Translation

Non-Corrigé ~raduction

Uncorrected Translation

CR 200016 (traduction)

CR2000116(translation)

Jeud i5juin 2000

Thursday15June2000808 The PRESIDENT: Pleasebe seated. The Sittingis open and 1give the floor to Professor

ProsperWeil forthe State ofBahrain.

THE MARITIMEDELIMITATION OPERATION

Mr. WEIL: Mr. President,Members of the Court, before concludingthe matter of defining

the territories of Bahrain which generate maritimeghts, it remains for me to Saya few words

about two precedentswhichtheother Part hasinsistentlyrelied upon.

Anirrelevant precedent:theBoggs-Kennedyline

87. Our opponents set great store, first of all, by a line proposed in 1948 by Commander

Kennedy of the British Admiralty and Whittemore Boggs, Geographer of the United States

Department of State, for theurposes of dividingthe seabed and subsoil of the Gulf betweenthe

riparian States. In the section of their report conceming the maritime areas located between

Bahrainand Qatar these two experts,as our opponents pointout,proposed that thisdivisionshould

be canied out in accordance with a median line drawn between Qatar and the main island of

Bahrain, without taking accountof the islands, islets, rocks, reefs and low-tideelevations located

between the two. Our opponentsclearly attachgreat importance tothis precedent,as they devoted

many pages to it in their Reply, after briefly refemng to it in their Memorial and Counter-

~emorial'. The textof the Boggs-Kennedyreportis reproducedin AnnexIV.127in Volume 10of

the Annexestothe MemorialofQatar [Illustration].

88. Mr.President,our opponents reallymusthave been at a loss for argumentsto be reduced

to relying upon such flimsy evidence. No onewill dispute the fact that Kennedy and Boggs are

undoubtedly hydrographicexperts of the highest order and fully deserve the praise heaped upon

themby the authorsof Qatar'swritten pleadings2. Their report is excellent and irreproachablefor

what itis - ofthat there is no doubt. However,it is utterly worthlessfor what it is not and does

notpurport to beybut which Qatarwould have usbelievethat itis. Allow meto explain.

&

'~emorial of Qatar, para. 11.37; Counter-Mernorialof Qatar, para. 8.96,Reply of Qatar,
paras.9.12-9.26.
Z~eplyof Qatar,para. 9.14,note43. 89. In order to findout whatthis report is,and what its authorsintended it to beyoneneed
t. 089
only castone'seye overits text. Ourattentionis thenirnmediatelydrawntotwothings.

90.First,the reportsetsoutrecommendationsfortheBritish and UnitedStatesGovernments

coieming proposals which theycould submit to theGulf States with a view to dividingup the

Gulf for thepurposes of exploitationof the seabed andsubsoil. That is to Saythat, first, it is a

proposa1 whichcan serve"asthe basis fornegotiations"(((commebasepour les négociations»)a ,s

the report states; and, second,this proposa1is limited to the continental shelf, excludingthe

superjacentwaters.

91. Second, theproposa1 is of an exclusivelytechnicaland practical nature; it is not- and

does not purportto be- basedon any legal consideration.Neither Boggsnor Kennedy,as Qatar

acknowledges,werelawyers3. Thereport'sauthorspointoutthat theirresponsibilitieswere limited

to the technical aspects of a fair and equitable division ofthe seabed and subsoil areas of the

PersianGulf onscientificpnnciples. Theyadd thatthechartsavailabletothemwereimpreciseand

incompleteand that sovereignty overcertain islandswas controversial. Our opponentshave had

the good grace to acknowledgethis: the Boggs-Kennedyreport, they write, is "based ...on

exclusively geographicalandtechnicalconsiderations,disregardingany legalor political factorsM4.

The proposalsmadeby the two eminentexperts- our opponentsmakeno secret ofthis either -

arebasedoncommonsenseprinciples(«principesde bonsens»),andnot onprinciplesandrulesof

law5. It can safely be said that their report has no legal aspirations and is without legal

significance. Legally,the Boggs-Kennedy reportdoesnotcreatea precedent. In anyevent it dates

back to a penod- 1948- when the law on maritime delimitation was embryonicand

considerations ofequitywerepurelyempincal and not definedin legal terms. It was not - asthe

Court laiows- until the Judgmentin the 1985LibydMalta case that the conceptof equiîyin the

matter of maritime delimitation assurned whatthe Court referred to as a "normativecharacterM6.

Sirnilarly,the solutionswhich the report'sauthors suggestedto the problem of the islandshave
010

3~eplyof Qatar,para.9.19.

4~eplyof Qatar, paras9..14and9.25-9.26.
'Replyof Qatar,para.9.26.
6~ontinentl heif(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta),I.C.J.Reports1985,p. 39,para.46.clearlybeen supersededin the light of the principlesof customarylaw expressedin Article 121of

the 1982Conventiononthe Law ofthe Sea.

92. To this should be added two other observations whichare equally devastating for our

opponents. The firstis thatas they acknowledge7,the Boggs-Kennedyreport, dated 16December

1948, makes no mention of the line proposedin the British letters of 23 December 1947 and

proposes a different line. We have to believe that the report's authors were not stmck by the

importance of this British line of 1947, whichQatar would today like to be seen as a highly

relevant, if not even decisive, circumstance for the maritime delimitation between Bahraiand

Qatar - a circumstancewhich thus dated back exactly one year. 1sit conceivable that this self-

styled "decision"by the British, whichwas allegedlyso important, couldhave completelyescaped

the notice of two suchexperienced expertsin Gulfaffairs? My secondobservation,which deals an

even more fatal blow to the other side's argument, is that, asthe other Party once again

acknowledges8,the Boggs-Kennedyline atûibutes - and nothing can be clearer than thi- the

HawarIslands to Bahrain.

93. Ouropponentsshouldperhaps havebeencarefulnotto rely upon such a rottenplank. "A

precedent that cannot be ignored": that is how Qatar describes the Boggs-Kennedy lineg. The

Court will decide.

Another irrelevant precedent: the maritimedelimitation agreementsconcludedbetween
riparianStatesintheGulf

94. Justas illusoryis the supportwhichtheother Partyhopesto find in maritimedelimitation

agreements concluded between riparian States in the Gulf, particularly in other agreements

concluded by either of the Parties to this dispute. As examplesof this treaty practicein the Gulf,

Qatar cites the 1958Agreementbetween Bahrainand SaudiArabia, the 1965 Agreementbetween

Qatar and Saudi Arabia,the 1969Agreement betweenQatarand Abu Dhabi, the 1969Agreement

between Qatar and Iranand the 1971Agreementbetween Bahrainand Iran: al1theseAgreements,

Qatarargues, are based on the mainland-to-mainland delimitation methodand do not take account

7~eplyof Qatar,para. 9.14,note 40.
'ïbid.

'Reply of Qatar,p. 320. of the islands situatedbetween thecoastsof the Partiesc~ncerned'~.This, Qatar contends,is a

"significantpractice"l',from which the Court shoulddraw inspirationin the presentcase. The

Agentof Qatar and ProfessorSalmonhavedweltat lengthon the Agreement betweenBahrainand

Saudi Arabia which, they stated, adopted the principle of proximity and fixed the maritime

boundary"onthebasisofa medianline and notonthe basisof allegedoc~u~ation"'~.

95. Mr.President, shouldit be emphasizedonceagain that negotiated delimitations may be

basedon al1kindsof factors andare not based exclusivelyor necessarilyon legal considerations?

A delimitation agreement is often the fruit of lengthy negotiations, in which considerations of

politicalor economic expediency,andthe balancingof mutual concessions,play a crucial part. A

Statemay accept alessfavourable boundaryon oneofitscoastlines inreturnfora morefavourable

delimitationon another segment ofits coastlineor forpolitical or economic advantagesin other

areas. One needonly thinkof agreementssuch as thoseconcludedbetweenArgentins and chileI3

or between Franceand ~onaco'~,to seethat it is not always,and in any casenot exclusively, the

law which dictated and explained thesolutions adopted. As a particularly authoritative

cornrnentatorwrote, the Agreement betweenFrance and Morocco, for instance, "inspired by

reasons of courtesyand goodneighbourliness,involvesan ad hocsolutionwhichwas not dictated

by any legalconsideration andcanbe explainedonlybythe specialnatureofthe relationsbetween

thetwo ~ountries"'~ [translationby theRegistry]. It may even happenthatthe negotiatorsensure

thatthe solutionthey adoptdefiesanalysisso that commentatorsare unableto identifythe reasons

O 3 2 behindeach segment ofthe lineadopted. Arecentexampleof thisopacity,knowinglysoughtafter,

isprovidedbythe maritime delimitationagreement concludeid n 1999,lastyear,betweenDenmark

and the United Kingdom concerningfishery limits and the continentalshelf betweenthe Faroe

'%eplyof Qatar,paras.9.27-9.36.
''~e~l~ofQatar,p. 328.

'*CR200015,p.20,para.47,andp.33,para.12.
131984Treatyof Peace andFriendshi,nternational MaritimeBoundaries,Charneyand Alexander,op. cit.
supranote45, Vol.1,p. 719(FrenchtranslainRevuegénéralede droit internationalp1,985,p.854).

141984MaritimeDelimitationAgreement,International MaritimeBoundaries, cited above Vol.II, p. 1581
(FrenchtranslatinRevuegénéraldee droit internationalpublic1990,p. 308).
"G. Guillaume,"Lesaccords de délimitoaritimepasssarla France"i,n Perspectivesdu droitde àa mer
1'issuede la Troisième ConfdeesNationsUnies,Colloquedelasociéfrançaisepourledroitinternationa(lRouen,
1983),Paris,Pedone,1984,p.284.Islands and the United Kingdom, the authors of which clearly sought to preclude any rational

attemptat a legale~~lanation'~.

96. Consequently, a negotiated maritime boundary,like that on which our opponents are

relying, is not necessarily - and is in fact seldom - identical to that which might have been

drawn by a courtby applying legal principlesand rules. As the Court stated in the LibydMalta

case"although theremay be no legal lirnitto the considerationswhich Statesmay take accountof,

thiscan hardly be tme for a court applying equitable This analysis was reiterated

and confmed in the Jan Mayen caseI8. Based as much, if not more, on political factors or

considerations of expediency rather than strictly legal considerations, treaty-related precedents,

suchas the practice inthe Gulf,arenot bindingupon the courts, whicharerequiredto adjudicatein

accordancewiththe law.

