Translation

BHY

CR 2006/36 (traduction)

CR 2006/36 (translation)

Vendredi 21 avril 2006 à 15 heures

Friday 21 April 2006 at 3 p.m. - 2 -

10 The PRESIDENT: Please be seated

Mr. PELLET: Thank you very much.

JURISDICTION OF THE C OURT

1. THE C OURT CANNOT CALL INTO QUESTION THE FINAL AUTHORITY
OF ITS JUDGMENTS ASRES JUDICATA (CONTINUED )

II. The Respondent cannot call into question the res judicata authority of the 1996 Judgment

23. Madam President, Members of the Court, at the end of my short statement this morning,

I alluded to my presentation of 28 February, during which I read out a fairly long extract from your

Judgment of 3February 2003 on the Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July1996

(I.C.J. Reports 2003, p.31, paras.70-71), and, relying solely on what you stated in that

2003 Judgment, I noted:

⎯ that the Court, in order to render its Judgment on the preliminary objections, had relied on the

sui generis situation prevailing at the time when it handed down that Judgment;

⎯ that the Court had been fully conversant with the very specific circumstance resulting from the

attitude of the Respondent itself; and

⎯ that the fact that the FRY had abandoned its claim to be the “continuator” of the former

Yugoslavia, and that this had led to its admi ssion to the United Nations, had had no influence

on the reasoning followed by the Court in its 1996 Judgment.

24. My opponents, who, generally, have barely addressed the 2003Judgment, confined

1
themselves on this pointto relying on a remark that appears in the 2004 Judgments rendered in the

cases relating to Legality of Use of Force. According to this obiter observation: “These statements

[in the Judgment on revision] cannot however be read as findings on the status of Serbia and

Montenegro in relation to the United Nations and the Genocide Convention” ( Serbia and

Montenegro v. Belgium, Judgment of 15December 2004,, para. 88; the seven other Judgments of

the same day contain identical passages).

11 25. It is certainly true that these are mere findings which do not in themselves have the force

of res judicata, if only because they are findings on which I had relied that appear in a Judgment on

1Cf. CR 2006/13, p. 40, para. 4.24 (Zimmermann). - 3 -

a request for revision, which is limited as such “to the question whether the request satisfies the

conditions contemplated by the Statute” (Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 July 1996

in the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections

(Yugoslavia v. Bosnia and Herzegovina), Judgment of 3 February 2003, p, 11, para. 16), and this is

also a citation from your 2003 Judgment. The fact remains that, in this crucial passage, the Court

quite clearly held that, in the case which concerns us , “the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could

appear before the Court between 1992 and 2000 and that this position was not changed by its

admission to the United Nations in 2002” ( Legality of Use of Force , joint declaration of

Vice-President Ranjeva, Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and

Elaraby, appended to the Judgment of 15Decemb er 2004, para.10). This is doubtless not res

judicata; but it is, all the same, a very authoritative interpretation ⎯ that of the Court itself ⎯ of

the 1996 Judgment, which, for its part, does have the force of res judicata.

26. I therefore consider it necessary, in the light of this interpretation :

⎯ first, to analyse the Respondent’s “perception” of the 1996 Judgment, a “perception” which

seriously distorts its meaning;

⎯ secondly, to show that the Re spondent, with no legal justific ation whatsoever, ignores the

res judicata authority attaching to a proper interpretation of that Judgment;

⎯ finally, to examine the grounds on which it relies for that purpose.

A. The Respondent distorts the meaning of the 1996 Judgment

27. Madam President, if we are to believe our colleagues on the other side of the Bar, the

Judgment of 11July 1996 is utterly exceptional, not only in the jurisprudence of the Court, but in

the annals of all courts, in all jurisdictions: so what we have is a co urt decision that is said to have

decided absolutely nothing. This theory of “res non judicata” is original but open to question.

12 28. I have tried my hand at drawing up a list of matters which, according to Messrs. Varady,

Djerić and Zimmermann, were not decided in 1996. They include:

⎯ the status of the FRY in relation to the United Nations 2;

CR 2006/12, para. 1.46 (Varady); CR 2006/13, p. 13, para. 2.13 (Djerić). - 4 -

⎯ the status of Yugoslavia in relation to the Court 3; and

4
⎯ the status of Yugoslavia in relation to the 1948 Convention .

We are then left wondering what the Court could have relied upon in 1996 in order to render

its Judgment.

29. This exercise in deconstruction is not, however, unqualified, Madam President. Indeed,

our opponents concede an important point, one which, I believe, is sufficient to negate their entire

argument: in order to find that it had jurisdic tion, the Court relied upon the “presumption” of

continuity between the FRY and the former Yugoslavia: “The only assumption on which the

1996 Judgment on preliminary objections was based is the assumption that the FRY had remained

bound by ArticleIX of the Genocide Convention continuing the treaty status of the former

5
Yugoslavia.”

30. This is partially true, Madam President, but it is not completely true. In reality, the Court

relied less on a “presumption of continuity” ⎯ which would have been mistaken and, what is more,

at variance with the position taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it has never sought to

6
conceal ⎯ than on the position of the Respondent itself on this subject. The crucial passage in the

1996 Judgment is to be found in paragraph 17:

“At the time of the proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on
27 April 1992, a formal declaration was adopted on its behalf to the effect that:

‘The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the State,
international legal and political pe rsonality of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, shall strictly abide by all the commitments that
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally.’

This intention thus expressed by Yugoslavia to remain bound by the
international treaties to which the former Yugoslavia was party was confirmed in an

13 official Note of 27April1992 from the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the
United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General. The Court observes, furthermore,
that it has not been contested that Yugoslavia was party to the Genocide Convention.
Thus, Yugoslavia was bound by the provisions of the Convention on the date of the

filing of the Application in the present case, namely, on 20March1993.” ( I.C.J.
Reports 1996 (II), p. 610.)

3CR 2006/13, p. 13, paras. 2.13 and 2.15 (Djerić).

4CR 2006/13, p. 38, para. 4.15; p. 38, para. 4.17; p. 40, paras. 4.21 and 4.22; p. 41, para. 4.26 (Zimmermann);
CR 2006/13, p. 26, para. 3.30 (Varady).
5
CR 2006/13, p.21, para.3.10; see also, p.26, para.3.30 (Varady); see also, pp.39-40, para.4.21
(Zimmermann).
6
Cf., ibid., pp. 30-31, para. 3.47 (Varady). - 5 -

31. In other words, the Court relied on two elements:

first, the FRY’s expressed intention to be bound; and

secondly, the lack of any objection to this intention.

32. On this basis, and without raising any other issue proprio motu, as it could have done if it

had had any doubt whatsoever as to whether it had jurisdiction, the Court found, by thirteen votes

to two, “that, on the basis of Article IX of th e Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide, it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute” ( I.C.J. Reports 1996(II) ,

Judgment of 11 July 1996, p. 623, para. 47.2 (a)). This, Madam President, is res judicata, and this

is what the Respondent is seeking once again to challenge.

B. The Respondent contests the very principle of res judicata authority

33. One of the striking features of the pleadings by counsel for Serbia and Montenegro on

questions of jurisdiction ⎯ sorry: “issues of procedure”! ⎯ is that they did everything they could

to avoid mentioning the principle of res judicata (which is somewhat paradoxical, and which I even

found irritating, since the only arguments devote d by Bosnia and Herzegovina to these matters

during the first round of oral pleadings consisted, precisely, of comments ⎯ albeit brief ones ⎯ on

7
this principle ). On the rare occasions when they did refer to the principle, their aim was either to

explain that it was not compromised by the Respondent’s new objections to your jurisdiction or,

more drastically, if not to deny its existence, at least to empty this fundamental principle of all

substance.

34. This was quite obviously the strategy employed by Professor Varady when he argued in

favour of the “need to face issues of access and jurisdiction” and when he blithely stated: “There is

no res judicata bar which would disallow the Court to address the issue of access and jurisdiction if

it appears to be justified.” 8 This amounts, in effect, to brushing aside the clear provisions of

14
Articles 59, 60 and 61 of the Statute whenever a ju dgment on preliminary objections in respect of

CR 2006/3, pp. 8-22 (Pellet).
8
CR 2006/12, p. 55, para. 1.39 (Varady). - 6 -

jurisdiction is at issue, and disregarding the we ll-established jurisprudenc e of the Court to the

9
opposite effect .

35. My opponent disputes, in particular, the relevance of the two precedents I cited, namely

the Judgment of 25 March 1999 on the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 11 June 1998

in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria

(Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria v. Cameroon), and that of 15 April 1949 in

the Corfu Channel case. In the first case, Mr. Varady feel s able to dismiss the 1998 Judgment on

the ground that it was an interpretative judgment, which therefore, in his view, had nothing to do

with res judicata. But that is not the problem! This deci sion is relevant simply because it contains

a very categorical finding ⎯ one that is particularly significan t because it restated the principle in

question in a general and abstract manner: “The language and structure of Article60 reflect the

primacy of the principle of res judicata . That principle must be maintained.” ( Request for

Interpretation of the Judgment of 11June1998 in the Case concerning the Land and Maritime

Boundary between Cameron and Nigeria (Cameron v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nigeria

v. Cameron), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 36, para. 12.) And further on we find: “The Court

would therefore be unable to entertain this first submission without calling into question the effect

of the Judgment concerned as res judicata” (ibid., p. 39, para. 16) ⎯ a judgment, I would point out,

on preliminary objections.

36. Regarding the Corfu Channel case, my distinguished opponent puts forward two

arguments:

⎯ first, Professor Varady concedes that, in the Judgment of 15 December 1949 on the assessment

of the amount of compensation, which I had cited, “the Court did, indeed, refuse to revisit an

earlier finding on jurisdiction which was challe nged on the same grounds as the ground

10
submitted earlier” ; and then he goes on: “It is important to add that this earlier finding was

the finding reached in the merits phase, rather than in the preliminary objections phase.” 11

15 Here again, this fact ⎯ though perfectly true ⎯ is not relevant: what is relevant is that the

9CR 2006/3, p. 14, para. 9.See also Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, Judgment ,
I.C.J. Reports 1972, pp. 55-56, para. 18 (b).

1CR 2006/12, p. 55, para. 1.41.
11
Ibid. - 7 -

Court nonetheless held, in connection with a judgment on preliminary objections, that the

judgment possessed the force of res judicata, and I have not sought to read anything more into

what it said ( Corfu Channel, Assessment of Amount of Compensation, Judgment,
12
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 248) ;

⎯ secondly, counsel for Serbia and Montenegro asse rted that, if one examines not the third, but

the second Judgment rendered in the Corfu Channel case, that of 19 April 1949 on the merits,

“the Court did address new objections raised regarding jurisdiction, in spite of... an earlier

judgment on preliminary objections...” 13. This is true only if one reads the decision very

cursorily. In fact, Madam President, the objection raised by Albania during the proceedings on

the merits concerned the interpretation of a cl ause in the Special Agreement concerning the

modalities of compensation, which it had been deci ded to make the subject of a separate phase

of the proceedings; this matter had not been th e subject of any earlier decision, so that there

could be no question of res judicata. And it is even open to question whether this Judgment, in

which Mr.Varady seems to have taken such interest, does not provide an illustration of the

idea of a partial forum prorogatum, to which I referred this morning, since the Court did in fact

find, without further elaborating thereon, that: “No reason was given in support of this new

assertion, and the United Kingdom Agent did not ask leave to reply.” ( Corfu Channel ,

Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 23.) And it was only thereafter that the Court entered into a

discussion of the Albanian objections.

37. In any event, regardless of my opponen t’s views on the matter, the principle of res

judicata exists. It is firmly maintained by the Court’s jurisprudence. And it “must be maintained”,

as the Court itself has emphasized.

38. Professor Zimmermann adopted a different approach, one seemingly more respectful of

res judicata, but which, ultimately, nevertheless amounts to refusing to apply it in the present case.

16 On no less than seven occasions ⎯ which strikes me as more like the Coué method of

self-hypnosis than argument ⎯ he states: “The Court has never decided upon the question whether

1Cf. Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-2005, Vol. II, Jurisdiction, Nijhoff,
Leiden/Boston, 2006, p. 804.
13
CR 2006/12, pp. 55-56, para. 1.42. - 8 -

or not the Respondent became bound by the Genocide Convention and its Article IX. This

question is accordingly, for that reason too, not res judicata” 14.

39. This, Madam President, is something of a paradox, since, as I was saying a moment ago,

if there is one point on which the Court ruled in its Judgment of 1996, it is this one! Of course, we

know that Mr.Zimmermann and his colleagues draw a distinction ⎯ and rightly so, in terms of

15
legal theory ⎯ between “being bound” and “becoming bound” but, precisely, what your

distinguished Court decided in 1996, was that, at the time when the Application was filed, the

Respondent was bound by the Convention. So whether it could become bound is moot and of

purely academic interest.

40. But above all it is, I believe, putting the problem back to front, because res judicata

applies not to the reasoning of the judgment, or at any rate only to the grounds on which it is

necessarily based, but to its operative part. No on e has, I think, better expressed this very general

principle of the law applicable to all legal decisions which are res judicata than Anzilotti when, in

his opinion in the case concerning the Interpretation of Judgments Nos.7 and8 (Factory at

Chorzów), he said:

“[I]t is certain that the binding effect at taches only to the operative part of the
judgment and not to the statement of reasons.

The grounds of a judgment are simply logical arguments, the aim of which is to

lead up to the formulation of what the law is in the case in question . . .

When I say that only the terms of a judgment are binding, I do not mean that
only what is actually written in the operative part constitutes the Court’s decision. On

the contrary, it is certain that it is almost always necessary to refer to the statement of
reasons to understand clearly the operative part and above all to ascertain the causa
petendi. But, at all events, it is the operative part which contains the Court’s binding
decision . . .” (Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (Factory at Chorzów),

Judgment No.11, 1927, P.C.I.J,. Series A, No. 13, p. 24, dissenting opinion of
JudgeAnzilotti; see also Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925,
P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 11, pp. 29-30.)

41. In the 1996 Judgment on preliminary objections, the operative part consists of two

categories of decision ( Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), pp. 623-624):

14CR 2006/13, p. 59, para. 4.100: see also p. 38, paras. 4.11 and 4.15; p. 41, paras. 4.26, 4.28 and 4.29, and
p. 42, para. 4.31.
15
Ibid., p. 22, para. 3.13 (Varady). - 9 -

17 ⎯ on the one hand, in Section (1) of paragraph 47, the Court rejects each of the objections raised

by Yugoslavia ⎯ which obviously precludes the Respondent from raising them again;

⎯ on the other hand, and this has far wider imp lications, in Section (2), it finds that it has

jurisdiction on the basis of Article IX of the 1948 Convention; it dismisses the additional bases

of jurisdiction invoked by Bosnia and Herzegovin a; and states that the latter’s Application is

admissible.

42. This could not be clearer: from then on, by virtue of res judicata, which applies to

judgments on preliminary objections just as it do es to judgments on the merits, neither of the

Parties ⎯ which were alone bound by these decisions ⎯ could challenge them. Yet this is what

the Respondent seeks to do. However, Members of the Court, as I shall endeavour to show in the

last part of my presentation this afternoon, the reasons relied on by Serbia and Montenegro cannot

pose a bar to the operation of the principle of res judicata.

C. The reasons invoked by the Respondent cannot call into question the 1996 Judgment

43. Listening to the oral pleadings for counsel of Serbia and Montenegro, I found myself

frequently wondering if they had not got the wr ong judgment and if, in reality, the one they

regarded as being res judicata was not the one (or rather the ones ⎯ yet they do strongly resemble

one another and, as is the usual practice, I shal l only refer to that concerning Belgium) which you

delivered on 15December 2004 on the preliminary objections raised in the cases relating to the

Legality of Use of Force . But of course, Madam President, our colleagues are far too shrewd ⎯

and too learned ⎯ to make a blatant error one would not forgive in our first-year students, and they

are careful to say that the importance of the 2004 Judgments is not that “[they] would have res

judicata effect with respect to this case, but because [they make] a truthful ascertainment [of Serbia

18 and Montenegro’s access to this Court before 1 November 2000], and because this is an objective

determination which simply cannot be divorced from our case” 16.

