Non Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
CR 2010/22 (traduction)
CR 2010/22 (translation)
Vendredi 22 octobre 2010 à 15 heures
Friday 22 October 2010 at 3 p.m. - 2 -
10 Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit
aujourd’hui pour entendre le Nicaragua et la Colombie en leur second tour de plaidoiries. Je donne
tout d’abord la parole à S. Exc. M. Carlo Argüello Gómez, agent du Nicaragua.
M.ARGUELLOGOMEZ: Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour,
bonjour.
1. La semaine que nous venons de passer a été de s plus inhabituelles. Pour ma part, je ne
puis que louer la Cour pour la patience avec laquelle elle a écouté des arguments qui remettaient en
cause le sens, qu’elle avait pris pourtant soin de rendre très clair, de son arrêt d’octobre 2007.
2. Le conseil du Honduras balaie du revers de la main l’importance que le Nicaragua accorde
au caractère définitif de cet arrêt en ce qui concerne la question de la délimitation maritime entre le
Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes, en le qualifiant de «leitmotiv de la chose
1
jugée» . Et c’en est bien un. C’est même le leitmotiv de toute cette procédure. Le conseil du
Honduras a également indiqué que, dans le cas où il ne serait pas autorisé à intervenir, il lui
demeurerait loisible d’engager «de nouvelles procédures contre le Nicaragua et la Colombie», et de
2
«demander que ces procédures soient jointes à la présente affaire» . S’il le faisait, il ne me resterait
plus qu’à lui opposer une fois encore notre sempiternel «leitmotiv de la chose jugée».
3. La question de la chose jugée entache à tel point la requête à fin d’intervention du
Honduras que, comme l’expliquera le professeur Pellet, elle rejaillit également sur toute affirmation
de compétence que le Honduras pourrait avancer au titre du pacte de Bogotá. L’article VI du pacte
exclut tout recours dans le cas de questions dé jà tranchées par une instance internationale. La
requête à fin d’intervention ne devrait donc pas av oir été soumise à la Cour, et celle-ci devrait
l’écarter sans autre forme de procès.
4. Monsieur le président, la Colombie a cette semaine encore ⎯comme elle l’avait fait la
semaine passée, dans le cadre des audiences c onsacrées à la requête à fin d’intervention du
Costa Rica ⎯ plaidé sur le fond de la présente affaire. Aussi n’avons-nous guère été surpris de lire
dans la presse régionale que certains de ses haut s représentants avaient publiquement remercié le
1
CR 2010/21, p. 12, par. 16 (Wood).
2
Ibid, p. 18, par. 38. - 3 -
CostaRica et le Honduras de l’aide apportée à la Colombie dans le cadre de l’affaire pendante
3
devant la Cour .
11 5. Pour ne pas faire perdre davantage de temps à la Cour, je résisterai à la tentation de réfuter
les affirmations d’ordre factuel et juri dique avancées au fond par la Colombie ⎯ainsi que par le
Honduras ⎯, et me contenterai de réserver de ma nière générale la position du Nicaragua sur
l’ensemble de ces points.
6. Mercredi dernier, la Colombie a versé au dossier des juges ⎯ à l’onglet 2 ⎯ un graphique
intitulé «zone dans laquelle le Honduras prétend avoir des intérêts juridiques» (CAG1). Ce
graphique montre bien pourquoi le Nicaragua a dû solliciter l’assistance de la Cour pour contrer la
tentative d’amputer son espace maritime. Sur le graphique, nous pouvo ns voir les frontières
instituées par différents traités et en vigueur act uellement entre les parties à ces instruments:
Costa Rica/Panama, Panama/Colombie et Jamaïque/Colombie. Ces frontières ne sont pas en cause
en la présente instance. Ce qui, en revanche, est assurément en cause, au nord, c’est le rectangle
que revendique à présent le Honduras, et dont la base, au sud, est constituée par le parallèle de
14° 59' 08" de latitude nord, comme si l’arrêt de 2007 n’avait jamais existé. La souveraineté sur les
formations que nous voyons au centre du graphique ⎯trois petites îles inhabitées: SanAndrés,
Providencia et l’îlot de SantaCatalina, ainsi que quelques cayes ⎯est en litige en la présente
affaire. Toutes ces formations qui représentent en tout une masse terrestre d’une superficie de
44kilomètres carrés seulement, sont reproduites su r le graphique dans des proportions qui n’ont
rien à voir avec leurs dimensions réelles, et se ta illent clairement la part du lion dans les espaces
maritimes de la région. La longue côte contin entale du Nicaragua se retrouve ainsi avec moins de
80milles de mer territoriale et de plateau continen tal. Pour mieux faire comprendre la situation,
nous avons ajouté la ligne d’équidistance que le CostaRica a revendiquée en tant que frontière
maritime avec le Nicaragua lors des audiences de la semaine dernière. Sur le graphique (CAG 1),
nous pouvons voir que, rien que dans la zone représentée, les îles et cayes revendiquées par la
Colombie se voient attribuer des zones maritim es d’une superficie de plus de 166000kilomètres
carrés, tandis que le littoral nicaraguayen n’en engendre qu’un peu moins de 58000kilomètres
3
El Nuevo Diario , 21octobre2010, «Colombia valora postura de Honduras y CostaRica en litigio con
Nicaragua». - 4 -
carrés. C’est la raison pour laque lle nous avons saisi la Cour, et introduit une instance contre le
Honduras, et une instance contre la Colombie.
L’7a.ffaire Nicaragua c.Honduras a été tranchée par l’arrêt de la Cour en date du
8 octobre 2007. Telle est l’affaire que le Honduras ⎯ et la Colombie ⎯ s’emploient à rouvrir.
