Non- Corrigé Traduction
Uncorrected Translation
l
CR2000/15(traduction)
CR2000/15(translation)
Mercredi 14in 2000
Wednesday 14June2000008 The PRESIDENT :Pleasebe seated. The Sittingis open,etje donne laparoàM. Reisman
aunom de 1'Etatde Bahreïn.
LES QUESTIONS MARITIMES
PREMIÈRE PARTIE
38. Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour. La Cour se
souvient qu'avant lasuspensionde l'audiencehier soir,j'étaisen train de m'acquitterde ma tâche
quiconsistaitàdécrirela géographie physiqueet la qualificationjuridique de cette géographie aux
fins d'une délimitation maritime. J'avais examiné rapidementle fait que Bahrein est un Etat
pluri-insulaireou un archipelefacto, par opposition à Qatar quiest un Etat continental. Et j'ai
indiqué quela ligne de côte d'un Etat pluri-insulaireou d'unEtatarchipel est le péexterne
établid'après la laisse de basse mer, ce qui avait imposéde dénombrer les îleset les autres
formationsmaritimesdontil faut tenir compte parceque ce sontles points debàsutiliserpour la
délimitationentreBahreïn et Qatar. La Cour se souviendraquej'ai tout d'abord examiFasht al
Azm et quej'ai démontré e,n me fondantsur les preuves scientifiquesqui ontprésentéeest qui
n'ontpas étécontestées,queFasht aAzmfaitpartie de l'îledeSitrah. J'aiattiré ensuitel'attention
de la Cour sur Qit'ataradah et j'ai montré, enme fondant encore sur des preuves scientifiques,
que Qit'at Jaradah remplissait les conditions énoncéesà l'article 121, paragraphe 1, de la
conventionde 1982et est égalementuneîle. Enraison de sonstatut d'île, nous avonscommencéà
examiner le haut-fond découvrant deFasht ad Dibal qui, vous vous en souvenez, se trouve à
2'08milles del'îlede Qit'atJaradah.
A la fin del'audience,je vous aidonnélectured'unelettreque l'agent politiqueadressaiten
1946aux deux souverains en leur demandant dedire si, leuravis, ils possédaient Fashtad Dibal
et, dans l'affirmative, sur quoi ils se fondaient.La réponsedes deux souverains, sur le plan de
l'argumentation juridique, a étéconformeà la position adoptéepar ces Etats depuis plusieurs
dizaines d'années.Ce qui étaitparticulièrementimportantmon sens, ai-jedit, c'est que les deux
souverains, tout comme l'agent politique,raisonnaient en se fondant sur l'hypothèse quele
haut-fond découvrant se prêtait à l'exercice de la souveraineté et que les conditions de -3-
l'établissement de cette souveraineté seraient lesfondements habituels de la souveraineté
territoriale. Il s'agissait en quelque sorte d'une hypothèsecommune et partagée, en sommeune
espèce d'hypothèserégionale. Sur la foi de cesréponses, l'agentpolitique a conclu que Bahreïn
avait enfaitdroità Fashtad Dibal. Ce documentimportantfigure égalementdansvotre dossier 1.
39. Hormis les activitésrelevant de l'exercice dela souveraineté menées surcertaines
formations maritimes et indiquant que la souverainetéy est exercée,activités qui commencent
en 1938,(lorsque la BAPCO a cherché à obtenir de Bahreïn l'extension de la superficie de ses
concessionspétrolières),toute la zone maritime située entlaplus grande île de Bahreïn et Qatar a
fait l'objetde relevéset de nombreuses formations maritimesont étémarquéessous une formeou
une autre aux fins de la sécuritéde la navigation et de l'établissement de cartes. En
1950 - j'insiste sur cette date de 195- la BAPCO a signaléau souverain de Bahreïn qu'elle
avait effectuédes relevésjusqu'à la laisse de bassemer au large de la côte de Qatar. Les activités
de la BAPCOavaientété autorisée psar Bahreïn. Ellesavaientété effectuéesau grandjour et Qatar
devait enavoir connaissance. Pourtant, aucune protestationn'a étéenregistrée.D'ailleurs,lorsque
PCL, la société pétrolièredont l'action était soumiseau contrôle de Qatar, a décidéen 1940de
placer des repères de navigation sur, 'parexemple, Tighaylib,Mashtan et Janan, elle a demandé
l'autorisationde Bahreïn.
40. Qatar, encore unefois pour éviter d'avoir àproduire des preuves d'effectivités etbien
que son souverain ait admis qu'il étaitpossible, pour dire qui était propriétaire dehauts-fonds
découvrants,de se fondersur des principes territoriaux, soutienà présentque la souveraineté sur
cette zone est régienon par desprincipes territoriauxmais par le droit de la mer, dans la version
que Qatarpropose et quiinnove.
41. Tout comme ce fUtle caspour Qit'atJaradah, Bahreïn exerce depuisfort longtempsson
autoritésur Fasht adDibal. Ici aussi, je me bornerai à résumerles faits, ces effectivitésétant
exposéesen détaildans les écritures. La souveraineté de Bahreïn s'est manifestéede la manière
suivante:
1
Lettre du 18 janvier 1947 du résident politique britanniqueau secrétaired'Etat pour les Indes, annexe344,
vol. 6,p. 1480. 2
- des opérationsde relevé et l'octroideconcessionspétrolières ;
3
- la constructionde cairns ;
4
- la constructiond'un puits artésien ;
5
- l'octroi delicencespour la mise en placede pièges à poissonspermanents ;
6
- la solutionapportéeàdesproblèmesdenavigation dansle secteur ;
7
- l'assistance fournielorsde situationsd'urgenceenmer ; et
- les patrouillesdes garde-côtesde Bahreïndans le secteur 8.
42. Qatar n'a, quant à lui, pas apporté lamoindrp ereuve de ses propres effectivités sur
Fasht ad Dibal. Sans le vouloir peut-être, il a toutefoisfourni de multiples preuves des
manifestations de la souverainetéde Bahreïn, tout en critiquant l'importance juridique de ces
effectivités. Qatarconteste la pertinencejuridique des balises et des puits construitspar Bahreïn.
Comme je l'ai expliquéau sujet de Qit'at Jaradah, il s'agit bien là de manifestations de
souveraineté. A tout le moins, si le Royaume-Uni a désigné Bahreïe nt non Qatar pour érigeret
entretenir les balises, c'est qu'à sesyeux,1'Etatqui étaitappelé à le faire était Bahreïn,puisqu'il
étaitle seul Etat actif dans la région. De même,Qatar conteste la pertinence du forage par la
BAPCO d'unpuits artésiensur Fasht ad Dibal en 1940,mais omet dedire que la BAPCOagissait
en vertu de la concession accordée par Bahreïn un mois auparavant. Qatarnie par ailleurs que
Fasht ad Dibal soit utiliséexclusivement pardes bateauxbahreeinitesou que Bahreïn y assure seul
les contrôles opéréspar les garde-côtes, mais Qatar n'apporte aucune preuve à l'appui de ces
affirmations.
2
MémoiredeBahreïn.,par. 576.
3
Ibidpar. 586.
4
Ibidpar. 584et 586.
5
Ibidpa,. 577.
6
Ibidpa,. 577-579.
7
Ibidpa,. 577a579.
8
Ibidpa,. 598et 599, rapportdes garde-côtesde Bahreïn, annexe 24,vol.a151. 148 C.Janan
43. Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, l'illustration qui apparaît
maintenant à l'écran présenteI'île de Janan. Qatar fonde sa revendication sur Janansur cinq
motifs. Le premieret le deuxièmesont la proximitéet la géomorphologie.La proximitén'est pas
un fondement detitre de souverainetéen droit international, comme l'a démontré sir Elihu. En
réalitéi,l y a proximitéentreJananet les îles Hawar,et la souverainetésur les îles Hawar revienta
Bahreïn. Quantàlarevendicationfondéesur lagéomorphologie,commel'a fait observersir Elihu,
la géomorphologiede toute cette région- y compris l'Arabie saoudite et l'Ira- est la même.
En troisième lieu, Qatar a invoquédes documents qui visent à prouver une reconnaissance
diplomatique dela souverainetéde Qatar sur Janan. Ces documents onttous été dénoncéc somme
étantdes faux et ont étretirés. En quatrièmelieu, Qatar prétendpouvoir bénéficier la doctrine
Huber qui s'applique aux différentescomposantesd'un archipel, de telle sorte que, si Qatar a la
souveraineté sur lesîles Hawar, il l'aaussi surJanan. Bahreïn souscritau principe exprimédansla
doctrine Huber mais fait observer que les revendications de souverainetéde Qatar sur les îles
O 11 Hawar qui seraientutiles pour l'applicationde la doctrine Huber sontfondéesentièrementsur des
faux qui sont désormais retirés de l'affaire. Enfin,dernier motif, Qatar soutient que la
Grande-Bretagne aaccordéJanan à Qatar dans la lettre de 1947. Bahreïn rejette cette thèse. Le
dossier montre que la sentence de 1939 reconnaissait la souveraineté de Bahreïn sranan parce
que celle-ci faisaitpartie intégrantedesîles Hawar. Janan figuraitsur la listedes îlesque Bahreïn a
soumiseau gouvernementbritannique. Janan aété considéré cemmefaisantpartiedesîles Hawar
lors desnégociationsrelativesaux concessionspétrolièresdes annéestrente.Bahreina installédes
balises sur Janan en 1939,suità la décisionde 1939 , etc.Dans les annéesquarante,un certain
nombre de communications britanniques peu cohérentes ont traitéde Janan de manière
contradictoire. Dans son contre-mémoire, Bahreïn a passé ces communications en revue pour
démontrer quel'on peut facilementreplacer dans leur contexte les divergences d'objectifs et les
confusions souventcompréhensiblesconcernant les îles du groupe de Hawar 1. En tout étatde
cause, même lesfonctionnaires britanniques ont accepté le caractèredéfinitif del'arbitrage
9
Voir réplide Bahreïnp.6 et7.
IO
Contre-mémoirde Bahreïn,p. 130a 151.de 1939. Bahreïn défend devantla Cour l'idéeque cet arbitrage,qui a établila souverainetéde
Bahreïn sur les îles Hawar, s'étendait à Janan. Bahreïn se permet de faire observer qu'ilserait
extraordinairement dommageable de démembrerl'archipel des îles Hawar et d'attribuer à Qatar
une de ses composantes qui fait partie intégrantede l'archipel, à savoir Janan, essentiellement,
comme l'a dit M. Volterra, commeunprix de consolationautermede la présenteprocédure.
D.Les effectivités
44. La Cour voit icilesnombreusesautresîles qui fontpartiede Bahreïn. Bahreïn aun droit
sur ces îles, non seulement en raison des effectivitésqu'ila démontréesmais aussi parce qu'elles
font partie du système plun-insulaire,c'est-à-dire del'archipelqui constitue son territoirece sont
ses ((formations naturelles)). Les nombreuses îles qui composent l'archipel ou les archipels
constituent,comme le veut lanature même de l'archipel,un ensembleou, pour utiliser l'expression
dujuge Huber, «un groupe)). Par conséquent,outreles effectivitésque Bahreïn aétabliesen ce qui
concerne lesîles et les autresformationsmaritimes,le statut d'archipelde Bahreïnne le fait-il pas
bénéficierd'une présomption ancienne, applicableaux archipels en général,exprimée ausiècle
précédentpar le juge Huber dans l'affaire de l'Ile de Palmas? «Pour ce qui est des groupes
d'îles)),a dit lejuge Huber,«il est possiblequ'un archipelpuisse, dans certainscas, être regardé en
11
droit commeune unité,et quele sort de lapartieprincipaledécidedu reste)) . C'estla raison pour
laquelle la Cour, dans l'affaire des Minquiers et des Ecréhous, ajugé superflu de rendre une
décisionformelledistincte concernantchacundesîlots et chacundesrochers maisa choiside «dire
d'une manièregénérale à laquelledes Parties appartient la souverainetsur chaque groupedans son
ensemble)) 1.
45. Le célèbredictum de M.Huber nous amène maintenant au problème générad les
hauts-fonds découvrants. Bahreïn a montré,en apportant la preuve de multiples effectivités
manifestes, qu'il possédaitun titre sur les hauts-fonds découvrants. Si la souverainetésur ces *
formations maritimes revient à Bahreïn, c'est qu'elles font partie des formations maritimes de
l'archipel. Bahreïn ayant démontrée ,n apportant la preuve d'effectivités, qu'iljouissait d'une
IIRevuegénéraldee droit international public,1935,p. 183.
12
Minquierset Ecréhous, rrét,1J.Recuei1953,p.53.souverainetésur les principales formationsmaritimes,il est dispensé,en vertu de lajurisprudence
établiepar les précédentsde l'lle de Palmas et des Minquiers et Ecréhous,de démontrer qu'il
exerce un contrôle de niveau comparable sur lesîlots et rochersplus petits pour faire reconnaître
son titre sur ces derniers. Le titre de Bahreïnest consolidépar lefait que le Royaume-Uni, en tant
que puissance régionale,a constamment reconnu la souverainetéde Bahreïn sur ces mêmes
formations maritimes. L'idée queces formations puissent appartenir à Qatar n'a jamais été
évoquée. Commel'a affirméle tnbunal saisi de l'arbitrage Erythrée/Yémen« ,la commune
renomméeest égalementun élémenitmportantpourla consolidationdu titre»13.A cet argument,le
conseil de Qatar opposed'unton plaintifque «endécidanten 1947d'attribuer les droitssouverains
sur les hauts-fonds de Dibal et Qit'at Jaradah à Bahreïn, le Gouvernementbritannique paraît avoir
commis une erreur»14. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour,
peut-êtreest-ceQatarquisetrompe.
46. Dans tous les exemples d'effectivitéson trouve premièrement «une manifestation
délibéréd ee la souverainetéet de l'autoritésur le territoire par l'exercice de lajuridiction et de
fonctions étatiques»15 et, deuxièmement, une prise encompteducontexte et des circonstances. Ces
critèresont permis de faire régner,souplementmais systématiquement,l'étatde droit, sous une
formegénéraled ,ans unetrès largegammede situations géographiques et historiques.
