation,
since even the famous General Assembly Resolution on Permanent
SovereigntyOver Natural Resources 3,provides that compensation is due.

To whom, in such cases is compensation due? If in the anti-trust,
product-liability and other situations, the corporate veil is freely pierced
to assert the State's jurisdictional power, why should it not also be
pierced to determine the State's responsibility to the interests actually
injured by action damaging to a foreign enterprise? In the instant case,

Spain asserted its power to deal with Barcelona Traction's subsidiaries in
Spain, disregarding the Canadian nationality of Ebro and others. The
equitable balance of legal interests permits Belgium to pierce the veil of
the Canadian "charter of convenience" and to assert the real interests of
the shareholders-assuming of course that their continuous Belgian
character is established. In so far as there has been an increase in the
permissible limits of the exerciseof Stateauthority over foreign corporate

enterprises, there must be an accompanying realistic liberalisation of
rules identifying the State or States which may, in case of abuse, invoke
the right of diplomatic protection.

15. The legal rights which are vindicated through the international

and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association, July 1964, pp. 29 and 48,
and authorities there cited.
l Mecsas, "Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations in Product Liability
Actions: Forum Non Conveniens and Due Process Limitations on In Personam
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations", 50 Corne11Law Quarterly, p. 551 at
p. 563 (1965). Cf. Arnerican Law Institute,Restatement of the Law, Second,-
Conflict of Laws, TitlC (1967 ed.).
The Record of the Association, Vol. 21, No. 4, April 1966, p. 240 at p. 252.
G.A. 1803 (XVII), 14 Decernber 1962. Cf. Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty
Over Oil Resources (1966), p. 30.ciaire sont-elles franchies dans les affaires qui mettent en jeu la responsa-
bilité,du fait de ses produits, d'une ((supersociététentaculaire » ayant
de nombreuses filiales à l'étranger? Des règles justifiées lorsqu'elles
s'appliquent àdes conflits inter-Etats dans le systèmeconstitutionnel des

Etats-Unis peuvent ne plus l'être lorsqu'ellecsonstituent un fardeau pour
le commerce international l.Le Comité dudroit international de 1'Asso-
ciation du barreau de la ville de New York a conclu que ((l'extensiondes
dispositions réglementaireset pénalesde la loi de 1934sur l'échange des
valeurs (Securities Exchange Act) ..aux sociétésétrangèresdont les
valeurs ne sont ni cotées aux Etats-Unis ni offertes au public sur le
territoire des Etats-Unis constitue une violation du droit international 2.

14. Dans des Etats dont les problèmes économiqueset financiers sont
de nature différente, ledroit international tend de plus en plus à ad-
mettre des mesures impliquant des nationalisations. Au lieu de réclama-
tions contre ce que l'on dénonçaitjadiscomme une expropriation illégale,
la discussion porte maintenant en grande partie sur le montant de l'in-
demnité à verser puisque mêmela résolution bien connue de 1'Assem-
bléegénérale relative à la souveraineté permanente sur les ressources

naturelles stipule qu'une indemnisation est due.
A qui est-elle due en pareil cas? Si, dans des situations mettant en jeu
la réglementationantitrust et la responsabilitédu fait des produits, etc.,
le voile social est librement levépour affirmer la compétencejuridiction-
nellede I'Etat, pourquoi neleserait-ilpas aussipour déterminer larespon-
sabilité de1'Etat à l'égard desintérête sffectivementlésés par une mesure
portant préjudice à une entreprise étrangère?En l'espèce,l'Espagne a

affirmésacompétence à l'égard des filialesde la Barcelona Traction en
Espagne, en dépit de la nationalité canadienne de 1'Ebro et d'autres
filiales. Un équilibreéquitable des intérêts juridiquesdoit permettre à
la Belgique d'écarterle voile du ((statut de complaisance » canadien et
de défendre lesintérêts réelsdes actionnaires - à supposer évidemment
que la continuité de leur caractère belge soit établie. Dans la mesure
où les limites admises de l'exercicede l'autorité de 1'Etat sur des entre-

prises appartenant à des sociétésétrangèressont repoussées, lesrègles
permettant d'identifier 1'Etat ou les Etats qui peuvent, en cas d'abus,
invoquer le droit de protection diplomatique devraient parallèlement
êtreassouplies d'une manière réaliste.
15. Les droits, au sens juridique, que l'on fait respecter par la pro-

national and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association, juillet 1964, p. 29 et
48, et les auteurs citésdans cet article.
l Mecsas, «Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporation in Product Liability
Actions: Forum Non Conveniens and Due Process Limitations on In Personam
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporatioi)50 Corne11Law Quarterly, p. 563 (1965).
Voir American Law Institute,Restatement of the Law, Second,-Conjlicof Laws,
titre C (éd. 1967).
The Record of the Association, vol. 21, no 4, avril 1966, p. 252.
Voir Mughraby, Permanent Sovereignty Over Oil Resources (1966), p. 30. 1962.procedure of diplomatic protection, are not identical with rights derived
from the applicable municipal law; the rights are on different planes.
There are situations in which no right under municipal law existsbecause

that law does not provide or permit legalaction to enforce the claim, but
international law does afford a remedy.The obvious cases are those where
an injury is inflicted by a State instrumentality or agent which is immune
from suit. If, for example, a naval vesselof State A negligently rams and
sinksa merchant vesselof State B, and the law of State A does not permit
any legal action against the State or its instrumentality, State B, on the
international plane, may press a claimfor damages on behalf of the vessel
which possessesits nationality l.Of course if there are no local remedies,
the international rule for exhaustion of such remedies is not applicable

and a State may incur international liability for the very reason that there
is no local remedy 2. Although statutes now ptovide in many countries a
cause of action for damages caused by the death of a person, no such
cause of action existed at common law. The subject was discussed by
Umpire Parker in the Lusitanc iases ((1923) VI1 U.N.R.I.A.A., pp. 32,
34ff.),in holding that international law and practice support the presenta-
tion ofclaimsofheirs and widows(wherethe nationality requirements are
met), irrespective of the question whether under the law of the State

charged with responsibility for wrongful death, the heir or widow has a
right to damages.

16. In connection with the instant case, the question arises from the
argument that there can be no international right to damages for share-
holders indirectly injured by damage to the Company in which they

hold shares, since no such right is generally established in municipal law.
Much reliance is placed upon the proposition that under most systemsof
municipal law, shareholders have no rights in or to the assets of the
corporation until after it is dissolved or wound up. Shareholders' suits
are indeed provided by law in the United States and somwhat less
extensivelyin Great Britain. In the United States "The derivative stock-
holder-plaintiff is not only a nominal plaintiff, but at thesame time a real

awarded damages to the owners of the British collier Confdence, which had been run
down by the United States frigate ConstitutIIIMoore, International Arbitrations,
3063. Cf. The Lindisfarne, in the United States-Great Britain Claims Commission
under the 1910 Treaty,VI U.N.R.Z.A.A., 21.

SOin Ruden's case and in Johnson's case, in the United States-Peruvian Claims
Commission 1870,awards were made to the claimants when a circular of the Minister
of Justice forbade the judges to receive suits of the type in question. Moore, Inter-
national Arbitrations,l. III,pp. 1653 and 1656.cédure internationale de la protection diplomatique ne sont pas iden-
tiques à ceux qui découlentdu droit interne applicable; ils se situent sur
des plans différents. Parfois, il n'existe aucun droit en vertu du droit

interne parce que celui-ci ne prévoit et n'autorise aucune action en
justice à l'appui d'une réclamation,alors que le droit international, lui,
offreun recours. Les cas évidentssont ceux où un préjudiceest causépar
un organisme ou un agent de 1'Etat qui ne peut êtreassignéen justice.
Si, par exemple, un navire de guerre de 1'EtatA éperonnepar négligence
et coule un navire marchand de 1'Etat B et si la législationde 1'Etat A
n'autorise aucun recours contre 17Etatou ses organismes, 1'Etat B peut,

devant des instances internationales, intenter une demande en répara-
tion pour le navire qui possèdesa nationalité l.Naturellement, en I'ab-
sence de recours internes, la règle internationale qui exige l'épuisement
de ces recours n'est pas applicable et la responsabilité internationale
d'un Etat peut êtreengagéedu fait mêmede leur absence 2. Bien que
la législation de nombreux pays reconnaisse maintenant le droit de
demander des dommages-intérêts du faitdu décèsd'une personne ayant

entraîné un préjudice, ce droit n'existait pas en common law. Cette
question a étéévoquéedans les affaires du Lusitania ((1923), Nations
Unies, Recueil des sentences arbitrales,vol. VII, p. 32, 34 et suiv.) par
l'arbitre, M. Parker. Celui-ci a soutenu que le droit des gens et la
pratique internationale reconnaissent aux héritiers et à la veuve le
droit de se pourvoir en justice (quand les conditions de nationalité sont
remplies), indépendamment de la question de savoir si les lois de 1'Etat

qui est accusé d'être responsable du décèsadmettent le droit à répa-
ration en faveur de l'héritierou de la veuve.
16. En l'espèce,la question se pose parce que l'on soutient que des
actionnaires indirectement lésés par un préjudiceinfligé à la sociétédont
ils possèdent des actions ne peuvent, en droit international, jouir d'un
droit à réparation puisqu'un tel droit n'est pas généralementadmis en
droit interne. Pour défendre cette thèse, on tire grand argument de ce

que, dans la plupart des systèmesde droit interne, les actionnaires n'ont
aucun droit sur l'actif d'une sociététant au'elle n'a Dasété dissouteou
liquidée.Or les actions intentées par lesLactionnaires sont bel et bien
prévuespar la Iégislation américaineet, à un degrémoindre, en Grande-
Bretagne. Aux Etats-Unis, (l'actionnaire demandeur dans un derivative

En vertu de la convention de réclamations Grande-Bretagne-Etats-Unis de
1853, l'arbitreaccordé des dommages-intérêtsaux vrovriétaires du charbonnier
britannique Confidence qui avait étéCoulépar la frégate'américaine Constitution;
Moore, International Arbitrations, vol.p.3063. Voir TheLindisfurne. affaire iugée
par le tribunal arbitr~tats-unis-~rande-~retagne constitué en-vertu du traitéde
1910, Nations Unies, Recueil des sentences arbitrales, vol. VI, p. 21.
Dans l'affaire Ruden et dans l'affaire Johnson, la Commission de réclamations
Etats-Unis-Pérou de 1870 aa.ccordédes dommages-intérêts aux demandeurs après
qu'une circulaire du ministre de la justice eut prescrit aux juges de tenir ce type
d'action pour irrecevable. Moore,nternationul Arbitrations, vol. III, p. 1653 et
1656.party in interest. He sues not solely upon a corporate cause of action but

also upon his own cause of action". See Koessler, "The Stockholder's
Suit: A Comparative View", 46ColumbiaLawReview1946,pages 238and
242. The provisions for shareholder suits in the European countries
seem to be somewhat less favourable to the shareholder. But the trend in
France is toward more protection of shareholders, as Judge Gros points
out in paragraph 11 of his separate opinion.

17. Although the concept of corporate personality is a creature of
municipal law, none of the theories evolved in that frame of reference can
be relied on universally to explain the legal relations surrounding that
"technical legal device".

"Gierke's theory was based upon Germanic village communities,
medieval guilds and similar truly corporate entities. But such a

theory hardly fits the modern holding Company. .. The result is
that those who administer the law, whether as judges, revenue
authorities, or as administrators, in civilian and common law
systems alike [and I would add in the international law system]have
had to discard al1known theories of corporate personality, and to
relativise the conception ofjuristic personality, respecting it for some
purposes [lx,disregardingit for others, in accordance with the nature

ofthe problem before them." (Friedmann, Legal Theory,5th ed. 1967,
pp. 522-523.See also p. 571.)

I would paraphrase and adapt a dictum from a recent decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in an anti-trust case:the International
Court of Justice in the instant case is "not bound by formal conceptions
of" corporation law. "We mustlook at theeconomic reality of the relevant

transactions" and identify "the overwhelminglydominant feature" 2.The
overwhelmingly dominant feature in the affairs of Barcelona Traction
was not the fact of incorporation in Canada, but the controlling influence

l Thus, for exarnple, where a corporation carriesaopurely commercial activity,
internationallaw does not "pierce the veil" to grant it the sovereign imrnunity
attaching to the State by which it is wholly owned and rnanaged; see Harvard
Foreign States, 1932, Art. 12, p. 641.on Cornpetence of Courts in Regard ro
Mr. Justice Marshall delivering the opinion of the Court in United States v.
The Concentroted Phosphate Export Assn. Inc. et al.,S.9Ct. p. 361 at pp. 366-367,
1968. Cf. the statement of a leading mernber of the New York Bar: "To give any
degree of reality to the treatment, in legal terms, of thefor the settlement of
international economicdisputes, one must examine the internationalrnmunity, its
ernerging organizations, its dynamics, and relationships among its greatly expanded
mernbership." (Spofford, "Third Party Judgment and International Econornic
Transactions", 113 Hague Recueil 1964, III, pp. 121-123.) suin te l'est pas d'une manièrepurement formelle; il est en même temps
véritablement partie au procès. Il engage une action non seulement

pour faire valoir undroit de lasociété mais aussp iour son propre compte. x
Voir Koessler, «The Stockholder's Suit: A Comparative View », 46
Columbia Law Review1946,pages 238 et 242. Dans les pays européens,
les dispositions qui régissent ledroit d'agir de l'actionnaire semblent
êtreun peu moins favorables à celui-ci. En France, cependant, comme

M. Gros l'indique au paragraphe 11 de son opinion individuelle, on
s'oriente vers une protection accrue des actionnaires.
17. Bien que la notion de la personnalité sociale soit une créationdu
droit interne, on ne peut s'appuyer sur aucune des théories édifiées dans
ce domaine pour expliquer dans tous les cas les rapports juridiques en-

tourant cet « artifice de technique juridique ».
((Lathéoriede Gierke étaitfondéesur les communautésvillageoises

germaniques, lesguildesmédiévalee st entitésdu mêmegenreformant
véritablementun corps social. Mais une telle théoriene peut guère
s'appliquer a une sociétéholding moderne ...Il s'ensuit que tous
ceux qui appliquent le droit, en qualité de juges, d'agents du fisc
ou d'administrateurs, ont dû abandonner, aussi bien dans les sys-

tèmes de droit civil que dans ceux de common law [et j'ajouterai
dans celui du droit international], toutes les théories connues de la
personnalité sociale pour ne plus attribuer qu'une valeur relative
à la notion de personnalité juridique, en continuant cependant de
la respecter dans certaines cas l, en n'en tenant pas compte dans

d'autres, selon la nature du problème dont ils sont saisis. ))(Fried-
mann, Legal Theory,5'éd.1967,p. 522-523.Voir égalementp. 571.)

Me permettant de paraphraser et d'adapter une observation exprimée
dans une décision récentede la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis concernant
une affaire antitrust, je dirai qu'en l'espècela Cour internationale de
Justice ((n'estpas liéepar des notions formelles ))du droit des sociétés.
((Nous devons prendre en considération la réalitééconomique des

transactions en question ))et identifier la caractéristique vraiment pré-
dominante )).Pour ce qui est de la Barcelona Traction, la caractéris-

Par exemple, lorsqu'une sociétése livre à des activités purement commerciales,
le droit international nelèvepas le voil)Ipour lui accorder l'immunitésouveraine
dont bénéficie 1'Etat qui en a l'entière propriétéet en assure seul la gestion; voir
Harvard Research in International Law, Report on Cornpetence of Courts in Regard
to Foreign States 1932, art. 12, p. 641.
Prononcé de l'opinion de la Cour, par le juge Marshall, dans l'affaireUnited
p. 366-367. Voir la déclaration d'un membre éminent du barreau new-yorkais:Ct.,
(Pour envisager avec quelque réalisme letraitement à appliquer sur le plan juridique
aux moyens de règlement des différendséconomiquesinternationaux, il faut prendre
en considération la communauté internationale, la manière dont elle commence à
s'organiser, son dynamisme et les relations entre ses membres toujours plus nom-
breux. 1(Spofford, «Third Party Judgment and International Economic Trans- of far-flung international financial interests manifested in the Sofina
grouping.

It may wellbe that the new structures of international enterprise willbe

increasingly important l,but any glance at the world-wide picture today
shows chat non-governmental corporations still have a major role to
play 2.That is why so many new States, and the United Nations itself,
encourage the investment of private capital 3.

The Right to Extend DiplornaticProtection
to Corporate Enterprises

18. The decision of the Court, in this case, is based on the legal con-
clusionthat onlyCanadahad aright to presenta diplomatic claimonbehalf

of Barcelona Traction which was a Company of Canadian nationality.
My own conclusion is that, for reasons which 1shall explain, Canada did
not have, in this case,a right to claim on behalf of Barcelona Traction. As
a matter of general international law, it is also my conclusion that a
State, under certain circumstances, has a right to present a diplomatic
claim on behalf of shareholders who are its nationals. As a matter of

proof of fact, 1find that Belgium did not succeed in proving the Belgian
nationality, between the critical dates, of those natural and juristic
persons on whose behalf it sought to claim. The Belgian claim must
therefore be rejected.

The Record ofActual Diplomatic Representations

19. If a State extends its diplomatic protection to a corporation to
which it has granted a "charter of convenience" while at the same time

l See Friedmann et al., International Financial Aid, 1966; Kirdar, The Structure of
United Nations Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries, 1966.
See Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law, 1964, Chap. 14;
Hyde, "Economic Development Agreements", 105 Hague Recueil 1962,1, p. 271.

Blough, "The Furtherance of Economic Development", International Organi-
zation, 1965, Vol. XIX, p. 562, and especially, Dirk Stikker's report to UNCTAD
on "The Role of private enterprise in investment and promotion of exports in
developing countries" (1968), UN Doc. TDl351Rev.1, and "Panel on Foreign
Investment in Developing Countries", Amsterdam, 16-20 February, 1969, E/4654,
ST/ECA/ 117. tique vraiment prédominante est non pas le fait que cette sociétés'est
constituéeau Canada, mais le contrôle exercépar de vastes intérêts finan-
ciers internationaux, en particulier sous la forme du groupe Sofina.

Il se peut fort bien que les structures nouvelles de l'entreprise inter-
nationale prennent à l'avenir une importance croissante l mais il
suffit de jeter un coup d'Œilsur le monde d'aujourd'hui pour s'aperce-
voir que les sociétésnon étatiques ont encore un grand rôle à jouer 2.
C'est pourquoi tant de nouveaux Etats et les Nations Unies elles-mêmes

encouragent les investissements de capitaux privés 3.

Le droit de protection diplomatiqud ees sociétés

18. La décisionde la Cour est fondée sur la conclusion juridique que
seul le Canada avait le droit de présenter une réclamation diplomatique
au nom de la Barcelona Traction, sociétéde nationalité canadienne. Ma
propre conclusion est que, pour les raisons que j'exposerai, le Canada

n'avait pas le droit, en l'espèce,de présenter de réclamation au nom de
la Barcelona Traction. Sur le plan du droit international général,je
conclus également qu'un Etat possède, dans certaines circonstances, le
droit de présenter uneréclamation diplomatique au nom d'actionnaires
qui sont sesressortissants. Sur le plan des faits, je constate que la Belgique

n'a pas réussi à prouver la nationalité belge, entre les dates critiques, des
personnes physiques et morales au nom desquelles elle a fait valoir une
réclamation. La demande de la Belgique doit donc êtrerejetée.

Rappel des représentations diplomatiquq esi ontété faites

19. Lorsqu'une sociétébénéficiede la protection diplomatique d'un
Etat qui lui a accordé un ((statut de complaisance » et, en mêmetemps,

actions», Recueil des cours de l'Académiede droit international de La Haye, 1964,
tome 113, vol. III, p. 121-123.)
Voir Friedmann et al.,International Financial Aid, 1966; Kirdar, The Structure
of United Nations Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries, 1966.
Voir Friedmann, The ChangingStructure of International Law, 1964, chap. 14;
droit international de La Haye, 1962, tome 105, vol. 1, p. 271. de l'Académie de
Voir Blough, «The Furtherance of Economic Development .,Internafional
Organization, 1965,vol. XIX, p. 562, et spécialementle rapport dM. Dirk Stikker
à la CNUCED sur «Le rôle de l'entreprise privée dans les investissements et la
promotion des exportations dans les pays en voie de développement 11,1968, doc.
des Nations Unies TD/35/Rev.l, et le rapport du Groupe d'étudedesinvestissements
étrangers dans les pays en voie de développement, Amsterdam, 16-20février 1969,
doc. des Nations Unies, E/4654, ST/ECA/I17. similar diplomatic assistance is being extended by another State whose
nationals hold 100 per cent. of the shares, the situation might be con-
sidered analogous to cases of dual nationality of natural persons '.In
those cases, international jurisprudence supports the principle that
preference should be given to the "real and effectivenationality", as was
held by this Court in the Nottebohm, Second Phase, Judgment (I.C.J.
Reports 1955,pp. 4,22), which will be discussedlater in this opinion.

If Canada could be considered the State of the "real and effective
nationality" of Barcelona Traction and if Canada assumed and main-
tained the role of Barcelona Traction's diplomatic protector, such facts
would militate against the Belgian posture that Belgium was the State

entitled to press theclaim. The arguments of the Parties followed some
such theory; Counsel for Spain called it an "essential point" and exam-
ined at length the record of Canadian diplomatic activity in the case (20
June 1969). The lack or failure of Canadian diplomatic protection is
distinctly relevant to an analysis of the so-called "exceptions" to the
alleged general rule that only the State of which the company has the
nationality is entitled to claim on its behalf. Such "exceptions" will be
discussed later. The facts relative to the positions as claimant Govern-
ments of Canada and Belgium-and of Great Britain and the United
States as well-must accordingly be taken into account. The record
throws light on the nature and extent of the several national interests.

In the instant case, Spain was at one time confronted by diplomatic
representations of Great Britain, Canada, the United Statesand Belgium.

But at that stage of multiple diplomatic activity, specificclaims fordam-
ages were not being advanced; Spain was being asked to take steps to
halt what were considered to be destructive actions against Barcelona
Traction. Spain'sreplies in the early stagesrested on the proposition that
the Government could not interfere with the normal functioning of the
Spanish courts.

Great Britain
20. The first British Note was dated 23 February 1948and asserted an
interest due to the dismissal of high-ranking British officersin the Barce-
lona Traction company and to the position of bondholders "resident in
the United Kingdom". (A.P.O. (1960), Vol. III, pp. 193 ff. for this and
subsequent démarches, except as otherwise noted.) In the next British
Note, of 27 March, there was support for the Canadian representations

Theanalogymay be drawneven though the nationalityof shareholdersis not the
test of the nationality of a corporation forpurposes of internationallaw.

172 BARCELONATRACTION (OP. IND. ESSUP) 171

d'une assistance diplomatique similaire d'un autre Etat, dont des ressor-
tissants détiennent 100 pour cent de ses actions, la situation peut être
considérée commeanalogue aux cas de double nationalité des personnes
physiques l. En pareils cas, la jurisprudence internationale est favorable
au principe selon lequel la «nationalité effective))doit prévaloir, ainsi
que l'ajugéla Cour dans l'arrêt rendu enl'affaire Nottebohm,deuxième
phase (C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p. 22), dont il sera question plus loin dans la
présenteopinion.
Si le Canada pouvait êtreconsidérécomme 1'Etat dont la Barcelona

Traction avait la «nationalité effectiv», et s'il avait assuméet continué
de tenir le rôle de protecteur diplomatique de la Barcelona Traction, cela
iraità l'encontre de la thèsebelge selon laquelle la Belgique était1'Etat
habilité à faire valoir la réclamation. Dans leur argumentation, les
Parties se sont d'ailleurs inspirées d'unethéorie dece genre; les conseils
de l'Espagne y ont vu un «point essentiel» et se sont penchéslonguement
sur l'activitédiplomatique exercéepar le Canada dans l'affaire (séance
du 20 juin 1969). Il est clair que l'absence ou le défaut de protection

diplomatique de la partdu Canada estun élémenp tertinent dans l'analyse
de cequel'on a appeléles «exceptions »à la prétenduerèglegénérale selon
laquelle seul1'Etatdont la société a la nationalité esten droit de présenter
une réclamation en son nom. Ces ((exceptions » seront examinéesplus
loin. Il faut donc prendre en considération les faits qui se rapportenà la
position des Gouvernements du Canada et de la Belgique, ainsi que de
la Grande-Bretagne et des Etats-Unis, en tant que gouvernements
réclamants; ceux dont on a connaissance mettent en lumière la nature
et l'importance des différentsintérêts nationaux en jeu.

En l'espèce, l'Espagne s'est vue l'objet, à un moment donné, de
représentations diplomatiques de la Grande-Bretagne, du Canada, des
Etats-Unis et dela Belgique. Mais pendant cette phase d'activitédiploma-
tique multiple, aucune demande concrète de dommages-intérêtsn'a été
formulée;l'Espagne étaitsimplement priéede prendre des mesures pour
mettre un terme àdesactions considéréescomme destructrices à l'encontre
de la Barcelona Traction. Au début,la position prise par l'Espagne dans
ses réponses a étéque le gouvernement ne pouvait s'ingérerdans le

fonctionnement normal des tribunaux espagnols.
Grande-Bretagne

20. La premièrenote britannique, en date du 23 février1948,exprimait
un intérêtà raison du licenciement de membres britanniques du personnel
de direction de la Barcelona Traction et de la situation des porteurs
d'obligations ((résidantau Royaume-Uni 1)(Voir A.E.P. (1960), vol. III,
p. 193et suiv. pour la démarche en question et celles qui ont suivi, sauf
indication contraire.) Dans sa note suivante,datée du 27mars, leGouver-

l L'analogieest valablemêmesi la nationalitédes actionnaires n'est pasle critère
de la nationalitéd'une sociaux finsdu droit international.

172 "on behalf ofthe United Kingdom bondholders". On 28 September 1951,
the British Note speaks on behalf of the protection of (unidentified)
"shareholders and bondholders". Thereafter, aside from correspondence
about the failure of Spain to reply to the British Notes and about the
committee of experts and its report in 1951,the British position seemed
to be merely one of supporting Canada. Throughout this period, Canada
had no embassy in Madrid and its notes were transmitted through the

British Embassy. But the Receiver and Manager of Barcelona Traction,
in a memorandum submitted to the Supreme Court of Ontario, on 24
December 1951,reported a conference with British Treasury officials in
London on the preceding 25 July, during which Mr. Eggers, a represen-
tative of the Treasury, "stated that Great Britain had taken no action
independent of Canada. He insinuated that the British had merely fol-
lowed the Canadian lead which we know to be untrue". (Emphasis sup-
plied.) (Receivership Docs., Vol. 5, p. 772.) The basis for this last con-
clusion is not clear.

Canada

21. The aid of the Canadian Government was originally requested by
National Trust, as trustee for certain Barcelona bond issues, which made
representations to the Canadian Government when it learned of the
developments in Spain following the bankruptcy judgment of 12February
1948. Counsel for National Trust informed the Supreme Court of
Ontario that :

"The Government of Canada as a result of such representations
made a demarche to the Government of Spain through appropriate
diplomatic channels with regard to the matter ... '" (Receivership
Docs., Vol. 1,p. 16.A memorandum in ibid., Vol.4, p. 585,indicates
that Barcelona Traction joined National Trust in its representations.)

22. The first Canadian Note-like the first Belgian Note and the
second British Note-was dated 27 March 1948.(The Belgian Note will

be cited later to A.M., Vol. IV, Annex 250.) Canada made an officia1
protest, alleging a denial of justice to Barcelona Traction, Ebro and
National Trust, because of a lack of proper notice and an absence of
jurisdiction under the principles of private international law. Passing
over some of the Canadian notes, one finds that on 21 July 1949 a long

l This statement was made by Counsel on 9 July 1948 in connection with
National Trust's application fthe appointment of areceiver and manager, an
application which was grantedy the Courton 15July 1948.

173 nement britannique appuyait ((au nom des obligataires au Royaume-Uni ))

les représentations formuléespar le Canada. La note britannique du
28 septembre 1951parle de protégerles intérêts «des actionnaires et des
porteurs d'obligations » (non identifiés).Par la suite, mise à part la
correspondance relative au fait que l'Espagne n'avait pas répondu aux
notes britanniques ou concernant la commission d'experts et le rapport
présentépar cette dernière en 1951, la Grande-Bretagne semble s'être
bornée à appuyer le Canada. Pendant toute cette période, le Canada

n'ayant pas d'ambassade à Madrid, ses notes ont ététransmises par
l'intermédiairede l'ambassade de Grande-Bretagne. Mais le receiver et
administrateur de la Barcelona Traction a fait état, dans un mémoire
présenté à la Cour suprêmede l'Ontario le 24 décembre 1951, d'une
conférencequi avait eu lieu à Londres le 25 juillet précédentavec des
fonctionnaires du Trésor britannique et au cours de laquelle M. Eggers,
un représentant du Trésor,aurait ((déclaréque la Grande-Bretagne n'avait

pris aucune initiative indépendamment du Canada ». «11 a insinué »,
ajoutait le receiver, ((que les Britanniques s'étaientcontentésde suivre
les Canadiens, ce que nous savons n'être pas vr »ai(Les italiques sont de
nous.) (Doc. du receivership,vol. V, p. 772). On ne voit pas clairement
sur quoi se fonde cette dernière conclusion.

Canada
21. A l'origine, c'est la National Trust qui, en sa qualitéde trustee
pour certaines émissionsd'obligations de la Barcelona, a demandél'aide
du Gouvernement canadien: elle a fait des représentationsau Gouverne-

ment canadien lorsqu'elle a appris les événementssurvenus en Espagne
à la suite du jugement de faillite du 12 février 1948. Le conseil de la
National Trust a donnéles indications suivantes à la Cour suprêmede
l'Ontario :
((A la suite de ces représentations, le Gouvernement canadien a

effectuéune démarche auprès duGouvernement espagnol, par les
voies diplomatiques appropriées, au sujet de l'affaire ... ))@oc. du
receivership,vol. 1,p. 16.Un mémoire(ibid., vol. IV, p. 585)indique
que la Barcelona Traction s'est associée auxreprésentations de la
National Trust.)

22. La première note canadienne - comme la premièrenote belge et
la deuxièmenote britannique - étaitdatéedu 27 mars 1948. (La note
belge sera citéepar la suite dans A.M., vol IV, ann. 250.) Le Canada
émettait une protestation officielle, alléguant qu'il y avait eu déni de
justiceà l'encontre de la Barcelona Traction, de 1'Ebroet de la National
Trust pour absence de notification et défaut de compétenceen vertu
des principes du droit international privé.Laissant de côté certainesdes

l Cette déclaration a été faitepar le conseil de la National Trust le 9juillet 1948
à propos de la requêtede la National Trust demandant la nomination d'un receiver
et administrateur, requête à laquelle la Cour suprêmea fait droit le 15juillet 1948.note of protest alleges discrimination against Canadian interests and
against "foreign investments in Spain"; the emphasis is on Ebro, a
Canadian corporation.

23. In February of 1950, there was close collaboration between the
Canadian and Belgian Governments; they proposed to urge the Spanish
Government to agree to the appointment of a committee of experts
composed of representatives of Spain, Canada and Belgium to study

certain financial aspects of the Barcelona case. The Governments of
Great Britain and of the United States were also consulted by Canada
and it was planned that those governments would support the démarche.
Canadian drafts of the proposed note to Spain were submitted to the three
other Governments. Throughout, Canada stressed its appreciation of the
large financialinterest of Belgian nationals in Barcelona Traction. A text
provisionally approved, stated that the Governments of the United
Kingdom and of the United States "are interested in this matter as it
relates to the security of foreign investments generally". The phrasing of
the quoted clause was suggested by the United States. Before the final
text could be CO-ordinatedwith al1the four Governments, the Spanish

Government took the initiative by a Note of 16 March 1950 to the
British Embassy in Madrid, proposing a similar commission, but com-
posed of Spanish, Canadian and British representatives; Belgium was
omitted l.

24. There is some question whether the Canadian and British participa-
tion in the Tripartite Committee of Experts in 1950-1951 should be
considered as an aspect of diplomatic protection. The Receiver and
Manager on 16 November 1950 sent a memorandum to the Ontario

Court informing him that the Canadian Department of External Affairs
had asked him to put up $20,000 to cover the fees and expenses of Mr.
Norman, the Canadian member of the Commission. The Receiver and
Manager asked for authority to pay that amount and said:

"It is my opinion that the intervention of the Government of
Canada in this matter has been of the utmost importance and that
the continued support of the Government of Canada is essential if
the integrity of the portfolioeld by the plaintiff [National Trust] is
to be restored and the properties presentlyunder seizure in Spain are
to be recovered." (Receivership Docs., Vol. 4, p. 585.)

l The documentation is in A.R., Annexes 37 and 38. Mr. Heineman, the directing
that the Canadian Note was about to be delivered with the support of the othernt
three Governments; telegram Heineman to Brosens in Buenos Aires, 24 February
1950, 0. & S., New Docs. 1964, App. 8.notes canadiennes, on trouve, àladate du 21juillet 1949,une longue note
de protestation faisant état d'une discrimination contre les intérêts
canadiens et à l'encontre d'([investissements étrangers en Espagne)),

l'accent étantmis sur I'Ebro, sociétécanadienne.
23. En février1950. une étroite collaboration s'étaitétablieentre les
Gouvernements canadien et belge; ces deux gouvernements proposèrent
d'inviter le Gouvernement espagnol à accepter que soit constituée une
commission d'experts composéedereprésentants del'Espagne, duCanada
et de la Belgique, qui aurait étéchargéed'étudier certainsaspects finan-
ciers de l'affaire de la Barcelona. Les Gouvernements de la Grande-
Bretagne et des Etats-Unis furent également consultéspar le Canada
et il étaitprévuque ces gouvernements appuieraient la démarcheenvi-
sagée.Le Canada soumit aux trois autres gouvernements des projets

de la note destinée à l'Espagne. Pendant toute cette période, il ne cessa
pas de reconnaître l'importance des intérêtsfinanciers des ressortissants
belges dans la Barcelona Traction. Un texte fut provisoirement approuvé,
aux termes duquel les Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et des Etats-
Unis déclaraient «s'intéresse[rà cette affaire car elle concerne la sécurité
des investissements étrangers en général ». Le libelléde ce membre de
phrase avait étésuggéré par les Etats-Unis. Avant que les quatre gouver-
nements puissent s'entendre sur la mise au point du texte définitif,le
Gouvernement espagnol, par une note du 16 mars 1950 adressée à
l'ambassade de Grande-Bretagne à Madrid, prit l'initiative de proposer

une commission analogue mais composée de représentants espagnols,
canadiens et britanniques, la Belgique étantlaissée endehors '.
24. On peut se demander si la participation des Canadiens et des
Britanniques à la commission tripartite d'experts de 1950-1951doit être
considérée comme un aspecd t e la protection diplomatique. Le 16novem-
bre 1950,le receiver et administrateur a adresséau juge de l'Ontario un
mémoirel'informant que le ministère canadien des Affaires extérieures
lui avait demandé de déposer unesomme de 20 000 dollars pour couvrir
le montant des honoraires et desfraisde M. Norman, lemembre canadien

de la commission. Le receiveret administrateur demandait l'autorisation
de verser ce montant en déclarant:
«'JYestimeque l'intervention du Gouvernement canadien dans
cette affaire est de la plus haute importance et que le maintien de
l'appui du Gouvernement canadien est indispensable si l'on veut

rétablir dans son intégritéle portefeuille détenu par la requérante
[la National Trust] et recouvrer les biens actuellement saisis en
Espagne. ))@oc. du receivership,vol. IV, p. 585.)

