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CR 2010/2 (traduction)

CR 2010/2 (translation)

Lundi 19 avril 2010 à 15 heures

Monday 19 April 2010 at 3 p.m. - 2 -

8 The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The hearing is open. I first

wish to announce that the President, for compelli ng reasons, is unable to sit in the case this

afternoon. We shall now hear the continuation of the first round of oral argument of the Republic

of Guinea. J’appelle à la barre M. Sam Wordsworth. Monsieur Wordsworth, vous avez la parole.

M. WORDSWORTH :

V. V IOLATION PAR LA RDC DES DROITS PROPRES DE M. D IALLO

EN TANT QU ’ACTIONNAIRE (ASSOCIÉ )

1. Monsieur le vice-président, Messieurs de la Cour, c’est un honneur pour moi que de

plaider devant vous en la présente affaire. Celle-ci, en effet, met en jeu deux questions importantes

concernant la nature et l’étendue de l’ingérence devant être constatées pour qu’un Etat soit jugé

internationalement responsable des dommages subis par un étrange r se trouvant, ou s’étant trouvé,

sur son territoire.

2. La première de ces questions ⎯dont il m’appartient de traiter ⎯ a été abordée par la

Cour dans sa décision en l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power

Company, Limited (Belgique c. Espagne), deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970, p. 3) 1; elle a

été examinée (bien que de manière quelque peu elliptique) par la Chambre constituée en l’affaire

de l’ ELSI ( Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (Eta ts-Unis d’Amérique cI.talie), arrêt,

C.I.J. Recueil 1989, p.15) et elle l’a également été par la Cour, aux fins d’établir sa compétence,

dans son arrêt du 24 mai 2007. Il s’agit de la question de l’ingérence de l’Etat dans les droits d’un

actionnaire ou, dans ce cas précis, dans les droits d’un associé ⎯ car il s’agit, en l’espèce, de droits

afférents à une «société privée à responsabilité lim itée» («SPRL»). La seconde question, qui sera

examinée par M.DanielMüller, c oncerne l’ingérence de l’Etat dans les droits de propriété d’un

étranger et offre à la Cour une occasion rare, et l’on pourrait même dire précieuse, de sceller la

question de la nature et de l’étendue de l’ingére nce devant être constatées pour qu’il puisse être

conclu qu’il y a eu expropriation en droit international.

1Voir également Agrotexim et autres c. Grèce (1996) 21, Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, p.282,

par. 62. - 3 -

3. La position adoptée par la RDC est, dans les grandes lignes, la même pour ces deux

questions : après son expulsion, nous dit-on, M. Diallo a conservé tous ses droits en tant qu’associé,

tout comme il a conservé ses parts sociales elles-mêmes dans ses deux sociétés. S’il n’a pas exercé

9 ces droits après son expulsion, c’est là son choix, et non un motif d’engagement de la responsabilité

internationale de la RDC. Dans les deux cas, notre réplique, dans ses grandes lignes, est elle aussi

la même : les juridictions internationales ont i nvariablement abordé d’un point de vue pragmatique

la question de savoir s’il y avait eu privation de droits et, de même que, s’agissant d’une

réclamation concernant une expropriation, l’on ne saurait, dans cette optique, répondre que

l’actionnaire reste le propriétaire effectif d’actions devenues sans valeur, l’on ne saurait, s’agissant

d’une réclamation concernant les droits d’un actionnaire, répondre que cet actionnaire conserve des

droits théoriques qui, en conséquence des fa its illicites commis par l’Etat en cause (une

conséquence voulue et anticipée), ne peuvent en réalité être exercés.

4. La RDC a aussi ⎯ tardivement ⎯ adopté une autre ligne de défense, consistant à arguer

que l’une des deux sociétés de M. Diallo, Africom-Zaïre, n’existait plus au moment de l’arrestation

et de l’expulsion de l’intéressé. Cet argument, qui a été présenté pour la première fois lors des

audiences sur les exceptions préliminaires tenues en novembre2006, va à l’encontre de ce que la

RDC avait affirmé dans ses premières pièces de procédure, et même des décisions de ses propres

tribunaux. C’est là un point dont M.Pelle t traitera plus tard dans la journée ⎯par la voix, bien

sûr, de M.Thouvenin ⎯, autre illustration, peut-être, du fait que c’est la réalité sous-jacente qui

compte, et non l’apparence extérieure. Quoi qu’il en soit, dans ma plaidoirie, je partirai du principe

que M.Diallo détenait des droits en tant qu’asso cié des deux sociétés à la date à laquelle il a été

expulsé de RDC.

5. J’examinerai ensuite les trois droits spécifiques de l’associé en jeu en l’espèce :

a) le droit de prendre part et de voter aux assemblées générales des deux sociétés ;

b) le droit de nommer le gérant, responsable de la SPRL ; et

c) le droit de surveiller et de contrôler les actes du gérant et les opérations des sociétés.

6. La nature précise de ces droits est celle établie par le droit interne de la RDC. C’est ce qui

ressort du paragraphe64 de l’arrêt du 24mai200 7, dans lequel la Cour a jugé que «l’acte

internationalement illicite revient, dans le cas de l’associé ou de l’actionnaire, à la violation par - 4 -

l’Etat défendeur des droits propres de celui-ci dans sa relation avec la personne morale, droits

propres qui sont définis par le droit interne de cet Etat». Mais la Cour ne manquera pas de

constater que les droits sur lesquels s’appuie la Guinée en l’espèce sont les droits de participation et

de contrôle du fonctionnement de la société gé néralement (si ce n’est universellement) reconnus

2
aux actionnaires par le droit interne des Etats . En l’espèce, la principale source de droit interne est

10 le décret du 27février1887 sur les sociétés commerciales dont j’ai reproduit les principales

dispositions dans le plan de plaidoirie qui, je l’espère, se sera frayé un chemin jusqu’à votre table.

Articles 78-79 du décret de 1887

7. Je vais commencer par le droit de prendre part aux assemblées générales et de voter, droit

revêtant une importance fondamentale et évidente et, bien sûr, l’un de ceux que la Cour a

expressément mentionnés à titre d’exemple dans l’affaire de la Barcelona Traction (par. 47).

a) L’article 78 du décret de 1887, reproduit au paragraphe 2 a) de mon plan de plaidoirie, confère

à l’assemblée générale «les pouvoirs les plus étendus pour faire…les actes qui intéressent la

société». Ainsi, les associés ⎯ agissant de concert dans le cadre de l’assemblée générale de la

société ⎯ jouissent des droits propres les plus étendus qui soient.

b) L’article 79, reproduit au paragraphe 2 b) du plan de plaidoirie, est essentiel en ce qui concerne

l’exercice de ces droits propres et la protection de tout actionnaire ⎯pas uniquement d’un

associé de SPRL. Cet article dispose que, «[n]ono bstant toute disposition contraire, tous les

associés ont le droit de prendre part aux assem blées générales et jouissent d’une voix par part

sociale».

c) Il y a là bien évidemment deux aspects: le dro it de voter, mais également le droit de prendre

part à l’assemblée générale. Dans un ex trait tiré du commentaire du professeurMakela,

figurant au paragraphe2 c) de mon plan de plaidoirie, l’ auteur commence par mentionner le

droit de vote, mais il écrit ensuite ceci :

«Attenda byce associés at general meetings is of major importance, as the
reports on the state of the company by the appropriate corporate organs (management,
auditors) and the discussion of vari ous plans are likely to enlighten associés about

2
Voir, par exemple, International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Vol.XIII Business and Private
Organizations, Ch. 2, Limited Liability Companies and Private Companies (1998). - 5 -

corporate affairs. In these general meetings each associé has a number of votes 3
proportionate to the number of parts sociales he holds (one vote per part sociale).»

Il s’ensuit que M.Diallo avait le droit d’être présent et de prendre part à l’assemblée générale

et, puisqu’il détenait ou contrôlait toutes les voix, d’exercer par le biais de cette assemblée les

«pouvoirs les plus étendus pour faire … les actes qui intéress[aient] la société».

d) Tout cela importe en l’espèce car l’aptitude de M.Diallo à exercer les droits conférés par les

articles 78 et 79 du décret de 1887 doit être examin ée au regard, également, de l’article premier

4
11 de l’ordonnance-loi 66-341 de la RDC, reproduit au paragraphe 2 d) de mon plan de plaidoirie.

Cette autre disposition avait pour effet d’obliger M.Diallo, qui souhaitait commercer en RDC

par l’intermédiaire de sociétés congolaises, à établir ses sociétés et leur siège en RDC et à

assurer la tenue des assemblées générales de ces sociétés en RDC.

e) En expulsant M. Diallo, la RDC a effectivement privé celui-ci de la jouissance de son droit de

prendre part aux assemblées générales des sociétés et de voter. Les assemblées générales

devaient se tenir en RDC; M.Diallo en av ait été expulsé; l’expulsion était définitive et

M.Diallo ne pouvait revenir sur le sol congol ais sans risquer, et même sans avoir la

quasi-certitude, d’être sévèrement sanctionné. L’ordonnance-loi de 1983 dispose en effet qu’un

étranger expulsé qui revient en RDC sera condamn é à une peine d’emprisonnement de un à six

mois, assortie d’une amende ; et, pour faire bonne mesure, il sera en outre expulsé au terme de

5
l’exécution de sa peine . En pratique, il était ainsi devenu im possible à M. Diallo de participer

effectivement et de voter aux assemblées générales de ses deux sociétés.

8. La RDC invoque à cet égard deux moyens de défense.

9. En ce qui concerne les faits, tout d’abord, elle affirme qu’aucune assemblée générale

6
n’ayant été convoquée, l’expulsion de M.Diallo n’ a entamé en rien son droit de participation .

Mais la RDC ne saurait assurément exciper du fait que M.Diallo n’a pas convoqué d’assemblée

générale quand une telle assemblée ne pouvait pas, au regard du dro it congolais, être tenue en

Guinée.

3 Roger Makela Massamba, Droit des affaires – Cadre juridique de la vie des affaires au ZaïreCadicec/De
Boecke Université, 1996, p. 303-304.
4
Observations écrites de la Guinée (OEG), annexe 35.
5
Voir l’ordonnance-loi de 1983, art. 21, Exceptions préliminaires de la RDC (EPRDC), annexe 73.
6 Contre-mémoire de la République démocratique du Congo (CMRDC), par. 2.12-2.13. - 6 -

a) en outre, ce n’est pas répondre que de dire que M. Diallo pouvait en théorie organiser la tenue

d’une assemblée générale en RDC, où il aurait voté par le truchement d’un mandataire. Si, en

règle générale, un associé peut en effet désigner un mandataire, la situation en l’espèce était

différente en ce sens que, selon l’article22 des statuts d’Africontainers 7, seul un autre associé

pouvait ainsi être mandaté — or, à la date de son expulsion, M. Diallo était, comme chacun sait,

le seul associé.

b) En tout état de cause, l’article81 du décret de 1887 prévoit que l’associé peut désigner un

mandataire 8. Mais le droit d’être ainsi représenté est un droit complémentaire reconnu à

12 l’associé. Ce droit est réduit à néant s’il de vient le seul moyen pour l’associé d’exercer son

droit de vote, et se transforme ainsi de fait en obligation. De plus, comme je l’ai déjà noté,

l’associé a le droit de prendre part — et non pas uniquement de voter — à l’assemblée générale

et, pour exercer concrètement ce droit important, M. Diallo devait bien évidemment être présent

en personne.

10. Ensuite, s’agissant du contenu du droit applicable, la RDC a avancé un nouvel argument

dans sa duplique, à savoir que M.Diallo aurait pu tenir les assemblées générales des sociétés en

9.
Guinée, nonobstant l’articlepr emier de l’ordonnance-loi 66-341 La RDC affirme à présent que

cette disposition a été introduite dans un c ontexte postcolonial donné et dans un but

spécifique ⎯imposer aux entreprises belges dont le principal centre d’exploitation était sis en

RDC d’établir aussi en RDC ⎯ et non en Belgique ⎯ leur siège administratif. Ainsi, soutient-elle,

la disposition en question ne s’ appliquerait pas d’une manière générale à toutes les sociétés

immatriculées en RDC 10. Cette affirmation ne s’appuie sur aucun précédent ni sur aucune autre

source faisant autorité. Elle va à l’encontre du préambule de l’ordonnance-loi 66-341, qui renvoie

au décret 1887 en termes généraux. Elle va aussi à l’encontre du libellé de l’articlepremier de

l’ordonnance-loi, dont l’application est bien de portée générale, et dont je vais vous donner lecture :

«Les sociétés [et non pas uniquement les sociétés belges] dont le principal siège
d'exploitation est situé au Congo doivent avoir au Congo leur siège administratif.

7 Mémoire de la Guinée (MG), annexe 1.
8
OEG, annexe 35, p. 236.
9
OEG, annexe 35, p. 244.
10Duplique de la République démocratique du Congo (DRDC), par. 2.19. - 7 -

On entend par «siège administratif» au sens de la présente ordonnance-loi, le
lieu où est établie l'administration centrale de la société [et non pas uniquement les

sociétés belges] et où se réunissent les assemblées générales et le conseil
d'administration».

