SEPARATE OPINION OF
JUDGE SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE
1 agree with the decision of the Court in this case, and 1 also
consider that the main ground for it, as stated in the Judgment
(namely that the claim is not of a character to engage the Court's
judicial function), forms a correct and sufficient basis for the
decision. 1 have however certain additional remarks to make, and
also an additional ground for reaching the same conclusion. Finally,
because of the particular considerations on which the Judgment
is founded, the Court has not thought it necessary to consider
whether it would have jurisdiction to entertain the claim if the
grounds of objection mentioned in the Judgment did not exist.
While 1think the Court was right in this, 1have reasons for wanting
to deal with the main jurisdictional issues indicated in the submis-
sions of the Parties.
In this opinion, Parts 1 and II (pp. 97-100, and 100-108) contain
my additional observations on the basis of the Court's decision.
Part III (pp. 108-111) gives my additional ground for reaching the
same conclusion. InPart IV(pp. 111-127) 1consider the jurisdictional
issues arising on Article 19 of the Trusteeship Aqreement for the
former British Cameroons; and in Part TT(pp. 127-130) 1discuss the
objection rationetemporis advanced by the Respondent State to the
admissibility of a part of theclaim.
"MOOT" CHARACTER OF THE CASE.
THE QUESTION OF REPARATION
It has been obvious from the start that this case had certain
very unusual features, arising from the combined facts that the
Applicant State's claim or request related to a situation which was
not merely in the past, but wholly terminated and non-recurrent,
and which for al1practical purposes was so at the date of the Appli-
cation; while at the same time thelatter contained no claim for any
compensation or other form of reparation in respect of the illegali-
ties alleged to have been committed during the period when this
The term"moot" is here used in the sense given to it in Ameriter-legal
minology, as denotincase or claim whis or has become pointless and without
object.
86situation wasstill actively in existence. Nor was any attempt made
to introduce such a claim at any later stage of the proceedings l.
This combination makes the case almost unique in the annals of
international litigation. It concerns alleged breaches of an inter-
national agreement, the Trusteeship Agreement for the former
British Cameroons. Now, it is in no way singular that an allegation
that a breach of treaty has occurred, should not be accompanied
by any claim for compensation or other reparation, where the
treaty is still in force and operating; for in that case, any finding in
favour of the plaintiff State functions as a prohibition on the con-
tinuance or repetition of the breach of treaty, and this may be al1
that is required, and in any event makes the judgment effective 2.
Moreover, the latter necessarily operates as a finding about the
correct interpretation or application of the treaty, and therefore
servesa useful and effective legal purpose during the life-time of the
treaty.
Equally, it would be quite normal to allege in respect of a treatÿ
that was no longer in force, that breaches of it which occurred
during its currency had caused damage to the plaintiff State, for
which the latter claimed compensation or other reparation. In the
absence of sucli a claim however, the issue of whether there was a
breach of the treaty while it was still in force, could only be an
academic one: a judgment on that issue, even if favourable to the
plaintiff State, could create no rights or obligations for either party
to receive, enjoy, do or refrain from doing anything. Nor would the
treaty any longer be in existence, so that the judgment could have
no operative relevance by way of declaring the treaty's correct
interpretation or application. Such a judgment could at most
afford a moral satisfaction to the party in whose favour it was pro-
nounced, and could at most have an academic interest, however
high its authority as a pronouncement of law. But courts of law
are not there to make legal pronouncements in abstracto,however
l It is not proposed to discuss here whethethe framing of such a claim would
infact have been practicable at all, orso, would have been permissibleat a later
stage than that of the initial ApplicatioWhat was quite clear throughout, w-as
that there had been no error or oversight. On the contrary, it was insisted in the
most positive manner that the Applicant State was notaçking for anything but a
declaration that theRespondent State had administered the Trust irregularly.
This also applies to what may occur in cases such as the Corfu Channel case,
where the Court, though finding that a violation of territoriasovereignty had
taken place, awarded no compensation or other reparation (none was requested),
lation constituted"in itself an appropriatesatisfaction".This declaration,how-vio-
ever, though it related to a past anirreversible event, was also relevant to a still
continuing situation in which a repetition of the violation of sovereignty could occur,
and it had operative legal effect as a prohibitionor interdiction on any such
repetition.This was quite a different case from the present one.great their scientific value as such. They arethere to protect existing
and current legal rights, to secure compliance with existing and
current legal obligations, to afford concrete reparation if a mong
has been committed, or to give rulings in relation to existing and
continuing legal situations. Any legal pronouncements that emerge
are necessarily in the course, and for the purpose, of doing one or
more of these things. Otherwise they serve no purpose falling
within or engaging the proper function of courts of law as a
judicial institution.
Since, in the present case, it is the combination of the two
things-the process of alleging breaches of a treaty instrument due
to come to an end two days after the Application was filed, coupled
with the failure to claim any reparation for these alleged breaches,
that gives the case its special character-it is worth considering
certain other consequences of the latter circumstance, which would
immediately have come to light had the Court proceeded to the
merits, and which in my opinion have a direct relevance to the
question of the admissibility (or perhaps more appropriately in the
context-the examinability) of the Applicant State's request,
considered as such.
By not claiming any compensation, the Applicant State placed
itself in a position in which, had the Court proceeded to the merits,
the Applicant could have obtained a judgment in its favour merely
by establishing that breaches of the Trust Agreement had been
committed, without having to establish, as it would otherwise
have had to do (i.e. if reparation had been claimed) that these
breaches were the actual and proximate cause of the damage
alleged to have been suffered-that is the incorporation of the
Northern Cameroons in the Federation of Nigeria rather than in the
Republic of Cameroon; without, in short, having to establish the
international resPonsibility of the Cnited Kingdom for this out-
come. Neither in the Application or Mernorial of the Applicant
State, nor in its oral pleadings, did it do morethan seek to set up a
general presumption that if the United Kingdom, as Administering
Authority, had conducted matters differently, the result would have
been different. No proof of this was offered, nor even any real
prima facieevidence of it, and in the nature ofthe case it hardly could
have been. There are, moreover, aspects which suggest that not even a presumption to that effect could legitimately be drawn. In short,
it could onlyremain entirely speculative what would have happened
if this or that circumstance or action had been different l.
The point is that, on the basis of the Application as framed, and
without establishing any actual causallink between the irregularities
alleged and the damage complained of, the Applicant State could
have called for a judgment in its favour. The result isthat, had the
Court proceeded to the merits, andhad it considered the allegations
ofirregularities in the administration of theTrust, and in the conduct
of the plebiscite leading up to its terinination, to be justified, it
would have found itself in the position of being obliged to give
judgment against the Respondent State, irrespective of whether
these irregularities had been the cause of the damage complained of.
This is clearly not a position in which the Court ought to allow
itself to be placed. It is not the task of an international tribunal
to apportiori blame in vacuo, or to find States guilty of illegalities
except as a function of, and relative to a decision that these have
been the cause of the consequences complained of, for which the
State concerned is accordingly internationally responsible; or
except in relation to a still continuing legal situation in which a
pronouncement that illegalities have occurred may be legally
material and relevant.
THE RIGHT OF THE COURT NOT TO GIVE ANY FINDING
ON JURISDICTION. THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL
PROPRIETY
The Judgment of the Court in the present case is essentially
founded on the view that, irrespective of the Cou?trtJc som$etence
to gointo thewzeritsof thecase(and even if it is competent to do so),
l The majority in favour of joining the Federatioof Nigeria was broadly3-2.
It would have needed a heavy swing for this to be converted into a majority the
other way. Moreover, the very fact that as many as two out of every five voted to
join the Republic of Cameroon, tends to show that the vote was free and unin-
fluenced by anterior policies. This wequally the view taken in the independent
report of the universallyrespected UnNations Commissioner, AmbassadorAbdoh,
on which the General Assembly acted in framing its resolution No. 1608 (XV) of
21 April 1961. A further poinis that the Southern Cameroons, no less than the
Northern, had always been administered as an integral part of Nigeria. Yet this
did not prevent its population froopting to join the Republic of Cameroon, not
Nigeria.The presumption, if any, must be that the previous method of admin-
istration had littledirect bearing onthe result.Yet this previous method of
administration constitutedthe Applicant State'schief ground of complaint.the claim is of such a character that the Court ought not to entertain
it; or alternatively, that any decision that might be given by the
Court in favour of the Applicant State (and if none, then cadit
quaestio), cozdd only be of such a character that the Court ought
not, in the prevailing circumstances, to give it, and ought not
therefore to examine the claim at all. The Court has not, 1 think,
pronounced the claim to be formally inadmissible, but it has in
effect (to make use of the French term recez~abilité tr)eated it as non-
receivable or unexaminable because ofthe consequences (Le.strictly,
the lack of any) which would ensue if it was acceded to.
In my opinion, however, a claim which would and couldonly have
the outcome described in the Judgment of the Court (assuming
even, that there was a finding on the merits in favour of the claim),
must itself be regarded as inadmissible.
Underlying the Judgment of the Court thereare clearly consider-
ations of pro+riet?l,and this raises a general issue of pnnciple-that
is to Say, of how far and in what circumstances a court which has,
or may have, jurisdiction to go into a case, can and should decline to
exercise that jurisdiction (or even to consider the question of
jurisdiction) on the ground that it would not be proper for it to do
so in the circumstances. Although the Judgment refers to previous
cases in which the Court, or its predecessor the Permanent Court,
declined to pronounce on certain matters for reasons essentially of
unsuitability, and these cases are clearly relevant, 1 regard them
as not quite comparable to the present case, in which the position is
that, irrespective of its jurisdiction (and even if it has it), the Co~rt
is declining altogether to exercise it, cr even to consider whether
it has any jurisdiction. This involves an issue familiar in connection
with requests for advisory opinions 1,but less so in the field of
international litigation, where it maji be argued that if a court is
competent in relation to a given case, it must exercise that compe-
tence, and must therefore consider the question of its competence.
This is a serious issue which requires to be dealt with, since it is in
a general way evident that courts exist in order to go into and
decide the cases they are both duly seised of, and have jurisdiction
to entertain, withorit picking and choosing which they will pro-
nounce upon, and which not 2.
l For a recent judicial affirmatof the right cf the Court to decline to give
an advisory opinionevenwherecompetent to do so, see the case of Certain Expenses
of tThe fact that jurisdictiis assumed, does not of course mean that the tri-
bunal concerned necessarily prcceeto hear and determine the merits, for it may
reject the claimin limine on some ground of inadmissibili(non-exhaustion of
localremedies, undue delay,operatiof atime-limit, etSuch a rejection however.
on grounds of this kind, is itself an exercise of jurisdiction. No doubt there is a duty in principle for an international tribunal
to hear and determine the cases it is both seised of, and competent
to go into; and therefore, equally to consider the question of its
competence. But there must be limits to this duty. In order to
see what these may be, it will be necessary to discuss the general
relationship between jurisdiction or competence on the one hand,
and, on the other, the considerations which may cause a tribunal
to refuse to proceed to the merits.
The line between questions of jurisdiction (which basically relate
to the competence of the Court to act at all) and questions of
admissibility, receivability or examinability (which relate to the
nature of the claim, or to particular circumstances connected with
it) l is apt in certain cases to get blurred. For this reason, inter-
national courts have tended to decline to draw too hard and fast a
distinction, or to sub-categorise too rigidly the general category of
"preliminary objections", or else they have declared the distinction
to be of secondary importance 2; and there have certainly been
cases in which a claim has been pronounced to be inadmissible, even
though the objections on the score of jurisdiction had not been
fully disposed of, so that strictly the court might not be competent
to act at a11 3.Per contra, there have been cases in which a court
has found itself to be competent, yet has refused to proceed any
further, on what were essentially grounds of propriety 4.
A given preliminary objection may on occasion be partly one of
jurisdiction and partly of receivability, but the real distinction
and test would seem to be whether or not the objection is based on,
l See generally, British Year Book of Intevnational Law for 1958, pp. 8-25, and
Rosenne, The International Court of Justice, pp. 249-259.
See the Permanent Court in the Mavrommatis and Polish Upper Silesia cases
(P.C.I. J., Series A, No. 2, IO and No. 6,p. 19).
See the Interhandel case (Jurisdiction)I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6, in which
the present Court upheld a plea of inadmissibility,although an objection t0 its
jurisdiction wasstill outstanding,and was never disposed of. The immediate re-
sult is the same, but not necessarily in the long run; for a successful object0on
the jurisdiction necessarilterminates the affair once and for all, whereas some
pleas of inadmissibilit(e.g. that local remedieshave not been exhausted) relate
to defects that may be cured by the subsequent action of the party concerned.
In the Monetary Gold case (I. C. J. Reports 1954, at pp. 31-33) the Court,
while expressly finding that jurisdictihad been conferred upon it by the Partles,
declined to exercise it because of the absence of another State which the Court
regarded as a necessary party to the proceedings. or arises from, the jurisdictional clause or clauses under which the
jurisdiction of the tribunal is said to exist. If so, the objection
is basically one of jurisdiction. If it is founded on considerations
lying outside the ambit of anÿ jurisdictional clause, and not
involving the interpretation or application of such a provision,
then it will normally be an objection to the receivability of the
clairn (see further in Part V hereof).
1 have however pointed out elsewhere l that the classification
of preliminary questions into the two categories of jurisdictional
questions and admissibility questions is oversimplified, and can be
misleading when it comes to considering and determining at what
stage and inwhat order given objections, of eitherkind, can properly
be acted upon-for each category is capable of subdivision into (a)
questions which, while remaining preliminary (in the sense of
preliminary to the merits), are substantive in character, and (b)
questions wliich are of a wholly antecedent or, as it were, "pre-
preliminary" character. Considerations of propriety or suitability
will certainly figure amongst the latter. Thus in the jurisdictional
field, there is the substantive or basic jurisdiction of the Court
(Le. to hear and determine the ultimate merits), and there is the
possibility of (preliminary) objections to the exercise of that
jurisdiction. But also, there is the Court's preliminary or "inci-
dental" jurisdiction (e.g. to decree interim measures of protection,
admit counterclaims or third-party interventions, etc.) which it
can exercise even in advance of any determination of its basic
jurisdiction as to the ultimate merits; even though the latter is
challenged; and even though it may ultimately turn out that the
Court lacks jurisdiction as to the ultimate mei-its 3.Although much
(though not all) of this incidental jurisdiction is specifically provided
for in the Court's Statute, or in Rules of Court which the Statute
empowers the Court to make, it is really an inherent jurisdiction,
the power to exercise which is a necessary condition of the Court-
or of any court of law--loeing able to function at all. Kevertheless,
there mayin particular casesbe objections (which would accordingly
be of a pre-preliminary character) to the Court being entitled to
exercise this power in relation to some specific part of its incidental
jurisdiction. For example. a request for interim measures nlay be
met either with a denial that, on their merits, these should be
granted, or with a challenge to the vightof the Court to grant them,
See for instance British Year Book of International Law for 1958,pp. 56-60.
There may be intermediate issues of merits-e.g.where interim measures of
protectionare requested,but the necessity for them is contested othe merits.
This occurred in the Anglo-IranianOz1 Company case, in which the Court
granted a requestfor the indication of interim measures in advance of a.ny decision
such competence (I.C.J. Report1951, at pp. 92-93);ut in the subsequent juris-ld have
dictionaI phase of the case the Court decided that it had not-whichentailed
automatically the canceiiation of the interim measures (I.C.J1952,at pI14).or the propriety of its doing so in the given case-in effect a juris-
dictional issue l.
It is thus clear that arising from its seisin-that is to Say from
the fact of being duly seised of a case by means of a formally
valid application stating the grounds of the claim, and the grounds
upon whjch it is contended that the Court is competent to entertain
it 2, the Court, irrespective of its substantive jurisdiction in re-
lation to the ultimate merits, becomes immediately possessed of
a preliminary competence enabling it to do a variety of things in
relation to the case.
It is in pursuance of this preliminary competence, which, as 1have
said, is really inherent in the functioning of any court of law, that
the Court must be considered to have acted in the present case in
declining to examine the claim, irrespective of its competence to do
so. But in considering how far the Court is entitled to act in this
way, irrespective of, and without deciding, the question of its
competence, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are also differ-
ent categories of preliminary objections of a non-jurisdictional
character, and that the category of questions of receivability is
itself sub-divisible.
The essence of any preliminary objection (andthis applies as well
to receivability as to jurisdictional objections) is that, if good, it
holds good and brings the proceedings to an end 3, irrespective of
the plaintiff State's ability to prove its case on the merits. But
in the field of admissibility or receivability, some objections clearly
cannot, or ought not, to be gone into or decided until after the
competence of the tribunal is fully established; whereas others can,
and must, be taken in advance, and irrespective of any determina-
tion of competence. An example of the former category would be
pleas of inadmissibility closely connected with the merits, such as
the objection ratione temporis in the present case, whereby it was
sought to exclude in limine any complaints about acts or events
taking place prior to the Applicant State's admission to the United
Nations (see Part V hereof). Another case would be a plea of
inadmissibility relating to defects which are capable of being cured
1 According to its settled jurisprudencethe Court will not insist on its juris-
diction in respect of the ultimatemerits being amrmatively established before
it grants a request for interim measures. On the other hanit will not granthe
request if it is clear, even at that stage, that there is not any possible basis on which
it couldbe competent as to the ultimate merits-see British Year Book ofInter-
national Law for 1958, pp. 109-114.
Statute, Article 40; Rules of Court, Artic32.
Except of course where the objection is joineto the merits or in the type
pf case mentioned in note 3 on p.102.by appropriate action, such as a plea of non-exhaustion of local
remedies: if the plaintiff State is able to cure the defect, it would
obviously be absurd for it to return to the Court, only to find that
the latter then declared itself to be incompetent on jurisdictional
grounds. Therefore, al1 jurisdictional issues should be disposed of
first in such a case l.
There are however other objections, not in the nature of objec-
tions to the competence of the Court, which can and strictly
should be taken in adz,anceof any question of competence. Thus a
plea that the Application did not disclose the existence, properly
speaking, of any legal dispute between the parties, must precede
competence, for if there is no dispute, there is nothing in relation
to which the Court can consider whether it is competent or not.
It is for this reason that such a plea would be rather one of ad-
missibility or receivability than of competence. In the present
case, this particular ground of objection arose as one of competence,
because the jurisdictional clause invoked, namely Article 19 of the
Trust Agreement, itself required the existence of a dispute. But
irrespective of the particular language of the jurisdictional clause,
the requirement that there must be an actual dispute in the proper
sense of the term, and not merely (for instance) a simple difference
of opinion, is a general one, which must govern and limit the
power of any tribunal to act. For reasons 1 shall give later, 1
consider that there \vas not, in this sense, a dispute in the present
case.
Very similar considerations apply to the plea thatthe Application
should not be entertained on the ground that, owing to events
occurring since it was filed, it has manifestly lost al1raison d'Are-
that it has become "moot"-so that a decision on the merits
would be objectless. There would clearly be an element of absurdity
.in the Court going through al1 the motions of establishing its
jurisdiction, if it considered it must then in any event decline to
examine the claim on this ground, however competent it might be
to do so. Thisground is in fact one of tliose on which the Court has,
and rightly, declined to act in the present case.
In the same way, if the Court considered (asit didin the hlonetary
Goldcase-supra, p. 102, note 4) that because of the absence of a
necessary party, it could not examine the claim, this is a conclusion
which would make a decision on competence unnecessary 2, and
lThat this was not done in the Interhandel case (see fo3,p.102 above), was
obj,ection ostensibly leopen.and allegedly "moot" statusof the jurisdictional
Except where a joinder of the party in questionwas possible and seemed
probable: for it would be pointleto effect the joinder unless the Court was-
petent-see pp. 102 and 104 supra, and footnote 3 on p.IO?.even impossible if the presence of that party was required not only
for a determination of the merits, but also of the question of
cornpetence-as the Court might well have held in the present case
in relation to the Federation of Nigeria.
A similar sort of position must arise where the objection touches
not so much the substance of the claini, asthe character of what the
Court is requested to do about it, having regard to the surrounding
circumstances-as for instance if the Courts asked to do something
which does not appear to lie within, or engage, its judicial function
as a court of law. In cases of this kind, the question of competence
or jurisdiction becomes jrrelevant, for it would be inappropriate,
and even misleading, for the Court to avoid the issue by simply
finding itself to lack jurisdiction, even if it did lack it; or alter-
natively, to find itself to be competent when it was manifest that
it could not in any event exercise that competence for a $riori
reasonstouching the whole nature of its function as an international
tribunal and judicial institution.
Itis in the manner above indicated that the dismissal of a claim
on what are essentially grounds of propriety, and irrespective of
competence, can be reconciled with the general rule that if the
Court is in fact competent, .it must exercise its competence and
proceed to the merits unless the claim falls to be rejectedfor some
reason of inadmissibility arising on its substance; for the issue of
propriety is one which, if it arises, will exist irrespective of com-
petence, and will make it unnecessary and undesirable for compe-
tence to be gone into, so that there will be no question of the Court
deciding that it has jurisdiction but refusing to exercise it.
There is another reason also for postulating a certain latitude for
the Court, on grounds of policy or propriety, to decline in limine to
entertain claims that it might be competent to go into, and which
might not be open to objection on grounds of straight inadmissi-
bility. In the general international legal field there is nothing cor-
responding to the procedures found under most national systems
of law, for eliminating at a relatively early stage, before they reach
the court which would otherwise hear and decide them, claims
that are considered to be objectionable or not entertainable or1
some a priori ground. The absence of any corresponding "filter"procedures in the Court's jurisdictional field makes it necessary
to regard a right to take similar action, on similar grounds, as
being part of the inherent powers or jurisdiction of the Court
as an international tribunal.
It has however been contended that the Applicant State's claim
in the present case zeiouldengage the Court's judicial function,
because a judgment in favour of that State could have effects, in
the sense that it could be put to someuse; and that in any case the
task of the Court is to declare the law (direle droit) and not to
concern itself with the effects of its decisions. This might be true
if the decision could have some legal effect. It is quite another
matter when it would manifestly be incapable of any effective
legal application at all, for it then becomes a decision of a kind a
court of law ought not in principle to render.
Evidently a judgment of the Court, even if not capable of effective
legal application, could have other uses. It could afford a moral
satisfaction. It could act as an assurance tothe public opinion of one
or other of the parties that something had been done or at least
attempted. There might also be political uses to which it could be
put. Are these objects of a kind which a judgment of the Court
ought to serve? The answer must, 1 think, be in the negative, if
they are the only objects which would be served--that is, if the
judgment neither would nor could have any effective sphere of legal
application.
It was also suggested on behalf of the Applicant State during the
oral hearing, that a judgment of the Court inits favour would, or at
any rate might, have a legal effect or possible legal application,
inasmuch as it mjght be made the basis of further proceedings,
before either the Court itself or some other international tribunal.
TVl-ietherthis would be the case can only be entirely speculative, and
the Court could not in any event render a judgment on a hypo-
thetical basis of this kind.
However, $rima jacie, and so far as can be seen at present, no
such further proceedings would be possible without the consent of
the Respondent State. Furthermore, it would seem that the Court
could not, on any subsequent request for an interpretation of its
judgment (if it had given one on the merits), declare by way of
purported interpretation, that the judgment gave rise to obligations
l It may exist in special caseinstance the European Convention Human
Rights provides for a screening proceduwhereby claims can be declared irre-
ceivable before ever they reachthe European Commission or Court of Human Rights. that had not been asserted in the original claim, and the merits
of which (having regard to the considerations set out in the second
half of Part 1of the present Opinion) would never have been gone
into. This would not be to interpret the judgment, but to give
effect to a new claim, ancl without any investigation of it as such,
or into the question whether the irregularities, on this hypothesis
found to have occurred, had actually been the cause of the result
complained of. In the Right of Asylum (Interpretation of Judgment)
case, the Court was emphatic that it could not, by way of inter-
pretation of its Judgment in the original Riglzt of Asylum case,
pronounce upon what was essentially a new claim. It said (I.CJ.
Refiorts 1950,at p. 403) that the gaps which the Applicant State
claimed to have discovered in its original Judgment were "in
reality ...new questions which cannot be decided by means of
interpretation. Interpretation can in no way go beyond the limits
of the Judgment, fixed in advance by the Parties themselves in
their submissions." The Court went on to Say that, in reality, the
object of the questions then being put to it was " to obtain by the
indirect means of interpretation, a decision on questions which
the Court was not called upon by the Parties to answer". Similarly
in the subsequent and related Haya de la Torre case (1.C. J. Reports
1951, at p. 79),the Court declared that questions "not submitted
to the Court [by the original application] and consequently ...
not decided by it" could not be made the basis of any deduction
"as tothe existence or non-existence of an obligation" resulting from
the original decision. In the present case, the question of any
obligation for the Respondent State to pay compensation or make
reparation in any other form, even if the alleged irregularities in
the administration of the trust territory were established, has not
been submitted to the Court, and does not form part of the claim.
III
THE QUESTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY LEGAL
DISPUTE, PROPERLY SO CALLED
The Court could, in my opinioc, on another ground have reached
the conclusion that it could not examine the claim-namely that
there was not, properly speaking and in the legal sense, any dispute
between the Parties at the date of the Application to the Court.
1 cannot share the Court's view that there was a dispute, because
it seems to me, as 1 shall hope to show, that logically the very
same considerations which have led the Court to find that it would
be incompatible with its judicial function to entertain the claim,
97 should also have led it to hold that there was not, in the proper
sense, any legal dispute. The two things are really different
aspects of the same basic juridical situation.
The question of the existence of a dispute would of course have
arisen on Article 19 of the Trust Agreement, if the Court had gone
into that provision. It is however, as 1 said earlier, a general ques-
tion, which must arise in any event since, unless there is in the legal
sense a dispute, there exists nothing which the Court, as a court
oflaw, can deal with, even for the purpose of determining its compe-
tence. On this point, and in order to show that the question is
one "which, strictly speaking, does not relate to the jurisdiction of
the Court: a problem which, indeed, arises prior to any question of
jurisdiction...",1 associate myself with the reasoning contained in
Part 1 of my colleague Judge Morelli's Dissenting Opinion in the
SozlthWest Africacase(Jurisdiction)-I.C. J. Reports1962, at pp. 546-
566.
It must be admitted however that it rnay not be easy in a given
case to Say whether a dispute exists or not-particularly where,
superficially, there riay now be al1the appearance of one. The Judg-
ment of the Court, in my opinion,proceedson the basis that since the
Parties take different views as to whether the United Kingdom did
or did not correctly administer the Tnst-one alleging and the
other denying this-there must be a dispute between them. This
seems to me to beg the question. That there should be difficulty
about the matter is due to the lack of any clear definition of what
is meant by a dispute for legal purposes. It is generally accepted
that if there is a dispute, it must have existed before, and at the
date of, the Application to the Court, and that the making of the
Application does not suffice per se to create a dispute. It is also
accepted that the mere assertion or denial of a dispute is not
sufficient in itself either to establish or refute its existence; and
further, that a dispute must involve something more than a mere
difference of opinion. Beyond that, there are only subjective ideas,
and there is little agreement on any objective test.
1 share the view expressed in Part II of Judge Morelli's Opinion
already referred to (I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 566-588), that there
is a minimum reqiiired in order to establish the existence of a
legal dispute, properly so called-that is (to come very close to
the language of the present Judgment itself) a dispute capable of
engaging the judicial function of the Court. This minimum is that
the one party should be making, or should have made, a complaint,
claim, or protest about an act, omission or course of condnct,
present or past, of the other party, which the latter refutes, rejects,
or de~iies the validity of, either expressly, or else implicitly by
persisting in the acts, omissions or conduct complained of, or by
fading to take the action, or make the reparation, demanded. If
98 since this is admitted to be irreversible, and no claim that it can
or should be altered is put forward.
In short, a decision of the Court neither would, nor could, affect
the legal rights, obligations, interests or relations of the Parties
in any way; and this situation both derives from, and evidences,
the non-existence of any dispute between the Parties to which a
judgment of the Court could attach itself in any concrete, or even
potentially realizable, form. The conclusion must be that there may
be a disagreement, contention or controversy, but that there is
not, properly speal~ing,and as a matter of law, any dispute.
To state the point in another way, the impossibility for a de-
cision of the Court in favour of the Applicant State to have any
effective legal application in the present case (and therefore the
incompatibility with the judicial function of the Court that would
be involved by the Court entertaining the case) is the reverse
of a coin, the obverse of which is the absence of any genuinedispute.
Since, u-ith reference to a judicial decision sought as the out-
come of a dispute said to exist between the Parties, the dispute
must essentially relate to what that decision ought to be, it follows
that if the decision (whatever it might be) must plainly be without
any possibility of effective legal application at all, the dispute
becomes void of al1 content, and is reduced to an empty shell.
ARTICLE 19 OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT.
THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION
Even if, for the reasonsgiven above, and in the Judgment of the
Court itself, did not consider that the Court is entitled to hold,
and right in holding, that it should not examine the claim of the
Applicant State, and need not go into the question of its jiiris-
diction to do so,1 should in any event hold that it did not possess
such jurisdiction, for broadIy the same reasons, mzhtutis mutandis,
as those contained in Parts V, VI and VI1 of the Joint Dissenting
Opinion which my colleague Judge Sir Percy Spender and 1 wrote
in the Soztth West Africa case (Jurisdiction)(I.C.J. Reports 1962,
at pp. 518-526 and 547-56~).
However, 1 share the view expressed by Judge Sir Percy Spender
in his Separate Opinion in the present case, that this case has
features of its own relative to the question of jurisdiction, that
require to be dealt with.1am in generalagreement with his Opinion
and associate myself with it1 can therefore confine my own remarks
to certain points1 specially want to make. Moreover, having regardto what is said in Judge Sir Percy Spender's Opinion, 1 need not
deal with the additional reasons which exist in the present case for
thinking that such clauses as Article 19 of the Trust Agreement
must be interpreted and applied so as to avoid the unreasonable
and impossible conflicts (of which the present case could have
afforded, and indeed did potentially afford, a conspicuous example)
liable to arise if the Court is regarded as having a concurrent
jurisdiction with the appropriate political'organ or organs, in order
to supervise the conduct of the Trust.
For the purposes of what follows, 1 shall assume that, contrary
to the views expressed in Part III above, there is a dispute within
the meaning of Article 19, since otherwise cadit quaestio.
I. The scopeof Article 19.
(a) Analysis of the firovisions of the Trust Agreement. What rights
did it conteron whnt Stutes or otlzeresztities?