47. Bahreïn, dans son mémoire, a apporté la preuve de l'exercice historique de sa
souverainetésur les formations insulaires16en invoquant notamment le témoignage d'anciens
marinsetpêcheurs(de perleset depoissons)deBahreïnet d'Arabie saoudite''.
l3Sentencearbitralede 1998entre I'Erythréeet leYémen,par. 516.
l4Contre-mémoirede Qatar, par. 6.19.
l5Sentencearbitralede 1998entre I'Erythréeet leYémen,par. 239.
l6Mémoirede Bahreïn,sections6.1A et6.2 B.
l7Voir les déclarationsd'Ibrahim bin Irhama Al Binali, annexe 15,vol. 2, p. 12;Ahmad bin MoharnadAl
Shayji,annexe 16,vol. 2, p. 12;Mohamadbin AbdallahAl Thawadi, annexe17,vol. 2, p. 129 ; Salehbin Abdallabin
Mohamad,annexe 18, vol. 2, p. 132; MubarakAhmad al Naaimi, annexe 18, vol. 2, p. 134 ;Mubarakbin SalrnanAl
Ghatam, annexe20, vol. 2, p. 136;Ali bin Ahmad ShaheenAl Dosari, annexe 21, vol.2, p. 13; Majedbin Abdallabin
Thamir AlDosari,annexe22, vol.2,p. 142 ;Abdallabin Ali binThamirAl Dosari,annexe23, vol.2,p. 144 ; Salimbin
Mohammed SalimAl-Omairi, annexe 26, vol. 2, p. 176 ;Khalil bin Ibrahim Al-Khaldi, annexe 27, vol2. , p. 179;
Abdullah bin Thazaa Al-Majdal, annexe 28, vol. 2, p. 182 ; Sulaiman bin Sagr bin Salman Al-MajdalAl-Khaldi,
annexe 29,vol.2, p. 184; Baderbin Mohammed Al-Majdal AI-Khaldi, annex3e0, vol. 2, p. 186 ;et Mubarakbin Saad,
annexe31,vol.2, p. 188(toutes cesdéclarationsfigurent dansla répliquede Bahreïn). 48. Dans son contre-mémoire,Qatar conteste six catégoriesd'actes de souveraineté
bahreïnites :l'érectionde balises ou de caims,les activitésdes compagniespétrolièresl ,'assistance
auxpêcheurs, l'usage exclusifdesfashts, la sécurité de lanavigation et les opérationsde police en
meret la pêchedesperles et des poissons. Soyonsclair :Qatarne contestepas la réalité des actes
bahreïnitesmais leurimpactjuridique. Dans son mémoire,Qatar examinedans le détaill'érection
par Bahreïn de balises et de caims sur les formationsmaritimes c~ntestées'~.Ces activités sont
bien connues. Qatar a reconnu qu'elles sont le fait des Bahreïniteset qu'il n'a jamais lui-même
jamais déployéd'activités analogues. Et sur le plan juridique, nos adversaires se contentent
d'affirmerqu'«iln'a jamais été admiq suede telsactes emportaientl'acquisitiondetenit~ires))'~.
49. Un Etat continentalpourrait ne pas attacher d'importanceparticulièreaux cairns et aux
balises. Pour les populations maritimes et archipélagiques,ces structures sont en revanchetrès
importantes :elles sontindispensables àlanavigationetparfoismême àla surviedesmarins. C'est
pourquoi, à tout le moins, l'érectionde baliseset de caims par Bahreïn(non imitépar Qatar sur ce
point)témoigned'unvif intérê ptour les formations maritimes. Dansl'affaire des Grisbadama, le
tribunala relevéque les effortset les fiais liéàce type d'activitésdémontraient la perception d'un
droitet d'un devodO. Qatar ne s'estmanifestementpas senti investidu droit ni du devoir d'établir
oud'entretenir dessystèmes d'aide à la navigationdanscette région.
50. Dans la même veine,le tribunal saiside l'affaireErythréeA'émen déclare,au sujet des
pharesyéménitesq , ue leurconstructiona des«conséquences»
014 «La construction et l'entretien de phares en dehors de tous arrangements
conventionnels et pour une duréeindéteminéeentraînaient certaines conséquences.
L'acceptation de l'offredu Yémenne valait pas reconnaissance dela souverainetéde
celui-ci sur des îles. Mais elle valait acceptationdu fait que le Yémenétaitle mieux
placépour se charger del'établissementet de l'entretiende feuxdans ce secteur dela
mer Rouge et étaitdisposé à le faireet que, lorsqueviendraitfinalementle moment de
déterminer le statut de ces îles, le Yémen serait certainement une ((partie
intéressée».2'» [Traduction du Greffe.]
''Mémoirede Qatar,par6.41-6.45.
l9Contre-mémoirede Qatar,par6.21.
20Travaux dela CPA1921,p.135.
21Sentence arbitrale1998entre1'Erythret le Yémen,par237. 51.Pour Bahreïn,le fait d'avoir, depuisdes dizainesd'années,établiet entretenudes balises
et des caims démontrequ'il accepte et assume les responsabilités maritimesd'un Etat archipel,
qu'il manifeste un intérêt constanp tour les formations maritimes en question, son sens des
responsabilitéset du devoiret qu'il exercesajuridiction en apportant son aide aux marins. Cette
action a d'autant plus d'importance que Qatar, pour sa part, n'a jamais établi ni entretenula
moindrede ces installations. Bahreïn conclut par conséquenqtue, de ce pointde vue, ces activités
constituentdes effectivitésdéterminantes.
52. S'agissant des activités exercéepar les compagniespétrolières,là encore, les faits ne
prêtentpas à controverse. Ce quin'empêche pas Qatar, dans son contre-mémoire,de soutenir que
lesdites activitésne constituent pasdes preuves d'actes de souveraineté^ M^ai. les activités
exercéessur un territoirepardes agentsprivés envertu de permisdélivrésparun Etat revendiquant
ce territoire,permis sanslesquels cesactivitésne pourraient pasêtremenéeslégalementdans 1'Etat
concerné,constituentbel et bien des manifestationsde souveraineté.Une fois de plus, Bahreïna
produitdespreuves de l'exercicedetelles activités,alors queQatarn'en a présentaucune.
53. Dans les manifestationsbahreïnites de souverainetéfigurentégalementcertains moyens
fournisaux pêcheurs(abstraction faitedes balises et caims dontj'ai déjà parlé), ainsi quesuits
forés parune compagniepétrolière en vertu d'une autorisationde Bahreïn oupar des ressortissants
bahreïnites utilisant les îles en cause. Je tiensire remarquer de nouveaul'absence d'activités
analoguesde la partde Qatar.
54. Quant à l'utilisation desfashts [hauts-fonds]par des bateaux bahreïnites, la question
n'estpas de savoir si les ressortissants d'autresEtats les utilisaientaussi,mais quel Etat exerçaitsa
compétencesur eux. Une fois de plus, Bahreïn a produit une masse d'éléments de preuve de
l'exercice de sa juridiction en matièrelégislative, réglementaiet administrative. A nouveau,
Qatar,lui,n'a rien présenté.
E.Les bancsd'huîtres perlières
55. Monsieur leprésident, Madameet Messieursles Membresde la Cour,pour faire le point
juridique et géographique des revendicationserritorialesde Bahreïn, il fautégalements'intéresser
22Contre-mémoiredeQatar,par.6.29.0 1 5 aux bancs d'huîtresperlièreset voir l'effetqu'ils aurontsur la délimitationmaritime entreBahreïn
et Qatar. Lesbancs sont misen évidencesur la carte. Cettequestion a ététraitée aveu cnecertaine
dérision et nonpas examinéeau fond lors des plaidoiries de la semaine dernière. Elle mérite
mieux. Pour les Etats du Golfe, la pêchedes perles représentaitau XIX' sièclel'équivalentdu
pétrole aujourd'hui. Différents bancsrelevaient de Bahrein, d'Abou Dhabi et de Qatar en vertu
d'un usage traditionnelet étaientexploités principalementpar leurs flottes respectives, rejointes
occasionnellement par les bateaux d'autres tribus amies. En 1905, les jurisconsultes de la
Couronnebritanniqueont publiéun avisautorisant à fairevaloir des droitscoutumiersexclusifssur
les zones traditionnellesde pêche des perles23et ces droitsfurent reconnuspar un accord de 1911
mais soumis au contrôle de la résidencequi vérifiaitsi des concessions étaientaccordées à des
étrangersz4. Je penseque personne ne peut contester matériellementque les bancs particuliers
montréssur la carte étaientbahreïniteset non qatariens :Qatar possédaitd'autres bancsvers l'est,
ce qui expliqueprobablementl'emplacementde Doha.
56. Bahreïn soutientqu'en ce qui concerne l'acquisition dela souverainetésur les bancs, le
point essentielest de savoirsi le Gouvernementde Bahreïnexerçait une autoritéétatique exclusive
sur les Bahreïnites et les ressortissants étrangers qui travaillaientsur ces bancs. Qatar n'a fourni
aucune preuve indiquant qu'il exerçaitunejuridiction étatiquequelconquesur ces bancs d'huîtres
perlières.
57. M. Paulsson a déjàfait l'historiquede cette pêchedes perles et évoqué la manièredont
cette activité commença àdécliner dansles annéesvingtpour ne plus êtreaujourd'hui que tout à
fait insignifiante. Ce déclinmet-il fin pour autant à la souverainetéque Bahreïn a acquise
jusqu'alors? Qatar n'a produitaucunepreuve attestantdel'abandon de cesdroitspar Bahreïn. Au
contraire, Qatar sait que Bahrein n'a cesséde les revendiquer pendant toutesles négociations.
Lorsqu'un gisement de pétrole oude gaz est épuisé à Qatar et que la terre alentour n'est plus
exploitée et redevientdésertique, Qatar perd-ilpour autantla souverainetésur ce temtoire? Si tel
23
Rapportdesjurisconsultes Finlay etCarson,11février1905,mémoire deBahreïn,annexe321, vol.6, p. 1431.
24Lettredu lieutenant-colonelCox,résidentpolitique bràl'agent politiquebritannique,11juillet 1911,
mémoirede Bahreïn,annexe22,vol. 6,p. 1434-1435. n'est pas le cas, il n'y a aucuneraison pour que la souverbahreïnite ne soit pas reconnue sur
cesvieux bancsdepêcheperlière.
58. Monsieurle président,Madame et Messieurs les Membresde la Cour, Bahreïn soutient
quela délimitationentre Bahreïnet Qatar correspondune délimitation entun Etat continentalet
un Etat pluri-insulaire ou un archipel. Pour Bahreïn, les îles et les hauts-fonds découvrants
l'intérieurde l'archipel de fait bahreïnite sont bahreïnites,parce que Bahreïn y manifeste depuis
8 $6 très longtemps sa souverainetédans la mesure où le milieu, sur les formations maritimes en
question, se prêàel'habitathumain, parce queces formationsfont partie intégrantede l'archipel,
enfin parce qu'ellesfont aussil'objet d'uneunerenomméeàl'échelleinternationale.
Je vousremercie de votreattention. Monsieurle préside,e vous seraistrès obligéde bien
vouloir appelermaintenantàlabarre moncollègue,ProsperWeil,qui décriraendétail lesprincipes
juridiques régissantcette délimitation. Merci.
Le PRESIDENT :Mercibeaucoup, professeurReisman. 1now give the floor to Professor
Prosper Weil.
Mr. WEIL:
THE MARITIME DELIMITATIOP ROCESS
Mr. President,Membersofthe Court,
By wayof introduction,permit me to tell the Courthowhonoured1amto take the floor here
on the maritimeaspects of this case-a case in which the Courtwill make onemore contribution
to that edifice of the law of maritime delimitation which,judgment by judgment, it has been
constructingformore than 30years.
Permit me also tothank the Govemment of the State of Bahrain for the confidence it has
shownmeby instructingmeto defendinterestswhichare vitalfor its future.
Finally, permit me to address my respectful congratulations to the new Members of the
Court, itsnewPresidentanditsnew Vice-President.
1. Mr.President,Membersof the Court, thisis the firsttime in recent historythat the Court
finds itself faced directly with a problem of delimitation of the temtonala. The previouscases-from the North Sea ContinentalSheif cases in 1969 to the Jan Mayen case in
1993 - basicallyinvolved a delimitation ofthe continentalshelf,of fishery zonesor of exclusive
economiczones. Thistime, it is a delimitationof the territorialsea whichthe Courtis invited to
undertake, in the whole of the southern sector andin part of the northem sector';only in the
remainderof the northernsector will the boundaryto be drawn separatethe continental shelf and
the fisheryzonesofthetwo States.
2. This is indeeda "newlegal situation",to quoteQatar'swordsin its pleadings2,a situation
whichonly aroseinthecourseofthe proceedings. [Illustration.]WhenQatar filedits Application
in 1991, neither Bahrain nor Qatar claimed more than three nautical miles of territorial sea.
Betweenthe outer limitsof thetwo territorialseas,there extendedin 1991 a continental shelf and
high seaszone, andthis is the zone in whichthe single maritimeboundarythen envisagedwas to
run.In this zone,too, beyond the temtorialseas of the two countries,ran the line dividing the
subsoilresourceswhichwas envisagedby the Britishin 1947. Finally,in this samezonebeyond
the temtorial seas of the two countrieswere located thetwo features which arenow so strongly
contested: FashtadDibal and Qit'atJaradah. [Illustration.] Sincethe extensionof the territorial
sea to 12nautical miles decided on by Qatar in 1992 andby Bahrainin 1993, the geographical
context of the delimitationhas changed profoundly. For a large part of its course, the single
maritimeboundary will now run withinthe temtorial seasof the two States,that is toSay,through
the areawhere thetwotemtorial seasoverlap. Qit'atJaradah,whichatthe time theApplicationwas
filedlay outsidethetemtorial seasof thetwo States,isnowsituatedwithinboth Bahrain's12miles
of territorial seaand Qatar's 12milesof territorialsea. With regard toFasht adDibal,which was
alsooutsidethe temtorialseasof thetwoStateswhen theApplicationwasfiled,a smallpartofthis
featurenow lies withinQatar's temtorialsea, the remainder being less than 12nauticalmiles from
both theBahrainiislandof SitrahandtheBahrainiisland of Qit'atJaradah,that is to Say,withinthe
territorialsea of Bahrain.
3. The factthatthe delimitation tobe undertakenis essentiallya territorialseadelimitationis
one ofthe principal characteristicsof our case. The distanceswhichit involveshave nothingin
'~ounter-~emonalofBahrain,paras.457-461.
'~emonal of Qatar, aras.11.31.5-11.12. common with those which were involvedin previouscases. They arnountto only a few nautical
miles- in the present case adistanceof 10nauticalmilesseemsa considerableone; on a map,for
? 018 example, the HawarIslands appear to be far from themain island of Bahrain, whereas in reality
they are only Il nautical miles away from it. As we shall see, this aspect is not without legal
consequences.
4. The questionthus ariseswhether,and in whatway, the principles andmles governingthat
part of the courseof the maritime boundary whichseparates the territorial seas of the two States
differfiom thosegoveming the delimitation of the other maritime spaces.Without going intothe
detailsof its turbulenthistory, 1would simply observethat from the 1969Judgments in the North
SeaContinentalShelfcases onwards, the delimitation of maritimespaces other than the territorial
sea has been characterized by a prolonged descent into the horrors of the equidistance
method - faulted in every possible way, the victim ofa veritable witch-hunt which hasechoed
around this hall againand again. The delimitationofthe territorial sea,however, a delimitationby
proxirnity, aroused little passion, and no one considered questioning therule of customary law
which found expression in Article 12 of the 1958 Convention on the Tenitorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, a provision which was repeated word for word, more than 20 years later, in
Article 15 of the 1982 Conventionon the Law of the Sea - narnelya boundary "everypoint of
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the
temtorialseas ofeach of thetwo Statesis measured". The sole exceptionis "whereit is necessary
by reason of histonc title or other special circumstancesto delimit the temtorial seas of the two
Statesin a waywhichis at variancetherewith".