11. Et il est certainement impératif, pour assure r l’exécution de cette loi, qu’une société ne

puisse, comme la RDC le prétend à présent, contourner celle-ci, en tenant dans l’Etat étranger une

assemblée générale dont elle ferait authentifier le procès-verbal par les services consulaires

congolais. Dans le cas contraire, les principaux cadre et moyens d’action dont disposeraient les

actionnaires belges pour exercer le contrôle sur le urs sociétés congolaises de meureraient basés en

dehors du territoire de la RDC, ce qui, nous semb le-t-il, est précisément ce que l’ordonnance-loi

66-341 visait à éviter.

13 12. Je dois ajouter, dans un souci d’exhaustiv ité, que, dans son cont re-mémoire, la RDC a

soutenu que le droit de convoquer une assemblée générale était un droit de la société, et non de

l’associé lui-même 11. Nous supposons qu’elle a renoncé à faire valoir cet argument car, ainsi

qu’indiqué dans notre réplique, le droit de réclamer la tenue d’un e assemblée générale fait partie

des droits fondamentaux de tout actionnaire en dro it interne. En ce qui concerne l’ordre juridique

de la RDC, ce droit est prévu à l’article 83 du décret de 1887, qui est reproduit au paragraphe 2 e)

de mon plan de plaidoirie: les associés détena nt au moins un cinquième du nombre total de parts

sociales ont le droit d’exiger la convocation d’ une assemblée générale, faute de quoi ils peuvent

évidemment saisir la justice congolaise. Peu importe que, dans l’usage, l’acte de convocation

émane, matériellement, de la gérance de la société.

Article 65 du décret de 1887

13. J’en viens maintenant à l’article65, qui est reproduit au paragraphe3 du plan de

plaidoirie que je vous ai communiqué. Cet article énonce le droit qu’a une assemblée générale

⎯autrement dit le droit des associés lorsqu’ils sont réunis dans un tel cadre ⎯ de nommer le

gérant, c’est-à-dire, bien sûr, le responsable de la société. Là encore, il s’agit d’un important droit

de participation au contrôle de la société. M. Diallo, qui, en définitive, se trouvait être l’unique

associé des deux sociétés, avait le droit de nomme r gérant la personne de son choix, lui-même

compris. Et, comme c’est on ne peut plus souvent le cas pour les SPRL, M.Diallo s’est en effet

11
CMRDC, par. 2.14. - 8 -

12
nommé lui-même gérant, et ce, pour une durée illimitée , ainsi que l’y autorisait l’article 67 du

décret de 1887 1, qui, d’ailleurs, énonce à cet effet des garanties.

14. La dernière fois qu’elle a plaidé devant vous, la RDC a reconnu que l’article 65 énonçait

14
un droit propre de l’associé , et le paragraphe53 de l’arrê t du 24mai2007 consigne la position

qu’elle avait exprimée à l’audience de novembre2006, à savoir que M.Diallo ⎯ en tant

qu’associé ⎯ avait le droit d’être nommé gérant et le droit de ne pas être révoqué sans motif. Et

néanmoins, dans son contre-mémoire, la RDC adopte la position inverse, affirmant que l’article 65

15
énonce le droit de la société de nommer le gérant , créant ainsi une confusion entre le droit de

l’assemblée générale ⎯ autrement dit le droit des associés ⎯ et les droits de la société. Toutefois,

14 les droits de l’associé ne changent pas de nature du seul fait qu’ils sont exercés non pas

individuellement mais collectivement, dans le cadre de l’assemblée générale, et rien, sur le plan des

principes, ne peut venir fonder la nouvelle thèse de la RDC prétendant le contraire.

15. La RDC, dans sa duplique, met surtout en exergue le fait qu’un certain M.N’Kanza

aurait été nommé gérant d’Africontaine rs après l’expulsion de M.Diallo 16. Ainsi, soutient-elle

dans un style assez pittoresque, M. Diallo pouvait exercer ses droits en vertu de l’article 65, et il l’a

fait. Or, ce n’est pas là la question, et, en tout état de cause, cette assertion est fausse.

16. L’important, c’est que, à la suite de sa déten tion et de son expulsion, et en violation de

l’article 65, M. Diallo a été privé du droit de nommer le gérant de son choix ⎯ à savoir lui-même.

Concrètement, et conformément aux desseins de la RDC, il ne pouvait plus, depuis la Guinée,

remplir les fonctions de gérant. Que M.Diallo ait, pour des raisons pratiques, été contraint de

nommer gérant une tierce personne ne changerait rien en ce qui concerne la question de l’ingérence

dans le droit énoncé par l’article 65 : l’associé n’ en aurait pas moins été privé du droit de nommer

le gérant de son choix ⎯ c’est-à-dire lui-même.

17. Toutefois, dans les faits, il n’y a pas eu de nomination d’un nouveau gérant.

12MG, annexe 3.
13
OEG, annexe 35, p. 235, seconde colonne.
14
CR 2006/52, p. 10-11, par. 7.
15CMRDC, par. 2.08-2.09.

16DRDC, par. 2.7. - 9 -

a) si, dans une lettre du 12février1996 reçue d es avocats d’Africontainers, M.N’Kanza est

présenté comme gérant 17, rien ne donne à entendre que se serait tenue avant cette date une

assemblée générale extraordinaire, conformément aux prescriptions du décret de 1887 18, dont le

procès-verbal aurait été authentifié. Cela, du reste, irait à l’encontre de la propre argumentation

de la RDC, selon laquelle M.Diallo n’a pas convoqué, ni cherché à convoquer, d’assemblée

19
générale .

b) en outre, dans des sources ultérieures, M. N’Kanza n’est pas présenté comme gérant, mais

comme «directeur d’exploitation» ; parallèlement, c’est MD . iallo ⎯ et non pas

M. N’Kanza ⎯ qui signe les lettres envoyées en RDC depuis la Guinée en tant que PDG

d’Africontainers, ou autrement dit, que gérant 21. C’est M.Diallo que, dans sa décision du

15 20 juin 2002, la Cour d’appel de Kinshasa/Gombe présente comme l’associé-gérant

22
d’Africontainers . Et M. Diallo a expliqué, dans la déposition qu’il a faite dans le cadre de la

présente espèce, qu’il n’avait pas nommé de nouveau gérant, et aurait été bien en peine de le

23
faire, en raison, notamment, de son expulsion .

18. Au vu des éléments de preuve, il s’av ère donc que M.N’Kan za n’a pas été nommé

gérant d’Africontainers ⎯ et n’aurait de fait pu l’être ; l’eût-il été, toutefois, qu’il n’y en aurait pas

moins eu violation des droits propres de M.Diallo en tant qu’associé ⎯violation du droit de

l’unique associé de nommer le gérant de son choix.

Articles 71 et 75 du décret de 1887

19. J’en viens au troisième et dernier dro it propre de M.Diallo qu’invoque la Guinée en

l’espèce, à savoir le droit qu’a l’associé de surveill er et de contrôler les actes de la SPRL, en

application des articles 71 et 75 du décret de 1887.

17MG, annexe 201.

18Voir art. 65, 67, 84 et 87 du décret de 1887. OEG, annexe 35.
19
CMRDC, par. 2.12-2.13.
20 e
MG, annexe 213, 4 page.
21MG, annexe 219.

22EPRDC, annexe 64, 4 page.

23RG, annexe 1, réponse à la question 32. - 10 -

20. L’article71, qui est reproduit au paragraphe4 a) du plan de plaidoirie que je vous ai

communiqué, confère aux associés un droit spécifique de surveillance dans des circonstance
s bien

précises, à savoir dans le cas où leur nombre est inférieur ou égal à cinq. Etant l’unique actionnaire

de ses deux sociétés, M.Diallo détenait, en applica tion de l’article71, tous les droits et pouvoirs

conférés aux «commissaires». Ce droit de surv eillance est également prévu à l’article19 des

statuts d’Africontainers : «La surveillance de la société est exercée par chacun des associés.» 24

21. Le contenu de ce droit de surveillance est précisé à l’article75: «Le mandat des

commissaires consiste à surveiller et à contrôler, sans aucune restriction, tous les actes accomplis

par la gérance, toutes les opérations de la société et le registre des associés.» (Paragraphe 4 b) du

plan de plaidoirie.)

22. En conséquence, M.Diallo avait le dro it de surveiller et de contrôler, sans aucune

restriction, la gérance et les opérations de ses deux sociétés. Une fois de plus, parce qu’il a été

détenu et expulsé, M.Diallo a été mis dans l’ incapacité d’exercer ces droits contractuels

importants.

16 23. Je crois comprendre que si la RDC reconnaît que les articles71 et 75 définissent en

théorie des droits de l’associé, elle affirme né anmoins que, en l’espèce, M.Diallo n’était pas

titulaire de ces droits, et ce, pour deux raisons.

24. Tout d’abord, la RDC soutient que la géran ce et le contrôle de la gérance ne peuvent être

exercés par la même personne, à savoir M. Diallo 25. Je relèverai, bien entendu, que

a) cet argument est en contradiction avec la position de la RDC selon laquelle M. Diallo avait en

réalité nommé un nouveau gérant, M. N’ Kanza. Si cette position était exacte ⎯ et elle ne l’est

pas pour les raisons que j’ai déjà indiquées ⎯, cet argument tomberait immédiatement, du

moins pour ce qui concerne Africontainers. Reste que, selon la RDC, il y avait un gérant, dont

il relevait du droit propre de M. Diallo de surveiller et de contrôler les actes ;

b) en tout état de cause, et c’est là un point cap ital, la RDC invente une restriction qui ne figure

nulle part dans le libellé du décret de 1887 de même qu’elle est absente de la jurisprudence et

de la doctrine qu’elle a présentées à la Cour. Le libellé de l’article 71, l’emploi de l’expression

24
MG, annexe 1.
25
CMRDC, par. 2.10-2.11 - 11 -

«chaque associé», suggère sans ambiguïté que da ns une société dont le nombre d’associés est

inférieur ou égal à cinq, un associé détient les pouvoirs de surveillance et de contrôle du

commissaire, qu’il soit également le gérant de la société ou non. Cela est d’autant plus vrai que

26
l’article64 du décret de1887 prévoit qu’un associé peut également être gérant , que

l’article67 met ensuite en place des prot ections spéciales pour le gérant-associé 27, et que

l’exercice de cette double fonction est une pratique tout à fait courante au sein des SPRL, qui,

comme la Cour s’en souvient peut-être, ont été définies comme des formes hybrides de sociétés,

28
comparables à certains égards à de simples partenariats ou à des «sociétés de personnes ».

25. S’il peut sembler quelque peu artificiel de considérer que M. Diallo était un associé ayant

le pouvoir de surveiller et de contrôler les actes qu’il accomplissait lui-même en tant que gérant,

cela ne découle pas du droit congolais mais du fait que, dans le cadre de la protection diplomatique,

il est nécessaire de faire la distinction entre les dro its de l’actionnaire, qui consistent à surveiller et

17 à contrôler, et le pouvoir de gestion du gérant, qui agit en tant qu’organe de la société, comme la

Cour l’a relevé au paragraphe 66 de son arrêt de mai2007. Le fait que la Cour insiste sur la

distinction entre i)les droits de l’associé et ii)les pouvoirs exercés par le gérant est d’une grande

utilité, car il appert ainsi clairement que les droits propres de M.Diallo en vertu des articles 71 et

75 sont juridiquement distincts des droits de ges tion exercés par lui en sa qualité de gérant, et donc

d’organe de la société.

26. A cet égard, ce que la RDC ne dit pas ⎯ et ne peut dire ⎯, c’est que les droits prévus

aux articles 71 et 75 sont ceux de la société, et non de l’associé ; ce n’est manifestement pas le cas.

27. J’en viens brièvement au second argument invoqué par la RDC concernant les articles 71

et 75, argument connexe avancé dans sa duplique, selon lequel les droits de surveillance et de

contrôle sont conférés uniquement à des experts financiers (appelés commissaires aux comptes).

La RDC précise que le droit de l’associé se limite à participer à la désignation d’un ou de plusieurs

26
Voir OEG, annexe 35, p. 235, seconde colonne.
27 Ibid.

28 Voir Louis Frédéric, Traité de droit commercial belge , tomeV, éd.Fecheyr, Gand, 1950, p.877; voir aussi,
s’agissant de l’équivalent français de la SPRL, la «société à responsab ilité limitée» (SARL), PaulLeCornu, Droit des
sociétés, Montchrestien, Paris, 2003p.733; et Philippe Merle, Droit commercial. Sociétés commerciales , Dalloz,
Paris, 2000, p. 189. - 12 -

29
commissaire(s) aux comptes au cours de l’assemblée générale de la société . Une fois de plus, ces

affirmations ne sont étayées par aucune source faisant autorité, et peut-être n’y a-t-il pas lieu de

s’en étonner puisqu’elles sont en contradiction av ec les termes exprès de l’article71, qui prévoit

spécifiquement ce qui suit: «Si le nombre des associés ne dépasse pas cinq, la nomination de

commissaires n’est pas obligatoire et chaque associé a les pouvoirs des commissaires .» Compte

tenu du fait que les sociétés de M. Diallo comptaient moins de cinq associés et du libellé exprès des

30
statuts d’Africontainers , M.Diallo, en sa qualité d’associé, jouissait de droits propres de

surveillance et de contrôle.