97. Neither the practice in the region in questionnor the practice followedin its relations

witha third Stateby eitherof the parties tothe disputein which a courtis calledupon to adjudicate

arean exceptionto this rule. In theJanMayencase, forinstance, Denmarkarguedthatthe method

followed in a maritime delimitation agreement concludedin the same region by the other party,

Norway, with a third State, Iceland, constituted a relevant factorand a precedent on which the

Courtshould baseits decision. Denmarkalso invokedthe precedent of a Norwegiandecree - that

is, a unilateral measure by the other party itself- concerning an island of the Svalbard

archipelago. TheCourt refusedto attach anyvalue tothis argument.

98. The factthat other delimitation agreementsinthe Gulf concludedby one of the Parties to

this dispute with a third State did not take account of certain islands or low-tide elevations is

therefore irrelevantin the present case. Furthermore,as 1have alreadyobserved,developmentsin

international law with regard to maritime delimitation- particularly in respect of islands and

low-tide elevations - prevent agreementsthat go back such a long way in time fiom being
e
regarded as precedentsthat apply today. Nor shoulditbe forgotten thatthe agreementsreliedupon

16seecomrnentarbyy A. G.OndeElfennk,TheInternationalJournalofMarine andCoastalLaw,Vol. 14,1999,
p.541.

"~ontinentalShelf(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta), C.J Reports 1985,p.40, para.48.
18~aritime el imitationintheAreabenveenGreenlandandJanMayen,I.C.J.Reports1993,p. 63,paras.57-58. by Qatar relate mainly to the continental shelf,while in the present case it is a single maritime

boundarythat the Courtis beingasked to determine.

99. Moreover, treaty practice in the Gulf is so diverse that it defies any attempt at

systematization. The agreements referred toby Qatar demonstrate the empirical nature of the

solutions adopted in each case. If the Court refers to the agreements relating to the Gulf

reproducedin Charneyand Alexander'swork InternationalMaritimeBoundaries,it willfindthat it

isnotonlythe fewagreementsreliedupon by ouropponentswhichexhibitthis empiricalnature but

al1of the agreements concludedin this part ofthe worldand even al1of the agreementsconcluded

in al1parts of the worldI9. In his summarystudy appearing at thebegiming of the work, entitled

"Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations",

ProfessorBowettwrites:

"The situationsare so diverse thatgeneralizationsare hazardous,and to attempt
to postulate 'rules'[notethe quotationmarks]wouldbe to fa11into the error which the
courts have persistently, and rightly, a~oided."~'[La situation de chacune de ces
entitésest dzférente;aussi est-il risquéde procéderà des généralisationse ,t se
hasarder à supposer l'existence de ((règles»[le mot ((règles»est entre guillemets]

revient à commettrel'erreurque les tribunauxont toujours,et àjuste titre,pris soin
d'éviter(traductiondu Greffe).]

100.In a word,the purported"practicein the Gulf' relied upon so heavily by ou. opponents

is of nohelp in resolvingthe problem submittedto the Court, which,in the wordingused in Qatar's

Application instituting proceedings, is to draw the maritime boundary "in accordance with

international law".

101. Having concluded this lengthy digression on the Boggs-Kennedy line and treaty

practice in the Gulf, 1 now come to the question of whether all, or only some, of Bahrain's

temtones generatemaritimeprojections andcanbe usedas base pointsforthe purposes of drawing

the maritime boundary.

O14 C.Which ofBahrain'sterritoriesmaybeusedasbase pointsfor drawingthemaritime
boundary?

102.Mr. President,onceit has been determinedwhich of Bahrain's landfeaturesare capable

of generating maritime projections and, in particular, serving as base points for calculating

I9opc.t., Vol.1131.
'Olbid.,p154.Bahrain'sterritorial sea, one question arises. That question is as follows: are these features

therefore- that is, bythe mere fact ofhaving the capacityto generatemaritimerights in favourof

Bahrain - capable ofservingas basepoints for establishingthemedianlinewithin the contextof a

delimitation operation?

103.Qatar'sreplyto this questionis "no" and is based on two well-knowntheories derived

from previous decisions: first, the theory of "special or unusual characteristics", towhich the

delimitationmay gant onlypartial effector evenrefuse to grantany effect atall, eventhough they

have a right to generatemaritime rights; secondly,the theory that a point which serves as a basis

for determining the breadth of a State'stemtorial sea does not necessarily serve as a basis for

drawing the delimitation line. Qatar invokes these two theories for refusing to take into

consideration the islands and low-tide elevations located betweenthe eastern coast of the main

islandof Bahrain and thewestern coast of the Qatarpeninsula. 1shouldlike to point outagain -

and1begthe Courtto excusethis repetition - that,in relyingon thesetwo theories, ouropponents

are implicitlybut inevitablyacknowledging thatthe features in questionare Bahraini temtory. If

Dibalwerenot underBahrainisovereignty, for instance, why would Qatarplace such emphasison

its"minor geographicalfeature" or "incidental special feature" status, or why would it strive so

hard to maintain that Dibal is not part of Bahrain's"coastline"and cannot serve as a basis for the

maritime delimitation*'?

104. Whatever the answer, neither of the theories invoked by Qatar is applicable in the

present case. That iswhat 1shouldnow like to demonstrate.

Thetheoryof minor,specialorunusual features

105. And first the theory of minor, special or unusual features, on which my fiiend

Jean-Pierre Quéneudec dwela tt length. It was-and 1need hardlyrepeatthis - in the North Sea

Continental Shelfcases that the Courtlaid down for the first time the principlethat delimitationof

the continental shelf must, albeit without "totallyrefashioning geography",endeavour to "abat[e]
.
the effects of an incidental special feature (une particularité non essentielle) fiom which an

21~ounter-~emorialof Qatar, paras. 8.42,8.57and 8.106;Reply ofQatar,para.9.42. unjustifiable difference of treatment couldres~lt"~~.Given, as the Court noted in this case, that

"[tlhe slightest irregularityin a coastlineis automaticallymagnified by the equidistanceline .. .",

"[slogreat anexaggerationofthe consequencesof a natural geographical feature mustbe remedied

or compensated for as far as possible, being of itself creative of inequity"23. Thus the Court

suggested in thiscase that "the disproportionally distorting effect"that may arise fi-omtaking into

consideration, when establishing the equidistance line, "islets, rocks and minor coastal

projections"24,should "be elirninated". Andin the operativeprovisions of its Judgment,the Court

ruled that not only should "the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties" be taken into

consideration but also "the presence of any special or unusual features" (toute caractéristique

spécialeou inhabit~elle)~~.

106. As we pointed out in our ~emorial~~,and as the Court knows better than 1, this

approach has been confirmed and developedin subsequentdecisions. The Court has, however,

taken care to emphasize on each occasion that it is not a question of remoulding nature or

refashioning geography, thus putting its finger on the contradictory, or even somewhat flighty,

nature of an exercisethat consistsof respecting nature and geographyby violating them or,if you

prefer, violatingnature and geographyonthe pretext of respecting them. In defenceof this theory,

it should bebornein mind, andthis is important,that it was designedto deal with certaingenuinely

rare and exceptionalsituationswhere takinga minor geographicalfeature into considerationwould

haveledto anunjustified imbalanceand hencea manifestandundeniableinequity.

107.Perhapsthe Court will one daydecideto abandonor reorient the theory of insignificant

features in favourof the fundamentalprinciple,which it has vigorously affied and reaffied

many times, ofthe primacy of geography. There is no doubtthat it would thus end the ambiguity
016

bom of the somewhatwealistic and probably chimerical desire of those who drafted the 1969

Judgment to respect nature while correcting it. There is also no doubt that it would thereby

considerably simplifythe law of maritime delimitation. However,even if it preferred not to cal1

22~orthSeoContinentalShelf;I.C.J.Reports1969,50,para.91.
23~bid.,.49,para89.

24~bid.,.36,para57.
"Ibid., p54,para. 101.

26~emorialofBahrain,paras.542et seq.into question itsjurisprudence in this matter, the Court would increaseits significanceif it wereto

confirm its exceptional and,so to speak, residual natureas a safetyvalve, as it were, reservedfor

the specific situations for which it was designed. However the Court intends to treat this .

jurisprudence in future, one thing,in any event,is certain: this theory,relied on so heavily by our

opponents2',is not relevant in this case and cannot legitimizethe so-called mainland-to-mainland

delimitationmethod. There are a number of reasons forthis.

108. First, as the Court pointed out in the 1969 Judgments, the theory of insignificant

features was conceived with a veryspecific aim in mind, with a viewto correctingthe distortion

created by taking account of minor coastal features in a situationconsisting of lateral or adjacent

coasts, and for continental shelf delimitations involvingreas a relatively long way off fiom the

coasts. Lateral delimitation, delimitation at a long distance from the coasts:this is the twofold

constraintwhichthe Court has imposeduponthe scopeofthisjurisprudence. Where,however,it is

a question of delimiting the territorial sea, even if this is between adjacent coasts, "these

[distorting]effects are much less markedand may be very slight",the Court stated,"owingto the

very close proximityof suchwatersto the coastsconcemed"; andit added that:

"the distortingeffects ofateral equidistancelines under certain conditionsof coastal

configuration are nevertheless comparatively smallwithin the limits of territorial
waters, but produce their maximumeffect in the localitieswhere the maincontinental
shelfareaslieMer

In the present case it is between opposite coasts that the delimitationis to be carried out in the

southernsector, that is in that area wherethe disputed features are located, and it is a question of

territorial sea delimitation,closeto the coasts of the two Parties. Theraison d'êend basis of the

theory of insignificant featurescapableof having an unduly distortingeffect are notto be foundin

the presentcase andthis theoryis irrelevantin this instance.

109. Secondly,we are not dealing here - 1come back to this matter onceagain - with a

land massor mainlandoff whichthere are some islandsor low-tideelevations,in respect of which

one might wonderwhether, in view of their insignificance,they really do deserveto be taken into

considerationforthe purposes of drawingthe maritimeboundary. Neither the HawarIslands, nor

27~emonalofQatar, para. 1.37; Counter-Memonlf Qatar,paras.7.26-7.27; ReplyofQatar, para9..40.
2s~orthSeaContinentalShelf;I.C.J.Reports1969,p. 18,para.8, andp.37,para.59.Dibal, Jaradah or any other island or low-tide elevation can be described as an "insignificant

feature" of the coastline or as an "incidental special feature"lying off a main coast. They al1

constitute an integral part of the ensemble of Bahrain, of which they are important constituent

elementsin geographical, political,humanand economicterms. To paraphrasethe expressionused

by a member of the Arbitral Tribunal in the GuinedGuinea-Bissaucase, without these features

Bahrainwould not be Bahrain. By asserting vigorously,for instance, that Dibal is not part of the

coast of Bahrain and cannot be regarded as representing the coast of Bahrain for delimitation

purposes29,Qataris askingthe Courtto basethe maritime delimitationon a mutilated, distortedand

fictitious State of Bahrain.