5. Thanksto the efforts of the CourtfromLibyaIMaltain 1985toJanMayenin 1993, little
by little the law on maritime delimitationrecoveredsome unity. Whateverthe maritime space to
be delimited, whateverthe applicable law is- customarylaw or treaty law- ,whether ornot a
singlemaritime boundaryis to be drawn,in every casethe delimitation process nowtakes place in
two stages, narnelya provisional equidistance line,followed by an adjustrnentof that line if the
circumstances require and justify such an adjustment3. Accordingly, throughout the single
para.467; Counter-Mernorolf Qatar,paras.,7.21, 7.28.tar,para.11.37. See Counter-Memonalof Bahrain, maritimeboundarywhich the Courtis requestedto determine, fiomsouth to north,it is, as the two
Parties agree, "proper to beginthe process of delimitationby a median line provisionallydrawn"
829 and, in the secondstage, if suchappearsnecessary,to take account of"circurnstanceswhichmight
modifythe result produced"-the Courtwill recognizethe expressionsit used inthe JanMayen
case4. It shouldbe added that betweenthe "special circumstances" oftemtonal sea delimitations
and continentalshelfdelimitationsgovemedby Article 6 of the1958Convention,on theone hand,
and the "relevant circumstances"of other delimitations the onlydifference is nowterminological:
in bothcases,asthe Courtexplainedinthat case, thesearefacts"necessaryto betakeninto account
in the delimitationprocess"5. The two-stage processwas confîrmedin the recentEritreaffemen
ArbitralAward, inwhich the Tribunal statedthat it had takenas its fundamentalpoint of departure
that,asbetweenoppositecoasts,a medianlineobtains6.The Courthasundoubtedlystatedthatthis
unification of the rules goveming the delimitation process applies"at any rate in regard to a
delimitationbetween opposite coasts"". This precautionary language - which does not preclude
the extensionof the two-stage process to delimitationsbetweenadjacentcoasts - does not in any
case apply to temtonal sea delimitations,since the customaryrule in Article 15 of the 1982
Conventionexpresslystates,in black and white, thatit applies"wherethe coasts of two Statesare
oppositeor adjacentto each other".
6. Does this mean, Mr.President,that the delimitation ofthe temtorial sea has lost every
shed of independence,that al1its originalityby comparisonwiththe delimitationof other maritime
spacesis a thing of the past, andthat consequently thereis nothing todistinguishthe presentcase
from the earliercases decidedby the Court, which concemedthe delimitationof the continental
shelf, of fisheryzones and of exclusiveeconomic zones? Certainlynot. The Court observedin
1969thatthe distorting effect producedby a slight irregularityin a coastline or a small island off
the Coastis negligibleat a shortdistance fiom the coastline but becomes moremarkedthe Mer
4MaritimeDelimitation in the Area between Greenlandand JanMayen,I.C.J.Reports 1993, p. 62, paras.53
and55.
'~aritimeDelimitatiitheAreabetweenGreenlandandJanMayen, I.C. Reports 1993,p. 62,para.55.
%econdStage,para.83.
'~aritime DelimitationintheArea betweenGreenlandandJanMayen,I.C.J.Reports 1993,p. 58,para.46; cf.
p. 62,para.56. one goes fkomthe coast8; this observation remains correctand fully valid. As a result of it,
030
corrections- for example the half-effect or no effect - are confined to long-distance
delimitations,such as those of the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone, whereas
equidistance remains firmly therule for short-distancedelimitations,whichby their very nature is
whattemtorial sea delimitationsare. Nor should itbe forgottenthat, althoughtoday the customary
rule regardingthe delimitationof thetemtorial sea laiddown in Article 15 ofthe 1982 Convention
is based on what might be called the ordinary law of maritime delimitation,it nonetheless has
One temtorial sea
particular force because of its explicit and strongly asserted character.
delimitationis inevitablyand necessarilymore equidistantthan another, 1have to Say. Likewise,
the distinction between oppositecoasts and adjacent coasts, which has alreadybeen reduced to
virtual insignificancein delimitations of the continentalshelf and of fisheryzones and exclusive
economiczones, becomes totally irrelevantin a temtorial sea delimitationoncethe customary rule
in Article 15is declared applicablein al1geographicalsituations.
7. It is this customaryrule in Article 15which, in the present case, governsthe delimitation
over the major part of its course- the two Parties agreeon this point - andthis is the first time
the Courthas beencalleduponto apply thisrule in so specific amanner. 1would add that neither
Bahrainnor Qatararepartiesto anyof the four 1958Geneva Conventions,andalthough Bahrainis
a partyto the 1982UnitedNationsConventionon the Law ofthe Sea, Qatar, which hassignedbut
not ratifiedit, is not a party to it, and consequentlythecustomarylaw is applicable.
8. The Parties equally concur,and 1feel thispoint is extremely important,in believingthat
the principlesof contemporarylaw shouldgovernthe delimitation9.Accordingly,we mustrid this
case of considerationsand conceptswhereby this or that factor would acquirewhat the Court has
called,in regard to geologicalandgeophysical factors, "aplace which nowbelongsto thepast"'O.
021 9. 1would observein passingthat what is true of the delimitation of maritime spacesis, of
course, also true of the title of a State to the spaces adjacentto its coasts. 1find it dificult, for
example, to understand SirIan Sinclair's reasoning,the pretext for which is the theory of
orth tea ContinentalShelf;I.C.J.Reports1969,p. 18,para.8; p. 37,para.59; p.49,para.89.
9~emorialof Qatar,para.11.2; Counter-MernaflBahrain,paras4.64seq.
'O~ontinentalhelf(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Mal,.C.J.Reports1985,p. 36,para.40.inter-temporallaw, thattoday sovereigntyoverthe Hawar Islands shouldbe determinedin the light
of the rule in force between 1936and 1939,whereby the maximum breadth ofthe territorial sea
was three nauticalmiles. Every island, he said, which is wholly or partly within three nautical
miles of a State'sainland coast,is underthe sovereigntyof that State. With regard to the islands
situated beyondthe three nautical milesof the territorial seas it existedin the years 1936-1939,
but within 12nauticalmiles, SirIan continued, theyare under the sovereignty ofthe coastal State
by virtue of the so-called proximity principlecccompriscorrectement)) ["a psroperly understood"]
and the "porticodoctrine"". This reasoning,Mr. President,relies on conceptsand rules which are
totally a thing of the past. It is in the application and context of contemporary law and
contemporaryterminologythatthe maritime aspects of the present case mustbejudged, and not in
the light and applicationor contextof the law and terminologyof three quarters of a century ago.
Why,therefore,wouldthe Courtmakea findingin the year 2000fiom the standpointof the context
of the territorial sea of the30s? And conversely, whatis the relevance here, may 1ask, in the
contextof the 1930s,of the 12-milelimit oftheterritorialsea which datesfiom a much latertime?
10.This is not, 1hasten to Say,the only example of our opponents'misunderstandingof the
principle which they themselves rightly proclairn: that the maritime delimitation should be
undertaken by the Courtwithin the framework of present-day law. 1am thinking more especially
of the role they wishto see attributedto the 1947Britishline,whichgoesback to the time whenthe
law of the sea bore but a distant relationship to whatit is now.1shall have occasionto revert to
this.
11.Mr. President,it is whenthe two-stageoperation - on which,1repeat, the Partiesare at
one - has tobecomea realitythata gulfopensbetweenthem.
12.In the viewof Qatar,the delimitationprocess must beginwith a provisional equidistance
linedrawn accordingto what ouropponentscal1«la méthodede calculde masseterrestre à masse
terrestre))["the mainland-to-mainlandmethod"]12.This method, theyexplain,consistsin takuigno
account of land which is above water otherthanthe main island ofBahrain, on the one side, and
the peninsula of Qataron the other; in other words,in reasoningasthoughthe islandsand low-tide
''CR 200016pp.45-48, para23-28.
'2~ounter-~emorialf Qatar,231; Replyof Qatap. 332.elevations between the two did not exist: «la méthodede calcul de masse terrestre à masse
terrestre)),["the mainland-to-mainland method"],we read in Qatar's Reply, «ne prend pas en
compteles îles, îlots,rochers, récifet haut-fondsdécouvrants»["disregardsislands, islets, rocks,
reefsand low-tide ele~ations"]'~.In their undoubted awarenessof the fragilityof this method, our
opponents,the Court willhave noted, did notrepeatthe description «la méthode de calculde masse
terrestreà masseterrestre))["themainland-to-mainlandmethod"]in their oral presentation; evenif
the term has vanished, though, the argument has not altered onejot. The provisional equidistance
lineisdrawn firstfiom mainlandto mainland; Qatarthen departsfrom it in the second stageofthe
operationin orderto makethe maritime boundarycoincidewith the 1947Bntish line. It is only in
the extreme south and the extreme north that the coincidence ceases: in the south, because the
Britishline awardsthe HawarIslands to Bahrain, whichis obviously vexingto our opponents; in
thenorth because the British line stops atpoint BLV and therefore requiresto be completed. Yet
thesetwo segments, exceptfor the maritime boundary requestedby Qatar,coincide preciselywith
the 1947British line. [Illustration.] The description of a two-stage delimitation procesiss purely
anillusion. Contrarytowhat Ouropponentswouldhave us believe,the boundary claimedby Qatar
is not the result of an adjustment of theinitial equidistanceline made for reasons of equity; in
actualfact, it has noconnectionwiththe initial equidistance line. The lineclaimedby Qatarwould
havebeen exactlythe sarnewithoutgoingthroughthe provisionalstage of an equidistance line,and
this pointless detour is, no doubt, attributableto Qatar'swish to present to the Court an operation
whichhas the guiseof legal rectitude. Tothis pointtoo 1shallhave occasionto revert.
13. With the maritime boundary alongthe 1947Bntish line thus fixed, Qatar then requests
the Court to award the above-waterfeatures situated between the western coast of Qatar and the
eastem coast of the main islandof Bahrain - of which no account had been taken previously -
accordingto whether they lie to the east or the west of that boundary. In paragraph 7.41 of its
Reply,Qatar writesas follows:
(([Qatar] revendique la souveraineté sur toutesles îles, îlots, récifs et
hauts-fondsdécouvrants. .. qui sont situésà l'est dela ligne délimitantles mers
territoriales respectives desdeuxEtats. S'ilsrelèventde la souverainetéde Qatar,ce
n'estpas parce qu'ilsfournissentunejustification auxfins de la délimitation maritime,
13~eplyofQatar,p. 333. maisparce qu'ilsrelèventde Qatarpar suitede la délimitation maritime effectuée sur
d'autresbases.»
If 1may,1willreadoutthis all-importanttext inits original version:
["It [Qatar] claims sovereignty overal1the islands, islets,reefs and low-tide
elevations... which are situated to the east of the line delimiting the respective
territorialseasbetweenthe two States.If they fa1underthe sovereigntyof Qatarit is
not becausetheyprovideajustzj?cationforthemaritime delimitation,but becausethey
appertain to Qatar as a consequenceof the maritime delimitationeffected on other
grounds."1
Accordingly, Al Hul, HalatNun, QassarNun, JaziratMashtan, Thighaylib and Umm Jalid are
awarded by our opponents to Bahrainnot on the basis of a title or ofthe effective exercise of
sovereignty,but for the one and only reasonthat they lie to the west of the maritime boundary
soughtby Qatar. Fashtad Dibal,Qit'atJaradah,FashtBuThur andthe Hawar Islands are claimed
by Qatar,not on the basis ofa titleor of the effectiveexercise of sovereignty,but forthe one and
only reason that they lie east of the maritime boundary soughtby Qatar. When it comes to
Fasht alAzrn, ouropponentssimplycutitintwo.
14.In a word, Qatar's argumenc tomesdownto twopropositions:
- First: that the maritimeboundarybetweenBahrain and Qatarmust be the 1947British line
adjustedin thesouthand extendedin thenorth.
- Second: that the insularandquasi-insularfeatureslying tothe eastof that linemust be placed
by the CourtunderQatar'ssovereignty; thoselying to the Westof that line mustbe placed by
the CourtunderBahrain'ssovereignty.
15. [Illustration] In the face of this thesis- which consists in delimiting the sea by
regarding areas of land as non-existentwhichneverthelessdefinitelydo exist, and in determining
sovereignty overthem as a consequenceof maritime delimitation - Bahrain'sposition istotally
different. Bahrainstartsfromtheterritorialsovereigntyandthecoastalgeographyofthe twoStates
and requeststheCourt to draw the maritime boundary consistentlywiththose two factors. As my
friend Michael Reismanhas shown,Bahrainis an insular ensemble. Such is nature,such is the
geography. Suchtoo is the history, andsuchis the political, economicand humanreality. Over
this ensemble Bahrain - and Bahrain alone - has performed acts ofsovereignty. Over this
ensembleBahrain - andBahrainalone - haseffectivelyexercised Statepowers. Comparedwith
the total, complete and absolute absence of egectivitéson the part of Qatar, the effecivitésof Bahrain in the componentparts of this ensemble morethan suffice, far more, given the nature of
these temtories, to establishits sovereignty. It is the territoryof the Stateof Bahrainas a whole, as
it exists, that generates maritime projections,and not only the main island, formerly called
A1Awal. It is the whole of the coasts of the State of Bahrain, and notthose of the main island
alone, which constitutes Bahrain's "coastal front"and "coastal opening". It is from this "coastal
front" and this "coastal opening"-the words are the Court's - that the process of delimitation
must proceed andthe provisional equidistance linebe drawn. After which, onceit has been drawn,
in the second stage of the delimitationprocessthe questionwill arise whether equity requiresthat
the line be adjusted. Inthe southem sector,no adjustmentis necessary. In the northern sectoron
the other hand, as we shall see later, Bahrain considers that two adjustrnentsare needed: one in
favour of Bahrain, to take account of the locationof the pearling banks; the other in favour of
Qatar, to take account of the maritime delimitationswith third States. This, Mr. President,is
Bahrain's position.
16.It canbe seen from this brief résumé of the positions of thetwo Parties thatthey disagree
basically on two issues of principle. And it is thisdual disagreement whichis at the heart of the
disputewhichthe Courtis invitedto decide.
17.The firstarea in whichthe Parties have oppositeviews goes to the verybasis of the law
of maritimedelimitation and,to a wider extent,ofthe lawof the sea. For this is wherethe dividing
line falls between, on the one hand, the Qatarithesis that a maritime delimitation precedesand
conditions the temtorial distribution and,on the other,theBahrainithesis which advocates that a
maritime delimitationshouldbe based on temtorial sovereignties. Does the landdominatethe sea,
025 as international law has long proclaimed? Or will the Court now overthrow that principle and
decidethat henceforththe seawill dominatethe land? Thisis whatis at stakein ourcase.
18.Once thisissue, of the greatest significance,is settled,it will be for the Court to consider
a question which is specific to the present dispute: that of the relevance, for the purposes of the
maritimedelimitationbetween Bahrain and Qatar,ofthe British line of 1947. Thisline is the be-al1
and end-al1 of Qatar's claim, eventhough Qatar tries to dissimulatethe fact by invoking the
so-called provisional equidistance line, which in reality - as 1 have already pointed out- is
nothingbut a fictionand a sham. 19.It is aroundthesetwo centralissueMr. President, Membersofthe Court,that1wish to
build my presentation: theissue of what Qatar calls the((masseterrestre a masse terrestre))
["mainland-to-mainland"]method of delimitatiandtherelationshipbetweenlandandsea,firstof
all; andhenthe issue of theplacetobeatiributedto theBritishline1947.
20. 1now come to the first partof my statement,whichdeals with the issue of principle
posedby the mainland-to-mainland[masseterrestreàmasseterrestre]methodof delimitation.
1.THE ISSUE OFPRINCIPLE:THESO-CALLEDMAINLAND-TO-MAINLAND[MASSETERRESTRE
A MASSETERRESTRE] METHODOFDELIMITATION ANDTHERELATIONSHIPBETWEEN
LANDANDSEA
21. Mr.President, Membersof the Court,the law of maritime delimitationhas developed
continuallysince the Court laid the foundations of such law in its Judgments in the cases
concemingthe NorthSea ContinentalSheZfin 1969. Yet if there is a field in whichthe basic
principles havenot variedin the slightest, thatfield is indeed thebasis of the right of Statesover
maritimeareas. The basis of such rights has alwayslain, today as yesterday, in a relationship
betweenland - or more preciselyStatesovereigntyover land,i.e., temtonal sovereign-y and
sea: a one-way relationship, withno wayback, flowingfiom land to sea andnever the reverse.