On trouvera les documents pertinents daA.R., ann. 37 et 38. Le 24 février
1950, M. Heineman, la personnalité dirigeade la Barcelona Traction, semblait
assuréque la note canadienne était sur le point d'êtredélivrée avec l'appui destrois
autres gouvernements; télégramme adressépar Heineman Brosens à Buenos Aires,
le24 fkvrier 1950 (O.C., nouv. doc. 1964, app. 8). In its pleading, Spain took the position, on 20 June 1969,that when the
Canadian and British members of the Committee joined in signing an
Agreed Minute which supported the Spanish contention that foreign
exchange had been denied to Barcelona Traction because the Company
refused to furnish the information demanded by the Spanish authorities,
this was an indication that theCanadian Government was satisfied that
there was no basis for Barcelona's complaints. However, Mr. Glassco,
the Receiver and Manager, informed the Ontario Court through his
memorandum of 24 December 1951that he had attended a conference in
the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa together with representa-
tives of National Trust and Barcelona Traction. He said they-

"... were advised that the Canadian and British Governments had
signed the Agreed Minute in order to prevent the issuance of a
much stronger unilateral statement by the Spanish Government;
that the statements in the Agreed Minute with respect to foreign
exchange had been agreed with a view to saving the face of the
Spanish Government as regards the non-provision of foreign ex-
change to the subsidiaries of the defendant [Barcelona Traction] in
the past; and that the Canadian and British Governments hoped

that the atmosphere created by the Agreed Minute would be such
that the private interests concerned could work out a settlement of
their differences in the expectation that auitable modus operandi
for the future could be achieved with the Spanish Government".
(Ibid V.ol. 5, p. 756.)
25. The next Canadian Note of 26 July 1951 reflects a continuing
Canadian interest sinceit objects to the issuance of new share certificates
of the subsidiaries which "would be to render valuelessthe previously is-
sued shares". Ebro, National Trust and Barcelona Traction bondholders
are mentioned. The Canadian Note of 28 September 1951stresses both
Ebro and Barcelona Traction and says Canada "feels bound to renew its
representations ...for the protection of the interests of these compa-
nies". A long Note of 22 December 1951invokes Canadian rights under
a treaty between the United Kingdom and Spain concerning respect for
corporate personality and offersto arbitrate that issue.The Note reserves
the "right to make any claim under international law which may be open
to it ifthe sale of theetstakes place on the 4thJanuary, 1952,sinceit is
advised that this would constitute a denial of justice". In this Note,
Barcelona Traction, Ebro, Catalonian Land, International Utilities and

National Trust as trustee for the bonds, are al1 mentioned. (A.C.M.,
Vol. VI, Annex 1, No. 28 '.)

l Consequent upon certain enquiries and observations from the Bench, Belgium

175 Dans ses plaidoiries l'Espagne a soutenu, le 20 juin 1969, que le fait
que les membres canadien et britannique de la commission acceptèrent
de signer un procès-verbal conjoint favorable à la thèse de l'Espagne,
selon laquelle les devises auraient étérefusées à la Barcelona Traction
parce que la sociétén'avait pas fourni les renseignements exigéspar les
autoritésespagnoles, indique que le Gouvernement canadien avait acquis
la conviction que les réclamationsde la Barcelona n'étaient pas fondées

(audience du 20juin 1969).Or M. Glassco, le receiveret administrateur,
a fait savoir au tribunal de l'Ontario, dans son mémoiredu 24 décembre
1951,qu'il avait assisté,au ministèredes Affaires extérieures à Ottawa,
à une conférence à laquelle participaient desreprésentants de la National
Trust et de la Barcelona Traction. Ces derniers, a-t-il dit,
«ont été informéq sue les Gouvernements canadien et britannique

avaient signéle procès-verbalconjoint afin d'éviterque le Gouverne-
ment espagnol ne fasse une déclaration unilatérale formulée endes
termes beaucoup plus forts; que les passages du procès-verbal
conjoint relatifs aux devises avaient étémis au point d'un commun
accord en vue de permettre au Gouvernement espagnol de sauver
la face quant au refus de fournir des devisesaux filialesde la défen-
deresse [la Barcelona Traction] dans le passé;et que les Gouverne-

mentscanadienetbritannique espéraientqueleprocès-verbalconjoint
créeraitun climat propice permettant aux intérêtsprivés en cause
d'arriver à un règlement de leurs différendsen attendant qu'un
modus operandi approprié pût êtremis au point pour l'avenir avec
le Gouvernement espagnol )(ibid., vol. V, p. 756).
25. La note canadienne suivante, datéedu 26juillet 1951,montre que

le Canada continue à cette époque à s'intéresserà la question puisqu'il
s'élèvecontre l'émissionde nouveaux certificats de titre par les sociétés
filiales,émissionqui aurait pour effet((de priver deleur valeur lesactions
précédemment émises »Il est fait mention des obligataires deI'Ebro,de la
National Trust et de la Barcelona Traction. La note candienne du
28 septembre 1951met l'accent à la fois sur 1'Ebroet sur la Barcelona
Traction et déclareque le Canada ((s'estimeobligéde renouveler ..ses

représentations visant la protection des intérêts deces sociétés ». Une
longue note du 22 décembre 1951 invoque les droits que possède le
Canada en vertu d'un traité entre le Royaume-Uni et l'Espagne concer-
nant le respect de la personnalité des sociétéset propose de soumettre
la question à l'arbitrage. Dans cette note, le Gouvernement canadien se
réserve «le droit de faire usage de toutes les voiesde recours dont il peut
disposer endroit international, sila vente desbiensa lieu le4janvier 1952,

étant donné qu'il est informé que cette vente constituerait un dénide
justice1).La Barcelona Traction, 17Ebro,la Catalonian Land, l'Inter-
national Utilities et la National Trust, en tant que trustee des obligations,
sont toutes mentionnéesdans la note (A.C.M., vol. VI, ann. 1, no28 l).
-
l A la suite de certaines questions et observations de membreslaCour, la

175 175 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP. OP. JESSUP)

26. On 12February 1952,the BelgianAmbassador in Madrid reported
a conversation with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Artajo,
in which thelatter told him that the SpanishConsul in Ottawahad talked
about the Barcelona case with the Canadian Secretary of State for
External Affairs who said: (tr.) "The Canadian interests in this case are
so small that it interests us very little." Such a view does not seem to be
quite in linewith the Canadian Note of 21April1952 which wasproduced
as a new document by Belgiumin May 1964.TheNote repeats the Cana-

dian view of the mistreatment of the companies in Spain, especially
Ebro; invokes again the treaty of 1922and willingnessto resort to arbitra-
tion; but concludes that no further exchange of Notes was apt to help
reach a settlement and that private negotiations might be the best way to
a solution. In sending a copy of this Note to the Belgian Ambassador in
Ottawa, the Canadian Government noted that it was much shorter than
a draft which had previously been shown to the Belgian Government-
there was no use reiterating legal arguments.K. J. Burbridge to Vicomte
du Parc, 7 May 1952.)It was not until 10 May 1969that Mr. Artajo, in
a letter in reply to an enquiry from the Spanish Agent in the Barcelona
Tractioncase before this Court, flatly denied the accuracy of the Belgian

Ambassador's report. (Spanish New Docs., 16May 1969,Vol. III, p. 18.)
The lapse of time in securing such a denial was not explained.

27. Canada's further activity in the case was moderate. On 15 Feb-
ruary 1955,Mr. Arthur Dean, American attorney for Sidro, suggestedto
Wilmers in Brussels that it would be helpful if Canada would join in a
démarche in Madrid, although he doubted whether Canada could be

convinced that they had sufficientinterest other than in the rights of the
Canadian trustee for the bonds. (0. & S., New Docs., 1964,App. 13.)
Canada had by this time established its ownembassyin Madrid and it ap-
pears that the Canadian Secretasyof State for External Affairshad paid a
persona1 cal1 on the Foreign Office in Madrid in connection with the
Barcelona casein 1954(A.C.M., Vol. VI, p. 109).On 21 March 1955the
Canadian Government had commended Mr. Dean's visit, saying that
Canada "continues, of course, to be deeply interested in the affair of
Barcelona Traction". (A.C.M.,Chap. II, Ann. 1,Doc. No. 30.) On 1July
1955,Mr. Deanwrote at lengthto Mr. Pearson,Canadian SecretaryofState
for External Affairs,reporting on his visit in Madrid. He hopedanadian

Ambassador Pope would be instructed tojoin in energeticrepresentations

produced additional documentation in 1964 and in 1969e.g.,Distr. 64/72 and
64/74 and 1969New Docs. 42-45.

176 26. Le 12février1952,l'ambassadeur de Belgique à Madrid a rapporté
une conversation qu'il avait eue avec le ministre espagnol des Maires
étrangères,M. Artajo, au cours de laquelle ce dernier lui avait dit que
le consul d'Espagne à Ottawa avait discutéde l'affaire de la Barcelona
avec le secrétaire'Etat canadien aux Affaires extérieures, lequelaurait
déclaré:((Les intérêts canadiensdans cette affaire sont si minimes que

celle-ci nous intéressepeu).Un tel point de vue cadre mal, semble-t-il,
avecla note canadienne du 21 avril 1952qui a éproduitepar la Belgique
en tant que nouveau document en mai 1964.Dans cette note, leGouverne-
ment canadien réitère sonopinion concernant le traitement infligéaux
sociétésen Espagne, notamment à l'Ebro, invoque de nouveau le traité
de 1922et réaffirme qu'ilest prêà recourirà l'arbitrage, mais il conclut
qu'aucun nouvel échangede notes ne permettra d'arriver à un règlement
et que le meilleur moyen de parvenir à une solution est peut-êtrede
procéder à des négociations privées. Enenvoyant copie de cette note à

l'ambassadeur de Belgique à Ottawa, le Gouvernement canadien lui a
fait observer qu'elle était beaucoup plus courte qu'un projet qui avait
étécommuniqué antérieurementau Gouvernement belge car il ne servait
à rien de répéter lesarguments juridiques exposés précédemment.
(K. J. Burbridge au vicomte du Parc, 7 mai 1952.)Ce n'est que le 10mai
1969 que M. Artajo, répondant à une demande de renseignements
formuléepar l'agent de l'Espagne dans l'affairede larcelona Traction,
a carrément nié l'exactitudede ce qu'avait rapporté l'ambassadeur de
Belgique. (Nouv. doc. espagnols, 16mai 1969,vol. III,p. 181.)La raison
pour laquelle il a fallu tant de temps pour obtenir cette dénégationn'a

pas étéexpliquée.
27. Par la suite, le Canada n'a eu dans cette affaire qu'une activité
réduite. Le 15 février 1955, M. Arthur Dean, avocat américain de la
Sidro, a écrià Wilmers, à Bruxelles, qu'il considéreraitcommejudicieux
que le Canada se joigne à une démarche à Madrid, encore qu'il doutât
de la possibilitéde convaincre le Canada de l'existencedans cette affaire
d'un intérêt canadiensuffisant, en dehors des droits durustee canadien
pour les obligations. (O.C., nouv. doc., 1964,app. 13.) Le Canada avait,
à l'époque,établi sa propre ambassade à Madrid et il semble que le

secrétaired'Etat canadien aux Affaires extérieuresse soit rendu person-
nellement au ministère des Affairesétrangères à Madrid en 1954 pour
discuter de l'affairede la Barcelona (A.C.M., vol., p. 109).Le 21 mars
1955, le Gouvernement canadien a appuyé en ces termes la visite de
M. Dean: (([LeCanada] continue naturellement à attacher une grande
importance àl'affairede la Barcelona Tractio)(A.C.M., chap. II,ann. 1,
doc. no30). Le le'juillet 1955,M. Dean a écritlonguement àM. Pearson,
secrétaired7Etatcanadien aux Affairesextérieurespour lui rendre compte

Belgiquea produiten 1964et 1969desdocumentssupplémentaires:voirparexemple
nouveaux documents déposés les 5et 7 mai 1964 et nouveaux documents, 1969,
nos42-45. to Foreign Minister Artajo. (New Docs., 1964.)Mr. Pearson replied on
19 July that Canada believed that the best hope lay inprivate negotia-
tions.

"The Canadian Government has not been prepared actually to
intervene in this matter or to make representations to the Spanish
Government as to the measures which ought to be taken toward a
settlement."
The requested instructions to Ambassador Pope would not be sent.

(~bid .n)1957, Belgiuminformed Canada that they intended to resort
to the International Court of Justice. The Canadian official merely ex-
pressed his appreciation for the courtesy of keeping him informed.
Belgium similarlynotified Ottawa in 1964and 1965.(Belgian NewDocs.,
Nos. 42 et seq.)

Finally, further questions from the Bench were conveyed by the
Belgian Ambassador in Ottawa on 23 June 1969, to the Canadian
Secretary of State for External Affairs, who replied on the following day
that the correspondence which had passed between the Canadian and
Spanish Governments was in the dossier before the Court and was self-
explanatory.
"As was suggestedin a communication of 21April 1952,the Govern-
ment of Canada was of the opinion that there was little chance of

settling this dispute by means of additional diplomatic representa-
tions. The Government of Canada has acted accordingly." (My
trans., New Docs. Nos. 44-45.)
It isa fair conclusion that Canadian diplomatic protection of Barcelona
Traction ceased in April 1952.

United States
28. Apparently the first diplomatic démarche by the United States
Government on behalf of Barcelona Traction was a Note from the
Chargéin Madrid to Foreign Minister Artajo on 22 July 1949.The Note
stated that:

". ..the Government of the United States lends its support to and
is in concurrence with the Note of 21 July 1949,submitted to your
Ministry by the British Embassy on behalf of the Canadian Govern-
ment, the Note in question relating to the treatment which has been
and iscurrently being accorded to the Canadian company, Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, a company in which
American citizens have interests...
The treatment which had been accorded this company, in whichde sa visità Madrid. Il exprimait l'espoir que M. Pope, l'ambassadeur
du Canada, recevrait pour instructions de s'associeresreprésentations
énergiquesauprèsdu ministre des AffairesétrangèresArtajo. (Nouv. doc.
1964.)M. Pearson a répondule 19juillet que le Canada pensait que des
négociationsprivées offraientle meilleur espoir d'arriverune solution.

(Le Gouvernement canadien n'a pas eu l'intention d'intervenirdans
cette affaire ni de faire des représentations au Gouvernement
espagnol quant aux mesures qu'il conviendrait de prendre en vue
d'arriver un règlement. »
Les instructions demandéesne seraient donc pas envoyées à M. Pope.

(Zbid E.n)1957,la Belgiquea fait savoir au Canada qu'elleavait I'inten-
tion de saisir la Cour internationale de Justice. Le haut fonctionnaire
canadien qui a répondu a simplement expriméson appréciation de la
courtoisie aveclaquelleil était tenu au courant. La Belgiquea, de même,
aviséOttawa de sesintentions en 1964et 1965.(Nouv. doc. belges, n0V2
et suiv.)
Enfin, le 23juin 1969,l'ambassadeur de Belgique àOttawa a transmis
d'autres questions émanantde membres de la Cour au secrétaire d'Etat
canadien aux Affaires extérieures, lequela répondule lendemain que la
correspondance échangée entre les Gouvernements canadien et espagnol
étaitdans les dossiers de la Cour et s'expliquait d'elle-même.

((Telqu'il l'avait suggédans sa communication du 21 avril 1952,
le Gouvernement du Canada était d'opinion qu'ily avait peu de
chances de réglercette dispute au moyen de représentations diplo-
matiques additionnelles. Le Gouvernement du Canada a donc agi
en conséquence. 1)(Nouv. doc., nos44-45.)

On estfondé àconclure que la protection diplomatique dela Barcelona
Traction par le Canada a cesséen avril 1952.
Etats-Unis

28. Il semble que la première démarche diplomatique faite par le
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis au nom de la Barcelona Traction ait été
l'envoi d'une note, le 22 juillet 1949, par le chargéd'affaires des Etats-
Unis à Madrid à M. Artajo, ministre des Affaires étrangères,dans
laquelle il étaitdit:

«le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis apporte son appui et son accord
à la note du 21juillet 1949présentéeà votre ministèrepar I'ambas-
sade britannique au nom du Gouvernement canadien, note qui a
trait aux mesures dont a étéet dont est présentement l'objet la
sociétécanadienne Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Limited, sociétdans laquelle des ressortissants américains ont des
intérêts..
Les mesures dont a été l'objet cettesociété,dans laquelle sont foreign capital is so heavily invested, has had an adverse effect in
foreign banking and investment circles ..." (A.P.O., 1960,Vol. III,
p. 247.)
Attention has already been called to the CO-operationof the United
States with Canada in February 1950, where American interests were
described as arising from "the security of foreign investments generaliy".

In June and July 1951,the United States Embassy requested complete
copies ofthe reports of the Spanish experts on the international tripartite
cornmittee and "reiterates its deep interest in the issues involved in the
case of the Barcelona Traction Company. .." (ibid., pp. 249 and 251).
It seemsthat the United States Secretary of Commerce, when in Madrid

in October 1954,brought up with some officialsof the Spanish Govern-
ment the possibility of that Government's intervention in the judicial
proceedings; he was told this was hardly possible. (Spanish New Docs.,
1969, Vol. III, p. 174.)

29. In 1955, United States Ambassador John Lodge in Madrid lent
his assistanceto Mr. Arthur Dean in connection with his efforts on behalf
of Sidro. An office memorandum of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,30 March 1955,recorded that Ambassador Lodge had phoned to
support Mr. Dean's request for an interview with Minister for Foreign
Affairs Artajo.
"The United States Ambassador stressed the extraordinary interest
-he insisted that it be put that way-which the State Department
attributes to a rapid and satisfactory solution of thatmatter about
which the aforesaid Department continues to be concerned. He

suggests the opportuneness of a solution by direct negotiations
between the parties." (Loc. cit.)

The interview was granted-the request having been supported by the
Canadian Embassy also-and Mr. Dean in writing to Mr. Artajo to
express his thanks, stated:

"Our inability to arrive at an appropriate settlement of this matter
is naturally a matter of very great concern to the management and
shareholders of Sofina,in which there is now a substantial American
interest..." (Spanish New Docs., 1969,Vol. III, p. 178.)

Mr. Dean informed Mr. Lester Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State
for External Affairs, about his visits as already noted.
30. But despite the warmth of Ambassador Lodge's messageto the
Spanish Foreign Office,it is clear that the interest of the United States
was ofa general nature and that its supportdidnot amount to diplomatic
protection of the Barcelona Traction Company or of any identified BARCELONATRACTION (OP.IND. JESSUP) 177

investis de si nombreux capitaux étrangers, ont eu des conséquences
néfastes dans les milieux bancaires et financiers à l'étrange...»
(A.E.P., 1960,vol. III, p. 247.)

On a déjàsignaléla coopération qui s'était instauréeentre les Etats-
Unis et le Canada enfévrier1950,époque àlaquelle lesintérêtasméricains
avaient étéprésentés commese rapportant à ((la sécurité desinvestisse-
ments étrangers en général ».
Enjuin et enjuillet 1951,l'ambassade des Etats-Unis a demandéqu'on
lui fasse parvenir un ou plusieurs exemplaires du rapport complet des

expertsespagnolsfaisant partie de la commission tripartite internationale
et a exprimé (à nouveau levifintérêq tu'elleporte aux questions soulevées
par l'affaire de la Barcelona Traction ..))(ibid., p. 249 et 251).Il semble
que, pendant son séjour à Madrid en octobre 1954,le ministre du com-
merce des Etats-Unis avait mentionné à certains fonctionnaires du
Gouvernement espagnol la possibilitéd'une intervention du Gouverne-
ment espagnol dans la procédurejudiciaire; il lui fut répondu que cela
ne serait guère possible. (Nouv. doc. espagnols, 1969,vol. III, p. 174.)
29. En 1955,M. John Lodge, ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Madrid,
a prêté son assistance à M. Arthur Dean dans ses efforts en faveur de la

Sidro. Un mémorandum interne du ministère des Affaires étrangères
d'Espagne en date du 30 mars 1955constate que M. Lodge a téléphoné
pour appuyer la requête par laquelle M. Dean sollicite une audience de
M. Artajo, ministre des Maires étrangères.
((L'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis voulait souligner l'extraordinaire

intérê(til a insistépour qu'on l'indique ainsi) que le département
d'Etat accorde à une solution rapide et satisfaisante de cette affaire,
qui préoccupetoujours ledit département. II se permet de soumettre
au ministre des Maires étrangèresla pertinence de rechercher la
solution au moyen de conversations directes entre les deux parties
intéressées.)(Loc. cit.)

L'entrevuea été accordée - lademandeayant étéappuyépear l'ambassade
du Canada également - et M. Dean, en exprimantpar écritsesremercie-
ments à M. Artajo, a dit:
((L'incapacitéoù nous sommes d'arriver à un règlement approprié
de cette affaire est naturellement un sujet de grande préoccupation

pour la direction et les actionnaires de la Sofina - où les intérêts
américainssont maintenant substantiels ...))(Nouv. doc. espagnols,
1969,vol. III, p. 178.)
Comme il a déjà été noté, M. Dean a informé de ses démarches
M. Lester Pearson, secrétaired'Etat canadien aux Maires extérieures.

30. Mais, malgré le ton chaleureux du message de M. Lodge au
ministère des Maires étrangères d'Espagne,il est clair que l'intérêd tes
Etats-Unis étaitde caractèregénérae lt que son appui n'allait pasjusqu'à
exercer une protection diplomatique en faveur de la société Barcelona shareholders in that company or in Sidro or in Sofina. In a cable of
15 February 1955,before the visits to Madrid which have just been de-
scribed, Mr. Dean advised Wilmers, President of Barcelona Traction
and then in Brussels, that he had-

". .. received request from our Department [SC. Department of
State] suggesting they have never considered operating company
in question [SC. Barcelona Traction] American and have treated
this matter not as a protection case but on more general grounds
of principle regardingtreatment and encouragement of international
investment and would appreciate extent to which U.S. capital now
participating in company". (0. & S., New Docs. 1964,App. 13.)

Itis not known what information was given to the State Department
concerning the extent of the United States capital participation at that
time l.It seems clear from the record that the placing of Barcelona
Traction shares in thenames of American nominees did not require any
investment of United Statescapital. But Mr. Dean apparently represented

both Sidro and Sofina and on 1 February 1955he informed the Spanish
Ambassador in Washington that Sofina was "the majority common
shareholder" in Barceiona Traction, and informed the Spanish Foreign
Minister that there was a"substantial American interest" in Sofina. (The
letter to the Ambassador is in the New Documents presented by Spain
on 16 March 1964.)

31. There were referencesby Spain to Amitas, a Delaware corporation
which financed the National Trust receivership, as if it represented a
United States interest, but the real interest there seems to have been
Belgian. The Canadian Receiver and Manager of National Trust bor-

rowed at least $980,000 from Amitas by selling to Amitas Receiver's
5 per cent. certificates. In his request to the Ontario Court for authoriza-
tion to borrow the first $100,000 on 25 August 1949,the Receiver and
Manager referred to this-

"American Intercontinental Trade & Service Company (Amitas)
Inc., a Delaware corporation which is understood to be associated
or affiliated with a Belgian corporation which holds bonds and the
majority of the outstanding shares"
of Barcelona Traction. (ReceivershipDocs., Vol. 2, p. 273.) On 3 August

he had written to the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board about
l As indicated elsewhere, the evidence offered concerning certifications and
paymentsof coupons does not seempersuasivedespitethe argumentof counsel for
Belgium on 8 July 1969 citing A.M., Vol. 1, Annexes 18 and 20, pp. 133 and 142. Traction ou d'actionnaires nommémentdésignésde cette société,de la
Sidro ou de la Sofina.Dans un télégramme datédu 15février1955,avant
les visites Madrid qui viennent d'êtreévoquéesM , . Dean a fait savoirà
M. Wilmers, président dela Barcelona Traction, qui se trouvait alors

àBruxelles, qu'il avait
«reçu requêtede notreDépartement [ledépartementd'Etat] exposant
qu'ils n'avaientjamais considérésociétéd'exploitation en question

[la Barcelona Traction] comme américaineet avaient traité cette
question non comme un cas de protection mais sur plan plus général
des principes concernant traitement et encouragement investisse-
ments internationaux et seraient heureux connaître montant pour
lequel capitaux US investis actuellement dans société».(O.C., nouv.
doc., 1964,app. 13.)

On ignore quels renseignements ont été donnéa su département d'Etat
au sujet de l'importance de la participation des capitaux américains à
cette époque l.Il sembleévident d'aprèsle dossier que l'inscription d'ac-
tions de la Barcelona Traction au nom de nomineesaméricainsn'a pas
nécessité d'investissementsde capitaux américains. Mais M. Dean
représentaitapparemment à ia fois la Sidro et la Sofina et,1"efévrier

1955, il a informél'ambassadeur d'Espagne àWashington que la Sofina
était «le principal actionnaire ordinaire de la Barcelona Traction»,et a
fait savoir au ministre des Affaires étrangèresd'Espagne qu'ily avait
des ((intérêtsméricains substantiels1)dans la Sofina (la lettre adressée
à l'ambassadeur se trouve dans les nouveaux documents présentéspar
l'Espagne le 16mars 1964).
31. L'Espagne afait allusionà Amitas, la sociétéde1'Etatdu Delaware
qui a financé lereceivership de la National Trust, comme si elle avait

représenté des intérêts américainsm ; ais il semble qu'en l'occurrenceles
intérêtsvéritablesétaient belges. Le receiver canadien, administrateur
de la National Trust, a emprunté à Amitas au moins 980000 dollars en
lui remettant la contrepartie descertificatspour cent émispar sessoins.
En demandant à la cour de l'Ontario l'autorisation d'emprunter la
premièretranche de 100000 dollars le25août 1949,lereceiveret adminis-
trateur fait mention de cette

«American IntercontinentalTrade & ServiceCompany (Amitas)Inc.,
une sociétéconstituéedans 17Etatdu Delaware qui serait associéeou
affiliéeune société belge détenant des obligationset la majoritédes
actions émises))

par la Barcelona Traction (doc. du receivership, vol. II, p. 273). Le
3 août, dans une lettre adresséà la Commission de contrôle des changes

l Comme il a étéindiqué ailleurs, les élémentsde preuve présentésconcernant
les certifications et le paiement des coupons ne paraissent pas convaincants, malgré
l'argumentation développéepar un conseil de la Belgique le 8 juilletitant
A.M.,vol.I,ann. 18et20,p. 133et 142.

179the anticipated dollar transaction, and made a more definite statement.
He stated that Amitas is-

"controlled, 1 believe wholly owned, by the Belgian interests, com-
monly referred to as 'Sofina',who are the majority owners of the
equity stock of the Barcelona Company and who also hold a sub-
stantial quantity of its bonds".

He explains that if his receivership is successful, he will have plenty of
United States dollars to repay the loan but:
"Looking at the darkest side of the picture, should the portfolio
prove unsaleable, the position would simply be that Amitas would

be unable to collect anything upon the Receiver's certificates as
there is no personal liability attached thereto." (Ibid., p. 277. The
last receiver'srequest to the Court for authority to borrow, which is
recorded in the Receivership Documents filed with this Court by
Spain, was on 19 March 1963;Vol. 8, p. 1356.)

This evidence supports the Belgian assertion that the Receiver was
financed by Sofina, but of course there wereAmerican interests in Sofina.

The Receiverin his numerous requests didnot refer to nominees or to the
trust agreement of Sidro with Securitas which will be discussed later in
this opinion.
32. On 25 May 1967,the Belgian Embassy in Washington enquired of
the United States Department of State whether the first United States
Note of 22 July 1949, concerning American interests in Barcelona
Traction, had in mind Americans interested as owners or beneficial
owners of shares or whether it included also American citizens acting as
trustees or nominees for third persons not having American nationality.
The State Department's reply of 5 June 1967stated that the 1949Note
was inspired by questions of principle relative to the equitable treatment
of Foreign investments in order to preserve the confidence of foreign
investors in the security of their investments in Spain. The interests of
American citizens which were mentioned in the 1949Note, referred only
to those who had rights of property or beneficial ownership in the com-
pany. (Belgian New Doc. 5 presented 7 April 1969.)

33. The first Belgian Note concerning the Barcelona Traction case is
dated 27 March 1948(A.M., Vol. IV, Annex 250). The Note stresses the
importance of Belgian interests in Barcelona Traction by asserting that
Sidro owns more than 70 per cent. of the shares of Barcelona Traction
and other Belgian individuals own enough to bring the total to 80 per du Canada au sujet de la transaction en dollars envisagée,il s'exprimait
en termes plus précisencore. Il affirmait en effet qu'Amitas est

((souscontrôle et, je crois, propriétéexclusive du groupe d'intérêts
belges, généralementconnu sous le nom de «Sofina »,propriétaire
majoritaire du capital-actions de la société Barcelonaet qui détient
aussi une part importante de son capital-obligationsB.
Il explique que si son receivershipest couronné desuccès,il disposera en

abondance de dollars des Etats-Unis pour rembourser le prêt,mais:
((Pour mettre les choses au pire, si le portefeuille devait se révéler
invendable, Amitas serait tout bonnement incapable d'obtenir quoi
que cesoit sur lescertificatsdu receiver,auxquels ne s'attache aucune
responsabilité personnelle.» (Ibid., p. 277. La dernière requête

adressée à la Cour par le receiver pour obtenir l'autorisation d'em-
prunter, dont on trouve trace dans les documents du receivership
soumis à la Cour par l'Espagne, date du 19 mars 1963; vol. VIII,
p. 1356.)
Ces témoignagesrenforcent l'assertion belge selon laquelle le receiver

étaitfinancépar la Sofina, mais cette dernière englobait évidemment des
intérêtsaméricains.Dans ses nombreuses demandes, le receiver ne fait
mention ni des nominees,ni del'accord de trustdela Sidro avecSecuritas,
examinéplus loin dans la présenteopinion.
32. Le 25 mai 1967,l'ambassade de Belgique àWashington a demandé
au département d'Etat si la première note des Etats-Unis, en date du
22 juillet 1949, concernant les intérêtsaméricains dans la Barcelona
Traction se référaità des Américains intéressé àsla sociétéen tant que
propriétaires ou benejïcial owners,ou si elle concernait également des
citoyens américainsagissant comme trustees(ou mandataires) ou nominees
pour des tiers ne possédant pas la nationalité américaine. Dans sa

réponse du 5juin 1967,le département d'Etat a déclaréque la note de
1949 avait étéinspiréepar des considérations de principe relatives au
traitement équitable des investissements étrangers, visantà préserverla
confiance des investisseurs étrangers en ce qui concerne la sécuritéde
leurs investissements en Espagne. Les intérêtsdes citoyens américains
dont il est fait mention dansla note de 1949ne concernent que ceux des
personnes jouissant, à l'égardde la sociétéd, e droits de propriétéou de
benejïcial ownership.(Nouveaux documents belgesdéposélse7 avril 1969,
doc. no5.)

Belgique
33. La premièrenote belge concernant l'affairede la Barcelona Trac-

tion est datéedu 27 mars 1948 (A.M., vol. IV, ann. 250). Cette note
souligne l'importance des intérêtsbelges dans la Barcelona Traction,
précisantque la Sidro détient plusde 70 pour cent des actions de cette
sociétéet que d'autres actionnaires belges individuels en possèdent cent. In addition, the Belgian State had 50,000 shares of Sidro received
as a capital tax, and 40 to 45 per cent. of the First Mortgage bonds of
Barcelona Traction were also held by Belgians. Like the British Govern-
ment, the BelgianGovernment notes that some of the higher ranks of the
personnel of the companies have been discharged, especiallyMr. William
Menschaert, a Belgiannational, President and solelegalrepresentative of
Ebro in Spain. The proceedings in Spain are summarized and declared
improper or illegal.The note concludes with the statement that there has
been a series of denials of justice which cannot help but gravely injure
legitimate Belgianinterests in the companies involved. The Spanish reply
as usual indicated that the Government could not interferewiththe courts.

The next Belgian Note on 22 July 1949 touched on the refusal of
foreign exchange, reviewed the further steps in the Spanish proceedings

and repeated that the denial ofjustice continued to injure very important
Belgian interests (ibid., Annex 252). Spain sent a reasoned rebuttal on
26 September 1949but did not challenge Belgium'sright to speak for the
Belgianinterests (ibid.,Annex 253).

34. As already noted, in February 1950 Belgium was actively co-
operating with Canada on the project for establishing a tripartite com-
mittee of experts. When this démarchewas frustrated by the Spanish
proposal, Belgium vigorously objected to being left offthe Committee of
Experts. Belgium's next diplomatic protest was on 13 July 1951 (ibid.,
Annex 254). Stress was laid on the effectof the measures in Spain on the
Belgianinvestors. It was said that in equity, note should be taken of the
interest of Barcelona Traction in Ebro and of the interest of Sidro in
Barcelona;the interest of the Belgianinvestors in Sidro wasgiven at 40 to
45 per cent., without counting the participation of Sofina which was 35
per cent. After there had been some conversations on the subject, the
Belgian Note of 7 November 1951 again stressed their concern in the
protection of very important Belgian interests and enclosed a memoran-
dum on Spanish law (ibid., Annex 256).

35. The Spanish reply of 14 November 1951now insisted that diplo-
matic intervention in the Barce2ona Traction case was the exclusive
function ofthe Canadian and British Governments, whoserepresentatives
had been asked tojoin in the expert committee to examinethe question of
the refusal of foreign exchange (ibid., Annex 257). Belgium replied on
6 December, discussing the merits of the matter and asserting that the
importance of the Belgian interests in the capital of Barcelona Traction
justified Belgiumbeing represented on the Comrnittee of Experts. On the
same date, Belgiumproposed arbitration under the treaty of 19July 1927; suffisammentpour porter le total à 80 pour cent. De plus, 1'Etat belge
possédait50000 actions de la Sidro reçues en paiement de l'impôt sur
le capital, et 40 45 pour cent des obligations First Mortgage de la
Barcelona Traction étaientégalementdétenuespar des Belges. Le Gou-
vernement belge constate, comme le Gouvernement britannique, qu'une
partie du personnel dirigeant des sociétéavait étélicenciée,notamment
M. William Menschaert, ressortissant belge, présidentet unique repré-
sentant légalde 1'Ebro en Espagne. La note donne un résumé dela
procédurejudiciaire suivie en Espagne, qui est taxée d'irrégulièreou
illégale.Pour conclure, la note déclare qu'ila eu une sériede dénisde
justice, lesquels ne peuventmanquer de lésergravement lesintérêtbselges

légitimesdans les sociétésen question. La réponse espagnole indique
comme d'habitude que le gouvernement ne peut s'immiscer dans les
affaires des tribunaux.
La note belge suivante, datéedu 22juillet 1949,traitait du refus d'allo-
cation de devises, passait en revue les étapessuivantes dela procédure
judiciaire espagnole et répétait quele dénide justice continuait de léser
de très importants intérêtsbelges (ann. 252). L'Espagne a répondu le
26 septembre 1949en opposant une fin de non-recevoir motivée, mais
sans contester le droit de la Belgiqueintervenir en faveur des intérêts
belges (ann. 253).
34. Comme il a déjàété indiqué, enfévrier1950la Belgiquecollaborait
avec le Canada pour mettre au point le projet concernant la constitution
d'une commissiond'expertstripartite. Lorsque cette démarcheeut échoué
Belgiquelprotesta vigoureuse-
par suite de la proposition espagnole, la
ment contre le fait qu'elle n'étaitpas admisefaire partie de la commis-
sion d'experts. La protestation s~ivante que la Belgique a élevépar la
voie diplomatique date du 13juillet 1951(ann. 254). La Belgiquey souli-
gnait les répercussionsdes mesures prises en Espagne pour les investis-
seurs belges. Elle disait qu'ilavait lieu, en équité,de tenir compte de
la participation de la Barcelona dans 1'Ebroet de celle de la Sidro dans
la Barcelona; les intérêtses investisseurs belgesdans la Sidro étaient de
40 à 45 pour cent sans compter la participation de la Sofina, qui était de
35pour cent. Aprèsdiverspourparlers, la note belge du 7novembre 1951
soulignait de nouveau que le Gouvernement belge se préoccupaitde la
protection d'intérêts belgetrès importants; à cette note étaitjoint un
mémorandum surla procédurejudiciaire espagnole (ann. 256).
35. La réponseespagnoledu 14novembre 1951insistesur lefait qu'une

intervention diplomatique dans l'affaire de laBarcelonaTraction était
du ressort exclusif des Gouvernements canadien et britannique, dont les
représentants avaient étinvitésà faire partie de la commission d'experts
pour examiner la question du refus de devises (ann. 257). La Belgique a
répondule 6décembreen examinant lefond dela question et en soutenant
que l'importance des intérêtsbelges dans le capital de la Barcelona
Traction donnait àla Belgiqueledroit d'êtrereprésentéeàla commission
d'experts.A la mêmedate, la Belgiquea proposéun recours à l'arbitragethe issue would be the damage to Belgian interests caused by the bank-
ruptcy of Barcelona(ibid.,Annex258).The Spanish reply of22December
1951argued that Belgiumhad not complied with the 1927treaty since it
had not presented a formal claim, had not proved the Belgiannationality
of the shareholders in a Canadian company, and had not shown that
Belgianinterests had been injured by an illegal act on the part of Spain
(ibid.,Annex 259).Belgiumreplied in rebuttal on 31 December 1951,and
Spaincountered on 3 January 1952(ibid., Annexes 260and 261). At this
stagethe issue concerning the right of Belgiumto interpose in connection
with a Canadian company, cornes sharply into focus.