44. However, our opponents have effectively treated the 2004 Judgments on the one hand,

and the 1996 and 2003 Judgments on the other, at best as if they formed part of one single case and

1CR 2006/13, p. 62, para. 5.9 (Varady). - 10 -

as though the former had, if not binding force, then at least probative value far superior to that of

the latter, in other words of the Judgments delivered in our case.

45. From the opening words of his statement of 8March, ProfessorVarady placed “[the]

three Judgments of this Court, wh ich are of particular importance in the procedural history of the

cases arising from the Yugoslav conflicts” on the same level 17. The following day, Mr.Djeri ć,

after explaining the Court’s purported lack of jurisdiction to rule on whether the Respondent had

right of access to the Court in its Judgments of 1996 and 2003, announced: “Madam President,

eventually the question of the FRY’s access to the Court was resolved in 2004 by the Judgments in

the cases concerning Legality of Use of Force ” 1, concluding with a certain audacity that “[t]he

determination on access to the Court in a particular period of time necessarily applies to all cases

19
before the Court instituted during that period” . The same day, Professor Varady was harping on

the same theme: “These findings and conclusive clarifications [in the 2004 Judgments] set aside

20
the assumption on which the 1996 Judgment on preliminary objections was based.” And

Professor Zimmermann, after claiming that it was essential for the Court to expressly take a

position on this question, stated:

“I trust that such a determination ca nnot be made, since this would entail a

conclusion that Bosnia and Herzegovina could bring a case at a time when the
Respondent, that is, the FRY ⎯Serbia and Montenegro ⎯ as this Court itself has
determined in its 2004 Legality of Use of Force Judgments [had no access to the
21
Court].”

46. These repeated assertions ⎯ and these are just examples ⎯ by counsel for Serbia and

Montenegro raise very serious objections:

19 ⎯ notwithstanding the half-hearted denials by Professor Varady at the very end of his statement 22,

they are tantamount to an admission that th e reasoning followed by the Court in the 2004

Judgments means it has to overturn its Judgment and reverse the clear acceptance of its

jurisdiction in its 1996 Judgment, which would be to introduce into the legal arsenal available

17
CR 2006/12, p. 45, para. 1.4 (Varady); see also p. 54, para. 1.38.
18
CR 2006/13, p. 14, para. 2.16.
19Ibid., p. 16, para. 2.21; see also paras. 2.22-2.23.

20Ibid., p. 25, para. 3.25; see also para. 3.24.
21
Ibid., p. 36, para. 4.3.
22CR 2006/13, p. 62, para. 5.9. - 11 -

to the Court a sort of regulatory judgment: th e principle, as it were , of the retrospective

precedent, which would represent a redoubtable threat to legal security and to the credibility of

the res judicata principle;

⎯ and what is being suggested to us goes well beyond the res judicata principle: not only does it

transcend the boundaries of one case, encompassing a whole series of cases arbitrarily defined

as forming a whole, but also, far from being confined to the operative part, it also encompasses

the reasoning, whereas, as I said, citing Anzilotti’ s words, even in the event of the identity of

the parties, of petitum and causa petendi, “only the operative part of the judgment is binding”

by virtue of res judicata, not the reasoning.

47. In support of these truly revolutionary clai ms (which are also profoundly destabilizing to

settled legal positions), two arguments and two alone are put forward: “exceptionality” on the one

hand and consistency on the other.

48. Mindful of the unusual nature of their argument, our opponents, and above all

Mr.Varady, vie with one another in repeating that the case between us is unique of its kind, is

incomparably complex 23, and that naturally “reopening the issue of jurisdiction cannot be a routine

matter, and only exceptional circumstances can provide justification” 24. Of course, but even

accepting that it is possible ⎯ quod non ⎯ what criterion could the Court rely on in order to

decide that a situation is sufficiently “exceptional ” to warrant such an attack on one of the most

firmly established principles? In order to measure the degree of complexity necessary to reach this

extreme? And does complexity constitute a legal basis? Obviously not.

49 I am certainly ready to share the opinion that this case is exceptional by virtue of the
25
20 issues it raises, because ⎯ as counsel for Serbia and Montenegro admit ⎯ it concerns a “tragedy”

on a scale to which we are –– happily –– unaccustomed, and because the truth which the Court will

reveal will be of great comfort to the victims a nd contribute largely to reconciliation between the

peoples in the region. Nonetheless I have some difficulty in accepting that this case is so

extraordinary in terms of “procedure” or jurisdiction, even though ⎯ and I say this with respectful

23Cf. CR2006/12, p.46, para.1.7 (Varady); p.48, para.1.13; p.51, para.1.36; p. 56, para.1.45 or
CR 2006/13, p. 23, para. 3.16 (Varady); p. 36, para. 4.5 (Zimmermann).

24CR 2006/13, p. 19, para. 3.4 (Varady); see also p. 60. 5.2.
25
Cf. CR 2006/12, p. 46, para. 1.5 (Varady). - 12 -

frankness, Madam President ⎯ I cannot help thinking (and I quote) that the Court was perhaps not

very inspired “in purporting to find ex post facto clarification of the situation as it was in

1992-2000” (Legality of Use of Force, separate opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 20) in its Judgment

of 2004, whereas it could easily have avoided arousing in the Respondent legally unjustified hopes

of obtaining a review of a judgment which is not “reviewable” as a result of its adoption of a

position that was “far from self-evident” ( ibid., joint declaration of Judge Ranjeva, Vice-President,

and Judges Guillaume, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal and Elaraby, appended to

the Judgment of 15 December 2004, para. 12); that is another quotation, Madam President.

50. There is no doubt that th is raises problems of consistency ⎯ not just one problem; at

least two. But only one seems to concern the Respondent:

“It cannot possibly be held in one case before the Court that the FRY was not a
Member of the United Nations and did not have access to the Court in a particular

period of time, and in another case that th e FRY was a Member of the United Nations
or that it had access to the Court in that same period of time.” 26

Mr. Djerić is indignant about this, a feeling echoed by ProfessorZimmermann 27, who points out

that the same problem will arise again in connect ion with the outcome of the Application filed by
28
Croatia against Yugoslavia in 1999 .

51. However, along with the issue of “horizontal” consistency so to say, raised by the

difference between the solutions adopted in, on the one hand, the Legality of Use of Force cases

and, on the other, the present case, there would be another –– that of “vertical” consistency, internal

to this case, if you, Members of the Court, were to uphold this singular claim put forward by the

Respondent. That, to my mind, would be consider ably more detrimental to the integrity of the

21 judicial function than the other form of inconsiste ncy: the spectre of a “h orizontal” inconsistency

raised by our opponents.

52. In one case, that of a “vertical” inconsistency internal to the present proceedings, you,

Members of the Court, would place yourselves in a difficult position (an understatement, but I trust

a respectful one) in relation to Articles60 and 61 of your own Statute, and would necessarily be

2CR 2006/13, pp. 16-17, para. 2.23 (Djerić).

2Ibid., pp. 36-37, paras. 4.6-4.8.
28
Ibid., p. 37, para. 4.9. - 13 -

constrained to contravene the res judicata principle that is inseparable from your eminent judicial

function. As a former President of the Court wrote: “One of the most important characteristics of

the law as declared by courts and tribunals must be stability” 2; and abiding by the principle of res

judicata is the fundamental prerequisi te for such stability. True, the need for stability would not

emerge completely unscathed from a “horizontal” mismatch in the outcomes of different cases.

However, much as the consistency and predictability of jurisprudence are undoubtedly desirable, in

not following in one case the solution reached in another you would not be contravening any rule

of law: you are not bound by the stare decisis principle. Just as the 2003 Judgment did not possess

for the Legality of Use of Force cases “any force of res judicata” (Judgment of 15 December 2004,

para. 80), nor do the 2004 Judgments for the present case.

53. As the Court held in its 11June1998 Judgment on the preliminary objections raised by

Nigeria in the case concerning its land and maritime boundary with Cameroon:

“It is true that, in accordance with Ar ticle59, the Court’s judgments bind only
the parties to and in respect of a particular case. There can be no question of holding

Nigeria [read Bosnia and Herzegovina in the present case] to decisions reached by the
Court in previous cases. The real question is whether, in this case, there is cause not
to follow the reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases.” ( Land and Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria): (Equatorial
Guinea Intervening), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998 , p.292,

para. 28.)

54. There can be no doubt, Madam President, th at in the present instance there is a first and

decisive reason for not following the precedents established by the 2004 Judgments in the Legality

22 of Use of Force cases. That reason is that, by reversing your 1996 finding on jurisdiction in this

case, you would contravene a number of fundamental rules without any legal grounds for doing so:

Serbia and Montenegro have not cited any, and we can see none either. But that is not all.

55. There are a number of considerations whic h would tend to mitigate the disadvantages of

“horizontal” inconsistency, for which I respectfu lly propose on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s behalf

that you should opt, in preference to “vertical inco nsistency”; that is to say, an inconsistency

internal to this case, the consequences of whic h would, I believe, be totally devastating–– the

consequences that would flow from your reopening the issue of your jurisdiction in the present case

in defiance of res judicata.

29Nagendra Singh, The Role and Record of the International Court of Justice, Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 185. - 14 -

56. There is, by contrast, no disadvantage, in my opinion, in accepting what we might term

the “circumstantial” risk. The Court, Madam Pres ident, does not act in an unchanging world.

Facts unknown when it renders a judgment may surf ace later. The situations submitted to it

change— and this can take place over the very period in which a case remains sub judice, which

can be an extremely lengthy one (especially if it involves a number of phases), as the present case

demonstrates — a point to which I will return on Monday. The Court can only carry out its judicial

function on the basis of the situation prevailing at the time of its judgments; and the need for legal

stability implies that the clock stops at that point; that, indeed, is why Article 61 of the Statute sets

such strict conditions on the nature of the facts that can justify requests for revision, and on the

time-limits for it. And that is, I repeat, the only means that exist for challenging a judgment, “since

it is in the general interest that disputes rela ting to the same subject-matter are not protracted

indefinitely: ut sit finis litium” 30[translation by the Registry].

57. In the present case, it is quite normal that two judgments, separated by some ten years,

should take different views of the facts— which had, moreover, changed considerably, as was

recognized in the 2004 Judgments —, leading if necessary, regrettable as it may be, to different, or

even conflicting, legal outcomes. However— an d I will examine this point in greater depth on

Monday— it would not be normal to deprive an ap plicant of a merits judgment, after it had won
23

the issue of the Court’s jurisdicti on, because of the unusual length of the proceedings, for which it

is not responsible 3.

58. Second, this would, moreover, be even less normal for two cases, or series of cases,

involving Serbia and Montenegro: as I indicated in my argument of 28February 32, that State is

chiefly, although not entirely, responsible for the dela y in proceedings, as well as for the fact that

its legal position “within the United Nations and vis-à-vis that Organization remained highly

33
complex during the period 1992-2000”, as was noted by the 2004 Judgments , when it was up to it

alone to put an end to that uncertainty. There is thus nothing aberrant in differing outcomes being

30
Leonardo Brant, “L’autorité de la chose jugée en droit international public”, LGDJ, Paris, 2003, p. 27.
31See also CR 2006/3, pp. 16-17, paras. 14 and 15.2 (Pellet).
32
Ibid., pp. 16-17, paras. 15-16.
33
Para. 64; see also paras. 67 and 73. - 15 -

applied depending on whether the State is respondent, as in the present case, or applicant, as in the

Legality of Use of Force cases; and there is no reason to favour the applicant (by which I mean the

applicant in the cas es relating to the Legality of Use of Force ) in such a case.

Professor Thomas Franck will return to this important point shortly.

59. Third, Madam President, these two Judgments, from 1996 and from 2004, share one

feature which, paradoxically perhaps, justifies the di fferences in the outcomes reached. I have just

said that, to establish its jurisdiction in the pres ent case, the Court based itself both upon the stated

intention of the FRY to be bound by its commitments and upon the lack of any objections to that

intention. The 2004 Judgments essentially do exactly the same thing: there, the Court based itself

upon the position of Serbia and Montenegro that it was not a party to the Statute and was not bound

by ArticleIX of the 1948Convention 34. So what had happened in the meantime? What had

happened in the meantime was that Serbia and Montenegro had changed its position, and the Court,

in both cases, took note of that country’s current position at the time when it gave judgment. In

other words, Members of the Court, Serbia and Montenegro’s own changes of position explain, to a

large extent at least, the admittedly different (a lthough less so than one might think) solutions
24

reached by this Court in the Legality cases, on the one hand, and in the one that you are currently

hearing, on the other.

60. I believe, Madam President, that in the considerations which I have briefly outlined there

are a number of factors which ac count for the differing positions adopted by the majority of the

Members of the Court in the two cases, and that these to some extent mitigate the horizontal

inconsistency to which I referred earlier.

61. Before I finish, I would like, with your permission, Madam President, to recapitulate

briefly the main points of a presentation which has undoubtedly been somewhat technical:

(1) there is no rule of law or any legal principle which would allow the Court, at this stage of the

proceedings, to reverse the finding in its 1996 Judgment, whereby it accepted that it had

jurisdiction to hear Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Application;

34Para. 84. See also the separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, paras. 16-19. - 16 -

(2) in adopting that Judgment, the Court satisfied itself that it had jurisdiction and it cannot now go

back on that decision. The Court cannot simply assume jurisdiction in a permissive manner,

without having other legal grounds for doing so;

(3) that Judgment — of 1996 — was made at a time when the Respondent, which had raised seven

preliminary objections, was in a perfect position to dispute the Court’s jurisdiction for lack of

jus standi, particularly since it alone was in a position to resolve the situation obtaining at that

time which was engendering so many legal difficulties;

(4) since it did not do so at the appropriate time , it is estopped from taking any initiative in this

regard and must be regarded as having accepted the Court’s jurisdiction from this standpoint;

(5)the 1996Judgment, whereby the Court establis hed its jurisdiction, enjoys the authority of

res judicata and is not susceptible of appeal, otherwise than through an application for revision,

under the conditions laid down in Article 61 of the Statute;

(6) any ruling whereby the Court reversed the 1996 Judgment, which carries res judicata authority,

would be incompatible both with the res judicata principle and with Articles 59, 60 and 61 of

the Statute;

25 (7) the Judgments rendered in 2004 in the Legality of Use of Force cases are of no significance

whatsoever for the current case, and the Court, which is not bound by precedent, would not

contravene any rule of law by not repeating that solution in the present case;

(8) finally, there are, moreover, substantial differences between the two cases, stemming notably

from the differing periods and circumstances in which the Judgments were adopted, the

difference in Serbia and Montenegro’s status in the proceedings and the identical ratio

decidendi of the two Judgments, which paradoxically produced opposing outcomes— since

both rulings were based upon the changing positio n of the Respondent in the present case

regarding its legal status relative to the United Nations and the Statute of the Court, on the one

hand, and to the 1948 Genocide Convention on the other.

And this is probably an appropriate moment to ask you, Madam President, to give the floor

to Professor Thomas Franck, who will address the issues of good faith and estoppel. I thank you

very much, Members of the Court, for your attention. - 17 -

Le PRESIDENT : Merci Monsieur Pellet. Je donne maintenant la parole à M. Franck.

M. FRANCK : Merci, Madame le président. Plaise à la Cour.

Estoppel et bonne foi

1. Avec votre permission, je vais vous présen ter plusieurs propositions d’ordre juridique qui

intéressent la question de votre compétence.