YetwhatQataris askingthe Courttodois to reversethisrelationship. Thisisthe firstpoint1shall
review.
22. Havingstated theobvious,facts which todate appearedto be unassailable,thatit is land
whichdominatestheseaandnot thereverse, that maritimerightsderive fromterritorialsovereignty
and notthereverse, that itis thecoastal opening which deters aritimeprojectionsandnot the
0 2 6 reverse,the question arisas to what exactly is understoodby the tem "land".What is land?
Qatar refusestorantthisstatusto low-tide elevations:for Qatar,low-tide elevationsarenot land;
they belong tothe sea,theybelongto the water. Forthis reason,in a secondStrandofargument,1
shallconsiderwhichof Bahrain'sabove-waterfeatureshave the status of "land",Le.,"temtories"
under Bahrain's "territorial sovereignty" as such have coasts which give rise to maritime
projections.
23. Afterthat therewillbe a thirdand lastissue: are al1of Bahrain's coastswhichgive rise
to maritime projectionsto be taken intoconsiderationin the delimitation process, fordrawingthe maritime boundary and constructing the equidistanceline? Or should only some of them be
selected forsuch a purpose? As the Court knows, for Qatar just because a point on the coastof
Bahrain is used asa basis for calculatingitsmtorial sea, it should not automaticallybe usedas a
basis for constructingthe maritime boundarybetweenBahrain andQatar. For us, on the contrary,
each coast ofBahraingives rise to a territorial seaandeach coastof Bahrain cantherefore be used
as a baseline andbase point for constructingthe equidistance line asa first stage. This raises,as
the Courtcannotfailto notice, afurther,extremelyimportantissueofprinciple.
24.At thispoint 1wouldlike to maketwo preliminaryremarkson the way in which the case
is presentedbeforethe Court.
25. First, as the Court has no doubt noted, there is the exclusively defensiv- 1 would
almost Saynegative - nature of our opponents'lineofargument. What do we readthroughoutour
opponents' threew-rittenpleadings? Whathave we heardthroughouttheir oral arguments?Thatthe
islands and low-tide elevations located between Qatar'swestern coast and the eastem coast of
Bahrain's main island should not be taken into account in the process of delimitation; that
Bahrain'sacts of sovereignty over these temtories are not relevant in establishing effectivitésin
Bahrain'sfavour; that Bahrain's low-tide elevations arenot Bahrainitenitory and therefore may
not serveas basepoints for establishinga maritimeboundq. This,Mr. President,iswhat wehave
read and heard. Yetnever, not once,not one singletime,have we reador heard Qatar'sproofin the
0 2 7 form of a single document, or a single actionpositively establishing Qatar'ssovereignty over a
particular islandor a particular low-tideelevation. The only considerationson which Qatar bases
its claim to certainislands and low-tide elevationsare their locationto the east of the maritime
boundary claimed by Qatar, Le., iheir closer proxirnityto the Qatar peninsula than to the main
island of Bahrain.Proximity, proximity, proximity! Our opponents'arguments lead back to this,
again and again,hereas elsewhere.
26. This brings me to my second remark. Inmaking such efforts to showthat a particular
island or a particular low-tide elevationcannot givese to maritime rights in Bahrain's favou, r
that a particularpoint onhe coastof Bahrainmust notbe used as a base point forthe construction
of the equidistanceline, evenif the breadth of Bahrain'stemtorial seais calculatedm that point,Qatar implicitlybut necessarilyacknowledgesthat that particular island,that particularlow-tide
elevation,orthat particularpointonthe coastisthetemtory ofthe StateofBahrain.
27.Mr.President,my statementon thisissueof principlewill thereforebe dividedinto three
parts:
- First, 1shall recallthe obvioustruth that maritime delimitation musbte effected between the
actual coasts of the two States. In requestingthe Courtto draw the maritime boundaryby
taking account solelyof the coasts of the main island of Bahrain and the coastof the Qatar
peninsula,as if nothing lay between them,as if these same pieces of land locatedbetween
thesecoastsdid not exist,andin requestingthe Courtto awardsovereigntyovertheland lying
east ofthat boundary to Qatar,and west of that boundaryto Bahrain, ouropponents'disregard
thefundamentalprinciplesofthe lawof thesea.
- After that, 1 shall reviewwhich tenitories of Bahrain giverise to maritimerights,and then
considerthe maritimerightsoflow-tideelevations.
- Lastly,movingon fromthe questionof titletothat of delimitation,1shallconsiderwhether al1
the land and al1the coastsof Bahrain whichgive rise to a maritime titlein Bahrain'sfavour
maybeusedas base pointsforthe constructionof thedelimitationline.
A. Landfirst,then sea
28.Mr.President,ifthere is one principleofthe lawofthe sea, as1havealreadysaid,which
has assumedan almost axiomaticvalue both politicallyand legally,it is indeedthe principlethat
the rightsof Statesoverthe sea derivefrom temtorial sovereignty,being theprolongationof such
sovereignty,and that suchrightsare exercisedthrough the intermediaryof the coastalfront. The
principle has been accepted for centuries for the temtorial sea; it is accepted today,
unquestionably,for the continentalshelf and the exclusiveeconomic zone. This philosophyof
maritime rightsdoes not springfrom the imaginationof legalwriters concernedwithintellectual
consistency, butfrom the will of States. It is in this mannerthat the rule of law wasframed and
that itis applied by States andby international tribunals. And, had these principlesnot been
challengedby Qatarin this case,1wouldneverhave dreamtof recallingthem here,soobviousare
they.Maritimerights,rightsderivedfromterritorialsovereignty
29. Maritime rights arenot autonomousnghts, they do not existby themselves: their origin
and theirjustificationare found inthe sovereigntyof the State over itsland territory. Thisis what
the Courthas steadfastlyasserted and reasserted. As far back as 195 1- half a centuryago - the
Court emphasized,in the case conceming Fisheries,"the close dependence of the temtorial sea
upon the land domain," settingforththe fundamentalprinciple that "[ilt is the land which confers
upon the coastalState a right to the waters off its coa~ts"'~.In 1969,in the cases concemingthe
NorthSea ContinentalShelJ;as we are al1aware, the Court confirmedthis approach in wording
which is well-recognizedandnow classic: "the land",so the Court said, "is the legal sourceof the
power which a State may exercise over territorialextensions to seaward", giving rise to "the
principle. ..that the land dominatesthe seau[((leprincipe quela terre dominela mer))]15.Ten
years later,in 1978,in the case concemingtheAegeanSeaContinentalSheg the Court statedwith
remarkable precision: "it is solely by virtue of the. .. State's sovereigntyover the land" that
intemational law grants it rights overthe sea. Such rights, it said, are "legally both an emanation
from and an automatic adjunct of the temtonal sovereignty of the. .. state"I6. Maritime rights
derive fiom the sovereigntyof the State overa temtory; they are an "emanation"fromit, they are
an "adjunct"of it. They arelike the shadowwhichfollowsman. Theydo not exist bythemselves,
they are derivedrights. The commonplaceexpression "maritime projection"is literallytrue: land
projects seawards. Thesearetruthswhichwebelievedweresimplynot open to question.
The roleofthe coastalfront
30.Severalfundamentalaspects of the lawof the sea, enshrinedinjudgments of the Court,
derive fiom the above. First, there is the decisiverole of the coasts, since the "coastal front"or
"coastal frontage" - these are the Court's expressions,1 reiterate - constitutes the mandatory
intermediaryused in anymaritimeprojection. The forms of wording usedby the Court are toowell
known,andtoo legion, forit to be necessary,or evenpermissible,to quotethem againhere. Nor is
there any need to clarify that when we talk of coasts in this context we are talking, in a legal
I4~isheri,s.C.RJ.ports1951p.133.
orth theaContinentalShelf;I.C.J.Reports1969,p. 51,para.96.
I6~egeanSea ContinentalSheif(Greecev. Turkey),I.C.J.Reports1978,p. 36,para.86. context, about coastsrepresentedby baselinesand base points. In one of his works, my fiend
Michael Reismanused theterm "legal coastline": the baselineh , e wrote, is the "legal coastline"
[«côtejuridique))]". However,as the Courthas ofienemphasized,such stylization mustnot lead
ustoreshapenatureandrefashiongeography. Coasts arewhatthey are. Maritimedelimitationisa
legal operation, i.e., an operation of will, one which is based on the recording of
geographical-historical facts; ittakes geography and historyas its starting-pointsin order to
pronounce thelaw. Maritime delimitation shouldlead us neither to reshapenature in order to
renderit moreharmoniousor more simple,as our opponents would wish,norto rewritehistoryin
orderto refashiontemtorial sovereigntiesinwhat mightbe considered amorerationalmanner.
31.Thatthisprincipleof the pre-eminence ofland oversea, a principle whichthe Court has
asserted, reiteratedandreassertedon manyoccasions, still prevailstodayis borneout, interalia, by
the fact that the recent Eritreanemen arbitration was splitinto two stages,the first devotedto
territorial sovereignty, andthe secondto the maritime boundary. As the Tribunaldeclaredin its
secondAward, in delimiting the maritimeboundaries,it was required to take into account the
030 opinion that it formed on the question of territorial sovereignty'*: it did not appear to have
occurredto theTribunalthat it mighthaveproceededinreverseorder.
Qatar's distortionof Bahrain'scoast
32. Mr.President,adrnittedlyour opponentsdo not challengeany of the principles1have
just recalled. Their tactic lies elsewhere. Itconsists in attempting to applythese principlesto a
versionof Bahrain's coastthat hasfirstbeenmutilated anddistorted. Ifweareto believethem,the
coast of Bahrain whichthe Court must take into account is solely that of the main island of
Bahrain,to whichthey generouslyaddthe coastsof Muharraqand Sitrah,excludingthe coasts of
al1theother featureswhichmakeup theStateof Bahrain.
33. Withthe Court'spermission,1wouldlike to digressinto thebywaysof terminologyhere
in answerto a complaintthat in Ourpleadingswe have referredto insularandquasi-insular features
Uormations insulaires ou quasi-insulaires]. Neither the term features ,i$onnations] nor the
"W. M. Reisman & G.E. Westerman,Straight Baselines in International Maritime DelNewtYork,,
1992p.1,note1.
's~econdstage, para.82.adjectivesinsular or quasi-insular[insulaires ou quasi-insulaires] findfavourwith Ouropponents.
The conceptof feature, they state, is "aliento international law"and "meaningless",and if Bahrain
has used it so often in its pleadings, thisis done, they add, "to obscure the legal sit~ation"'~.A
term "fully open to ...criticism" so ProfessorQuéneudecreiterated in this very courtroom a few
days agoZ0.
34. Well, well! "Aconcept aliento international law?" The authorsof the 1969Judgments
in the cases concerningthe North Sea ContinentalShelf,were they still with us,would have been
shocked to hear this complaint, they who so ofien referred, even in the operative part of the
Judgment,to a naturalgeographical feature [accidentgéographiquenaturel], an incidental special
feature[particulariténon-essentielle], or a special or unusualfeature [caractéristique spéciaou
inhabituel~e]~'. The authors of the 1977Arbitral Award in the case conceming the Maritime
Delimitation betweenFrance and the UnitedKingdomwould be no less shocked,they who also
referred, on alrnost every page, to geographical features,incidental special features, special or
unusualfeatures, particularfeatures,physicalfeatures,or distinct features[situationgéographique,
caractéristique géographique, données géographiques, élément And,
Mr. President,whatof Article46 of the 1982Conventionon the Law of the Sea,which definesan
archipelagoas a group of islands and "othernatural features"[((autres élements naturels))]? Our
opponents wouldhave donebetter to take a closer look at the subject before launchingthemselves
intothisline of reasoning.
35. So much for English terminology. In the Frenchversion of the 1969Judgmentsand of
the 1977Franco-British Arbitral Award,the term "feature" has been translatedin various ways:
((caractéristique», ((accident)), ccparticularité». In the French text of Article46 of the
1982Convention on the Law of the Sea,the term "othernatural features" has been translatedby
((autres élémentn saturels)). It would seem, 1regret to note, that there is no French word which
corresponds exactlyto "feature"in the meaningin whichthis term is used in the contextof the law
'%eplyofQatarp, ara.7.11.
''CR 2000/10,p.9,para.59.
*'~ee,for example,North Sea ContinentalShelf;I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.49, para.89; p. 50, para.91; p.54,
para.101.
2 2 ~ ~ ~ Vol.XVIII,p.45,para.70; p.58,para.101;p.60,paras.107-108,etc.of the sea. It is interestingin this respectto note that in a single paragraphof the Franco-British
Award, in the same,single paragraph,the word "feature"has beentranslated, afewlines apart,in
threedifferent~a~s*~.The Registryofthe Courthas also translated"features"in variouswaysas:
((élémentsnaturels», ((caractéristiques géographiques»,({reliefs maritimes)), cflormations
naturelles»24. The Court will forgive me, 1 think, if1use any one of these terms here, without
distinction,or if sometimes1also speakofformations or, simpler still,if 1 use the Englishterm
"features".
36. As for the adjective"insularor quasi-insular"which we haveused to describe these
features,1amwellawarethatit isnota cornmonplaceexpression,butit seemedtous convenientto
groupunderthistenn elementswhichareislands,true islands,withinthemeaningofArticle 121of
the UnitedNations Conventionon the Law of the Sea as well as elements whichare not islands,
suchaslow-tideelevations. It is a convenienceoflanguage,justas theterm "maritimefeatures" is
a convenienceof language,beingthe term commonlyused in English,and one whichmy friend
Michael Reismanused just now. Maritime features,@ormationsmaritimes] are in reality land
features Uormations] which protrudeabove the sea and which affectmaritime delimitation to a
greaterorlesserextent.
37.It is preciselyal1thesefeaturesthatQatarwantsthe Courttodisregard,inrequestingit to
establishthedelimitationbetween thecoastof the Qatarpeninsulaandthe coastofthemainisland
of Bahrain,as if there werenothingin between. Qatar fmdstwojustificationsfor suchmutilation
of theStateof Bahrain,which1shallreview briefly. Oneis the allegedminor, insignificantnature
ofthesefeaturesand1shallreturntothislater. Theotheris whatouropponentshavecalledintheir
pleadingstherequirementofsimplicity[l'exigencede
Mr.President,do you wishtotakea break hereorto continuefora few minutes?
230p.citpara.107,p. 60(Englishversion)andp. 191(Frenchversion).
24~eplyof Qatar,p. 295, paras.7.11,8.13,9.9.
2S~ounter-~emonaolf Qatar,paras.7.9,7.24 and7.51. The PRESIDENT: 1 thinkthat we may stop now. Thankyou, Professor. The Court will
adjoum for a quarterof anhour. Thankyou.
TheCourtadjourned from 11.25am. to 11.40am.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Sitting is resumed and 1 give the floor to
ProfessorProsper Weil.
Mr. WEIL:
Thefalse argumentof "simplicity"
38. Qatar contends that when a maritime area is dotted, as is the southern sector in the
present case, with areatnumber of islands, islets,reefs, rocks and low-tideelevations it becomes
extremelydifficult,if notimpossible,to relyonthese countless maritime features[impossibledese
baser sur ces innombrablesformations maritimes] for the purpose of drawing the maritime
bounde and that they must thereforebe "disregarded". Al1the more so, adds Qatar, when the
legal status of numerousfeatures is debatableanduncertain2'. Faced withthis practical and legal
impossibility,so the opposingParty maintains,a delimitation whichtook account of such features
would be quite simply impossible,andonly a mainland-to-mainland delimitationis possible ("any
delimitation other than a mainland-to-mainland delimitation wouldbe extremely difficult to
1 033
detennine if not to practically impossible" ..."only a mainland-to-mainland delimitationis
practically possible")[((toutedélimitatiautrequ'unedélimitation opérée entre les deux masses
continentales serait extrêmement dificile, sinon impossible en pratique)) ... ((seule une
délimitationentrelesdeuxterritoiresprincipauxapparaîtpossible dans lapratique))]28.
39. Mr. President, admittedly the existence of features does complicate the situation, and
matters would be simpler ifthe State of Bahrain were no more than its main island, Al Awal.
However the State of Bahrain is something other than and more than its main island, even
complementedby Muharraqand Siîrah. Bahrain'sother islands and low-tide elevations equally
26~ounter-~emorial of Qatar,para. 7.24; see para. 9.39.
27~ounter-~emorialof Qatar,para. 7.24.
2s~ounter-~emorial of Qatar,paras. 7.9and7.23.exist,andcannotbe wiped offthemapinthename of simplicity. How many legalproblems would
be broughtto an easy,instantsolution if,in thename of a so-calledprinciple of the requirementof
simplicity [exigence de simplicité],we took no account of everything which is precisely the
problem. It is one thing, in the narneof simplicity,to avoiddrawing a maritimeboundarywhich
has too many changesof direction; the simplified equidistanceline has long been acceptedin the
practice ofStatesas well as injurispmdence. However, wipingout a large part of the temtory of a
State or thecoastal front of a State in the name of simplicityis refashioning nature, reshaping
geographyandrewritinghistory, somethingwhichthe Courthasalways firmly opposed.
40. Between the main island of Bahrain and the peninsula of Qatar there is not the legal
vacuumwhich our opponentsimagine. In givingthe nameof "Bahrain"only tothe main islandof
this State,Qatartwists wordsandasksthe Courttotake thepartforthe whole.
41.A glanceat the map moreover showsthat these features,and Qatarwouldsparethe Court
the task of determiningthe legal nature ofuch features on the grounds that such a task wouldbe
too difficult for it, these features number no more than two in the final analysis-yes,
Mr. President, two: Fasht al Azm and Qit'atJaradah. The legal nature of al1the others is not in
doubt. There is no doubt even in respect of Fasht al Dibal, there is no divergencebetween the
parties: Fasht alibalis a low-tideelevation. There remain,I reiterate, onlytwo issues,that ofthe
legal status of Fasht al Azmand that of thelegal status of Qit'atJaradah. Yet even there, asmy
friend and colleague MichaelReisman has. shown, doubt crumbles after the most cursory
examinationof the situation.
The lack of relevance, inthis case, of the argument of security and of the principleof
non-encroachment
42. Nor willthe Court be impressedby the spectre of securitybrandishedby ~atd~, or by
the principle of non-encroachment. Map 10of the Reply of ad' [illustration]is typical in this
regard,and the Court knows thismapwell. Thismap givesthe Court a nod and a wink: "Seehow
reasonablewe are in Qatar! See how Bahrainis unreasonable,requesting a maritimeboundaryso
close toour coast!"- A veryheavynod andwink, truth to tell,since our opponentsproducedthis
29~ounter-~emonalofQatar,para.7.25; CR200019,p. 37,para. 9.
3%acingp.314in the Replyof Qatar. map twice during their oral presentation,as the first and last map fiaming their argumentsin their
entirety. Mr. President, 1 am well aware, having emphasized it myselfin this courtroom in a
previous case, thatthe concem to avoid drawinga maritime boundaryso close to the coastline of
one of the parties that there is a possible threat to its security is a factor which the Courtt
disregard. For this reason,wherethe temtories of two Stateslie someway away fromeach other,
the Court avoids drawing the maritime boundary along the beaches, so to speak, of one of the
parties and farfiom the coast of the other party. Asthe Court said in 1993in the caseconcerning
JanMayen:
"while courts have been unwilling to allowsuch considerationsof security to intmde
upon the major task of establishing a primary boundary in accordance with the
geographicalcriteria,theyareconcemedto avoidcreatingconditionsof imbalance".
Security considerations, the Court added in the sarne case, "are of course not unrelated to the
delimitationof maritime ~~aces"~'.
43. However,Mr.President,this is notat al1the situation here. This is not atal1the issue. In
the presentcase, the proximityofthe maritime boundary tothe coastsof Qatar is not,or would not
beythe consequenceof the maritimedelimitation process. Itis the consequence of a geographical
andpolitical fact,1mean that it isthe consequenceofthe presence, ashort distance fromthe coast
of Qatar, of islands and other natural featuresunder the sovereignty ofBahrain. It is due to the
0 3 5 proximityof the landtemtones ofthe two Parties; it is due to geographyand history. Moving the
maritimeboundaq away fiom oneof the coasts in the present case, acase which concerns coasts
lyingclosetogethernaturally,wouldbe tantamountto failingto takeaccount of theexistenceof the
land temtories of the other Party,.e., it wouldbe tantamountto disregardinggeography. This is
precisely what Qatarrequests the Court to do: to disregard [ne pas tenir compte]certain of
Bahrain'stemtones. In relying on a panoply of maps which are at times somewhatbiased, our
opponents resort to somewhat of a psychological operation, one which they hope will lead the
Courtto drawthe course ofthe maritimeboundaryas if the Bahrainitemtories whichlie closestto
the coastof Qatar didnot exist. This inevitably bringsto mind the way in which theFranco-British
Tribunalreacted to the suggestionthat it drawthe continental shelfboundary in theChannel using
31CaseconcerningMaritime DelimitationintheArea between GreenlandandJan Mayen,I.C.J.Reports 1993,
pp74-75,para81. the mainland-to-mainland method, ignoring (in the English meaning of that word) the
ChannelIslands. The Tribunal's reactionwas curt and firm: "The ChannelIslands, however,do
exist"[({Maislesîles Anglo-Normandesexistent))]32.Andin this case, Mr.President,do not Fasht
ad Dibal, Qit'atJaradah, Qita'ael Erge, Fasht alAzm, an integralpart of Sitrah,Al Mu'tarid,etc.,
also exist? Al1these temtories "do exist" [((existent)>].And if they exist, why should theybe
ignored in the delimitationprocess? And why therefore should delimitationbe canied out on the
basis of irnaginary,reconstitutedcoasts,and not onthebasis of realcoasts?
44. Temtorial sovereignties are what they are, the heirs to history, and often therefore
capricious. When, as a result of history, two State temtories lie relatively far away from each
other, it is clear that the maritime boundary shouldnot be drawn in such a way that it passes
excessively close to one of them. Yet when, as a result of history, two State temtories are
separated only by a narrow, constrictedmaritime area,the maritime boundarywill inevitablyand
unavoidably nin close to the temtory of both parties. My friend SirElihuLauterpachthas given
the Court many examples of situations of this kind scattered aboutthe ~orld~~.The situationis
exactlythe samein the presentcase. Bearingin mindthe short distance separating the easternmost
Bahraini temtories from the western coast of Qatar, the maritime boundarycannot do otherwise
036 than run closetoboth the westerncoastof Qatarandthe coasts ofthe easternmostpartsofthe State
of Bahrain. Recallingthe weightthe Court attachesto the principleof the stabilityof frontiers,it is
difficult to imaginethat it mightpermit the determinationof maritime boundariesto openthe door
to revisionismon a vast scaleofthe course of land boundaries.
45. Mr. President, this showsthe importanceof the decisionthe Court is asked to take. It is
the very substanceof one of the Parties - the State of Bahrain- that is at stake. Considerations
ofsecuriîyor non-encroachmentdo not come into it. Becausethe maritimeboundarybetweenthe
temtories of Bahrain and the temtory of Qatar would run close to the coast of Qatar we must not
conclude that these temtories should be ignored or disregarded [((ignorés))]in the maritime
delimitation process, nor must we conclude that the maritime delimitation should be effected
between the State of Qatar as it stands and a State of Bahrain amputated of a large part of its
3 2 ~ ~ ~Vol..XVIII,pp.88and223,para.183.
3 3 2000/11,p.34,para.75. substance,Le.,an imaginaryStateof Bahrain. The descriptionby a memberof the Tribunal,in the
case conceming the Maritime Delimitation between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, of
Guinea-Bissau's"broad bulwark of islands" applies, mutatismutandis,to the carpet of Bahraini
islandsand otherfeatureswhich stretchestothe gates ofthe Qatar peninsula. "Guinea-Bissau,"the
arbitrator wrote, "would not be what it is without the ~ija~os."~~ And Bahrain, Mr.President,
would not be what it is without the featuresCformationsw ] hich Qatar seeksto wipe off the map.
As for the somewhat scornful accusation levelled against Bahrainby our opponents-a
principality with an "imperialist"image of itself as a State "ruling the waves" [((dominant les
-it is too ridiculousand extravagantevento warrantrebuîtal.
A "carpet", a "group", a "chain", a "system" ofislands and low-tide elevations-in a single
word an archipelago
46. It is not without interest in this connection to note what the Arbitral Tribunal in the
Eritredemen case referredto as the "undoubtedrule"[((règleincontestée))t]hat the outerlimit of
the territorial sea may legitimatelybe drawn from a baseline which includes an entire chain, or
group of islands withno gap betweenthem of more than 12nautical miles16.In the present case,
O 3 7
we are dealing withwhatthe Eritredemen Tribunalcalled, in the case of the Dahlaks, a "tightly
knit group ofislandsandislets"[((groupeétroitementtissé d'îles et d'îlots»],togetherwithlow-tide
elevations,which formpart of the coastal configuration. Stillon the subject of the Dahlaks,the
Tribunal also refers-and 1 cannot resist the temptation to quote its images - to "an island
system" [((systèmeinsulaire))]whose extemal fiinge should serve as the baseline ofthe territorial
sea3'. Refemng to anothergroup of islands,theEritredYemenAward States: "here againthere is,
if not acarpet,at least a considerable scaîtering of islandsand isle...which . ..ultimatelyform
part of a large island cluster or system ..." [((là encore, il y a, sinon un tapis, du moins un
extraordinaire éparpillemeno tu unsystèmed'îleset d7lots qui. .. en déjnitive,font partie d'un
vaste groupe ousystèmeinsulaire))][traductiondu grefle] j8.The Tribunalrefers to "an intricate
3 4 ~ ~ ,Vol. XXI,p. 204, para.134.
"~ernorialof Qata, ara.10.33; Replyof Qatar, ..30; CR2000/10,p. 8,para.57.
36~irstStage,para.473.
"second Stage,para.139.
38~econdStage,para.149. systemof islands,islets and reefs"[((systèmcomplexed'lles,d'llotset de récifs))]i, shortto an
archipelago- anactual archipelago, a geographical archipelago, independently of anapartfiom
the questionas to whether it is an archipelagoin lawwithinthe meaningof the 1982 Convention.
This,the Couriwillnote, issomethingow opponentsdo not challengesincetheythemselvesrefer
to the "group" or the "archipelago"of ~ahrain~'. What our opponentsdo challenge,what they
question, is the composition of this archipelago, which they would limit to a "compact"
group- the word recurs very frequently, compact,Le., restricted - of only a few islands,
excludingtheotherislands andlow-tide elevationslocated betweenthe main islandof Bahrainand
the coast of Qatarand, excludingof course,the HawarIslands. Must we recallthat in 1939and
1947the Britishauthoritiesheldthat not onlythe HawarIslands,but also DibalandJaradah,were
part of this so-called "compact"entity? Similarly,our opponentsdo not raise any obstaclesto
acknowledgingininternationallawthe existenceof a conceptofthe unity of islandgroups41.
47. "Carpetof islands", "clusterof islands","chainof islands","island system","complex
system", "groupofislands","archipelago",theidea behindthesemanifoldcolourhl descriptionsis
0 3 8 alway"the same: in the presenceof a geographicalreality of this type, the temtorial sea must
necessarilybe measuredfiom the externalfnnge fiange extérieure]of the carpet,the cluster,the
system or the group, so said the Eritreaflemen Tribunal. Fiftyyears on, we recall thefamous
description oftheNorwegiancoastgivenby the Courtin the Fisheries case: "thelargeand small
islands... the islets,rocks andreefs, somealwaysabovewater, othersemergingonlyat lowtide,
areintruth but anextensionofthe Norwegianmainlar~d"~'A . dmittedl- andpleasedonotmake
me Saythe opposite - the mainisland ofBahraindoesnot havea "sslfjaergaard"a ,nd Bahrainis
not using the argumentof a f'sskjaergaardfa,rnittedlythegeographyis not at al1the same. Yet it
couldwell be saidof Bahrain'sfeaturesUormations]what the Courtsaid of the "s&aergaard"in
1951, namely that it "constitutes a whole with the mainland"(in the English version of the
Judgmentthe termmainland [terrefirme] is used) and that consequentlyit is "the outer line...
3g~econdStagepara.151.
40~orexampleCR 2000/5p.32,para.1; CR 200016 ,.13, paras2-3;p. 15,para. 1; p.16,para.13,
etc.
41ForexampleCR 2000/6 p.47paras2.5and28.
42~.~.JReports951p,. 127. which must be taken into account into delimiting ...temtorial waters". In this case as in that
one - 1 am still quoting from the 195 1 Judgment- "this solution is dictated by geographic
realitie~"~~: Geographical realities, but also political, economic, sociological and historical
realities. Qatar endeavours to paint a picture of Bahrain- and this is the core of its
reasoning - as a continental State off which lie scatteredtiny, insignificant pieces of confetti,
off-lying features Uormationsau large]. No, Mr.President, this is not what the situation is.
Bahrain is an insular and quasi-insular system,an archipelago al1 of whose component parts
together [toutesensemble],as Lorimer said, make up the State of Bahrain. Mr, President, Qatar
acknowledges and even emphasizesthat the maritime area lying between the coast of the main
island of Bahrain and the coast of the Qatar peninsula is "dotted" with "countless"
[ctinnombrables»] islands, islets,rocks and low-tideelevation~~~.However, acknowledging this,
and itdoes acknowledgethis, why does it then refuseto take account of this reality in the process
of maritime delimitation? Paradoxically, would it be because they are so numerous as to be
"countless"[ctinnomb tatbweems)st]roceedas if they did not exist? In seeking,underthe
0 3 9 virtuous pretext of simplicity, to take account of only a single component of this indissoluble
whole,the otherParty doesnot simplifythe situation,itdistortsit.
Qatar applies its so-caiïed mainland-to-mainland method[méthodede calcul de masse
terrestreàmasseterrestre]selectively
48. Better still! Qatar appliesits so-calledmainland-to-mainlandmethod[méthodede calcul
de masse terrestre à masse terrestre]in a highly selective manner. In paragraph7.31 of the
Counter-Memorialwe read that "In the present case, Qatar submitsthat the provisionalmedianline
must be drawn from relevant points on the two mainland coasts ..."[((Enla présente instance,
Qatarsoutientque la ligne médianeprovisoire doit être construitàpartir despoints pertinents
des côtes des deuxterritoiresprincipaux.))] This is the essence of the method: drawing the
provisional equidistance line on the basis of points on the two mainland coasts [territoires
principaux]. Yet, Mr. President, Qatar does not proceed in this manner, not at all. 1 would
respectfully draw the Court's attention to map 14in the Mernorial of Qatar, to map 5 in the
43~o~ il.p.128.
