Dissenting opinion by Judge Badawi Pasha (translation)

Document Number
001-19490409-JUD-01-03-EN
Parent Document Number
001-19490409-JUD-01-00-EN
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Bilingual Document File

DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA.

[Translatio~z.]
1 agree with the Court's findings on the facts, as stated in the
Judgment (pp. 12-15), and with its rejection of the contention that
Albania herself laid the mines.

The Court then considers the argument that the mines may have
been laid with the Albanian Government's connivance, and sums
it up in the following words : "According to this argument, the
minelaying operation was carried out by two Yugoslav warships at
a date prior to October zznd, but very near that date.This would
imply collusion between the Albanian and the Yugoslav Govern-
ments, consisting either of a request by the Albanian Governnent
to the Yugoslav Government for assistance, or of acquiescence by
the Albanian authorities in the laying of the mines."

To demonstrate this collusion, the UnitedKingdom Governnent

relied on the evidence of Commander Kovacic and on a number of
presumptions of fact or or, circumstantial evidence.

The Court considered that,
on the one hand, the facts related by the witness from his own
knowledge were not sufficient to prove what the United Kingdom
Government claimed that they proved,
on the other hand, that the facts (presumptions of fact), even
in so far as they are established, justify no definite conclusion.

Of these facts, the Court expressly mentioned the possession
by Yugoslavia of GY mines, which it said not to have been proved,
and the conclusion, drawn from the existence of a treaty between
Albania and Yugoslavia that those two countries participated in
the criminal act of minelaying. But when it said that the facts
justified no definite conclusion, the Court evidently meantal1 the
facts, without exception or distinction.
1 also agree with the Court on this conclusion, and 1 think that
tbere may be a strong suspicion of connivance, but that it is not
judicially proved.
In order to make clear what follows, 1 feel obliged to mention
al1 the presumptions on which the United Kingdom Government
relies as submitted in its speeches (pp. 980 and 995, Verbatim
Record, January 17th-zznd, 1949)~and to make a general remark
on circumstantial evidence.

The presumptions mentioned on page 980 are five in number
and are as follows :

58 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 59
I. The fact that the mines were placed actually in front of and
probably inSaranda Bay itself in the territorial waters of Albania
suggests that Albania must haye been at least to some extent
implicated in the laying of this minefield.

2. The conduct of Albania both after the blowing up of the ships
on October 22nd and even more after the discovery of the
minefield on November 13th was not the conduct which would
be expected of a Power which had learned for the first time of
the existence in her territorial waters just off a small Albanian
port of a dangerous minefield, but rather that of a State embar-
rassed by a most inconvenient discovery.
3. It is posçible to find motives, which Albania may have had for
causing the minefield to be laid and therefore for Yugoslavia, at
that time her closest friend and ally, assisting her, since Albania
did not herself possess the resources for doing so, and no country
other than Yugoslavia and Albania had the resources and the
motives for laying a minefield here before October zznd.

4. The minefield consisted of German GY mines, marked with a
swastika ; there were available stocks of German GY mines in
Yugoslavia ;Yugoslavia had marked these mines with a swastika,
and had the means of laying this minefield. The mines therefore
must have come from Yugoslavia.

Owing to the close friendship and relationship between the two
5. countries, it is inconceivable that Yugoslavia laid the mines
mithout the knowledge of the Albanian Government.

Two other presumptions are given on page 995 :

I. There would have been a serious risk that the minelaying would
have been seen from Limion Bay, Denta Point, and St. George's
Monastery, if not from other points also.
2. This risk was so serious and so evident that no one intending
to lay mines without Albania's consent would ever have dared
run it.

The general observation is as follows :
In a system of evidence which is based upon free appraisal by
the judge, as is the case in national criminal legislation and in
international law, circumstantial evidence means facts which,
while not supplying immediate proof of the charge, yet make the
charge problable with the assistance of reasoning. The elements
of such circumstantial evidence must be interpreted and associated

in order to draw the relevant inferences and reconstruct the data
on which the hypothesis of responsibility is founded. In this
process of interpretation and association, there is a risk of commit-
59 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 60

ting errors of appreciation, of letting the imagination fil1 in the
gaps in the evidence, or of reasoning in a specious manner. This
method of evidence, which seeks or pretends to arrive at certainty,
most often attains only a high degree of probability. The fact
remains that under some legislations, circumstantial evidence must
be weighty, accurate and concordant. On the other hand, the
most reliable doctrine takes the view that "proof by circumstantial
evidence is regarded as successfully established only when other
solutions would imply circumstances wholly astonishing, unusual
and contrary to the way of the world". These rules must be a
constant guide in weighing evidence.

The Court then comes to the United Kingdom argument that
whoever laid the mines, they cannot have been laid without the
Albanian Government knowing of it.

The Court feels bound to state first that "it cannot be concluded
from the mere fact of the coiltrol exercised by a State over its
territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to
have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, not yet
that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This
fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neitherinvolves
prima fucie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof."

The Court then mentions two classes of facts which corroborate
one another. The first relates to Albania's attitude before and

after the catastrophe of October zznd, 1946 ; the others concern
the possibility of observing minelaying from the Albanian coast.
From facts and observations connected with these two orders
of facts which the Court considers as established, the conclusion
is drawn that the minelaying which caused the explosions of
October zznd, 1946, could not have been unknown to the Albanian
Government .
Then, after referring to the Albanian authorities' omission, if
not to send a general notification to al1 States, at least to warn
the warships of the danger that they were running into, during
nearly two hours, from the moment when they were reported to
the Commander of the Coastal Defences by the look-out post at
St. George's Monastery, up to the time of the explosion of the
Sazimarez, the Court concludes that Albania is responsible under
international law for the explosions and the damage and loss of
human life that resulted, and that the Albanian Government must

pay ccmpensation to the United Kingdom Government.

It is these two last findings of the Court that, to my regret, 1
cannot accept.
60 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 61

The two series of facts, on which the Court bases its finding in
regard to knowledge, were put forward with others by the United
Kingdom in support of the argument of connivance. But after
considering this argument, the Court came to the conclusion that,
in spite of seven concurrent presumptions, it was still a conjecture.
In any case, it is clear that if connivance or collusion has not
been established, the knosledge of the minelaying that would be
the consequence of this connivance, is necessarily excluded. To
maintain the contrary would be equivalent to saying that arguments
insufficient for establishing connivance are sufficient to prove
knowledge inasmuch as it is a consequence of connivance-which

1 think is inadmissible.
In the British argument, knowledge is so confused with
connivance, that it is impossible to separate them. But connivance
presupposes Yugoslavia's complicity, and the Court, with which
1 agree, thinks that this complicity is not proved.

How then can the two notions be separated ? Evidently the
only way would be to reject the argument that the minelaying
operation was the result of a plot and to confine oneself to the mate-
rial fact of the minelaying, on the assumption that it was carried
out by an unknown agency ;it must be ascertained whether the
circumstances of the case lead to the conclusion that Albania, quite
apart from al1connivance, had, or had not, knowledge of the mine-
laying. By reducing the problem to these terms, we are able,

of course, to dissociate knowledge from connivance ; but in
that case, physical proof so to speak of knowledge is necessary.
Reduced to that abstraction, knowledge could only be estab-
lished if it were shown that Albania, or, more exactly, the
local authorities on the coast, saw the minelaying operation.
The question ofvisibility from the coastthen assumes an importance
which it would not have in the case of connivance ;for the latter,
as the United Kingdom Counsel maintained, could take place at
govemment level, between Belgrade and Tirana, without the local
authorities having seen anything. At the same time, the knowl-
edge of the minelaying must be determined in respect of time,
i.e., the moment when Albania learned of the minelaying must be

determined. Whereas, in the case of connivance, it is of little
importance to decide the inoment when it took place (for connivance
in itself is sufficient to irivolve the responsibility of the territorial
State), the precise moment when knowledge occurred must be
determined, in order to decide when the obligation to notify the
existence of the minefield first arose, or if there were not sufficient
time to make the notification, when arose the obligation to wam
the ships which were passing through the Channel of the danger
into which they were running.
The United Kingdom stated that this visibility was estab-
lished beyong dispute, both before the Security Council and in the

61 DISSENTING OI'INION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 62

early stages of the proceedings. The evidence of the naval officers
had the same positive ring. But Counsel for the United Kingdom
no longer regards this fact as important in his oral reply
(pp. 993-995). He even admitted the possibility that the coastal
authonties had neither seen nor heard anything. Knowledge
would then have existed at the governmental level between Tirana
and Belgrade. But this would not be simple knowledge, but
knowledge as a consequence of connivance.
Even in so far asthe United Kingdom Counsel, in his speech in
reply, held visibility to constitute a presumption of connivance,
he did not do so not because it constitutes a certainty, but because
it involves such a serious and evident nsk for anyone intending to
lay mines, that he would never have dared to do sowithout Albania's

consent.
In short, the evidence of knowledge, in the UnitedKingdom case,
is the same as that for connivance. But for the purpose of estab-
lishing connivance, it was considered conjectural. Can it be
thought otherwise as regards the establishing of knowledge ?