110.But there is one evenmore crucial reason torejecthere any reliance uponthe theory of

insignificant coastalfeatures. Thejurisprudenceconcemingthe partial or zero effectto be granted

in delimitationto certain rninor featuresof the coast of a State presupposesthat these features are

part of the tenitory of the State in question. The solepurpose of this theory is to alleviate the

impactof a minorgeographicalfeatureof a coast on the courseof the maritimeboundary. Never, 1

repeatnever, has anyjudgment, any arbitralaward,reliedupon this theory to reject a geographical

feature on the other side of a previously determined maritime boundary andhence transfer

sovereigntyoverit to that other party. Thetheory of insignificantcoastal featuresappertainsto the

lawof maritime delimitation; it is not an aspect of the law of territorial sovereignty. And yet it is

preciselythat role whichour opponentsintendthat it shouldplay.

111.So much, Mr. President, for thetheory of insignificantcoastal features. In the hope of

makingthose featuresof the Stateof Bahrain it finds troublesome vanish,as if by waving amagic

wand,the opposingPartyinvokesa secondtheory, that of theduality of baselinesand base points.

Inthe present casethis argument does not hold water, any morethan the previous argument. That

is what 1shouldnow like to rapidly demonstrate.

Thetheory of theduaiity of baseiinesandbase points

112.The Courtwill recall thatin their wTittenpleadingsour opponentscriticizedus at length

forrelying, in the construction of our median line, on the base points from which the breadth of

29~ounter-~emorial of Qatar, paras.6.76.85. Bahrain'stemtorial sea maybe calculated. Qatarstatesthat the baselinesand base points usedto

constructa median line arenot necessarilythe same as those usedto determine the breadth of the

territorial sea of the partiesunder the customary rules which found expression in the 1982

Convention. Even if Bahrainwere entitledunder international law,Qatar argues,to calculatethe

breadth of itsterritorial sea fromthe low-water mark of aparticularisland or low-tide elevation,

this wouldnot imply that the island or low-tide elevationin questioncan or must serveas a base

pointfordrawingthe equidistanceline.It isthereforenot,Qatarconcludes,becauseBahrain would

be ableto calculatethebreadthof its temtorialsea fromDibal,Jaradah,Qit'at ashShajarah,Qita'a

el Erge, etc., that the equidistance linemay or must be constructed fiom those same points.

Thinkingthat they wouldperhaps putme in a difficultposition,thosewho draftedQatar's written

pleadings sawfit to base thisargumenton my contribution to thefestschrifipublishedin 1992in

honour ofJudge Elias, a former President ofthe Court, under the title ((Apropos de la double

fonctiondes lignes etpointsde basedansledroit delamer))30T . heyeven wentso far as to dome

the honour of describingmy analysis as "definitiveW3'!The other Partyhas been much more

discreetwithregard to thisproblemin theoral proceedings.But, whilethe questionhas no longer

been addressedhead-on,Qatar'sargument remains unchanged.Notonly has Professor Quéneudec

expresslyconfmed thisby askingthe Courtto refer on this matterto Qatar's writtenpleadings32,

but he stated that "even ifone accepts that Bahrain is justified in using some of these islets to

establish baselines forits territorial sea,theseislets couldnot, however, normallybe used as base

points for drawing a delimitationline between Qatar and ~ahrain"~~;this is exactly the same

argument as that defendedin Qatar'swritten pleadings34. 1 therefore feel that 1owe you some

explanationsconcerningthismatter.

30~ssayinHonourofJudgeTaslimOlawaleElias,E.G.BelloandB. A.Ajibola,eds.,2vols.,MartinusNijhoff,
1992,Vol1,p. 145etseq.
"ReplyofQatar,para.9.40,note87.

"CR2000/9,p. 41,para.19.
3 3 2000/10,p. Il, para.62.

34~ounter-~emoriaolfQata, aras.7.33-7.38;ReplyofQat, aras.8.7-8.13. Jurisprudentialbackground

113. Mr.President,our opponents are correctin statingthat according to the jurisprudence

the fact that a pointonthe coast, anisland,an islet,a projection,or a low-tideelevationn be used

as a base point forcalculatingthe breadthof the territorial seais notfficientto require that it be

used by the Court as a base point forthe purposesof drawing a maritime boundary betweenthat

Stateand a neighbouringState. This dualiîyhas been acceptedin severaljudgrnents, in particular

in the Judgment in the case conceming ContinentalShelf(LibyanArab JamahiriydMalta),which

constructedthe medianline betweenMaltaand Libyawithoutreferenceto an islet which Maltahad

includedin its straightbaselines. The Court stated

"In any eventthe baselinesas determinedby coastal Statesare not identicalper
se with the points chosen on a coast to make it possible to calculate the area of
continental shelf appertaining to that State. In this case,the equitableness of an
equidistance line depends on whether the precaution is taken of eliminating the

disproportionateeffectof certain 'islets,rocksand minorcoastalprojections"'35.

114. Consequently,as 1wrote in my essay,there can be no debate, Qatar is correct, that the

"baselinesandbasepoints fromwhicha delimitationline is drawnare determinedindependentlyof

the baselines and base points of the territorial seaof the States concemed" [translation by the

Registryl, and that consequently, "a geographical characteristicmay be used as a base point for

calculatingthe territorialsea, without beingused asa base point for delimitati~n"[translationby

theRegistry].

115. If 1maybe allowed apersona1observation,may 1tell the Court that 1wrote this essay

because, in my work on the issues of maritime delimitation,1 found myself delving into the

020 sources,the raisond'êtrea,nd the scopeof thisjurisprudence. 1admit that the issue had not come

tomind at thetirne1wrote mybookon the lawofmaritimedelimitation a fewyearspreviously; as

dideveryone, at thethe 1considered it tobe evident,to be a given,that the equitable resultsought

might be found, inter alia, by moving the baselines and base points. The purpose of my

contribution to Essays in Honour of Judge TaslimOlawaleElias was precisely to review the

validity ofhisjurisprudence. Thereis no contradictionbetweenthe essay andthe analyseswhich1

35~ontinentlhelf(LibyanArabJamahiriydMalta),I.C.J.Reports1985, p.48, para.64.

360p.cit.supra,Note 30,p. 156.have the honourto submitto the Court in the present case. Our opponentsmay rest assured: my

essay doesnotembarrassme and inno way do1denyit.

116.This said- and 1beg the Court'sindulgence for having said it- let us return to the a

factsof thematteras theyappear inthe lightof thejurisprudence.

117.It must be firstrecalled that the relevant texts which, as we know, have the weight of

customarylaw, al1refer to the baselines fromwhich the breadth ofthe territorial sea is measured.

This is astrue with regard to title as withregard to delimitation. With regard to title,Le.,for the

calculation of the breadth out to sea of the various maritimejurisdictions, the 1982Convention

defrnesthe breadth of al1maritime spacesby a maximum distancefiom the "baselinesfromwhich

thebreadthofthe territorialsea is measured": so says Article 33inrespect of the24 nauticalmiles

of the contiguous zones; so says Article 57in respect of the 200nautical miles of the continental

shelf. Withregard to delimitation, the Conventions of 1958 and 1982, which have the force of

customary law, also define the line of equidistance from the baselines and base points of the

temtonal sea. in the present case, it is the customary nom governing the delimitation of the

territorialseathat is at issuein respectof the greaterpart ofthe delimitation,and1would recallthat

this nom expresslydefinesthe median line in relation to the baselinesof the territorialsea of each

of thetwo States.

118.This shows thatthe concept of"baselinesfrom whichthe breadth ofthe temtonal sea is

measured" is the keystone to the architecture of projections by States over the maritime spaces

adjacent to theircoasts, whether in establishingthe title of coastal States overhese spaces or in

delimitingtheoverlappingprojectionsof twoneighbouringStates.

119.Therationalebehind this principleis easilyunderstood. If internationallaw,both treaty

law and customary law,calculatesthe breadth out to sea of al1the maritime spaces,as well as the

courseof thedelimitationline, on the basis ofthe baselinesand basepoints fromwhichthe breadth

of the territorial seais measured, this is because these baselines and base points represent the

coasts,are equivalenttothecoasts. This,and in my opinion itis highlyrevealing,explainswhy the

Court, in defining the equidistance method, has to date referred either to the coasts or to the

baselines andbase points,without distinction. The Judgrnentshavetreated coasts andbaselinesor

base points as synonymous, as something conceptually interchangeable: the base points andbaselines represent the coast; and inverselythe coast is represented by the base points and

baselines. This synonymystandsout inone passagefiom the Judgmentsin the cases concerning

theNorthSea ContinentalShelf;in which the Courtdefinesthe equidistanceline as "a line every

point onwhich is the samedistance away fromwhateverpoint it is nearest toon the coastof each

of the countries concemed3'". Accordingto this passage, equidistancefrom the coasts means

equidistancefrom thebaselinesand basepointsfrom whichthe breadthof the territorialsea is

calculated. The wording usedin the mostrecent Judgment,the Judgmentin the case concerning

MaritimeDelimitationin the Areabetween Greenland andJan Mayen: "themedian line between

the temtorial sea baselines"is strictlyaccurateand admirably precise. The wording usedby the

Court in 1969and 1993on the one hand, matchesthat of the 1958and 1982Conventionson the

other,utterly,totallyandperfectly.

120.As 1recalledin the essag8 our opponentshave cited,it is moreover apparentfrom the

work of the Intemational Law Commissionthat no one, so it would appear, ever envisaged

constructingan equidistanceline fromcoastal points whichwere detachedfiom the baselinesand

basepointsof the territorialea. It wasa decisionofthe Courtwhich uncoupledthe two concepts.

However,the dictum which enshrined this dichotomy in the case conceming ContinentalShelf

(LibyanArab JamahiriydMalta)was manifestly not the Court's last word,since what actually

happenedwas thatthe Court abandonedthis dictum andtook a diametricallyopposite stancein the

case concemingMaritime Delimitationin the Areabetween Greenland andJan Mayen in 1993.

From nowon, in accordance with thislatestJudgment,1would recall, the provisionalmedian line

isdefmedas "themedianline between the territorialseaba~elines"~~.

Thescopeand limitsof thisjurisprudence

121.In my essay, afierreviewingthis background,1raised the question: "Shouldwe stop

here?" In other words, which principle shouldnow have force of law: that found in the case

concemingContinentalShelf(LibyanArabJamahiriydMalta)orthe morerecent onefoundin the

case conceming Maritime Delimitationin the Areabetween Greenland and Jan Mayen?And 1

37~orthSea ContinentalShelf;Z.C.J.Reports1969,p. 20,para. 13.