2. En premier lieu, je commencerai par ré péter la proposition défendue par mon ami et

collègue Alain Pellet pour qui la question de vo tre compétence doit trouver tout simplement sa

réponse dans l’application du principe de la res judicata. Je n’ai guère besoin d’ajouter quoi que ce

soit à sa plaidoirie sur ce point.

3. En deuxième lieu, je vous prierai d’étab lir votre compétence en empêchant le défendeur

de se présenter désormais dans l’arène en brandi ssant un nouveau statut destiné à le protéger qui

contredit directement la thèse que Belgrade a systématiquement défendue pendant toutes les

précédentes étapes de notre litige. Je vous prierai de recourir à la doctrine de l’estoppel équitable et

26 à l’obligation de bonne foi pour empêcher le défend eur de plaider en ce sens ou de faire valoir une

argumentation de ce type.

4. En troisième lieu, je vous prierai, Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, pour le cas où vous ne

seriez pas tous convaincus que, pour régler la qu estion de votre compétence, il faut faire appel aux

principes juridiques de la res judicata, de l’estoppel et de la bonne foi, de considérer au moins cette

question comme si elle se posait pour la première fois ⎯ c’est-à-dire comme une question que vous

avez à résoudre de novo, après avoir analysé à fond les éléments de preuve disponibles, sans jamais

invoquer la décision que vous avez rendue sur la compétence dans les affaires de l’OTAN de 2004.

Je tâcherai de démontrer que lesdites affaires n’ont tout bonnement aucun rapport avec les besoins

de l’espèce.

5. En quatrième lieu, je tâcherai de donner quelques indications quant à la voie à emprunter

pour établir votre compétence de novo : il faudra peut-être étudier les questions que soulèvent le

statut, ou les statuts, sui generis de la RFY, ses rapports avec l’ONU et son adhésion à la

convention sur le génocide pendant la période cruciale allant de 1992 à 1995, c’est-à-dire la période - 18 -

pendant laquelle ont eu lieu les actes génocides dont nous faisons état. Mon amie et collègue

Brigitte Stern développera ces thèmes pour vous plus en détail cet après-midi et lundi.

L’obligation de cohérence dans l’affirmation des droits

6. J’examine donc la question de l’ estoppel équitable et de la bonne foi. Pour nous, le

défendeur ne saurait au stade actuel de l’espè ce adopter au sujet de son statut une position

radicalement opposée à celle qu’il a adoptée à chac une des autres phases du litige. Si la Cour est

de notre avis, le statut du défendeur aujourd’hui devrait être compatible avec celui que la RFY a

revendiqué d’un bout à l’autre de l’instance : le statut d’un Etat qui était Membre de l’Organisation

des NationsUnies, encore que fra ppé de certaines interdictions, et qui était partie à la convention

sur le génocide d’un bout à l’autre de la périod e pendant laquelle les actes génocides ont été

commis.

7. Dans la première de mes plaidoiries, j’ ai étudié comment le défendeur a constamment

cherché à créer l’impression que l’article IX de la convention sur le génocide est ambigu sur le

point de savoir si cette disposition établit en matière de génocide la responsabilité de l’Etat en sus

de la culpabilité individuelle, mais une responsabilité distincte de cette culpabilité. Aujourd’hui, je

voudrais m’arrêter sur la deuxième des grandes ambiguïtés dont le défendeur fait état. C’est

M.Varady qui en a parlé au premier tour en no us disant que «la question de savoir si la RFY

27 ⎯c’est-à-dire le défendeur ⎯ est devenu partie à la convention sur le génocide par voie de

succession n’a…à ce jour jamais été tranchée pa r la Cour avec l’autorité de la chose jugée»

(CR 2006/13, p. 38, par. 4.15) : là encore, l’on ne sait pas où l’on en est.

8. Cette situation, nous dit-il, s’explique par «la simple raison qu’aucune des Parties n’avait

mis en doute l’éventuelle qualité de partie de la RFY à la convention sur le génocide» ( ibid., p. 38,

par. 4.17). D’après M. Varady, cette ambiguïté sur le point de savoir si le défendeur était partie à la

convention a duré non seulement pendant toute la phase de 1993 de l’espèce, mais aussi pendant la

phase de 1996. Lors de cette phase de 1996, d it-il, «la qualité d’Etat successeur en matière de

traités de la RFY ⎯ le défendeur ⎯ n’a pas été examinée; elle n’a pas même été soulevée» ( ibid.,

p. 40, par. 4.21). - 19 -

9. «La question n’a pas été examinée?» «Elle n’a pas même été soulevée?» [«Ce n’était

pas une question à régler?»] Nous constatons ic i que le défendeur s’est abstenu de brandir le

moyen de défense le plus évident qui consistait à dire qu’il n’était pas partie à la convention au titre

de laquelle l’action judiciaire était engagée. La Bosnie n’aurait évidemment pas eu lieu de soulever

la question. Elle n’avait pas inté rêt à montrer qu’elle intentait une action en se trompant de partie

adverse ou qu’elle intentait son ac tion contre une partie qui avait cessé d’exister. Mais la RFY

avait quant à elle toutes les raisons de soulever la question au titre de sa défense. Faut-il interpréter

son abstention à cet égard comme une ambiguïté? Un avocat de Belgrade qui eût été doué de

raison n’aurait-il pas demandé l’autorisation de plai der que la RFY n’était pas partie au traité dont

la violation était le fondement même de l’acti on engagée? Ne faut-il pas tenir pour acquis que

l’équipe de la RFY aura fait enquête à cet égard et que la réponse émanant des autorités de

Belgrade aura consisté à dire: «non, vous ne pouvez pas utiliser ce moyen de défense parce que

la RFY revendique activement la qualité de pa rtie à la convention». In contestablement, s’abstenir

de contester la compétence de la Cour au motif que l’on n’est pas partie à la convention nous

interpelle très clairement, très fortement, sans la moindre ambiguïté. Le message est le suivant:

voilà la position que Belgrade a adoptée d’un bo ut à l’autre des huit prem ières années du litige,

parfois en cherchant à en tirer parti (sous la fo rme d’une demande reconventionnelle) et parfois en

payant volontiers ce qu’il peut en coûter de cons erver systématiquement cette attitude. Mais il ne

peut y avoir d’ambiguïté, et il n’y eut aucune ambi guïté de la part de la RFY, ni de la part du

demandeur, ni de la part de la Cour.

10. M. Varady admet que la Cour en 1993 a écarté toute ambiguïté, qu’elle a bel et bien

conclu que la RFY avait elle-même accepté qu’ell e était partie à la convention, et que ce fait

ressortait de sa déclaration du 27avril1992. Dans cette déclaration, et je cite le résumé qu’en a

28 donné M.Varady, «la RFY avait…exprimé l’intent ion d’assurer la continu ité de la personnalité

juridique de l’ex-Yougoslavie et, par conséquent, d’honorer les obligations conventionnelles de

cette dernière» (CR2006/13, p.39, par.4.20). Ne peut-on penser, à la lecture de la décision que

vous rendez donc en1993, que les avocats de Belgrade ont dû se dire qu’ils pourraient peut-être

gagner ce procès lors de la phase suivante, en 1996, au moment où la seule question qui se poserait

serait celle de la compétence et de la recevabilité, s’ils étaient autorisés à plaider que la RFY était - 20 -

en réalité un Etat nouveau et qu e, pour cette raison-là précisément, ce n’était plus alors un Etat

partie à la convention? Or, il n’a jamais été présenté d’argumen t en ce sens. Manifestement,

la RFY n’était pas du tout disposée à obéir aux exig ences du Conseil de sécurité et de l’Assemblée

générale qui voulaient la voir accepter le stat ut d’Etat successeur de l’ex-Yougoslavie parmi

d’autres. La RFY a continué de soutenir passionnément avoir l’exclusivité de la succession. Et

l’on se demande alors à nouveau : que faut-il penser de cette affirmation que le défendeur présente

le plus souvent dans le silence mais parfois aussi avec beaucoup d’éloquence quand il dit être en

fait très étroitement lié par la convention ?

11. Il n’y a ici pas trace d’ambiguïté. Systém atiquement, dans le cadre du litige qui a abouti

à la décision rendue par la Cour en 1996, le défendeur n’a présenté aucune thèse autorisant à penser

qu’il n’était pas partie à la convention et il a beau coup plaidé tant dans ses pièces écrites qu’à

l’audience en formulant des arguments qui n’auraient pas eu beaucoup d’intérêt stratégique si le

défendeur n’avait pas été partie à la convention. Il était donc inévitable que la Cour s’en tînt à

nouveau à ce que le défendeur disait. Sur cette décision, M.Varady s’exprime ainsi: «la Cour

s’est contentée» ⎯ s’est contentée, dit-il ⎯ «de noter que l’ ex-Yougoslavie» ⎯là encore c’est

M.Varady qui souligne ⎯ a «signé la convention sur le génocide le 11décembre1948 et…

déposé son instrument de ratification sans réserve, le 29août1950». Mais il vous est également

demandé d’estimer que, du moment qu’il «n’ava it pas été contesté» au cours de la procédure

de1996 que la Yougoslavie fût toujours partie à la convention sur le génocide ( ibid., p.39-40,

par.4.21), par conséquent, «la qu estion de savoir si la RFY avai t la qualité d’Etat successeur à

l’égard de la convention sur le génocide, question qui n’avait pas même fait débat entre les Parties,

n’a pas été tranchée par la Cour» (ibid.). Est-ce là une déduction raisonnable ? Qui, sinon la RFY,

aurait contesté avoir encore la qualité de partie à la convention? En l’absence de cette

contestation, la Cour avait constaté que la Youg oslavie et, par son intermédiaire, la RFY étaient

effectivement liées par la convention sur le génocide. Ce fut là la raison pour laquelle la Cour a

estimé avoir compétence. La Cour avait fondé ce tte conclusion sur le fait crucial que la RFY

n’avait pas contesté être partie à la conven tion. Cette absence de contestation n’avait

manifestement pas servi les avocats de la Serb ie mais ce fut pourtant une stratégie que le
29

gouvernement qui était leur client tenait beaucoup à leur voir adopter. - 21 -

12. Mais la RFY ne s’est pas contentée d’acquiescer passivement. Elle a activement

manifesté sa qualité de partie à la conven tion en formulant elle-même des demandes

reconventionnelles à l’encontre de la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Sa duplique du 22février1999, sur la

quasi-totalité de ses cinq cents premières pages, revient uniquement à affirmer qu’elle est partie à la

convention sur le génocide. Quelle autre inte rprétation pouvez-vous donner de cette longue

accusation, qui sera retirée par la suite, cette accusation de pr étendu génocide que Belgrade avec

une extraordinaire témérité a tenté de faire commettre à son encontre par la Bosnie ? Bien entendu,

ces prétentions totalement erronées ont été abandonnées quasiment aussitôt après avoir été

présentées. Pourquoi? Elles n’ont été retir ées qu’au moment où il est devenu tactiquement

opportun de changer son fusil d’épau le, d’affirmer sur le plan juridi que l’absence de continuité et

de se débarrasser de huit ans passés à insister sur la continuité.

er
13. Ce fut là la tactique revisée adoptée après le 1 novembre 2000, date à laquelle un

nouveau régime en place à Belgrade a décidé de demander son admission à l’Organisation des

Nations Unies. Pour échapper à la responsabilité de ce que Belgrade avait fait, ce qui avait été fait

par les dirigeants de la RFY désormais en situation d’échec et désormais détestés, Belgrade décida

d’obéir enfin aux décisions prises en 1992 par le Conseil de sécurité (résolution 777 du

19 septembre 1992) et par l’Assemblée générale (résolution 47/1 du 22 septembre 1992). En 1992

en effet, huit ans plus tôt, les principaux organes politiques des Nations Unies, écŒurés par ce que

faisait Belgrade, lui avaient demandé d’entrer à l’ONU comme nouvel Etat Membre, les Membres

de l’Organisation cherchant par ce moyen à exercer assez d’influence pour juguler les politiques de

Belgrade. Entre-temps, pour fa voriser de sa part un changement de politique, la délégation de

Belgrade aux Nations Unies se vit refuser le privilège de prendre la parole et de voter dans certains

des organes de l’Organisation. Puis, à la suite d’échecs graves sur le terrain et à la suite aussi d’une

révolte dans le pays, Belgrade a finalement compris qu’il était temps de renouveler sa stratégie.

14. Nous sommes tous heureux que l’ère Milosevi ć soit terminée et il se pourrait bien,

comme nous l’avons tous appris, Madame le président, qu’il y ait plus de joie au ciel pour un seul

pécheur qui se repent que pour tous les anges qui s’y trouvent réunis. Mais le pécheur repenti

commence toujours par admettre et non par nier qu’il fut naguère un pécheur. Et il commence sa - 22 -

vie nouvelle en acceptant la responsabilité d’un passé criminel et non en refusant cette

responsabilité; il demande la possibilité de se repentir et de réparer ses torts.

15. Ma collègue, MmeStern, examinera le poin t de savoir s’il faut considérer que la RFY a

été Membre de l’ONU pendant les longues années où elle n’a pas obéi aux décisions prises par les

30 principaux organes politiques des Nati onsUnies, au sujet de son statut notamment. Ma tâche est

différente: je dois montrer que cette volte-face de dernière minute, cette décision tactique

consistant à obéir enfin à des décisions prises huit ans auparavant ne peut pas vraiment être en toute

équité la réponse aux questions à régler en l’es pèce. Il n’est pas possible d’absoudre une partie

d’obligations qu’elle avait régulièrement à assume r d’un bout à l’autre de ce long procès et dont

elle a même cherché à tirer profit. Que l’on voit ic i le signe de l’obligation de manifester sa bonne

foi ou bien une contrainte imposée par l’estoppel importe moins que l’idée fort simple qu’il ne faut

pas laisser la Serbie-et-Monténégro échapper au x obligations lui incombant en vertu de la

convention sur le génocide en décidant au bout du compte de prendre une mesure qui lui a été

demandée depuis longtemps et à laquelle elle a lo nguement résisté mais qui ne fut jamais censée

être un moyen d’échapper à la responsabilité d’avoir commis un génocide.

16. Tout au contraire : en l’espèce, il n’a touj ours existé qu’un seul défendeur et, jusqu’à une

date extrêmement récente, le défendeur en question n’a jamais nié que la requête du demandeur fût

destinée à la Partie qu’il fallait. Ou bien ladite Partie était de mauvaise foi quand elle a accepté

l’acte introductif d’instance ou bien le fait qu’elle s’abstienne pendant si longtemps de contester en

être le véritable destinataire doit permettre de l’empêcher par voie d’ estoppel d’agir ainsi

aujourd’hui. D’une façon ou de l’autre, il sera it absolument injuste que la Cour récompense

Belgrade d’accepter en définitive d’obéir à une de mande du Conseil de sécurité en l’absolvant de

toute responsabilité en matière de génocide.

17. Après tout, les Parties s’ accordent à reconnaître que, penda nt les huit premières années

de ce procès, le litige ne portait nullement sur le point de savoir si la FRY était liée par la

convention sur le génocide. Que faut-il déduire de ce silence qui valait acquiescement ? Et du fait

que Belgrade avait même affirmé exercer des droits au titre de la convention à l’encontre à la fois

de la Bosnie et des Etats membres de l’OTAN ? Le défendeur voudrait nous faire croire que, dans

les premiers stades de l’espèce, la question n’ a tout bonnement jamais été évoquée, que cette - 23 -

question se situait en quelque sorte en terrain inconnu du point de vue procédural, un terrain rempli

d’ambiguïtés qui n’ont été résolues que lorsque Belgrade a décidé d’adopter une attitude contraire à

celle qui fut la sienne pendant huit ans et a cherché alors à modifier rétroactivement un statut

juridique qui devenait de plus en plus incommode. Mais il existe un autre motif beaucoup plus

plausible pour lequel Belgrade vient seulement de décider aujourd’hui, après toutes ces années,

d’affirmer ce qui eût été précédemment la ra ison la plus patente de vouloir échapper aux

obligations découlant de la convention sur le génocide. Belgrade aurait pu dire à la Cour en 1992

et n’importe quand ensuite: je ne suis pas qui vous pensez. Je ne suis pas la Yougoslavie. Je ne

suis certainement pas en tout cas cette Yougoslavie-là, celle qui commet tous les faits dont le

31 Conseil de sécurité l’accuse et qui sont de plus en plus souvent confirmés par le TPIY. Je ne suis

tout bonnement pas cet Etat-là.