Nature de la violation commise par la RDC

28. Tels sont donc les droits de l’associé au jourd’hui en jeu: les droits de participer à

l’assemblée générale et de voter à cette occasion, le droit de désigner le gérant de son choix, et le

droit de contrôle et de surveillance reconnu pa r les articles71 et 75. Je souhaite à présent dire

quelques mots de plus sur la nature de la violati on de ces droits par la RDC. Lors des audiences

consacrées aux exceptions préliminaires, celle-ci a en effet présenté l’affaire El Triunfo comme un

exemple «typique» d’affaire ayant pour enjeu une atteinte aux droits des actionnaires 31, et fait

18 valoir que la Guinée devait démontrer l’existe nce d’une violation du même ordre que le

remplacement arbitraire d’administrateurs de la société, la convocation d’assemblées générales

32
sans notification des actionnaires ou le déni d’accès à certains documents de la société .

29. Or, de même que les droits pertinents des actionnaires dans chaque cas découlent du droit

interne applicable, de même la question de la vi olation doit être tranchée par rapport aux faits de

l’espèce: il n’y a pas de critère général applicab le. En l’espèce, la tâche de la Cour est

relativement simple, la Guinée invoquant une violation sur la base des deux éléments suivants :

a) l’intention sous-tendant les actes de l’Etat , qui était précisément d’empêcher M.Diallo

d’exercer ses droits propres à l’égard de ses deux sociétés ;

b) les conséquences de ces actes, qui ont eu pour effet de réduire à néant les droits pertinents.

29 DRDC, par. 2.25.
30
MG, annexe 1.
31
Recueil des sentences arbitrales (RSA), vol. XV, p. 474-475.
32 CR 2006/52, p. 12, par. 11. - 13 -

30. En ce qui concerne l’intention, je souhaitera is me référer à la propre jurisprudence de la

Cour et, plus précisément, à l’affaire de l’ELSI. Dans cette dernière, la Chambre s’était concentrée

sur la question de l’intention que sous-tenda it les actes pertinents attribuables à l’Etat ⎯ en

l’occurrence, la réquisition des biens de la société ⎯ afin de déterminer s’il y avait eu ou non

violation des droits reconnus aux actionnaires par un tr aité bilatéral, à savoir le traité d’amitié, de

commerce et de navigation conclu entre l’Italie et les Etats-Unis. J’ai reproduit la disposition

pertinente de cet instrument ⎯le paragraphe2 de l’articleIII ⎯ au paragraphe5 de mon plan de

plaidoirie. Elle se lit comme suit :

«les ressortissants, sociétés et associations de chacune des hautes parties contractantes
seront autorisés, en conformité des lois et règlements applicables à l’intérieur des

territoires de l’autre haute partie contract ante, à constituer, contrôler et gérer des
sociétés et associations de cette autre haute partie contractante», etc.

31. Ainsi que sirArthurWatts et d’autres l’ont relevé 33, et comme cela ressort des

34 35
commentaires de MM.Lowe et F.A.Maan relatifs à l’affaire, la Chambre a considéré que les

droits propres des actionnaires étaient en jeu, le juge Oda ayant toutefois exprimé son opinion

dissidente sur ce point.

19 32. La chambre a abordé de façon pragmatique la question de l’exercice du droit de contrôler

et de gérer —le droit des actionnaires de contrôle r et de gérer—, et a jugé qu’«[i]l [était]

indéniable que la réquisition «de l’usine et des équipements connexes» d’une entreprise d[evait]

normalement équivaloir à une privation, du moins pour une part importante, du droit de contrôler et

de gérer» (Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (Etats-U nis d’Amérique c.Italie), arrêt, C.I.J.

Recueil 1989, p. 50, par. 70).

33. La Cour a ainsi jugé que la suppression, da ns les faits, de l’objet sur lequel portaient le

contrôle et la gestion entraînait une violation du dr oit de contrôler et de gérer. Contrairement à ce

qu’avance la RDC, point n’est besoin qu’il y ait eu violation de droits «classiques» des

33 «Nationality of Claims: Some Relevant Concepts», in V.Lowe and M.Fitzmaurice, Fifty Years of the
International Court of Justice , Grotius, Cambridge, 1996, p.424 et 435. ir également «Claims of Shareholders in
st
International Law», A.Cohen Smutny, in Binder (dir.publ.), International Investment Law for the 2Century, 2009,
p. 370 ; Z. Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims, 2009, p. 410.
34 Lowe, «Shareholders’ Rights to Control and Manage: from Barcelona Traction to ELSI», in Liber Amicorum
Judge Shigeru Oda, N. Ando et al. (dir. publ.) (2002), p. 269.

35 F.A.Mann, «Foreign Investment in the Inte rnational Court of Justice: The ELSI Case», AJIL, vol.86,
p. 97-98. - 14 -

actionnaires. Pour parvenir à cette conclusion, la Chambre s’est concentrée sur l’intention

sous-tendant l’acte prétendument illicite, déclarant que :

«Comme la réquisition avait donc pour dessein d’empêcher Raytheon

d’exercer, pendant six mois décisifs, ce qui constituait à l’époque l’un des aspects les
plus importants de son droit de contrôler et de gérer l’ELSI, la question se pose de
savoir si la réquisition était conforme aux exigences du paragraphe 2 de l’article III du

traité de 1948.» (Ibid. ; les italiques sont de nous.)

34. En l’occurrence, la Chambre n’a, il est vrai , pas conclu à la violation du paragraphe 2 de

l’articleIII, mais c’est parce qu’e lle a estimé que les actionnaires ne détenaient plus les droits en

question à la date de la réquisition. Elle a cependant examiné, à juste titre, le «dessein»

sous-tendant l’acte pertinent. La mê me approche a été adoptée en l’affaire El Triunfo — citée par

la RDC à l’appui de sa thèse— dans laquelle le tribunal s’est concentré sur l’existence d’une

«intrigue» visant notamment à «évincer la direction et prendre le contrôle des intérêts américains»

36.
[traduction du Greffe]

35. Le contexte factuel est, dans le cas de M. Diallo, relativement plus simple que dans celui

de l’ELSI, puisque les actes sous-jacents sur lesquels se fonde la Guinée ⎯ à savoir la détention et

l’expulsion ⎯ étaient dirigés contre M. Diallo lui-même, c’est-à-dire contre l’actionnaire. En effet,

M. Diallo — l’actionnaire — a été placé en déte ntion puis expulsé précisément parce qu’il détenait

et exerçait ses droits propres de contrôle sur ses deux sociétés. Il a é
té placé en détention et

expulsé, une détention et une expulsion dont le but était, précisément, de l’empêcher de les exercer.

36. Les preuves de l’intention sous-tendant les actes de la RDC sont pour l’essentiel de deux

ordres.

a) Tout d’abord, il ressort des éléments de preuve documentaires que l’on a cherché ⎯ avec

succès ⎯ à faire intervenir l’exécutif pour qu’il prenne des mesures visant à empêcher

M.Diallo de poursuivre les diverses instances introduites au nom de ses sociétés devant les

juridictions de la RDC. La détention et l’expu lsion de M.Diallo font directement suite à la

20 lettre en date du 29 août 1995 adressée au ministre de la justice par Zaïre Shell 37, dans laquelle

cette société demandait au ministre d’intervenir rela tivement à l’arrêt Africontainers

⎯ dont M. Vidal vous a parlé ce matin ⎯, ainsi qu’à la lettre de Zaïre Fina et Zaïre Mobil Oil,

36
RSA, vol. XV, p. 474.
37
MG, annexe 166. - 15 -

38
en date du 15 novembre 1995 . Compte tenu de la chronologie des événements ayant conduit

à l’expulsion, la conclusion selon laquelle l’Etat a agi pour se conformer aux souhaits des

sociétés pétrolières semble s’imposer. Le fait que ZaïreShell a ensuite réglé l’aller simple de

M. Diallo afin que celui-ci quitte la RDC est, pour ainsi dire, la cerise sur le gâteau.

b) Viennent ensuite les éléments de preuve directs de la position adoptée au sein du Gouvernement

de la RDC. M.AbdoulayeSylla, alors ambassadeu r de la Guinée en RDC, relate un entretien

avec le représentant du premier ministre, au c ours duquel on lui a fait clairement comprendre

⎯ rapporte-t-il ⎯ que si M.Diallo poursuivait ses réclam ations, sa situation allait s’aggraver

au-delà de tout ce qu’il pouvait imaginer 3. Or, il est intéressant de noter que la RDC n’a fourni

aucun élément de preuve tendant à réfuter cette déclaration.

37. Ce silence correspond d’ailleurs à la pos ition que la RDC a adoptée devant la Cour.

Ainsi que M. Forteau l’a indiqué ce matin, la RDC a soutenu, au moins un temps lors des dernières

audiences, que M.Diallo avait été expulsé dans le contexte et en raison des réclamations de ses

40
sociétés .

38. Voilà pour l’intention. En ce qui concerne les conséquences de la détention et, plus

particulièrement, de l’expulsion, M.Diallo n’a, en fait, pas pris part aux assemblées générales de

ses sociétés et n’a pas non plus voté, parce qu’il ne le pouvait pas. Il n’a pas exercé son droit de

nommer le gérant de son choix —à savoir lui-même— parce qu’il ne pouvait pas exercer

effectivement ce droit. Bien que les sociét és aient poursuivi une activité minimale après

l’expulsion de M.Diallo, la réalité est, une fois encore, que celui-ci n’a pas supervisé ni contrôlé

ces activités, parce qu’il ne le pouvait pas. Il est d’ailleurs révélateur que même les biens de ses

41
sociétés ⎯ il existe un inventaire des biens d’Africontainers à la date de l’expulsion , dans lequel

21 figurent plus de 100des conteneurs qui étaient au centre de son activité ⎯ aient été laissés à

42
l’abandon et aient disparu .

38 EPRDC, annexe 74.

39 RG, annexe 2, p. 16
40
CR 2006/50, p. 21, par. 25 ; CR 2006/52, p. 19, par. 8.
41 MG, annexe 199.

42 OEG, annexes 31-33. - 16 -

39. Ainsi que l’a indiqué la Chambre du tribunal des réclamations Iran/Etats-Unis en

l’affaire Yeager, «l’expulsion est par nature une mesure di rigée contre le demandeur lui-même.

Elle peut néanmoins, dans le même temps, avoir une incidence directe sur ses biens et droits de

43
propriété» [traduction du Greffe] . Cette conclusion s’applique parfaitement à l’expulsion de

l’associé et à la possibilité que celle-ci ait une incidence directe sur ses droits en tant qu’associé. Il

ressort des faits de l’espèce que l’expulsion visait le demandeur en sa qualité d’associé, et qu’elle a

directement, et inévitablement, porté atteinte à ses droits en tant que tel.

40. Monsieur le président, Messieurs de la Cour, ainsi s’achève mon intervention. Je vous

remercie pour l’attention que vous aurez bien voulu accorder à ces questions relativement

ésotériques du droit congolais des sociétés. Permettez-moi de vous demander de bien vouloir

maintenant appeler à la barre M. Daniel Müller.

Le VICE-PRESIDENT, faisant foncti on de présiden:tJe vous remercie,

Monsieur Wordsworth, pour votre exposé. I shall now give the floor to Mr. Müller. You have the

floor, Sir.

Mr. MÜLLER :

VI. E XPROPRIATION

Mr.Vice-President, Members of the Court, it is a great privilege for me to represent the

Republic of Guinea here before you.

1. My colleague Mr. Wordsworth has just shown that the Democratic Republic of the Congo

violated rights held by Mr. Diallo as associé in Africom-Zaïre and Africontainers-Zaïre, his direct

rights in relation to those legal persons 44. But, what is more, the actions taken by the Congolese

authorities against Mr.Diallo personally, and ag ainst the businesses of the two companies, were

such that they resulted in the outright expropriation of the parts sociales owned by him.

43Kenneth P.Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran , Iran-United States Claims Tr ibunal Reports (Iran-US CTR),

vol. 17, p. 99, par. 30.
4Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 606, para. 64. - 17 -

22 2. The rights being asserted by Guinea ar e not rights belonging to the companies ⎯ not

corporate rights which the Judgment on preliminary objections bars the Applicant from asserting

45
before the Court . What is involved here is purely and simply Mr. Diallo’s right of ownership, his

ownership, of the parts sociales in Africom and Africontainers. The question is therefore not

whether the DRC interfered with Mr. Diallo’s rights in relation to the legal entities ⎯ as the

[Respondent] would seem to suggest in its Rejoinder 46. Rather, it is showing that the DRC

infringed Mr. Diallo’s property rights in his parts sociales.

3. Mr. Vice-President, Members of the Court, the DRC is under a legal obligation, on a

number of bases, to respect Mr.Diallo’s ownership. First, the guarantee of private property is

solidly established in its domestic law. The Tr ansitional Constitutional Act of the Republic of

Zaire in force when Mr.Diallo was expelled unequivocally acknowledges that “individual or

47 48
collective property rights are guaranteed” . In its written pleadings , Guinea has also cited other

legislative enactments confirming this constitutional guarantee. There is clearly no reason to

withhold such a guarantee from Mr. Diallo because he is a Guinean national. On the contrary, the

Court made clear in its Judgment in 1970 in the Barcelona Traction case:

“When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals,

whether natural or juristic persons, it is boun d to extend to them the protection of the
law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them.”
(Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second
49
Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33) .