36. A Belgian Note of 21 March 1955, indicating the possibility of

private negotiations which were then in train, and mentioning the visits
of Mr. Dean, is not printed in the Annexes to the Belgian Memorial but
as Annex 66,DocumentNo. 2, of the 1963PreliminaryObjections. Then,
on 31 December 1956,Belgiumsent a long Note summarizing the whole
affair (A.M., Vol. IV, Annex 262). On 16 May 1957,a further Belgian
Note refers to certain persona1 conversations of their Ambassador in
Madrid and broaches the possibility of a judicial settlement' (ibid.,
Annex 263). The Spanish Note of 10 June 1957 and the Belgian
Note of 8 July deal extensively with the question of the right of
Belgium to act in this case (ibid., Annexes264 and 265).The last Note
puts more stresson the 50,000shares held by the Belgian Stateand sum-
marizes again the extent of the interestsof Sidro. It seemsunnecessary to
followthe ensuing correspondence which involvesthe actual Application
to this Court, the discontinuance and the new Application of 1962.

37. It is hard to explain the apparent reluctance of the applicant
Government to place this entire record before the Court in a composite
and coherent form especiallyin view oftheir recent initiative in eliciting
the information from the Government of the United States as noted
above. But the conclusion emerges that although in 1948the Canadian
Government, like the other three Governments involved, was disturbed
by the judicial proceedings which overtook Barcelona Traction in Spain,
the chiefCanadian interest was in the securities of which National Tmst
was trustee and that when the bonds were paid off after the assets were
soldin Spain, Canadian interest declined.Thiswasthe conclusionreached
by counselfor Belgiumin his pleadingin 1964.(Oral Proceedings, 13May
1964.)It must be borne in mind that the securities pledged under the
Barcelona Traction Prior Lien and First Mortgage bonds held by
National Tmst Co., Ltd., as trustee, included bonds and shares of Ebro
and of Catalonian Land Co., Ltd., and other subsidiaries. Of Ebro, for

example, there were some £11 million face value, of bonds and some
300,000shares of stock. (In another connection, it isinteresting that many
of the shares had blank powers of attorney attached to the certificates. BARCELONATRACTION (OP.IND. JESSUP) 181
conformémentau traité du 19juillet 1927; cet arbitrage aurait dû porter

sur le préjudice causéaux intérêtsbelges par la faillite de la Barcelona
(ann. 258). Dans sa réponse du 22 décembre1951,l'Espagne a soutenu
que la Belgique ne s'étaitpas conformée aux dispositions du traité de
1927 puisqu'elle n'avait pas présentéformellement de réclamation,
n'avait pas apportéla preuve de la nationalité belge des actionnaires de
la sociétécanadienne et n'avait pasmontréque des intérêtb selgeseussent
subi un préjudice à raison d'un acte illicite imputablà l'Espagne (ann.
259).La Belgique a réfutéces arguments dans sa réponsedu 31 décembre
1951 et l'Espagne a répondu le 3 janvier 1952 (ann. 260 et 261). A ce
stade la question du droit d'intervention de la Belgique au sujet d'une
sociétécanadienne a étéposéetrès clairement.
36. La note du 21 mars 1955,par laquelle la Belgique se référait à la
possibilitéde régler l'affairepar des négociations privéesalors en cours

et mentionnait la visite de M. Dean, n'est pas annexéeau mémoire belge,
mais figure dans les annexes aux exceptions préliminaires de 1963
(ann. 66, doc. no2). Ensuite, le 31 décembre1956,la Belgique a envoyé
une longue note résumant toute l'affaire (A.M., vol. IV, ann. 262).
Une nouvelle note de la Belgique en date du 16mai 1957fait étatde cer-
tains entretiens personnels de l'ambassadeur de Belgique à Madrid et
envisage la possibilité d'un règlement judiciaire (ann. 263). La note
espagnole du 10juin 1957et la note belge du 8juillet traitent longuement
de la question de savoir si la Belgique a le droit d'intervenir dans cette
affaire (ann. 264 et 265). Cette dernière note insiste sur le fait queat
belge détient 50000 actions et rappelle l'importance des intérêts dela
Sidro. Il ne semble pas nécessairede passer en revue la correspondance
ultérieurequi concerne la requêteprésentée à la Cour, le désistementet

la nouvelle requête de1962.
37. Il est difficiled'expliquer l'apparente hésitationdu Gouvernement
demandeur à soumettre tout ce dossierà la Cour sous une forme ordon-
néeet cohérente,surtout si l'on considèresa récente initiative,rappelée
précédemment,en vue d'obtenir des renseignements du Gouvernement
des Etats-Unis. Mais on peut en conclure que, bien qu'en 1948le Gouver-
nement canadien, comme les trois autres gouvernements en cause, se soit
inquiétédelaprocédurjeudiciaire ouvertecontre la Barcelona en Espagne,
le Canada s'intéressaitprincipalement aux titres dont la National Trust
était letrustee et que, lorsque les obligations eurent été remboursées
après la vente de l'actif en Espagne, l'intérêdtu Canada s'est atténué.
C'est la conclusionà laquelle le conseil de la Belgique a abouti en 1964.
(Procédure orale, 13 mai 1964.)Il ne faut pas oublier que les titres qui

garantissaientlesfiligations Prior Lienet FirstMortgage de la Barcelona
Traction et qui étaient détenuspar la National Trust en tant que trustee
comprenaient des obligations et des actions de 1'Ebroet de la Catalonian
Land Co. Ltd., ainsi que d'autres filiales. En ce qui concerne 1'Ebropar
exempleil y avait desobligations d'une valeurnominale voisine de 11mil-
lions de livres sterling et environ 300000 actions. (Dans un autre ordreSee Receivership Documents, Vol. 1, p. 54.) But Canada apparently had
no deep abiding interest either in Canadian shareholdings in Barcelona

Traction, for they were not large, or in the Company itself which (at
least after the payment of the bonds) was linked to Canada only by the
"charter of convenience" and the receivership proceedings '.The latter
were not of a nature to stimulate Canadian diplomatic action, although,
under the supervision of the Ontario court, the Receiver and Manager
took an active part in trying to promote a settlement through negotiations
of the private interests involved. (See Receivership Documents, Vol. 5,
p. 774.) 1 do not find it credible that Canada can be considered to be
competing with Belgiumin diplomaticprotection ofthe interests clustered
around Barcelona Traction.

The interests of the United States and Great Britain were those of
governments of States which contain great financial capitals-New York
and London. Neither of them pressed claims on behalf of specificpersons
whether natural or juristic. Both Governments have a general interest in
the welfare of international "banking and investment circles" which are

closely linked with their national economies.

Belgium remains the only identifiable claimant against Spain in con-
nection with the bankruptcy of the Barcelona Traction Company.
If,under international law, a State is not entitled to extend its diplo-
matic protection to large shareholder interests of its nationals in circum-
stances such as those in the instant case, none of the equity interests in
the Barcelona Traction enterprise would be entitled to diplomatic pro-
tection. 1 do not believe international law requires that such a con-
clusion be reached.

38. There is no question that, under international law, a State has in
general a right toextend its diplomaticprotection to a corporation which
has its nationality, or national character as it is more properly called.
The proposition raises two questions:

(1) What are the tests to determine the national character of a corpora-
tion?
(2) Assuming the appropriate tests are met, must that national char-

Belgian counsel's argument on 30 June 1969 about the "violation of Canadian
sovereignty" and interference withthe functions of the receiver as a Canadian
"public authority" does not seem to reflect the actual thinking of the Canadian
Government.d'idées,il est intéressant de noter qu'un grand nombre d'actions étaient
accompagnéesde procurations en blancjointes aux certificats. Voir doc.
du receivership, vol. 1, p. 54.) Toutefois le Canada n'attachait apparem-
ment grand intérêtni à la participation canadienne dans la Barcelona

Traction, qui n'étaitpas très importante, ni à la société elle-mêmqeui
(tout au moins aprèsle paiement des obligations) n'étaitliéeau Canada
que par le ((statut de complaisance ))et la procédure du receivership l.
Cette dernière n'étaitpas de nature à inciter le Gouvernement canadien
à entreprendre une action diplomatique bien que, sous la surveillance
de la cour de l'Ontario, le receiver et administrateur se soit activement
efforcéde favoriser un règlement par la voie de négociations entre les
intérêts privésen cause. (Voir doc. du receivership,vol. V, p. 774.)Je ne

pense pas que l'on puisse raisonnablement considérerle Canada comme
rivalisant avec la Belgique pour assurer la protection diplomatique des
intérêts groupéa sutour de la Barcelona Traction.
Les intérêts des Etats-Unis et de la Grande-Bretagne étaientceux des
gouvernementsde deux Etats où setrouvent degrandes placesfinancières,
New York et Londres. Aucun de ces gouvernements n'a présentéde
réclamations pour le compte de personnes déterminées, physiquesou
morales. Ils ont l'un et l'autre un intérêtgénéral à voir prospérer les

((milieux internationaux de la banque et des investissements », qui ont
des liens étroitsavec leur économienationale.
Contre l'Espagne, la Belgique demeure le seul demandeur identifiable
comme tel en ce qui concerne la faillite de la société BarcelonaTraction.
Si, en droit international, un Etat n'est pas habilitéà exercer la pro-
tection diplomatique d'importants intérêts deses ressortissants en tant
qu'actionnaires de sociétésdans des circonstances semblables à celles
de l'espèce,aucun des intérêtsse présentant sous forme d'actions dans

l'entreprise de la Barcelona Traction n'aurait alors droit à la protection
diplomatique. Je ne pense pas que le droit international exige que l'on
aboutisse a une telleconclusion.

38. Il ne fait pas de doute qu'en droit international un Etat dispose
en généraldu droit d'accorder sa protection diplomatique à une société

possédant sa nationalité ou, plus exactement, son caractère national.
cette proposition soulève deuxquestions:
1) Quels sont lescritèrespermettantde déterminerle caractèrenational
d'une société?
2) A supposer que les critèrespertinents soient satisfaits, ce caractère

L'argument de l'un des conseils de la Belgique, le 30 juin 1969, concernant la
«violation de la souveraineté canadienne. el'ingérence dans les fonctions du
receiver en tant qu'«organe publ1)ne semble pas refléter la véritable façon de
penser du Gouvernement canadien. (Audiencedu 30 juin 1969.) 183 BARCELONATRACTION (SEP.OP. JESSUP)

acter be "real and effective" as shown by the "link" between the corpora-
tion andthe State, just as, in the Nottebohmcase, this Court decided that
a certain claim to nationality is not enough in al1situations to justify a
State in extending its diplomatic protection to a natural person?

39. There are two standard tests of the "nationality" of a corporation.
The place of incorporation is the test generally favoured in the legal
systems of the common law, while the siègesocial is more generally
accepted in the civil law systems. (See Kronstein, "The Nationality of
International Enterprises", 52 Columbia Law Review (1952), p. 983.)
There is respectable authority for requiring that both tests be met l.

It is not possibleto speak ofa singlerule for al1purposes.The tests used
in private international law have their own character, as wellbrought out
by Caflisch, "La nationalité des sociétés commercialesen droit inter-
national privé", Annuaire suissede droit international, Vol. XXIV, 1967,
page 119.
Commercial treaties and claims conventions often contain their own
definitions of which companies shall be considered to have thenationality
of a State forpurposes of the treaty. (Cf. Walker, "Provisions on Com-

panies in United States Commercial Treaties", 50 American Journal of
International Law, 1956, p. 373; Wilson, United States Commercial
Treaties and International Law, 1960; and, for a more comprehensive
survey, Ginther, "Nationality of Corporations", Osterreichische Zeit-
schrijt fur OffentlichesRecht, Vol. XVI, 1966,p. 28 at pp. 31-59.) The
tests used for such purposes may be quite different-even in the practice
of the same State-from the tests used for other purposes. For example,
the "control" test was widely used to determine the enemy character of
property during war, but it is not established in international law as a

general test of the nationality of a corporation 2. On the other hand,
controlmay constitutethe essentiallink which, whenjoined to nationality,
givesthe Statethe right to extenddiplomaticprotection to thecorporation.
It isafamiliar fact that the laws of certain Statesprovide favourable con-
ditions for companies incorporating therein, especially in relation to
taxation. Canada is one such State, Liechtenstein is another. In the
United States, many companies find it advantageous, for various reasons,
to incorporate in Delaware or New Jersey 3.Charters secured for such

reasons may be called "charters of convenience".

40. The Judgment of the Court in Nottebohm, SecondPhase, in 1955

l There is ample coverage of the literaturein the excellent study by Ginther,
op. cit., infra.
See the observations of the Permanent Courtof International Justiceon the
control testin Certain German Znterests Polis h pper Silesia (Series A, No. 7,
at p. 70).
on Business within theTerritory",30 Harvard Law Review, 1917, p. 676. whoCarry BARCELONATRACTION (OP. IND. JESSUP) 183

national, manifestépar le «lien» entre la sociétéet l'Etat, doit-il être
((effect»f(voir l'affaireNottebohm, où la Cour a décidé que l'affirmation

d'un certain lien de nationalité ne suffitpas toujours à habiliter un Etat
à accorder sa protection diplomatique à une personne physique)?
39. Il existe deux critères usuelsde la ((nationalité))d'une société.
Le lieu où la sociétéest constituée estle critère généralemenrtetenu par
les systèmesjuridiques de commonlaw, tandis que le siègesocial est plus
généralement accepté dans les systèmesde droit civil. (Voir Kronstein,

cThe Nationality of International Enterprises », 52 Columbia Law
Review, 1952,p. 983.)Il ne manque pas d'auteurs fort respectables pour
dire que ces deux critèresdoivent êtresimultanément satisfaits l.
On nesaurait parler d'une règleunique valable à toutes fins. Lescritères
utilisésen droit international privéont leur caractère propre, comme l'a
bien montréCaflisch dans «La nationalitédes sociétés commerciales en
droit international privé ))Annuairesuisse de droit international,1967,

volume XXIV, page 119.
Lestraités decommerce et lesconventions de réclamations contiennent
souvent leur propre définition des société qsui seront considéréescomme
ayant la nationalité d'un Etat aux jîns du traité ou de la convention.
(Cf. Walker, ((Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial
Treaties », 50 American Journal of International Law, 1956, p. 373;
Wilson, UnitedStates CommercialTreaties and InternationalLaw, 1960;

et, pour une analyse plus complète,Ginther, (Nationality of Corpora-
tions »,OsterreichischeZeitschrijitjiïr ofentliches Recht, vol. XVI, 1966,
p. 31-59.)Les critères ainsi utilisés peuventêtretout à fait différents-
mêmedans la pratique d'un mêmeEtat - descritèresappliquésàd'autres
fins. Par exemple, le critèredu ((contrôle »a étélargement employépour
déterminerle caractère ennemide biens en temps de guerre, mais il n'est
pas reçu en droit international comme critère généralde la nationalité

d'une société 2.D'autre part, lecontrôlepeut constituer leliende rattache-
ment essentielqui,joint à la nationalité, confèreà 1'Etatle droit d'accor-
der une protection diplomatique à la sociétéI.l est bien connu que la loi
de certains Etats offre des conditions favorables aux sociétéq sui s'ycons-
tituent, notamment en matièrede fiscalité. Le Canada en est un exemple,
le Liechtenstein en est un autre. Aux Etats-Unis, de nombreuses sociétés
trouvent des avantages, pour diverses raisons, à se constituer dans le

Delaware ou le New Jersey 3.Les statuts obtenus pour de pareils motifs
peuvent êtrequalifiésde (statuts de complaisance ».
40. L'arrêtrendu par la Cour en 1955 dans l'affaire Nottebohm,

' On trouvera un abondant exposé de la doctrine dans l'excellente étudede
Ginther,op. cit., infra.
Voir lesobservationsde la Cour permanentede Justice internationalesur le
critèredu contrôle dans l'affairerelativeCertains intérêts allemandsen Haute-
Silésiepolonaise, fond, arrêtno 7, 1926, C.P.Z.J. sérieAp. 70.
Cf. Cahill,Jurisdictionover Foreign Corporationsand Individuals whoCarry
on Business withinthe Territory*, 3Harvard Law Review, 1917,p. 676.(I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 4), has been widely discussed in the subsequent

literature of international law, particularly with reference to the so-called
"link theory" by which the effectiveness of nationality may be tested l.

It has been argued that the doctrine is equally applicable in the case of
ships flying "flags of convenience" and in relation to the diplomatic
protection of corporations. 1 have maintained the view that it should

apply in both those situations 2.
41. In the instant case the Partiesdid notdebate the applicability of the
link principle to the Barcelona Traction Company, but they werecertainly
aware of the question. The Spanish side stated:

". .. the Spanish Government never disputed the effectivecharacter
of Barcelona Traction's Canadian nationality, because a number of
factors were present which were sufficientproof of the existence of a
real link between the Company and the economic life of Canada".
(P.O., 1963,p. 190.)

Counsel for Belgiumargued on4July 1969that "if the Canadian Govern-
ment had been able to espouse in international judicial proceedings the

cause of Barcelona Traction, its action could have been challenged on the
ground of the lack of sufficient true Canadian interest". Counsel for
Spain responded directly to this remark on 21 July.
42. 1am in full agreement with the proposition that the decisions of the
International Court of Justice should not be based upon a legal rule or
principle which has not been considered by the parties 3-indeed, 1
believe that the failure to heed that proposition is the only criticism

which can properly be directed at the Court's decision in Nottebohm.
When, however, both Parties have revealed a full awareness of the fact
that the "link" principle might be applied to test the national quaiity of
Barcelona Traction, the fact that they did not choose to develop their
arguments on the ground of legal principle, rather than of fact, cannot
operate to prevent the Court from dealing with the principle. Of course

l The wide range of unfavourable comments is refiected in the text and citations
in Grossen, "Nationalité et protection diplomatique", lus et Lex, Festgabe zum
70. Geburtstag von Max Gutzwiller, 1959, p. 489. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, 1966, has a full treatment at pp. 323 ff. His position is generally
favourable to the Court's judgment.

Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea", 59 Columbia
Law Review, 1959, pp. 234, 256. Meyers, The Nationality of Ships, 1967,fully covers
the question offlags of convenience, and the applicability of the rule to corporations
is treated in Harris, "The Protection of Companies in International Law in the Light
of the Nottebohm Case", 18 Internationaland Comparative Law Quarterly, April 1969,
p. 2The proposition has been admirably expounded in Carsten Smith, The Re-
lation Between Proceedings and Premises, a Study in International Law,62.deuxièmephase (C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p. 4), a été abondammentdiscuté

dans les ouvrages de droit international parus depuis, notamment en ce
qui concerne ce qu'on a appelé «la théoriedu rattachement », qui per-
mettrait de vérifierle caractèreeffectifde la nationalité '.
Il a étéaffirméque cette doctrine est applicable égalementau cas des
navires battant ((pavillon de complaisance »et à celui de la protection

diplomatique des sociétés. J'ai personnellemens toutenu cette opinion 2.

41. En l'espèce,l'argumentation des Parties n'a pas porté surle point
de savoir sileprincipe du rattachement s'appliquait àla société Barcelona
Traction, mais elles étaient certainement conscientes du problème. Du
côté espagnol,on a dit que

«le Gouvernement espagnol n'a jamais contesté le caractèreeffectif
de la nationalité canadiennede la Barcelona Traction, à cause de la

présence d'un ensemble d'élémentsqui constituent une preuve
suffisantede l'existenced'un lien réelde la société avec la vie écono-
mique canadienne ».(E.P., 1963,p. 190.)

Le conseil de la Partie belge a allégué le 4juillet 1969que, «si le Gouver-
nement canadien avait étéen mesure de prendre fait et cause pour la
Barcelona Traction, son action aurait pu êtrecontestéevu l'insuffisance
d'un véritableintérêt canadien ».Le conseil de l'Espagne a répondu à
cette observation précisele 21juillet.

42. Je souscris entièrement à l'idéeque les décisionsde la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice ne devraient pas êtrefondéessur une règle ni sur
un principe juridique qui n'aurait pas étévisépar les Parties - et je
crois mêmeque la seulecritique valable que l'on puisse adresser à l'arrêt
Nottebohmest de n'en avoir pas tenu compte. Toutefois, les deux Parties

ayant montré qu'ellesétaient parfaitementconscientes de ce que le prin-
cipedu « rattachement » pouvait êtreappliqué pour déterminerlecaractère
national dela BarcelonaTraction, cen'estpas parce qu'elles sesont abste-
nues de développerleurs arguments sur la base de principes juridiques,
plutôt que de faits, qu'il serait interdit à la Cour de traiter du principe.

l La très grande diversité des commentaires défavorables qui ont étéformulés
ressort du texte et des citations de Grossen, ciNationalité et protection diploma-
tique»,lus et Lex, Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag von Max Gutzwiller, 1959,p. 489.
Brownlie fait une analyse approfondie dans Principles of PublicInternationalLaw,
1966, p. 323 et suiv. D'une façon générale,il se prononce en faveur de l'arrêt dela
Cour.
Jessup, cThe United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea >)59 Columbia
Law Review, 1959,p. 234,256. Meyers, dans TheNationality ofShigs, 1967,examine
à fond la question des pavillons de complaisance, tandis que l'application de la
règle aux sociétésest traitée par Harris, dans The Protection of Companies in
International Law in the Light of the Nottebohm Case ))18Internationaland Com-
parative Law Quarterly, avril 1969, p. 275.
Cette thèse a été admirablementexposéepar Carsten Smith, dans The Relation
Between Proceedings andPremises, a Study in InternationalLaw (1962). the question whether the link principle does apply to juristic persons ia
question of international law andjura novit curia.The implication in the
pleading of Belgian counsel just cited, intimated a conclusion that the
link principle does apply to juristic persons.

It is indeed true thatsince Spain admitted that Canada had a right to
extend diplomatic protection to Barcelona Traction, it may be argued
that Spain is estopped to deny such a right although the elements of true
estoppel may be lacking and such estoppel could be claimed (if at all) by
Canada and not by Belgium. Aside from the fact that 1believe thejuris-
prudence of the Court has tended to rely too heavily on estoppel or
preclusion, the question posed here is in the first place a question of the
Court's finding a rule of law. The Court in its Judgment does not accept
the application of the link theory to juristic persons. Since 1have reached
the conclusion that the existence of a link between a corporation holding
a "charter of convenience" and the State granting the charter, is the key
to the diplomatic protection of multinational corporate interests, 1 can-

not avoid the problems of law and fact on any such basis as the applica-
tion of the doctrine of estoppel in this particular case.

43. Tthas also been argued that the Court should not passjudgment on
the question whether there existed the necessarylink between Canada and
Barcelona Traction without hearing argument on behalf of Canada.
Canada might have sought to intervene in theinstant caseunder Article 62
of the Statute, but it did not do so. It is said that after judgment is
pronounced in this case of Belgium v. Spain, Canada might find some
jurisdictional ground to found an application to institute a case of
Canada v. Spain. It is known that no such jurisdictional ground now
exists. It seemsquite unreal to suppose that Spain would now agree with
Canada upon a compromissubmitting to the Court a Canadian claim on
behalf of Barcelona Traction, thus exposing Spain to the new hazard of
being required to pay some two hundred millions of dollars of damages.
But if the Court were properly seised of an application by Canada, it

would have to take cognizance of the fact that following Article 59 of the
Statute, "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case". Had theCourt endorsed
the application of the link principle to juristic persons, in its present
decision in BeIgium v. Spain, Canada could have argued against that
conclusion in the hypothetical case of Canada v. Spain, or might have
relied on Spanish admissions that Canada was entitled to protect the
Company. Bien sûr, la question de savoir si le principe du rattachement s'applique
ou non aux personnes morales constitue un problème de droit inter-
national et un cas dejura novit curia. La plaidoirie du conseil belge pré-
citéeappelle implicitement la conclusion que le principe du rattachement
s'applique effectivementaux personnes morales.
En vérité, puisque l'Espagna e admis que le Canada avait le droit d'ac-
corder une protection diplomatique à la Barcelona Traction, on pourrait
soutenir que l'Espagnene peut plus lui dénier cedroit, en vertu de'estop-

pel, encore que les éléments d'unvéritableestoppel fassent défautet que,
à supposer qu'on puisse l'invoquer, c'estau Canada et non à la Belgique
qu'ilappartiendrait de le faire. Outre qu'à mon avislajurisprudence de la
Cour a tendance à s'appuyer excessivementsur la notion d'estoppelou de
forclusion, la question qui se pose ici est en premier lieu de savoir si la
Cour peut conclure à l'existence d'une règlde droit. Dans son arrêt, la
Cour n'admet pas l'application aux personnes morales de la théoriedu
rattachement. Comme je suis arrivé à la conclusion que l'existenced'un
lien de rattachement entre une sociétédotée d'un((statut de complai-
sance »et 1'Etatlui ayant accordéce statut constitue la clédu probième
de la protection diplomatique des intérêts desociétésmultinationales,
je ne puis esquiver les problèmesqui se posent sur le plan du droit et des

faits en invoquant par exemple l'application de la doctrine de I'estoppel
enl'espèce.
43. On a égalementsoutenu que la Cour ne devrait pas se prononcer
sur I'existencedu lien de rattachement nécessaireentre le Canada et la
Barcelona Traction sans entendre les arguments du Canada. Celui-ci
aurait pu demander à intervenir dans l'instance en vertu de l'article 62
du Statut, mais il nel'a pas fait. On a dit qu'une fois l'arrêtrendu en la
présente affaire,qui oppose la Belgique àl'Espagne, le Canada pourrait
trouver une base juridictionnelle lui permettant d'intenter une action
contre l'Espagne.L'on sait qu'iln'existeàprésentaucune basejuridiction-
nelle de cet ordre.I paraît toutà fait illusoire de supposer que l'Espagne
puisse s'entendremaintenant avecle Canada pour élaborer uncompromis
saisissant la Cour d'une réclamation canadienne pour le compte de la

Barcelona Traction, ce qui exposerait une nouvelle fois l'Espagne au
risque de devoir verserquelque 200 millions de dollarsàtitre d'indemnité.
Mais, si la Cour était valablement saisie d'une requête canadienne,elle
devrait tenir compte de ce que, selon l'article9 du Statut, (cla décision
de la Cour n'est obligatoire que pour les parties en litige et dans le cas
qui a étédécidé ».Si,dans son arrêtrelatifà la présente affaireBelgiquec.
Espagne, la Cour avait pris parti pour l'application du principe de rat-
tachement aux personnes morales, le Canada aurait été endroit de con-
tester cette conclusion dans une affaire hypothétiqueCanada c. Espagne,
ou encore il aurait pu faire valoir que l'Espagne a admis que le Canada
étaithabilitéà protégerla société. The "Link" Concept
44. It seemsto be widelythought that the "link" concept in connection
with the nationality of claims, originated in the International Court of
Justice's Judgment in Nottebohm. 1 do not agree that in that instance the

Court created a new rule of law. Indeed the underlying principle was
already wellestablished in connection with diplomatic claims on behalf of
corporations. To look for the link between a corporation and a State is
merelyanother exampleof what isnowthe familiar practice of "lifting the
veil". See,for example Cohn and Simitis "'Lifting the Veil'in the Com-
pany Laws ofthe European Continent", 12Internationaland Comparative
Law Quarterly (1963), page 189; Drachsler in Report of the Section of
International and ComparativeLaw of the American Bar Association, July
1964, page 29. The practice of such States as the United States and
Switzerland had already given weight to the proposition that a corpora-
tion would not be protected solely because it was incorporated in the
State, i.e., had the State's nationality; some other link was required and
that link usually was related to the ownership of shares. Such abstention,
being as it were "against interest", has special probative value '.

Three years after the decision in Nottebohm, the Italian-United States
Conciliation Commission, under the presidence of the late Professor
Sauser Hall, in the Flegenheimercase stated:
"The right of challenge of the international court, authorizing it to
determine whether, behind the nationality certificate or the acts of
naturalisation produced, the right to citizenship was regularly
acquired, is inconformity with the very broadrule of efectivity which
dominates the law of nationals entirely and allows the court to
fulfill its legal function andremove the inconveniences specified."

(Emphasis supplied.) (53 American Journal of International Law,
1959,p. 944.)
That the link concept represents a general principle of law and not
merelyan adhocrule for the decision ofa particular case,isindicated also
by its applicability to the test of the nationality of ships which fly "flags
of convenience". These maritime situations are comparable to the cor-
porate situations just discussed since they involve corporate decisions to
register their shipsunder the flagsof States which offerspecialadvantages
in connection with tax, labour and other laws.

45. The Judgment in Nottebohm, Second Phase, was pronounced on
6 April 1955. At that time, the International Law Commission, which
w-s preparing its projects on the law of the sea, had not yet developed

' State practice isnoted infra, paras. seq.t La notionde ((rattachement »
44. Une idée assezrépandue, semble-t-il, est que la nation de crat-
tachement)), employée à propos de la nationalité des réclamations,
trouve son origine dans l'arrêt rendupar la Cour internationale de Justice

en l'affaireottebohm.Je conteste qu'en l'occurrencela Cour ait créé une
nouvelle règle de droit. En fait, le principe sous-jacent était déjàbien
établi,à propos des réclamations diplomatiques présentéesau nom de
sociétés. Rechercher le lienexistant entre une société et un Etat, ce n'est
pas autre chose que la pratique - désormais familière - de la ((levéedu
voile».Voir par exemple Cohn et Simitis: ((Lifting the Veil)in the Com-
pany Laws of the European Continent »,12International andCompara-
tive Law Quarterly (1963), page 189; Drachsler, dans Report of the

Section of International andComparativeLaw de I'AmericanBar Associa-
tion,juillet 1964,page 29. La pratique d'Etats comme les Etats-Unis et
la Suisse avait déjàconféré uncertain poids à l'idéequ'une société n'est
pas protégéepour la seule raison qu'elle a été constituée sulre territoire
de 1'Etat - autrement dit qu'ellea la nationalité de1'Etat;un autre lien
de rattachement est nécessaire,que l'on a habituellement cherchédans
la propriété des actions. L'abstentionde ces Etats, en quelque sorte
contraire à leur intérêt, aici un caractère particulièrement probant l.
Troisans après l'arrêN t ottebohm,la Commission de conciliation italo-

américaine, présidép ear le regretté professeur Sauser-Hall, a déclaré
dans I'affaireFlegenheimer :
«Le droit de remise en question du juge international, l'autorisant
à déterminersi, malgré le certificatde nationalité ou les lettres de

naturalisation présentés, ledroit de citoyennetéa étérégulièrement
acquis, estconforme à la règle très généra deI'eflectivitéqui domine
entièrementle droit en matière de nationalitéet permet au juge de
s'acquitter de ses fonctions et de surmonter les inconvénients cités.»
(Les italiques sont de nous.) (53 American Journal of International
Law, 1959,p. 944.)

Que la notion de rattachement représenteun principe générad l e droit
et pas seulement une règle spécialemenc tonçue pour trancher une affaire
isoléeestégalementdémontré par lefait qu'on ya recourspour déterminer
la nationalité desnavires battant ((pavillon de complaisance ))Dans le
domaine maritime, ces situations sont comparables à celle que nous
venons d'examiner à propos des sociétésp ,uisqu'elles supposent la déci-
sion collective (sociale)d'immatriculer le navire sous le pavillon d'Etats

dont la législationfiscale et la législationdu travail entre autres offrent
des avantages spéciaux.
45. L'arrêt Nottebohm, deuxième phase,a été rendule 6 avril 1955.
A l'époque,la Commission du droit international, qui élaboraitalors ses
projets sur le droit de la mer, n'avait pas encore mis au point la notion

La pratique des Etats est notéeinfrap,ar. 60 et suiv.

187the concept of a "genuine link" as a requisite for the recognition of the
nationality of a ship. But the link theory was thereafter activelyargued in
the Commission and at length in the Geneva Conference of 1958on the
Law of the Sea. Article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas was
adopted in the following terms: ,

"Each State shall fixthe conditions for the grant of its nationality
to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right
to flyits flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they
are entitled to fly.heremust exist a genuinelink between the State
and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social mat-
ters over ships flyingits flag." (Emphasis supplied.)

46. In 1959,governments weresubmitting to the InternationalCourt of
Justice viewson the Constitution oftheMaritime Safety Committee of the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization case. The in-
fluence of the link concept was apparent. (Meyers, The Nationality of
Ships, 1967,pp. 227ff.)When the Court gave its Advisory Opinion on the
above case in 1960,it clearly confined itself to a particular question of
treaty interpretation and declined to examine general customary law on
"a genuinelink". (I.C.J. Reports 1960,p. 171.)It made a passingreference
to Article 5 of the "unratzjiedGeneva Convention on the High Seas". In
his dissenting opinion, Judge MorenoQuintana said that the provision in
Article 5-

"... by which international law establishes an obligation binding
in national law, constitutes at the present time the opinio &ris
gentium on the matter". (Ibid., p. 178.)

The Nottebohm case itself was not discitssed at length in connection
with the law of the sea in the International Law Commission but Dr.
Garcia Amador, Special Reporter for the International Law Commission
on State Responsibility, in his Sixth Report, noted that he had added a
paragraph to his earlier draft "inorder to incorporate the rule laid down
by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case". (Yearbook
of the International Law Commission, 1961, Vol. II, p. 53; see Article 23
of his revised draft at p. 49.) Although the "link" concept was much
discussedat the Geneva Conference, only a fewgovernments or delegates
referred to the Nottebohm case (Meyers, op. cit., pp. 269 ff.).Four
States-Netherlands, Norway, Liberia and the United Kingdom-in
their pleadings in theConstitutionoftheMaritime Safety Committeeof the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization case made some
reference to the Court's statements in Nottebohm, Second Phase, about
"unilateral acts" of States. (I.C.J. Pleadings,pp. 357-359; 365-366;374; du ((lien substantiel)comme condition de la reconnaissance de la na-
tionalité d'un navire. Mais la théoriedu lien de rattachement a donné
lieu ensuiteà des débats animés au sein dela commission, et la conférence
de Genèvede 1958sur le droit de la mer l'a soumise à un examen appro-

fondi. L'article 5 de la convention sur lahaute mer, tel qu'ila étéadopté,
se lit ainsi:
(Chaque Etat fixeles conditions auxquelles il accorde sa nationa-

lité aux navires ainsi que les conditions d'immatriculation et du
droit de battre son pavillon. Les navires possèdent la nationalité
de 1'Etatdont ils sont autorisés à battre pavillon. II doit exister un
lien substantiel entre I'Etat et le navire; 1'Etat doit notamment
exercer effectivementsajuridiction et son contrôle, dans lesdomaines
technique, administratif et social, sur les navires battant son pavil-
lon. )(Les italiques sont de nous.)