8. Mais il y a un autre arrêt de la Cour qui n’ a pas été mentionné. En la présente espèce, la
Colombie a en effet soulevé des exceptions prélim inaires et affirmé, entre autres, que le traité
e
de 1928 conclu par elle avec le Nicaragua avait fixé une frontière maritime suivant le 82 méridien,
et que, de ce fait, la Cour n’avait pas compétence, cette question ayant déjà été réglée par les
Parties aux termes de ce traité. Or, dans son a rrêt du 13 décembre 2007, la Cour a conclu que «le
12 traité de1928 et le protocole de1930 n’[avaie nt] pas opéré de délimitation générale des espaces
4
maritimes entre la Colombie et le Nicaragua» et a unanimement décidé de rejeter «l’exception
d’incompétence en ce qu’elle a[vait] trait à la délimitation maritime entre les Parties» 5.
9. Tant la Colombie que le Honduras ont fait valoir que le traité de1986 n’avait pu être
affecté par l’arrêt d’octobre2007, et le Nicaragua en convient pour autant qu’il s’agisse de la
Colombie, laquelle n’était pas partie à l’affaire. Mais un aspect important a été omis. Le traité
entre la Colombie et le Honduras prenait pour point de départ le point de coordonnées 14° 59' 08"
de latitude nord et 82°00'00" de longitude oue st; autrement dit, la ligne de délimitation
e
commençait à l’intersection du 82 méridien ⎯ revendiqué par la Colombie comme constituant sa
frontière maritime avec le Nicaragua ⎯ et du «15 e parallèle», revendiqué par le Honduras en tant
que frontière avec le Nicaragua.
10. Or, l’arrêt du8octobre2007 en l’affaire Nicaragua c.Honduras a établi que le
e
15 parallèle (le parallèle de 14°59 '08" de latitude nord, en réalité ) ne constituait pas la frontière
maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras, laquelle suivait une ligne bissectrice orientée plus au
nord. Exit, donc, la première coordonnée de latitude sur laquelle reposait le traité de 1986. L’arrêt
de décembre2007 a établi que le 82 eméridien ne constituait pas la frontière maritime entre le
4 Différend territorial et maritime (NicaragC.oc lombie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 869, par. 120.
5 Ibid., p. 875, par. 142, sect. 1 c). - 5 -
Nicaragua et la Colombie. Exit donc, cette fois, la première co ordonnée de longitude du traité
de 1986.
11. L’une des affaires est revê tue de l’autorité de la chose jugée vis-à-vis du Honduras,
l’autre l’est vis-à-vis de la Colombie. Le résultat, en tout état de cause, est que le traité de 1986 a
été amputé de ses deux jambes. Ce traité n’a pas de point de départ valable ; il ne repose sur rien.
12. Et néanmoins, le Honduras s’est présenté de vant la Cour en affirmant que ses intérêts
juridiques susceptibles d’être affectés par la déci sion de celle-ci en la présente affaire étaient
précisément ⎯ et exclusivement ⎯ des intérêts découlant du traité de 1986. C’est bien cela qu’ont
plaidé les conseils du Honduras et de la Colombie cette semaine: que les intérêts juridiques sur
e
lesquels le Honduras fonde sa requête à fin d’intervention sont ceux, situés au nord du 15 parallèle,
6
qui découlent du traité de1986 . Or, il s’agit là de la zone qui a, sans la moindre ambiguïté, été
13 attribuée au Nicaragua par l’arrêt de 2007. Le tr aité de 1986 ne saurait primer l’arrêt de 2007, en
ce qui concerne les droits du Honduras et du Nicaragua. L’argument du Honduras fait long feu.
13. Le Honduras a abondamment plaidé, dans l’affaire Nicaragua c. Honduras, que la Cour
ne pouvait rendre un arrêt susceptible d’affecter le traité de1986 conclu entre lui et la Colombie,
qui n’était pas partie à l’affaire. En note de bas de page, dans le compte rendu de la présente
plaidoirie, nous avons indiqué les passages des pièces de procédure écrite et des exposés oraux que,
dans le cadre de cette affaire, le Honduras a directement consacrés à la question du traité de 1986.
7
On me dit que cela représente 3121mots . Et ce sont à présent 1000mots de plus, ainsi qu’une
semaine de votre temps précieux, qui auront été dédiés à ces arguments sur les limites que ce traité
imposerait au pouvoir de décision de la Cour.
14. Mais, Monsieur le président, l’ironie du sort ⎯ sans doute ⎯veut que l’articleII de ce
traité ⎯ le traité de 1986 ⎯ contienne justement la disposition suivante :
«La délimitation énoncée dans l’article précédent ne préjugera pas sur le tracé
des frontières maritimes déjà établies ou qui seraient établies à l’avenir entre l’une
6 CR 2010/18, p. 14-15, par. 7 (López) ; ibid., p.42-43, par.38 (Wood); CR2010/20, p.19, par.18 (Bundy);
ibid., p.25, par.38 (Bundy); CR2010/18, p.44, par.43 (Wood) ; CR 2010/20, p. 28, par. 4 (Kohen) ; CR 2010/20,
p. 31, par. 11 (Kohen).
7 CMH, p.22, par.2.16-2.19, p.27, par.2.28, p.65, par.4. 22, p.66, par.4.25, p.77, par.5.18, p.85, par.5.36;
p. 133, par. 7.2, p. 142-143, par. 7.31-7.37, p.144-146, par.7.41-7.43, p.149, r.8.10, p.150, par.8.13, p.151,
conclusions (2) ; RH, p. 95-96, par. 5.42 et CR 2007/8, p. 22, par.22, p.23, par.26, p.46-47, par.35-36, (Quéneudec);
CR 2007/10, p. 32, p. 153 (Colson). - 6 -
quelconque des parties contractantes et des Etats tiers, pourvu que ce tracé n’affecte
pas la juridiction reconnue à l’autre partie contractante par le présent instrument.»
15. Ainsi, le traité de 1986 autorise les par ties à «tracer» à l’avenir des frontières maritimes
avec des Etats tiers, mais il n’autoriserait pas la Cour à déterminer les espaces maritimes respectifs
du Nicaragua et de la Colombie en l’absence du Honduras !