18. Ne vous seriez-vous pas attendus à ce que ce soit là la première des choses que le

défendeur dirait à la Cour si c’est bien là ce qui correspond à ses convictions ?

19. M.Varady nous a dit que «les ambiguïtés ont été dissipées depuis que la RFY est un

nouveau Membre de l’Organisation des NationsUnies qui l’a admise en2000…» (CR2006/13,

p.24, par.3.23). Mes collègues étudieront quel effet a eu cette admission de la RFY à

l’Organisation des Nations Unies en qualité de nouvel Etat Membre. Mais permettez-moi de vous

assurer qu’avant cette admission, il n’existait aucu ne ambiguïté. La RFY estimait être liée par la

convention. La Bosnie estimait que la RFY était liée dans le cadre de la présente affaire. La Cour

a régulièrement jugé que la RFY était liée par la convention.

20. Il n’existe en l’occurrence aucune ambigu ïté. Pendant près d’une décennie, Belgrade a

été Partie à la présente affaire en réincarnant en quelque sorte la Yougoslavie, qui était l’une des

parties originelles à la convention sur le génocide. Et pourquoi Belgrade a-t-il aujourd’hui, après le

début du nouveau millénaire, découvert soudainement qu’à cette époque même, son identité n’était

pas celle-là après tout ? Après avoir déambulé penda nt des années dans les couloirs de l’ONU tel

un «Hollandais volant» de la diplomatie, payant même parfois ses cotisations et faisant distribuer

des documents comme n’importe quel autre Etat Memb re, contestant très fort l’action menée pour

contraindre Belgrade à demander à nouveau son admission à l’Organisation, et après avoir présenté

soi-même une demande reconventionnelle au titre de la convention ? Pourquoi Belgrade soutient-il - 24 -

maintenant avec insistance n’avoir jamais prétendu être l’unique successeur de l’ex-Yougoslavie ?

Pourquoi prétendre que tout cela ne s’est jamais passé, qu’il y a simplement eu quelques

malentendus, quelques ambiguïtés ?

21. La réponse qui est regrettable encore qu e compréhensible est tout bonnement qu’il s’agit

là d’un opportunisme de procédurier. Depuis le début, les régimes successifs de Belgrade s’étaient

convaincus eux-mêmes que, comme on le prétend dans les romans policiers modernes, «ils s’en

tireraient bien». Ils pouvaient participer à un e procédure, ils pouvaient même présenter une

demande reconventionnelle au titre de la convention sur le génocide, et le monde entier constaterait

que les allégations formulées étaient mensongères, qu’il y avait eu une méchante guerre civile, que

l’on pouvait reprocher des crimes à tous les camps, et on s’en tiendrait là. Et ce n’est que lorsque

les éléments de preuve recue illis avec tant de peine par des organismes internationaux et

notamment le TPIY ont commencé à s’accumuler au point qu’il devint inévitable de conclure à un

génocide planifié, dirigé et exécuté par Belgrade ⎯ce n’est qu’alors seulement que leur stratégie

juridique prit une autre direction. Ce n’est qu’à ce moment-là seulement que nous avons vu opérer

un changement de direction à 180degrés. La Serbie-et-Monténégro fit enfin ce que le Conseil de

sécurité lui avait demandé tant d’années auparavant: le pays a demandé son admission aux

32 Nations Unies en qualité de nouvel Etat Membre ⎯ ce qu’il pouvait et aurait dû faire en 1993. Et

la Serbie-et-Monténégro a ratifié la convention sur le génocide de novo. Mais l’admission et la

ratification n’ont pas été faites dans un nouvel esprit de respect du droit international, c’était une

tactique nouvelle pour échapper au droit et ne pas obéir aux demandes. Désormais, on disait à ses

concitoyens : nous nous sommes absous nous-mêmes; nous sommes désormais invulnérables, nous

ne pouvons plus être responsables de ce que nous a vons fait. On pourra faire rendre des comptes à

quelques individus devant le TPIY, mais nous, le peuple serbe, nous serons acquittés en droit.

22. Je me rends compte que j’ai parlé d’éléments qui ne sont pas nécessairement synonymes

de droit: j’ai parlé de comportement honorab le, de moralité, de bonne foi. Mais ces

préoccupations ne sont pas sans pertinence quand il est question du droit ou de l’intégrité de la

justice. Nous soutenons que l’éq uité, la bonne foi, quel que soit le sens qu’on leur attribue, ne

peuvent pas permettre qu’une te lle volte-face, opérée dans la dernière phase d’un litige ⎯ d’un

litige qui porte en outre sur la responsabilité d’un génocide ⎯ dégage un Etat de sa responsabilité - 25 -

alors que celle-ci est prouvée. Il ne faut pas pe rmettre d’absoudre un Etat qui, c’est parfaitement

évident, est l’Etat même qui a infligé de telles souffrances à ses voisins et qui tente encore, comme

il l’a fait si souvent jusqu’à présen t, de trouver la tactique qui lu i épargnera d’avoir à affronter la

vérité de ses actes.

23. Il ne faut pas autoriser cette façon de fa ire. Mais nous ne voulons pas voir simplement

triompher l’équité: heureusement, il s’agit aussi du droit. C’est le vice-président Alfaro dans

l’opinion individuelle qu’il a jointe à l’ arrêt rendu par la Cour dans l’affaire du Temple de Préah

35
Vihéar qui a le mieux défini l’obstacle juridique à opposer à une tactique de ce genre, en adoptant

pour principe applicable «qu’un Etat partie à un litige international est tenu par ses actes ou son

attitude antérieure lorsqu’ils sont en contradiction avec ses prétentions dans ce litige». Ecartant les

appellations d’« estoppel», de «préclusion», de «forclusion» ou d’«acquiescement» souvent

données à la doctrine, le juge Alfaro a fait observer que

«dans le domaine international, sa substance est toujours la même: la contradiction
entre les réclamations ou allégations présentées par un Etat et sa conduite antérieure à

ce sujet n’est pas admissible (allegans contraria non audiendus est) . Son objectif est
toujours le même : un Etat n’est pas autorisé à tirer profit de ses propres contradictions
au préjudice d’un autre Etat.» 36

24. En outre, a dit encore le jugeAlfaro à ce sujet, «un Etat peut être lié aussi par une

37
attitude passive …à l’égard de dr oits affirmés par un autre Etat…» . Madame le président, nous

33 sommes exactement dans cette situation en l’espèce. En changeant d’attitude, attitude qui fut tantôt

active, tantôt passive, sur son stat ut au sein de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et à l’égard de la

convention sur le génocide, le défendeur a perd u le droit de tirer aujourd’hui profit de son

changement de tactique le plus récent. Le défe ndeur adopte en s’opposant de façon flagrante à sa

position antérieure une attitude qu’il estime aujour d’hui plus favorable à l’issue du litige en ce qui

le concerne et il espère s’emparer d’une victoire technique alors qu’il est au bord de la défaite.

25. Ce serait de fort mauvais augure pour nous, bien entendu, mais ce serait pire encore pour

le droit du génocide et particu lièrement néfaste pour l’intégrité du processus judiciaire que

d’autoriser le défendeur à procéder ainsi. Je citerai une fois encore le jugeAlfaro qui dit: «Si un

35Affaire du Temple Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 39.

36Ibid., p. 40.
37
Ibid. - 26 -

Etat ne proteste pas alors que…une protes tation apparaîtrait indispensable…cette carence

signifie … acquiescement ou consentement tacite.» 38 Le même auteur parle aussi de «l’abandon»

des droits qui ne sont pas affirmés et il cite avec approbation un autre juge de la Cour,

sirHerschLauterpacht, pour qui l’idée répond à «un besoin fondamental de stabilité», et le

jugeAlfaro ajoute que «les effets juridiques du principe sont si fondamentaux qu’ils tranchent

seuls, par eux-mêmes, l’objet du différend et qu’on ne saurait considérer comme un simple incident

39
de la procédure toute infraction à ce principe» . Dans cette opinion magistrale, le jugeAlfaro

étudie ensuite la jurisprudence abondante qui est disponible, notamment un bon nombre d’affaires

antérieures, d’arbitrages et de textes qui confortent la proposition générale qu’il a énoncée.

26. Laisser la RFY/la Serbie-et-Monténégro prendre part pendant huit ans à un litige en

admettant parfois tacitement, parfois expresséme nt qu’elle est Membre de l’Organisation des

NationsUnies et partie à la convention sur le génocide puis, tout juste avant de parvenir au stade

final du litige, la laisser affirmer au contraire qu’ elle n’a jamais été membre de l’Organisation ni

partie à la convention, reviendrait à faire grav ement entorse à ce «besoin fondamental de stabilité»

dont parlait le juge Alfaro. Il ne faut laisser aucune partie jouer avec ce processus et en tirer profit;

et sûrement pas une partie accusée d’avoir violé la convention sur le génocide.

La RFY ne peut pas modifier son acceptation de la compétence de la Cour in medias res

27. Le défendeur, après s’être affirmé pendan t des années lié par la Charte et par la

convention, comme le montrent les lettres qu’il a adressées au Secrétaire général de l’ONU le

27 avril 1992, cherche aujourd’hui à s’extirper d’une position devenue pour lui de plus en plus

34 intenable sur le fond. Le cour onnement de cette manŒuvre tac tique est la manière dont il a

prétendument adhéré de novo à la convention sur le génocide en 2001, sans toutefois accepter la

juridiction obligatoire de la Cour en vertu de l’ article IX. Mais, sans aucun doute, il y était déjà

partie. La qualité de partie à la convention n’est pas une chose insignifiante qui relève du simple

caprice. Elle est sans conteste soumise aux règles de la succession d’Etats. Madame le président,

quoi que l’Etat de Serbie-et-Monténégro puisse être, quelle que soit son origine, ce n’est pas le

38Affaire du Temple Préah Vihéar (Cambodge c. Thaïlande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 40.

39Ibid., p. 41-42. - 27 -

produit d’une génération spontanée. C’est forcément le successeur ou le continuateur d’une entité

antérieure et, quel que soit le nom donné à son gén iteur, celui-ci était partie à la convention sur le

génocide. Cette adhésion nouvelle et restreinte ne peut apparaître que comme un retrait à peine

déguisé de la compétence de la Cour en plein milieu de la présente affaire ⎯ une compétence

depuis longtemps reconnue, en paroles et en actes , par le défendeur devant la Cour. Il est

impossible de croire que vous, les membres de cette haute juridiction, le laisserez aller de manière

aussi délibérée à l’encontre de l’objet et du but de la convention et des règles de conduite devant la

Cour. Face à une stratégie d’ évasion comparable adoptée par le défendeur dans l’affaire

Nottebohm, vous avez déclaré: «une fois la Cour régulièrement saisie, la Cour doit exercer ses

pouvoirs tels qu’ils sont définis par le Statut» ( C.I.J. Recueil 1953, p.122). Et dans l’affaire

Nicaragua, vous avez fermement rejeté la thèse d’une Partie selon laquelle e lle avait effectué un

«retrait ou [une] modification» de la compétence de la Cour pour faire échouer une prétention

valide (C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 416). Dans cette affaire Nicaragua, vous avez également ajouté que,

lorsqu’un Etat accepte la compétence de la Cour, il établit par là un «réseau d’engagements» dans

lequel «le principe de la bonne foi joue un rôle essentiel» ( ibid., p. 418), et vous avez rattaché cela

au droit des autres Etats de «tenir compte» de ces engagements de «bonne foi» et de «tabler sur

eux» (ibid., p. 418 et 473, citant l’affaire des Essais nucléaires).

Les décisions rendues par la Cour dans les affaires de 2004 relatives à la Licéité de l’emploi de
la force ne commandent pas l’issue de la présente espèce et ne peuvent pas conduire à
échapper à ces conclusions

28. M. Varady a dit à la Cour, pendant le pr emier tour de plaidoiries, que la «logique a

fatalement conduit la Cour à conclure en 2004, en ses arrêts sur la Licéité de l’emploi de la force ,

que la RFY n’était pas partie à son Statut entre 1992 et 2000. Il s’ensuit manifestement»,

ajoute-t-il, «que la RFY ne pouvait pas non plus être demeurée liée par la convention sur le

génocide» (CR2006/13, p.28, par.3.38). Le dema ndeur, au contraire, s’efforcera de démontrer

35 que la Cour n’est pas tenue de suivre les décision s qu’elle a rendues dans les affaires de l’OTAN,

pour plusieurs raisons dont la plus évidente est que, en l’espèce, les Parties ne sont pas les mêmes.

M. Pellet en a déjà parlé. - 28 -

29. Mais ce n’est pas la seule raison. Une au tre raison est que, par le fond, les affaires de

l’OTAN diffèrent de notre espèce. En 2004, vous avez décidé que la RFY/SM avait perdu son

droit d’agir en vertu de la convention sur le génocide pendant la période pertinente. Il ne vous était

pas demandé de décider si elle avait également cessé d’être responsable du génocide qu’elle était

en train de commettre. Cela, c’était l’objet d’une autre affaire, celle qui nous occupe aujourd’hui.

30. Ce ne sont là, toutefois, que des raisons techniques. Il existe une meilleure raison, qui

tient aux caractéristiques essentielles des affaires de l’OTAN. Avec tout le respect que je dois à la

Cour, Madame le président, ces affaires ne cons tituent tout simplement pas un précédent très

solide, et cela n’est pas dû seulement au nombre et à la force des opinions des juges qui ont rejeté

le raisonnement de la majorité. Que faut-il pour qu ’une décision de justice ait valeur de précédent

dans une autre espèce ? Avant tout, il faut qu’elle ait été rendue après un examen complet de toutes

les questions pertinentes, entre de s parties entre lesquelle s il existe réellement un différend, font

valoir avec diligence tous les ar guments possibles et présentent to us les éléments de preuve dont

elles disposent. Comme nous allons tenter de le démontrer, ce n’est pas ainsi que les affaires de

l’OTAN vous ont été soumises par Belgrade.

31. A cet égard, il est intéressant de relever, ici aussi, les propos tenus par mon collègue,

M. Varady, pendant le premier tour. Il nous a dit que, ni en 1993, ni en 1996, dans ses conclusions

concernant sa compétence à l’égard de la RFY, la Cour n’a tranché cette question, «pour la simple

raison qu’aucune des Parties n’avait mis en doute l’ éventuelle qualité de partie de la RFY à la

convention sur le génocide» (CR2006/13, p.38, par.4.17). Nous espérons que M.Varady

continue à être de cet avis lorsque nous affirmon s qu’une décision ne peut pas être considérée

comme ayant tranché une question si cette question n’a jamais été pleinement débattue, de bonne

foi, par des parties dont les intérêts s’opposent réellement.