The jurisdictional clause of the Trust Agreement for the former
British Cameroons, Article 19, was as follows:
"If any dispute whatever should arise between the Administering
Authority and another Member of the United Nations relating to
the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement,
such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation or other means,
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice provided
for in Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter."
Thecentral issue of jurisdiction arising on this clause (as on Article 7
of the Mandate for South West Africa l),is what are the provisions
here intended to be referred to by the words "the provisions of
this Agreement". In my opinion, these words must be read as if
they were followed by the phrase "in respect of which that Member
enjoys substantive rights under the Agreement". Before giving my
main reason for this view, 1 must briefly state the nature of the
Trust Agreement.
Like the former Mandates (andthe one remaining one), and like
most of the other Trusteeships, the British Cameroons Trusteeship
involvedtwo classes of provisions-that is of substantive provisions,
for Article 19, being a purely jurisdictional clause, stood by itself
But in the South West Africa case there was a second central issue arising on
the jurisdictionclause, which does not anse in the presentcase-I.CJ.Reports
1962, at pp. 504 ff.
Significantlyal1 those Trusteeshipwhich only contained provisions about
the administrationof the Trust in the interests of the populatiof the Trust
United Nations),did notcontain any jurisdictional adjudicationclause.f the113 JUDG. 2 XII 63 (SEP. OPIN. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)
and apart £rom the substantive provisions. The two classes of the
latter were (u) provisions as to the rights and obligations of the
Administering Authonty (the Lnited Kingdom) for the adminis-
tration of the Trust in the interests of the population of the Trust
Territory-which it will be convenient hereinafter to call "conduct
of the Trust" provisions or articles; and (b) prox,isions in which
rights, mainly of an economic or establishment character (equality
of treatment. non-discriniination. ,ic"t to enter. travel or reside in
the Territory, to own property there, etc.), were conferred on the
Members of the United Nations as a class, for themselves individu-
ally as States, or for their nationals. It will be convenient herein-
after to call the pro~isions in this category "national rights" pro-
\-isions or articles.
The complaint of the Applicant State in the present case (as
with that of the two Applicant States in the Soutiz West dfrica
case) related exclusively to the former category of provisions
(conduct of the Trust). The Applicant did not invoke or make
any claim or complaint in respect of the national rights prox,isions
of Articles 9, IO, II and 13.
Three further points require to be stressed:
First, the mention of Members of the United Nations occurred
exclusively in the Articles conferring rights upon them in their
indixTidualcapacity or upon their nationals-Articles g,IO,Ir and 13.
They were not mentioned in any of the conduct of the Trust
pro~isions or even in those of the Preamble to the Agreement. Al1
these provisions referred only to the Administering Authority, or
to organs of the United h'ations such as the General Assembly or the
Trusteeship Council. Correspondingly, these organs wcre not nien-
tioned in any of the national rights articles, although the Ad-
ministering Authority naturally was. Thus it can be plainly seen
that one of these two categories of provisions (conduct of the
Trust) created a link exclusively between the Administering Au-
thority andthe Knited Nations as an entity, or certain of its organs;
while it was only the other category (of national rights provisions)
that created any link or contractual tie between the Administering
Authority and the Menzhersof the Cnited Nations individually.
Secondly, to make the picture thus presented even clearer, the
Trust Agreement was concluded by being embodied in a resolution
of the United Nations Assembly, and it has been common ground
throughout the present case that the sole entities formally parties
to it were the Administering Authority on the one hand, and the
United Nations represented by the General Assembly on the other,
and that the Members of the United Nations, as such, were notindividually parties to the Agreement. The particular rights they
individually possessed under certain clauses of it (and those only)
were in effect "third-party" rights. It was admitted on behalf of the
Applicant State that the Members of the United Nations were third
parties in relation to the Trust Agreement, although it was sought
to argue that they were a "somewhat special" kind of third party.
But it was not seriously suggested that they could, in relation to
the Agreement derive direct individual rights from their corporate
Membership of the entity which alone was, and as such, a party
to the Agreement.
Thirdly, although the point is a lesser one, it is worth noticing
that, whereas the organs of the United Nations could be relied
upon to supervise the execution of the conduct of the Trust pro-
visions with which they were directly concerned, they might well
feel no particular interest in the enforcement of the national rights
provisions. It was in this latter respect that the role of the Court
under Article 19 was a necessary one. It was not in any other respect
necessary, given the functions to be carried out by the organs of the
United Nations in supervising the administration of the Trust-
functions involving a far closer control than any which the League
of Nations had exercised in respect of the former Mandates.
The situation just described can, in my opinion, lead to only
one valid legal conclusion, which is that to be stated in the next
sub-section.
(b) Did the Applicant State have the capacity to invoke Article 19
igzrespectof matters relating to the conduct of the Trust?
The real issue that arises on the scope of Article 19 is not what
provisions of the Trust Agreement it relates to (its actual language is
quite general) but under what provisions the individual Members of
the United Nations had rights which they could assert by invoking
Article 19. This must be so because it is axiomatic that a State can
only invoke the jurisdictional clause of an international agreement
in respect of, and in order to assert, rights which (whether as a
party to the agreement, or on a "third-party" basis) that State
possesses, under or in relation to one or more of the provisions of
the agreement. If there are provisions of the agreement relative to
which it is clear, a priori, that the State concerned has and canhave no substantive rights, then it must necessarily lack capacity
to invoke the jurisdictional clause in respect of them l.
The conclusion just stated results directly and inevitably from
the universally accepted principle that, whatever the apparent
generality of its language ("any dispute whatever" relating to
"the provisions" of the Agreement), a purely jurisdictional clause,
such as Article 19 of the Trust Agreement, cannot confer substantive
rights. The substantive rights it refers to must be sought elsewhere,
either in the same instrument or in another one. Al1a jurisdictional
clause can do, is to enable any such rights, whatever they may be
(artd if they independefztly exist), to be asserted by recourse to the
tribunal provided for-this provision being the real purpose of a
jurisdictional clause, and al1it normally does.
Thus, in the present case, the scope of Article 19 is necessarily
governed not only by what it says itself, but also, and even more
importantly, by whet rights were conferred by the rest of the Trust
Agreement, and ou whatparties orentities. As has already been seen,
the Trust Agreement only conferred separate substantive rights on
Members of the United Nations individually, by Articles 9, IO, II
and 13, which are not invoked in the present case. No rights for
Member States, as such and individually, were conferred by any of
the remaining provisions, which relate to the conduct of the Trust.
Hence Article 19 can only be invoked by individual Member States
in respect of the former class of provisions, for only under these did
the separate Member States possess rights in their individual
capacity. This is not merely a valid, but a necessary conclusion, and
for the following reason also.
There are in general only two ways in which a State can, as such
and individually, claim rights under a treaty: (i) the State may be
an actual party to the treaty, in which case (subject of course to
any specific exceptions or exclusions contained in the treaty itself)
such State will have rights in relation to the treaty as a whole, and
can invoke al1 its provisions, without needing to be expressly
indicated as entitled to do so under one or more specific provisions;
or (ii) though not a party, a State can enjojr rights if these are
expressly conferred on it eo nomine, or as a member of a named or
indicated class. But from this it follows that, in case (ii), anon-party
State can claim only the actual rights conferred on non-parties,
arise on the merits of any given case-whetherifa State "qualifies" as possessing
rights under a particulaprovision of a treaty, those rights in fact been vio-
lated. The questionof qualification itsis a preliminaryone affecting the Capa-
city of the State concerned to invoke the jurisdicticlause of the treatvand
hence affectingthe cornpetence of the Court.and could not claim rights in respect of any other provision cf the
treaty. Therefore, in the present case, the Members of the United
Nations, not being individually parties to theTrust Agreement, could
claim rights only under the nationalrights provisions, and could not
individually claim them in respect of the conduct of the Trust
provisions. It follows that, since Article 19 could only be invoked
by a Member Statein respect of the substantive rights it possessed
under theTrust Agreement, and since the individual Members of the
United Nations did not, as such, possess rights under the conduct
of the Trust provisions (being neither named in them nor separate
parties to the Agreement as a whole),they could not invoke Article 19
in respect of those provisions.
Whatever the generality of its language, Article 19 must be read
subject to the fundamental consideration that it is only a juris-
dictional clause, not conferring any substantive rights. Thedifficulty
is not that Article19 is incapable on its language of applying to the
conduct of the Trust provisions, if the Member States had, in their
individual capacities,any rightsunder these. But they had not ; and
Article 19 (beinga purely jurisdictional provision) could not by itself
create them. It could operate only in respect ofrights which the party
invoking it already possessed. The Applicant State in the present
case had, as a non-Partyto the Trust, no individual rights under the
conduct of the Trust provisions which alone it cites, and therefore
cannot invoke Article 19 in respect of them. In short the Applicant
State lacks the capacity to invoke Article 19 in respect of the only
provisions of the Trust which are the subject of its complaint; and
if the Applicant State lacks this capacity, then the Court can have
no jurisdiction to entertain a claim which, in effect, the Applicant
State has no legal right to make.
The foregoing conclusion, stated in this particular way-i.e. on
the basis not so much of the scope of Article 19, as of the incapacity
of Members of the United Nations to invoke it in respect of pro-
visions under which they had no direct rights-seems to me in-
controvertible in the present case, and 1 have wanted to stress this
way of looking at it for two reasons which are peculiar to the present
case as compared with the South West Africa case.
First, whereas in that case it was arguable (though not in my
opinion correctly so-see I.C.J. Reports 1962,pp. 499-502)that if the
Mandate for South West Africa was a treaty, the Members of the
former League of Nations were al1individually parties to it, this is
IOjnot possible in the present case. It is admitted that they were not
parties to the Trust Agreement, and that the United Nations in its
corporate capacity was the sole party, apart from the Administering
Authority.
Secondly, whereas in the days of the League of Nations it might
not universally have been considered that a body such asthe League
of Nations was, as an entity, possessed of international personality
over and above, and distinct from, the aggregation of its Member
States, so that it might lack treaty-making capacity (see I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 475, note 1),the Court in the case of I?ziztriesto
United Nations Servants recognized once and for al1 the separate
and distinct international personality of the United Kations
(I.C.J. Reports 1949, at p. 179). Its capacity to enter into or be
a party to international agreements is admitted-and it has fre-
quently been exercised l.
The conclusion which inevitably follows from and is necessitated
by these unquestionable legal facts, and by the position of the
United Nations, in its corporate capacity, as the sole other party to
the Trust Agreement, is and must be that the interest of the
individual Member States in the co~iduct of the Trust was exer-
cisable and realizable only through the corporate inachinery and
action of the United Nations. This is the answer-at least in the
present case-to the contention that al1 Member States had an
interest in the conduct of the Trust; they had it, but they could
exercise it only through the United Nations, and net through the
Court, except as regards provisions of the Trust conferring national
rights on them as separate States. This conclusion is not affected
by the fact that, in the present case, geographical propinquity
gave the Republic of Cameroon a greaterinterest in the conduct
of the Tiust tl-ian was possessed by most other Member States.
This could not suffice to entitle the Republic to exercise or realize
that interest except through the rnachinery of the United Nations;
for that interest, during the currency of the Trust, was bound up
with that of the United Nations, and of the whole Trusteeship
System, and could not be independently served or dealt .with.
And clearly the Applicant State cannot now have other or greater
rights or capacities than it enjoyed while the Trust was still in force.
(c) The contention that thetermination of the Trust was not fiart
of thz conductof the Trust.
The Respondent State in the present case, while making the
considerations just discussed one of its main contentions, also put
See also ArticIof the General Conventioon the United Nations Privileges
and Immunities of 13 February1946.
106 forward an additional argument, to the effect that even if Article 19
were regarded as applying to al1the provisions of the Trust Agree-
ment, and the Applicant State as having rights under (and as being
entitled to invoke) them all, the present case would still not be
covered, since it related not to the conduct, but to the termination
of the Trust, its incidents and outcome, and this was a matter on
which the Trust Agreement was wholly silent. It was part of this
contention that although the Applicant State did indeed invoke
specific provisions of the Trust, and alleged violations of them, it
did so only as part of, or in order to Iead up to, the complaints
relating to the termination of the Trust.
This contention does not seem to me to be well founded. The latter
part of it onlygoes to the motives which the Applicant State may
have had in alleging violations of specific provisions of the Trust:
it does not alter the fact that they were alleged. Whether the
Applicant State would in fact ever have made these allegations
except in the context of the termination of the Trust may be
doubted; but there can be no doubt that it couldhave invoked these
provisions l,in order to allege irregularities in the conduct of the
Trust, quite independently of the Trust's prospective termination,
and even if there had been no immediate question of that. In short,
allegations of irregularities in the conduct of the Trust, whether
justified or not, retain their status as such whatever the aim with
which they are made.
Moreover, even if it is literally true that Article 19 speaks of
disputes about "the provisions" of the Trust Agreement, and that
there are no express provisions about termination, 1 think that
eventual termination must be regarded as being inherent in the
declared aim of the Trust, namely of "progressive development to-
wards self-government and independence" (see Article 76 (b) of the
Cnited Nations Charter, and the reference in Article 3 of the Trust
Agreement to the "basic objectives of the International Trusteeship
System laid down in -4rticle 76 of the...Charter"). Since the attain-
ment of these ends "in accordance with the freely-expressed wishes
of the peoples" (Article 76 (b)) is regarded as being, if not the
whole object, at any rat6 the chief raison d'être of the Trusteeship
System, it seems to me difficult not to regard steps taken for that
purpose, or in the actual process of its realization (plebiscites, etc.),
as being an implied part of the whole conduct of the Trust. 1would
therefore have to hold that the jurisdictional clause of the Trust
-4greement must be regarded as covering disputes about the termi-
nation of the Trust, if 1 regarded that clause as relating to the
conduct of the Trust at al]. I have thought it right to go into this
' Assuming, that is, for purposes of the argument, that19rofthe Trust
related tohese provisions at all.
107matter, since some emphasis was laid upon it in the arguments of
the Respondent State.
2. The questionoj settlementby negotiationor othermeans.
Article 19 required, finally, that the dispute should be one that
could not be settled "by negotiation or other means", and was not.
The right to have recourse to the Court, and the competence of the
Court to entertain the claim, therefore depended on, and could not
arise unless and until, attempts to satisfy this condition had been
made and had failed.
(a) Was thereany such settlement?
It has been contended that the whole matter was in fact settled
"by other means", namely when the United Nations Assembly
adopted resolution 1608 (XV) of21 April1961. As will be indicated
presently (p. 123), the phrase "settlement ...by other means" in
Article 19, strictly denotes a settlement arrived at by the parties
themselves, by or through other means than negotiation (e.g.conci-
liation, arbitration,etc.), which they have agreed to resort to-rather
than a settlement arrived at independently by some third entity,
with or without their concurrence. Nevertheless, this contention of
the Respondent State isa material one requiring consideration. More-
over, there is a good deal inthe Judgment of the Court indirectly to
warrant, or lend colour to it, although the Judgment is not based
on it,but rather on the different, if related, view that the resolution
of the Assembly, if it did not formally settle the dispute as such,
rendered it pointless, sothat any decision of the Court in regard to it
would be pointless too.
Rut it has to be observed that the pointless character of the dis-
pute did not arise solely from the termination of the Trust under
Assembly resolution 1608. An essential ingredient was also the
absence of any claim for compensation or other reparation for
the damage supposedly caused by the form this termination took,
allegedly in consequence of the irregularities committed by the Res-
pondent State in the conduct of the Trust. Therefore, the fact that
resolution 1608constituted one of the elementsrendering the dispute
pointless or without object would not, since the resolution was only
part ofwhat was necessary for that purpose, suffice to demonstrate
that it constituted in itself a complete and final settlement of the
dispute.
However, the Respondent State's contention that it did, is
evidently well founded on the assumption (which was also part
of the Respondent State's case, and accords with my own view)
that the Applicant State had no separate rights in its individual,
108 120 JUDG. 3 XII 63 (SEP. OPIX. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)
statal, capacity under the conduct of the Trust provisions of the
Trust Agreement, but had rights only under the national rights
provisions. On that basis (which was the one contended for by the
Respondent State-correctly inmy view), it was the United Nations
alone, as an entity, and as the sole party to the Trust Agreement
(apart from the Administering Authority) which, with the consent
of the latter, was entitled to deal with the general conduct of the
Trust, including its termination, and to "settle" any disputes about
such matters. 011 that basis, the matters here in question were
indeed settled by Assembly resolution 1608.
But equally, on that basis, it would of course become irrelevant
whether the dispute was so settled or not, since (on that basis) it
would not be a dispute to which Article 19 applied at all. The con-
tention that resolution 1608 settled the dispute for the purposes
of Article 19isrelevant only on the assumption that, under theTrust
Agreement, the separate Members of the United Nations, in their
individual capacity as such, didhaverights in relation to the general
conduct of the Trust which they could assert through the medium
of Article 19.
If that assumption had to be made, then 1 would find myself
unable to accept the Respondent State's contention that resolution
1608 settled the dispute-for if the Applicant State did indeed
possess separate individual rights in relation to the conduct of the
Trust, distinct from those of the United Nations as an entity, the
Assembly could not have been empowered to deal with or settle
a dispute between the Applicant State and a third party (the
Administering Authority) relating to those rights-at least \vithout
the consent of the Applicant State-which, by voting against
resolution 1608, did not give its consent to any settlement such
as might result from the resolutionl. If, as the Respondent State
contended, the Applicant State's dispute was with the Assembly,
this was a separate and additional dispute; for the complaint of the
Applicant State was not merely that the Assembly decided to
incorporate the Northern Cameroons in the Federation of Nigeria,
but also that it was the (allegedly) irregular course of conduct
pursued by the Respondent State in the administration of the
Trust, which had led the Assembly to do this. Otherwise, it was
contended, the Assembly would have decided differently. If reso-
lution 1608 settled any dispute, it settled the dispute between the
Applicant State and the Assembly. The arrangements made under
that resolution for terminating the Trust, with the consent of the
l Whether the Applicant was "bound" by the resolution, in the sense that it
had to accept thfactof the terminatioof the Trust on the basis provifor in
debar it from pursuinany legal right of action it might have agthird partyuld
(the AdministeringAuthority) whose alleged wrongfulconduct was said to be
responsible for this result. Administering Authority, were necessarily res inter alios acta as
respects any dispute between that Authority and the Applicant
State, concerning any separate rights the latter might have in its
individual capacity, relative to the conduct of the Trust provisions
of the Trust Agreement.
The real truth is that the Applicant State did not individually
have any such rights, but had rights only in relation to the national
rightsprovisions of the Agreement, which were not, and never have
been, in issue in this case. The United Nations alone, as an entity,
had conduct of the Trust rights; and for that reason the Assembly
resolution settled the whole issue of the termination of the Trust.
The dispute between the Applicant State and the Respondent
State proceeded on the basis of the Applicant State's contention
that it enjoyed personally and individually certain rights under
the Trust which, in my opinion, it did not in fact possess. But, had
it done so, they would have been separate rights and a dispute
about them would have been a separate dispute l.
l Certain other considerations serve to bring out the separate character of the
dispute. It would seem that in the period Rlarch-April, 1961, the United Kingdom
as the Administering Authority, the United Nations Assembly as the supervisory
organ, and the Republic of Cameroon as a State geographically interested,were
al1 maintaining different, and in several respects divergent, attitudes about the
whole question of the termination of the Trust. The United Kingdom was willing,
but in no way specially anxious, that the Trust should be terminated at that time.
Its main preoccupation was that if the Trust was to be terminated, this should be
on a basis that was workable and, so far as possible, in accordance wifh, or at any
rate not contrary to, the wishes of the peoples concerned. The chief aim of the
Fourth Committee and Assembly of the United Kations was to terminate the Trust
on any terms that would give the Trust Territory independence, or voluntary in-
corporation in an independent African State. The Assembly was far more con-
cerned with terminating the Trust as soon as possible, on any reasonable basis,
than with the precise form the termination took.
The Republic of Cameroon, on the other hand, was primarily concerned with
the basis of termination. Rather than accept the form it did take, the Republic
would have preferred the Trust to continue, in so far as the Northern Cameroons
was concerned, and not to terminatc.
It seems therefore that three quite distinct attitudesexisted on the question of
termination: on the part of the United Kingdom, neutrality, that is willingness
either to terminate or to carry on, as the Assembly might direct: on the part
of the Assembly, a very definite desire to terminate on any reasonable and de-
fensiblebasis; but on the part of the Republic of Cameroon, a desirenotto terminate
except on the basis that the Northern Cameroons would go to the Republic.
Moreover, the essence of what the Republic of Cameroon has contended is that,
but for certain irregularities allegedlycommitted by the United Kingdom in the
II0 (b) Would theParties in any casehavehad any authority orcapacity
to settle the dispute by negotiation or other means?
The requirement that the dispute should be one that "cannot be
settled by negotiation or other means" is clearly meaningless as a
condition of the right to have recourse to the Court, and of the
competence of the Court to act if such a recourse is attempted, unless
two presuppositions are made. These are (1) that the dispute should
be one which, in its nature, is capable of being settled directly
between the parties by negotiation or other means (for if not, it
cannot be the kind of dispute contemplated by Article 19); (2) that
there shall have been at least some actual attempt at settlement
between the parties, by negotiation or other means, such as could
afford a basis for a finding by the Court that the dispute could not
be so settled, and that in consequence the Court was now competent
to settle it by means of a judicial decision. It is, orshould be, obvious
that a proposa1 for a reference to the Court, such as was contained
in the Applicant State's Note of I May 1961, addressed to the United
Kingdom Government, could not itself constitute an attempt at
settlement for the purposes of Article 19, since that Article made it
a pre-condition of any obligation to have recourse to the Court that
independent attempts at settlement should alreadyhave been made,
and have failed. It will be convenient to consider this latter question
first.
(i) Properly speaking, was any attempt at a settlevnentevermade,
other than proposal for a referenceto the Cozbrt?
Article 19 is an absolutely common-form jurisdictional clause
such as appears, or has appeared, in scores, not to Say hundreds,
of treaties and other international agreements. Its meaning is per-
fectly well understood by international lawyers the world over.
What it contemplates in the present connection is a settlement or
attempted settlement directly betweentheparties-by negotiation or
administration of the Trust, and in the conduct of the finalplebiscite, the outcome
would have been different, and the Assembly would have decided to incorporate
the Northern Cameroons in the Republic of Cameroon. Whether this would have
been the case or notcan only be speculative;but its relevance tothe jurisdictional
question is that the Republic is not seeking to reverse or impugn the validity of
the Assembly resolution terminating the Trust. What the Republic says in effect,
is that thisresolutionever would have been adopted, but for the alleged United
Kingdom maladministration of the Trust, and misconduct of the plebiscite.
It seems clear therefore thatese allegations on thepartcf the Republic involve
The allegations made by the Applicant State involved an issue such as the Assem-
bly was not entitled to settle, if the ApplicaState was entitled to make these
allegations. It was not in fact entitto make them because it had no individual
rights under the conduct of the Trust provisions of the Agreement. Had it had any,
they would necessarily have beenseparate from those of the United Nations,since
it is precisely in this, that their separate characwould have consisted. JUDG. 2 XII 63 (SEP. OPIN. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)
123
other means. By "other means" is meant such things as conciliation,
arbitration, fact-finding enquiries, andso on. LTnderArticle 19 of
the Trust Agreement, an attempt at settlement by negotiation,
or by one or other of these means, would have had to precede any
proposal for a reference to the International Court, before any
obligation to have recourse to the Court could arise. It is quite
clear that no such attempt at settlement, at least by any normally
envisaged "other means", was madein the present case ;and here it
may be useful to recall that in a common-form jurisdictional clause
such as Articl19, settlement by "other means" denotes a settlement
by means other than negotiation, but nevertheless by means such
as the parties have jointly a~reedto resort to or employ. It does not
include means imposed by the one party on the other, or on both
of them by an outside agency. The whole point of the ultimate
reference to the Court (to which the parties have duly agreed under
the jurisdictional clause) is that they have not been able to settle
the dispute themselves, by negotiation or agreed other means. To
meet that possibility, the parties have agreed in advance to one,
but only one, form of compulso~ysettlement-the ultimate reference
to the Court. They cannot (via the reference to "other means") be
held to have agreed inadvance to any other (necessarily unspecified)
form of compulsory settlement.
Was there any attempt at settlement by "negotiation", and
what does negotiation mean? It does not, in my opinion, mean a
couple of States arguing with each other across the floor of an
international assembly, or circulating statements of their complaints
or contentions to its member States. That is disputation, not
negotiation; and in the Joint Opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender
and myself in the South West Africa case, we gave reasons for not
regarding this kind of interchange as constituting a negotiation
within the contemplation of such a provision as Article 19 of the
Trust Agreement.
It was there equally pointed out that, even if it were possible to
regard such interchanges as constituting negotiation according to
the generally received concept of that term, it would still not be
right to hold that a dispute "cannot" be settled by negotiation,
when the most obvious means of attempting to do this, namely
by direct discussions between the parties, had not even been tried-
since it could not be assumed that these would necessarily fail because
there had been no success in what was an cntirely different, and cer-
tainly not more propitious, milieu. Now the only direct interchanges
between the parties in the present case were the Notes of May 1961.
II2124 JUDG. 2 XII 63 (SEP. OFIN. SIR GERALD FITZ>IAURICE)
The purpose of these Notes, however, was not negotiation on the
substance of the dispute, but to consider whether there should be
an agreed reference to the Court. These Notes did not even contain
any proposa1 for, or discussion of, a possible basis for settlemerit.
If they involved any negotiations at al], it was about the method
of adjudicating the dispute-i.e. the possibility of an agreed reference
-to the Court by means of a compromis-not ?-boutthe substance of
the dispute itself.
There were also two significant admissions made on behalf of the
Applicant State. In the fi~st place, it was conceded, and indeed
strenuously contended, that the proceedings in the United Nations
Assembly in March-April1961, were quite separate and distinct from
the dispute between the Parties before the Court, and could in no
way constitute a settlement of that dispute. But in that case, how
could the statements and discussions in the Assembly, or made for
the purpose of those proceedings, constitute a negotiation relative
to the quite separate matter of the dispute subsequently referred
to the Court? And if they consequently did not, and if the May
interchange of Notes was not a negotiation, as clearly it was not,
what negotiation ever at any time took place? Evidently none.
The second admission made on behalf of the Applicant State-iI
admission is here the correct term-is that the dispute did not
crystallize-did not even receive birth until May 1961, that is until
after the adoption of Assembly resolution 1608. If that is so, theri
since it is not possible to negotiate in relation to a non-existent
dispute, nothing that took place previous to May 1961 could have
constituted a negotiation concerning the actual dispute now before
the Court; while the May interchange of Notes constituted not a
negotiation but the reverse.
(ii) Was tlzedispute one that was in its natzire capable oj settle-
nzeqztEetweenthe parties alone, by .izegotiutio?i?othevwzeans?
The really important matter, howe~rer,in relation to the question
of a possible settlement, is that ârising on the first of the pre-suppo-
sitions mentioned on p. 122 above ;for there isclearly no purpose in
asking whether any attempt at settlement by negotiation or other
means ever took place, if the dispute was one which the Parties in
any event never could have had the capacity or authority tn settle
by their own joint action. Clearly, thetype of clispiite contemplated
by Article 19 must have been one which the Parties coztld have
settled by negotiation or other means, if they could reach agreement
onthe terms ofsettlement ; or if they could agree on the other nieans
of settlernent (such as arbitration, conciliation. fact-finding com-
113mission, etc.), and if they agreed to abide by the result. It follows
therefore, that if the disputeas of such a character that the Parties
would not have been entitled to settle it as between themselves
by any of these n~ethods, and without reference to, and agreement
by, some other entity, such as the United Nations, then it cannot
be a dispute of the kind contemplated by Article 19, and falls
outside the scope of that provision. In short, the dispute must
relate to matters or interests which the Parties could freely deal
with themselves, if so minded and able to reach agreement. The
moment it appears that i~ino circumstances could the Parties ever
have settled the matters in dispute between them by any joint
exercise of their own free wills, it becomes apparent, and follows
necessarily, that such a provision as Article 19 can have no appli-
cation.
In the Joint Opinion in the Sozfth West A/Y'EC~case, reasons were
given (I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 551-552) for thinking that questions
relating to the conduct of any Mandate would, precisely, constitute
an order of question having implications going far beyond the scope
of any particular dispute between the mandatory Power and anotlier
Member of the League, and therefore as beins incapable of inde-
pendent settlement between them. Exactly similar considerations
apply in the case of disputes over the conduct (or termination! of
any Trust. But there are certain differences between the two cases
which cal1 for consideration. These arise partly from the peculiar
position of the Republic of Cameroon in the present case, as com-
pared with that of the two Applicant States in the Sozlth West
Africa case, and partly from a certain difference of wording in the
texts of the two respecti~re jurisdictional clauses.
Since in the Solith Wesi dfrica case, the two Applicant States
possessed literally no interest whaterer that was not possessed by
any other Member of the United Nations (because only conduct of
the Mandate provisions were involved), it seemed impossible to
hold (as the Judgment of the Court in that case must imply) that
these two States would have, or ever could have had, the capacity
to settle with the then Respondent State (South Africa) the issues
regarding the conduct of the Mandate raised by their Applications.
In the present case, the Republic of Cameroon, racially and geo-
graphically had an interest of its own, not possessed by other
Members of the Vnited Nations, and it might be argued that it and
the Administering Authority had the capacity to settle a dispute
regarding this individual interest. As has already been noted how-
ever, at the time when attempts to settle the dispute might have
been made, this interest was inextricably interwoven with the whole
question of the conduct and termination of the Trust, and of the
Trusteeship System in general-matters which the Parties to the
present proceedings could not possibly have been entitled to dea!with or regulate igiterse, whatever the strength of any persona1
interest they, or either of them, niight have possessed.
The type of settlement contemplated by Article 19 was of course
such a settlement as might have been a~rived at, by or between the
Parties (or resulting from their joint action) previous to the date on
which the Application to the Court was made, but which was not so
arrived at. It has to be asked therefore whethzr, at any material
time previous to 30 May 1961, the Parties could possibly have had
any right or capacity to settle the subject-matter of the Came-
roon complaint between theni. Even if the Administering Authority
had been willing to agree that the territory in question should go
to the Republic of Cameroon, what capacity or authority could it
possibly have liad to do a sort of private deal with the Republic
to that effect,when the Assembly was actively exercising its corpo-
rate powers in regard tothat very same matter-powerr wliich ithad
both a right and a duty to exercise under the United Nations
Charter, to which both the Republic of Cameroon and the United
Kingdom were parties? The question lias only to be asked, for it to
be immediately apparent that it was not for these Sta.tes to regulate
such matters, which must therefore have been quite outside the
scope of Article 19.
