Translation

CO

CR 2005/12 (traduction)

CR 2005/12 (translation)

Lundi 25 avril 2005 à 10 heures

Monday 25 April 2005 at 10 a.m. - 2 -

8 Le PRESIDENT: Veuillez vous asseoir. L’audience est ouverte. La Cour se réunit

aujourd’hui pour entendre le second tour de plaidoiries de la République démocratique du Congo.

Le Congo prendra la parole ce matin jusqu’à 13 heures et cet après-midi, de 15 heures à 16 h 30, au

sujet de ses propres demandes. Je donne donc la parole à M. Kalala.

KMAr. ALA:

General introduction

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as Co-Agent of the DRC in this case, I have listened

attentively to the oral arguments of the representatives of the respondent State. In this connection, I

note the statement by Professor Ian Brownlie, speaking on behalf of the Republic of Uganda, when

he told us that the Congo: “has from the beginning deliberately adopted a pleading strategy

divorced from the Rules of the Court, from legal logic, and from the sound administration of

justice”. In this second round of oral argument, the representatives of the DRC will seek to avoid

such strong language. They will continue vigorou sly to defend the interests of the DRC, but

courteously, and with respect for their opponent. They will be at pains to abide scrupulously by the

provisions of Article60 of the Rules of Court. Thus the Congo will not simply repeat, word for

word, passages from its written pleadings, whether expressly or implicitly 2. Nor will the DRC

reiterate its arguments without seeking to answer th e objections raised by Uganda. This approach

will, I hope, enable the judicial debate to move forward.

2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, since the start of its presentation in the first round of

oral argument, Uganda has stressed that this dispute must not be judged from a Manichaean

viewpoint of good against evil, ange ls versus demons. Thus we were told that this was not a case

of a demon, the invader, and an angel, the country invaded 3. It was with this in mind that Uganda’s

9 counsel told you that you must take account of the Rwandan genocide, the problem of the

Interahamwe, the public statements by Mr.Yerodia and indeed ⎯ above all ⎯ the roles of the

Sudan and Rwanda.

1CR 2005/10, p. 8, para. 2.
2
See, for example, Mr. Brownlie’s speech in CR 2005/7, p. 14, para. 17; cf. CMU, Vol. 1, p. 40, para. 52.
3CR 2005/6, p. 17, para. 5. - 3 -

3. Mr. President, as a Congolese, I have noted the lessons on the subtleties of the history of

my country kindly dispensed by the Respondent’s counsel. I would, however, say this to them: in

these proceedings the DRC has brought before the C ourt its dispute with Uganda. That dispute

results from Uganda’s participation in the war which has ravaged the Congo since 2August1998

and which, according to numerous independent s ources, has caused severalmilliondeaths. The

roots and origins of this conflict are doubtless many-sided, and history will apportion responsibility

among all those involved: Congolese, Africans, Europeans, others . . . However, what the Congo

is asking of the Court is not to pass judgment in terms of history, morality or international politics,

but to render a judgment in law. And in law there is clearly, as between Uganda and the Congo, on

the one side an aggressor State and on the other an aggressed State. It is the Congo, and not

Uganda, whose territory has been invaded, its population massacred and tortured, its wealth

plundered. In that sense there is not a dem on and an angel, but a State responsible under

international law and another which has been gravel y injured by those violations. It is solely on

this specific point that the Court is being asked to rule.

4. Allow me, Mr. President, to add one more th ing on this subject. Over the last few days,

you have heard much talk of Rwanda, described as invader of the Congo, and still more of the

Sudan, characterized as a terrorist State and Uganda’s aggressor. Mr.President, Members of the

Court, in the 1980s Nicaragua regarded itself as a victim of the use of force by the United States,

but also by El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. However, only the dispute between Nicaragua

and the United States was brought before this Court, and then decided by it. Similarly, here, the

DRC has brought to the Court only its dispute with Uganda, and it is solely on that dispute that the

Court is being asked to rule. Mr.Reichler alluded in somewhat ironic terms to the DRC’s

“frustration” at having been unable to bring Rwanda before the Court 4. Allow me officially, on

10 behalf of the DRC, to reassure him. The Congo has also brought its dispute with Rwanda to the

Court. Hearings in the preliminary phase of the proceedings are due to be held this coming July.

Perhaps Uganda, too, has a certain sense of frustrati on, in that it appears to wish to bring to the

Court its dispute with the Sudan. Mr. President, in the first round of oral argument, the Sudan was

4
CR 2005/6, p. 41, para. 65. - 4 -

cited by Uganda’s counsel close to 250 times ⎯ we counted them! It is not for me to ascertain the

reasons for this veritable “obsession” with the Sudan to which our opponents appear to have

succumbed. For their part, in the remainder of these proceedings the DRC’s counsel will continue

to confine themselves to the dispute between the Congo and Uganda. They will have nothing to

say about any responsibility of other States in other disputes, whether Rwanda, the Sudan, or

others. Only the actions of Uganda will be evaluated and criticized in the light of existing positive

international law. The Court will have no difficulty in ruling on this matter without raising the

issue of the responsibility of thirdStates, quite simply because there is absolu tely no need to rule

on the responsibility of thirdStates in order to be able to determine the extent of Uganda’s

responsibility for the acts in question.

5. Mr.President, in his introductory speech last Friday, 15April, Mr.KhidduMakubuya,

Agent of Uganda, stressed the improvement in po litical and diplomatic re lations between our two

countries. In that context he wondered why the DRC should have chosen unilaterally to reactivate

5
this case , asking “whose interests it really serves”.

6. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I am Congolese. I was in Kinshasa in August 1998

when the war began; I subsequently met larg e numbers of Congolese whose families have been

affected by the war, in the north and east of the country. I also met many Congolese soldiers in

connection with the special military commission created for purposes of these proceedings, who

fought against the Ugandan Army and who have told me some terrible and moving stories. I can

11 assure you that no Congolese citizen would unders tand why our Government should drop all its

claims against Uganda on account of its actions in the Congo. I can assure you that no Congolese

citizen would understand why Uganda should be simply allowed to escape all responsibility after

having occupied almost 900,000 sq km of Congolese territory and of having been responsible there

for atrocities and pillage. I can assure you that no Congolese citizen would understand why our

Government should abandon any prospect of comp ensating the victims out of reparations payable

by Uganda on account of its wrongful acts, when the United Nations Security Council itself, moved

and outraged by the Kisangani fighting in June 2000, demanded that Uga nda make reparation for

5
CR 2005/6, p. 10, para. 8. - 5 -

the damage inflicted upon the civilian population of Kisangani. I hope this answers my honourable

opponent’s shocking question: “whose interests [doe s] it really serve”? He would doubtless reply

that the pursuit of these proceedings is certainly not in the interest of Uganda. And he would be

partly right. Partly, for it is in everyone’s inter est that the two States’ respective responsibilities be

determined on the basis of law, by a judicial fo rum as independent, impartial and prestigious as the

International Court of Justice.

7. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the Congolese people cry out in their distress and

appeal to your Court for justice. It is true that the Congolese and Ugandan peoples are obliged by

history, geography, sociology, globalization and the fight against poverty to live together and to

co-operate in all areas of life. There are, for example Lubaga living in both the DRC and Uganda,

Kakwa in both the DRC and Uganda. In the DRC, over 80 per cent of the population are of Bantu

origin. And in Uganda, the Baganda, who have given their name to the country, are also Bantu and

constitute the ethnic majority. Thus, no political leader, Congolese or Ugandan, will ever be

powerful enough to sunder completely the bonds of fraternity, solidarity and friendship which unite

the Congolese and the Ugandan people.

8. That said, it is essential that the war damage caused to the DRC by Uganda be judicially

assessed and effectively compensated, so as to enable our two countries finally to close this page of

history and contemplate the future with fresh eyes. When you have burned someone’s house and

injured his children, reconciliation with the victim s must necessarily be pr eceded by an admission

of guilt and payment of compensation.

12 9. The DRC therefore hopes that its dispute w ith Uganda will serve as an example to all

African States ⎯ and to the world ⎯ when tempted to have recour se to force in international

relations, in violation of the United Nations Char ter. The Congo was shocked to hear Uganda’s

Defence Minister tell us in his speech last Monda y, 18April, that the United Nations Security

Council and the international community could not be counted on to settle Africa’s problems 6. In

other words, the system of collective security established by the United Nations Charter as a

guarantee of international peace and security is mean ingless as far as Uganda is concerned, so that

6
CR 2005/7, p. 38, para. 10, and p. 47, para. 33. - 6 -

it is obliged to take the law into its own hands. Coming from an African State and Member of the

United Nations, that statement is totally unacceptabl e and explains the policy of force pursued by

Uganda against the DRC. That is the reason why, in a world which seeks to foster respect for the

rule of law, and in a Great Lakes region where it is sought to bring criminal proceedings against

individuals for violation of the rules of intern ational humanitarian law, it would be wrong not to

bring proceedings also against States which trample under foot the rules of international law.

10. Mr.President, Members of the Court, in invoking the international responsibility of

Uganda before this Court, the DRC seeks to make its own contribution to the struggle, worldwide,

to ensure respect for the rule of law in inter-Sta te relations. In short, the Congolese people, their

feet firmly grounded on earth, their gaze turned resolutely to the sky, hope that this Court, in which

they have total confidence, will bring together sk y and earth and give them the justice which they

deserve in order to heal their wounds.

11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, whilst reserving the right to provide written replies

in accordance with the schedule laid down by the Court, the De mocratic Republic of the Congo

will already seek, in the course of th is oral presentation, to outline a reply to the questions put by

some of you last Friday. In this regard, I can immediately give a preliminary answer to the

question put by JudgeVereshchetin. The Congo’s claim covers a period commencing at the start

of Uganda’s aggression on 2 August 1998 and terminating with the present proceedings.

12. And now, Mr. President, Members of the Court, I will outline for you the various stages
13

in the DRC’s presentation in this second round of oral argument:

⎯ first, Professor Salmon will make a general critique of the Respondent’s argument, highlighting

certain particularly significant aspects of the present dispute;

⎯ secondly, Professor Klein will criticize more specifically the arguments put forward by Uganda

in support of its denial that it violated the principle of non-use of force in international

relations;

⎯ ProfessorCorten will then address the status of Uganda as occupying Power between the

months of August 1990 and June 2003, with all the consequences which that entails;

⎯ with your permission, I shall then return to the Bar in order to refute Uganda’s objections

regarding violations of human rights in the occupied territories; - 7 -

⎯ ProfessorSands will then deal with Uganda’s argument on the illegal exploitation of natural

resources in occupied territory;

⎯ finally, H.E. Mr. Jacques Masangu-a-Mwanza will, as agent of the DRC, officially present my

country’s submissions.

Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your kind attention and ask you kindly

to give the floor to Professor Salmon.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Monsieur le professeur Kalala. Je donne maintenant la parole à

Monsieur le professeur Salmon.

Mr. SALMON: Mr. President, Members of the Court.

Uganda’s approach to evidence

Introduction

1. Uganda’s first round of oral argument revealed new facets of its counsels’ talent in the art

of wielding rhetoric. The ode to truth sung by Paul Reichler was of stirring stuff; it had the ring of

Verdi. We were far removed from the lessons gi ven to the Congolese about the need for care and

14 professionalism in respect of evidence 7. Humility reigned. Bossuet’s influence made itself felt.

The truth had to be told. Veritas, does it not have the same gracious appearance we can

admire in this courtroom?

It had to be told.

We were going to see.

sWwe.

We first saw the relativity of truth over time . Did AulusGellius, speaking in the second

century, not write “truth is the daughter of time”?

7
Uganda, which lectured the DRC at length on the quon of evidence (burden of proof, standard of proof,
authority and weight of the evidence). See the response by Philippe Sands, CR 2005/3, p. 24, para. 17.
8Noctes atticae, XII, II, 7 (middle of the second century). - 8 -

I. Retraction

2. We first witnessed several instances of retraction. A number of points asserted as true in

Uganda’s written pleadings are no longer so.

9
⎯ Before, there was no question of Uganda having supported the MLC ; now, Uganda makes a

limited admission to having done so ⎯ that movement having been, it is said, a sort of de facto

government. Assuming this latter assertion to be plausible ⎯ quod non ⎯ nobody explains to

us how this could have been true before the Lusaka Agreements.