The DRC is therefore required by international law to accord Mr. Diallo the guarantee provided for

in its domestic law.

4. Secondly, the African Charter of Human a nd Peoples’ Rights, adopted on 27 June 1981 at
23

Nairobi, an international instrument to which the DRC has been a party since 1987, extends exactly

45Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 618, para. 98 (3) (c).
46Rejoinder of the DRC (RDRC), p. 23, para. 2.30.

47Art. 22, Journal officiel de la République du Zaïre [Official Journal of the Republic of Zaire], 35th year, special
issue, Apr. 1994. See also Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1Aug. 1964, Art. 43, Moniteur
congolais, 5th year, special issue, 1Aug. 1964; TransitionConstitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Apr. 2003, Journal officiel de le République démocratique du Congo , 44th year, special issue, 5Apr.2003; and
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Feb. 2006, Art. 34.

48Reply of Guinea (RG), p. 88, paras. 2.98 and 2.99.

49See also, Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1 Aug, 1964, Art. 46, Moniteur congolais (5th
year), special issue, 1Aug.1964 (“Every alien in the territory of the Republic shall enjoy the protection granted to
persons and property under the present Constitution, except where otherwise provided by national law.”). - 18 -

the same guarantee, as do other regional human rights instruments 50. Under Article14 of the

51
Charter: “The right to property shall be guaranteed.”

5. Finally, general international law also requi res States to respect the property of aliens in

their territory. Already in 1922 the Arbitral Tribunal established under the auspices of the

Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims case observed that “le droit

de propriété de l’étranger ami doit toujours être pleinement respecté” 52. Modern international law

formulates this obligation in negative terms 53: while recognizing a State’s right to take measures

affecting property rights of private individuals ⎯ this also being the case of human rights

instruments ⎯, international law subjects this to limits and conditions, to which I shall return a bit

later. We need only cite Un ited Nations General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) on Permanent

54
Sovereignty over Natural Resources , which reflects customary international law as it now

55 56
stands , and resolution 3281 (XXIX) , the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States; both

of these countenance some infringements of property rights through nationalization or

expropriation while imposing conditions on them.

6. In light of these various sources of the obligation not to interfere with property rights, we

cannot help but be taken aback by what Mr.Kalala said during the oral proceedings in 2006: he

suggested that, “if the DRC had expelled Mr. Diallo to prevent his two companies from recovering

24 the monies due to them[,]... the best solution would have been simply to expropriate the two

companies concerned” 57. As if it were as simple as that and the DRC were free to take property of

50
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Paris 1952, Council
of Europe, Treaty Series, No. 9, Art. 1; American Convention on Human Rights, San José, 1969, Art. 21, United Nations,
Treaty Series, Vol. 1144, p. 150 (I-17955).
51
African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ Rights, Art.14, United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol.1520, p.271
(I-26363).
52
Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway v. United States of America), Arbitral Award, RIAA, Vol. I, p. 332.
53
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, Judgment No .7, 1926, P.C.I.J., SeriesA,
No. 7,2.2. See also Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, Partial
Award, 17 Mar. 2006, paras. 255-262 (available on the PCA website,
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SAL-CZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306.p…).
54
United Nations, General Assembly, resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 Dec. 1962, point I, para. 4.
55
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company (Texaco-Calasiatic) v. Government
of the Libyan Arab Republic, Arbitral Award, Merits, 27 Nov. 1975, International Law Reports, Vol. 53, p. 389, para. 87.
See also, R.Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law”, RCADI [The
Hague Academy Collected Courses], Vol. 176, 1982-III, p. 293.

56United Nations, General Assembly, resolution 3281 (XXIX), 14 Dec. 1974, Art. 2, para. 2 (c).
57
CR 2006/52, p. 22, par. 20 (Kalala). - 19 -

its nationals or aliens without restriction. This is especially surprising inasmuch as the DRC in its

eighth, ninth and tenth periodic reports to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

on implementation of the African Charter plainly affirmed its commitment to respect for property

rights:

“The Constitution, in its Article 34, re-affirms that private property is sacred.
The State guarantees the right to indivi dual or collective property acquired in
conformity with the law or with custom.” 58

The DRC’s commitment to respect for private property stands in clear contradiction to Mr. Kalala’s

assertion.

7. Although the DRC obviously did not open ly and formally expropriate Africom and

Africontainers, the measures it took against Mr. Diallo ⎯ which my colleagues discussed this

morning ⎯ nevertheless infringed his property rights and resulted in the taking of his parts

sociales in the companies (I). But the DRC failed to comply with the conditions imposed by

international law on a State’s right to expropriate and thereby incurred international responsibility

for an internationally wrongful act (II). I shall elaborate on these two points in order.

I. The actions taken by the Congolese authorities amount to
the expropriation of Mr. Diallo’s parts sociales

8. So, the first question: do the actions taken by the Congolese authorities amount to the

expropriation of Mr. Diallo’s parts sociales?

Expropriation and property title

9. The [Respondent] says that they do not, relying on the fact that the property title

belonging to Mr.Diallo was never taken from him. It asserts in its Counter-Memorial that, “by

Guinea’s own admission, Mr. Diallo to this day remains the owner of his parts sociales” 5. Guinea

25
does not deny this. But the fact that title remains proves only that the DRC did not formally

expropriate Mr.Diallo’s property by means of a compulsory conveyance of title. This does not

however mean that there has been no taking.

58
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ministry of Human Rights, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Periodic Reports to the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights (period from July 2003 to July 2007), Kinshasa, June 2007, p. 38, para. 151 (available on the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights website: http://www.achpr.org/english/state_reports/DRC/DRC_State%20Report.pdf).
5Counter-Memorial of the DRC (CMDRC), p. 21, para. 1.38 and p. 28, para. 2.07. - 20 -

10. Indeed, ownership is much more than just the title creating and proving it. Ownership of

60
property instead consists of a “bundle of rights” , to quote a former President of the Court, that a

person may exercise in respect of a thing. T ogether, these rights establish the owner’s power over

61
his property or, as German legal scholars have called it, the “Herrschaftsgewalt” . In other words,

Mr. Vice-President, title to property is merely the wrapper enveloping the rights that define, and are

the reason for, ownership, just as a glass merely c ontains the water in it. A taking, the deprivation

of ownership, can thus just as easily consist of a conveyance of title ⎯ the entire glass is taken

away ⎯ as of the siphoning off of the content of title, of the rights of ownership ⎯ once the glass

has been emptied, it has lost its value.

62
11. International jurisprudence and the writers clearly confirm that expropriation does not

have to involve the transfer of title to property bu t can also occur even where title remains with the

owner. The Court in Strasbourg, in its leading decision on expropriation, Sporrong and

63
Lönnroth , thus stated, and I quote the 1982 judgment: “In the absence of a formal expropriation,

that is to say a transfer of ownership, the Court considers that it must look behind the appearances

26 and investigate the realities of the situation complained of . . .” 64 The Court in San José took the

same pragmatic approach when it stated in its judgment on the merits in the Ivcher Bronstein case

that it could not restrict itself to determining whether a formal expropriation transferring title took

65
place, but that it also had to look beyond appearances .

60R.Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law”, RCADI,
Vol. 176, 1982-III, p. 270.

61R. Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteignung und Entschädi gung im geltenden Völkerrecht , Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
New York, Tokyo, 1995, p. 150.

62See, inter alia, G.C.Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?”, BYBIL,
Vol.38, 1952, pp.307-338; B.H. West on, “‘Constructive Takings’ Under Intern ational Law: A Modest Foray into
Problem of ‘Creeping Expropriation’”, Virginia Journal of International Law , Vol.16, 1975, No.1, pp.103-175;

R.Higgins, “The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law”, RCADI, Vol.176,
1982-III, pp. 259-392; R. Dolzer, “Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property”, ICSID Review ⎯ Foreign Investment Law
Journal, Vol. 1, 1986, pp. 41 to 65; Y. Nouvel, “Les mesures équivalent à une expropriation dans la pratique récente des
tribunaux arbitraux”, RGDIP, Vol. 106, 2002, pp. 79-102.
63
Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Applications Nos. 7151/75 and 7152/75, 23 Sep. 1982, Series A, No. 52.
64
Ibid., para. 63, Series A, No 52, pp. 24-25. See also, Străin and Others v. Romania, Application No. 57001/00,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 2005-VII, para.42; Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], Application No.28342/95,
ibid., 1999-VII, pa.6; Vasilescu v. Romania, Application No2 .7053/95, ibid., 1998-III, para.1 and
Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece, Application No. 14556/89, 24 June 1993, Series A, No. 260-B, para. 42.
65
Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, 6 Feb. 2001, Series C, No. 74, para. 124. - 21 -

12. A great many arbitral awards confirm this, such as the Award in the TAMS case made by

the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: “[e]n droit in ternational, la privation ou la confiscation de

biens peut s’opérer à travers l’ingérence d’un Et at dans l’utilisation desdits biens ou dans la

jouissance des bénéfices qu’ils génèrent, même s’il n’ est pas porté atteinte au titre juridique sur les

66
biens” . In the Bayindir case, an arbitral tribunal set up under ICSID auspices similarly noted that

“il pourrait y avoir expropriation même s’il n’était pas porté atteinte au titre sur les biens” 67.

13. Thus, it does not matter that on paper Mr. Diallo is still the owner of the parts sociales in

the companies he founded in the 1970s, because the only decisive considerations in determining

whether there has been a taking are the actual effect s which the acts and omissions attributable to

the Congolese authorities had on Mr. Diallo’s property rights.

Expropriation and intention of the State authorities

14. Even if the expulsion had not been aimed at depriving Mr. Diallo of his property but at

68
“preventing him... from taking legal action to recover the debts due to his companies” , as the

Respondent has claimed, quoting rath er cavalierly from Guinea’s Reply 69, the State authorities’

27 intention is also without relevance for the determin ation of the existence of a taking. It is beyond

doubt that the DRC wished to rid itself of Mr. Diallo and his companies for reasons having

absolutely nothing to do with the public interest of the State and to do so through a completely

arbitrary process, as my colleagues and friends s howed this morning, but that has no bearing in

determining whether or not Mr.Diallo was expropria ted. It is the actual effects of the measures

taken on the property rights, and those effects alone, which matter. And this is confirmed by the

jurisprudence, from which I shall once again quote the TAMS award handed down by the

6Tippets, Abbet, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2,
29 June 1984, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports , Vol.6, p.225. See also, Harza EngineeringCo. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, Award No. 19-98-2, 30 Dec. 1982, ibid., Vol. 1, p. 504 ; Dames and Moore v. Islamic Republic of Iran
et al. , Award No. 97-54-3, 20 Dec. 1983, ibid., Vol. 4, p. 223 ; Thomas Earl Payne v.Government of the Islamic

Republic of Iran, Award No. 245-335-2, 8 Aug. 1986, ibid., Vol. 12, p. 9, para 20.
6Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Pakistan , ICSID, case No.ARB/03/29, Award,
27 August 2009, para. 443 (available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents /Bayandiraward.pdf). See also, Técnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexique, ICSID, case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Arbitral Award of 23 May 2003, para. 116,

in ILM, Vol. 43, 2004, p. 133 and Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Hungary, ICSID, case No. ARB/04/15, Award,
13 Sep. 2006, para. 63 (available on the ICSID website: http://icsid.worldbank.org/).
6RDRC, p. 20, para. 2.30.

6Ibid., para. 2.29. - 22 -

Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: “[l]’int ention du gouvernement est moins importante que

l’effet des mesures sur le propriétaire, et la form e des mesures de contrôle ou de l’ingérence est

70
moins importante que la réalité de leur impact” .

Expropriation and effects on property rights

15. We therefore need to take a closer look at the reality, rather than the mere semblance of a

title of property, in order to determine whethe r the acts attributable to the Congo deprived

Mr. Diallo of his rights of property, of the contents of the glass.

16. The concept of property is necessarily rooted in the domestic law of States and the

71
general principles of law . These contents consist of a numbe r of legally protected rights which

only the holder can exercise over his property to the exclusion of any third party 72.

⎯ First, he may use his property as he sees fit or ev en not use it if he so wishes. To give an

example, I can drive my car, I can even let someone else drive it with my permission of course

and I can decide to rent out my car. This is the usus.

28 ⎯ Then, the owner alone is entitled to the fruits, if any, generated by his property. I can freely

control the rent received for renting out my car. This is the fructus.

⎯ And lastly, the holder may control his property, ch ange it, transform it, even break and destroy

it and, above all, may dispose of it. I can thus change the colour of my car, get rid of the roof

in order to change it into a convertible –– th e weather in The Hague just now certainly speaks

in favour of such a change –– and I can also sell it. This is the abusus.

70
Tippets, Abbet, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, Award No. 141-7-2,
29 June 1984, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports , Vol. , . 25-226. See also, Phelps Dodge
Corporation, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No. 217-99-2, 19 Mar. 1986, ibid., Vol1 .0, .30;
Harold Birnbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No. 549-967-2, 6 July 1993, ibid., Vol. 29, p. 270;
Shahin Shaine Ebrahimi, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No.560-44/46/47-3, 12October1994, ibid., Vol.30,
p. 190; George E. Davidson v. Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No585-457-1, 5Mar.1998, ibid., Vol.34, p.3,

para. 106. See as well, A. Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of
Ghana, Jurisdiction and Liability, Award of 27 Oct. 1989, ILR, Vol. 95, p. 209; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A.
and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID, case No.ARB/97/3, Award, 20A ug.2007, para7.5.20 (available at
http://www.investmentclaims.com/); L.E.S.I. S.p.A. and ASTALDI S.p.A. v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria,
ICSID, case NoA.RB/05/3, Award, 1N2ov2.008, para.31 (available on the ICSID website:
http://icsid.worldbank.org/). To the same effect, see G.C.Christie, “What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under
International Law?”, BYBIL, Vol. 38, 1952, p. 309.

71Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., SeriesA/B, No. 76 , p. 18. See also R.Higgins, “The
Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law”, RCADI, Vol. 176, 1982-III, p. 270.

72Ibid. See also F.A. Mann, “Outlines of a History of Expropriation”, The Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 75, 1959,
pp. 190-191. - 23 -

This, in very classical terms, is the meaning given to Articles544 and 546 of the Belgian Civil

Code, to Article 544 of the French Civil Code, or to paragraph 903 of the German BGB and I could

73
go on . All these rights –– usus, fructus and abusus –– together form ownership. It follows that,

if the owner is deprived of the possibility of exerci sing his rights over his property, and even if he

still formally possesses his title of property, his rights of property have been violated: he has been

expropriated.

17. As early as 1961, in the draft convention on the international responsibility of States for

injuries to aliens, the Harvard Law School laid down, in Article 10 (3) (a) of the draft, that:

“A ‘taking of the use of property’ [the English expression ‘taking of property’ is
certainly more accurate and rather poorly rendered in French as ‘mainmise sur un

bien’], includes not only an outright taking of property but also any such unreasonable
interference with the use, enjoyment, or dis posal of property as to justify an inference
that the owner thereof will not be able to u se, enjoy, or dispose of the property within
74
a reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference.”

18. The jurisprudence of international arbitration, which forms an impressive corpus of

75
decisions regarding expropriation, prov ides further support for this conclusion . For the sake of

the argument, one has only to refer, somewhat arbi trarily I must admit given the vastness of the

29 choice, to the award of the tribunal set up under the aegis of ICSID in the E.L.S.I. case. In its

Award of November2008, the Tribunal, examin ing general international law on the subject,

recognized that

“[t]he effect of the State measure is equi valent to expropriation as soon as it restricts
the use which the beneficiary was intending to make of that right and/or reduces the
76
benefit it was supposed to produce” . [Translation by the Registry.]

19. In its Award concerning the claim lodged by Mr.Davidson, ChamberNo.1 of the

Iran/US Claims Tribunal also declared itself convinced that the Islamic Republic of Iran “a privé le

73
For other references, see F.A. Mann, “Outlines of a History of Expropriation”, ibid.
7Draft convention on the international responsibility of States for injuries to aliens, prepared by the Harvard Law

School in 1961, reproduced in R.Ago, First report on Stat e responsibility, A/CN.4/217 and Add.1, Ann.VII, Yearbook
of the International Law Commission, 1969, Vol. II, p. 142.
7See also Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Republic of Hungary , ICSID Case No.ARB/04/15, Award,

13 Sep. 2006, paras. 65-66 (available on the ICSID website at http://icsid.worldbank.org/).
7LESI, S.p.A. and Astaldi, S.p.A. v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID case No. ARB/05/3, Award,
12Nov.2008, para.131 (available on the ICSID webs ite at http://icsid.worldbank.org/). See alsoCompañia del

Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa Rica, ICSID case No.ARB/96/1, final award, 17Feb.2000, para.77, ICSID
Review ⎯ FILJ, Vol.15, 2000, p.194; Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Hungary, ICSID case No.ARB/04/15,
Award, 13Sep.2006, paras.65-66 (available on the IC SID website at http://i csid.worldbank.org/); Bayindir Insaat
Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Pakistan, ICSID case No.ARB/03/29, Award, 27 Aug. 2009, para. 443 (available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf). - 24 -

demandeur de ses droits fondamentaux de propriété, parce qu’il ne pouvait exercer aucun contrôle

sur les bénéfices générés par ces biens, ni en avoir l’usage ou la jouissance” 77. And the Tribunal

went on: “[m]ême s’il n’y a pas eu transfert de titre juridique, le Tribunal conclut que l’ingérence

du défendeur dans les droits de propriété du demandeur s’est muée en confiscation” 78.

20. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is exactly the same in the present case; the

Congo’s interference in Mr.Diallo’s property rights over his parts sociales can only be

characterized as expropriation. Indeed, despite th e fact that he still possesses the formal title to

property, and although he remains the holder of legal title to all the parts sociales in his two

companies, he is deprived of all the rights which are normally attached thereto and, consequently,

of the value of his property.

21. In its written pleadings, the DRC is only inte rested in the end of the story when denying

that one of the effects of Mr.Diallo’s unlawful expulsion was to expropriate his parts sociales in

the companies he had set up. However, the Respondent glosses over the fact that, on two

30 occasions, the Congolese authorities deprived Mr. Diallo of the use of his parts sociales. First, in

1988, when the Guinean businessman was apprehende d then imprisoned for a year in a totally

arbitrary fashion and without any legal basis 79, and then, again, just before his expulsion in 1995.

ProfessorThouvenin has already spoken about this this morning. Despite the fact that, in both

cases, these measures were only temporary, although the imprisonment in 1988 lasted for a year

after all, these interferences and the ensuing c onsequences had a negative effect on the value of

Mr. Diallo’s parts sociales. In fact, the result of his removal was that substantial debts could not be

recovered and that highly promising investment projects could not be realized.

77
George E. Davidson v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No.585-457-1, 5Mar.1998,
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports, Vol. 34, p. 3, para. 111. See also Petrolane, Inc., et al., v. The Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al. , Award No.518-131-2, 14Aug.1991, ibid., Vol.27, p.93; Seismograph Service
Corporation, et al. v. The National Iranian Oil Company, et al.Award No.420-443-3, 31Mar.1989, ibid., Vol.22,
p. 78 et seq. For other applications of this criterion, Tippets, Abbet, McCarthy, Stratton (TAMS) v. TAMS-AFFA
Consulting Engineers of Iran, Award No.141-7-2, 29June1984, ibid., Vol.6, p.225; Foremost Tehran, Inc., et al. , v.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No. 220-37/231-1, 10 Apr. 1986, ibid., Vol. 10, p. 243; Phelps
Dodge Corporation, et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No.217-99-2, 19Mar.1986, ibid., Vol.10, p.130;
Sola Tiles, Inc. v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No. 298-317-1, 22 Apr. 1987, ibid., Vol. 14,

p. 231.
7George E. Davidson v. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No.585-457-1, 5Mar.1998,
ibid., Vol. 34, p. 3, para. 111.

7RG, pp. 6-14, paras. 1.8-1.28. - 25 -

22. In this connection, it is important to reme mber that, legally speaking, Mr. Diallo was the

only associé of the two companies and their only gérant and, commercially speaking, their director,

which made his presence indispensable for their running. As a result of the DRC’s arbitrary

measures, he could no longer use th em, manage them and make them profitable as he intended.

Probably because the unscrupulousness shown by the authorities in their action against Africom’s

legitimate claims for payment made such an impr ession on him, he was never able to recover the

debts owed to that company, just as he was unable to have the judgment in favour of Africontainers

80
enforced , its execution having been “stayed”, following the intervention of the political

authorities 81. Although he regained the use of his pr operty, its value was seriously impaired.

These are certainly not consequences linked to “the chances and hazards resulting from general

82
economic conditions” , as was the case in the Oscar Chinn case.

23. Mr.Diallo’s expulsion in 1996 was the final blow, the coup de grâce dealt to his

property rights. Admittedly, and Guinea has never denied this, this expulsion only concerned the

person of its national without being directly aimed at his property rights. Yet as the African

Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has recognized, “the measures taken by the

31 Respondent State in the arrest, detention and sub sequent deportation of the victims ‘called into

question a whole series of rights recogni zed and guaranteed in the Charter’, including the right to

83 84
property” . Arbitration jurisprudence has also considered that expulsion measures are liable to

infringe property rights. This arbitrary measur e, at odds with the DRC’s obligations, deprived

Mr. Diallo, owner of the parts sociales in Africom and Africontainers, of their effective use and of

the control of his property, as Mr.Wordsworth explained a few moments ago. For, when the

owner is removed from his property, he is inevitably deprived of its use, of its usus, of the

80MG, Ann. 153.

81OG, pp. 19-23, paras. 1.45-1.55.

82Oscar Chinn, Judgment, 1934, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 63, p. 88.
83
African Commission on Huma n and Peoples’ Rights, Institute for Human Rights and Development in
Africa/Republic of Angola, Communication No.292/2004, pa ra.73 (emphasis added), in African Union, Twenty-fourth
Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2008, p. 148.
84
Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran , Award No.324-10199-1, 2Nov.1987, Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal Reports, Vol. 17, p. 99, para. 30; Jimmi B. Leach v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 440-12183-1,
6 Oct. 1989, ibid., Vol.23, p.237, para.18;A. Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre
and the Government of Ghana, Jurisdiction and Liability, Arbitral Award, 27 Oct. 1989, ILR, Vol. 95, p. 209. - 26 -

possibility of making it yield a profit. The African Commission rightly remarked that “[t]he right

to property necessarily includes a right to have access to property” 85.

86
24. Allow me to point out that, contrary to the DRC’s allegations , it is neither juridically

nor intellectually possible to treat the companies of which Mr. Diallo was associé and gérant on a

par with major commercial companies quoted on the stock exchange. I readily admit that the value

of the latter is influenced hardly at all or ve ry little by the presence or absence of one of their

shareholders or gérants in the State where they are establishe d. But the situation of Africom and

Africontainers was quite different: they were not major commercial companies quoted on the stock

exchange, but SPRLs, private limited liability companies under Congolese law, whose legal status

and régime are characterized by a very marked intuitu personae character. Mr. Diallo was at one

and the same time the only associé (direct or indirect) and the only gérant of the two companies. It

is he who ran and developed his companies’ affa irs. Without him, Africom and Africontainers

were devoid of any usefulness and value. If the parts sociales had been freely negotiable, which is

87
32 not the case , who would have wished to invest or purchase its parts and, by virtue of that, hold a

stake in companies which were deprived of their principal asset, Mr. Diallo, and which, by virtue of

the actions of the State authorities, no longer ha d any opportunity in a climate of hostility and

constraint to pursue their normal commercial activ ities? In reality, the DRC therefore not only

deprived Mr.Diallo of the use of his parts sociales, but also of every opportunity to exercise

control over his possessions and to sell them at their real value.

*

25. Mr.Vice-President, Members of the Court, even if the companies continued to exist

formally ⎯ which the Congo appears to question ⎯ the parts sociales of which Mr.Diallo

remained the formal owner are stripped of any r eal value owing to the actions of the Congolese

authorities. To quote once again the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, “ces droits sont rendus à

85
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v.
Nigeria, Communications Nos.15093, 128/94, 13094 and 152/96, pa ra.77, in Organization of African UnityTwelfth
Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1998-1999, p. 64.
86
RDRC, p. 21, para. 2.31.
87See Article 36 of the Decree of 27 Feb. 1887 on Commercial Corporations, OG, Ann. 35. - 27 -

88
ce point inutiles qu’ils doivent être réputés pour avoir été expropriés” . Mr.Diallo’s expulsion

definitively deprived him of the control and use of his rights of property. There is thus no doubt

that, this being so, Mr. Diallo’s parts sociales must be regarded as having been expropriated.

II. The expropriation carried out constitutes an internationally wrongful act

26. This expropriation, albeit indirect, de facto , or creeping, or all of these at once,

constitutes an internationally wrongful act attributable to the Democratic Republic ⎯ and,

Mr. Vice-President, this is my second point. Although the Respondent has not found it necessary

to dispute Guinea’s analysis on this question, a few words on it are certainly needed; I shall

nevertheless be brief.

27. As regards the question of attributing the expropriation to begin with, it has been

demonstrated this morning that the various m easures which, by their effects, ultimately

expropriated Mr.Diallo of his parts sociales are attributable to the DRC. This is the case of his

arbitrary, unlawful and unjustified arrest in 1988, as in 1995, and of his expulsion in 1996. All

89
33 these measures are acts taken by the executive . The expropriation of Mr. Diallo’s parts sociales

resulting from a combination of these acts attri butable to the Congolese authorities can but be

attributed to the same authorities. It is a composite act, “a series of actions or omissions defined in

aggregate as wrongful” 9.

28. Turning now to the second element on which every internationally wrongful act is based,

the violation of an obligation of a State under inte rnational law, I pointed out at the beginning of

this oral argument that international law does not prohibit expropriation, the infringement of

91
property, but places particular li mitations and conditions upon it . To comply with international

law, an expropriation, regardless of how it is characterized, must be made in the public interest, in a

8Starrett Housing Corp. et al v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et , Award No.ITL 32-24-1,
19 Dec. 1983, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports , Vol.4, p.154. See also, G.C. Christie, “What Constitutes a
Taking of Property Under International Law?”, BYBIL, Vol. 38, 1952, p. 311.
89
Art.4 of the Articles on Responsibility of States fInternationally Wrongful Acts, United Nations General
Assembly resolution 56/83, 12 Dec. 2001, Ann.