46. Lorsque, en 1959, les gouvernements ont soumis à la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice leurs vues sur l'affaire de la Compositiondu Comité
de la sécuritémaritime del'Organisation intergouvernementaleconsultative
de la navigation maritime, l'influencede la notion de rattachement a été
manifeste. (Meyers, The Nationality of Ships, 1967, p. 227 et suiv.)

Quand la Cour a rendu son avis consultatif en 1960,elle s'esttrèsclaire-
ment contentée de traiter une question particulière d'interprétation des
traitéset s'est refuséeà examiner le droit coutumier généralsur le ((lien
substantiel)). (C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 171.) La Cour a fait allusion en
passant àl'article 5 de la convention ((nonratzjiéede Genèvede 1958sur
la haute mer )(les italiques sont de nous). Dans son opinion dissidente,
M. Moreno Quintana a déclaréque la disposition de l'article 5,

((par laquelle le droit international créeune obligation à la charge
du droit national, constitue aujourd'hui l'opiniojuris gentium en la
matière ))(Zbid.,p. 178.)

L'affaire Nottebohmn'a pas été beaucoupdiscutée à propos du droit
de la mer, àla Commission du droit international, mais M. Garcia Ama-
dor, rapporteur spécialde la commission pour la question de la responsa-
bilitédes Etats a indiqué,dans son sixièmerapport, qu'il avait ajoutéun
paragraphe à son projet antérieur«pour ymentionner la doctrine élaborée

par laCour internationale de Justice dans l'affaire Nottebohm ))(Annuaire
dela Commission dudroit international, 1961,vol. II, p. 55;voir l'article23
du projet revisé, p.51.) Bien que la notion de ((rattachement » ait été
abondamment débattue à la conférencede Genève, l'affaireNottebohm
n'aété évoquée queparun petit nombre de gouvernementsou de délégués
(Meyers,op.cit., p. 269et suiv.).Quatre Etats -les Pays-Bas,la Norvège,
le Libériaet le Royaume-Uni - ont faitallusion, dans leurs exposésécrits
relatifsà I'OMCI, à ce qu'avait dit la Cour dans l'arrêtNottebohm,

deuxièmephase, au sujet des ((actes unilatéraux)) des Etats. (C.I.J.
Mémoires,p. 357-359; 365-366; 374; 404-405.) Le point important est 188 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEPO . P. JESSUP)

404-405.) Theimportant point is that there wasgrowing recognition of the

rule that if a State wishes to have its "unilateral acts" recognized and
given effectby other States, those acts must conform to the principles and
rules of international law. If a State confers its nationality on a person
who has no genuine link with it, another State may not need to recognize
the person as such national. Such nationality has been styled "a citizen-

ship of convenience" '.If a State purports to confer its nationality on
ships by allowing them to flyits flag,without assuring that they meet such
tests as management, ownership, jurisdiction and control, other States
are not bound to recognize the asserted nationality of the ship 2. As a
matter ofprinciple and logic-supported byState practice-a comparable
rule is applicable to corporations. A State may, by extendingdiplomatic

protection to a corporation, hold out that corporation as having its
"nationality", becausethe Statehad granted it itscharter of incorporation.
But if in fact there is no "genuine link" between the corporation and the
State in question, the State to which diplomaticrepresentations are made
may, on that ground reject them. Perhaps one makes here an analogy to

stateless persons but the stateless individual has nothing behind him and
cannot be protected until the present imperfect law of human rights is
fully developed 3. On the other hand, the corporation which has a
nominal connection with a State of incorporation but whose shares are
al1owned by nationals of another State in which latter State the actual

management and control of the Companyare carried on, has behind it the
shareholders who represent the real interest. No rule of law, no principle,
forbids that latter State to extend its diplomatic protection to those
interests.

47. It is true that the Court in the Constitutionof the Maritime Safety

l Uebersee Finanz-Korporation A.G., Liestal, Switzerland, Plaintif, Fritz von
Opel, Zntervener-Plaintiff v. Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General, et al., 133 F.
Supp. 615, 619 (1955), affd. 244 F. 2d 789 (1957). This case, decided by the United
International Courtrof Justice inNottebohm, also involved a consideration of thee
validity of the naturalizationof a Gerrnan in Liechtenstein during the Second
World War. The question was in part whether the intervener was an innocent
stockholder in a Company vested by the Alien Property Custodian as enemy alien
property. The United States Court did not cite the Nottebohm case.
There are, however, situations in which national courtstill find it appropriate
to recognize "the law of the flag"; seeCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 83 S. Ct. (U.S.) 671 (1963).
And query whether the terrn "man" in "The Rights of Man" includes a cor-
poration!
The Court's decision in Nottebohm, Secondphase, has been criticized as creatinga
new group of apatrides; see Bindschedler-Robert, "Laprotection diplomatique des
sociétés et des actionnaires",Revue de la Sociétédes juristes bernois, Vol. 100,
1964, p. 141. BARCELONATRACTION (OP. IND.JESSUP) 188

l'acceptation de plus en plus étenduede la règlesuivant laquelle, si un
Etat désireque d'autres Etats reconnaissent ses « actes unilatéraux » et

leur donnent effet, ces actes doivent êtreconformes aux principes et aux
règles du droit international. Si un Etat confère sa nationalité à une
personne qui ne lui est rattachée par aucun lien effectif, un autre Etat
n'a pas forcément à reconnaitre à ladite personne la qualitéde ressortis-
sante du premier. La nationalité accordéedans ces conditions a été

appelée((nationalitéde complaisance l.Si un Etat entend conférersa
nationalité à desnaviresenlesautorisant à battre sonpavillon, sans veiller
à ce qu'ils satisfassentà des conditions comme cellesde gestion, de pro-
priété,dejuridiction et de contrôle, les autres Etats ne sont pas tenus de

reconnaitre la nationalité ainsi attribuée aux navires 2.Les principes et
la logique - corroborés par la pratique des Etats - veulent qu'une
règlecomparable s'applique aux sociétésU . n Etat peut, en accordant sa
protection diplomatique à une société, affirmeq rue cette société possède
sa ((nationalité» parce qu'illa lui a conférée au moment où elle s'estcons-

tituée.Mais si en fait il n'ya pas de ((lien de rattachement effectif »entre
la sociétéet I'Etat en question, 1'Etatauquel des représentations diploma-
tiques sont faites peut, pour cette raison même, les repousser.On établit
peut-êtreici une certaine analogie avec la situation des apatrides, mais

l'apatride n'a riensur quoi s'appuyer et ne peut pas êtreprotégétant que
les règlesjuridiques concernant les droits de l'homme - à présent très
imparfaites - ne se seront pas pleinement développée s.En revanche,
la société théoriquementrattachée à 1'Etatoù elle s'estconstituée, mais
dont les actions sont toutes entre les mains de nationaux d'un autre Etat,

d'où la gestion effective et le contrôle sont exercés,a derrière elle des
actionnaires qui représentent les intérêtsréels.Aucune règle de droit,
aucun principe, n'empêche le deuxièmE etat d'accorder sa protection
diplomatique à ces intérêts.
47. Il est vrai qu'à propos de la Compositiondu Comitéde la sécurité

l Uebersee Finanz-KorporationA.G.,Liestal, Switzerland, Plaintiff,Fritz vonOpel,
Intervener-Plaintiffc. Herbert Brownell,Jr., Attorney General, et al., 133 F. Supp.
615, 619(1955), aff'd. 244F.2d 789 (1957). Cette affaire, tranchée par le tribunal
fédéraldu district de Columbia, l'annéeoù la Cour internationale de Justice a rendu
sa décisiondans I'affaireNottebohm, posait égalementleproblème de la validitéde la
naturalisation d'un Allemand au Liechtenstein pendant la deuxième guerremondiale.
II s'agissait en particulier de savoir si la partie intervenante était un actionnaire
innocent d'une société placéseous séquestre par 1'AlienProperty Custodiancomme
bien ennemi. Le tribunal américain n'a pas fait référenceà l'affaire Nottebohm.
Il existe cependant des situations dans lesquelles les tribunaux nationaux croient
encore devoir reconnaître le «droit du pavillon »;voir McCulloch c. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 83 S. Ct. (U.S.) 671 (1963).
Et l'on peut se demander si le mot ahomme )dans les droits de l'homme)J
peut s'appliquer à une société!
La décision prise par la Cour dans l'affaireottebohm, deuxième phase,a été
critiquée comme créant une nouvelle catégorie d'apatrides; voir Bindschedler-
Robert, eLa protection diplomatique des sociétéset des actionnairr,Revue de la
Sociétédesjuristes bernois,1964,vol. 100,p. 141.Committee of theInter-GovernmentalMaritime Consultative Organization
case, as a matter of treaty interpretation, and taking into account the
travauxpréparatoires,stated that :
". ..it is unlikely that it was contemplated [in drafting the Conven-
tion which established IMCO] that the test should be the nationality
of stock-holders and of others having beneficial interests in every
merchant ship; facts which would be difficultto catalogue, to ascer-
tain and t,omeasure. To take into account the names and nationali-
ties of the owners or shareholders of shipping companies would ...
'introduce an unnecessarily complicated criterion' ... On the other
hand, the criterion of registered tonnage is practical, certain and

capable of easy application." (I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 169.)

It would be unsound to transpose some of these words from their con-
text, where persuasive reasons are set out for the particular issue before
the Court, to support an argument that it is not practical to ascertain the
existence of preponderant, majority or substantial stock interests in
corporations. In particular it will be shown that in at least certain cases,
international law does not exclude the protection of shareholders on the
ground that it is difficult to identify them, e.g., in the case where inter-
national law permits the protection of foreign shareholdersin a corpora-
tion which is the victim of unlawful destructive acts performed by the

State of incorporation. Nor can the rule which permits the protection of
shareholders in certain circumstances be discarded because Company
management may sometimes find it inconvenient to reveal the exact
position in regard to the ultimate ownership of the shares.

48. One of the reasons for the rule on continuity of nationality of
claims is the avoidance of assignments of claims by nationals of a small
State to nationals of a powerful State. If a powerful State should seek to
attract corporations to incorporate under its laws so that it could claim
them as its nationals even though the corporations had no further con-
nection with that State, this Court should not "regard itself as bound by
the unilateral act" of that State. The same conclusion must be reached
when less powerful States attract the incorporation of companies or the
registration of ships by providing "charters of convenience" or "flags of
convenience".

It has been noted that Canada is one of the States which attracts the
incorporation of companiesthrough favourable tax laws,etc. Counsel for
Spain called attention to the fact that a corporation called the San
Antonio Land Company was incorporated in Toronto in the sameyear-
1911-as Barcelona Traction by Mr. Pearson, "the promoter and first
president ofBarcelonaTraction". Theidentity of someofthe personalities

in the two companies, as well as their London agents, was stressed. Themaritime de l'organisation intergouvernementale consultative de la navi-
gation maritime, la Cour, interprétant une disposition conventionnelle
et tenant compte des travaux préparatoires, a estimé

((improbable que l'on ait envisagé (lors de la rédaction de la
convention portant création de I'OMCI) que le critère dût être la
nationalité des actionnaires ou de telles autres personnes ayant
réellementla propriété detout navire de commerce; il s'agit là de
faits difficiles cataloguer, à vérifieret à mesurer. Faire inter-

venir la question du nom et de la nationalité des propriétaires ou
des actionnaires des compagnies de navigation ..((introduirait
un critère inutilement compliqué » ..Au contraire, le critère du
tonnage immatriculé est pratique, certain et facilement applicable.))
(C.I.J. Recueil 1960, p. 169.)

Il ne seraiA .as~rudent d'extraire certains de ces termes de leur con-
texte, celui d'un exposéde raisons convaincantes concernant la ques-
tion particulièredont la Courétait saisie, pour appuyer l'argument selon
lequel il n'est pas commode de vérifierl'existence de participations
prépondérantes, majoritairesou substantielles dans des sociétés par ac-
tions. On verra en particulier que, dans certains cas au moins, le droit
international n'exclut pas la protection des actionnaires parce qu'il est
difficilede les identifier puisque par exemple il autorise la protection
des actionnaires étrangers d'une société victimed'actes illicites et des-

tructeurs commis par 1'Etatoù elle s'estconstituée.On ne peut pas non
plus écarter la règle qui permet de protéger les actionnaires dans cer-
taines circonstances pour la raison que les dirigeants de la société peu-
vent parfoistrouver desinconvénients à révélec re qu'il enest exactement,
en dernier ressort, de la propriétédes actions.
48. L'une des raisons de la règle de la continuité de la nationalité
des réclamationsest qu'il convient d'éviterque des ressortissants d'un
petit Etat ne transfèrent leurs droits à réparation aux nationaux d'un
Etat puissant. Si un Etat puissant cherchait à attirer des sociétéspour
qu'elles se constituent selon ses lois, de manièreà pouvoir les présenter

comme ses ressortissantes, mêmesi elles ne lui étaient rattachées en
aucune autre manière, la Cour ne devrait pas ((se considérer comme
liéepar l'acte unilatéral))de cet Etat. La mêmeconclusion s'impose
quand des Etats moins puissants favorisent la création de sociétésou
l'immatriculation d'un navire en offrant un cstatut de complaisance »
ou un «pavillon de complaisance )).
On a soulignéque le Canada est l'un des Etats qui attirent les sociétés
par une législationfiscale favorable, etc. L'un des conseils de l'Espagne
a relevéque M. Pearson, «le promoteur et le premier président de la

Barcelona Traction)), a constitué à Toronto une société appeléela
San Antonio Land Company la mêmeannée - 1911 - que celle où la
Barcelona Traction s'est créée.Le fait que certaines des personnalités
des deux sociétés, ainsique leurs représentants à Londres, étaient les 190 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP.OP. JESSUP)

business of the Land Company was carried on in Texas. Counselquoted
from the report of the Special Master of the Federal District Court in
New York l:
"Tt is perfectly clear that the Toronto office, the Board of

Directors, etc, was maintained only in pursuance of the require-
ments of the statutory existence of the corporation under the laws
of the Dominion of Canada. Theeffectivecontrolof theaffairsof'the
corporationplainly waslodged elsewherethaninTorontoand followed
the peregrinations of Dr. Pearson, the master mind 2." (Hearing of
27 May 1969.)
49. The evidence showsthat counsel for Spain was correct in asserting

that the situation in Barcelona Traction was parallel. Throughout, one
finds that the important decisions, the vital planning, was done by such
persons as Heineman, Wilmers, Speciael, Hubbard and Lawton, whose
instructions issued from Great Britain, the United States and Belgium
and Spain itself, but rarely if ever from Canada. The general meetings of
shareholders held in Toronto seem to have been proforma affairs. It is
true that in 1948a "Receiver and Manager" of Barcelona Traction was
appointed in Canada and operated out ofToronto, but sincethe operating
companies in Spain had passed into the control of the bankruptcy offi-

cials there, the Receiver and Manager could merely try to encourage a
settlement; he did not have the power to make a settlement.

Counsel for Belgium, in the same pleading in which he rebutted some
of the Spanishcontentions about the San Antonio LandCo. case, quoted
from a judgment of Mr. Justice Roxburgh in the English High Court of
Justice, the following passage which strongly confirms the fact that
Barcelona Traction's management was not centred in Toronto:

"Barcelona was a holding and not an operating Company. Sterling
was its life blood. It also borrowed pesetas but it had littleerest in
Canadian dollars. London was its financial seat. .. .There were in
Canada, sofar as 1know, or rather sofar as 1have been told, nothing
but a registered office ofundisclosed size with a staff of undisclosed
dimensions, and share registers."

l The natureof the litigation in question is not relevantto the point being dis-
cussed here.
The rebuttalof counsel for Belgium,on 27 June 1969, while correctlypointing
to some errorsin the Spanish analysis of the San Antonio Land Co. case, did not
affectthe point here underconsideration.mêmes,a étésouligné.La Land Company exerçait son activitéau Texas.
Le conseil a citéle rapport du Special Master du tribunal fédéralde
district de New York l:
((11est parfaitement évidentque la seule raison d'êtredu bureau

de Toronto, du conseil d'administration, etc., étaitd'assurer I'exis-
tence statutaire de la sociéten vertu de la législationdu Dominion
du Canada. Le contrôle efectif des afaires de la société se trouvait
évidemment ailleurs qu'à Toronto et suivait les pérégrinations de
son inspirateur,M. Pears~n.~ »(Audience du 27 mai 1969.)

49. Les faits rapportés montrent que le conseil de l'Espagne était
fondé à affirmer que la situation de la Barcelona Traction pouvait être
mise en parallèle. D'un bout à l'autre, on s'aperçoit que les décisions
importantes et les plans essentiels étaient élaborés pardes gens comme
Heineman, Wilmers, Speciael, Hubbard et Lawton, dont les ins-
tructions étaient transmises de Grande-Bretagne, des Etats-Unis, de
Belgique et d'Espagne même, maisrarement, voire jamais, du Canada.
Les assembléesgénéralesd'actionnaires, tenues à Toronto, semblent
avoir étéde pure forme. Il est vrai qu'en 1948,un«receiveret administra-

teur »de la Barcelona Traction a éténommé au Canada et qu'il s'est
acquitté de ses fonctions à Toronto, mais puisque les sociétés exploi-
tantes, en Espagne, étaient alors sous le contrôle des organes de la
faillite,leeceiveret administrateur ne pouvaitque s'efforcerd'encourager
un règlement; il n'avait pas le pouvoir deprocéder à un règlement.
Le 27juin 1969 dans la plaidoirie où il réfutait certaines des thèses
espagnoles au sujet de l'affairede laSan AntonioLand Co., le conseil de
la Belgique a extrait d'une décisionrendue par M. Roxburgh, juge à
la Haute Cour de justice d'Angleterre, le passage suivant, qui tend très

nettement à confirmer que la direction de la Barcelona Traction n'avait
pas son centre à Toronto:
«La Barcelona Traction était une sociétéde portefeuille et non pas
une sociétéd'exploitation. La monnaie dans laquelle elle opérait
essentiellement étaitla livre sterling. Elle empruntait aussi des pese-
tas, mais ne s'intéressait guère auxdollars canadiens. C'était Lon-

dres qui était son centre financier...Il n'y avait enfin au Canada,
pour autant que je sache, ou plutôt pour autant que j'aie entendu
dire, qu'un siègedont l'importance ne nous a pas étérévélée p,os-
sédantun personnel dont l'effectifn'a pas étéporté à notre connais-
sance, et les registres des actionnaire))

La nature dulitige est sans rapportavec le point en discussion.

La réponsedu conseil de la Belgique, dans laquellecelui-ci relevait àjuste titre
certaines erreursdans l'analyseespagnole de l'affairede la San Antonio LandCo.,
est sans incidencesur la question à l'examen.(Audience du 27 juin 1969.)Counsel noted that on the final point the judge had not had discovery,

but counsel did not deny the truth of the judge's comment.

It is truethat Roxburgh J. was dealing with a period of time anterior to
the bankruptcy proceedings in Spain, but 1find nothing in the record to
suggest that there was later a material change whereby the principal
power centre of Barcelona Traction was located in Toronto l.

50. There are three situations in which there is wide agreement that

a State may extend its diplomatic protection to shareholders who are its
nationals, although the compacy whose shares they hold has the nation-
ality of another State. These three situations are sometimes considered
"exceptions" to a general rule allowing protection of the corporation
itself.

51. The first of these situations is where the corporation has been
incorporated in the State which inflicts the injury on it without legal
justification. and where the shareholders are of another nationality.
It is insuch situations that one finds the widest agreement that a State
may extend diplomaticprotection to shareholders who are its nationals 2.
The rationale seems to be based largely on equitable considerations and

In the same court proceeding, the testimony of MT. Hubbard, Chairman or
President of Barcelona Traction during several years, is not wholly clear. He testified
that al1 meetings of the Directors of the Company were held in Canada; that he
attended some but not al1 such meetings; that neither he nor his predecessor or
successor as President or Chairman was resident in Canada; that Mr. Speçiael, as
President may have gone to Canada from New York to attend some directors'
meetings; it was not necessary for the President or Chairman of the Board to
preside over directors' meetings. (According to the Company law of Canada, it
seems that the directors present may elect a chairman of the meeting if neither the
President nor vice-president is present; Fraser and Stewart, Handbook on Canadian
Company Law, Fifth Ed. 1960, p. 134.) Mr. Hubbard indicated that some decisions
were made in London, with notice to the office in Toronto and that in other cases
"instructions came from Canada". Mr. Hubbard testified that "There was a very
to a list submitted to the Court in the same proceeding) the only one appearingrding
in the Iist of registered shareholders in 1948 (A.M., Ann. 2) held one share. (The
records of the Court proceedings are in A.C.M., Vol. 1, Annex 13, especially
Document No. 6.) This was a Mr. Merry who is listed as Secretary of the Company
(but not a director) in 1918. (A.P.O., Ann. 22, Doc. No. 2. This is the only extract
from minutes of directors' meetings which lists those present, so far as 1 have been
able to ascertain; thredirectors were present.)

The Respondent here shares in this agreement. Bindschedler-Robert (op. ci?.,
p. 174),writing in 1964,considered that this viewwas being accepted in international
law. She cites the well-reasoned and well-documented study by Kiss, "La protection

192Le conseil a noté que, sur ce dernier point, le juge n'avait pas eu le

bénéfice d'une procédure de discovery mais il n'a pas contestél'exactitude
des observations du juge.
Il est vrai que M. Roxburgh envisageait une époque antérieure à celle
de la procédure defaillite en Espagne, mais je ne trouve dans le dossier

aucun indice d'un changement marquant intervenu par la suite et en
vertu duquel le centre principal de décision de la Barcelona Traction
aurait été transporté à Toronto l.

50. On s'accorde généralement à reconnaître qu'il existe trois situa-
tions dans lesquelles un Etat peut accorder sa protection diplomatique

à des actionnaires qui sont ses ressortissants, quoique la sociétédont
ils détiennent des actions possède la nationalité d'un autre Etat. Ces
trois situations sont parfois considérées comme des((exceptions )à une
règle générale permettant la protection de la société elle-même.

51. La première de ces situations se présentelorsque la sociétéa été
constituée dans 1'Etat qui lui a infligéun préjudice sans justification
juridique et que les actionnaires sont d'une autre nationalité.

C'est dans ce genre de situation qu'il est le plus généralementadmis
qu'un Etat peut accorder une protection diplomatique à des actionnaires
ayant sa nationalité ?. Cela tient dans une large mesure à des considé-

l Le témoignage que M. Hubbard, qui fut chairman ou président dela Barcelona
Traction pendant plusieurs années, a présentédans l'affaire considérée, n'estpas
d'une clarté parfaite. M. Hubbard a déclarésous la foi du serment que toutes les
réunions du conseil d'administration de la société avaient lieu au Canada; qu'il
assistait certaines de ces réunions mais pas à toutes; que ni lui, ni son prédécesseur,
ni son successeur au poste de président ou de chairnian ne résidaient au Canada;
que M. Speciael, comme président, a pu se rendre de New York au Canada pour
assister certaines réunions du conseil d'administration; qu'il n'étaitpas nécessaire
que le président ou leChairman of the Board présideces réunions. (Suivant le droit
canadien des sociétés,il semble que, en l'absence du président et du vice-président,
les administrateurs présents peuvent élireun président de séance;Fraser and Stewart,
Handbook on Canadian Company Law, Seéd.1960, p. 134.) M. Hubbard a indiqué
que certaines décisionsétaient prises Londres, le bureau de Toronto en étant avisé,
et que dans d'autres cas il étaitreçu des ((instructionsdu Canada]II a déclaréque
11le conseil d'administration était très étofféau Canada11Or, des administrateurs
inscrits sur la liste déposéedevant le tribunal comme résidant au Canada, le seul qui
figure dans la liste des porteurs d'actions nominatives en 1948 (A.M., ann. 2)
possédait une action. (Pour les documents ayant trait à cette affaire devant la Haute
Cour de justice d'Angleterre, voir A.C.M., vol. ann. 13, notamment le doc. no 6.)
C'était un certain M. Merry, indiqué comme secrétaire de la société(mais pas
administrateur) en1918 (A.E.P., vol. 1, ann. 22, doc. no 2. Pour autant que j'aie pu
le vérifier, c'estle seul extrait des procès-verbaux des réunions du conseil d'adminis-
tration qui mentionne le nom des personnes présentes; trois administrateurs
assistaient la réunion.)
Le défendeur partage ici cette opinion. En1964, Bindschedler-Robert (op. ci?.,
p. 174)considérait que cepoint de vueétait en voie d'êtrereçu en droit international.
Elle cite l'analyse très logique et bien documentée de Kiss sur «La protection the result is so reasonable it has been accepted in State practice. Judge
Charles De Visscher says this result is required by "des considérations
impérieuses de justice". ("De la protection diplomatique des action-
naires d'une société contre 1'Etatsous la législation duquelcette société
s'est constituée", 61 Revue de droit internationalet de législationcom-
parée, 1934,p. 624.) By hypothesis, the respondent State has committed

an unlawful act from which injury results. The corporation itself cannot
seek redress and therefore the State whose nationals own the shares may
protect them ut singuli. The equities are particularly striking when the
respondent State admits foreign investment only on condition that the
investors form a corporation under its law. These points are clearlymade
byPetrén,109HagueRecueil,1963,II, pages 506 and 510.Petrén referswith
approval to the earlier lectures by Paul De Visscher, 102HagueRecueil,
1961, T,page 399; see especially pages 478-479.

Judge Wellington Koo, in his separate opinion in this Barcelonacase
in 1964asserted emphatically:

". ..the original simple rule of protection of a company by its
national State has been found inadequate and State practice, treaty
regulation and international arbitral decisions have corne to recog-

nize the right of a State to intervene on behalf of its nationals,
shareholders of a company which has been injured by the State of
its own nationality, that is to say, a State where it has been incorpo-
rated according to its laws and therefore is regarded as having
assumed its nationality" (I.C.J. Reports 1964, p. 58).

Judge Wellington Koo considered it immaterial whether this rule should

or should not be considered as an "exception".
52. It is curious that this "exception" should have been so widely
accepted since it ignores the traditional rule that a State is not guilty of
a breach of international law for injuring one of its own nationals. It
rebuts also the notion that an injury to a corporation is not a direct

diplomatique des actionnaires dans la jurisprudence et la pratinternationale",
in La personalité morale et ses limites (1960), p. 179. Kiss indeed cites abundant
Ch. De Visscher, Sibert, Ralston, Fitzrnaurice, Pinto, Paul De Visscher, Perry,d,
Séfériades,Jones, Guggenheim, Battagliani,Bindschedler, but query whether al1
these carry their conclusion as far as does Kiss. See also in support of the broader
rule allowing protection of shareholders, Agrawala, "State Protectiof Share-
holders' Interests in Foreign CorporationThe Solicitor's Quarterly, 1962, p. 13;
Nial, "Problems of Private International Law", 101 Hague Recueil, 1960, III,
p. 259.rations d'équitéet le résultat est tellement raisonnable qu'il a étéac-

ceptédans la pratique des Etats. M. Charles De Visscher constate que ce
résultat est nécessitépar « des considérations impérieusesde justice ».
(«De la protection diplomatique des actionnaires d'une sociétécontre
1'Etatsous la législationduquel cette sociétés'est constituée »,61 Revue
de droit internationalet de législation comparée, 1934,p. 624.) Par hypo-
thèse, 1'Etat défendeur a commis un acte illicite ayant provoqué un
dommage. La société elle-mêm nee peut obtenir réparation et, en consé-

quence, 1:Etat dont des ressortissants possèdent des actions peut les
protéger ut singuli. Les considérations d'équitésont particulièrement
frappantes lorsque 1'Etat défendeurn'admet des investissementsétran-
gers qu'à condition que les investisseurs constituent une sociétéaux
termes de son droit national. Ces points sont clairement signaléspar
Petrén (Recueil descours del'Académiede droit internationalde La Haye,

1963,tome 109,vol.II, p. 506et 510).M. Petrén mentionne, en l'approu-
vant, le cours fait précédemmentpar Paul De Visscher (ibid., 1961,
tome 102,vol. 1, p. 399; voir surtout p. 478 et 479).
M. Wellington Koo, dans son opinion individuelle jointe à l'arrêt
rendu sur l'affaire de la Barcelona Traction en 1964, affirmait avec
force que:

((la règle de la protection d'une sociétépar son Etat national,
simple à l'origine, a étéjugée insuffisante,et la pratique des Etats,
les dispositions conventionnelles et les décisionsarbitrales inter-
nationales en sont arrivées à reconnaître à un Etat le droit d'inter-

venir en faveur de ses ressortissants, actionnaires d'une sociétéqui
a étélésée par 1'Etatdont elle possèdela nationalité,autrement dit
1'Etatoù cette société a étéconstituée conformément à la législation
localeetdont elleest en conséquencecenséeavoirpris la nationalité ».
(C.I.J.Recuei11964, p. 58.)

M. Wellington Koo estimait qu'il étaitsans importance de savoir si cette
règledevait ou non êtreconsidérée comme une ((exception ».
52. Il est étrangeque cette ((exception » ait étési généralement reçue,
car elle faitfi de la règletraditionnelle selon laquelle un Etat ne viole
pas le droit international en faisant tort à un de ses propres ressortis-
sants. Elle exclut aussi l'idéequ'un dommage causé à une société n'est

diplomatique des actionnaires dans la jurisprudence et la pratique internat»,nale
dans La personnalitémorale et ses limites (1960), p. 179. Kiss cite en effet de nom-
breuses autorités qui se prononcent en faveur de la reconnaissance de droits plus
larges encore aux fins de la protection des actionnaires; il se réfèrechard,
Ch. De Visscher, Sibert, Ralston, Fitzmaurice, PintoPaul De Visscher, Perry,
Séfériades,Jones, Guggenheim, BattaglianiBindschedler, mais, se demande si tous
ces auteurs vont aussi loin que lui dans leurs conclusions. Agrawala, danste
Protection of Shareholders' Interests in ForeigCorporations », The Solicitor's
Quarterly, 1962, p. 13, et Nial, dansProblems of Private InternationalLaw »,
chap. IV, Recueil des cours de l'Académie de droit internationdi de La Haye, 1960,
protection des actionnaires.optent égalementpour la règle plus généraleautorisant la injury to the shareholders.Moreover, if the foreign shareholders may be
protected insuch a situation, it is also necessary to choose one horn of a
dilemma: either one admits that the right of the shareholders existed at
the moment when the injury was done to the corporation, which means
that the rights of shareholders may be damaged by an injury to the
corporation, or, if that right came into existence subsequently, then one
ignores the rule of international law that a claim must be national in
origin.Moreover,the admission ofthis "exception" negates theargument,
sometimes advanced against the diplomatic protection of shareholders,
to the effectthat such claims expose an accused State to a vast variety of
claims on behalf of persons of whose existence it was ignorant. Since
customary practice has, however, accepted this "exception", other argu-
ments against protection of shareholders are correspondingly weakened,
especially since the doctrine in question generally does not insist that the
life of the corporation must have been extinguished so that it could be
said the shareholdershad acquired a direct right to the assets.

53. The second situation in which it is widely agreed that a State may

claim on behalf of its shareholders in a foreign corporation, is where
the State of incorporation has liquidated or wound up the corporation
after the injury was inflicted by some third State.

This situation differs from that just considered in that the respondent
Statehas committedits unlawful act (let us Saytotal confiscation) against
a foreign corporation. Here some doctrine would Say that ordinarily
State A, the State ofincorporation, should bethe oneto extend diplomatic
protection. But by hypothesis the corporate life has been extinguished by
State A, so that-just asin the first situation-a claim can not be pressed
for the corporation. Brownlie states the situation as follows:

"Where the State under the law of which the company is incorpo-
rated terminates the existence of the company in law, or other
circumstances make the company practically defunct, the share-
holders remain as the interests affected by government act: inter-
vention on their behalf would seem to be justified in such a case."
(Brownlie, Principles ofPublic InternationalLaw, 1966,p. 401.)

Here it may be said that after liquidation and payment of creditors,
the shareholders-under an applicable system of municipal law-have a
property interest in the assets and for that reason may be protected. But
at the time of the unlawful act ("confiscation") they did not have such a
property interest and therefore under the rule of continuity the claim did
not have in origin the appropriate nationality on that basis. pas un préjudice directinfligéaux actionnaires. De plus, si les action-
naires étrangers peuvent bénéficierd'une protection dans une telle
situation, de deux choses 'l'une:ou bien I'on aamet que le droit des ac-
tionnaires existait au moment où 'lepréjudicea étécausé à la société, ce
qui implique que les droits des actionnaires peuvent êtreléséspar un
préjudiceporté à la société,u bien, si I'on considèreque ce droit n'appa-
rait qu'ensuite, on méconnaîtla règlede droit international selon laquelle

les réclamations doivent êtrenationaies dans leur origine. De plus, l'ac-
ceptation de cette ((exceptionfait perdre toute substanceà un argument
allégué parfoiscontre la protection diplomatique des actionnaires, à
savoir que de semblables réclamations exposent 1'Etat mis en cause à
une foule de demandes diverses faites au nom de personnes dont il
ignorait l'existence.Cetteexception sayant néanmoinsétéconsacréepar
la coutume, d'autres arguments contre la protection des actionnaires s'en
trouvent affaiblis, d'autantpius que la doctrine en question n'exige
généralementpas que la sociétéait cesséd'exister pour qu'on puissedire
que les actionnaires ont acquis un droit propre sur les avoirs.
53. La seconde situation où l'on s'accorde généralemen àt reconnaître

qu'un Etat peut introduire une réclamationau nom de ses ressortissants,
actionnaires d'une sociétéétrangère,se présente lorsque 1'Etat où la
sociétéa été constituée liquidécelle-ci,le dorrimageayant étécausépar
un Etat tiers.
Cette situation diffère de celle qui vient d'êtreévoquée enceci que
1'Etat défendeur a commis son acte illicite (par exemple, la confisca-
tion totale) aux dépensd'une société étrangère.Ici, une certaine doctrine
affirmerait que d'ordinaire c'està 1'Etat A - 1'Etat où la sociétéa été
constituée - qu'appartient le droit d'accorder la protection diploma-
tique. Mais, par hypothèse, la sociétéa été dissoutepar 1'EtatA, de
sorte que, tout comme dans la premiere situation, une demande en

justice ne peut pas êtreintroduite au nom de la société. Brownliedécrit
la situation comme suit:
((Lorsque 1'Etat sous la loi duquel la sociétéest constituée met fin
à l'existence de la sociétéen droit, ou qu'en raison d'autres cir-
constances la sociétéest pratiquement détruite, c'est dans le chef

des actionnaires que subsistent les intérêtsaffectéspar I'acte du
gouvernement: en un tel cas, une intervention en leur nom pa-
raîtrait justifiée.Brownlie, Principles of Public InternationalLaw
(1966), p. 401.)

On peut dire ici qu'après la liquidation de la sociétéet le paiement
des créanciers lesactionnaires - en vertu d'un systèmede droit interne
applicable - ont un intérêt patrimonialdans les avoirs et peuvent être
protégés pour cette raison. Mais au moment de l'acte illicite (((confis-
cation))) ils n'avaient pas d'intérêp t atrimonial de cet ordre et, par
conséquent,en vertu de la règlede la continuité, on ne saurait dire que
la demande ait eu à l'origine la nationalitérequise. 194 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP.OP. JESSUP)

54. But Brownlie equates the case of the termination of the existence
of the company with the case where it is "practically defunct". This is a
term which was used by the British Government in the Delagoa Bay case
and used a good deal by the Parties in their pleading in the instant case.
Its exactmeaning is not clear but Barcelona Traction did have some lifein
Canada even after the practical annihilation in Spain. From 1948on it
was under a receivership, but the "appointment of a receiverand manager
over the assets and business of a company does not dissolve or an-
nihilate the company ..." (Kerr, OntheLaw andPractice as to Receivers,
13th ed. by Walton, 1963, p. 232). As already noted, the Receiver and
Manager of Barcelona Traction concerned himself only with promoting
negotiations for a settlement between the private parties; none of the
public utility enterprises in Spain were under his direction or within his

control; and he had to borrow the money for his operations from an
affiliate or subsidiary of the Belgian company, Sidro.