⎯ Before, Ugandan troops had not been sent into the Democratic Republic of the Congo until

11 September 1998 10; now, it is admitted that a minor turning point occurred on 13August

11
with the taking of Bunia . This step in the right direction is nevertheless not enough, as we

shall see.

⎯ Before, there was no question of there havi ng been any looting of natural resources 12 and

13
GeneralKazini had nothing to feel guilty about . It is now admitted that there was some

misconduct, but our opponents hasten to add that it was prohibited by instructions issued by the

highest Ugandan authorities.

15 ⎯ Before, the Ugandan Embassy and ambassa dor’s residence in Kinshasa had been

14 15
expropriated ; now, this is no longer the case , and for good reason, since it was never true.

3. On the other hand, a new claim is put fo rward: the alleged capture of Beni by the Forces

armées congolaises, barely alluded to in Uganda’s writte n pleadings and now described as a major

16
attack on 6, or 7, August 1998, but without the slightest evidence offered to substantiate it .

Truth’s relativity over time is ec hoed by its relativity in space . Pirandello comes to mind.

Right you are (if you think you are).

9
CMU, paras. 138-143.
10
RU, para. 152.
11
CR 2005/6, pp.35-36, para.55 (Mr.Reichl er). The seizure of that airfield was already admitted in Uganda’s
Counter-Memorial, p. 37, para. 47.
12
CMU, para. 152; RU, paras. 321 et seq.
1RU, para. 496.

1CMU, para. 408.

1CR 2005/10, p. 38, para. 42 (Mr. Suy).
16
CR 2005/6, p. 35, para. 53 (Mr. Reichler), and CR 2005/7, p. 43, para. 24 (Mr. Mbabazi). - 9 -

II. Contradictions between counsel or between positions taken in the

written proceedings and those in the oral proceedings

4. We had long known that truth was relative. BlaisePascal already said: “Truth on this

17
side of the Pyrenees, error on the other.”

5. Uganda reduces the territorial dimension of this adage, applying it even within its own

positions or between its own counsel, who are untroub led by numerous contradictions in respect of

certain facts.

⎯ Thus, they swear to us that Uganda did no t help Kabila drive Mobutu from power in

Kinshasa 18, while this is contradicted by the annexes to Uganda’s Counter-Memorial . 19

⎯ Thus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is acc used of a lack of vigilance in respect of

Ugandan rebels or criticized on account of collaboration by the Congolese authorities with the

rebels between May and July 1998 20, but elsewhere it is admitted that the Democratic Republic

16 of the Congo was co-operating at that time with Uganda 21 and it is asserted that the first

22
Congolese attack against Uganda did not take place until 6 August .

23
⎯ Here we are told that the Suda nese were driven from the airfields , there that those airfields

were conquered “before the Sudanese . . . could occupy them” 24 and even that the decision of

11September1998 was taken in order “to deny th e Sudan opportunity to use the territory of

25
the DRC to destabilize Uganda” . Where does the truth lie?

⎯ Thus, Uganda’s written pleadings demand full reimbursement for the value of the embassy and

the ambassador’s residence for “expropriation”, while ProfessorSuy swears that “Uganda has

26
never claimed that there was seizure or expropriation of its property” . Who can make any

sense out of this?

17Excerpt from Pensées, V, 294 (1670).

18CR 2005/6, p. 23, para. 24 (Mr. Reichler).
19
CMU, Ann. 42, p. 14; for the details, see Mr. Klein, CR 2005/11, pp. 14-15, para. 10.
20
CMU, paras. 334-339; CR 2005/7, paras. 5-6, 8-11, 38 and 77 (Mr. Brownlie).
21
CR 2005/6, paras. 29-32 (Mr. Reichler).
22Ibid., p. 35, para. 53. See the response in Corten, CR 2005/11, para. 17.

23CR 2005/7, p. 15, para. 18 (Mr. Reichler); CR 2005/7, p. 47, para. 32 (Mr. Mbabazi).

24CMU, p. 41, para. 52.
25
Ibid., Ann. 27, judges’ folder of Uganda, tab 5.
26
CR 2005/10, p. 38, para. 42 (Mr. Suy). - 10 -

III. Unsupported assertions

6. Our opponents, it would seem, enjoy the pr ivilege of access to the revealed truth, which

enables them to proceed by way of assertions unsup ported by the slightest evidence. This is to

forget the discourse by the Marquis de Condorcet, who proclaimed: “The truth belongs to those

27
who seek it, not to those who claim to possess it.” Thus, it is an unwise strategy to confine

oneself to unsupported assertions, as our opponents do.

⎯ There still is not the slightest evidence that the Democratic Republic of the Congo participated

28
in the attacks referred to in Uganda’s Counter-Memorial . The incident involving the

unfortunate adolescents who died in the flames in Kishwamba is assuredly appalling, but the

documents relied on by the other Party do not de monstrate that the Congolese participated in

any way whatsoever in this atrocity. Uga nda only produces a single, non-probative, document

17 concerning one of these incidents and nothing about the other four. This was already pointed

out in the Congo’s Reply, but our opponents have apparently given up trying to prove

something which cannot be proved 29.

⎯ There still is not the slightest evidence that the DRC supported Ugandan rebel movements, as

claimed 30.

The most egregious instance is, however, the myth of the Sudanese in the Congo. One could

just as well have said the Martians in the Congo ⎯ that the Martians had used Congolese territory

to attack Uganda ⎯ and repeated the words “Mars” or “Martians” nearly 250 times, as is the case

for the words “Sudan” or “Sudanese” in our opponent s’ pleadings. It is not enough to repeat the

same fable ad nauseam for it to become reality. The presence of the Sudanese in the Congo is a

31
tale made up from start to finish . While there may have been c ontacts with the Sudanese, what

proof is there of a diabolical conspiracy? There is no evidence of an appeal for help; not the

slightest indication of a prisoner taken or of weapons or materiel seized; not the slightest evidence

32
of Sudanese at the airfields . On the other hand, it was the Suda n which, in the Security Council

2Discours sur les conventions nationales, April 1791.

2CMU, pp. 221-223.
29
CR 2005/11, paras. 7 and 8 (Mr. Corten).
30
CR 2005/11, p. 20, para. 39 (Mr. Brownlie) and CR 2005/11, para. 12-13 (Mr. Corten).
3CR 2005/11, paras. 20-26 (Mr. Corten).

3CR 2005/11, p. 31, para. 37 (Mr. Corten). - 11 -

33
in October1998, accused Uganda of aggression . And what did Uganda’s Minister for Foreign

Affairs say in October 1998 on the subject of a claimed threat from the Sudan: “In my opinion, this

threat is artificial; Sudan does not have the capability to carry it out.” 34 He said this in

October 1998.

⎯ Nor is there any evidence in the least that rebel groups were incorporated into the Forces

35 36
armées congolaises or of a plot involving the DRC and the Sudan .

In respect of this, the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to convey to the Court its

deep concern over this technique employed by our opponents. It is comparable to what might be

called systematic conditioning. It is a well-know n, classic strategy: “If you throw enough mud,

some will stick.”

18 7. Further, the Court will not be insensitive to the fact that it is extremely difficult for the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, even with its duty to co-operate in bringing evidence before the

Court, to adduce negative evidence that it did not appeal to the Sudanese, that the Sudanese were

not there. It is a rare chance to come across the statement by the leader of the MLC, who,

recounting the battles culminating in the fall of Gbadolite, says that he pursued the Forces armées

congolaises and Hutus until reaching Gbadolite and he makes no mention of a single Sudanese

37
soldier .

8. In another context in which the DRC is being asked to prove a negative, that of the alleged

attack by its army on Ugandan forces stati oned in Beni, the most one can do is invoke

presumptions. During the hearings held by the Porter Commission, nobody ever reported an attack

by the Forces armées congolaises in Beni 38.

IV. Evasions

9. A Chinese proverb holds: “The truths we le ast wish to learn are those we have the most

interest in knowing.” Thus, it is counter-productive to seek to avoid giving answers.

3CR 2005/3, p. 43, para. 36 (Mr. Corten).
34
RDRC, Ann. 108.
35
CR 2005/11, p. 28, paras. 29-30 (Mr. Corten).
3CR 2005/11, p. 30, paras. 34 et seq. (Mr. Corten).

3Jean-Pierre Bemba, Le choix de la liberté, pp. 41-46.

3CR 2005/11, p. 29, para. 32 (Mr. Corten). - 12 -

A. Repeating falsehoods as if the DRC had not al ready shown the opposite to be true in its
written pleadings

10. Uganda excels in the art of reiterating uns ubstantiated allegations despite the Democratic

Republic of the Congo having refuted them in its written pleadings.

11. Thus, in respect of the alleged support provided to rebel groups by the Government under

Mobutu’s régime 39, or the claimed lack of participati on by Uganda in the Kitona airborne

operation 40, Uganda’s counsel plead as if they were unaware of any of the arguments set out by the

Democratic Republic of the Congo in its Additional Observations on the Ugandan counter-claims.

19 B. Uganda systematically fails to respond to the questions it has been asked

12. Similarly, Uganda does not answer the questions put to it in the course of this current

round of oral argument.

⎯ What was the exact date of their interven tion? Uganda now maintains that it was

13 August 1998, but Operation “Safe Haven” certainly began on 7, if not 6, August.

⎯ What was the date on which all consent to Uganda’s presence in the border zone was definitely

withdrawn? According to our opponent’s oral statements, it was never withdrawn. Yet, on

6August1998, the Democratic Republic of the Congo accused Uganda of aggression 41; this

fact was acknowledged by Uganda itself in a November1998 document of the Ugandan

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which notes that this accusation had been made by the Democratic

42
Republic of the Congo at the Victoria Falls Summit on 7 and 8 August 1998 .

⎯ The other side does not seek to explain how its arguments can be reconciled with Security

Council resolutions 1234 and 1304 43.

⎯ No reasoned response concerning its status as occupying Power, as recognized by the

Secretary-General’s Special Representative on 2February2002 4, or to the arguments

3AWODRC, paras. 1.11 et seq.
40
Ibid., para. 1.87.
41
CR 2005/4, p. 13, para. 17 (Mr. Corten).
4CMU, Ann. 31, p. 14.

4CR 2005/4, p. 15, para. 2 (Mr. Corten).

4CR 2005/4, p. 27, para. 16 (Mr. Klein). - 13 -

advanced by the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the irrelevance of the self-defence

claim and of the supposedly “modest” presence of Ugandan troops 45.

⎯ Why did Uganda not protest to the Congo in Au gust in respect of the alleged aggression or

refer the matter to the Security Council 46? According to its written pleadings, it did not

complain until October 1998, but without ever claiming either aggression or self-defence

before filing the Counter-Memorial 47.

13. Many other examples could be cited concerning not only human rights violations but also

instances of natural resources looting.

20
C. Silence

14. Abbé Dinouart, a churchman ⎯ admittedly, little known ⎯ in a pamphlet entitled “The

Art of Silence” wrote in 1771 in respect of certain silences: “It is a contemptuous silence not to

condescend to respond to those who address us, or who await our views in regard to them, and to

48
treat everything they say with disdainful arrogance.”

15. The first characteristic in this connection is our opponents’ mastery of the technique of

“hurdling”, i.e. jumping over obstacles. Anything in the way is simply ignored in the argument.

Particularly apparent: their love of silence, or the amnesia which strikes them in respect of their

oral argument on consent. Various events are considered as so many instances of renewed consent:

the Protocol of 27 April 1998, the Lusaka Agreem ent of 10 July 1999, and the Luanda Agreement

of 6September2002. They choose to overlook the period when there was no consent, between

6August1998 and the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The diversity of these consents, in terms of

their nature and object, is obscured.

16. Silence also in respect of the continua tion of the aggression after the Lusaka Agreement

of 10July1999. According to Uganda’s Rejoi nder, there was no military engagement after that

49
Agreement . Then what about the UPDF’s conquests of Gemena on 9 and 10July, Zongo on

45CR 2005/2, pp. 51-52, paras. 25 and 26 (Mr. Salmon) and CR 2005/4, p. 23, para. 9 (Mr. Klein).
46
CR 2005/3, p. 43, para. 39 (Mr. Corten).
47
RU, p. 112, paras. 256 and 258.
48Abbé Dinouart, L’Art de se taire [The Art of Silence], text presented by Jean-JacquesCourtine and
Claudine Haroche, Petite collection Atopia, Jérôme Million, Grenoble 2002, p. 44.

