ÿ on- Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
YUGONPO
CR 200419(traduction)
CR 200419(translation)
Lundi 19avril 200416heures
Monday 19April2004 at 4 p.m.8 Le PRESIDENT :La Cour entendra maintenant la plaidoirie du Portugal. Je donne la parole
à M. Luis Tavares, agent du Portugal.
M. TAVARES :
1.Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, c'est un immense honneur pour
moi quede meprésenteraujourd'hui devant vous entant qu'agent de la République portugaise.
Tout d'abord, je voudrais vous présentermes compliments, Monsieur le président, ainsi
qu'aux autres Membres de la Cour. Je voudrais égalementadresser mes salutationsàla délégation
de la Serbie et Monténégroet aux délégationdes autres Etatsdéfendeurs.
2. Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, la présenteespèce a suivi un
cours inhabituel. La République fédéralede Yougoslavie -aujourd'hui la Serbie et
Monténégro -a déposé auprèdsu Greffier de la Cour desrequêtescontre plusieurs Etats membres
de l'OTAN, dont le Portugal. Dans I'affaire l'opposaàtla Républiqueportugaise, la Yougoslavie
a invoqué, pourfonder la compétencede la Cour, le paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut et
l'article IX dela convention sur le génocide.
Par la suite, la Yougoslavie a déposé son mémoire et le Portugal a soulevé certaines
exceptions préliminaires.
3. La Serbie et Monténégro a présenté sa réponse sous forme d'observations et de
conclusions écrites;elle n'y a répliquéucune des exceptions formuléespar le Portugal sauf une,
celle relative au défautde validitéde la déclaration d'acceptationde lajuridiction de la Cour par la
Yougoslavie. La Serbie et Monténégro l'a réfuté ee affirmant qu'elle ((n'étaitpas et ne pouvait
pas êtrepartie au Statut de la Cour [du fait qu'elle n'était pas]Membre de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies)). Il s'ensuit que la déclarationd'acceptation de la compétencede la Cour ne
pouvait êtrevalide lorsqu'elle aétédéposée. LaSerbie et Monténégroa de même fait valoir
qu'elle n'était pas partiea convention sur legénocideà l'époquedes événements qui font l'objet
de la présente instance.
Dans ses conclusions, la Serbie et Monténégro a prla Cour de statuer sur sa compétence
la lumièredes arguments avancésdans ces observations écrites. En d'autres termes, la Serbie et
Monténégro a demandé à la Courde se déclarer incompétente poutrrancher I'affaireau fond.9 4. La Républiqueportugaise est d'accord avec la Serbie et Monténégro : la Cour n'a pas
compétencepour statuersur le fondde l'affaire.
Le Portugal respecte la position actuelle de la Serbie et Monténégro. Mais cette position
entraîne certaines conséquencesau regard du droit :la Serbie et Monténégron'a plus d'intérêt
juridique à voir réglerle différenddont elle a saisi la Cour et, partant, la présente instanceest
devenue sans objet.
5. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, le Portugal n'en débuterapas
moins précisément sa plaidoirie par uneanalyse desconsécluencesjuridiques de la position adoptée
par la Serbieet Monténégrodans sesobservationset conclusions écrites.
La question de l'incompétencede la Cour n'est plus, aujourd'hui, matièàecontroverse entre
les Parties. Néanmoins, ex abundanticautela, le Portugal préciseraà ce stade certains arguments
exposés dansle cadre de ses exceptions préliminaires écrites.
Le Portugal ne reviendra pas sur la nullitéde la déclaration d'acceptationde la compétence
faite par la Républiquefédérale de Yougoslavie, l'acquiescemendte la SerbieetMonténégro surce
point ayant été formulé explicitement. Les écrituresportugaises, les observations écrites de la
Serbie et Monténégro etles documents soumis par le I'ortugal aux fins de la présente affaire
suffisentàétablirce défautde validité.
En outre, l'ensemble des arguments développés au sujet des exceptions préliminairessont
subsidiaires par rapport aux questions relatiàelaperte par la Serbieet Monténégro detout intérêt
juridique et au défautd'objet de la présente instancequi en découle.
6. En conclusion, je voudrais ajouter que, si nous nous abstenons de répéterles arguments
développésdansnos écritures,cen'est en aucun cas parce que nous y aurions renoncé.
Je tiens égalementà souligner querien de ce qu'avance le Portugal dans la présente phasede
l'instance ne devra êtreconsidéré comme un assentiment quant au fond.