The other difference between the present case and the South
West Africa case is that Article ; of the Mandate for South West
Africa spoke only of a dispute that could not be settled "by negoti-
ation", whereas P,rticle 19 speaks of one that cannot be settled by
negotiation "or other means". It might be contended therefore
that, even if it is the fact that this type of dispute (i.e. about the
conduct or termination of the Trust) is inherently incapable of being
settled by negotiation between the parties, stiU it cannot have
been inherently incapable of settlementby any means at all-for in-
stance, precisely, byactionin, or by the action of, the United Nations.
The answer to tl:is coiltention has, in effect, already been given-
seepp. 119and 123above. It would involve an erroneousinterpretation
of the notion of settlement by "other means" in ajurisdictional clause
suchasArticle 19. The term "settlement", as has been seen, denotes
settlement between, or by the action of, the parties; or by methods
jointly resorted to by them. Eut it is clear that the Parties in the
present case would no more, by themselves, have had the right to
settle this class of dispute by these "other means", than to do so by
private negotiation. The conclusions of a fact-finding or conciliation
commission, or arbitral tribunal, could not in any way have dealt
with the United Nations interests involved, which altogether tran-
scended those of the Parties, and which migfit have been quite at
variance with those conclusions. Nor could these conclusions in any
way have bound the United Nations. Inshort, whetherby negotiation,
or by other means, there could not have been anj7 real settlement
through the action of the Parties alone. There was no question of
115their referring the matter to the United Nations-it was already
there. But had there been any such reference, this could only have
implied a recognition of the fact that only theVnited Nations could
deal with the matter, which consequently exceeded the scope of
Article 19.
THE OBJECTION ''RATION5 TEMPORIS"
\
Since, in my view, the Applicant State aoes not have the right
to invoke Article 19 of the Trust Agreement at al1in respect of the
matters to which the Application relates, andthe Court consequently
lacks jurisdiction to go into the merits of any part of it, it becomes
strictly unnecessary to consider any preliminary objection which
might arise on the substance of the claim, such as the objection
ratione temporis advanced by the Respondent State, to the effect
that al1that part of the Applicant State's complaint which relates
to acts or events having taken place previous to the date when it
became a Member of the United Nations-(:'pre-membership" acts
or events) should be ruled out as inadmissible on that ground.
However, since the Parties devoted a considerable part of their
argument to this question, and it involves an important issue of
principle, 1propose to say something about it.
This objection, to my mind, concerns-tk admissibiiity of the
claim rather than the competence of the Court, and is quite in-
dependent of Article 19 of the Trust Agreement, in the sense
that even if Article 19 applied in principle to the present type of
complaint, and the Court had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint
of that type, the objection ratione temporis in respect of pre-
membership acts and events could still be advanced in order to
rule out in Limine that part of the complaint. The objection was
however treated by both sides in the case as a jurisdictional one;
and by the Applicant State as depending exclusively on Article 19,
in the sense that if, as Article19 required, the Applicant State was
a Member of the United Nations at the moment when the dispute
arose and on the date of the lodging of the Application, and if the
latter was lodged before Article 19 ceased to be in force because
of the termination of the Trust, then, seeing that Article 19 did not
in terms excludedisputes about pre-membership acts or events, the
Applicant State was automatically entitled to include complaints
about these acts and events in its Application. 128 JUDG. 2 XII 63 (SEP. OPIN. SIR GERALD FITZ~IAURICE)
The view that the matter turns wholly on Article 19 is, in my
opinion, certainly incorrect. In their nature, questions of admissi-
bility relating to the substance of a claim cannot be disposed of
simply by a finding that the jurisdictional clause is in principle
applicable. Thus a plea of non-exhaustion of local remedies, or as
to the "nationality" of a claim l, could be advanced and could
operate to rule out the claim as inadmissible, even though al1 the
requirements of the jurisdictional clause were met (so that the
Court could proceed to the ultimate merits but for these non-
jurisdictional objections). Indeed, preliminary objections of this
kind cannot, unless the case has some exceptional feature, be heard
at al1 unless the Court has jurisdiction (see pp. 103-105 above).
Since the validity of admissibility objections normally depends
on considerations lying outside the jurisdictional clause as such,
it is obviously immaterial that the latter has not specifically made
the absence of any such grounds of objection a condition of the
Court being able to proceed to the ultimate merits. The silence of
the jurisdictional clause simply leaves the matter open, to depend
on general principles of law, or possibly on other provisions of the
instrument concerned. Thus in the present case it is immaterial,
and in no way conclusive, that Article 19 did not in terms exclude
pre-membership acts and events from its scope. The truth is that
Article 19 would have had expressly to include them, in order to
rule out a priori any objection to them based on independent
grounds. The case of reservations or conditions ratione temporis
contained in Declarations made under the Optional Clause of the
Court's Statute is quite a different one, and not in point, for reasons
to be stated in a moment.
Turning now to the substance of the particular objection ratione
temporis advanced in the present case, it is clear that it could not
apply to the whole complaint, since part of the latter concerns acts
and events taking place subsequent to the Applicant State's
admission to the United Nations ("post-membership" acts or
events), e.g. in connection with the conduct of the plebiscite in the
Northern Cameroons. The objection is however advanced in respect
of the most important part of the Applicant State's complaint,
which alleges irregularities in the conduct of the Trust (virtually
lLe., that the claimant State is making a claim in respect of an injury to a per-
son or Company not of its nationality.
117since its inception), but for which the result of the plebiscite would
allegedly have been different.
In my opinion, the validity of the objection ratione temporis in
respect of the pre-membership acts and events depends on whether
the Applicant State is making a separate and independent claim
in respect of these, or is only citing them in order to establish,
or as part of the process of establishing, or as relevant to its com-
plaints about, the post-membership acts and events. In so far as the
Applicant State is not making use of the earlier matters for the
last-named purpose only, but is making them the basis of indepen-
dent complaints, the claim must, to that extent, be considered in-
admissible. The reason is, briefly, that since the Applicant State
did not exist as such at the date of these acts or events, these
could not have constituted, in relation to it, an international wrong,
nor have caused it an international injury. An act which did not,
in relation to the party complaining of it, constitute a wrong at the
time it took place, obviously cannot ex post facto become one.
Similarly, such acts or events could not in themselves have con-
stituted, or retroactively have become, violations of the Trust
in relation to the Applicant State, since the Trust confers rights
onlÿ on Members of the United Nations, and the Applicant State
was not then one, nor even, over most of the relevant period, in
existence as a State and separate international persona.
It u-as argued that when States make a Declaration under the
Optional Clause of the Statute, accepting the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction, they must in terms exclude from the scope of that
acceptance disputes relating to past acts, events or situations,
if they intend that there shall be such an exclusion, or else must
expressly relate their acceptance to the future only. This however
proves nothing. These Statesare already in existence, and admitting
that if their Declaration does not exclude the past, this will be
regarded as covered-nevertheless it would still be the case that
this could be so o+zlyin respect of those particular past acts, events
or situations (previous to the Declaration in question) which took
place after the State making it had itself come into existence, and
therefore couldhave rights or obligations relative to those past acts,
events or situations. In relation to anything having occurred pre-
vious to its existence as a State, there uould be no right or obliga-
tion that could be invoked under an Optional Clause Declaration.
A State might indeed perhaps have worded its Declaration in such
a way that it could, technically, be taken before the Court in such
a case, but even if the Court was formally competent, so far as the
actual language of the two relevant Declarations went, the claim
itself would have to be ruled out as inadmissible so soon as it be-
came clear that it related to a period in respect of which it was im-
possible npriori for the defendant Stateto be under any obligation. Similarly, States cannot, by accepting the Optional Clause,
create rights for themselves in respect of a period previous to their
existence as States. If they were then in existence, they naturally
could have rights in respect of acts and events then occurring, and
could later on invoke an Optional Clause Declaration for the
purpose of asserting those rights, in any case where there had been
no express exclusion of the past under the Declaration of the other
party to the dispute. But in relation to a period in respect of which
there were no rights, none can ever arise, unless by express agree-
ment, and no express exclusionis necessary. The whole issue is not
one of the applicability as such of the jurisdictional clause or
Optional Clause Declarations involved, but of whether, a priori,
there exist, or could exist, any rights for the assertion of which
(via the Court) these provisions exist. Much more could be said on
this subject; but if the position were not as here stated, there
would be no limit to the antiquity of the matters in respect of
which claims could constantly be made, and perpetually be liable
to be re-opened.
In the present case, it comes to the same thing in practice
whether the conclusion is ut in the form that the AL1licant State
is precluded from making any claim in respect of pre-membership
acts or events, or in the form that complaints relative to these
must be ruled out as inadmissible, except for their probative effect
in connection with the admissible post-membership claims. Now,
according to the way in which the Republic of Cameroon framed its
submissions, both in the original Application and at the close of
the oral hearing, it was undoubtedly making various pre-member-
ship acts and events a separate and independent ground of com-
~laint. These were indeed an essential element of the claim taken
is a whole, and the Applicant State was asking the Court to pro-
nounce upon them as such. Had the Court decided to examine
the claim, 1 consider that these complaints would have hadto be
ruled out as inadmissible. On the other hand, had the Court pro-
ceeded to the merits on the remaining (post-membership) portion
of the claim, then the earlier actsand eventscould, sofar asrelevant,
have been cited by the Applicant State in support of, or to assist
in establishing, that part of the claim which was admissible ratione
temforis.
1conclude by saying that, while 1 have thought it desirable to
deal with thematters considered in Parts IV and V of this Opinion,
this does not affect my earlier expressed view that the Court itself
was right not to do so, for the reasons given on pp. 104-106 above.
(Signed)G. G. FITZMAURICE.
SEPARATE OPINION OF
JUDGE SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE
1 agree with the decision of the Court in this case, and 1 also
consider that the main ground for it, as stated in the Judgment
(namely that the claim is not of a character to engage the Court's
judicial function), forms a correct and sufficient basis for the
decision. 1 have however certain additional remarks to make, and
also an additional ground for reaching the same conclusion. Finally,
because of the particular considerations on which the Judgment
is founded, the Court has not thought it necessary to consider
whether it would have jurisdiction to entertain the claim if the
grounds of objection mentioned in the Judgment did not exist.
While 1think the Court was right in this, 1have reasons for wanting
to deal with the main jurisdictional issues indicated in the submis-
sions of the Parties.
In this opinion, Parts 1 and II (pp. 97-100, and 100-108) contain
my additional observations on the basis of the Court's decision.
Part III (pp. 108-111) gives my additional ground for reaching the
same conclusion. InPart IV(pp. 111-127) 1consider the jurisdictional
issues arising on Article 19 of the Trusteeship Aqreement for the
former British Cameroons; and in Part TT(pp. 127-130) 1discuss the
objection rationetemporis advanced by the Respondent State to the
admissibility of a part of theclaim.
"MOOT" CHARACTER OF THE CASE.
THE QUESTION OF REPARATION
It has been obvious from the start that this case had certain
very unusual features, arising from the combined facts that the
Applicant State's claim or request related to a situation which was
not merely in the past, but wholly terminated and non-recurrent,
and which for al1practical purposes was so at the date of the Appli-
cation; while at the same time thelatter contained no claim for any
compensation or other form of reparation in respect of the illegali-
ties alleged to have been committed during the period when this
The term"moot" is here used in the sense given to it in Ameriter-legal
minology, as denotincase or claim whis or has become pointless and without
object.
86OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE
[T~aduction]
Je m'associe à la décision rendue par la Cour en l'espèce et je
suis aussi d'avis que le motif principal sur lequel elle se fonde,
tel qu'il est exposé dans l'arrêt (et d'après lequel la demande
n'est pas de nature à mettre en jeu la fonction judiciaire de la Cour)
constitue une base exacte et suffisante. J'ai néanmoins certaines
autres observations à faire et je voudrais indiquer une raison
supplémentaire de parvenir à la même décision.Enfin, étant donné
les considérations spéciales sur lesquelles repose l'arrêt, la Cour
n'a pas estimé nécessaire de rechercher si elle aurait compétence
pour connaître de la demande au cas où les chefs d'exception
mentionnés dans l'arrêt n'existeraient pas. L'attitude de la Cour
me parait fondée sur ce point mais j'ai des raisons de vouloir
traiter des principales questions touchant à la compétenceque les
Parties ont indiquées dans leurs conclusions.
Les première et deuxième parties (pp. 97-100, et 100-108)de la
présente opinion contiennent les observations supplémentaires que
je voudrais faire sur la base de la décision de la Cour. Dans la
troisième partie (pp. 108-111) j'expose la raison supplémentaire
que j'ai de parvenir à la même conclusion. Dans la quatrième
partie (pp.III-IZ~), j'étudielesquestions relatives à la compétence
que pose l'article19 de l'accord de tutelle pour l'ancien Cameroun
britannique. Dansla cinquième-partie (pp. 127-I~o), j'examine I'ex-
ception ratione temporis que 1'Etat défendeur a soulevéequant à la
recevabilité d'une partie de la demande
LE CARACTÈRE KMOOT» ' DE L'AFFAIRE.
LA QUESTION DE RÉPARATION
Il est apparu dès le début que l'affaire présentait certains traits
fort inhabituels résultant de la combinaison des, faits suivants:
d'une part, la réclamation ou la demande de 1'Etat demandeur
concernait une situation qui non seulement étaitpasséemais encore
avait entièrement pris fin et ne pouvait plus sereproduire, situation
qui en pratique avait déjà à tous égardsce caractère à la date de la
requête; d'autre part, la requête ne contenait aucune demande
d'indemnisation ou de réparation sous quelque forme que ce soit,
l Le terme emoots est ici utilisé au sens qui lui est donné dans la terminologie
américaine et s'applàqune affaire àuune demandequi est, ou est devenue,
inutile et sans objet.
86situation wasstill actively in existence. Nor was any attempt made
to introduce such a claim at any later stage of the proceedings l.
This combination makes the case almost unique in the annals of
international litigation. It concerns alleged breaches of an inter-
national agreement, the Trusteeship Agreement for the former
British Cameroons. Now, it is in no way singular that an allegation
that a breach of treaty has occurred, should not be accompanied
by any claim for compensation or other reparation, where the
treaty is still in force and operating; for in that case, any finding in
favour of the plaintiff State functions as a prohibition on the con-
tinuance or repetition of the breach of treaty, and this may be al1
that is required, and in any event makes the judgment effective 2.
Moreover, the latter necessarily operates as a finding about the
correct interpretation or application of the treaty, and therefore
servesa useful and effective legal purpose during the life-time of the
treaty.
Equally, it would be quite normal to allege in respect of a treatÿ
that was no longer in force, that breaches of it which occurred
during its currency had caused damage to the plaintiff State, for
which the latter claimed compensation or other reparation. In the
absence of sucli a claim however, the issue of whether there was a
breach of the treaty while it was still in force, could only be an
academic one: a judgment on that issue, even if favourable to the
plaintiff State, could create no rights or obligations for either party
to receive, enjoy, do or refrain from doing anything. Nor would the
treaty any longer be in existence, so that the judgment could have
no operative relevance by way of declaring the treaty's correct
interpretation or application. Such a judgment could at most
afford a moral satisfaction to the party in whose favour it was pro-
nounced, and could at most have an academic interest, however
high its authority as a pronouncement of law. But courts of law
are not there to make legal pronouncements in abstracto,however
l It is not proposed to discuss here whethethe framing of such a claim would
infact have been practicable at all, orso, would have been permissibleat a later
stage than that of the initial ApplicatioWhat was quite clear throughout, w-as
that there had been no error or oversight. On the contrary, it was insisted in the
most positive manner that the Applicant State was notaçking for anything but a
declaration that theRespondent State had administered the Trust irregularly.
This also applies to what may occur in cases such as the Corfu Channel case,
where the Court, though finding that a violation of territoriasovereignty had
taken place, awarded no compensation or other reparation (none was requested),
lation constituted"in itself an appropriatesatisfaction".This declaration,how-vio-
ever, though it related to a past anirreversible event, was also relevant to a still
continuing situation in which a repetition of the violation of sovereignty could occur,
and it had operative legal effect as a prohibitionor interdiction on any such
repetition.This was quite a different case from the present one. à raison des illégalitésprétendument commises à l'époqueoù cette
situation existait bien. On n'a pas essayénon plus de présenter une
demande en ce sens à un stade ultérieur de la procédure l.
Cette combinaison rend l'affaire quasiunique dans les annales du
contentieux international. Il s'agit d'allégations selon lesquelles
un accord international - l'accord de tutelle pour l'ancien Camer
roun britannique - aurait été violé. Or, il n'est nullement
étrange qu'une assertion relative à la violation d'un traité ne
s'accompagne pas d'une demande d'indemnisation ou de réparation
sous une autre forme lorsque le traité est toujours en vigueur et en
cours d'application, car alors toute constatation en faveur du deman-
deur a pour effet d'interdire que la violation du traité se poursuive
ou se répète - c'est peut-être là tout ce qu'on recherche; en tout
cas cela donne au jugement un caractère effectif 2. En outre, le
jugement constitue nécessairement une constatation sur le point de
savoir si le traité a été bien interprété ou appliqué; par suite il a
une utilité et une efficacité sur le plan juridique pendant tout le
temps où le traité est en vigueur.
Il serait de mêmetout à fait normal d'alléguer, à propos d'un
traité devenu caduc, que des violations survenues pendant sa vali-
dité ont causéun préjudice à 1'Etat demandeur, lequel, de ce fait,
réclame une indemnisation ou une autre réparation. En l'absence
d'une telle réclamation, cependant, la question de savoir s'il y a eu
violation du traité pendant qu'il était en vigueur ne peut avoir
qu'un caractère académique: un jugement rendu sur ce point, même
en un sens favorable à 1'Etat demandeur, ne pourrait donner le
droit ou imposerl'obligation à aucune des parties de recevoir ou d'ob-
tenir quoi que ce soit, de faire ou de s'abstenir de faire quoi que ce
soit.Le traitéaurait de son côté cesséd'exister, de sorte qu'en disant
si le traité a étécorrectement interprété ou appliqué le jugement
ne pourrait avoir aucun intérêt pratique. Un tel jugement pourrait
tout au plus fournir une satisfaction d'ordre moral à la partie en
faveur de laquelle il serait rendu; il pourrait tout au plus présenter
un intérêtacadémique, quelle que soit d'ailleurs son autorité en
-
1 Je ne me propose pas d'étudier ici si, en fait, il eût étépossible de formuler
une telle demande ou si, dans l'affirmative, il eût été permis de le faire postérieure-
ment au dépôt de la requête initiale. Ce qui n'a cessé d'être fort clair, c'est qu'il
n'y a eu ni erreur ni inadvertancAu contraire, on souligné dela manière la plus
nette que l'État requérant ne demandait rien qu'une déclaration selon laquelle
I'État défendeur avait irrégulièrement administré territoiresous tutelle.
Cela vaut également pour des situations comme celles qu'on a rencontrées dans
l'affaire du Détroit defozcoù la.Cour, tout en constatant qu'il yavait euviolationde
souveraineté territorian'a accordé niuneindemnité,niuneautre réparation (aucune
n'était demandée) et a déclaré que sa constatatiquant à la violation constituait
«en elle-même une satisfaction approprié» (C. I. J. Reczteil 1949, pp. 35-36). Mais
si cette déclaration avait tràun événementpassé et irréversible, elle s'appliquait
aussi à une situationqui durait puisquela souveraineté pouvait être de nouveau
violée: elle avait un effet juridicelui d'interdire ou de prohiber toute nouvelle
trouvons ici.ce genre. C'étaitun cas fort différent de celui dans lequel nous nous
87great their scientific value as such. They arethere to protect existing
and current legal rights, to secure compliance with existing and
current legal obligations, to afford concrete reparation if a mong
has been committed, or to give rulings in relation to existing and
continuing legal situations. Any legal pronouncements that emerge
are necessarily in the course, and for the purpose, of doing one or
more of these things. Otherwise they serve no purpose falling
within or engaging the proper function of courts of law as a
judicial institution.
Since, in the present case, it is the combination of the two
things-the process of alleging breaches of a treaty instrument due
to come to an end two days after the Application was filed, coupled
with the failure to claim any reparation for these alleged breaches,
that gives the case its special character-it is worth considering
certain other consequences of the latter circumstance, which would
immediately have come to light had the Court proceeded to the
merits, and which in my opinion have a direct relevance to the
question of the admissibility (or perhaps more appropriately in the
context-the examinability) of the Applicant State's request,
considered as such.
By not claiming any compensation, the Applicant State placed
itself in a position in which, had the Court proceeded to the merits,
the Applicant could have obtained a judgment in its favour merely
by establishing that breaches of the Trust Agreement had been
committed, without having to establish, as it would otherwise
have had to do (i.e. if reparation had been claimed) that these
breaches were the actual and proximate cause of the damage
alleged to have been suffered-that is the incorporation of the
Northern Cameroons in the Federation of Nigeria rather than in the
Republic of Cameroon; without, in short, having to establish the
international resPonsibility of the Cnited Kingdom for this out-
come. Neither in the Application or Mernorial of the Applicant
State, nor in its oral pleadings, did it do morethan seek to set up a
general presumption that if the United Kingdom, as Administering
Authority, had conducted matters differently, the result would have
been different. No proof of this was offered, nor even any real
prima facieevidence of it, and in the nature ofthe case it hardly could
have been. There are, moreover, aspects which suggest that not even ARRÊT 2 XII63 (OP. INDIV.SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE) 99
tant que prononcé de droit. Mais les tribunaux ne sont pas là pour
énoncerdes formules juridiques dans l'abstrait, si grande qu'en soit
la valeur scientifique. Ils sontà pour protéger des droits existants
et juridiquement valables, pour assurer le respect des obligations
existantes et juridiquement valables, pour accorder une réparation
concrètesiun préjudice a été co~mis ou pour prendre des décisions
ayant trait à des situations juridiques qui existent et doivent durer.
C'est nécessairement dans le cadre et aux fins de I'ufie ou de
plusieurs de ces activités qu'un prononcé juridique doit êtrefor-
mulé. S'il en va autrement, le prononcé ne répond à rien qui
mette en jeu ou implique la fonction normale de l'institution
judiciaire qu'est un tribunal.
Yuisque le cara.ctère particulier de la préserite espècetient à la
combinaison de deux éléments - allégations d'après lesquelles il
aurait été contrevenii à un instriirnent conventionnel devant venir à
expira.tion deux jours a?rè le dép5tde la requête d'unepart, absence
d'une demande de réparatior? da chef de ces prétenduesviolations
d'a~tre part - il est utile d'étudier certaines des conséquences
de ce deuxième élémentqui seraient immédiatement apparues si
la Cour avait procedéà iin exarnen au fond et qui, à mon avis, ont
un rapport direct avec la question de la recevabilité de la requête
de 1'Etat demandeiir c~nsidérke comme tell: (peut-être d'ailleurs
serait-il plus ap~roprié de parler, dans le contexte. d'a exami-
nabilité Y).
En ne réclaniant aucur,e inde~znisation, l'État demandeur s'est
placédans iirie situation telle que, si la Cour avait stâtué au fo~d,
il aurait pu obtenir une d(.,cisioncnça faveiir en établissant simple-
ment que des violations de l'accord de tutelle avaient étécommises;
il n'aurait pas eu à 4tablir -- ce qu'il aurait dû faire s'il avait de-
mandé une réparation -- que cits violatjons étaient la cause réelle
et directe dii préjudice aUép4, à savvir l'union du Cariieroun
septen.triona1 avec le FédCration de Nigéria et non avec la Républi-
que.du Cameroun; il c'aurait pas c~ien somme à établir 1sres9o.n-
sabditéinternationale dil Ro~,~aiamt-Ur? i.raison de ce fait. Ni dans
la requête,ni dans le mernoire, ni dans les plaidciries, 1'Etat deman-
deur n'a fait plus qui pser une pr6son:ptlon généraled'après
laque!le, si le Royaume-Uni, autorith zdrninistrante, avâit agi diffé-
remment, le résultat aurait été différent. Aucune preuve n'a été
offerte, auciinea.ppa.r.encedepreuve m&men'a été réellementfournie
et,vu la nature de l''affaire,cela n'efit guèreétS~ossible. Certainsfac-
teurs, au reste,donr~erità penser qu'une présomption en ce sens n'é-
tait pas même légitime.Bref, ce qui serait arrivé sitelle ou telle cir- a presumption to that effect could legitimately be drawn. In short,
it could onlyremain entirely speculative what would have happened
if this or that circumstance or action had been different l.
The point is that, on the basis of the Application as framed, and
without establishing any actual causallink between the irregularities
alleged and the damage complained of, the Applicant State could
have called for a judgment in its favour. The result isthat, had the
Court proceeded to the merits, andhad it considered the allegations
ofirregularities in the administration of theTrust, and in the conduct
of the plebiscite leading up to its terinination, to be justified, it
would have found itself in the position of being obliged to give
judgment against the Respondent State, irrespective of whether
these irregularities had been the cause of the damage complained of.
This is clearly not a position in which the Court ought to allow
itself to be placed. It is not the task of an international tribunal
to apportiori blame in vacuo, or to find States guilty of illegalities
except as a function of, and relative to a decision that these have
been the cause of the consequences complained of, for which the
State concerned is accordingly internationally responsible; or
except in relation to a still continuing legal situation in which a
pronouncement that illegalities have occurred may be legally
material and relevant.
THE RIGHT OF THE COURT NOT TO GIVE ANY FINDING
ON JURISDICTION. THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL
PROPRIETY
The Judgment of the Court in the present case is essentially
founded on the view that, irrespective of the Cou?trtJc som$etence
to gointo thewzeritsof thecase(and even if it is competent to do so),
l The majority in favour of joining the Federatioof Nigeria was broadly3-2.
It would have needed a heavy swing for this to be converted into a majority the
other way. Moreover, the very fact that as many as two out of every five voted to
join the Republic of Cameroon, tends to show that the vote was free and unin-
fluenced by anterior policies. This wequally the view taken in the independent
report of the universallyrespected UnNations Commissioner, AmbassadorAbdoh,
on which the General Assembly acted in framing its resolution No. 1608 (XV) of
21 April 1961. A further poinis that the Southern Cameroons, no less than the
Northern, had always been administered as an integral part of Nigeria. Yet this
did not prevent its population froopting to join the Republic of Cameroon, not
Nigeria.The presumption, if any, must be that the previous method of admin-
istration had littledirect bearing onthe result.Yet this previous method of
administration constitutedthe Applicant State'schief ground of complaint. ARRÊT 2 XII 63 (OP. INDIV. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE) IO0
constance, telle ou telle action avaient été différentes ne pouvait
relever que du domaine de l'hypothèse l.
L'important estque l'État demandeur aurait pu solliciter un juge-
ment ensa faveur sur labase delarequêtetelle qu'ill'aprésentée etsans
avoir à établir un rapport réel de cause à effet entre les irrégularités
alléguéeset le préjudiceprétendu. Par suite, si la Cour avait procédé
àl'examen au fond et avait considérécommejustifiées lesallégations
d'irrégularités concernantl'administration de latutelle et le déroule-
ment du plébiscite qui a mené à lalevéedela tutelle, elleseserait vue
obligéede rendre une décisiondéfavorable à 1'Etat défendeur, que
ces irrégularités aient étéou non la cause du préjudice incriminé.
C'est là manifestement une position dans laquelle la Cour ne
doit pas accepter de se trouver placée. Il n'appartient pas à un
tribunal international de prononcer un blâme dans le vide ou de
déclarer un Etat coupable d'illégalités,ci ce n'est dans le cadre et
à propos d'une décision précisant que ces illégalités sont la cause
des conséquences incriminées et que 1'Etat visé en est par suite
responsable sur le plan international, si ce n'est encore en liaison
avec une situation juridique qui doit durer et au sujet de laquelle
il peut être juridiquement utile et pertinent de dire que des illé-
galitésont étécommises.
DROIT QU'A LA COUR DE NE PAS SE PRONONCER
SUR LA COMPÉTENCE. LA QUESTION
DE LA FONCTION JUDICIAIRE
L'arrêtde la Cour en la présente espèceest essentiellement fondé
sur cette idéeque, indépendawmentdu point de savoir si la Cour a
compétence pour statuerau fond (et mêmesi elle a cette compétence),,
L'union à la Fédération de Nigéria a étédéciàéune majorité de trois contre
deux environ. Un renversement de majorité auraitnécessité un fortcourant.
De plus, le fait que deux électeurs sur cinq aient votél'union avec la Répu-
blique du Cameroun tendà montrer que le scrutin a étélibre et n'a pas étéinfluencé
par les mesurespriseantérieurement.C'est également l'opinion que le Commissaire
des Nations Unies, l'ambassadeur Abdoh, personnalité universellement respectée,
a indiquée dans le rapport indépendant sur lequel l'Assemblée générale s'est fondée
pour élaborer la résolution 1608 (XV)21avril 1961. Un autre facteur est celui-ci'
le Cameroun méridional ,ut comme le Cameroun septentrional,a toujoursété
administré comme partie intégrantede la Nigéria. Cela n'a pas empêchéla popu-
lation d'opter pour l'union avla République du Cameroun et non pour l'union
avec la Nigéria. Si l'on doit présumer quelqchose, c'est plutôt que le système
administratif antérieur'a guère eu d'influencdirecte sur le résultat. Or c'est
le système administratifantérieur qui constitule grief principade l'Étatde-
mandeur.
89the claim is of such a character that the Court ought not to entertain
it; or alternatively, that any decision that might be given by the
Court in favour of the Applicant State (and if none, then cadit
quaestio), cozdd only be of such a character that the Court ought
not, in the prevailing circumstances, to give it, and ought not
therefore to examine the claim at all. The Court has not, 1 think,
pronounced the claim to be formally inadmissible, but it has in
effect (to make use of the French term recez~abilité tr)eated it as non-
receivable or unexaminable because ofthe consequences (Le.strictly,
the lack of any) which would ensue if it was acceded to.
In my opinion, however, a claim which would and couldonly have
the outcome described in the Judgment of the Court (assuming
even, that there was a finding on the merits in favour of the claim),
must itself be regarded as inadmissible.