49RU, p. 79, para. 176. - 14 -

29 July, Libenge (1,356 km from the Ugandan border) on 22 July 50, Bongandanga and Basankusu

51
on 30November1999 to the south of Lisala ? What about the fighting in Bomongo, Moboza,

Dongo in February2000, in Imese in April2000, in Buburu in late April2000, in Mobenzene in

52
May-June 2000 ? What about the bloody battles as from 5June2000 between Ugandan and

Rwandan forces for control of Kisangani?

17. The other Party’s silence is particularly telling in respect of Kisangani. UPDF troops

arrived there by air on 1September1998; they fought the Rwandan army there first in 1999 and

21 then twice in 2000. This led the Security Council to issue the well-known condemnation set out in

resolution 1304.

18. Uganda has said nothing about any of th is, because these facts totally undermine its

argument. The claim that the pivotal date was 11September1998 crumbles because Kisangani

was taken on 1September; what justification can be asserted for this conquest? Why battle

Rwanda? What is the relationship between those battles and securing the border, subduing

Ugandan rebels or an imaginary Sudanese enem y? Why did the fighting continue after the

ceasefire of the Lusaka Agreements of 10 July 1999? We would very much like to see the silence

broken on all of these points.

V. Outright denial of proven truths

19. Our opponents would have been well-advised to remember the words of St. Gregory the

Great: “Never has straightforward truth done anything by duplicity.”

A. Fabricated or ludicrous evidence

20. It is apparent that many of the documen ts produced by Uganda were written long after

the fact, that they constitute fabricated, purpose- made evidence and are of a particularly dubious

nature.

5RDRC, p. 97, para. 2.75.
51
Ibid., p. 96, para. 2.73.
5Ibid., p. 97, para. 2.75. - 15 -

⎯ For example, the sworn testimony of an official from the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

that the Protocol of 27 April 1998 was motivated by the Kichwamba attack, which occurred on

8 June 1998 53, in other words a month-and-a-half after the Protocol was signed.

⎯ For example, the document from the UPDF Hi gh Command which is said to show that the

54
decision to send troops into the DRC was taken on 11 September 1998 . This document only

justifies the maintenance of the troops. But, it has now been established, by the documents of

the Porter Commission, that Operation “Safe Haven” began on 7August1998 and that the

objective was to support Congolese rebels. Moreover, General Kazini and President Museveni

22 himself admitted before the Commission that Operation “Safe Haven” began on 7 August with

55
the capture of Beni .

⎯ Another example, the statement by a witness arrested in May2000 who described air-drops

taking place in November 2000, even though he was in prison at the time 56.

There is not even one contemporary document until 11December1998 evidencing any

war-like act by the Sudan or the Democratic Re public of the Congo; the documents filed by

Uganda are later ones written specifically for the purpose.

⎯ The testimony of the former Ugandan Ambassador to Kinshasa concerning documents

implicating Mobutu in a plan to assassina te PresidentMuseveni are highly suspect ⎯ I spoke

57
about them in my first statement here and will not repeat myself .

21. Uganda maintained in its written pleadings that the accusations against the UPDF as to

the looting of natural resources were contradicted “by sworn testimony and documentary

58
evidence” and that there was no evidence that Uganda had failed to take action to prevent illegal

59
activities . We now know the truth about that.

53RU, pp. 42-44, para. 91; see Mr. Corten, CR 2005/4, pp. 11-12, paras. 11-12.
54
RU, p. 67, para. 155 (DRC judges’ folder, tab 5).
55
See the evidence drawn from the Porter Commission poi nted out by MaîtreKalala, CR2005/2, pp.30-31,
paras. 40-41.
56
See the details in CR 2005/3, p. 15, para. 16 (Mr. Salmon).
57Ibid., p. 14, para. 16.

58RU, paras.456-494; CR 2005/5, p. 41, para. 30 (Mr. Sands).
59
Ibid., p. 42, para. 35. - 16 -

B. Deliberate denial of truths now well established

22. It would be a never-ending task to compile a list of the truths which Uganda’s written

pleadings and oral argument have been devoted to hiding.

⎯ Ugandan support for the pro-Kabila rebel, who ultimately seized power in Kinshasa and

overthrew Marshal Mobutu.

⎯ The UPDF’s military intervention before mid-September.

⎯ Support for Congolese rebel groups before the signing of the Lusaka Agreement, since

General Kazini admits that Operation “Safe Ha ven” was organized jointly with the Congolese

rebel movements beginning on 7 August 1998.

23 ⎯ UPDF participation in the illegal exploitation of the natural resources and other wealth of the

Congo. In its written pleadings, Uganda called in to question the reliability of the report by the

United Nations Panel of Experts on the looting a nd illegal exploitation of the natural resources

of the Congo. The Porter Commission’s work has now proved the involvement of the UPDF

and its top leaders in the unlawful activities affecting the natural resources of the Congo, out of

motives either of personal gain or to cover up the illegal exploitation of those resources by

60 61
private companies , notably the Victoria company . On this point, the United Nations reports

are confirmed by the Porter Commission.

⎯ Finally, we can also cite Uganda’s contenti on that, if exploitation did take place, it was on

behalf of the local population 62.

23. That then is the truth ⎯ Veritas ⎯ which Uganda sought to show. It is to be feared that

this is a misinterpretation of Quevedo’s precept th at “the truth should neve r be shown naked, but

veiled in her chemise”.

24. Mr.President, Members of the Court, this thought from the great Spanish playwright

closes my presentation. I thank the Court for having kindly accorded me its attention.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Monsieur le professeu r Salmon. Je donne maintenant la parole à

Monsieur le professeur Klein.

6CR 2005/5, p. 13, para.14 (Mr. Kalala); CR 2005/5, p. 25, para. 2, p. 28, para. 3 (Mr. Sands).
61
CR 2005/5, p. 35, para. 15 and p. 37, para. 18.
6Ibid., p. 41, para. 28. - 17 -

KMLr.IN:

The use of force by Uganda against the Congo canno t be justified either by self-defence or by

consent

1. Mr.President, Members of the Court, Uga nda endeavoured, last week, to provide some

legal justification for its military interventioon Congolese territory by relying on the principal

argument that this action was justified by self-def ence. At the same time, but without always

drawing a clear distinction between the two arguments, the Respondent has also repeatedly invoked

24
the consent of the Congolese authorities to justify the presence of its armed forces on Congolese

territory. This morning I have to return to those twodefences in order to show that neither is

founded in law.

I. The use of force by Uganda against the Congo cannot be
justified on the basis of self-defence

2. I will thus begin by showing that Uganda cannot validly invoke the right of self-defence in

the present case, both because that State has not been the victim of an armed attack and because the

conditions to be fulfilled under inte rnational law in order to invoke self-defence were certainly not

met in the case of the invasion of Congolese territo ry by the Ugandan army. Before examining

those two points in greater detail, I wish to pointout that my task will be to show that Uganda’s

arguments on self-defence are devoid of any legal f oundation. It will also be helpful to keep in

mind the factual backdrop described in detail by my colleague Professor Olivier Corten last Friday,

when he showed at length that the other Party’s arguments are devoid of foundation in fact 6.

A. Uganda cannot validly invoke self-defence be cause it was not the victim of an armed

attack

3. Concerning the first of those points, th e existence of an armed attack, Uganda has

presented arguments that, to say the least, cannot be described as particularly clear. Thus, whilst

emphasizing the fact that the legal position of the Respondent is not based on the concept of

preventive or pre-emptive self-defence 64, Mr. Brownlie at the same time has stated that “there are

63
CR 2005/11, pp. 20-27, paras. 4-26.
64
CR 2005/7, p. 29, para. 72 (Mr. Brownlie). - 18 -

situations in which it is unrealistic and practica lly impossible to insist on a distinction between a

direct response to an armed attack and anticipatory or preventive action” 65.

25 4. It is thus not easy to comprehend precisely the scope of Uganda’s legal argument on

self-defence. In the first place, it would seem appropr iate in any event to take Uganda at its word,

and to exclude any argument based on preventive or pre-emptive self-defence 66. But one must then

be coherent and admit that any military actio n based on the need to prevent or anticipate

forthcoming attacks cannot be justified on the basis of self-defence . It should be borne in mind, in

this respect, that the Respondent’s written pleadings, like the oral statement presented on its behalf

over the past few days, are literally ridd led with references to such concerns 67. All the military

actions carried out by the Ugandan army on Congolese territory and justified by the sole concern to

prevent future attacks must thus, based on the cr iteria used by Uganda itself, be regarded as

contrary to international law.

5. Only one hypothesis thus remains, that of self-defence in reaction to an attack that could

be described as “consummated”. Uganda seeks to es tablish the existence of such an attack, basing

its argument on alleged connec tions between the Congolese Government and various Ugandan

rebel groups operating from Congolese territory. The Respondent basically advances two criteria

to found its conclusion that the Congo committed an ar med attack. One is the direct participation

68
of the State in the action of armed groups . This calls for no particular comment, save for a

reminder that such a factual situation has certain ly not been established in the present case. The

other criterion put forward by Uganda is that of the forbearance, or lack of control, of a State with

respect to armed groups on its territory, which “r enders the State harbouring such armed bands

susceptible to action in accordance with Article 51 [of the Charter]” 69. According to Mr. Brownlie,

“this consequence is the result of the application of well recognized principles of State

65
Ibid., p. 28, para. 71.
6Ibid., pp. 29-30, para. 72.

6See, inter alia, ibid., p.14, para.17, and the citation of thatement by the Ugandan Minister for Foreign
Affairs, which can be found in th at oral statement (“Against the perceived threat of increased destabilization of Uganda
especially by the Sudan using Congoles e territory as it had previously doneUganda deployed additional forces to
counter this threat”, CMU, Ann.42, p.15; emphasis added). See al so, in Mr.Brownlie’s statement, para.20 and the

extracts from documents cited, p. 16.
6CR 2005/7, p. 33, para. 92 (Mr. Brownlie).

6Ibid. - 19 -

26 responsibility and the existence of direction and control by the territorial sovereign is not

necessary” 70.

6. That proposition is astonishing in more ways than one. First because Mr. Brownlie infers

that the Democratic Republic of the Congo show ed toleration of Ugandan rebel groups in the

border zone simply from the fact that the Congo, in its written pleadings, recognizes the existence

of such groups in that area 71. But the mere acknowledgment that armed groups were present on its

territory is not, however, tantamount to toleration. As Professor Corten very clearly explained last

Friday, Uganda cannot admit that the Congo was engaged, up to the summer of 1998, in active

collaboration with the UPDF in action agains t the Ugandan rebel groups present on Congolese

territory and, at the same time, accuse the Congo lese authorities of failing in their obligations of

72
vigilance by tolerating the activities of those groups . The argument clearly does not stand up in

terms of fact. It is equally deficient in law. To assimilate mere tolerance by the territorial

sovereign of armed groups on its territory with an armed attack clearly runs counter to the most

established principles in such matters. That positio n, which consists in considerably lowering the

threshold required for the establishment of aggression, obviously finds no support in the Nicaragua

Judgment. However, neither can it find support in, for example, the Tadic judgment rendered by

the ICTY Appeals Chamber, nor in the writings of ProfessorDinstein, to which the other Party

nevertheless attributes considerable authority. That author confines himself to indicating that a

similar notion of toleration was enshrined in the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and

Security of Mankind, adopted by the Internati onal Law Commission in 1954, but he himself does

not accept such a hypothesis among the acts capable of giving rise to a right of self-defence 73.

Uganda’s argument on this point thus proves totally devoid of foundation, in fact as in law. It

completely distorts the legal concept of aggression.

70Ibid.
71
Ibid., p. 29, para. 76.
72
CR 2005/11 (Mr. Corten).
73Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd. ed., Cambridge, CUP, 2001, pp. 181-183. - 20 -

27 As we will also see, Uganda has not been able to show that its military action, even assuming

that it was justified by a prior armed attack, me t the requirements of necess ity and proportionality

which must underpin any recourse to self-defence.

B. The use of force by Uganda does not meet the requirements of proportionality or
necessity

7. Uganda, in its first round of oral argument, sought to combine the requirements of

necessity and proportionality, claiming that the first was in some way included in the second. With

the greatest respect, I would like to point out to ou r opponents that this is not the case, and that the

various sources to which the Congo referred in its initial oral presentation clearly show the

distinction between those two requirements, even if they are closely related 74. In the present case,

Uganda has not been able to show that those requirements were met.