9Art.15, para.1, of the Articles on Responsibil ity of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ibid. Seealso
Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Hungary, ICSID case No.ARB/04/15, Award, 13 Sep. 2006, para. 63 (available

on the ICSID website at http://icsid.worldbank.org/).
9See para. 5 above. - 28 -

non-discriminatory fashion and in compliance with the law; it must also be accompanied by

compensation 92. Although under the current law of Stat e responsibility “[t]he characterization of

an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law” and is not affected by

93
its characterization in internal law , let me say in passing that, in principle, Congolese law fixes

the same conditions 94.

29. And yet, Mr. Vice-President, none of them has been respected in the present case:

34 ⎯ the DRC has never offered any compensation wh atever for the financial loss suffered by

Mr.Diallo. On this point alone, the DRC’s expropriation does not comply with the

requirements of international law, without it bein g necessary at this stage in the proceedings to

determine whether such compensation must be “just and equitable”, “appropriate”, “adequate”

or “full and entire” ⎯ in any event, it must exist, which is not the case here;

⎯ the expropriation of Mr. Diallo was not made for any public use motive and was done without

any respect for the rule of law. The expropr iation and destruction of the economic value of

Mr.Diallo’s property were a result of his rep eated imprisonment and expulsion, which were

motivated, at best, by the requirements of certain private interests and remain wholly arbitrary.

As ProfessorsThouvenin and Forteau demonstrated this morning, Mr.Diallo’s periods of

detention and his expulsion were themselve s incompatible with the [Respondent’s]

international obligations and completely without justification.

9Norwegian Shipowners (Norway v. United States of Americ a), Arbitral Award, RIAA , Vol.I, p.332; Certain
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, Judgment No.7, 1926, P.C.I.J., SeriesA, No.7, p.22; Metalclad
Corporation v. Mexico , ICSID case No.ARB/(AF)/97/1, Award, 30Aug.2000, para.99, ICSID Review ⎯ FILJ ,
Vol. 16, 2001, p. 194; Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Award, 3 Aug. 2005, para. IV.D.7 (available
on the website at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf); Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v.

Czech Republic , Partial Award, 17Mar.2006, paras.255-257 (available on PCA website at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1149); Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Pakistan, ICSID case
No. ARB/03/29, Award, 27 Aug. 2009, p4aa. (available on the website at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf); United Nations General Assembly resolution1803 (XVII),
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 14 Dec. 1962, para. 4.
93
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Art.3, United Nations General
Assembly resolution 56/83, 12 Dec. 2001, Ann.
94
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mini stry of Human Rights, eighth, nint h and tenth periodic reports to the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, implementation of the Afri can Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights (July2003 to July2007), Kinshasa, June2007, p. 37, para.151 (available on the website of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at http://www.achpr.org/francais/state_reports/DRC/rapport_DRC.pdf). - 29 -

30. The Democratic Republic of the Congo thus engaged its international responsibility and

Guinea is entitled to receive repa ration for the expropriation of the parts sociales of its national,

Mr. Diallo, in Africom and Africontainers.

31. These remarks conclude my statement. Thank you Mr. Vice-President, Members of the

Court, for your kind attention. At this point, I was supposed to ask you to give the floor to

ProfessorAlainPellet. But nature has interfered in our affairs. I am therefore going to suggest,

Mr. Vice-President, that you should give the floor to Professor Jean-Marc Thouvenin so that he can

read out the statement prepared by Mr. Pellet.

The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Mr.Müller, for your statement. I

think this is an appropriate time to take a tenminute break, after which I shall give the floor to

Professor Thouvenin. The session is adjourned.

The Court adjourned from 4.15 to 4.25 p.m.

35 The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed. I

give the floor to Professor Thouvenin to read the oral argument of Mr. Pellet. You have the floor,

Professor.

Mr. THOUVENIN: Thank you, Mr. Vice-President.

VII. R EPARATION AND ISSUES OF CAUSALITY

Mr.Vice-President, Members of the Court, my learned friend AlainPellet, trapped in a

distant land by the fury of the volcano Eyjafjöll — such a difficult name to pronounce — has asked

me to read his submission and to ask the Court to excuse his truly involuntary desertion. It is

therefore he who is speaking through me.

1. Mr.Vice-President, my learned friends have set out the internationally wrongful acts of

the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is for me to establish that those acts caused harm to

Mr. Diallo and that reparation must be made for that injury. However, in common with the other

members of our delegation who have spoken in turn before the Court since this morning, I am in an

embarrassing position: pursuant to Article60 of the Rules of Court, I am bound not simply to - 30 -

repeat the facts and arguments already containe d in the written pleadings; yet I cannot comply

strictly with that requirement because the Responde nt has not felt itself obliged to respond to what

was said in our Reply on the subject of the damage suffered by Mr. Diallo and of the causal nexus

between that damage and the violations, attributab le to the DRC, of his rights under international

law 95. This is in fact an important aspect of the case which has brought us before the Court, one

which cannot simply be made to disappear me rely because the Respondent has avoided addressing

it.

2. I shall revisit only very briefly the matter of the means of reparation, on which the DRC

has maintained absolute silence, since the only real issue in that regard is that of putting a value on

the injury. We have asked all along for this assessment to be deferred to a later phase of the case if

the quantum cannot be set in the negotiations between the Parties 96, and the Respondent has not

36
objected. Of course, one must not abuse the maxim “he who is silent consents”— or, more

formally put, the adage “qui tacet consentire videtur si loqui debuisset ac potuisset”. In the event,

however, I struggle to see how otherwise one might interpret the DRC’s silence on this point.

3. I must, on the other hand, despite the attempts by our opponents to circumvent the issue,

say a few words about the substance and origin of the compensable damage, which is the direct

consequence of the infringements of international law attributable to the DRC. It is therefore

helpful to touch briefly on what comprises the damage for which reparation can (and must) be

made in these proceedings before saying something about the means of reparation.

I. The compensable harm

4. In the operative part of its Judgment of 24May2007 on the preliminary objections, the

Court unanimously declared “the Application of th e Republic of Guinea to be admissible in so far

as it concerns protection of Mr. Diallo’s rights as an individual” and, by fourteen votes to one, that

the Application was likewise “admissible in so far as it concerns protection of Mr.Diallo’s direct

rights as associé in Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire” ( Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of

Guinea v. Democratic Republic of Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007,

95
See RG, Chap. 3, pp. 91-100.
9See MG, p. 7, paras. 1.17-1.18; pp. 73-74, para. 3.83 and Submissions, p. 108, para. 5.2, and RG, Submissions,
p. 101, para. 4.2. - 31 -

p. 618, paras. 98 (3) (a) and 98 (3) (b)). Conversely, by the same majority, it held “the Application

of the Republic of Guinea to be inadmissible in so far as it concerns protection of Mr.Diallo in

respect of alleged violations of rights of Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire” ( ibid.,

para. 98 (3) (c)).

5. Those decisions clearly have an effect in terms of the extent, or at least the subject-matter,

of the right to reparation on which the Republic of Guinea can rely: compensation is only payable,

in the present case, for the harm suffered by Mr. Diallo as an individual and as associé — the sole

associé — in Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire. On the other hand, since the Court rejected

the protection “by substitution” asserted by the Appli cant, reparation cannot be made to that State

for the damage incurred by those companies as such — on this account at least.

37 6. I do not think it necessary, Mr.Vice-Pres ident, to dwell on the various heads of

compensable harm. There are three of them:

⎯ reparation is sought first of all from the DRC for the damage resulting from the infringements

of Mr. Diallo’s human rights which are, patently, attributable to it;

⎯ the DRC must also make good the damage caused by the expropriation of Mr. Diallo, the sole

owner of Africom and Africontainers;

⎯ and also the harm he suffered in consequence of numerous interferences, described just now by

Mr. Sam Wordsworth, with his rights as associé.

A. The damage caused by the infringements
of Mr. Diallo’s human rights

7. First, then, the DRC has an obligation to make good the damage caused by the

infringements of Mr.Diallo’s most fundamental human rights at the hands of the Zairean

authorities: his successive totally arbitrary arrests in 1988 and in 1995-1996, the partial solitary

confinement imposed on him and his expulsion in circumstances which breached the requirements

of the law and of human dignity. These are blatan t violations for which Guinea is owed reparation

to compensate for the material and moral injuri es incurred by its national who, as Guinea’s Agent

pointed out this morning, had spent his entire adult life— more than 30years— in Zaire. The

same can be said of Mr.Diallo’s rights pursuant to Article 36(1) (b) of the Convention on

Consular Relations which, by the same token, de prived the Republic of Guinea of any opportunity - 32 -

to provide him in a timely manner with assistan ce under the Convention, to which both States are

parties — the DRC since 1976 and Guinea since 1988 97.

8. A word nevertheless about the slightly my sterious approach of our Congolese friends to

the personal possessions which Mr. Diallo had to le ave behind, being giving no chance to organize

their repatriation or sale before his abrupt expulsi on. The DRC notes in its Rejoinder that Guinea

38 asserted, in relation to Mr.Diallo’s personal effects, that “[t]his category does not raise any

98
particular legal problems” , and then, with its unparalleled ta lent for feigned indignation, is

surprised that we returned to this point in our Reply 99— merely in fact to point out that the

property thus abandoned as a result of the circumstances of the expulsion has never been recovered

by its owner 100. In any event, we note th e DRC’s comment that “[t]he matter was therefore settled

in regard to this category of property” 101and believe that we can read in it a promise of

compensation.

9. I cannot fail to note, however, on the one hand that the irony displayed by the Respondent

in this regard testifies to its indifference to Mr.Diallo’s rights— however well-established they

may have been— and the material and moral in juries their infringement caused him, and on the

other that, as can be seen from the inventory of those effects, drawn up without him being present

on 12February1996, the sums in question may be negligible to a State, but they are not to an

individual who had no other property — no other h ousehold effects, it goes without saying, since

he is the owner of significant securities interests— to which I shall return very shortly. What is

102
more, it suffices to cast an eye over this list to see that Mr.Diallo did indeed, as he has said ,

have to leave his adopted country without being able to take any of his possessions. However,

assuming that “[t]he matter [is] therefore settled in regard to this category of property”, I shall

97
See LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001 , p.492, para.74, and
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p.39,
para. 50 and p. 52, paras. 99-102. See also today’s oral submission by Professor Jean-Marc Thouvenin, paras. 27-30.
98
RDRC, p. 15, para. 1.48, citing MG, p. 55, para. 3.36.
99
Ibid., para. 1.49.
10RG, p. 54, para. 1.137.

10RDRC, p. 15, para. 1.48.

10RG, Ann. 1, p. 11. - 33 -

dwell on it no further. We formally take note of the fact, and would ask you, Members of the

Court, to take note of it also in your forthcoming judgment.

B. The injury caused by the infringements
of Mr. Diallo’s property rights

10. There is another kind of property, however, (likewise moveable property) of which

Mr.Diallo was deprived by the defacto expropriation, resulting from his expulsion , which

prevented him, the very same Mr.Diallo, from acting as the sole associé in Africom and

Africontainers with a view to recovering the debts owed to both companies, the entire proceeds of

which would have gone to him. It is moreove r not, I would emphasize, the rights of the two

39 companies which are in issue here but, rather, as Mr. Daniel Müller has also shown from a different

perspective, it is Mr. Diallo’s right of ownership which has been rendered nugatory.

11. Because, Mr. Vice-President, the sole purpo se of those arrests and those long periods of

incarceration was to intimidate Mr.Diallo and to have him abandon his efforts to recover the

amounts owed to his two companies, of which he was the sole associé and owner, and to manage

those companies. The same is true of th e ensuing “expulsion/refusal of entry”. Those

internationally wrongful acts have also, in a broa der sense, deprived Mr.Diallo of his right of

ownership, not only in his personal possessions but also, significantly, in his two companies. For

that is indeed what is at stake. In contrast to the situation in the Barcelona Traction case (and to

the usual situation in the contemporary world of business), both Africom-Zaire and

Africontainers-Zaire had a sole shareholder, a sole associé— the name matters little: they had a

sole owner.

12. The internationally wrongful acts of the DRC have deprived Mr. Diallo of his property.

It seems to me rather pointless then to wonder which of the rights of the two companies in question

Guinea is not entitled to protect. What is clear is that it is entitled to protect the rights of ownership

of which Mr. Diallo was unlawfully deprived a nd that, accordingly, the only issue which arises is

that of assessing the value which was attached to those companies, of which he was the sole

proprietor and which, before the acts to which these proceedings relate, had no debts owing to - 34 -

them, as Guinea, unrebutted, has stated 103. That valuation must relate to the moment at which the

internationally wrongful acts whose details we have been discussing throughout the day were

committed.

C. The injury caused by the infringements of Mr. Diallo’s rights as associé

13. Ascertaining which harm can be the subject of reparation on the basis of Mr.Diallo’s

direct rights as associé in Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire, on the other hand, involves

distinguishing between the rights of the associé and the rights belonging to the companies

themselves.