7. Monsieur le président, je voudrais maintenant vous prierde donner la parole à notre
coagent, M. l'AmbassadeurJoa6 Salgueiro, puis à notre conseil, M. Miguel Galva6 Teles, qui
présenteraet développeral'argumentation orale dela République portugaise.
Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour.10 Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Monsieur Tavares. Je donne maintenant la parole à
S.Exc. M. Salgueiro.
M. SALGUEIRO :
1. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, je commencerai, si vous le
permettez, par vous présenter mesrespects les plus sincères,vous priant de croire que c'est pour
moi un grand privilègeque de me présenter aujourd'hui devantvous. En tant qu'ambassadeur du
Portugal au Royaumedes Pays-Bas,je dirai, si vous le voulez bien, quelques mots au nom de mon
gouvernement.
2. Permettez-moi égalementde saluer la délégatiode la Serbieet Monténégro. LePortugal
est très attaché au renforcementdes relations bilatérales entreles deux Etats. Ces relations ont
récemment connu un regain de par la visite dans notre pays du président de la Serbie et
Monténégro, ennovembre dernier. La République portugaisese félicite en outre des efforts
déployés par la Serbie et Monténégroen faveur de la paix, de la démocratieet d'une intégration
progressive au sein des institutions euro-atlantiques, tout comme elle se réjouit perspective
d'une stabilisation de la situation dans larégion.
3. Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, comme il a déjà étéindiqué,le
Portugal n'abordera pas le fond de la présente affaire.Je me contenterai de rappeler que notre pays
a participéàl'opération((Forcealliée))en1999en fournissanttrois avions de reconnaissance F-16,
ainsi que les pilotes et personnels auxiliaires (soit cinquante-trois personnes au total). Il a ainsi
contribué, quelque modestementque ce soit, àune initiativecollective destinàemettre finà une
catastrophe humanitaire qui se prolongeait depuis quelque tempsdéjà. Le Portugal regrette les
pertes humaines qu'a causées cetteopération. Nous demeuronstoutefois convaincus que ces pertes
auraient étébien plus lourdes si le drame humanitaireque connaissait le Kosovo s'était poursuivi.
4. Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, le Portugal est un Etat qui
respecte pleinement le droit international. Nous avons acceptéla compétencede la Cour lorsque
nous sommes devenus Membres de l'organisation des Nations Unies en 1955 et nous demeurons
attachés àl'idéeque la Cour internationale de Justice a un rôle cràcjouer en faveur du respect
du droit international. 5. Le Portugal soutient toutefois qu'il ne serait pas souhaitable que la Cour connaisse de
cette affaire,qu'elle n'a pas compéten l'espèceet queles demandessont irrecevables. Je vous
prierais donc, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir donner la parole à notre conseil,
M.MiguelGalva6Teles, qui, comme l'a annoncé notre agent, présentera et développera les
argumentsduPortugal sur ces questions.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Excellence. J'appelle maintenant à la barre
M. Miguel Teles.
Mr. GALVA O ELES:
Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is an honour for me once again to plead before the
International Court of Justice:. wish to present my compliments to you, Mr. President,
Mr.Vice-President,andto al1hlembers ofthe Court.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1 would first like to make two preliminary
observations.
Since the events and the written pleadingsal1pre-date February 2003, when the Applicant
adopted a new constitution and a new name, I shall refer to it indiscriminately as Serbia and
Montenegro,Yugoslaviaor the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia.
I will notreproduce herethe referencesto be found inthe written textnthe Registry of
the Court, or not in full at least.ould, however,ask that they be inserted, as usual, in the
verbatim record.
1.LACK OF LEGAL INTERESTINA SETTLEMENTOFTHEDISPUTEAND
FAILURE TC)PURSUETHE OBJECTIVEOF THE PROCEEDINGS
1.1. The position taken by Serbia and Montenegro in its written observations and
submissions raises a question related to the integrity of the Court'sjudicial fa matter
which comes before Portugal's preliminaryobjections. It is of course incumbentupon the Court
itself, and not on the Parties, as it has stated on occasions, to ensure the integrity of its
judicial function (see formple,Nottebohm,I.C.J.Reports 1953, p. 122,NorthernCameroons,
I.C.J. Reports 1963, pp. 29-31 and 37-38, and Nuclear Tests, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 271,paras. 57-58). In this respect, Mr. President, Members of the Court, Portugal only seeksto draw
your attentionto a few points.