8. With respect to the first of those requirements, necessity, Mr. Brownlie has said nothing at

all about the condition that force may exclusively be used as a necessary measure of self-defence.

He simply dismissed the emphasis placed by R obertoAgo on the condition of the exhaustion of

75
peaceful means of settlement of disputes, on the ground that it is not a customary rule . In reality,

Uganda’s position on this point has proved far too radical, since it fails to address the connections

between the condition of necessity and the exhausti on of peaceful means of settlement. In this

respect, it all depends on the circumstances of the c ase. In a case where a State is targeted by a

blitzkrieg, being bombed and invaded by the ar med forces of another State, obviously no one

would expect the invaded State to seek to use peaceful means to settle each dispute with the

invader before using armed force in order to repe l the aggression. However, in the case of latent

threats or small-scale attacks repeated over a certain period of time, as in the situation complained

of by Uganda, necessity has to be assessed very diffe rently. It clearly implies that other means of

28 action have proved totally unproduc tive, before the use of force is called for, as a last-resort

solution.

74
See inter alia extracts from the Judgment on Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua and
the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons cited during the first round of oral
argument of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Tuesday 12 April 2005, CR 2005/3, p. 47, para. 2).
75
CR 2005/7, Monday 18 April 2005, p. 32, para. 89 (Mr. Brownlie). - 21 -

9. It is obviously insufficient simply to ma ke a few general comments, as Minister Mbabazi

did, about the ineffectiveness of the Security Council , in order to justify a total failure to appeal to

76
that organ at any time before using force . The Security Council has admittedly been guilty of

inaction in the past, particularly in connection with the Rwandan genocide. But can this really be

used to justify a deliberate future policy of ignori ng the obligation to seise that organ of situations

which appear to constitute a threat for international peace and security, but rather opting for

unilateral action in all circumstances? Need it be recalled that, in the present case, Uganda did not

make even the slightest attempt to seise the Council of the alleged attack of which it subsequently

claims to have been the victim? The full-blown apologia for unilateral armed action that the Court

heard from Uganda last week, especially as it came from one of the most important members of the

Government, can only arouse the strongest concerns for the future.

10. Lastly, I must again refer back to Mr. Brownlie’s statement that “if the concept of

necessity of self-defence is to be applied on the basis of effectiveness and common sense, it is

77
surely the view of the victim State and its nationals which must prevail” . Here, once again, the

proposition is totally incorrect, both in fact and in law. In law, it seems that Uganda is determined

not to accept the dictum of the Court in the Oil Platforms case which I mentioned during my first

statement. I can thus only reiterate once again that “the requirement of international law that

measures taken avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and

objective, leaving no room for any ‘measure of discretion’” 78. Uganda’s argument is particularly

29 unacceptable as, in terms of fact, the idea that this military action was a response to a real necessity

was far from being shared by all, even in Uganda. A particularly striking illustration of this is the

statement by the Democratic Party, dated 18 Se ptember 1998, expressing the disagreement of that

political opposition group regarding the armed action initiated by Congo, observing that:

“the objectives such as national security which President Museveni has given for what

amounts to military aggression by Uganda ca nnot be achieved . . . through military
adventure. On the contrary, it will be more difficult to achieve such objectives if we
employ military means instead of peaceful ones such as diplomacy.” 79

76CR 2005/8, Monday 18 April 2005, p. 38, para. 10; p. 47, para. 73 (Mr. Mbabazi).
77
CR 2005/7, Monday 18 April 2005, p. 34, para. 92 (Mr. Brownlie).
78
Judgment of 6 November 2003, p. 196, para. 73.
79RDRC, Ann. 66. - 22 -

Thus the armed action was far from being perceived as being the only possible means of action.

11. In the same way that it failed to prove th e requirement of necessity, Uganda, in its first

round of oral argument, was unable to show that its armed action was proportionate to the prior

attack it allegedly suffered. It is helpful, first of all, to return to the question of the graphic

representation of the extent of Ugandan occ upation and incursion on Congolese territory. The

Respondent has repeatedly criticized the sketch-maps presented by the Congo, contending that they

did not correspond to the actual Ugandan military presence on the ground. And in this respect

80
Uganda has presented the map annexed to the Harare Disengagement Plan which, it claims,

reflects much better the reality of the situation 81. However, those representations of the extent of

the Ugandan military presence in the Congo are by no means incompatible, as the Respondent has

sought to show.

Mr.President, Members of the Court, a simple comparison of those maps, paying careful

attention to the border-line between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Congo-Brazzaville,

which is not very clear on the Harare map, will show that they basically reflect the same reality and

identify in the same way the area under the control of the UPDF, although the Harare map refers to

joint control by the UPDF and the MLC over the area in question. ProfessorCorten will return,

later on, to the significance of that joint reference to the UPDF and the MLC. But for the purposes

30 of the present discussion, it thus appears clearly that, unfortunately for Uganda, the map on which

it has sought to rely does not substantiate its position in any way.

12. In any event, that is not the main issue. The basic problem remains that, faced with the

absence of any initial attack by the Congo, any countermeasure based on alleged self-defence can

only be disproportionate. In this respect, th e Respondent has once again become mired in

contradictions. On the one hand, as we have alr eady indicated, it maintains that it is not basing its

legal argument on any concept of preventive or pre-emptive self-defence. On the other, however, it

justifies the proportionality of its action by poin ting to the danger for Uganda of the alliance

allegedly formed between the DR C, Sudan and Ugandan rebel groups 82. However, this danger is

80
CMU, Ann. 79.
81
CR 2005/6, Friday 15 April 2005, paras. 101-102 (Mr. Reichler); CR2005/7, Monday 18April2005, p.31,
para. 86 (Mr. Brownlie).
8CR 2005/7, Monday 18 April 2005, p. 22, para. 42, in particular points 3 and 4 (Mr. Brownlie). - 23 -

once again presented as a threat for the future with respect to which, as the Congo has shown in its

first round of oral argument, proportionality proves extremely difficult ⎯ if not totally

impossible ⎯ to assess.

La3st.ly ⎯ and ProfessorSalmon has already referred to this earlier today ⎯ one cannot

fail to note that Uganda only invoked self-defence to justify its military action up to the taking of

Gbadolite, in early July 1999 83. At no time has the Respondent mentioned the military actions by

its troops on Congolese territory beyond Gbadolit e after July1999. Those military actions

culminated with the capture, in the spring of 2000, of the town of Mobenzene, several hundred

kilometres from Gbadolite in the direction of Kinshasa. The Congo clearly described these military

actions in its written pleadings 84 and in oral argument 85. One could also add mention of clashes

between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisa ngani in June2000, as ProfessorSalmon also

recalled just now. Uganda has remained silent on all this, because it knows full well that it could

not justify any of its military acti ons on the ground of proportionate self-defence. It is particularly

aware of this as, shortly after the Kisa ngani clashes, the Security Council adopted

31 resolution1304(2000), whereby it stated very clear ly that Uganda “violated the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”; that finding obviously totally

destroys Uganda’s argument of self-defence 86.

14. In conclusion, it is thus clear that Uga nda’s military actions against the Congo, from the

month of August1998, cannot be justified on the ground of self-defence, first because the

Respondent was not the victim of an armed attack w ithin the meaning of international law. In any

event, the requirements of necessity and proportiona lity for self-defence were certainly not met in

the present case. Thus Uganda’s military interv ention in the Congo cannot be justified by any

argument of self-defence, but nor can it be justif ied by any consent thereto by the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, as I would now like to show in the second part of this statement.

8CR 2005/8, Monday 18 April 2005, pp. 46-47, para. 32 (Mr. Mbabazi).
84
RDRC, pp. 96-98.
85
CR 2005/2, Monday 11 April 2005, p. 47, para. 16 (Mr. Salmon).
8Refer back to RDRC, pp. 36-38. - 24 -

However, Mr. President, at this stage I will defe r to your decision, either for me to continue

this statement or to suspend it for a break, should you so wish.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Klein. It is indeed time to have a break of ten

minutes, after which you will continue.

The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Klein, please continue.

Mr. KLEIN: Thank you, Mr. President.

II. Uganda’s use of force against the Congo cannot be justified on the basis of consent

15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, at th is stage there are still two fundamental points

of disagreement between the Parties regarding the possibility of justifying the military presence of

Ugandan troops on Congolese territory on the basis of c onsent. In the first place, it is clear to the

Congo that, contrary to what our opponents claim, the consent of the Congolese authorities to the
32
presence of Ugandan troops had ceased to exist in A ugust 1998. Secondly, it is equally clear that

the scope of the Lusaka Agreement of 10July 199 9 is far from being as broad as Uganda claims,

and that one cannot read into it any expression of consent by the Democratic Republic of the

Congo to the maintenance of Ugandan armed forces on Congolese territory after the conclusion of

that agreement. In explaining its position on this point, the Congo will now seek to provide

elements of an answer to the question put to the Pa rties last Friday by Judge Elaraby. But before

addressing these two points in detail, I should like fi rst to consider an issue which the respondent

has basically failed to address in its oral argument, namely the question of the scope of the consent

given by the Congolese authorities, were that con sent to be proven. I would therefore begin by

recalling in this connection that, in any event, a nd even supposing it to be proven, the consent of

the Democratic Republic of the Congo could only have covered a hypothetical peaceful presence of

UPDF troops on Congolese territory. - 25 -

A. The consent of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, even supposing it proven, could

only have covered a hypothetical peaceful presence of UPDF troops on Congolese territory

16. Professor Brownlie, in his presentation last Tuesday, most opportunely reminded us that,

according to the work of the International La w Commission on State responsibility, consent can be

effective only within the limits within which it was given 8. However, having noted this point,

Uganda’s counsel failed to apply it in our case. They never made it clear as to what precisely the

Congolese authorities’ alleged consent related. A fortiori, at no time did they attempt to show that

the conduct of the Ugandan troops in the Congo from the month of August 1998 remained within

the limits of that purported consent. The ques tion is, however, crucial, and the Democratic

Republic of the Congo would be delighted to hear our opponents’ views on this point in the second

round of oral argument. The point is indeed crucial, for it highlights the essentially academic

88
nature of Uganda’s argument on consent, as Professor Corten already pointed out two weeks ago .

33 17. According to Uganda’s own argument, in 1997-1998, as well as in 1999 in the Lusaka

Agreement, the Congolese authorities gave their consent to the presence of UPDF troops for a quite

specific purpose: the fight against rebel groups launching attacks on Ugandan territory from the

Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is this factor which Uganda’s c ounsel have constantly

emphasized throughout their oral argument 89. This was thus an essential limit, ratione materiae,

on the consent purportedly given by the Congolese authorities to the presence of Ugandan troops in

the Democratic Republic of the Co ngo. However, it is clearly not military action by UPDF troops

on Congolese territory against Ugandan rebel groups which forms the subject of the Democratic

Republic of the Congo’s complaints before this Court today. What is at stake in this case ⎯ need I

remind you? ⎯ is hostile actions by Ugandan troops against the Congolese Armed Forces, the

capture of towns, the destruction of civil infrastructure, the very serious violence committed against

Congolese civilian populations, and the plundering of the Congo’s natural resources. Clearly, none

of those acts is capable of being covered by an y form of consent on the part of the Congolese

authorities. Thus, the only practical effect of the consent relied on by Uganda –– even supposing it

proven ⎯ could be to provide legal justification fo r the peaceful presence of Ugandan troops on

8CR 2005/8, p. 9, para. 7 (Mr. Brownlie).
88
CR 2005/4, p. 9-10, para. 6 (Mr. Corten).
8See, inter alia, CR 2005/8, p. 10, para. 12 (Mr. Brownlie); ibid., p. 23, para. 21 (Mr. Reichler). - 26 -

Congolese territory, or, at most, the conduct by the UPDF of military action against any rebel

groups still active. I would therefore urge the Cour t to keep this consideration in mind when the

consent argument is again raised, whether today or in the days to come.

Having clarified this point, we can now return to the first period concerned by the consent

argument. I will show that in this case the Congo ’s consent to the presence of Ugandan troops on

Congolese territory no longer existed in August 1998.