14. Unsurprisingly, the DRC expresses at the outset its resolve to be “extremely quick to

resist any attempt by the Applicant to slip into the debate before the Court on the merits of the

104
40 dispute any matters which the Court already clearly barred in its Judgment of 24 May 2007” , and

its indignation at Guinea’s continuing “blur[ring of] the distinction between ‘Diallo and his

companies’” and at its attempt “to reintroduce into the debate the question of the debts due to these

Congolese companies, an issue that the Court declared inadmissible in its Judgment of

105
24 May 2007” . These remarks show that the Respondent has failed— or is refusing— to

understand Guinea’s line of argument on this point.

15. While wishing it were otherwise, we ha ve, of course, taken good note of the Court’s

views on this matter— as I have just done once again, when I cited the last subparagraph of the

2007 Judgment. Yet that decision — which we naturally do not question — leads one, precisely, to

wonder what are the respective rights of, on the one hand, the associé — the sole associé, I would

again point out— and, on the other, his companies— bearing in mind, as the Court likewise

emphasized in the Judgment on the preliminary obj ections, that both the relevant companies are

sociétés privées à responsabilité limitée (private limited liability companies)— SPRLs—

“incorporated under Congolese law, i.e., companies ‘which are formed by persons whose liability

is limited to their capital contributions; which are not publicly held companies; and in which the

parts sociales , required to be uniform and in registered form, are not freely transferable’”, as

10RDRC, p. 1, para. 05.
104
Ibid.
10Ibid., p. 17, para. 2.04. - 35 -

stipulated by Article36 of the Decree of 27February1887 on commercial corporations

(AhmadouSadioDiallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary

Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 594, para. 25). This clearly has consequences for the

nature and substance of the recognized rights of associés, which Mr. Sam Wordsworth described a

short time ago, as did Mr. Daniel Müller 10.

16. I therefore need to point out that those rights are:

⎯ the right to take part in general meetings;

⎯ the right to choose a new gérant (manager);

⎯ the right to oversee and control the acts carried out by the management and all the operations of

the companies; and

41 ⎯ the right to retain ownership in the parts sociales belonging to him— here all the parts

sociales, since Mr. Diallo is the sole associé in Africom-Zaire and Africontainers.

17. For the Court to find that infringement of those rights requires full reparation in one or

107
more appropriate forms , it is both necessary and sufficient for Guinea to establish that the rights

in question (those of Mr.Diallo as the sole associé in the two companies) were violated by the

DRC (this has been done by my colleagues), and that those violations gave rise to the damage

which Mr. Diallo suffered in that regard.

II. The right to reparation

18. Before turning to the ⎯ rather simple ⎯ question of the forms to be taken by the

reparation owed by the DRC for the various injuries I have just described, I must,

Mr.Vice-President, address a preliminary issue dividing the Parties: do Africom and

Africontainers exist or not?

A. The purported problem of the “existence”
of Africom and Africontainers

19. Yet I must say, Mr.Vice-President, that I am only addressing the so-called problem of

the existence of Africom and Africontainers out of a concern to respond to one of the few new

106
See also, RG, Chap. 2, pp. 56-90.
10See Article 31 of the ILC Articles on “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” annexed to
United Nations General Assembly resolution 62/83 of 12 December 2001. - 36 -

arguments raised (repeatedly) in the DRC’s Rejoinder, for in my view, no matter how this question

is resolved, Guinea, which is acting to protect Mr. Diallo’s rights as associé in Africom-Zaire and

Africontainers, must be given reparation for the two companies’ lost assets. But the reasoning

underlying that reparation will vary depending on whether the companies are considered still to

“exist” or to have “disappeared” ⎯ and it is on purpose that for now I am using legally neutral

terminology:

⎯ if the companies still exist, then it is a matter of determining to what extent the DRC’s

wrongful acts have prevented and are preventing Mr.Diallo from exercising his rights as

associé and the question is purely one of causation;

42 ⎯ if the companies have ceased to exist, if they have disappeared, then the situation is that

considered by the Court in the Barcelona Traction case, which the Parties have cited in their

written pleadings and which warrants brief attention here.

20. The Parties differ on this point, which the Court did not settle in its Judgment in 2007,

wherein it notes

“the existence of a disagreement between the Parties on the circumstances surrounding

the establishment of Africom-Zaire and the conduct of its activities, on the
continuation of those activities after the 1980s, and on the consequences these
questions may have under Congolese law. It nonetheless takes the view that this
disagreement essentially relates to the merits and that it has no bearing on the question

of the admissibility of Guinea’s Application as challenged in the Congo’s objections.”
(AhmadouSadioDiallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports2007 , p.605, para. 59; emphasis
added.)

Thus, it is now at this stage that this question needs to be dealt with.

21. To make things as clear as possible, please allow me now at the outset,

Mr.Vice-President, to state the Republic of Guinea’s position on this point. We maintain ⎯ and

these are two different but complementary things:

⎯ that when Mr. Diallo was expelled (and in the years immediately following ⎯ at least until

1996) the two companies genuinely existed, de jure as well as de facto; and

⎯ that, on the other hand, it has by now (it is neither necessary nor possible to say since when

exactly) become unreasonable to argue that they ha ve retained, in the words of the Court in its

1970 Judgment, their “capacity to take corporate action” (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power - 37 -

Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970 , p.41,

para. 66).

22. The Respondent, for its part, clings to th e notion that the compan ies have not ceased to

exist ⎯ no doubt both to minimize its responsibility and to evade application of the principle, to

which I shall return in a moment, reiterated by the Court in the Barcelona Traction case.

23. In paragraph 2.07 of its Rejoinder, the DRC “challenges Guinea to provide the slightest

proof that: (1)the two companies have been dissolved by the Respondent; (2)there was a

43 liquidation surplus after payment of taxes and any de bts; and (3) Mr. Diallo was prevented by the

108
Congolese authorities from receiving his share of that surplus” . That “challenge”,

Mr. Vice-President, is not lacking in gall:

⎯ the DRC expelled Mr. Diallo from its territory and forbade him to return, without allowing him

any possibility of redress;

⎯ that internationally wrongful act prevented Mr.Diallo, the sole associé and the gérant of the

two companies, from being able to liquidate them and receive the benefits of liquidation;

⎯ by its own admission, the DRC had the two companies struck off its Register of Companies (on

the grounds that they were no longer conducting any business ⎯ and for good reason, their

gérant and sole associé having been expelled and his property having been taken de facto . . .);

⎯ and the DRC itself proved incapable of providing a copy of the companies’ Articles of

Incorporation (after having boasted that it would do so and then producing a document which

was patently irrelevant) and ended up admitting that it was “highly possible that [the

Africom-Zaire] file was removed from the f iles, lost or destroyed by the [Congolese]

administrative staff” (AhmadouSadioDiallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of

the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 593, para. 22) 109.

And what does the Respondent do in respect of the point which it is incapable of proving ⎯ or

does not want to prove ⎯ even though it has in its possessi on all the necessary means to show

whether its allegations are true? It challenges th e Applicant (which has hardly any means for the

108
RDRC, p. 18, para. 2.07
10See also the document annexed to letter No. 132.52/01/00013/2007 from the Agent of the DRC, quoted in RG,

p. 93, para. 3.7. - 38 -

task) and Mr.Diallo, who (because of the Congolese authorities’ wrongdoing) lives thousands of

kilometres away and is utterly destitute, to prove their point.

24. It bears keeping in mind in this regard that the Kinshasa/Gombe Court of Appeal in its

judgment of 20June2002 noted that Africontaine rs was “currently without known address in the

110
Democratic Republic of the Congo” and that the last action by a lawyer acting for the company

in that case dated back to 3October1996. Th e judgment itself was rendered in default, the

44 appellee in that case having failed to appear at the hearing on 14November2001. Generally

speaking, the last event evidencing participation by one of Mr. Diallo’s companies (Africontainers

in this case) in proceedings of any sort (whether in litigation or otherwise) occurred on 7 July 1997

(at a meeting with Gécamines representatives in the context of the Containers Disputes

Commission 111). After that, nothing. This, Mr. Vice-President, disproves two assertions ventured

by Mr. Kalala in the hearings on the preliminary objections:

⎯ it is untrue that “the two companies,... continued to operate long after Mr.Diallo’s

112
expulsion” , unless “long after” is taken to mean one year later ⎯ which nevertheless

remains unconvincing when account is taken of how complex the case is and how slowly

litigation proceeds in the DRC; and

⎯ by the same token, it is also untrue that “Africom and Africontainers are not poor and do not

lack the financial resources to pursue and exhaust local remedies to recover the money owed to

113
them” ; those resources vanished shortly after Mr. Diallo’s expulsion ⎯ and with them, in

reality, the two companies, which then ceased to be involved in any activity whatsoever ⎯

whether business activity or litigation.

25. The argument is moreover totally at odds with the completely new argument advanced

by the DRC in its Rejoinder when it claims that Africom and Africontainers were in “a state of

undeclared bankruptcy even when Mr.Diallo was still living in the DRC” ⎯ a phrase which it is

visibly quite proud of, repeating it, verbatim, no le ss than five times in this very brief pleading 114.

11PODRC, Ann. 64.

11MG, Ann. 226.
112
CR 2006/52, p. 22, para. 19.
11Ibid., p. 24, para. 28.

11RDRC, p. 17, para. 2.06, p. 19, paras. 2.12 and 2.13, p. 23, para. 2.27, p. 24, para. 2.31. - 39 -

The aim to be achieved by this new tactic is obvi ous: by denying that Mr.Diallo’s investments

were worth anything economically and commercia lly, the DRC seeks to escape having to comply

with its obligation to make full reparation for the injuries caused by the breaches of its international

115
obligations .

26. Mr.Vice-President, I do not think it prod uctive to enter into the factitious debate
45
116
fabricated by the Congo as to the existence of Africom-Zaire . It is however worth pausing a

moment on the DRC’s twofold contention that th e companies ceased to have any meaningful

existence ⎯ in the mid-1980s in Africom’s case and at an unspecified date but at any rate before

Mr. Diallo’s expulsion in 1995 in Africontainers’ case.

27. Before proceeding further, Mr.Vice-President, Members of the Court, I would like, by

way of a small digression, to present our apologies to you and to the Congo, which will be able to

read the verbatim record of these hearings and wh ich was gracious enough not to draw attention to

our blunder, for a bit of carelessness in proofreading which has resulted in readers of page94 of

our Reply being able to follow an exchange between members of our team. One of us – myself, I

fear! (may I remind you that this is Alain Pellet speaking) ⎯ thought that the subsistence of

activity on the part of Africom-Zaire could be show n by reference to the 3 July 1995 judgment of

the Kinshasa Tribunal de grande instance; however, that judgment was handed down in favour of

Africontainers, not Africom 117. After reading the draft, one of my excellent colleagues annotated it

to point out that the example was ill-chosen ⎯ as paragraph 3.9 concerns Africom alone ⎯ and he

suggested citing the PLZ v. Africom case instead. Unfortunately, this suggestion, one that was

most apropos, escaped my notice and we printed th e annotation rather than the correction which

should have followed from it.

28. Contrite as I am in once again offering my apologies, this is only a half-bad thing,

because the two episodes show that when Mr. Diallo was expelled the two companies had activities

(at least “judicial” ones) and were not at all moribund, as the DRC now claims in its Rejoinder but

has never before argued:

115
RDRC, p. 16-17, para. 2.13 and p. 20, para. 2.27.
116
See also the letter dated 31 Jan. 2007 from the Agent of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Registrar
of the International Court of Justice, Ann., para. 6.
11See MG, Ann. 153. - 40 -

⎯ the example given in the draft text and unfortuna tely retained in paragraph3.9 of the Reply

confirms that just a few weeks before his expulsion Mr.Diallo, in the capacity of gérant of

Africontainers, had obtained confirmation from the court of the very sizeable debt owed to the

46 company by Zaire Shell; the full enforceability of that judgment was affirmed by the Court of

Appeal on 13 September of that year 118 and nobody ever suggested that the plaintiff company

might have been in a stat e of undeclared bankruptcy ⎯ and, moreover, the size (more than

13 million United States dollars at the time) of th e debt thus twice upheld would have rendered

any such notion absurd;

⎯ as for the example which my attentive colleague suggested in replacement of this one, it

concerns Africom and rebuts the Respondent’s assertion that Africom was at that time “in a

state of de facto bankruptcy”.

29. In this connection, it need only be said that:

⎯ on 11January 1995, the Ministère Public before the highest court in the Congo, the Supreme

Court of Justice, pointed out that the lease entered into between Africom-Zaire and PLZ had

been renewed from year to year, with a new tenancy agreement each year until 1991;

⎯ the date on which a dispute arose between these two companies, which was the subject of legal

rulings from 1993 onwards; and that

⎯ Africom-Zaire called upon the Supreme Court in 1994 to annul these decisions, which gave an

opportunity, in 1995, for the Ministère Public to verify and vouch for the fact that on that date

119
Africom-Zaire had been properly re-entered in the trade register in 1980 .

30. This provides ample confirmation that Afri com-Zaire did indeed continue to exist after

the mid-1980s, and that it was still entered in the trade register in 1995, when the Ministère Public

made its submissions. In other words, it is estab lished and irrefutable that, at the time when

Mr.Diallo was expelled, Africom and Africontainers existed juridically, were recognized as such

by the highest legal authorities in Zaire and, far from being juridically and financially moribund as

the DRC would have us believe, had, on the contrary , just won a victory before the courts of that

country. If, subsequently, Mr. Diallo’s companies did in fact experience problems, it was owing to

118
MG, Anns. 169 and 170.
119
Ibid. - 41 -

47 the interference by the Congolese authorities, in the form of imprisoning their gérant and creating a

range of obstacles to stop them recovering their de bts. The Respondent cannot now shelter behind

its own unlawful acts in order to deny its obligation of reparation.