It was thought however that justification for a reply in the
affirmative was to be found in the Report of the Committee of
Experts appointed by the Court, especially the second Report
drawn up after the experiments at Saranda.
The fact is that even in these reports, which barely differ in
their general conclusions on this point, the evidence is still con-
jectural. In the first place, there is only certainty in regard to
visibility from Denta Point, and then only provided a look-out
post existed there, and that weather conditions (sea, clouds, wind,
etc.) were normal.

The existence of a post at Denta Point, which is accessible only
from the sea and lacks al1means of communication with Saranda,
remains a matter of conjecture, as the Court has recognized. On
the other hand, it remains to be proved that the look-outs' watch
was regular and effective, i.e., covering the whole night, and that
weather conditions on the exact day the minelaying took place
were normal, the month of October being mostly one in which
weather conditions are particularly abnormal.
The day on which the mines were laid is evidently not known.
The United Kingdom argues that it was about October aznd, Le.,
October 20th or z~st ; but there is no certainty on this point,
and above all, nothing to prevent the date being some other day
between May 15th and October zand.
On every side, then, there are unknown and vague facts, and this
is why, when the Experts state that the operation must have been
observed from a certain point under certain conditions, they
merely express a scientific probability or certainty, provided al1

the required conditions are fulfilled. To convert this scientific
opinion into human truth or certainty-still more, judicial cer-
62 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA
63
taint y-is an entirely different matter. When 'the indispensable
data concerning the conditions are lacking, the only answer, in my
view, must be negative.
There remains the attitude of Albania, both before and after
October 22nd, 1946. This attitude is said to be shown by her
diplomatic notes, her opposition or obstruction to the sweeping
of the Channel ; the indifference she showed after the minefield
was discovered : she did nothing to investigate or pursue the author
of the minelaying ; she showed no surprise, indignation or pertur-

bation after the discovery ; she blamed the United Kingdom for
violating her sovereignty by sweeping the mines, thus forgetting
the more serious violation of that sovereignty represented by the
laying of the mines in her temtorial waters.
In the eyes of the United Kingdom, this attitude is one of a
State embarrassed by a most inconvenient discovery ;it is not the
attitude of one that has learned of the existence of a dangerous
minefielclin its territorial waters, just off a smallbanian port.

The correct attitude would apparently have been for Albania
as early as October zznd, the date of the accident, or, at any rate
October 26th, the date of the,first United Kingdom communication,
to have asked for the sweeping of the Channel or to have consented
to the sweep, even though she had not been invited to participate ;
and on November 13th to have opened an enquiry into the origin
of the minefield. Albania ought, on the other hand, either to have
addressed a protest to the United Nations against the unknown
agency which had violated her sovereignty by laying minefields

in her temtorial waters, and to have requested the United Nations'
intervention to discover the guilty State, or else to request a friendly
State to sweep the minefield.
It isell-known that in the case of prosecutions under municipal
law, when a person is accused of having committed an offence, the
conduct of the accused or his behaviour after the crime is often
used as a presumption against him. This behaviour sometimes
manifests itself as embarrassment or.discomfort, accompanied by
contradictions when he endeavours to provide an alibi or explain
certain circumstances which seem to weigh against him. At other
times, this behaviour assumes the opposite form, and the accused
protests his innocence vehemently and makes every effort to cast
suspicion on others. Both forms of behaviour might well be
manifested by an innocent man whose awkwardness or indignation
caused him unconsciously to adopt such a suspicious attitude.

The question then of the subsequent attitude of an accused
person must be handled with the greatest care, specially when, as

in the actual case, this question relates by its nature to connivance
more than to knowledge. And still more so when States are
involved. The attitude of an individual is generally persona1 and
subjective, and to be explained by his particular psychology ; the
67 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASWA
64
actions of a State are generally the result of deliberation, of a com-
promise between different views, and sometimes of suggestions or
advice from foreign sources, or various other considerations which
cannot possibly be circumscribed or determined. It would not

be right then, where State responsibility is involved, to act on the
mere analogy of what occurs in the case of the criminal respons-
ibility of individuals.

In regard to the diplomatic notes, the first United Kingdom
communication of October 26th was a short and peremptory noti-
fication. The Albanian note of October 31st, in addition to inop-
portune protests and an unexplainable declaration of non-respons-
ibility in case the sweep should take place in territorial waters,
contains a staternent that Albania has no objection €0 the under-
taking, although she seems to make the usual confusion between

interior waters and territorial waters. The United Kingdom
answer to this note, dated November ~oth, gives the United King-
dom Government's decision ta sweepthe ChannelonNovember 12th;
the tone of the notification is equally peremptory. The United
Kingdom does, it is true, refer to the sweeps of October 1944 and
February 1945, undertaken without objection from Albania ; and
assurance is given that no ship will sojourn in Albanian waters
(apparentlythis expression means interior waters). But Albania's
consent is not asked, as the Central Mine Clearance Board had
recommended, nor is Any invitation made to Albania to send an
observer.
Meanwhile, the discussion in the Central Mine Clearance Board
in London, of which Albania may have received information,

gives the impression of some confusion, and denotes doubt as to
the regularity of unilateral action.
It is not inconceivable then that the apparently strange attitude
of Albania may have been dictated by suggestions or advice
inspired by the international political situation of the moment.
If, on the other hand, account is taken of the fact that States
differ in their strength,culture, history, position and a multitude
of other circumstances, and consequently do not react in the same
Ivay to a given situation, and of the fact that the countries involved
are the United Kingdom on one side and Albania on the other, it
\vil1bc readily admitted that too much attention must not be paid
to Albania's attitude.

My conclusion therefore is that there may be strong suspicion
of knowledge, just as of connivance; but that this is not sufficiently
proved, either by the evidence furnished by the United Kingdom,
or by the Experts' Report.

Since knowledge has not been judicially proved, it is superfluous
to consider whether, Albania after learning of the minelaying, was,
6.4 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA
65
in the hypothesis-the only one envisaged by the United Kingdom
-that mines were laid on October 20th or z~st, in a position to
notify the existence of the minefield in the Medri channel, or at
least to warn the British fleet when it was steaming towards the
Channel, and whether, by her failure to do so, Albania's respons-
ibility was involved. In any case, the necessary facts to establish
such a possibility have not been reported or discussed.

* * *

It remains to be seen whether, apart from connivance or know-
ledge, Albania committed a fault which may have caused the
explosion, and upon which her international responsibility for the
damage suffered may eventually be founded.

The United Kingdom did not maintain, as an alternative ground
of responsibility, thatuch a fault existed. Counsel for the United
Kingdom even declared formally that, unless she had knowledge,
Albania was not responsible.
However, the opinion was expressed that the terms used in the
Special Agreement are general and cover al1 cases of international
responsibility, and that it is for the Court to examine whether
such a fault can be proved to have been committed by Xlbania.
Before examining this aspect of tht. question, it must be stressed
that international law does not recognize objective responsibility
based upon the notion of risk, adopted by certain national legisla-
tions. Indeed, the evolution of internatioiial law and the degree
of development attained by the notion of international CO-operation
do not allow us to consider that this stage has been reached, or is

about to be reached.
The failure of Albania to carry out an international obligation
must therefore be proved, and it must also be proved that this was
the cause of the explosion.
Some are of the opinion that a general obligation exists for States
to exert reasonable vigilance along their coast and that the failure
of Albania to act with due diligence was, in the absence of
knowledge on her part, the reason that the minefield remained
undiscovered and that itcaused the explosion.
Such a general obligation does not exist and cannot exist. Even
assuming that it does exist, the causal nexus between the failure
to carry out the obligation and the explosion remains to be shown.
Others, while admitting that no general obligation to exert
vigilance and no absolute criterion exist, maintain that in any case
there does exist a degree of vigilance which every State must
exercise, but that the extent of such vigilance is to be determined
according to the circumstances of each case.
111 particular, it is asserted that Albania exaggerated her rights
of sovereignty as regards the passage of ships in her territorial
waters. This excessive and almost morbid anxiety in regard to