1.2.Under Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Statute, the existence of a dispute is an essential
prerequisite of the exercise of the Court's jurisdictionin a contentious case. The purpose of
proceedings is to settle disputes (Nuclear Tests,I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 270, para. 55)- and to
settlethem onthemerits. Incidental issuesofjurisdiction mayclearly ariseduringthe proceedings
and preclude such settlement on the merits. It is nevertheless undeniable that this is the legal
purpose ofproceedingsand that it is for the Applicantto pursuethat purpose.
In the present case- and considering the situation in purely objective terms- Serbiaand
Montenegro, according to its observations and submissions on the preliminary objections, is
seekinga decisionexclusivelyonjurisdiction andwith negative content,since it acknowledgesthat
the Court lacksjurisdiction to rule on the merits. It is thus no longer pursuingthe aim of obtaining
a decisionon the merits of the case.
1.3.Admittedly, in the case conceming Monetary Gold RernovedfrornRome in 1943, the
Court accepted that the Applicanthad raised a preliminary question regardinglack ofjurisdiction
and itwas in dealing with that question thatthe Court decided it could not adjudicate upon Italy's
claims. But the circumstances of that case were very specific- as the Court indeedemphasized
(I.C.J.Reports1954,pp. 28-29).
Italy had a legal and legitimate interest in seising the Court, even for the purpose of
obtaining a negative decision onjurisdiction. The position taken by the United Kingdom during
the proceedings shows this clearly(it should,moreover,be noted that the preliminary question or
objection raisedby Italy only concemed its first claim, althoughthe Court consideredthat it could
not adjudicateupon the secondone either).
Pursuant to the Washington Statement of 25 April 1951, the seisin of the Court by Italy
representeda conditionof the upholdingof its claim to receive the gold in partial satisfaction for
the damage caused to it by the Albanian law of 13 January 1945. The Washington Statement,to
which Italywas not a party, laidupon itthe burdenof seisingthe Court of pre-determinedclaims.
1.4.There is no similar occurrence in the present case. Serbia and Montenegro does not
have a legalinterest or a legitimateinterest inthe seisin of the Court. The issue is not to ascertain whether preliminary objections raised are admissible. The point is simplythat the purpose of the
proceedings,the settlementof a disputeonthe merits, is no longer being pursued by the Applicant
andhas simply disappeared.
1.5. Furthermore, the legal grounds on whichthe Applicant claims to found the Court's
jurisdiction of the Court no longer exist (Article 38, paragraph2, of the Rules): either under
13 paragraph 1, combined with ArticleIX of the Genocide Convention, or under Article36,
paragraph2, of the Statute. Serbiaand Montenegrohas relinquishedthese grounds ofjurisdiction.
1.6. Even if, as the Agent has said, Portugal will, ex abundanti cautela, return to some
aspectsof the preliminary objectionsit has raised, it relies on Serbia and Montenegro'sagreement
as to the Court's lack of jurisdiction and on its admission of the preliminary objections not
explicitly dealt with in its observationsand submissions. By virtue of waiver and estoppel, Serbia
andMontenegro is nowprecluded fromchangingits position.
Everything that Portugal will Sayfrom now on is without prejudice to this point and is
therefore assertedin the alternative.
II. THE COURT'S LACKOFJURISDICTIONRATIONETEMPORISUNDER ARTICLE 36,
PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE S'TATUTE
2.1. As the Agent has also pointed out, Portugal will not again address the question of the
invalidityof Yugoslavia's declarationacceptingtheCourt'sjurisdiction. Inthis respect, itrefersto
itswritten pleadingsandto the observationsand submissionsof Serbiaand Montenegroand claims
the benefit of what hasbeen saidandwhathas been and will be arguedby the other Respondentsin
the cases parallelto this one.
What the Portuguese Republicwill argue further on is thus in the alternativeon two counts,
in respect, first, of the lackof legalintereston the part of Serbia and Montenegroand the failureto
pursue the objective of the proceedings and, second, in respect of the invalidity of Yugoslavia's
declaration accepting thejurisdictionofthe Court.