380p.citsupra.Note 30,pp. 147-148.
3g~arititneDelimitationintheAreabetweenGreenlandandJanMayC.J1.eports1993,p. 60,para.49.added: "In the law of maritime delimitation, asubjectwhich is stillevolving,nothin... canbe

said to be definitive, and further considerationis necessary in order to grasp al1aspects of the

issue."[TranslationbyRegistty.]

122. At fust sight,the theory of theduality of baselines and base pointsfound in thecase

conceming Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta)does not appear devoid of

justification. Linesand pointsare not always usedforthe same purpose. When it is a matterof

determining the outer, seawards limit of the temtonal sea and, by the same token, al1other

maritimejurisdictions, thefunctionof thebaselinesandbase pointsis to representthe Coastto be

projectedinto the adjacentmaritime spaces. Whenit is a matter of drawinga maritimeboundary

betweentwo States,their functionis different. It is to ensure anequitable divisionof the area

wherethe titles of the two States overlap. In my essay, 1 added that, althoughthe distinction

betweenthe two functionsofbaselinesandbasepointsmight wellbeunderstoodin sucha manner,

neverthelessitindeed contravened directly thtreaty provision- provisions of customarylaw-

which1mentioned earlier,and went againstother rulingsof the Court. That observationremains

tme. 1 therefore brought my essay to a conclusionby speculatingthat the jurisprudence might,

sooneror later, haveto undertakea "critical review"of the problemas a whole. Bearingin mind

the close,logicalrelationship which the Courtas establishedbetweenwhatit has called"thelegal

basisof that whichis to be delimited and...entitlementto itW4Ob,aringin mind also the content

of the treaty provisions to which 1 have referred, which are provisions of customarylaw, the

question may well beasked whetherthe distinctionmadein the caseconcerningContinentalShelf

(LibyanArab JamahiriydMalta)isjustified. Sincethetitle extendingseawardsof thecoastal State

is determined from the baselines of the temtorial sea, should not the delimitationof maritime

spacesbetween States whosetitles overlapbe effected from these same lines. Perhaps the case

conceming Maritime el imitati onthe Area between GreenlandandJan Mayenhas openedthe

door to such revision, presumingthat such revision has not already been effectedwhen the

Judgmentin that case refers tonequidistanceline "betweenthe temtorialseabaselines".

40~ontinentl helf(LibyanArabJamahiriya/Malta)1.C.J.Reports 1985,p.30,para.27andp. 46,para.61. 123.Withoutthere beingany needto delve furtherintothis issue, an issuewhich it is forthe

Court to decide,it sufficesto observethat, in any event, the dichotomybetweenbaselinesused for

thepurposesof determiningthe outerlimit of maritime spacesand baselines usedfor the purposes

of delimitationloses itsrationalein the present case, whereit is a matterof delimitingthe temtorial

sea in narrow areas between opposite coasts, the effect of distortion then being very minor.

Drawing the equidistance line on the basis of the base points from which the breadth of the

territorial seais calculatedis1the more imperative in thepresent case in that the breadthwould

not be calculated fiom a few isolated features, detached fiom a continent ormainland [masse

terrestre] but, as in the situationsmentioned in thetreanemen Award to which 1 have already

referred4', fiom the outer limit, or external fringe lfrange extérieure], of an insular and

quasi-insular ensemble,of a closely woven "carpet of islands",no one part of which is separated

fiom anotherby more than 12nauticalmiles.

1'24.Inother words, andto bringthis point to a conclusion,once it has been establishedthat

the breadth of Bahrain's territorialsea must be calculated, in accordance with internationallaw,

fiom the base points of Bahrain'sislands and low-tide elevations,there is only one conclusionin

law: the provisional median line between Bahrain and Qatar must be drawn on the basis of the

same base points. The course of the maritime boundary which Bahrain requests the Court to

establishmeetsthis principle.

IITHE 1947 BRITISHLINEIS IRRELEVANTFORTHEPURPOSESOFDELIMITINC

THE MARITIMEBOUNDARY

125.Mr.President,Members ofthe Court, having soughtto replace amaritime delimitation

between the true coasts of Bahrain and Qatar by a "mainland-to-mainland" [((masse

terrestreà musse terrestre))] delimitation betweenfictitious coasts, the other Party still has to

defmethe courseof the maritimeboundaryit claimed. Atthat stage, Qatar givespnde of placeto a

line proposedby the British authoritiesin 1947in order to organize the oil operations of the two

companiesconcemed.

41~econdStageparas.139an143. 126.The exact contentof the Qatariclaim in thisrespectis calculatedin its ambiguity,and 1

would cal1attention to this. After that, 1shall showthat the 1947 British line is irrelevantto the

Court'sdelimitationofthemaritimeboundary. •

127.In its Application instituting proceedings of5 July 1991, Qatar requestedthe Court to

delimit the single maritime boundary between the two countries "with due regard to the line

dividingthe sea-bed of the two States as described in the British decision of 23 December1947"

[((comptedûmenttenude lalignedepartage desfonds marinsdécritsdansla décision britannique

du 23 décembre1947))l. As the Courtis aware,the "decision"towhich this refersis constitutedby

two letters identical in content, addressed tothe Rulersof both countries on 23 December 1947by

Pelly, the British PoliticalAgent in Bahrain. To echothe wordingused, the purpose of the letters

was to forward to both Rulers a map showing the line "which, His Majesty's Governent

considers,divides in accordancewith equitable principlesthe sea-bed aforesaid". The map has not

been found,but the lettersprovide sufficientinformationforan analysisto presentno difficulties.

128. As Members ofthe Courtwill note fiomthe copies ofthese letters which appearin the

judges'folders,their contentmaybe summedup as follows:

(1) the British Government stated that it had "for some time past, had under consideration the

boundary which shoulddelimit" [devrait délimiter]the two countries'rights in the bed of the

seabetweentheir respectivetenitories;

(2) the proposed line was a median line "based generally"on the configurationof the coastline of

the Bahrainmain islandand thepeninsula ofQatar;

(3) the line covered the seabed only and not the waters above it and was without prejudice to

existingnavigationrights;

(4) the British Governmentstated that it "will,in future,regardal1the sea-bed lyingto the west of

this line as being under the sovereignty of His Highness the Shaikh of Bahrain and al1the

sea-bed lying to the east of it as beingunder the sovereigntyof [His Highness the Shaikh of

Qatar] ";

(5) the exceptions to this line were that the Shaikhof Bahrain was recognizedas having sovereign

rightsin first: the areasof the DibalandJaradahshoalswhich are abovethe spring tide low-water level;

under internationallaw, so the letters state,these shoals shouldnot be considered tobe islands

having territorial waters;

- second: the islands of the Hawar group and the temtorial waters pertaining thereto and

delimitedin accordancewith internationallaw,excludingJanan Islandwhich wasnot regarded

asbeing includedin this group;

(6) the letters added that the division so described had been madeon the basis of the maps and

informationcurrently available and that it was subject torevision in the event of more exact

geographicaldata being forthcomingat a laterdate. Mr. President,Membersof the Court,that

wasthe British decisionof 1947.

Qatar'smaritimeclaim givespride ofplacetothe 1947Britishline

129.Theselettersof 1947arenot merelyoneof the argumentsadvancedby Qatar insupport

of the lineitclairns. They are thevery substance ofQatar'sclaim. What Qatar requeststhe Court

to do in the submissions containedin its Applicationis to award it the 1947line withthe exception

of Dibal and Jaradahon the one handand the Hawarislands on the other. This restrictionexplains

the wording usedby Qatar in its Application instituting proceedings; Qatar does not request in its

Application that the Court decidethat the British line is the maritime boundary; this is not what

Qatar requests in its Application. Qatar requeststhe Court to draw the maritime boundary "with

due regard to"[((comptedûmenttenu))]this line. Thiswording, somewhathermeticat first sight,is

clarifiedby paragraph 21oftheApplication,whichreads:

"Qatardid not oppose the partof the line which the British Govemment stated
was based onthe configurationofthe coastlines ofthe two Statesand was determined
in accordance with equitable principles. On the other hand, Qatar rejected and

continuesto rejectthat partofthe linewhichenclavesthoseHawarislands whichwere
regardedby the British Govemmentin 1947as being includedinthe Hawargroup."

026 In plain terms, Qatar requests the Courtto consider that the 1947 letters have force of law in

respect ofthose provisions which suit them and to deny them force of law in respect of those

provisionswhichstandthem in il1stead.

130.Beforegoing any fhther, allow me one remark on the way in which Qatarhas worded

its maritimeclaim. The objectof Qatar'sApplicationinstitutingproceedings is: "to draw inaccordancewithinternationallaw a singlemaritime boundary between the
maritimeareas of sea-bed, subsoil andsuperjacent waters appertaining respectivtoy

the Stateof Qatarandthe State ofBahrain".

That is it, that is Qatar's "subrniss[ctconclusion~~]. o draw in accordancewith international a

lawa singlemaritime boundary.Inrequestingthe Courtto have due regardto the line dividingthe

seabed as described in the British decision of 23 December1947, it does not frame a tme

submission[conclusion]; it puts forwarda contention,thatis to say an argumentin supportof its

submission. It does not appearto methat this contentionshouldcarry anygreaterweight withthe

Court than anyother argument. It is for theCourt, for the Court alone,to determine thegrounds,

Le.,the reasonsand considerationsof fact and law, on whichits decisionis based. As it statedin

thecase concemingNuclearTests:

"TheCourthas ...repeatedlyexercisedthe powerto exclude,when necessary,
certain contentionsor arguments whichwere advanced by a party as part of the

submissions,but which were regardedby the Court,not as indications ofwhat the
party wasasking the Court todecide,but as reasonsadvanced whythe Court should
decideinthe sensecontendedfor bythat

Toecho an expressionusedin the 1951Judgmentin the caseconcerningFisheries, thereferenceto

the 1947 British line is at most an "element[s]which might fumish reasons in support of the

Judgment but cannot constitutethe de~ision"~~.Recallingthis jurisprudence in the recent case

conceming the Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spainv. Canada), the Court confmed that it "will

distinguish between the dispute itself and argumentsused by the Parties to sustain their ...

submissionsonthe dispute"44.

131. In short, what the Courtis requested to do in the present ca-e the submissionof
Q 2 7

whichit is seised is, 1repeat,to drawthe singlemaritimeboundarybetweenthe twoParties. As

forknowing whatfactorsor what circurnstancesthe Courtmust take intoaccountin exercisingits

function,thisis amatterfortheCourt'sdiscretion.