34 B. The Congo’s consent to the presence of U gandan troops on Congolese territory no longer
existed in August 1998

18. In his presentation last Tuesday, Professor Brownlie devoted a good part of his argument

in regard to the period 1997-1998 to revisiting facts which are not disputed by the Democratic

Republic of the Congo. Thus he referred in pa rticular to the Congolese authorities’ informal

consent to the presence of Ugandan troops on Congolese territory in the border zone with Uganda

90
for the purpose of combating certain rebel groups . Since the Congo has never disputed the fact of

that consent, it seems to me pointless to return to it here. The only real point of disagreement

between the Parties in relation to this initial peri od is over whether or not it was formalized in an

official document: the Protocol signed between the two States on 27 April 1998. On this point, by

contrast, Uganda was remarkably brief in its last presentation, confining itself to quoting the terms

of the Protocol without seeking to conduct any real analysis 9. We can well understand why, for

there is absolutely nothing in th e actual terms of this Protocol of April 1998 which would indicate

that it expressed formal consent to the presence of foreign troops on Congolese territory. With the

Court’s permission, I will again remind you of the te rms of the key provision in that agreement:

“the two armies agreed to co-operate in or der to insure security and peace along the common

92
border” . Where, in this, is there any record of a formal consent by the Congo to the presence of

Ugandan troops on its territory? Taking the words in their ordinary meaning, agreeing “to

co-operate in order to insure security and peace along the common border”, is not to accept “the

maintenance ⎯ or presence ⎯ of Ugandan troops on Congo lese territory along the common

9CR 2005/8, pp. 9-12, paras. 9-20 (Mr. Brownlie).
91
Ibid, p. 13, para. 22.
9CMU, Ann. 19. - 27 -

border”. Thus the actual text of the Protoc ol of April1998 contains no evidence of any

“formalization” of the consent previously given by the Congolese authorities to the presence of the

Ugandan troops. That does not, however, mean th at such informal consent had disappeared, but

simply that it was never formalized.

19. The consent of the Congolese authorities having at all times remained informal, it could

logically be withdrawn in an equally informal mann er. And that is exactly what President Kabila

did in his statement of 27 July 1998. Here again our opponents appear to have some problems with
35

the ordinary meaning of the words of that statement. Does the fact that only Rwanda is expressly

referred to and that Congo is no t expressly mentioned change anything at all in the sense of the

statement’s final sentence, which reads as follows : “This marks the end of the presence of all

93
foreign military forces in the Congo” ? Were the Ugandan troops present in the Congo at that

time in such a state of symbiosis with their new environment that they no longer identified

themselves as “foreign [armed] forces”? Rather than seeking to emphasize supposed doubts in the

wake of that statement, Uganda could have applied itself to explaining how its thesis that its troops

remained in the Congo throughout the month of August1998 with the consent of the Congolese

authorities could be reconciled with various st atements cited by ProfessorCorten in his

94
presentation on Wednesday 13April . All of these have two points in common: they

systematically accuse Uganda of aggression, and date from the month of August1998.

Mr.Reichler has sought to cast doubt on their scope in regard to Uganda, essentially on the basis

that they allegedly merely emanated from press reports 95. However, that allegation is as false as it

is futile: false because the accusations of aggressi on in question originate from direct sources, in

particular United Nations documents; futile becau se, in any event, a document prepared by the

Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows that the Respondent was perfectly well aware of the

Congolese accusations from the beginning of August 1998. Professor Salmon referred to it this

morning. Allow me now to cite the relevant ex tract from that document, which refers to “the

9MDRC, pp.60-61, para. 2.11.
94
CR 2005/4, pp. 13-14, para. 17.
9CR 2005/8, p. 18, para. 5 (Mr. Reichler). - 28 -

allegation made by the DRC [at the Victoria Falls Summit of 7 and 8August1998] that Uganda

96
and Rwanda had committed aggression against the country” .

20. Our opponents appear to have great difficulty in reconciling themselves with the ordinary

meaning of words. “Aggressors” and “invited” ar e however, in their current sense, words rarely

36 used as synonyms. The same observation could indeed be applied to the words “uninvited forces”,

used in several Security Council resolutions, on which Uganda has to date remained strangely

silent. In any event, and let us once again remind ourselves, even supposing ⎯ quod non ⎯ that

consent can still be established at that date, it could only have covered the peaceful presence of

Ugandan troops in the Congo. In no way coul d it preclude the wrongfulness of the many hostile

actions conducted by those tr oops against the Congolese Armed Forces during the months of

August and September 1998.

As we shall now see in the final part of my presentation, Uganda’s argument that the Lusaka

Agreement of 10July 1999 evidenced the Congo’s consent to the presence of Ugandan troops on

Congolese territory is equally unfounded.

C. The Lusaka Agreement of 10July1999 is not evidence of consent by Congo to military
operations by Ugandan troops

21. According to the argument developed by Uganda, the Lusaka Agreement of 10 July 1999

entitles Ugandan troops in law to be present in Co ngolese territory with effect from that date. The

explanation for this is said to be that the Lusak a Agreement is a “comprehensive system of public

97
order” closely linking the settlement of the inter-Sta te conflict to the settlement of the civil war

that had been tearing Congo apart since the summer of 1998. This argument, and the reading of the

Lusaka Agreement on which it is based, are in reality quite untenable. So I wish to state at the

outset, in reply to Judge Elaraby’s question, that the Democratic Republic of Congo’s view is that

the Lusaka Agreement does not entitle Ugandan troo ps in law to be present in Congolese territory,

even before the period of one hun dred and eighty days initially prescribed for the withdrawal of

those troops has expired. The aim of the Lusaka Agreement was not and could not be suddenly to

96
Document entitled Uganda’s position on issues of peace and s ecurity in the Great Lakes region ,
November 1998, CMU, Ann. 31, p. 4.
9CR 2005/6, Friday 15 April 2005, p. 49, para. 85 and CR 2005/8, Tuesday 19 April 2005, p. 20, para. 11
(Mr. Reichler). - 29 -

legitimise a military presence that was clearly unlaw ful up to that point. The argument that the

Lusaka Agreement goes beyond a simple ceasefire ag reement is certainly acceptable, but in no

sense can this justify the view that this aspect of the agreement is thereby simply excluded from

37 any legal analysis of this document. In fact it is solely the internal part of this agreement that goes

beyond the scope of a ceasefire. It is only in the context of this internal part, implementation of

which is a matter for the Congolese protagonists alone even if the other parties are invited to give

98
their support , that the process of national reconciliation is contemplated. This process includes,

inter alia, setting up a national conference, adopting a new constitution and even the creation of a

new army 99. But according to the Ugandan argument, Congo allegedly agreed to the presence and

maintenance of the foreign forces that had invaded its territory a year before until this process of

national reconciliation had reached its end, or until the rebel groups still present in Congolese

100
territory had been eliminated . You will agree that this is a surprising proposition; in particular,

it amounts to giving the clauses of the Lusaka Agreement a meaning completely foreign to them.

22. As regards the foreign troops in Congolese territory at the time, the expressly stated

purpose of the Lusaka Agreement was to organize the modalities of withdrawal, of the departure of

these troops, not of their continuing future presen ce in Congo by legalising that presence one way

or another. Article III, Section 12, of the Agreement could not be clearer in this respect. It states:

“The final withdrawal of all foreign forces from the national territory of the DRC shall be carried

out in accordance with the calendar in Annex ‘B’ an d a withdrawal schedule to be prepared by the

United Nations, the OAU and the JMC.” 101 This is clearly about the withdrawal of foreign armed

forces, even if this is pursuant to a certain timetable, not about keeping them in Congolese territory.

And Uganda seeks in vain to use another provision of Annex A of the Agreement as an argument:

“All forces shall remain in the declared and recorded locations until (a) in the case of foreign forces

102
withdrawal has started in accordance with JM C/OAU, United Nations withdrawal scheme.”

Here, the Respondent stresses the words “remain in place” in order once more to infer consent to

98Art. III, Sec. 19 of the Agreement and Art. 5.1 of Ann. A.

99Art. 5.1 of Ann. A.
100
Oral argument by Mr. Reichler, Tuesday 19 April 2005, CR 2005/8, p. 24, para. 23.
101CMU, Ann. 45.

102Art. 11.4, Ann. A. - 30 -

103
38 the presence and maintenance of its troops in Congolese territory , but again this is a very

incomplete reading of this provision, intentionally divorced from its context. The purpose of the

chapter in which it appears is to organize the redeployment of the various protagonists’ forces to

defensive positions in zones where those forces are in contact 104. This is quite simply from the

viewpoint of a ceasefire, not of a “comprehensive system of public order” ⎯ of avoiding a

resumption of hostilities between the various opposing armed forces. It is clearly with this end in

view, and this end only, that these forces are required ⎯ Article11.4 of th e Annex states “all

forces shall be restricted to the declared and recorded locations” 105⎯ not authorized, to stay in

certain fixed positions pending their final withdr awal. Once again the reading of the Lusaka

Agreement proposed by Uganda is very difficult to reconcile with the ordinary meaning of the

words in this instrument, as well as with its overall scheme.

23. By way of confirmation, a comparison of the Lusaka Agreement with the Luanda

Agreement of 2002 clearly shows that Uganda is a ttempting to give the first of these instruments a

scope that is completely foreign to it. This comparison is all the more striking because the Luanda

Agreement contains both clauses relating to the withdrawal of UPDF troops according to a given

timetable, exactly like the Lusaka Agreement, and a clause expressing Congo’s consent to a limited

Ugandan military presence in the Ruwenzori mountains which has no equivalent in the Lusaka

Agreement. The first of these clauses is expressed in terms very similar to the clause in the Lusaka

Agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Congolese territory: “The G[overnment] O[f]

U[ganda] commits itself to the continued withdrawal of its forces from the DRC in accordance with

the Implementation Plan... attached thereto.” 106 The contrast between this provision on the

withdrawal of foreign forces and the provision, still in the Luanda Agreement, that expresses

Congo’s consent to the maintenance of Ugandan army units in part of its territory is particularly

striking: “The Parties agree that the Ugandan troops shall remain on the slopes of

39 MountRuwenzori until the Parties put in place security mechanisms guaranteeing Uganda’s

10CR 2005/8, Tuesday 19 April 2005, p. 24, para. 23 (Mr. Reichler).
104
“Chapter 11. Redeployment of forces of the parties to defensive positions in conflict zones.”
105
Emphasis added.
10Art. 1, para. 1. - 31 -

security, including training and coordinated patrol of the common border.” 107 Thus it is very clear

that the provisions on the withdrawal of armed forces from Congolese territory, even if this

withdrawal is spread over time, can in no way be presented as having the same meaning and the

same scope as a provision whereby Congo unambiguously consents to the presence of these troops

in its territory. Obviously these two provisions have fundamentally different aims. While, I repeat,

the Lusaka Agreement does contain a provision on the withdrawal of foreign troops similar to that

found in the Luanda Agreement, we search in va in in the 1999 Lusaka Agreement for a provision

of the same type as that just cited and wh ich clearly expresses consent to the presence and

maintenance of Ugandan troops in Congolese territory . Thus the meaning attributed by Uganda to

the Lusaka Agreement is obviously contradicted by the Luanda Agreement.

24. But over and above these textual arguments, there are more fundamental reasons why the

Ugandan position on this point is unacceptable. If instruments such as the agreement concluded in

Lusaka on 10July1999 were to be given the in terpretation suggested by Uganda, there are very

good reasons for thinking that the governments in pl ace in States affected by a conflict with both

internal and external dimensions would in futu re be wary of signing any ceasefire and national

reconciliation agreement. In agreeing to become pa rties to such agreements they would risk being

burdened for an indefinite period with very intr usive foreign “guests”, who would have succeeded

in giving the outward signs of an accepted presence to what would be none other than an intrusion

into the territory and into the internal affairs of the State concerned. There would be the inevitable

risk of consent being invalidated by constraint , and it is for all these reasons that the Ugandan

argument that the Congolese authorities had consen ted to the presence of UPDF troops in Congo

by becoming parties to the 1999Lusaka Agreemen t is unacceptable. The disengagement plans

40 adopted subsequently to implement and adapt th e Lusaka Agreement are part and parcel of the

latter, and therefore the Congo’s adhesion to th ese instruments is clearly not the expression of any

consent whatever to the maintenance of Ugandan troops in Congolese territory which the

Respondent is seeking to infer from these agreements.