Gj DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 66

sovereignty implies that, in order t O maintain her sovereignt y,
Albania should have exercised a stricter and more rigorous vigilance
than that of countries who recognize freedom of innocent passage.
On the other hand, it is asserted that Albania, through her
representative on the Security Council, loudly proclaimed that
she was extremely vigilant, in order .to prevent incursions and
infiltrations by Greeks, precisely in the district where the mines
were laid and the explosion took place.
In the first place, to give a decision as to a lack of vigilance
or supervision by a State in a particular district, it would be
necessary to know the availabilities of that State : resources,
organization, situation at the moment,. and a number of other
coksiderations.
Secondly, 1 do not think that her exaggeration of her rights
should necessarily involve an aggravation of Albania's duty of
supervision. If there exists a duty of absolute or relative watch-
fulness, international law alone can determine its extent and limits.
But this duty cannot be increased or diminished by -the conduct
of the State in question. This can only result from Albania's

possibilities and not from her declarations.
On the otherhand, it may be asked whether the United Kingdom
argument does not exaggerate the importance of the contradiction
in Albania's defence on the question of vigilance-sometimes affirm-
ing and sometimes endeavouring to deny it. Does not the vigilance
to which the Albanian representative referred seem only to be
vigilance against Greek incursions and infiltrations, by landing
from small boats ; this does not necessarily coincide with the
vigilance that would enable a minelaying operation carried out at
night at a certaindistance from thecoast to beseen and distinguished.
Moreover, this exaggeration of her rights and jealousy of her
sovereignty seem rather to show the wish of Albania to limit the
duty of supervision by means of this preventive barrage, rather
than an obligation to redouble her supervision.
Finally,it may be asked whether foreseeing the laying of mines
should be considered as a normal obligation and if, consequently,
international law lays down, and is justified in laying down, an
obligation of watchfulness suitable for preventing or observing

such minelaying.

For these reasons, my reply to the first point in the first question
in the Special Agreement is in the negative. This reply governs
the reply to the second point, concerning compensation, and the
latter must also be in the negative.

On the other hand, 1 cannot agree with the Court's decision
as to its jurisdiction to assess the amoiint of compensation. In my view, the words of the Special Agreement "is there any
duty to pay compensation" ("y a-t-il le cas de réfiarationsà

donner"), compared with those of the submissions in the United
Kingdom Application, clearly exclude such jurisdiction. This
is confirmed by the fact that the Special Agreement amounts to
a novation of the application, resulting from negotiations and
therefore implying mutual concessions on the positions originally
adopted.
Though they may be obscure, the terms of the Special Agreement
must none the less be interpreted in the light of the declarations
and of the attitudes of the Parties, as denoting absence of juris-
diction. And if there still were any doubt, the exceptional nature
of the Court's jurisdiction, founded on the consent of the Parties
and, as a corollary, on the restrictive interpretation of the Special
Agreement, should in any case exclude such jurisdiction.
Anyhow, 1 do not think that the jurisprudence of the Permanent
Court of International Justice.can be invoked in the particular
circumstances of the present case, nor that the Security Council's
Resolution can be interpreted without due regard for the terms
in which the matter was referred to the Council ; these terms did

not and could not hôve any reference to a pecuniary settlement
of the dispute.
Finally, the parallelism between compensation and satisfaction
is only apparent. Owing to its nature, unlike "compensation",
"satisfaction" is not limited to a single form. The fact that the
Parties have discussed before the Court the different methods
by which satisfaction may be given does not imply that it was
intended that the method of assessing the amount of the compelis-
ation should also be submitted to the Court's examination.

Bilingual Content

OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

Je suis d'accord avec les conclusions de la Cour sur les faits de
l'affaire, tels qu'ils ont étéexposés dans l'arrêt (pp. 12-15), ainsi
que sur sa conclusion rejetant la thèse selon laquelle l'Albanie
aurait elle-même mouilléles mines.
La Cour se prononce ensuite sur la thèse d'après laquelle le
mouillage des mines aurait étéeffectué avec la connivence du
Gouvernement albanais, en la résumant dans les termes suivants :
« Selon cette thèse, l'opération de mouillage aurait étéfaite par
deux navires de guerre yougoslaves, à une époque antérieure au

22 octobre, mais très voisine de cette date. Le fait impliquerait une
collusion entre le Gouvernement albanais et le Gouvernement
yougoslave, collusion qui se serait manifestée ou dans une demande
d'assistance par le Gouvernement albanais au Gouvernement
yougoslave, ou par un acquiescement au mouillage par les autorités
albanaises. ))
Pour démontrer cette collusion, le Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni s'est appuyé sur le témoignage du commandant Kovacic ainsi
que sur un nombre de présomptions de fait ou preuves circonstan-
cielles.
La Cour a estimé,
d'une part, que les faits relatés de science personnelle par le

témoin ne suffisent pas à faire la démonstration que le Gouver-
nement du Royaume-Uni croit pouvoir y trouver,
d'autre part, que les faits (présomptions de fait), mêmedans ia
mesure où ils sont établis, n'autorisent aucune conclusion ferme.
De ces faits, la Cour a cité expressément la possession par la
Yougoslavie de mines GY, qui n'aurait pas étéjudiciairement
établie, et la conclusion, tirée de l'existence d'un traité entre
l'Albanie et la Yougoslavie, à leur participationdans l'acte criminel
du mouillage des mines. Mais en disant que les faits n'autorisent

aucune conclusion ferme, la Cour a évidemment entendu tous les
faits, sans exception ou distinction.
Je suis également d'accord avec la Cour sur cette conclusion et
j'estime quela connivence peut être fortement soupçonnéemais que
judiciairement elle n'est pas établie.
Pour l'intelligence de ce qui va suivre, j'estime toutefois nLOces-
saire de citer toutes lesprésomptions sur lesquelles le Gouvernement
du Royaume-Uni s'est appuyé, telles qu'elles ont étéprésentées
dans son exposéoral (pp. 980 et 995 des exposésorarix, 17-22janvier
1949)~et de faire une remarque généralesur les preuves par indices
(circumstantial eviderzce)
Les présomptions citées à la page 980, et qui sont au nombre de
cinq, sont les suivantes :

58 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA.

[Translatio~z.]
1 agree with the Court's findings on the facts, as stated in the
Judgment (pp. 12-15), and with its rejection of the contention that
Albania herself laid the mines.

The Court then considers the argument that the mines may have
been laid with the Albanian Government's connivance, and sums
it up in the following words : "According to this argument, the
minelaying operation was carried out by two Yugoslav warships at
a date prior to October zznd, but very near that date.This would
imply collusion between the Albanian and the Yugoslav Govern-
ments, consisting either of a request by the Albanian Governnent
to the Yugoslav Government for assistance, or of acquiescence by
the Albanian authorities in the laying of the mines."

To demonstrate this collusion, the UnitedKingdom Governnent

relied on the evidence of Commander Kovacic and on a number of
presumptions of fact or or, circumstantial evidence.

The Court considered that,
on the one hand, the facts related by the witness from his own
knowledge were not sufficient to prove what the United Kingdom
Government claimed that they proved,
on the other hand, that the facts (presumptions of fact), even
in so far as they are established, justify no definite conclusion.

Of these facts, the Court expressly mentioned the possession
by Yugoslavia of GY mines, which it said not to have been proved,
and the conclusion, drawn from the existence of a treaty between
Albania and Yugoslavia that those two countries participated in
the criminal act of minelaying. But when it said that the facts
justified no definite conclusion, the Court evidently meantal1 the
facts, without exception or distinction.
1 also agree with the Court on this conclusion, and 1 think that
tbere may be a strong suspicion of connivance, but that it is not
judicially proved.
In order to make clear what follows, 1 feel obliged to mention
al1 the presumptions on which the United Kingdom Government
relies as submitted in its speeches (pp. 980 and 995, Verbatim
Record, January 17th-zznd, 1949)~and to make a general remark
on circumstantial evidence.