2.2. Under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, "[tlhe States parties.
may .. .declare that they reciognizeas compulsory ipsofacto and without special agreement,in
relation to any other Statec'ceptingthe same obligation, the jurisdiction ofthe Court in al1legal
proceedings ..." Paragraph 2 of Article 36 itself lays down a requirement of reciprocity: recognition of the
jurisdiction of the Court is valid only in relation to those States accepting the same obligation
(Phosphates in Morocco, PrelirninaryObjections, P.C.I.J., SeriesA/B, No. 74, p. 22; Electriciy
Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Preliminary Objections,P.C.I.J., SeriesA/B, No. 77, pp. 80-81;
14 Land and MaritimeBoundary betweenCameroon and Nigeria (Cameroonv. Nigeria), Preliminary
Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 300, para. 45). As the Court stated in the case concerning the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (Preliminary Objection),"[bly these Declarations,jurisdiction is conferred
on the Court only to the extent to which the two Declarations coincide in conferring it" (1C.J.
Reports 1952, p. 103; see also CertainNorwegianLoans,I.C.J.Reports 1957, p. 23).
2.3. The declaration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, signed on 25 April 1999,
contains a rese~ation ratione temporis. It states that Yugoslavia recognizes thejurisdiction of the
Court "in ail disputes arising or which may arise ["surgissantoupouvant surgir", in the French
translation] after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard to the situations or facts
subsequent to this signature .. .".
In laying down a temporal limitation in its declaration, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
obviously sought to protect itself, in respect of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, against any
claims which might be brought by other States andwhich dealt with itsconduct in connection with
the dismemberment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its afiermath.
Since thejurisdiction of the Court depends on the declarations of Portugal and of Serbia and
Montenegro coinciding, the conditions laid down inthe declaration of Serbia and Montenegro must
be fulfilled to enable the Court to rule on the merits.
2.4. In itsOrder on the request for the indication of provisional measures in the present case,
the Court stated: "a 'legal dispute' ... 'arose' between Yugoslavia andthe Respondent, as it did
also with the other NATO member States, well before 25 April 1999,concerning the legality of
those bombings as such, taken as a whole", and "the fact that the bombings have continued after
25 April 1999 and that the dispute concerning them has persisted since that date is not such as to
alter the date on which the disputearose; ...each individual airattack could not have given rise to
a separate subsequent dispute ...". As the Court observed, it is clear that the dispute crystallized during the Security Council
meetings on 24and 26 March 1999.
2.5 In respect of the question whether or not the dispute existed before the "critical date"
(25 April 1999),the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia propounds two lines of argument.
The first appeared during the oral argument in lhe incidental proceedings concerning
provisional measures. According to counsel for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Corten,
each NATO act was an instanttmeous wrongjiulact; and each of those acts gave rise to a separate
dispute (CR 99/25, 12May 1999,pp. 18-19).
The other line of argument is found in the Memorial, in which the Federal Republic of
Yugoslaviaalleges:
"After the Orders of the Court, dated 2 June 1999, the dispute aggravated and
extended. It got new elements concerning failures of the Respondents to fulfill their
obligations established by Security Council resolution 1244 and by the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."
(Para. 3.2.1.)
And then:
"these new disputed elements are part andparce1of the dispute related to the bombing
of the territory of the Applicant. The dispute arising from the bombing matured
throughout the new disputed elements related to responsibility of the Respondents for
the crime of genocide committed to Serbs and other non-Albanian groups in the area
under control of KFOR.'" (Para. 3.2.12.)
After quoting the Court's Judgment in the case concerning Right of Passage (Merits),
according to which a dispute cannot arise "until al1 its constituent elements [have] come into
existence" (I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 34), Serbia and Montenegro alleges that "after 10June 1999,
new disputed matters appeared which originated fromillegal use of force, and sothey became new
elementsof the dispute" (para. 3.2.16).
2.6 These two lines of argument are contradictory. The first breaks the dispute down into a
multiplicity ofmini-disputes. The second maintainsthe unity of the dispute, transforming it into a
dispute which was inchoate at thetime the Application instituting proceedings was filed.
2.7 Portugal will not revisit the "instantaneous wrongful acts" argument, which the Court
rejected in its Order on the request for the indication of provisional measures and Serbia and
Montenegro abandoned in the Memorial (para. 3.2.16). Suffice it to say that, as Serbia and16 Montenegro itselfhas recognizedbyvirtue of its declaration acceptingthejurisdiction ofthe Court,
a dispute is not to be confusedwiththe facts underlyingit.
2.8 In respect of the second line of argument, it should first be noted that the events
occurring after 10June 1999have given rise to a dispute which is clearlyseparatefrom the earlier
dispute, concerningtheNATO bombing and itsconsequences.