31. In paragraph 2.06 of its Rejoinder, the Respondent takes the trouble of “explaining to

Guinea that there is a difference between striking a company off the Register of Companies on the

one hand and a company’s dissolution and subseque nt liquidation on the other”. Still according to

the DRC,

“The first is a purely administrative measure, simply placing on record that a

company has ceased trading. The company continues to exist legally and may always
resume trading at a later date by re questing a new registration number from the
Registry of Companies. The second may ensue from a voluntary decision by the
associés (voluntary dissolution) or from a decision handed down by a court (judicial

dissolution). The dissolution (legal demise) leads to the liquidation (physical demise)
of the company.”

And the Respondent goes on:

“The two companies concerned were in a state of undeclared bankruptcy even
when Mr.Diallo was still living in the D RC. In the Respondent’s view, these two
private commercial companies have not yet been officially dissolved, as only the
120
associés have the authority to take such a step, and legally they continue to exist.”

32. May I say, Mr.Vice-President, that I am not entirely convinced by these helpful

“explanations”?

⎯ to begin with, I have just shown that, far fro m being in the “comatose” state described by the

DRC, the two companies showed signs of cl ear vitality under the impetus of their only associé

just before Mr. Diallo’s expulsion;

⎯ secondly, it is after all strange ⎯ and this is an understatement ⎯ that the two companies

could have been struck off without the Congo having found the slightest trace of them,

whereas, under Article29 of the Decree of 6 March 1951 establishing Zaire’s trade register:

“cancellation shall be pronounced by the court in the place of registration” 121. This important

text, which for your convenience has been reproduced in the plan of my oral argument, shows

48 that, while ceasing to trade may be a ground for cancellation, cancellation is only possible

when pronounced by a court;

12RDRC, p. 17, para. 2.06.
121
Available on the website http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20economique/Registre/D.06.03.1…. - 42 -

⎯ I would also point out that, in any event, even accepting that cancellation had occurred

surreptitiously, without being notified to the representative of the SPRL concerned and without

leaving the slightest trace, this would rather tend to confirm that, since 1996, these companies

have actually ceased to exist: whether “cancelled” or not, no one can still prove their existence

122
(including the Respondent, in whose territory they were registered ); even if Mr. Diallo (or a

gérant appointed in his stead ⎯ but, according to the DRC itself, it was still, in 2002,

123
Mr. Diallo ) ⎯ so, even if Mr. Diallo so wished, it would, therefore, clearly be impossible for

him both to safeguard the rights of the compani es and to dissolve them; and, moreover, there

would be no point in dissolving them, since it is clear that today these companies have lost all

value. I shall come back to this.

33. But I must first draw the conclusions this obvious fact points to: Africom and

Africontainers do not exist at this moment ⎯ either in law or in fact. Contrary to Barcelona

Traction, on which the Court ruled, in its Judgment of 1970, that it had neither “ceased to exist

or... lost its capacity to take corporate action” ( Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,

Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970 , p.41, para.66),

Africom and Africontainers ceased to exist (the Respondent shows itself incapable of proving the

contrary) and, consequently, lost all capacity to take corporate action. This being so, the assets of

the companies can necessarily only fall to their sole associé. All the more so because their

disappearance is the result of the DRC’s own acts ⎯ the DRC, which cannot rely on its own

unlawful acts in order to escape reparation for the prejudice they have caused. Nemo auditur

propriam turpitudinem allegans . . .

124
34. As Guinea has shown in its Reply –– without being contradicted –– the DRC cannot,

in order to escape these consequences, shelter behind Article 114 of the 1887 Decree, under which:

125
49 “[a]fter being dissolved, commercial corporations are held to exist in order to be liquidated” ,

which is carried out by liquidators appointed under the control of the associés and acting under

12See para. 24 above.
123
RDRC, p. 17, para. 2.06.
124
RG, pp. 95-97, paras. 3.15-3.21.
12OG, Ann. 35. - 43 -

their supervision. Only “[i]n the event of the nu llity of the company” may “the courts... decide

126
upon the method of liquidation and appoint liquidators” ; however, no judicial liquidation

procedure has been initiated by the Congolese authorities. As for Mr. Diallo, it is clear that, having

been prevented from exercising his rights as associé, he could not have appointed a liquidator ⎯

for the same reasons as those set out by Sam Wordsworth a few minutes ago.

35. By the same token, Mr.Diallo was deprived of the possibility of receiving the assets

belonging to his companies. Two things need to be borne in mind here:

⎯ first, that the very function of the liquida tors, under the terms of Article117 of the 1887

Decree, is to “initiate and pursue any legal proceedings on behalf of the company, receive any

payments, grant releases with or without dischar ge, sell all the companies’ securities, endorse

any bills of exchange and settle or reach agreement on any dispute” ⎯ in other words, to

realise the assets of the companies concerned, it being understood

⎯ second, that neither Africom-Zaire nor Africontai ners had any debts, with which, as I would

again point out, the Congo agrees 12.

36. In accordance with Article 121 of the Decree, the sums thus recovered would have had to

be distributed to the members ⎯ and here, therefore, fall to the sole associé, in other words,

Mr. Diallo.

37. To summarize, Mr. Vice-President:

(1) until the day after Mr.Diallo’s “refusal of entry”, Africom and Africontainers ⎯ by acts (the

very ones which caused Mr.Diallo to be un ceremoniously expelled) and in particular by

various legal actions ⎯ indicated their desire to recover the sizeable debts owed to them;

(2)following this “expulsion/refusal of entry” , these activities ceased and, although the two

companies were not declared bankrupt or put into liquidation, they ceased to exist and even the

DRC itself is unable to establish their existence;

50 (3) this proof of the existence of the compan ies which the Respondent cannot provide, it cannot

then demand of Guinea, and, of course, if Mr. Di allo had an opportunity to act on behalf of his

126
Art. 115, ibid.
127
See para. 16 above. - 44 -

companies, he would indeed himself be completely unable to prove, before the Congolese

courts (or authorities), the continued existence of the corporate entity of the companies;

(4) this being so, as I said a few moments a go, reparation is due to Mr. Diallo, the sole associé in

the two SPRLs, not for the damages they have suffered, but for the losses he himself has

suffered through the expropriation of which he has been the victim.

38. To be absolutely clear, Mr.Vice-President , it seems that the solution would hardly be

different if it were accepted that these phantom companies had continued to enjoy legal existence

since 1996. If that were so ⎯ which I do not believe ⎯ consideration would also have to be given

to the fact that:

⎯ Mr.Diallo must be compensated for the loss of the value of the two companies of which he

was sole associé and therefore sole owner;

⎯ that loss is the consequence of the interna tionally wrongful acts of the Congolese authorities,

who manu militari removed Mr. Diallo from Congolese territory in order to prevent him from

asserting the rights of the companies concerned;

⎯ it must be assessed as at the date upon which the wrongful acts in question occurred.

And this prompts me, Mr.Vice-President, to say a few words, in conclusion, on the forms of

reparation due to the Republic of Guinea as a result.

B. Forms of reparation

39. Just a few words, since while the very special circumstances of the case may lend

themselves to detailed analysis, we are nonetheless on familiar ground here:

⎯ because the internationally wrongful acts of the DRC have caused injury to Mr.Diallo (in

respect of which Guinea is entitled to exercise its diplomatic protection), reparation is owed by

the Respondent 128;

51 ⎯ this must be full reparation, in the sense that “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all

the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability,

129
have existed if that act had not been committed” .

12Cf. Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No.8, 1927 , P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p.21, or Art.31 of the

ILC Articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. - 45 -

40. Such is the traditional b asis of the primacy accorded to restitutio in integrum as a means

of reparation: “restitution most closely conforms to the general principle that the responsible State

is bound to wipe out the legal and material con sequences of its wrongful act by re-establishing the

130
situation that would exist if that act had not been committed” . It goes without saying, however,

that in the present case, restoring the status quo ante in such a way is not practicable: it is simply

not possible to go back in time and wipe out all the damage resulting from the disgraceful treatment

inflicted on Mr. Diallo; it is not possible to enable him to resume his activities as gérant and sole

associé of the companies Africom and Africontainers today, as if nothing had happened for more

than 15years; it is no longer possible to pick up the threads of the procedures which were set in

motion to protect his investments and which are now lost in the archives of the DRC’s courts; and

it is not possible, if truth be told, to resuscitate the two companies of which he was the sole associé,

in other words the sole proprietor. Whatever the moral or material damage suffered, the only

realistic means of reparation is therefore compensation, because, as recalled in Article36 of the

ILC Articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, “[t]he State responsible

for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused

thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution”.

41. This applies with regard to reparation for the damage suffered by Mr.Diallo as an

individual by virtue of his successive arbitrary arrests, the treatment he suffered in those situations

and the expulsion/refusal of entry which deprived him of all his personal property and seriously

prejudiced his dignity. And as I pointed out a few moments ago 131, the DRC acknowledges ⎯

albeit reluctantly, but it does so ⎯ that this kind of injury must be compensated for. Let that be

duly noted.

52 42. As regards reparation for the damage suffered by Mr. Diallo because of the expropriation

which deprived him of his right to full and comple te ownership of Africom and Africontainers, this

can of course only take the form of compensation, which raises the question of how those assets are

to be assessed. But as I have pointed out, that does not form part of this stage of the proceedings

129
Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47. See also Art. 31, para. 1,
and Art. 34 of the ILC Articles.
130
Para. (3) of the commentary on Art. 35 of the ILC Articles (ILC Yearbook, 2001, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 96).
13See para. 7 above. - 46 -

and I shall not dwell on it now, except to say th at, while Guinea readily acknowledges that its

Application, produced with some degree of improvisation, certainly exaggerated that
132
assessment , the minimizing of it by the DRC is of course out of place: the infringements of

Mr.Diallo’s various rights under international law are serious, and his moveable property was

certainly of considerable value prior to 1988, which is probably the key date after which the acts of

the Respondent wrongfully prejudiced the Applicant’ s rights. Again, it will be for the Court to

determine that value in the reparation phase, if the Parties cannot agree on an amount within a

reasonable time following delivery of the Judgment, a period which Guinea asks the Court to fix at

six months.

43. That negotiation will also have to c over the compensation owed by the DRC for the

infringements of Mr. Diallo’s rights as associé in the two companies, breaches whose many aspects

have just been described in detail by SamWord sworth. Here, it is sufficient to note once again

that, in view of the special circumstances of the case, satisfaction in the form of recognition by the

Court of the breaches committed by the DRC would cer tainly not be adequate: Mr.Diallo is a

self-made man whose success and reason for living were bound up with the running ⎯ in a

dynamic and even visionary way in some respects ⎯ of his two companies, which were his pride

and joy, and which were taken away from him in particularly trying circumstances.

44. Mr. Vice-President, Members of the Court, thank you for listening with care to what has

been a fairly dense day of oral argument, ending wi th that of AlainPellet which I have just read

out. I now become myself once more, Mr. Vice-Presid ent, in order to thank you most sincerely for

your attention.

53 The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Our thanks to you, Mr. Thouvenin, and, through

you, to Professor Pellet, for these arguments on behalf of the Republic of Guinea ⎯ presented in a

slightly unusual way, but one that is certainly ju stified by the exceptional circumstances, which are

beyond our control and outside even the highest intern ational jurisdiction. That concludes the first

round of oral argument of the Republic of Guinea. Before closing the hearing, I shall give the floor

132
Cf. OG, pp. 2-3, para. 0.09 and CR 2006/51, p. 10, para. 10 (Camara). - 47 -

to JudgeBennouna, who would like to put a questi on to the Republic of Guinea. You have the

floor, Judge Bennouna.

Judge BENNOUNA: Thank you, Mr. Vice-President. As you have just said, my question is

addressed to the Republic of Guinea, and is as follows.

The Republic of Guinea is asking the Court to d eclare that Mr. Diallo has been the victim of

expropriation as a result of the decisions of the De mocratic Republic of the Congo. How does the

Republic of Guinea reconcile this claim with paragraph(3) (c) of the operative clause of the

Judgment of 24 May 2007 on the preliminary objections, in which the Court declared “the Republic

of Guinea to be inadmissible in so far as it concerns protection of Mr. Diallo in respect of alleged

violations of rights of Africom-Zaire and Africontainers-Zaire”? Thank you, Mr. Vice-President.

The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, JudgeBennouna. The written

version of this question will be transmitted to the Parties by the Registrar of the Court as soon as

possible. You have the floor again, Judge Bennouna.

Judge BENNOUNA: There was a small omission in my citation. I said “declares the

Republic of Guinea to be inadmissible . . .”, but the text of the operative clause reads “declares the

Application of the Republic of Guinea to be inadmissibl e”. So that small correction needs to be

made. Thank you again, Mr. Vice-President.

54 The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you. The exact question will be

transmitted in writing. The Republic of Guinea is invited to reply to this question in its second

round of oral argument. The Court will meet again on Monday 26 April at 10 a.m. to hear the first

round of oral argument of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The hearing is closed.

The Court rose at 5.30 p.m.

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