107
Art. 1, para. 4. - 32 -

25. Even assuming that consent could be inferred from the Lusaka Agreement ⎯ which, I

repeat, the Congo refuses to consider ⎯ it should be stressed once again that in any event such

consent would only justify the stationing of Ug andan troops in Congolese territory in their

positions at that time. In no way would it justif y the various hostile actions by the Ugandan army

in Congolese territory after July 1999, particularly against the Congolese Armed Forces. I stressed

earlier this morning how numerous these hostile armed actions had been after that date. Once

again, it is revealing in this connection that the other Party says nothing about the limits of the

consent allegedly given by the Congolese authoriti es in the Lusaka Agreement and that it does not

show in any way that action by its troops in Congolese territory after 10July1999 stayed within

these limits. It is perhaps worth stating at this stage that Uganda could not seek to justify that

military action on some other basis, such as alle ged prior violations by the DRC of the Lusaka

Agreement. The Court clearly dismissed the count er-claim submitted by Uganda on this point for

lack of connection with the principal claims of Congo. I will return to this shortly. Thus the result

of that decision is clear. Issues relating to compliance or non-compliance with the Lusaka

Agreement are not part of the present dispute, and Uganda would seek in vain to use alleged

violations of that Agreement as an argument to justify its military actions in Congolese territory

after 10 July 1999.

26. But I still have one final issue to tackle this morning. Uganda also claims that, in

addition to expressing consent by Congo to th e presence of UPDF troops, the Lusaka Agreement

confirms the legitimacy of military action by Uganda as from August 1998. By their adhesion to it,

the parties to the Agreement, w ith the Democratic Republic of Congo in the first rank, allegedly

41 recognized that it was necessary for Uganda to conduct this military operation in Congolese

territory in self-defence108. This was claimed to be the case because the Agreement expressly

recognizes the security concerns of the Democr atic Republic of the Congo and of neighbouring

States, and because it refers to the necessity fo r putting an end to the activities of armed groups

present in the territory of the Congo, the activities of most of these groups being directed against

Uganda. Here again the argument is completely without foundation. The Lusaka Agreement

108
CR 2005/8, Tuesday 19 April 2005, p. 24, para. 23 (Mr. Reichler). - 33 -

certainly does not rule on the legal validity or th e legitimacy of the claims of the various parties,

whether these be the signatory States or the two Congolese rebel movements concerned. It does

not do so expressly, or by implication as the other Pa rty seems to imply. In the Order by which it

dismissed Uganda’s count er-claim seeking a finding that th e Democratic Republic of Congo was

responsible for alleged violations of the Lusaka Ag reement, the Court stated very clearly that the

issues dealt with in the Lusaka Agreement, “which relate to methods for solving the conflict in the

region agreed at multilateral level in a ceasefire acco rd having received the ‘strong support’ of the

United Nations Security Council (resolutions1291 (2000) and 1304(2000)), concern facts of a

different nature from those relied on in the Congo’s claims, which relate to acts for which Uganda

109
was allegedly responsible during that conflict ” . Since, according to the Court’s own analysis,

the Lusaka Agreement focuses on issues different in nature from those relating to the establishment

of international responsibility, it is clear that it certainly cannot be regarded as recognizing the

validity of a legal argument developed by Uganda precisely in order to escape its international

responsibility.

Hence, just as the Lusaka Agreement cannot be used to support the Ugandan argument of

alleged consent, neither does it demonstrate any purported recognition by Congo that the armed

activities of the UPDF in Congolese territory si nce August1998 were justified on the ground of

self-defence.

27. As a general conclusion, therefore, it is clear that Uganda’s attempts to justify its armed

action against the Congo do not stand up to scrutiny. Professor Corten showed last Friday that the

facts of the case did not support the argument of sel f-defence at all. We have just seen that the

same was true in law, because the conditions imposed upon the exercise of self-defence in

42 international law were in no way satisfied in the present case, either in regard to the existence of an

initial act of aggression or as to fulfilment of th e requirements of necessity and proportionality.

The position is the same with regard to the existence of alleged consent by the Congolese

authorities to the presence of Ugandan troops. This consent is not established at all for the relevant

periods, and even assuming that it could be, Uganda has never set out the limits of this consent or

109
Order of 29 November 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 680, para. 42. - 34 -

shown that the action by its armed forces remained within those limits. In any event, this is an

argument whose practical effect would be extremely limited. All of these elements thus clearly

establish Uganda’s international responsibility on account of the act of aggression of which Uganda

was guilty in invading the Congo from August 1998 and maintaining a military presence there until

the beginning of June 2003.

I thank the Court for its patience and its atten tion, and now request that it give the floor to

my colleague, ProfessorOlivierCorten, who will show that the status of Uganda throughout this

period was certainly that of an occupying State.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Monsieur le professeu r Klein. Je donne maintenant la parole à

Monsieur le professeur Corten.

Mr. CORTEN: Thank you, Mr. President.

Uganda’s status as occupying Power under international humanitarian law

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, since the beginning of this case, the Democratic

Republic of the Congo has always stressed Uganda’s status as occupying Power 110. The

occupation means that Uganda may be held re sponsible for any violation of the rules of

international humanitarian law applicable to the o ccupied territories, be this the protection of the

Congolese people or of its property and resources. It is also important to remember that this status

does not depend on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the presence of the Ugandan troops in the

occupied Congolese territory. Uganda continued to be an occupying Power in Congo between

43 August 1998 and June 2003 and did so irrespective of the validity of the legal title it may have

invoked to justify its presence 11.

2. The decisive consequences attaching to the status of occupying Power doubtless explain

why the Respondent has sought to challenge this status 112. In this connection, two arguments were

reiterated in the first round. According to one, the limited number of Ugandan soldiers or agents in

110
Application of 23 June 1999, para. I(b) of the submissions; MDRC, p.47, para. 157; p. 169, para. 4.20;
p. 273, para. 1, of the submissions; RDRC, pp. 98-100; see also para. 5.05.
11Oral argument of Mr. Salmon, 11 April 2005, CR 2005/2, pp. 50-55, paras. 21-30.

11Oral argument of Mr. Suy, 20 April 2005, CR 2005/9, pp. 22-25, paras. 40-41; oral argument of Mr. Brownlie,
20 April 2005, CR 2005/10, p. 17, para. 48; see also RU, pp. 245-246, para. 525. - 35 -

the Congo, together with their strictly localized presence, would not warrant the characterization of

Uganda as occupying Power. According to the other, it is not Uganda but Congolese rebel

movements which, de facto, administered northern and eastern Congo. So it is they, not Uganda,

who should be termed occupiers.

3. Mr. President, Members of the Court, neither of these arguments can be accepted, as I

shall show you in this oral argument. Moreover, and this will be the object of the third part of my

oral argument, one wonders whether Uganda did no t finally acquiesce in its status as occupying

Power.

I. The relatively limited and localized Ugandan presence in the Congo does not affect
its status as occupying Power

4. But to begin with, Uganda stresses the limited number of its troops in the Congo during

this period of occupation. At the most, this number was supposedly 7,200, according to the version

113
found in the Counter-Memorial , or “around 10,000”, according to the version put forward in the

oral proceedings 114. Uganda adds that its presence was limited to designated strategic locations,

115
such as the airfields in northern Congo .

5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me first remind you of a few facts. In their oral

44 arguments, the representatives of Uganda pointed out that the Ugandan troops had seized control of

towns far removed from the common border 116. By consulting the map being projected behind me,

and which you will find as tab 18 in your judges’ fo lder, you will be able to appreciate the scale of

the Ugandan occupation in view of all the town s occupied, from Bunia and Beni, close to the

eastern border, to Bururu or Mobenzene, in the fa r western part of Congo. The southern boundary

of the occupied area runs north of the towns of Mbandaka westwards, then extends east to

Kinsangani, rejoining the Ugandan border between Goma and Butembo.

6. To fully understand the effect of the occupation of all these towns, it is perhaps interesting

to recall the topography of this part of the Congo. This other map is tab 36 in your judges’ folder.

113
CMU, p. 50, para. 63; emphasis added.
11Oral argument of Mr. Reichler, 19 April 2005, CR 2005/8, p. 31, para. 40, and p. 25, para. 26; p. 36, para. 50;

in a slightly different vein, see the oral argument of Mr. Reichler on 15 April 2005, CR 2005/6, p. 48, para. 82; see also
RU, p. 75, para. 170.
11Oral argument of Mr. Reichler, 15 April 2005, CR 2005/6, p. 37, para. 58; see also RU, pp. 75-76, para. 170.

11Oral argument of Mr. Reichler, 15 April 2005, CR 2005/6, p. 47, para. 80. - 36 -

Please excuse its very inferior quality, but it does show one thing well. Excluding the extreme east

on the one hand and the region of Gbadolite on the othe r, all the area is covered in dense, lush and

sometimes impenetrable forest. Indeed, counsel for Uganda stressed this aspect:

“It was critical to the success of the plan that Ugandan forces take control of all
airfields between the Ugandan border and Gbadolite... there were no highways or
even roads in this part of the DRC. Tr avel was by foot, through dense forest and

jungle, or by air. Supplies could only be brought in by air. Control of airfields was a
sine qua non for resupplying or reinforcing troops marching across this terrain. It was
also essential in order to prevent enemy forces from resupplying or reinforcing their
117
own troops . . .”

On Uganda’s own admission, controlling the airfields in an area such as this is all it takes to

prevent “enemy forces”, i.e. mainly the official authorities of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo, from administering it.

7. It is hard not to conclude from all this that Uganda occupied the area before you, which

you will find as tab 3 in your judges’ folder. Here too, the occupation of Congo extends throughout

its whole width, from east to west, running down as far as a line situated north of the

Mbadanka-Kisangani-Goma axis. Given the characteristics of the region and Uganda’s strategy as
45

explained to you by its representatives, there is no doubt that this entire region was indeed placed

“under the authority of [a] hostile army”, to qu ote the words of the Hague Regulations defining

occupation 11.

8. So much so, Mr. President, that the Ugandan authorities did not rest content with

controlling the occupied territories militarily, by seizing all the strategic points in northern and

north-western Congo. They also performed acts of administration in the occupied territories.

Uganda literally created Ituri Province, in east ern Congo, appointing administrators and even

119 120
governors there . Uganda also supervised elections throughout the territories it occupied . The

121
Court is quite familiar with these events, which have been set out in the Reply . But I wish to

bring them to the attention of Uganda, which remains obstinately silent on the subject of them in its

oral arguments.

117Oral argument of Mr. Reichler, 15 April 2005, CR 2005/6, p. 37, para. 58.

118Oral argument of Mr. Salmon, 11 April 2005, CR 2005/2, p. 50, para. 22.
119
Oral argument of Mr. Klein, 13 April 2005, CR 2005/4, pp. 24-25, paras. 10-11.
120See the review in the pro-government Ugandan newspaper New Vision, 28 January 2000; RDRC, Ann. 12.

121Ibid., pp. 99-101, paras. 2.81-2.85. - 37 -

9. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in these circumstances the exact number of UPDF

soldiers in Congo, whether 7,000 or 10,000, or probably even more, is not a decisive criterion.

10. In this connection, I should like to r ecall a few episodes from contemporary Congolese

history, with which I am familiar.

⎯ Between 1887 and 1908, King Leopold II created, th en administered the “independent State of

the Congo” with an iron fist. However, according to estimates, control of the whole territory

was in the hands of 648 officers and 1,612 NCOs, in other words, a total of 2,260 men in all 122.

⎯ The Congo then became a Belgian colony. In 1948, the colony’s ordinary budget earmarked

funds for 15,702 officers and soldiers then in the Congo. 123

46 11. How can it be explained that this vast territory ⎯ i.e. the entire territory of the Congo,

not just its northern and north-eastern parts ⎯ could have been controlled and administered with

such limited numbers? First, owing to the topogr aphical peculiarities of the region, which I have

already described. Then, thanks to the co-operation of Congolese officers and soldiers recruited by

the colonial Power, in the same way as Uganda was able to count on local auxiliary forces, as I

shall show you in the second part of this presentation.