It is public knowledge thatNATO's military action in the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia
had in fact ended before 10June 1999. It was on that day that the Security Council, acting
pursuant to ChapterVI1of the Charter,adopted resolution 1244 (1999). That resolutionprovided
for effective international civil and security presences (para.7; Annex2, para. 3). The
international security presencewasto have "substantialPATOI participation".
The accusations levelledbythe FederalRepublic of Yugoslaviain itsMemorialin respect of
events having occurred before 10June 1999 relate to aerial attacks launched by NATO. Those
relatingto events after 10June concernactionsby localpeople of Albaniandescentandthe alleged
omissionsby KFOR. The two disputeshave entirely different objects. Portugalwill return to this
point.
2.9 If, conversely, it were to be supposedolely for purposes of argumentthat the dispute
dealing withthe events after 10June 1999is not a new one, it can only be the continuationof the
earlier dispute. Indeed, it is one thing to ascertain the existence of elements providing the
groundwork for a disputewithout that dispute being established,but it is another to Saythat a
dispute has arisen and is maturing.
Now, the FederalRepublicof Yugoslavia has itself acknowledgedthatthe dispute existed at
the time the Application instituting proceedingswas submitted,because it statedthe object of the
dispute in the Application. Even inthe Memorial, while on the one hand asserting that al1the
elements making up the dispute were not present at 25 April 1999, on the other it states: "The
dispute aroseinthe discussions at theSecurityCouncil meetingsof24 and 26March 1999between
Yugoslavia andthe Respondentsbefore 25 April1999concerningthe legalityof those bombingsas
such,taken as a whole" (para.3.2.16).
Moreover, assuming arguendo that events subsequent to 10June 1999 amounted to the
culminationof a single dispute,then no dispute characterizedby al1the necessaryelements existed17 at the time the Application instituting proceedings was submitted. However, as the Permanent
Court stated in the case concerning Electriciy Cornpan-vof Sofia and Bulgaria (Preliminary
Objections) in respect of the Belgian claim respecting Bulgarian law, "it rested with the Belgian
Government to prove that, before the filing of the Application, a dispute had arisen between the
Governments respecting the Bulgarian law of February 3rd, 1936" (P.C.I.J., SeriesA/B, No. 77,
p. 83; see also Certain Phospllate Lands in Nauru, Prelirninary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1992,
p. 266, para. 68, and Land and Maritime Boundary betweenCameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary
Objections,I.C.J.Reports 1998, p. 322, para. 110).
111.THE COURT'S LACKOF JURlSDlCTlON UNDERARTICLE IX OF THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION
3.1 Serbia and Montenegro no longer founds the jurisdiction of the Court on Article IX of
the Genocide Convention; it has relinquished this argument. In this respect, the Portuguese
Republic will state its desire to benefit from what has been and will be said by other Respondents
in the cases parallel to this one. Once again, Portugal's arguments to follow will be in the
alternative.
A,,Lackofjurisdiction ratione materiae
3.2. In its Order concerning the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, the
Court took the view that "the essential characteristic of genocide is the intended destruction of a
'national, ethnical, racialor religious group"' and that "it tioesnot appear at the present stageofthe
proceedings that the bombings which fonn the subject of the Yugoslav Application 'indeed entai1
the element of intent, towards a group as such, required by the provision quoted above"' [Article2
of the Genocide Convention] (Legaliy of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion,I.C.J.Reports 1996,p. 240, para. 26). .
A dolus specialis is required for genocide: to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such (Article :2 of the Genocide Convention); The
Prosecutorv. GoranJelisic, ICTY, Judgment Trial Cl'hamber 1, 14 December 1999, Case
No. IT-95-10, para. 78; The ,Prosecutorv. Jean Paul Akayesu, ICT, judgment Trial Chamber I,
2 September 1998, CaseNo. ICTR-96-4,paras. 498, 517-522;TheProsecutor v. GeorgesAndersen18. Rutanganda, ICTR, Judgment Trial Chamber 1, 6 December 1999, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T,
para. 59; The Prosecutor v.AI+ed Musema,ICTR,judgment Trial Charnber I, 27Januaty 2000,
CaseNo.ICTR-96-13,para. 164.
3.3.In its Memorial, Serbia and Montenegro didnot shed any light onthisdolusspecialis.
Whilenot even establishing genocidal intentas a fact, it tries vaguelyto prove itbyinference
on the basis of the bombing of chemical plantsin Pancevo and the use of depleted uranium.