16. Monsieur le président, dans sa plaidoiri e d’hier, le Honduras a versé au dossier des juges
ce qu’il a appelé une «carte représentant la zone des intérêts honduriens». La voici maintenant
projetée à l’écran (CAG: MW6). Il en ressor t que la frontière maritime que le Honduras
revendique est la même que celle à laquelle il préte ndait dans le cadre de l’affaire que la Cour a
tranchée en octobre 2007. Le Honduras représente encore comme siennes les zones situées au nord
e
du 15 parallèle dont la Cour a conclu qu’elles ne faisaient pas partie de son espace maritime.
L’image parle d’elle-même.
17. Monsieur le président, je ne voudrais pas fa ire perdre à la Cour davantage de temps sur
cette question. J’ai demandé à M.Pellet de répondre aussi succinctement que possible aux trois
heures de plaidoiries présentées par le Honduras et la Colombie.
14 18. Je vous serais donc reconnaissant, Monsieur le président, d’appeler M. Pellet à la barre.
Je vous remercie.
Le PRESIDENT: Je remercie M.Carlos ArgüelloGómez, agent de la République du
Nicaragua, de sa plaidoirie. I now invite Professor Alain Pellet to take the floor.
PELr.LET:
1. Thank you very much, Mr.President. Mr.President, Members of the Court, Back to the
Future seems to be the preferred scenario of our Colombian friends. And I understand that
Counsel for Honduras — also friends of ours — enthusiastically endorse that scenario.
2. The purpose of these hearings is (or at least should be) — as you recalled in your opening
speech on Monday, Mr. President,
“pursuant to Article 84, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court[,] to hear the oral argument
of the Republic of Honduras and the Parties on the question whether the Application
for permission to intervene in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime - 7 -
Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), filed on 10June2010 by Honduras under
8
Article 62 of the Statute, should be granted” .
The hearings are supposed to be devoted to this , and not to the maritime delimitation or the
question of ownership of the insular features in the zone disputed by Co lombia and Nicaragua.
And I acknowledge that, generally speaking, Honduras’s representatives occasionally took this into
account yesterday afternoon, unlike our colleagu es speaking on behalf of Colombia, who mistake
both the stage and the proceedings.
3. I do not know when the Court intends to schedule the hearings in the case which
Nicaragua submitted to it with a view to resolving its dispute with Colombia— soon, I hope, in
spite of the applications for permission to interven e, which, in the unlikely event they are granted,
would further and unduly delay consideration of the case. I must say, however, that listening to our
opponents, I had the impression that I had been prope lled into the future and was hearing the oral
arguments they will make when the merits of the ca se can finally be considered. But we are not at
that stage, and Nicaragua’s Agent has just sai d what was necessary in order to safeguard our
15 position. Albeit less poetically, I am going to bring us back to the present, that is, to the question
(the only question which should concern us) regarding the merit of Honduras’s incidental request to
intervene in the case between Nicaragua and Colo mbia. This boils down to determining (and
determining this alone) whether Honduras has asserted an interest of a legal nature which may be
affected by the decision in the dispute before the Court in the main proceedings; or, in other words,
9
whether the “condition of Article 62” has been met — it being understood, of course, that the State
wishing to intervene has the discretionary power to exercise or not to exercise its right— not “to
10
intervene” , but to submit an application for permission to intervene to the Court.
4. In so doing, Mr. President, I will of course respond to the arguments of both Colombia and
Honduras together since — they make no real mystery about it — they make common cause but for
one small difference, and I will begin with th is, concerning the possibility for Honduras to
intervene as a party. I will then address three points in turn:
8CR 2010/18, pp. 10-11 (Owada).
9
CR 2010/19, p. 14, para. 5 (Pellet).
1CR 2010/21, p. 22, para. 9 (Boisson de Chazournes). - 8 -
⎯ the matter of the confusion cultivated by these tw o cronies on their respective roles; once this
has been clarified, I will consider:
⎯ first, the scope of the 2007 res judicata in respect of each of them; and,
⎯ second, the effect which the treaties concl uded between Colombia and Honduras in 1986 and
between Colombia and Jamaica in 1993 might — or rather cannot — have.
1. Honduras’s intervention as a party
5. Mr. President, I am jealous! Jealous of Professor Crawford and the freedom afforded him
by his Agent to give a lecture — a fascinating on e, by the way — on the possibility for a State to
intervene as a party in a case before the Court. I too would very much ha ve liked to share my
thoughts with you on this interesting subject . Unfortunately, AmbassadorArgüello did not
demonstrate a great deal of sympathy when I told him that I in turn wished to showcase my
16 professorial talents to the Court: he instructed me to keep to the only two aspects of practical
significance in the present case— and, in all honest y, as Counsel, I cannot say that he was all
wrong.
6. The first of those practical aspects c oncerns the first condition which, my opponent
contends, must be met in order for a State to be able to intervene as a party in a case in which it
considers that it has an interest of a legal nature at stake: it must have a jurisdictional link to both
of the original parties 11. In the abstract, this is not a problem: if the possibility for such an
intervention exists, the condition is automatically met. Th e learned professor’s assertion is, on the
other hand, highly suspect when he ventures to apply it to this case: “First, as to jurisdiction, that
12
problem does not arise here, since all three States are parties to the Pact of Bogotá.” But, contrary
to that opinion, which Honduras shares 13, this is not sufficient, Mr.President! From that
jurisdictional basis, the Court’s jurisdiction in the present case must be effectively derived.
7. What do the relevant articles of the P act of Bogotá say? While ArticleXXXI does of
course provide for the Court’s jurisdiction in the ci rcumstances set forth in Article 36, paragraph 2,
11
CR 2010/20, p.41, para.12 (Crawford); see also CR 2010/ 21, p.27, para.6 (López Contreras) and p.18,
para. 37 (Wood).
12
CR 2010/20, p. 46, para. 31.
