Non-Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected 1 Translation
YUGONIT
CR 200431(traduction)
CR 200431(translation)
Mardi 20 avrilà212h 10
Tuesday20 April 2004 at.m. Le PRESIDENT :Je donne la paroleà M. Ivo Braguglia, agent d'Italie.
Mr. BRAGUGLIA:
Schemeof legal arguments
1.Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour for me to take the floor as Agent
of the Government of the Italian Republic in this sitting devoted to considering the Preliminary
Objections raised by my Government, in accordance with Article 79 of the Rules of Court, in the
case conceming the Legality ofUse ofForce initiated by the Application filed by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia on 29 April 1999.
2. 1shall note that the shortened name "Serbia and Montenegro" willbe the only one used
from now on in the Italian Govemment's statement,even though most of the facts and actions
which will be referred to occurred at a time when that name had not yet been adopted by the
Applicant.
3. Mr. President, Members of the Court, please allow me briefly to sketch out the structure
and content of the Italian Government's oral statement, which will be completed today by
Professors Leanza and Daniele.
4. Preliminarily, Italy wishes to point out that it is in agreement with most of the arguments
set out by the Agents and counsel of the other respondent States and, accordingly, will concentrate
on aspects which have not yet been dealt within full.
5. First, Italy refers to the Preliminary Objections raised in its Memorial of 3 July 2000.
Italy believes thatl1the arguments expounded in that document should be upheld by the Court,
especially after Serbia and Montenegro's Written Observations of 18December 2002 and the
28 February 2003 letter from its Agent.
6. However, further comments and observations would appear necessary to address the
radical change of attitude manifested by Serbia and Montenegro in the documents mentioned
above.
9 7. First, in the opinion of the Italian Government, thefacts related by Serbia and Montenegro
in those two documents are such that there can no longer be any doubt as to the merit of the PreliminaryObjections conceming the Court's lack ofjurisdiction rationepersonarum and ratione
materiae. The Italian Govemnient's oral statement will therefore first be devoted to considering
the Court's lack ofjurisdiction.
8. This examination will be structured so as to make clear, in particular, that this case is
different, and legally autonomous, from al1other cases nom appearing on the Court's List in which
Serbia andMontenegro is a respondent. Mr. Leanza,who will, with your permission, take the floor
after me, will elaborate onhese:lines of argument.
9. Secondly, Italy will concentrate on, and draw the Court's attention to, the legal
consequences deriving in the present case from the Observations submitted by Serbia and
Montenegro furtherto Italy's PireliminaryObjections.
10.The Italian Govemmc-ntconfesses its astonishment at the very unusual stance adopted by
Serbia and Montenegro in its Observations. Even if we refuse to see these Observations as
expressing an implied abandonment of claim- which the applicant Govemment does not
admit-, we can only point ciutthat Serbia and Montenegro did not even go to the trouble of
disputing, in any waywhatsoever, the PreliminaryObjections submittedby Italy.
11. On the contrary, Serbia and Montenegro confined itself to drawing the Court's attention
to facts- notably its admission to the United Natioris and its accession to the Genocide
Convention, which was acconlpanied by a reservation ta Article IX- which have the obvious
effect of reinforcing- and were perhaps intended toreinforce - Italy's Preliminary Objections in
respect of theCourt's lack ofjiirisdiction.
12.It is the Italian Government's view that this self-contradictoryattitude shows that there is
in truth no longer any dispute between Serbia and Montenegro and Italy and that, accordingly, the
conditions necessary for the exercise of the Court's high judicial functions are not met in the
current case. This part of thieItalian Govemment's argument will be set out by Mr. Daniele.
Mr. President,1now ask you to give the floorto Mr. Leanza and 1thank you.
10 Le PRESIDENT : Merci, M. Braguglia. Je donne maintenant la parole a M. le
professeur Leanza. Mr. LEANZA:
Reiteration of PreliminaryObjectionsNos. 1 and 4
13.Mr. President, Members of the Court, 1have the honour to devote my statement to the
four Preliminary Objections already raised in writing, which Italymaintains and confirms in their
entirety. First, the Italian Government will take the liberty of reiterating Preliminary Objections
Nos. 1and4.
14.Preliminary ObjectionNo. 1,conceming the inadmissibility of Serbia and Montenegro's
11th submission, should be sustained in full. In its 11th submission, Serbia and Montenegro
accuses Italy of acts which - given when and where they were allegedly committed, as well as
their nature and their perpetrators - are completely different from those forming the
subject-matter ofSerbia and Montenegro'sApplication andthus are not part of the samedispute. It
is therefore obvious that Serbia and Montenegro seeks, through its 11th submission, impermissibly
to broadenthe subject-matter of the Application.
15.Mr. President, Members of the Court, in respect of Objection No. 4, Italy will recall the
arguments raised in its Memorial to show that Serbia and Montenegro's submissions are
inadmissible intheir entirety.
16. Even assuming the Court were to conclude that it has jurisdiction in this case- which
Italy does not believe it will -the Court could notrender itsjudgment on the merits. Given that
the set of cases brought by Serbia and Montenegro concerns only a small number of NATO
member States, the Court would find itself requiredto judge acts that were also, and principally,
comrnitted by several other States which are not parties to the present case but whose position
would inevitablybe prejudged by a decision of the Court.
17.Further, even if al1the States which paAicipated in NATO's action in Yugoslavia were
subject to the judgrnent of the Court, the point of view from which the facts would need to be
ascertained would no doubt be determined by the basis of junsdiction found in each case. It
followsthat the same facts would be assessedby the Court sometimes in the light of the Genocide
Convention, sometimes from the viewpoint of the prohibitionon the use of armed force. Thus, the
action - obviously one designed and carried out as a unified whole - would likely be perceived by the Courtas less unitary, and possibly even as fragrnentary,and a true, reliable understanding of
it would therefore not be possible. This would prove to be a ground for inadmissibility which the
Court could notignore.
Restatementof Preliminary Objection No. 2 in the light of the Observations
of Serbia and Montenegro
18.Mr. President, Memb'ersof the Court, 1now tum to Preliminary Objection No. 2 relating
to the Court's lack ofjurisdictionrationepersonarum.
19. Referring to the arguments already set out in the Preliminary Objections, the Italian
Govemment wishes to bring to the Court's attention some considerations suggested by the facts
described by Serbia and Montenegro in its Observations of 28 February 2003 (sic) as "newly
discovered facts which have emerged since earlier pleadings were filed".
20.The fact that Serbia and Montenegro was admittedto the United Nations with effect from
1November 2000 proves coriclusively that, as Italy inaintained in its second Preliminary
Objection, it was not a party to theStatute of the Court when the Application was filed, i.e. on
29 April 1999.
21. On that date Serbia and Montenegro, not being a Member State of the United Nations,
was not a party to the Statute in accordance with Article 93, paragraph 1, of the United Nations
Charter, nor had it ever asked to become a party to the Statute under paragraph 2 of the said
Article,as a non-Member of the United Nations. Serbia alidMontenegro therefore wasnot entitled
to appear before theCourt under Article 35,paragraph 1,of the Statute.
22. Mr. President, Meinbers of the Court, the question is still whether the Court could
nevertheless regard itself as having jurisdiction ratione personarum pursuant to Article 35,
paragraph 2, because Serbia ;andMontenegro was allegedly a party to a "treaty in force" laying
downthejurisdiction of the Court.
12 23. In its second Preliminary Objection, the Italian Government set out a good many
arguments on this issue. In particular, Italy maintaincd that the mere presence of a clause
conferringjurisdiction in a treaty in force between twotiites,one of which, the Applicant, isnot at
the same time a party to the Statute, could not give thatState the right to appear before the Court, unless it met the conditions laid down by the SecurityCouncil in its resolution No. 9 of 15October
1946.This Serbia and Montenegro has not done, and does not claim ever to have done.
24. However, the issue thus summarized is no longer of any interest in the case now before
us, since Serbia and Montenegro - as it has stated in its observati-ns sent the United Nations
Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary, notification of accession to the Genocide
Convention, dated6 March 2001. This notification wasaccompanied by a reservation with regard
to ArticleIX excluding any compulsory jurisdiction ofthe Court.
25. In its Observations Serbia and Montenegrojustified the notification of accession as
follows: it "did not continue the personality and treatymembership of the former Yugoslavia, and
thus specifically, it was not bound by the Genocide Convention until it acceded to that Convention
(with a reservation to Article LX)in March 2001".
26. In the light of the intentions manifestedby Serbia and Montenegro, the notification of
accession-the unilateral nature of whichis well establishe- cannot but imply thataccordingto
Serbia andMontenegro even the Convention was not,when the Application was filed, a "treaty in
force" between theParties to the case within themeaning of Article 35, paragraph 2, ofthe Statute.
Consequently, according to the Applicant the Genocide Convention could not form a basis on
which the Court could found its jurisdiction ratione personarum in relation to Serbia and
Montenegro.
27. Neither can it be maintained, from the point of view of Serbia and Montenegro, that
Article IX acquired the status of a "treaty in force" between the Parties after the filing of the
Application, thus remedying the initial lack ofjurisdiction when the Court has to mle on the
preliminary objections.
13 28. Such a conclusion is at variance with the reservationentered by Serbia and Montenegro
to ArticleIX of the Genocide Convention,a reservation whichexcludes al1compulsoryjurisdiction
of the Court.Thus, and without having toconsider what the force of such a reservation would be,
Serbia andMontenegro implicitly but very clearly confirms that it does not consider that the Court
hasjurisdiction rationepersonarunz in this case.
29. Serbia and Montenegro inevitably comes to this conclusion, but does not Sayso openly.
Serbia and Montenegro- while fully convinced that the Court lacks jurisdiction ratione personarum, for the reasons given- does not Say so explicitly, perhaps out of concern for
consistency. Moreover, since this is a position shared bq-the Respondent and the Applicant, it
would be difficult for the Court not to take it into account.
Restatementof PreliminaryObjection No. 3 in light of the Observations
of Serbia and Montenegro
30. Mr. President, Merribers of the Court, as regards Preliminary Objection No. 3 the
opinions expressed by Serbia and Montenegro clearly demonstrate its profound conviction that the
Court also lacksjurisdictionrarionemaleriae.
31. Serbia and Montenegro admits that it was not bound by the Genocide Convention before
March 2001. In other words, according to the Applicani:Govemment, the Convention, and in
particular its Article, was n,otin force in relations between Serbia and Montenegro and Italy,
either when the events that arehesubject of the Application occurred or when the Application was
filed.
32. Still according to Serbia and Montenegro, the notification of accession to the Convention
in March 2001 did not operate to confer jurisdiction ratione materiae on the Court ex post facto.
As 1havejust said regarding Preliminary Objection No. 2,such a conclusion is at variance with the
reservation enteredby Serbia and Montenegro to ArticleIX of the Convention, a reservation which,
if it applies to the future, must be regarded as also applying to the past.
33. It follows that, as regards jurisdictionone mczteriae,Serbia and Montenegro also has
corne round - if not to the arguments put fonvard by Italy in support of its third Preliminary
Objection - at the very least to the conclusions that tht: Italian Government draws from them.
14 Exactly like Italy, Serbia and 1Montenegtnow takes the view that the Genocide Convention does
not constitute a basis on whic~hthe jurisdiction ratione nlateriae of the Court could be founded.
Moreover, this is in line withneCourt's conclusions,albeit prima facie, in its Order on Provisional
Measures of 2 June 1999.
34. In the light of the foiregoing,the Italian Govemnient asks the Court to set the final seal on
its provisional statement and so toeclare its lack ofjurisdiction under ArticIX of the Genocide
Convention as regards the dispute between Serbia andMontenegro and Italy. Specificity and legal autonomy of the present case in relation to any other dispute before
the Court concerning Serbiaand Montenegro as respondent
35. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Italy wishes to stress that the considerationsjust
setforth on the lack ofjurisdictionratione materiae would not be affected by the Court's Judgment
of 3 February 2003 on the Application for revision of the Judgment delivered in the case between
Bosnia Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. In the Italian Govemment's view, there are various reasons
for concludingthat, in this case, the Court shouldnot adhere to that precedent.
36. To begin with, that Judgment was delivered pursuant to Article 61 of the Statute on an
application for revision. The Court was called upon, not to settle legal matters directl- such as
the questions ofjurisdiction and admissibility submittedto the Court in the present case-but only
to Saywhether or not the party claiming revision had proved the existence "of some fact ofsuch a
nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgrnent'was given, unknown to the
Court and also to the party claimingrevision".
37. Second, in the above-mentionedJudgment,the Court avoided taking a definitiveposition
on whether Serbia and Montenegro in fact became a party to the Genocide Convention on its
accession to independence following the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. In fact, the Court simply refused to accept that Serbia and Montenegro's situation
with respect to the Convention could have been aitered. by the General Assembly resolution
admitting it to membership of the United Nations, or by the letter from the United Nations Legal
15 Counsel of 8 December 2000, calling upon Serbiaand Montenegro to undertake treaty actionswith
a view to completing its accession to the GenocideConvention.
38. Lastly, whereas in the case between it and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro
was acting as respondent and its interest was in getting the Court to declare that it did not have
jurisdiction, in this case the positions are reversedand one would expect Serbia and Montenegro,if
anything, to be concemed to convince the Court that it does havejurisdiction.
39. In fact, Serbia and Montenegro's position in relation to the time from which the
Genocide Convention began to produce its legaleffects with respect to it cannot be seen as merely
a defence tactic. On the contrary, Serbia and Montenegro is expressing a genuine conviction: it
does not consider itself party to the Convention before March 2001. It would be somewhat difficult for the Court not to take account of the conviction expressed by Serbia and Montenegro
with respect to the applicant but:not the respondent.
40. In conclusion, in the view of the Italian Govemment, the Court is at liberty to rule as it
chooses on Jtaly's second and third Preliminary Objection. However, the Court should not
overlook the fact that thestwal Objections now correspond to Serbia and Montenegro's stance on
the GenocideConvention.
41. Mr. President, Members of the Court, in the view of the Italian Govemment, if the Court
were to decide not to take account of Serbia and Montenegro's position on its situation regarding
the Genocide Convention, it nnight, as a prerequisite, have to rule on two of the most fiercely
debated issues in modem treaty law.
42. The former consists :inestablishing how and when a State resulting fiom the dissolution
of a predecessorStatebecomes party to the multilateral treritiesby which the predecessor State was
bound. The second question irelates to the legal validity of a reservation made by a State after
becoming party to the intemational treaty concemed.
43. These are two very tricky matters, whose solution would require detailed discussion,
which would notbe particularly appropriate at this phase irithe proceedings, dealingsolely with the
preliminary objections. However, according to the Italian Govemment, the Court could and
perhaps should avoid any consuderation of such questions.
16 44. In fact, the Observations made by Serbia and Montenegro on the preliminaryobjections,
and the letter from its Agent on 28 February 2003 raise a question which the Court must consider
as a preliminary, prior to any question relating to its owi jurisdiction or the admissibility of the
Application. To set out our arguments on this aspect of the question, may 1ask you, Mr. President,
to give the floorto Mr. Daniele.
Le PRESIDENT :Merci, Monsieur le professeur L.eanza. Je donne maintenant la parole à
M. le professeur Luigi Daniele. Mr. DANIELE:
The dispute is without object
45. Mr. President, Members of the Court, as Mr. Leanza has just said, 1will be addressing a
single question. But it is certainly a very important question to which the Italian Govemment
attaches greatimportance; a question that the ItalianGovemment regards as a wholly preliminary
matter, which needs to be examined in lirnine litis, that is to Saybefore tuming to the issues of
jurisdiction and admissibility raised by the present case. The question is: can a dispute, under
Article 38,paragraph 1, of the Statute, between Serbiaand Montenegro on the one hand, and Italy
on the other seriously be considered to exist now? And ifthere is such a dispute, does it still have
an object?
46. According to a well-established principle of itsjurisprudence, for the Court to exercise
itsjudicial functions, there must be a dispute between the parties to the proceedings.
47. Confining myself to the best known precedents, 1 would first cite the Judgrnent of
21December 1962 on Preliminary Objections in the cases concerning South West Africa
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1962,
p. 319,para. 328). There the Court acknowledged that theexistence of the dispute is a question of
an entirely preliminary nature, which the Court should thus consider before even addressing
questionsconceming its jurisdiction or the admissibilityof the application. It was by virtue of that
principle that the Court, before examining the preliminary objections to its jurisdiction raised by
South Africa, considered that it was "necessary to decide a preliminary question relating to the
existenceof the dispute which is the subject of the Application".
48. This principle was reiterated in the Nuclear Tests cases, between Australia and
NewZealand on the one hand, and France on the oiher. In the Judgrnents of 20 December 1974
(IC.J. Reports 1974, pp. 253 and 260, para. 24, and pp. 457 and 463, para. 24), the Court found
that it had"first to examine a question which it finds to be essentially preliminary, namely the
existence of a dispute, for, whether or not the Court has jurisdiction in the present case, the
resolutionof that question could exert a decisive influenceon the continuation of the proceedings". 49. The Court's jurisprudence is also very clear on the necessity for the dispute to exist not
only when the application is filed, but also when the judgrnent is delivered. In the Judgment of
2 December 1963 (case conceming Northern Camerootzs (Cameroons v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections,I.C.J. Reports 1963,p. 15,paras. 33-34), after recalling that "the function
of the Court is to state the I;iw", the Court ruled that "it may pronounce judgment only in
connection with concrete cases where there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual
controversyinvolving a conflict of legal interests between the parties".
50. The principle concennedhere has been reiterated in a number of decisions, even recent
ones. 1shall only instance the Judgment of 14February 2!002,in the case concerning the Arrest
Warrantof 11April 2000 (DevnocraticRepublic of the Congo v. Belgium) (para. 32). The Court
then had occasion to state that, accordingto itsjurisprudence, "events occurring subsequentto the
filing of an application may reriderthe application without object such that the Court is not called
upon to give adecision thereon".
51.The Court's jurisprudence also shows clearly thit the disappearance of the object of the
dispute could depend on events arising from the conduct of the parties or of any one of the parties.
In the Judgments on the above-mentioned Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France)
(New Zealand v. France), the Court- after interpreting tlie declarations of the French authorities
as representing an undertaking;to refrain fiom any further atmospheric nuclear tests in the South
Pacific- concluded that "the objective of the Applicant has in effect been accomplished"
18 (paras. 52 and 55) and that "the object of the claim havinp clearly disappeared, there is nothing on
which to givejudgrnent" (parais.59and 62).
52. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Italian Govemment considers this
jurisprudence decisive in the present case.
53. Italydoes not seek itodispute the fact that, when the Application was filed, there was a
real dispute between Serbia and Montenegro and Italy. That dispute concerned aspects of Italy's
participation in the NATO action known as "Allied Force".
54. According to Serbia.and Montenegro, during that action, genocidal acts were cornrnitted
on its territory and against its population. Again according to Serbia and Montenegro, Italy, by participating in that action, breached the rights belonging to Serbia and Montenegro as party to the
Genocide Convention. Whencejurisdiction of the Courtunder Article IX of that Convention.
55.For its part, the Italian Govemment has always firmlydismissed the allegationsof Serbia
and Montenegro, both at the provisional measures stage and thereafter, raising the Preliminary
Objections on which the Court is now called upon to rule. in particular, 1would refer to the third
PreliminaryObjection, whereby - as Mr. Leanza hasjust recalled - Italy contended thatthe acts
formingthe object ofthe Application of Serbia andMontenegrodefinitely did not constitute acts of
genocide and therefore do not faIlwithin the Court'sjurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide
Convention.
56. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the question is now whether there is currently -
i.e.,when the Court is called upon to rule on the Preliminary Objections- a dispute between
Serbia and Montenegro and Italy, or if, since the Application was filed, either the dispute has
become mootor its object has disappeared.
57. Now, the view expressed by Serbia and Montenegro, first in its Written Observations in
response to Italy's Preliminary Objectionsand subsequentlyreiterated and confirmedin its Agent's
19 letter of 28 February 2003, proves - in the opinion of the ItalianGovernment - that the dispute
which constitutedthe object of the Application of Serbia and Montenegro has indeed disappeared
and has becomemoot.
58. For in those two documents, Serbia and Montenegro has radically altered its position
vis-à-vis theGenocide Convention. 1would venture to point outat this juncture that, in the context
of these proceedings, the Genocide Convention constitutes the true central core around which the
entire case has developed. First, as the Court stated in its Provisional Measures Order of 2 June
1999 (paras. 28 et seq.), ArticlIX of the Convention is the only possible legal basis on which the
'
jurisdiction of the Courtcould be founded. Secondly,sincethe Court'sjurisdiction relates solelyto
ArticleIX of the Convention, Serbia and Montenegrocannot, in the present case, raise any other
complaint againstItaly than the violation of the rights that Serbia and Montenegro seeks to derive
fromthat Convention.
59. However, Serbia and Montenegro is now saying that it only became a party to the
Convention by virtue of its notice of accession in March 2001. That statement, reiterated twice,inalmost identical terms, necessariilyleads to two conclusions. First, according to the current position
of Serbia and Montenegro, it was not a party to the Convention either when the acts forming the
subject-matter of the Application occurred (i.e., between 24 March and 10June 1999, the date
when the NATO action ceased), or, obviously, when the Application was filed, on 29 April 1999.