Underlying the Judgment of the Court thereare clearly consider-
ations of pro+riet?l,and this raises a general issue of pnnciple-that
is to Say, of how far and in what circumstances a court which has,
or may have, jurisdiction to go into a case, can and should decline to
exercise that jurisdiction (or even to consider the question of
jurisdiction) on the ground that it would not be proper for it to do
so in the circumstances. Although the Judgment refers to previous
cases in which the Court, or its predecessor the Permanent Court,
declined to pronounce on certain matters for reasons essentially of
unsuitability, and these cases are clearly relevant, 1 regard them
as not quite comparable to the present case, in which the position is
that, irrespective of its jurisdiction (and even if it has it), the Co~rt
is declining altogether to exercise it, cr even to consider whether
it has any jurisdiction. This involves an issue familiar in connection
with requests for advisory opinions 1,but less so in the field of
international litigation, where it maji be argued that if a court is
competent in relation to a given case, it must exercise that compe-
tence, and must therefore consider the question of its competence.
This is a serious issue which requires to be dealt with, since it is in
a general way evident that courts exist in order to go into and
decide the cases they are both duly seised of, and have jurisdiction
to entertain, withorit picking and choosing which they will pro-
nounce upon, and which not 2.
l For a recent judicial affirmatof the right cf the Court to decline to give
an advisory opinionevenwherecompetent to do so, see the case of Certain Expenses
of tThe fact that jurisdictiis assumed, does not of course mean that the tri-
bunal concerned necessarily prcceeto hear and determine the merits, for it may
reject the claimin limine on some ground of inadmissibili(non-exhaustion of
localremedies, undue delay,operatiof atime-limit, etSuch a rejection however.
on grounds of this kind, is itself an exercise of jurisdiction.la demande a un caractère tel que la Cour ne doit pas en connaître;
ou sur cetteidée que toute décisionque la Cour pourrait rendre en
faveur de 1'Etat demandeur (si elle n'en rendait pas, cadit quaestio)
ne pourrait que revêtirun caractère tel que, vu les circonstances de
la cause, la Cour ne devrait pas la prononcer et ne devrait donc pas
du tout étudier la demande. La Cour n'a pas dit, je crois, que la
demande était formally inadmissible mais elle l'a considéréeprati-
quement (pourreprendre la notion française derecevabilité), comme
irrecevable ou cinexaminable » en raison des conséquences (ou plus
exactement de l'absence de conséquences) qui s'ensuivraient s'il
y était fait droit.
A mon avis, une demande qui n'aurait et ne pourrait avoir que
le résultat décrit dans l'arrêt de la Cour (mêmesi l'on suppose
qu'une décisionfavorable soit rendue au fond) doit être considérée
comme inadmissible.
A la base de l'arrêtde la Cour, il y a manifestement des raisons
tenant à ce qu'il lui paraTt approprié de faire, ce qui pose sur le
plan généralla question de principe suivante: dans quelle mesure
et dans quelles circonstances un tribunal qui a, ou peut avoir,
compétence pour connaître d'une affaire, peut-il ou doit-il refuser
d'exercer cette compétence (ou même d'examiner la question de
compétence) au motif qu'il ne serait pas approprié qu'il le fasse en
l'occurrence? Certes. l'arrêt mentionne des cas dans lesauels la
Cour ou l'ancienne Cour permanente ont refuséde se prononcer sur
certains points, en alléguant essentiellement qu'il ne conviendrait
pas qu'elles le fassent ;cesprécédentssont fortpertinents mais ils ne
me paraissent pas tout à fait comparables au cas présent où la
situation est celle-ci: indépendamment de sa compétence (et même
si elle a compétence), la Cour refuse del'exercer ou mêmed'examiner
si elle a compétence. Cela soulève une question courante lorsqu'il
s'agit de demandes d'avis consultatifs mais plus rare dans le
domaine du contentieux international où l'on peut soutenir que, si
un tribunal a compétence pour une affaire donnée, il doit exercer
cette compétence et donc examiner la question de sa compétence.
C'est là un problème important qui appelle un développement
car, d'une manière générale,il est évident que les tribunaux sont là
pour étudier et trancher les affaires dont ils sont dûment saisis
et qu'ils sont habilités à régler, sans pouvoir choisir celles sur les-
quelles ils se prononceront et celles sur lesquelles ils ne se pronon-
ceront pas 2.
Pour une récent& affirmatiodu droitqu'a la Cour de refuser de donner un
avis consultatif même si elle est habilàtle faire, voir Certaines dép~nsesdes
Nations Unies(C. 1.J. Recueil 1962, p. 155).
Le fait que le tribunal reconnaisse sa compétencene veut pas direnaturellement
que le tribunal va nécessairement statuer au fond, car il peut la demande
d'emblée pour un motif touchant à l'irrecevabilité (non-épuisemdes recours
internes, retard excessif, expirad'un délai, etc.). Mais rejeter une demande
pour un motif de ce genre revient, enàsexercer la compétence. No doubt there is a duty in principle for an international tribunal
to hear and determine the cases it is both seised of, and competent
to go into; and therefore, equally to consider the question of its
competence. But there must be limits to this duty. In order to
see what these may be, it will be necessary to discuss the general
relationship between jurisdiction or competence on the one hand,
and, on the other, the considerations which may cause a tribunal
to refuse to proceed to the merits.
The line between questions of jurisdiction (which basically relate
to the competence of the Court to act at all) and questions of
admissibility, receivability or examinability (which relate to the
nature of the claim, or to particular circumstances connected with
it) l is apt in certain cases to get blurred. For this reason, inter-
national courts have tended to decline to draw too hard and fast a
distinction, or to sub-categorise too rigidly the general category of
"preliminary objections", or else they have declared the distinction
to be of secondary importance 2; and there have certainly been
cases in which a claim has been pronounced to be inadmissible, even
though the objections on the score of jurisdiction had not been
fully disposed of, so that strictly the court might not be competent
to act at a11 3.Per contra, there have been cases in which a court
has found itself to be competent, yet has refused to proceed any
further, on what were essentially grounds of propriety 4.
A given preliminary objection may on occasion be partly one of
jurisdiction and partly of receivability, but the real distinction
and test would seem to be whether or not the objection is based on,
l See generally, British Year Book of Intevnational Law for 1958, pp. 8-25, and
Rosenne, The International Court of Justice, pp. 249-259.
See the Permanent Court in the Mavrommatis and Polish Upper Silesia cases
(P.C.I. J., Series A, No. 2, IO and No. 6,p. 19).
See the Interhandel case (Jurisdiction)I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 6, in which
the present Court upheld a plea of inadmissibility,although an objection t0 its
jurisdiction wasstill outstanding,and was never disposed of. The immediate re-
sult is the same, but not necessarily in the long run; for a successful object0on
the jurisdiction necessarilterminates the affair once and for all, whereas some
pleas of inadmissibilit(e.g. that local remedieshave not been exhausted) relate
to defects that may be cured by the subsequent action of the party concerned.
In the Monetary Gold case (I. C. J. Reports 1954, at pp. 31-33) the Court,
while expressly finding that jurisdictihad been conferred upon it by the Partles,
declined to exercise it because of the absence of another State which the Court
regarded as a necessary party to the proceedings. Il n'est pas douteux qu'en principe un tribunal international a
le devoir de trancher les affaires dont il est saisi et qu'il est habilité
à régler, et qu'il a donc aussi le devoir d'étudier la question de sa
compétence. Mais il doit y avoir des limites à cela. Pour voir quelles
sont ces limites, il faudra examiner d'une part le rapport d'ensemble
entre la compétence ou la juridiction, et d'autre part les autres
considérations qui peuvent amener un tribunal à refuser de statuer
au fond.
Il se peut que, dans certains cas, la délimitation ne soit pas très
nette entre les questions de compétence (quifondamentalement ont
trait au point de savoir si la Cour est habilitée à agir) et les ques-
tions d'admissibility, de recevabilité ou d'« examinabilité 1)(qui
ont trait à la nature de la demande ou aux circonstances particu-
lières la concernant) l.C'est pourquoi les tribunaux internationaux
ont eu tendance à refuser de faire une distinction trop stricte ou de
subdiviser en catégories trop ridiges les ((exceptions préliminaires »
ou bien ils ont déclaré que la distinction avait une importance
secondaire et il y a sans aucun doute eu des cas où une demande
a étéjugée irrecevable alors que les exceptions à la compétence
n'avaient pas étéentièrement tranchées, de sorte qu'à strictement
parler la Cour aurait pu n'avoir nullement compétence 3.Par con-
tre, il y a eu des cas où un tribunal qui s'était estimé compétent
a refusé cependant d'aller plus avant, pour des motifs tenant
essentiellement à ce qui lui paraissait approprié à sa fonction 4.
Il se peut qu'une exception préliminaire donnée concerne et la
compétence et la recevabilité; mais la distinction, le test réel, dé-
pend semble-t-il du point de savoir si l'exception repose ou est
l Voir en général British Year Book of International Law, 1958, pp8 à 25, et
Rosenne, The International Court of Justice, pp. à259.
Voir les arrêts de la Cour permanente danles affaires Mavrommatis et Haute-
Silésie polonaise (C.P. J.I., sArino 2, p. IO, et no 6, p. 19).
Voir l'affaire de l'lnterhandel (exceptions préliminaires) (C.I. J. Recueil 1959,
p. 6) dans laquelle la Cour a admis une exception d'irrecevabilitébien qu'une
des exceptions à la compétence fût en suspens et n'ait jamais ététranchée. Si le
effet, lorsqu'elest retenue, une exceptioneàlla compétence met fin définitive-
ment à une affaire alors que certaines exceptions d'irrecevab(par exemple le
non-épuisement des recours internes) concernent des défauts auxquels la partie
intéressée peut éventuellement remédier par la suite.
Dans l'affaire dl'Ormonétaire (C. I. J. Recueil 195pp. 31-33)où la Cour a
dit expressément que les Parties lui avaient conféré compétence, eile a refusé
d'exercer cette compétence en raison de l'absence d'un autre État dont elle con-
sidérait la présence l'instance comme nécessaire. or arises from, the jurisdictional clause or clauses under which the
jurisdiction of the tribunal is said to exist. If so, the objection
is basically one of jurisdiction. If it is founded on considerations
lying outside the ambit of anÿ jurisdictional clause, and not
involving the interpretation or application of such a provision,
then it will normally be an objection to the receivability of the
clairn (see further in Part V hereof).
1 have however pointed out elsewhere l that the classification
of preliminary questions into the two categories of jurisdictional
questions and admissibility questions is oversimplified, and can be
misleading when it comes to considering and determining at what
stage and inwhat order given objections, of eitherkind, can properly
be acted upon-for each category is capable of subdivision into (a)
questions which, while remaining preliminary (in the sense of
preliminary to the merits), are substantive in character, and (b)
questions wliich are of a wholly antecedent or, as it were, "pre-
preliminary" character. Considerations of propriety or suitability
will certainly figure amongst the latter. Thus in the jurisdictional
field, there is the substantive or basic jurisdiction of the Court
(Le. to hear and determine the ultimate merits), and there is the
possibility of (preliminary) objections to the exercise of that
jurisdiction. But also, there is the Court's preliminary or "inci-
dental" jurisdiction (e.g. to decree interim measures of protection,
admit counterclaims or third-party interventions, etc.) which it
can exercise even in advance of any determination of its basic
jurisdiction as to the ultimate merits; even though the latter is
challenged; and even though it may ultimately turn out that the
Court lacks jurisdiction as to the ultimate mei-its 3.Although much
(though not all) of this incidental jurisdiction is specifically provided
for in the Court's Statute, or in Rules of Court which the Statute
empowers the Court to make, it is really an inherent jurisdiction,
the power to exercise which is a necessary condition of the Court-
or of any court of law--loeing able to function at all. Kevertheless,
there mayin particular casesbe objections (which would accordingly
be of a pre-preliminary character) to the Court being entitled to
exercise this power in relation to some specific part of its incidental
jurisdiction. For example. a request for interim measures nlay be
met either with a denial that, on their merits, these should be
granted, or with a challenge to the vightof the Court to grant them,
See for instance British Year Book of International Law for 1958,pp. 56-60.
There may be intermediate issues of merits-e.g.where interim measures of
protectionare requested,but the necessity for them is contested othe merits.
This occurred in the Anglo-IranianOz1 Company case, in which the Court
granted a requestfor the indication of interim measures in advance of a.ny decision
such competence (I.C.J. Report1951, at pp. 92-93);ut in the subsequent juris-ld have
dictionaI phase of the case the Court decided that it had not-whichentailed
automatically the canceiiation of the interim measures (I.C.J1952,at pI14).fondée sur la clause ou les clauses juridictionnelles en vertu des-
quelles on prétend établir la compétence. Si tel est le cas,l'exception
porte essentiellement sur la compétence. Si elle repose sur des
considérations extérieures à une clause juridictionnelle et ne met-
tant pas en jeu l'interprétation ou l'application d'une telle disposi-
tion, il s'agira normalement d'une exception à la recevabilité de la
demande (voir la partie V ci-après).
J'ai souligné ailleurs lque la classification des exceptions prélimi-
naires en deux catégories, selon qu'elles ont trait aux questions de
compétence ou aux questions de recevabilité, est simpliste et peut
êtretrompeuse lorsqu'il s'agit de considérer et de déterminer à quel
stadeet dans quel ordre il convient de réglerdes exceptions données
de l'une ou l'autre catégorie; car on peut encore subdiviser chaque
catégorie et distinguer: a)les questions qui, tout en restant préli-
minaires (en ce sens qu'elles sont préliminaires à l'examen du fond)
ont un caractère de fond; et b) les questions qui sont à tous égards
préalables et, en quelque sorte, d'un caractère (pré-préliminaire D.
Entrent à coup sûr dans cette dernière catégorie les considérations
tenant à ce qu'il est convenable de faire. C'est ainsi que, sur le plan
juridictionnel, il existe une compétence de fcnd oz de base
(consistant à se prononcer sur ce qui est le fond cirréductible ))2,
et que des exceptions (préliminaires) àl'exercice de cette compétence
peuvent être présentées. Mais il existe aussi une compétence
$réliminair oue ((incidente » (faculté de prendre des mesures
conservatoires, d'accepter des demandes reconventionnell~s ou des
interventions de tiers, etc.) que la Cour peut exercer avant même
d'avoir statué sur sa compétence quant au fond ((irréductible D,
mêmesi cette dernière est contestée et mê~xes'il se révèleen fin
de compte que la Cour n'a pas compétence à cet Pgard 3.Bien que la
compétence incidente soit en grande partie (maispas entièrement)
prévue en termes exprès dans le Statut de la Cour ou dans le
Règlement que le Statut autorise la Cour à arrêter, il s'agit en
réalitéd'une compétence inhérente; la faculté de l'exercer est un
élément indispensable au fonctionnement de la Cour comme à celui
de n'importe quel tribunal. Néanmoins, il peut y avoir, dans des
cas particuliers, des exceptions d'après lesquelles la Coar n'au:-ait
pas le droit d'exercer cette faculté qüa~it à l'un des aspects particu-
liers de sa compétence incidente (ces exceptions auraient par suite
un caractère (pré-préliminaire 1))Ainsi on peut répondre à une
l Voir par exemple British Year Book of International La1958,pp. 54-60.
Ilse peut qu'il y ait des questions intermédiairestouchant au fond, par exemple
lorsque des mesures conservatoiresont demandées mais que leur nécessité est
contestée au fond.
Le cas s'est produit dans l'affairl'dn,olo-iruniaw Gil Co. où la Cour a fait
droità une demande en indication de niesures conservatoavaiit toute décision
sur sa compétence quant au fond «irréductible>, admettaqu'elle pourrait auair
cette compétence (C.I. J. Recueil 1951,p92-93);mais, dans la phase ultérieure,
la Cour a décidé qu'ellen'avait pas cette compétence, ce qui a entraîné automatique-
ment l'annulationcies mesures coriservatoires (C. I.J. Recueip.1114).or the propriety of its doing so in the given case-in effect a juris-
dictional issue l.
It is thus clear that arising from its seisin-that is to Say from
the fact of being duly seised of a case by means of a formally
valid application stating the grounds of the claim, and the grounds
upon whjch it is contended that the Court is competent to entertain
it 2, the Court, irrespective of its substantive jurisdiction in re-
lation to the ultimate merits, becomes immediately possessed of
a preliminary competence enabling it to do a variety of things in
relation to the case.
It is in pursuance of this preliminary competence, which, as 1have
said, is really inherent in the functioning of any court of law, that
the Court must be considered to have acted in the present case in
declining to examine the claim, irrespective of its competence to do
so. But in considering how far the Court is entitled to act in this
way, irrespective of, and without deciding, the question of its
competence, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are also differ-
ent categories of preliminary objections of a non-jurisdictional
character, and that the category of questions of receivability is
itself sub-divisible.
The essence of any preliminary objection (andthis applies as well
to receivability as to jurisdictional objections) is that, if good, it
holds good and brings the proceedings to an end 3, irrespective of
the plaintiff State's ability to prove its case on the merits. But
in the field of admissibility or receivability, some objections clearly
cannot, or ought not, to be gone into or decided until after the
competence of the tribunal is fully established; whereas others can,
and must, be taken in advance, and irrespective of any determina-
tion of competence. An example of the former category would be
pleas of inadmissibility closely connected with the merits, such as
the objection ratione temporis in the present case, whereby it was
sought to exclude in limine any complaints about acts or events
taking place prior to the Applicant State's admission to the United
Nations (see Part V hereof). Another case would be a plea of
inadmissibility relating to defects which are capable of being cured
1 According to its settled jurisprudencethe Court will not insist on its juris-
diction in respect of the ultimatemerits being amrmatively established before
it grants a request for interim measures. On the other hanit will not granthe
request if it is clear, even at that stage, that there is not any possible basis on which
it couldbe competent as to the ultimate merits-see British Year Book ofInter-
national Law for 1958, pp. 109-114.
Statute, Article 40; Rules of Court, Artic32.
Except of course where the objection is joineto the merits or in the type
pf case mentioned in note 3 on p.102. ARRÊT 2 XII 63 (OP. INDIV. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE) IO4
demande de mesures conservatoires en disant que ces mesures ne
doivent pas êtreaccordées au fond ou en contestant soit le droit
de la Cour de les accorder, soit qu'il convienne de le faire en
l'espèce - ce serait là une question juridictionnelle l.
Il est donc clair qu'à la suite de la saisine - c'est-à-dire le fait
que la Cour est dûment saisie d'une affaire par la voie d'une requête
valable en la forme, qui indique les motifs de la demande et les
motifs sur lesquels on s'appuie pour prétendre que la Cour est
compétente - la Cour possède immédiatement, et indépendam-
ment de sa compétence quant aux élémentstouchant irréductible-
ment au fond,une compétencepréliminaire qui l'autorise àprocéder
à des actes divers à l'égardde l'affaire.
C'est dans le cadre de cette compétence préliminaire, laquelle,
comme je l'ai dit, est réellement inhérente au fonctionnement de
n'importe quel tribunal, qu'on doit considérer que la Cour a agi en
l'espèce lorsqu'elle a refuséd'examiner la demande, toute question
de compétence à part. Mais, quand on recherche dans quelle mesure
la Cour est justifiée à agir de la sorte, indépendamment de toute
question de compétence et sans que celle-ci soit tranchée, il faut
se rappeler qu'il existe aussi plusieurs catégories d'exceptions
préliminaires d'un caractère non juridictionnel et que la catégorie
des questions de recevabilité peut êtreelle-même subdivisée.
Il est de l'essence d'une exception préliminaire (relative à la
recevabilité ou à la compétence) qu'elle met fin à l'instanceT3si
elle est jugée fondée et si elle est retenue - et cela que 1'Etat
demandeur soit ou non en mesure de prouver au fond que sa re-
quête était justifiée. Mais, s'agissant de la recevabilité, il est évi-
dent que certaines exceptions ne peuvent ou ne doivent pas être
examinées ou tranchées avant que la compétence du tribunal soit
pleinement établie, alors que d'autres peuvent et doivent être
envisagées au préalable et indépendamment de toute décision sur
la compétence. On peut donner comme exemples d'exception de
la première catégorie: les exceptions d'irrecevabilité étroitement
liées au fond, telle que l'exception ratione temporis en l'espèce,
en vertu de laquelle on cherche à exclure d'emblée tout grief con-
cernant des actes ou des événements survenus avant l'admission
de 1'Etat demandeur aux Nations Unies (voir la partie V
Ilest de jurisprudencconstante que la Cour n'exige pas que sa compétence
soit positivement établquant au fond t irréductiblavant de faire droià une
demande de mesures conservatoiresD'autre partelle ne fait pas dàola requête
s'il est clair, même stade, qu'il n'y a pas la moindre base sur laquelle elle pourrait
étayer cettecompétence au fond. Voir British Year Book ofInternational Law,
1958, pp. 109-114.
Statut, ar40; Règlement, art.32.
Sauf bien entendu lorsque l'exception est jointe au fond, ou dans le genre ae
cas prévu à la note 3, 102.by appropriate action, such as a plea of non-exhaustion of local
remedies: if the plaintiff State is able to cure the defect, it would
obviously be absurd for it to return to the Court, only to find that
the latter then declared itself to be incompetent on jurisdictional
grounds. Therefore, al1 jurisdictional issues should be disposed of
first in such a case l.
There are however other objections, not in the nature of objec-
tions to the competence of the Court, which can and strictly
should be taken in adz,anceof any question of competence. Thus a
plea that the Application did not disclose the existence, properly
speaking, of any legal dispute between the parties, must precede
competence, for if there is no dispute, there is nothing in relation
to which the Court can consider whether it is competent or not.
It is for this reason that such a plea would be rather one of ad-
missibility or receivability than of competence. In the present
case, this particular ground of objection arose as one of competence,
because the jurisdictional clause invoked, namely Article 19 of the
Trust Agreement, itself required the existence of a dispute. But
irrespective of the particular language of the jurisdictional clause,
the requirement that there must be an actual dispute in the proper
sense of the term, and not merely (for instance) a simple difference
of opinion, is a general one, which must govern and limit the
power of any tribunal to act. For reasons 1 shall give later, 1
consider that there \vas not, in this sense, a dispute in the present
case.
Very similar considerations apply to the plea thatthe Application
should not be entertained on the ground that, owing to events
occurring since it was filed, it has manifestly lost al1raison d'Are-
that it has become "moot"-so that a decision on the merits
would be objectless. There would clearly be an element of absurdity
.in the Court going through al1 the motions of establishing its
jurisdiction, if it considered it must then in any event decline to
examine the claim on this ground, however competent it might be
to do so. Thisground is in fact one of tliose on which the Court has,
and rightly, declined to act in the present case.
In the same way, if the Court considered (asit didin the hlonetary
Goldcase-supra, p. 102, note 4) that because of the absence of a
necessary party, it could not examine the claim, this is a conclusion
which would make a decision on competence unnecessary 2, and
lThat this was not done in the Interhandel case (see fo3,p.102 above), was
obj,ection ostensibly leopen.and allegedly "moot" statusof the jurisdictional
Except where a joinder of the party in questionwas possible and seemed
probable: for it would be pointleto effect the joinder unless the Court was-
petent-see pp. 102 and 104 supra, and footnote 3 on p.IO?. ARRÊT 2 XII 63 (OP. INDIV. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)
IO5
ci-après). On pourrait citer aussi les exceptions d'irrecevabilité
relatives à des défauts auxquels une mesure appropriée permet de
remédier, par exemple une exception fondée sur le non-épuisement
des recours internes: si 1'Etat demandeur peut remédier à ces dé-
fauts, il serait manifestement absurde quIil revienne devant la
Cour pour que celle-cise déclare alors incompétente pour desmotifs
tenant à la juridiction. Par suite, dans une affaire de ce genre, toutes
les questions juridictionnelles devraie~t êtrerégléesd'abord l.
Il est cependant d'autres exceptions n'ayant pas le caractère
d'exceptions à la compétence de la Cour qui peuvent et, à stric-
tement parler, doivent êtreexaminées firéalablementà toute ques-
tion de compétence. Ainsi, une exception d'après laquelle la re-
quête n'a pas révélé qu'il existait véritablement un différend entre
les parties doit êtrediscutée avant la compétence, car, s'il n'y a
pas de différend, il n'y a rien à propos de quoi la Cour puisse en-
visager sa compétence ou son incompétence. C'est pour cette rai-
son qu'une telle exception concernerait plutôt la recevabilité que
la compétence. En l'espèce, cette exception s'est présentée comme
une exception à la compétence parce que la clause juridictionnelle
invoquée, à savoir l'article 19 de l'accord de tutelle, exigeait elle-
même l'existence d'un différend. Mais, quel que soit le libellé
de la clause juridictionnelle, la condition d'après laquelle il doit y
avoir un différend réelau sens propre du terme et non pas seulement,
par exemple, une divergence d'opinions, est une condition géné-
rale qui s'impose nécessairement à tout tribunal et limite sa
faculté d'action. Pour des raisons que j'indiquerai plus loin, je
considère qu'en ce sensil n'y avait pas de différend en l'espèce.
Des considérations très semblables s'appliquent à l'exception
tendant à ce que la requête ne soit pas examinée motif pris de ce
que des événements survenus depuis son dépôt lui ont fait perdre
manifestement toute raison d'être, l'ont rendue «moot», de sorte
qu'une décision au fond serait sans objet. Il y aurait nettement
quelque chose d'absurde à ce que la Cour se donne le mal d'établir
sa compétence, si elle estimait que, même compétente, elle doit
en tout cas refuser d'examiner la demande pour la raison qui vient
d'êtreindiquée. C'est là en fait l'un des motifs pour lesquels la
Cour a refusé d'agir, avec raison, en la présente affaire.
De même,si la Cour estimait (comme dans l'affaire de l'Or mo-
nétaire,voir plus haut, p. 102, note 4) qu'en raison de l'absence d'une
partie indispensable, elle ne peut étudier la demande, cette conclu-
sion rendrait inutile toute décision sur la compétence 2;elle la ren-
l Si cela n'a pas étéfaitdans l'affaire de l'lnterhandel (voir note 3, p. 102), c'est en
raison de la nature spéciale et du caractère prétendmoot del'exceptiojuri-
dictionnelle que l'on a ostensiblement lpendante.
A moins qu'une jonction de la partie en questionpossible et semble pro-
bable: il serait en effet inutile d'y procéder si la Cour n'était pas compétente. Voir
pp. 102et 104 ci-dessus et note 3102.even impossible if the presence of that party was required not only
for a determination of the merits, but also of the question of
cornpetence-as the Court might well have held in the present case
in relation to the Federation of Nigeria.
A similar sort of position must arise where the objection touches
not so much the substance of the claini, asthe character of what the
Court is requested to do about it, having regard to the surrounding
circumstances-as for instance if the Courts asked to do something
which does not appear to lie within, or engage, its judicial function
as a court of law. In cases of this kind, the question of competence
or jurisdiction becomes jrrelevant, for it would be inappropriate,
and even misleading, for the Court to avoid the issue by simply
finding itself to lack jurisdiction, even if it did lack it; or alter-
natively, to find itself to be competent when it was manifest that
it could not in any event exercise that competence for a $riori
reasonstouching the whole nature of its function as an international
tribunal and judicial institution.
Itis in the manner above indicated that the dismissal of a claim
on what are essentially grounds of propriety, and irrespective of
competence, can be reconciled with the general rule that if the
Court is in fact competent, .it must exercise its competence and
proceed to the merits unless the claim falls to be rejectedfor some
reason of inadmissibility arising on its substance; for the issue of
propriety is one which, if it arises, will exist irrespective of com-
petence, and will make it unnecessary and undesirable for compe-
tence to be gone into, so that there will be no question of the Court
deciding that it has jurisdiction but refusing to exercise it.
There is another reason also for postulating a certain latitude for
the Court, on grounds of policy or propriety, to decline in limine to
entertain claims that it might be competent to go into, and which
might not be open to objection on grounds of straight inadmissi-
bility. In the general international legal field there is nothing cor-
responding to the procedures found under most national systems
of law, for eliminating at a relatively early stage, before they reach
the court which would otherwise hear and decide them, claims
that are considered to be objectionable or not entertainable or1
some a priori ground. The absence of any corresponding "filter" ARRÊT 2 XII 63 (OP. INDIV. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE) 106
drait- même impossible si la présence de cette partie était néces-
saire,non seulement aux fins d'une décisionau fond, mais aussi aux
fins d'une décision sur la question de compétence - comme la
Cour aurait fort bien pu l'admettre en l'espèceà propos de la Fédé-
ration de Nigéria.
On se trouve forcément dans une situation du même genre lors-
que l'exception porte moins sur le fond de la demande que sur
le caractère de ce que la Cour est priée de faire à ce sujet
eu égard aux circonstances - cela se produit par exemple si la
Cour est invitée à faire quelque chose qui n'implique pas ou ne met
pas en jeu la fonction judiciaire qui est la sienne comme tribunal.
Dans des cas de ce genre, la question de compétence ou de juridic-
tion devient sans pertinence, car il serait inapproprié et même fal-
lacieux que la Cour élimine la question simplement en constatant
qu'elle n'a pas compétence, mêmesi c'est bien le cas; ou que la
Cour s'estime compétente alors qu'il est manifeste qu'elle ne peut
en toute hypothèse exercer cette compétence pour des raisons
générales a firiori touchant à la nature de sa fonction comme tri-
bunal international et institutionjudiciaire.
C'est de la manière indiquée plus haut que l'on peut concilier
le rejet d'une demande pour des motifs tenant essentiellement à ce
qu'il convient de faire - et indépendamment de la compétence -
avec cette règle généraleque, si la Cour est en fait compétente,
elle doit exercer cette compétence et connaître du fond, à moins
que la demande doive êtrerejetée pour une raison d'irrecevabilité
tenant au fond; la question de ce qu'il convient de faire est en
effet,lorsqu'elle se pose, sans rapport avec la compétence et rend
inutile et indésirable un examen de la compétence, de sorte qu'il
ne sera pas question que la Cour décide qu'elle a compétence et
refuse de l'exercer.
Il y a une autre raison d'admettre que la Cour puisse dans une
certaine mesure, pour des motifs de politique généraleou sur la base
de ce qui lui paraît approprié, refuser d'emblée de connaître des
demandes qu'elle pourrait êtrehabilitée à examiner et qui pour-
raient ne pas êtresusceptibles de rejet pour des raisons de stricte
irrecevabilité. Dans le domainegénéraldu droitinternational, iln'y a
rien qui corresponde aux procédures applicables dans la plupart des
systèmes juridiques nationaux et où l'on prévoit l'élimination relati-
vement tôt au cours de l'instance, avant que le tribunal soit
appelé àtrancher, des demandes considérées comme inacceptables
95procedures in the Court's jurisdictional field makes it necessary
to regard a right to take similar action, on similar grounds, as
being part of the inherent powers or jurisdiction of the Court
as an international tribunal.