Itistrue that after 1948there was some trading in Barcelona Traction
shares on the Brussels Bourse (Verbatim Record for 7 July 1969), and
according to Moody's Manualof Investments,for years ranging from 1952
to 1967,there were sales in New York, Canada and London. No infor-
mation is available to make it possible to say whether the transactions
were merely speculative, but it may be noted that in 1961,when the first
Belgian application was withdrawn from this Court in expectation of a
private negotiated settlement, the quoted price was somewhat higher.

55. It is true that so faras Canadian law is concerned, the shareholders
had not yet acquired a direct right to the assets but since1do not base my
conclusion on this factor, 1 do not pursue it further.
56. 1also find it unnecessary to consider in detail what isconsidered the
third "exception" where shareholders may admittedly be protected,
namely where the injury is inflicted directly on the shareholders and not
indirectly through damage to the company.

* *

57. It is now possible to turn to the question which is crucial for the
instant case, namely whether the three situations just mentioned are the
only ones in which international law permits a State to extend diplo-
matic protection to shareholders who are its nationals.

1 find no evidence or reasoning which precludes such protection in
other situations, but the questioncan be answered only by analysing the
fundamental principles underlying the right of diplomatic protection. 54. Mais Brownlie assimile le cas où il est mis fin à l'existence de la
sociétéà celui où elle estcpratiquement détruite ))(practically defunct).
C'est le terme qui a étéemployépar le Gouvernement britannique dans
l'affaire de laelagoa Bay et qui est fréquemment reprispar les Parties

dans leur argumentation en l'espèce.Le sens exact de cette expression
n'est pas clair, mais il est vrai que la Barcelona Traction a conservéune
certaine vie au Canada, mêmeaprès son anéantissement pratique en
Espagne. A partir de 1948elle s'esttrouvéeplacéesous receivership,mais
cla nomination d'un receiver chargéd'administrerlesavoirs et lesaffaires
d'une sociétén'entraîne pas la dissolution ou l'anéantissement de la
sociét...)(Kerr, OntheLawandpractice as to Receivers, 13'éd.par Wal-
ton, 1963, p. 232). Comme nous l'avons déjàfait observer, le receiver
et administrateur de la Barcelona Traction s'est occupé seulement de

favoriser des négociations en vue d'un arrangement amiable entre les
parties privées;aucune des entreprises de service public situéesen Es-
pagne ne se trouvait sous sa direction ou sous son contrôle; il a dû em-
prunter l'argent nécessaire à ses opérations à une filiale de la société
belge Sidro.
Il est vrai qu'après 1948les actions de la Barcelona Traction ont fait
l'objet de quelques transactionsà la Bourse de Bruxelles (compte rendu
de la séancedu 7juillet 1969)et, selon le Moody's ManualofInvestments,
pendant des années,de 1952 à 1967,des ventes ont eu lieuà New York,

au Canada et à Londres. On ne possèdepas de renseignements permet-
tant de déterminer s'il s'agissaitde transactions purement spéculatives,
mais on notera qu'en 1961, lorsque la Belgique s'est désistéedel'ins-
tance qu'elle avait introduite devant la Cour par sa première requête,
dans l'espoir qu'il serait possible d'aboutià un arrangement amiable
entre les parties, les cours ont étéun peu plus soutenus.
55. Il est vrai qu'en droit canadien,. les actionnaires n'avaient pas
encore acquis un droit propre sur les avoirs mais, commeje nefondepas
mes conclusions sur cet élémentj,e n'en poursuivrai pas l'analyse.

56. J'estime également superflu d'examiner en détail ce qu'on a
appeléla troisième (exception ))justifiantune protection des actionnaires,
à savoir le cas où les actionnaires ont étélésésdirectement, et non pas
indirectement par suite du préjudicecausé à la société.

57. On peut maintenant en venir à la question, cruciale en l'espèce,
de savoir si les trois situations qui viennent d'êtreévoquéessont les
seules dans lesquelles le droit international permette à un Etat d'ac-

corder une protection diplomatique à des actionnaires qui sont ses
ressortissants.
Je ne trouve aucune preuve ni aucun argument qui interdise une telle
protection dans d'autres circonstancesmais on ne peut vraimentrépondre
à cette question qu'en analysant les principes fondamentaux sur les-
quels repose le droit de protection diplomatique. The Basic Principleof State "Interest"

58. In this opinion traditional language has been used, for example in
speaking of injuries to a corporation as such, but this is really a bit of
anthropomorphism since, as Sir Edward Coke remarked, corporations
"have no souls" (case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Rep. 32) and as stated by
more recent jurists, the corporation "is not a thing. It is a method."
(Douglas and Shanks, "Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary
Corporations", 39 Yale Law Journal, 1929,pp. 193, 194.)That corpora-
tions have a nationality, is a legalfiction'. In legal principle and practice,
the situation is that in relations with other States, a State is entitled to
treat a corporation as ifit were one of its nationals, provided the corpora-

tion is connected with it by certain links.

"Indeed, it is at least arguable that al1cases of apparent protection
of corporations are in reality cases of protection of the shareholding
interest of nationals of the protecting State." (Clive Parry, "Some
Considerations upon the Protection of Individuals in International
Law", 90 Hague Recueil, 1956,II, p. 657at p. 704.)

It is customary also to speak about "claims of individuals" or "of
natural persons" and about "corporate claims" or "claims of corpora-
tions". Such language is convenient, but it conceals the fact that in inter-
national relations, the claimsin question are always the claims of a State,
not of a natural or juristic person. A citizen has no right to diplomatic
protection; it is wholly within the discretion of the government whether

it will or will notextend its diplomatic protection.
59. A State takes up a claim against another State when it considers
that its own interests have been affected.As the Court said in Nottebohm,
Second Phase(p. 24) "Diplomatic protection and protection by means of
international judicialeproceedings constitute measures for the defence of
the rights of the State". In Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (P.C.Z.J.,
Series A, No. 2, p. 12) the Court identified the State's "own rights" as
"its right to ensure in the person of its subject respect for the rules of
international law". Almost the identical words were repeated by the
Court in Pamvezys-Saldutiskis Railway (P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 76,
p. 16), although in this latter case the Court went on to elaborate the

importance of "the bond of nationality".

l "Legal fiction", according to Morris Cohen, "is the mask that progress must
Wear to pass the faithful but blear-eyed watchers of our ancient legal treasures. But
novation, they work havoc in the form ofntellectual confusion." Quoted in Trans-
national Law, p. 70. Le principe fondamental.de l'«intérê )tde 1'Etat

58. J'ai recouru dans la présente opinion au langage traditionnel,
par exemple quand j'ai parlé de préjudiceinfligé à une société entant
que telle, mais c'est un peu de l'anthropomorphisme car, ainsi que

sir Edward Coke l'a fait observer, les sociétés (n'ont pas d'âme 1)(affaire
Sutton's Hospital, 10 Rep. 32) et, comme d'autres juristes l'ont dit plus
récemment,la société (n'est pas une chose. C'estune méthode. ))@ouglas
et Shanks, (Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations »,

39 Yale Law Journal, 1929, p. 193, 194).C'est par une fiction juridique
que les sociétésont une nationalité l. Dans les principes et la pratique
juridiques, la situation est que, dans ses relations avec d'autres Etats,
un Etat a le droit de traiter une sociétécomme un de ses ressortissants,

à condition qu'elle lui soit rattachéepar certains liens.
((En effet, il est au moins possible de soutenir que tous les cas

de protection apparente de sociétéssont en réalitédes cas de pro-
tection des intérêts d'actionnaires ressortissantsde 1'Etat protec-
teur. )) (Clive Parry, ((Some Considerations upon the Protection
of Individuals in International Law )),Recueildes cours del'Académie

de droit international de La Haye, 1956, tome 90, vol. II, p. 704.)
On a l'habitude aussi de parler de ((réclamationsindividuelles ))ou
réclamations de personnes physiques ))ainsi que de ((réclamations de

sociétés ». Ces termes sont commodes mais ils dissimulent le fait que,
dans les relations internationales, les réclamations en question émanent
toujours d'un Etat et non pas d'une personne physique ou morale.
Un citoyen n'a aucun droit à la protection diplomatique; le gouver-

nement est entièrement libre de décider s'ilaccordera ou non celle-ci.
59. Un Etat endosse une réclamation contre un autre Etat lorsqu'il
considère que ses propres intérêtsont étéatteints. Ainsi que la Cour l'a
déclarédans l'affaire Nottebohm, deuxièmephase: (La protection diplo-

matique et la protection par la voie judiciaire internationale constituent
une mesure de défensedes droits de 1'Etat. ))(C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p. 24.)
Dans l'affaire des Concessions Mavrommatis en Palestine, la Cour per-
manente de Justice internationale a définile ((droit propre ))de 1'Etat

comme le ((droit qu'il a de faire respecter en la personne de ses ressor-
tissants, le droit international ))(C.P.J.I. série A no2, p. 12). Elle a usé
de termes presque identiques dans l'affaire du Chemin defer Panevezys-
Saldutiskis (C.P.J.I. sérieAIB no76, p. 16), bien que dans cette dernière

affaire elle ait poursuivi en insistant sur l'importance du ((lien de na-
tionalité ».

rLa fiction juridique ))selon Morris Cohen, eest le masque que doit mettre le
progrès pour passer devant les gardiens fidèles mais a la vue trouble de nos anciens
trésors juridiques. Cependant si les fictions juridiques jouent un rôle utile en atté-
nuant ou en amortissant ainsi le choc de l'innovation, elles ont un effet désastreux
par la confusion intellectuelle qu'elles engendrent 1).Cité dans Transnational Law,
p. 70. In explaining the basis for a State'sright to give diplomatic protection,
the rather simplistic notion that a State was injured when an injury was
inflicted abroad upon the least of its nationals, has come to be superseded
by the realization of the national economic importance of foreign invest-
ments as State interests.

This is one reason why it is not now pertinent to stress the differencein
municipal law between private "rights" and "interests", as Judge Gros

shows so clearly in his separate opinion.

". .. States protect their corporations chiefly on the basis of the
real national interest and not, in fact, on the basis of nationality.
In such a situation, it seems necessary to allow the State of the
nationality of these shareholders to present their claims to the limit
of their interest in the cor~oration... .
Since the protection of national interest in foreign corporations
is based on protecting an economic or pecuniary interest, it matters
little whether theparty in whose behalf the protection isexercisedisa
shareholder or a bondholder, or even if the national interest is held

indirectly; e.g., if a national corporation controls another corpora-
tion whichholds bonds or shares in a third corporation sustaining an
injury." (Khalid A. Al-Shawi, The Role of the CorporateEntity in
InternationalLaw, 1957,pp. 55 and 59.)

"In three countries-Italy, Britain and France-al1 proposals for
foreign investment must clear government agencies before they can be
carried sut, whether or not government sources of credit are used ...
The Government of Japan, through the Ministry of Finance (and when
required, through such additional agencies as the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Investment and the Ministry of Agriculture), must
approve al1foreign investments ..." (Friedmann and Kalmanoff, Joint

International BusinessVentures, 1961,pp. 188and 190.)

60. No survey of State practice can, strictly speaking, be comprehen-
sive and the-practice of a single State may Vary from time to time-
perhaps depending on whether it is in the position of plaintiff or defen-
dant. However, 1am not seeking to marshal al1the evidence necessary to
establish a rule of customary international law. Having indicated the
underlying principles and the bases of the international law regarding
diplomatic protection of nationals and national interests, 1need only cite
some examples to show that these conclusions are not unsupported by
State practice and doctrine.

61. The primacy of the general economic interests of the State in
protecting private investments abroad, and the minimizing of any one es- La notion assez simpliste invoquée commefondement du droit d'un
Etat d'accorder une protection diplomatique, à savoir que 1'Etat était
lésélorsqu'un préjudice était causé au dernier de ses ressortissants à
l'étranger,a reculéà partir du moment où l'on s'estaviséque les investis-
sements faits à l'étrangeravaient de l'importance pour l'économiena-
tionale comme intérêts de 1'Etat.
C'est une des raisons pour lesquelles il n'est pas ici pertinent de
souligner la différenceexistant en droit interne entre les «droits» et
((intérêt»sprivés, comme M. Gros le montre si clairement dans son
opinion individuelle.

(...les Etats protègent leurs sociétés essentiellementsur la base
de l'intérêntational réelet non, en fait, sur la base de la nationalité.
Dans une telle situation, il semble nécessaire d'autoriser 1'Etat
dont les actionnaires ont la nationalité à présenter leursréclama-
tions dans la mesure où ils ont un intérêd tans la société...
Dès lors que la protection de l'intérêntational dans les sociétés
étrangèresest fondé sur la protection d'un intérêt économique ou
pécuniaire,il importe peu que la partie au nom de qui la protec-

tion est exercéesoit un actionnaire ou un obligataire ou même
que l'intérêt national soit détenu indirectement - de qui est le cas
par exemple si une sociéténationale contrôle une autre société
possédantdes actions ou des obligations dans une troisième société
ayant éprouvé unpréjudice. )(Khalid A. Al-Shawi, TheRole of the
Corporate Entity inInternationalLaw, 1957,p. 55 et 59.)

((Dans trois pays, l'Italie, la Grande-Bretagne et la France, tous les
projets d'investissements à l'étrangerdoivent recevoir l'autorisation des
autorités compétentesavant de pouvoir êtreexécutés,que les sources
de crédit utilisées soient ou non gouvernementales ..Au Japon, le
gouvernement, par l'intermédiairedu ministère des finances (et, le cas
échéant, d'autres administrations comme le ministère du commerce
international et des investissements et le ministère de l'agriculture), doit
approuver tous les investissements à l'étrange...» (Friedmann et
Kalmanoff, Joint International BusinessVentures, 1961, p. 188, 190.)
60. Aucune étude de la pratique des Etats ne peut êtrevraiment ex-
haustive et la pratique d'un Etat donné peut elle-même varier d'une
époque à l'autre, sans doute selon qu'il se trouve dans la position de de-

mandeur ou de défendeur. Mais mon propos n'est pas de réunirtoutes
les preuves nécessairespour établir l'existence d'une règlede droit in-
ternational coutumier. Ayant indiquéles principes fondamentaux et les
bases sur lesquelles repose le droit international de la protection di-
plomatique des nationaux et des intérêts nationaux,il me suffira de citer
quelques exemples pour montrer que ces conclusions ne sont pas sans
trouver un appui dans la pratique des Etats et dans la doctrine.
61. La primauté des intérêts économiqueg sénérauxde I'Etat, dans
la protection des investissements privés à l'étranger, et la tendance à sential testjustifying diplomatic protection, are strikingly brought out in
the message of the Swiss Conseil fédéralof 29 October 1948to the As-
semblée fédéralec,oncerning the negotiation of agreements with Yugo-
slavia on trade, payments, and a global settlement of Swiss claims for
nationalized property :

"Article 5 indicates what must be considered as Swiss assets,

holdings or claims. This question presents no difficulty when the
assets belong to natural persons; in that case the nationality of the
owner or creditor servesas the criterion. So far ascorporate persons
and companies are concerned, theseat, which must bein Switzerlahd,
has not been made the only test, but the question is also raised as to
whether there is a substantial Swiss interest in the corporate person
or company. In most cases the substantial Swiss interest will be
shown to exist when the effectivemajority of the capital is in Swiss
hands. If there is no such majority, it is the minority exerting a
decisiveinfluenceon the company which isto be taken into account;
this is particularly easy to discern when there is a compact minority
on one side and a scattered majority on the other. The composition
of the board of directors and senior management may also be a
determining factor when it belongs to them to shape the will of the
corporate person and decide on its behalf. Lastly, in certain cases
the creditors ought not to be ~~verlookedeither, for they too may

exert a certain influence on the undertaking. But it is always neces-
sary to consider the real circumstances and not trust in purely legal
constructions, whose sole aim may be to dissimulate the true facts."
(Feuille fédéraledo la Confédération suisse1 ,00' année 1948, Vol.
III, p. 672 at 686. [Translationfrom Frenchby the Registry.])

62. In its note of 20 April 1938to the Mexican Government, in regard
to the case of Mexican Eagle Oil Company, a Mexican corporation, the

British Government said:
"But the fact remains that the majority of shareholders who are
the ultimate sufferers from the action of the Mexican Government
are British, and the undertaking in question is essentially a British
interest.
For this reason alone His Majesty's Government have the right
.. .to protest against an action which they regard as unjustified."
(8 Whiteman Digest of InternationalLaw, p. 1273.)

In a section of the British Digestof InternationalLaw, entitled "Protection
of British Interests in Foreign-Incorporated Companies", one finds a
number of passages in which the stress is on the British "interests"
rather than on the nationality of the company. (See Vol. 5, Part VI,
pp. 535 ff.) ne pas s'entenir à un critère unique et essentiel qui justifierait l'exercice
de la protection diplomatique, ressortent d'une manièrefrappante du
message du Conseil fédéral suisse à l'Assemblée fédérale e,n date du
29 octobre 1948,au sujet de la négociation d'accords avecla Yougoslavie
en matièredecommerce,depaiements et derèglementglobal desréclama-
tions suissespour les biens nationalisés:

eL7article 5 indique ce qui doit être considérécomme biens,
participations ou créances suisses.Cette question ne présenteaucune
difficultéquand les biens appartiennent à des personnes physiques;
dans ce cas, on se fonde sur la nationalité du propriétaire ou du
créancier.En ce qui concerne les personnes morales et les sociétés
commerciales, on n'a pas seulement tenu compte du siègequi doit
êtreen Suisse, mais on s'est encore demandé s'il existait, dans la
personne morale ou la société,un intérêtsuisse prépondérant

(substantial interest). Dansla plupart descas, l'intérêstuisseprépon-
dérant sera démontrélorsque la majorité effective du capital se
trouve en mains suisses. S'iln'y a pas de majorité, il y alieu de s'en
tenir à la minorité quiexerce une influence décisivesur la société;
ce fait est particulièrement facileà constater lorsqu'une minorité
compacte se trouve en présenced'une majoritédispersée.La compo-
sition du conseil d'administration et de la direction peut aussi être
déterminante lorsquec'est à eux qu'ilappartient deformer la volonté
de la personne morale et de déciderpour elle. Enfin, dans certains
cas, on ne doit pas négligernon plus les créanciers,car eux aussi
peuvent exercer une certaine influence sur l'entreprise. Maisil faut

toujours considérerles circonstances réelleset ne pas se fier à des
constructions purement juridiques, qui peuvent avoir uniquement
pour but de dissimuler les faits véritables.)(Feuillefédéralede la
Confédératios nuisse, 100'année,1948,vol. III,p. 686.)
62. Dans sa note du 20 avril 1938au Gouvernement mexicain, con-

cernant l'affaire de laMexican Eagle Oil Company, société mexicaine,
le Gouvernement britannique déclarait:
((Maisle fait demeure que la majoritédes actionnaires qui sont
en dernière analyse les parties léséespar l'acte du Gouvernement

mexicain sont britanniques, et l'entrepriseen question est essentielle-
ment un intérêt britanniaue.
Ne serait-cequepour cetteraison, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
a le droit...de protester contre une action qu'il considèrecomme
injustifiée.Whiteman,DigestofInternationalLaw,vp o.127VI.II,

Dans une sectiondu British DigestofInternationalLaw, intitulée (Protec-
tion of British Interests in Foreign-Incorporated Companies »,on trouve
un certain nombre de passages où l'accent est mis sur les ((intérêts »
britanniques plutôt que sur la nationalité de la société. (Voir vol.5,
partieVI, p. 535et suiv.) 63. In regard to the practice of the United States, it has already been
noted that that Government maintains that it is entitled under inter-
national law to pratect substantial Arnerican shareholder-interests in
foreign corporations and that it declinesto protect American companies
in which the substantial interest is alien-owned. Thus, in 1912, the
Department of State declined to make representations on behalf of an
American Company in which Americans owned only $100 worth of
shares out of a total of $450,000. (V. Hackworth, Digest of International
Law, p. 845.) In 1965, the same Department informed an American

embassy: ". ..the Government of the United States has the right under
principles of international law to intervene or espouse a claim on behalf
of nationals of the United States who own a substantial interest in a
corporation organized under the laws of. .. [a foreign country]". (8
Whiteman Digest, p. 1272.)

The Restatement of Foreign ~elations Law of the American Law
Institute (1965)in Section 173 provides that a State is liable for damage
to alien stockholder interests in a corporation of a third State if "a
significant portion of the stock" is alien-owned, the corporation fails to
obtain reparation, for reasons which the shareholders can not control,
and the corporation has not waived or settled its claim.

"In international law, as in the domestic law of the United
States, there has been a gradually increasing tendency to disregard
the separate corporate entity when necessary to avoid injustice.
Originally the United States, like Great Britain, refused to intervene
on behalf of its national shareholders in a foreign corporation .. .
Since late in the 19th century, a number of such claims have been
presented to and allowed by international tribunals. In most of

these, the international responsibility of the State with respect to the
injury to the alien shareholder as such was not squarely presented as
a question of international law, since this point was settled by the
terms of the international agreement establishing the tribunal or by
the compromisunder which the case was submitted to it .. .[citing
Delagoa Bay]. However, the practice of providing for such cases in
international arbitration agreements has apparently corne to be
regarded as a reflection ofcustomary international law, and it now
seems to be recognized that, at least under some circumstances, the
State is responsible for the injury to alien shareholders owning a
significantinterest in the injured corporation." (Reporter's Notes to
S. 172; cf. II, Hyde, p. 904.)

64. In the Hannevigcase, Norway espoused against the United States,
the claim of Hannevig, a Norwegian national, on theground that hehad a

199 63. Pour ce qui est de la pratique des Etats-Unis, on a déjànotéque
le gouvernement de ce pays estime que le droit international l'autorise
à protéger des intérêts substantiels détenuspar des actionnaires améri-
cains dans des sociétésétrangèreset qu'il refusede protégerles sociétés
américaines dans lesquelles l'intérêtsubstantiel est étranger. Ainsi, en
1912,le département d7Etat a refuséde faire des représentations au nom
d'une sociétéaméricaine dans laquelle la participation américaine au
capital n'étaitque de 100 dollars, sur un total de 450000. (Voir Hack-
worth, Digest of InternationalLaw, p. 845.)En 1965,lemêmedépartement

d'Etat a informéune ambassade américaine queale Gouvernement des
Etats-Unis a le droit, en vertu des principes du droit international,
d'intervenir ou d'endosser une réclamation au nom de ressortissants des
Etats-Unis qui possèdent unintérêt substantiedlans une sociétéconstituée
selon les lois de ...[un pays étranger] »(Whiteman, Digest, vol. VIII,
p. 1272).
11est dit dans le Restatement of ForeignRelations Law de 1'American
Law Institute (1965), à la section 173, qu'un Etat est responsable du
préjudice causéaux intérêtsdes actionnaires étrangers d'une société
d'un Etat tiers siune part importante du capita1)est en mains étrangères,
si la société nepeut pas obtenir réparation pour des raisons indépen-
dantes de la volontédes actionnaires et si la sociétén'a pas renoncé sa

réclamation ou abouti à un arrangement.
«En droit international, de mêmeque dans le droit interne des
Etats-Unis, une tendance toujours plus forte s'est manifestée à ne
pas tenir compte de la personnalité morale distincte quand cela est
nécessairepour éviter une injustice. l'origine, lesEtats-Unis, tout

comme la Grande-Bretagne, ont refusé d'intervenir en faveurde
leurs nationaux actionnaires d'une sociétéétrangère ..Depuis la
fin du XIXe siècle, un certain nombre de réclamations de cette
nature ont étéprésentées à des tribunaux internationaux qui les
ont admises. Dans la plupart des cas, la responsabilitéinternationale
de 1'Etat àraison du préjudice causé à l'actionnaire étranger entant
que tel n'était pas carrément présentéecomme une question de
droit international car cette question était régléeconformément à
l'accord international constituant le tribunal ou conformément au
compromis en vertu duquel l'affaire luiétaitsoumise ..[ici,citation
de la DelagoaBay]. Toutefois, il semble que la pratique qui consiste

à prévoirde tels cas dans les accords internationaux d'arbitrage ait
fini par êtreconsidérée comme dérivédeu droit coutumier inter-
national et il paraît maintenant admis que, du moins dans certaines
circonstances, 1'Etatest responsable du préjudice causà des action-
naires étrangersqui possèdent un intérêitmportant dans la société
lésée.»(Reporter'sNotes, sur la section 172;cf. Hyde, vol. II, p. 904.)

64. Dans l'affaire Hannevig, la Norvège a endossé, à l'encontre des
Etats-Unis, la réclamation d7Hannevig, un ressortissant norvégien ausubstantial interest in certain American corporations alleged to have
been damaged by action of the United States Government. (The case is
described in 32 American Journalof IntrrnationalLaw, 1938,p. 142.)The
United States did not assert the American character of the corporations
as a basis for resisting thelaim.

65. This section of the opinion may close with the words of Judge
Huber in the familiar Ziat, Ben Kiranclaim:

"International law, which in this field, is in the main based on
principles of equity, has laid down no forma1criterion for granting
or refusing diplomatic protection to national interests bound up
with interests belonging to persons of different nationalities." (8

Whiteman Digest, p. 1283.)

The Question of Double orMultiple Protection
66. Counsel for the Respondent made numerous statements to the
effect that diplomatic protection could never be extended by more than
one State in any one case. Such an argument is advanced against the
possibility that more than one large shareholding interest might be

protected, it being alleged that if the State of which the Companyhas the
nationality is the only State entitled to extend diplomatic protection,
impermissible double protection would be avoided. That position is not
correct sincethere are various situations in which international law recog-
nizes the right of more than one State to interpose in connection with the
same allegedly wrongful act.
67. In an ordinary case of dual nationality, both of those States of
which claimant is a national may extend protection although in case of
conflict an international tribunal may apply the doctrine of effective
nationality. This Court said in the Reparationfor Injuries Sufered in the
Service of the United Nations case: "International Tribunals are already
familiar with the problem of a claim in which two or more national
States are interested, and they know how to protect the defendant State in
such a case." (I.C.J. Reports 1949,pp. 174, 186.)In tha,tcase, the Court
was asked by the General Assembly to consider, and it did consider,
whether a claim might be brought both by the State of which the injured
person was a national and by the United Nations. The Court said that
"there is no rule of law ... which compels either the State or the Or-

ganization to refrain from bringing an international claim". The General
Assembly thereafter recognized that two claims might be presented, and
authorized the Secretary-General to negotiate agreements to reconcile
action by the United Nations with the rights of the State of which the
victim was a national. (UN General Assembly Res. 365(IV), 1Dec. 1949,
para. 2.) motif que celui-ci avait un intérêtsubstantiel dans certaines sociétés
américaines qui, prétendait-il, avait subi un préjudice par le fait du
Gouvernement des Etats-Unis. (L'affaire est décrite dans 32 American
Journal of InternationalLaw, 1938,p. 142.) Les Etats-Unis n'ont pas fait
valoir le caractèreaméricain des sociétépsour s'opposerà la réclamation.
65. On peut clore la présente partie de cette opinion en citant les
paroles prononcées par le juge Huber dans l'affaire bien connue Ziat,
Ben Kiran:

((Ledroit international qui, dans ce domaine, s'inspire essentielle-
ment des principes de l'équité, n'établiaucun critère formel pour
accorder ou refuser la protection diplomatique àdes intérêts natio-
naux liésà des intérêtsappartenant àdes personnes de nationalités
différentes1(Whiteman Digest, vol. VIII, p. 1283.)

La question de laprotection double oumultiple
66. Les conseils du défendeur ont dit à de nombreuses reprises que
la protection diplomatique ne pouvait jamais être accordéepar plus d'un

Etat dans un cas donné. Ils entendent ainsi écarter la possibilité de
protections simultanées lorsqu'ily a plus d'une participation importante,
faisant valoir que, si 1'Etatdont la sociétéa la nationalité est le seul qui
ait le droit d'accorder une protection diplomatique, on évitera unedouble
protection inadmissible. L'argument n'est pas fondécar il existe diverses
situations dans lesquelles le droit international reconnaîtà plus d'un
Etat le droit d'intervenià propos d'un mêmeacte prétendument illicite.

67. Dans un cas ordinaire de double nationalité. les deux Etats dont
le demandeur est ressortissant peuvent accorder leur protection, encore
qu'en casde conflit un tribunal international puisse appliquer la doctrine

de la nationalité effective. Dans son avis consultatif en l'affaire de la
Réparationdes dommages subis au service des Nations Unies,la Cour a
dit: ((Les tribunaux internationaux connaissent bien le problème que
pose une réclamation à laquelle sont intéressés deuxou plusieurs Etats
nationaux, et ilssavent commentprotéger,enpareil cas,1'Etatdéfendeur. »
(C.I.J. Recueil 1949, p. 186.) Dans cette affaire, l'Assemblée générale
Nations Unies avait demandé à la Cour d'examiner si une réclamation
pouvait êtreprésentée à la fois par 1'Etat dont la personne léséeétait
ressortissante et par les Nations Unies. La Cour, ayant procédé à cet
examen, a déclaré: «il n'existe pas de règlede droit..qui oblige soit
1'Etatsoit l'organisation à s'abstenir de présenter uneréclamation inter-
nationale)). L'Assemblée générala e reconnu ultérieurement que deux

réclamations pourraient être présentéeset elle a autorisé le Secrétaire
général à négocier lesaccords utiles pour concilier l'action de I'Organi-
sation et les droits que pourrait posséder1'Etat dont la victime était 68. The situation is not so simple when one considers the condition of
artificial or juristic persons. International law has not developed a clear
mle of dual nationality for such entities although different criteria are
employed for determining nationality. Respondent indicated that a
company rnay have dual nationality because both criteria are acceptable
(Preliminary Objections, 1963,p. 191),but it insisted only one of the two
States rnay make a claim. Yet in caseswhich are now very commcn in the
commercial life of the world, the corporation rnay have various links
with more than one State-links just as real as those which rnay connect a
natural person with two different States whose nationality he possesses.
International law cannot be oblivious to these corporate links. As already
indicated above, they include the place of incorporation, the place of
management, the place of operation (probably including employment of
labour and payment of taxes), the nationality of the persons (natural or
artificial) who exercise ccntrol, whether through the board of directors
and management, or through stock interests, which not infrequently rnay
exercisecontrol even when a relatively small minority.

69. 1shall not go over al1the cases but merely note the double orjoint
diplomatic interposition in Delagoa, Mexican EagIeand Tlahualilo.(Cf.
Paul De Visscher, 102Hague Recueil,1961,1, pp. 477-478.)In the case of
Barcelona Traction, diplomatic representations, someperhaps only in the
nature of good offices, were made by Canada, the United Kingdom,
United States of America and Belgium.

In the case of two different but simultaneous justifiable diplomatic
interpositions regarding the same alleged wrongful act, the Respondent
can eliminate one claimant by showing that a full settlement had been
reached with the other. If, in this case, Spain made a settlement with
Canada for Barcelona Traction, the Belgian claim for the shareholders
might be considered moot.

70. With al1 respect to the Court, 1 must point out the irrational

results of applying a rule which would provide that only the State in
which a company is incorporated rnay extend diplomatic protection in
case of damage inflicted under circumstances in which the State inflicting
the damage incurs liability under international law, as illustrated by the
organization of the Iranian Oil Consortium. In September 1954an agree-
ment was concluded between eight oil companies on the one side and, on
the other side, the Government of Iran and the Government-owned
National Iranian Oil Company;it was ratified by the Iranian Parliament. ressortissante. (Assemblée généraler,ésolution 365 (IV), 1" décembre
1949,par. 2.)
68. Leschoses ne sont pas aussi simples lorsqu'on envisagela situation
des personnes morales. Dans leur cas, le droit international n'a pas mis
au point de règle clairesconcernant la double nationalité, bien que l'on
emploie des critères différentspour déterminer la nationalité. Le défen-
deur a indiqué qu'une sociétépeut avoir une double nationalité parce
que les deux critèressont acceptables (E.P., 1963,p. 191),mais il insiste
sur le fait qu'un seul des deux Etats peut présenter une réclamation.
Pourtant, dans des cas maintenant très courantsdans la viecommerciale,
la sociétépeut avoir des liens divers avec plus d'un Etat, liens qui sont

tout aussi réelsque ceux qui peuvent rattacher une personne physique
à deux Etats différentsdont elle possède la nationalité. Le droit inter-
national ne peut pas ne pas tenir comptede ces liens sociaux. Commeon
l'a déjàindiqué plus haut, il s'agit notamment du lieu où la sociétéest
constituée (place of incorporation), du lieu de l'administration, du lieu
de l'exploitation (ce qui peut intéressernotamment l'emploi de la main-
d'Œuvre et le paiement des impôts), de la nationalité des personnes
physiques ou morales qui exercent le contrôle soit par l'intermédiaire
du conseil d'administration et de la direction soit par l'intermédiaire
d'intérêtsdans le capital social (il n'est pas rare que le contrôle appar-
tienne à une minoritérelativement faible).
69. Sans reprendre toutes les affairesl'une aprèsl'autre, je me bornerai
à noter l'intervention diplomatique double ou multiple qui s'estproduite
dans les affairesde la Delagoa, de la MexicanEagle et de Tlahualilo(voir

Paul De Visscher, Recueil des cours de l'Académiede droit international
de La Haye, 1961, tome 102, vol. 1, p. 477-478). Pour ce qui est de la
Barcelona Traction, des représentations diplomatiques, dont certaines
n'avaient peut-être quele caractère de bons offices, ont étéfaites par le
Canada, le Royaume-Uni, les Etats-Unis et la Belgique.
S'agissant de deux interventions diplomatiques justifiables, interven-
tions différentes mais simultanées, propos du mêmeacte prétendument
illicite, le défendeur peut écarter un réclamant s'il montre qu'il est
parvenu à un règlement complet avecl'autre. Si, en l'espèce, l'Espagne
avait abouti à un arrangement avec le Canada à propos de la Barcelona
Traction, la réclamation belge au nom des actionnaires pourrait être
considérée commesans objet.
70. Avec tout le respect dû à la Cour, je dois appeler l'attention sur

les résultats irrationnels auxquels aboutirait une règle selon laquelle,
si une société subissaitun dommage dans des circonstances qui, en vertu
du droit international engageraient la responsabilité de 1'Etat auteur
du dommage, seul 1'Etatoù la société s'esc tonstituéepourrait accorder
sa protection diplomatique; je citerai cette fin l'exemplede l'organisa-
tion de 1'TranianOil Consortium. En septembre 1954, un accord a été
conclu entre huit sociétés pétrolièresd ,'une part, et, d'autre part, le
Gouvernement iranien et la National Iranian Oil Company, société The agreement gives to the Consortium the exclusiverights in a defined
area for the production, refining and processing of crude oil and naturai
gas, together with other facilities. The eight participating oil companies
include the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, now British Petroleum
Company, which participates to the extent of 40 per cent.; fiveAmerican
oil companies also having 40 per cent.; the one Dutch company having
14per cent. and the French company having 6 per cent. To carry out the
operations, the Consortium caused to beincorporated in the Netherlands,
two Dutch companies, one a Producingcompany and the other a Refining

company. Al1the shares of the Dutch Producing company and of the
Refiningcompany are ownedby an Englishholding company, Iranian Oil
Participants Limited, with officesin London. The shares of the "Holding
Company" are owned by the members of the Consortium in the percen-
tages indicated above '. The two operating companies were incorporated
in the Netherlands because of the liberal provisions of its commercial
code whch permit the companies to have their head officesand board of
directors and management overseas, in this case, in Iran. The code also
permits "one-man" companies, whichmakes it possiblefor al1their shares

to be held by the "Holding Company" in London. Fortunately, the Iran-
ian Oil Consortium agreement was so skilfully drawn in a CO-operative
spirit, that one does not anticipate the likelihood of any diplomatic
clairns, quite aside from the fact that the agreement includes notable ar-
rangements for arbitration of any disputes 2.But should there be any
question in thefuture of representations by any government, it would be
absurd to maintain that the Netherlands Government would be the sole
government entitled to make such representations. Nor would it seem
rational to assign an exclusive role to the British Government on the
ground that the Holding Company was incorporated in Great Britain

and has its officein London. Perhaps a stronger link between the enter-
prise and Great Britain would be the extent of British Government
participation in holding shares in British Petroleum.

' Actually, in 1955 nine independent American companies were admitted to
participate and each of the original American participating companies surrendered
1percent. of their shareholdings to the newgroup. For the purposes of this illustrative
Iranian Oil Services Ltd. This account of the organization of the companies is company,
based upon "History and Constitution of Iranian Oil Participants and Iranian Oil
Services",a talk byMr. J. Addison, General Manager of Iranian Oil Participants
Ltd. to Staff Information Meeting, Tehran, 21 August 1961.

See "The Oil Agreement Between Iran and the International Oil Consortium:
The Law Controlling", by Abolbashar Farmanfarma, of the Tehran Bar, in 34
Texas Law Review, 1955,p. 259. appartenant à 1'Etat.Cet accord, qui a été ratifiépar leParlement iranien,
donne au consortium, dans une zone déterminée,des droits exclusifs
de production, de raffinage et de traitement du pétrole brut et du gaz

naturel, ainsi que d'autres facilités.Les huit sociétés pétrolièrep sartici-
pantes sont: l'ancienne Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, devenue la British
Petroleum Company, dont la participation est de 40 pour cent; cinq
sociétés pétrolières américaina eysant aussi une participation de 40 pour
cent; une sociétéhollandaise avec une participation de 14 pour cent et
une société française avec 6pour cent. Pour sesopérations d'exploitation,
le consortium a constitué aux Pays-Bas deux sociétés hollandaises,l'une

pour la production et l'autre pour le raffinage. Toutes les actions de la
société de production et de la société de raffinage hollandaises appartien-
nent à une société holding,171ranianOil Participants Limited, qui a ses
bureaux à Londres. Les actions de la ((sociétéholding))sont réparties
entre les membres du consortium selon les pourcentages indiqués plus
haut l. Les deux sociétés d'exploitation ont étéconstituéesaux Pays-Bas
à cause des dispositions libéralesdu code de commerce de ce pays, qui

permet aux sociétés d'avoirleur siège,leur conseil d'administration et
leur directionà l'étranger, en l'occurrence enIran. Ce code autorise ausi
les sociétés (unipersonnelles n, de sorte que rien ne s'oppose à ce que
toutes les actions des sociétés en causesoient détenues par la csociété
holdings de Londres. Heureusement, l'accord de I'iranian Oil Consor-
tium a étérédigési adroitement et dans un tel esprit de coopération que
l'éventualitéderéclamationsdiplomatiques paraît peu probable en dehors
du fait que l'accord prévoit des dispositionstrès intéressantes envue de

l'arbitrage des différendsqui pourraient surgir '.Mais, à supposer que
la question de représentations par un gouvernement ou un autre vienne
à se poser à l'avenir, il serait absurde de soutenir que le Gouvernement
néerlandais est le seul habilité faire de telles représentations.Il ne serait
pas non plus rationnel, semble-t-il, d'attribuer un rôle exclusif, dans ce
domaine, au Gouvernement britannique sous prétexte que la société
holding a été constituée en Grande-Bretagne et a ses bureaux à Londres.

On trouverait peut-êtreun lien derattachement plus fort entre l'entreprise
et la Grande-Bretagne dans l'importance de la participation du Gouver-
nement britannique dans la British Petroleum.
*
- *

entrer au consortium et chacune des sociétés américainesqui en faisaient partie à
l'origine a cédé1 pour cent de sa participation au nouveau groupe. Il est superflu,
pour le propos que le présent exemple est destiné illustrer, de donner de plus
amples précisions sur la situation d'une autre sociétébritannique,Iranian Oil
Services Ltd. Ce compte rendu de'organisation des sociétés estfondés«History
and Constitution of Iranian Oil Participants and Iranian Oil Servjces)), causerie
faite parM. J. Addison, directeur généralde I'Iranian Oil Participants Ltd., lors
d'une réunion d'information du personnel, Téhéran,le 21 août 1961.
Voir «The Oil Agreement Between Iran and the InternationaOil Consortium:
The Law Controlling Ipar Abolbashar Farmanfarma, du barreau de Téhéran,dans
34 Texas Law Review, 1955,p. 259. 71. The Court could logically have begun its analysis of the case by
examining the proof of the nationality of the physical or juristic persons
whom Belgiumasserts the right to protect. If it found that such nationality
was not proved, the Belgianclaimmust be dismissed without regard to the
rule concerning the diplomatic protection of shareholders in a corpora-

tion chartered in a third State.

72. The burden of proof was clearly on the Applicant to prove the
Belgian nationality of the shareholders on whose behalf Belgium claims.
The Belgianargument (7 May 1969)that Spain was estopped or precluded
from contesting the Belgian character of Sidro and Sofina, is not per-
suasive.

TheContinuity Rule

73. The two dates on which the nationality had to be proved, are
determined by the rule of continuity. As the term implies, the rule requires
that the nationality remain unchanged between those two dates. Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice makes a forceful argument against any "too rigid and
sweeping" application of the continuity rule, but 1believe his illustrative
situation in paragraph 62 of his separate opinion may be covered by
another rule deriving from the law of State succession, and on that basis
would escape the application of the continuity rule for international

claims which 1 consider to be generally binding-specialia generalibu~
derogant .

74. Although the phraseology varies, there is general agreement on the
principle that the claim must be national in origin, that is toaythat the
person or persons alleged to have been injured must have had the na-
tionality of the claimant State on the date when the wrongful injury was
inflicted. One might well admit that there is a certain artificiality in the
whole notion since it rests basically on the Vatelian fiction, but 1do not
think the Court can change a long established practice on this matter.
(But cf. 1932Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, Vol. 37, pp. 479
K.,and Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, 1947, p. 116.)

75. There was a fleeting attempt by Belgium to identify the origin of
the claim as the refusa1 of foreign exchange, which indeed started the
toboggan down the slide in terms of the Belgian contentions. (See espe-
cially the statement by counsel for Belgium on 18April 1969: "Belgium

rests its case on the illegality in international law of Mr. Suanzes's
rulings in Octoberand December 1946and the circumstances surrounding
them.")
This position was abandoned (it would have weakened the Belgian
case in terms of the continuityrule), and throughout much of the written
pleadings and oral argument it seems to have been taken for granted 71. La Cour aurait pu logiquement commencer son analyse de l'affaire
en examinant la preuve de la nationalité des personnes physiques ou
morales que la Belgique affirme avoir le droit de protéger. Si elle avait
constaté quelapreuve de cette nationalitén'étaitpas établie,la demande
belge aurait dû êtrerejetée,indépendamment de la règle relative à la

protection diplomatique des actionnaires d'une société constituée dans
un Etat tiers.
72. C'étaitmanifestement au demandeur qu'il incombait de prouver
la nationalité belge des actionnaires au nom desquels la Belgique a
présentésa réclamation. L'argument de la Belgique (audience du 7 mai
1969)selon lequel l'Espagne aurait perdu le droit de contester le caractère
belge de la Sidro et de la Sofina n'est pas convaincant.

La règlede la continuité

73. Les deux dates auxquelles la nationalité doit être prouvéesont
déterminéespar la règle de la continuité. Comme le mot l'implique, la
règle exige que la nationalité soit demeurée inchangéeentre ces deux
dates. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice avance des arguments convaincants pour
condamner toute application «trop rigide et trop stricte 1de la règlede
la continuité, mais,à mon avis, la situation qu'il donne comme exemple
au paragraphe 62 de son opinion individuelle relève d'une autre règle
découlantdu droit de la succession d'Etats et,à ce titre, elle ne tomberait
pas sous le coup de la règlede la continuité applicable aux réclamations

internationales, dont la portéeest àmon avisgénérale -specialiagenerali-
bus derogant.
74. Malgréles différencesde terminologie, on s'accorde généralement
à admettreie principe selon lequel la réclamationdoit êtrenationale dans
son origine, c'est-à-dire que la personne ou les personnes qui auraient
subi un préjudicedoivent avoir eu la nationalité de 1'Etatréclamant à la
date où elles ont étéinjustement léséesO . n pourrait reconnaître que la
notion même est empreinte d'un certain artifice puisqu'elle repose
essentiellement sur la fiction de Vatel, mais je ne pense pas que la Cour

puisse modifier une pratique établie de longue date en cette matière.
(Mais voir Annuairedel'Institutde droit international,1932,vol. 37,p. 479
et suiv., et Jessup, A Modern Law ofNations, 1947,p. 116.)
75. La Belgique a bien essayéun instant de considérercomme point de
départ de sa réclamation le refus de devises,lequel a en effetamorcétout
le mécanismede l'affaire du point de vue belge. (Voir surtout I'affir-
mation d'un des conseils de la Belgique le 18 avril 1969: ((la Belgique
s'appuie sur l'illégalité endroit international des décisions prises en
octobre et décembre 1946 par M. Suanzes et des circonstances qui les
entourent II.)

Cette position a étkabandonnée (elle aurait affaibli la thèsebelge du
point de vue de la règlede la continuité) et dans une grande partie des
piècesécrites etdes plaidoiries il semble avoir été admis commeévident 203 BARCELONATRACTION (SEP.OP.JESSUP)

that the critical date, when the injury complained of was inflicted, was
that of the Reus decree declaring Barcelona Traction bankrupt, namely
12 February 1948 l.1 think the Court is entitled to accept that date, at
least to thextent of sayingthat if the claim wasnot Belgianon that date,
the claim must be dismissed.

76. The terminal date under the continuity rule is more controversial.
Historically, many international claims have been settled through the

diplomatic channel and never werepresented to an international tribunal.
In many mixed claims commissions, claims were heard long after the
events complained of because the commissions were established ad hoc
after a certain number of claims had accumulated. For a moderate
example, the British-American Mixed Claims Commissions established
under a treaty concluded in 1910,decided in 1920a claim based on events
which took place in 1898. (VI, U.N.R.I.A.A., p. 42.) This diplomatic
practice supported the view that the nationality of the claim had to be
proved up to the time when it was espousedby the State. Thereafter, it
was argued, the claim could be regarded as statal and,for the purposes of

the continuity rule, the status of the individual on whose behalf the claim
was made, became immaterial.

Now the first Belgian representation in regard to the bankruptcy
proceedings involving Barcelona Traction, was dated 27 March 1948
(A.M., Vol. IV, Annex 250). But in its Note of 22 December 1951(ibid.,
Annex 259), Spain maintained that Belgium had not then as yet made a
forma1 claim. This was denied by Belgium (Annex 260), which insisted
that its diplomatic protest of March 1948should be considered a forma1

claim. In any event, at that period Belgium seemsto have claimed on
behalf of the Barcelona Traction Company and not the Belgian share-
holders.
77. However, when a case is brought before a permanent tribunal such
as the International Court of Justice, the date of the application takes the
place of the first diplomatic representation 2.Counsel for Belgium on
4 July 1969made a persuasive argument in favour of choosing that as the
date required by the continuity rule although 1 do not agree that the
Court is driven to making new law no matter what terminal date it

In its final submissions on 15July 1969 under headVI, Belgium asserted:

Traction's capital was in Belgian hands on the critical dates of 12 February 1948
and14 June1962 andso remainedcontinuouslybetweenthose dates.."(Emphasis
supplied.) The same assertion was amplified under heading V.

See Institut de droit international, Annuaire, 1965, Vol. II, p. 270. que la date critique, c'est-à-direla dateà laquelle le préjudiceincriminé
a étécausé,étaitcelle du jugement de Reus prononçant la faillite de la
Barcelona Traction, à savoir le 12 février1948 l.Je pense que la Cour
peut accepter cette date, du moins dans ce sens que la demande de la
Belgique doit êtrerejetée sielle n'avait pas un caractère belge à cette
date.
76. La date finale à prendre en considération envertu de la règlede
continuité prêteplus à controverse. Historiquement, maintes réclama-

tions internationales ont étérégléespar la voie diplomatique et n'ont
jamais été portées devant un tribunal international. Dans de nombreuses
commissions mixtes de réclamations, des demandes ont étéentendues
longtemps aprèsles faits incriminésparce que les commissions en ques-
tion avaient été constituées sur une base ad hoc une fois qu'un certain
nombre de revendications s'étaient accumuléesP .our prendre un exem-
ple modéré,le tribunal arbitral Grande-Bretagne-Etats-Unis, établi en

vertu d'un traitéconclu en 1910, s'estprononcéen 1920sur une demande
fondée sur desévénementsqui avaient eu lieu en 1898(Nations Unies,
Recueildes sentencesarbitrales, vol. VI, p. 42). Cette pratique diplomati-
que confirme l'opinion selon laquelle la nationalité de la réclamation
doit êtredémontréejusqu'au moment où elle a étéendosséepar I'Etat.
Par la suite, a-t-on affirmé,la réclamation pourrait être considérée
comme celle de 1'Etatet, aux fins de la règlede la continuité,le statut de
l'individu au nom duquel la demande a étéintroduite devient indifférent.

Or, la premièrereprésentation belge relative à la procédurede faillite
de la Barcelona Traction est datée du 27 mars 1948 (A.M., vol.IV,
ann. 250). Mais, dans sa note du 22 décembre 1951 (ibid., ann. 259),
l'Espagnesoutient que la Belgiquen'a pasencore àcette dateintroduit de
demandeformelle. C'estce que nie la Belgique(ibid.,ann. 260),qui main-
tient que sa protestation diplomatique de mars 1948doitêtreconsidérée
comme une demande formelle. Quoi qu'il en soit, à cette époque, la
Belgique semble avoir présenté sa demandeau nom de la société Bar-

celona Traction et non des actionnaires belges.
77. Toutefois, lorsqu'une affaire est portée devant un tribunal per-
manent tel que la Cour internationale de Justice, la date d'introduction
de la requête primecelle de la première représentation diplomatique 2.
Un des conseils de la Belgique s'est montré très persuasif lorsqu'il a
plaidéle 4 juillet 1969en faveur du choix de cette date-là comme étant
celle qu'exigela règlede la continuité,bien que je ne sois pas convaincu

l Dans ses conclusions finales du 15 juillet 1969 la Belgique a affirmésous la
rubriqueVI
eque le Gouvernement belge a établi que88% du capital de la Barcelona
Tractionse trouvaient en mains belges aux dates critiques du 12février 1948et
italiques sont de nous.)nt restés de façon continue entre ces dates(Les

LaVoir Institut de droit international, Annuaire, 1965II,p. 261-262. selects. Counsel for Spain on the other hand, insisted on 21 July 1969
that the critical moment for the terminal date should be when the terms

of the dispute were clearly defined whichcould only be after the respon-
dent State had indicated its position. 1find slight precedent for this view
and see no logic in it l. 1 therefore conclude that the terminal date for
compliance with the continuity rule is 19June 1962,thedate of the "new"
Application.

Piercing theVeil of Sidro and Sofina

78. Belgiumconcededthat to prove the nationality of Sidro and Sofina
it should go, and had gone, beyond the simple facts of State of corpora-
tion and sèigesocial. It stated that in strict law it was not necessary to go
beyond that but-

"it has always admitted-basing itself on the constant practice of
States-that a government is only justified in taking up the claim of
a company lZ1if the latter's nationality be real and effective. For
this reason, the Belgian Government has made a point, from its very
first pleadings, of showing that three-quarters of Sidro's shares

belonged to Belgian shareholders on the two crucial dates (1948and
1962).On account of the size of the participation in Sidro's capital
of another Belgian company, Sofina, the Belgian Government has
taken a further step; it has shown that on the same dates Belgian
shareholders had an even larger holding in Sofina than in Sidro."
(Reply, Part III, Sec. 1013,p. 738.)

In the next section Belgium States that it is not obliged to show that
Sidro's sharesare, for the major part, Belgian owned but has nevertheless
done so particularly in Annex 133to the Reply.

79. In the light of this statement in its written pleading, the Court is
justified in deciding whether Belgium succeeded in its attempt to prove

the nationality of the alleged Belgian shareholders in Sidro and Sofina,
in other words, to pierce the corporate veils of these two Belgian com-
panies. T repeat that share-ownership is not a test of corporate nationality

l Nevertheless, there is some support for the view that nationality must be
continuous to the date of the Court's judgment; see the convenient summary in
Roëd, "Bankruptcy and the Espousal of Private Claims under International Law"
in Legal Essays-A Tribute to Frede Castberg, 1963, pp. 307-309.
The "company" in question is Sidro as shareholder in Barcelona Traction.
Washington, stated that he represented "Sofina, the majority common shareholder"
in Barcelona Traction. [Footnoteadded.] que la Cour se trouve contrainte d'innover en droit, quelle que soit la
date finale qu'elleretienne. Un des conseils de l'Espagne a affirméen re-
vanche le 21juillet 1969quelemoment critique àretenircommedatefinale
devrait êtreceluioù lesconditions du différendont été clairement définies,-
ce qui nepeut sefaire qu'aprèsque 1'Etatdéfendeuraindiquésa position.
Je,ne trouve guèrede précédents à l'appui de cette thèseque je ne consi-

dère pas comme logique '. J'en conclus donc que la date finale pour
l'application de la règlede la continuité est le 19juin 1962, date de la
(nouvelle »requête.

Levéedu voiledes sociétés Sidro et Sojina

78. Le Gouvernement belgea admis que, pour prouver la nationalitéde

la Sidro et dela Sofina,elle nepouvait se contenter et ne se contentait pas
d'alléguer les simples élémend tse fait que sont1'Etatoù la sociétés'est
constituéeet le siègesocial. Il a déclaréqu'en droit strict, il n'était pas
nécessaire d'allerplus loin, mais

((qu'ila toujours été admis - en s'appuyant sur la pratique cons-
tante des Etats - qu'un gouvernement n'est justifié à endosser la
demande d'une sociétéque si la nationalitéde celle-ciest effective.
Pour cette raison, le Gouvernement belge a tenu, dèsses premières
écritures, à montrer que les trois quarts des actions de la Sidro
appartenaient à des actionnaires belges aux deux dates critiques
(1948 et 1962). Eu égard à l'importance de la participation d'une

autre société belge, la Sofina, dans le capital de la Sidro, le Gouver-
nement belge a fait un pas de plus: il a démontré quela part des
actionnaires belges dans la Sofina était, aux mêmesdates, plus
importante encore que dans la Sidro. » (R., troisième partie, par.
1013,p. 738.)

Dans le paragraphe suivant, la Belgiquedéclaren'avoir pas à démontrer
que les actions de la Sidro sont, en majeure partie, propriétébelge mais
procède néanmoins à cette démonstration en particulier à l'annexe 133
à la réplique.
79. Ëtant donné que cette déclaration figure dans les écritures, la

Cour est fondée à dire si la Belgique a réussi à prouver la nationalité
des prétendus actionnairesbelges de la Sidro et de la Sofina, en d'autres
termes, à lever le voile social de ces deux sociétés belges. Je répèteque
la propriétédes actions n'est pas un critère de la nationalitédes sociétés
- --
' Cependant, on a parfois considéréque la nationalité devait être continue
jusqu'à la date de l'arrêt de laCour; voir le résumécommode figurant dans Roëd,
cBankruptcy and the Espousal of Private Claims under International Law », in
Legal Essays, - A Tribute to Frede Castber~, 1963, p. 307-309.
La es sociétéen question est la Sidro en tant qu'actionnaire de la Barcelona
Traction. Dans sa lettre dule' février 1955 à l'ambassadeur d'EspagaeWashing-
ton, M. Arthur Dean a déclaréreprésenter ala Sofina, qui détient la majorité des
actions ordinaire)de la Barcelona Traction. [Cette note est de nous.] in thebroad sense,but, as Belgiumstates,a test of whetherthe nationality
is "real and effective". Belgium in effect thus accepts the application to
corporations of the Nottebohm link principle. But there are other
Belgian statements in the oral argument which seemto modify that posi-
tion and which object to the Spanish demand for proof of Belgianshare-
holding in the two Belgian companies.

80. If, as 1 maintain, Canada was not legally competent to protect
Barcelona Traction because of the absence of a link (such absence being
in part proved by the extent of foreign shareholding) l, then Belgium by
the same token would not be legally competent to protect Sidro unless
the presence of a link is established. This is the challenge which Belgium

seems to have accepted. Apparently Belgium was willing to have the
link tested entirely bythe extent of shareholdings and not by other factors.
This may be due to inability to prove that the international controlling
group was associated with or operated out of Belgium. Here again there
is an illustration of the fact that the rule which permits claims to be
submitted on behalf of shareholders places a heavy burden of proof on

the claimant State, especially in the case of great international holding
companies whose focus of power can not easily be proved especiallyover
a period of years. There is added difficulty in time of war when many
steps, some of them devious, but quite justifiable, need to be taken to
avoid enemy appropriation or exploitation and also characterization as
enemyby alliedor friendly States.As Berlehas abundantly demonstrated,
the centre or focus of power is not necessarily to be identified by the

location of the largest number of shares 2.Counselfor Belgiumrecognized
this fact in stating, on 13 May 1969, that Sofina was, at one period,
controlled by about 8 per cent. of the shareholdings. The place of in-
, corporation, whence the promoters of an enterprise secure a "charter of
convenience", has lost its significanceas evidenceofthe real identification

l In al1the analyses of the nationality of shareholders, very little emphasis is put
on any Canadian holdings. On 1 April 1962, out of 1,798,854 issued shares of
Barcelona Traction 41,294 wereheld in Canada. The Canadian shareholders included
57 individuals (of whom 20 held less than 5shares each) and 43 Canadian companies
of which one, Houston & Co., held 30,225 shares. In the "U.S.A. Section", 11,
not counting Newman & Co., held over 1,000 shares each. 15shareholders holding a
total of2,387 shares, had addresses in Belgium. Of these, 7 held only 1 share each;
in at least some of these cases they seem to have been simply qualifying shares
(A.M., Annex 10).

"... it is just possible that in talking the language of 'ownership' in relation to
the flow of national capital, we are talking the language of history rather the
language of reality"(Berle, Power Without Property (Eng. ed. 1960), p. 45).
This is true because, as Judge Tanaka has pointed out, anonymity brings about
the separation of management from the ownership. (Cf. Morphologie des groupes
financiers, Centre de recherche et d'informatiosocio-politiques, 1962, pp. 9 and
60, and Meyssan, Les droits des actionnaires et des autres porteurs de titres dans les
sociétés anonymes,1962, pp. 9-10.) BARCELONATRACTION(OP. IND. JESSUP) 205

au sens large, mais, comme l'affirmela Belgique, un critère permettant
de déterminer si la nationalité est vraiment ((effective)).La Belgique
accepte donc en pratique l'application aux sociétésdu principe du rat-
tachement énoncédans l'affaire Nottebohm.Mais d'autres affirmations
ont été avancéep sar la Partie belge dans ses plaidoiries, qui semblent

s'écarterde cette position et qui dénient à l'Espagne le droit d'exigerla
preuve de la participation belge au capital des deux sociétésbelges.
80. Si, comme je le maintiens, le Canada n'était pasjuridiquement
compétent pour protéger la BarcelonaTraction faute d'un lien de ratta-
chement (ce défaut delien étantprouvéen partie par l'importance de la
participation étrangère au capital social) l,la Belgique, pour la même

raison, n'aurait juridiquement compétencepour protéger laSidro que si
l'existence d'un lien de rattachement était établie.La Belgique semble
avoir acceptéle combat sur ce terrain. Apparemment elle a bien voulu
accepter pour critère du lien de rattachement l'importance de la parti-
cipation au capital social, à l'exclusion d'autres facteurs. Cette prise de

position est peut-êtredue à l'impossibilitéde prouver que le groupe
international exerçant le contrôle avait des attaches avec la Belgique ou
opérait à partir de la Belgique. Cela montre une fois encore que la
règle qui permet de présenter des réclamations au nom d'actionnaires
impose une preuve difficile à 1'Etat réclamant, surtout quand il s'agit

de grandes sociétésholding internationales, dont les centres d'autorité
ne sont pas faciles à localiser, surtout sur une longue période.Des dif-
ficultés supplémentairesse présentent en temps de guerre, lorsque de
nombreuses mesures, et notamment des mesures de camouflage tout à
fait justifiables, doiventêtreprises pour éviterla confiscation ou I'exploi-
tation par l'ennemi, ainsi que la classification comme sociétéennemie

par des Etats alliésou amis. Comme Berlel'a abondamment démontré,le
centre ou foyer d'autorité ne se trouve pas nécessairement à l'endroit
où est réunie la majorité des actions 2.Un des conseils de la Belgique

lDans toutes les analyses dela nationalité des actionnaires, on ne parle guère des
éventuelsavoirs canadiens. Le le' avril 1962, sur 1 798 854 actions émisespar la
Barcelona Traction, 41 294 actions étaient détenuesau Canada. Les actionnaires
canadienscomptaient 57 particuliers (dont 20 possédaientmoins de 5 actions chacun)
et 43 sociétéscanadiennes, dont une, Houston & Co., détenait30 225 actions. Sous
la rubrique«actionnaires des Etats-Uni»,il y en avait 11, sans compter Newman &
Co., qui possédaientplus de 1000 actions chacun. 15 actionnaires détenant au total
2387 actions avaient des adresses en Belgique. Parmi ceux-ci, 7 ne possédaient
qu'une action; dans quelques-uns au moins de ces cas, il semble qu'il s'agissait
responsabilités sociale(A.M.,dann. 10.)était nécessaire, en vue de l'exercice de
(...l est bien possible qu'en parlant la langue deapropriété»d propos des
courants de capitaux nationaux, on parle la langue de l'histoire et non pas celle de la
réalit» (Berle, Power Without Property, éd. anglaise1960, p. 45).
Cela est vrai car, comme M. Tanaka l'a souligné,l'anonymat entraîne la sépa-
ration de la gestion et de la propriété.(Cf. Morphologie des groupes financiers,
Centre de recherche et d'information socio-politiques, 1962, p. 9 et 60, et Meyssan,
Les droits des actioanaires et des autres porteurs de titres dans les sociétés anonymes,
1962, p. 9-10.) of a holding company. Moreover, the siège socialin terms of an office,
etc.,can be merely a façade.

81. There is, to be sure, a certain logic in taking the position that if
international law permits a State to protect a shareholder interest, the
State should be able to protect a single shareholder and would not have
to prove that a substantial percentage of the shares were held by its
nationals. This seemsto be the Swisspractice but not that of the United
States and there is very little support in the doctrine for pushing logic to
such extremes. Nor does the claimant State in the instant case rely on
any such principle-quite the contrary. Law is constantly balancing
conflicting interests. The British-American Claims Commission, under
the Presidency ofHenri Fromageot, in 1923inthe Eastern Extensioncase,
declared that "the function of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of
opposing rights and interests by applying ... the corollaries of general
principles". (VI, U.N.R.Z.A.A.,pp. 112, 114.)It is such reasoning which
supports Dunn's allocationof risktheoryinthe law of State responsibility.

1have elsewherepointed out as a transnational illustration, the power of
a single shareholder to induce a great corporation to change its policies.
But the international protection of broad State interests of an economic
and financial character does not require permitting a State to protect, let
us say, a holder of just one of the hundreds of millions of shares of a
company like A.T. & T.

82. It must be realized how different in character are various corpora-
tions. Holding companies like BarcelonaTraction are very differentfrom,
let us say,the Ford Motor Company or the Du Pont Company. In these
two examples,regardless of foreign holdingsor interests ofthe companies,
and regardless of the number of their shares which may be held by
foreign interests, the location of plant, the employment of labour and
the payment of taxes are al1factors, in addition to place of incorporation
and of policy making, identifying the companies as "American". Gener-
alizations clustered around the word "corporation" or "company" are
therefore dangerous.

83. If one looks at the link ofmanagement-brains, the citizenship ofan

individual is not conclusive. If a "Nottebohm" were the sole managing
and controlling personality in a company, this would not prove that the
company wasidentifiedwith Liechtenstein,for purposes ofthe application
of rules of international law. Nor is apparent residence conclusive;com-
pare the arguments of the Parties about the residence of Juan March at l'a reconnu quand il a déclaréle 13 mai 1969 qu'il fut un temps où la

Sofina étaitcontrôléepar environ 8 pour cent des actionnaires.
Le lieu de constitution, qui permet aux promoteurs d'une entreprise
d'obtenir un ((statut de complaisance 11a perdu sa signification comme
preuve de l'identitéréelled'une sociétéholding. D'autre part, le siège
social, sous forme de bureaux, etc., peut n'êtrequ'une façade.
81. Il y a, bien sûr, une certaine logique à considérer que si le droit
international permet à un Etat de protéger un intérêt représenté par
des actions, 1'Etat devrait pouvoir protéger un actionnaire unique, sans
avoir à prouver qu'un pourcentage substantiel des titres est détenupar

ses ressortissants. Telle semble êtrela pratique suisse mais non pas celle
des Etats-Unis et la doctrine est fort peu favorableà une logique poussée
à de tels extrêmes.En l'espèce,1'Etat réclamant ne s'appuie d'ailleurs
pas sur un principe de ce genre, bien au contraire. Le droit établitcons-
tamment un équilibreentre des intérêts divergents. Le tribunal arbitral
Grande-Bretagne-Etats-Unis, sous la présidence d'Henri Fromageot,
a déclaréen 1923 à propos de l'affaire de l'Eastern Extension que ((la
jurisprudence a pour fonction de résoudre les conflits entre droits et

intérêts opposésen appliquant ..les corollaires de principes géné-
raux 11(Nations Unis, Recueildessentencesarbitrales, vol. VI, p. 112,114).
C'est sur un raisonnement analogue que s'appuie la théorie deDunn sur
la répartition des risques dans le droit de la responsabilité des Etats.
J'ai rappeléailleurs, pour illustrer le caractère transnational, qu'un seul
actionnaire pouvait amener une grande société à modifier sa politique.
Mais la protection internationale d'intérêts étatiquesgénérauxde carac-
tère économique et financier n'exige pas qu'un Etat ait la faculté de

protéger, mettons, le titulaire d'une seule des centaines de millions
d'actions d'une société comme 1'A.T. & T.
82. Il faut bien voir que les sociétéssont par nature très différentes
les unes des autres. Les sociétésholding comme la Barcelona Traction
diffèrentprofondément de la sociétéFord ou de la sociétéDu Pont par
exemple. Pour ces deux dernières, indépendamment du fait qu'elles
peuvent détenir des participations ou avoir des intérêts étrangers, et
indépendamment du nombre de leurs actions qui peut êtreaux mains
d'étrangers, l'emplacement de l'usine, la main-d'Œuvre, le versement

d'impôts, sont autant de fatteurs qui concourent tous, en plus du lieu
où la sociétéa été constituée et oùse trouvent les organes directeurs, à
leur donner le caractère ((américain ».Il est donc dangereux d'énoncer
des généralisations à partir du seul terme de ((société))(corporation ou
company) .
83. Si l'on considère le lien entre la gestion et la prise de décision,
dans le cas d'une société,la nationalité d'un particulier n'est pas un
élémentdéterminant. Il pourrait se trouver qu'un ((Nottebohm 1exerce

à lui seul la direction et le contrôle d'une société, mais celane prouve-
rait.pas que cette société s'identifie au Liechtensteinaux fins de I'appli-
cation de règles de droit international. Le lieu apparent de résidencecertain periods, and the challenges to evidence produced to prove resi-
dence. From the point of view of explaining the reasons for diplomatic
protection, it may be significant that the controlling power group has,
for onereason or another, strong political influence with a certaingovern-
ment. Spain's invocation of old press reports of scandalous connections
between Belgian Government officials and personalities connected with

Sidro or Sofina, suggested this element.

84. There are, of course, abundant precedents for protection of bond-
holders-1 refer to the holders of corporate bonds and not the holders of
government bonds which raise entirely different legal (and political)
problems, as Drago clearly showed. In the instant case, there was at
certain times, as already noted, stress by Great Britain and by Canada
upon the interests of bondholders. As a characterization of the claim as
Belgian, bondholding does not seem to be significant.

Proof by Presumptions

85. In the attempt by Belgium to prove that Sofina's shares were held
by Belgians, at least in large part, there is a very extended analysis of
Belgian wartime legislation. The subject is covered in greatest detail in
Annex 133 of the Reply and in counsei's pleading on 13 May 1969. In

this line of argument it is explained thatnder the legislation in question,
various rules werelaid down concerning certifications and the declarations
of ownership of types of shares, whether held in Belgium or abroad. The
argument is to Saythe least devious and rests on a pyramid of presump-
tions. In Annex 133 to the Reply at page 769, it is said that the proof
adduced "rests on presumptions, but presumptions represent a mode of
proof recognized by al1legislative systems ...".Yet counsel for Belgium
on 17April wisely admonished the Court: "The Court will, 1trust, here
as elsewhere, reject any attempt to substitute allegations for proof or in-
sinuations for fact." It must also be noted that Belgian counsel admitted
on 4 July 1969that the certificates did not purport to establish continuity
of Belgian ownership. Moreover, there are faciletransitions asfrom broad
categories such as "non-enemy", which included "allied", to the partic-
ularity of "Belgian". 1 do not find the evidence at al1convincing.

In the pleading of Belgian counsel in 1964, it was stated on 15 April
that there is a presumption "that when a Company is established in an'est pas non plus déterminant; voir à ce sujet les thèses desParties sur
le lieu de résidencede Juan March à certains moments, et la manière
dont les moyens de preuve produits ont été contestésQ . uand il s'agit
d'expliquer les motifs d'une protection diplomatique, le fait que le
groupe qui contrôle la société exerce,pour une raison ou pour une

autre, une forte influence politique auprès d'un gouvernement donné
peut présenterde l'importance. Il est du moins permis de le supposer,
lorsqu'on constate que l'Espagne a cité d'anciens comptes rendus de
presse faisant état derelations scandaleuses entre des membres du Gou-
vernement belge et des personnalitésproches de la Sidro ou de la Sofina.
84. Il existe, bien entendu, de nombreux précédents à l'exercice de
la protection d'obligataires -je veux parler des titulaires d'obligations
émisespar des sociétéset non pas des porteurs de titres d'emprunts
publics, qui donnent lieu à des problèmes juridiques (et politiques)
entièrement différents, comme Drago l'a bien montré. En l'espèce,la

Grande-Bretagne et le Canada ont, à certains moments, comme on l'a
déjà noté,soulignéles intérêts des obligataires. Pour établirle caractère
belge de la réclamation, la détention d'obligations ne semble pas être
un élémentimportant.