"~ounter-~emonal of Qatar, para. 7.24. Counter-Memorialof Qatar, andto map 14in the Replyof Qatar [showmaps]where it willsee that
Qatar indeed constructs its so-called mainland-to-mainlandmasse terrestre à masse terrestre]
provisionalmedianline fiomthe mainland[territoire principal]of Bahrainbutnot at all,not at all,
not at al1fromthemainland[territoireprincipal]of Qatar. Qatar constructsitsprovisionalmedian
line fiom the western coastof JaziratHawar,Le.,fiom the westerncoast of the westenunost island
of the Hawargroup. To explainthis flagrantbreachof the pnnciples they proclaim, our opponents
wite that the Qatar peninsula,the peninsula, shouldbe understood as embracingthe main Hawar
Island, theatural extension of the land mass of ~atar~~.Here we have islands that have been
naturalized to become part of the mainland land mass. In fact, since Jazirat Hawar is the
westernmost of the Hawar Islands, not only does Qatar remove that island- Jazirat Hawar-
fiom the scope of its so-called method, but the totality of the Hawar Islands, including, in
particular, Suwadash Shamaliyah and SuwadalJanubiyah. To show itself in a good light, the
otherPartythen proposes, in an allegeddesirethat both Parties should be treated equally [afinde
traiter les Parties de manièreégale],to basethe median line on Bahrain'sside also on some
islands,the islandsof Sitrahand~uharra~~~.The inconsistencybecomes evenmore glaringwhen
we note that on thethree maps in its written pleadings, Memorial, Counter-Mernorialand Reply
[show maps] Qatar exempted from its so-called mainland-to-mainland [masse terrestre à masse
terrestre]methodnot only Jazirat Hawarand the interveningislands, but alsotwo further islands,
O
Rabad al Sharbiyah and Rabad ash Sharkijah, even further away from the mainland [territoire
principal] of Qatarthan is Jazirat Hawar. On the map found under No. 41 in the judges' folders
submittedto the Court a fewdays ago [showmap], Qatar'sbase points wereprudently movedback
onto Jazirat Hawar. The onlylessonwhich1candraw fiom this is that ouropponentsarenot very
consistent in the application of the farnousmainland-to-mainland method[méthodede calculde
masseterrestreà masse terrestre].
49. By theby, SitrahandMuharraqas a counterpartto the Hawar Islands? What generosity!
What concem for equality! Mr. President, how dare Qatar putSitrah and Muharraq on the same
footingas the Hawar Islands? Sitrah and Muharraqare districts of the townof Manama, fiom al1
45~eplyofQatar,para.9.37.
46~bid. points of view theyare an integralpart of the main island. Sitrahand Muharraqare not subjectto
any dispute, whereas the Hawar Islands lie at the heart of this dispute. In short, for al1the
intermediate featuresapart fiom the Hawar Islands Qatar proposes to beginby delimitingthe sea
before determiningterritorial sovereignty. When it comes to the Hawar Islands, this method is
forgottenand swept aside. In respect of theHawar Islands, Qatar requests the Court to startwith
sovereignty, itsown sovereigntyof course, and to deduce from that sovereigntythe course of the
maritimeboundary. In other words,Qatar wouldlike the Courtto apply its fundamentaltheoryof
the mainland-to-mainlandmethod [méthodede calcul de masse terrestre à masse terrestre]to
Bahrainbutnotto Qgar. Ouropponentshaveclearlyforgottenthe Englishproverb "Whatis sauce
for thegooseis sauce for the gander"[«Cequiest bonpour l'unest bonpour l'autre))][traduction
dugreffe].
The so-called mainland-to-mainland metho[d méthodede calcul de masse terrestre a masse
terrestre]is self-destructive: the ambiguitoyf Qatar'sargument
50. Yet this is not all, Mr. President. The so-called "method"which Qatar proposes to the
Court is, in some respects, self-destructiveandsuicidal. By protesting so stndently against the
allegeddefectsof a maritime boundarytakingaccount of the intermediatefeatures,our opponents,
as 1have already said, implicitly acknowledgethat such features are part of the State of Bahrain,
for were they not the temtory of Bahrain, the maritime consequences which Qatar fears, the
consequences itobjects to, wouldnot exist and the entire edifice of Qatar's reasoningwould have
neitherpurposenor raison d'être.
51. We put our finger here on one of the inconsistencies,one among several, of Qatar's
reasoning. What, precisely, is the basis of Qatar'srequest that the Court take no account, in its
maritime delimitation, of the natural features lying between the western coast of the Qatar
041
peninsula and theeastem coast of the island of Bahrain? What exactly is the argument? Does
Qatar challengeBahrain'ssovereignty overthese features, or is its argument that these features,
although under Bahrain'ssovereignty, are tooinsignificantto be taken into accountin the process
of maritimedelimitation? Quiteobviously, thetwo approachesare fundamentallydifferentbut,as
the Court has noted,the other Party hasnot made a clear choicebetween them and is hedgingits
bets. The so-called mainland-to-mainland method [méthodede calcul de masse terrestre à masse
terrestre]is legally unacceptable
52.Mr. President, the method advocatedby Qatar is legally unacceptable. Qatar'sreasoning
consists in relying on the fact that a maritime boundary which took account of Bahrain's
sovereigntyover the intermediate featureswould run closeto the coast of Qatar,whichis tme, and
concluding fiom that that it needsto denythis sovereignty. Qatar also takesBahrain'ssovereignty
over the intermediate features as a starting-pointfor denyingthis sovereignty in the name of its
maritimeconsequences. The reversa1 ofthe basic land-seasequence,establishedby the practice of
States and by international jurisprudence,is radical, completeand total. Temtorial sovereignty
does not derive from the maritime boundary; itis the maritime boundary whichderives from
territorial sovereignty. Following Qatar's reasoning, it would no longer be "the coast of the
temtory of the State [which]is the decisive factorfor title..."47over maritimeareas. It wouldbe
the opposite. It wouldno longerbe the landwhich is "thelegal source of the powerwhich a State
mayexercise overterritorialextensions sea~ards"~~.It wouldbe the opposite. It wouldnot be "by
virtue of the coastal State'ssovereignty over the lac4' that the maritime rights of the parties
wouldbe established. It wouldbe the opposite.
53. Second, Qatar's claim limits thecapacity to engender maritimejurisdictions to what
Qatarcalls mainlands[territoiresprincipaux],excludinganyother land tenitory. Thetemtory ofa
Statewouldthus be madeup of amainland[territoire principal] and oftemtories whichwouldnot
have that status. Under Qatar's approach,even some islandsare deprivedof this power,in flagrant
contradiction withthe principle of customary law,expressed inArticle 121of the Conventionon
042
the Law of the Sea, that islands give rise to the sarne maritime jurisdictions as "other land
temtory".
54. To sum up, followingQatar'sline of reasoning,theprinciple that the landdominates the
sea would be replaced, for land temtories other than mainlands[territoires principaux], by the
opposite principle thatthe sea dorninatesthe land. For suchtemtories, landwouldno longerbe the
source of maritime rights, but the consequence of them; the sea would engender territorial
47~ontinentalSheiffinisiaLLibyan ArabJamahiriya),I.C.J.Reports1981,para.73.
48~orthSea ContinentalShelI.C.Reports1969,p. 51,para.96.
49~egeanSea ContinentalSheif (Grev.eTurkey),I.C.J.Reports1978,p. 36,para.86. sovereignty. And,if we believe Qatar,1repeat- 1reiterate- that this would be true not only of
low-tide elevations, but also of true islands, of islands which are most undeniably islands, of
islandswhich arethe most island-like,dare1say. Qatarwouldlikethese islands too tobe Qatarior
Bahrainidepending on whether they lie east or west of the maritimeboundary. Insteadof giving
risetomaritimerights,in accordancewiththe rule set forthin Article 121of the Conventionon the
Law of the Sea,territorial sovereigntyover islands wouldbecome a mere by-product of maritime
delimitation.
55. Mr. President,the Court will note that so far 1have used the word mainland [territoire
principal],usedby our opponentsintheirwrittenpleadings,withouttranslatingit into French,as in
thecaseof the word featuresflormations]. Our opponentsdo nothidethe factthat this conceptlies
at theheart of theirtheory, therean be nodoubt on this matter. "At the very heart of this method
of delimitingmaritime areas, lies, by definition,the conceptof a mainland." [((Aucoeurde cette
méthodede délimitationdes espaces maritimesse trouve,par définition même,le concept de
"masse terrestrefi».] The question then arises what is a mainland [masse terrestre; territoire
principal]? Qatar States immediately thereafter that mainland means "a large piece of land, a
continentalmass" [((ungrand morceaude terre, unemasse~ontinentale))]'~ a,nd it refers to the
definition givenin Webster'sDictionary: "a continuousbody of land constitutingthe chief part of
a countryor continent" [((unemasseterrestred'unseul tenantconstituantlapartie principaled'un
pays oud'uncontinent))][traductiondu greffe]. The chiefpart[partieprincipale]: this definition,
aswe see, is essentiallyempirical. It is not a definition,it is a description. The differencebetween
an islandand a continentis quantitativeand not qualitative. It is one of degree rathern one of
nature. A very large island is a continent; everythmg is a matter of proportion and scale. In
relationto the European-Asiatic "continent",Britainis an island,or a groupof islands: do we not
commonly speakof the BritishIsles? With regard to themaritimedelimitation between France and
the UnitedKingdom, on the contrary, Britainis a mainlandoff whose shores lie other islands-
Q 4 3
the Isle of Wight, for example. The main island of Bahrain appears an island in relationto the
continental land masses of SaudiArabia and of Qatar; in relation to Tighaylib or Umm Jalid, it
''keplyof Qatar,para.9.37. appears a mainland [territoire principal].
Sometimes the word mainland is translated by
((continent)),but this term does not convey the connotationof relativity as much as the English
word does. The Registry of the Court appears to share these hesitations. 1 looked, 1 soughtto
know how it translated mainland-to-mainland[masse terrestre à masse terrestre]. And 1found
that it was sometimestranslated by((méthode de continentà c~ntinent))~'s,ometimesby ((méthode
de masseterrestre à masse terre~tre))'~.Elsewhere,the Registry has translated "mainland coast"
by «la côte du territoire principal))53.Article 13 of the 1982Convention on the Law of the Sea
detennines the régime of low-tide elevations depending on their distance «du continent ou d'une
ile» in the French versionof the Convention,or "fromthe mainland or an island" in the English
version. Wemay well ask whetherMax Huber,in hisIsland ofPalmas Award,was not in the right
to employthe tenn terrafirma in preferenceto mainland,adding immediatelyin brackets, because
he too had doubts, that heunderstoodthis to mean "the nearest continentor island of considerable
size"[((leplus proche continentou île d'étendueconsidérab~e))]~w ~, ich admirablyhighlights the
relative,urelycomparativenatureof this concept.
56. It is this relativity, 1 believe, which explains why the concept of mainland, or
((continent)),or ((masseterrestre)),which lies at the heart of our opponents'theory, has no legal
specificity. Whether "continent"or island,in both casesit is what Article 121ofthe Conventionof
the Law of the Sea calls a "land tenitoryu [((territoire terrestre))]; and, as 1 shall recall, the
1982Convention grantslow-tideelevationsexactly the samelegal régime whether they be located
off amainland[territoire principal], off a continent, or off an island. This leads me to a remark
whichis alsoglaringlyobvious.
57. There is no hierarchy betweenthe land temtories and the coasts. In Qatar's view, the
# 044
principal island of Bahrain warrants being taken into consideration because of its large size,
becauseit is a mainland[territoire principal], but Bahrain'sislands andother smallertemtories do
not warrantconsideration because of their small siz- pieces of confetti, 1said earlier, scattered
or example,Replyof Qata, ara.9.11.
or example,ReplyofQatar, . 332.
53~eplof Qatar,para.438.
S4VN~~~~ V,ol.II,p.829. overthe sea as it were. It is this imageof two substantialmainlands separatedby a maritime area
dottedwith insignificant,negligible, minusculefeaturesthat Ouropponents seekto impress upon
the Court through theirreasoningand maps. 1need hardly recall, Mr. President,that accordingto
thejurisprudence of the Court, "the capacity to engender"maritime rights "derives not from the
land mass but from sovereignty overthe land ma~s"~~.Not fiom a physical feature, but from a
legal and political element. Once it has been establishedthat it is part of the State temtory of
Bahrain, the smallest of small islets engenders maritime projections. In internationallaw, land
territories are not divided into mainlands [territoiresprincipaux], the only ones to be taken into
accountin maritime delimitation, andnon-mainland temtories, i.e., secondaryones, which can be
"disregarded" [((ignorés))]or forgotten about in maritime delimitation! Professor Quéneudec's
statementthat the "mainlandcoasts ... are.. .the only true coasts of the two tat tes"e'^okes a
distinctionwhich the Court strictly condemns.
58. Qatar'smaritime theory,and our opponentsdo not deny it, is in somerespects a further
applicationof the so-called "principle of proximity"whichthey dreamtup to suit the needs of the
present case, with regard as much to the Hawar Islands as to the other natural features lying
betweenthe mainlandof Bahrainand the peninsula ofQatar. My fiiend SirElihuLauterpachthas
addressedthe Courtonthe inexistenceofthisprinciplein internationallaw, and1shallnot return to
thisquestion. 1shallmerely emphasize that,as farbackas 1969,in the casesconcerningtheNorth
Sea Continental ShelJ;the Court rejected thisprinciplein the strongest possible terms. Thisis a
dictumnot often quoted fiom the 1969Judgrnent,but a dictum which deserves a few secondsof
ourattention:
"Submarineareas do not really appertainto the coastal State because - or not
only because- they arenear it. Theyarenearit of course; but this would not suffice
to confer title, any more than, according to a well-established principle oflaw ...
045 mere proximityconfersper se title to landtemt~ry."~'
59.There wouldappearto be nothingmore to add. Territorial sovereignty, sovereigntyover
features Ijformations] as over mainlands [territoires principaux], is determined by a subtle
5s~ontinentalShelf(LibyanArabJarnahiriya/Malta)I,.C.J.Reports1985,p. 41,para.49.
S 6 ~200010,p.43, para.9.
orth tSea ContinentalShelf;I.C.J.Reports1p.31para.43.interplayoftitles andefectivitésand,as SirElihurecalled, itis only if suchcriteriaareinsufficient
to determinesovereigntythat international law resorts to the subsidiary criterion of proximity, of
contiguity,of appurtenance[rattachement],or of the situationin relationto a maritime boundary.
The authorities quotedby our opponents - Fitzmaurice,Waldock,Bowett - are unanimouson
this head.
60. The recent Eritrea/Yemencase provides a striking example of this approach. The
Tribunalstatedthat inthe absence ofany factortippingthe scalesin favour ofone or otherof the
Statesconcemed, there is "some presumption"[((certaineprésomption))]a , nd its cautionmust be
noted, that an islandbelongs to the State off whose Coastit lies. The Tribunaladded thatsuch a
presumptionwouldcomeintoplayonlyifthe eflectivités "speakwithan uncertainvoice" [((parlent
d'unevoix in~ertaine))]~~t,e expressionisanadmirableone. Sucha presumption giveswayto any
actual evidence tippingthe scales in favour of one of the Parties. Inother words, recourseto
proxirnity, to contiguity, to appurtenance [rattachement]is limited to situations in which the
Tribunalhas nootheravailableelement allowingitto determinesovereigntyon othergrounds. The
Tribunalstatedthat such a presumption, designed to avoid a situationof non liquet,would only
comeintoplayifneitherStatewereableto show morethantheotherin respectof presenceand the
exercise of State fun~tions~~.This was so for the islands lying in the Beagle Channel: in the
absenceof anytitleor effectivité the Arbitral Tribunalawardedthemto the parties,aswerecalled,
by locationon onesideor the otherof the maritime boundarydrawnin the Channel. Thisexample,
quoted by Professor~uéneudec~~ e,xactly echoesthe spirit ofEritreaflemen. In that case, the
Tribunalrecalled thatvery feweffectivités weresufficientto tip the scalesin the case ofdifficult,
inhospitableor isolatedtemtories, andoncethe scaleshad beentipped,so to Say,the presumption
based onproximity,continuityorappurtenance[rattachementJ6'no longerhad effect. Themethod
advocated by our opponents, which consists in drawing a maritime boundary using the
mainland-to-mainland[masse terrestre à masse terrestre] method,then sharing out the islands
58~irsStageparas.457-458;cfpara.480.
'%rst Stageparas.507-508;cfpara.458.
6 0 ~2000/10,p. Il, para.63.
6'~irsStagepara.452. according to their location on one side or the other of this boundary- i.e., on the basis of
proximity,of contiguity,of appurtenance[rattachement]- canonly be used in the casesin which
nootherfactor (particularlyeffectivité)llowsthe issue of territorial sovereigntyto be determined.
There can be no question, the Eritreah'emen Tribunal stated explicitly, of drawing a maritime
boundary"withoutregard tothe islandswhosesovereigntyhasbeen determinep6*- that is to Say
determinedby theapplication of thepnnciples andrulesgoverningterritorialsovereignty,
Al1the natural featuressituatedbetween thecoasts of the two so-cailed "massesterrestres"
[mainlands]areBahrainiterritory
61. Mr. President,if the match,if you will permitthe expression,betweenQatar andBahrain
endedin a drawas regardstitles to or effectivits ith regard toland features situated betweenthe
coast of Qatar and the coast of the main island of Bahrain,then, yes, the presurnption based on
proximity, contiguity, appartenance [appurtenance], the situation on one or other side of a
maritimeboundary drawnonthe basis of other criteria, couldmake it possible to determine ascore
and decide betweenthe Parties. Butthisis not so inthe presentcase, for tworeasons.
62. Firstly because, as you havebeen told, Bahrain has atitle to al1these features. An old
titleno doubt, buta historical one. The State of Qatar,as weow,was formedby separation from
the State of Bahrain,which in the nineteenth centurystill includedthe peninsulaof Qatar, andit is
only the temtories over which the Al-Thani dynasty exercised its authority which split from the
Stateof Bahrain to formwhatin thetwentieth centurywasto becomethe Stateof Qatar.
63. Subsequently, above all, because-independently of this consideration of legal
history- there is the principle that in the absence of a clear legal title, it is the continuous and
effective exercise of Statefunctions which constitutes the criterion of territorial sovereignty,as
MaxHuber statedin the celebrated passagein his Award in the Island of Palmas case, to which
reference was recently made by a Member of the Court in his opinion in the case concerning
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (~otswana/~amibia)~~,and has also been made here by my fiiend
ElihuLauterpacht. In addition, accordingto the principle laiddownby the Permanent Court inthe
047
case conceming Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, recentlyevoked by another Member of the
62~econdStage,para. 83.
63~issentingopinionof JudgeKooijmans,para. 14. Court, again in the case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), in the
jurisprudence thetribunalhas been satisfiedwith "very littlein the way of the actualexercise of
sovereignrights,providedthat the other State could notakeout a supenorclaimMblI .n our case,
itis not a mere handful ofeffectivitéswhich Bahrain can point to, but a large number,as my
colleagueshave shown. To bonow an expressionfromtheEritreaflemenAward, allow me toSay
that Bahrain ccpource qui est de manifestersa présenceet son autorité, amieux à présenter))
[traduction du greffe]"has more to show by way of presence and display of a~thority"~~ than
Qatar.
64. Thepreponderanceof eflectivitésisindeedoverwhelming.It is not a matterfor doubt, it
is indisputable and, moreover,undisputeck it is in favour of Bahrain. Bahrain'sactivities, its
presence, itseffectivitésspeak as loudly asthenature of the place permits, whereasthe activities,
the presence,the effectivitésof Qatar are totally inaudible. This is true of the HawarIslands, of
course,but it is equally trueof the otherfeatureswhich are crucialforthe courseof the maritime
boundary - Fasht ad Dibaland Qit'atJaradah. Over thesetwo features,as MichaelReismanhas
just demonstrated,and overal1the others,Bahrainhas exercisednumerousacts of sovereignty,and
hasbeenthe onlyone todo so. Thepositionofthe otherParty - ithasto be saidandrepeatedyet
again- is revealing: itcontents itselfwithminimizing,denigrating,disquali%ng Bahrain'sacts
of sovereignty by speakingdisdainfully of «lesprétenduespreuves d''actesde souveraineté' de
Bahrein))["so-called evidence of Bahrain'sactsof ~overei~nty"']~b~,t it has beenunable to cite
one singleactof sovereigntyby Qatar. Andit isprobablybecauseQatardoesnothavethe slightest
effectivitéto rely on thatour opponentshave inventedsubstitutetheonesintendedto serveas some
kind of a "sparewheel",suchas the theorywhichawardsto the coastalState,automatically andin
principle,l1insularorotherfeatureslyingwithinits temtonal sea.
65. 1wouldnot wish to take up the Court'stime by referringyet againto Bahrain's actsof
sovereignty over Dibal and Jaradah, as well as over the other featuressituatedbetweenthe main
O 4 8 island of Bahrainand thepeninsulaof Qatar,or yet once moreto the integrationof these features
64~issentiopinionofJudgeRezek,para.15.
'*FirstStage,para.507.
Counter-MemonaolfQatar,paras.6et seq.into the Bahraini ensemble and the importance whichsome of them have for the economic and
social development ofthe State of Bahrain. In regard to those of these features which lie to the
west of the boundary claimed by Qatar, no evidence of the effective existence of Bahrain's
sovereigntyis reallyneeded since,as we haveheard6',Qatardoes not claimthem. Theyare to the
west of the boundary,and that is all, that suffices. It is therefore quite pointless to examine
Bahrain'seffectivitéswith respectto, let us say, Thaylibor Jazirat Mashtan. As regards Bahrain's
effectivitéswith respectto suchof these featuresas Qatar claimsbecausethey lie to the east of the
maritimeboundarywhich it claims,in particular DibalandJaradah,may1refer you onthis pointto
our pleadings68 and towhat my fiiendMichaelReismanhasjust indicatedto us.
66. In a word,in the case beforeus Bahrain is alone, to repeat the phraseology used in the
Eritrea/Yemenarbitration,in showingevidenceof «unemanifestation intentionnelle deson pouvoir
et de son autorité surle territoireen questionpar l'exercicede sajuridiction et des fonctions
Etatiques))[traductiondu greffe] [["anintentionaldisplayof power and authonty over thetemtory,
by the exerciseof jurisdiction and Statefun~tions"]~-~ admirable phraseology destinedto become
as celebrated as the other repeatedly cited passage of MaxHuber in his Award in the Island of
Palmascase. Itis therefore thissovereigntyof Bahrainwhichis the starting-pointandthe basis on
which the maritimeboundary must be drawn. But how? This is a problem 1 wish to examine a
little later.
Theso-called((méthodd ee calculdemasseterrestreàmasseterrestre»["mainland-to-mainland
method"]is politicallyunacceptable
67. As well as these considerationsof a legal nature,there is a politicalaspect of the utmost
importance. Should the masse terrestreà masse terrestre[mainland-to-mainland] delimitation
theory cary the day and henceforth becomelaw, the principle of the stability of frontiers,whose
crucial role in the international legal system my fiiend FathiKemicha has pointed to, would be
greatly endangered. Will the Court allow a State's sovereignty overan island or other feature
resulting from the application of the principlesand rules of intemationallaw goveming territorial
67CR 2000f10,p.12,para. 64.
68~emorialof Bahrain,para568-603;Replyof Bahrain,para335-351.
69~irstStage,pa239. sovereigntyto be open to challengebecause of, or onthe pretext of, an alleged irrationalityin its
maritimeconsequences? In our presentcase, once Bahrain,pursuantto the principles andrules of
84 9
international lawgoveming territorial sovereignty,is sovereign in Fasht ad Dibal, Qit'atJaradah,
the Hawar Islands and the other islandsand low-tide elevationslying between the main island of
Bahrainand the peninsulaof Qatar,willthe Court allow thissovereigntyto be called into question
onthe pretext or occasionof the maritime delimitation? Geography,Mr.President,is not a source
of law,geographyby itselfis nota legaltitle. If the delimitationof maritime spaceswereto be the
occasion, orprovide the pretext, for refashioning political boundaries inherited from history, it
would woefully erode the stabiliîy of international relations.Will theCourt allow maritime
delimitationto serve as a starting-pointfor a processof large-scaletemtorial revisionismone
end of the planet to the other? This, quite apart from the specific dispute between Bahrain and
Qatar,is somethingwhich isat stakeinthe presentcase.
B. What aretheterritoriesof Bahrain whichgeneratemaritimerights?
68. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, 1 now reach the second issue which 1 wish to
examine in regard to the relationship between land and sea and the process of maritime
delimitation. Once it is established that the theory of ((masse terrestreà masse terrestre))
[mainlandto mainland]delimitationis contraryto the fundamentalprinciplesof the law of the sea
and the law of territorial sovereignty,a more practical question arises, one closer to the
circumstancesof the present case: do all, or only some,of Bahrain'sterritoriesgenerate maritime
rights? Does a distinction have to be drawn between territories of Bahrain and temtories of
Bahrain?
Islands,islets, rocks
69. As Qatar observes in its pleadings, the law of the sea "knows several concepts to
characterizepieces of land emerging from the seau, narnely islands, rocks, reefs and low-tide
elevation~'~.Earlier, in its Memorial, Qataralso mentionedsand-banks7',but as a legal category *
theyare obviouslynon-existent. Also, the concept of rocks, mentionedin Article 121,paragraph3,
t! O5 O
70~eplyofQatarpara.7.12.
71~emonalof Qatarpara.10.17. ofthe Convention,is not unanimouslyregardedas formingpart of customaryinternational law,but
this is a problem which does not arise here. That said, the other Party does not adhere to the
classification it suggested with so much precision itself. As we pointed out in our
~ounter-~emorial~',Qatar doestwothings. The first is simplyto refrain fiom mentioning certain
featuresor to rninimizethis or that feature in the hope of showing it tobe less important than it
reallyis. So, forexample,Tighaylib,which Qatar describes asa reef- i.e., nothingat al- is in
fact a low-tide elevation. The second-a method to which Qatar has recourse frequently and
almost systematically - is to describe certain islandsas islets, which do not correspond to any
legalcategory whatsoever. Understandme fully, Mr.President: to describe an island of a small
size as an islet is perfectly innocentand acceptableif done purely descriptively,soas to indicate
that theisland is small, and provided nonormative effectis attachedto the description, thatis to
Say,if there is no attempt to distinguishbetween the legal status of an island andthat of an islet.
But the manifest purpose of Our opponents in describing certain Bahraini islands - with an
extraordinaryrichnessof vocabulary - as "small islands","islets","smallislets", "tiny islets",and
even,to crown it all, "Lilliputiani~lets"s a sortoflegalcapitis deminutio.
70. It must be observed once more that there is no such legal category as an islet in
internationallaw. Even these "tinyfragmentsof emerged~and"74d ,escribed andderided the other
day by Mr. Quéneudec,these tiny fragments of emergedland, what do they arnount to legally?
Legally they are islands. Whatever their size, every island, that is to Say, according to the
definitionin Article 121of the Conventionon the Law of the Sea, every "naturallyformed area of
land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide", generates the sarne maritime
jurisdictions as other land territones. Nor, as we al1know, is it relevant whether the island is
inhabitedor habitable,or whetherit is neither inhabitednor habitable: an islandis an island, and
t O 5 1
that isthat. How can Qatar write that, in asserting that in matters of maritimedelimitation "an
island is an island", we have contradictedboth international jurisprudence and State practice?75
72~ounter-~emorialfBahrain, ara.484.
73~eplyof Qatar,p. 283, paras.7.22, 7.25, 7.29,7.33, 7.35, 7.41, 8.8, 8.12, 9.39, 9.42, 9.50, 9.58, 9.60;
CR2000/10,p. 10,para.61.
7 4 2000/10,p. 1,para.61.
75~eplyof Qatar,para.9.9. Have, then, the authorsof Qatar's pleadingsneverread Article 121of the 1982 Convention,which
for thatmatter has been forcefullyreaffirmed in the Eritreamemencase? Every island, however
small, says the Tribunal, and even rocks provided they are proud of the water at high tide, is
capable of generatinga territorial sea of 12nauticalles76and creates a low-water baselinefrom
whichthe territorialseais to be mea~ured~~.
Low-tide elevations: theircharacteris territorialand that of land
71.Oncethe misunderstandingcreatedbythe other Party's systematicuse of theword "islet"
has been resolved, the issue which arises, and itis the only issue whicharises fromthe legal point
of view, is that of low-tide elevations. As we pointedout in ourounter-~emorial~',the concept
and the legalrégimeoflow-tide elevationshavelongbeen uncertain,as evidenced evenin 1951by
the Court's Judgment in the Nonvegian Fisheries case7'. It was not until Article 11 of the
1958Geneva Conventionon the Temtorial Sea and the ContiguousZone, which Article 13of the
1982United Nations Convention repeatsword for word - thus not until 1958- that both the
terminology and the legalrégimewerestabilized. As the Court knows,the Parties agreethat these
provisions have customaryforce. Since 1958,therefore, uncertaintyandhesitation as to the status
of low-tideelevationsis athing of thepast- terminologically, conceptuallyand legally.
72. First, terminologically: the "dryingrocks", "shoals"and "rocksawash" formerly spoken
of have given wayto "low-tide elevations",justas in French the «sèches»,cflondsaffleurants))and
($on& couvrantset découvrants» have givenwayto ((hauts-fondsdécouvrants)).Theterminology
I 0 5 2 is now settled. Consequently,we can only regretthat from time to time our opponents continue to
have recourseto out-of-date tenns nolongerrecognizedin internationallaw.
73. Conceptually, today we know precisely what a low-tide elevation is. A low-tide
elevation is defined in Article13 of the 1982 Convention, to which the two Parties ascribe
customary force, as "a naturally formed area of land which is surroundedby and above water at
low tide but submergedat high tide". This definition,of exemplaryprecision, is a pendant to the 4
76~econdStage,para. 155.
77~econdStage,para. 156.
78~ounter-~emorialof Bahrain,para.522.
79~.~.Reports 1951,p. 128. definition of "island" given in Article 121: "a naturally formed area of land ... which is above
water athigh tide"; low-tideelevationsare abovewaterat low tide andsubmerged at high tide.
74. Finally, and thisis the most important, the legal régime: there exist between low-tide
elevations and islands both points of similarity and differences. Accordingto Article 121of the
United Nations Convention,the temtorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf of an island are govemed by the sarne rules as are applicable to "other
land temtory", no differencebeingmade betweenan islandand otherlandtemtory. The low-water
line of a low-tide elevation,on the otherhand, may,accordingto Article 13of the Convention, "be
used as the baseline formeasuring the breadthof the temtorial seauonly ifit is situated "whollyor
partly at a distancenot exceedingthe breadthof the territorialsea fiom the mainland or an island";
otherwise, Article 13 continues, the low-tide elevation has no "temtorial sea of its own".