It has however been contended that the Applicant State's claim
in the present case zeiouldengage the Court's judicial function,
because a judgment in favour of that State could have effects, in
the sense that it could be put to someuse; and that in any case the
task of the Court is to declare the law (direle droit) and not to
concern itself with the effects of its decisions. This might be true
if the decision could have some legal effect. It is quite another
matter when it would manifestly be incapable of any effective
legal application at all, for it then becomes a decision of a kind a
court of law ought not in principle to render.
Evidently a judgment of the Court, even if not capable of effective
legal application, could have other uses. It could afford a moral
satisfaction. It could act as an assurance tothe public opinion of one
or other of the parties that something had been done or at least
attempted. There might also be political uses to which it could be
put. Are these objects of a kind which a judgment of the Court
ought to serve? The answer must, 1 think, be in the negative, if
they are the only objects which would be served--that is, if the
judgment neither would nor could have any effective sphere of legal
application.
It was also suggested on behalf of the Applicant State during the
oral hearing, that a judgment of the Court inits favour would, or at
any rate might, have a legal effect or possible legal application,
inasmuch as it mjght be made the basis of further proceedings,
before either the Court itself or some other international tribunal.
TVl-ietherthis would be the case can only be entirely speculative, and
the Court could not in any event render a judgment on a hypo-
thetical basis of this kind.
However, $rima jacie, and so far as can be seen at present, no
such further proceedings would be possible without the consent of
the Respondent State. Furthermore, it would seem that the Court
could not, on any subsequent request for an interpretation of its
judgment (if it had given one on the merits), declare by way of
purported interpretation, that the judgment gave rise to obligations
l It may exist in special caseinstance the European Convention Human
Rights provides for a screening proceduwhereby claims can be declared irre-
ceivable before ever they reachthe European Commission or Court of Human Rights. ou ne pouvant être examinées pour un motif a priori. Étant
donné l'absence d'un ((filtrage ))analogue dans le domaine juri-
dictionnel où la Cour se meut l, on doit considérer le droit de
prendre des mesuressemblables, pour des motifs semblables, comme
entrant dans les pouvoirs inhérents ou dans la compétence de
la Cour en tant que tribunal international.
On a cependant soutenu que la demande de l'État requérant
mettait effectivement en jeu, en l'espèce, la fonction judiciaire de la
Cour parce qu'un jugement en faveur de cet Etat pourrait avoir des
effets,en ce sens qu'onpourrait en faire quelqueusage ;et que, detoute
manière, la tâche de la Cour est de dire le droit et non de s'occuper
des effets de ses décisions. Cela pourrait être vrai si la décision
pouvait avoir quelque effet juridique. Mais il en va différemment
lorsque la décision ne pourrait manifestement avoir aucune appli-
cation juridique effective, car il s'agit alors d'une décision d'un
caractère tel qu'un tribunal ne doit pas en principe en rendre de
semblable.
Il va de soi qu'une décision de 13.Cour, mêmesi elle n'est pas
susceptible d'application juridique effective, pourrait êtreemployée
à d'autres usages. Elle pourrait fournir une satisfaction morale.
Elle pourrait servir à assurer à l'opinion publique de l'une ou l'au-
tre des parties que quelque chose a étéfait ou du moins tenté. Elle
pourrait êtreemployée aussi à des fins politiques. Mais est-ce là le
genre d'objectif qu'un arrpt de la Cour doit avoir? La réponse
doit être dgative, il me semble, si ce sont là les seules fins que
l'arrêt puisse servir et si. par suite, l'arrêt n'avait et ne pouvait
avoir aucun domaine d'apylication jz~rid-que.
On a ka"ement indiaué. au nom de 1'Etat demandeur. ' Ien da nt
la procédure orale, qu'un arrêtde la Cour favorable au demandeur
aurait ou, en tout cas, pourrait avoir un effet juridique ou une appli-
cation juridique dans la mesure où il pourrait constituer la base
d'une nouvelle instance soit devant la Cour elle-même, soit devant
un autre tribunal international. C'est !à une question qui re-
lève nécessairement de la spéculation pure, et la Cour ne pourrait
de toute façon rendre un arrêtsur une hase hypothétique de cegenre.
Quoi qu'il en soit, au premier aborc! et autant qu'on puisse le voir
maintenant, aucune autre instance de ce genre ne sera.it possible
sans 1'a.sseatiment de i'Etat 6éfendeu.r. En outre, il semble que, si
la Cour était ultérieurement saisie d'une requete portant sur l'in-
terprétation de son arrêt (au cas où elle aurait statué au
fond), elle ne pourrait, par la voie interprétative, dire que l'arrêt
---
Il peut en existedans des cas particulierainsi, la Convention européenne
des droits del'hoinnie prévoit une pr~cédure de filtrage, gàlaquelle des de-
mandes peuvent être déclarées irrecevables avant d'être portées devant la Com-
mission européenne ou la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme.
96 that had not been asserted in the original claim, and the merits
of which (having regard to the considerations set out in the second
half of Part 1of the present Opinion) would never have been gone
into. This would not be to interpret the judgment, but to give
effect to a new claim, ancl without any investigation of it as such,
or into the question whether the irregularities, on this hypothesis
found to have occurred, had actually been the cause of the result
complained of. In the Right of Asylum (Interpretation of Judgment)
case, the Court was emphatic that it could not, by way of inter-
pretation of its Judgment in the original Riglzt of Asylum case,
pronounce upon what was essentially a new claim. It said (I.CJ.
Refiorts 1950,at p. 403) that the gaps which the Applicant State
claimed to have discovered in its original Judgment were "in
reality ...new questions which cannot be decided by means of
interpretation. Interpretation can in no way go beyond the limits
of the Judgment, fixed in advance by the Parties themselves in
their submissions." The Court went on to Say that, in reality, the
object of the questions then being put to it was " to obtain by the
indirect means of interpretation, a decision on questions which
the Court was not called upon by the Parties to answer". Similarly
in the subsequent and related Haya de la Torre case (1.C. J. Reports
1951, at p. 79),the Court declared that questions "not submitted
to the Court [by the original application] and consequently ...
not decided by it" could not be made the basis of any deduction
"as tothe existence or non-existence of an obligation" resulting from
the original decision. In the present case, the question of any
obligation for the Respondent State to pay compensation or make
reparation in any other form, even if the alleged irregularities in
the administration of the trust territory were established, has not
been submitted to the Court, and does not form part of the claim.
III
THE QUESTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF ANY LEGAL
DISPUTE, PROPERLY SO CALLED
The Court could, in my opinioc, on another ground have reached
the conclusion that it could not examine the claim-namely that
there was not, properly speaking and in the legal sense, any dispute
between the Parties at the date of the Application to the Court.
1 cannot share the Court's view that there was a dispute, because
it seems to me, as 1 shall hope to show, that logically the very
same considerations which have led the Court to find that it would
be incompatible with its judicial function to entertain the claim,
97a donné naissance à des obligations non mentionnées dans la
demande initiale et que (compte tenu des considérations exposées
dans la deuxième moitié de la première partie de la présente
opinion) elle n'aurait pas examinées au fond. Cela serait non pas
interpréter l'arrêt mais donner effet à une demande nouvelle, sans
que celle-ci ait étéexaminée en tant que telle ou sans qu'ait été
étudiéela question de savoir si les irrégularités qui, dans cette
hypothèse auraient bien étécommises, avaient en fait étéla cause
du résultat incriminé. Dans l'affaire du Droitd'asile(Interprétation),
la Cour a nettement souligné qu'elle ne pouvait, par le biais d'une
interprétation de l'arrêt rendu dans la première affaire du Droit
d'asile, se prononcer sur ce qui était par essence une nouvelle
demande. Elle a dit (C. I. J.Recueil 1950 ,. 403) que leslacunesque
l'État demandeur croyait apercevoir dans l'arrêtde la Cour étaient
((en réalitédes points nouveaux sur lesquels il ne peut êtrestatué
par voie d'interprétation. L'interprétation ne saurait en aucun cas
dépasser leslimites de l'arrêttelles que les ont tracées d'avance les
conclusions des Parties. ))La Cour a ajouté ensuite qu'en réalitéles
questions qui lui étaient poséestendaient à «obtenir, par la voie
indirecte d'un arrêt interprétatif, la solution de questions dont la
Cour n'a pas étésaisie par les Parties en cause 1).De même,dans
l'affaire subséquente et connexe Haya de la Torre (C. I. J. Reczteil
1951, p.79), la Cour a déclaréque des questions qui ne lui avaient
pas étésoumises par la requêteinitiale et qu'elle n'avait donc pas
tranchées ne pouvaient servir de base à une conclusion quelconque
((relativeà l'existence ou àl'inexistence d'une obligation ))résultant
de la décisioninitiale. Dans l'affaire gui nous occupe, la question
relative à une obligation qu'aurait 1'Etat défendeur de verser une
indemnité ou de réparer sous une autre forme, - même si l'on
établissait le bien-fondé des allégations relatives aux irrégularités
aui se seraient ~roduites dans l'administration du territoire sous
tutelle - n'a pas étésoumise à la Cour et ne fait pas partie de la
demande.
III
LA QUESTION DE L'EXISTENCE D'UN DIFFÉREND
JURIDIQUE PROPREMENT DIT
A mon avis, la Cour aurait pu parvenir à la conclusion qu'elle ne
pouvait examiner la demande en s'appuyant sur un autre motif -
à savoir qu'il n'y avait, à proprement parler et au sens juridique,
aucun différendentre les Parties à la date àlaquelle la requêtea été
soumise à la Cour. Je ne puis partager l'opinion de la Cour selon
laquelle il y a eu différend, car il me semble- et j'espère le démon-
trer - que logiquement les mêmesconsidérations qui ont amenéla
Cour à constater qu'il serait incompatible avec sa fonction judiciaire
97 should also have led it to hold that there was not, in the proper
sense, any legal dispute. The two things are really different
aspects of the same basic juridical situation.
The question of the existence of a dispute would of course have
arisen on Article 19 of the Trust Agreement, if the Court had gone
into that provision. It is however, as 1 said earlier, a general ques-
tion, which must arise in any event since, unless there is in the legal
sense a dispute, there exists nothing which the Court, as a court
oflaw, can deal with, even for the purpose of determining its compe-
tence. On this point, and in order to show that the question is
one "which, strictly speaking, does not relate to the jurisdiction of
the Court: a problem which, indeed, arises prior to any question of
jurisdiction...",1 associate myself with the reasoning contained in
Part 1 of my colleague Judge Morelli's Dissenting Opinion in the
SozlthWest Africacase(Jurisdiction)-I.C. J. Reports1962, at pp. 546-
566.
It must be admitted however that it rnay not be easy in a given
case to Say whether a dispute exists or not-particularly where,
superficially, there riay now be al1the appearance of one. The Judg-
ment of the Court, in my opinion,proceedson the basis that since the
Parties take different views as to whether the United Kingdom did
or did not correctly administer the Tnst-one alleging and the
other denying this-there must be a dispute between them. This
seems to me to beg the question. That there should be difficulty
about the matter is due to the lack of any clear definition of what
is meant by a dispute for legal purposes. It is generally accepted
that if there is a dispute, it must have existed before, and at the
date of, the Application to the Court, and that the making of the
Application does not suffice per se to create a dispute. It is also
accepted that the mere assertion or denial of a dispute is not
sufficient in itself either to establish or refute its existence; and
further, that a dispute must involve something more than a mere
difference of opinion. Beyond that, there are only subjective ideas,
and there is little agreement on any objective test.
1 share the view expressed in Part II of Judge Morelli's Opinion
already referred to (I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 566-588), that there
is a minimum reqiiired in order to establish the existence of a
legal dispute, properly so called-that is (to come very close to
the language of the present Judgment itself) a dispute capable of
engaging the judicial function of the Court. This minimum is that
the one party should be making, or should have made, a complaint,
claim, or protest about an act, omission or course of condnct,
present or past, of the other party, which the latter refutes, rejects,
or de~iies the validity of, either expressly, or else implicitly by
persisting in the acts, omissions or conduct complained of, or by
fading to take the action, or make the reparation, demanded. If
98de connaître de la requête auraient dû l'amener aussi à dire qu'il
n'y a au sens propre aucun différend d'ordre juridique. Ce sont là
en fait deux aspects d'une mêmesituation de droit fondamentale.
La question de l'existence d'un différend aurait évidemment été
soulevée à propos de l'article 19 de l'accord de tutelle si la Cour
avait examiné cette disposition. Il s'agit là cependant, comme je l'ai
dit précédemment, d'une question généralequi doit de toute faqon
se poser car, s'il n'y a pas de différendau sens juridique, il n'existe
rien dont la Cour puisse connaître en tant que tribunal, même
en vue de se prononcer sur sa compétence. Sur ce point et afin de
montrer que c'est là un problème ((qui, à proprement parler, ne
concerne pas la juridiction de la Cour: d'un problème qui, au
contraire, est préalable à toute question de juridiction ..)),je
m'associe au raisonnement indiqué par mon collègue M.Morelli dans
la première partie de son opinion dissidente en l'affaire du Sud-
Ouest africain (Compétence) - C. I. J. Reczieil1962, pp. 564-566.
Il faut reconnaître cependant qu'il peut êtredifficile dans im cas
donné de dire s'il existe un différend 012 non - en particulier
lorsque superficiellement, toutes les apparences d'un différend
peuvent êtreréunies. L'arrêtde la Cour me semble reposer sur la
base suivante :puisque les Parties ont des opinions divergentes sur le
point de savoir si le Royaume-Uni s'est acquitté convenablement ou
non de l'administration de la tutelle - l'une affirmant que tel est
le cas et l'autre le contestant -, il doit y avoir différend entre elles.
Mais cela me paraît une pétition de principe. S'il y a une difficulté
à cet égard, cela provient de l'absence d'une définition claire de ce
que l'on entend par un différend à des fins juridiques. Il est géné-
ralement admis que, s'ily a différend, celui-cidoit avoir existé avant
la date de présentation de la requête à la Cour et exister encore à
cette date, et que le dépôt de la requête nesuffit pas àlui seul pour
créerun différend. Il est également admis que la simple affirmat'ion
ou dénégationd'un différend ne suffit pas en soi à prouver ou à
réfuter son existence et, en outre, qu'im différend doit comporter
quelque chose de plus qu'une simple divergence d'opinion. A part
cela,il n'y a que des idéessubjectives et l'on n'est guère d'accord sur
un critère objectif quelconque.
Je partage l'avis qui a étéexprimépar M.Morelli dans la deuxième
partie de son opinion déjà citée (C. I. J. Recueil 1962, pp. 566-568)
et selon lequel un certain minimum est requis si l'on veut établir
l'existence d'un différend juridique proprement dit - c'est-à-dire
(pour rester très près des termes de l'arrêt actuel) d'un différend
pouvant mettre en jeu la fonction judiciaire de la Cour. Il faut au
moins que l'une des Parties formule ou ait formulé, à propos d'une
action, d'une omission ou d'un comportement présents ou passés
de l'autre Partie, un grief, une prétention ou une protestation que
ladite Partie conteste, rejette ou dont elle dénie la validité, soit
expressément, soit implicitement en persistant dans l'action, l'omis-
sion ou le comportement incriminés, ou bien en ne prenant pas la
98mesure demandée, ou encore en n'accordant pas la réparation
souhaitée. Lorsque ces élémentsexistent, peu importe, comme l'a
dit M. Morelli, que la demande vienne d'abord et le rejet (exprès ou
résultant d'un certain comportement) ensuite, ou que le comporte-
ment soit le premier à apparaître et soit suivi d'une plainte, d'une
protestation ou d'une prétention à laquelleil n'est pas fait droit.
Cette définition, qui contient le minimum et qui suffit dans la
grandemajorité descas,ne fait toutefois pastrès clairement ressortir
l'élément essentielsans lequel, à mon avis, un différend ne peut
exister, l'élément à défaut duquel on ne peut prouver de façon
objective et indiscutable qu'il existe un différend juridique propre-
ment dit, l'élément en l'absenceduquel le soi-disant différend ne
saurait être qu'une simple divergence de vues sur des problèmes
d'intérêtthéorique, scientifique ou académique l.J'accepte, à cet
effet, la définition du différend juridique qui a étéprésentéepar
1'Etat défendeur en l'espèce - le Royaume-Uni - et qui à mon
sens contribue à éclaircir utilement un problème difficile. Selon
cette définition(que j'amenderailégèrement),iln'existe à proprement
parler de différend juridique (pouvant êtrepris en considération
par un tribunal et mettant en jeu la fonction judiciaire de celui-ci)
que si l'issue ou lerésultatdu différend, sous forme de décisionde la
Cozrr,peut affecter les intérêtsou les rapports juridiques des parties,
en ce sens que cette décision confèreou impose à l'une ou l'autre
d'entre elles un droit ou une obligation juridique (ou qu'elle con-
firme ce droit ou cette obligation), ou bien qu'elle joue le rôle d'une
injonction ou d'une interdiction pour l'avenir, ou encore qu'elle
constitue un élémentde détermination à l'égard d'une situation
iuridiaue continuant à exister.
Si l'on applique ce critère en l'espèce, alors qu'aucune indemni-
sation ni aucune autre forme de réparation n'est demandée, on voit
qu'une décisionde la Cour ne saurait comporter aucune indemni-
sation ou réparation ni aucun droit d'en recevoir, ni par conséquent
imposer aucune obligation à cet égard. Il ne saurait donc y avoir
aucun différendentre les Parties quant à l'existence d'un tel droit
ou d'une telle obligation. De même,la tutelle sur le Cameroun
septentrional étant levée,une décisionde la Cour ne saurait conférer
ni imposer aucun droit ni obligation à l'une ou l'autre des Parties
en ce qui concerne la gestion de tutelle ou en ce qui concerne
l'interprétation ou l'application de l'accord de tutelle. De même
encore, comme la base de la levéede la tutelle est irrévocable et que
ni l'une ni l'autre des Parties n'a le pouvoir d'y revenir ou de
la modifier, une décisionde la Cour ne pourrait en traiter. 11ne
peut donc y avoir aucun différend entre les Parties, que ce soit
du Sud-Ouest africaije, dois préciser qu'à partce point ses vues diffèrent l'affaire
des miennes. Il estime qu'il eun différend dans la présente affaire. since this is admitted to be irreversible, and no claim that it can
or should be altered is put forward.
In short, a decision of the Court neither would, nor could, affect
the legal rights, obligations, interests or relations of the Parties
in any way; and this situation both derives from, and evidences,
the non-existence of any dispute between the Parties to which a
judgment of the Court could attach itself in any concrete, or even
potentially realizable, form. The conclusion must be that there may
be a disagreement, contention or controversy, but that there is
not, properly speal~ing,and as a matter of law, any dispute.
To state the point in another way, the impossibility for a de-
cision of the Court in favour of the Applicant State to have any
effective legal application in the present case (and therefore the
incompatibility with the judicial function of the Court that would
be involved by the Court entertaining the case) is the reverse
of a coin, the obverse of which is the absence of any genuinedispute.
Since, u-ith reference to a judicial decision sought as the out-
come of a dispute said to exist between the Parties, the dispute
must essentially relate to what that decision ought to be, it follows
that if the decision (whatever it might be) must plainly be without
any possibility of effective legal application at all, the dispute
becomes void of al1 content, and is reduced to an empty shell.
ARTICLE 19 OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT.
THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION
Even if, for the reasonsgiven above, and in the Judgment of the
Court itself, did not consider that the Court is entitled to hold,
and right in holding, that it should not examine the claim of the
Applicant State, and need not go into the question of its jiiris-
diction to do so,1 should in any event hold that it did not possess
such jurisdiction, for broadIy the same reasons, mzhtutis mutandis,
as those contained in Parts V, VI and VI1 of the Joint Dissenting
Opinion which my colleague Judge Sir Percy Spender and 1 wrote
in the Soztth West Africa case (Jurisdiction)(I.C.J. Reports 1962,
at pp. 518-526 and 547-56~).
However, 1 share the view expressed by Judge Sir Percy Spender
in his Separate Opinion in the present case, that this case has
features of its own relative to the question of jurisdiction, that
require to be dealt with.1am in generalagreement with his Opinion
and associate myself with it1 can therefore confine my own remarks
to certain points1 specially want to make. Moreover, having regardau sujet de la gestion future de la tutelle (puisqu'elle n'existe plus)
ou de ce qu'il faudrait faire par rapportàla base de la levéede la
tutelle, car l'on admet que celle-ci est irréversible; nul ne prétend
qu'elle pourrait ou devrait êtremodifiée.
Bref une décisionde la Cour n'aurait ni ne pourrait avoir aucun
effet sur les droits, obligations, intérêtsou rapports juridiques
des Parties; cette situation découle- et témoigne - du fait qu'il
n'existe pas entre les Parties un différendauquel pourrait se rap-
porter un arrêt de la Cour sous une forme concrète ou même éven-
tuellement susceptible de réalisation. On doit en conclure qu'il
peut y avoir désaccord, opposition de thèses ou controverse, mais
qu'il n'y a, à proprement parler, sur le terrain du droit, aucun
différend.
Autrement dit, le fait qu'une décision de la Cour en faveur de
l'État demandeur ne pourrait en l'espèce avoir aucune application
juridique effective (etpar conséquent qu'il serait incompatible avec
sa fonction judiciaire que la Cour connaisse de l'affaire) est le
revers d'une médaille dont l'avers est l'absence d'un véritable
différend.
Puisque, s'agissant d'une décision judiciaire visant à trancher
un prétendu différendentre les Parties, le différenddoit se rattacher
essentiellement à ce que doit êtrela décision, il s'ensuit que, si la
décision (quelle qu'elle puisse être) doit être manifestement in-
susceptible d'application juridique réelle, le différend se trouve
dépourvu de tout contenu et n'est plus qu'une enveloppe vide.
L'ARTICLE 19 DE L'ACCORD DE TUTELLE.
LA QUESTION DE COMPÉTENCE
Mêmesi, pour les motifs exposés plus haut et dans l'arrêt de
la Cour lui-même, ilne me paraissait pas que la Cour est en droit
et, a raison de dire qu'elle ne doit pas examiner la demande de
1'Etat requérant et n'a pasà aborder la question de sa compétence
pour ce faire, je n'en estimerais pas moins qu'elle ne possède pas
cette compétence, essentiellement et mutatis mutandis, pour les
raisons indiquées dans les partiesV, VI et VII de l'opinion dissi-
dente commune que mon collègue sir Percy Spender et rnoi-même
avons rédigéedans l'affaire du Sud-Ouest africain (Compétence)
(C.1.J. Recueil 1962,pp. 518-526 et 547-563).
Cependant, je partage l'avis exprimé en la présente affaire
par sir Percy Spender dans son opinion individuelle, selon lequel
cette affaire offre certains caractères particuliedu point de vue
de la compétence dont il est nécessaire de traiter.Je suis dans l'en-
semble en accord avec son opinion et je m'y associe. Je puis donc
limiter mes propres observations à certains points que je veux par-to what is said in Judge Sir Percy Spender's Opinion, 1 need not
deal with the additional reasons which exist in the present case for
thinking that such clauses as Article 19 of the Trust Agreement
must be interpreted and applied so as to avoid the unreasonable
and impossible conflicts (of which the present case could have
afforded, and indeed did potentially afford, a conspicuous example)
liable to arise if the Court is regarded as having a concurrent
jurisdiction with the appropriate political'organ or organs, in order
to supervise the conduct of the Trust.
For the purposes of what follows, 1 shall assume that, contrary
to the views expressed in Part III above, there is a dispute within
the meaning of Article 19, since otherwise cadit quaestio.
I. The scopeof Article 19.
(a) Analysis of the firovisions of the Trust Agreement. What rights
did it conteron whnt Stutes or otlzeresztities?
The jurisdictional clause of the Trust Agreement for the former
British Cameroons, Article 19, was as follows:
"If any dispute whatever should arise between the Administering
Authority and another Member of the United Nations relating to
the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement,
such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation or other means,
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice provided
for in Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter."
Thecentral issue of jurisdiction arising on this clause (as on Article 7
of the Mandate for South West Africa l),is what are the provisions
here intended to be referred to by the words "the provisions of
this Agreement". In my opinion, these words must be read as if
they were followed by the phrase "in respect of which that Member
enjoys substantive rights under the Agreement". Before giving my
main reason for this view, 1 must briefly state the nature of the
Trust Agreement.
Like the former Mandates (andthe one remaining one), and like
most of the other Trusteeships, the British Cameroons Trusteeship
involvedtwo classes of provisions-that is of substantive provisions,
for Article 19, being a purely jurisdictional clause, stood by itself
But in the South West Africa case there was a second central issue arising on
the jurisdictionclause, which does not anse in the presentcase-I.CJ.Reports
1962, at pp. 504 ff.
Significantlyal1 those Trusteeshipwhich only contained provisions about
the administrationof the Trust in the interests of the populatiof the Trust
United Nations),did notcontain any jurisdictional adjudicationclause.f the ticulièrement mettre en lumière. Au surplus, eu égard à ce qui est
dit dans l'opinion de sir Percy Spender, je n'ai pas besoin de par-
ler des raisons supplémentaires existant en l'espèce pour lesquelles
on doit admettre que des clauses comme l'article 19 de l'accord
de tutelle doivent être interprétées et appliquées de manière à
éviter les conflits déraisonnables et absurdes (dont la présente af-
faire auraitpu fournir, et même avirtuellement fourni, un exemple
manifeste) qui risqueraient de s'élever si la Cour était considérée
comme compétente concurremment à l'organe ou aux organes po-
litiques appropriés pour surveiller la gestion de la tutelle.
Aux fins de ce qui suit, je supposerai que, contrairement aux
vues exprimées dans la partie III ci-dessus, il existe un différend
au sens de l'article 19 (autrement, cadit quaestio).
I. La portée del'article 19
a) Analyse des dispositions de l'accord de tutelle. Quels droits
conférait-il? A quels États ou autres entités?
La clause juridictionnelle de l'accord de tutelle pour l'ancien
Cameroun britannique - l'article 19 - était ainsi conçue:
cTout différend,quel qu'il soit, qui viendrait à s'éleverentre
l'Autorité chargée de l'administration et un autre Membre des
Nations Unies relativement à l'interprétation ou à l'application des
dispositions du présent Accord, sera, s'il ne peut être réglépar
négociationsou un autre moyen, soumis à la Cour internationale
de Justice, prévueau Chapitre XIV dela Charte des Nations Unies. »
La question centrale de compétence qui se pose à propos de
cette clause (comme à propos de l'article 7 du Mandat pour le Sud-
Ouest africain l)est celle de savoir quelles sont les dispositions que
l'on a voulu désigner par les termes (dispositions du présent Ac-
cord )).A mon avis, ces mots doivent êtrelus comme s'ils étaient
suivis de l'expression ((à l'égard desquelles ce Membre jouit de
droits de fond en vertu de l'Accord ».Avant de donner la prin-
cipale raison pour laquelle je suis de cet avis, je dois indiquer
brièvement la nature de l'accord de tutelle.
De mêmeque les anciens Mandats (dont le seul qui existe encore)
et de mêmeque la plupart des autres accords de tutelle, l'accord
pour le Cameroun britannique comportait deux catégories de dis-
positions - ou plutôt de dispositions de fond, car l'article 19,
Mais dans l'affaire du Sud-Ouest ajricain, une deuxième question centrale se
C. 1.J. Recueil 1962, pp. 504 et suivantes.t ne se pose pas en l'espèce. Voir
Il est significatif qu'aucun des accords de tutelle qui contenaient uniquement
des dispositionsur l'administration dla tutelle dans l'intérêt la population
du territoirsous tutelle (et ne conféraient pas de droits commerciou autres
aux Membres des Nations unies) ne comportait declause juridictionnelle.113 JUDG. 2 XII 63 (SEP. OPIN. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)
and apart £rom the substantive provisions. The two classes of the
latter were (u) provisions as to the rights and obligations of the
Administering Authonty (the Lnited Kingdom) for the adminis-
tration of the Trust in the interests of the population of the Trust
Territory-which it will be convenient hereinafter to call "conduct
of the Trust" provisions or articles; and (b) prox,isions in which
rights, mainly of an economic or establishment character (equality
of treatment. non-discriniination. ,ic"t to enter. travel or reside in
the Territory, to own property there, etc.), were conferred on the
Members of the United Nations as a class, for themselves individu-
ally as States, or for their nationals. It will be convenient herein-
after to call the pro~isions in this category "national rights" pro-
\-isions or articles.
The complaint of the Applicant State in the present case (as
with that of the two Applicant States in the Soutiz West dfrica
case) related exclusively to the former category of provisions
(conduct of the Trust). The Applicant did not invoke or make
any claim or complaint in respect of the national rights prox,isions
of Articles 9, IO, II and 13.
Three further points require to be stressed:
First, the mention of Members of the United Nations occurred
exclusively in the Articles conferring rights upon them in their
indixTidualcapacity or upon their nationals-Articles g,IO,Ir and 13.
They were not mentioned in any of the conduct of the Trust
pro~isions or even in those of the Preamble to the Agreement. Al1
these provisions referred only to the Administering Authority, or
to organs of the United h'ations such as the General Assembly or the
Trusteeship Council. Correspondingly, these organs wcre not nien-
tioned in any of the national rights articles, although the Ad-
ministering Authority naturally was. Thus it can be plainly seen
that one of these two categories of provisions (conduct of the
Trust) created a link exclusively between the Administering Au-
thority andthe Knited Nations as an entity, or certain of its organs;
while it was only the other category (of national rights provisions)
that created any link or contractual tie between the Administering
Authority and the Menzhersof the Cnited Nations individually.