II. The presence of local administrations subordinated to it does not affect

Uganda’s status as occupying Power

12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Uganda admits providing assistance to the Congo

Liberation Movement, the Rassemblement pour le Congo démocratique , and other rebel

movements, of a political as well as a military kind, through the training of soldiers, supplies of

weapons and even by joint engagement in the battles of the UPDF and the Congo Liberation Army,

the armed branch of the MLC 124. On the other hand, our opponents stress the fact that this was

125
only “limited assistance” ⎯ their words ⎯ to anti-government forces . Assistance limited in

126
time to begin with, since it did not start, in military terms at least, until March 1999 . Then

122
De Boeck, G., Les révoltes de la force publique sous Leopold II, Congo 1895-1908 , Anvers, ed. EPO, 1987,
p. 52, and Ann., p. 505.
123
Jolimont, P., “Naissance de la Force Publique 1888”, Bulletin militaire, No. 32, état-major de la force publique,
November 1948, p. 635.
124
Oral argument of Mr. Reichler, 15 April 2005, CR 2005/6, p. 54, para. 98; RU, p. 80, para. 180.
125Oral argument of Mr. Reichler, 15 April 2005, CR 2005/6, p. 54, para. 98; RU, p. 82, para. 185.

126Ibid., p. 83, paras. 187 and 189, and oral argument of Mr. Reichler, 15 April 2005, CR 2005/6, para. 98. - 38 -

assistance limited qualitatively, since this support was only provided on an ad hoc basis, solely to

defend Uganda 127.

13. As for the first aspect of this Ugandan ar gument, it is necessary at this point to quote

again the words of General Kazini, according to wh ich, on 7 August 1998, “we [in other words the

Ugandan armed forces] decided to launch an offens ive together with the rebels, a special operation

128
47 we code-named Safe Haven” . It was thus on 7 August 1998 that a “joint offensive” was led by

the UPDF and the Congolese rebel forces. It was from this moment that Uganda exercised control

over the DRC, even though, in fact, it was only later that it decided to create a new entity, the

129
MLC, in circumstances related by the leader of this movement in a book published in 2001 .

14. Moreover, a careful reading of this work is enough to give a fair idea of the extent of

Ugandan modesty in this particular aspect of the case. In reality, it would seem that the MLC could

only be created, be supported by an army (the Congolese Liberation Army (ALC)), conquer towns

and administer territories, thanks to Uganda’s support 130. Only when the Ugandan instructors had

finished training an army of several tens of thousands of men did the UPDF consider reducing its

troops on the ground. Yet this did not prevent these troops from reserving the possibility of

returning, and above all of continuing to issue their orders through the local auxiliary forces 131.

Moreover, this control of the rebel movements by the Ugandan authorities was not limited to the

military arena. It also extended to the economic sphere, a point to which Professor Sands will

revert this afternoon 132. In any event, it is clear that the situation fully corresponds with the

requirements of international la w; for there to be occupation ⎯ I am quoting a reference source

already referred to by Professor Salmon in the first round ⎯ “it is sufficient that the occupying

127
Ibid.
128
“Lead Counsel: So you can briefly explain to the commission what ‘Operation Sa fe Haven’ was about.
Brigadier J. Kazini: “Safe Haven”. This was now an operation... The operation wa s code-named “Safe Haven”
because there was a need to change in the operationa l plan. Remember, the earliest plan was to jointly ⎯ both
governments ⎯ to jointly deal with the rebels along the border; that was now the UPDF and the FAC. But now there
was a mutiny, the rebels were taking control of those areas. So we decided to launch an offensive together with the
rebels, a special operation we code-named Safe Haven”; CW/01/03 24/07/01, p. 129.

12Jean-Pierre Bemba, Le choix de la liberté, pp. 41-46. See RDRC, pp. 115-124, paras. 2.109-2.128..

13Oral argument of Mr. Tshibangu Kalala, 11 April 2005, CR 2005/2, pp. 35-36, paras. 56-57; pp. 37-40,
paras. 60-72.

13See the remarks by Jean-Pierre Bemba reproduced in the Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
p. 118, para. 2.114.
132
See also RDRC, pp. 100-101, para. 2.84, and in particular, the quotations from the above-mentioned work by
Jean-Pierre Bemba. - 39 -

force can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within the

occupied district” 133.

48 15. Mr. President, Members of the Court, to escape the consequences of its acts, Uganda

dwelt at length on the conclusion of the Lusaka ceasefire and successive agreements. According to

the Respondent, these agreements legitimized the rebel movements as de facto administrators and

recognized their control over the occupied territo ries. Our opponents have dwelt at length on a

134
map which presents northern and north-eastern Congo as “area 1” . You can see this map being

projected behind me. This map, as well as th e whole Agreement from which it is taken, is

reproduced as tab41 in your judges’ folder. An d I invite you to directly consult the text

reproduced on the pages indicated in this documen t as pages 3 and 4. According to Uganda, since

the MLC is designated as administrator of this area, area 1, Uganda could not itself be considered

as occupying Power. However, as you see now, accord ing to the text of this Agreement, area1,

which reflects the situation of the forces on the grou nd on 18 November 2000, is indeed that of the

135 136
“MLC and UPDF” ; not, therefore, of the MLC alone, as counsel of Uganda implied . This

means that the UPDF may be regarded as having controlled all of area 1 as far as the extreme west

of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is noteworthy that the geographical positions of the

MLC and the UPDF are thus treated jointly by this Agreement. In short, this plan confirms the fact

that the UPDF was an occupying Power of the area ⎯ of all the area ⎯ even if this was partly

through the medium of the MLC. As for the rebel movements’ purported legitimacy under the

terms of the ceasefire agreements, it is hard to see what its significance could be for the question

which concerns us. For the only question that is im portant at this stage is whether Uganda actually

controlled northern and north-east ern Congo. Whether this control was exercised directly or

through the medium of subordinate forces is of no decisive legal consequence.

13United States Army Field Manual in Whiteman, Digest of International Law , Vol. 10, p. 541; Mr. Salmon,
11 April 2005, CR 2005/2, pp. 50-53, paras. 22-26.
134
CMU, Ann. 79; see oral argument of Mr. Reichler, 19 April 2005, CR 2005/8, p. 30, para. 37.
135
Ibid.
13Oral argument of Mr. Reichler, 19 April 2005, CR 2005/8, p. 30, paras. 37 and 38. - 40 -

49 16. Mr. President, Members of the Court, among the various categories of occupation

scholarly writers mention is o ccupation through a local government 137. Numerous precedents are

cited:

138
⎯ the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam through a local Cambodian government ;

⎯ the occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel through a local Lebanese force 139;

⎯ the occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkey th rough a local Cypriot administration, or an

140
older example :

⎯ the occupation of a number of European countries by Nazi Germany, during the Second World

War, with often very limited numbers ⎯ a few hundred officials for the whole of Belgium and

northern France for example 141.

17. Certainly, Uganda cannot simply hide behind the fact that the occupied territories were

partly administered by groups under its control. In the particular circumstances, there is no doubt

that Uganda can be described as an occupying Power in the light of current international

humanitarian law. This is probably what explains ⎯ and I now come to the third and last part of

my oral argument ⎯ the fact that Uganda ultimately seems to have acquiesced in the status of

occupying Power.

III. Uganda’s conduct shows that it acquiesced in its characterization as occupying Power

18. Mr. President, Members of the Court, since the adoption of resolution 1234, on

9April1999, the Security Council has called upon “a ll parties... in the Democratic Republic of

the Congo” to respect “the [provisions of the] Geneva Conventions of 1949” 142. In its

137
Adam Roberts, “What is military occupation?”, BYBIL, 1984, p. 284; emphasis added.
138See, inter alia , United Nations General Assembly resolu tions 35/6 of 22 October 1980, 36/5 of
21 October 1981 and 37/6 of 28 October 1982.

13See inter alia United Nations General Assembly resolution 35/122A of 11 December 1980.

14See inter alia United Nations General Assembly resolu tions 33/15 of 9 November 1978, 34/40 of
20 November 1979 and 37/253 of 13 May 1983.

14J.Gerard-Libois and J. Gotovitch, L’an 40. La Belgique occupée , CRISP, Bruxelles, 1971, pp. 132-140;
Louveaux, C.L., “La magistrature da ns la tourmente des années 1940-1944”, Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie,
1981, Vol. II, p. 663.

14S/RES/1234, 9 April 1999, para. 6. - 41 -

50 resolution1341 of 22 February 2001, the Security Council, after demanding that the Ugandan

forces withdraw from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 143,

“Reminds all parties of their obligations with resp ect to the security of civilian

populations under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and stresses that occupying forces should
144
be held responsible for human rights violations in the territory under their control.”

19. It is clear from this resolution that Uganda , as a party to the conflict, was considered by

the Security Council as occupying Power within th e meaning of international humanitarian law.

To Congo’s knowledge, Uganda has never made the slightest objection or reservation with respect

to this resolution.

20. For example, Uganda has never claimed th at it could not be characterized as occupying

Power within the meaning of resolution 1342/2001, because its army, as it now says, only occupied

a few locations or airfields yet did not control any area. On the contrary, Uganda concluded various

agreements confirming that it did not dispute its status as occupying Power:

⎯ the Sirte Agreement of 18 April 199 refers to the withdrawal of the UPDF from the “areas

145
where there are troops of Uganda . . .” ;

⎯ in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the States parties declare that they are “determined to

146
ensure the respect for . . . the Geneva Conventions of 1949” . The same parties later refer to

the “territory under their control” 147;

⎯ in the Harare Disengagement Plan, we have seen that there was an “area 1”, controlled by the

UPDF and its ally, the MLC;

⎯ lastly, the Luanda Agreement of 6 Septembe r 2002 contains a reference, in Article 2,

148
paragraph 3, to the “territories currently under the Uganda[n] control” .

14S/RES/1341, 22 February 2001, para. 2.
144
S/RES/1341, 22 February 2001, para. 14; emphasis added.
145
MDRC, Ann. 65.
14Preamble, fifth preambular paragraph; text in MDRC, Ann. 31.

14Paragraph 22 of the Agreement; text in MDRC, Ann. 31.

14Art. 2, para. 3, of the Agreement, RU, Ann. 84. - 42 -

51 21. As you see, these agreements do indeed refer to areas or territories under Ugandan

control, not just to localities or still less airfields. Uganda cannot, having accepted these texts, now

claim never to have controlled part of Congolese territory.

22. Similarly, it should be recalled that, in the first round of oral argument, my colleague

ProfessorKlein quoted a letter sent by the sp ecial representative of the United Nations

Secretary-General, on 2 February 2002, to the Uganda n Minister of Defence. In that letter, which

you will find at tab29 in your judges’ folder, th e UPDF troops were specifically referred to as

“occupying force” 149, which justified their taking all necessary steps “to ensure security in the

150
North East DRC” . In his reply of 5 February 2002, the Ugandan Minister of Defence made not

the slightest attempt to dispute this neverthel ess very clear characterization as occupying Power 151.

Mr.Mbabazi, now Ugandan counsel and lawyer in this case, made no objection or reservation,

seeming on the contrary to accept Uganda’s obligations in its capacity as occupying Power. You

will find the complete text of this letter as Annex 76 to the Ugandan Rejoinder.

23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, acquiescence may be defined in international law

as ⎯ I am here citing a reference source ⎯ “consent given by a state, by virtue of its (active or

152
passive) conduct in a given situation” . In our case, it is clear that Uganda’s conduct may be

interpreted as acquiescence in its status of occupying Power. Not only did Uganda not object when

this status was established in various texts drawn to its attention (passive conduct), but also

concluded a number of agreements which contain a clear recognition of this status (active conduct).

In short, Uganda may therefore be regarded as ha ving itself acquiesced in its status of occupying

Power.

52 24. Mr. President, I should not like to conclude this presentation without already at this stage

giving some elements of a reply to the question put by Judge Kooijmans last Friday. The territories

occupied by Uganda have varied in size as the c onflict has developed. During the phase when the

UPDF troops were advancing, the area initially c overed Orientale Province and part of Nord-Kivu

149
Oral argument of Mr. Klein, 13 April 2005, CR 2005/4, p. 27, para. 16, quoting document 1 of the documents
submitted by the DRC for the oral proceedings, January 2005, para. 6.
150
Ibid.
15Uganda Rejoinder, Ann. 76.

15Jean Salmon, ed., Dictionnaire de droit international public, Bruxelles, Bruylant/AUF, 2001, see
“acquiescement”, p. 21. - 43 -

Province. In the course of 1999, it increased to cover a major part of Equateur Province too.