The presumptions mentioned on page 980 are five in number
and are as follows :

58 59 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

I. Le fait que les mines furent placées,devant et peut-être même
dans la baie de Saranda, à l'intérieur des eaux territoriales alba-
naises, conduità la conclusion que l'Albanie doit avoir été,au
moins dans une certaine mesure, impliquée dans le mouillage
de ce champ de mines.
2. L'attitude de l'Albanie, tant après le minage des navires le
22 octobre qu'après surtout la découverte du champ de mines
le 13novembre, n'était pas l'attitude que l'on pouvait attendre
d'une Puissance qui venait d'apprendre l'existence, dans ses
eaux territoriales, immédiatement au large d'un petit port alba-
nais, d'un dangereux champ de mines, mais plutôt celle d'un
État embarrassé par une découverte extrêmement gênante.
3. La possibilitéde trouver des motifs pour lesquels l'Albanie aurait
eu des raisons de faire mouiller ce champ de mines et, par consé-
quent, pour que la Yougoslavie, qui était à l'époqueson plus
proche ami et allié,l'y assistât, puisque l'Albanie ne possédait
pas elle-mêmeles moyens de faire cette opération et qu'aucun
pays, autre que la Yougoslavie et l'Albanie, n'avait les motifs
ou les moyens de mouiller un champ de mines à cet endroit avant
le 22 octobre.

4. marquées d'une croixgamméeit en;il existait des stocks de ces mines
allemandes GY en Yougoslavie. La Yougoslavie avait marqué
ces mines d'une croix gamméeet disposait des moyens de mouiller
ce champ de mines. Les mines, par conséquent, provenaient
certainement de Yougoslavie.

5. Étant donné les relations étroites et amicales unissant les deux
pays, il est inconcevable que la Yougoslavie puisse avoir mouillé
ces mines à l'insu du Gouvernement albanais.
Deux autres présomptions sont citéesà la page 995 :

I. Le mouillage du champ de mines aurait sérieusement risqué
d'êtreobservé de la baie Limione, de la pointe Denta et du
monastère Saint-Georges, sinon d'autres positions encore.
2. Ce risque était si grave et si Cvident que personne, ayant l'inten-
tion de mouiller des mines sansl'assentiment de l'Albanie,n'aurait
jamais osé leprendre.

La remarque généraleest la suivante :
Dans un système de preuves basé sur la libre appréciation par le
juge, comme c'est le cas de législations pénales nationales et du

droit international, les indices sont des faits qui, sans fournir une
preuve immédiate de l'imputation, la rendent probable à l'aide du
raisonnement. Ils doivent être interprétés et rapprochés pour en
déduire des conséquences pertinentes et reconstruire les données
de l'hypothèse de responsabilité. Dans ce travail d'interprétation
et de rapprochement, on risque de commettre des erreursd'apprécia-
tion et de suppléer par l'imagination aux lacunes des éléments de

59 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 59
I. The fact that the mines were placed actually in front of and
probably inSaranda Bay itself in the territorial waters of Albania
suggests that Albania must haye been at least to some extent
implicated in the laying of this minefield.

2. The conduct of Albania both after the blowing up of the ships
on October 22nd and even more after the discovery of the
minefield on November 13th was not the conduct which would
be expected of a Power which had learned for the first time of
the existence in her territorial waters just off a small Albanian
port of a dangerous minefield, but rather that of a State embar-
rassed by a most inconvenient discovery.
3. It is posçible to find motives, which Albania may have had for
causing the minefield to be laid and therefore for Yugoslavia, at
that time her closest friend and ally, assisting her, since Albania
did not herself possess the resources for doing so, and no country
other than Yugoslavia and Albania had the resources and the
motives for laying a minefield here before October zznd.

4. The minefield consisted of German GY mines, marked with a
swastika ; there were available stocks of German GY mines in
Yugoslavia ;Yugoslavia had marked these mines with a swastika,
and had the means of laying this minefield. The mines therefore
must have come from Yugoslavia.

Owing to the close friendship and relationship between the two
5. countries, it is inconceivable that Yugoslavia laid the mines
mithout the knowledge of the Albanian Government.

Two other presumptions are given on page 995 :

I. There would have been a serious risk that the minelaying would
have been seen from Limion Bay, Denta Point, and St. George's
Monastery, if not from other points also.
2. This risk was so serious and so evident that no one intending
to lay mines without Albania's consent would ever have dared
run it.

The general observation is as follows :
In a system of evidence which is based upon free appraisal by
the judge, as is the case in national criminal legislation and in
international law, circumstantial evidence means facts which,
while not supplying immediate proof of the charge, yet make the
charge problable with the assistance of reasoning. The elements
of such circumstantial evidence must be interpreted and associated

in order to draw the relevant inferences and reconstruct the data
on which the hypothesis of responsibility is founded. In this
process of interpretation and association, there is a risk of commit-
5960 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

preuve, ou de faire des raisonnements spécieux.Cemode de preuves,
qui cherche la certitude ou y prétend, n'atteint le plus souvent
qu'une haute vraisemblance. Toujours est-il que, suivant certaines
législations, les indices doivent êtregraves, précis et concordants.
D'autre part, la doctrine la plus autorisée en la matière estime que
((la preuve par indice n'est censée êtreréussie que quand toute
autre solution ne serait possible qu'en admettant des circonstances
tout à fait étonnantes, inhabituelles et contraires au cours du mon-

de )).Ces règles doivent êtrele guide constant dans l'appréciation
des preuves.

La Cour passe enfin à la thèse émisepar le Royaume-Uni, d'après
laquelle, quels que fussent les auteurs du mouillage des mines,
celui-ci n'a pu êtreeffectuésans que le Gouvernement albanais en
eût connaissance.
La Cour croit tout d'abord devoir déclarer quJ(con ne saurait

conclure du seul contrôle exercé par un Etat sur son temtoire
terrestre ou sur ses eaux territoriales quecetEtat a nécessairement
connu ou dû connaître tout fait illicite international qui y a été
perpétrénon plus qu'il a nécessairement connu ou dû connaître
ses auteurs. En soi, et indépendamment d'autres circonstances, ce
fait ne justifie ni responsabilitérima facie ni déplacement dans le
fardeau de la preuve. »
Elle retient ensuite deux ordres de faits qui se corroborent
mututllement. Les premiers ont trait aux attitudes de l'Albanie
avant et après la catastrophe du 22 octobre 1946, les autres concer-
nent les possibilités d'observer un mouillage de la côte albanaise.

Des faits et constatations rentrant sous ces deux ordres de faits,
que la Cour considère comme établis, elle tire la conclusion que le
mouillage du champ de mines, qui ,a provoqué les explosions du
22 octobre 1946, n'a pas pu échapper à la connaissance du Gouver-
nement albanais.
Après avoir constaté ensuite l'omission des autorités albanaises,
sinon de faire la notification généraleà tous les États, d'avertir les
navires de guerre du danger au devant duquel ils s'avançaient,
pendant l'intervalle de près de deux heures qui s'est écoulé depuis
le moment où les navires furent signalésau commandement de la
défensecôtière par le poste de guet du monastère Saint-Georges,

jusqu'à l'explosion du Saumarez, la Cour conclut que l'Albanie est
responsable, selon le droit international, des explosions et des
dommages et pertes humaines qui en sont résultés,et qu'il y a
lieu pour le Gouvernement albanais de donner des réparations au
Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.
Ce sont ces deux dernières conclusions de la Cour que je regrette
de ne pouvoir accepter.
60 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 60

ting errors of appreciation, of letting the imagination fil1 in the
gaps in the evidence, or of reasoning in a specious manner. This
method of evidence, which seeks or pretends to arrive at certainty,
most often attains only a high degree of probability. The fact
remains that under some legislations, circumstantial evidence must
be weighty, accurate and concordant. On the other hand, the
most reliable doctrine takes the view that "proof by circumstantial
evidence is regarded as successfully established only when other
solutions would imply circumstances wholly astonishing, unusual
and contrary to the way of the world". These rules must be a
constant guide in weighing evidence.

The Court then comes to the United Kingdom argument that
whoever laid the mines, they cannot have been laid without the
Albanian Government knowing of it.

The Court feels bound to state first that "it cannot be concluded
from the mere fact of the coiltrol exercised by a State over its
territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to
have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, not yet
that it necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors. This
fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neitherinvolves
prima fucie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof."

The Court then mentions two classes of facts which corroborate
one another. The first relates to Albania's attitude before and

after the catastrophe of October zznd, 1946 ; the others concern
the possibility of observing minelaying from the Albanian coast.
From facts and observations connected with these two orders
of facts which the Court considers as established, the conclusion
is drawn that the minelaying which caused the explosions of
October zznd, 1946, could not have been unknown to the Albanian
Government .
Then, after referring to the Albanian authorities' omission, if
not to send a general notification to al1 States, at least to warn
the warships of the danger that they were running into, during
nearly two hours, from the moment when they were reported to
the Commander of the Coastal Defences by the look-out post at
St. George's Monastery, up to the time of the explosion of the
Sazimarez, the Court concludes that Albania is responsible under
international law for the explosions and the damage and loss of
human life that resulted, and that the Albanian Government must

pay ccmpensation to the United Kingdom Government.