La preuve parprésomption

85. Voulant prouver que les actions de la Sofina étaientdétenues,du
moins en grande partie, par des Belges,la Belgiqueprocède àune analyse
très détailléede la législation belge pendant la guerre. On trouve une

étude très approfondie de la question à l'annexe 133 de la réplique et
dans la plaidoirie faite parl'un des conseils le 13 mai 1969.11a étéex-
pliquédans ce contexte qu'en vertu de cette législation,les certifications
et les déclarations concernant la propriétéd'actions, qu'elles soient
détenuesen Belgique ou à l'étranger,étaientassujettiesà diverses règles,
selon la catégorie. L'argument est à tout le moins tortueux, et repose
sur une accumulation de présomptions. Dans l'annexe 133 à la réplique
(p. 11 de l'annexe), on nous dit que la démonstration ((s'appuiesur des
présomptions, mais [que]la présomption estun mode de preuve reconnu
par toutes les législations...».Pourtant, le 17 avril, un des conseils de

la Belgique a adressé à la Cour un sage avis: «Ici comme ailleurs, la
Cour rejettera toute tentative faite pour substituer des allégations à
des preuves ou des insinuations à des faits))Il y a lieu de noter aussi
que, le 4 juillet 1969,un conseil belge a reconnu que la certification ne
visait pasà établirle caractèrecontinude la propriétébelge. Par ailleurs,
on passe bien facilement de certaines grandes catégories, lecaractère
(non ennemi )par exemple qui vise entre autres les «alliésa,à des caté-
gories particulières comme le «caractère belge)).Ces moyens de preuve
ne me convainquent pas du tout.
Dans les p aidoiries de 1964, à la séancedu 15 avril, le conseil de la

Belgique déc arait que (lorsqu'une société estconstituéedans un Etat etparticular State and enjoys the national character of that State, thcem-
pany is also owned and controlled by shareholders of the same nation-
ality". By this token, the controlling shareholders of Barcelona Traction
would have been Canadian. Counsel offered a further presumption that
sincethe shares of Sidro and Sofina "are traded principally in the Brussels
stock market", Belgian nationals own the shares in those companies.
[Ibid., p. 14.1It was further suggested that if shareholders give an address
in Belgium, they must be presumed to be Belgians. [Ibid., pp. 9-10.]

86. The Belgian Memorial filedin 1959after the first Application, was
more realistic in its appraisal of a submitted classification of ownership
of Barcelona Traction shares. The Memorial stated (at p. 19):

"It should be noted that the foregoing classification was,in almost
al1cases, established on the basis of the place of residence of the
person in whose name the shares were registered at that time.
Having regard to the Anglo-saxon custom of resorting to nominees
who are merely custodians of the securities, such a classificationdoes
not necessarily correspond to the place of residence of the real
owners of the securities. Sidro itself had its Barcelona Traction
shares registered in thename of an American nominee.
Furthermore, the place of residence may not correspond to the
nationality of the person concerned, but this is ofno great importance

in view of the small number of shares considered as Belgian apart
from those held by the Sidro company."
On 13 May 1969, Belgian counsel presented a long detailed list of
presumptions, largely based on the time and place of declaration and
certificationunder the Belgian wartime legislation. The information
does not seem, as claimed by counsel, to be "both exact and consistent".

On 7 May counsel for Belgium had argued from certain reports of
trading in Barcelona Traction bearer shares on the bourse in both Paris
and Brussels during 1961-1962.(The reports are in A.R., Annexes 131

and 132.)In Paris the shares were apparently unlisted and there was no
record of the number of shares bought and sold. In Brussels 44,264
shares were traded and counsel remarked: "True it cannot be said that
al1the purchasers were necessarily Belgianbut the likelihoodis that they
were." [Emphasis supplied.]

87. The actual Belgian position seemed to fa11back on that taken by
counsel on 7 May 1969in the following statement:
"After all, and this is a point of some importance, it is not neces-
sary for the Government of Belgium to satisfy the Court regarding possèdela nationalité de cet Etat, il est en tout cas à présumer que la
sociétéest la propriété d'actionnairesde la mêmenationalité et est con-
trôlée par eux)). A ce compte-là, les actionnaires qui contrôlaient la

BarceIona Traction eussent étécanadiens. Le conseil de la Belgique a
fait appelà une nouvelle présomption selon laquelle, étantdonnéque les
actions de la Sidro et de la Sofina(sont négociées surtout à la Bourse de
Bruxelles)),les actions de ces sociétésappartiennent à des ressortissants
belges. De plus, il a suggéré que, si les actionnaires donnent une adresse
en Belgique, ils doivent être présuméb selges.
86. Dans lemémoirequ'ellea déposéen1959aprèslapremièrerequête,
la Belgique a portéun jugement plus réalistesur une classification dont

les actionnaires de la Barcelona Traction avaient fait l'objet. On lit
dans le mémoire(p. 19):
« Il faut noter que la classification ci-avant a été établie,dans la
quasi-totalité des cas, sur la base de résidencede la personne au
nom de laquelle les actions se trouvaient inscrites à cette époque.

Etant donnél'habitude anglo-saxonne de recourir à des nominees,
simples gardiens des titres (custodians), une telle classification ne
correspond pas nécessairement à la résidence des propriétaires
véritables destitres. La Sidro elle-mêmeavait ses actions Barcelona
Traction enregistréesau nom d'un nominee américain.
D'autre part, la résidencepeut ne pas correspondre à la nationa-
lité,mais l'observation est sans incidence notable vu le petit nombre
d'actions réputéesbelges en dehors de celles de la sociétéSidro. ))

Le 13 mai 1969, le conseil de la Belgique à présenté une longueliste
détailléede présomptions, fondéesen grande partie sur la date et le lieu
des opérationsde déclaration et de certification effectuées enapplication
des lois adoptéespar la Belgique pendant la guerre. Les renseignements
invoquésne semblent pas être (à la fois préciset concordants)) comme

l'affirme le conseil.
Le 7 mai, le conseil dela Belgiquea tiréargument de certains rapports
concernant la négociationen bourse des actions au porteur de la Barce-
lona Traction tant à Paris qu'à Bruxelles en 1961-1962.(Ces rapports
figurent dans A.R., ann. 131 et 132.) A Paris, les actions n'étaientap-
paremment pas inscrites à la cote et il n'existait pas de document sta-
tistique concernant le nombre d'actions achetéesou vendues. A Bruxel-
les, 44 264 actions ont ététraitéeset le conseil de la Belgique a fait ob-

server: ((Certeson ne peut pas dire que tous les acheteurs étaient né-
cessairement belges mais les probabilitéssont en ce sens. )(Les italiques
sont de nous.)
87. En fait, la position de la Belgique peut se ramener, semble-t-il, à
celleque son conseila expriméele7mai 1969dansla déclarationsuivante:
((Aprèstout, et ce point a quelque importance, il n'incombe pas

au Gouvernement belge d'établir devantla Cour l'identité et la the identity and Belgian nationality of every individual shareholder
whose rights and interests underlie the Belgian claim. According to
the doctrine recognized by this Court and generally accepted by
States, Belgium is presenting a claim for injury done to the State of
Belgium through wrongs inflicted upon its nationals. The Court
therefore, need do no more than estimate in proximate terms the
number of Belgian shareholders in Barcelona Traction."

Although he argued that the evidence is enough for the Court to find
that as of 14 June 1962 "at least 200,000 bearer shares in Barcelona
Traction were owned by Belgians other than Sidro", it was actually
left to the Court to make an approximate estimate. Al1of these presenta-
tions and others not noted here, do not sufficeto discharge the burden of
proof which rested on the Applicant.

88. One cannot deny that it is far from easy to trace the ownership of
bearer shares. In the Certain German Znterests in Polish Upper Silesia
case, the Polish Government argued that "no importance can be attached

to the possession of bearer securities, sinceit is impossible to ascertain in
whose hands they may be at a givenmoment". (P.C.Z.J.,Series A, No. 7,
p. 67.) The Court did not find it necessary to pursue this point. In the
instant case, Belgiumsaid that Spain was seekingto drive them with their
backs to the wall by demanding a probatio diabolicafor identification of
holders of bearer shares. But Belgium insistedthat in this instance it was
able to accomplish this almost impossible task. (Memorial, 1959,p. 17;
Reply, Part III, p. 156,and C.R. for 13 May 1969.) 1 am not convinced
that it succeeded l.

Apparently 341,326 bearer shares were in the trust account with

Securitas (to be discussedlater herein), after being deposited 31December
1939 (O.S., p. 203). Then 8,525 more bearer shares were deposited by
Sidro with Securitas-7,925 on 12 December 1939and 600 on 22 Feb-
ruary 1940-while 2,075 bearer shares were, for some reason, left in
Brussels. (Zbid.,pp. 203-204.)
When on 19April 1948,Sidro asked Securitas to send to Newman &
Co. various securities,it included in the lot to be sent 6,025bearer shares
and the coupons of 341,326bearer shares, but not the latter certificates
themselves. (App. 2 to Annex 11 of the Anexes to the Memorial.) In
January 1952, Sidro converted the 341,326 bearer shares then in its

The Belgian State in 1946 or 1947 possessed 10,000 sharesof Sofina and 50,000
shares of Sidro. The shares were acquiredin payment of a capital levy in 1946 but
were apparentlyheld by the State only brieflyand probably not after 31 December
in another context that Belgian counsel spoke, on 4 July 1969, of "the overallwas
claim, here put forwardby the Belgian Government,in respectof the injurydone to
the Belgian State by the unlawful acts for which Spain is responsible". nationalité belges de chacun des actionnaires dont les droits et les

intérêtssont à la base de la requêtebelge. D'après la doctrine re-
connue par la Cour et généralement acceptéepar les Etats, la
Belgique présente une demande en raison d'un préjudice causé à
1'Etat belge par des actes préjudiciablescommis à l'encontre de ses
ressortissants. Par conséquent, il suffit à la Cour d'évaluer en
chiffres approximatifs le nombre d'actionnaires belges de la Barce-

lona Traction. ))
Bien que, à son avis, les preuves aient étésuffisantes pour permettre à
la Cour de conclure qu'au 14juin 1962, «au moins 200 000 actions au
porteur de la Barcelona Traction étaient lapropriétéde Belgesautres que
la Sidro», la Belgique a en fait laissé à la Cour le soin de procéder à

une estimation approximative. Toutefois, malgré ces diversarguments
et d'autres qui ne sont pas relevés ici,la charge de la preuve continue
àincomber au demandeur.
88. Nul n'ira contester qu'il n'est guère facile de déterminer la pro-
priété d'actionsau porteur. Dans l'affaire relative à Certains intérêts
allemands enHaute-Silésiepolonaise,le Gouvernement polonais a soutenu
((qu'on ne saurait attacher de l'importance à la possession de titres au

porteur, étant donné qu'il est impossible de contrôler en quelles mains
ceux-cise trouvent à un moment déterminé » (C.P.J.I. sérieA no7,p. 67).
La Cour n'a pas jugéutile d'aller plus loin. En l'espèce,la Belgique dit
que l'Espagne cherchait à la mettre au pied du mur en lui réclamantla
probatio diabolica que représenterait l'identification des détenteurs
d'actions au porteur. Mais la Belgique elle-mêmea soutenu qu'en l'oc-
currence elle pouvait accomplir ce tour de force (M. 1959, p. 17; R.,

troisième partie, p. 737, et compte rendu de l'audience du 13mai 1969).
Je ne suispas convaincu qu'elle l'ait réuss .
Apparemment, 341326actions au porteur figuraient dans le compte de
trust ouvert avec la Securitas (nous en reparlerons plus loin), après
avoir étédéposéesle 31 décembre 1939 (O.C., p. 203). Puis, la Sidro
a confié à nouveau 8525 actions au porteur à la Securitas - soit 7925
le 12 décembre1939et 600 le 22 février1940 - tandis que 2075 actions

restaient, pour une raison ou une autre, à Bruxelles (ibid., p. 203-204).
Quand, le 19avril 1948,la Sidro a demandé à la Securitas de remettre
à Newman & Co. divers titres, elle a fait figurer dans le loà remettre
6025 actions au porteur et les coupons afférents à 341 326 actions au
porteur, mais non pas les actions elles-mêmes (A.M., app. 2 à l'ann. 11).
En janvier 1952,la Sidro a converti les 341326actions au porteur qu'elle

l En 1946 ou 1947 I'Etat belge possédait 10 000 actions de la Sofina et 50 000
actions de la Sidro. Ces actions ont étéacquises en 1946 en paiement d'un impôt sur
le 31 décembre 1947. VoirA.O.C., ann. 30, app. 3, p. 368 et 381 et sous-app. 3,
p. 388. C'est dans un autre contexte que lellet 1969,le conseil de la Belgique a
parlé du ((grief global présentépar le Gouvernement belge au sujet du préjudice
causéà 1'Etat belge par les actes illégauxdont l'Espagne est resp)].able possession to registered shares; they were registered in the name of
Newman & Co. (See ibid., Annexes 11 and 4.) 1 have not been able to
establish that none of these 341,326 bearer shares changed hands be-
tween 12 February 1948 and January 1952.
Itis alleged that 244,832additional bearer shares were owned by other
Belgians in February 1948. (M., Sec. 10.)It was claimed that on 14June
1962, 200,000 bearer shares were held by Belgians other than Sidro.
(O.S., p. 206). 1find no proof that these bearer shares were continuously
Belgian-owned (assuming the above allegations to be correct) between
1948and 1962.

89. In reply to a question from the Bench concerning the possible
effecton continuity ifshares weretransferred during the period 1948-1962,
counsel for Belgium said, on 4 July 1969,that if shares were sold to other
Belgians and then repurchased by Sidro, "the continuity requirement
would be satisfied". But "if the shares had been sold to, and then re-
purchased from, non-Belgian nationals, other than Spanish nationals, the
requirement might possibiy not have been satisfied...".The Spanish side

challenged this statement, and properly so, because one does not seewhy
this situation would differfrom counsel'sthird case. The third case he put
was where the shares had been sold to, and then repurchased from,
Spanish nationals; here he agreed the continuity requirement would not
have been satisfied. Counsel sought to justify his answer to his own
second case by various quotations to the effectthat the continuity rule is
artificial and should be re-examined. But he merely says that Belgium
"feels it right that the existence of this body oftical opinion should be
drawn to the attention of the Court". He did not, however, deny the
existence of the rule. When later he analysed his evidence of Belgian
holdings in 1948,he did not try to adduce proof that the shares did not
change hands between 1948 and 1962. It was in this context that he
rejected the Spanish suggestion that Belgium should prove in regard to
each shareholder that he was a Belgian and that he was a shareholder
during the critical period. Counsel said:

"It is a lengthy and expensiveprocedure to carry out the investiga-
tion proposed by the Government of Spain. It isjustifiable if there is
something to be distributed. [Sc.an award in this case.] It is not
justifiable otherwise."

He felt this was the more true because he considered that Belgium had
proved that there was at al1material times Belgian ownership of at least
200,000 shares aside from the Sidro holdings. None the less, the state-
ment is a damaging admission of Belgium's inability to identify the détenait alorsen actions nominatives, inscrites au nomde Newman & Co.
(voir ibid., ann. 11 et 4). Je n'ai pas étà mêmed'établirqu'aucune de
ces 341326 actions au porteur n'avait changé de mains entre le 12 fé-
vrier 1948et janvier 1952.
On nous dit que 244 832 autres actions au porteur étaientaux mains
d'autres ressortissants belges en février1948 (M., p. 12, par. 10). On a
soutenu qu'au 14juin 1962,200 000 actions au porteur étaientaux mains

de ressortissants belges autres que la Sidro (O.C., p. 206). Je ne trouve
aucune preuve que ces actions au porteur aient été constamment aux
mains de Belges (à supposer que les allégationsci-dessus soient exactes)
entre 1948et 1962.
89. En réponse à une question d'un membre de la Cour concernant
l'effet qu'auraient pu avoir la vente et le rachat des actions pendant la
période 1948-1962 du point de vue de la condition de continuité, le
conseil de la Belgique a dit, le 4juillet 1969,qu'au cas où la Sidro aurait
vendu ses actions à d'autres ressortissants belges et les leur aurait ra-
chetées,(la condition de continuité [aurait été]satisfaite».Mais, «si les
actions avaient étévendues puis rachetées àdes ressortissants non belges

autres que des ressortissants espagnols, il est possible que cette condi-
tion n'aurait pas été satisfaite ..». Les conseils espagnols ont contest6
cette déclaration,à bon droit, car on ne voit pas pourquoi cette situation
différerait du troisième cas envisagépar le conseil de la Belgique. Ce
cas est celui où les actions auraient étévendues puis rachetées à des
ressortissants espagnols; etlà, il a reconnu que la condition de continuité
n'aurait pas étésatisfaite. Le conseil belge s'est efforcéde justifier la
réponsequ'il donnait à sa seconde hypothèse par diverses citations ten-
dant à montrer que la règle de continuité est artificielle et devrait être
réétudiéeM . ais il se contente de dire que la Belgique ((estime qu'il est
bon d'attirer l'attention de la Cour sur l'existencede cet ensemble d'opi-

nions critiques)).Il n'a pas nié toutefois l'existence de la règle. Quand
par la suite il a analysé les preuves qu'il apportait de la participation
belge en 1948, il n'a pas essayédu tout de montrer que les actions
n'avaient pas changé de mains entre 1948et 1962.C'est dans ce contexte
qu'il a écartél'idée avancée par l'Espagne que la Belgique devrait prou-
ver, au sujet de chaque actionnaire, qu'il avait la nationalité belge et
qu'il était actionnaire pendant la période critique. Le conseil dit à ce
propos :

Il faut une procédure longue et coûteuse pour mener à bien
les recherches proposées par le Gouvernement espagnol. Elle se
justifie s'il a quelquechose àdistribuer [uneindemnité, en l'espèce].
Sinon, elle ne sejustifie pas))

A son avis, c'était d'autant plus vrai que la Belgique avait, disait-il,
prouvé qu'il y avait constamment eu, à tout moment déterminant,
200 000 actions aux mains de ressortissants belges, outre les titres dé-
tenus par la Sidro.Tln'empêcheque, par là, il a été forcé de reconnaître 211 BARCELONATRACTION(SEP. OP. JESSUP)

shareholders it sought to protect. The exhaustive effort to trace the
bearer shares would hardly have been necessary if Belgium had been
confident that the Court would be convinced that Sidro was the real
owner of the 1,012,688 registered Barcelona shares throughout the
critical period since so large a holding would presumably satisfy the
demand that Sidro be identified with Belgian interests. This may be
another slight indication that Belgian counsel were aware that they were,
for one reason or another, not in a position to prove when the Securitas
trust arrangement terminated. (See paragraph 96 below.)

Securitas as Trusteefor Sidro

90. On 6 September 1939 Sidro concluded a "custodian" contract
iyith Securitas Ltd. which was a United States corporation formed under
the laws of Delaware. (P. 722 of the Chayes Opinion, A.R., Ann. 125; so
stated also in A.O.S., Ann. II, p. 206. Other statements of fact here are
taken from the recital in Annex 3 of the Memorial unless otherwise
stated.) Itis said that this contract was concluded "foreseeing the danger
of war".. (The contract is in A.M., Ann. 3, App. 2.) Such a custodian
contract did not transfer the "real ownership" which was vested inSidro.

91. The recitals in Annex 3 of the Memorial do not mention the fact
(revealed later in A.O.S., Ann. 11, p. 207) that on the same date, 6 Sep-
tember 1939, Sidro made with Securitas a second contract which was a

trust agreement. It was further revealed that this trust agreement of 6
September 1939was replaced by anothertrust agreement on 27 February
1940,but it is said that the differences between the two trust agreements
are without relevance for this case! Itis said that the second agreement
merely took advantage of some new Belgian war legislation. The texts of
the trust agreementshave never been revealed throughout the pleadings.
But the existence of the trust agreement of 27 February is recorded in
Annex 3,page 36,to the Memorial, where it is described as completing the
measures for protection during the war. It is said that this trust agree-
ment was to enter into force when the Brussels area was occupied by the
enemy or when any other critical situation developed threatening the
normal operations of Sidro. It is further recited that the period of the
application of the trust agreement was indicated by a "suspense period"
which would cease sixmonths after the end of the critical period. Turning
again to Annex 11of the Observations and Submissions, at pages 207and
208, it is stated that when one of the "Operative Events" occurred,que la Belgiqueest dans l'impossibilité d'identifierles actionnaires qu'elle
prétend protéger. 11n'aurait guère été utile de se donner beaucoup de
peine pour identifier les actionnaires au porteur si la Belgique avait
vraiment cru pouvoir convaincre la Cour que la Sidro étaitle véritable
propriétaire des 1012 688 actions nominatives de la Barcelona et l'avait
été pendant toute la période critique, car une participation aussi im-
portante aurait probablement suffi pour que soit remplie la condition
d'après laquellela Sidro devait s'identifier aux intérêtsbeiges. Peut-être
y a-t-il là un léger indicesupplémentaire de ce que les conseils belges
avaient conscience que, pour une raison ou pour une autre, ils n'étaient
pas à mêmede prouver à quel moment l'accord concernant le dépôt

auprès de la Securitas avait pris fin. (Voir par. 96 ci-après.)

La Securitas en tant quetrustee de la Sidro

90. Le 6 septembre 1939,la Sidro a conclu un contrat de ((dépôt ))avec
la Securitas Ltd., société américainceonstituéeconformémentau droitdu
Delaware. (Consultation de M. Chayes, A.R., vol. II, ann. 125, p. 23;
dans le mêmesens: A.O.C., ann. 11, p. 206. Sauf indication contraire,
les autres donnéesde fait mentionnéesici sont extraites de l'exposéfigu-
rant à I'ann. 3 au mémoire.)Il y est dit que ce contrat avait étéconclu

devant la menace de la guerre ».(Le contrat est reproduit dans A.M.,
ann. 3, app. 2.) Un contrat de cette nature ne transférait pas larealowner-
ship dont la Sidro était titulaire.
91. L'exposéqui se trouve à l'annexe 3 au mémoire nementionne pas
le fait (révélplus tard dans A.O.C., ann. 11,p. 2) qu'à la mêmedate, le
6 septembre 1939,la Sidro a conclu un second contrat avec la Securitas,
un contrat de trust. 11a étédévoiléque ce contrat de trust du 6 septembre
1939avait étéremplacépar un autre contrat de trust, le 27 février1940,
mais l'on a ajouté que les différencesentre les deux contrats de trust
étaientsans importance pour la présente affaire!Le second contrat tirait
simplement parti de certaines dispositions nouvelles de la législationde
guerre adoptée par la Belgique. Le texte des accords de trust n'ajamais

étédivulguéau cours des plaidoiries. L'existence du contrat de trust du
27 février estcependant rapportée à la page 36 des annexes au mémoire
(ann. 3), où il est dit qu'il complèteles mesures de protection du temps
de guerre. Ce contrat de trust devait entrer en vigueur dèsque l'agglomé-
ration bruxelloise serait occupéepar l'ennemiou que toute autre situation
critique viendraità se présenter, menaçant le fonctionnement normal de
la Sidro. 11est d'autre part déclaréque la périoded'application du con-
trat de trust était assortie d'une suspenseperiod devant prendre fin six
mois aprèsla fin de la situation critique. Si l'on en revient l'annexe 11
des observations et conclusions (p. 207 et 208), on y lit que, par la sur- Securitas automatically became a trustee of Sidro's property outside
Belgium and especially of 341,326 bearer shares of Barcelona Traction.
The 1,012,688 registered shares were also already on deposit with
Securitas and its possession was transformed into "legal ownership"
when Securitas became trustee l. Securitas became the trustee in May
1940(ibid., p. 209).

Curiously enough, Mr. Mockridge, Belgium's Canadian expert, refers
to the agreement of 6 September 1939 as the "trust agreement" under
which Securitas "became Trustee rather than Custodian". (A.R., Ann.
126, p. 8). On the other hand, Professor Chayes, Belgium's American
expert, bases the trust onthe agreement of 27 February 1940and does not
reveal a familiarity with the earlier trust agreement of 6 September 1939.
92. Annex 17 to the Observations and Submissions is a certificate
without date signed by members ofthe committee named in application of

clause 9 of the trust deed of 27 February 1940,certifying, in conformity
with clause 4 (III) of the trust deed, that the state of danger which
threatened Sidro (citing clause 3 of the trust deed) had ceased to exist on
14 February 1946 (p. 230). (1 note that the Belgian Government had
returned to Brussels on 8 September 1944and Germany surrendered on
7 May 1945.) According to the report of Securitas to Sidro dated 24
September 1946 (op.cit.Ann. 18, p. 231; photocopy in A.R., Ann. 123),
the "suspense period" ended 14 August 1946, which was six months
after the certifieddate of the end of the danger; this is to be according

to Article 4 (III) of the trust deed. Securitas reports an inventory of what
they held in trust on that date. The letter says they hold the securities
subject to future instructions from Sidro. Thereis no flat statement that
they ceased at that moment to be trustee although this is implied. A
further letter of 17 April 1947(A.M., Ann. 3, App. 8) encloses a state-
ment of securities held for Sidro "in custody for your account" as of 31
December 1946. It was not until 19 April 1948 that Sidro instructed
Securitas to send the securities to Newman & Co. On 3 May 1948

Securitas wrote that they had delivered the securities and that this
operation closed Sidro's depositaccount with them (A.O.S., Anns. 19and
20). The lists showed 1,012,688shares registered in the name of Charles
Gordon & Co., and certificates (presumably of bearer shares?) 6,025.
On 7 June 1948, Newman & Co. wrote that the shares in the former

Securitas held for Sidro many securities other than and in addition to those of
Barcelona Traction.For example, of Mexican Light & Power Co. 6 per cent.
cumulative income debenture stockthey held shares to par value of,254,250,
registered in the name of the Midland Bank of Lasnominees, and to the value
the nominees in both instances holding for the account of Charles Gordo&inees,
Co. (A.O.S., Ann. 14, p. 219).venance d'un des Operative Events, la Securitas devenait automatique-
ment trustee des avoirs de la Sidro situésen dehors de la Belgique et

notamment des 341326 actions au porteur de la Barcelona Traction. Les
1012 688actions nominatives étaientdéjàdéposées auprèsde la Securitas
et leur possession s'est transformée en une legal ownership lorsque la
Securitas est devenue trustee l,événement quiest survenu en mai 1940
(A.O.C., ann. Il, p. 4).
Fait assez curieux: M. Mockridge, expert canadien pour la Belgique,

se réfèreà l'accord du 6 septembre 1939comme étant l'accord de tr&st
aux termes duquel la Securitas ((estdevenue trustee plutôt que custodian))
(A.R., vol. II, ann. 126,p. 8). De son côté, M. Chayes,expert américain
pour la Belgique, fait reposer le trust sur l'accord du 27 février1940et
semble nepas connaître le contratde trust antérieurdu 6 septembre 1939.
92. L'annexe 17 aux observations et conclusions consiste en un certi-
ficat non daté, signépar les membres du comiténomméen application

de la clause 9 du contrat de trust du 27 février1940,et il est déclarédans
ce certificat, conformément à la clause 4 (III) du contrat de trust, que
l'étatde danger qui menaçait la Sidro (termes repris de la clause 3 du
contrat de trust) avait pris fin le 14 février 1946. (Je rappelle que le
Gouvernement belge est revenu à Bruxelles le 8 septembre 1944 et que
l'Allemagne s'estrendue le 7 mai 1945.)Selon le rapport adressépar la

Securitas à la Sidro en date du 24 septembre 1946 (A.O.C., ann. 18;
photocopie dans A.R., ann. 123) la suspense period s'est terminée le
14août 1946,c'est-à-dire six mois après la date àlaquellel'état de danger
avait pris fin selon le certificat; il est dit que tout cela est conformà
l'article 4 (III) du contrat de trust. La Securitas dresse un inventaire de
ce qu'elledétienten trust à cette date. Dans sa lettre, la Securitas déclare

qu'elle détientles titres sous réserve desinstructions futures de la Sidro.
Il n'est pas expressément déclaréqu'elle a cessé à ce moment d'être
trustee, bienque celasoit implicite. Unelettre postérieure,du 17avril 1947
(A.M., ann. 3, app. 8), contient en annexe une liste des titres ((détenusen
garde » pour le ((compte »de la Sidro au 31 décembre1946.Ce n'est que
le 19avril 1948que la Sidro a chargéla Securitas d'envoyer lestitres àla

société Newman & Co. Le 3 mai 1948,la Securitas a écritqu'elle leslui
avait remis et que cette opération clôturait le compte de dépôt de la
Sidro auprèsde la Securitas (A.O.C., ann. 19et 20). Dans la liste annexée
à cette lettre figurent 1 012 688 actions nominatives enregistréesau nom

l La Securitas détenait pour le compte de la Sidro beaucoup d'autresquetres
ceux de la Barcelona Traction. Par exemple, pour ce qui est duative income
debenture stock% de la Mexican Ligh& Power Co., elle détenait des actions pour
une valeur nominale de 254250 dollars, enregistréesau nom de la Midland Bank
de Londres en qualité deominee, et des actions pour une valeur de 1 958 000 dol-
lars, enregistréesau nom de la Schroder Bank de Londres en qualité de, ces
Gordon and Co. (A.O.C., ann.14, p. 2.)actions pour le compte de la sociétéCharlesgroup had been registered in their name and were in the Chase Safe
Deposit Co. in New York (ibid., Ann. 22).

93. Securitas was dissolved by legalaction in Delaware, 16September
1948(ibid., Annex 25, p. 258). An affidavit by Duncan, Alley and New-
man, al1directors or officersof Securitas, 30 October 1958,attesting this
fact, says they examined the books of Securitas and that it had held (in
addition to the registered shares) 341,326 bearer shares at Winchester
House, London, and 7,925 plus 600 bearer shares in Chase National
Bank, New York. Further, on 20 January 1947Securitas "delivered" to
Sidro 1,400of these bearer shares and on 25 February 1947,1,100of the
same. On 16 January 1947, the safe deposit box at Winchester House,
with contents, was "assigned" to Sofina. On 3 December 1947, in ac-
cordance with request of Sidro, the 341,326bearer shares were credited

by Sofina to Sidro's account (ibid An,nex 26).

94. Now title to bearer shares may be considered to pass by delivery
of the certificates,lessthe transferee is a nominee or other depositary,
for the trustee. It is not clear to mefrom the documents whether Securitas,
as trustee, did actually divestself of title to these bearer shares through
thesetransactions. It should be noted that the communications in question
were originally in Englishand the words quoted above-"delivered" and
"assigned"-are the actual terms used, which might or might not indicate
passage of title from the trustee. (See A.O.S., Ann. 25.)

95. Itis a vital matter to know whenthe trust ceasedto exist. Professor
Chayes, Belgium's Americanexpert, clearly points out why this is so; he
says that during the German occupation of Belgium-

"... Securitas acted as trustee of the property. As such, Securitas
held legal title to the property and could manage the property in its
own discretion, without regard to any instructions from Sidro.
Indeed, the whole point of the arrangement was to free Securitas
from the control of Sidro, since during the German occupation,
instructions might come from Belgiumwith respectto the shares that
were inimical to Sidro's true interests and to the allied cause.
Securitas was of course, bound to use its discretion for the benefit of
Sidro, the beneficiarynder the trust instrument. The trustee would
be liable if it abused its discretion or used its position to take
advantage of Sidro. And it had to account to Sidro, ultimately, for
dividends and other profits. Butubject to these general limitations,de Charles Gordon & Co. et des certificats (probablement d'actions au
porteur?) pour 6025actions. Le 7juin 1948,Newman & Co. écrivaitque
les actions de la première catégorieavaient étéenregistréesà son nom
et qu'ellesétaientdéposéesauprès de la Chase Safe Deposit Co. à New
York (A.O.C., ann. 22).
93. La Securitas fut dissoute par décision judiciaireprononcée dans
le Delaware le 16septembre 1948(A.O.C., ann. 25, p. 258). Il est affirmé
dans une déclaration sous sermentde MM. Duncan, Alley et Newman,
tous trois administrateurs ou dirigeants de la Securitas, déclaration qui
est datéedu 30 octobre 1958,et dans laquelle la dissolution est attestée,
que les signataires ont examiné les livresde la Securitas et que cette der-
nièredétenait, en plus desactionsnominatives, 341326actions au porteur
déposées à la Winchester House, à Londres, et 7925plus 600 actions au

porteur déposées à la Chase National Bank, à New York. En outre, le
20 janvier 1947,la Securitas remit (deliveredà la Sidro 1400de ces ac-
tions au porteur et, le25 février1947, 1100actions semblables. Le6jan-
vier 1947,le coffreà la Winchester House fut transféré(assigned) à la
Sofina, avec son contenu. Le 3 décembre1947, à la suite d'une demande
de la Sidro, les 341326 actions au porteur furent créditépar la Sofina
au compte de la Sidro (A.O.C., ann. 26).
94. On peut admettreque la propriétéd'actionsauporteur esttransmise
par la remise des certificats,oins que le nouveau détenteurne soit un
nomineeou autre dépositaire dutrustee. Je ne comprends pas bien, au vu
des documents, si la Securitas en sa qualitéderustee a éteffectivement
dépouilléede son titre sur ces actions au porteuà la suite de ces opéra-
tions.Il convient de relever que les communications en question ont été

faitesà l'origine en anglaiset que les mots delivered et assignedcitésci-
dessussont ceux qui ont étéemployésen fait, ce qui pourrait ou ne pour-
rait pas indiquer que lestrustees ont étédessaisis du titre (voir A.O.C.,
ann. 25).
95. Il est essentiel de savoir quand le trust a cesséd'exister. Lepro-
fesseur Chayes, expert américain pour la Belgique, montre clairement
pourquoi; il dit que pendant l'occupation dela Belgiquepar l'Allemagne

la Securitas a agi en tant querustee des biens. En cette qualité,la
Securitas détenait un titre juridique sur les biens et pouvait gérer
ces biens comme elle l'entendait sans avoir à tenir compte des ins-
tructions de la Sidro. En fait, le but essentiel de l'arrangement
était delibérerla Securitas du contrôle de la Sidro puisque, pendant

l'occupation allemande, des instructions contraires aux véritables
intérêts dela Sidro et à la cause des Alliéspouvaient être données
de Belgique à propos des actions. La Securitas étaitnaturellement
tenue d'user de son pouvoir dans l'intérêd te la Sidro qui était le
bénéficiaireaux termes de l'accord de trust. Le trustee aurait été
responsable s'ilavait abuséde son pouvoir ou profitéde sa position
aux dépensde la Sidro. Finalement il devait rendre compte à la as trustee during the war Securitas had full authority over the

property" (A.R., Ann. 125,p. 707) '.

Chayes concludes that the trust had been terminated by 12 February
1948, but in proof of this statement he merely cites Annex 3 to the
Memorial, paragraph (g), where it is asserted that the trust ended on
14August 1946.It is apparent that he either never saw the trust deeds or
was not at liberty to disclose their exact terms.
96. Spain, in its Preliminary Objections in March 1963,pages 61-62,
remarked on the failure to produce the trust deeds. It also noted the
fragile character of the "proof" that the trust ended on 14August 1946.
It noted other documentary omissions by Belgium, some of which at
least were later supplied-but the trust deeds were not supplied. The

Belgianomission isespeciallyremarkable in Annex 11to the Observations
and Submissions, page 208, where it discussesthe two trust agreements of
6 September 1939and 27 February 1940and, as already noted, blandly
remarks that the differences between the two contracts are irrelevant for
the purposes of this case! The content of the trust agreements is described
but the text is not produced. In the Rejoinder (p. 951)Spainhammers the
point that, with al1its documentation, Belgiumhas not produced the text
of the trust agreements, adding a footnote that it was again calling at-
tention to this abnormality. The Rejoinder cites the Chayes opinionalong
the linesnoted above. It makes the soundpoint that sincethe personalities
acting for Sidro, Securitas and Sofina are essentially the same, their as-
sertions supporting each other are equivalent to self-servingdeclarations
which have little probative value.