Secondly, to make the picture thus presented even clearer, the
Trust Agreement was concluded by being embodied in a resolution
of the United Nations Assembly, and it has been common ground
throughout the present case that the sole entities formally parties
to it were the Administering Authority on the one hand, and the
United Nations represented by the General Assembly on the other,
and that the Members of the United Nations, as such, were notétant une clause purement juridictionnelle, était seul de son es-
pèce et indépendant des clauses de fond. Celles-ci étaient soit a)
des dispositions relatives aux droits et obligations de l'autorité
administrante (le Royaume-Uni) quant à l'administration de la
tutelle dans l'intérêtde la population du territoire sous tutelle
- qu'il sera commode d'appeler ci-après dispositions ou articles
ayant trait à (la gestion de la tutelle »; soit b) des dispositions par
lesquelles des droits, principalement de nature économique ou
d'établissement (égalitéde traitement, non-discrimination, droit
de pénétrer, de voyager ou résider dans le territoire, d'y posséder
des biens, etc.), étaient conférésaux Membres des Nations Unies
comme tels, pour eux-mêmes à titre individuel en tant quJEtats
ou pour leurs ressortissants. Pour des raisons de commodité, on
les désignera ci-aprèspar l'expression dispositions ou articles ayant
trait aux ((droitsrnationaux ».
Les griefs de l'Etat,demandeur dans la présente affaire (de même
que ceux des deux Etats demandeurs dans le cas du Sud-Ouest
africain) concernaient exclusivement la première catégorie de
dispositions (gestion de la tutelle). Le demandeur n'a pas invoqué
les dispositions relatives aux droit nationaux contenues dans
les articles 9, IO, II et 13 et n'a émisaucune prétention ou grief à
leur sujet.
Trois autres points sont à souligner:
Premièrement, il n'était fait mention des Membres des Nations
Lnies que dans les articles qui leur conféraient des droits à titre
individuel ou en conféraient à leurs ressortissants - articles 9,IO,
II et 13. Ils n'étaient citésdans aucune des dispositions (relatives
à la gestion de la tutelle) ni mêmedans celles du préambule de
l'accord. Toutes ces dispositions ne se référaient qu'à l'autorité
administrante ou à des organes des Nations Unies comme 1'Assem-
bléegénérale oule Conseil de tutelle. Inversement, ces organes n'é-
taient mentionnés dans aucun des articles sur les droits nationaux,
alors que naturellement l'autorité administrante l'était. Ainsi il
apparaît clairement que les dispositions relatives à la gestion de
la tutelle ne créaient un lien qu'entre l'autorité administrante et
l'organisation des Nations Unies en tant qu'entité, ou certains de
ses organes, alors que seules les dispcsitions sur les droits natio-
naux créaient un lien ou une relation contractuelle entre l'autorité
administrante et les A!lfemb~esdes Nations Unies pris individuel-
lement.
Deuxièmement, pour préciser encore les choses, la conclusion de
l'accord de tutelle s'est faite par incorporation dans une résolu-
tion de l'Assemblée desNations Vnies; et il a étécommunément
admis au cours de toute la présente affaire que les seules entités
qui fussent officiellement parties à cet accord étaient l'autorité
administrante d'une part et l'organisation des Nations Unies re-
présentée par l'Assemblée généralede l'autre, les Membres desindividually parties to the Agreement. The particular rights they
individually possessed under certain clauses of it (and those only)
were in effect "third-party" rights. It was admitted on behalf of the
Applicant State that the Members of the United Nations were third
parties in relation to the Trust Agreement, although it was sought
to argue that they were a "somewhat special" kind of third party.
But it was not seriously suggested that they could, in relation to
the Agreement derive direct individual rights from their corporate
Membership of the entity which alone was, and as such, a party
to the Agreement.
Thirdly, although the point is a lesser one, it is worth noticing
that, whereas the organs of the United Nations could be relied
upon to supervise the execution of the conduct of the Trust pro-
visions with which they were directly concerned, they might well
feel no particular interest in the enforcement of the national rights
provisions. It was in this latter respect that the role of the Court
under Article 19 was a necessary one. It was not in any other respect
necessary, given the functions to be carried out by the organs of the
United Nations in supervising the administration of the Trust-
functions involving a far closer control than any which the League
of Nations had exercised in respect of the former Mandates.
The situation just described can, in my opinion, lead to only
one valid legal conclusion, which is that to be stated in the next
sub-section.
(b) Did the Applicant State have the capacity to invoke Article 19
igzrespectof matters relating to the conduct of the Trust?
The real issue that arises on the scope of Article 19 is not what
provisions of the Trust Agreement it relates to (its actual language is
quite general) but under what provisions the individual Members of
the United Nations had rights which they could assert by invoking
Article 19. This must be so because it is axiomatic that a State can
only invoke the jurisdictional clause of an international agreement
in respect of, and in order to assert, rights which (whether as a
party to the agreement, or on a "third-party" basis) that State
possesses, under or in relation to one or more of the provisions of
the agreement. If there are provisions of the agreement relative to
which it is clear, a priori, that the State concerned has and canNations Unies en tant que tels n'étant pas individuellement par-
ties à l'accord. Les droits particuliers qu'ils détenaient individuel<
lement en vertu de certaines clauses de ce dernier (et de celles-là
seulement) étaient en fait des droits conférésà des ((tiers». Il a
étéreconnu au nom de 1'Etat demandeur que les Membres de
l'organisation des Nations Unies étaient des tiers par rapport à
l'accord de tutelle bien que l'on ait cherché à faire valoir qu'ils
appartenaient à une espèce ((un peu spéciale » de tiers. Mais
on n'a pas sérieusement donné à entendre qu'ils pourraient, pour
ce qui est de l'accord, tirer des droits individuels directs de leur
appartenance collective à l'entité qui était seule, et en tant que
telle, partieà l'accord.
Troisièmement, bien que ce point soit moins important, il vaut
la peine d'observer, que si l'on pouvait compter sur les organes des
Nations Unies pour surveiller l'application des dispositions sur la
gestion de la tutelle qui les intéressaient directement, il était fort
possible que ces organes ne s'intéressent pas particulièrement à
la mise en Œuvre des dispositions sur les droits nationaux. C'est
à ce dernier égard que le rôle de la Cour en vertu de l'article 19
était nécessaire. Il n'était nécessaire à aucun autre égard, étant
donné les fonctions que devaient remplir les organes des Nations
Unies pour la surveillance de l'administration de la tutelle- fonc-
tions comportant un contrôle beaucoup plus serré que celui que
la Sociétédes Nations avait exercé à l'égard desanciens Mandats.
La situation que je viens de décrirene peut àmon avis mener qu'à
une seule conclusion juridique valide, celle qu'énoncela sous-section
suivante.
b) é état demandeur avait-il qualité pour invoquer l'article 19
relativement à des questions concernant la gestion de la tutelle?
La véritable question qui se pose à propos de la portée de l'ar-
ticle19 est de savoir non pas à quelles dispositions de l'accord de
tutelle il se rapportait (son libellémêmeest très général),mais en
vertu de quelles dispositions les Membres des Kations Unies pris in-
dividuellement avaient des droits qu'ils pouvaient faire valoir en in-
voquant l'article 19.S'il doit bien en êtreainsi, c'est parce qu'il est
évident qu'un Etat ne peut invoquer la clause juridictionnelle d'un
accord international qu'à propos des droits qu'il possède (soit
comme partie à l'accord, soit en tant que tiers) en vertu oàl'égard
d'une ou de plusieurs dispositions de l'accord et en vue de faire
valoir ces droits. S'il existe des dispositions de l'accordà l'égardhave no substantive rights, then it must necessarily lack capacity
to invoke the jurisdictional clause in respect of them l.
The conclusion just stated results directly and inevitably from
the universally accepted principle that, whatever the apparent
generality of its language ("any dispute whatever" relating to
"the provisions" of the Agreement), a purely jurisdictional clause,
such as Article 19 of the Trust Agreement, cannot confer substantive
rights. The substantive rights it refers to must be sought elsewhere,
either in the same instrument or in another one. Al1a jurisdictional
clause can do, is to enable any such rights, whatever they may be
(artd if they independefztly exist), to be asserted by recourse to the
tribunal provided for-this provision being the real purpose of a
jurisdictional clause, and al1it normally does.
Thus, in the present case, the scope of Article 19 is necessarily
governed not only by what it says itself, but also, and even more
importantly, by whet rights were conferred by the rest of the Trust
Agreement, and ou whatparties orentities. As has already been seen,
the Trust Agreement only conferred separate substantive rights on
Members of the United Nations individually, by Articles 9, IO, II
and 13, which are not invoked in the present case. No rights for
Member States, as such and individually, were conferred by any of
the remaining provisions, which relate to the conduct of the Trust.
Hence Article 19 can only be invoked by individual Member States
in respect of the former class of provisions, for only under these did
the separate Member States possess rights in their individual
capacity. This is not merely a valid, but a necessary conclusion, and
for the following reason also.
There are in general only two ways in which a State can, as such
and individually, claim rights under a treaty: (i) the State may be
an actual party to the treaty, in which case (subject of course to
any specific exceptions or exclusions contained in the treaty itself)
such State will have rights in relation to the treaty as a whole, and
can invoke al1 its provisions, without needing to be expressly
indicated as entitled to do so under one or more specific provisions;
or (ii) though not a party, a State can enjojr rights if these are
expressly conferred on it eo nomine, or as a member of a named or
indicated class. But from this it follows that, in case (ii), anon-party
State can claim only the actual rights conferred on non-parties,
arise on the merits of any given case-whetherifa State "qualifies" as possessing
rights under a particulaprovision of a treaty, those rights in fact been vio-
lated. The questionof qualification itsis a preliminaryone affecting the Capa-
city of the State concerned to invoke the jurisdicticlause of the treatvand
hence affectingthe cornpetence of the Court.desquelles il est clair a priori que l'État intéressén'a et ne sau~ait
avoir aucun droit de fond, il s'ensuit nécessairement que cet Etat
n'a pas qualité pour invoquer la clause juridictionnelle en ce qui
les concerne l.
La conclusion qui vient d'être énoncéerésulte directement et
nécessairement du principe universellement accepté selon lequel,
quelle que soit la généralité apparente de ses termes (((tout différend
quel qu'il soit » relatif aux « dispositions ))de l'accord), une clause
purement juridictionnelle comme l'article 19. de l'accord de tutelle
ne peut conférer aucun droit de fond. Les droits de fond aux-
quels une clause de cette sorte se réfèredoivent êtrerecherchés
ailleurs, soit dans le mêmeinstrument soit dans un autre. Tout ce
quepeut faire une clause juridictionnelle, c'est de permettre de faire
valoir de tels droits quels qu'ils puissent être (età condition qzh'ils
existent indépendaw~rnente )n recourant au tribunal prévu - c'est
là le but réeld'une clause juridictionnelle et c'est normalement à
cela qu'elle se borne.
Ainsi, en l'espèce, la portéede l'article 19 dépend nécessairement
de savoir non seulement quel est son énoncé mais aussi,et cela est
encore plus important, quels droits sont conféréspar le reste de
l'accord de tutelle et àquellesParties eu entités.Ainsi que nous l'avons
déjà vu, l'accord de tutelle lie confère des droits de fond distincts
aux Membres des Nations Unies pris individuellement que par les
articles g,ro, II et 13, lesquels ne sontpas en cause dans la présente
affaire. Aucune des autres dispositions,~qui concernent la gestion
de la tutelle, ne confère de droits aux Etats Membres pris indivi-
duellement en tant que tels. L'article 19 ne peut donc C-trsinvoqué
par les Etats Nembres àtitre individuel qu'à l'égardde la première
catégorie de dispositions, car ce n'est qu'en vertu de celle-ci qu'ils
possèdent des droits propres. Cette conclusion est non seulement
juste mais nécessaire et je vais en donner encore une autre raison.
Tl n'y a en gén6ra!que deus voies par lesquelles un Etat peut,
en tant qüe tel. et individue?lement, pr6tendre avoir des droits en
vertu d'un traité: i) cet Etat peut être effectivement partie au
traité, auquel cas (sous réserve, bien entendu, des exceptions ou
exclusions figurant exprcssément dans le texte du traité) il a des
droits quant au traité dans son ensemble et il peut en invoquer
toutes les dispositions, rails qu'il soit nécessairequ'une ou plusieurs
dispositions spécifiqiles indiquent espressément qu'il est hab-ité
à le faire; ou bien ii) tout en n'étant pas partie au traité, cet Etat
peut jouir de certaics droitssi ceus-ci lui sont expressément conférés
à titre individuel ou à titre de membre d'une catégorie nommée
C'est là natureilemenilne question totalelnediiférente de cel-e qui ne
peut se poser que sur le fond d'une af--ide savoir si, lorsquÉtat est riqua-
lifi2comme détenant des drcits en vertu des diqositiparticulières d'un traité,
ces droits ont en fait étéviolés. La question de la qualitéquestion prélimi-
naire qui affecte la capacité de l'État intéresséuer la clause juridictionnelle
du traité et par conséquent la compétence de la Cour.and could not claim rights in respect of any other provision cf the
treaty. Therefore, in the present case, the Members of the United
Nations, not being individually parties to theTrust Agreement, could
claim rights only under the nationalrights provisions, and could not
individually claim them in respect of the conduct of the Trust
provisions. It follows that, since Article 19 could only be invoked
by a Member Statein respect of the substantive rights it possessed
under theTrust Agreement, and since the individual Members of the
United Nations did not, as such, possess rights under the conduct
of the Trust provisions (being neither named in them nor separate
parties to the Agreement as a whole),they could not invoke Article 19
in respect of those provisions.
Whatever the generality of its language, Article 19 must be read
subject to the fundamental consideration that it is only a juris-
dictional clause, not conferring any substantive rights. Thedifficulty
is not that Article19 is incapable on its language of applying to the
conduct of the Trust provisions, if the Member States had, in their
individual capacities,any rightsunder these. But they had not ; and
Article 19 (beinga purely jurisdictional provision) could not by itself
create them. It could operate only in respect ofrights which the party
invoking it already possessed. The Applicant State in the present
case had, as a non-Partyto the Trust, no individual rights under the
conduct of the Trust provisions which alone it cites, and therefore
cannot invoke Article 19 in respect of them. In short the Applicant
State lacks the capacity to invoke Article 19 in respect of the only
provisions of the Trust which are the subject of its complaint; and
if the Applicant State lacks this capacity, then the Court can have
no jurisdiction to entertain a claim which, in effect, the Applicant
State has no legal right to make.
The foregoing conclusion, stated in this particular way-i.e. on
the basis not so much of the scope of Article 19, as of the incapacity
of Members of the United Nations to invoke it in respect of pro-
visions under which they had no direct rights-seems to me in-
controvertible in the present case, and 1 have wanted to stress this
way of looking at it for two reasons which are peculiar to the present
case as compared with the South West Africa case.
First, whereas in that case it was arguable (though not in my
opinion correctly so-see I.C.J. Reports 1962,pp. 499-502)that if the
Mandate for South West Africa was a treaty, the Members of the
former League of Nations were al1individually parties to it, this is
IOj ou désignée.Mais il s'ensuit que, dans le deuxième cas, un État
tiers ne eut ré tendre au'aux droits effectivement conférés aux
tiers et ne saurait réclamer aucun droit quant aux autres disposi-
tions du traité. Ainsi, en l'espèce, les Membres des Nations Unies,
qui ne sont pas individuellement parties à l'accord de tutelle, ne
peuvent prétendre avoir des droits qu'en vertu des dispositions
relatives aux droits nationaux et ils ne peuvent en réclamer au
titre des dispositionç concernant la gestion de la tutelle. Par consé-
quent, comme les Etats Membres des Nations Unies pris indivi-
duellement ne peuvent invoquer l'article 19 que relativement aux
droits de fond au'ils ~ossèdent en vertu de l'accord de tutelle et.
comme ils ne possèdent, en tant que tels, aucun droit en vertu des
dispositions relativesà la gestion de la tutelle (n'étant ni nommés
dans celles-ci ni parties distinctes à l'accord dans son ensemble),
ils ne peuvent invoquer l'article 19pour ce qui est de ces dispositions.
Quelle que soit la généralité deses termes, l'article 19 doit être
lu en tenant compte de cette considération essentielle qu'il s'agit
uniquement d'une clause juridictionnelle ne conférant aucun droit
de fond. La difficultén'est pas que l'article 19 ne saurait, vu son
libellé,s'appliquer aux dispositions sur la gestion de la tutelle, à
supposer quelesEtats Membres aientbien, à titre individuel, des droits
en vertu de celles-ci. fait, ils n'en ont pas; et l'article 19 (disposi-
tion purement juridictionnelle) ne saurait à lui seul en créer. Cet
article ne peut jouer qq'à l'égard de droits appartenant déjà à la
partie qui l'invoque. L'Etat demandeur en l'espèce n'a, en tant que
tiersà l'accordde tutelle, aucun droit individuel en vertu des dispo-
sitions sur la gestion de la tutelle, qui sont lesle? qu'il cite; il ne
saurait donc invoquer de ce chef l'article 19. Bref 1'Etat demandeur
n'a pas qualité pour invoquer l'article 19 relativement aux seules
dispositions de l'accord de tutelle qui fassent l'objet de sa demande;
et, si 1'Etat demandeur n'a pas cette qualité, la Cou; n'a pas compé-
tence pour connaître d'une demande qu'en fait 1'Etat demandeur
n'a pas juridiquement le droit de présenter.
La conclusion qui précède, énoncée sous cette forme - c'est-à-
dire en se référantmoins à la portée de l'article 19 qu'à l'incapacité
des Membres des Nations Unies de l'invoquer relativement à des
dispositions qui ne leur confèrent pas de droits directs- me semble
en l'espèce indiscutable et j'ai voulu mettre l'accent sur cette
façon de l'envisager pour deux raisons quisont propres à la présente
affaife - par comparaison avec l'affaire du Sud-Ouest africain.
Premièrement, tandis que dans ce dernier cas on a pu faire valoir
(àtort, selonmoi -voir C. I. J. Recueil 1962, pp. 419-502) que,si le
Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest africain était un traité, les Membres de
l'ancienne Société desNations étaient tous individuellement partiesnot possible in the present case. It is admitted that they were not
parties to the Trust Agreement, and that the United Nations in its
corporate capacity was the sole party, apart from the Administering
Authority.
Secondly, whereas in the days of the League of Nations it might
not universally have been considered that a body such asthe League
of Nations was, as an entity, possessed of international personality
over and above, and distinct from, the aggregation of its Member
States, so that it might lack treaty-making capacity (see I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 475, note 1),the Court in the case of I?ziztriesto
United Nations Servants recognized once and for al1 the separate
and distinct international personality of the United Kations
(I.C.J. Reports 1949, at p. 179). Its capacity to enter into or be
a party to international agreements is admitted-and it has fre-
quently been exercised l.
The conclusion which inevitably follows from and is necessitated
by these unquestionable legal facts, and by the position of the
United Nations, in its corporate capacity, as the sole other party to
the Trust Agreement, is and must be that the interest of the
individual Member States in the co~iduct of the Trust was exer-
cisable and realizable only through the corporate inachinery and
action of the United Nations. This is the answer-at least in the
present case-to the contention that al1 Member States had an
interest in the conduct of the Trust; they had it, but they could
exercise it only through the United Nations, and net through the
Court, except as regards provisions of the Trust conferring national
rights on them as separate States. This conclusion is not affected
by the fact that, in the present case, geographical propinquity
gave the Republic of Cameroon a greaterinterest in the conduct
of the Tiust tl-ian was possessed by most other Member States.
This could not suffice to entitle the Republic to exercise or realize
that interest except through the rnachinery of the United Nations;
for that interest, during the currency of the Trust, was bound up
with that of the United Nations, and of the whole Trusteeship
System, and could not be independently served or dealt .with.
And clearly the Applicant State cannot now have other or greater
rights or capacities than it enjoyed while the Trust was still in force.
(c) The contention that thetermination of the Trust was not fiart
of thz conductof the Trust.
The Respondent State in the present case, while making the
considerations just discussed one of its main contentions, also put
See also ArticIof the General Conventioon the United Nations Privileges
and Immunities of 13 February1946.
106 ARRÊT 2 XII 63 (OP. INDIV. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE) II7
à celui-ci, en l'espèce cela n'est pas possible. Il est admis que les
Membres n'étaient pas parties à l'accord de tutelle et que, en
dehors de l'autorité administrante, l'organisation des Nations
Unies à titre collectif y était seule partie.
Deuxièmement,tandis qu'à l'époque dela Société desNations il
aurait pu ne pas êtreuniversellement admisqu'un organisme comme
la Société desNations possédait, en tant qu'entité, une personnalité
internationale située au-dessus et indépendante de celle des Etats
Membres qui la composaient, de sorte que la Sociétépouvait ne pas
avoir lacapacité d'être partie à des traités (voir C. J. Recueil 1962,
p. 475, n. I),la Cour dans l'affaire de la Réparationdes dommages
subis aztservice des Nations Unies a reconnu une fois pour toutes
la personnalité internationale séparéeet distincte de l'Organisation
des Nations Unies (C. I. J. Recueil 1949, p. 179). Sa capacité de
conclure des accords internationaux ou d'y êtrepartie est admise -
et il en a fréquemment été faitusage l.
La conclusion qui découle nécessairement de ces faits juridiques
irréfutables et de la position del'organisation des Nations Unies, en
tant qu'organisme collectif,et seule autre partie àl'accord de tutelle,
est et doit être que les Etats Membres pris individuellement ne
peuvent réaliser et concrétiser l'intérêtqu'ils ont à la gestion de la
tutelle que par l'intermédiaire de l'appareil et de l'action collective
des Nations Unies. Telle est la réponse - au moins en l'espèce -
à la thèse selon laquelle tous les États Membres avaient un intérêt
quant à la gestion de la tutelle; ils en avaient un mais ils ne pou-
vaient le concrétiser que par la voie des Nations Unies et non celle
de la Cour, sauf en ce qui concerne les dispositions de la tutelle leur
conférant des droits nationaux à titre distinct. Le fait qu'en l'espèce
la proximité géographique ait donné à la République du Cameroun
un intérêtà la gestion de la tutelle plus grand que celui de la plupart
des autres États Membres ne modifie pas cette conclusion. Cela ne
pouvait suffire pour donner à la République du Cameroun le droit
de réaliser ou de concrétiser cet intérêt autrement qu'au moyen de
l'appareil des Nations Unies; car cet intérêt, pendant la duréede la
tutelle, était liéà celui des Nations Unies et à celui du régime de
tutelle tout entier et l'on ne pouvait y répondre ni en traiter
indépendamment. Or, l'État demandeur nepeut manifestement avoir
maintenant des droits ou des aptitudes autres, ou plus larges, que
ceux dont il jouissait quand la tutelle était encore en vigueur.
c) Thèse selon laquellela levée dela tutelle ne faisait pas partie
de la gestionde la tutelle
Quoique l'État défendeuren l'espèceait fait de ce qui précèdel'un
des points essentiels de son argumentation, ila égalementprésentéla
1 Voir aussi l'artIcde la Convention sur les privilèges et les immunités des
Nations Unies en date du 13 fév1946. forward an additional argument, to the effect that even if Article 19
were regarded as applying to al1the provisions of the Trust Agree-
ment, and the Applicant State as having rights under (and as being
entitled to invoke) them all, the present case would still not be
covered, since it related not to the conduct, but to the termination
of the Trust, its incidents and outcome, and this was a matter on
which the Trust Agreement was wholly silent. It was part of this
contention that although the Applicant State did indeed invoke
specific provisions of the Trust, and alleged violations of them, it
did so only as part of, or in order to Iead up to, the complaints
relating to the termination of the Trust.
This contention does not seem to me to be well founded. The latter
part of it onlygoes to the motives which the Applicant State may
have had in alleging violations of specific provisions of the Trust:
it does not alter the fact that they were alleged. Whether the
Applicant State would in fact ever have made these allegations
except in the context of the termination of the Trust may be
doubted; but there can be no doubt that it couldhave invoked these
provisions l,in order to allege irregularities in the conduct of the
Trust, quite independently of the Trust's prospective termination,
and even if there had been no immediate question of that. In short,
allegations of irregularities in the conduct of the Trust, whether
justified or not, retain their status as such whatever the aim with
which they are made.
Moreover, even if it is literally true that Article 19 speaks of
disputes about "the provisions" of the Trust Agreement, and that
there are no express provisions about termination, 1 think that
eventual termination must be regarded as being inherent in the
declared aim of the Trust, namely of "progressive development to-
wards self-government and independence" (see Article 76 (b) of the
Cnited Nations Charter, and the reference in Article 3 of the Trust
Agreement to the "basic objectives of the International Trusteeship
System laid down in -4rticle 76 of the...Charter"). Since the attain-
ment of these ends "in accordance with the freely-expressed wishes
of the peoples" (Article 76 (b)) is regarded as being, if not the
whole object, at any rat6 the chief raison d'être of the Trusteeship
System, it seems to me difficult not to regard steps taken for that
purpose, or in the actual process of its realization (plebiscites, etc.),
as being an implied part of the whole conduct of the Trust. 1would
therefore have to hold that the jurisdictional clause of the Trust
-4greement must be regarded as covering disputes about the termi-
nation of the Trust, if 1 regarded that clause as relating to the
conduct of the Trust at al]. I have thought it right to go into this
' Assuming, that is, for purposes of the argument, that19rofthe Trust
related tohese provisions at all.
107 ARRÊT 2 XII 63 (OP. INDIV. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE) 118
thèse supplémentaire suivante: mêmesi l'on considéraitl'article 19
comme s'appliquant à toutesles dispositions de l'accord de tutelle et
1'Etat demandeur comme avant des droits en vertu de toutes celles-
ci (et comme étant en droit de les invoquer toutes), cet article ne
s'appliquerait paspour autant àla présenteaffaire car ellea trait non
pas à la gestion, mais à la Levéede la tutelle, aux incidentsquil'ont
marquéeet à son issue, et que c'est là un problème dont l'accord de
tutelle ne parlait absolument pas. On a soutenu notamment à cet
égardque, si 1'Etat demandeur avait effectivement invoquédesdispo-
sitions spécifiquesde l'accord de tutelle et allégué desviolations de
celles-ci, il ne l'avait fait que dans le cadre des griefs relatifs à la
levéede la tutelle et pour introduire les griefs en question.
Cettethèse ne me semble pas bien fqndée.Dans sa dernière partie,
elle ne concerne que les motifs que 1'Etat demandeurpeut avoir eus
d'alléguer desviolations aux dispositions spécifiques de la tutelle:
cela ne,change rien au fait qu'elles ont étéalléguées.On peut douter
que 1'Etat demandeur eût en fait jamais présentéces allégations
autrement que dans le contexte de la levéede la tutelle; mais il ne
saurait faire de doute qu'il aurait pu invoquer ces dispositions l
pour alléguer des irrégularitésdans la gestion de la tutelle, tout à
fait indépendamment de la levée prévue de celle-ci et mêmes'il
n'en avait pas été question dans l'immédiat. Bref, justifiéesou non,
les allégations concernant des irrégularités dans la gestion de la
tutelle conservent leur valeur en tant que telles, quel qu'ait été
leur but.
En outre, mêmes'il est littéralement exact que l'article 19 parle
de différends relatifs aux « dispositions » de l'accord de tutelle et
qu'aucune disposition ne concerne expressément la levéede celle-ci,
je pense que la levéeéventuelle doit êtreconsidéréecommeinhérente
à l'objectif déclaréde la tutelle, qui es« l'évolution vers la capacité
à s'administrer eux-mêmes ou l'indépendance ))(voir l'article 76,
alinéa b))de la Charte des Nations Unies et la référencede l'article 3
de l'accord de tutelle (aux fins essentielles du Régimeinternational
de tutelle énoncées à l'Article 76 de la Charte...»).Comme on consi-
dère que la réalisation de ces fins ((compte tenu des aspirations
librement exprimées des populations » (art. 76 b)) est, sinon l'unique
but, du moins la principale raison d'êtredu régime de tutelle, il
me semble difficile de ne pas envisager les mesures prises à cet
effet, ou au cours mêmede cette réalisation (plébiscites,etc.), comme
s'intégrant implicitement à la gestion de la tutelle dans son ensem-
ble. Par conséquent, si j'estimais que la clause juridictionnelle de
l'accord de tutelle s'appliquait en quoi que ce fût à la gestion de la
tutelle, je devrais reconnaître que cette clause doit êtreconsidérée
comme couvrant les différends relatifs à la levée de la tutelle. Il
En supposant,aux fins de cette argumentatioque l'article 19 de l'accord
de tutelle ait eu un rapport quelconque avec ces dispositions.
107matter, since some emphasis was laid upon it in the arguments of
the Respondent State.
2. The questionoj settlementby negotiationor othermeans.
Article 19 required, finally, that the dispute should be one that
could not be settled "by negotiation or other means", and was not.
The right to have recourse to the Court, and the competence of the
Court to entertain the claim, therefore depended on, and could not
arise unless and until, attempts to satisfy this condition had been
made and had failed.
(a) Was thereany such settlement?
It has been contended that the whole matter was in fact settled
"by other means", namely when the United Nations Assembly
adopted resolution 1608 (XV) of21 April1961. As will be indicated
presently (p. 123), the phrase "settlement ...by other means" in
Article 19, strictly denotes a settlement arrived at by the parties
themselves, by or through other means than negotiation (e.g.conci-
liation, arbitration,etc.), which they have agreed to resort to-rather
than a settlement arrived at independently by some third entity,
with or without their concurrence. Nevertheless, this contention of
the Respondent State isa material one requiring consideration. More-
over, there is a good deal inthe Judgment of the Court indirectly to
warrant, or lend colour to it, although the Judgment is not based
on it,but rather on the different, if related, view that the resolution
of the Assembly, if it did not formally settle the dispute as such,
rendered it pointless, sothat any decision of the Court in regard to it
would be pointless too.
Rut it has to be observed that the pointless character of the dis-
pute did not arise solely from the termination of the Trust under
Assembly resolution 1608. An essential ingredient was also the
absence of any claim for compensation or other reparation for
the damage supposedly caused by the form this termination took,
allegedly in consequence of the irregularities committed by the Res-
pondent State in the conduct of the Trust. Therefore, the fact that
resolution 1608constituted one of the elementsrendering the dispute
pointless or without object would not, since the resolution was only
part ofwhat was necessary for that purpose, suffice to demonstrate
that it constituted in itself a complete and final settlement of the
dispute.
However, the Respondent State's contention that it did, is
evidently well founded on the assumption (which was also part
of the Respondent State's case, and accords with my own view)
that the Applicant State had no separate rights in its individual,
108m'a sembléutile de traiter de cette question car l'État défendeur lui
a donné une certaine importance dans son argumentation.
2. La question du règlementpar des négociationsou un autre moyen
L'article 19 exige enfin que le différend ne puisse êtrerégléet
n'ait pas étéréglé cpar négociations ou un autre moyen ». Le
droit de se présenter devant la Cour et la compétence de la Cour
pour connaître de la demande dépendent donc de ce que des tenta-
tives pour remplir cette condition aient étéfaites et aient échoué.
a) Y a-t-il eu un tel règlement?