Allegation by inference means that Serbia and Montenegro does not propose to prove intent
directly. However,reasoningby inferenceisjustifiable only whenthe facts are conclusive. In the
present case, however, they are not conclusive at all. The chemical plants were targetsin
themselves, and the explanation for the use of depleted uranium lies in its amour-piercing
capabilities;1 use the term 'explanation',not 'justification'.oreover, the Federal Republicof
Yugoslavia makesno allegationof fact that would link Portugalwith the choiceof thesetargets and
the use ofthese weapons, in particular that Portugal approvedthe bombingof the chemicalplants
andthe use of depleted uranium - whichwouldbe untrue.
In paragraph 1.6.1.1 of the Memorial, Serbia and Montenegro asserts with regard to the
bombing of the chemical plants in Pancevothat "the responsible individualsof the Respondents
should have known that strikes against such facilities .may incur an additional risk to the
population. ..". But "should have known" amounts to an accusation of negligence, notto say
unthinking negligence, notof intent.
Moreover, Serbia and Montenegro itself acknowledgesthat there was no genocide at al1
before 10 June. We read in paragraph 3.2.16of the Memorial that before25 April 1999"The
disputed matter. .. was breach of the obligation not to use force against anotherState". In
paragraph 3.2.12, referring to events subsequentto 10 June 1999, Serbia and Montenegrostates
that "[tlhe disputearisingfromthe bombingmatured throughoutthe new disputed elements related
to responsibility of the Respondents forthe crime of genocide committedto Serbs and other non-
Albanian groups inthe area undercontrolof KFOR"; so"new", not "previous".
19 Thus, according to Serbia and Montenegro, genocide existed onlyafter 10 June- an
allegationwhich, let us be clear,is at they least far-fetchedand evenoffensive. 3.4. Further, we find no neferenceto alleged acts by Portugal. Serbia and Montenegro never
says that a Portuguese aircraft has bombed any target, or that a member of the Portuguese armed
forces has used depleted uranium or done anything whatever. This would not be possible anyway
when, as the Co-Agent has said, Portugal's contribution to NATO forces was limited to three
reconnaissance aircraft and their supporting personnel.
3.5. Serbia and Montenegro attributes the events after 10 June 1999 to Albanian separatists.
Even if these events were nol:the subject of a fresh dispute, for the dispute to fa11within the
provisions of Article 9 of the Genocide Convention, Serbia and Montenegro would have to show,
cumulativelyand with supporting facts:
(a) that these Albanian separatists were acting with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Serb
national group (which, incidentally, does not square Twiththe constant reference in paragraph
1.5.6of the Memorial to Serbsand other non-Albanian groups); and
(b) what Portugal's omissions were and what it could have done to prevent the Albanian
separatists' activities.
And yet Serbiaand Montenegromakes neither allegalion.
3.6. The allegations by Serbia and Montenegro, even if true - which they are not - and if
proved would never bear any relation to a genocidesituation.
As regards their connection with Article 9 of the Genocide Convention, the claims by Serbia
and Montenegro do not stand the test in the cases conceming Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide(1.C.J.Reports 1996, pp. 615-616,paras. 30
and 32) and OilPlatforms (1.C.J.Reports 1996,p. 810,para. 16). They do not even stand the tests
in Ambatielos (I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 18) and in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaraguav.UnitedStates of America (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 427, para. 81).
T'hearguments of Serbia and Montenegro are notplausible enough to bring them within the ambit
of Article 9 of the Genocide Convention;there is no reascvzableconnectionbetween the claims and
the Convention. B. Lack ofjurisdiction rationepersonae and ratione temporis
3.7. It is apparent from the records that Portugal did not become a party to the Genocide
Conventionuntil 10May 1999.The Portuguese Republic acquiredthe status of party by accession.
Contrary to what would happen in the event of a declaration of succession, accession has no
retroactive effectwhatever.
3.8. If the essentials of a dispute between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Portugal
that could be regardedn abstracto as a dispute as to genocide were present (which is not the case)
before 10May 1999,that dispute could only be a matter of customary law. There couldnever be a
dispute between Contracting Parties,to which Article 9 ofthe Convention refers, becausePortugal
was not such a party.
3.9. As a result, even if reference could be madeto a dispute relating to genocide and even if
it were possible toconvert a dispute covered by customary law into a dispute regarding the
interpretation, application and implementation of the Convention, the Court could never give a
ruling on events prior to 10May 1999with regardto Portugal.