132. This said, Mr. President,our opponentsobviouslyfeel embarrassedat requestingthe
'2

Court, simultaneously,toawardthemthe 1947line whilstrejecting someelements of it. In order

42~uclearTesI.C. Reports1974,p262,para.9.
43~isheriI.C. J ports 1951, 126; cf.Minquiersand EcrehI.C. J.ports 1953,52; Nottebohm,
I.J.Reports 1953,secondsta, 16.

4I.C. Jeports1998,para.32.to getthemselves out of this uncomfortable situationthey dreamtup the argument that, even ifthe

1947 line perse is not the maritime boundary, it neverthelessconstitutes a factor or a highly

relevantcircumstancefortheprocess of drawingthatboundary. Letme explain.

133.On the one hand,our opponents reiteratead injnitum that Qatar does not considerthe

1947British line to be the maritime boundaryandthat it doesnot request the Courtto recognizeit

as such. This was spelt out in the ~ernorial~~,recalled in the ~e~l~~~ c, nfirmed in the oral

arguments. Qatar,so ProfessorSalmonstatedright at the beginning of the oral arguments47,does

not considerthat the 1947line "isa binding decision". Qatar doesnot rely on the line as "finaland

binding",he repeated at theend of Qatar'soral statements4*.Qatarexplicitly acknowledgesthat,in

the opinion of the British authorities themselves,the line describedin 1947 wasmerely a proposa1

submittedto the two countries,that it was not binding and that serious doubts had been raised on

the British side as to the validity of the proposed solution49. Furthemore, ProfessorSalmon

recalled:

"the two interested Parties themselves expressedtheir opposition" to the proposed
solution, so much so, as my friend Jean Salmon said, that, "His Britannic Majesty
ultimately yielded to thefacts by agreeingto the matterbeing submittedto arbitration

between twosheikdoms".

Professor Salmon's conclusion: "this decision was not legally opposable to the two States

134. Having said this, on the other hand our opponents accord decisive weight for the

purposesof the presentcaseto the line proposedby the Britishin 1947: a fact,they Say,whichthe

Court cannot fail to take into accountin its delirnitationbecause, so Qatar contends,it is a "factor

or a circumstance highly rele~ant"~',"a significantrelevant factor", or better still, an "established

fact, something virtually set in ~tone"~~.And, although Qataremphasizes that it does not rely on

- - -

45~emorialofQatar,Ann.II.19,para.11.20.
%eply of Qatar,para.8.17.

47C~2000/5,p.30,para.7.
4 8 ~2000/10,p.26,para.10.

49~emorialofQatar,paras.10.41-10.43;ReplyofQatar,paras.8.17-8.18.

''CR2000110,p.26, para.10.
"MemonalofQatar,para. 11.19.

5 2 ~2000/10,p. 18,para.1andp.47,para.23.the 1947lineas a "historictitle"withinthe meaningof Article 15of the Convention on the Lawof

the Sea, it neverthelesssees it as an "important historicalaspect" or a "historical circumstance"

which the Court is invited to take into c~nsideration~~.Not a historic title, but a historical

circurnstanceoraspect ofthe greatestimportance: our opponentsplay on words andin any event

have difficultyin hidingtheir embarrassment.

135.Thus, in the same breath, Qatar statesloud andclear thatthe 1947line is not a legally

binding decisionbut that it is a circumstanceof decisiveweight in settling the present case. In

ProfessorQuéneudec's words t, e Courtis requested "notto disregardit or notto ignoreit, in other

words not to act as if this line had never e~isted"~~.To escapethis uncomfortable contradiction,

our opponentsperform averbalpirouette: they describethe 1947linenot as "thestartingpointfor

a legal argument,butas itsend-result" and, repeatedl,sa "referencelineW5'.

136. Factor, aspect, circumstance, reference line: behindthese terms, legally correctin

appearance, lurksan infinitelymoreradical approach. Forwhat Qatarrequests the Court to do is

nothing more and nothingless thanto recognizethe 1947line as the maritime boundarybetween

the two countries. If Qatar endeavous to concealthis evidentfact, afact clearlyillustratedbythe

map nowonthe screen[showmap],it is becausethe BritishlettersrecognizedBahrain'srightsover

the HawarIslands,DibalandJaradahandthat theymadetheproposedlineterminate at pointBLV,

i.e., before the end-pointthe Court is today invited to give the liThe submissions in Qatar's

written pleadings expresslyrequest the Court to draw a boundary,between points L and BLV,

"following the lineof the Britishdecisionof 23December 1947"[((suivantla ligneétabliepar la

décisionbritanniquedu23 décembre1947~1.This couldnotbe moreexplicit.

137.As 1alreadyhad occasionto emphasize yesterday,the delimitation processfollowedby

Qatar is an illusion. There is no relationship betweenthe provisionalequidistance linedrawnby

Qatar and the maritime boundaryclaimedby Qatar. Theprovisionalequidistanceline, as 1 have

already said,plays no role whatsoeverin thisprocess,andthe result wouldbe exactlythe sameif

we sparedouselves the detour via the provisionalmedianline. In order to justify this approach,

53~ounter-~emoriao1fQatar, paras7..11and7.48; ReplyofQatar,para.8.15.

54~R2000110,p. 52,para.43.
"CR2000110,p.27,para.12. which in reality leads directly to the 1947 line, Qatar Statesthat the role played by the relevant

circurnstances,in the presentcasethe 1947line,is not limitedto verimng the equitablenature of a

provisional equidistance line- therefore the provisional equidistanceline becomes pointless -

but consistsindeterminingthe choice ofthemethodor methods ofdelirnitati~n~~1 . hadto read this

twice to believewhat 1was reading. For,Mr.President,this takes us light-years back intime, to

the time whenit was reiterated, reiterated, untiringly reiterated bethe Court, in thiscourtroom,

that anymethodor combinationof methodswas appropnate providedthat it producedan equitable

result; that no one methodwas preferredto or more appropriate than another; that a delimitation

process in two stages was a flight of fantasy on the part of counselor of an author. What Our

opponentsrequestthe Courtto do isto sweepawaythe progress achievedsince the caseconcerning

the ContinentalShelf (Libyan ArabJamahiriydMalta) towards the establishment of a juridical

frarnework for the delimitation process, and to revert to the old-fashioned theory, a theory

definitivelyrejected by the Court, of equity alone, in other words to retm to a law which is

outdated andbelongs to thepast.

The 1947 British line is totally irrelevant to the maritime boundary whichthe Court is
1 030 requestedto delimit

138. Butthis is not the essential point. The essentialpoint is that the 1947line is neither a

"special circumstance" in the segments where the Courthas to delimit a territorial sea, nor a

"relevantfactoror circurnstance"in the segmentswhere maritimejurisdictions are to be delirnited

beyond the territorial sea, nor a "reference line".Shifting a provisional equidistance line can be

justified by aeographical,economicor political factor. Itcannotbejustified by the existenceof

another line,drawn on other bases. A line is the end-point of a process,not its begiming or its

causalfactor. In addition,ifthe 1947linewas as"highlyrelevant"as our opponentswouldhaveus

believe, whythen would.this linebe any less pertinent whereit recognizes Bahrain's sovereignty

over the HawarIslands, over Dibal, over Jaradah? This question, which we raised in our

~ounter-~emorial", remainsunanswered.

56~eplyof Qatar, para.8.23.
57~ounter-~emorialofBahrain,para.551. 139.In orderto explainthe importance which they wishto have attachedto the 1947Bntish

line,our opponents have hadrecourse,both in the oralphaseand in theirwrittenpleadings,to an

extraordinary and not unappetizing argumente :ven if thislinehas beenchallenged,we aretold, it p

hasbeenthe subjectof discussionand consideration, "either withthe aimoftransformingit intoan

agreed line or with a view to modikng or adapting its co~rse"'~. A proposition whichhas the

forceof law becauseit has been discussed and rejected: rarely has a partyconfessedits weakness

soforcefilly.

140.1sit not alsosignificant,1repeat, that theweightwhich Qatarclaims to attach tothe

Britishlettersis equally selective? Qatar says "yes",a resolute "yes" tothe 1947 line,but only

northof the Hawar Islands. To the southemsegment ofthe 1947lineQataranswerswith a radical

"no",just asit answers"no"to therecognitionbythe 1947letters ofBahrain'snghts overDibaland

over Jaradah. How would our opponents have reacted,Mr.President,and how would theCourt

react if Bahrain maintained that the 1947 letters were authoritativein recognizing the rights of

Bahrain to the Hawar Islands, Dibal and Jaradah, but irrelevant in drawing the dividing line

betweenthe seabeds? Howwould the other Party have reactedand how would the Courthave

reacted?

TheBritish lettersof 1947arenot a"decision"havinganylegalauthoritywhatsoever

141.Mr. President,Qatar explicitly acknowledgesa ,s1have alreadyobserved,thatthe 1947

Britishletters didnot constitutea bindingdecisionand thatthe partiesconcemednever abidedby

them. Bearingin mindthe absenceofdisagreementbetweenthe Partiesonthis essentialpoint,it is

pointlessto repeat herethe detailedanalysis of the documents annexedtothe pleadingsofthe two

parties5'. In the eyes of the authoritiesin London - the Bntish documentsleave no doubtabout

this- the purposeof the seabeddivision envisagedin the 1947letterswas, as Professor Salmon

indicated,"to avoid any conflictbetweenthe oil interestson either sidein the waters separating

Bahrain from the Qatar peninsula"60.This divisionwas to be regardedas a simple ((limitedes

"CR 2000110,p. 47, para. 23. Similarly,Replyof Qatar, para.8.19.
5%emorial of Qatar,paras. 3.83-3.84,6.224, 10.22etseq., 10.27; Counter-Memonalof Bahrain, paras. 560-561,
etc.

6 0 ~2000/10,p. 25,para. 8.opérations)) [operatinglimit], as a practical divisionof a provisionalnature about which it was

alwayssaid that it was made withoutprejudice to the settlementof themaritime boundary. Sans

préjugerdu dzfférendconcernant lesfonds marins, sanp sréjugerd'unéventuel règlemen ptortant

sur la frontière [without prejudiceto the seabed dispute, without prejudice to the eventual

settlement ofthe boundary]: this statement can be foundin innumerable documents whichare on

the fileand someof which arecitedby the other party6'.This is particularlythe case with thetwo

Britishletterson whichProfessorSalmon reliedin this veryhall lastweek: first,a leîter of 1951,

whichrefersto "a tentativelinegivenfor the ...purposeof oil surveyonly and without prejudice

to the finaldelimitation of theseabedb~undary"~~;then a letter of 1966in whichthe Political

Resident wrote that his interlocutorscould acceptthe 1947line ((sanspréjugerd'unarrangement

qui pouvait êtreatteint concernantla frontière maritime)) ["without prejudice to an eventual

settlement ofthe maritime b~undary"]~~.The issue of the maritime boundary,an issue totally

independentof the "operatinglimit" proposedby the British,was subsequently,in the mindsofthe

Britishauthorities- as Qataracknowledges -, to be settledby arbitrati01-1~~.

142.Nor does the other Party disputethe fact that neither of the two Parties accepted the

1947 line. Accordingly,it is not astonishing thatin 1949,two yearslater, when they announced

their claim tothe continental shelf, neither Bahrainnor Qatar made the slightest referenceto the

seabeddivision proposed in 1947. Quite the contrary,in their 1949proclamations,which, says

Qatar, were prepared by the British authorities, both Qatar and Bahrain posîponed the

determinationof theouter limitof their continental shelves to a subsequentdecision,whichwasto

follow consultation with the neighbouring tat tes^^ .here was clearly no question of a

determinationof theboundaryofthecontinental shelfhavingbeenmadeby the 1947decision.

61~eplyof Qatar,Anns. IV.17and18,Vol.4, pp. 91and95. SeealsothedocumentsciintheReplyof Qatar,
para. 8.28-8.30.

6 2 ~2000110,p.31,para.16.
6 3 ~2000/10,p.33,para.20.

64~emorialof Qatar, aras.10.25and10.43.
65~emorialof Qatar,Anns.11.55and11.56,Vol.5,p. 221and225. 143. Mr.President, if, as Qatar admits, the 1947 line was never authoritative, never

declaratoryof the law,neverestablished avalidmaritimeboundary,whyshouldthis linehavethe

forceof lawnow,to thepointof imposing itselfonthe Court?

The1947Britishline concernedthe seabedonly,andnotsuperjacentwaters

144.Moreover,wemustnot forget that the Britishlettersconcernedthe seabedonly,andnot

superjacentwatersandnavigationalrights. Admittedly,asQatarindicates, a nurnberof agreements

relatingto the delirnitationof the continental shelfwere subsequently transfoby the Parties-

accomplished,said Qatar'spleadings - into a single maritimeboundary. But, Mr. President-

this transformation,Qatarpretends to forge- this transformation,whenit occurred,took placeby

agreement betweenthe two parties. Thiswas preciselythe case in theGulf of Paria which our

opponents mentioned. Inthe absenceof agreementbetweenthe parties,thetransformationdidnot

takeplace. In theJan Mayencase,for example,the Courtconsideredthatowingto the opposition

of one of the parties itsnot empowered to draw asinglemaritime boundarycoveringboth the

continentalshelfand the superjacent watercol~rnn~~1.am alsothinkingofthe recentagreement,to

which 1 have referred already, betweenDenmarkand the United Kingdom,which establishes a

differentlimit for the continentalshelf off the Faroe Islandsfrom the one which the parties had

previouslyestablishedfortheirfishingzones6'.

The 1947Britishline isof no intrinsicvalue

145. Lacking the authorityof a "bindingdecision",does the 1947line then have at least

some intrinsicmerits, merits ofitsown which, regardlessof its authorityor absenceof authority,

wouldqualiQ it to becomethe maritime boundarybetweenthe two countries? Again the reply is

firmlyinthe negative.

146.The meritsofa linebasedon laware certainlynotpossessedbythe 1947line. Thatwas

not itsgoal. WhattheBritishauthoritiessought,if 1mayremind you,wasto draw alimitin regard

to the operations of the two oil companies,BAPCOon the Bahraini sideand PLC on the Qatari

66~aritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenlandand Jan Mayen, I.C.J.Reports 1993, pp.57-58,
paras.43-44.
67~eenote 16above.side. In short,as Qatarsays, a "practicalmethod~lo~~"~n ~,thing else and nothing more, intended

to enablethepetroleumactivities tobe separatedfi-omeachother.

147. What ismore, howcould the British have aspired to anything better? The region was

little knownand the geographicaldata wereincomplete,as the 1947lettersrecognize, and as Qatar

acknowledgesb9. Hence the explicitly provisional characterconferred on the proposed division:

"this division",said the letters, "hasbeen made onthe basis of the maps and informationat present

available", and "is subject to revision in the event of more exact geographical data being

forthcomingat a laterdate".

148.Also, there is nothing to indicatethe considerationswhich were the basis for drawing

this line, exceptthat the letters proclaim itto be based in a general fashionon the configurationof

the mainislandof Bahrain and thatof the Qatarpeninsula. Contraryto whatthe 1947lettersassert,

this linewas not an equidistanceline betweenthe main islandof Bahrain and the Qatar peninsula;

it was a line closer to the main island of Bahrain than to the Qatar peninsula. In its Memorial,

Qatar advancesthe argument thatthis fact couldbe explainedby the differencein coastal lengths,

but it acknowledges that this is pure suppositionon its part70. We may also wonder by what

extraordinarycoincidence a line proposedin 1947couldhavetaken account,almost prophetically,

of the conceptof disparity of coastal lengthsas thejurisprudencewas to understand itmany years

later. Justas opaque arethe reasons whichprompted thechoiceof the two pointsmentionedin the

1947 letters,arnely the North Sitrah Light Buoy (NSLB) andthe Bahrain Light Vesse1(BLV).

Here againthe explanationhazardedby Qatar - "probably"fornavigationalreasons7'- is purely

conjecturaland of no interestasregards the seabed.

Mr. President, 1have no more thanten minutes or so lefi, do you wish me to break now or

wouldyouprefer me to finish?

The PRESIDENT: If it is a questionof no more than ten minutes or so, you may continue,

ProfessorWeil.

68~emorialof Qatar, para1.0.16.
69~emorialof Qata, ara.10.17.

7Memorialof Qatarp, aras.10.21and11.14.
7Memonalof Qatarp , aras.10.19and11.40. Mr.WEIL: 1shallcontinue.

ThePRESIDENT: If it is a questionofno morethanten minutesor so.

Mr.WEIL: 1hope so.

The Britishlineof 1947is irrelevanttothecontemporarylawof thesea

149. But that is not the essence of the matter. What most radically prevents the

transformation ofthe 1947 line into a single maritime boundaryis the fact that the Court is

requested to effect the maritime delimitationin accordancewith present-day international law.

There, as1noted at the beginningof my remarks, both Partiesare in agreement7*.Now, as Qatar

acknowledges in itswritten pleadings73,the 1947 line was proposed by the Britishjust a few

months afierthe Tman Proclamation, at atime when neitherthe conceptof continentalshelf nor

the law of continentalshelf delimitationhad yet been established. In 1947,the conceptof single

maritimeboundarydid not exist. In 1947,theprinciplethatislan-s al1islands,eve- generate

O 3 5 the samemaritimejurisdictionsas othertemtories hadnotgained acceptance. In1947,theconcept

and the régimeof low-tideelevationswas not stabilized. The year 1947lies in the prehistory of

maritime delimitationlaw. What majortransformationsthat law has undergonesincethen! From

being physical as iten was, the conceptof natural prolongation has becomelegal. Frombeing

geologicalandgeomorphologicalas it thenwas,the conceptof continentalshelfhasbeenlinkedto

that of distance and partly mergedinto theen totally unlaown concept of exclusiveeconomic

zone. As to the operation of delimitation, itis nowadaysobliged to start with an equidistance

line- which for years seemed unthinkable and nearly sacrilegious.When we read in the

Judgmentof the Cowt in 1982,in theTunisidLi cbyethat equidistanceis not "amethodhaving

someprivilegedstatusin relationto othermeth~ds"',ndwhenwe read inthe 1984Gulfof Maine

Judgmentthat there is no method which "hasintrinsicmerits"and "of which it canbe said that it

720nthisagreementoftheParties,see Counter-olfBahrain,paras.464-467.

73~eplofQatar,para.8.21.
74~ontinenlhelf(TunisiaLibyanArabJamahiriya),I.C.J.Reports1982p.79,para.110. must receive priority"75,we find ourselvesin a legal world thathas foundered into oblivion. The

war ofreligion over equidistanceis today somethingthat has been swallowedup in the past. And

what are we to Sayof the radical transformation of the conceptof equity, which has ceased to be

subjective sincetheLibya/MaltaJudgment?

150. Mr.President, a continental shelf line proposedin 1947by a third State for practical

reasons essentially to do with the operations of two oil companies,and the basis of which is a

matter of pure conjecture, and that the two Parties concemed have rejected- such a line,

Mr.President, is quite out of keeping with the principles and rules of contemporary law which

govemthe determinationof a maritime boundary.

Thepractice relatingtooiland theconduct of theParties

151.To escape the unequivocal condemnationof its claimfor a maritime boundary resting,

overa substantialpart of its course, upona line proposedin 1947by the British, theopposingParty

hasrecourse to a final salvage attemptby relying on the practicerelating to oil and the conduct of

the Parties.

036 152.This attempthad alreadybeenoutlinedinthe writtenReply where,in an attemptto give

some credence to the 1947line "underthe current law of maritime delimitati~n"~~Q , atar placed

reliance upon the conduct of the parties regarding oil concessions. Qatar referred to the

TunisidLibyaJudgmentin which the Court consideredsuch conductto provide "indicia . ..of the

line orlines whichthe Parties themselvesmay have consideredequitableor actedupon as such -

if onlyas an interim solutionaffectingpart onlyof the area to be deli~nited"~~Q . atar submits,we

read in the Reply, that the conduct of the Parties relating to the limits of their respective oil

concessionsreinforces, "to some extent"[((dansunecertain mesure))]t,he value of the 1947line as

a relevantfactor in the present case7*,sincethat linehas "fromtimeto time" [«de tempsà autre))]

been relied upon by the Parties and the British authorities for determining the operating limits

75~elimitationof the Maritime Boundaty in the Gulf of Maine area, Z.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 315,
paras.162and163.
76~eplyof Qatar,p. 308.

77~eplyof Qatar, para.8.26, citing ContinentalShelf (TunisidLibyanArab Jamahiriya),I.C.J. Reports 1982,
p. 84,para. 118.
78~eplyof Qatar,para. 8.26. ['(limited'exploitation))]of the two Parties'offshorepetroleum licences79.Whatever might have

been the Parties' respective perceptionsof the1947 line,Qatar concluded, "owingto the role that

has been historicallyassignedto that linein the conductofboth States, therecan be no doubt as to

the relevanceof the 1947 linein the lightofthe contemporarylaw ofmantirne delimitati~n"~~.

153. In its oral arguments,the opposing Party resumed this line of argument but gave it a

somewhatdifferentconnotation.

154. On the one hand,the thesis was amplified. Not only was a centralplace givento it by

Professor alm mon b^',above al1the cautious phraseology of the Reply - «dans une certaine

mesure, de temps à autre))- has given wayto peremptoryassertions. "[Tlhe 1947 line", stated

Professor Salmon, "fulfilled [its] purpose [since] it was taken into account, significantly, as a

reference line for the activities ofthe oil c~m~anies"~~."Bahrain... made no attempt to exploit

I oilfieldsto the east of t1947 lineeversincethe adoptionof that line"", he added.

155. Yet, on the other hand, our opponents have considerably moderated the legal

characterizationof the facts on which they rely. Whereas the written pleadings of Qatar relied

firmlyon TunisidLibya,ProfessorQuéneudecbacked downby stating:

"Itwould certainlybe improperand inaccurateto inferthe existence of anytype

of 'defacto' line from the Parties'conduct, as was partly the case in 1982 in the
ContinentalShelf(TunisidLibya)case. The situationin the present caseis in no way
comparableto the situationinthatcase."84

156. Let us take note of this, for how indeed could the two cases be compared? In the

TunisidLibyacase we hadconduct on the part of the two Parties. In our case what weessentially

have is conduct on the part of the oil companies and of a third pariy, the United Kingdom, a

variable and uncertain conduct [dans une certaine mesure, de temps à autre], a conduct

systematically accompaniedby a reservationconcemingthe provisional characterof the boundary

and the statementthat it was without prejudice to the question of the boundary of the continental

'%e.plofQatar,para.8.27.

'keplyofQatar,para.8.3.
"CR2000/10,pp.27etseq.,paras.12etseq.

8 2 2000/10,p. 27,para.12.
"CR2000/5,p. 33,para.12.

8 4 2000/10,pp.48-49,para.29. shelf, and the constant opposition ofthe two govemments concemed to any final solutionof the

boundary basedon that "expedient" solution85.No, it is definitely not in the theory of the deficto

line in the TunisidLibyacasethat our opponents couldplace some hope. Whether or notthe 1947

line"fulfilleditspurpose"regardingthe activity of thetwo oil companiesis not the question. What

is important,andthe only thingthat is important, is that, in the eyes of the Bahraini Governmentat

least,the 1947 limited'exploitationhas neverrepresented a continentalshelfboundaryand still less

a maritime boundary.

157. This being so,there is no need to dwell on the factual inexactitude of our opponents'

lineof argument. It will sufficeto remindyouthat activitiesof oil companieshave morethan once

been conductedby companiesso authorizedby the Government of Bahrain beyond the 1947line,

and more particularly, butnot exclusively, aroundthe Hawar Islands, Dibal and Jaradah. 1venture

in passing to ask a question: do our opponents not realize that by arguing a claimed lack of

0 3 8 activities on the part of the Bahraini oil company to the east of the 1947line, they transformthe

activitiesof that same Bahrainioil company around theHawar Islands, Dibal and Jaradahinto an

indicium of the sovereignty of Bahrain over those sarne features? And why then would the

exclusion of the Hawar Islands from the scope of the oil concessions of Qatar, mentioned by

Mr. JanPaulsson,notbe anindiciumof the sovereigntyof Bahrain overthe Hawarislands?

158.Incidentally,it is notjust activitiesto do with oil that Bahrainhas conductedafier 1947

to the east of the 1947line, butal1sorts of other activities such as coastguard patrols. 1venturein

thisrespect toreferyou toOurwrittenpleadings86.

159. Added to this is the fact that jurisprudence is reluctant to make the distribution of

resources into a decisivecriterionof the course of amaritimeboundary. Itis no doubtthe casethat

tribunals cannot completely overlook this reality when it is precisely the fishery resources and

those of the subsoil of thesea which are involved and are what is at stake in many problems of

maritime delimitation. Tribunals are nevertheless definitely reluctant to over-emphasize such a

fluctuating factor. Resources, and oil resourcesin particular, are not always easy to locate; oil is

not necessarilywhere it is expectedto beyand it may be discovered whereit was not expected to
-- - --

a s ~2000110,p. 40, para.33.

%ee MemorialofBahrain,paras.575,576,587,598 and599. Cf. map7 in theMemonal of Bahrain. occur. A product soughtafier todaymay be looked down ontomorrow- pearls are aperfect case

in point- and vice versa. As statedby my friend JanPaulsson,oil prospectingin the area that is

the subjectof this dispute has so far been somewhatdisappointing, butthere is no telling what the

futureholds. Giventhat, accordingto the Court, a maritime boundary"involvesthe same element

of stability and permanence"87as a land frontier,its course cannotbe determinedon the basis of

naturally uncertainand changingeconomicconsiderations.

Negotiationsbetweenthe Parties

160. Next, and 1shall conclude with this, to the considerations derivingfrom the practice

relating to oil, Qatar has added in its oral arguments one argumentbased on the negotiations

I 0 3 9 conducted between the two Governmentsfrom 1966 onwardssS,while specifyingthat the various

proposals put forwardin that context "arenotof coursebindingupon either of the~arties"'~.There

is no need torefute as to the meritsthe analysisof the negotiationspresented by our opponents. It

willsufficethat 1refer to the rule laid downby the Permanent Courtof InternationalJustice in the

Factory at Chonbw caseg0,recalled by the Charnber of the Court in the El Salvador/Honduras

case9'and confirmedby the Courtin the firstphase of ourown case,narnelythat theCourt

"cannot take account of declarations, admissionsor proposals which the partiesmay
have made in the course of direct negotiationswhenthe negotiations in questionhave
not ledto an agreement betweentheparties"92.

Any mer discussion wouldbe superfluous.

161.At the closeof this long investigationof the Britishline of 1947,my conclusionwill be

simple and clear:

- primo, the British line of 1947cannotbecome the single maritime boundary, for its course

doesnot meet the requirements of contemporarylaw;

~e~eanSeaContinentalShelf(Greecev. Turkey),I.C.J.Reports197para.85.

*'CR2000/1p 0,.33etseq,para20etseq.
"CR 20001 0,p.38para.24.

90~~~~~eri esNo. 9,p. 19; SeriesANo. 17,paras.51 and62-63.
9'~and,IslandandMaritimeFrontierDispute,I.C.J.Reports 1992para.73.

92~aritimeDelimitationand TerriiorialQuestionsbetween Qatar and Bahrain,Jurisdictionand Adrnissibility,
I.C.J.Reports1994,p. 126.- secundo,the British line of 1947cannoteven betaken into considerationas a relevant factor

for the delimitation. It wasnever seen by its authors or understood by its recipients as

anythrngelse than a mere limite d'exploitatfor the purposes of the activitiesof the two oil

companies. It wasnever designedasanythingendowedwithlegal force,and stillless binding

force,either by the Britishauthontiesor by Bahrainor by Qatar. It is not in keeping withany

principleof law.

162.Mr.President, Membersofthe Court, 1am quite awarethat 1have been long and rather

tedious and 1 beg you to excuse me. 1 thank you for your attention and would ask you,

Mr. President,to give the floor presentlyto Professor Reisman,who will describethe course of the

maritimeboundary sought byBahrain. Thank you verymuch.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Weil. The Courtwill adjouni for a quarter of an

hour.

TheCourtaa'journef drom 11.35a.m.to 12 noon.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is resurned and 1 give the floor to

ProfessorReisman.

The PRESIDENT: Thankyou Professor. The sittingis adjowned for a quarterof an hour.

TheCourtadjournedfrom Il .35a.m.to 12noon.

The sitting is resumed and 1 give the floor to
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated.

ProfessorReisman.

M. REISMAN : Jevous remercie.

Introduction

Monsieurle Président,MadameetMessieursles Membresde la Cour, 1. Mon ami Prosper Weil a présenté la théorie d Beahre'ïnconcernant la délimitation, ainsi

quela critique détaillée quecet Etat fait de celle de Qatar. Mon proposest de décrirel'application

effectivede la théoriede Bahreïn àune frontièremaritime. Commenousl'avonsexpliqué,la Cour

est confrontée à la délimitationd'un espace maritimeentre un État continental, Qatar, et un Etat

pluri-insulaireou archipel, Bahreïn. Comme nousl'avons égalementexpliqué, dansla mesureoù

la décisionde la Cour su les questions territoriales aura de profondes répercussions surla

délimitation maritime, Bahreïns'est vu contraint de proposer des conclusions subsidiaires, qui

reposent chacunesur l'hypothèsed'une décision différente concernant ld aélimitationterritoriale.

Jeprésente ànouveaumes excusespour la complexité de cette démarche.

A. Lessecteursnordet sud

2. Les deuxParties conviennent quela délimitationdevrait être effectuéeen distinguant deux

secteurs contigus,celui du nord et celui du sud. SelonBahreïn, les pointsretenir pour la ligne de

partageentre cessecteurs sontFasht al DibaletRK',lepoint choisi par Qatarcomme son extrémité

septentrionale.

3. Bahreïnaccepte le choixfaitpar Qatar decequ'il appellelepoint de sa côte qui se trouve

leplusvers le largemais tient àfaireobserver que ce point a changé au cours de la présente affaire.

Dansson mémoire,Qatar parle du «point le plus septentrionalde lacôte de Qatar [tel que] situéà

l'est du feu de Ras Rakan) 3. Dans son contre-mémoire, Qatar, modifiant sa conception de la

partie la plus septentrionale de sa côte, donne sa préférenceau pointRK', basésur la laisse de

pleine mer de sacôte94.J'ai formulé des observationssulres incohérenceset les objectifstactiques

de Qatar dans l'exposéque j'ai fait ici auparavant. Bahreüi a systématiquement appliqué les

dispositionsde l'article5 de la conventionde 1982surle droit de la mer pour déterminerles côtes

respectivesdesîles composant sonou ses archipel(s),mais, en principe,s'enremet àQatar pour ce

quia traità la décision portantsur ce qui constituela côte qatarienne. Comme la Cour l'a dit dans

l'affaire desPêcheriesanglo-norvégiennes« , l'Etat côtier apparaît comme le mieux placépour

93Mémoirede Qatar,par. 9.4
94Contre-mémoirede Qatar,par.6.98et 8.10. apprécierles conditions localesquipeuvent dicterle choix.»g5Bahreïn anéanmoinsutiliséla laisse

de basse mer pour déterminerles zones côtièresqatariennes parce qu'il s'agitlà de la norme

juridique internationaleet qu'elleestnettementplus favorableQatar. 11appartiendraàla Cour de

décidercommentelle ajusteraplus loin en direction dela péninsulela ligne de délimitationqui en

découle,conformémentauxsouhaitsde Qatarlui-même.