13Application for permission to intervene of the Government of Honduras, p.5, para.21 and CR 2010/18, p.46,
para. 49 (Wood); and see also CR 2010/21, footnote 11. - 9 -
of its Statute, ArticleVI of the same instrument excludes from the Court’s jurisdiction “matters
already settled... by decision of an international court”. Colombia is fully aware of this: it
vehemently invoked the application of Article VI in the context of the dispute in which Honduras is
seeking to intervene and succeeded in profiting fro m it when the Court declared itself without
jurisdiction to entertain a part— an important part— of the case which Nicaragua had initiated
against Colombia 14. However, as I demonstrated on Wednesday 15 (and I will revisit it briefly),
Honduras’s entire argument in support of its applica tion for permission to intervene consists of
17
reopening the questions concerning delimitation already decided by the 8 October 2007 Judgment;
the Court does not have jurisdiction to pronounce on those claims, which form the very subject of
the Honduran application to intervene, and that ap plication must be rejected — also rejected — on
the basis of Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá.
8. I must say that I cannot help but w onder whether Honduras, well aware that it cannot
intervene as a party — if only through lack of a jurisdictional link to Nicaragua (for the reasons I
have stated)— has therefore fabricated this request, which it insists on presenting as the
“principal” 16request, merely in the hope that the Court, which can but reject it, will grant its
request “in the alternative” as a sort of “consolati on prize”. Members of the Court, such reasoning
is of course legally unacceptable and you cannot be taken in by it, but counsel will on occasion
entertain vain hopes of this nature. And, in this instance, the hope is all the more groundless
because another condition, which is applicable to both situations, has clearly not been met and
demands that the Honduran requests be rejected, whether “principal” or “in the alternative”.
Honduras does not in fact assert a legal interest in intervening, which is a requirement in both
hypotheses.
9. Although the State seeking to intervene clearly seems to acknowledge that this is a general
17
requirement , Professor Crawford wished to cast doubt over this: conceding that Article 62 makes
14
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (II), p. 861, para. 90.
15
CR 2010/19, pp. 15-27, paras. 8-33 (Pellet).
16Application for permission to intervene of the Government of Honduras, p. 5, para. 23; pp. 5-6, para. 24; p. 7,
paras.9-31; see also CR 2010/18, p.7, par.7; pp.8-29, para.1-22; pp3.0-31, para.8-29
(BoissondeChazournes) and p.31, para.2; p.35, pa ra.17; p.36, paras.18-20 (Wood); and CR 2010/21, p.18,
paras. 34-36 (Wood) and p. 27, para. 7 (López Contreras).
17CR 2010/21, p. 11, para. 13 (Wood). - 10 -
no distinction between intervention as a party and intervention as a non-party, he asserts that it is
“less clear” in the first case, because the idea of in tervening as a party “is a creation of your case
18
law” . I do not want to get into a scholarly, academic discussion on this point; to me, however, it
seems very clear that, even if a creation of the jurisprudence, it must still be anchored in the
Statute, and that anchorage could only be Article 62 of the Statute. However — and I cannot say it
enough — that provision requires that for any intervention the State seeking to intervene must have
an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the main case.
18 10. Unlike Colombia, therefore, we are alr eady in a position to give a firm answer to
JudgeDonoghue, whose question JamesCrawford see ms to have anticipated by telepathy.
Nicaragua resolutely believes that the capacity in which Honduras seeks to intervene is of
absolutely no importance: it cannot do so either as a party or as a non-party, and it opposes that
intervention.
2. The confusion of the roles
11. Members of the Court, listening to our opponents since the start of the week, I have
asked myself whether their real argument was not in fact a subliminal message which they are
trying to transmit to you, over and above the arguments they feign to expound. That unsaid
argument could be expressed in these terms: “things are so complicated, the legal relations
19
between the Parties [— the Parties and the non-parties, moreover —] so confused” , the facts are
20
so complex , that it is vital that you permit Honduras to intervene so that it can help you untangle
the “uncertain confusion” of the labyrinth in whic h the two States are trying to make you lose your
21
way . But this labyrinth is entirely of their own making; things are much simpler than they claim
if we put them back into perspective and give each of the actors his proper role.
12. Without proceeding in chronological order, the most convenient way is undoubtedly to
start with the 13December2007 Judgment, in which the Court considered that it did not have
18CR 2010/20, p. 43, para. 18 (Crawford).
19
CR 2010/18, p. 32, para. 6 and p. 46, para. 50 (Wood) and CR 2010/20, pp. 24-25, paras. 38-39 (Bundy).
20Ibid., p. 20, para. 4; p. 52, para. 13 (Boisson de Chazournes).
21See Jean Racine, Phèdre, Act II, scene 5, “L’aveu de Phèdre” (“The confession of Phèdre”) [translation by the
Registry]. - 11 -
jurisdiction to pronounce on the question of “s overeignty over the islands of San Andrés,
Providencia and Santa Catalina”, settled by the 1928 Barcenas-Esguerra Tr eaty (a treaty whose
validity is contested by Nicaragua). The Court did however find jurisdiction “to adjudicate upon
the dispute concerning sovereignty over the maritime features claimed by the Parties other than”
19 those three islands and “upon the dispute c oncerning the maritime delimitation between the
Parties”22. Accordingly, those are the only questions th at may be at issue in the dispute in which
Honduras seeks to intervene.
[Slide No. 1: geographical context]
13. The “geographical context” of this dispute is defined by the sketch-map at the beginning
of the Judgment on the preliminary objections, whic h is reproduced at tab No.3 of the judges’
folder.
[Slide No. 1.1: the geographical context of the relevant zone for the purposes of the delimitation]
14. Onto this we have superimposed the rele vant zone for the purposes of the delimitation as
it appeared in figure3.1 of Nicaragua’s Repl y and on which Colombia and Honduras have been
trying to capitalize. It does not appear to me th at there is much cause for derision: this zone
corresponds very closely, in my view, to that which the Court itself considers to be the
geographical context— a context which obviously must be taken into consideration for the
purposes of the delimitation to be made between the Parties to the main case— who are, and I
should not have to repeat it, Nicaragua, as Applicant, and Colombia, as Respondent.
[End of slide No. 1]
I 15. should not have to repeat these self-evident fa cts, Mr. President, but unfortunately it is
absolutely necessary, because we were dumbfounded by the force with which those pleading on
Colombia’s behalf undertook to demonstrate on Wednesday that Colombia — Colombia! — had a
legal interest in the case against it submitted to the Court by Nicaragua. Thus, through its Agent, it
asserted that: “Colombia is not precluded from upholding its rights vis-à-vis Nicaragua and
claim[s] its rights north of the 15th parallel and west of meridian 79° 56' 00" and west of the rest of
22
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2007 (II), p. 876, para. 142. - 12 -
23 24
the line fixed in that Treaty” ; Messrs.Bundy and Kohen voiced their agreement — as did
20
Honduras, whose Agent elected himsel f defender of Colombia’s rights 25and whose Advocate
during yesterday afternoon’s hearings heartily endorse d the statements in this vein by the Agent of
Colombia 26.
16. But Colombia is playing at scaring itsel f. No-one— not Nicaragua, in any case— is
saying that: as the Respondent in this case, Colo mbia can assert the rights which it believes it has
(just as Nicaragua can clearly contest them — and it does contest them most vigorously, especially
the claim which I have just mentioned). As a third party to the 8 October 2007 Judgment — which
settled the Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean
Sea — Colombia is not bound by it and is at liberty to reject both the reasoning and the operative
clause in it— even if that is undoubtedly somewhat foolhardy— given that by concluding the
1986 Treaty with Honduras, it demonstrated that it did not have any claim to assert north of the
15th parallel, judgment or no judgment.
17. However, with respect to the Judgment on the preliminary objections in this case — no
longer the 8 October Judgment, but the 13 Decemb er 2007 Judgment (a very “productive” year for
the Court) — the situation is reversed: in that instance, Honduras is the third party and Colombia
the Party. Nevertheless, in terms of its reas oning, that second Judgment does help to clarify
things — and I will come back to it in a moment.
[Slide No. 2: course of the maritime boundary]
18. It is the exact opposite for Honduras. It is a third party to the case between Nicaragua
and Colombia in which it wishes to intervene, and it must establish that it has a legal interest which
may be affected by the future decision of the Cour t. On the other hand, it was a Party to the case
which led to the October2007 Judgment— by which it is bound. Vis-à-vis that Judgment, it is
clearly in a very different position to Colombia: as far as Honduras is concerned, that Judgment
23CR 2010/20, p. 13, para. 19 (Londoño).
24
See, among numerous examples, CR 2010/20, p. 27, para. 46 (Bundy) and p. 38, para. 35 (Kohen).
25CR 2010/18, p. 14, paras. 7-8 (López Contreras).
26CR 2010/21, p. 13, para. 19 (Wood). - 13 -
has the force of res judicata and it cannot assert any legal interest which would go counter to the
operative clause of that decision or the reasoning behind it.
21 19. Mr.President, it is in the light of these cons iderations and, I hope, clarifications, that it
must be asked whether Honduras— Honduras, and not Colombia— can, with a semblance of
credibility, claim the essential legal interest.
[Slide No. 3: the scope of the 2007 res judicata]
3. The scope of the 2007 res judicata
20. In this regard the scenario is no longer Back to the Future but In Search of Lost Time [A
la recherche du temps perdu] , because our Honduran and Colombian friends employ a time
machine to the past in an attempt to wipe away the Judgment of 8 October 2007.
21. They do so through reasoning which, while not always easy to follow, may no doubt be
summarized fairly easily as follows: because Colombia is not bound by this decision ⎯ from
2007 ⎯, neither is Honduras in its relations with Colombia and Honduras can therefore claim an
interest in the present case, since Colombia h as acknowledged, and continues to acknowledge, that
Honduras has rights in the area where it claims to have them. You will observe in passing,
Members of the Court, that Laurence Boisson de Ch azournes’s odd principle (an interest of a legal
nature exists because Honduras “c onsiders” such to be the case 2), that this odd principle is
partially reviewed and corrected by Colombia: Honduras has a legal interest because I, Colombia,
believe so28.
22. This, Mr.President, is very poor framing of the issue; true, the effect of res judicata is
relative, but it is binding on each of the parties in absolute terms. Agreed, Colombia is not bound
by the 2007 Judgment. But Honduras is and must comply with it.
23. Allow me to quote: “Maritime areas situat ed within the rectangle and lying north of the
bisector are not at issue in the present case. As between Nicaragua and Honduras, the Court has
ruled that those areas appertain to Honduras.” Were this not phrased in such polished English
27
CR2010/18, p2.1, para5. (Boisson de Chazour nes); see also 2010/21, p2.2, para9.
(Boisson de Chazournes).
2See, e.g., CR 2010/20, p. 25, para. 39 or p. 27, para. 47 (Bundy); see also p. 37, para. 34 (Kohen). - 14 -
(American, actually), I could have said it myself, word for word 29. But it was Mr.Bundy who
made the statement on Wednesday. I am however w illing to join in it: the Court has decided that
22 the northern part of the area in which Honduras clai ms to have a “legal interest” allowing it to
intervene belongs to Honduras ⎯ and that is res judicata. It also decided, in the same Judgment,
that the areas south of that same line appe rtained to Nicaragua; that is equally res judicata. And,
unless what the Court has decided is to be called into question, Honduras cannot invoke any
interest which might be affected by the future judgment.
24. Yet it does just that: the “rectangle” a ppearing on the sketch-map now being projected
shows its claims in this respect. We have already said a great deal about this, but it warrants a few
more quick words:
30
⎯ let me repeat ⎯ according to Honduras itself, this rect angle defines (and circumscribes) its
potential interest;
⎯ it is bounded in the east by the 82nd meridian, the starting point of the line defined by the
1986 Treaty, on which the Court refrained from ta king a position in its 2007 Judgment so as to
31
avoid any risk of prejudicing the rights of Colombia, not a participant in the proceedings ;
but, three months later, in its Judgment of 13 December 2007, on the preliminary objections in
our case, the Court considered “that, contrary to Colombia’s claims, the terms of the [1930]
Protocol [to the 1928 Treaty], in their plain a nd ordinary meaning, cannot be interpreted as
effecting a delimitation of the maritime boundary between Colombia and Nicaragua”
(Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007(II) , p.867, para.115), thus rendering the arbitrarily set
boundary of the 82nd meridian meaningless;
⎯ the southern side of the rectangle is not jus tified either: it follows from the Judgment of
8 October 2007 that Honduras has no rights south of the 2007 line;
29
CR 2010/20, p. 23, para. 33 (Bundy).
30
CR 2010/19, pp. 28-29, paras. 38-41 (Pellet).
3Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 758, paras. 315-316. - 15 -
⎯ as for the eastern side, it is to be observed that it cannot in and of itself have any particular
significance and, more importantly, that the dash ed line on the illustrative sketch map included
in that Judgment extends eastwards of the 80th meridian.
[Slide No. 4: enlargement of sketch-map No. 7 (course of the maritime boundary line)]
23 25. According to both Honduras and Colombia, the continuation of the line not only beyond
the 82ndmeridian but even beyond the 80this of no significance. As evidence of this,
Messrs. Bundy and Wood cite the arrow in sketch -map No. 8 in the 7 October 2007 Judgment, on
which they try to focus our attention: both clai m in effect that this is the only illustration
32
representing the delimitation effected by the Court . Even if we stick to this sketch-map, which is
merely the enlargement of sketch-map No.7 , which is entitled “Course of the maritime boundary
line”, it is clear that the arrow in the east, with its tip at the 82nd meridian, shows that the boundary
extends beyond this meridian.
[Slide No.5: Honduras’s judges’ folder ⎯ tab8 (map showing the area of Honduras’s interests
together with Nicaragua’s “delimitation area”)]
33
26. Sir Michael hoped to “please” me by producing sketch-map MW6 yesterday. While I
am touched by his intention, the announced aim has not been met: there is still the arrow in
sketch-map No.8 and my opponent, to my great displeasure, carefully avoided showing the line
from sketch-map No. 7 (illustrating the “course of the maritime boundary line”) ⎯ which you now
see before you.
T7h.is ⎯ dashed ⎯ line continues beyond the 80th meridian ⎯ until some
185 nautical miles from the mouth of the River Coco, the starting point for the maritime boundary
between Honduras and Nicaragua. If the Court had been in the slightest doubt in regard to the fact
that “the area where the rights of third States may be affected” could result in fixing the endpoint of
that boundary on or near the 82nd parallel, it would undoubtedly not have drawn the line out so far.
In keeping with this, it is telling that the Court w as careful to state that “in no case may the line be
interpreted as extending more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured”. And, as the C ourt did this, the obvious reason was that it had in
32
See, in particular, CR 2010/20, p. 21, para. 25 (Bundy); see also CR 2010/21, p. 14, para. 23.
33
CR 2010/21, p. 14, para. 23. - 16 -
mind a distant tripoint, one less than 200 miles away but still distant, and that it firmly believed that
the third State in question was not Colombia but Jamaica; I am going to return to this.
[Return to slide No. 3]
24 28. On this point Colombia insists vehemently : “I”, it says, “am the third State”. Last
Wednesday I showed why this was not the case: the third State is Jamaica 34. The Judgment of
8 October 2007 admits of no doubt on this subject.
29. True to its determination to preserve the rights of third States, the Court enters into a
lengthy analysis in the Judgment of those Stat es which would potentially be affected by the
maritime boundary between Nicaragua a nd Honduras as decided by the Court 3. It proceeds by
process of elimination in doing so:
⎯ in paragraph315 of the Judgment it conclud es that Colombia’s rights under the 1928Treaty
could not be affected;
⎯ in paragraph316 it arrives at the same conclu sion in respect of Colombia’s rights under the
1986 Treaty;
⎯ but the Court’s conclusion in respect of Jamaica’ s rights, which it considers in paragraph 317,
is altogether different:
“Another possible source of third-State interests, is the joint jurisdictional
régime established by Jamaica and Colombia in an area south of Rosalind Bank near
the 80thmeridian pursuant to their 1993 bila teral Treaty on maritime delimitation.
The Court will not draw a delimitation line that would intersect with this line because
of the possible prejudice to the rights of both parties to that Treaty.” ( Territorial and
Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 759, para. 317.)
It is at that stage in the reasoning, and not until th at stage, that the Court states that it must refrain
in those proceedings from fixing an endpoint which would require consideration to be given to the
rights of Jamaica, not a party to the case.
30. But let us assume Colombia to be the thir d State (even though the direction of the line
drawn by the Court is enough to rule out this possibility categorically); let us assume so, that
cannot make any difference in the matter:
34
CR 2010/19, p. 30, paras. 43-44 (Pellet).
3Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 759, para. 318. - 17 -
36
25 ⎯ between Nicaragua and Honduras, the boundary is completely and definitively determined ;
⎯ and this is confirmed by ⎯ among other things ⎯ the length of the line showing the “course of
the maritime boundary line” on sketch-map No. 7;
⎯ furthermore, if the endpoint was to be situated in the vicinity of the 82nd meridian, then it was
absurd for the Court to take account of the 1993agreement between Colombia and Jamaica,
which concerns a maritime area far removed from this one;
⎯ as we know, a very common way to preserve the rights of third parties is to refrain from fixing
37
an endpoint , but in no way does this mean that the maritime delimitation putting the dispute
to rest is not complete as between the Parties;
⎯ it was particularly appropriate to refrain from doing so in the October 2007 Judgment since that
was what the Parties were expecting: “As fo r the endpoint, neither Nicaragua nor Honduras in
each of their submissions specifies a precise seaward end to the boundary between them.”
(Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 756, para. 312.);
⎯ thus, regardless of the endpoint and the third State in question ⎯ whether Jamaica, Colombia,
Liechtenstein or Nepal ⎯ it is impossible to see what legal interest Honduras could claim:
Honduras’s maritime boundary w ith Nicaragua is fixed ⎯along its entire length ⎯ and you
can’t choose your neighbour.
[End of slide No. 3]
31. And there is something else (on top of what I have just said). Honduras is asking the
Court to “to join [greffer] to these proceedings” a dispute which it defines as consisting of
“determining: a maritime boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua; and a tripoint among
Honduras, Nicaragua and Colombia” 38. However, neither of the two Parties to the main case has
asked the Court either, and this is obvious, to determine an allegedly missing segment of the
36CR 2010/19, p. 20, para. 18 (Pellet).
37
Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jam ahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p.91, para.130;
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Applica tion for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1984, p.27, and Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya /Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985 , pp.26-28,
paras. 21-23; or Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial
Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, paras. 238, 245 and 307.
38Application for permission to intervene, p.5, para.22; see also p.9, para.36; CR2010/18, p.41, para.34
(Wood) and CR 2010/21, p. 18, para. 34. - 18 -
26 maritime boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua or to determine a tripoint or generally to
39
effect the lateral or horizontal delimitati on of their boundaries with their neighbours .
Accordingly, it is clear that Honduras is seeking to add a new dispute to the one between Nicaragua
and Colombia (as they concur in defining it). As ProfessorCrawford said so very well in his
masterly statement: “intervention may not be used to tack on a new case, distinct from the case
that exists between the original parties” 4; and this is not limited to interventions as a party ⎯ in
saying so, by the way, Professor Crawford looked to the Court’s Judgments in 1981, 1985 and
1990. And, to my knowledge, none of those States s eeking to intervene wished to do so as a party.
And, more recently, in its Judgment in 2001 on the Philippines’ Application for permission to
intervene in the Indonesia/Malaysia case, the Court, quoting the words of the Chamber in 1990,
pointed out that the purpose of intervention “is not ... to enable a third State to [indeed] tack on
[greffer] a new case . . .” — which is exactly what Honduras says it wants to do ⎯ “An incidental
proceeding cannot be one which transforms [a] case into a different case with different parties.”
(Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sip adan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Application to
Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 588, para. 35.)
[Return to slide No. 3: scope of the 2007 res judicata]
32. To recapitulate in respect of this third point, Mr. President:
⎯ the only purpose of Honduras’s hoped-for intervention is to call into question the
2007 Judgment determining its maritime boundary with Nicaragua along its entire length;
⎯ as that Judgment is res judicata vis-à-vis Honduras, Honduras cannot assert any interest of a
legal nature in the area in which it claims to have one ⎯ the rectangle;
⎯ the Court cannot fix a tripoint which would inevitably concern a third State, Jamaica; but
27 ⎯ even if this were to involve Colombia (quod non) , Honduras has no legal interest in the
determination of that point;
⎯ such a determination is not being requested by the Parties in the main proceedings and
consequently is not at issue;
39
See Nicaragua’s Reply, Submissi ons, pp.239-241, and Colombia’s Re joinder, Submissions, p.337,
respectively.
40
CR 2010/20, p. 41, para. 14. - 19 -
⎯ in making such a request, Honduras is attempting to “tack on a new case” to the case Nicaragua
has referred to the Court; that is not the purpose to be served by intervention as an incidental
proceeding.
[Slide No. 6: the irrelevance of the 1986 and 1993 Treaties]
4. The irrelevance of the 1986 and 1993 Treaties
33. Mr. President, there remains the 1986Treaty, which, like Bizet’s Arlésienne, is much
talked-about without ever being capable of produc ing the mythical effects that Colombia and
Honduras ascribe to it. The same is true of the 1993 Treaty.
34. Members of the Court, you are familiar with the line resulting from the treaty entered
into in 1986 by Colombia and Honduras. It has been added to the sketch-map seen a moment ago.
35. According to Professor Kohen, we are saying two things about this treaty:
⎯ first, we are said to claim that the Court ruled in its 2007 Judgment (the one between Nicaragua
41
and Honduras) on the legal effects of the 1986 Treaty ;
⎯ second, we supposedly contend that the treaty itself creates such rights 42.
In fact, that is not really what we are saying.
36. On the second point, we are not talking about “subjective rights” of Nicaragua; we are
merely saying that, in concluding the treaty, Co lombia showed that it considered the maritime
boundary it had accepted as meeting the requirement of an equitable result. Yet Nicaragua has no
intention of invoking the treaty in question per se, as our opponents have made so abundantly
clear 4: Nicaragua has always considered this treaty to be invalid. It maintains that, were the treaty
28 valid, it would manifest erga omnes the rights which Colombia claims were granted to it south of
the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Hondur as. But, once again, in this instance these
claims, even as so circumscribed, cannot be upheld because, in entering into this agreement, the
parties dealt with sovereign rights belonging to Nicaragua. In this connection we are in full
41
CR 2010/20, pp. 29-31, paras. 7-11.
42
Ibid., p.18, para.20 (Bundy); p.28, para.5; pp. 31-32, para.12; pp.36- 37, paras.29-33 (Kohen);
CR 2010/21, p. 14, para. 25; or p. 16, para. 29 (Wood).
43CR 2010/20, p. 36, para. 29; p. 37, para. 33 (Kohen). - 20 -
44
agreement with the statements made by my opponent and in the references he has cited as
authority: it is a matter of determining who (Colombia or Nicaragua) has “better title” to the
disputed maritime areas. But Honduras, for its part, is not involved: it holds no rights south of the
line determined in the 2007 Judgment.
37. As for that Judgment’s effect vis-à-vis Co lombia, it is a fact that it has no binding force
on Colombia ⎯ and I find that MarceloKohen went to a great deal of pointless effort to gather
45
citations in a footnote (No.11 in his statement ) to no fewer than 19Judgments of the Court to
show that the Court “may only exercise its jurisdiction in respect of States which have consented to
46
it” ! I shall however point out that, while statin g in paragraph316 of its Judgment that it was
placing no reliance on the 1986Treaty “to establish an appropriate endpoint for the maritime
delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras”, the Court nevertheless observed:
“that any delimitation between Honduras and Nicaragua extending east beyond the
82ndmeridian and north of the 15thparallel (as the bisector adopted by the Court
would do) would not actually prejudice Colombia’s rights because Colombia’s rights
under this Treaty do not extend north of the 15thparallel” ( Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 758-759, para. 316).
47
With bravado our opponent quoted this passage from your Judgment ; however, this is the Court’s
very clearly stated view of the spatial confines of Colombia’s rights, arising from its conclusion of
the 1986 Treaty ⎯ even if this observation is not res judicata for Colombia.
38. Yet, all these considerations are just so ma ny digressions from the issue before us today:
once again, Colombia is arguing the existence, or scope, of its own rights under the 1986Treaty.
29 That is not the issue. The only question is to de termine what role this instrument could play in
establishing the legal interest claimed by Honduras. And the answer is clear: it has none.
39. SirMichael, knowing that the geographi cal approach is a dead-end, argues that
Honduras’s interest is linked to the question of the validity of the 1986 Treaty:
⎯ in the 2007Judgment, he says, “the Court refrained from passing judgment on [Colombia’s]
treaty rights and obligations” 48; we have no problem here;
44CR 2010/20, pp. 34-36, paras. 22-28 (Kohen).
45
Ibid., p. 30, footnote 11 (Kohen).
46
Ibid., para. 9.
47Ibid., pp. 29-30, para. 8 (Kohen). - 21 -
⎯ therefore it is not correct that we were contending that the Judgment rendered the treaty invalid
(“the 2007 Judgment rendered the 1986 Treaty invalid”);
⎯ in fact, the Treaty is invalid per se , but the Court could not take a position on this in
Colombia’s absence; but the point is that
⎯ the Court was able in its 2007 Judgment to define the course of the maritime boundary between
Nicaragua and Honduras, which it fixed along the line of the azimuth described in
subparagraph 3 in the 2007 Judgment, without ruling on the validity of the 1986 Treaty, at least
not in the operative part, and did so in the absence of Colombia, a third State.
[Slide No. 6-1: remove the 1986 line, add the 1993 line]
40. The conclusions I am now drawing from the 1986Treaty can also be drawn from the
1993Treaty. But for different ⎯ and even simpler ⎯ reasons: reasons which, once again, can
clearly be seen in a sket ch-map, a good sketch-map ⎯ to respond to yesterday’s invocation of
Bonaparte’s spirit by SirMichael, who thus celebrated Trafalgar Day in his fashion. The
sketch-map now before you shows that the azimuth decided by the Court in 2007 does not intersect
with the line established by the 1993 Treaty between Colombia and Jamaica.
41. Nicaragua “has maintained its persistent objections to” this Treaty ⎯ contrary to
49
Mr. Bundy’s contention but in keeping with the Court’s ob servation in just those words in its
Judgment of 8October2007 5. Moreover, even if this treaty were valid and were binding on
30 Nicaragua ⎯ quod non, I repeat, unfortunately for Honduras, it finds itself on the “wrong side of
the line”. There is no interest it can claim to barge into a case which, as that Judgment has made
clear to all, does not concern it in any way.
[End of slide No. 6]
Members of the Court, I thank you most sincerely for your attention and ask you,
Mr. President, to give the floor to the Agent of Nicaragua.
48
CR 2010/21, p. 15, para. 24 (Wood).
49
CR 2010/20, p. 20, para. 24 (Bundy).
5Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), p. 736, para. 255. - 22 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you for your statement, ProfessorPellet. J’invite maintenant
S. Exc. M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez à venir présenter ses conclusions.
M. ARGUELLO GOMEZ : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs
de la Cour. Je vais à présent donner lecture d es conclusions finales du Gouvernement de la
République du Nicaragua.
C ONCLUSION FINALE
En application de l’article60 du Règlement de la Cour et au vu de la requête à fin
d’intervention déposée par la Ré publique du Honduras et de ses plaidoiries, la République du
Nicaragua déclare respectueusement ce qui suit : par sa requête, la République du Honduras remet
manifestement en question l’autorité de la chose jugée dont est revêtu l’arrêt du 8 octobre 2007. La
République du Nicaragua considère en outre que le Honduras ne satisfait pas aux prescriptions
énoncées à l’article62 du Statut et aux alinéas a) et b) du paragraphe2 de l’article81 du
Règlement de la Cour.
En conséquence, la République du Nicaragua : 1)s’oppose à l’admission de la demande
d’intervention et 2) prie respectueusement la Cour de rejeter la requête à fin d’intervention déposée
par le Honduras.
Une copie signée du texte écrit de notre conclusion finale a été communiquée à la Cour.
Monsieur le président, pour conclure notre par ticipation à ce stade de la procédure orale, je
tiens, au nom de la République du Nicaragua et de notre délégation, à vous exprimer, à vous-même
ainsi qu’à chacun des éminents Membres de la Cour, notre profonde gratitude pour toute l’attention
que vous avez aimablement prêtée à nos exposés. J’étends également nos remerciements,
Monsieur le président, au Greffe de la Cour et à l’équipe des interprètes, aux délégations du
31 Honduras et de la Colombie ainsi qu’à leurs conse ils. Enfin, je tiens à remercier personnellement
et publiquement l’équipe du Nicaragua. Merci, Monsieur le président. - 23 -
Le PRESIDENT: Je remercie S.Exc.M. Carlos José Argüello Gómez pour son exposé.
Ainsi s’achève le second tour de plaidoiries du Nicaragua.
L’audience est levée à 15 h 55.
___________
Translation