It is these two last findings of the Court that, to my regret, 1
cannot accept.
60 6r OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

En effet, les mêmesdeux ordres de faits, qui justifient la conclu-
sion de la Cour sur la connaissance, ont étéinvoqués avec d'autres
par le Royaume-Uni à l'appui de la thèse de la connivence. Toute-
fois, en examinant cette thèse, la Cour a estimé qu'elle demeurait
conjecturale, nonobstant les sept présomptions réunies.
Quoi qu'il en soit, il est évident que si la connivence, ou la
collusion, n'est pas établie, la connaissance du mouillage, en tant
que conséquence de cette connivence, est nécessairement exclue.
Soutenir le contraire équivaudrait à dire que des preuves insuffi-
santes pour établir la connivence seraient suffisantes pour établir
la connaissance, qui en est la conséquence, ce qui est, à mon avis,

une proposition inadmissible.
En fait, dans la thèse britannique, la connaissance se confond
avec la connivence, si bien qu'on n'arrive pasà l'en séparer.Mais la
connivence suppose la complicitéde la Yougoslavie, et la Cour, avec
laquelle je suis d'accord, estime que cette complicité n'est pas
établie.
Comment pourrait-on donc arriver à séparer les deux notions ?
Évidemment, leseulmoyen serait d'écarter l'opération du mouillage
comme un complot, de s'en tenir à sa matérialité en la supposant
effectuée par un inconnu, et de chercher si les circonstances de
l'affaire permettent de croire que l'Albanie a ou non, en dehors de
toute connivence, connu le mouillage. En réduisant le problème à
ces termes. on arrive certes à érigerla connaissance en une notion
autonome ét distincte de la connyvence, mais dans cette hypothèse
il faut des preuves pour ainsi dire physiques de la connaissance.

En effet, réduite à cette abstraction, la connaissance ne serait
possible à établir que si l'on établit que l'Albanie ou, plus exacte-
ment, les autorités locales sur la côte ont vu l'opération de mouil-
lage. La question de visibilité de la côte prend dès lors une im-
portance qu'elle ne saurait avoir dans l'hypothèse de la conni-
vence, car celle-ci, ainsi que le conseil britannique l'a soutenu, peut
s'effectuer sur un plan gouvernemental entre Belgrade et Tirana,
sans que les autorités locales n'aient rien vu. En mêmetemps, il
devient nécessaire de situer la connaissance du mouillage dans le
temps, c'est-à-dire fixer le moment où l'Albanie a pris connaissance
du mouillage. Alors qu'avec la connivence il importe peu de
déterminer le moment où elle a eu lieu, car elle sufit à elle seule pour
engager la responsabilité de 1'Etat territorial, la détermination du
moment précis de la connaissance est nécessairepour fixer le point
de départ de l'obligation de notifier l'existencdu champ de mines

ou, à défaut du temps nécessaire pour faire les notifications, de
l'obligation d'avertir les navires qui traversent le chenal du danger
auquel ils s'exposent.

Cette visibilité, le Royaume-Uni l'affirmait, tant devant le
Conseil de Sécurité quedans les premières étapes de la procédure,
Gr DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 61

The two series of facts, on which the Court bases its finding in
regard to knowledge, were put forward with others by the United
Kingdom in support of the argument of connivance. But after
considering this argument, the Court came to the conclusion that,
in spite of seven concurrent presumptions, it was still a conjecture.
In any case, it is clear that if connivance or collusion has not
been established, the knosledge of the minelaying that would be
the consequence of this connivance, is necessarily excluded. To
maintain the contrary would be equivalent to saying that arguments
insufficient for establishing connivance are sufficient to prove
knowledge inasmuch as it is a consequence of connivance-which

1 think is inadmissible.
In the British argument, knowledge is so confused with
connivance, that it is impossible to separate them. But connivance
presupposes Yugoslavia's complicity, and the Court, with which
1 agree, thinks that this complicity is not proved.

How then can the two notions be separated ? Evidently the
only way would be to reject the argument that the minelaying
operation was the result of a plot and to confine oneself to the mate-
rial fact of the minelaying, on the assumption that it was carried
out by an unknown agency ;it must be ascertained whether the
circumstances of the case lead to the conclusion that Albania, quite
apart from al1connivance, had, or had not, knowledge of the mine-
laying. By reducing the problem to these terms, we are able,

of course, to dissociate knowledge from connivance ; but in
that case, physical proof so to speak of knowledge is necessary.
Reduced to that abstraction, knowledge could only be estab-
lished if it were shown that Albania, or, more exactly, the
local authorities on the coast, saw the minelaying operation.
The question ofvisibility from the coastthen assumes an importance
which it would not have in the case of connivance ;for the latter,
as the United Kingdom Counsel maintained, could take place at
govemment level, between Belgrade and Tirana, without the local
authorities having seen anything. At the same time, the knowl-
edge of the minelaying must be determined in respect of time,
i.e., the moment when Albania learned of the minelaying must be

determined. Whereas, in the case of connivance, it is of little
importance to decide the inoment when it took place (for connivance
in itself is sufficient to irivolve the responsibility of the territorial
State), the precise moment when knowledge occurred must be
determined, in order to decide when the obligation to notify the
existence of the minefield first arose, or if there were not sufficient
time to make the notification, when arose the obligation to wam
the ships which were passing through the Channel of the danger
into which they were running.
The United Kingdom stated that this visibility was estab-
lished beyong dispute, both before the Security Council and in the

6162 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

comme indiscutable. Les dépositions des officiers navals avaient
également le mêmeton affirmatif. Mais dans la réplique orale, le
conseil britannique ne considère plus ce fait comme important
(pp. 993-995). Il admet même la possibilité que les autorités
côtières n'aient rien vu ou entendu. La connaissance aurait alors

existé sur le plan gouvernemental entre Tirana et Belgrade. Mais
alors cene seraitplus la connaissance pure, ce serait la connaissance,
en tant que conséquencede la connivence.
Mêmedansla mesure où le Royaume-Uni, dans sa réplique orale,
retient la visibilité comme présomption de la connivence, il la
considère comme telle non parce qu'elle constitue une certitude,
mais simplement parce qu'elle constitue un risque si grave et si
évident pour celui qui a l'intention de mouiller des mines que, sans
l'assentiment de l'Albanie, il n'aurait jamais oséle prendre.
En somme, les preuves de la connaissance, dans la thèse
britannique, sont les mêmesque celles de la connivence. Mais ces
mêmes preuves ont été considérées comme conjecturales pour
établir la connivence. Peuvent-elles être considérées autrement
pour établir la connaissance ?

On a cru trouver la justification d'une réponse affirmative dans
le rapport du Comité des experts nommés par la Cour, surtout le
second rédigéaprès les expériences faites à Saranda.

A la vérité,mêmedans ces rapports, qui ne diffèrent guère par
leurs conclusions générales sur cette question, la preuve reste
conjecturale. Tout d'abord, la certitude de visibilité n'existe que
pour la pointe Denta, et encore, à la condition qu'il y ait eu un
poste de veille et que les conditions atmosphériques (mer, nuages,
vent, etc.) soient norn~ales.
Or, l'existence d'un poste à la pointe Denta, accessible seulement
du côté de la mer et dépourvu de tous moyens de communication
avec Saranda, demeure, la Cour l'a reconnu, conjecturale. D'autre

part, il resteà prouver que les postes de veille étaient réguliers et
effectifs, c'est-à-dire couvrant toute la nuit, etque les conditions
atmosphériques au jour précis où le mouillage a eu lieu étaient
normales, le mois d'octobre étant pour une bonne partie marqué
par des conditions atmosphériques précisément anormales
On ne connaît évidemment pas le jour où le mouillage î été
effectué.La thèse britannique le situe aux environs du 22 octobre,
c'est-à-dire20 ou 21 octobre, mais rien n'est certain à cet égard, et
surtout rien ne s'oppose à ce que ce jour soit un autre jour entre le
15 mai et le 22 octobre.
De tous côtés, il y a donc des faits inconnus ou imprécis, et
c'est pourquoi, lorsque les experts déclarent que 1'opl;ration a di1
êtrevue de tel point, dans des conditions déterminées, i!s ne font

qu'exprimer une probabilité ou une certitude scientifique lorsque
toutes les condiiions se trouvent remplies. Traduire cette opinion
scientifique en une véritéou certitude humaine et surtout judiciaire,
62 DISSENTING OI'INION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 62

early stages of the proceedings. The evidence of the naval officers
had the same positive ring. But Counsel for the United Kingdom
no longer regards this fact as important in his oral reply
(pp. 993-995). He even admitted the possibility that the coastal
authonties had neither seen nor heard anything. Knowledge
would then have existed at the governmental level between Tirana
and Belgrade. But this would not be simple knowledge, but
knowledge as a consequence of connivance.
Even in so far asthe United Kingdom Counsel, in his speech in
reply, held visibility to constitute a presumption of connivance,
he did not do so not because it constitutes a certainty, but because
it involves such a serious and evident nsk for anyone intending to
lay mines, that he would never have dared to do sowithout Albania's

consent.
In short, the evidence of knowledge, in the UnitedKingdom case,
is the same as that for connivance. But for the purpose of estab-
lishing connivance, it was considered conjectural. Can it be
thought otherwise as regards the establishing of knowledge ?