On a soutenu que l'ensemble du problème avait en fait étéréglé
((par un autre moyen »- lorsque l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations
Unies a adopté le 21 avril 1961 la résolution 1608 (XV). Comme je
le montrerai plus loin (p. 123)~l'expression c(règlement ...par un
autre moyen ))qui figure à l'article 19 s'entend strictement d'un
règlement auquel les parties parviennent elles-mêmes, par des
moyens autres que la négociation (par exemple la conciliation,
l'arbitrage, etc.) sur lesquels elles se sont mises d'accord - et non
d'un règlement auquel un organisme tiers parvient indépendam-
ment, avec ou sans leur assentiment. Néanmoins, cette thèse de
1'Etat défendeur n'est pas sans pertinence et appelle un examen.
En outre. ,l J a dans l'arrêt de la Cour matière à la iustifier ou
à la rendre plausible, bien que l'arrêt s'appuie non pas sur cette
thèse mais sur l'argument - différent encoreque connexe - d'après
lequel, si la résolution de l'Assembléen'a pas régléformellement le
différend entant que tel, elle l'a rendu sans objet, de sorte que toute
décisionde la Cour à son égard serait également sans objet.
Mais il faut observer que la levéede la tutelle en application de la
résolution 1608 de l'Assemblée n'est pas le seul élément qui
ait rendu le différend sans objet. Un autre élémentessentiel est
l'absence de toute demande d'indemnisation ou d'autre réparation
pour les dommages prétendument causés par la manière dont la
levéede la tutelle a eu lieu, par suite des irrégularités qui auraient
étécommises par 1'Etat défendeur dans la gestion de la tutelle.
Par conséquent, le fait que la résolution 1608 ait étél'un des
élémentsôtant toute portée au différend ou le rendant sans objet
ne suffirait pas à démontrer qu'elle constituait en elle-mêmeun
règlement complet et définitifdu différend,puisque cette résolution
n'était qu'une partie de ce qvi était nécessairepour cela.
Toutefois l'argument de 1'Etat défendeur selon lequel elle consti-
tuait un tel règlement est manifestement bien fondési l'on part de
cette hypothèse (soutenue également par 1'Etat défendeur et qui
correspond à ma propre opinion) que le demandeur n'avait pas de 120 JUDG. 3 XII 63 (SEP. OPIX. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)
statal, capacity under the conduct of the Trust provisions of the
Trust Agreement, but had rights only under the national rights
provisions. On that basis (which was the one contended for by the
Respondent State-correctly inmy view), it was the United Nations
alone, as an entity, and as the sole party to the Trust Agreement
(apart from the Administering Authority) which, with the consent
of the latter, was entitled to deal with the general conduct of the
Trust, including its termination, and to "settle" any disputes about
such matters. 011 that basis, the matters here in question were
indeed settled by Assembly resolution 1608.
But equally, on that basis, it would of course become irrelevant
whether the dispute was so settled or not, since (on that basis) it
would not be a dispute to which Article 19 applied at all. The con-
tention that resolution 1608 settled the dispute for the purposes
of Article 19isrelevant only on the assumption that, under theTrust
Agreement, the separate Members of the United Nations, in their
individual capacity as such, didhaverights in relation to the general
conduct of the Trust which they could assert through the medium
of Article 19.
If that assumption had to be made, then 1 would find myself
unable to accept the Respondent State's contention that resolution
1608 settled the dispute-for if the Applicant State did indeed
possess separate individual rights in relation to the conduct of the
Trust, distinct from those of the United Nations as an entity, the
Assembly could not have been empowered to deal with or settle
a dispute between the Applicant State and a third party (the
Administering Authority) relating to those rights-at least \vithout
the consent of the Applicant State-which, by voting against
resolution 1608, did not give its consent to any settlement such
as might result from the resolutionl. If, as the Respondent State
contended, the Applicant State's dispute was with the Assembly,
this was a separate and additional dispute; for the complaint of the
Applicant State was not merely that the Assembly decided to
incorporate the Northern Cameroons in the Federation of Nigeria,
but also that it was the (allegedly) irregular course of conduct
pursued by the Respondent State in the administration of the
Trust, which had led the Assembly to do this. Otherwise, it was
contended, the Assembly would have decided differently. If reso-
lution 1608 settled any dispute, it settled the dispute between the
Applicant State and the Assembly. The arrangements made under
that resolution for terminating the Trust, with the consent of the
l Whether the Applicant was "bound" by the resolution, in the sense that it
had to accept thfactof the terminatioof the Trust on the basis provifor in
debar it from pursuinany legal right of action it might have agthird partyuld
(the AdministeringAuthority) whose alleged wrongfulconduct was said to be
responsible for this result. droits distincts, à titre individuel, en tant qu'État en vertu des
dispositions de l'accord relatives à la gestion de la tutelle et n'avait
dedroits qu'en vertu des dispositions relatives aux droitsnationaux.
Sur cette base (conforme à la thèse soutenue - à juste titre, à mon
avis - par 1'Etat défendeur), seule l'organisation des Nations
Unies, comme entité et unique partie à l'accord de tutelle, en
dehors de l'autorité administrante était en droit, avec le consente-
ment de cette dernière, de s'occuper sur le plan généralde la gestion
de la tutelle, y compris de sa levée,et de «régler ))tous les différends
concernant de tels problèmes. Sur cette base, les problèmes en
cause ont bien étérégléspar la résolution 1608 de l'Assemblée.
Mais aussi, sur cette base également, la question de savoir si le
différenda étéainsi régléou non perdrait son importance, puisque ce
ne serait pas un différend auquel pourrait s'appliquer l'article 19.
La thèse selon laquelle la résolution 1608arégléledifférend aux finsde
l'article19 est pertinente uniquement si l'on admet qu'en vertu de
l'accord detutelle les différents Membres des Nations Unies, en tant
que tels et à titre individuel, avaient effectivement des droits
relativement à la gestion générale de la tutelle, qu'ils pouvaient
faire valoir au moyen de l'article 19.
Si l'on devait admettre une telle hypothèse, je me trouverais
alors dans l'incapacité d'accepter l'argument de 1'Etat défendeur
selon lequel la résolution 1608 a régléle différend. En effet, si
1'Etat demandeur avait possédéen propre et à titre individuel,
pour ce qui est de la gestion de la tutelle, des droits distincts de
ceux de l'organisation des Nations Unies en tant qu'entité, l'As-
sembléen'aurait pas eu,le pouvoir d'examiner ou de réglerun diffé-
rend survenu efitre 1'Etat demandeur et un tiers (l'autorité ad-
ministrante),à propos de ces droits - en tout cas pas sans l'assen-
timent de 1'Etat demandeur - qui a voté contre la résolution 1608
et n'a donc donné son assentiment à aucun règlement pouvant
découler,de cette résolution l. Si, comme 1'Etat défendeur l'a sou-
tenu, 1'Etat demandeur avait un différend avec l'Assemblée,
c'était là un différend séparéet supplémentaire: en effet, 1'Etat
demandeur ne formulait pas simplement le grief que l'Assemblée
avait décidéd'intégrer le Cameroun septentrional dans la Fédéra-
tion de Nigéria, il prétendait aussi que c'était la ligne de conduite
(prétendument) injustifiée adoptée par l'État défendeur dans l'ad-
ministration de la tutelle qui avait amené l'Assemblée à le faire.
Si le défendeur avait agi autrement, affirmait-il, l'Assemblée
aurait pris une décision différente. Si la résolution 1608 a
régléun différend quelconque, c'est le différend entre l'État deman-
l C'est une chose de savoir si le demandeétait 11liéxpar la résolution, en ce
sens qu'il devait acceptle fuide la levée de la tutelle sur la base prévue dans la
résolution; c'en est une autre de savoir si cette résolution pouvait l'empêcher de faire
valoir un droitd'action qu'iaurait pu avoir à l'encontred'un tiers (l'autorité
administrante)à la gestion prétendumentmauvaise duquelil imputaitce résultat. Administering Authority, were necessarily res inter alios acta as
respects any dispute between that Authority and the Applicant
State, concerning any separate rights the latter might have in its
individual capacity, relative to the conduct of the Trust provisions
of the Trust Agreement.
The real truth is that the Applicant State did not individually
have any such rights, but had rights only in relation to the national
rightsprovisions of the Agreement, which were not, and never have
been, in issue in this case. The United Nations alone, as an entity,
had conduct of the Trust rights; and for that reason the Assembly
resolution settled the whole issue of the termination of the Trust.
The dispute between the Applicant State and the Respondent
State proceeded on the basis of the Applicant State's contention
that it enjoyed personally and individually certain rights under
the Trust which, in my opinion, it did not in fact possess. But, had
it done so, they would have been separate rights and a dispute
about them would have been a separate dispute l.
l Certain other considerations serve to bring out the separate character of the
dispute. It would seem that in the period Rlarch-April, 1961, the United Kingdom
as the Administering Authority, the United Nations Assembly as the supervisory
organ, and the Republic of Cameroon as a State geographically interested,were
al1 maintaining different, and in several respects divergent, attitudes about the
whole question of the termination of the Trust. The United Kingdom was willing,
but in no way specially anxious, that the Trust should be terminated at that time.
Its main preoccupation was that if the Trust was to be terminated, this should be
on a basis that was workable and, so far as possible, in accordance wifh, or at any
rate not contrary to, the wishes of the peoples concerned. The chief aim of the
Fourth Committee and Assembly of the United Kations was to terminate the Trust
on any terms that would give the Trust Territory independence, or voluntary in-
corporation in an independent African State. The Assembly was far more con-
cerned with terminating the Trust as soon as possible, on any reasonable basis,
than with the precise form the termination took.
The Republic of Cameroon, on the other hand, was primarily concerned with
the basis of termination. Rather than accept the form it did take, the Republic
would have preferred the Trust to continue, in so far as the Northern Cameroons
was concerned, and not to terminatc.
It seems therefore that three quite distinct attitudesexisted on the question of
termination: on the part of the United Kingdom, neutrality, that is willingness
either to terminate or to carry on, as the Assembly might direct: on the part
of the Assembly, a very definite desire to terminate on any reasonable and de-
fensiblebasis; but on the part of the Republic of Cameroon, a desirenotto terminate
except on the basis that the Northern Cameroons would go to the Republic.
Moreover, the essence of what the Republic of Cameroon has contended is that,
but for certain irregularities allegedlycommitted by the United Kingdom in the
II0deur et l'Assemblée. Les dispositions prises en vertu de cette ré-
solution pour mettre fin à la tutelle, avec le consentement de I'au-
torité administrante, étaient nécessairement res inter alias acta en
ce qui concerne tout différendentre cette autorité et 1'Etat deman-
deur au sujet des droits propres que ce dernier pouvait avoir, à
titre individuel, relativement aux dispositions de l'accord ayant
trait à la gestion de 'a tutelle.
Lavéritéest que 1'Etat demandeur, prisindividuellement, n'avait
aucun droit de ce genre ;il n'avait de droits qu'à l'égard desdisposi-
tions de l'accord concernant desdroitsnationaux,qui n'étaientpas et
n'ont jamais étéen cause dansla présenteaffaire. Seulel'Organisation
des Xations Lnies, en tant qu'entité, avait des droits relatifs à la
gestion de la tutelle; et c'est poztrcetteraison que la résolution de
l'Assembléea réglé la question delalevéedela tytelle dans son ensem-
ble. Le différendentre !'Etat demandeur et 1'Etat défendeur procé-
dait de la thèse de 1'Etat demandeur selon laquelle il jouissait
personnellement et individuellement de certains droits en vertu
de l'accord de tutelle, qu'à mon avis il ne possédait pas en réalité.
Mais, à supposer qu'il les eût possédés,il se serait agi de droits
distincts et un différend à leur sujet aurait été un différend dis-
tinct l.
l Certaines autres considérations font ressortir le caractère distidu différend.
Il semblerait que, dans la période mars-avri1961,le Royaume-Unien tant qu'auto-
rité administrante,l'Assemblée des Nations ITnies en tant qu'organe de surveillance
et la République du Cameroun en tant qu'État intéressé pour des raisons géogra-
phiques avaient tous des attitudesdifférentes et plusieurs égards divergentes sur
l'ensemble de la question de la levée de la tutelle. Le Royaume-Uni consentait
volontiers àvoir la tutelleprendrefin à cette date mais sansenêtre particulièrement
désireux. Sa principale préoccupation était que la levée de la tutelle, si elle devait
se faire, eût lieu dans des conditions pratiquement satisfaisanteset autant que
possible conformes, ou en tout cas non contraires, aux vŒux des populations
intéressées. Le principalobjectif de la Quatrième Commission et de l'Assemblée
des Sations IJnies était de mettrefin B la tutelle de quelque manière que ce fût,
pourvu que le territoire sous tutelleacquît son indépendance ou s'intégrât volon-
tairement dans un État africain environnant. L'Assemblée était beaucoup plus
préoccupéedemettre fin à la tutelle aussitôque possible, dans n'importe quelles
conditions raisonnables, que d'envisager la forme exacte de la levée de la tutelle.
En revanche la République du Cameroun était intéressée au premier chef par
la base de la levée de la tutelle. I'lutOt que d'accepter la forme que celle-ci a prise,
la République aurait préféréque la tutelle fût maintenue en ce qui concerne le
Cameroun septentrional et qu'il n'yfut pas mis fin.
II semble donc y avoir eu trois attitudestotalement différentes sur la question
de la levée de la tutelle: de la part du Royaume-Lni, la neutralité, c'est-à-dire
le consentement soit à la levée, soit au maintien de la tutelle, selon les directives
de l'Assemblée; de la part de l'Assemblée, le désir bien défini de mettre fin à la
tutelle sur n'importe quelle base raisonnableet défendable; mais, de la part de la
République du Cameroun, le désir de n'y voir mettre fin que si le Cameroun sep-
tentrional sous administration britannique lui revenait.
En outre, l'essence de la thèse de la République du Cameroun est que, n'eussent
étécertaines irrégularités prétendument conlmises par le Royaume-Uni dans l'ad-
1IO (b) Would theParties in any casehavehad any authority orcapacity
to settle the dispute by negotiation or other means?
The requirement that the dispute should be one that "cannot be
settled by negotiation or other means" is clearly meaningless as a
condition of the right to have recourse to the Court, and of the
competence of the Court to act if such a recourse is attempted, unless
two presuppositions are made. These are (1) that the dispute should
be one which, in its nature, is capable of being settled directly
between the parties by negotiation or other means (for if not, it
cannot be the kind of dispute contemplated by Article 19); (2) that
there shall have been at least some actual attempt at settlement
between the parties, by negotiation or other means, such as could
afford a basis for a finding by the Court that the dispute could not
be so settled, and that in consequence the Court was now competent
to settle it by means of a judicial decision. It is, orshould be, obvious
that a proposa1 for a reference to the Court, such as was contained
in the Applicant State's Note of I May 1961, addressed to the United
Kingdom Government, could not itself constitute an attempt at
settlement for the purposes of Article 19, since that Article made it
a pre-condition of any obligation to have recourse to the Court that
independent attempts at settlement should alreadyhave been made,
and have failed. It will be convenient to consider this latter question
first.
(i) Properly speaking, was any attempt at a settlevnentevermade,
other than proposal for a referenceto the Cozbrt?
Article 19 is an absolutely common-form jurisdictional clause
such as appears, or has appeared, in scores, not to Say hundreds,
of treaties and other international agreements. Its meaning is per-
fectly well understood by international lawyers the world over.
What it contemplates in the present connection is a settlement or
attempted settlement directly betweentheparties-by negotiation or
administration of the Trust, and in the conduct of the finalplebiscite, the outcome
would have been different, and the Assembly would have decided to incorporate
the Northern Cameroons in the Republic of Cameroon. Whether this would have
been the case or notcan only be speculative;but its relevance tothe jurisdictional
question is that the Republic is not seeking to reverse or impugn the validity of
the Assembly resolution terminating the Trust. What the Republic says in effect,
is that thisresolutionever would have been adopted, but for the alleged United
Kingdom maladministration of the Trust, and misconduct of the plebiscite.
It seems clear therefore thatese allegations on thepartcf the Republic involve
The allegations made by the Applicant State involved an issue such as the Assem-
bly was not entitled to settle, if the ApplicaState was entitled to make these
allegations. It was not in fact entitto make them because it had no individual
rights under the conduct of the Trust provisions of the Agreement. Had it had any,
they would necessarily have beenseparate from those of the United Nations,since
it is precisely in this, that their separate characwould have consisted. b) Les parties auraient-elles ezden tout cas le pou7loirou la capa-
cité deréglerle diférend par négociationsoz6z~nautre moyen?
La condition d'après laquelle le différend ne doit pas pouvoir
(êtreréglépar négociations ou un autre moyen )ne saurait mani-
festement avoir de sens, dans la mesure où elle s'applique au droit
de recourir à la Cour et à la compétence de la Cour pour agir si
un tel recours est présenté, que si l'on fait deux présuppositions.
Il faut: 1) que le différend soit par sa nature szrsceptibled'être
réglédirectement entre les parties par négociations ou un autre
moyen (sinon, ce ne peut êtreun différend di1type envisagéà l'ar-
ticle19) ;2) qu'il y ait eu au moins une tentative réellede règlement
entre les parties par négociations ou un autre moyen, ce qui per-
mettrait à la Cour de constater ou non que le différend n'a pu être
régléde la sorte et qu'elle devient ainsicompétentepour le réglerpar
une décisionjudiciaire. Il est évident - ou ildevraitl'être - qu'une
proposition de renvoi à la Cour, comme celle que contenait la
note adresséepar lJEtat demandeur au Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni le I~~ mai 1961, ne saurait par elle-meme constituer une ten-
tative de règlement aux fins de l'article ~c),puisque cet article
soumet toute obligation de recourir à la Cour à la condition préa-
lable que des tentatives indépendantes de règlement aient déjà
étéfaite? et aient échoué.Pour des raisons de commodité, j'exami-
nerai d'abord cette dernière question.
i) Y a-t-il jamais eu à proprement parler tentative de règlement
autre que la proposition tendant à soumettre l'afaire à 10 Coud
L'article 19 est une clause juridictionnelle absolument courante,
qui figure ou a figurédans des dizaines, pour ne pas dire des cen-
taines, de traités et autres accords internationaux. Sa significa-
tion est parfaitement claire pour les internationalistes du monde
entier. Ce qu'elle prévoit dans le cas qui nous occupe, c'est un
règlement ou une tentative de règlement direct entre les parties
ministration de la tutelle et l'organisatidu plébiscite final, résultat aurait
étédifférent et l'Assemblée aurait décidé d'intégrer le Cameroun septentrional
dans la République du Cameroun. La question de l'exactitudou de l'inexactitude
de cette affirmation ne peut avoir qu'un caractère hypothétique, mais sa pertinence
pour la question de la compétence est que la République ne cherche pas à faire
annuler la résolution de l'Assemblée mettantàfla tutelle àiattaquer sa validité.
Ce qu'affirme en fait la République, c'eque cetterésolution n'aurait jamais été
adoptée sans les prétendues fautes commises parleRoyaume-Uni dans i'adminis-
tration du territoire et l'organisadu plébiscite.
Il en ressortà l'évidence que ces allégations de la République font intervenir
une question distincte dece!le qui se posaià l'Assemblée et que celle-ci n'a pas
réglée. Les allégations de'Etat demandeur faisaient intervenir une questioque
l'Assemblée n'était pas en droit de réglàrsupposer que l'État demandeur ait été
présenter parce qu'in'avait pas de droitindividuels envertu des dispositiondes
l'accord relativesla gestion de la tutelle. S'il en avait eu, ils auraient été nécessaire-
ment distincts de ceux de l'organisatdes Nations Uniespuisque c'est précisément
en cela qu'aurait consisté leur caractère distinct. JUDG. 2 XII 63 (SEP. OPIN. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)
123
other means. By "other means" is meant such things as conciliation,
arbitration, fact-finding enquiries, andso on. LTnderArticle 19 of
the Trust Agreement, an attempt at settlement by negotiation,
or by one or other of these means, would have had to precede any
proposal for a reference to the International Court, before any
obligation to have recourse to the Court could arise. It is quite
clear that no such attempt at settlement, at least by any normally
envisaged "other means", was madein the present case ;and here it
may be useful to recall that in a common-form jurisdictional clause
such as Articl19, settlement by "other means" denotes a settlement
by means other than negotiation, but nevertheless by means such
as the parties have jointly a~reedto resort to or employ. It does not
include means imposed by the one party on the other, or on both
of them by an outside agency. The whole point of the ultimate
reference to the Court (to which the parties have duly agreed under
the jurisdictional clause) is that they have not been able to settle
the dispute themselves, by negotiation or agreed other means. To
meet that possibility, the parties have agreed in advance to one,
but only one, form of compulso~ysettlement-the ultimate reference
to the Court. They cannot (via the reference to "other means") be
held to have agreed inadvance to any other (necessarily unspecified)
form of compulsory settlement.
Was there any attempt at settlement by "negotiation", and
what does negotiation mean? It does not, in my opinion, mean a
couple of States arguing with each other across the floor of an
international assembly, or circulating statements of their complaints
or contentions to its member States. That is disputation, not
negotiation; and in the Joint Opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender
and myself in the South West Africa case, we gave reasons for not
regarding this kind of interchange as constituting a negotiation
within the contemplation of such a provision as Article 19 of the
Trust Agreement.
It was there equally pointed out that, even if it were possible to
regard such interchanges as constituting negotiation according to
the generally received concept of that term, it would still not be
right to hold that a dispute "cannot" be settled by negotiation,
when the most obvious means of attempting to do this, namely
by direct discussions between the parties, had not even been tried-
since it could not be assumed that these would necessarily fail because
there had been no success in what was an cntirely different, and cer-
tainly not more propitious, milieu. Now the only direct interchanges
between the parties in the present case were the Notes of May 1961.
II2- par négociations ou un autre moyen. Par cun autre moyen )),
on entend la conciliation, l'arbitrage, les enquêtes, etc. En vertu
de l'article 19 de l'accord de tutelle, une tentative de règlement
par négociations ou par l'un ou l'autre de ces moyens aurait dû
précéder toute proposition de renvoi à la Cour internationale,
avant que puisse naître une obligation quelconque de recourir à
la Cour. Il est parfaitement clair qu'en l'espèce aucune tentative
de règlement de ce genre, en tout cas par l'un des autres moyens
normalement envisagés, n'a étéfaite; et peut-être est-il utile de
rappeler ici que, dans une clause juridictionnelle courante comme
l'article19, un règlement par ((un autre moyen » désigneun règle-
ment par un moyen autre que la négociation, mais néanmoins tel
que les parties aient pu décider d'un commun accord d'y avoir
recours ou de l'employer. Cela ne saurait inclure un-moyen imposé
par l'une des parties à l'autre, ou aux deux par un organisme ex-
térieur. Le renvoi ultime devant la Cour (auquel les parties ont
dûment consei~ti en vertu de la clause juridictionnelle) a un sens
lorsque les parties n'ont pas pu régler le différend elles-mimes par
négociations oii un autre moyen convenu. Afin de pourvoir à cette
éventualité, les parties ont accepté d'avance une forme de règle-
ment obligatoire, mais une seule - le renvoi ultime devant la Cour.
On ne peut admettre que, par le jeu de la formule « un autre moyen »,
elles aient accepté par avance n'importe quelle autre forme de
règlement obligatoire (nécessairement non spécifiée).
Y a-t-il eu une tentative de règlement cpar négociations » et
qu'entend-on par négociations? A mon avis, il ne suffit pas que
deux Etats se cherchent querelle rau sein d'une assemblée
internationale ou distribuent aux Etats Membres l'exposé de
leurs griefs ou de leurs thèses. Cela, c'est de la controverse et non
de la négociation; et, dans l'opinion dissidente commune que sir
Percy Spender et moi-mêmeavons déposéedans l'affaire du Sud-
Ouest africain, nous avons donné les motifs qui empêchent de
considérerce genre d'échanges comme constituant des négociations
au sens où l'entend une disposition telle que l'article19 de l'accord
de tutelle.
Il a également étésouligné à cet kgard que, mêmesi l'on pou-
vait considérerde tels échanges comme constituant des négociations
dans l'acception habituelle de ce terme, il ne serait néanmoins
pas exact d'affirmer qu'un différend ((ne peut » êtreréglépar des
négociations, lorsque le moyen le plus évident de chercher à le
faire,à savoir des,discussions directes entre les parties, n'a même
pas étéessayé - car on ne peut tenir pour acquis qu'elles auraient
nécessairement échouédu seul fait qu'elles ont étéinfructueuses
dans ce qui était un cadre entièrement différent et certainement
pasplus propice. Or les seuls échanges directs entre les Parties en124 JUDG. 2 XII 63 (SEP. OFIN. SIR GERALD FITZ>IAURICE)
The purpose of these Notes, however, was not negotiation on the
substance of the dispute, but to consider whether there should be
an agreed reference to the Court. These Notes did not even contain
any proposa1 for, or discussion of, a possible basis for settlemerit.
If they involved any negotiations at al], it was about the method
of adjudicating the dispute-i.e. the possibility of an agreed reference
-to the Court by means of a compromis-not ?-boutthe substance of
the dispute itself.
There were also two significant admissions made on behalf of the
Applicant State. In the fi~st place, it was conceded, and indeed
strenuously contended, that the proceedings in the United Nations
Assembly in March-April1961, were quite separate and distinct from
the dispute between the Parties before the Court, and could in no
way constitute a settlement of that dispute. But in that case, how
could the statements and discussions in the Assembly, or made for
the purpose of those proceedings, constitute a negotiation relative
to the quite separate matter of the dispute subsequently referred
to the Court? And if they consequently did not, and if the May
interchange of Notes was not a negotiation, as clearly it was not,
what negotiation ever at any time took place? Evidently none.
The second admission made on behalf of the Applicant State-iI
admission is here the correct term-is that the dispute did not
crystallize-did not even receive birth until May 1961, that is until
after the adoption of Assembly resolution 1608. If that is so, theri
since it is not possible to negotiate in relation to a non-existent
dispute, nothing that took place previous to May 1961 could have
constituted a negotiation concerning the actual dispute now before
the Court; while the May interchange of Notes constituted not a
negotiation but the reverse.
(ii) Was tlzedispute one that was in its natzire capable oj settle-
nzeqztEetweenthe parties alone, by .izegotiutio?i?othevwzeans?
The really important matter, howe~rer,in relation to the question
of a possible settlement, is that ârising on the first of the pre-suppo-
sitions mentioned on p. 122 above ;for there isclearly no purpose in
asking whether any attempt at settlement by negotiation or other
means ever took place, if the dispute was one which the Parties in
any event never could have had the capacity or authority tn settle
by their own joint action. Clearly, thetype of clispiite contemplated
by Article 19 must have been one which the Parties coztld have
settled by negotiation or other means, if they could reach agreement
onthe terms ofsettlement ; or if they could agree on the other nieans
of settlernent (such as arbitration, conciliation. fact-finding com-
113 ARRÊT 2 XII 63 (OP. IXDIV. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE)
124
l'espèceont étéles notes de mai 1961. L'objet de ces notes était ce-
pendant non pas de négociersur le fond du différend mais d'envi-
saeer sil'affaire devait être soumise d'un commun accord à la Cour.
Elles ne contenaient mêmepas deproposition, ni d'indication, quant
à une base possible de règlement. Si elles comportaient un élé-
ment quelconque de négociation, c'était sur la façon de trancher
judiciairement le différend - c'est-à-dire sur la possibilité de
s'adresser d'un commun accord à la Cour par voie de compromis
- mais non sur le fond du différend lui-même.
Deux aveux significatifs ont été faitsau nom de l'État deman-
deur. Premièrement, celui-ci a admis, et même s'estefforcé de
démontrer, que les débats qui s'étaient déroulés à 1'Assem-
blée généraledes Nations Unies en mars-avril 1961 étaient tout
à fait distincts et indépendants du différend entre les Parties
porté devant la Cour et ne pouvaient en aucune manière consti-
tuer un règlement de ce différend. Mais alors, comment les décla-
rations et les discussions à l'Assemblée,ce que l'on a dit ou écrit
en vue de ces débats, comment cela pouvait-il constituer des né-
gociations relatives à la question tout à fait distincte qu'est le
différendultérieurement déféré à la Cour? Si donc cela ne pouvait
pas constituer une négociation et si l'échange de notes du mois
de mai n'était pas non plus une négociation, ce que manifestement
il n'était pas, quelles négociations ont jamais eu lieu à aucun
moment ? Evidemment aucune.
Le second aveu fait au nom de l'État demandeur - si tant est
qu'aveu soit ici le terme exact - c'est que le différendne s'est pas
((cristallis1-n'a pas mêmepris naissance avant le mois de mai
1961 et ne serait donc né qu'après l'adoption de la résolution 1608
de l'Assemblée. S'il en est ainsi, étant donné que l'on ne peut
négocier sur un différend inexistant, rien de ce qui s'est déroulé
avant mai 1961 ne saurait avoir constitué des négociations relatives
au différend dont la Cour est actuellement saisie en fait, dès lors
que l'échange de notes du mois de mai a constitué non pas une
négociation mais l'inverse d'une négociation.
ii) Le différendétait-ilpar nature susceptibled'être régléentre les
seules parties par négociations ou un autre moyen?
La question vraiment importante en ce qui concerne la possibilité
d'un règlement est toutefois celle qui résulte de la première des
présuppositions indiquées plus haut (p. 122),car il serait manifeste-
ment inutile de s'interroger sur l'existence d'une tentative de règle-
ment par négociations ou un autre moyen si le différend était
de ceux que les parties n'auraient jamais eu la capacitéou lepouvoir
de régler par leur propre action commune. Il est évident que les
différends envisagés à l'article 19 doivent êtred'un type tel que les
parties auraient pu les régler par négociations ou un autre moyen
si elles avaient pu parvenir à un accord sur les termes d'un règle-
ment; ou si elles avaient pu s'entendre sur le choix d'autres moyensmission, etc.), and if they agreed to abide by the result. It follows
therefore, that if the disputeas of such a character that the Parties
would not have been entitled to settle it as between themselves
by any of these n~ethods, and without reference to, and agreement
by, some other entity, such as the United Nations, then it cannot
be a dispute of the kind contemplated by Article 19, and falls
outside the scope of that provision. In short, the dispute must
relate to matters or interests which the Parties could freely deal
with themselves, if so minded and able to reach agreement. The
moment it appears that i~ino circumstances could the Parties ever
have settled the matters in dispute between them by any joint
exercise of their own free wills, it becomes apparent, and follows
necessarily, that such a provision as Article 19 can have no appli-
cation.