In his pleading on 7 May 1969, counsel for Belgium dealt with the
question of nominees but did not discuss the trust. On 4 July, he brushed
aside the trust issue which had again been raised by counsel for Spain on
18 June. Nor do 1 find elsewhere in the Belgian oral arguments an at-
tempt to meet the Spanish criticism of the failure to produce the text of
the trust agreements.
In his final pleading of 21 July, counsel for Spain stressed the non-
production of the trust agreements, calling attention to the whole record
on this matter, ending with a reference to the opinion of Professor

Cbayes. In particular he remarked that the only transfer of shares which
Securitas made was that of 3 May 1948to Newman & Co.-two-and-a-

l Securitas evidently was not a "passive trustee" in the sense described by Judge
Augustus Hand in the San Antonio Land and Irrigation Co. case to which the Spanish
side attached such importance. (New Documents,Vol. III, p. 114.) Sidro des dividendes et autres bénéfices.Mais, sous réservede ces
restrictions générales,la Securitas, en qualité de trustee pendant la
guerre, avait tous pouvoirs sur les biens. )(A.R., vol. II, ann. 125,

p. 8.)l
Chayes conclut que le trust avait pris fin le 12 février 1948 mais, à
l'appui de cette affirmation, il cite seulement l'alinéa g) de l'annexe 3 au
mémoireoù il est déclaréque le trust a pris fin le 14août 1946.Il semble
évident qu'iln'a jamais vu les Trust Deeds ou qu'il n'étaitpas libre d'en
divulguer le contenu exact.
96. Dans ses exceptions préliminairesde mars 1963(p. 61-62), 1'Espa-

gne faisait observer que les Trust Deeds n'avaient pas été produits.Elle
relevait aussi le caractère fragile de la ((preuve ))selon laquelle le trust
avait pris fin le 14 août 1946.Elle constatait que la Belgique avait omis
de produire d'autres documents dont certains tout au moins ont été
fournis par la suite - mais non les Trust Deeds. Cette omission de la
Belgique frappe spécialementquand on lit l'annexe 11 aux observations
et conclusions, page 208, où, après avoir examinéles deux contrats de

trust des 6 septembre 1939et 27 février1940,la Belgique, comme il est
dit plus haut, affirme candidement que les différencesentre les deux
contrats n'ont pas d'importance dans la présente affaire!Le contenu
des contrats de trust est indiquémais le texte n'en est pas produit. Dans
la duplique (p. 951) l'Espagne revient avec insistance sur le fait que,
malgrétoute sa documentation, la Belgique n'a pas produit le texte des
deux contrats de trust et elle ajoute dans une note qu'elle attire de nou-

veau l'attention sur cette anomalie. C'est sur le mêmeton que la duplique
mentionne la consultation de Chayes. Elle invoque l'argument de poids
selon lequel, comme les personnes agissant au nom de la Sidro, de la
Securitas et de la Sofina sont essentiellement les mêmes, leurs affirma-
tions à l'appui les unes des autres ne sont pas autre chose que des décla-
rations pro domon'ayant guèrede force probante.
Dans sa plaidoirie du 7 mai 1969, l'un des conseils de la Belgique a

traitéla question des nomineesmais n'a pas examiné letrust. Le 4juillet,
il a écartéla question du trust qui avait de nouveau étésoulevéepar un
conseil de l'Espagne le 18juin. Je constate qu'à aucun autre moment les
conseilsdela Belgiquen'ont essayéderépondre aux critiquesde l'Espagne
quant au fait que le texte des contrats de trust n'avait pas étéproduit.
Dans sa dernièreplaidoirie, le 21juillet 1969,le conseil de l'Espagne a
soulignéque les contrats de trust n'avaient pas étéproduits et il a attiré

l'attention sur l'ensemble de cette question en se référant pourfinir à
l'avis du professeur Chayes. Il a notamment fait observer que la seule
cession d'actions opéréepar la Securitas étaitcelle qu'elle avait faite le

l La Securitas n'était évidemmentpas un «tvusteepassif1)au sens indiqué par le
juge Augustus Hand dans l'affaire de la San Antonio Land and Irrigation Co.,
affaire à laquelle on a accordé tellement d'importance du côté espagnol. (Nouv.
doc., vol. III, p. 114.)half months after the critical date of the declaration of bankruptcy.

(This is in accord with A.M., Ann. 11,App. 2).

97. 1 fully agree with Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (in paragraph 58 of his
separate opinion) that this Court does not have any fully developed
practice on rules of evidence,but 1 believethat in the circumstances which
have been described it is proper to apply the common law rule which is to
the effectthat if a partyfails to produce on demand a relevant document
which is in its possession, there may be an inference that the document
"if brought, would have exposed facts unfavourable to the party. .." l.
Although it is true, as Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice emphasizes, that one
should givedue weightto the pressures engendered by the situation in the

Second World War, international law has long taken cognizance of
practices designed to thwart belligerents by concealing the truth; the
history of the law of neutral rights and duties, is full of examples. If
disclosure of the text of the trust deeds would have prejudiced some
governmental interest, Belgium could have pleaded this fact, as the
United Kingdom successfully pleaded "naval secrecy" in the Corfu
Channelcase, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pages 4, 32.

Article 48 of theRules of Court concerning documents submitted after
the close of the written proceedings, requires consent of the other party

or a special decision of the Court; in this instance, the other party asked
for the production of the trust document. Nor was the Court strict in the
instant case about applying the rule-witness the fact that over 4,000
pages of "new" documents wereintroduced by the two Parties during the
oral proceedings between 21 April and 8 July 1969.

98. The legal aspect of the trust situation whichis important is the one
which distinguishes it from the nominee situation. As Chayes points out,
during the trust, Securitas had not only legal title but full control, even
though the beneficial title was in Sidro. Accordingly Belgiancharacter of
the claim did not existduring the trust. But in the nominee situations, the

nominee is in the position of an agent and the legal title coincides with
the beneficial title in the principal even though he is not a registered
shareholder.

lWigmore, Evidenc ed ed. 1940,Vol. 2, secs. 285 and 291. Wigmore traces the
rule back to the beginning of the seventeenth century. BARCELONATRACTION(OP. IND. TESSUP) 215

3 mai 1948 à la sociétéNewman & Co. - deux mois et demi après la
date critique dujugement defaillite(cequi estconforme à l'ann. 11,app. 2

du mémoire).
97. Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (par. 58
de son opinion individuelle)pour penser que la Cour n'a pasde pratique
bien établie en matière d'administrationde la preuve, mais je crois que
daris les circonstances qui ont étéévoquéesil conviendrait d'appliquer
la règlede la commonlaw selon laquelle, lorsqu'une partie ne présente
pas un document pertinent setrouvant en sa possessionquand la demande

lui en est faite, on peut présumer que «le document en question, s'il
avait étéproduit, aurait révélé defsaits défavorables à cette partie..))I.
Ilest vrai, comme sirGerald Fitzmaurice lefait observer,qu'ilfaut prendre
dûment en considérationles pressions qui ont pu s'exercerdans la situa-
tion crééepar la deuxièmeguerre mondiale, mais le droit international
a pris acte depuis longtemps des pratiques par lesquelles on cache la
vérité pour déjouerlesprojets des belligérants.L'histoire desdroits et des

obligations juridiques des neutres en offre de très nombreux exemples.
Si la divulgation du texte des Trust Deeds avait dû porter atteinte à un
intérêt d'Etat, la Belgiqueaurait pu se prévaloir de cet argument, comme
le Royaume-Uni, qui a arguéavec succèsdu (secret naval ))dans l'affaire
du Détroit de Corfou,C.I.J. Recueil 1949,pages 4, 32.
L'article 48 du Règlementde la Cour, relatif à la présentation de docu-
ments aprèsla fin de la procédureécrite,exigel'assentiment de la partie
adverse ou une décision spécialede la Cour; ici la Partie adverse a

demandéque ledocument de trustsoitproduit. D'ailleurs, dans la présente
affaire, la Cour n'a pas insistésur l'application rigoureuse de la règle -
comme le démontrele fait que plus de 4000 pages de documents (nou-
veaux )ont été présentées par les deux Parties pendant la procédureorale
entre le 21 avril et le 8juillet 1969.
98. L'aspect juridique important de la situation de trustee est celui qui
le distingue du nominee.Comme Chayes l'a souligné,la Securitas n'avait

pas seulement un titre juridique mais elle avait aussi tous pouvoirs
pendant la durée du trust, alors mêmeque la Sidro était investie du
benejicial title. Par conséquent,la réclamation n'avait pas de caractère
belge pendant la duréedu trust. En revanche, dans le cas du nominee,
celui-ciest dans la situation d'un mandataire etle titre juridique coïncide
avec lebenejicialtitle du mandant, même si lenom de ce dernier ne figure
pas sur le registre des actionnaires.

l Wigmore, Evidence, 3e éd., 1940, volII, sect. 285 et 291. Wigmore fixe au
au débutdu XVIIe sièclel'originede cette règle.

216 The Status of "Nominees"

99. The requirements of linguistic simplicity necessitate the constant
use of the term "shareholder". The danger is that the reality behind the
term will be lost to sight through semantic insistence upon the term
itself'.To my mind, this defect faults the Spanish arguments concerning
nominees. The Spanish argument identifies in al1 situations, the real
"shareholders" with the names inscribed on the stock registers. See the

Counter-Memorial, Chapter VI, Sections 47 ff. and Rejoinder, Part III,
Chapter II, especially Subsection 2. The legal situation of nominees
reveals the fallacy of this approach, quite aside from the fact that the
names of holders of bearer shares do not appear on the register although
they are certainly "shareholders".

100. Under principles of private international law, the legal nature of
the right, title, ornterest of nominees in whose names Barcelona Traction
shares were registered, must be determined by either New York or Ca-

nadian law. Counsel for Belgium properly noted on 7 May 1969that the
principles governing the choice of law are not unfamiliar to the Court in
view of the Permanent Court's decisions in the Serbian and Brazilian
Loans cases, P.C.I.J., Series A, Nos. 20 and 21. Since according to the
unrebutted expert opinions of Chayes and Mockridge there is no material
differencebetweenthe two legal systems inthe matters here involved, they
need not be analyzed separately.

Annex 125 of the Reply is the opinion of Professor Chayes, and An-

nex 126isthe opinion of Mr. Mockridge on the Canadian law. 1think it is
clear that under both New York and Canadian law, the nominee does not
have "real title", is not the "real owner" and that the one for whom the
nominee acts has al1the real elements of ownership 2.The limitations on
this statement are only those which relate to the rights of the corporation,
as for example, its right to deal with the registered owner in the payment
of dividends, etc. As has been shown, where shares are held by a trustee
under a trust instrument, the same conclusion cannot be drawn. The
distinction is clear in both opinions although Mockridge lays more stress
on cases wherethere is a "bare trust". There can be situations in which the

legal owner of even 97 per cent. of the shares may own something

l On this point counsel for Belgium, speaking on 4 July 1969, was absolutely
correct: "The questionis not who has the right to term himself 'shareholder' but, in
Professor Ago's own words, 'who in the last resort has a proper claim to the economic
law."nt of the ownership of a share'.so as to enjoy the protection of international
In opposition to the Belgian position on nominees, Spain invokes an opinion
from an eminent New York law firm-Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl.
(See C.M., Chap. VI, p. 675, and the text of the firm's letter of 28 February 1963in
Annex 65, Appendix 2, Preliminary Objections 1963). In my view, this opinion
does not controvert the essentiaof the Chayes opinion. La situation des nominees

99. Pour simplifier, on est amenéà employer constamment le terme
((actionnaire». D'où le danger que l'emploi répété du mot fasse perdre
de vue la réalité qu'il recouvre l.A mon sens, c'est là précisémentle
défaut de l'argumentationespagnole au sujet des nominees,qui identifie

en toutes circonstances les véritables((actionnaires ))d'après les noms
inscrits sur les registres des actions. Voir à ce sujet le contre-mémoire,
chapitre VI, paragraphes 47 et suivants et la duplique, troisièmepartie,
chapitre II, en particulier la sous-section 2. La situation des nominees
en droit révèlele caractère fallacieux de cette manière de voir, et cela
indépendamment dufaitque les noms des détenteursd'actionsau porteur

n'apparaissent passur le registre bien qu'ilssoient indubitablement des
actionnaires.
100. En vertu des principes du droit international privé, la nature
juridique du droit, titre, ou intérêtdes nominees au nom desquels les
actions de la Barcelona Traction étaient enregistréesdoit êtredéterminée

par le droitde 1'Etatde New York ou par ledroit canadien. Le 7 mai 1969
un conseilde la Belgiquea souligné à juste titre que les principes régissant
la détermination dudroit applicable sont connus de la Cour vu les arrêts
de la Cour permanente dans les affaires des Emprunts serbes et des
Empruntsbrésiliens, C.P.J. sZ .ieA nOVOet 21. Puisque, aux dires non
démentisdes experts Chayes et Mockridge il n'existeaucune différence

appréciableentre les deux systèmesjuridiques en cause sur les points qui
nous occupent ici, il n'ya pas lieu de les analyser séparément.
L'annexe 125 de la réplique est constituée par la consultation de
M. Chayes et l'annexe 126par celle de M. Mockridge sur le droit cana-
dien. Il est hors de doute, je pense, qu'aussi biendans le droit de 1'Etatde

New York que dans le droit canadien le nomineen'a pas de ((titre véri-
table N,qu'il n'estpas le ((véritablepropriétaire ))et que celui pour qui il
agit dispose de tous les éléments réeldse la propriété 2.Les seules restric-
tions à cet égardsont celles qui se rapportent aux droits de la société,
par exemple son droit de payer les dividendes à ceux dont les noms
figurent sur les registres, etc. Ainsi qu'on l'a montré, lorsque des actions

sont détenues par un trustee en vertu d'un instrument de trust, la même
conclusion ne s'applique plus.Cette distinction est claire dans les deux
consultations, bien que Mockridge place davantage l'accent sur les cas

Sur ce point, l'un des conseils de la Belgique a absolument ra(La question
n'est pas de savoir qui a le droit de se qualifier lui-même d'«actionnaireelon
les termes mêmesde M. Ago, 1qui peut revendiquer en dernier ressort le contenu
économique de la propriété d'une 1action r,de manière à bénéficierde la pro-
tection du droit international.Audience du 4juillet 1969.)
A l'opposé de la position belge sur lesminees l'Espagne invoque l'opinion
d'une éminente firme d'avocats new yorkais- Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland
et Kiendl. (Voir C.M., chap.I,p. 675,et le texte de la lettre dela firme du 28février
1963 à I'ann. 65, app. 2, A.E.P.) A mon avis, cette opinion ne contrepas pour
l'essentiel la consultation Chayes.worthless because, for example, of the beneficial interests of a usufruct
under German law-but this is not such a case. (Cf. the decision of the

United States District Court in theUeberseecase cited above, at p. 13of
that Court's opinion.)

101. Chayes in his conclusion on page 722 (loc.cit. says "1havethe
honor to conclude that neither Securitas, Ltd., Charles Gordon &
Company, Newman & Company ever had any property interest in the
Barcelona Traction shares, except for the period of the German oc-
cupation of Belgium during World War II, when Securitas, Ltd., held
them as Trustee". Mockridge (A.R., p. 732)agrees with Chayes except he
adds the period during which the shares were vested in the Canadian
Custodian of Enemy Property which period he saysterminated before the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. According to the Obser-

vations and Submissions (p. 204),they were deblocked 29April1947; this
fact is confirmed in the Reply, paragraph 994. When the shares werefirst
transferred to Charles Gordon & Co., there was attached (in accordance
with cabled instructions by Wilmers) a notice readin:

"We hereby certify that the within transfer does not involve a
change of ownership of the shares represented by the annexed
certificates ast is being made to Charles Gordon & Co. as nominee
of Ourdepositary therefore no transfer tax is exigible." (A.M., Vol. 1,

Ann. 3, App. 5, p. 50.)
This was on 11 September 1939 and Chayes stresses that there was
nothing inconsistent with the Securitas arrangement in the fact that
Sidro transferred direct to Gordon& Co. (A.R., Vol. II, Ann. 125,p. 5).
Chayes States on the same page that Sidro listed the shares registered in
Gordon's name with the United States authorities before the United
States entered the war but there is no documentary record of this listing.
But he says that Sidro reported the trust agreement with Securitas and
did not report Gordon as holding any interest.

102. 1find that it is of no legal consequence that the agents in whose

names the shares were registered were not listed publicly as professional
nominees. (So also inCanada; Mockridge, A.R., p. 729.)The practice of
registering shares in themes of nomineesis very common in the United
States as Chayes shows (ibid., pp. 708-709). Although nominees were
much used in time of war to cloak the identity of the real owner, they are
generally used in the United States-where bearer shares are not issued-
simplyto facilitate transactions in sharl.Somewhat comparably, when
shares are pledged with a bank as collateral for a loan, a stock power
endorsed in blank will be attached.

Under the name of"share warrants"bearershares may beissued in Canada

218 où il n'existe qu'un bare trust. Mêmes'il a 97 pour cent des actions le
legazownern'aura peut-être qu'un portefeuille sansvaleur en raison par
exemple de l'existenced'un beneficialownerusufruitier tel qu'il existeen
droit allemand - mais ce n'est pas le cas en l'espèce. (Voirp. 13 de la
décisiondu tribunal de district des Etats-Unis dans l'affaire Uebersee

précédemment citée.)
101. Dans sa conclusion (A.R., vol.II,ann. 125,p. 23)Chayesdéclare:
«Je conclus que ni Securitas Ltd., ni Charles Gordon& Co., ni Newman
& Co. n'ont jamais eu d'intérêetn qualitéde propriétairesdans lesactions
de la Barcelona Traction sauf lors de l'occupation de la Belgiquepar les
Allemands pendant la deuxièmeguerre mondiale, lorsque la Securitas
Ltd. détenaitcesactions en qualitédetrustee.)Mockridge (ibid.,ann. 126,
p. 8)partage cette opinion de Chayes, saufqu'ilajoute la périodependant
laquelle les actions ont étéconfiées (vested) au séquestrecanadien des
biens ennemis, périodequi, dit-il, s'est terminée avant le début de la
procédurede faillite. D'aprèsles observations et conclusions (p. 204) ces

titres ont étédébloquésle 29 avril 1947, fait qui est confirmédans la
réplique,au paragraphe 994. Lorsque les actions ont été transféréespour
la première fois à Charles Gordon & Co., elles étaient accompagnées
(conformément aux instructions câbléespar Wilmers) d'une attestation
ainsi conçue:
((Nouscertifionsque le présenttransfert ne met pas enjeu un change-
ment de propriétédes actions représentéespar les certificats ci-joints,
le transfert étant faitCharles Gordon & Co. en tant que nominee
de notre dépositaire; aucune taxe de transmission n'est par consé-
quent exigible.»(A.M., vol. 1, ann. 3, app. 5, p. 3, note.)

Ce transfert s'est effectué le11 septembre 1939et Chayes souligne que
le fait que la Sidro a transféréles titres directementà Gordon & Co.
n'était nullementcontraire à l'accord conclu avecla Securitas (A.R.,
vol. II,ann. 125,p. 5). A la même page, Chayesindique que la Sidro a
déclaré aux autoritésaméricaines lesactions inscrites au nom de Gordon
avant que les Etats-Unis n'entrent en guerre, mais cela n'est enregistré
dans aucun document présenté. Chayes ajoute cependant que la Sidro a
mentionné l'accord de trust avec la Securitas et n'a pas indiqué que
Gordon eût sur les titres un intérêt quelconque.

102. Je constate qu'il est juridiquement sans importance que les
mandataires au nom desquels lesactions étaientinscrites ne figurent pas
au grand jour sur des listes denomineesprofessionnels (il en est ainsi au
Canada; Mockridge, ann. 126,p. 5).La pratique consistant à inscrire les
actions au nom de nomineesest très courante aux Etats-Unis, comme le
montre Chayes (ann. 125, p. 9-10). Bien qu'on ait fait grand usage des
nominees en temps de guerre pour dissimuler l'identité des véritables
propriétaires,le système est généralement employa éux Etats-Unis - où
il n'est pas émisd'actions au porteur - simplement pour faciliter la
négociationdesactions l.Dans lemêmeordre d'idées,lorsque des actions
-
l Des actions au porteur peuvent êtreémisesau Canada, comme en Angleterre, 218 BARCELONA TRACTION (SEP.OP. JESSUP)

103. Chayes noted (ibid., pp. 714 and 715) that unregistered owners
of shares may bring a shareholder's derivative suit, or under Delaware
and New York law, in case of voting against a merger, may demand an
appraisal of their shares and cash payment of the appraised value. In an

appraisal case the New York court said there was no justification for
interpreting the word "stockholder" in the statute as meaning "registered
stockholder" (ibid., p. 720). Mockridge shows that Canadian courts
interpreted the word "shareholder" in agreements, as being broader than
and not.limited to "registered shareholders" '.

Mockridge (ibid., p. 730) indicates that shares registered in Charles
Gordon & Co.'s name were vested in Canada although Charles Gordon &
Co. had United States nationality, because Sidro as beneficial owner was

"enemy" during the German occupation. He does not mention Securitas
in this context. In the Observations and Submissions (p. 199),it is said
that while the trust was still in force, Sidro declared the Barcelona Trac-
tion sharesunder Belgian law, although they were registered in the name
of Charles Gordon & Co.

104. The jurisprudence of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
of the United States is of interest, notwithstanding the fact that this is a
national body, operating in accordance with its statutory terms of

reference and with the terms of agreements with various governments 2.
For example, the Commission "denied recovery to a domestic [Le.,
United States] corporation with more than eighty per cent. of its stock
registered in the names of American citizens but beneficially owned by
aliens. (Claim of Westhold Corporation ...)" (Foreign Claims Settlement
Commissionof the UnitedStates, Decisions and Annotations, 1968,p. 20).
Thus neither place of incorporation nor majority of shares registered in
the names of American nominees, sufficedto make the claim "American".

In the Annotations one reads (at pp. 39-41):

"Beneficial interest.-Occasionally legal title is vested in one
person while the true owner is another. Normally such an arrange-

as in England, but they are not extensively used; Schlesinger, Comparative Law,
2nd Cf. Henn, Corporations, 1961, sec. 179: "Statutory references to shareholders
are not always clear as to whether they refer only to shareholders of record or also
to the beneficial owners of shares.bstantial amount of stock is held by brokers
in their ownames (known as 'street names') in behalf of their customers."

For the contrary Spanish view on theterest of this jurisprudence, see C.M.,
Chap. VI, Section 55. BARCELONA TRACTION (OP. IND. JESSUP) 218

constituent la garantie d'un emprunt auprès d'une banque, un pouvoir
en blanc est fourni.
103. Chayes souligne (ibid., p. 15et 16)que le propriétairenon inscrit

peut intenter une derivative suiten qualitéd'actionnaire, ou, en vertu des
législationsdu Delaware et de 1'Etat de New York, s'il s'agit de voter
contre une fusion, il peut demander une évaluation de ses actions et le
paiement en espècesde la valeur ainsi attribuée.Dans un litige relatif à
une évaluation,le tribunal de New York a déclaréque rien ne justifiait

que le mot ((actionnaire »,tel qu'il estemployédans la loi, soitinterprété
comme signifiant ccactionnaire inscrit))(ibid., p. 21). Mockridge montre
que lestribunaux canadiens ont interprétéleterme (actionnaire »employé
dans desconventions, comme étantd'une portéeplus large et ne désignant
pas seulement les actionnaires inscrits »l.
Mockridge (ann. 126,p. 6) indique que les actions inscrites au nom de

Charles Gordon & Co. ont étémises sous séquestreau Canada bien que
la firme Charles Gordon & Co. eût la nationalité des Etats-Unis, parce
que la Sidro, en tant que benejcial owner,était ((ennemie »sous l'occupa-
tion allemande. Il ne fait pas mention de la Securitas à ce propos. Dans
les observations et conclusions (p. 199), il est indiqué que la Sidro a

déclaréles actions dela Barcelona Traction conformément à la législation
belge à une date où le trust n'avait pas pris fin et où ces actions étaient
inscrites au nom de Charles Gordon & Co.
104. La jurisprudence de la Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
of the United States présente ici de l'intérêt,bien qu'il s'agissed'un

organisme national, dont le mandat est régipar la loi et par des accords
conclus avec divers gouvernements =. Par exemple, la commission « a
refuséréparation à une sociéténationale [c'est-à-direaméricaine]dont les
actions étaientinscrites pour plus de 80 pour cent au nom de citoyens
américainsmais avaient des étrangerspour benejcial owners (Claim of
Westhold Corporation...) 11 (Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of

the United States, Decisions andAnnotations, 1968, p. 20). Ainsi, ni le
lieuoù lasociété étaitconstituéenilefaitque la majoritédes actions étaient
inscrites au nom de nomineesaméricainsne sufisait à rendre la demande
« américaine 1).
On lit dans les Annotations (p. 39-41):

((Beneficial interest- Il arrive que le titre juridique soit détenu
par une personne alors que le propriétaire véritable estune autre

sous le nom de share warrants mais l'usage en est peu fréquent; Schlesinger, Com-
parative Law(2e éd., 1960, p. 442).
' Cf. Henn, Corporations, 1961, sect. 179aLorsqu'ils mentionnent les action-
naires, les textes législatifs n'établissent pas toujours très clairement s'il s'agit
seulement des actionnaires inscrits ou également desenefîcial owners d'actions.
Bon nombre de titres sont détenus par des courtiers ou agents de chanen leur
nom propre (ou street names) pour le compte de leurs clie1)s.
prudence dans leC.M., chap. VI, par. 55.spagne quant à l'intérêtde cette juris- ment is unnecessary; but asthe Arndt decisionindicates, a 'cloaking'
of title was sometimes imperative in view of the discriminatory
measures that were practiced during World War II. Applying
settled rulesof internationallaw,the Commission held that beneficial
interest, as opposed to nominal or bare legal title, was controlling in
dekiding the question of ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]

A more common example of beneficial ownership is the case of
an agent who acquires title to property on behalf of his principal.. .

The technical, legalformin which title to property is held, and the
legal capacity to sue, constituting the so-called 'indicia of title,' must
be considered of secondary importance to the question whether the
interest for which espousal is sought is truly that of a United States
national. ...

A claim concerned an interest in a family fund or 'syndicate',
that owned shares of stock in a Swisscorporation, which assertedly
owned al1the outstanding shares of stock in a Yugoslav corporation.
It was stated that 18,949shares of stock held by the 'syndicate'in
Switzerland had been transferred to claimant in 1942,in recognition
of her undivided fractionalinterest inthe familyfund ...It appeared
that the various record entries of the transactions were designed

merely to cloak the shares of stock with ownership by a national of
the United States, adevicewhich was then considered best calculated
to safeguard the family interests. The Commission held that on the
date of loss claimant was not the owner of the 18,949 shares of
stock, but was the beneficial owner of only a 5.29% interest in the
family fund. (Claim of Antonia Hatvany, Docket No. Y-1063, Dec.
No. Y-910, Final Decision.)"

105. Belgium not having established the Belgian character of any
substantial number of shares throughout the critical period which the
continuity rule defines, might rely, and at times seemed to rely, on the
Belgian nationality of the group which shaped the will of the corporate
person and dictated its policies. This also may be a difficult task in the
case of great holding companies with many cross-holdings of shares,
whichcross-holdings, Belgiumstated, werepermissible under Belgian law.
The centre of power may be deliberately concealed, not only in time of
war, but for reasons of avoidance of taxation or of the application of
anti-trustlaws, or otherwise. The individuals who give instructions-for personne. Des dispositions de cette nature sont normalement super-
flues; mais, comme le montre la décisiondans l'affaire Arndt, il
était parfois indispensable de camoufler le titre étant donné les
mesures discriminatoires en vigueur pendant la deuxième guerre
mondiale. Appliquant des règles établies de droit international,
[les italiques sont de nous] la commission a estiméque le beneficial
interest,ar opposition au titre nominal ou simplement legal, joue
un rôle décisifquand il s'agit de déterminerqui est propriétaire.
Un exemple plus fréquent de beneficial ownership est celui du
mandataire qui acquiert des droits de propriétépour le compte de
son commettant ...
La forme technique, légaledu titre de propriété,et la capacité
juridique d'agir pour le faire valoir, constituant ce que l'on appelle
les«indices» d'un titre, doivent êtreconsidéréecomme secondaires
lorsqu'il s'agitde savoir si l'intértour lequel l'endossement est

demandé est véritablement celui d'un ressortissant des Etats-
Unis ...
Une réclamation concernait un intérêd tans un fonds de famille
ou ((syndicat», qui possédait des actions dans une société suisse,
elle-même, affirmait-on,propriétairede toutes les actions en circula-
tion d'une société yougoslave. Il a étéindiquéque 18949 actions
détenuespar le syndicat en Suisse avaient ététransféréesà la récla-
mante en 1942, comme constituant sa part personnelle dans le
fonds familial ...Il est apparu que les diverses écriturespassées
visaient seulement à donner l'impression que les actions étaientla
propriété d'un ressortissant des Etats-Unis, procédéconsidéré
alors comme le plus propre à sauvegarder les intérêtde la famille.
La commission a jugéqu'à la date de la perte la réclamanten'était
pas propriétaire des 18949 actions, mais beneficial ownerd'un
simple intérêdte5,29 % dans le fonds de famille»(Claimof Antonia
Hatvany, Docket noY-1063, Dec. noY-910, décision finale.)

105. La Belgique, n'ayant pas démontréqu'un nombre important
d'actions étaientbelges et avaient conservé cecaractèrependant toute la
périodecritique commeleveut la règledela continuité,pourrait invoquer,
comme du reste elle a paru le faire divers moments, la nationalitébelge
du groupequi inspirait lesdécisionsde la sociétet lui dictait sapolitique.
Mais là aussi la tâche est peut-êtredifficile,s'agissantde grandes sociétés
holding avec de nombreuses participations mutuelles qui, selon la Bel-
gique, étaientlicites en droit belge. On veut peut-être délibérémednitssi-
muler le centre d'autoritéréel,non pas seulement en temps de guerre,
mais aussi pour des raisons fiscales,pour l'application des lois antitrustexample, in this case, Mr. Heineman and Mr. Wilmers-may be acting
for unidentified financial interests, although1 have no reason to suggest
that this was actually the case. Belgiumin the Reply (Ann. 127, Vol. II)

quotes from the report of the Spanish members of the International
Committee of Experts in 1950, passages attesting that Sidro controlled
Barcelona Traction and that Sofina controlled Sidro; and counsel stated
on 13 May 1969that at least in a certain period, Sofina "étaitcontrôlée
par des filiales". The Spanish arguments and Belgian explanations about
the alleged "Belgianization" and take-over bids in 1964 do not prove
what the situation was on 19June 1962.But whatever is the alleged basis
for the State interests which justify protection, that basis must be proved
just asmuch as ifthejustification wereto be found solelyin the continued
nationality of shareholders.

106. The influence of the Court's judgments is great, even though
Article 59 of the Statute declares that the decision"has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case". It may
be said that the new methods and institutions for foreign investments
which have been referred to earlier in this opinion, will overtake the
possible consequences of the rule which the Court now holds to be the
law. But not al1of the older business practices have been abandoned and
the managerial community of the commercial world might have to meet
the announced rule by new devices.If, for example, it is agreed that when
the Company has been wound up and has ceased to exist, the share-
holders, now having a direct right to the assets, may benefit from the
diplomaticprotection of the State of which they are nationals, it would be
quite feasible to secure the cancellation of the "charter of convenience"
which the corporation had obtained. But surely no economic, social or

political advantage would be gained if in a situation like that in the
instant case, the life of the Barcelona Traction Company had to be
officiallyended in Canada so that the principal shareholders, who are the
real parties in interest, could be protected diplomatically. And could it
be reasonably argued in such circumstances, that the United States
would be the State entitled to extend diplomatic protection because a
majority of the shares werefound to be registeredin the name of American
nominees? One is entitled to test the soundness of a principle by the
consequences which would flow from its application; the consequences
here would clearly be undesirable. With deference to the opinion of the
Court, 1 cannot agree that international law imposes such a solution of ou pour d'autres motifs encore. Les personnes donnant les instructions -
par exemple, en l'espèce,M. Heineman et M. Wilmers - ont très bien

pu agir pour des intérêtsfinanciers non identifiés,encore que je n'aie
aucune raison de penser que ce fut effectivementle cas. Dans la réplique
(A.R., vol. II, ann. 127),la Belgiquecite des extraits durapport des mem-
bres espagnols de la commission internationale d'experts de 1950 selon
lesquels la Sidro contrôlait la Barcelona Traction, et la Sofina la Sidro,
et le 13mai 1969l'un de ses conseils a déclaréqu'au moins pendant une

certaine période la Sofina ((étaitcontrôlée par des filiales D. Les thèses
espagnoles et les explications de la Belgique au sujet de la prétendue
((belgianisation ))de la sociétéet des offres d'achat de 1964ne prouvent
rien quant à la situation au 19juin 1962.Or, quel que soit le fondement
sur lequel reposeraient les intérêts de 1'Etatjustifiant une protection, il
faut en apporter la preuve mêmes'il suffisait, aux fins de la justification
requise, d'établir la continuitéde la nationalitédes actionnaires.

106. Les arrêtsde la Cour ont un retentissement considérable, bien
que, selon l'article 59 du Statut, la décisionne soit ((obligatoire que pour
les parties en litige et dans le cas qui a étédécidé))On dira peut-êtreque
les méthodeset institutions nouvelles en matière d'investissementsétran-
gers auxquelles il a étéfait allusion précédemmentdans la présenteopi-
nion sont appelées à l'emporter sur les conséquences éventuellesde la
règle que la Cour considère maintenant comme l'expression du droit.

Mais les anciennes pratiques commerciales n'ont pas toutes étéabandon-
néeset la règle annoncée amènera peut-êtreles milieux dirigeants du
monde commercial à recourir à des~rocédén souveaux. Par exem~le.Ail'on
s'accordait à reconnaître qu'une foisque la société a étéliquidéeet a cessé
d'exister les actionnaires, ayant désormais acquis un droit propre sur les
avoirs, peuvent bénéficierde la protection diplomatique de 1'Etat dont

ilssont ressortissants, il seraitparfaitement possible d'obtenir l'annulation
du (statut de complaisance ))accordé à la sociétéM. ais il est certain qu'il
n'y aurait aucun avantage économique, social ou politique à exiger, dans
une situation semblable à celle de la présente affaire,que la société- en
l'espècela Barcelona Traction - ait officiellement cesséd'exister au
Canada pour que les principaux actionnaires, qui sont les véritables

parties intéressées, puissentbénéficierde la protection diplomatique. Et
pourrait-on alors raisonnablement soutenir que, dans ces conditions,
1'Etathabilité à exercer la protection diplomatique serait les Etats-Unis,
parce qu'il aurait étéconstatéque la majoritédes actions étaientinscrites
au nom de nominees américains?On est en droit de juger de la valeur
d'un principe d'aprèsles effets que produit son application; or, dans le the problem which the BarcelonaTractioncase has laid before the Inter-
national Court of Justice*.

(Signed) Philip C. JESSUP.

* Since 1 have personally had occasion to correct misconceptions
about the "law's deiays" as a feature of the procedure inthe International
Court of Justice, 1, like Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, welcome the inclusion
in this Judgment of the Court of an indication of the fact that the fault
lies with governments of States and not with the Court or its Registry.
The Court has never been asked to treat a contested case or a request

for an advisory opinion by summary procedure, quite apart from the
possible use of the standing Chamber of Summary Procedure, but if the
governments concerned desired a prompt decision, the Court could meet
their request. cas présent,ces effetsseraient manifestement fâcheux. Malgrétout mon
respect pour l'opinion de la Cour, je ne puis croire que le droit inter-
national obligeà donner une telle solution au problème qui a étésoumis
à la Cour internationale de Justice en l'affaire de la BarcelonaTrac-
tion*.

(Signé)Philip C. JESSUP.

* J'ai eu personnellementl'occasion de corriger certaines idéesfausses
au sujet des (délaisde justice1)qui caractériseraient la procédure de la
Cour. Je me félicitedonc, comme sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, de trouver dans

le présent arrêt une allusion au fait que la faute en incombe aux
gouvernements des Etats et non pas à la Cour ou à son Greffe. Il n'a
jamais été demandé à la Cour d'appliquer la procédure sommaire à une
affaire contentieuse ou à une demande d'avis consultatif, sans parler
d'une éventuellemise à contribution de la chambre de procéduresom-
maire. Si les gouvernements souhaitaient qu'une décisionsoit rendue
rapidement, la Cour pourrait certainement leur donner satisfaction sur
ce point.

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Document Long Title

Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup

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