It was thought however that justification for a reply in the
affirmative was to be found in the Report of the Committee of
Experts appointed by the Court, especially the second Report
drawn up after the experiments at Saranda.
The fact is that even in these reports, which barely differ in
their general conclusions on this point, the evidence is still con-
jectural. In the first place, there is only certainty in regard to
visibility from Denta Point, and then only provided a look-out
post existed there, and that weather conditions (sea, clouds, wind,
etc.) were normal.

The existence of a post at Denta Point, which is accessible only
from the sea and lacks al1means of communication with Saranda,
remains a matter of conjecture, as the Court has recognized. On
the other hand, it remains to be proved that the look-outs' watch
was regular and effective, i.e., covering the whole night, and that
weather conditions on the exact day the minelaying took place
were normal, the month of October being mostly one in which
weather conditions are particularly abnormal.
The day on which the mines were laid is evidently not known.
The United Kingdom argues that it was about October aznd, Le.,
October 20th or z~st ; but there is no certainty on this point,
and above all, nothing to prevent the date being some other day
between May 15th and October zand.
On every side, then, there are unknown and vague facts, and this
is why, when the Experts state that the operation must have been
observed from a certain point under certain conditions, they
merely express a scientific probability or certainty, provided al1

the required conditions are fulfilled. To convert this scientific
opinion into human truth or certainty-still more, judicial cer-
62 63 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

alors que les données nécessaires relatives à ces conditions font
défaut, ne peut donner, à mon avis, qu'une réponsenégative.

Reste l'attitude de l'Albanie, tant avant qu'après le22 octobre
1946. Cette attitude serait attestée par les notes diplomatiques
de l'Albanie, par son opposition ou obstruction au déminage du
chenal, par l'indifférence qu'elle a marquée après la découverte

du champ de mines, en ne procédant à aucune mesure d'enquête
ou de poursuite, et en ne manifestant aucune surprise, indignation
ou trouble à la suite de cette découverte, en s'en prenant au
Royaume-Uni pour la violation de sa souveraineté par le dragage
des champsde mines et oubliant ainsi la violation plus grave de cette
souveraineté par le mouillage de mines dans ses eaux territoriales.
Cette attitude serait donc, aux yeux du Royaume-Uni, celle d'un
État embarrassé par une découverte extrêmement gênante,plutôt
que d'un État qui viendrait à apprendre l'existence dans ses eaux
territoriales, immédiatement au large d'un petit port albanais, d'un
dangereux champ de mines.
L'attitude correcte aurait apparemment étépour l'Albanie, dès
le 22 octobre, date de l'accident, ou au moins le 26 octobre,
date de la première communication britannique, de demander le

dragage du chenal ou d'y consentir, nonobstant qu'elle n'avait pas
étéinvitée à y participer, et, dès le13 novembre, d'ouvrir une
enquête au sujet de l'origine du champ découvert. L'Albanie
aurait dû, d'autre part, soit s'adresser aux Nations Unies pour
protester contre l'inconnu qui avait violé sa souveraineté en
posant des champs de mines dans ses eaux territoriales, et pour sol-
liciter son intervention pour la découverte de 1'Etat coupable, soit
recourir à un État ami pour procéderau dragageduchamp demines.

On sait que dans les poursuites, faites en application d'une
législation nationale, d'une personne accusée d'avoir commis une
infraction, la conduite de l'accusé ou son comportement après
la perpétration du crime sont souvent utilisés comme une
présomption contre lui. Ce comportement prend parfois la Iorme

d'une gêne ou d'un embarras, accompagné de contradictions,
pour l'explication de son alibi ou de certaines circonstances qui
seraient à sa charge. Il prend parfois aussi exactement la forme
contraire, de crier son innocence avec véhémenceet de tenter de
rejeter les soupçons sur d'autres que lui. L'une ou l'autre forme
pourrait égalementêtreadoptéepar un innocent dont la maladresse
ou l'indignation peuvent le pousser, sans s'aviser, à adopter ces
attitudes suspectes.
Il faut donc manier cette question d'attitude subséquente d'un
accusé avec la plus grande circonspection, d'autant plus qu'en
l'espèce, cette question, de par sa nature, se rattache à la
connivence plutôt qu'à la connaissance. Cette circonspection
s'impose avec plus de force lorsqu'il s'agit d'États. En effet, les

attitudes d'un individu sont généralement des réactions indivi-
63 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA
63
taint y-is an entirely different matter. When 'the indispensable
data concerning the conditions are lacking, the only answer, in my
view, must be negative.
There remains the attitude of Albania, both before and after
October 22nd, 1946. This attitude is said to be shown by her
diplomatic notes, her opposition or obstruction to the sweeping
of the Channel ; the indifference she showed after the minefield
was discovered : she did nothing to investigate or pursue the author
of the minelaying ; she showed no surprise, indignation or pertur-

bation after the discovery ; she blamed the United Kingdom for
violating her sovereignty by sweeping the mines, thus forgetting
the more serious violation of that sovereignty represented by the
laying of the mines in her temtorial waters.
In the eyes of the United Kingdom, this attitude is one of a
State embarrassed by a most inconvenient discovery ;it is not the
attitude of one that has learned of the existence of a dangerous
minefielclin its territorial waters, just off a smallbanian port.

The correct attitude would apparently have been for Albania
as early as October zznd, the date of the accident, or, at any rate
October 26th, the date of the,first United Kingdom communication,
to have asked for the sweeping of the Channel or to have consented
to the sweep, even though she had not been invited to participate ;
and on November 13th to have opened an enquiry into the origin
of the minefield. Albania ought, on the other hand, either to have
addressed a protest to the United Nations against the unknown
agency which had violated her sovereignty by laying minefields

in her temtorial waters, and to have requested the United Nations'
intervention to discover the guilty State, or else to request a friendly
State to sweep the minefield.
It isell-known that in the case of prosecutions under municipal
law, when a person is accused of having committed an offence, the
conduct of the accused or his behaviour after the crime is often
used as a presumption against him. This behaviour sometimes
manifests itself as embarrassment or.discomfort, accompanied by
contradictions when he endeavours to provide an alibi or explain
certain circumstances which seem to weigh against him. At other
times, this behaviour assumes the opposite form, and the accused
protests his innocence vehemently and makes every effort to cast
suspicion on others. Both forms of behaviour might well be
manifested by an innocent man whose awkwardness or indignation
caused him unconsciously to adopt such a suspicious attitude.

The question then of the subsequent attitude of an accused
person must be handled with the greatest care, specially when, as

in the actual case, this question relates by its nature to connivance
more than to knowledge. And still more so when States are
involved. The attitude of an individual is generally persona1 and
subjective, and to be explained by his particular psychology ; the
6764 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

duelles et subjectivesquis'expliquent parsa psychologie particulière,
alors que les actions d'un Etat sont généralement le résultat de
délibérations,de compromis entre des vues différentes et parfois la
conséquence de suggestions ou de conseils venant de sources
étrangères, ou la conséquence de considérations diverses qu'on ne
saurait circonscrire ou déterminer. 11ne serait pas conforme à la
nature des choses de procéder, dans le domaine de la responsabilité
des Etats, par simple analogie avec les conditions de la responsa-
bilité pénale des individus.
Au sujet des notes diplomatiques, il convient de signaler que la
première communication britannique, du 26 octobre, est une notifi-