32. Si c’est le cas, Monsieur Varady, vous conviendrez sans doute que les arrêts de2004

relatifs à la Licéité de l’emploi de la force ne sauraient constituer un précédent valable pour la

présente affaire parce que, en2004, Belgrade, le demandeur n’avait aucun intérêt de bonne foi à

contester les moyens de défense des défendeurs ⎯la Belgique et le Canada ⎯ qui ont fait valoir,

avec succès, que Belgrade n’avait pas le droit d’introduire cette instance. Puisqu’il n’était pas dans

l’intérêt du demandeur, dans les affaires de l’OTAN, de contester l’argument des défendeurs selon - 29 -

lequel Belgrade n’était ni membre de l’ONU, ni partie à la convention sur le génocide, on ne peut

36 pas dire que la Cour, dans ces af faires, ait eu le bénéfice d’échan ges d’arguments complets et de

bonne foi. Nous retrouvons ici le problème de la bonne foi des plaideurs. La RFY, qui avait

introduit l’affaire tranchée en 200 4, se disait victime d’un génocide commis par certains Etats

membres de l’OTAN, accusation on ne peut plus grave. Et lorsque deux de ces Etats ont fait

observer que la RFY n’était peut-être ni membre de l’ONU, ni partie à la convention sur le

génocide, la RFY s’est-elle défendue contre cet argument qui, s’il était retenu, allait forcément

conduire au rejet de sa demande? Selon moi, Ma dame le président, le défendeur n’était que trop

heureux de perdre sur ce terrain, parce que cela lui donnait une meilleure chance de succès dans la

présente affaire. Je le répète avec tout le respect que je dois à la Cour : un précédent établi dans de

telles circonstances doit être omis, ou écarté, et non pas répété.

33. Permettez-moi, Madame le président, de rappeler brièvement les arguments qui furent

opposés à la Serbie-et-Monténégro dans les affaires de l’OTAN. Dès 1999, au sujet de la demande

en indication de mesures conservatoire dépos ée par Belgrade, le Canada, représenté par

M. Philippe Kirsch, alors ambassadeur, avait ouvert la procédure orale en affirmant à la Cour que :

«la République fédérale de Yougoslavie n’es t pas partie au Statut de la Cour. La
Yougoslavie n’a pas rempli les conditions requises par les organes politiques de
l’Organisation des NationsUnies pour être admi se au sein de cette organisation et ne

saurait automatiquement bénéficier de la qualité de Membre du précédent Etat de
Yougoslavie».

Ce n’est donc pas comme si la question n’avait pas été soulevée ou comme si elle n’était pas

importante. L’équipe juridique de Belgrade devait sa voir que, si elle ne parvenait pas à réfuter cet

argument dans cette instance-là, la RFY serait privée d’accès à la Cour et ne pourrait pas se

présenter devant elle pour demander des réparations en vertu de l’article IX de la convention. Pour

triompher, elle devait faire un effort pour démontre r la qualité de continuateur qu’elle revendiquait

depuis longtemps.

34. En 1999, elle fit effectivement un effort dans ce sens, faisant valoir qu’elle était bien

l’Etat continuateur, que d’ailleurs l’ONU lui dema ndait toujours de payer sa contribution annuelle

et que, en fait, elle la payait en partie. Le 5 janvier 2000, la RFY déposa un mémoire sur le fond,

dont la partie 3.1 s’intitule «La République fédé rale de Yougoslavie est un Etat Membre des

Nations Unies» et la partie 3.4, «La compétence de la Cour au titre de l’article IX de la convention - 30 -

sur le génocide». Je n’ennuierai pas la Cour en lui exposant tous les excellents arguments avancés

par la RFY à l’appui de ces propositions, car je ne ferai en cela que répéter une grande partie de ce

que mes collègues et moi-même soutenons en la présente instance.

37 35. Cependant, le 18 décemb re 2002, tout cela changea brusquement. La RFY, en

«complét[ant] ses communications antérieures» ⎯ complétant ? ⎯ informa la Cour qu’elle était

devenue « nouvellement [les italiques sont dans l’origin al] Membre de l’Organisation des

Nations Unies». Mais elle alla beaucoup plus loin. Non seulement la RFY, sous un nouveau nom,

était devenue un nouveau Membre de l’Organisation, mais en plus, soutenait-elle ⎯ et c’est ce qui

importe ici ⎯ «il en découl[ait] qu’elle ne l’était pas avan t cette date». Vraiment ? Et pourquoi ?

Quant à la convention sur le génocide, la RFY informa la Cour que, n’ayant jamais été membre de

l’ONU, elle n’avait jamais été partie à la convention sur le gé nocide «avant d’adhérer à cette

convention (avec une réserve à l’article IX) en mars 2001».

Le PRESIDENT: Monsieur le professeur, je pe nse qu’il serait temps de faire une pause.

Nous reprendrons sous peu. L’audience est suspendue.

L’audience est suspendue de 16 h 30 à 16 h 45.

Le PRESIDENT : Veuillez vous asseoir. Monsieur Franck, vous pouvez poursuivre.

M. FRANCK : Madame le président, avant la pause je faisais allusion au changement

survenu dans l’attitude de la RFY le 18 décembre2002, date à laquelle elle a informé la Cour

qu’elle complétait ses communicatio ns antérieures et qu’elle était nouvellement devenue Membre

de l’ONU, d’où il découlait qu’elle ne l’était pas avant cette date, et elle a notifié son adhésion à la

convention sur le génocide avec une réserve à l’article IX.

36. M. Varady, qui a toute ma sympathie à cet égard, s’est alors trouvé soudain dans la

situation délicate de devoir communiquer à la Cour cette volte-face vertigineuse en 2002; il l’a fait

en priant la Cour «de statuer sur sa compétence à la lumière de l’argumentation exposée» par son

gouvernement. Mais de quelle argumentation s’agissa it-il? Celle qui insistait sur le statut d’Etat

continuateur, ou la communication de dernière minu te par laquelle il était renoncé à ce statut ? Et

s’il s’agissait de cette dernière, po urquoi n’était-il pas tout simple ment mis fin à la procédure? - 31 -

Dans ses plaidoiries en2004, M.Varady a insisté sur le fait que la communication de

décembre 2002 à la Cour n’était «pas une notificat ion de désistement, comme l’[avait] prétendu la

plupart des défendeurs…» (CR2004/14, p.20, par. 27), en ajoutant: «nous n’avons ni informé la

Cour que nous n’allions pas poursuivre la pro cédure, ni dit quelque chose d’approchant» ( ibid.,

38 p.20, par.30). Mais évidemment, la position de la RFY était devenue intenable, et le conseil

devait en avoir conscience. Pourquoi la RFY a-t-elle donc poursuivi la procédure ?

37. La réponse à cette question a été très bien donnée à l’audience du lendemain par

M. Daniel Bethlehem, représentant la Belgique, qui a déclaré :

«Il n’est pas demandé à la Cour [dans cette déclaration] ⎯ non plus qu’ailleurs

dans les conclusions orales du demandeur ⎯ de se déclarer compétente. Il ne lui est
pas demandé de faire droit à la prétention de la Serbie-et-Monté négro affirmant la
compétence. L’agent de la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a pas prié la Cour de rejeter la
principale exception d’incompétence formulée par la Belgique sur la base de la
non-appartenance de la Serbie-et-Monténégro à l’Organisation des Nations Unies à la

date critique. Sur ce dernier point, les part ies sont toujours d’accord. Et…cette
appréciation commune, s’agissant de cet aspect liminaire de la compétence, est
déterminante dans l’affaire soumise à la Cour.» (CR 2004/15, p. 10, par. 8.)

38. «Cette appréciation commune» du demande ur et du défendeur. En effet, elle était

déterminante. Et elle était déterminante, non pa s sur la base d’une argumentation complète et

raisonnée présentée par des parties en désaccord, mais en raison de ce que M.Bethlehem a

justement appelé une «apprécia tion commune» entre la RFY et certains des Etats de l’OTAN qui

avaient contesté le statut du demandeur. On pe ut comprendre pourquoi certains membres de la

Cour se sont peut-être sentis obligés d’accepter «cette appréciation commune» aux fins de cette

affaire particulière. Mais ce n’est pas de cela que sont faits les grands principes du droit. Et même,

si les parties avaient été, non pas des Etats, mais des boxeurs sur un ring, l’un d’eux aurait très bien

pu être disqualifié à vie pour avoir fait seulement semblant de se battre.

39. Il pourrait sembler étrange que Belgrade n’ait pas vigoureusement fait valoir son droit,

en tant que partie à la convention sur le génocide à la date critique, d’engager son action contre les

Etats de l’OTAN. Il pourrait sembler étrang e que Belgrade n’ait même pas fait un effort

symbolique pour réfuter les affirmations des Etat s défendeurs contestant sa qualité de Membre de

l’ONU à l’époque critique et de partie à la convention sur le génocide. Mais, comme M.Varady

l’a expliqué par la suite, les ta cticiens de l’équipe juridique ne demandaient pas mieux que de - 32 -

poursuivre l’affaire, et de la perdre précisément à cause de cet argument selon lequel cette nouvelle

Yougoslavie n’était pas, et n’avait pas été, cette autre Yougoslavie . Son «principal objectif

stratégique», avait déclaré M.Varady, avait été de «transformer la responsabilité collective en

responsabilité individuelle»40. Il était trop évident qu’en perdant, comme il allait inévitablement le

faire, sa cause contre les Etats de l’OTAN sur un point de procédure aussi circonscrit, Belgrade

s’assurait un avantage pour la suite, l’affaire contre la Bosnie, la plus importante.

39 40. Mais s’il n’était pas dans l’intérêt de Be lgrade, dans les affaires contre les Etats de

l’OTAN, de disputer de la question de sa qualité de Membre de l’ONU ou de partie à la convention

sur le génocide alors, sûrement, Madame et Messieurs les juges, on ne peut pas dire que la Cour ait

eu le bénéfice d’un échange complet d’arguments sur cette question par de s parties véritablement

opposées par un différend. Pour reprendre les te rmes de M.Varady lui-même, la décision ne

pouvait avoir qu’un effet très limité «pour la raison évidente qu’aucune des parties n’avait vraiment

contesté le statut de la RFY».

41. Autrement dit, Madame le présiden t, si la Cour ne se considère pas ⎯ comme nous

pensons qu’elle devrait le faire ⎯ comme liée par les décisions qu’elle a déjà rendues sur sa

compétence en l’espèce en1996 et en2003, nous la prions respectueusement de se considérer du

moins comme entièrement libre de déterminer de novo dans une procédure véritablement

contradictoire ⎯ celle-ci ⎯ si la RFY était effectivement Membre de l’ONU et partie à la

convention sur le génocide au moment où le géno cide allégué a été perpétré. Pour l’aider dans

cette tâche, ma collègue et amie, Mme Stern, démontrera que la RFY est restée Membre de l’une et

partie à l’autre pendant toute la période cruciale. Il s’ensuit que vous continuez à avoir compétence

pour connaître de ce différend.

Le défendeur veut faire admettre une symétrie entre droits et obligations

42. Le défendeur veut faire admettre une symétrie entre droits et obligations pour vous

convaincre de l’applicabilité du pr écédent des affaires de l’OTAN à la présente espèce. Pour

décider si la RFY est restée Membre de l’ONU pe ndant la période pertinente du génocide, vous

examinerez bien sûr les décisions prises par le Conseil de sécurité concernant son statut. Le

4012 NIN 9, décembre 2004. - 33 -

défendeur voudrait vous voir conclure que le Cons eil de sécurité avait décidé qu’il n’était pas

membre, et que ce statut de non membre était la conséquence de la décision prise par les organes

politiques de l’ONU de suspendre certains de ses droi ts de participation. Cette déduction est tout à

fait injustifiée, car ces résolutions ont simplement créé une asymétrie entre les droits de la RFY et

ses obligations en vertu de la Charte.

43. La décision d’imposer une asymétrie tempor aire entre droits et obligations est une arme

utilisée fréquemment par les institutions pour amener les Etats récalcitrants à se conformer à leurs

obligations. Une juste interprétation des mesures pr ises par le Conseil de sécurité et l’Assemblée

40 générale pour restreindre les droits de Membre de la RFY devrait vous amener à conclure que ces

mesures concordent mieux avec l’idée que la RFY était et restait Membre qu’avec l’idée contraire.

44. L’imposition d’une telle asymétrie entre droits et obligations est une méthode courante

pour réprimer le non-respect de la loi et, peut-être, induire un changement de comportement. Dans

le droit national de certains pays, par exemple, le s personnes incarcérées pour crimes n’ont pas le

droit de vote, mais elles doivent néanmoins payer des impôts. En droit anglais, les étrangers

ennemis peuvent être poursuivis même s’ils n’ont pas eux-mêmes le droit de poursuivre 41. Aux

Etats-Unis, les sociétés étrangères peuvent, dans certains cas ⎯ par exemple le défaut d’inscription

au registre ⎯, se voir refuser le droit d’agir devant le s tribunaux, sans échapper pour autant à la

juridiction de ces mêmes tribunaux (voir Arizona Revised Statutes, titre 10, chap. 15; Foreign

Corporations, 10-1502A et E ; Delaware General Corporation Law, art. 383 a) et b)).

45. Dans le droit des NationsUnies, il n’y a pas non plus de raison de présumer que

l’imposition d’une telle asymétrie à un Etat qui ne se conforme pas à ses obligations puisse

dispenser cet Etat de tous ses devoirs envers l’Organisation, et encore moins de toutes ses

obligations conventionnelles. Ce n’est pas une si mple conjecture de ma part, c’est ce qui ressort

clairement de la pratique de l’ONU. Lorsque, en 1974, l’Assemblée générale a rejeté les lettres de

42
créance des représentants accrédités auprès d’elle par la République d’Afrique du Sud et qu’elle a

refusé aux représentants de Pretoria le droit de pr endre la parole et de voter, chacun savait que

l’intention n’était nullement de retirer au régime d’apartheid sa qualité de Membre de l’ONU ou de

41Amin c. Brown [2005] EWHA 1670 (Ch.).
42
Nations Unies, doc. A/PV.2281 (1974), p. 76 et 86. - 34 -

le décharger des obligations découlant pour lui de la Charte, des résolutions impératives du Conseil

de sécurité ou des traités en vigueur. Au contraire, la décision de limiter le droit de participation de

l’Afrique du Sud ⎯ qui créait un précédent ⎯ avait pour but d’inciter cet Etat à se conformer à ses

obligations de Membre, et non pas de lui donner un moyen facile de s’y soustraire.

46. Les deux cas ne sont pas identiques mais, si je cite le précédent des lettres de créance de

l’Afrique du Sud, c’est pour démontrer que les organes politiques de l’ONU ont découvert que

suspendre le droit d’un Etat à prendre la parole et à voter à l’Assemblée générale est un moyen de

faire pression sur lui pour qu’il se conforme aux décisions des NationsUnies, et ne revient en

aucun cas à le dispenser de toutes les obligations découlant pour lui de la Charte ou des traités.

41 47. Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, si vo us considérez maintena nt que vous devez une

nouvelle fois réexaminer la question de votre co mpétence, veuillez tenir compte de tout ce que je

viens d’exposer. Qu’on ne vous fasse pas croire que, lorsque les organes principaux de l’ONU ont

décidé de restreindre les droits de la RFY, ils entendaient en même temps la dispenser de ses

obligations ou lui retirer sa qualité de Membre. En vertu de la Charte des Nations Unies, même un

Etat qui a été suspendu ⎯ce qui n’était pas le cas de la RFY ⎯ reste Membre, reste tenu de

s’acquitter des obligations que lui impose la Charte, y compris celle de l’article 25, «d’appliquer les

décisions du Conseil de sécurité…».

48. Ce serait un comble, en effet, que la mesure prise par le Conseil de sécurité et

l’Assemblée générale précisément pour obliger la RFY à se co nformer aux obligations que lui

impose la Charte soit considérée comme déchargeant en même temps la RFY de son devoir de

respecter ces mêmes obligations.