Accordingly, and here is the difference, unlike islands,which always generate territorial sea
whatever their location, a low-tide elevation generatesor fails to generateterritorial sea according
to its location. One pointmust be added,which derivesboth fromthe wording of Article 13itself
and fiom the travaux préparatoires: a low-tide elevation,it is universally recognized, does not
generate aterritorialseaunless itis situatedat a distancefiom a "mainland"or an "island"less than
the breadth of the temtorial sea. If it is situated lessthan 12nauticalmiles fiom another low-tide
elevation it does not generate temtonal sea: leap-fiogging, le saute-mouton, fiom one low-tide
elevationto anotherad injîniturnisnotpossible. Theserules arenow firmlyestablished.
053 75. It will be of interestto notethat in theEritreaflemen case the Tribunal, in statingthat a
reef that is not also a low-tide elevation cannot serveas a baseoint80,confirms a contrario that a
reefwhich has thenature of a low-tide elevation can serveeffectivelyas abase point for measuring
the territorialsea. The situationis crystalclear.
76. Another rule deservingmention in this respectpoints in the same direction: this is the
rule in Article 7,paragraph4, of the 1982Convention,whichprovidesthat straightbaselines "shall
not be drawn to and fiom low-tide elevations, unlesslighthousesor similarinstallationswhich are
permanentlyabove sea levelhave been built on them or except in instanceswhere the drawingof
"second stagepara143. baselines to and fiom such elevationshas received general international recognition". That is to
Say,if either of these conditions is met, straight baselines can be drawn to and fiom a low-tide
elevation. However, Mr.President, seeingthat straight baselines can only be drawn to and from
"appropriate points"- in the words of the Convention itself - on the Coastand certainly cannot
be drawnto and fiom pointsin the water,aquaticpoints, out at sea,the pnnciple laid downin this
provision necessarily impliesthat by theirnature low-tide elevationsare land and not sea, and if
they are land they formpart of State temtory. A straight baselinecannot be drawn to and froma
pointin the water.
77. Even though certain low-tideelevationsdo not generateterritorial sea, because they lie
beyondthe lirnitsof the temtorial sea,this is not at al1becausethey are not Statetemtory. If they
were not State temtory by their nature, they could never generatemaritime jurisdiction. State
temtory is what low-tide elevations always are, regardless of their location. Even if situated
beyond the outer limits of the territorial sea of a mainland or an island at a point Mer than
12nauticalmiles, a low-tide elevationcannonethelessbe subjectto State sovereignty. If that were
not so, there would be no justification for a State to be able to erect a lighthouse or similar
permanentinstallationon it and make that lighthouseor installationthe point supporting a straight
O 5 4 baselinefiom which, as the Convention permits,the breadth ofits temtorial sea will be measured.
Nor would there be anyjustification fora low-tideelevationto berecognizableby other Statesas a
point of support for a straight baseline. Whatever their location,low-tide elevations arealways
subjectto the lawwhich govemsthe acquisitionand presemationof territorial sovereignty,with al1
its subtleties of title and efectivités. The old controversy, whichwas still current in 1953at the
time of Minquiers and Ecrehoso , n the capabilityof low-tide elevations- as was said in the past
and as Sir Gerald Fitvnaurice said - of appropriation in sovereignty, a pleasing expression,that
controversy belongsto thepast.
78. Mr.President, the other Party claims that Qatar has sovereignty over Dibal and
Jaradah- it clearly claims sovereignty- although it considers both of them to be low-tide i
elevations; thisDibal is and, in our view, Jaradah is not. In doing so, it acknowledgesthat
low-tideelevationscanbethe objectof sovereignty. However,itmaintains - andhere appearsthe
awkwardpoint in its reasoning - that low-tide elevations situatedin the territorial sea are under Statesovereignty,but assea, as a body of a water, andnot as land temtory. As regards a low-tide
elevation situated beyond the outer limit of the temtorial sea but within the outer limit of the
continentalshelf(i.e.,in practice,between 12and 200nautical miles), thelow-tide elevation,Qatar
maintains,is part of its continentalshelf At lessan 12miles the low-tide elevationis water, it is
temtorial sea. Beyond 12 miles but within 200 miles it forms part of its continental shelf and
therefore is no longer subject to State sovereignty but to the sovereign rights which the coastal
Statepossesses overits continental shelf. Inshort- and1believe this is no misrepresentationor
parody of our opponents' argument - a low-tide elevation is water if it is situated less than
12milesfrom the coast,but seabed ifit is situatedmorethan 12miles fromthe coast; it will never,
theySay,be landtemtory.
79. Qatar draws two surprising conclusions from this theory that low-tide elevationsare
maritime - aquatic or seabed- in character. First, being sea, "it is the law of the sea that
applies", and not the law of temtorial sovereignty at all, in that 1 quote Professor Salmon -
"low-tide elevations are not subject to appropriation in the sarne way as terra&ma may be
O
appropriated"81;Qatar does not deny thatthey are capable of appropriation since Qatar clairns
them,or in any event claims Dibal and Jaradah. But they are not capable of appropriationin the
sarneway as terrafima may be appropriated. Secondly, whatis even more surprising,low-tide
elevationshaveno coast; they cannot therefore representthe coast of a State and cannotform part
of that coast; as Qatarwxites,«il n'yapas àproprementparler derivage sur unélémend te la
géographiemarine auquels'applique l'expression «haut-fon découvrant))e ,t un tel haut-fond
découvrant n'est donc pau sn élémend te la côte)) ["there is properly speaking no shore on a
maritimefeaturewhich qualifies as a low-tide elevation, and alow-tide elevation thereforeis not
part of thecoast"lS2. It is water, it is seabed, it is not a piece of land, it is not a coast. By this
strangeargument Qatarseeks to disqualifj Fasht ad Dibal,Qit'atash Shajarah,Qita'ael Erge and
Fasht Bu Thur as Bahraini coastal points en blocg3: if we are to believe Qatar, legallyal1these
featuresare aquatic in character. But if this is so, Mr.President, may 1 again put the following
"CR2000/5,p. 39,para.21. Similar, emorialof Qatar,para.10.59.
82~ounter-~emonaolfQatar,para.6.95. Similarly,CR2000/9,p.40, para.18.
83~ounter-~emoriaolf Qatar, paras6..82-6.83. question: how do Ouropponents explainthe customaryrule expressedin Article 13of the 1982
Convention,which by its very wordingpermits a State to calculatethe outer limit of its territorial
sea from the low-water line on certain low-tide elevations? Are therethen base points in the p
temtorial sea which are aquatic points detached fiom the coast? No, Mr. President. The sea, at
1
least until the presentday, does not generateany maritime projection; only land can do that. The
sea does not dominate the sea any more than it dominates the land. It is true that low-tide
elevations generate maritime projection, only in certain limited geographical situations,but this
does not affecttheir inherent nature, whichis and remains alwaysthe same - territorialandthat of
land.
80. It is interesting to note that in theritrea/Yemencase it was in the first stage of the
arbitral procedure, relating to temtorial sovereignty, that the Tribunal made a finding on the
low-tide elevations; it would seem clear that it assimilated them toislands, islets and rocks in
deciding that ((lesîles,îlots, rocherset hauts-fondsdécouvrants)[)"the islands, islets, rocks and
low-tide elevations"]ofthis or thatgroup ((relèvend te la souverainetéterritoriale))["aresubjectto
the territorial sovereignty"]of oneorother of the partiess4.As we can see,the Tribunalhas treated
0 56 low-tide elevations as being subject to "temtorial sovereignty", without distinguishing between
those of them which aresituated inthe temtorial sea and thosewhich lie outside the temtorial sea.
The idea which Qatar would like the Court to accept in the present case, that a State cannot
exercise temtorial sovereignty over a low-tide elevation situated beyondthe outer limit of its
temtorial seass,was evidentlynot intherninds oftheEritredemen Tribunal.
81. What is more, in the present case Qatar'sargument would result in absurd- totally
absurd - consequencesin regard to Fashtad Dibal. If we followQatar,Dibal - which,as we al1
agree, is a low-tide elevation- wouldhave two different legal characters since the outer limit of
12nautical miles fiomthe peninsulaof Qatar crosses Dibal. The part situatedlessthan 12nautical
miles fromthepeninsulaof Qatar, startingfiom Dibal,wouldthereforebe Qatari territorialsea. As
5
regards the part situated more than 12nautical miles fiom the peninsula of Qatar, it would be
continental shelf, so we are told; but since that part is situatedless than 200 nautical miles from
84~irsttage,para.527; [French translaby theRegistry].
8S~ounter-~emoriaolfQatar,para.6.15. both Qatar and Bahrain and would therefore formpart of the continental shelvesof both Bahrain
and Qatar, it would have to be delimited. The delimitation of the continental shelf too would
precede and conditionthe determinationof the temtorial sovereignties. Not until the continental
shelves of thetwo countrieshad been delimitedwouldwe how to whom sovereigntyover part of
Dibalbelonged. Onceagain, Qatarwouldlikethe seato determinethe sea.
82.Lookingatthings fi-omQatar'sstandpoint,the situationofQit'atJaradahwouldbejust as
peculiar. In Qatar'sview, as the Court knows, Jaradahis a low-tideelevation. In our view it is an
island. Now Jaradahis less than 12nauticalmiles fiom both Qatarand the mainisland of Bahrain,
that is toSay,it is withinthe territorialseasof the two countries. Qatar'sapproachwould therefore
place Jaradah under the sovereignty of both countriespending a maritime boundarybeing drawn
across the area in whichthe two territorialseas overlap,the stepwhich wouldmake it possible to
determine on which side of the maritime boundary Jaradah lay. Territorial sovereignty over
Jaradah, as overDibal,would be determined bythe maritimedelimitation.
057 83. Because Qatar is doubtless aware of the remarkable absurdity of this situation, it
proposes that the issue ofDibal andJaradahshouldbe tackled «dansuneautreperspective)); that
is its own expression: "fi-omanother perspective". In other words, by short-circuiting the
reasoning which 1havejust suggested and explained. Dibal and Jaradah must be under Qatar's
sovereignty, to use their very words, «en raison de leur situation))["by their very location"],
narnely because they are closer to Qatar than to the main island of ~ahrain'~. In reality, as the
Court knows, Dibal is closer to the Bahraini island of Qit'atJaradah than to Qatar. But even if
Dibal was closerto Qatar than any Bahrainiisland, one would be tempted to Say«Etalors))?"So
what?"
84.Qatarhas nohesitation in maintainingthat sovereigntyoverevery feature,be it an island
or a low-tide elevation,epends on whetherit is situatedto the east or to the west of the maritime
boundary which the Court is to determine. "[Tlhe attributionof the islet of..AlMu'taridto one
State or the other willepend on knowing onwhat side of the delimitation line the islet will be
located",said counsel for Qatar. It is "the course of that line .. .that will have the effect of
86~emorialof Qatar,para.10.73; Counter-Memorialof Qatar,para.6.85. confemng title to these low-tide elevations in the light of their location in relation to the
delimitationline."" What counsel forQatar calls "theattributionof sovereigntyMg to the maritime
boundary is not only a reversa1of the natural order of things, it makes proximity the criterion of
sovereignty. Thus Dibal and Jaradah,as 1havejust observed,are claimed by Qatarbecause they
4
are closer to the peninsula of Qatar than to the main island of Bahrain. The Hawar Islands are
claimedby Qatar "byvirtue",we aretold"of theirproximityto Qatar'scoastNg9T . he eastem partof
Fasht alAzm, Fasht Bu Thur, Qit'atash Shajarah,Qita'ael Erge, Rabad ash Sharquiyah,Rabadal
Ghabiyah, Jazirat Ajirah,al1these are claimed by Qatar not because it has any title whereby to
exercise effectivitésin them; no, they are claimed by Qatar because they lie to the east of the
maritimeboundary which Qatar requeststhe Courtto draw by ignoringthese features. Proxirnity,
the keystoneof territorial sovereignty,the principal criterion ofsovereignty,the decisiveelementin
058
maritime delimitation-once more,thisis the theorywhichQatar requeststhe Courtto endorse.
85. Mr.President, if, instead of Qatar's imaginarytheory, we apply the well-established
principlesand rules which govern territorial sovereignty,the islands and low-tideelevationslying
to the east of the maritime boundaryclaimed by Qatar are subject to Bahrain'ssovereigntyby the
same title, for the same reasons and with every ounce of certainty as the islands and low-tide
elevationslying to the westof this boundary. Withoutexception,everyone of thesefeatureswhich
has the status of an island naturally generates a territorial sea: the principal island ofBahrain,
Sitrah and Muharraq, but also al1 the other islands, those comprising the archipelago of the
HawarIslands, Rabad al Ghabiyah, Rabad ash Sharquiyah, Jazirat Ajirah, Al Mu'tarid, Jazirat
Mashtan, Jabari and Qit'atJaradah. Those of the low-tide elevations which are situated less than
12nauticalmiles from aBahrainitemtory, be itthe mainisland or otherBahrainiislands,alsohave
theirown territorial sea: Fasht ad Dibal, situatedless than 12miles from both Fasht al Am (i.e.,
the islandof Sitrah)andthe island ofJaradah; Qit'at ashShajarah,situated lessthan 12miles from
the islandofUmm Jalid; Qita'aelErge,situatedlessthan 12miles fromthe mainisland of Bahrain
and the islands of Al Mu'tarid,Mashtan,Jazirat Hawar, Rabad ash Sharquiyah,Jazirat Ajirah and
"CR 2000110p, . para.62andp. 13,para.64.
"CR 2000110,p. 11,par63.
89~eplyof Qatar,para.1.7. Umm Jalid; Fasht Bu Thur,situatedless than 12miles fromthe main island and fromthe islands
of Al Mu'tarid,Mashtan, Jazirat Hawar, Rabad al Ghabiyah, Rabad ash Sharquiyah and Jazirat
~jirah~. As far as Fasht al Azmis concerned,it forms part of the island of Sitrah,as my fnend
Reisman has shown; but even if we followed Qatar'sreasoning that it is a low-tide elevation
distinctfromthe island of Sitrah, even inthat case FasAni wouldneverthelesshave its own
territorial sea,because it would then be a low-tideelevation situatedless than 12miles fiom the
mainislandand from theislandsof Sitrah andmmJalid.
86.Before goingfurtherand establishingwhetheral1these Bahrainitenitories, which 1have
purposely enumerated in somewhat haphazard fashion,are capable of acting as base points in
calculatingthe line, in determining the line of delimitation, to dispose of two precedents
which Qatarrelies on to support its peculiar theory of"first the sea, then the1lshall talk
about the Boggs-Kennedyline and about treaty practice in the Gulf. If we are to believe Qatar,
0 5 9 these are decisive precedents which the Courtcould or should rely on in applying the méthodede
calcul de masse terrestrà masse terrestre [mainland-to-mainland method]. Neither ofthese
precedents, 1 hope to succeed in demonstrating tomorrow, has theslightest relevance for the
purposesofthe present case.
1thankyou for yourpatienceMr. President.
ThePRESIDENT: Thankyou, Professor Weil. This brings thismoming'ssittingto an end.
We shallresume tomorrow at 10a.m.. The Courtis adjoumed.
TheCourt rose at1.05p.m.
"~eeMemonalof Bahrain,paras.619and626.
Translation