cation courte et péremptoire. Dans la note albanaise du 31 octobre,
on ne peut manquer de relever, à côté de protestations déplacées
et d'une déclaration inexplicable de non-responsabilité au cas où
l'opération de nettoyage a lieu dans les eaux territoriales, que
l'Albanie déclare n'avoir aucune objection à l'entreprise, tout en
semblant faire cette confusion constante entre eaux intérieures et
eaux territoriales. La réponsebritannique à cette dernière note du
IO novembre communiquant la décision du Gouvernement britan-
nique de nettoyer le chenal le 12 novembre, est notifiéesur un ton
également péremptoire. Certes, elle rappelle les nettoyages, sans
objection de l'Albanie d'octobre 1944 et de février1945, et donne
l'a~aisement au'aucun navire ne sera stationné dans les eaux
albanaises (apparemment cette expression signifie les eacx inté-

rieures), mais elle ne demande pas, ainsi.que le Comité central de
déminage l'a recommandé, le consentement de l'Albanie, ni ne
comprend-elle une invitation à l'Albanie d'envoyer un observateur.
Entre temps, les débats au Comité central de déminage à Lon-
dres, dont l'Albanie a pu prendre connaissance, ne laissent pas de
donner l'impression d'une certaine confusion, ou de faire douter
de la régularité d'-me action unilatérale.
Il n'est donc pas inconcevable que l'attitude apparemment
étrange de l'Albanie a étédictée par des suggestions ou conseils,
inspirés par la situation politique internationale de l'époque.
Si, d'autre part, on tient compte du fait que les Etats diffèrent
par leur puissance, culture, histoire, situation et une foule d'autres
traits, et n'ont par conséquent pas le mêmecomportement dans

une conjoncture déterminée, et qu'il s'agit en l'occurrence du
Royaume-Uni, d'une part,et de l'Albanie, d'autre part, on admettra
facilement qu'il ne faut pas s'exagérerl'importance de cet argument
d'attitude.
Je conclus donc que la connaissance, de mêmeque la connivence,
peut être fortement soupçonnée, mais elle n'est pas suffisamment
établie ni par les preuves avancées par le Royaume-Uni ni par le
rapport des experts.

La connaissance n'étant pas judiciairement établie, il est oiseux
d'examiner si l'Albanie, après avoir connu le mouillage des mines,

64 DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASWA
64
actions of a State are generally the result of deliberation, of a com-
promise between different views, and sometimes of suggestions or
advice from foreign sources, or various other considerations which
cannot possibly be circumscribed or determined. It would not

be right then, where State responsibility is involved, to act on the
mere analogy of what occurs in the case of the criminal respons-
ibility of individuals.

In regard to the diplomatic notes, the first United Kingdom
communication of October 26th was a short and peremptory noti-
fication. The Albanian note of October 31st, in addition to inop-
portune protests and an unexplainable declaration of non-respons-
ibility in case the sweep should take place in territorial waters,
contains a staternent that Albania has no objection €0 the under-
taking, although she seems to make the usual confusion between

interior waters and territorial waters. The United Kingdom
answer to this note, dated November ~oth, gives the United King-
dom Government's decision ta sweepthe ChannelonNovember 12th;
the tone of the notification is equally peremptory. The United
Kingdom does, it is true, refer to the sweeps of October 1944 and
February 1945, undertaken without objection from Albania ; and
assurance is given that no ship will sojourn in Albanian waters
(apparentlythis expression means interior waters). But Albania's
consent is not asked, as the Central Mine Clearance Board had
recommended, nor is Any invitation made to Albania to send an
observer.
Meanwhile, the discussion in the Central Mine Clearance Board
in London, of which Albania may have received information,

gives the impression of some confusion, and denotes doubt as to
the regularity of unilateral action.
It is not inconceivable then that the apparently strange attitude
of Albania may have been dictated by suggestions or advice
inspired by the international political situation of the moment.
If, on the other hand, account is taken of the fact that States
differ in their strength,culture, history, position and a multitude
of other circumstances, and consequently do not react in the same
Ivay to a given situation, and of the fact that the countries involved
are the United Kingdom on one side and Albania on the other, it
\vil1bc readily admitted that too much attention must not be paid
to Albania's attitude.

My conclusion therefore is that there may be strong suspicion
of knowledge, just as of connivance; but that this is not sufficiently
proved, either by the evidence furnished by the United Kingdom,
or by the Experts' Report.

Since knowledge has not been judicially proved, it is superfluous
to consider whether, Albania after learning of the minelaying, was,
6.465 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

était, dans l'hypothèse - la seule envisagée par le Royaume-Uni
- d'un mouillage effectué le 20 ou 21 octobre, à mêmede notifier
l'existence du champ de mines dans le chenal Médriou du moins
d'avertir la flotte britannique lorsqu'elle s'avançait vers le chenal
et si, en ne le faisant pas, sa responsabilité était engagée. Quoi
qu'il en soit, les élémentsde fait nécessaires pour établir cette
possibilité n'ont éténi rapportés ni débattus.

Reste à savoir si, indépendamment de la connivence ou de la
connaissance, il n'existe pas à la charge de l'Albanie une faute
quelconque qui aurait causé l'explosion et sur laquelle serait éven-

tuellement fondéesa responsabilité internationale pour le dommage
subi.
Le Royaume-Uni n'a pas soutenu, comme une base subsidiaire
de la responsabilité, l'existence de pareille faute. Son conseil a
déclaré même formellement que sans connaissance l'Albanie n'est
pas responsable.
On a estimétoutefois que les termes du compromis sont généraux
et couvrent tous les cas de responsabilité internationale et qu'il
incombe à la Cour d'examiner si pareille faute peut être établie
à l'encontre de l'Albanie.
Avant d'examiner cetaspect de la question, ilimporte de souligner
que le droit international ne connaît pas la responsabilité objective,
basée sur la notion de risque que certaines législations nationales
ont adoptée. En effet, l'évolution du droit international et le degré

de développement de la notion de coopération internationale ne
permettent pas de considérer que cette étape a pu êtrefranchie ou
est près de l'être.
Il faut donc établir une obligation internationale à la charge de
l'Albanie dont le manquement lui serait imputable et serait la
cause de l'explosion.
D'aucuns estiment qu'il existe une obligation généralepour
les Etats d'exercer une vigilance raisonnable sur leurs côtes et que
le manque de due diligence de la part de l'Albanie a, à défaut de
connaissance, étécause que le champ de mines est resté ignoré et
qu'il a causé l'explosion.
Or, pareille obligation généralen'existe pas et ne peut exister.
Dût-elle mêmeexister, le lien de causalité entre le manquement à
cette obligation et l'explosion reste à démontrer.

D'autres, reconnaissant qu'il n'existe pas d'obligation générale
de vigilqnce ou de critère absolu, soutiennent qu'il existe, de toute
façon, un degré de vigilance que tout Etat doit exercer, mais que '
la mesure de cette vigilance devrait être déterminée suivant les
circonstances de chaque cas.
En l'espèce, on relève que l'Albanie avait exagéré ses droits
de souveraineté relativement au passage des navires dans ses eaux
territoriales. Ce souci excessif et presque morbide de laoriveraineté DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA
65
in the hypothesis-the only one envisaged by the United Kingdom
-that mines were laid on October 20th or z~st, in a position to
notify the existence of the minefield in the Medri channel, or at
least to warn the British fleet when it was steaming towards the
Channel, and whether, by her failure to do so, Albania's respons-
ibility was involved. In any case, the necessary facts to establish
such a possibility have not been reported or discussed.

* * *

It remains to be seen whether, apart from connivance or know-
ledge, Albania committed a fault which may have caused the
explosion, and upon which her international responsibility for the
damage suffered may eventually be founded.