Mr. President,still need about a quarter of an hour if 1continue, or is it time forthe break?
Le PRESIDENT :Le moment est venu d'observer une paused'une duréede dix minutes.
L'audience reprendra ensuite.
M. TELES :Merci infiniment.
The Courtadjournedfiom 4.40to 4.50p.m.
Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vous asseoir. Monsieur Teles, vous pouvez poursuivre la
présentationde votre plaidoirie.
M. GALVAO-TEL :ESerci, Monsieur le président.
IV LACK OFJURISDICTIONOF THE COURTORINADMISSIBILITY OF CLAIMS
BECAUSEOF THE MONETARYGOLDRULE
4.1. In its written pleadings, Portugal argued that the Court could not rule on the merits
according theMonetary Gold rule. Even if, as we have seen, there are other grounds prior to the latter whythe Court is unable to rule on the merits, the Portuguese Republic has a duty to explain
the argument set out inthe written pleadings in greater detail.
21 4.2. The claims of Serbia and Montenegro in the Application instituting proceedings and
reproduced in the Memorial al1relate to air attacks on the territory of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
As Serbia and Montenegro have asserted on several occasions, these air attacks were
launchedand conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Orgailization(see in particular para. 2.8.1.1.5
of the Memorial).1twas also throughNATO that Portugal contributed to KFOR.
4.3. As Portugal obsewed in its written pleadings (Preliminary Objections of the Portuguese
Republic, para. 131), NATO is an international organisation in the strict sense, with its own
international legalpersonality.
It has main bodies, including a supreme body,the North Atlantic Council, and subsidiaries,
among them the Secretary Gerieral (on whose orders Operation "Allied Force" was launched). It
has its own militas, structures, including the Militaqf Committee and, as regards Europe,
SACEUR.
It has the power to enter into treaties. For example NATO, represented by its Secretary
General, with its Member States, was a party to the FoundingAct on Mutual Relations,
Cooperationand Security beiweenNATOand the RussilznFederationof 27 May 1997 (NATO
On-line library, BasicTexts, http://www.nato.int).
4.4. Furthermore, the "Agreement on the status of NATO, National Representatives and
International Staff', signed in Ottawa on 20 September 1951 (among the easily accessible
publications, including theN,ATOOn-line Library), not only grants NATO a legal personality
(Art. IV), but also, like its staff and the representatives of'the Member States of the Organization,
grants it privileges and immunities in similar terms to those granted by the 1946United Nations
Convention on Privileges and immunities(UnitedNations, TreatySeries,Vol. 1,p. 15and Vol. 90,
p.327),to its staff and the representatives of the Member Statesto the United Nations.
Particularly noteworthy is Article XXV of the Ottawa Agreement, which states: "The
22
Council acting on behalf of the Organization may conclude with any Member State or States supplementary agreements modifyingthe provisions of the present Agreement, so far as that State
or those States are concerned".
4.5. As the Court asserted in relation to the "United Nations Convention on Privileges and
Immunities", "it is difficult to see how such a convention could operate except upon the
international plane and as behveen parties possessing international personality" (Reparation for
Injuries Sufferedin the Service of the UnitedNations, I.C.J.Reports 1949, p. 179).
4.6. As Professor Alain Pellet noted in an article he published,
"NATO is an international organization and, as such, possesses international legal
personality. While it is true that it is a somewhat special organization, whose
institutionalization has been empirical and gradual, it nevertheless has permanent
organs, has been assigned a mission of its own, and has legal capacity and privileges
and immunities, al1of which led the International Court of Justice, where the United
Nations is concemed, in its Opinion of 11April 1949 on Reparations for injuries
suffered in the Service of the United Nations, to conclude that the latter was an
'international personality'." ("L'imputabilité d'éventuels actes illicit-s
Responsabilitéde l'OTAN ou des Etats membres", Kosovo and the International
Community,Ed. Christian Tomuschat,Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002,p. 198.)
4.7.International legal personalityis a matter of objective reality.
In any event, the United Nations has recognized NATO as an international organization. In
this connection, Portugal refersto footnote 99 in its written pleading and to the annexes mentioned
therein.
Similarly, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia recognized NATO by adopting with it, on
15October 1998, the Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement (Ann. 39 of Portugal's written
pleading).