Uganda subsequently maintained control of this area through th e rebel troops operating under its

authority, even when it had withdrawn part of its army. Earlier, I showed various maps giving

some indication of the maximum area of occupation. Here is one of them again. A more specific

determination, chronologically as well as geographi cally, will be provided at a later stage by the

Democratic Republic of the Congo with the aid of a sketch, in conformity with the timetable laid

down by the Court.

25. Mr. President, Members of the Court, tha nk you for your attention. May I ask you to

give the floor to Maître Tshibangu Kalala, who will begin consideration of one of the consequences

of the occupation by Uganda: the human rights violations in the occupied territories.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Monsieur le professeu r Corten. Je donne maintenant la parole à

Monsieur Kalala.

Mr. KALALA:

Uganda’s violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the DRC listened attentively to the replies given by

153
Professor Brownlie on behalf of Uganda, concerning the evidence of violations of human rights

and of international humanitarian law set out in the written pleadings of the Congo and in the oral

presentations of 13April by ProfessorsPierreKlein, OlivierCorten and myself 154. Pursuing a

pleading strategy that is surprising, to say the least, Uganda refrained from a specific rebuttal of the

53 different cases of human rights violations cite d in the Congolese oral arguments on the basis of

varied and concordant sources. Instead, Mr.Br ownlie chose to spend his time challenging the

substance of certain allegations in the Congo’s Application filed in 1999, even though the Congo

155 156
had clearly indicated, in its Memorial and in its Reply , that it would no longer be seeking to

hold Uganda internationally responsible for certain of the acts mentioned in its Application. In

15CR 2005/10, 20 April 2005, pp. 8 et seq. (Mr. Brownlie).
154
CR 2005/4, 13 April 2005.
15MDRC, para. 5.

15RDRC, para. 2.05. - 44 -

other words, the respondent State preferred to challenge points which the DRC had already

abandoned rather than responding to the charg es maintained against it by the Congo. Thus,

Uganda has once again, in its oral pleadings, chosen not to contribute to moving the judicial debate

forward.

2. In his presentation, Mr.Brownlie focused his objections to the evidence of Uganda’s

responsibility for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the DRC

by confining himself to procedural matters and rul es of evidence. In this connection, he developed

three categories of argument.

3. First, Uganda raised two types of prelimin ary objection. On the one hand, it claimed that

the DRC’s arguments concerning human rights violations were characterized by “discontinuity”, in

that it was presenting fresh allegations of human rights violations at successive stages of the

157
proceedings, amounting to a “new case” . On the other, Uganda stated that the Court could not

rule on human rights violations that took place dur ing the fighting in Kisangani between its troops

158
and those of Rwanda, given the latter State’s absence from these proceedings .

4. Secondly, Uganda persists in impugning, in very broad terms, the reliability of sources

establishing the responsibility of the UPDF for violations of international humanitarian law and

159
human rights .

54 5. Thirdly, Uganda denies any responsibilit y for breaches of the duty of due diligence,

imposing an obligation to prevent and punish human rights violations perpetrated in the areas under

its control, for the simple reason that it claims not to be an occupying Power in the DRC 160.

Overall, Uganda considers that the accusations made against it, in respect of actions or omissions

161
by its army in Ituri, are totally groundless because it played a peacekeeping role in that region .

6. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I shall endeavour in this presentation to show that

the arguments put forward by Uganda are totally without foundation. First, I shall establish that the

evidence submitted by the DRC in the different phases of the proceedings, including the oral phase,

15CR 2005/10, 20 April 2005, p. 15, paras. 37-38; p. 16, paras. 43-44 (Mr. Brownlie).

15Ibid., p. 22, paras. 67 and 68.
159
Ibid., p. 16, paras. 39-42.
16CR 2005/10, 20 April 2005, p. 15, para. 39 (Mr. Brownlie).

16Ibid., p. 17, paras. 47 et seq. - 45 -

is fully consistent with its initial claim, as formulated in its Application, and on no account

constitutes a “new case”. In the second part of my argument, which I shall take up this afternoon, I

shall show that the numerous violations of human rights and international humanitarian law

attributable to the Ugandan forces are proved be yond any reasonable doubt by credible, varied and

concordant sources. Thirdly, I shall explain that Uganda’s claims that the Democratic Republic of

the Congo and the United Nations recognized the UPDF ’s peacekeeping role in the region of Ituri

are baseless and that, on the contrary, Uganda’s ac tion consisted in fomenting the conflicts in that

region, in violation of its duty of vigilance.

I. Uganda’s preliminary objections must be rejected

7. In the first part of this presentation, Mr .President, I shall deal in turn with the two

preliminary arguments raised by Uganda in its oral pleadings.

55
A. The facts adduced by the DRC at the differe nt stages of the proceedings as evidence of
Uganda’s human rights violations are fully consistent with its initial claim, as set out in its
Application

8. In his oral presentation of 20 April, Mr . Brownlie accused the Congo of having presented

a “new case” on human rights violations at the various stages of the written proceedings, and

subsequently in oral argument, a case allegedly distinct from its initial claim in the Application

162
instituting proceedings . As regards the present oral stage, the Ugandan argument is based on the

fact that the DRC’s oral pleadings are said to deal exclusively with cases of human rights violations

in Ituri, to which no clear reference had been made in the written pleadings.

9. Mr.President, Members of the Court, the argument raised by Uganda is without any

foundation and totally devoid of effect, as I shall explain in what follows.

10. At the outset, it should be emphasized that Ug anda failed in its oral pleadings to identify

any particular legal consequence that flows from its argument, so that the latter would seem to be

purely gratuitous. It would app ear, however, that the opposing Party is seeking nevertheless to

make this argument a sort of objection to admiss ibility, when it concludes that the DRC should not

be allowed to “gain an advantage as a consequenc e of the eccentric and ineffective methods of

162
Ibid., p. 15, paras. 37-38; p. 16, paras. 43-44. - 46 -

pleading and proof she has chosen to adopt” 163. Mr.President, the argument put forward by

Uganda calls for serious clarification. The D RC would have far preferred that its human rights

case remained as it was at the time of its 1999Application, or of its Memorial or its Reply. The

DRC would have far preferred not to have to produce what Mr.Brownlie calls “a new case”.

Mr.President, Members of the Court, this is not a new claim by the DRC before this Court.

Rather, it is a matter of new violations, or new evidence of human rights violations committed by

Uganda, which have added themselves to the same, existing charges against it. In the

circumstances, the apparent “discontinuity”, to cite the language used by Mr. Brownlie, with which

the DRC has presented its human rights arguments in the course of the different stages of the

proceedings, is in fact only the result of the “continuity” with which the UPDF’s troops persisted

56 in their violations of human rights in the regions of the DRC occupied by them. In this connection,

it should be noted that the Court’s case law allows reference to be made, up to the close of the oral

proceedings, to facts occurring after submission of the Application which are properly consistent

with the initial claims 164.

11. I would remind you that the Application submitted by the DRC in June 1999 requests the

Court to adjudge that:

“Uganda is committing repeated violati ons of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
and their Additional Protocols of 1977, in flagrant disregard of the elementary rules of
international humanitarian law in conflict z ones, and is also guilty of massive human
165
rights violations in defiance of the most basic customary law.”

The Application clearly indicates that it concerns “the various human rights violations perpetrated

by the Ugandan Republic since 2 August 1998”, while making it clear that the facts referred to are

mentioned “by way of illustration” and “in no sense constitute an exhaustive list”. Moreover, the

Application reserves the DRC’s right to “supplemen t and amplify the present request in the course

of the proceedings”. The new documents and ne w cases of human rights violations submitted by

the DRC in the different phases of the proceedings, including those concerning events in Ituri, are

thus fully in keeping with the request as set out in the Application institu ting proceedings. All of

163
Ibid., paras. 68 et seq.
16Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and aganst Nicaragua, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports

1986, p. 39, para. 58.
16Application instituting proceedings, filed in the Registry of the Court on 23 June 1999, Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). - 47 -

these incidents and documents concern repeated violations of human rights committed since

August 1998 by Uganda in conflict zones in the DRC.

12. Contrary to what Uganda contends 16, the DRC has never, in the course of the present

oral stage, confined its human rights case against Uganda to events in Itur i exclusively. Indeed,

this point had been made clear by Professor Klein:

“It should, however, be made clear, at this stage in the argument, that the

situation in Ituri will be evoked here mere ly as one example of Uganda’s breaches of
its obligations as an occupying power, speci fically in the area of fundamental human
rights. The conclusions we will come to in this case can obviously be applied to the

57 other areas of167e Congo where Uganda exercised control and similarly breached its
obligations.”

In the circumstances, Mr. President, Members of the Court, it can only be a matter of surprise that

Uganda gives the impression of having failed to a ppreciate the purely illustrative nature of the Ituri

incidents described by the DRC in its oral argument, and the fact that it is fully consistent with the

Application filed by the DRC in 1999.

B. There is no problem of jurisdiction for that part of the claim relating to the events in
Kisangani

13. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I shall now address the second preliminary

objection raised by the opposing Party. Although the Court’s jurisdiction is clearly established in

the present case with regard to the entire dispute placed before it, the respondent State nevertheless

seeks to remove from that jurisdiction the question of the events that occurred in Kisangani in 1999

and 2000. In the hope of evading the responsib ility it has incurred as a result of the unlawful

conduct of its armed forces in Kisangani, Uganda contends that the absence of Rwanda from the

proceedings precludes the Court from ruling on t hose events. It is regrettable that Uganda

contented itself, in the course of its oral pleadi ngs, with simply referring the Court to its written

pleadings on this point 168. The DRC, for its part, will take the trouble to give an oral presentation

of the legal arguments showing that there is no r eason to deny the Court jurisdiction to rule on the

responsibility of Uganda for the events in Kisangani.

16CR 2005/10, 20 April 2005, pp. 16-17, paras. 44-46 (Mr. Brownlie).
167
CR 2005/4, 13 April 2005, p. 23, para. 8 (Mr. Klein).
16CR 2005/10, p. 22, para. 67 (Mr. Brownlie). - 48 -

14. First of all, I would respectfully remind the Court of the precise purpose of the

Congolese claim in relation to the events that occurred in Kisangani. The purpose of the DRC’s

claim is simply to secure recognition of Uganda’s sole responsibility for the use of force by its own

armed forces in Congolese territory, on three occasions, in and around Kisangani, as well as for the

serious violations of essential rules of international humanitarian law committed on those

occasions 16.

58 15. Rwanda’s absence from these proceedings is totally irrelevant and cannot prevent the

Court from ruling on the question of Uganda’s respon sibility. The Court has no need whatever to

rule on the legal position of Rwanda in order to take a decision on the complaints made by the

Congo against Uganda in respect of the events at Kisangani. The Court may adjudicate on those

events without having to consider the question of whether it should be Rwanda or Uganda that is

held responsible for initiating the hostilities that led to the various clashes in and around Kisangani.

Mr.President, no argument based on the absence of an allegedly “indispensable” third State can

preclude the exercise by the Court of its jurisdicti on with regard to this aspect of the dispute of

which it is seised today. As the Court recalled in the Nauru case, there is nothing to prevent it

exercising its jurisdiction with regard to a responde nt State, even in the absence of other States

implicated in the Application. In that case, the Court had considered that the interests of the two

States absent from the proceedings “[did] not cons titute the very subject-matter of the judgment to

be rendered on the merits of Nauru’s Application” and that “the determination of the responsibility

of New Zealand or the United Kingdom [was] not a prerequisite for the determination of the

responsibility of Australia, the only object of Nauru’s claim” 170. The circumstances are exactly the

same with regard to the aspect of the present dispute which concerns us here.

16. Having regard to the foregoing, the DRC respectfully requests the Court unconditionally

to reject as without foundation the procedural arguments put forward by Uganda.

Mr. President, I stand ready, if you wish, to interrupt my presentation at this point in order to

resume at 3 p.m.

169
Request for the indication of provisional measures, s ubmitted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 115, para. 13; RDRC, pp. 320-322, paras. 5.14-5.17.
170
I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 261-262, para. 55. - 49 -

Le PRESIDENT : Merci, M. Kalala. Le moment est en effet venu de s’arrêter, et voici qui

conclut l’audience de ce matin. Les plaidoiries re prendront cet après-midi à 15heures et je vous

donnerai à nouveau la parole. Je vous remercie.

La séance est levée.

L’audience est levée à 13 heures.

___________