The United Kingdom did not maintain, as an alternative ground
of responsibility, thatuch a fault existed. Counsel for the United
Kingdom even declared formally that, unless she had knowledge,
Albania was not responsible.
However, the opinion was expressed that the terms used in the
Special Agreement are general and cover al1 cases of international
responsibility, and that it is for the Court to examine whether
such a fault can be proved to have been committed by Xlbania.
Before examining this aspect of tht. question, it must be stressed
that international law does not recognize objective responsibility
based upon the notion of risk, adopted by certain national legisla-
tions. Indeed, the evolution of internatioiial law and the degree
of development attained by the notion of international CO-operation
do not allow us to consider that this stage has been reached, or is

about to be reached.
The failure of Albania to carry out an international obligation
must therefore be proved, and it must also be proved that this was
the cause of the explosion.
Some are of the opinion that a general obligation exists for States
to exert reasonable vigilance along their coast and that the failure
of Albania to act with due diligence was, in the absence of
knowledge on her part, the reason that the minefield remained
undiscovered and that itcaused the explosion.
Such a general obligation does not exist and cannot exist. Even
assuming that it does exist, the causal nexus between the failure
to carry out the obligation and the explosion remains to be shown.
Others, while admitting that no general obligation to exert
vigilance and no absolute criterion exist, maintain that in any case
there does exist a degree of vigilance which every State must
exercise, but that the extent of such vigilance is to be determined
according to the circumstances of each case.
111 particular, it is asserted that Albania exaggerated her rights
of sovereignty as regards the passage of ships in her territorial
waters. This excessive and almost morbid anxiety in regard to

Gj66 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

impliquait que pour la sauvegarder l'Albanie devait exercer une
vigilance plus stricte et plus rigoureuse que celle exercée par les
pays qui reconnaissent la liberté de passage inoffensif.
On relève, d'autre part, que l'Albanie a proclamé haut, par la
voix de son représentant au Conseil de Sécurité, qu'elleexerçait
une grande vigilance en vue de prévenirles incursions et les infiltra-
tions grecques, précisément dans la région où le champ de mines
a étémouilléet où l'explosion a eu lieu.
Or, tout d'abord, pour se prononcer sur le défaut concret de
vigilance ou de surveillance d'un Etat sur une régiondéterminée,
il serait nécessaire de connaître l'ensemble des ~ossibilités dudit
État, ses ressources, son organisation, sa situatick au moment en

question et une foule d'autres considérations.
Ensuite, je ne pense pas que l'exagératior, de ses droits devrait
nécessairement entraîner l'aggravation des devoirs de surveillance
de l'Albanie. S'il existe un devoir de surveillance absolu ou relatif.
le droit international peuseul déterminer son étendueet seslimites.
Maisce devoir n'a à êtreni aggravé ni atténué par le comportement
de 1'Etat en question. Il ne peut l'êtreque par ses possibilités,mais
non par ses déclarations.
D'autre part, on peut sedemander sila thèsebritannique n'exagère
pas la portéede la contradiction du système de défensede l'Albanie
sur la question de vigilance, tantôt l'affirmant, tantôt cherchant
à le nier. La vigilance à laquelle le représentant albanais faisait

allusion ne semble-t-elle pas êtrelavigilance relative aux incursions
et infiltrations grecques par des débarquements au moyen de petits
bateaux, vigilance qui ne coïncide pas nécessairement avec celle
qui permet de voir et de distinguer une opération de mouillage
effectuée,pendant la nuit, à une certaine distance de la côte ?
Au surplus, cette exagération de ses droits et le souci jaloux
de sa souveraineté ne traduisent-ils pas le désir de l'Albanie de
s'atténuer le devoir de surveillance par ce barrage préventif plutôt
qu'ils ne comportent l'obligation de redoubler de surveillance ?
Enfin, il y a lieu de se demander si la prévision de mouillage des
mines doit êtreconsidérée commeune obligation normale et si, par

conséquent, le droit international établit, et est justifié d'établir,
l'obligation de surveillance appropriée à la prévention ou à la
constatation de ce mouillage.

Pour ces motifs, ma réponse au premier point de la première
question du compromis est dans la négative. Cette réponse com-
mande la réponse au deuxième point relatif aux réparations,
laquelle doit. également êtrenégative.

Je ne puis, d'autre part, me rallier à la décision de la Cou

relative àsa compétencepour fixer le moctant des réparations dues. DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BADAWI PASHA 66

sovereignty implies that, in order t O maintain her sovereignt y,
Albania should have exercised a stricter and more rigorous vigilance
than that of countries who recognize freedom of innocent passage.
On the other hand, it is asserted that Albania, through her
representative on the Security Council, loudly proclaimed that
she was extremely vigilant, in order .to prevent incursions and
infiltrations by Greeks, precisely in the district where the mines
were laid and the explosion took place.
In the first place, to give a decision as to a lack of vigilance
or supervision by a State in a particular district, it would be
necessary to know the availabilities of that State : resources,
organization, situation at the moment,. and a number of other
coksiderations.
Secondly, 1 do not think that her exaggeration of her rights
should necessarily involve an aggravation of Albania's duty of
supervision. If there exists a duty of absolute or relative watch-
fulness, international law alone can determine its extent and limits.
But this duty cannot be increased or diminished by -the conduct
of the State in question. This can only result from Albania's

possibilities and not from her declarations.
On the otherhand, it may be asked whether the United Kingdom
argument does not exaggerate the importance of the contradiction
in Albania's defence on the question of vigilance-sometimes affirm-
ing and sometimes endeavouring to deny it. Does not the vigilance
to which the Albanian representative referred seem only to be
vigilance against Greek incursions and infiltrations, by landing
from small boats ; this does not necessarily coincide with the
vigilance that would enable a minelaying operation carried out at
night at a certaindistance from thecoast to beseen and distinguished.
Moreover, this exaggeration of her rights and jealousy of her
sovereignty seem rather to show the wish of Albania to limit the
duty of supervision by means of this preventive barrage, rather
than an obligation to redouble her supervision.
Finally,it may be asked whether foreseeing the laying of mines
should be considered as a normal obligation and if, consequently,
international law lays down, and is justified in laying down, an
obligation of watchfulness suitable for preventing or observing

such minelaying.

For these reasons, my reply to the first point in the first question
in the Special Agreement is in the negative. This reply governs
the reply to the second point, concerning compensation, and the
latter must also be in the negative.

On the other hand, 1 cannot agree with the Court's decision
as to its jurisdiction to assess the amoiint of compensation.67 OPINION DISSIDENTE DE BADAWI PACHA

A mon avis, les termes du compromis : ((y a-t-il le cas de répa-
rations à donner )) (uis there any dzlty to pay compensation »),
comparés à ceux des conclusionsde la requête britannique, excluent
clairement cette compétence. Cette interprétation est confirmée
par le fait que le compromis constitue une novation de la requête,
obtenue par des négociationset impliquant pour cette raison des
concessions réciproques sur les positions primitives.

Mêmeconsidéréscomme obscurs, les termes du compromis
n'en devraient pas moins êtreinterprétés à la lumière des déclara-
tions et attitudes des Parties, dans le sens de l'incompétence.
Si, toutefois, des doutes subsistaient encore, le carectère excep-
tionnel de la juridiction de la Cour, basoe sur le consentement
des Parties et soncorollaire d'interprétation restrictive decompro-
mis, devrait, en tout cas, exclue cet'ie compétence.

Au demeurant, il ne me semble pas que la jurisprudence de la
Cour permanente de Justice internationale puisse êtreinvoquée
dans les circonstances particulières de la présente espèce, ni que
la Résolution du Conseil de Sécuritépuisse êtreinterprétéeen
faisant abstraction des termes par lesquels le Conseil a étésaisi,
lesquels termes n'avaient et ne pouvaient avoir aucune référence
à un règlement pécuniaire du conflit.
Enfin, le parallélisme entre réparations et satisfaction n'est
qu'apparent. Par sa nature et contrairement aux ((réparations »,
« satisfaction ))ne se matérialise pas par un mode unique. Le
fait que les Parties ont discuté devant la Cour les divers modes
par lesquels satisfaction peut êtredonnée n'implique donc pas
qu'on a entendu que la fixation du montant des réparations soit
égalementl'objet d'examen de la Cour. In my view, the words of the Special Agreement "is there any
duty to pay compensation" ("y a-t-il le cas de réfiarationsà

donner"), compared with those of the submissions in the United
Kingdom Application, clearly exclude such jurisdiction. This
is confirmed by the fact that the Special Agreement amounts to
a novation of the application, resulting from negotiations and
therefore implying mutual concessions on the positions originally
adopted.
Though they may be obscure, the terms of the Special Agreement
must none the less be interpreted in the light of the declarations
and of the attitudes of the Parties, as denoting absence of juris-
diction. And if there still were any doubt, the exceptional nature
of the Court's jurisdiction, founded on the consent of the Parties
and, as a corollary, on the restrictive interpretation of the Special
Agreement, should in any case exclude such jurisdiction.
Anyhow, 1 do not think that the jurisprudence of the Permanent
Court of International Justice.can be invoked in the particular
circumstances of the present case, nor that the Security Council's
Resolution can be interpreted without due regard for the terms
in which the matter was referred to the Council ; these terms did

not and could not hôve any reference to a pecuniary settlement
of the dispute.
Finally, the parallelism between compensation and satisfaction
is only apparent. Owing to its nature, unlike "compensation",
"satisfaction" is not limited to a single form. The fact that the
Parties have discussed before the Court the different methods
by which satisfaction may be given does not imply that it was
intended that the method of assessing the amount of the compelis-
ation should also be submitted to the Court's examination.

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Dissenting opinion by Judge Badawi Pasha (translation)

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