In the Joint Opinion in the Sozfth West A/Y'EC~case, reasons were
given (I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 551-552) for thinking that questions
relating to the conduct of any Mandate would, precisely, constitute
an order of question having implications going far beyond the scope
of any particular dispute between the mandatory Power and anotlier
Member of the League, and therefore as beins incapable of inde-
pendent settlement between them. Exactly similar considerations
apply in the case of disputes over the conduct (or termination! of
any Trust. But there are certain differences between the two cases
which cal1 for consideration. These arise partly from the peculiar
position of the Republic of Cameroon in the present case, as com-
pared with that of the two Applicant States in the Sozlth West
Africa case, and partly from a certain difference of wording in the
texts of the two respecti~re jurisdictional clauses.
Since in the Solith Wesi dfrica case, the two Applicant States
possessed literally no interest whaterer that was not possessed by
any other Member of the United Nations (because only conduct of
the Mandate provisions were involved), it seemed impossible to
hold (as the Judgment of the Court in that case must imply) that
these two States would have, or ever could have had, the capacity
to settle with the then Respondent State (South Africa) the issues
regarding the conduct of the Mandate raised by their Applications.
In the present case, the Republic of Cameroon, racially and geo-
graphically had an interest of its own, not possessed by other
Members of the Vnited Nations, and it might be argued that it and
the Administering Authority had the capacity to settle a dispute
regarding this individual interest. As has already been noted how-
ever, at the time when attempts to settle the dispute might have
been made, this interest was inextricably interwoven with the whole
question of the conduct and termination of the Trust, and of the
Trusteeship System in general-matters which the Parties to the
present proceedings could not possibly have been entitled to dea!de règlement (tels que l'arbitrage, la conciliation, une commission
d'enquête, etc.) et se mettre d'accord pour en accepter le résultat.
Il s'ensuit donc que, si le différend est d'une nature telle que les
parties n'auraient pas étéfondées à .le régler entre elles par l'une
quelconque de ces méthodes et sans en référer à une autre entité,
telle que l'organisation des Nations Unies, pour en obtenir l'assenti-
ment, il s'agit d'un différend qui ne peut êtredu type envisagépar
l'article19 et qui est exclu du champ de cette disposition. Bref le
différend doit avoir traità des questions, ou à des intérêtsdont les
parties pourraient librement disposer elles-mêmessi elles en avaient
le désiret étaientàmêmedeparvenir àun accord. Du moment qu'il
apparaît que les parties n'auraient pu en aucun cas réglerentre elles
les questions controversées par le jeu conjoint de leur libre volonté,
il devient évident et il s'ensuit nécessairement qu'une disposition
comme l'article 19 ne saurait avoir d'application.
Dans l'opinion dissidente commune en l'affaire du Sud-Ozlestafri-
cain (C. I. J.Recueil 1962, pp. 551-552) sont exposées les raisons
de penser que les problèmes relatifs àla gestion d'un Mandat consti-
tuent précisémentle genre de problèmes dont les implications dépas-
seraient largement la portée d'un différend particulier entre la
Piiissance mandataire et un autre Membre de la Société desNations
et qui ne seraient donc pas susceptibles d'êtreréglésindépendam-
ment entre ces deux pays. Des considérations exactement similaires
s'appliquent au cas des différendssur la gestion (ou la levée)d'une
tutelle. Mais il y a entre les deux cas quelques différencesqu'il faut
examiner. Elles résultent, en partie, de la situation particulière de
la République du Cameroun dans la présente affaire par rapport à
celle des deux Etats demandeurs dans l'affaire du Sud-Ouest af~icain
et, en partie,d'une certaine différencede rédaction entre les textes
des,deux clauses juridictionnelles.
Etant donné que, dans l'affaire du Sud-Ouest ajricain, les deux
États demandeurs n'avaient littéralement aucune espèce d'intérêt
que n'importe quel autre État Membre des Nations Unies n'eût
pas (car seules des dispositions ayant trait à la gestion du Mandat
étaient en cause), il semblait impossible de soutenir (comme l'arrêt
de la Cour en l'espèce l'implique nécessairement) que ces deux
Etats a~raient eu ou auraient jamais pu avoir la capacité de régler
avec 1'Etat défendeur (l'Afrique du Sud) les questions relatives à la
gestion du Mandat que soulevaient leurs requêtes. Dans la présente
affaire, la République du Cameroun a, pour des raisons ethniques
et géographiques, un intérêtpropre que d'autres Membres des Na-
tions Unies ne possèdent pas. L'on pourrait soutenir que le Came-
roun et l'autorité administrante avaient la capacité voulue pour
réglerun différendconcernant cet intérêtpropre. Toutefois, comme
on l'a déjà fait observer, au moment où l'on aurait pu essayer de
résoudre le différend, cet intérêt étaitinextricablement liéau pro-
blème de la gestion et de la levée de la tutelle dans son ensemble
et au problème du régime de tutelle en général - questions quewith or regulate igiterse, whatever the strength of any persona1
interest they, or either of them, niight have possessed.
The type of settlement contemplated by Article 19 was of course
such a settlement as might have been a~rived at, by or between the
Parties (or resulting from their joint action) previous to the date on
which the Application to the Court was made, but which was not so
arrived at. It has to be asked therefore whethzr, at any material
time previous to 30 May 1961, the Parties could possibly have had
any right or capacity to settle the subject-matter of the Came-
roon complaint between theni. Even if the Administering Authority
had been willing to agree that the territory in question should go
to the Republic of Cameroon, what capacity or authority could it
possibly have liad to do a sort of private deal with the Republic
to that effect,when the Assembly was actively exercising its corpo-
rate powers in regard tothat very same matter-powerr wliich ithad
both a right and a duty to exercise under the United Nations
Charter, to which both the Republic of Cameroon and the United
Kingdom were parties? The question lias only to be asked, for it to
be immediately apparent that it was not for these Sta.tes to regulate
such matters, which must therefore have been quite outside the
scope of Article 19.
The other difference between the present case and the South
West Africa case is that Article ; of the Mandate for South West
Africa spoke only of a dispute that could not be settled "by negoti-
ation", whereas P,rticle 19 speaks of one that cannot be settled by
negotiation "or other means". It might be contended therefore
that, even if it is the fact that this type of dispute (i.e. about the
conduct or termination of the Trust) is inherently incapable of being
settled by negotiation between the parties, stiU it cannot have
been inherently incapable of settlementby any means at all-for in-
stance, precisely, byactionin, or by the action of, the United Nations.
The answer to tl:is coiltention has, in effect, already been given-
seepp. 119and 123above. It would involve an erroneousinterpretation
of the notion of settlement by "other means" in ajurisdictional clause
suchasArticle 19. The term "settlement", as has been seen, denotes
settlement between, or by the action of, the parties; or by methods
jointly resorted to by them. Eut it is clear that the Parties in the
present case would no more, by themselves, have had the right to
settle this class of dispute by these "other means", than to do so by
private negotiation. The conclusions of a fact-finding or conciliation
commission, or arbitral tribunal, could not in any way have dealt
with the United Nations interests involved, which altogether tran-
scended those of the Parties, and which migfit have been quite at
variance with those conclusions. Nor could these conclusions in any
way have bound the United Nations. Inshort, whetherby negotiation,
or by other means, there could not have been anj7 real settlement
through the action of the Parties alone. There was no question of
115les Parties à la présente instance n'auraient manifestement pas été
fondées à étudier et à réglerentre elles seules, et cela si fort que fût
l'intérêtpersonnel que les deuxParties ou l'une d'entre ellesauraient
pu avoir.
Le genre de reglement envisagé par l'article 19 était naturelle-
ment un règlement qui aurait pu être effectué, par ou entre les
Parties (ou par suite de leur action conjointe), avant la date du
dépôt de la requêtedevant la Cour, mais qui ne l'a pas été.On doit
donc se demander si, à un moment quelconque avant le 30 mai 1961,
les Parties auraient pu avoir le droit ou la capacité de réglerentre
elles ce sur auoi or te la la in tedu Cameroun. Mêmesi l'autorité
administrante a<ait étédkposée à admettre que le territoire liti-
gieux devait aller àla République du Cameroun, à quel titre aurait-
elle eu la capacité ou le pouvoir voulu pour conclure à cet effet une
sorte de marché avec la République, alors que l'Assembléeétait en
train d'exercer activement ses pouvoirs collectifs sur ce point
même - pouvoirs qu'elle avait à la fois le droit et le devoir d'exercer
dans le cadre de la Charte des Nations Unies, à laquelle aussi bien
la République du Cameroun que le Royaume-Uni étaient parties?
11suffit de poser la,question pour voir immédiatement qu'il n'appar-
tenait pas à ces Etats de résoudre ces problèmes, qui sont donc
nécessairement restés hors du domaine de l'article 19.
L'autre différence entre la présente affaire et l'affaire du Sud-
Ouest africain tient à ce quel'article 7 du Mandat pour le Sud-Ouest
africain ne parlait que d'un différend non susceptible d'êtreréglé
((par des négociations 1)alors que l'article 19mentionne un différend
ne pouvant être réglépar négociations (ou un autre moyen )).
On pourrait donc prétendre que, même sic'est un fait que ce genre
de différend (sur la gestion ou la levéede la tutelle) est par nature
insusceptible d'êtreréglépar voie de négociations entre les parties,
il est impossible que, par nature, il n'ait pu êtreréglépar un moyen
quelconque - par exemple et précisémentpar l'action des Nations
Unies ou une action menée dans le cadre des Nations Unies. On
a déjà en fait répondu à cette thèse (voir pp. 119 et 123ci-dessus).
Elle entraînerait une interprétation erronée de la notion de règle-
ment par (un autre moyen ))dans une clause juridictionnelle telle
que l'article 19. Le terme (règlement »,comme on l'a vu, s'entend
soit d'un règlement entre les parties ou résultant de l'action des
parties, soit d'un règlement effectué par des méthodes utilisées
conjointement par les parties. Mais il est clair que les Parties en
l'espèce n'auraient pas plus eu le droit de résoudre ce genre de
différendpar elles-mêmesen recourant à un (autre moyen )quede
le régler par voie de négociations privées. Les conclusions d'une
commission d'enquêteou de conciliation ou d'un tribunal arbrital
n'auraient pu en aucune manière traiter des intérêtsdes Nations
Unies qui étaient en jeu, intérêtsqui transcendaient entièrement
ceux des Parties et avec lesquels ces conclusions auraient pu être
très largement incompatibles. Ces conclusions n'auraient pu nontheir referring the matter to the United Nations-it was already
there. But had there been any such reference, this could only have
implied a recognition of the fact that only theVnited Nations could
deal with the matter, which consequently exceeded the scope of
Article 19.
THE OBJECTION ''RATION5 TEMPORIS"
\
Since, in my view, the Applicant State aoes not have the right
to invoke Article 19 of the Trust Agreement at al1in respect of the
matters to which the Application relates, andthe Court consequently
lacks jurisdiction to go into the merits of any part of it, it becomes
strictly unnecessary to consider any preliminary objection which
might arise on the substance of the claim, such as the objection
ratione temporis advanced by the Respondent State, to the effect
that al1that part of the Applicant State's complaint which relates
to acts or events having taken place previous to the date when it
became a Member of the United Nations-(:'pre-membership" acts
or events) should be ruled out as inadmissible on that ground.
However, since the Parties devoted a considerable part of their
argument to this question, and it involves an important issue of
principle, 1propose to say something about it.
This objection, to my mind, concerns-tk admissibiiity of the
claim rather than the competence of the Court, and is quite in-
dependent of Article 19 of the Trust Agreement, in the sense
that even if Article 19 applied in principle to the present type of
complaint, and the Court had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint
of that type, the objection ratione temporis in respect of pre-
membership acts and events could still be advanced in order to
rule out in Limine that part of the complaint. The objection was
however treated by both sides in the case as a jurisdictional one;
and by the Applicant State as depending exclusively on Article 19,
in the sense that if, as Article19 required, the Applicant State was
a Member of the United Nations at the moment when the dispute
arose and on the date of the lodging of the Application, and if the
latter was lodged before Article 19 ceased to be in force because
of the termination of the Trust, then, seeing that Article 19 did not
in terms excludedisputes about pre-membership acts or events, the
Applicant State was automatically entitled to include complaints
about these acts and events in its Application.plus lier en aucune manière les Nations Unies. Bref, que ce soit
par des négociations ou par un autre moyen, l'action des seules
Parties n'aurait pu aboutir à un véritable règlement. Il n'était
pas question pour elles de soumettre l'affaire à l'organisation des
Nations Unies - laquelle en était déjà saisie. Mais, à supposer
qu'elle lui ait étésoumise, on aurait par là implicitement reconnu
que seule cette Organisation pouvait s'occuper du problème, qui
dépassait par conséquent la portée de l'article 19.
L'EXCEPTION (RATIONE TEMPORIS ))
Puisque, àmon avis, l'État demandeur n'a aucundroit d'invoquer
l'article19de l'accord de tutelle à l'égard des questions viséesdans
la requêteet que la Cour est par conséquent sans compétence pour
juger au fond une partie quelconque de la requête, il n'est pas
nécessaire,à strictement parler, d'examiner les exceptions prélimi-
naires qui peuvent êtresoulevéessur le fond de la demande, telle
que l'exception ratione temporis qui a étéprésentée par lJEtat
défendeur et selon laquelle toute Ia partie des griefs de 1'Etat
demandeur concernant des actes ou événements survenus avant
son admission comme Membre des Nations Unies (actes ou événe-
ments (antérieurs à l'admission ») doit êtrerejetée comme irre-
cevable de ce chef.
Toutefois, puisque les Parties y ont consacréune bonne part de
leur argumentation et que cela met en jeu une importante question
de principe, je me propose d'en dire quelques mots.
A mon avis, cette exception concerne la recevabilité de la deman-
de plutôt que la compétence de la Cour; elle est tout à fait indé-
pendante de l'article 19 de l'accord de tutelle, en tant que, même
si l'article19 s'appliqiiait en principe au genre de griefs dont il
s'agit présentement et si ia Cour étaitcompétente pour en connaître,
on pourrait toujours opposer l'exception ratione tem9oris ayant
trait aux actes et événements antérieurs àl'admission pour écarter
d'emblée cette partie cle la deniande. Or cette exception a été
traitéepar lesZcux Parties en l'espècecornice visant la compétence;
l'État demandeur l'a considérée commeexclusivement fondée sur
l'articl19 en tant que, si, conformémentaux prescriptions de l'ar-
ticle 19, l'État demandeur était Membre des Nations Unies au
moment de la naissance du différendet à iz date de l'introduction
de la requêteet si cette requêtea étédéposéeavant que l'article 19
ait cesséd'êtreen vigueur du fait de l'extinction de la tutelle, il
était automatiquement fondé à inclure dans sa requête les griefs
visant les actes et événementsantérieurs à son admission, vu que
l'article19 n'excluait pas expressément les différends relatifà ces
actes ou événements. 128 JUDG. 2 XII 63 (SEP. OPIN. SIR GERALD FITZ~IAURICE)
The view that the matter turns wholly on Article 19 is, in my
opinion, certainly incorrect. In their nature, questions of admissi-
bility relating to the substance of a claim cannot be disposed of
simply by a finding that the jurisdictional clause is in principle
applicable. Thus a plea of non-exhaustion of local remedies, or as
to the "nationality" of a claim l, could be advanced and could
operate to rule out the claim as inadmissible, even though al1 the
requirements of the jurisdictional clause were met (so that the
Court could proceed to the ultimate merits but for these non-
jurisdictional objections). Indeed, preliminary objections of this
kind cannot, unless the case has some exceptional feature, be heard
at al1 unless the Court has jurisdiction (see pp. 103-105 above).
Since the validity of admissibility objections normally depends
on considerations lying outside the jurisdictional clause as such,
it is obviously immaterial that the latter has not specifically made
the absence of any such grounds of objection a condition of the
Court being able to proceed to the ultimate merits. The silence of
the jurisdictional clause simply leaves the matter open, to depend
on general principles of law, or possibly on other provisions of the
instrument concerned. Thus in the present case it is immaterial,
and in no way conclusive, that Article 19 did not in terms exclude
pre-membership acts and events from its scope. The truth is that
Article 19 would have had expressly to include them, in order to
rule out a priori any objection to them based on independent
grounds. The case of reservations or conditions ratione temporis
contained in Declarations made under the Optional Clause of the
Court's Statute is quite a different one, and not in point, for reasons
to be stated in a moment.
Turning now to the substance of the particular objection ratione
temporis advanced in the present case, it is clear that it could not
apply to the whole complaint, since part of the latter concerns acts
and events taking place subsequent to the Applicant State's
admission to the United Nations ("post-membership" acts or
events), e.g. in connection with the conduct of the plebiscite in the
Northern Cameroons. The objection is however advanced in respect
of the most important part of the Applicant State's complaint,
which alleges irregularities in the conduct of the Trust (virtually
lLe., that the claimant State is making a claim in respect of an injury to a per-
son or Company not of its nationality.
117 ARRÊT 2 XII 63 (OP.INDIV. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE) 128
Il ne fait pas de doute à mes yeux que la thèse d'après laquelle
la question tourne entièrement autour de l'article 19 est inexacte.
Les questions de recevabilité relatives au fond d'une demande ne
sauraient, de par leur nature même, être régléespar la simple
constatation que la clause juridictionnelleest en principeinapplica-
ble. Ainsi, une exception ayant trait au non-épuisement des recours
internes ou à la ((nationalit» d'une demande lpeut êtresoulevéeet
servir à écarter la demande comme irrecevable même si toutes les
prescriptions de la clause juridictionnelle sont satisfaites (de sorte
que, n'étaient les exceptions ne portant pas sursa compétence, la
Cour pourrait procéder à l'examen des questionsrelevant irréductible-
ment du fond). Et même, à moins que l'affaire ne présente certains
caractères exceptionnels, la Cour ne saurait connaître d'exceptions
préliminaires de cette sorte que si elle a compétence (voir pp.104-105
ci-dessus).
Puisque la validité des exceptions d'irrecevabilité dépend norma-
lement de considérations extérieures à la clause iuridictionnelle
en tant que telle, il importe évidemment peu que cette clause
n'ait Das ex~ressément subordonné à l'absence de tout chef d'ex-
cePt& de iette sorte l'aptitude de la Cour à connaître de ce qui
constitue le fond (irréductible ».Le silence de la clause juridiction-
nelle a pour seul effet que la question reste ouverteet que sa solution
dépend des principes générauxdu droit ou éventuellement d'autres
dispositions de l'instrument dont il s'agit. Ainsi, en l'espèce, il
est sans importance et il n'est absolument pas concluant que l'ar-
ticle 19 n'ait pas expressément exclu de son champ d'application
les actes et événementsantérieurs à l'admission. En vérité,il aurait
fallu que l'article19 les inclue expressément pour que toute excep-
tion à leur égard fondéesur des motifs indépendants soit écartée
a priori. Pour des raisons que j'énoncerai dans un instant, le casdes
réserves ou limitations rationetemporis contenues dans les déclara-
tions faites en vertu de la disposition facultative du Statut de la
Cour est tout à fait différent et n'est paspertinent.
Pour en venir à la susbstance de l'exception ratione temporis
présentée en l'espèce, il est clair qu'elle ne saurait s'appliquer à
l'ensemble de la demande, puisqu'une partie de celle-ci vise des
actes et événementssurvenus après l'admission de 1'Etat demandeur
aux Nations Unies (actes ou événements «postérieurs à l'admis-
sion )))en liaison par exemple avec la mise en Œuvre du plébiscite
du Cameroun septentrional. Mais cette exception vise la partie la
plus importante des griefs de 1'Etat demandeur, celle qui a trait
à de prétendues irrégularités dansla gestion de la tutelle (commises
une personneou une sociétén'ayant pas sa nationalité.n donimage subi par
=17since its inception), but for which the result of the plebiscite would
allegedly have been different.
In my opinion, the validity of the objection ratione temporis in
respect of the pre-membership acts and events depends on whether
the Applicant State is making a separate and independent claim
in respect of these, or is only citing them in order to establish,
or as part of the process of establishing, or as relevant to its com-
plaints about, the post-membership acts and events. In so far as the
Applicant State is not making use of the earlier matters for the
last-named purpose only, but is making them the basis of indepen-
dent complaints, the claim must, to that extent, be considered in-
admissible. The reason is, briefly, that since the Applicant State
did not exist as such at the date of these acts or events, these
could not have constituted, in relation to it, an international wrong,
nor have caused it an international injury. An act which did not,
in relation to the party complaining of it, constitute a wrong at the
time it took place, obviously cannot ex post facto become one.
Similarly, such acts or events could not in themselves have con-
stituted, or retroactively have become, violations of the Trust
in relation to the Applicant State, since the Trust confers rights
onlÿ on Members of the United Nations, and the Applicant State
was not then one, nor even, over most of the relevant period, in
existence as a State and separate international persona.
It u-as argued that when States make a Declaration under the
Optional Clause of the Statute, accepting the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction, they must in terms exclude from the scope of that
acceptance disputes relating to past acts, events or situations,
if they intend that there shall be such an exclusion, or else must
expressly relate their acceptance to the future only. This however
proves nothing. These Statesare already in existence, and admitting
that if their Declaration does not exclude the past, this will be
regarded as covered-nevertheless it would still be the case that
this could be so o+zlyin respect of those particular past acts, events
or situations (previous to the Declaration in question) which took
place after the State making it had itself come into existence, and
therefore couldhave rights or obligations relative to those past acts,
events or situations. In relation to anything having occurred pre-
vious to its existence as a State, there uould be no right or obliga-
tion that could be invoked under an Optional Clause Declaration.
A State might indeed perhaps have worded its Declaration in such
a way that it could, technically, be taken before the Court in such
a case, but even if the Court was formally competent, so far as the
actual language of the two relevant Declarations went, the claim
itself would have to be ruled out as inadmissible so soon as it be-
came clear that it related to a period in respect of which it was im-
possible npriori for the defendant Stateto be under any obligation. ARRÊT 2 XII63 (OP. INDIV. SIR GERALD FITZMAURICE) 129
pratiquement depuis le début de celle-ci), sans lesquelles le résul-
tat du plébiscite aurait étédifférent.
A mon avis, la validité de l'exception rationetemporis fondéesur
les actes et éyénementsantérieurs à l'admission dépenddu point de
savoir si 1'Etat requérant présente une demande distincte et
indépendante à leur sujet ou bien s'il ne les cite qu'en vue d'établir
l'existence d'actes et d'événements postérieursà son admission, ou
dans le cadre de son système de preuve oy à propos des griefs qu'il
formule à cet égard. Dansla mesure où 1'Etat demandeur ne se sert
pas exclusivement à cette dernière fin des élémentsantérieurs et où
il en faitla base de griefs indépendants, la demande doit pour autant
êtreconsidérée commeirrecevable. En bref, la raison en est celle-ci:
étant donné que 1'Etat demandeur n'existait pas comme tel à la
date de ces actes ou événements,ceux-ci n'ont pu lui faire subir un
préjudice international ni lui causer un dommage international. Un
acte qui, au moment où il s'est produit, ne constituait pas un
préjudice à l'égardde la partie qui s'enplaint ne saurait évidemment
devenir préjudiciable a posteriori. De méme, ces actes ou événe-
ments ne sauraient avoir constitué en eux-mêmes,ni êtredevenus
rétroactivement, des violations de l'accord de tutelle vis-à-vis de
I'Etat demandeur, puisque l'accord n'a conftré des droits qu'aux
seuls Membres des Nations Unies, que 1'Etat demandeur n'en
était pas un alors et que, pendant la plus grande partie de la
période pertinente, il n'existait mêmepas comme Etat et comme
personne internationale distjncte.
On a soutenu que, si les Etats qui font une déclaration d'accep-
tation de la juridiction de la Cour en vertu de la disposition facul-
tative du Statut désirent en exclure les différends relatifs aux
actes, événements ou situations passés, ils doivent soit exclure
expressément ces différends du domaine de leur acceptation, soit
rattacher expressément et exclvsivement leuracceptation à l'avenir.
hiais cela ne prouve rien. Ces Etats existent déjà et, étant admis
que, si leur déclaration n'exclut pas le passé, on doit considérer
qu'elle le couvre, il n'en reste pas moins qu'il ne peut s'agir en
l'occurrence que des actes, événementsou situations pa+s (anté-
rieurs àla déclaration en question)survenus aprèsque 1'Etat décla-
rant a pris naissance et a par conséquent été en mesure d'avoir des
droits ou obligations quant à ces actes, événementsou situations
passés.En ce qui concerne tout ce qui s'est produit avant la venue
à l'existence de cet Etat en tant que tel, aucun droit et aucune
obligation ne pourraient êtreinvoquésaux termes d'une déclaration
f~ite en vertu de la disposition facultative. Il se peut bien qu'un
Etat ait rédigésa déclaration de telle sorte qu'il puisse technique-
ment êtrecité devant la Cour en pareil cas mais, mêmesi la Cour
est formellement compétente, à ne s'en tenir qu'au texte des deux
déclarations pertinentes, la demande doit êtreécartéecomme irre-
cevabledès lors qu'il apparaîtcjairement qu'ellevise une périodeoùil
était impossible apriori que 1'Etat défendeur ait aucune obligation.
118 Similarly, States cannot, by accepting the Optional Clause,
create rights for themselves in respect of a period previous to their
existence as States. If they were then in existence, they naturally
could have rights in respect of acts and events then occurring, and
could later on invoke an Optional Clause Declaration for the
purpose of asserting those rights, in any case where there had been
no express exclusion of the past under the Declaration of the other
party to the dispute. But in relation to a period in respect of which
there were no rights, none can ever arise, unless by express agree-
ment, and no express exclusionis necessary. The whole issue is not
one of the applicability as such of the jurisdictional clause or
Optional Clause Declarations involved, but of whether, a priori,
there exist, or could exist, any rights for the assertion of which
(via the Court) these provisions exist. Much more could be said on
this subject; but if the position were not as here stated, there
would be no limit to the antiquity of the matters in respect of
which claims could constantly be made, and perpetually be liable
to be re-opened.
In the present case, it comes to the same thing in practice
whether the conclusion is ut in the form that the AL1licant State
is precluded from making any claim in respect of pre-membership
acts or events, or in the form that complaints relative to these
must be ruled out as inadmissible, except for their probative effect
in connection with the admissible post-membership claims. Now,
according to the way in which the Republic of Cameroon framed its
submissions, both in the original Application and at the close of
the oral hearing, it was undoubtedly making various pre-member-
ship acts and events a separate and independent ground of com-
~laint. These were indeed an essential element of the claim taken
is a whole, and the Applicant State was asking the Court to pro-
nounce upon them as such. Had the Court decided to examine
the claim, 1 consider that these complaints would have hadto be
ruled out as inadmissible. On the other hand, had the Court pro-
ceeded to the merits on the remaining (post-membership) portion
of the claim, then the earlier actsand eventscould, sofar asrelevant,
have been cited by the Applicant State in support of, or to assist
in establishing, that part of the claim which was admissible ratione
temforis.
1conclude by saying that, while 1 have thought it desirable to
deal with thematters considered in Parts IV and V of this Opinion,
this does not affect my earlier expressed view that the Court itself
was right not to do so, for the reasons given on pp. 104-106 above.
(Signed)G. G. FITZMAURICE. De même, des États ne sauraient, en acceptant la disposition
doits concernant une période antérieure
facultative, se créeer des
à leur existence en tant qu'Etats. S'ils ont existé à l'époque,ils ont
naturellement pu avoir des droits à l'égard desactes et événements
alors survenus et ils peuvent invoquer ensuite une déclaration faite
en vertu de la disposition facultative afin de faire valoir ces droits,
dans tous les cas où le passé n'a pas étéexpressément exclu de la
déclaration de l'autre partie en litige. En ce qui concerne une
période où il n'y a pas eu de droits, il ne saurait en naître que par
accord exprès; aucune exclusion expresse n'est donc nécessaire.
Il ne s'agit pas de savoir si la clause juridictionnelle les déclara-
tions faites en vertu de la disposition facultative en question sont
applicables en tant que telles; il s'agit de savoir sipriori il existe,
ou il a pu exister, des droits que ces dispositions autorisentreven-
diquer (par l'intermédiaire de la Cour). On pourrait s'étendre sur ce
sujet; mais, si la situation n'était pas celie que j'ai indiquée, il n'y
aurait guère de limite quant à l'ancienneté des (luestions à l'égard
desquelles des demandes pourraient être constamment présentées
et seraient perpétuellement susceptibles de resurgir.
Dans la présente affaire, cela revient pratiquement au mêmede
conclure que 1'Etat demandeur ne peut présenter aucune demande
à l'égard des actes ou événements antérieurs à son admission, ou
que des griefs ayant trait à de tels actes ou événements doivent
êtreécartéscomme irrecevables à moins qu'ils n'aient une valeur
de preuve au sujet de demandes recevables concernant la période
postérieure à l'admission. Or, d'après la manière dontla République
du Cameroun a présenté ses conclusions, tant dans sa requête
initiale qu'à la fin de ses plaidoiries, elle a fait, sans aucun doute,
des actes et événements antérieurs à son admission des griefs
distincts et indépendants. Ceux-ci onten vérité constituéun élément
essentiel de la demande ri sedans son ensemble et 1'Etat demandeur
a invité la Couràse prononcer sureux comme tels. Je considère que,
si la Cour avait décidéd'examiner la demande, ces griefs auraient
dû êtreécartéscomme irrecevables. En revanche, si la Cour avait
abordé l'étude au fond des autres gfiefs (ceux qui portent sur la
période postérieure à l'admission), 1'Etat requérant aurait pu citer
les actes et événements antérieurs dans la mesure où ils auraient
été pertinents pour étayer la partie de la demande qui aurait été
recevable ratione temporis ou pour contribuer à établir son bien-
fondé.
* * *
Pour conclure je dirai que, si j'ai jugé opportun de traiter des
questions qui font l'objet de la quatrième et de la cinquième
partie de la présente opinion, je reste néanmoins d'avis que la Cour
a eu raison de ne pas en parler, pour les motifs indiqués aux pages
104 à 106 ci-dessus.
(Signé)G.G. FITZMAURICE.
Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice