Non Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
CR 2013/3 (traduction)
CR 2013/3 (translation)
Mercredi 17 avril 2013 à 10 heures
Wednesday 17 April 2013 at 10 a.m. - 2 -
10 The PRESIDENT: Bonjour. Veuillez vous asseoir. The sitting is open. The Court is
meeting today to hear the first round of oral argument by the Kingdom of Thailand. I will now
give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Virachai Plasai, Agent of the Kingdom of Thailand. You have
the floor, Sir.
M. PLASAI :
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, c’est un grand honneur et un
réel privilège pour moi de représenter à nouveau le Royaume de Thaïlande devant vous en qualité
d’agent. Je m’adresse à vous ce jour avec tout le respect dû à l’organe judiciaire principal de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, et c’est avec le plus grand respect que je salue nos éminents
contradicteurs.
2. Nous avons pris note du souhait du Cambodge, exprimé par S. Exc. M. le vice-premier
ministre du Cambodge lundi matin, d’entretenir des relations pacifiques et constructives avec la
Thaïlande. Pour notre part, nous sommes depuis toujours fermement convaincus que nous pouvons
vivre avec nos voisins dans la paix et la prospérité. L’avenir de la Thaïlande et celui du Cambodge
sont étroitement liés. Les frontières ne sont pas faites pour diviser mais pour offrir des perspectives
de coopération et de développement mutuel. C’est dans cet esprit que la Thaïlande s’est associée
au «processus conjoint de levé et de démarcation» mené dans le cadre du mémorandum d’accord
du 14 juin 2000 . Ce processus, qui est mis en œuvre dans la région à présent revendiquée par le
Cambodge, est un processus convenu, non judiciaire, qui a pour but de déterminer le tracé de la
frontière.
3. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, mon gouvernement a toujours
eu le plus grand respect pour la Cour. Bien que ce respect ait été mis à rude épreuve par l’arrêt
rendu en 1962, il a prévalu, et la Thaïlande a appliqué la décision de la Cour, comme l’a
expressément reconnu le chef de l’Etat cambodgien de l’époque, le prince Sihanouk, lorsqu’il s’est
rendu sur le site du temple peu après. A présent, cinquante ans plus tard, nos contradicteurs
1Mémorandum d’accord entre le Gouvernement du Royaume de Thaïlande et le Gouvernement du Royaume du
Cambodge sur le levé et la démarcation de frontière terrestre, 14 juin 2000 (ci-après «mémorandum»). [Annexe 91 des
Observations écrites du Royaume de Thaïlande, 21 novembre 2011 (ci-après «OET»).] - 3 -
affirment que cette reconnaissance n’en était pas une, et la Cour est priée de dire, sous le couvert
d’une interprétation, ce qu’elle a refusé expressément de dire à l’époque.
11
I. Cambodia’s Application is an abuse of process and an abuse
of the integrity of the Court
4. Mr. President, the 1962 Judgment is clear. In 1962, and for the half century that followed,
the Parties were of the same view regarding its meaning and scope. From July 1962 onwards,
Thailand duly complied with the Judgment. Cambodia recognized that fact. But now, half a
century later, Cambodia has suddenly returned to the Court to question the meaning and scope of
the Judgment, relying solely on a brief passage from the reasoning which has been taken out of
context.
5. Mr. President, this spectacular volte-face by Cambodia is certainly not aimed at obtaining
an interpretation of the Judgment in good faith. It is clearly apparent from Cambodia’s pleadings
that its true motive is to again ask for something that the Court expressly refused to grant it in 1962,
namely a ruling on the frontier and the legal status of the “Annex I map”. This is, in fact, an appeal
against the 1962 Judgment — in other words, a request for revision. Cambodia’s Application is not
admissible under Article 60 of the Statute of the Court, and the criteria governing the jurisdiction of
the Court under that Article are not met.
6. Thailand considers itself justified in maintaining that its consent regarding the Court’s
jurisdiction is subject to the limits contained in the Statute of the Court. In this situation,
Cambodia’s Request would appear to be a flagrant abuse of process and an abuse of the very
integrity of the Court. Thailand is sure that, faced with such an improper request, the Court will be
at pains to preserve the integrity of its judicial function.
II. The present dispute is the result of a fresh territorial claim by Cambodia for
purposes of a unilateral application to have the Temple
placed on the World Heritage List
7. Mr. President, the present dispute has nothing to do with the original case. It was born of
a fresh territorial claim by Cambodia, which stemmed from Cambodia’s desire to be solely - 4 -
responsible for the Temple’s placement on the World Heritage List, despite the repeated offers
2
made by Thailand with a view to a joint nomination .
8. The dispute that gave rise to the original case, which concerned sovereignty over the
Temple, was definitively resolved immediately after the pronouncement of the Judgment. Thus, on
12 15 July 1962 Thailand handed the Temple over to Cambodia and withdrew all of its personnel from
the vicinity of the Temple, which was denoted on the ground by a fence and signs placed along the
3
boundary adopted by the Thai Council of Ministers five days earlier . Cambodia thereby obtained
4
what it had demanded in its Application instituting proceedings in 1959 (to which I will refer in
short as its “original Application”), namely sovereignty over the Temple and the withdrawal of
5 6
Thailand’s “detachments of armed forces” from the “portion of Cambodian territory” termed the
“ruins of the Temple” . Cambodia’s satisfaction was formally expressed on 27 September 1962 by
the head of its diplomatic corps before the General Assembly of the United Nations and on
5 January 1963 by its Head of State during the official ceremony at which it took possession of the
Temple .8
9. Until the 2000s, Cambodia never claimed a lack of effectiveness or challenged the
legitimacy of Thailand’s presence on the other side of the line determined by the Council of
Ministers several days after the Judgment. For a good half century, it did not suggest that
Thailand’s presence there was inconsistent with the Judgment. Cambodia has itself admitted, in the
present proceedings, that its activities in the area that it is now claiming today began in late 1998 at
the earliest, with the construction of a pagoda . Moreover, prior to the present proceedings,
2WOTh, para. 1.21.
3
FWETh, Ann. 5, 21 June 2012, Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Thailand of
10 July 1962, reproduced at tab 1.1 of the judges’ folder. See also WOTh, paras. 4.35-4.36, and FWETh, para. 1.13.
4
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 9; I.C.J. Pleadings,
Temple of Preah Vihear, Application instituting proceedings, Vol. I, p. 15.
5
Ibid., p. 15.
6
Ibid., p. 4.
7Ibid., p. 15.
8WOTh, paras. 4.37 and 4.43-4.47; FWETh, para. 3.68.
9FWEC, 8 March 2012, paras. 2.8 and 2.67, and Ann. 24. See also CR 2013/1, p. 64, para. 42 (Bundy). - 5 -
Cambodia never disputed the fact that Thailand had withdrawn from the Temple and its vicinity in
July 1962 .10
10. Cambodia even admitted, in various documents submitted to UNESCO’s World Heritage
11
Committee, that its territorial sovereignty did not extend to the area in question . When, in 2008,
the Temple was finally placed on the World Heritage List with Thailand’s support, the property as
13 registered did not extend beyond the line determined by the Council of Ministers in 1962, as the
map referred to by Cambodia’s counsel at Monday’s hearing shows . 12
11. As of the beginning of the 2000s, however, there was progressive encroachment beyond
the Council of Ministers’ line and into Thai territory, a flagrant violation of Article V of the
Memorandum of Understanding of 2000. Those illicit activities destabilized the negotiation
process that was under way at that time pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding and
naturally resulted in strong protests by Thailand . 13 However, in the interests of good
14
neighbourliness and fraternal relations within ASEAN , Thailand showed maximum restraint,
focusing on negotiating within the context of the existing mechanisms, including the Joint
Boundary Commission established by the Memorandum of Understanding.
12. This new frontier dispute crystallized in 2007, when Cambodia unveiled this plan
[Slide 1 ], which was included in its unilateral request to have the Temple placed on the World
st 16
Heritage List at the 31 session of the World Heritage Committee in Christchurch . That claim
encroaches some 4.5 sq km into Thai territory.
13. Thus, Mr. President, Cambodia’s true intentions became clear in Christchurch. Those
encroachments and other localized incidents — which had appeared to be isolated events, not part
of an organized plan — were formally transformed into a territorial claim. Cambodia clearly aims
to appropriate those areas within Thailand that it considers necessary for the registration of the
10WOTh, paras. 5.66-5.79; FWETh, paras. 3.68-3.69.
11See WOTh, Ann. 100, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, History of the Negotiations for the Inscription
of the Temple on the UNESCO World Heritage List, Nov. 2011.
12
CR 2013/1, p. 66, para. 53 (Bundy). See also Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, op. cit., Attachments 3
and 4, reproduced in WOTh, Ann. 100, pp. 708-709.
13
WOTh, Anns. 93 and 94.
14
Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
15Reproduced at tab 1.9 of the judges’ folder.
16See also WOTh, Ann. 100. - 6 -
Temple. After a period of negotiations — conducted in good faith, but to no avail — Thailand
reacted and increased its protests against those violations of its sovereignty and territorial
14 integrity . Contrary to Cambodia’s claims , those protests do not reflect a change in Thailand’s
position. On the contrary, they constitute confirmation of Thailand’s continuous sovereignty —
unchallenged until then — over the portion of territory newly claimed by Cambodia. Thailand was
not formally aware of that claim in a clear sense until 2007, and it is that claim which is the true
cause of the recent armed conflict, all of which has been provoked by Cambodia. In any event,
Thailand has simply exercised its right of self-defence under international law [end slide].
14. So, the present dispute does not concern the meaning or scope of the 1962 Judgment, but
rather the question of the frontier, a question that the Court itself excluded from the original case.
That question must be resolved under the Memorandum of Understanding of 2000. However,
Cambodia is completely refusing to enter into negotiations and obstinately insisting solely on the
1962 Judgment, with a view to imposing on Thailand the frontier line on the Annex I map as
arbitrarily transposed by Cambodia in its written pleadings. Mr. President, Cambodia’s current
Application, which has no basis either in fact or in law, has resulted in an unjustified interruption to
the legitimate negotiation process that is required under the Memorandum of Understanding
of 2000.
III. The area of approximately 4.5 sq km that is in dispute here does not constitute
the vicinity of the Temple within the meaning of the second paragraph
of the operative part of the 1962 Judgment
15. Mr. President, contrary to Cambodia’s claims, the portion of Thai territory that it has
claimed since 2007 is not, and cannot be, “the vicinity of the Temple” within the meaning of the
1962 Judgment, for the simple reason that, in its original Application, Cambodia claimed neither an
area of that size nor a specific frontier. The Court was unable, and would not have been entitled, to
rule ultra petita and grant Cambodia something it had not requested — at least not at the outset.
16. Even when Cambodia, going beyond its original Application, asked the Court in
March 1962 to rule on the location of the frontier and the legal status of the Annex I map, no
17
AC, 28 April 2011, Anns. III and IV.
18AC, para. 15; FWEC, para. 4.81. - 7 -
mention was made of any claim to those approximately 4.5 sq km. In any event, the Court
15 expressly refused to address those requests in the operative part of the Judgment, as they
represented an “extension of Cambodia’s original claim” (Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 36) . 19
17. That fundamental failing in Cambodia’s original pleadings explains the trouble it has in
the present proceedings when it comes to proving the supposed existence of that disputed area in
the original case. Indeed, Cambodia is unable to produce a single document from the original
case — not even its own pleadings — to that end. The best it can do is to falsify the record and
include in its written pleadings a line which constitutes a deliberate misrepresentation of Annex 49
of the Counter-Memorial of Thailand of 1961 , a document that it had, however, contested and
21
strongly criticized in the original case . What an about-turn, Mr. President! We will come back to
this point, which we consider crucial.
IV. The Thai Council of Ministers’ line of July 1962 denotes an area that corresponds to
the vicinity of the Temple within the meaning of the second paragraph
of the operative part of the 1962 Judgment
18. Mr. President, let us not forget that Thailand complied fully with the Judgment in 1962.
The line adopted by the Thai Council of Ministers in July 1962 in order to execute the Judgment
22
[Slide 2 ] is shown in red on this comparative mapping study carried out by the University of
Durham at our request . It denotes an area corresponding to the vicinity of the Temple as the
Parties and the Court understood them — and as they were described by the Court on page 15 of
the Judgment and illustrated on the map in Annex 85 (d), the only map that the Court used in the
24
16 original case . This is the “portion of Cambodian territory” claimed in the original case.
19See also FWETh, paras. 3.91-3.97.
20
AC, Cartographic Anns. 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8; FWEC, sketch on page preceding p. 77.
21
I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear, Vol. I, Reply of Cambodia, p. 473, paras. 74-77 and pp. 540-542
(report by Messrs. Doeringfeld, Amuedo and Ivey of 23 October 1961, Ann. LXVI (a)). See also various oral arguments
by Cambodia, ibid., Vol. II, pp. 368-381.
22Reproduced at tab 1.10 of the judges’ folder.
23Comparison by the IBRU of selected elements of the ITC map revised by Doeringfeld, Amuedo and Ivey’s
team (in black) and selected elements of the map showing the line adopted by the cabinet, in International Boundaries
Research Unit, A review of maps presented in the period 1959-1962 and others prepared in 2012, Durham University,
June 2012, p. 31 (FWETh, Ann. 46); also reproduced at tab 1.10 of the judges’ folder.
24Ann. 85 (d), “Map on the scale of 1:2,000 prepared by the International Training Centre for Arial Survey”
(FWETh, Ann. 52), reproduced at tab 1.2 of the judges’ folder. - 8 -
19. The Council of Ministers’ line corresponds, above all, to the only line that Cambodia
25
included in its pleadings in the original case , that indicated in Annex LXVI (c) to its Reply, which
is shown in black on the screen. The difference between those two lines [end slide; slide 3 ], 26
shown by the area in blue on the screen, was described by the Cambodian Head of State on
27
5 January 1963 as a “few metres”, “unimportant” in any event and accepted as de minimis .
20. Cambodia’s current claim represents a complete break with the past. The line described
by Cambodia in its written pleadings as the boundary of the vicinity of the Temple [end slide;
28
(Slide 4) ] is an arbitrarily transposed version of the frontier line on the Annex I map, a version
not contained in its pleadings in the original case. That is the green line on the screen at the
29
moment [end slide; slide 5) ].
The “few metres” judged to be de minimis in 1962 by the Cambodian Head of State — the
tiny area (0.07 sq km, to be precise) marked in blue on the screen — have suddenly increased to
30
[end slide; (Slide 6) ] several square kilometres, as you can see from the area in red here! That is
the approximately 4.5 sq km that Cambodia has claimed since 2007 — an area that, no matter how
you look at it, has nothing to do with the original case.
31
21. Despite the Court’s well-established case law in matters of interpretation , Cambodia is
desperately seeking, in order to support this new territorial claim, to have the Annex I map
incorporated in the operative part of the 1962 Judgment. With that in mind, it cites a non-existent
32
theory involving “decisional grounds” and “implied dispositifs” and relies on a quite isolated
17 passage from the reasoning of the Judgment . To that end, it ignores everything else in the
Judgment, as well as all records relating to the original case — including, above all, its own
pleadings [end slide].
25Reply of Cambodia, Ann. LXVI (c) (FWETh, Ann. 51), reproduced at tab 1.3 of the judges’ folder.
26Reproduced at tab 1.11 of the judges’ folder.
27WOTh, paras. 4.43-4.47; FWETh, paras. 3.68-3.69.
28
Reproduced at tab 1.12 of the judges’ folder.
29
Reproduced at tab 1.13 of the judges’ folder.
30Reproduced at tab 1.14 of the judges’ folder.
31See FWETh, paras. 3.26-3.37.
32FWEC, para. 4.23.
33
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 33; AC, para. 39;
and FWEC, paras. 1.23, 3.11-3.12 and 4.20-4.25. - 9 -
22. Mr. President, when it was confronted with Thailand’s abundant evidence on this
34
point , Cambodia immediately shut itself away in its parallel world, a world divorced from reality.
Thus, Cambodia claims that it was unaware of the Thai Council of Ministers’ line until 2007, when
it saw it marked on a “secret” map — a myth that, curiously, Cambodia is persisting with even at
36 37 38
the oral proceedings stage . However, a mere glance at Annexes 34 and 38 to the Written
Observations of Thailand — and, above all, Annex 4 to the Further Written Explanations of
Cambodia — is sufficient to refute that assertion . In any event, as our written pleadings have
already shown, the map to which Cambodia alludes, Series L7017, is not secret at all and was
communicated to Cambodia long before 2007 . 41
23. Our opponents also claim, without providing any evidence, that Thailand never, prior
to 2007, contested the frontier line on the Annex I map as they have transposed it in their written
42
pleadings before the Court in the present proceedings . On the contrary, as Thailand’s abundant
evidence shows, (i) Cambodia did not, in fact, claim that line until the late 2000s, (ii) Thailand was
unaware of that line until 2007, only discovering it in the context of the examination of Cambodia’s
application to the World Heritage Committee, and (iii) Thailand has always exercised sole
18 sovereignty over the land on the other side of the Council of Ministers’ line, doing so in a
43
continuous, peaceful and recognized manner, both before and after 1962 . Cambodia has never
provided a credible response to this evidence.
3Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011;
CR 2011/14, pp. 12-13 (Plasai); WOTh, paras. 4.33-4.69; FWETh, paras. 3.68-3.80.
35
AC, paras. 14-15; Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011,
I.C.J. Reports 2011; CR 2011/13, p. 27 (Berman); FWEC, 8 March 2012, paras. 1.3 (iii) and 2.23. See also FWETh,
paras. 1.31-1.33.
36
CR 2013/1, p. 44, para. 40 (b) (Berman), and pp. 66 and 74, paras. 52 and 87 (Bundy); CR 2013/2, p. 29,
para. 41 (Sorel).
37
WOTh, annexes, p. 206.
38
WOTh, annexes, p. 240.
39
FWEC, Ann. 4, pp. 15-16.
4See also WOTh, paras. 4.67-4.69.
4See, for example, WOTh, Ann. 94.
4AC, para. 12; FWEC, paras. 2.8, 2.23 and 2.67.
43
WOTh, paras. 1.26-1.27 and 4.43-4.69; FWETh, paras. 3.65-3.79. - 10 -
24. What is more, Cambodia continues to maintain that the present frontier dispute is the
44
result of issues relating to domestic politics in Thailand , while Cambodia’s aggressive foreign
policy and its new territorial ambitions are the real causes.
25. Cambodia’s parallel world even extends to the intellectual and legal domain. Its
pleadings postulate, without foundation, that the 1962 Judgment determined a frontier, despite that
question being expressly excluded from the original case. Thus, according to Cambodia, the region
of the Temple falls outside the scope of the Memorandum of Understanding of 2000 on the basis of
the 1962 Judgment and a theory — which is as obscure as it is untenable — positing a complete
and hermetic distinction between delimitation and demarcation . It contends that the Annex I map
thereby became the single, autonomous source as regards the path of the frontier in that region,
which had already been delimited, maintaining that the Parties simply have to “demarcate” the land
following the configuration of the frontier line on the map, with no regard for the actual
topography or generally accepted cartographic standards.
26. However, the reality, Mr. President, is that the Memorandum of Understanding of 2000
covers the entirety of the common frontier, including the region of the Temple . It does indeed
47
refer to the Franco-Siamese delimitation treaties , but it does not refer to the 1962 Judgment. The
Memorandum of Understanding thus constitutes indubitable proof that, for the two countries, the
question of the frontier in the region of the Temple is to be resolved between the two of them in
accordance with their treaty obligations, independently of the 1962 Judgment, as long as
Cambodia’s sovereignty over the Temple is respected.
27. As for the “Terms of Reference” concluded by the Parties in 2003 with a view to
implementing the Memorandum of Understanding of 2000, they do not refer to the 1962 Judgment
48
19 at any point. Contrary to Cambodia’s claims , none of the provisions in that instrument can be
understood as implicitly incorporating the 1962 Judgment in the process provided for by the
44CR 2013/1, pp. 65-67, paras. 49-54 (Bundy); CR 2013/2, pp. 28-29, para. 40 (Sorel).
45
FWEC, paras. 2.70, 4.49 and 4.78-4.79. See also Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2013, para. 43.
46WOTh, Ann. 91, Memorandum of Understanding, Arts. IV (1) and V.
47Ibid., Art. I (a) and (b).
48FWEC, para. 2.73. - 11 -
Memorandum of Understanding. On the contrary, that instrument provides, as a mandatory step,
for a joint survey of the “continuous watershed in the terrain” , a matter that was expressly
excluded from the Judgment (Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 33).
V. Cambodia has resorted to procedural improprieties in order to deny Thailand
the right to a fair hearing and to mislead the Court
regarding the facts of the matter
28. Mr. President, this case is necessarily dense with facts, given its particular circumstances.
In particular, the origins of the original dispute go back more than 50 years before the Judgment,
and more than 50 years have passed since that Judgment was rendered. The documents that we
have submitted establish facts that are relevant and useful for the Court in its assessment of the
meaning and scope of the Judgment.
29. Events prior to 1962 shed light on the pleadings of the Parties in the original
proceedings, notably as regards their perception of the disputed area in the original case and the
vicinity of the Temple . 50 Events subsequent to the Judgment, which both the Court 51 and
Cambodia itself believe to be relevant, indubitably show the absence of any dispute regarding the
53
meaning or scope of the Judgment .
30. To our great surprise, Cambodia accuses us of submitting to the Court written pleadings
54
that are too long and accompanied by an excessive number of annexes . Cambodia apparently
regards the present proceedings as a mere formality, considering that it has already won the Court
over, to the extent of denying Thailand’s basic right to a fair hearing. That is doubtless the reason
that Cambodia, for its part, provides very little evidence in support of its arguments, limiting itself
49FWEC, Ann. 26, Terms of Reference and Master Plan for the Joint Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary
between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Kingdom of Thailand, Step 4, Point 1.1, p. 15.
50WOTh, paras. 3.38-3.46; FWETh, paras. 1.13, 2.24-2.25, 3.61, 4.69 and 4.96-4.97.
51
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear
(Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Provisional Measures, Order of 18 July 2011, I.C.J. Reports 2011,
para. 37.
52
FWEC, paras. 2.17 and 4.56.
53See WOTh, paras. 4.26-4.72; FWETh, paras. 3.38-3.87.
54FWEC, paras. 1.1 and 5.2. - 12 -
20 at the written proceedings stage to accusing Thailand, in vague terms, of “establish[ing] its own
truth” , while hiding behind its so-called “respect” for the Court.
31. Mr. President, Cambodia would seem to understand the word “respect” in a way that
Thailand does not. It is apparently out of “respect” for the Court that Cambodia has repeatedly
resorted to real procedural improprieties in an attempt to mislead you regarding the facts of the
case.
32. Thus, Cambodia submits, as its only proof of the approximately 4.5 sq km that were
purportedly in dispute in the original case, a thoroughly rudimentary sketch, one of the most recent
incarnations of which appears on the unnumbered page preceding page 77 of the Further Written
Explanations of Cambodia . 57 However, in reality, Mr. President, this constitutes a
misrepresentation of Maps 3 and 4 in Annex 49 to the Counter-Memorial of Thailand, which
Cambodia has superimposed in an improper manner, entirely subverting their original purpose. In
total, Cambodia has submitted more than 10 such cartographic misrepresentations to the Court,
concocting them on the basis of documents produced by Thailand during the original
proceedings . 58
33. In the same vein, Cambodia has made numerous false declarations regarding several of
its other pieces of evidence, including the Annex I map . In particular, that map, which was
annexed to Cambodia’s original Application, is hyped on the website of the Cambodian Embassy
in Paris as having been “adopted by the ICJ as Annex I to its Judgment rendered on
60
15 June 1962” [translation by the Registry].
34. More serious, however, is the fact that the “Annex I map” that Cambodia has submitted
to the Court in the present proceedings is not the same as that submitted in the original case . 61
55FWEC, para. 2.33.
56
FWEC, para. 1.1.
57
Reproduced at tab 1.11 of the judges’ folder.
58Six in AC (Cartographic Anns. 2 (two sheets), 5, 6, 7 and 8); four in FWEC (pages preceding pp. 24 and 77,
and Anns. 34 and 35); and one attached to the letter of 19 July 2012 from the Agent of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the
Court (reproduced at tab 1.4 of the judges’ folder). See also FWETh, paras. 1.26-1.48.
59AC, para. 5.2 and Cartographic Anns. 2 (second sheet) and 7. See also FWEC, paras. 4.60 and 4.83, WOTh,
para. 1.11, and FWETh, paras. 1.35-1.48.
60See extract from the “Preah Vihear Dossier” (http://www.ambcambodgeparis.info/public_html/images/
ambdoc/pdf/Preah%20Vihear2.pdf) reproduced at tab 1.5 of the judges’ folder.
61Reproduced at tab 1.6 of the judges’ folder. - 13 -
21 Admittedly, both of the maps in question — namely, Annex I to the original Application and
Cartographic Annex 1 to the current Application — show the Temple lying on the Cambodian side
of the frontier. However, the paths of their respective frontier lines are not identical, differing very
significantly in some places. This is a real problem (and not, as Cambodia contends , a 62
“smokescreen”), since Cambodia is — wrongly — asking the Court to rule in favour of the frontier
line on the Annex I map. It is therefore legitimate to ask: Which line? And which map,
Mr. President? Cambodia is incapable of providing any explanation whatsoever as regards this
point.
35. Also in the name of “respect”, apparently, Cambodia has submitted, very late in these
63 64
proceedings [slide 7) ], a book published by Thailand in December 2011 that supposedly proves
the existence of a Thai “claim” to the disputed 4.5 sq km , which is a myth of Cambodia’s own
creation. As its name suggests, that book merely provides information. In any event, it only ever
refers to that area as a new disputed area that has nothing to do with the original case. Cambodia
has nevertheless put together a veritable montage of individual passages from the book, citing them
66
out of context and mistranslating them . Thus, according to the French translation that Cambodia
provided for the last paragraph of page 19 of the book [end slide; slide 8 ], the Thai Council of
Ministers “decided to delimit the area occupied by the Temple of Phra Viharn in two ways”. That
is entirely wrong.
[Insert the French translation of the sixth paragraph.]
The correct French translation of that passage is as follows: the Thai Council of Ministers “a
décidé que la seconde méthode sera utilisée pour la détermination de la limite des environs du
Temple de Phra Viharn” [“resolved that the second method shall be used for the determination of
62
CR 2013/1, p. 70, para. 71 (Bundy).
6Reproduced at tab 1.15 of the judges’ folder.
6Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Information that the Thai people should know about the case
concerning the Temple of Phra Viharn and the frontier negotiations between Thailand and Cambodia, Dec. 2011.
65
CR 2013/1, p. 19, para. 14 (Agent of Cambodia).
66
Letter dated 21 November 2012 sent to the Registrar of the Court by the Agent of the Kingdom of Cambodia;
reproduced at tab 1.7 of the judges’ folder.
6P. 19 (in Thai) is reproduced at tab 1.8 of the judges’ folder.
6Reproduced at tab 1.16 of the judges’ folder. - 14 -
the limit of the vicinity of the Temple of Phra Viharn”]. I repeat: “la seconde méthode” [“the
69
second method”], not “de deux manières” [“in two ways”] [end slide; slide 9) ].
22 36. Still on page 19, to give just one more example, Cambodia cites the first and
sixth paragraphs, omitting [show and cross out the four paragraphs omitted by Cambodia] the
four intervening paragraphs and submitting them to the Court as two successive paragraphs. Its
aim, in that regard, is clearly to establish an erroneous direct link between the two, thereby making
it appear that the Thai Council of Ministers’ line is a sign of Thailand’s disagreement with the
Judgment. Again, this is entirely wrong.
[Insert the French translation of the four omitted paragraphs.]
The French translation of the second paragraph of page 19, which was conveniently omitted
by Cambodia, reads as follows: “Cependant, en tant que membre de l’Organisation des Nations
Unies, la Thaïlande a le devoir de se conformer à l’arrêt, puisque l’article 94 de la Charte des
Nations Unies stipule que . . .” [“However, as a member of the United Nations Organization,
Thailand has the duty to comply with the Judgment, as Article 94 of the United Nations Charter
stipulates that . . .”] The two paragraphs that follow, also omitted by Cambodia, reproduce in full
the wording of Article 94 of the Charter in Thai. The fifth paragraph refers to the documents
making up the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of July 1962. When read in context,
therefore, the meaning of the sixth paragraph is clear. The Council of Ministers’ line was a
measure adopted by Thailand in good faith in order to implement the 1962 Judgment in accordance
70
with its international obligations .
37. Mr. President, Cambodia’s declarations of respect for the Court are entirely contradicted
by its attempts to distort the truth in this way [end slide].
38. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, je vais évoquer brièvement
l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires du 18 juillet 2011 à laquelle l’agent du
Cambodge s’est référé ce matin.
69Reproduced at tab 1.17 of the judges’ folder.
70p. 19 (both French and English translations) is reproduced at tab 1.8 of the judges’ folder. - 15 -
23 39. L’ordonnance que vous avez rendue avait pour finalité primordiale d’éviter de nouvelles
pertes en vies humaines telles celles dont la région avait malheureusement été le théâtre . Elle
72
faisait également état de dommages qui auraient été causés aux biens . Depuis son adoption, le
cessez-le-feu que la Thaïlande et le Cambodge avaient déjà adopté dans la région reste en vigueur.
Il n’y a eu ni incidents armés, ni pertes en vies humaines, ni dégâts matériels. Monsieur le
président, l’ordonnance de la Cour est respectée sur le terrain.
40. Mr. President, with your permission, our counsel will go into more detail regarding the
points that I have mentioned and will, in turn, make other points in response to Cambodia’s oral
arguments. I now ask that you give the floor to Professor Donald McRae, who will begin with an
analysis of the scope of the dispute brought before the Court in the present case. Thank you for
your attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Your Excellency. I give the floor to Professor McRae. You
have the floor, Sir.
M. McRAE :
L’ OBJET DE LA CONTESTATION
Je vous remercie. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, c’est pour moi
un grand privilège de plaider devant la Cour et un honneur de m’adresser à vous au nom du
Royaume de Thaïlande.
1. Monsieur le président, la question que je vais examiner ce matin est celle de l’objet de la
contestation que le Cambodge a portée devant la Cour. Il s’agit d’une affaire d’interprétation, le
Cambodge ayant prié la Cour d’interpréter l’arrêt qu’elle a rendu le 15 juin 1962. En pareil cas, il
faut d’abord se demander quelle est exactement la question dont la Cour est saisie.
2. A première vue, rien de bien sorcier, mais, comme il ressort des écritures des Parties et
71 Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 15 juin 1962 en l’affaire du Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge
c. Thaïlande) (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 18 juillet 2011, par. 50.
72Ibid. - 16 -
24 comme je vais vous le démontrer ce matin, cette question reste obscure. Cela résulte à mon avis du
caractère opaque et contradictoire de la demande initiale que le Cambodge a soumise à la Cour,
ainsi que de ses louvoiements dans sa réponse écrite et apparemment aussi au cours de la présente
procédure orale.
3. Il y a, bien entendu, une raison à cela. Comme nous l’avons souligné dans nos écritures,
et comme l’agent l’a déjà relevé, la véritable demande du Cambodge ne porte pas sur
l’interprétation de l’arrêt de 1962. Elle vise à obtenir le remaniement de cet arrêt et, par voie de
conséquence, une décision que la Cour a refusé de rendre en 1962. Demander directement
l’interprétation que le Cambodge souhaite serait une démarche évidemment vouée à l’échec, aussi
celui-ci a-t-il dû mettre en place un rideau de questions pour interprétation afin de dissimuler son
objectif réel. Mais une fois le rideau levé, il est clair qu’aucune raison ne justifie que la Cour se
prononce dans le sens voulu par le Cambodge.
La demande du Cambodge
4. Permettez-moi, Monsieur le président de commencer par le début. Qu’a demandé le
Cambodge dans la requête qu’il a soumise à la Cour ?
5. La réponse se trouve au paragraphe 45 de sa demande en interprétation. Ce passage nous
est à présent familier, mais je vais en donner lecture. Le Cambodge prie la Cour de dire et juger
que : [projection]
«L’obligation pour la Thaïlande de « retirer tous les éléments de forces armées
ou de police ou autres gardes ou gardiens qu’elle a installés dans le temple ou dans ses
environs situés en territoire cambodgien» (point 2 du dispositif) est une conséquence
particulière de l’obligation générale et continue de respecter l’intégrité du territoire du
Cambodge, territoire délimité dans la région du temple et ses environs par la ligne de
la carte de l’annexe 1 sur laquelle l’arrêt de la Cour est basé.»
Si nous examinions cette demande isolément, nous constatons immédiatement, comme nous
73
l’avons souligné dans nos observations écrites , qu’elle ne contient en fait aucune question. Il
s’agit d’une déclaration et non d’une question. Mais, dans la mesure où ce que le Cambodge dit au
paragraphe 45 de sa demande peut être formulé comme une question, il semble qu’il attende deux
choses de la Cour : premièrement, déclarer que l’obligation faite à la Thaïlande en vertu du
73Observations écrites, par. 4.87. - 17 -
deuxième point du dispositif de 1962 de retirer ses forces du temple est une conséquence
particulière de l’obligation générale et continue de respecter l’intégrité territoriale du Cambodge,
25 et, deuxièmement, déclarer que le territoire du Cambodge «dans la région du temple et ses
environs» a été délimité par la ligne tracée sur la carte de l’annexe 1.
6. La première de ces demandes ne pose vraiment aucune question d’interprétation. Il n’y a
aucun différend au sujet de l’obligation de respecter l’intégrité territoriale du Cambodge et, dans
l’arrêt de 1962, l’obligation de retirer les soldats thaïlandais du temple et de ses environs découle
expressément du fait que le territoire où se trouve le temple relève de la souveraineté du
Cambodge. Par conséquent, si c’est là tout ce que recouvre la demande, il s’agit tout simplement
de redire ce qui figure déjà dans le dispositif, et non de l’interpréter ce qui ne servirait à rien et
serait une perte de temps.
7. En revanche, la deuxième partie de la demande porte évidemment sur autre chose ; elle
semble vouloir conduire la Cour à reconnaître que «la région du temple et ses environs» a été
délimitée par la ligne tracée sur la carte de l’annexe I. Ce qui est curieux, c’est que cette demande
n’est pas formulée directement c’est une sorte de corollaire de celle soumise à la Cour ou
d’ajout à celle-ci, visant à obtenir une décision absurde, à savoir que l’obligation faite à la
Thaïlande de se retirer du temple et de ses environs est une conséquence du fait que le temple se
trouve en territoire cambodgien.
8. Mais pourquoi le Cambodge n’a-t-il pas posé cette question directement ? Parce qu’une
question directe appelle une réponse simple et sans détour. En 1962, la Cour n’a pas dit que la
ligne figurant sur la carte de l’annexe I constituait la frontière entre les Parties ; elle a expressément
refusé de le faire. Le Cambodge est donc forcé de camoufler sa question en l’insérant, presqu’en
passant, à la fin d’une question apparemment anodine.
9. Par conséquent, si l’on s’en tenait à ce que le Cambodge a demandé initialement à la Cour
«de dire et juger», la question serait relativement simple. La Cour serait priée d’exprimer une
évidence à savoir que les troupes thaïlandaises doivent se retirer parce que le temple se trouve
en territoire cambodgien. Ce serait une lapalissade et de plus totalement dépassé, étant donné qu’il
n’y a eu aucun différend sur la question depuis longtemps. La Cour serait saisie d’une question,
certes subrepticement, à laquelle il existe une réponse simple. En 1962, elle a rejeté la demande - 18 -
cambodgienne tendant à ce que la ligne tracée sur la carte de l’annexe I soit reconnue comme étant
la frontière entre les Parties, et elle ne peut dire aujourd’hui, sous le couvert d’une interprétation, ce
qu’elle a délibérément refusé de dire en 1962. [Fin de la projection]
26 10. Je ne me suis pas intéressé jusque-là à la phase introductive du paragraphe 45 de la
demande du Cambodge. Son examen fait apparaître autre chose, qui est à la fois différent et
déroutant. Voici comment cette phrase se lit : [projection]
«Etant donné «… que le temple de Préah Vihéar est situé en territoire relevant
de la souveraineté du Cambodge » (point 1 du dispositif), ce qui est la conséquence
juridique du fait que le temple est situé du côté cambodgien de la frontière telle qu’elle
fut reconnue par la Cour dans son arrêt, et sur la base des faits et arguments juridiques
développés ci-dessus, le Cambodge prie respectueusement la Cour de dire et juger
que…»
11. Monsieur le président, les termes «étant donné» figurant au début de ce passage semblent
indiquer que ce qui suit est un postulat sur lequel la Cour doit fonder sa réponse à la demande en
interprétation. C’est là que la demande du Cambodge sombre dans la confusion la plus totale. Car
le postulat même sur lequel s’appuie le Cambodge, à savoir que la «frontière» qui le sépare de la
Thaïlande a été déterminée dans l’arrêt de 1962, est une simple variante de ce que la Cour est priée
de dire et juger dans le corps de la demande déterminer qu’elle a réglé la question de la frontière
sur la base de la ligne figurant sur la carte de l’annexe I. En d’autres termes, le Cambodge a
énoncé, dans la partie introductive de sa demande formelle, un postulat sur lequel la Cour doit se
fonder, et ce postulat est ce que la Cour est ensuite priée de trancher dans le corps de la demande.
[Fin de la projection.]
12. Prier la Cour de supposer ce qu’elle doit trancher est un paradoxe qui entache la demande
du Cambodge et amène à se demander sérieusement si celui-ci a effectivement énoncé dans sa
requête une demande en interprétation fondée. A la lumière de l’article 60 du Statut de la Cour, le
Règlement est clair. Une demande en interprétation doit être précise ; aux termes du paragraphe 2
de l’article 98 du Règlement, elle doit indiquer avec précision «le point ou les points contestés
quant au sens ou à la portée de l’arrêt». Au paragraphe 45 de sa demande, le Cambodge ne
respecte ni l’une ni l’autre de ces conditions. Il n’y a ni clarté ni précision dans ce qu’il demande à
la Cour ; il n’y a que des faux-fuyants et de l’opacité. - 19 -
Le contexte plus large de la demande du Cambodge
13. L’ensemble du texte de la requête permet-il d’éclairer la demande cambodgienne ? Au
paragraphe 5, le Cambodge tente de satisfaire aux dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l’article 98 du
Règlement en identifiant les points de désaccord avec la Thaïlande au sujet du sens et de la portée
de l’arrêt de 1962. Deux de ces prétendus points de désaccord ont trait à l’existence alléguée d’une
27 frontière entre les Parties. Le Cambodge prétend que l’arrêt repose sur «l’existence préalable d’une
frontière internationale déterminée et reconnue entre les deux Etats» et que cette frontière établie et
reconnue aurait été définie à l’aide de la carte de l’annexe I. Or, comme la Thaïlande l’a souligné
dans ses observations écrites , aucun des prétendus points de désaccord ne révèle la moindre
divergence entre les Parties au sujet de ce que la Cour a tranché de manière définitive dans son
arrêt de 1962.
14. Mais en un sens, ces prétendus désaccords jettent une certaine lumière sur la demande du
Cambodge. Ils rendent explicite ce qui est implicite dans le paragraphe 45 de la demande formelle,
à savoir que la présente affaire a trait à la revendication du Cambodge qui est que la ligne tracée sur
la carte de l’annexe I constitue la frontière entre les Parties. Ils confirment directement ce qui se
cache au paragraphe 45. Le postulat contenu dans la partie introductive la Cour aurait, dans son
arrêt de 1962, reconnu la frontière entre les Parties se métamorphose en demande indirecte
tendant à ce que la Cour actuelle détermine que la ligne tracée sur la carte de l’annexe I constitue la
frontière et cette demande indirecte reflète la teneur réelle de la demande du Cambodge. C’est ce
qui, selon le Cambodge, fait l’objet de la contestation. C’est ce que le Cambodge voudrait voir
tranché, mais il la dit de manière détournée, indirecte et toujours implicite car une demande
75
expresse se heurterait au fait que, en 1962, la Cour a refusé de se prononcer .
15. En outre, comme la Thaïlande l’a signalé dans ses écritures , il existe bien un différend
au sujet de la frontière entre les Parties dans la région que les Parties tentent de résoudre. C’est le
but du mémorandum d’accord de 2000. Mais le différent en question n’a pas trait à l’interprétation
de la portée et du sens de l’arrêt de 1962, même si le Cambodge tente de le présenter ainsi.
74
Observations écrites de la Thaïlande, par. 4.1[3] et suiv.
75Temple de Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 36.
76Observations écrites de la Thaïlande, par. 4.110. - 20 -
16. L’autre point litigieux mis en évidence par le Cambodge dans la demande qu’il a
soumise à la Cour, c’est que l’obligation faite à la Thaïlande de retirer les soldats qu’elle a installés
dans le temple ou dans ses environs est une «obligation générale et continue» découlant du fait que
le temple se trouve en territoire cambodgien. Cela n’apporte aucun éclaircissement
supplémentaire. C’est une simple répétition de l’obscure demande contenue au paragraphe 45
qui, pour autant qu’elle ait le moindre sens, tend à ce que la Cour interprète le deuxième point
28 du dispositif comme signifiant que l’obligation faite à la Thaïlande de se retirer du temple et de ses
environs découle du fait que le temple se trouve sur un territoire relevant de la souveraineté du
Cambodge. Il s’agit, comme je l’ai dit plus tôt, de redire ce qui figure déjà au deuxième point du
dispositif, ce qui est totalement inutile.
17. Bien entendu, nul ne saurait affirmer sérieusement que le Cambodge veut simplement
une reformulation de l’arrêt de 1962. La demande en interprétation visant le deuxième point du
dispositif n’est qu’une ruse, un subterfuge, un moyen d’ouvrir l’arrêt à une éventuelle interprétation
qui remettrait en cause ce que la Cour a décidé en 1962.
18. Allons au-delà des apparences et l’objectif du Cambodge se révèle à nous : en priant la
Cour de dire qu’une «obligation continue» incombe à la Thaïlande de retirer ses soldats du temple
et de ses environs, obligation liée au postulat selon lequel la Cour a décidé en 1962 que la ligne
tracée sur la carte de l’annexe I constituerait la frontière entre les Parties, le Cambodge veut donner
l’impression qu’en 1962, le terme «environs» se référait à une zone qu’il affirme aujourd’hui être
d’une superficie de 4,6 km² et qui, toujours d’après ses fausses allégations, était en litige en 1962.
19. Cette tentative visant à générer une divergence sur le sens du terme «environs» a été
reconnue par la Cour dans son ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires du
18 juillet 2011. Or, en considérant qu’une contestation paraissait exister à ce sujet, la Cour ne
faisait qu’une évaluation prima facie, aux fins de cette ordonnance, elle ne rendait pas une décision
fondée sur une analyse complète des revendications et des arguments. Comme nous l’avons
montré dans nos écritures, il n’y a jamais eu de divergence sur le sens du terme «environs» en ce
qui concerne l’application du deuxième point du dispositif parce que la Thaïlande a honoré son
obligation de retirer le personnel militaire installé «dans le temple ou dans ses environs» au cours
du mois qui a suivi la décision de 1962. Ce n’est que lorsque le Cambodge a soumis la présente - 21 -
demande en interprétation que cette contestation sur le sens du terme «environs» a été créée de
toutes pièces. La différence aujourd’hui, c’est que le Cambodge veut affirmer son autorité sur un
secteur plus vaste autour du temple dont il prétend qu’il était prévu dans la décision de 1962. La
Thaïlande l’a reconnu, il existe un différend sur l’emplacement de la frontière, et elle conteste la
nouvelle demande du Cambodge concernant un secteur de 4,6 km² qui, selon lui, se trouverait en
territoire cambodgien, mais ce différend n’a rien à voir avec l’interprétation du deuxième point du
dispositif de 1962.
29 La question revisée
20. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, on pourrait s’attendre, dans
une procédure en vertu de l’article 60, à ce que la question soumise à l’interprétation soit claire
après le dépôt de la demande en interprétation. Or, comme nous l’avons démontré, cela est loin
d’être le cas d’autant plus qu’une modification évidente de la position du Cambodge dans sa
réponse vient encore aggraver les choses. Pour tenter de comprendre ce que celui-ci demande
précisément à la Cour, il y a donc lieu d’examiner sa réponse dans le détail.
21. Au premier abord, la réponse du Cambodge semble réaffirmer la position adoptée dans
77
sa demande en interprétation , le Cambodge indiquant, au paragraphe 1.7, réitérer le contenu de
ladite demande soumise le 28 avril 2011. Au fil du texte, il apparaît toutefois que tel n’est pas
réellement le cas. Le Cambodge prétend avoir découvert, à la lecture des observations écrites de la
Thaïlande, l’existence d’un nouveau différend. Il soutient à présent que les Parties sont en réalité
divisées sur le sens du terme «territoire» figurant au premier point du dispositif, ce qui lui permet
de revenir sur le prétendu «différend» relatif au deuxième point et d’en modifier la substance.
22. La phrase introductive du paragraphe 3.16 de la réponse du Cambodge expose très
clairement sa position :
«Le Cambodge soutient donc que les pièces de procédure en la présente affaire
démontrent sans aucune ambiguïté que le Cambodge et la Thaïlande ont un différend
sur 1) le sens et la portée de la façon dont la Cour a utilisé les expressions «en
territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge» dans le premier paragraphe, et
«ses environs situés en territoire cambodgien» dans le deuxième paragraphe du
dispositif de l’arrêt de 1962.»
77Réponse, par. 1.7. - 22 -
23. Il y a lieu de souligner deux points à cet égard. Premièrement, si, comme il le prétend, le
Cambodge n’a découvert qu’à la lecture des observations écrites de la Thaïlande l’existence d’un
différend sur l’interprétation du terme «territoire», ledit différend peut difficilement fonder une
demande en interprétation. Etant donné qu’il n’a fait aucune mention, dans sa demande initiale,
d’un désaccord concernant l’interprétation du premier point du dispositif, cette nouvelle demande
est irrecevable. L’article 98 du Règlement de la Cour autorise un Etat à présenter une demande en
interprétation lorsqu’il existe une contestation. Il n’autorise pas à commencer par présenter une
demande pour découvrir ensuite l’existence d’un différend, cas de figure qui constituerait un
recours abusif à la procédure prévue par l’article 60. Lundi, sir Franklin a cru pouvoir surmonter
cette difficulté en invoquant l’arrêt Avena, dans lequel la Cour avait examiné les écritures des
78
30 parties pour déterminer s’il existait un différend au sens de l’article 60 . Cette tentative est tout
simplement inopérante. Il va de soi que la Cour examine les conclusions des parties pour
déterminer s’il existe un différend, mais cela n’autorise pas une partie à découvrir l’existence d’un
différend une fois les pièces de procédure déposées.
24. Deuxièmement, au paragraphe 3.16 de sa réponse, le Cambodge soutient explicitement,
pour la première fois, que les Parties sont divisées sur le sens du terme «environs» employé au
deuxième point du dispositif, allégation qui ne figurait pas au paragraphe 5 de sa demande initiale.
Le Cambodge invoque maintenant un différend plus explicite et très distinct sur le sens du terme
«environs», faisant ainsi éclater au grand jour la finalité cachée de sa demande en interprétation,
qui est d’élargir la définition de ce terme de sorte qu’il englobe la prétendue zone de 4,6 km² en
litige.
25. Ont donc été modifiés la demande en interprétation du Cambodge et les fondements sur
lesquels elle s’appuie. Ce qui n’était apparemment pas contesté auparavant l’est soudain devenu.
La portée de l’interprétation sollicitée aujourd’hui semble s’être élargie par rapport à la demande
initiale, comme il ressort clairement de l’examen du paragraphe 5.9 de la réponse, qui énumère un
ensemble de nouveaux points apparemment en litige.
78CR 2013/1, p. 33, par. 18 (Berman). - 23 -
26. Les alinéas ii) à v) du paragraphe 5.9 font apparaître que, selon le Cambodge, le
différend porte aujourd’hui sur les premier et deuxième points du dispositif, en posant comme fil
conducteur le terme «territoire» utilisé dans l’un et l’autre de ces points, et en postulant qu’il existe
un désaccord sur la manière dont ils se lisent ensemble. Il est frappant de constater à quel point
cette partie du paragraphe 5.9 s’éloigne de la définition que la demande en interprétation faisait des
questions en litige.
27. Si la nouvelle demande du Cambodge est tout aussi opaque que sa demande initiale, la
raison du changement intervenu dans sa position est parfaitement claire. Le Cambodge tente de
pallier les carences de sa demande initiale, dans laquelle la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I n’était
pas assez clairement reliée au dispositif de 1962 ; son allégation selon laquelle le deuxième point
du dispositif était, d’une manière ou d’une autre, lié à la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I n’était tout
simplement pas plausible.
28. Face aux lacunes de son analyse, le Cambodge tente aujourd’hui d’invoquer, non plus
uniquement le deuxième, mais également le premier point du dispositif aux termes duquel le
temple est situé «en territoire relevant de la souveraineté du Cambodge». Le mot «territoire» a une
31 portée potentiellement plus large que le mot «environs» ; or, c’est précisément ce que recherche le
Cambodge pour étayer son argumentation selon laquelle l’interprétation du dispositif conduirait la
Cour à se pencher sur les motifs de sa décision, lesquels dissimuleraient en réalité une décision
consacrant la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I en tant que frontière entre les Parties. C’est ainsi qu’il
en vient à soutenir que l’expression «environs situés en territoire cambodgien» au deuxième point
du dispositif aurait la même signification que le terme «territoire» employé au premier.
29. Si ces éléments permettent de comprendre un peu mieux la stratégie du Cambodge, ils ne
précisent toutefois en rien la question sur laquelle celui-ci sollicite concrètement l’interprétation de
la Cour. En effet, après avoir montré, au paragraphe 5.9 de sa réponse, que la question réellement
soumise à l’interprétation n’est pas celle figurant dans sa demande initiale, mais porte plutôt sur le
sens du terme «territoire» employé au premier point du dispositif, le Cambodge réaffirme, dans le
dernier paragraphe de sa réponse, que l’interprétation sollicitée concerne précisément la question
formulée au paragraphe 45 de sa demande initiale. - 24 -
30. Tout cela n’a aucun sens ! Le Cambodge ne peut, d’une part, présenter à la Cour une
demande en interprétation ne portant pas sur le premier point du dispositif de 1962 puis prétendre
l’inverse et solliciter cette interprétation, et d’autre part, réaffirmer, comme il le fait dans sa
dernière demande, que la question de l’interprétation ne concerne pas ce point !
31. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, la Thaïlande attendait du
Cambodge qu’il précise, lors de ses plaidoiries de lundi, la question soumise à la Cour ; elle a bel et
bien obtenu un certain nombre de précisions.
Premièrement, l’agent du Cambodge a admis sans détour que la présente procédure vise à
79
faire reconnaître par la Cour que la ligne de l’annexe I constitue la frontière entre les Parties .
Deuxièmement, sir Franklin a confirmé que le paragraphe 45 de la demande initiale
contenait bien la question à interpréter, et a d’ailleurs affiché ce paragraphe à l’écran. Il est donc
permis de se demander si le Cambodge a renoncé aux nouvelles questions formulées dans sa
réponse.
32 Or, et c’est mon troisième point , tel n’est pas le cas. Dans ses explications sur le sens
du paragraphe 45, sir Franklin a indiqué que le renvoi qui y est fait au deuxième point du dispositif
implique mécaniquement un renvoi au premier. Ces deux points seraient, selon ses propres termes,
«organiquement lié[s]», voire «liés par une symbiose plus profonde» . 80
32. Monsieur le président, je reviendrai sur ce lien organique ou symbiotique un peu plus
tard, dans un exposé consacré à l’analyse de ce que la Cour a décidé en 1962. A ce stade, je tente
simplement de cerner la question sur laquelle le Cambodge demande l’interprétation de la Cour.
S’agit-il de la demande qu’il a formulée au paragraphe 45 une interprétation du deuxième point
du dispositif , ou de celle figurant dans sa réponse une interprétation des premier et deuxième
points et de la relation qui les lie ?
33. Pourtant, si l’on en croit ce que nous a dit lundi sir Franklin, les demandes du Cambodge
n’ont jamais varié. Selon lui, le renvoi au deuxième point du dispositif impliquait
automatiquement un renvoi au premier. Il s’ensuit que le Cambodge n’a pas découvert l’existence
d’un nouveau différend après avoir pris connaissance des observations écrites de la Thaïlande. Il
79
CR 2013/1, p. 20, par. 19 (Hor Namhong).
80CR 2013/1, p. 34, par. 19 (Berman). - 25 -
aurait apparemment toujours considéré que le renvoi, contenu dans le paragraphe 45, au deuxième
point du dispositif, impliquait également un renvoi au premier. Mais si tel était le cas, pourquoi
avoir formulé des questions supplémentaires dans la réponse ? En bref, les plaidoiries du
Cambodge, au lieu d’apporter des éclaircissements, ont rendu sa position encore plus confuse et
contradictoire.
34. Monsieur le président, dans ces circonstances, on comprendra que la Thaïlande demande
quelle est réellement la question dont l’interprétation est sollicitée. Le Cambodge ne peut
évidemment pas répondre, au risque de faire apparaître au grand jour l’absurdité de la question.
Voilà ce à quoi, libellée sur le modèle des écritures du Cambodge, elle pourrait ressembler :
«Etant donné que la Cour a, en 1962, rejeté la demande du Cambodge tendant à
ce que la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I soit reconnue en tant que frontière entre les
Parties, la Cour est priée de dire et juger qu’il y a lieu d’interpréter l’arrêt de 1962
comme établissant que la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I constitue la frontière entre les
Parties.»
33 Le Cambodge n’entend pas, cela va de soi, formuler une telle demande directement et doit donc la
dissimuler derrière un ensemble de questions et de points obscurs qu’il qualifie, assez étrangement,
81
de «logique imparable» dans sa réponse lesquels, espère-t-il, conduiront à la conclusion
recherchée.
35. Monsieur le président, j’ai indiqué au début de mon intervention l’importance, aux fins
des procédures en vertu de l’article 60, de connaître précisément la nature des questions
d’interprétation soumises à la Cour. Or, comme je l’ai montré, tel n’est pas le cas en l’espèce
puisqu’il est impossible d’obtenir des précisions ou des éclaircissements en raison, d’une part, de
l’incertitude qui entoure les points sur lesquels le Cambodge sollicite l’interprétation de la Cour et,
d’autre part, du fait que les questions qu’il semble poser, loin d’être celles qu’il souhaite réellement
voir tranchées, ne sont qu’un moyen de parvenir à ses fins. Il n’existe aucun différend sur le sens
ou la portée du terme «territoire» au premier point du dispositif de 1962 que l’on retienne ou pas
le postulat du Cambodge selon lequel la Cour a, en 1962, consacré la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I
en tant que frontière , car la souveraineté sur le temple n’est pas contestée. Il n’existe pas non
plus de différend sur le sens du terme «environs» au deuxième point du dispositif de 1962
81Réponse, par. 3.12. - 26 -
indépendamment, là encore, du postulat du Cambodge quant au statut de frontière que l’arrêt
de 1962 aurait conféré à la ligne tracée sur la carte de l’annexe I , étant donné que les troupes
thaïlandaises ont évacué cette zone en 1962 et que, en dépit des remous suscités par les barbelés, le
retrait effectif des troupes thaïlandaises n’a jamais été sérieusement contesté jusqu’à ce que le
Cambodge introduise la présente instance.
36. Ainsi, le Cambodge ne saurait se servir d’aucun des deux points du dispositif pour
rechercher dans les motifs de l’arrêt de 1962 le fondement de sa position, à savoir que, dans
l’exposé de ces motifs, la Cour, indirectement ou par inadvertance, a décidé avec force obligatoire
ce qu’elle a expressément refusé de faire dans le dispositif.
37. Monsieur le président, en 1959, le Cambodge a prié la Cour de trancher une question
spécifique : celle de la souveraineté sur le temple de Phra Viharn. Au cours de la procédure, il a
ensuite présenté une nouvelle demande tendant à obtenir la reconnaissance de la ligne figurant sur
la carte de l’annexe I comme frontière entre les Parties. Aujourd’hui, l’histoire se répète. En 2011,
le Cambodge a soumis à la Cour une demande en interprétation aussi alambiquée que confuse, qui
semblait porter sur le deuxième point du dispositif de 1962. Dans la suite de la présente procédure,
34 il a introduit une nouvelle demande visiblement différente concernant l’interprétation du premier
point du dispositif.
38. De même qu’elle a, à juste titre, rejeté la nouvelle demande du Cambodge en 1962, la
Cour devrait aujourd’hui rejeter la nouvelle question dont celui-ci demande l’interprétation. Ne
resterait alors que le contenu de la demande initiale qui ne constitue pas une question
d’interprétation et ne saurait en aucun cas obtenir la réponse attendue par le Cambodge. Comme le
soulignera toutefois M. Pellet dans la suite des plaidoiries de la Thaïlande, en tout état de cause, la
Cour n’a pas compétence pour répondre à cette demande car cela reviendrait à permettre le recours
à l’article 60 pour infirmer, sous couvert d’interprétation, ce qu’elle a décidé en 1962.
Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, de votre
aimable attention. Monsieur le président, je vous demande de bien vouloir appeler maintenant à la
barre M me Miron. - 27 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor McRae. And I now give the floor to
Ms Alina Miron. You have the floor, Madam.
Ms MIRON: Thank you, Mr. President.
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour to appear before this Court for
the first time. I am extremely grateful to the authorities of the Kingdom of Thailand for entrusting
me with this opportunity.
2. At the end of this morning session, it falls to me to supply the “cartographic evidence”
establishing that the dispute between the Parties in the original case was much more narrowly
defined than Cambodia contends today. First, with respect to its geographical scope, because it
related solely to the small portion of territory in which the Temple is situated, and not to an area of
4.6 sq km as now claimed by Cambodia (I); second, with respect to its subject, because it focused
on territorial sovereignty, and not on the delimitation of the frontier (II).
3. This twofold demonstration is sufficient to invalidate Cambodia’s argument in the present
case, according to which the Court is said to have recognized, with the force of res judicata, the
line appearing on the Annex I map as being the frontier line between the Parties. It is thus solely
for the sake of completeness that I will devote the end of my presentation to refuting the confusing
arguments put forward by Cambodia, which contends that the line on the Annex I map may be an
autonomous instrument for the delimitation of the frontier, as well as of the vicinity of the
Temple (III).
35 I. THE MAPS ,ILLUSTRATION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL
SCOPE OF THE 1962 DISPUTE
A. The disputed area according to Cambodia
4. Mr. President, Members of the Court, even after Monday’s pleadings, it is still not clear to
us exactly what areas are considered by Cambodia to be in dispute. It provides a few scant details,
but the reality is that no clear definition emerges. It identifies it as a perimeter of 4.6 sq km, but
fails thereafter to provide a single map of that perimeter, even though it claims that the perimeter in
question results from the intersection of two lines on a map.
I shall address these three points in turn. - 28 -
(a) The perimeter of “4.6 sq km”
5. Mr. President, Cambodia proceeds on the basis that a perimeter of some four and a half
sq km, which it has needed since 2007 in order to have the Temple included on the Unesco World
Heritage List, was the area in dispute in 1962. But the dispute settled by the Court in 1962 bore no
relation to this perimeter.
6. Furthermore, Cambodia has difficulty in proving the existence of such a disputed area in
1962. During the written proceedings, it produced a sketch-map, which, as
82
H.E. Ambassador Plasai pointed out, did not form part of the pleadings in 1962 . I shall come
back to that in a moment. The only document to which Cambodia referred on Monday was the
White Book of 2011 . It is quite extraordinary that the only evidence of the existence, in the
original case, of a disputed area of 4.6 sq km is a White Book submitted by Cambodia after the
closure of the written proceedings in the present case !84
(b) Cambodia’s hidden sketch-maps
[Slide 1: Map Sheet 3 of Annex 49 to Thailand’s Counter-Memorial (1961)]
36 7. During the recent written proceedings, Cambodia demonstrated tremendous cartographic
skill in order to convince you that the area it claims today was the area in dispute in 1962. That
skill was based on the misrepresentation of the expert maps submitted by Thailand and of
Annex 49 of Thailand’s Counter-Memorial. There is one sketch-map in particular with which
Cambodia appeared to have a veritable cartographic obsession . I am talking about the third sheet
of Annex 49 to the Counter-Memorial — Map Sheet 3 — currently on the screen. It shows an
enlargement of a 4 cm by 6 cm portion of the Annex I map and deliberately reproduces the
topographical errors contained therein. This was, moreover, noted by the experts from Delft in
82
See also FWETh, paras. 1.45-1.47, paras. 2.47-2.49.
8See CR 2013/1, p. 17, para. 7; p. 19, para. 14 (Hor Namhong); ibid., p.73, para. 82 (Berman); CR 2013/2,
p. 36, para. 53 (Sorel).
8Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, “Information that the Thai people should be aware of regarding the
case concerning the Temple of Phra Viharn and the Thai-Cambodian negotiations on the frontier”, December 2011,
submitted by Cambodia on 26 November 2012, letter No. 141155.
85
See also FWETh, pp. 22-27, paras. 1.35-1.43. - 29 -
their report . However, despite its lack of accuracy and modest origins, the Applicant produces no
87
fewer than nine imitations of it .
[Slide 2: Cartographic Annex No. 5 to the Request for Interpretation (2011)]
8. In fact, until this Monday, Map Sheet 3 had been favoured by Cambodia in preference to
the Annex I map. Cambodia had made it its map of reference in the present proceedings, although
never in its original form. [Animation] Thus in Cartographic Annex No. 5 to the 2011 Application
instituting proceedings, the legend added by Cambodia stated that the line of crosses was the
“Frontier line . . . adopted by the Court in 1962” . Supposing that this Court could adopt a map,
the question arises as to how. The fact is that, in 1962, the Court never mentioned this Map Sheet 3
in its Judgment, nor did it publish it with the volumes of written pleadings! It is difficult to see,
therefore, how it could have “adopted it” in its Judgment!
9. [Animation] To this same sketch-map, Cambodia added a “Thai frontier line, 1962”
[animation] and a “Thai frontier line, 2007”, with no explanation as to how it set about defining
these lines. What is more, the exercise is a most original one: cartographers are usually asked to
transpose the erroneous lines from old materials onto the correct (modern) maps. They are not
37 asked to put the correct modern lines onto old maps. However, Cambodia employs this baffling
technique in all of its cartographic evidence.
[Slide 3: The replacement of the sketch-map of the 2011 Order with Map Sheet 3]
10. Cambodia’s evident desire to have or to see the Court “adopt” this document has even
driven it to replace the sketch-map in the Court’s Order on the Request for the indication of
provisional measures with this Map Sheet 3, onto which it has transposed the quadrilateral of the
provisional demilitarized zone and added a number of place names which did not appear on either
the Court’s 2011 sketch-map or the original Map Sheet 3 . Members of the Court, it had not
escaped our attention that Cambodia was not fond of cartographic accuracy, but we had no idea
86
I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. I, p. 435.
87See also FWETh, p. 27, footnote 70.
88Cartographic Annex No. 5 to the 2011 Application instituting proceedings.
89
Letter from the Agent of the Kingdom of Cambodia to H.E. Mr. Philippe Couvreur, 19 July 2012 (tab 1.4 of the
judges’ folder). - 30 -
that it loathed it to the extent of replacing the Court’s sketch-map with the one with which it is so
infatuated!
11. A passing infatuation, however, judging from the — embarrassed — silence of
Cambodia during Monday’s pleadings. Map Sheet 3 seems to have disappeared, which is just as
well: it was hardly reliable.
[Slide 4: Sketch-map in Cambodia’s Response (2012)]
12. The second sketch-map kept out of sight by Cambodia during Monday’s pleadings is that
which it submitted, in its Response (Further Written Explanations of Cambodia), as unique proof of
the existence in 1962 of a 4.6 sq km perimeter. This is the rough sketch-map currently projected on
the screen, which, it asserted, was “the comparison made” 90 by Thailand’s experts. We
demonstrated in our Further Written Explanations that this sketch-map cannot constitute
91
evidence , for the simple reason that it was never presented during the original proceedings and
suddenly made its first appearance in 2012, in Cambodia’s Response. The question therefore arises
as to whether Cambodia’s abandonment of this sketch-map during the oral pleadings means that it
is no longer relying on it in order to demonstrate the existence of a 4.6 sq km perimeter in 1962.
38 (c) A perimeter purportedly determined by two lines, one of which is in fact indeterminable
13. The fact remains that Cambodia has still not presented the slightest shred of proof that
the perimeter in question existed in 1962. This area is not mentioned anywhere in the Judgment;
furthermore, throughout the lengthy initial proceedings, it was never identified by the Parties. We
have been through the 1,500 or so pages of the written and oral pleadings with a fine-tooth comb.
There is no trace of it — none!
[Slide 4bis: Sketch-map in Cambodia’s Response (2012)]
14. There was but one assertion, advanced by Mr. Bundy on Monday morning, that the
“famous” 4.6 sq km area resulted from the intersection of the line on the Annex I map with the
92
watershed line .
90
FWEC, p. 77, para. 4.65.
91FWETh, pp. 29-30, para. 1.47 and International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University, “A review of
maps presented in the period 1959-1962 and other prepared in 2012”, paras. 6.2 and 6.7 (Ann. 46 to the FWETh).
92
CR 2013/1, p. 73, para. 82, footnotes omitted (Bundy). - 31 -
93
15. Mr. Bundy’s claim is in fact a repeat of the argument put forward in the Response ,
which was represented cartographically by the sketch-map on the screen. The sketch-map has
perhaps vanished, undoubtedly because of its lack of credibility, but the logic behind its concoction
remains. According to Cambodia, the area in dispute is determined by the intersection of two lines:
the line on the Annex I map, in green, and the watershed line, in red. However, this explanation is
no more convincing than the sketch-map, for the following two reasons.
[Slide 5: Transposition of the line on the Annex I map]
First, we need to know how to locate the line on the Annex I map, which dates — I would
remind you — from 1908, on the ground. This entails devising a way of transposing it onto a
modern map. The difficulties involved are insurmountable. I shall return to this at the end of
94
my presentation. The map currently on the screen, produced by IBRU , shows some of the
possible transpositions. At this stage, I need only note that it is impossible to determine the
zone in dispute without knowing where the line on the map is located. Furthermore, the Court
will have observed that Cambodia does not offer any indications in this respect.
Second, Cambodia proceeds on the basis that the zone in dispute is delimited by the line on the
map to the north and by the watershed line to the south. But what happens to the east and to
39 the west? Where does Cambodia place the boundary of this “intersection”? Everything
depends on the transposition method used. As is clear from the map on the screen, very often
the lines — the green and yellow, for example — never meet the watershed line (in red).
When they do — as the blue line does — the first point of intersection is some 6.8 km from the
Temple, thus a considerable distance away.
16. Cambodia acts as if transposing the line on the map were easy. Besides the fact that this
95
view is in complete contradiction to that held by the experts from IBRU , Cambodia’s own
hesitations in the original proceedings regarding the location of a very limited portion of the line, to
9FWEC, p. 77, para. 4.65.
9See International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University, “Assessment of the task of translating the
Cambodia-Thailand boundary depicted on the ‘Annex I’ map onto the ground”, October 2011, (IBRU Assessment)
[WOTh, Ann. 96, p. 668].
95
Ibid. - 32 -
the north of the Temple, would suffice to establish that this is not the case. In the original
proceedings,
an Annex to the Application placed it some 500 m to the north of the Temple ; 96
whereas in the Reply, and on several occasions during the pleadings, Cambodia moved it closer
97
to the foot of the northern stairway, thus just a few metres from the Temple . An unstable
line, indeed!
17. As can be seen, therefore, the location of the line to the north of the Temple has given
rise to two different stances by Cambodia — and that’s without any estimate having been made to
the east and to the west! How can Cambodia therefore claim that the line on the map precisely
delimits both the area in dispute and the frontier? It remains a mystery.
[Slide 6: “Not the crucial area”]
40 18. The theory of the intersection of the two lines in fact enables Cambodia to lay claim
today to areas which it had excluded from the area in dispute in the original case. In effect, at that
time Cambodia showed sustained contempt for the interest demonstrated by Thailand’s expert on
the subject of the topography [animation] around the Phnom Trap hill [animation] and the O Tasem
stream, which appeared on the Annex I map, but which, in reality, proved not to exist.
Mr. Acheson, Counsel for Cambodia, waved those investigations aside, pointing out that
98
[animation] “this area, north-west of the Temple, is not the crucial area.” What Mr. Acheson
meant by this was that he did not consider relevant the examination of areas so far away from the
99
area in dispute . However, in the present proceedings, these areas to the north-west of the Temple
have become “the crucial area”. Mr. President, it is not possible to blow hot one minute and cold
fifty years later!
[End of slide 6]
96Note from the Embassy of France in Bangkok dated 9 May 1949, No. 114/49, I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of
Preah Vihear, Vol. I, Ann. XVI, p. 106; see also ibid., Vol. II, p. 189 (Pinto, 2 March 1962); and Temple of Preah
Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 31. See also WOTh, pp. 220-221, para. 5.24.
97I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. I, p. 465. See also FWETh,
pp. 191-193, paras. 4.67-4.69.
98
I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. II, p. 465 (Acheson, 22 March 1962).
99See also WOTh, pp. 43-45, paras. 2.44-2.46; ibid., pp. 243-244, paras. 5.62-5.6FWETh, pp. 147-148,
paras. 4.48-4.49. - 33 -
B. The “region of the Temple” within the meaning of the Judgment
19. Cambodia claims therefore — without any substantiating evidence, as has just been
noted — that the Judgment focused on a perimeter of 4.6 sq km. This, it is alleged, is what the
Judgment calls the “region of the Temple” . 100 Our argument is that, within the meaning of
Judgment, the region of the Temple is synonymous with “the Temple area”, and that both in fact
refer to the “portion of . . . territory . . . where there are the ruins” 101 of the Temple.
Professor McRae will show later that our assertion is supported by a number of pieces of written
evidence. It falls to me to prepare the way for his demonstration with an inventory of the
cartographic evidence that also supports this assertion.
[Slide 7: “Annex 85 (d) (partial reproduction)” (1962)]
20. Members of the Court, the map currently on the screen 102 is the true cartographic
representation of the geographical scope of the original dispute. I shall refer to it as Annex 85 (d),
since that was its number in the list of annexes in the original proceedings.
I shall make three observations about this map.
21. My first point concerns the origins of Annex 85 (d). The map on screen is an excerpt
from a large map which was hung on the wall of the Great Hall of Justice during the 1962 hearings,
in order to assist counsel in their demonstrations and to help the judges visualize the regions and
the details under discussion .103
41 [Slide 8: The Big Map (1962)]
22. The Big Map represented an enlargement of two sheets prepared by the experts from
Delft, in order to convey correctly the topography of the region around Phra Viharn and with a
view to accurately identifying the watershed line in the Temple area. [Animation] The Big Map
consisted of three segments. [Animation] The Thai team was able to consult two of those
segments in the archives of the Court; the third, however, which covers, among other things, the
Temple area, cannot be found.
100
See, in particular, CR 2013/1, p. 17, para. 7; p. 19, para. 12; p. 20, para. 19 (Hor Namhong); p. 22, para. 2;
p. 23, para. 5 (Sorel).
10I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. I, p. 4, para. 1. See also WOTh,
pp. 21-22, para. 2.6;pp. 23-24, para. 2.12;pp. 41-42, paras. 2.41-2.42;p. 91, paras. 2.24-3.25FWETh, p. 57,
para. 2.32.
10See also FWETh, Cartographic Ann. No. 52 and the judges’ folder.
103
See FWETh, p. 46, para. 2.20 and IBRU Review, paras. 5.1-5.3 [FWETh, Ann. 46]. - 34 -
[Slide 9: the Temple area on the Big Map]
23. Annex 85 (d) is in fact a part of the missing eastern segment. [Animation] The Court
requested that it be reproduced with the pleadings. For the purposes of reproduction, the excerpt
currently on the screen had to be cut from the eastern segment of the Big Map. This is, we think,
the reason why the rest of that third sheet has disappeared from the archives of the Court.
24. Mr. President, my second observation on the subject of Annex 85 (d) concerns its object.
There are several reasons to believe that it illustrates “the Temple area” as understood by the Court
in 1962.
[Slide 10: The Temple area in the Judgment]
25. First, the cartographic representation is corroborated by a textual description in the
Judgment. One passage describes the Temple area as follows:
“[animation] a frontier line which ran along the edge of the escarpment, or which at
any rate ran to the south and east of the Temple area, would leave this area in
Thailand; [animation] whereas a line running to the north, or to the north and west,
would place it in Cambodia” (Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 15; emphasis added).
This is the genuine intersection of the lines which defines the area in dispute! Thus, for the Court,
the Temple area was a small portion of the promontory on which Phra Viharn is situated.
Moreover, this is confirmed in the Judgment six pages later, when a distinction is made between
the Temple area, on the one hand, and the promontory, on the other, the first being included within
the second: “the whole Preah Vihear promontory, with the Temple area” (ibid., p. 21), wrote the
Court.
[Slide 11: Annex 85 (d) (partial reproduction) and the Council of Ministers map]
42 26. It is also the area from which Thailand had to withdraw any troops it had stationed there.
The two areas are broadly comparable, as Ambassador Plasai pointed out this morning and as
Professor Pellet will demonstrate later. This contradicts Mr. Bundy’s assertion that: “it is clear
from the 1962 Judgment that the geographical focus of the Court was much broader than the very
limited area circumscribed by Thailand on its famous Council of Ministers map”.
[Slide 12: Return to slide 10: Annex 85 (d)]
27. Second, the Court considered it necessary to have this excerpt from Annex 85 (d)
published with the volumes of the pleadings. That decision is particularly meaningful if account is - 35 -
taken of the footnote inserted by the Registry, which states: “Of the maps annexed to the
pleadings . . . only those which the Court deemed necessary for an understanding of the
104
Judgment . . . have been reproduced” .
28. Annex 85 (d) is one of five maps and sketch-maps reproduced for this purpose . So 105
was the Annex I map — in fact, in a different version to that submitted by Cambodia with its
Application in 1959 . If we have to weigh up in what way these two published maps were
“necessary for an understanding of the Judgment”, it is clear that the Annex I map was a ground for
deciding the sovereignty over the Temple, whereas the Annex 85 (d) map is an evident illustration
of the Court’s assessment of the geographical scope of the area in dispute.
[Slide 13: Selection of the Temple area]
29. Last but not least, the Court decided which portion of the Big Map should be published.
Unlike the other maps in the proceedings — all produced by the Parties — Annex 85 (d) was
produced by the Court itself. Of the entire Big Map, the Court thus selected around 4 per cent.
Only a desire to illustrate the Temple area on a large scale can explain the fact that the Court
ordered a unique piece of cartography to be cut up.
[End of slide 13]
43 II. DENTIFYING THE SUBJECT OF THE DISPUTE THROUGH
THE CARTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE
30. Members of the Court, the value attributed by Cambodia to the Annex I map is such that
it is necessary to put it back in the context of the case. Besides numerous pieces of documentary
evidence, both Parties relied on a sizeable arsenal of maps in order to substantiate their claim of
sovereignty over the Temple. To be exact, 59 maps and sketch-maps were submitted to the case
10I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. I, p. IX and ibid., Vol. II, p. VII
(emphasis added).
10I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Application, Ann. 1; Counter-Memorial,
Ann. 12 (b), Ann. 49 — Map Sheet 4; Rejoinder, Ann. 74; pleadings, Ann. 85 (d).
106
See CR 2013/1, p. 70, para. 68 (Bundy). - 36 -
file in the original proceedings . The number alone casts doubt on Cambodia’s categorical
108
assertion that the Annex I map was the “central” and “unique” ground of the Judgment.
31. What is more, that assertion is contradicted by a passage at the start of the Judgment, in
which the Court details the evidence on which it means to base its decision: “Maps haven been
submitted to it” (Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1962, p. 14), the Court recalled. I would draw your attention to the use of the plural — maps —
which at once undermines the tales of the uniqueness of the Annex I map.
A. The temple-centric approach to the Annex I map
during the original proceedings
[Slide 14: Annex I to Cambodia’s Application (1959)]
32. Members of the Court, Cambodia founded its title to sovereignty over the Temple on the
1904 Delimitation Treaty. However, as stated by the Court itself, the treaty “make[s] no mention
of Preah Vihear as such” (Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 16). Consequently, in order to corroborate its position, Cambodia was
forced to turn, among other arguments, to an instrument outside of the treaty. That was the
Annex I map, appended to the Application, and which is currently on the screen.
[Animation]
33. Unlike the 1904 Treaty, which was silent on the subject of the Temple, this map
identified it by name and placed it clearly to the south of the frontier. Its potential probative value
44 was therefore not insignificant, which explains why Thailand went to great lengths to contest its
109
authority .
34. Nevertheless, the point to be proved was in itself limited. According to Cambodia, “[t]he
map clearly shows the position of the Temple of Preah Vihear and clearly places the Temple on the
10I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. I, Application of Cambodia, Anns. I,
II; IVbis, VIbis, VII, XI, XIII, XIIIbis; Preliminary Objections of Thailand, Ann. 2; Observations of Cambodia,
Ann. XXXII; Counter-Memorial of Thailand, Anns. 7 (b), 7 (c), 12 (b), 15, 16, 46 (b), 48, 49-I, 49-II, 49-III, 49-IV;
Reply of Cambodia, Anns. XXXIII, XLIX, L, LI, LXVI (c), LXVI (d), LXVIII (a); Rejoinder of Thailand, Anns. 53, 54,
57, 60, 62, 64, 65 (b), 65 (c), 65 (d), 66 (b), 66 (c), 73, 74-1, 74-2, 75 (b), 75 (c), 76, 76bibid., Vol. II,
Anns. LXXII (c), LXXX, LXXXI, LXXXII, LXXXIII, 77 (e), 81 (a), 81 (b), 84, 85 (a), 85 (b), 85 (c), 85 (d).
10FWEC, p. 56, para. 4.10.
109
I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. I, pp. 174-180 and pp. 549-571. - 37 -
110
Cambodian side of the frontier” . If the Annex I map was significant, it was because it indicated
the exact location of the Temple. Whether or not the Court took account of the map or any other
argument, it was called upon to respond to a single question: does the Temple lie to the north or
the south of the frontier?
35. The Court’s response to that question was clear and unambiguous: “the map marked
Preah Vihear itself quite clearly as lying on the Cambodian side of the line” (Temple of Preah
Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 26).
[End of slide 14]
B. The other cartographic evidence contradicts the argument
that the Annex I map was unique
36. Mr. President, despite its clarity on the subject of the Temple, the Annex I map was not,
in the eyes of the Court, sufficient proof in itself of Cambodia’s title. The Judgment recalls other
events and refers to other maps before concluding that Cambodia’s claim is founded. I shall
quickly run through the other cartographic evidence mentioned in the Judgment.
[Slide 15: Annex XLIX to the Reply of Cambodia (1961)]
37. Amongst the other maps was one that Thailand had itself published in 1937. On two
occasions, on pages 27 and 28 of the Judgment, the Court draws attention to the fact that this map,
currently on the screen, indisputably shows a lack of animus domini on the part of the Respondent,
since it showed “Preah Vihear as lying in Cambodia” . 111
38. Members of the Court, on this map too, the Temple is quite clearly located to the south of
the frontier line. It therefore has probative value when determining who has sovereignty over the
45 Temple. However, would the Court attempt to extend its value to the delimitation of the frontier?
Of course not: the topography is virtually inexistent and, of all the place names given, only that of
the Temple has been translated by Cambodia. This final detail also leaves no room for doubt as to
the true purpose of Cambodia’s claims!
[Slide 16: Annex VIbis to Cambodia’s Application (1959)]
11Ibid., p. 443 (p. 6 of the English translation of Cambodia’s Reply, Distr. 61/122, 8 December 1961).
11Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 28. See also ibid.,
p. 27. - 38 -
39. Another map which helped to shape the Court’s finding was that filed by Thailand with
the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission in 1947. Once again, this map was of interest to the
Court because it “show[ed] Preah Vihear as lying in Cambodia” . 112
40. So, as for the Annex I map, the temple-centric approach thus prevailed in the
examination of all the cartographic evidence. The maps referred to in the Judgment had one point
in common: they all situated the Temple to the south of the frontier lines appearing on them. On
the other hand, they did not depict the same frontier lines. And if these differences did not trouble
either Cambodia’s Counsel or the Court, it is for the obvious reason that they did not undermine
their probative value with respect to sovereignty over the Temple.
[End of slide 16]
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LINE ON THE MAP AND
THE TOPOGRAPHY ON THE GROUND
41. Mr. President, Cambodia’s argument in the present case boils down to one proposition:
the Annex I map must be recognized as an autonomous instrument of delimitation, irrespective of
the 1904 Treaty 113 and of the criterion of the watershed line adopted by that treaty. This extreme
argument, however, fails to take account of the Court’s jurisprudence, which warns that maps,
especially old maps, which lack technical reliability, cannot constitute autonomous instruments of
114
delimitation . The Annex I map is not immune to such defects.
46
(a) The versions of the Annex I map
42. Before I apply myself to convincing you of this fact, I shall return for a moment to the
multiplicity of the Annex I map. We always use the singular — “the Annex I map” — but the
112
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 28.
11FWEC, pp. 8-9, para. 1.18 (twice).
114
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 582-583, para. 55. See
also Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 119-120, para. 44; see also Territorial and
Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2007 (II), pp. 722-723, paras. 213-2Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia),
Judgment of 19 November 2012, p. 100. See also arbitral award of 4 April 1928, Island of Palmas (United
States/Netherlands);arbitral award of 23 January 1933, Honduras borders (Guatemala, Honduras), RIAA, Vol. II,
p. 1325; award of 14 July 1945, Ruling concerning the disagreement between Ecuador and Peru over the
Zamora-Santiago Sector, RIAA, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 413-432. See also Jaworzina, Advisory Opinion, 1923, P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 8, p. 33. - 39 -
plural is more fitting — the Annex I maps — since there are in fact several versions in existence . 115
Cambodia has itself admitted this, in its Response , and again more clearly on Monday . To 117
date, the Thai team has counted six, three of which are in the archives of the Court dating from the
118
time of the original proceedings . In addition, there is the map submitted by Cambodia in
2011 .119
[Slide 17: “The Annex I map”] 120
43. On Monday, Mr. Bundy emphasized the fact that the known existence of multiple
versions was of no importance, since the only one that counted was “the map that Cambodia
121
attached as Annex I to its Application” . I would first point out that Cambodia has failed to
provide any proof that the map showing on the screen is the genuine version annexed to the
1959 Application. Next, even if it were, there is no basis for concluding, as Mr. Bundy does
perhaps a little too hastily, that this version was “[t]he only map the Court focused on in the
122
original case” . The existence of two other versions in the archives of the original case belies that
assertion.
[Slide 18: the “Court’s” version of the Annex I map] 123
124
44. Furthermore, as noted by Cambodia itself , the Court published a version of the map
125
which is not that filed by Cambodia in 1959 . Why would the version of the map published by
the Court be less important than the document submitted by Cambodia? I do not want to suggest
47 that there is a hierarchy between these various versions, but Cambodia’s silence on this subject
raises the question.
115WOTh, pp. 268-272, paras. 6.18-6.24; FWETh, p. 164, para. 4.28; pp. 193-195, paras. 4.70-4.73.
116FWEC, p. 16, para. 2.13.
117CR 2013/1, pp. 69-70, paras. 64-68 (Bundy).
118Ann. I, judges’ folder (Cambodia) version, 15 April 2013, tab 16 (in the archives, it bears the number 726147
on the back); Ann. I, similar to the first, but in better condition and without the number 726147 on the back; Ann. I
published by the Court (judges’ folder (Cambodia), 15 April 2013, tab 16).
119Judges’ folder (Cambodia), 15 April 2013, tab 17.
120Judges’ folder (Cambodia), 15 April 2013, tab 16.
121CR 2013/1, p. 69, para. 66 (Bundy). See also FWEC, p. 16, paras. 2.12-2.13.
122
CR 2013/1, p. 69, para. 66 (Bundy).
123
Judges’ folder (Cambodia), 15 April 2013, tab 15.
124
CR 2013/1, p. 69, para. 66 (Bundy).
125
CR 2013/1, p. 69, and judges’ folder (Cambodia), 15 April 2013, tab 16. - 40 -
[End of slide 18]
45. To conclude, Cambodia’s preferred version is, therefore, a map:
which Cambodia no longer has;
126
which Thailand has never received ;
which the Court has not published; and
in respect of which there are doubts as to whether it is the genuine Annex I map to the 1959
Application.
46. And this is but the tip of the iceberg. Because, even if we disregard the existence of
these multiple versions, Cambodia’s principle argument raises an even more decisive difficulty.
That of knowing how the line on the Annex I map should be transposed onto a modern map. As
127
part of the present proceedings, Thailand has submitted an expert report drawn up by IBRU ,
which details the difficulties of transposing the line onto a modern map . This is the report that
Mr. Bundy referred to briefly on Monday.
47. As that report shows, transposing the line on the map raises a number of difficulties.
There are two possible methods for transposing the line on the Annex I map: one natural and one
artificial. The first, the natural method, consists of identifying the intention of the drafters of the
map and remaining faithful to that intention . In the case of the Annex I map, the intention was to
identify the watershed line.
48. On this subject, I must admit that I find it difficult to understand how Thailand’s
position, according to which the frontier follows the watershed line, is supposed to be contrary to
130
the Judgment of the Court and to the treaty settlement of 1904-1908 . On the contrary, the Court
48 noted in its Judgment that “the Parties provided for a watershed line” , that line which satisfied
132
their desire for “certainty and finality by means of natural and visible lines” .
12WOTh, pp. 271-272, para. 6.24.
12International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University, “Assessment of the task of translating the
Cambodia-Thailand boundary depicted on the ‘Annex I’ map onto the ground”, October 2011, (IBRU Assessment)
[WOTh, Ann. 96].
12See also WOTh, pp. 257-279.
129
IBRU Assessment, see note 127 above, para. 41.
130
CR 2013/1, p. 68, para. 60, and pp. 71-72, paras. 75-80 (Bundy).
13Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 15.
13Ibid., p. 35; see also ibid., p. 15. - 41 -
[Slide 19: Transposition of the line on the Annex I map]
49. The artificial method of transposing the line, for its part, disregards both the intention of
the drafters of the map, whose aim was to plot a watershed line, and the desire of the Parties set out
in the 1904-1908 delimitation treaties for natural and visible lines. Because there is nothing natural
or visible in mathematical transposition: in effect, it consists of a series of mathematical
transformations of the data on the Annex I map and their transposition onto a modern map.
50. At Thailand’s request, the experts at IBRU have carried out this exercise. Since my time
is limited, I shall not dwell on their explanations, but would ask the Court to be so kind as to refer
to that document . I shall simply draw the Court’s attention to the result of that exercise, which is
the map currently showing on the screen. The transposition of the line on the Annex I map gives
an indefinite number of frontier lines, depending on the points of reference chosen. These lines are
situated some distance from the watershed line and also a considerable distance away from each
other, sometimes to the detriment of Cambodia, sometimes to the detriment of Thailand.
51. Mr. President, the map on the screen speaks for itself: the result obtained using the
artificial method is imprecise, arbitrary and uncertain. It is, therefore, poles apart from the
principle of the stability of frontiers , because there can be no stability in a frontier line which can
be applied in an indeterminate number of ways.
52. The natural method of transposition is, therefore, the obvious choice. Moreover,
135
Thailand and Cambodia agreed on this point in 1962 .
[Slide 20: Annex LXVI to the Reply of Cambodia (1961)]
49 53. In fact, during the original proceedings, Cambodia submitted only one serious attempt at
transposing a portion of the line on the Annex I map. This was the map that is currently showing
on the screen. It was a map that was supposed to represent the watershed line in the Temple area, a
136
map annexed to the Reply of Cambodia .
[Slide 21: Coincidence of the Thai and Cambodian watershed lines (1961)]
133
IBRU Assessment, see note 17 above and WOTh, pp. 257-279, paras. 6.1-6.31.
13Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 35.
135
FWETh, para. 4.44, in particular footnote No. 429; see also Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 21.
136
I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. I, Ann. LXVI, pp. 540-543, and
FWETh, Cartographic Ann. No. 51. - 42 -
54. It is worth noting that the watershed line claimed by Cambodia varies from that put
forward by Thailand in 1962 only in the Temple area; for the rest, it is almost identical.
55. Cambodia has since gone back on this common-sense position. It no longer champions
the watershed line it endorsed in 1962. It asks the Court to adjudge that the line on the Annex I
map is the frontier line, without ever making it clear what that line is. Above all, it insists that a
ruling finding the line on the Annex I map to constitute the boundary of the “vicinity of the
Temple” would be “an interpretation taking account of the effet utile — in the sense of an
interpretation which can be implemented effectively — . . . [of] the operative part of the
1962 Judgment” . However, nothing is less certain! Since nothing is known about the location of
the line on the map according to Cambodia, a ruling to that effect would be a ruling with the least
chance of an effective application!
[End of slide 21]
56. In reality, in the present proceedings, Cambodia is grappling with a number of
difficulties, each as insurmountable as the other.
First, in the original proceedings, Cambodia’s territorial claim concerned that small portion of
territory identified in the Judgment as the Temple area, depicted by the Court in the published
excerpt from Annex 85 (d). It is now asking the Court to award it an imaginary area of
4.6 sq km.
50 Next, in the initial proceedings, the use of the Annex I map, like other maps, moreover, had a
single purpose: to prove Cambodia’s title over the Temple. It is now asking the Court to
extend the value of that map to the delimitation of the frontier.
Finally, in the initial proceedings, Cambodia accepted that the frontier should follow the
watershed line and submitted a transposition of the line on the Annex I map which differed
from that claimed by Thailand only in the Temple area. It now rejects that line, which leaves
to Thailand all the territory to which it lays claim today.
Faced with these multiple contradictions, it is my view that the Court has no choice but to reject
Cambodia’s Request for interpretation.
13CR 2013/2, p. 22, para. 26 (Sorel). - 43 -
57. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the time has come for me to conclude this
presentation on the cartographic material. All that remains is for me to thank you for listening so
attentively and to ask, Mr. President, if you would be so kind as to give the floor to
Professor Alain Pellet, under whom I have the good fortune to train. But after the break, no doubt.
Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Ms Miron. Professor Pellet will speak after the break. The
hearing is suspended for 15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.40 a.m. to 12 noon.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I give the floor to Professor Pellet. You have the floor,
Sir.
Mr. PELLET: Thank you, Mr. President.
THE PARTIES ’ SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT DISCLOSES NO DISPUTE OVER THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE JUDGMENT
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as the Agent of Thailand has made quite clear to
you , what Cambodia has brought before the Court in the absence of any new fact is an
application for revision which dare not speak its name, dressed up as a request for interpretation,
51 whereas the meaning of the 1962 Judgment is beyond dispute. Proof of this one among
many is that the Parties’ conduct subsequent to the pronouncement of the Judgment
demonstrates their common understanding of its meaning and scope. It is my task to show that to
you this morning.
2. Any reference, Mr. President, to the conduct of the Parties subsequent to the Judgment
arouses in our opponents and friends on the other side of the Bar an irritation matching that
provoked by references to the Parties’ oral arguments, and above all to their submissions, during
the original case. In point of fact, the Parties’ oral arguments on the one hand, and their subsequent
conduct on the other, play slightly different roles: whereas “[i]nterpretation can in no way go
13See CR 2013/3, introductory speech of the Agent, and in particular paras. 11-12 and 18-25 (Plasai); see also
CR 2013/3 (McRae), The Subject-Matter of the Dispute, p. 1, para. 3. - 44 -
beyond the limits of the Judgment, fixed in advance by the Parties themselves in their submissions”
(Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 20 November 1950 in the Asylum Case
(Colombia/Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 403), the subsequent facts serve essentially to
determine whether there exists a dispute between them over the interpretation of the operative part
139
of the Judgment a sine qua non condition for the Court to be able to rule on a request for
interpretation; I shall return to that point this afternoon.
3. The fact remains that, where the Parties have consistently as is the case here
acquiesced in the implementation of the Judgment concerned over a very long period some
40 years at least in our case (I have in mind the years 1968-2008, during which such implied
acceptance of the Judgment’s interpretation was undeniable) that creates, at the very least, a
strong presumption that there is no dispute over that interpretation. Moreover, I cannot see how
Sir Franklin reconciles his hostility in relation to the Parties’ subsequent practice 140 with his robust
141
assertion that “a judgment of the Court, once handed down, has ‘a life of its own’” . Far from
introducing a time-limit “by the back door” for the filing of a request for interpretation , or 142
143
“marginalizing” the Judgment itself , a consistent and coincident practice by the Parties serves, on
the contrary, to confirm its meaning.
52 4. As the Court has observed, “to implement a decision is to apply its operative part”
(Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1959, p. 28). It follows that, where the Parties to a dispute submitted to the Court have
agreed on the implementation of the Judgment rendered, then they have interpreted it in the same
way. Such is the case here: Thailand has implemented the Judgment of 15 June 1962; Cambodia
has recognized this as is shown by the course of events during the period following the
pronouncement of the Judgment, notwithstanding a certain amount of initial skirmishing due
essentially to the diplomatic tension between the two States precisely in reaction to the
139
See CR 2013/1, p. 56, para. 7 (Bundy).
140
Ibid., p. 54, para. 56.
14CR 2013/1, p. 46, para. 41 (Berman).
142
Ibid., p. 54, para. 55.
143
Ibid. - 45 -
Judgment (I). It is only quite recently that Cambodia has gone back on this shared perception,
despite the fact there has been no new element justifying such an about-turn (II).
I. The period following the pronouncement of
the Judgment (1962-1971)
5. Mr. President, there can be no doubt that the Court’s Judgment was greeted with shock in
144
Thailand . Nonetheless, Bangkok very rapidly took a decision to implement it (less than a week
after the Judgment had been handed down ). That decision was notified to the United Nations on
146
6 July . And while that notification was accompanied by a reservation of rights, the Thai
authorities promptly took the necessary measures to implement the Judgment (1). Cambodia
indeed somewhat reluctantly recognized that those measures constituted the proper execution of
it (2), whilst complaining that Thailand was refusing to accept that the Judgment had fixed the line
of the frontier (3) which it had not in fact done, as I believe we have sufficiently demonstrated.
53 1. The resolution of the Thai Council of Ministers of 10 July 1962
147
6. The resolution of the Council of Ministers of 10 July 1962 is the internal act which
organized the procedure for the withdrawal of troops and the handover of the Temple to
148
Cambodia .
[Slide 1: Resolution of the Thai Council of Ministers (10 July 1962)]
7. The map which accompanied and illustrated the letter from the Ministry of the Interior, on
the basis of which the resolution of the Council of Ministers was adopted, was produced by
Thailand at the provisional measures stage and is currently projected on your screens; the pink line
illustrates the option adopted by the Council of Ministers.
14WOTh, p. 137, para. 4.33, and footnotes to pp. 234 and 256.
14See WOTh, Ann. 10: United States Embassy in Bangkok, Airgram to United States Secretary of State: “Full
Text of Bangkok Post article of June 21, 1962 concerning Prime Minister Sarit’s Announcement Thailand will Comply
with ICJ Decision on Phra Wiharn Case”, No. A-425, 23 June 1963.
14Letter of 6 July 1962 from the Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs to the United Nations Secretary-General
(Annex 1 to Cambodia’s Request for Interpretation).
147
FWETh, Ann. 5.
14See also CR 2013/3, Agent’s introductory speech, paras. 8-10 (Plasai). - 46 -
8. Moreover, the Thai Government immediately demonstrated its concern to mark on the
ground the extent and limits of the “vicinity” of the Temple as referred to in the second paragraph
of the Judgment’s operative clause. It stated that it was necessary to:
“1. Erect wooden signs, with the characteristics and size of a train station sign,
indicating the limit of the vicinity of the Temple of Phra Viharn, which are to be
placed: 1 at the Broken Stairway; 1 at the foot of the Naga Stairway; 1 at the left
wing corner of the Temple; and 1 at the escarpment behind the Temple.” 149
[End of slide 1; slide 2: “The vicinity of the Temple of Phra Viharn does not extend beyond this
limit”]
9. There was no question, contrary to what Cambodia claims, of marking out the frontier
150
between the two countries , but only and quite clearly of implementing the Judgment by
recognizing Cambodia’s sovereignty over the Temple and its vicinity: “The vicinity of the Temple
of Phra Viharn does not extend beyond this limit” . 151
10. Not once in the resolution of the Council of Ministers was there any question of a
“frontier” or a frontier line; the Council was concerned only to determine “the limit of the vicinity
of the Temple” and there is nothing extraordinary in the fact that two methods were envisaged
54 for this purpose: since the Court had not addressed the issue under this aspect, it was necessary to
define “the vicinity of the Temple”, pending a final determination of the frontier, without any
obligation to apply a particular method. It might perhaps have been preferable for the two Parties
to have come to an express agreement, but in the context of the period, given the trauma created in
Thailand by the Judgment, that would have been a lot to ask; moreover, as far as I am aware, there
is no rule obliging the parties to a case to negotiate the practical details of the implementation of
the Court’s judgment. If Cambodia had not agreed with the method adopted by Thailand it was up
to it to say so and, if need be, to bring fresh proceedings before the Court to have the Judgment
14FWETh, Ann. 5: Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Thailand of 10 July 1962
(declassified on 26 May 2011).
15FWEC, p. 27, para. 2.47; p. 31, para. 2.62. See also CR 2013/4 (McRae), The Self-Evident Interpretation,
p. 13, para. 5; p. 16, para. 11.
151
See also ibid., p. 15, para. 8; p. 16, para. 10; p. 21, para. 29; CR 2013/3 (Miron), The Cartographic Evidence
in the Original Proceedings, paras. 38-51. - 47 -
implemented, in so far as the Court had the necessary jurisdiction. On the contrary, it stated that
152
Thailand had “complied with the Court’s decision” .
11. I shall come back to this, but first I should like to draw attention to another remarkable
aspect of the Thai Government’s decision (which doubtless explains why, at the time, Cambodia
refrained from protesting that decision): namely the fact that the limit of the Temple vicinity
adopted by the Council of Ministers virtually coincided with the watershed line as put forward by
153
Cambodia in its initial written pleadings to the Court .
[End of slide 2, start of slide 3: The vicinity of the Temple of Phra Viharn and Cambodia’s
watershed line]
This graphic currently showing on your screen and with which you are familiar, since it
was used just now to illustrate the presentation of our Agent superimposes that line (dotted in
black) on the one adopted by the Thai Cabinet (shown in red). This clearly contradicts Cambodia’s
154
assertion that those lines “did not exist in 1962” . The red line, as adopted by the Council of
Ministers, quite clearly “existed”, and largely corresponded with that pleaded before the Court by
Cambodia itself. Furthermore, at the time, this interpretation of the Judgment, as it were “on the
ground”, did not provoke any objection from Cambodia. Quite the contrary.
55 2. Cambodia’s recognition of Thailand’s compliance with the Judgment
12. On 27 September 1962, Cambodia’s chief diplomat, Mr. Huot Sambath, stated before the
United Nations General Assembly:
“It was only after having refused several times to accept that decision and
having uttered many a threat against us that the Thai Government, feeling that it was
the object of world-wide disapproval, complied with the Court’s decision . . . Preah
Vihear has been restored to us.” 155
Thus, through the voice of its highest authorized representatives, Cambodia accepted that the
Temple had been “restored” to it, and that the Judgment had thus been implemented.
15WOTh, Ann. 28: United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Plenary
Meetings, 1134th Meeting, p. 174, para. 91 (Mr. Hout Sambath (Cambodia)).
15See I.C.J. Pleadings, Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Vol. 1, Reply of Cambodia, p. 472,
para. 77.
154
Application, 28 April 2011, p. 10, para. 25.
15WOTh, Ann. 28: United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth
Session,1134th Plenary Meeting, p. 174, paras. 91 and 93. - 48 -
13. Furthermore, several months after the withdrawal of the Thai forces, Cambodia, with
great pomp, took possession of the Temple. Prince Sihanouk’s visit, on 5 January 1963, which was
both highly symbolic and heavily covered by the media, took place within the boundaries resulting
from the resolution of the Thai Council of Ministers, and the Cambodian officials were perfectly
well aware of this. There was a magnificent cortège of more than 1,000 pilgrims and a party
156
atmosphere . The Prince/Head of State did not react in any way to the barbed wire barrier, which
he had undoubtedly seen, and noted as marking the physical representation of the Judgment . On 157
the contrary, he welcomed the fact that the Thai police behind the barbed wire were fraternizing
with the Cambodians, the shared cognac being a symbol of those friendly relations : “This is a58
159
good beginning for negotiations for the return of friendship between our two countries” , declared
the Prince. At most (and I refer to a telegram from the United States Embassy in Phnom Penh):
“When he mentioned the Thai construction of the barbed-wire area, he
described it as Thai encroachment by several meters on the Cambodian territory
awarded it by the International Court of Justice. He said that he would not, however,
make an issue of this matter as these few meters were unimportant.” 160
56 14. The Prince was quite right. The Temple area requested by Cambodia in the original
proceedings was [animation] 0.35 sq km, while that delimited by the Council of Ministers’ line
and, on the ground by the barbed wire, was [animation] 0.28 sq km. These [animation] 0.07 sq km
are quite clearly “unimportant”.
15. Is it for this handful of metres that Cambodia has brought this request for interpretation
before you, Members of the Court? If so, that is truly an insult to the dignity of the Court. If not,
then we are bound to note that Cambodia is challenging formal statements by its former Head of
State and I would cite other statements by Prince Sihanouk in 1963: “As the Temple has been
15See WOTh, pp. 146-174, para. 4.43.
157
See WOTh, p. 148, para. 4.46 and Ann. 49 (New York Times, 8 January 1963, “Peaceful Overture held in
Cambodia At Disputed Shrine”).
158
See WOTh, p. 149, para. 4.46.
15WOTh, Ann. 49, New York Times, 8 January 1963, “Peaceful Overture held in Cambodia At Disputed Shrine”.
16WOTh, Ann. 51: United States Embassy in Phnom Penh, Airgram to Department of State, “Cambodian
Official Reoccupation of Preah Vihear”, No. A-325, 10 Jan. 1963, p. 5; emphasis added. See also: ibid., Ann. 72,
Herbert de Ribbing, Note to the Secretary-General, “Report by the Special Representative on his First Visit to Cambodia
and Thailand and First Contact with their High Authorities”, 13 Sep. 1966, p. 6, para, 10; see also WOTh, Vol. I,
pp. 155-156, para. 4.56. - 49 -
returned to us, there is no longer anything to argue about.” 161 [Translation by the Registry] Or
again: “We must stop accusing each other. We have employed peaceful means: the International
Court of Justice regarding Preah Vihear. That case is now over, there is no longer any reason for
162
us to quarrel.” [Translation by the Registry]
[End of slide 3, start of slide 4: The two Princes]
16. Prince Sihanouk’s visit to the Temple in January 1963 recalls the other princely visit, that
by Prince Damrong in 1930, which constituted one of the crucial arguments that led the Court to
recognize Cambodia’s sovereignty over the Temple . And, Mr. President, what applies to the one
must apply to the other:
in the 1962 Judgment, the Court described the visit by Prince Damrong as “much the most
significant episode”, which, looked at “as a whole”, amounted to “a tacit recognition by Siam
of the sovereignty of Cambodia (under French Protectorate) over Preah Vihear, through a
failure to react in any way, on an occasion that called for a reaction in order to affirm or
preserve title in the face of an obvious rival claim” . In the new proceedings brought by
Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk’s visit, looked at as a whole, also represents “much the most
significant episode”: his silence, in the face of the barbed wire and the signs written in Thai,
57 signifies that he recognized that the situation he saw before him represented a satisfactory
implementation of the Judgment; and indeed contrary to what happened with the
1930 visit Prince Sihanouk immediately thereafter expressly acknowledged this;
second difference: Prince Damrong’s visit “was part of an archaeological tour made by the
Prince with the permission of the King of Siam” ; Prince Sihanouk was himself Head of
State of Cambodia, and there could be no doubt as to the official nature of his visit, made in
direct response to the Court’s Judgment.
161
WOTh, Ann. 55, La Vérité, 5 June 1963, interview with Prince Sihanouk by an Indian journalist, p. 2.
16WOTh, Ann. 56: Le Bulletin de l’Agence Khmère du Presse, interview with Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
Cambodian Head of State, given to the Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 July 1963.
16See also CR2013/4 (Crawford), How the Court established that Cambodia had sovereignty over the Temple,
paras. 8-12, “The Prince’s visit”.
164
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 30 and 31. See
also CR 2013/4 (Crawford), How the Court established that Cambodia had sovereignty over the Temple, para. 8.
165
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 30. - 50 -
what is more, “[a] clearer affirmation . . . can scarcely be imagined” of Thailand’s view of the
166
manner in which it had implemented the Judgment on the ground . “It demanded a reaction”,
which Cambodia did not give . 167
and we can transpose almost word for word to Prince Sihanouk’s visit the conclusions drawn
by the Court from that of Prince Damrong 30 years earlier: “What seems clear is that either
[Cambodia] [substituting Cambodia for Siam] did not in fact believe” that it could draw any
difference consequences from the Court’s Judgment which would correspond perfectly with
Prince Sihanouk’s statements on the implementation on the Judgment “or else [it] decided
not to assert [its title], which again means that [it] accepted [the Thai] claim, or accepted” the
claim asserted by Thailand on the ground 168 a position which, I would remind you,
concerned the “boundary of the Temple vicinity”, and not the frontier itself, which had still
(and still has) to be recognized and demarcated by agreement between the Parties.
[End of slide 4, repeat of slide 3]
58
3. The alleged Cambodian protests
17. It is true, Mr. President, that Cambodia’s position has been a somewhat variable one, and
in an 1967 interview Prince Sihanouk challenged the implementation of the Judgment, but once
again over a matter of metres only:
“All around Preah Vihear, the Thais have, by laying barbed wire around it, kept
the strip of land that runs between the base of the Temple and the frontier, which lies
several metres away as intended by the treaties reaffirmed by the decision of the
International Court of Justice.” 169
In asserting that the line of the barbed wire differed by a few metres from that of the frontier, the
Cambodian Head of State was probably thinking of the frontier line following the line of the
watershed as claimed by Cambodia in 1961 , which does indeed differ by a few metres from that
adopted by the Thai Council of Ministers (as can be seen from the superimposition of the two lines
166
See also CR 2013/4 (Crawford), How the Court established that Cambodia had sovereignty over the Temple,
para. 8.
167
See ibid.
16Ibid., p. 31.
169
Press conference of 22 October 1967 (FWEC, Ann. 19; emphasis added).
170
See above, para. 11. - 51 -
again showing on your screens). Members of the Court, are we here over a matter of metres? If so,
this is nothing more than an abuse of the interpretation procedure. If not, then Cambodia is
contradicting itself, which it is not entitled to do, possibly because it may be estopped from doing
so , and most certainly on grounds of good faith.
[End of slide 3]
18. A further word on the interesting table interesting, but deceptive that Mr. Bundy
has included in Cambodia’s judges’ folder. It can be found there under tab 10; we have
reproduced it at tab 4.1 of today’s folder. It is entitled: “Chronology of Cambodia’s objections to
the Thai position.” But in reality, if we look a little closer, the protests of which our opponents
make so much have nothing like the scope which they attribute to them:
either they cast doubt on Thailand’s acceptance of Cambodia’s sovereignty over the Temple
wrongly so, which is the case for documents 1, 10, 11, 14 and indeed 16 (and, moreover, by
implication only);
or they relate in reality to uncertainties or disagreements over the course of the frontier line, an
issue which the Judgment deliberately did not address; that is most notably the case with
59 documents 2, 4, 7, 8 and 9 (which simply quotes the previous one), 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18
and 19;
or again they simply contain a brief reference, which in reality echoes the statement by
Prince Sihanouk on the difference of a few metres between the boundary marking the vicinity
of the Temple and the frontier claimed by Cambodia; that is the case of documents 5, 12
and 15, which confirm the de minimis argument ; 172
finally, document 3 relates not to the position of the Parties but to that of a third party.
With the sole exception of the last of the documents cited in this table No. 19, which is
subsequent to the unilateral request for inscription of the Temple on the UNESCO World Heritage
List all of these documents date from the period of tension between the two countries which
followed the pronouncement of the Court’s Judgment. Subsequently, for 40 years, Cambodia, by
171
See also CR 2013/4 (Crawford), How the Court established that Cambodia had sovereignty over the Temple,
paras. 47-49; and CR 2013/4 (McRae), The Self-Evident Interpretation, p. 7, para. 20.
17See above, paras. 14-15 and 17. See also WOTh, p. 4, para. 1.15; FWETh, pp. 110-111, para. 3.68 and p. 190,
para. 4.65. - 52 -
its consistent attitude, showed that it regarded all of these problems as definitively settled. Indeed,
173
Cambodia appears to accept this .
19. In 1970, the two States resumed diplomatic relations . 174 However, Cambodia was
already suffering serious internal problems, and the Temple and the surrounding region were
occupied by the Viet Cong. Initially, Thailand had helped Cambodia’s regular troops to defend the
175
Temple . However, from 1975 it was occupied by the Khmer Rouge.
II. The period 1990 to 2007
20. Mr. President, in 2000 the two States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the
176
Survey and Demarcation of the Land Boundary, the “MoU” , which, as its name indicates,
defined the legal framework to be applied in determining boundaries. At the hearings on
provisional measures, the Agent of Thailand drew the Court’s attention to the fact that that
60 agreement did not mention the 1962 Judgment as a relevant instrument for the survey and
demarcation of “the entire stretch of the common land boundary”, which of course included the
Temple area . That silence, Mr. President, in no way represented any lack of respect for the
Judgment; it simply shows that both Parties considered that it was not relevant in relation to the
course of the frontier in the Dangrek massif, including in the Temple region, or, in other words,
that in ruling in accordance with such of Cambodia’s submissions as were admissible on the
sovereignty of the Temple, the Court had not thereby ruled on the location of the frontier. And I
would point out in passing that, while it is true, to the amazement of Professor Sorel, that the
“famous L7017 map” from 1978 “is not mentioned in the agreement of 14 June 2000” , that is for178
a different reason: paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article I of the Memorandum include only documents
established bilaterally, which Thailand has never claimed to be the case for the map in question,
and on which it places no reliance whatever as a “frontier title” in its favour.
173
See CR 2013/1, p. 65, para. 46 (Bundy).
17See WOTh, p. 157, para. 4.57.
17FWETh, Ann. 13, Washington Post, 11 July 1970, “Thai Troops Reported Guarding Threatened Temple in
Cambodia”; FWETh, Ann. 14, The Guardian, 6 Nov. 1974, “Cambodia’s temple outpost”.
176
WETh, Ann. 91, 14 June 2000.
177
CR 2011/14, p. 12, para. 8 (Plasai)see Arts. IV.1 and V of the Memorandum of Understanding.
17CR 2013/2, p. 29, para. 41. - 53 -
21. For their part, the local authorities did not wait for the Memorandum to be signed and for
the demarcation to be carried out in order to open the Temple to tourists. From 1990, its reopening
to the public was organized jointly by the Cambodian and Thai authorities.
[Slide 5: Facilities installed by Thailand]
22. Closely linked to the exploitation of the monument for tourist purposes was Thailand’s
installation [animation] of an access gate on the bridge across the Takhop-Tani stream [animation],
as well as a ticket office [animation] close to the great northern stairway. The Cambodian
61 authorities did not express the slightest doubt regarding Thailand’s right to install these facilities,
thus admitting that they were located on Thai territory. On the other hand, the Thai authorities
hesitated to accede to Cambodia’s request for the construction of toilets [animation] within the
179
actual Temple area, because their site was not on Thai territory .
[End of slide 5; slide 6: Iron gate and stairway leading to the Temple area]
Access to the Temple was by the bridge over the Takhop-Tani stream, some 100 m from the
northern stairway. And an iron gate had been erected nearby, again by the Thai authorities . All 180
of these facilities, which were located on Thai territory with the exception of the toilets, were
maintained by the Thai authorities.
23. At no time, prior to the present proceedings, did Cambodia claim that the bridge and the
ticket office were located on Cambodian territory, although they were less than 200 m from the
Temple’s northern stairway, and the signs were written in Thai . And, if only to restore the
historical truth, I would add that while it is correct, as Jean-Marc Sorel stated on Monday
afternoon, that the MoU of 2000 was signed “at a time of peace”, it is certainly not correct, on the
other hand, to assert that at that time “Thailand was still back behind the perimeter delimited by the
17WOTh, Ann. 97, see the affidavit of Lieutenant Surapon Rueksumran.
18FWETh, Ann. 20, see the photographs taken in 1998 (A Photograph of the Ceremony to mark the Trial
Opening of the Phra Viharn Promontory for Archaeological Site Visits and Studies, 1 August 1998; and FWETh,
Ann. 25, in 2001 (Photographs of the Iron Gate and the Iron Bridge at Takhop/Tani stream, taken on 17 December 2001).
181
See FWETh, p. 114, para. 3.71. - 54 -
182
frontier on the Annex 1 map” . Its presence inside that perimeter is evidenced by an impressive
number of documents in the case file . 183
[End of slide 6]
24. This modus vivendi as a result of co-operation between the local authorities functioned
satisfactorily from 1991 to 2001. But from 2001 Cambodia changed its position and decided to
exclude Thailand from any connection with the Temple. That year, an attempt to embody the
62 modus vivendi in an international agreement led to the dismissal from Cambodia’s Ministry of
184
Tourism of its Director-General, the sponsor of the agreement . At around the same time
Cambodia began building a road to facilitate access to the Temple from the Cambodian plain. It
also constructed on Thai territory a small pagoda some 300 m from the Temple, and encouraged
the permanent settlement of an ever-growing Cambodian community in the area adjacent to the
Temple. It was from that time that the dispute over the frontier in the region gradually crystallized.
Cambodia makes much of the fact — wrongly — that Thailand did not object to these
encroachments . That is not true: as our Agent has reminded you, Thailand protested strongly . 186
And it was precisely because Cambodia turned a deaf ear that the Thai authorities found
187
themselves obliged to temporarily close access to the Temple in December 2001 . I note,
moreover, that, in attempting to shift the debate to the interpretation of Article V of the
Memorandum of 2000, an instrument which relates solely to the survey and demarcation of the
182
CR 2013/2, p. 28, para. 40 (Sorel).
18See in particular: WOTh, Ann. 87: Summary of a meeting on the opening of Khao Phra Viharn as tourist site
between Thai side and Cambodian side, 7 Nov. 1991; WOTh, Ann. 88: A photograph of the iron gate at Tani stream,
circa 1992; WOTh, Ann. 18: “Hun Sen troops take Preah Vihear”, Bangkok Post, 1 Apr. 1998; WOTh, Ann. 21:
“Tourist Flock to Preah Vihear”, Bangkok Post, 2 Aug. 1998; FWETh, Ann. 24: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Thailand, Note N. Kor Tor 0603/1165 to the Governor of Si Sa Ket Province: Solving the Problems of Kiosks Selling
Goods and Wastewater Disposal in the Area of the Temple of Phra Biharn, dated 11 Dec. B.E. 2544 (2001) (Declassified
on 12 June 2012).
18FWETh, p. 115, para. 3.72; see the annex.
185
FWEC, pp. 34-35, paras. 2.74-2.79; p. 36, para. 2.81. See also CR 2013/2, p. 29, para. 41 (Sorel).
186
FWETh, Ann. 33; Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram to the Royal Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh,
5 April B.E. 2545 (2002); FWETh, Ann. 38, Kantharalak District Office, Note No. Sor Kor 0318/36 to the Governor of
Si Sa Ket Province: Inquiry about the situation in the area of Pha Mor I Dang, dated 5 Feb. B.E. 2546 (2003). See also:
WOTh, Ann. 93, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-Chairman of the Thailand-Cambodia Joint Boundary
Commission, Note to the Adviser to the Royal Government of Cambodia in charge of State Border Affairs,
25 Nov. 2004; WOTh, Ann. 94, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-Chairman of the Thailand-Cambodia
Joint Boundary Commission, Note to the Adviser to the Royal Government of Cambodia in charge of State Border
Affairs, 8 March 2005.
18FWETh, p. 116, para. 3.73. - 55 -
frontier, Cambodia again reveals its true colours: it is in fact on the course of the frontier that it
seeks to persuade you to rule, Members of the Court, in spite of or because of! your refusal to
do so in 1962. The distinction so vigorously canvassed by Cambodia 188 between delimitation
which it claims to have already occurred as a result of the 1962 Judgment, or of the latter’s
confirmation of a pre-existing delimitation and demarcation the systematic contrast drawn by
it between the two concepts is clearly part of that frontier strategy. It appears to me, moreover,
that the Judgment which you rendered yesterday to some extent downplayed the difference
189
between the two concepts . In any event, it is clear that the signature of the Memorandum shows
that at the present time the course of the frontier has not been fixed.
63 25. And, during the first half of the decade from 2000, the Joint Demarcation Commission
established by the agreement was effectively addressing the issue of the course of the frontier in the
190
Temple region .
[Slide 7: Master plan for zoning at Preah Vihear]
191
26. Access to the Temple on the Thai side was reopened in 2003 , but this improvement in
relations was short-lived. The unilateral request for inscription of the Temple on the Unesco World
Heritage List in 2007 once again poisoned the situation. Thus Cambodia was seeking to extend
substantially into Thai territory the various areas concerned, as can be seen from the map which it
submitted to the Thirty-First session of the World Heritage Committee : the “development zone”
(which is shown in blue) and the buffer zone (in green), but also the actual perimeter attributed to
the “property proposed for inscription” (in brown) extend aggressively beyond the Temple area as
envisaged by the Court in 1962, and as the two Parties had physically marked on the ground since
then.
18CR 2013/1, p. 28, para. 40 (Hor Namhong); CR 2013/1, p. 64, paras. 43-44 (Bundy); CR 2013/2, p. 12,
para. 7; p. 27, para. 38 and footnote 42, p. 28 (Sorel).
18See in particular Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment of 16 April 2013, paras. 65-67.
190
FWETh, Ann. 39, Bangkok Post, 18 Feb. 2003, “Border Talks”; FWETh, Ann. 40, Bangkok Post, 20 Feb.
2003, “Clear Borders Would Help End Temple Row”; FWETh, Ann. 41 Bangkok Post, 22 Feb. 2003, “Cambodians
‘Encroach’ on Thai Soil”.
191
FWETh, Ann. 42, Photographs of the Opening Ceremony of the Phra Viharn Promontory Border Area Point of
Entry for the Purpose of Tourism, taken on 31 May 2003.
19WOT, Vol. II, Ann. 100, att. No. 2, p. 707. - 56 -
27. Thailand, which had initially supported Cambodia’s initiative in principle , protested
194
strongly , with the result that the following year Cambodia confined its request to the Temple
itself and accordingly reduced the perimeter of the property proposed for inscription ; this was5
accepted by the World Heritage Committee, which expressly noted: [end of slide 7; slide 8:
Revised graphic representation of the property]
“that the property proposed for inscription is reduced and includes solely the Temple
of Preah Vihear and not the promontory as a whole with its cliffs and caves” . 196
64 That is as good a way as any of complying precisely with the terms of the 1962 Judgment; Unesco
returns to basics: what was recognized by the Judgment was that the Temple falls under
Cambodian sovereignty the Temple and not the promontory as a whole.
[End of slide 8]
28. Mr. President, in using its request for inscription of the Temple as a World Heritage Site
not only as a pretext for reviving its “frontier” claims which, however, had been clearly
excluded by the Court from the scope of its Judgment but also in unreasonably extending them,
Cambodia went back on the previous position consistently held by it since the adoption of the
Judgment and its implementation by Thailand:
having publicly recognized, through the voices of its highest authorized representatives, that in
withdrawing its troops Thailand had implemented the Judgment, it today claims that “Thailand
had not withdrawn from the ‘vicinity’ of the Temple as required under the second paragraph of
the dispositif, so Thailand did not observe the line on the Annex I map in the Temple
area”197 an unjustified use of the word “so”, for in no circumstances can this reflect a causal
link;
but even accepting Cambodia’s claim that the Court has determined the line of the frontier (and
we have shown sufficiently that this is not the case), and that the vicinity of the Temple located
193
FWEC, Vol. I, p. 36, para. 2.83, and Vol. II, Ann. 27, pp. 112-113; Ann. 31, pp. 165-166.
19Chronology available on the French page of the site of the Cambodian Authority for the Temple of Preah
Vihear: http://www.preahvihearauthority.org/france.html.
19See the revised map, attached to evaluation sheet No. 1224 (Preah Vihear (Cambodia)), available at:
http://whc.unesco.org/ahive/2008/whc08-32com-inf8B1ADD2f.pdf.
196
World Heritage Committee, decision 32COM 8B.102, Examination of proposals for inscription Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia), available at: http://whc.unesco.org/eng/decisions/1548.
197
FWEC, p. 25, para. 2.41; emphasis added. - 57 -
in Cambodian territory is defined to the north by the frontier line as determined by the Court
(quod non), Cambodia’s new claims are radically contradicted by the statements of
Prince Sihanouk and other Cambodian officials, who had stated in the 1960s that, if the barbed
wire was in the wrong place, it was only by a matter of a few metres. Clearly, Cambodia has
not returned to the Court for those few metres of which it claimed to have been deprived in
1963, and to which it attached no great importance. The 4.6 sq km which it claims today
coincide, curiously enough, with the territory necessary for the management of the Temple as a
World Heritage Site in the absence of co-operation on the part of Thailand .
65 Mr. President, may I now ask you kindly to give the floor to Professor Crawford. Many
thanks for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, professeur Pellet. J’appelle à la barre M. Crawford. Vous
avez la parole, Monsieur.
M. CRAWFORD :
LA MANIÈRE DONT LA C OUR A ÉTABLI QUE LE CAMBODGE DÉTENAIT
LA SOUVERAINETÉ SUR LE TEMPLE
La distinction entre les motifs et le dispositif
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, M. McRae et Mme Miron vous
ont rappelé ce qu’il avait été demandé à la Cour de trancher en 1962. Pour ma part, il m’incombe
de préciser la manière dont la Cour s’est prononcée sur ces points.
2. En 1934, Manley Hudson s’est intéressé à la distinction entre les motifs et le dispositif
o
dans les arrêts de la Cour permanente. [Projection n 1.] Selon M. Hudson,
«L’article 56 du Statut énonce la prescription suivante : «L’arrêt est motivé.»
Cependant, les Parties ne sont pas liées par les motifs. Chaque arrêt de la Cour se
conclut par un dispositif, dans lequel sont énoncées les mesures ou décisions prises par
la Cour ; les motifs aident à interpréter le contenu du dispositif.»9 [Traduction du
Greffe.]
19See also CR 2013/3, para. 16, Agent’s introductory speecCR 2013/3, paras. 23-37 (Miron), The
cartographic evidence in the original proceedings.
199
M. O. Hudson, The permanent Court of international Justice (1934), p. 419-4Voir également
Charles de Visscher, Problèmes d’interprétation judiciaire en droit international public (1963), p. 255-259. - 58 -
Ce commentaire de la procédure de la Cour, qui émanait d’un important auteur issu de la culture de
la common law, a été approuvé par un juriste de droit civil, qui se trouvait également être membre
o
de la Cour. [Projection n 2.] Le juge Anzilotti s’est en effet exprimé comme suit sur ce
point compte tenu du temps qui m’est imparti, je me contenterai de donner lecture de la
première et de la dernière phrase, mais le passage dans son ensemble mérite toute notre
attention :
«Dire que la demande en interprétation ne peut avoir pour objet que la partie
obligatoire de l’arrêt à interpréter, revient à dire qu’elle ne peut avoir pour objet que le
sens et la portée du dispositif, car il est certain que la force obligatoire réside
seulement dans le dispositif de l’arrêt et non pas dans ses considérants.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c’est le dispositif qui contient la décision obligatoire de la Cour et qui, partant, peut
os
faire l’objet d’une demande en ioterprétation.» (Interprétation dos arrêts n 7 et 8
(usine de Chorzów), arrêt n 11, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A n 13, p. 23-24 (opinion
dissidente du juge Anzilotti ; les italiques sont de nous).
66 Ce principe reste valable. Il ne s’agit pas de savoir si la Cour doit exposer des motifs ; bien sûr
qu’elle doit le faire. Même si, ces dernières années, la Cour a pu se montrer plus discursive et je
ne dis pas bavarde dans la présentation de ses motifs, elle ne s’est pas pour autant laissée aller à
des obiter dicta. La distinction entre les motifs et le dispositif, qui a toujours existé, subsiste. Dans
l’affaire du Mandat d’arrêt, la Cour a indiqué ce qui suit : [Projection n 3]
«La Cour rappellera le principe bien établi selon lequel elle a «le devoir de
répondre aux demandes des parties telles qu’elles s’expriment dans leurs conclusions
finales, mais aussi celui de s’abstenir de statuer sur les points non compris dans
lesdites demandes ainsi exprimées». (Droit d’asile, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 402).
Si la Cour ne peut donc pas trancher des questions qui ne lui ont pas été soumises, en
revanche la règle non ultra petita ne saurait l’empêcher d’aborder certains points de
droit dans sa motivation.» (Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République
démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 18-19, par. 43).
La Cour a alors indiqué clairement qu’elle ne se prononçait pas sur les questions de juridiction qui
se posaient en l’affaire. [Fin de la projection.]
3. En statuant dans des affaires la décision étant expressément énoncée dans le
dispositif , la Cour «fera état» de divers éléments qui, dans un système de common law,
pourraient bien être considérés comme faisant partie du ratio decidendi. Un ratio est un motif ; la
décision de la Cour, quant à elle, est contraignante pour les Etats, et elle est récapitulée
contenue dans le dispositif. - 59 -
Ce que le Cambodge veut vraiment
4. J’en viens maintenant à la question de savoir ce que le Cambodge veut vraiment. Lundi,
le conseil du Cambodge s’est proposé, afin d’illustrer la manière dont la Cour était parvenue à sa
décision en 1962, de nous livrer une «lecture cohérente et logique de l’arrêt» . Ce n’est pas de la
faute de M. Sorel si cela s’est révélé difficile, étant donné que le Cambodge se présente aujourd’hui
devant la Cour pour lui demander de prendre une décision qu’elle a, en 1962, expressément dit
201
qu’elle ne prenait pas . Le Cambodge demande aujourd’hui à la Cour de dire que la ligne de la
carte de l’annexe I doit être considérée comme faisant partie du dispositif d’un de ses arrêts, alors
que pareille décision non seulement ne figurait pas dans ce dispositif, mais en avait été
expressément exclue par la Cour. Il n’est donc guère surprenant que le Cambodge juge difficile
202
voire «complexe [et] peu linéaire» d’examiner les motifs de l’arrêt de 1962 à la lumière de
ce que la Cour a véritablement décidé.
5. Malgré tout, les contradictions et incohérences contenues dans l’exposé du conseil du
67
203
Cambodge ont permis de faire émerger une conclusion «logique» . Ce que le Cambodge
demande à la Cour de faire, sur la base de l’article 60, ce n’est rien de moins que de substituer à
une délimitation conventionnelle l’intégralité de la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I, c'est-à-dire sur
une distance de 115 km au total. Certes, M. Sorel a prétendu limiter la demande du Cambodge à
une zone plus réduite en se fondant sur le principe ultra petita. Sir Franklin, quant à lui, n’a pas
fait preuve de la même retenue. Il a purement et simplement nié que le principe ultra petita puisse
204
s’appliquer à l’article 60 ; selon lui, la seule limite aux prétentions du Cambodge est le bord de la
carte de l’annexe I. D’ailleurs, à en juger par la fixation que fait sir Franklin sur l’acquiescement
de la Thaïlande aux cartes, on peut se demander si la ligne frontière ne s’étend pas sur l’ensemble
des huit cartes établies par la société cartographique d’Henry Barrère en 1908 qui demeurent
pertinentes aux fins de la frontière, et auxquelles la Thaïlande comme la Cour l’a indiqué a
globalement acquiescé (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 24).
200
CR 2013/2, p. 10 (Sorel).
201CR 2013/3, L’objet du différend (McRae). Voir également supplément d’information de la Thaïlande, p. 153,
par. 4.13, citant C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 14.
202CR 2013/1, p. 22, par. 2 (Sorel).
203
CR 2013/2, p. 10 et suiv. (Sorel).
204
CR 2013/1, p. 51-52, par. 51 (Berman). - 60 -
6. Soit dit en passant, la Cour n’aura pas manqué de relever que sir Franklin interprétait
l’expression «est limité à», qui figure plusieurs fois dans l’arrêt (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 14, dernier
205
paragraphe), comme signifiant «comprend» . Eh bien moi, mon entendement est peut-être limité,
mais je ne le comprends pas ainsi !
7. Le Cambodge ne cesse de dire que la Cour n’a pu parvenir à sa décision de 1962 qu’en
retenant la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I en tant que ligne frontière. Il qualifie cette ligne de «sorte
206
de prérequis» , et soutient qu’«il existe une ligne frontière obligatoire entre les deux Etats dans la
région du temple et que celle-ci résulte de la ligne tracée sur la carte de l’annexe I» . Le 207
problème, c’est que la ligne frontière ne «résulte» pas de la ligne tracée sur la carte. La Cour n’a
pas retenu la carte en tant que description de la ligne frontière (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 36). Ainsi
208
que la Thaïlande l’a précisé dans l’instance initiale , et l’a de nouveau démontré en s’appuyant sur
68 des preuves d’expert en la présente instance , ladite carte ne saurait d’ailleurs donner une telle
description ; il en ressort seulement, d’une manière générale, que la frontière suit la ligne de
partage des eaux. Si la Cour s’est, à l’époque, penchée sur cette carte, c’est pour une raison
différente ; elle l’a fait en raison et uniquement en raison des enseignements que ce
document apporte en ce qui concerne la souveraineté sur le temple.
8. Quand bien même la carte en question aurait été la seule considération sur laquelle la Cour
aurait fondé son arrêt, celle-ci ne pourrait cependant l’interpréter, sur la base de l’article 60, que
dans la mesure où elle entre dans le cadre du dispositif de ladite décision. Cela a été précisé par la
Cour permanente, dans l’affaire du Service postal polonais à Danzig, lorsqu’elle s’est intéressée
aux limites de l’interprétation des motifs d’un arrêt. Selon la Cour permanente, «il est certain que
les motifs contenus dans une décision, tout au moins dans la mesure où ils dépassent la portée du
dispositif, n’ont pas force obligatoire entre les Parties intéressées» (Service postal polonais à
205
CR 2013/1, p. 52, par. 51, (Berman).
206
Réponse du Cambodge, par. 4.24.
207Ibid., par. 4.26.
208C.I.J. Mémoire, Temple de Préah Vihéar, duplique du Gouvernement royal de Thaïlande, vol. 1, p. 597-598,
par. 112, note de bas de page n 1, annexe n 76bis de la duplique de la Thaïlande (jointe aux observations écrites en tant
qu’annexe 102).
209Unité de recherché sur les frontières internationales de l’Université de Durham, «Evaluation de la tâche
consistant à transposer sur le terrain la frontière entre le Cambodge et la Thaïlande représentée sur la carte
de l’«annexe I», octobre 2011, annexe 96 des observations écrites de la Thaïlande ; à ce sujet, voir observations écrites de
la Thaïlande, p. 257-279. - 61 -
Dantzig, avis consultatif, 1925, C.P.J.I. série B n 11, p. 29-30) (les italiques sont de nous). La
210
Thaïlande a examiné ce point de manière approfondie dans son supplément d’information , et
appelé l’attention sur l’erreur que le Cambodge avait commise en ne tenant pas compte de ces
limites .11
9. Dans son exposé de lundi, sir Franklin a de nouveau ignoré les limites en question. Sous
l’intitulé «[l]’absence de tout fondement autre que la carte de l’annexe I dans l’arrêt» , il a 212
soutenu que celle-ci était le motif «essentiel» de l’arrêt, et que la Cour pouvait donc l’interpréter
sur la base de l’article 60. Or, si la Cour s’est penchée sur cette carte, c’était dans un but précis.
Celui-ci était d’ailleurs clairement indiqué dans le paragraphe précédent et, de nouveau, au
paragraphe suivant immédiatement celui que sir Franklin a cité. Si la Cour a examiné la carte,
c’était pour déterminer si les Gouvernements thaïlandais et cambodgien avaient effectivement
exercé leur «pouvoir d’adopter de telles déviations» afin d’adopter une déviation par rapport à la
ligne de partage des eaux «à Préah Vihéar» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 22). En revanche, la mention
«la Cour dit que les Parties ont adopté une déviation par rapport à la ligne de partage des eaux» ne
figure pas dans le dispositif de l’arrêt. La carte n’est pas mentionnée dans le dispositif, et elle y est
encore moins incorporée par référence ; la ligne représentée sur cette carte n’est pertinente aux fins
du dispositif que dans la mesure où elle a justifié la conclusion suivant laquelle le Cambodge
détenait la souveraineté sur le temple.
69 10. La carence de la réponse du Cambodge et, d’une manière générale, de l’interprétation
que celui-ci fait de l’arrêt de 1962 est qu’il ne s’intéresse nullement à la manière dont la Cour a
utilisé la carte. De même, il ne s’intéresse nullement à la manière dont la Cour a utilisé les autres
considérations qui avaient été soulevées au cours de l’instance. Sir Franklin a parlé de la «manière
particulière» dont la Cour avait statué en l’affaire 213 mais ni lui ni aucun autre conseil du
Cambodge n’a réellement analysé cette «manière particulière». C’est à cette tâche que mon
collègue M. McRae et moi-même allons nous atteler, avant et après le déjeuner.
210
Supplément d’information de la Thaïlande, p. 91, par. 3.30-3.31.
211Ibid., p. 91, par. 3.30-3.31.
212CR 2013/1, p. 48, par. 45 (Berman), citant C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 48.
213
CR 2013/1, p. 51, par. 50 (Berman). - 62 -
11. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, la Cour a tranché la question
de la souveraineté sur le temple en examinant certains documents notamment, mais pas
seulement, la carte et certains événements notamment, mais pas seulement, la visite du
prince puis, en ce qui concerne chacun de ces éléments, en s’interrogeant sur la manière dont la
Thaïlande y avait réagi. Selon la Cour, ce qu’il y avait de frappant dans toutes ces considérations,
c’est ce qu’elles permettaient d’apprendre de différentes manières, mais chacune clairement et
dans le même sens sur la question de la souveraineté sur le temple. Ce qu’il y avait de frappant
dans la pratique de la Thaïlande à l’époque, c’est l’absence de réaction de cet Etat. Du point de vue
de la souveraineté, la Thaïlande n’a réagi à aucun document ou événement que la Cour a examiné.
Ce silence de la Thaïlande a eu des conséquences juridiques, qui se sont révélées déterminantes
pour répondre à l’unique question à laquelle la Cour devait répondre.
12. Dans la suite de cet exposé, je reviendrai sur les différents éléments de preuve, et
rappellerai la manière dont la Cour les a utilisés pour trancher la question de la souveraineté. La
Cour a expressément indiqué qu’elle n’utilisait pas ces éléments pour répondre à une quelconque
autre question (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 14) ; de surcroît, ainsi qu’il ressort clairement de la manière
dont elle les a utilisés, ces éléments ne permettaient pas de répondre à la question dont le
Cambodge, en la présente instance, soutient néanmoins que la Cour y a répondu avec l’autorité de
la chose jugée.
La visite du prince
13. Je commencerai en revenant, une fois encore, sur ce que la Cour a qualifié d’«incident de
loin le plus important» (ibid., p. 30). Au sujet de cette visite du prince Damrong au temple, la Cour
a indiqué ce qui suit :
o
[Projection n 4.]
«Le prince ne peut avoir manqué de saisir les implications d’un tel accueil. On
pourrait difficilement imaginer une affirmation plus nette de titre de souveraineté du
côté franco-indochinois.» (Ibid., p. 30.)
70 Titre de souveraineté sur le temple et, bien évidemment, sur le terrain sur lequel celui-ci est situé.
Comme on le voit, selon la Cour, il s’est passé deux choses au temple. Premièrement, le
comportement de la France, dont le sens était très clair et ne pouvait prêter à confusion. - 63 -
Deuxièmement, l’attitude du prince, qui n’a pas pu ne pas comprendre ce qui se passait. Il n’était
pas en mission clandestine. Ce n’était pas un archéologue secret. Le drapeau, le champagne
coulant à flots, le résident français en tenue d’apparat, tout cela constituait une affirmation par la
France du titre territorial sur le temple ; l’exercice public, par un Etat européen, des attributs de
l’autorité souveraine.
14. Le prince était un éminent archéologue, dont les écrits dans ce domaine étaient largement
publiés. Il avait mis en place les services archéologiques de la Thaïlande, le système des musées
nationaux, la bibliothèque nationale et l’Institut royal de cet Etat. S’il visitait le temple, c’était à
des fins archéologiques . Le résident français a d’ailleurs qualifié le prince de «grand savant» , 215
ce qui était tout à fait vrai. Surpris de voir un officier français en tenue d’apparat, celui-ci a réagi
avec toute la politesse dont son peuple est coutumier. Ce fut une cérémonie chaleureuse, un jour de
grande chaleur et, compte tenu de la nature de la visite, le prince n’aurait pas employé des mots de
protestation explicites. Au lieu de cela, il a demandé au résident s’il ne serait pas plus à l’aise en
216
troquant son uniforme contre un costume civil de couleur blanche . Cela n’a cependant pas suffi
à empêcher la Cour de conclure, en 1962, que la Thaïlande avait acquiescé à l’affirmation de
souveraineté de la France.
15. Ayant constaté la clarté du comportement de la France, la Cour a jugé que le prince n’y
avait pas répliqué, mais avait au contraire fait montre d’une courtoisie totale. Elle a donc conclu
217
que la Thaïlande n’avait pas répondu .
16. De cet «incident … le plus important», la Cour a tiré la conclusion suivante :
o
[Projection n 5.]
«Si l’on considère l’incident dans son ensemble, il apparaît qu’il a équivalu à
une reconnaissance tacite par le Siam de la souveraineté du Cambodge (sous
protectorat français) [sur le temple], du fait que le Siam n’a pas réagi en une
circonstance qui appelait une réaction tendant à affirmer ou à conserver un titre de
souveraineté en face d’une prétention contraire évidente [sur le temple].»
(C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 30-31.)
214Governor of Khukhan Province to Second Deputy Councilor, District officer of Nam Om, annexe 39 d),
C.I.J. Mémoires 1962, vol. I, p. 396.
215 Minute des allocutions prononcées lors de la réception de S.A.R. Le Prince Damrong à Préah Vihéar
(30 janvier 1930) : C.I.J. Mémoires 1962, vol. I, annexe LIII a), p. 520.
216
Mémorandum de Luang Boriban, 29 janvier 1930 : C.I.J. Mémoires 1962, vol. I, annexe 39 g), p. 403.
217Ibid. - 64 -
71 17. Sir Franklin a tenté de minimiser l’importance de cet épisode, d’en faire un événement
secondaire, observant qu’il n’occupait que quelques paragraphes de l’arrêt. Tel n’était pourtant pas
l’avis de la Cour : selon elle, cet «incident … le plus important» était loin d’être secondaire et, si
elle l’a traité succinctement, c’est, à n’en pas douter, parce que les faits n’étaient pas contestés
comme ils l’étaient en ce qui concerne la carte, dont on rappellera que le Cambodge a commencé
par affirmer qu’elle était annexée à la convention. De plus, la visite du prince Damrong figure dans
une partie importante de l’arrêt, qui porte sur les événements qui ont suivi la période allant de 1904
à 1909 (p. 27-33) ; cette partie est d’une longueur équivalente à la section précédente consacrée à la
carte (p. 21-27), et il ne lui a pas été accordé une moindre importance.
18. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, un représentant colonial
français accueillant un prince, quels que soient la hauteur du mât sur lequel sont hissées les
couleurs de la France ou la température du champagne, et quand bien même cette cérémonie serait
218
accompagnée d’une fanfare militaire avec cornemuses, tambours et saxophones , n’est pas
l’occasion idéale pour cartographier le tracé d’une frontière. Il est difficile d’utiliser un saxophone
comme borne frontière, la chose étant un peu trop mobile. Quoi qu’il en soit, tel n’est pas le
résultat que, selon la Cour, la grandiose cérémonie organisée par la France a permis d’atteindre. A
cette occasion, les Français ont affirmé leur souveraineté sur le monument que le prince était venu
visiter. Si estoppel il y a eu, il portait sur l’objet de la visite du prince, c’est-à-dire le temple et lui
seul. On pourrait appeler cela un estoppel par cérémonie, organisée pour la circonstance ! 219
19. Sir Franklin a tenté d’inscrire cet épisode «sous la rubrique des tentatives faites par la
Thaïlande» pour se soustraire aux conséquences de son «attitude … à l’égard de la carte et de la
ligne de l’annexe I» . Pourtant, en 1930, lorsque cet épisode s’est produit, cela faisait plus de
trente ans que le prince Damrong avait pris la plume, en sa qualité de ministre de l’intérieur
fonctions qui n’étaient plus les siennes depuis fort longtemps , pour remercier les Français de
218Voir Albert R. Rice, From the Clarinet d’Amour to the Contra Bass: A history of large size clarinets (Oxford
University Press : 2008), p. 303, où il est fait référence à une décision ministérielle du 19 août 1845 relative à
l’instrumentation des fanfares militaires françaises.
219Lettre en date du 14 février 1930 adressée au ministre français des affaires étrangères par la légation française
au Siam, supplément d’information de la Thaïlande, annexe 2, 21 juin 2012 ; voir l’examen de ce document dans le
supplément d’information de la Thaïlande, p. 184 à 185, par. 4.58 ; voir également p. 182, note de bas de page 451.
220
CR 2013/1, p. 48, par. 45 (Berman) (les italiques sont dans l’original). - 65 -
leur onze cartes . Sir Franklin, non sans avoir estimé que le fait de ne pas lire l’arrêt permettait de
222
72 gagner du temps , a soutenu que «[r]ien ne permet[tait] … d’affirmer, comme la Thaïlande croit
223
pourvoir le faire, que la Cour disposait d’autres éléments pour fonder sa décision» . Et pourtant,
cette décision aurait bel et bien pu être fondée sur d’autres éléments. Le Cambodge veut que vous
interprétiez le texte sans le lire !
20. De plus, c’est avec le plus grand soin que la Cour a, en 1962, déterminé la valeur
probante respective des différents éléments qu’elle avait pris en considération aux fins d’établir la
souveraineté sur le temple. N’en déplaise à sir Franklin, le texte mérite d’être lu. Après avoir
examiné le déroulement de la visite du prince, la Cour a indiqué ce qui suit :
«Ce qui semble clair c’est ou bien que le Siam ne pensait pas en réalité posséder
de titre de souveraineté ce qui correspondrait parfaitement à l’attitude qu’il avait
toujours observée et qu’il a maintenue à l’égard de la carte de l’annexe I et de la
frontière qu’elle indique ou bien qu’il avait décidé de ne pas faire valoir son titre,
ce qui signifierait encore une fois qu’il admettait les prétentions françaises ou
acceptait la frontière à Préah Vihéar telle qu’elle était tracée sur la carte.» (Temple de
Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 31.)
Examinons tout d’abord la seconde partie de la proposition, [projection n 7] celle qui commence
par le second «ou bien». L’expression «les prétentions françaises» renvoie ici à la «prétention
contraire évidente» manifestée par l’accueil réservé au prince par le résident français. Selon la
Cour, la décision du Siam de «ne pas faire valoir son titre» aurait pu signifier deux choses : soit que
o o
le Siam «admettait les prétentions françaises» [projection n 8], soit [projection n 9] qu’il
«acceptait la frontière à Préah Vihéar». «Ou». La proposition est ici disjonctive. L’expression
o
«admettait les prétentions françaises» [projection n 10] est distinguée de manière disjonctive
de l’expression «acceptait la frontière à Préah Vihéar». Contrairement à ce que soutient
sir Franklin, la Cour n’a pas dit que le silence du Siam face à la prétention contraire de la France
n’était pertinent que «sous la rubrique» de la carte ou de la frontière que celle-ci décrivait à
Préah Vihéar. La reconnaissance par le Siam de la prétention française pouvait être considérée
indépendamment de la carte. Celle-ci n’était donc pas inséparable de la question du titre sur le
temple.
221C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 24.
222CR 2013/1, p. 48, par. 45 (Berman).
223
Ibid. - 66 -
21. La même conclusion s’impose lorsqu’on examine la première partie de la proposition.
o
[Projection n 11.] Selon la Cour, au vu de la visite du prince, il était possible que «le Siam ne
pensait pas en réalité posséder de titre de souveraineté», c’est-à-dire de titre sur le temple. Cela
aurait, de la même manière, permis de trancher la question de la souveraineté. Et la Cour d’ajouter
que le fait de ne pas penser posséder de titre de souveraineté «correspondrait parfaitement à
l’attitude [du Siam] à l’égard de la carte de l’annexe I et de la frontière qu’elle indique». Suivant
cette formulation, ce n’est donc pas «l’attitude [du Siam] à l’égard de la carte … et de la frontière
qu’elle indique» qui étaye la conclusion selon laquelle le Siam pensait ne pas posséder de titre.
C’est l’événement principal c’est-à-dire la visite du prince qui étaye cette conclusion. La
73 Cour ne s’est donc pas référée à la visite du prince simplement «sous la rubrique» de la carte. C’est
la visite elle-même qui a permis d’établir l’attitude de la Thaïlande à l’égard de la souveraineté sur
le temple. Il s’agit d’un motif distinct de l’arrêt. [Fin de la projection.]
La carte de l’annexe I
22. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, la carte de l’annexe I a fait
l’objet de nombreux débats dans le cadre de l’instance initiale. Elle a engendré un travail
considérable pour les experts des deux Parties. Cela n’est pas surprenant. La carte avait, pendant
deux ans, fait l’objet de négociations entre les membres d’une commission mixte, négociations
dont les procès-verbaux n’étaient pas tous intacts, alors même que les travaux précis de la
commission étaient incertains . Cela a donc nécessité de longues discussions . 225
23. En ce qui concerne la carte, les enjeux étaient très importants. C’est qu’en effet, sur un
point, cette carte était claire. Quelles que soient la version ou les versions que les Parties aient pu
examiner, elle indiquait, sans aucun doute possible, que le temple appartenait au Cambodge. De
même que la visite du Prince a été l’occasion d’une manifestation on ne peut claire du titre de
l’Indochine française, «la carte situait tout à fait clairement [le temple] du côté cambodgien de la
ligne» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 26). Par symbole figurant sur cette carte, la France affirmait sa
souveraineté, et elle le faisait «tout à fait clairement».
22C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 17-20.
22CR 2013/1, p. 36, 48, par. 12, 45 (Berman) ; CR 2013/1, p. 71, par. 74 (Bundy). - 67 -
24. La Cour a examiné la réponse des autorités thaïlandaises à cette affirmation. La
Thaïlande considérait qu’«elle n’a[vait] jamais accepté la carte ni la frontière qui y [était] indiquée
(tout au moins en ce qui concerne Préah Vihéar)» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 21 ; les italiques sont de
nous). Elle a donc nié toute acceptation, du point de vue de la souveraineté sur le temple. Elle a
contesté que la commission de délimitation pût valablement prendre une quelconque décision
équivalent à une «déviation [de la ligne de partage des eaux] situant [le temple] en territoire
cambodgien» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 22 ; les italiques sont de nous). A cela, la Cour a répondu
que les Parties pouvaient valablement prendre des décisions ayant pour effet de situer le temple en
territoire cambodgien, et je la cite : «les gouvernements avaient … le pouvoir d’adopter de telles
déviations» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 22).
74 25. Je relèverai que la Cour parlait de déviations par rapport à la ligne, et non de la
substitution d’une délimitation cartographique à une délimitation énoncée dans un instrument
conventionnel. Mais rien n’arrête le Cambodge. Soit on s’est écarté spécifiquement de la ligne
prévue dans la convention pour régler la question du temple, soit c’est la carte de l’annexe I toute
entière qui, dans toute son arbitraire splendeur, a remplacé ladite ligne, et ce, malgré le refus
explicite de la Cour de se prononcer en ce sens dans le dispositif de son arrêt.
26. Dans l’instance initiale, la Thaïlande a également soutenu qu’«une attitude purement
passive … ne saurait suffire à établir qu’elle consentait qu’on s’écartât pour Préah Vihéar de la
ligne de partage des eaux» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 22 ; les italiques sont de nous). Elle a contesté
que le silence qu’elle observé en prenant connaissance de la carte fût si significatif qu’il lui faisait
perdre un titre sur le temple qu’elle tenait de la convention. La Cour a répondu que ce silence était
significatif parce que, premièrement, les autorités thaïlandaises étaient des «personnalités
officielles siamoises de haut rang» qui «connaissaient Préah Vihéar» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 25 ;
les italiques sont de nous) elles connaissaient le temple et, deuxièmement, «la carte situait
tout à fait clairement [le temple] du côté cambodgien de la ligne» (C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 26) ; il
donc aurait fallu être aveugle pour ne pas le voir. Selon la Cour, ces autorités «n’ont réagi ni à
l’époque ni pendant de nombreuses années et l’on doit, de ce fait, conclure à leur acquiescement»
(C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 23). Dans le cas où l’on aurait pu et dû s’exprimer, le silence vaut
consentement. - 68 -
27. Or, le consentement dans un tel contexte n’a aucun sens si l’objet sur lequel il porte n’est
pas clair. Le silence de la Thaïlande se rapportait à une affirmation tout à fait claire. Lorsqu’elle a
eu l’occasion de dire quelque chose à propos du temple, la Thaïlande n’a rien eu à dire ; ce que la
carte disait à propos du temple, elle ne pouvait plus le contester.
28. La question qui se posait dans l’affaire initiale était de savoir lequel des deux Etats
détenait la souveraineté sur le temple. Quant à l’autre question, celle de la frontière, à laquelle la
Cour a refusé de répondre en 1962 et que le Cambodge cherche à présent à lui poser de nouveau,
les éléments de preuve modernes confirment ce qui était déjà clair auparavant, à savoir que la carte
ne donne pas de réponse.
29. La Thaïlande a présenté des éléments de preuve cartographiques modernes pour montrer
les problèmes insurmontables que pose la transposition sur le terrain de la frontière représentée sur
226
la carte de l’annexe I , et vous avez vu les illustrations que vous a présentées Mme Miron. Le
75 Cambodge n’a aucun argument sérieux à opposer à cela . Certes, M. Bundy a exhorté la Cour à
228
ne pas tenir compte de ce qu’il qualifie de documents «datant d’après l’arrêt» , mais le problème
de la transposition des lignes figurant sur la carte a bel et bien été soulevé dans le cadre de
229
l’instance initiale. La Thaïlande a soulevé ce problème ; le Cambodge en a débattu avec elle . Le
problème de la transposition a donc été abordé par les deux Parties à l’époque, alors qu’il ne l’a pas
été par le Cambodge dans la présente instance : il y a eu débat. Vous avez entendu M. Bundy
éluder le problème de la transposition en quelques mots à peine, et encore moins d’illustrations
graphiques : il ne sait que trop bien que la transposition de la frontière de la carte de l’annexe I
pourrait facilement se traduire par la souveraineté de la Thaïlande sur une partie de la plaine
cambodgienne ! Voilà qui en dit long sur le règlement des questions frontalières sous-jacentes par
226Unité de recherche sur les frontières internationales, université de Durham, «Evaluation de la tâche consistant
à transposer sur le terrain la frontière entre le Cambodge et la Thaïlande représentée sur la carte de «l’annexe I»,
octobre 2011, OET, annexe 96 ; à propos duquel, voir OET, p. 257-279.
227
Voir Supplément d’information du Cambodge (SIC), note de bas de page 14. Voir également SIC, p. 16-17,
par. 1.25.
228
CR 2013/1, p. 69, par. 63 (Bundy).
229Voir OET, p. 210-213, par. 5.22-5.25, où il est fait référence à C.I.J. Mémoires, Temple de Préah Vihéar,
duplique du Gouvernement royal de Thaïlande, vol. I, p. 48 de la traduction française, par. 112, note de bas de page 1 ;
annexe n° 76bis, duplique de la Thaïlande (jointe aux OET à l’annexe 102) ; C.I.J. Mémoires, Temple de Préah Vihéar,
plaidoiries, vol. II, p. 457-458 (M. Dean Acheson, 22 mars 1962) ; ibid., p. 568-569 (M. Henri Rolin, 28 mars 1962). - 69 -
l’application de l’article 60 du statut ! Le rôle de la Cour est de régler les différends, pas d’en créer
de nouveaux.
30. La question mérite qu’on s’y arrête. La définition d’une frontière par voie
conventionnelle donne lieu à de nombreuses cartes. Certaines sont jointes au traité au moment de
la signature. D’autres y sont ajoutées à la suite de travaux de levé ou de démarcation. Certaines
clarifient considérablement la physionomie de la frontière ; d’autres, nombreuses, n’apportent
guère plus voire rien de plus qu’une illustration de l’emplacement de la frontière dans le contexte
géographique général. De toute évidence, la ligne de la carte de l’annexe I entre dans cette dernière
catégorie. Elle représente une frontière qui suit une ligne de partage des eaux, ce que nous savions
déjà d’après le texte de la convention. Au-delà de cela, en raison des nombreuses et importantes
erreurs dans la description topographique qu’elle contient, cette carte ne saurait servir de base pour
situer la frontière sur le terrain. Ainsi qu’il est démontré dans le rapport de l’IBRU, toute tentative
de transposer sur le terrain la ligne représentée sur la carte de l’annexe I se traduirait par une
frontière qui ne suivrait presque pas du tout la ligne de partage des eaux, zigzaguant de haut en bas
de la chaîne des Dangrek, tel un grenadier en état d’ébriété ; un grenadier qui devrait toutefois être
très sportif, pour monter et descendre ainsi l’escarpement. Comme on le voit, tout cela n’est guère
pratique, une manière d’antithèse de ce que le commandant Bernard appelait de ses vœux lors de la
première séance de la commission mixte en 1904 : «Il est de première nécessité d’avoir avant tout
une frontière visible et connue de tous.»30
76 Monsieur le président, le moment me semble venu de faire une pause pour un sandwich.
Le PRESIDENT : La Cour se réunira cet après-midi à 15 heures pour entendre la suite des
plaidoiries du Royaume de Thaïlande. La séance est levée.
L’audience est levée à 13 heures.
___________
230Contre-mémoire de la Thaïlande, 29 septembre 1961, par. 77, C.I.J. Mémoires 1962, p. 195.
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