49. La vérité, Madame le président, est tout simplement que, en 2004, la Cour n’avait pas été

pleinement informée des mesures que l’ONU avait prises à l’égard de la RFY à l’époque où le

génocide était commis, époque où le défendeur continuait à exercer, à New York et aussi à

LaHaye, un grand nombre de ses prérogatives de Membre de l’ONU et de partie à la convention

sur le génocide. La RFY ne plaidait pas avec séri eux dans le cadre des affaires de l’OTAN. Je

vous en prie, ne cédez pas, ne vous laissez pas al ler à penser que cette décision de 2004 peut vous

donner des indications utiles pour résoudre les qu estions très différentes et hautement complexes

que pose la présente affaire qui, elle, est extrêmement sérieuse. - 35 -

50. Pour toutes ces raisons, les affaires de l’OTAN, un peu ⎯ paradoxalement ⎯ comme le

statut juridique de la RFY à l’ONU entre 1992 et 2001, devraient être écartées en raison de leur

spécificité. Elles ne méritent certainement pas d’ être considérées comme une réponse, aux fins de

la présente instance, aux questions délicates concer nant le statut du défendeur et les obligations

découlant pour lui de la Charte des Nations Unies et de la convention sur le génocide.

51. En conclusion, Madame le président, la Bosnie considère que vos décisions antérieures

sur votre compétence sont res judicata. Elle considère que, en voulant revenir sur sa position

concernant son statut de Membre de l’ONU et dpartie à la convention sur le génocide, et en

cherchant à la dernière minute à se soustraire à la compétence de la Cour, Belgrade viole les

principes de la bonne foi des plaideurs et qu’il faudrait y faire obstacle le cas échéant par la voie de

l’estoppel. Nous sommes convaincus que les affaires de l’OTAN ne peuvent pas être utilisées pour

42 valider une telle tactique, que la question du st atut du défendeur à l’époque critique impose une

évaluation complète de toutes les preuves pertinentes et que ces preuves montrent que le défendeur

était Membre de l’ONU à cette époque, sous réserve de quelques restrictions importantes apportées

à ses droits en vue d’obtenir de lui qu’il respect e ses obligations internationales, y compris celles

que lui imposait la convention sur le génocide.

Je vous remercie, Madame le président, Messieurs de la Cour.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, M. le professeur.

Mr. FRANCK : I ask you to call on my colleague, Professor Brigitte Stern.

The PRESIDENT: Professor Stern, you have the floor.

42 STMEsRN:

W HEN THE 1996 JUDGMENT WAS HANDED DOWN ,THE R ESPONDENT HAD

TO BE REGARDED AS PARTY TO THE G ENOCIDE C ONVENTION

1. Madam President, Members of the Court, following on from my two colleagues, who have

already addressed the issue of your jurisdiction, it is now my task to show you, on an alternative

basis, that, even if you today felt compelled to reconsider the principle of your jurisdiction in 1993,

you would be bound to take exactly the same decision, because in 1993, at the time when the - 36 -

Application was filed ⎯ as in 1996 when you rendered your decision ⎯ the FRY was a Member of

the United Nations and party to the Genocide Convention.

2. As the Agent of Serbia and Montenegro, Mr.Stojanovic, stated in his opening address,

“the Court must determine whether the Respondent had access to the Court when the Application

was filed ⎯ and I stress that he indeed said ‘when the Application was filed’ ⎯ and whether the

Court had jurisdiction with respect to the Resp ondent pursuant to Article IX of the Genocide

43
Convention” . Here at least is one point on which both Parties are agreed, and one cannot see how

it could be otherwise (see inter alia Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New

Application:2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court and

Admissibility of the Application, Judgment of 3 February 2006, para. 54).

43 3. Of course the situation has evolved since 1993, when these proceedings commenced. We

note what Professor Varady said in regard to the changes brought about by the new democratic

Government following the overthrow of the Milosevic régime, which he described in the following

terms:

“Many things were changed or redirected ⎯ and many things still have to be
changed or redirected.

At a number of critical junctures, th e new Government of the FRY opted to
follow the position taken by the majority of States in the international community ⎯
including that of the Applicant . . .

We accepted a status and all of its consequences . . .” 44

4. That is all very fine, but it simply means that, having for years insisted that it was the

continuator, as regards both its status with in the United Nations and its participation in

international treaties, and after being for years the effective continuator, the new Government was

at last going to accept, for the future, the status that the interna tional community had been urging

upon it. It is surely inconceivable that what wa s basically a positive attitude, which looked to the

future, could be misdirected so as to nullify re troactively proceedings instituted by Bosnia and

Herzegovina in respect of which the Internationa l Court had already accepted jurisdiction, thus

conferring on the Applicant what might be termed, so to say, a vested right in seeing justice done :

4CR 2006/12, p. 11, para. 7 (Stojanovic).

4CR 2006/12, pp. 58-59, paras. 1.52-1.55 (Varady). - 37 -

a vested right in having the truth established rega rding the ethnic cleansing suffered by Bosnia and

Herzegovina. A truth, incidentally, for which the need is all the more urgent now that

MrM. ilosevic has escaped international justice. How, out of one mouth ⎯ that of

Mr. Stojanovic ⎯ can the Respondent admit that “[s]erious crimes were committed during the war

45
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Muslims suffered worst” , while, out of another ⎯ that

of ProfessorVarady (but also those of Mr.Djeric and ProfessorZimmermann) ⎯ it attempts to

exploit the real progress made by Serbia and Montenegro towards rejo ining the community of

democratic States by, in an unjustified and unjustifiable manner, throwing the cause of

international justice into reverse? Is Serbia and Montenegro then telling us that, because, after

eight years of refusal ⎯ after assuming the role of continuato r with all the consequences attaching

thereto ⎯ it has finally agreed to don the garb of successor, all should now be as if it had accepted

the role of successor from the outset? I am bound, moreover, to note that, from time to time in its

44 oral argument Serbia has clothed its invitation to the Court to reverse its previous decisions in an

aura of goodwill: its counsel have suggested that, in the same way that “the recent 2004 Legality of

the Use of Force Judgments have, by setting aside disputes of the past, paved the way for further
46
improving . . . political relations . . .”, a decision by this Court finding that it has no

jurisdiction ⎯ and hence that it cannot pass judgment upon the acts committed by the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia ⎯ would, so they tell us, pave the way for further improving political

relations between the two countries appearing before you today. I will confine myself to repeating

to you what the Agent of Bosnia told you on th e first day of the first round of these hearings,

47
namely that there can be no true pe ace and reconciliation without justice . And a refusal to pass

judgment can in no circumstances ⎯ by definition ⎯ result in justice.

5. Thus Serbia and Montenegro contends that the entire proceedings must be retroactively

reconstructed on the basis of the 2004Judgments ⎯ or rather, I should say, “deconstructed” ⎯

since this would be to deny a jurisdiction alre ady accepted and to nullify proceedings that are

currently ongoing. In this sapping operation, th e arguments of Serbia’s counsel are cumulative,

45Ibid., p. 11, para. 6 (Stojanović).

46CR 2006/13, p. 37 para. 4.7 (Zimmermann).
47
CR 2006/12, pp. 21-22, paras. 15-16 (Softić). - 38 -

and well summarized by Professor Varady at the cl ose of his initial presentation on 8 March last. I

would remind you of what he said:

“We shall point out two reasons, each of which is sufficient to yield the

conclusion that this honoured Court has no ju risdiction in this case. First, we shall
demonstrate that the FRY (now Serbia and M ontenegro) had no access to the Court at
the relevant moment when the Application was submitted. The second reason leading
to the conclusion of lack of jurisdiction in this case is that Se rbia and Montenegro
never became bound and is not bound by ArticleIX of the Genocide Convention,
48
which is the only purported ground of jurisdiction.”

6. Logic, Madam President, Members of the Cour t, would require that Bosnia confines itself

to rebutting this second point, since it has consiste ntly sought to found your jurisdiction solely on

Article IX of the Genocide Convention, and that it should not reply ⎯ or at least do so on a wholly

subsidiary basis ⎯ to the arguments on the Court’s jurisd iction based on the issue of the FRY’s

membership of the United Nations. Notwithstanding that Serbia and Montenegro, whilst relying on

its so-called non-membership of the UnitedNations as its main argument, also uses that issue in

45 order to seek to show ⎯ over and over again ⎯ that the Genocide Convention is not applicable, I

shall nonetheless concentrate today exclusively on our opponents’ attempts to deny your

jurisdiction on the basis of ArticleIX of th e Genocide Convention, and will leave for Monday

morning my demonstration that the FRY must also be regarded as having been a Member of the

United Nations.

The PRESIDENT: Professor Stern. I am afra id that it is the usual request. Could you

please speak a little more slowly?

Ms STERN: I am sorry, I will try.

7. Before coming to the main thrust of my presentation, which I shall try to take more

slowly, I must therefore draw the Court’s attenti on to the consistency of the strategy followed by

Serbia and Montenegro since the start of this case: rather than accepting that the Court should

consider its conduct in relation to the Genocide Convention ⎯ and given its repeated claims that

there has been no genocide, that should not worry it ⎯ rather than doing that, it has preferred to

48Ibid., p. 59, para. 1.57 (Varady). - 39 -

commit virtually all the energy of its Agents and counsel to removing the Genocide Convention

from consideration by this Court.

8. In 1993 and 1996, the sole aim pursued by what was then the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia ⎯ but we shall see that, while the name changes, the strategy remains the same ⎯ was

to achieve what I referred to at the time as a “disqualification of the Genocide Convention, whose

universal scope has nonetheless been recognized by the Court” 4. That remains in 2006 what is at

stake in what ProfessorVarady somewhat casually refers to as “the procedural aspect of this

complex case” 5. True, he admits a few paragraphs further on: “[a]pproaching issues of procedure,

I do not want to disregard the fact that in this ca se . . . the allegation pertains to genocide, probably

51
the greatest crime known” . But he at once forgets what he has just said: having paid “lip

46 service”, in that very expressive English phrase , to humanitarian considerations, he immediately

ignores them, immersing himself in legal quibbles, whose purpose is to prevent your Court from

examining acts committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus to avoid any possibility of the truth

coming out and of justice being done.

9. In 1996–– as I need hardly remind you–– one of the main arguments relied on by the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to disq ualify the Convention was to deny that Bosnia and

Herzegovina was a party thereto. As you well kn ow, the Court rejected that argument in its

1996 Judgment. However, at that time the FRY had not thought of the converse argument. Now it

has done so, and here it is daring to defend before you, despite its numerous statements to the

contrary, despite the fact that it had raised no preliminary objections based on its non-participation

in the Genocide Convention, despite its reliance on the Convention in order to submit to the Court a

counter-claim in which it accused Bosnia and Herzegovina of genocide against the Serbs, and

despite its reliance on the Convention in order to bring proceedings against eight member countries

of NATO, it now comes to this Great Hall of Justice and tells us that “there is no conceivable way

4CR 1996/9, p. 9 (Stern).

5CR 2006/12, p. 39, para. 1.2 (Varady).
51
Ibid., para. 1.5 (Varady). - 40 -

in which Serbia and Montenegro could have either remained or become bound by Article IX of the

52
Genocide Convention” .
53
10. As the Agent of Bosnia and Herzegovina has already pointed out what Serbia and

Montenegro has just told you in 2006 is that, because ten years ago you rejected its arguments that

Bosnia and Herzegovina was not a party to the Genocide Convention, well, so what? Here is

another argument for you, ten years on: it was Se rbia and Montenegro that was not party to the

Convention. It is clear, Members of the Court, from the mere enunciation of such a claim, that you

cannot accept it.

11. Bosnia and Herzegovina will therefore s how you that this attempt to disqualify the

Convention cannot and must not succeed. To do so, I will begin by showing that the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia was undeniably a party to the Genocide Convention in 1993.

47 I. It is impossible to deny that the FRY was party to

the Genocide Convention in 1993

1. The Court has already ruled that the FRY was party to the Genocide Convention in 1993

12. Professor Zimmermann cont ended the contrary, stating: “the Court has so far never

decided upon the succession of Serbia and Montenegro with regard to the Genocide Convention,

which issue, therefore, for that reason too, is not res judicata” 54. But the issue is not whether the

Court has decided upon successor State status, whic h is of little significance; the real issue, the

fundamental issue, is the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a State party to the

Genocide Convention. And on this point, Madam President, Members of the Court, you could only

have found, with the authority of res judicata, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, now Serbia

and Montenegro, was party to the Convention. Had you not done so, you simply could not have

declared yourselves competent, as you so undeniably did.

13. I note that, while it is in principle only the operative part of a judgment of the Court that

carries the authority of res judicata, thus rendering it binding, and that, by the same token, the

“reasons contained in a decision, at least in so far as they go beyond the scope of the operative part,

5CR 2006/12, p. 54, para. 1.57 (Varady).

5CR 2006/30, p.11, para. 6 (Softić).
54
CR 2006/13, p. 38, para. 4.11 (Zimmermann). - 41 -

have no binding force as betwee n the Parties concerned” ( Polish Postal Service in Danzig,

Advisory Opinion, 1925, P.C.I.J., Series B, No.11 , pp.29-30), that statement by the Permanent

Court of International Justice means, a contrario, that the reasons which do not go beyond the

scope of the operative part or which support it are, of course, also binding. Applying that reasoning

to the circumstances of the present case, this di stinction enables us to conclude that, while the

Court in its 1996 Judgment confined itself in the operative part to declaring that it had jurisdiction

on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention, it could not have reached such a conclusion

without a prior finding in its reasoning— and I quote— that “Yugoslavia was bound by the

provisions of the Convention on the date of filing of the Application in the present case, on

20 March 1993” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.

Reports 1996(II) , p.610, para. 17). Inasmuch as this finding is “a condition essential to the

Court’s decision” ( Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and8 (Factory at Chorzów), Judgment

No. 11, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No.13 , p.20), that ground, which thus constitutes the condition

sine qua non of the operative part, should also be considered as having the force of res judicata.

Consequently, the Court’s finding that Yugoslavia was bound by the Genocide Convention in 1993

enjoys res judicata authority.

14. In support of this claim that the Court had never decided whether the FRY was party to

the Genocide Convention, ProfessorZimmermann stressed, inter alia, that the FRY had raised no

preliminary objection regarding its status as a party to the Genocide Convention— which we

readily acknowledge, while wondering how such a “forgotten” objection can now be aired— and

argued, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the Court could not have ruled on the

Respondent’s status, since the issue was never raised. However, as we know full well, the Court

can perfectly well take decisions on issues which have not been raised, on issues which are not

disputed, if it is of the opinion that they are significant and indeed Professor Zimmermann himself

chose to remind us of that in a different context, when he told us:

“Besides, one has also to take into consideration the fundamental nature of
issues relating to the party status of a given State and its access to the Court which the - 42 -

Court itself 55s to enquire into and which is independent of any approach chosen by
the parties.”

I agree with him entirely on this point. Even if it is undisputable ⎯ and no one can deny it ⎯ that

the FRY raised no objection regarding its status as a party to the Convention, the Court

nevertheless took a decision on this point, as it necessarily had to do in order to establish its

jurisdiction.

15. How can it be argued that the issue of access to the Court was not decided back in 1996,

since the Court clearly stated that its approach co nsisted in examining all as pects of jurisdiction?

“Having reached the conclusion that it ha s jurisdiction in the present case, both ratione personae

and ratione materiae on the basis of ArticleIX of the Genocide Convention, it remains for the

49 Court to specify the scope of that jurisdiction ratione temporis.” ( Application of the Convention

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.

Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 617, para. 34.)

As we can see, the Court overlooked nothing, considered everything, and undeniably reached a

determination on all aspects of its jurisdiction. We can thus see what the Court already decided in

1993: that the FRY was party to the Genocide Convention.