Secondly, and as a result, Serbia and Montenegro acknowledges that prior to 2001 it did not
possess any right or legalinterest arising from the Convention. Thus it was not entitled to invoke
any right orinterest based on that instrument, which Italy, by taking part in the NATO action, could
haveviolated and which could therefore have fallen within the Court'sjurisdiction under Article IX
of the Convention.
60. The new position aclopted by Serbia and Montenegro conceming its accession to the
Convention - constmed according to the principle of good faith, a principle which should always
governrelations between States, especially when they areparties to a case before the Court - can
only mean one thing: Serbia and Montenegro acknowledges, albeit implicitly, that it possesses no
legal interest under the Converition on which it could rely as against Italy, and of which a breach
could fa11within the Court's jui-isdictionunder Article IX of the Convention.
61. Mr. President, Members of the Court, there is thcrefore no doubt that, at this stage in the
proceedings, the dispute has indeed disappeared. Not only does Serbia and Montenegro, like Italy,
consider that the Court lacks jurisdiction, but also- and above al1- Serbia and Montenegro, like
Italy, considers that, in the present case, there is no questio-nof any Convention-based legal interest
which Serbia and Montenegro irouldclaim has been violated.
In other words, this is not simply a situation where. as a number of respondent States have
already contended yesterday and this moming, the two Parties to the proceedings have finally
reached agreement on the issue of jurisdiction and now consider that the Court's decision on this
issue should be negative. Here, it is the very object of the Application - the very object of the
substantive questions raised in the Application, that is to Say the treaty right of Serbia and
Montenegro, that Italy is said to have breached. That treaty right, according to the current position
of the Applicant, did not exist and, logically speaking, couldnot have been breached by Italy nor,
intruth, by any other State having taken part in the NATO action. 62. It is true that Serbia and Montenegro reaches this conclusion because it does not regard
itself as bound by the Convention prior to March 2001, whereas Italy has always firmly stated that
it never violated that Convention. This difference in the line of argument does not detract from the
conclusion that, as a result of the new position adopted by Serbia and Montenegro, any conflict of
legal interestswith the Italian Republichas disappeared.
63. Admittedly, Serbia and Montenegro has not adopted an explicit position in this respect.
In the Observations it presented in response to the Preliminary Objections, the Applicant simply
asserted that it did not become a party to the Convention until March2001 and requested the Court
to decide on its jurisdiction in the light of that situation. However, as the Court found in the
Judgrnents conceming the Nuclear Testscases (paras. 29 and 30), it is "the Court's duty to isolate
the real issue in the case and to identifi the object of the claim". It went on to state that "it has
never been contested that the Court is entitled to interpret the submissions of the Parties, and in fact
is bound to do so", this being "one of the attributes of itsjudicial functions".
64. In the present case, there is no doubt that it is for the Court to interpret the Observations
presented by Serbia and Montenegro in response to the Preliminary Objections, as well as its
Agent's letter of 28 February 2003. In the opinion of the Italian Govemment, the Court should
regard the statements contained in those documents, if not as an implicit notice of
discontinuance - which, as we have seen, Serbia and Montenegro does not admit- at least as an
admissionthat there is no longer anyconflict of legal interests between the Parties. As a result, any
decisionthat the Court may render on this case would settlequestions that are totally divorced from
the reality, as was the case with the questions arising in the Northern Cameroons case (p. 33), or
with questions that remain in abstracto, such as the questions raised in the Nuclear Testscases
(paras. 59 and 62).
Submissions
65. Mr.President, Members of the Court, for the reasons 1 have just set out, the Italian
Government requests the Court to find that no decision is called for on the Application of Serbia
and Montenegro, since the dispute between Serbia and Montenegro and Italy has become mootor
its object has disappeared. Further, and in the alternative, Italy would refer to the submissions setout in its Preliminary Objectioris. This concludes the statt:ment of the Italian Government and 1
thank you for your attention.
Le PRESIDENT : Je vou,sremercie, Monsieur le professeur. Ceci met un terme au premier
tour de plaidoiries de l'Italie.
La Cour reprendra ses travaux demain matin à 10heures pour entendre le premier tour de
plaidoiries de la Serbie etMontcinégro.
La séance estàprésent levée.
L'audience estlevée à 13lleures.
Translation