4.8. Bearing in mind this international personality and since, it is claimed, the bombing is
attributable to it,fthat bombing was unlawful (which Portugal does not concede), NATO would
have incurred international responsibility.
There is no question of discussing here whether Member States would have concurrent or
secondary responsibility if NATO's acts were unlawful. Portugal considers that, under current
23 international law, there is nothing that would make it responsible for NATO's acts, even if they
were unlawful. Be this as it may,the problem relates to the merits. What needs to be underlined is
that, even if concurrent responsibilityof Member States were accepted, that responsibility wouldpresupposeNATO's conduct being regarded as unlawful.Itwould bea matter of the responsibility
of the MemberStates byvirtue ofthe actsof an internationalorganization.
This meansthat the Court could never rule on Portugal's responsibility withoutfirst having
ruled on the legalityofNATO's conduct.
4.9. In 1954, the Court formulatedwhat is known as the Monetary Gold rule: it cannot
determinethe merits when the legalinterests ofa State whichhas not acceptedjurisdiction "would
not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision"
(MonetaryGold removedfi.om Rome in 1943,I.C.J. Reports1954,p. 32).
In 1992, the Court emphasized that, in the Monetaiy Gold case, "the determination of
Albania's responsibility wasa prerequisite for a decision to be taken on Italy's claims" (Certain
Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Preliniinary Objections, I.C..J.Reports 1992, p. 261, para. 55). The
criterion of theprerequisite was applied by the Court in the East Timor case: "in orderto decide
the claims of Portugal, it [the Court] would haveto rule.,as a prerequisite, on the lawfulness of
Indonesia's conductin the absence of that State'sconsent" (I.C.J.Reports 1995,p. 105,para. 35).
This has been the position taken by the International Court of Justice. If it upholds this
position, afortiori, it cannotrule on the meritsin the presentcase. To rule in the present case on
the claims of Serbia and Montenegro,it would as aprere*quisitehave to rule on the lawfulnessof
NATO's conductin the absence of the latter's consent. 'NATO's legal interests would constitute
the very objectof the decision
4.10. The fact that NATO is not a State alters nothing. The principle of consent to
jurisdiction is just asvalid for States as it is for any subject of international law constituted by
them. Furthermore, the Larsen-HawaiianKingdom arbitral award, although referring to a third
State, would regard the Monelaiy Goldrule as a general principle of public internationallaw, in a
caseto which two Stateswere not evenparties(Awardof 5February2001- www.pca-cpa.org).
The fact that international organizations cannotappearbefore the Court also altersnothing.
The Court is not opento Statesnot partiesto itsStatuteandwhich have notfulfilled the conditions
laid down by Security Councilresolution9 of 1946and, nevertheless,the Court is not able to rule
on the lawfulnessof their conduct. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent an international organization from giving its consentto
judgment being passedon a case, even if it is not party to the proceedings (providingthe Court, if it
so wishes, with information in accordance with Article 34, paragraph 2, of the Statute). In this
particular case,NATO has not given its consent.
4.11. Even if it were competent on other counts, the Court could therefore not rule on the
claims of Serbia and Montenegro.
V. NON-ADMISSIBILIT OYFTHE CLAIM RELATINGTO EVENTSAFTER 10JUNE 1999
5.1. In the submissions set out in its Memorial, Serbia and Montenegro added a claim
relating to acts subsequent to 10June 1999 (1lth conclusion), which was not included in the
Application introducing proceedings.
5.2. This claim was not implicit in the original claims, nor is it a development ofn
order to deal with it, the Court would have to consider aspects completely extraneous to the
original claims, both as regards the events-the activity of Albanian separatists, the action of
KFOR, etc.- the chronology and the law, for it is the new reliance on obligations which is at
stake, specifically that of preventing certain acts and of observing Security Council
resolution 1244(1999).
5.3. Moreover, there could not be any dispute regarding the events after 10June before the
filing of the Application. And, as we have seen, this is a new dispute, not a development of the
original dispute.
5.4. In accordance with its case law, expressed inter alia in its Judgment in the case
concerning Certain PhosphateLands in Nauru(I.C.J.Reports 1992, pp. 265-267, paras.63-71),
the Court cannotentertainthis new claim of Serbia and Montenegro.
25 Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your attention. This concludes the oral
argument of Portugal in the first round. Thank you.
Le PRESIDENT :Merci, Monsieur Teles. Ainsi s'achèvece premier tour de plaidoiries du
Portugal.
L'audienceest levéeà 17h 15.
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