16. It remains for me to show you that, even if you had not already established the status of

both States as parties to the Convention, you would be bound to do so again now. You would also

be bound to reject what I will call Serbia and Montenegro’s “maximalist” argument that major

legal obstacles barred it from even entertaining the idea of being a party to the Genocide

Convention, and its more moderate argument — if we can call it that since the ultimate outcome is

the same— that the circumstances of the successi on process in the former Yugoslavia resulted in

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no longer being a party to the Convention from, precisely,

27 April 1992.

17. We need to look at what Serbia and Montenegro wants to make you say. It wants to

make you say that from 27 April 1992 until 12 June 2001, when it acceded to the Convention with

a reservation (12June to account for the 90days for its accession of 12 March to come into

force) ⎯ thus for a period of nine years ⎯ it was not a party to the Convention: nine years which

55CR 2006/13, p. 42, para. 4.33 (Zimmermann). - 43 -

included the period of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the originator of the proceedings before you

today. Hence, throughout this period, Serbia and Montenegro was not bound by the Genocide

Convention, notwithstanding repeated, official, public declarations to the contrary. The Court

cannot accept such a conclusion.

2. In 1993, the FRY could have been a party to the Genocide Convention

18. I will therefore begin by rejecting what I have called the “maximalist” argument by

demonstrating that in 1993 the FRY could have been a party to the Genocide Convention. That

argument seeks to show that the conditions did not exist for even hypothetical participation in the

Convention, and thus to demonstrate that the FRY could not even claim to be party to the Genocide

50
Convention ⎯ and for two different reasons: first, because it was not a Member of the United

Nations and, second, because, as a non-United Nations Member, it had not received a specific

invitation by the Secretary-General to accede. Thes e are not, of course, alternative conditions, but

cumulative ones.

19. Before responding to this two-pronge d assault on us by counsel for Serbia and

Montenegro, I would like to say that the basic assu mption underlying this restrictive interpretation

appears to me to be misconceived. Misconceived because it is contrary to the Convention’s very

nature. Such a consideration has already been voiced in the present case in the separate opinion of

JudgeParra-Aranguren appended to the 1996 Judgment, in which he emphasized “the importance

of maintaining the application of such conventions of humanitarian character” ( Application of the

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and

Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II) , separate

opinion of Judge Parra-Aranguren, para.2). That view is, as I would remind you, largely in line

with what the Court itself stated in its 1951 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

“[t]he object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention
of the General Assembly and of the States which adopted it that as many States as

possible should participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of one or
more States would not only restrict the scope of its application, but would detract from
the authority of the moral and humanitari an principles which are its basis.”
(Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 24.) - 44 -

20. It is, moreover, highly instructive to note that in resolution 368 (IV), “[i]nvitations to be

addressed to non-Member States to become pa rties to the Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, adopted by the General Assembly on 3December 1949,

the intention was in no way to bar accession to th e Convention, but rather to broaden it as far as

possible.

21. This— important— general commenta ry over, I will now address Serbia and

Montenegro’s curious argument that it could not even claim to be a party to the Convention, when

at the time it was loudly declaring the contrary. I will reply by saying that there is absolutely no

51 validity to this objection for two cumulative reas ons, which thus counter very precisely the two

alleged obstacles to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s participation in the Genocide

Convention.

22. First, I submit, although I will not show it today, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

could have been a party to the Genocide Convention because it was a Member of the United

Nations in 1993. However, as I said, I will expand on that point on Monday.

23. Nevertheless, I will continue the analysis by demonstrating that if, for the sake of

argument, we assume that the Fe deral Republic of Yugoslavia was not a Member of the United

Nations — which Bosnia and Herzegovina does not a ccept — it could still have participated in the

Genocide Convention. I will remind you of this second limb of Serbia and Montenegro’s objection

in the terms in which it was expressed by Professor Varady:

“[n]ot every State can become a Contracting Party to the Genocide Convention. This
Convention, of which the Secretary-General of the United Nations is the Depositary, is

unconditionally open to Members of the United Na56ons. It is not unconditionally
open to non-Members of the United Nations.”

24. However, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as I will show you, Members of the Court,

had no need whatsoever of a special invitation as the Respondent contends, since it was engaged in

a succession process.

25. Nevertheless, before I show you that an invitation to accede was unnecessary for a

non-United Nations Member State in the event of State succession, I would like to repeat the

obvious, namely that, Member of the United Na tions or otherwise, the Federal Republic of

56CR 2006/13, p. 26, para. 3.31 (Varady). - 45 -

Yugoslavia had no need for a specific invitation, quite simply because it was party to the Genocide

Convention. It is agreed that the Secretary-General, who invites non-Member States to accede on

behalf of the General Assembly, never addresse d any such request to the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, a point on which Bosnia and Herzegovina does not contest the position of Serbia and

Montenegro. However, if this was the case and there was no invitation, it is because there was no

reason to address such a request to the Federa l Republic of Yugoslavia, since it was generally

regarded as a party to the Convention. This was, in any case, the opinion of the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia itself, which was after all the most directly concerned.

26. It was also the opinion of the Secretary-General. We could thus view the very fact that
52

he did not send such an invitation as evidence of his conviction that the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia was a party to the Genocide Convention. And that conviction is demonstrated by the

United Nations documents. In a document en titled “Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the

57
Secretary-General: Status as at 31December 1992” , that is to say after 27April 1992, a State

called Yugoslavia is indicated as having been bound since the initia l date of ratification by the

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That en try could only refer to the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, thus recognizing that it has retained th e status of its predecessor State. In 1996, the

Secretary-General even attempted to go further in recognizing the FRY’s status as continuator of

the treaty status of the SFRY: in the “Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary
58
of Multilateral Treaties” of 1996 , he included the now famous paragraph297, which stated that

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continued to hold all the rights and duties with respect to

international conventions of its predecessor. We all know of the political controversy among the

five States born out of the former Yugoslavia, wi th four of them refusing to accept a privileged

status for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a nd the paragraph was withdrawn. But if things

were no longer put down in black and white or expressed as clearly, the situation remained the

same, that is to say, a State remained bound by th e treaties of the SFRY, and that State could only

be the FRY. In other fora, the situation was mu ch clearer: for example, in the list of treaties

5United Nations doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/11, New York, 1993

5United Nations doc. ST/LEG/8, p. 89, para. 297. - 46 -

adopted under the aegis of Unesco, after 27 April 1997, next to the name “Yugoslavia” was written

“Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”.

27. Thus, no need for an invitation, since such an invitation would have been an absurdity.

Can we imagine the United Nations Secretary-General inviting a State party to the Genocide

Convention to accede to it? The mere enunciation of such an hypothesis demonstrates its inanity.

28. I would also like to rebut Professor Zimmerman’s interpretation of the letter of

8 December 2000 from the United Nations Legal Counsel to the FRY after its admission as a new

Member of the United Nations in November 2000. I will read you the passage, which I only have

in English: “It is the Legal Co unsel’s view that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should now

53 undertake treaty actions, as appropriate, in relation to the treaties concerned, if its intention is to

59
assume the relevant legal rights and obligations as a successor State.” ProfessorZimmermann

inferred from this that “the ap proach taken by the Legal Counsel confirmed that the FRY had not

been a party to the Genocide Convention beforehand” 60. This conclusion is incorrect and goes

beyond what the Legal Counsel said. I would simply note that the matter appears very much open,

since, first, the Legal Counsel was requesting action “as appropriate” and, second and more

importantly, the fact that the FRY was asked to clarify its intentions with respect to the treaties as a

successor State after November2000 does not mean in any way that it had not enjoyed, prior

thereto, the status of continuator of the predecesso r State: continuator with respect to treaties and

with respect to the United Nations — a key point that I will addr ess in greater detail after the

weekend.

29. However, I will now take our alternative argument even further by submitting that,

supposing that the FRY was neither a Member of the United Nations nor a party to the Convention,

and that you are of the opinion that without an invitation from the Secretary-General a

non-Member State cannot accede to the Convention— in regard to which you have, however,

already had occasion to emphasize the importance of participation being as widespread as

possible — there would still have been no need foran invitation in the present case, since there was

an ongoing succession process, a possibility for which no provision is made in Article [XI] of the

5CR 2006/13, p. 49, para. 4.57 (Zimmermann).
60
Ibid., para. 4.58. - 47 -

Genocide Convention. I will not reread the Article, but it states in one of its paragraphs that an

invitation is required for signature and, in another, for accession.

30. The invitation is an invitation to sign or an invitation to accede, but the Convention does

not make any reference to an invitation to continue or to succeed. In the event of a succession

process, the rules specific to State succession apply. In the present case, the predecessor State was

indisputably party to the Genocide Convention, which, if we accept the principle of the automatic

continuity of treaties, to which I will return shortly, would entail an obligation to participate, both

for the continuator State and for the successor State; but, in any case, even if we reject the

principle of automatic c ontinuity, it would confer a right to participate upon the successor State,

while the continuator State would, of course, necessarily remain bound by the treaty. How can one
54

dare suggest that the States which emerged from the former Yugoslavia, one of the original

signatories of the Convention, lacked the right to participate in it on the pretext that a succession

process had occurred in that State? I think that in asking the question we have already answered it.

This conclusion appears particul arly pertinent here, since, given the object and purpose of the

Convention, it is important that it should retain the same territorial scope of application.

31. True, I am aware that the Court in its 1996Judgment, when examining whether Bosnia

and Herzegovina was bound by the Genocide Convention, began its reasoning with the observation

that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a Member of the United Nations and therefore could become a

party in virtue of Article XI. This reasoning must , however, be seen within its context, which was

set by the FRY’s third preliminary objection, aime d at denying Bosnia, described as the “so-called

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” ( Application of the Convention for the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary

Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 , p.604), the status of State, on the ground that by

seceding it had violated the duties stemming from the right of peoples to self-determination. In

other words, the Court evoked Bo snia’s status as a Member of the United Nations in order to

confirm its status as a State— a status necessarily implied by membership of the United

Nations — a State established in conformity with international law, thus enabling Bosnia to rely on

the rules on State succession and preventing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from challenging

it under Article6 of the Convention on the Succes sion of States with respect to Treaties, since - 48 -

Article6 concerns illegal successions. In such a di stinctive context, it seems to me that it is not

possible to draw any conclusions on the need, as Serbia contends, for a special invitation to accede

to the Genocide Convention for all States born of a succession process. I would therefore simply

recall that there is no reference to such an invitation in Article [XI], and that there appears to be no

reason for requiring such an invitation in the context of a succession process.

32. Finally, in the further alternative, even if we were to assume that Serbia and Montenegro

needed an invitation to accede to the Convention, it seems to me that the entire thrust of United

55 Nations policy towards that country was aimed at making it comply with the Convention. I will not

quote once again all of the numerous resolutions that we have already cited so often, urging the

FRY to abide by the Genocide Convention, which imply that it was a party or at least would

suggest, if it was not, an invitation to participate in it. While I believe that we have thus refuted the

“maximalist” argument, and while I hope that we have shown you that all the legal conditions were

met for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be entitled to be a party to the Genocide Convention,

we must now address what I call the “moderate” position, which is that the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia was in fact not a party to the Genocide Convention.

3. The FRY was party to the Genocide Convention in 1993 because it had made a declaration
of continuation of its international treaty status

33. Your Court had little difficulty in reachi ng such a conclusion, given that it was so

obvious. In your Order of 8 April 1993, you first found that:

“a compromissory clause in a multilateral convention, such as ArticleIX of the
Genocide Convention relied on by Bosnia-Herzegovina in the present case, could, in
the view of the Court, be regarded prima facie as a special provision contained in a

treaty in force: whereas accordingly if Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia are both
parties to the Genocide Convention, disputes to which ArticleIX applies are in any
event prima facie within the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Court” ( Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Provisional
Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 14, para. 19).

The Court therefore took as its starting point the idea that, at the provisional measures stage, it was

sufficient for it to establish that the two States we re parties to the Convention. We know that the

main issue at that time was the party status of Bosnia. However, th e Court endeavoured to

ascertain that both States were parties. - 49 -

34. As regards the FRY, the Court reached the conclusion that the FRY was a party by virtue

of its expressed will. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s party status was also ascertained by the Court,

even if, let me repeat, the question of the legal basi s for such status was left open. The conclusion

thus reached was that both States were parties to the Convention, and that the latter could therefore

be considered to afford a prima facie basis of jurisdiction at that stage (ibid., p. 16, para. 26).

35. Then, naturally, the same reasoning was adopted, only this time no longer on a
56

primafacie basis, in the 1996 Judgment. I shall not repeat your entire reasoning, which is more

familiar to you than to us. I think I need only remind the Court of the unambiguous conclusion

adopted in 1996: “[t]hus, Yugoslavia was bound by the provisions of the Convention on the date of

the filing of the Application in the present case, namely, on 20March1993” ( Application of the

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and

Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996(II) , p.610,

para. 17; emphasis added).

36. Professor Varady attempted to cast doubt on this conclusion by suggesting that the

assumption on which it is based was false. Thus, th is is what he told us: he told us that the

assumption of the continuity of treaty status was in reality founded on the assumption of the

continuity of status within the United Nations, and that, since the assumption of continuity of status

within the United Nations had been nullified by the admission of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia to the United Nations in 2000, that should also have nullified the continuity of its treaty

status. In actual fact, this was not at all the reasoning adopted by the Court. The Court did not rely

on assumptions, it relied on the political and lega l reality, the reality of the declaration by the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it consider ed itself bound by the treaties signed by the

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ⎯ the reality, therefore, of a declaration by a sovereign

State that it was bound and that it would abide by all the obligations and all the treaties signed by

the SFRY. It was precisely in 1996 that the Court, holding that both parties were bound by the

Genocide Convention, took its decision ⎯ as you know ⎯ without basing itself on the FRY’s

status within the United Nations, that is to say its status as a Member or non-Member, successor or

continuator, a question which it did not settle. There is no need to invoke the continuity of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the Unite d Nations in order to draw hypothetical - 50 -

conclusions concerning the Genocide Convention. On the day it came into being, the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia said two things: it said firs t, “I hereby continue the status of the Socialist

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the United Nations”, and secondly, “I hereby assume all the

treaty obligations of the SFRY”. The Court analysed these two propositions as not being mutually

related, and still less as possessing a cause-effect relationship, since it did not examine the former

in order to take a position on the latter. This independent analysis of status within the United

Nations and of treaty status is entirely consiste nt with the view that was taken by the United

Nations, as expressed by the United Nations Unde r-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, in his

57 famous legal opinion of 16November1993: “The status of Yugoslavia as a party to treaties was

not affected by the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992 . . .

It did not address Yugoslavia’s status as a party to treaties.”

37. Your Court therefore simply concluded th at the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was

bound, not on the basis of an assumption, as counsel for Serbia would like to have us believe, or on

the basis of some inductive or deductive intellectua l construct, but simply that it was bound on the

basis of a reality which is central to all internat ional law, namely the consent of States. Let me

repeat once again, word for word, the language that you used: the Court relied on “[t]his intention

thus expressed by Yugoslavia to remain bound by the international treaties to which the former

Yugoslavia was party” ( Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment,

I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p.610, para. 17).

4. Even if it was not considered to be a continuator State, the FRY was party to the Genocide
Convention in 1993, by virtue of the rule of automatic succession to that universal treaty

38. I shall pass over this question rapidly, merely pointing out that Article34 of the

Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties lays down this rule of automatic

succession. I shall not waste your valuable time by discussing the scope of that Article ⎯ as you

know, it has been the subject of debate ⎯ or the means of applying it to all treaties; I shall simply

say that it is widely accepted that this princi ple applies to treaties incorporating norms of jus

cogens. - 51 -

39. Professor Zimmermann tried to convince you that this rule did not exist, totally ignoring

Article34, which he failed to cite even once. On the other hand, he ex tensively cited articles,

commentaries, references concerning newly indepe ndent States within the meaning of the 1978

61
58 Convention on Succession in respect of Treaties . Madam President, Members of the Court, I

confess that I have given the matter a great deal of thought but have been unable to find the

slightest connection between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a newly independent State

within the meaning of the Convention, and hence to find that these arguments have even the

slightest relevance. To my knowledge, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has never claimed to be

a newly independent State ⎯ a State previously colonized by Yugoslavia!

40. I shall not, therefore, devote too much time to rebutting this argument, and I shall merely

cite international practice and, in particular, the position adopted by the meeting of persons chairing

human rights treaty bodies, who made the following observation: “[t]he chairpersons emphasized,

however, that they were of the view that successor States were automatically bound by obligations

under international human rights instruments from the respective date of independence” 62.

41. This was also the position taken, as you know, Madam President, by the Human Rights

Committee ⎯ which you chaired at the time ⎯ when Bosnia submitted its report on compliance

with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a report which it submitted prior to any

notification of succession, thereby giving concrete effect to the principle of automatic succession 63.

42. Lastly, I would note that, even though I know very well that the Court did not wish to

resolve the issue of the rules of succession precisely applicable in 1996, it did not, however, rule

out the possibility of automatic succession by Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Genocide Convention

(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

(Bosnia and Herzegovinav. Yugoslavia), I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), para. 23).

6See for example CR2006/13, p.47, para. 4.51 (Zimmermann): “[f]requently, newly independent States will

submit to the Secretary-General ‘general’ declarations of succession... The Secretary...does not consider such a
declaration as a valid instrument of succession to any of the treaties deposited with him, and he so informs the
Government of the new State concerned”; or again, ibid., p. 51, para. 4.70: “the evidence of State practice appeared to
be unequivocally in conflict with the thesis that a newly independent State is under an obligation to consider itself bound
by a general law-making treaty applicable in respect of its territory prior to independence”.
62
Meeting of 19 to 23 September 1994, United Nations, doc. E/CN4/1995/80, 28 November 1994, p. 4, para. 10.
See also United Nations, doc. E/CN4/1996/76, 4 January 1996, p. 3, para. 8. emphasis added.
6See CCPR/C/79/Add.14, p. 2. - 52 -

5. Even if your Court did not recognize the applicability of the principle of automatic
succession, the FRY was party to the Genocide Convention in 1993, as it was in any case
bound as successor State by its many declarations

43. Regardless of the subjective reason why the FRY expressed its objective intention to be

bound by the Convention, international law is ba sed on the sovereign expr ession of the will of

States. A State cannot express its consent to be bound by a treaty and then, some years later, come

forward to say that, in the final analysis, it has changed its mind and that such consent must be

59 considered as never having been expressed. To accept such an approach would be to accept the

collapse of the entire structure of international law.

A declaration of will expressed publicly with th e intention of binding its author has binding
effect

44. I need not recall this axiom, which you enunciated in the case concerning Nuclear Tests

(New Zealand v. France), and which is sufficiently well known for me not to read out the relevant

passage ( Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974 , p.267, para.46). As you know, it is particularly

important to take account of the statements made by the representative of a party in the course of

judicial or arbitral proceedings, as these are considered to bind the parties64.

45. I shall therefore review ⎯ albeit not exhaustively ⎯ a number of unilateral declarations

by which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expr essed its firm intention to be a party to the

Genocide Convention and, if that is not enough, I shall also recall that it gave the same treaty

undertaking in the Dayton Agreements.

The many manifestations of the FRY’s intention to be a party to the Genocide Convention

The FRY’s intention as expressed in the documents of 27 April 1992

46. My colleague Alain Pellet has already read out these documents and I shall therefore not

go over them again, except to cite a phrase found in both the declaration by the “representatives of

the people of the Republic of Serbia” and the Note addressed to the Secretary-General, where it is

stated that the FRY “shall strictly abide by all the commitments that the Socialist Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia assumed internationally”.

6See Award made on 17 July 1986 by the Arbitral Tribunal set up under the Special Agreement of
23 October 1985 between Canada and France in connection with the Dispute concerning filleting within the Gulf of Saint
Lawrence, RGDIP, 1986, p. 756. - 53 -

47. There is no doubt that, in the light of th ese declarations, all the conditions laid down in

the Nuclear Tests case for unilateral declarations to be binding on a State are fulfilled in this case.

These declarations create legal obligations, given th e nature of their author, and I regard as futile

the attempt made by Professor Zimmermann to minimize the scope of these texts by saying that

they are purely political documents adopted by unauthorized bodies. I would point out nonetheless

60 that these texts were transmitted to the Secretary-General, and that the Secretary-General was asked

to circulate them as “official documents of the General Assembly” 6. By acting in this way, the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia wished to make it known to all the Members of the United Nations

that it was undertaking legal commitments. The de clarations of 27 April 1992 thus constitute an

immediate commitment with binding force for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

48. As the Court indicated in the Nuclear Tests case, this commitment exists independently

of any reaction by other States, that is to say, independently of any acceptance, but above all also

independently of any reaction of rejection. And this could be important to our case. Hence, once

again, these declarations expressed the intention of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, today

Serbia and Montenegro, to be unconditionally bound by the treaties to which the SFRY was party.

The intention of the FRY as manifested in its declarations during the proceedings in this
case

49. It has adopted a consistent line of conduct throughout all the stages of the proceedings.

50. During the proceedings relating to the request for the indication of provisional measures,

it insisted, inter alia , on the fact that the Court’s jurisdiction should remain confined to the

Genocide Convention. I shall merely cite what Professor Rosenne said at the hearing on

2April1993: “[t]he Federal Republic of Yugos lavia does not consent to any extension of the
66
jurisdiction of the Court beyond what is strictly stipulated in the Convention itself” .

51. This same line of conduct, as we know, was adopted during the 1996 oral pleadings .

Mr.Suy asserted on several occasions that the C onvention could be applicable to the parties, and

the only point that he discussed concerned the date of applicability; he attempted in particular to

deny that the Convention was applicable with ef fect from 6March 1992, the date of Bosnian

65United Nations, doc. A/46/915, 6 May 1992.
66
CR 1993/13, p. 15 (Rosenne). See also the letter cited in the Memorial of the Government of the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, dated 15 April 1994, p. 155, para. 4.2.2.3. - 54 -

independence. He admitted that it might be applicable from 29December 1992, from

61
14 December 1995, the date of the Dayton Agreements, and from other dates as well, but the latest
67
date accepted in the 1996 pleadings was the date of the Dayton Agreement .

52. Now, though, the Respondent tells us: “Oh no, no, no. We have been bound by the

68
Genocide Convention only since 2001.” Thus, the date is today again put back, this time by six

years.

The intention of the FRY as confirmed by it s treaty undertaking expressed in the Dayton
Agreements

53. But there is still more, there is also the fact that the intention of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia was undeniably confirmed in the Da yton Agreements. We know that, in those

Agreements, “the Parties agree to and shall comp ly fully with the provisions concerning human

69
rights set forth in Chapter One of the Agreement at Annex 6 . . .”.

54. Agree to and shall comply fully with. In fact, the Genocide Convention is the first treaty

that appears in that Annex. We also note that no restriction, no reservation, was entered by any of

the Parties, which state that they shall “comply fu lly with” the Conventions. In other words, what

we have here is a number of declarations wh ich clearly show that th e Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia was bound.

55. Bosnia considers that it was bound from the day it came into being, 27 April 1992. But

even if your Court adopted a later date, the Fede ral Republic of Yugoslavia could not escape its

responsibilities, particularly the responsibilities incurred, for example, prior to the Dayton

Agreements, since, as you know, in the 1996 Judgment, you clearly said:

“The Court thus finds that it has jurisdicti on in this case to give effect to the
Genocide Convention with regard to the rele vant facts which have occurred since the

beginning of the conflict which took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This finding is,
moreover, in accordance with the object and purpose of the Convention...”
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (II), p. 617, para. 34.)

6CR 1996/6, p. 23 (Suy).
68
CR 2006/13, p. 15, para. 2.19 (Varady).
69
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreements), 21November
1995, in United Nations doc., letter dated 29 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-Ge neral, doc. A/50/790, doc. S/1995/999, 30 November 1995,
p. 4. - 55 -

The interpretation of the various manifestations of the FRY will to be bound by the Genocide
Convention
62
56. As we have seen, the manifestations of th e will to be bound are countless and consistent

without the slightest exception; still, they have to be interpreted. We know that the declarations

have legal import, but if we interpret them, we can see them as either a declaration of continuity or

a notification of succession or ⎯ why not ⎯ as an act of accession, but regardless of the view

taken, the result is the same: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia manifested its will to be bound.

57. True, ProfessorZimmermann argued that, because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

undoubtedly intended to make a declar ation of continuity as the con tinuator State, this declaration

cannot be construed in any other way. And, in support of his argument, he states:

“Let me quote what was said on behalf of the Applicant by my esteemed

colleague Professor Brigitte Stern: ‘On ne voit pas pourquoi la notification de
succession, acte qualifié comme tel par un Etat souverain, devrait être considérée
comme une notification d’adhésion’ (CR 1996/9, pp. 32-33).” 70

Well, I am of course very flattered that my esteemed colleague Mr.Zimmermann cites me as

authority in support of his arguments, but he must surely know that, while I did indeed say what I

said and he quoted me accurately, the Court, for its part, completely disagreed with me on this

point. And I, for my part, rely on the authority of the Court, the sole source of authoritative

interpretations. And the Court, having before it Bosnia’s notification of succession, considered that

it could interpret it as it wished. You are well aware that it did not take a position on the manner in

which Bosnia and Herzegovina became a party; it said that Bosnia automatically became a party to

the Convention, or it became one by the effect, retro active or not, of its notif ication of succession;

or indeed whether Bosnia might not be considered to have acceded to the Genocide Convention.

58. Thus it is for the Court to make legal ch aracterizations. Nothing therefore prevents the

International Court of Justice from analysing the multiple declarations by the Federal Republic of

63 Yugoslavia as notifications of succession. Just as the Court did not specify in 1996 how Bosnia

and Herzegovina had become a party, there is no need to ascertain how the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia became a party; what matters is determining whether States are bound, not identifying

the legal process by which they became so.

7CR 2006/13, p. 45, para. 4.43 (Zimmermann). - 56 -

59. But Bosnia is going further. We are therefore going to show you, as I believe, that the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was indeed a pa rty to the Genocide Convention at the time when

Bosnia’s Application was filed. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not stop at that point in

its attacks on the Convention. No doubt thinking that it will fail, in the light of the clear facts, to

convince the Court that it was not a party to th e Convention, Serbia and Montenegro advances a

new argument in support of its contention that the Convention does not apply, even if the two

States were parties to it; this new argument is that the Genocide Convention was not a treaty in

force within the meaning of Article 35, paragraph 2, of your Statute.

The PRESIDENT: Professor Stern, do you think that would be an appropriate point to hold

over until Monday morning? You still have a fair way to go.

Ms STERN: I would need six or seven minutes.

The PRESIDENT: Then, please continue.

Ms STERN: Thank you, Madam President. Of course, since Bosnia and Herzegovina

considers the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to have been a Member of the United Nations in

1993, this discussion is in the alternative. I am therefore going to examine ArticleIX of the

Convention, in force in 1996, as the sole basis for the jurisdiction of the Court.

II. Article IX of the Genocide Convention is an independent,
sufficient basis for the jurisdiction of the Court

60. In denying that the Convention was in force, Serbia therefore now puts forward the thesis

that this is not a convention in force within the meaning of Article 35, paragraph 2. Once again, it is

going to base its argumentsolely on your Judgments in the Legality cases, which introduced a totally

unprecedented interpretation of the expression “treaties in force”.

64 61. We know that the Legality case produced a novel interpretation of the meaning of “treaty

in force” ⎯ a novel interpretation seized upon by Mr.Djeri ć in asking the Court to reconsider its

earlier interpretation. As the Cour t unambiguously stated, so Mr.Djeri ć tells us, in the Legality

case, this clause applies only to treaties in force at the date when the Statute entered into force.

A different position has, however, been taken in our case. - 57 -

62. I would remind you that in the Court’s Order indicating provisional measures you stated

as follows in paragraph 19:

“the Court . . . considers that proceedings may validly be instituted by a State against a
State which is a party to such a special provision in a treaty in force, but is not party to
the Statute, and independently of the conditi ons laid down by the Security Council in

its resolution 9 of 1946 (cf. S.S. Wimbledon”, 1923, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 1, p. 6) . . .
Article IX of the Genocide Convention . . . could... be regarded... as a special
provision contained in a treaty in force” ( Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovinav.
Serbia and Montenegro), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports
1993, p. 14, para. 19).

63. These prima facie conclusions adopted in 1993 were implicitly, but necessarily, again

reached in 1996.

64. Let us not forget that the Court necessarily recognized in its 1996 Judgment that a treaty

in force ⎯ and not just a treaty in force at the time when the Statute was adopted ⎯ could serve as

the basis for its jurisdiction, independently of status as a party to the Statute, because it upheld its

jurisdiction precisely without taking a position on the question of membership of the

United Nations.

65. Bosnia and Herzegovina is asking the Court to hold that, on this point also, the

1996 Judgment is res judicata, and to refrain from retroactively importing into our case a finding

which, as the President of this Court vigorously pointed out, there was no reason to reach, given

that Article 35, paragraph 2, had not been invoked by Serbia and Montenegro. As the document in

question is at present available only in English, I am going to quote it in the language of

Shakespeare:

“These Written Observations cont ained no invocation of Article 35,
paragraph2, as an alternative ground of jurisdiction ⎯yet, going beyond what the
Applicant requested in the present case, the Court has devoted some 23 paragraphs to
laying the grounds for a finding that Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute could not
have been an alternative basis for allowing access to the Court in respect of the
65
Genocide Convention so far as Serbia and Montenegro is concerned. This exercise
was clearly unnecessary for the present case. Its relevance can lie, and only lie, in
another pending case.” (Legality of Use of Force, Pr eliminary Objections, Judgment,
15 December 2004, separate opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 18.)

66. Aside from the fact that from the proced ural perspective that finding was unnecessary, it

is also questionable as to its substance. I shall not dwell on this matter; I would just like to raise

two points. The first is that there is no reason to give differing interpreta tions to the expression - 58 -

“treaties in force” in Articles 35, 36 and 37, as was noted by Professor Rosenne, who writes: “[t]he

expression treaties in force appears in Articles 35, 36, 37 of the Statute. This normally means that

the treaty must be in force between the parties on the date when the proceedings are instituted.” 71

The second point is that, even assuming that th e expression does not have the same meaning in

each of the three Articles, the interpretation adopted is by no means convincing. And indeed, in his

separate opinion appended to the Court’ s Judgment in the case concerning Legality of Use of

Force, Judge Elaraby criticized that interpretation from this standpoint, stating that “the

interpretation adopted by the Court ⎯ limiting ‘treaties in force’ to treaties in force at the time the

Court’s Statute came into force ⎯ is unduly restrictive” ( Legality of Use of Force , Preliminary

Objections, Judgment , 15December 2004, PointIII “Access to the Court under Article35,

Paragraph 2”, separate opinion of Judge Elaraby, para. 7).

67. In other words, whatever the true position may be, Bosnia and Herzegovina is asking the

Court, as I have already said, to consider the Judgment to be res judicata on this point as well. It is

therefore requesting the Court to decide this case on the basis of its own specific terms: in other

words, by standing by what it said in 1996, that is, that it had jurisdiction on the basis of Article IX

of the Genocide Convention, which means first th at the two States in dispute before you were

parties to the Convention and secondly that it was a convention in force. I hope to have convinced

you that you were correct in your decision at that time. Thank you, Madam President.

66 The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Stern. The Court now rises and the hearings will

resume on Monday next at 10 a.m.

The Court rose at 6.05 p.m.

___________

7S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-, Vol.II, Jurisdiction. 4th Edition,
Leiden/Boston, 2006, p. 641.