4. Le point le plus septentrional de Bahreïn,qui est le plus proche du point correspondant

faisantfaceà la côte qatarienne,setrouve,je l'ai déjàindiqué,surFashtad Dibal. Ainsiqueje l'ai

expliquélors de mon précédent exposé et que moncollègue, ProsperWeil, l'a redit avec plus de

détails,Fashtad Dibal est un haut-fond découvrant qui se trouveà un peu plus de deux milles

marins de Qit'atJaradah. Et une étude scientifique systématique de .Alexander a confirmé, la

Cour s'en souviendra,queQit'at Jaradahestune île aux termes duparagraphe 1de l'article121de

la convention sur le droit de la mer. Bahreïn a démontré les effectivités et les facteurs

archipélagiquesqui établissentsontitre surl'île. Qatarest resté muet surces deux points. La partie

pertinente du paragraphe 1 de l'article 13 de la convention sur le droit de la mer prévoitque

«[L]orsque des hauts-fonds découvrantsse trouvent, entièrementou en partie, à une distance du

continentoud'uneîle ne dépassantpas la largeurde la mer temtoriale,la laisse de bassemer sur ces

hauts-fondspeutêtreprise commeligne debasepour mesurerla largeurdela mer temtoriale.))Ainsi

une ligne de calcul entre la laisse de basse mer au point le plus septentrional deFasht ad Dibal,

orientéeest-sud-esten directiondupointRK',peut serviràdélimiterlessecteursnord et sud,qui, les

Parties enconviennent, doivent êteaitésséparément.

5. Qatarignore, au contraire,la descriptionfaite par Bahreïnde sa propre côte et proposede

repousser le point de base bahreeinau point leplus septentrionalde Muharraq. Commela Cour

peut le constater,le pointdebase de Qatarsetrouvebien àl'intérieurde l'archipelde Bahreïnetnon

,
O 4 2 sursa côte((juridique)).Pourlesraisons quej'ai exposéesplus tôt,Bahreïnrejette la lignedepartage

entre les secteursproposée parQatarainsi que les points debase correspondantsque Qatarplaceà

l'intérieurde l'archipeldeBahreïn plutôt que sursa côte,comme le droitinternationalleprévoit.

95C.Z.J.Recu1951,p.131. B.La délimitation dansle secteursud

6. La Cour constatera qu'il faut effectuer dans le secteur sud une délimitationdes mers

territoriales respectives de Bahreïnet de QatarCe secteur est donc régi par les dispositions de

l'article 15 de la convention sur le droit de la mer. Celui-ci dispose que la frontièrede la mer

temtoriale entre États dont les côtes se font faceesta ligne médiane dont tousles points sont

équidistants despoints lesplusprochesdes lignesdebase à partir desquellesest mesuréelalargeur

de la mer territoriale de chacun des deux États.)) La seconde phrase de l'article 15permet une

dérogation à cette règle lorsque cela est requis en raison de ((titres historiques ou d'autres

circonstances spéciales)). Il se trouve que les différents titres historiques qui s'attachent aux

formationsmaritimesde Bahreïn, dontj'ai parlélorsde mon exposéprécédent, coïncident avec les

points de base normaux que Bahreïn, en tant qu7Etatpluri-insulaire ou qu'Etat archipel de fait,

utiliseaux fins dela délimitationde sa mer temtoriale. Ainsi que Weil l'a montré, l'allégation

de Qatar selon laquelle les lettres de 1947ou les passages que Qatar en choisit constituent

une ((circonstancespéciale)n'a aucun fondement,que l'on se réfereà la conventionde 1958ou à

celle de 1982. La délimitationdans le secteur sud doit donc comporter, dans un premierstade,

l'identification des «lignes debasepartir desquellesest mesurée la largeurde la mer temtoriale

dechacun des deuxÉtats.))

7. Qatarsoutient vous vous rappellerez l'analyse deM. Weil qu'il s'agit ici d'une

délimitationrelativement simpleentre les ((territoiresprincipaux))de deux Etats, entre lesquelson

trouve quelques minusculesîles litigieuses. Qatarreconnaît, il est vrai, que Bahreïnest ce qu'il

appelleun ((archipelde fait)),mais ce fait embarrassantpeut être évacué, selon Qataraitantla

complexitégéographiquede Bahreïn comme s'il ne s'agissait pas d'un Etat composéd'îles et

d'autres formationsmaritimes. Qatar considère qu'ilest possible d'y parvenir en ne retenant

qu'une partie de Bahreïn, décritecomme un ((groupecompact))formépar certaines de ses îles

archipélagiques,cellesqui, et c'est bien commode,sont les plus éloignést non les plus proches

de Qatar, et en ignorantle reste. Ainsi, selonledus operandi proposépar Qatar, la Cour verra

sa tâche heureusement ramenée à l'établissementd'une prétendue lignemédiane entre les

((temtoiresprincipaux))des deux Etatsàun certain nombre d'ajustementsde cette ligne favorables

043
à Qatar, au choix de certains passages des lettresde 1947 allant dans son sens, touten ignorantsoigneusement ou écartantouvertement d'autres passages, pour ensuiterattacher les îles et les

autres formations maritimes à 1'Etat qui se trouve du mêmecôtéde cette prétendue «ligne

médiane». Et il n'est bien entendu nullement nécessairede s'intéressersi peu que ce soit aux

effectivités.

8.M. Weil a déjàmis en évidencele caractère indéfendabledespropositions de Qatardans

le secteur sud. Je me bornerai à ajouter que la prétendue«ligne d'équidistanceprovisoire»

proposéepar Qatarn'est pasune véritable ligne médiane. Une véritab lene médianedevraitêtre

tracéeàpartir de la ligne de base de la mer temtoriale des deux Etats,sans ajustement. La ligne

proposéepar Qatarest tout au plusune ligneajustée,car elle se fonde sur la laisse de pleinemer

des deux Etats et ne tient aucun compte de toutes les formations situéesau large de la laisse de

basse mer. En revanche, dansle secteur sud, au sud de la ligne de partage en secteurs,Bahreïn

propose à la Cour une véritable lignemédianeconstruiteà partir des points de la laisse de basse

mer de Fasht adDibalet de Qit'atJaradahetdespoints correspondants dela laisse de basse merde

la côte de Qatarquisont les plus proches.

9. En supposant, commenous le faisons ici, que la Cour restituera Zubarahà Bahreïn, la

relation entre celui-ciet Qatar devientune relationdjacencedes côtes, la côte de Qatar partant

du point Y sur la carte que vous voyez pour se diriger vers le nord-est et la côte de Zubarahde

Bahreïn se dirigeantensuite vers le sudjusqu'au point au niveau de l'agglomérationqatarienne

d'Umm El Ma. Cette modificationde la relation géographique obligela Cour àtracer une ligne

médianevers le large à partir du point Y, qui constitue dans cette hypothèsela frontièreterrestre

entreBahrein et Qatar,jusqu'à ce qu'ellerencontrele vecteur établipar la ligne médianedans la

zone située immédiatementau nord. La Cour remarquera que, pour Bahreïn, la ligne Y-O2

constituela fiontièremaritimedansce secteurdela zone. Par vecteur, nous entendons évidemment

une directionàpartird'un point,ce qu'il ne faut pasconfondreavecune lignejoignant deuxpoints

désignés.

10.Nous nous dirigeons de nouveau versle sudjusqu'à lalimite la plus méridionalede la

région deZubarah. Le point leplus méridional de la côbahreïnitede Zubarahtouchele temtoire

qatarien à Umm El Ma. La frontière maritimedans l'échancrure côtièrepeu profonde est, en

raison d'une configurationqui est celle de l'échancrure,une ligne entre des Etats dont les côtes sont d'abord adjacentes pour ensuite se faire face. Un encadréde la carte no8 du mémoirede

Bahreïn indiquela suite des points de base nécessairespour tracer une ligne médiane danscette

zone d'assez faible superficie. La ligne de délimitationpart de la côte pour rejoindre le point

s'ajusteelle-même pourtenir comptede la côtede Qatarmaisfinit par repartirvers le large du fait

de la circonstance géographiquede l'opposition des côtes entre le point bahreïnite de Ra's ash
I 0 4 4
Shamiah à Zubarah et le point qatariende Ra'Umm Hish. Il faut de nouveaucomger le vecteur

decette ligne pour tenircompte dupointmédiand'unvecteursituéentre lescôtes se faisantfacede

Bahreïn à Zubarah et de Qatar à Ra'sUmmHish. La Cour relèvera la présence dela ligne

indiquantlespoints opposésles plusproches entrela péninsulede Qatar et lepoint de base suivant,

quiest le haut-fond découvrant de Qita'elErge,dontje reparleraidansun instant.

11.En poursuivantvers le sud, le prochain pointde base de Bahreïn,commeje viens de le

dire, est Qita'ael Erge, haut-fond découvrant qie situeàmoins de 12milles marins d'AlAwal,

laplus grande île del'archipelde Bahreïn, ainsiqu'à moinsde 12millesmarinsde septautresîles,

notamment Al Mu'tarid, Mashtan, Jazirat Hawar, Rabad al Gharbiyah, Rabad ash Sharqiyah,

JaziratAgirahetUmmJalid. La Courverraque la multiplication desîlesbahreïnitesdansun rayon

de 12milles de Qita'a el Erge s'explique parle caractère extrêmemenc tompact de l'archipel de

Bahreïn.

12.Aprèsle pointde base de Qita'ael Erge, le pointdebase suivant surla côte de l'archipel

de Bahreïn se trouve à Fasht Bu Thur. Ce haut-fond découvrant, toutcomme Qita'a elErge, se

situeàmoins de 12milles marinsd'AlAwal, la plus grandeîle, ainsi qued'AlMu'tarid,Mashtan,

Jazirat Hawar, Rabad al Gharbiyah, Rabad ash Sharqiyah et Jazirat Agirah. Là encore, la

compacitéde l'archipel deBahreïnplace le haut-fond découvrantde Qita'ael Erge dans un rayon

de 12millesmarins d'uncertain nombred'îles deBahreïn.

13.Si nous allonsplus loin ausud, la laissede basse mere l'archipeldes Hawar devientla

côte de Bahreïn. Chacundes pointsde base méridionauxsuccessifs servant àla délimitation dela

mer territoriale avec Qatar constituemaintenantun point de la côte de l'îleprincipale de Hawarou

d'une des îles constituant le groupe des Hawar : les points de base les plus importants sont

Rabadash Sharqiyah,Jazirat Agirah, Suwad ash Shamaliyah,Suwad al Janubiyah et la laisse de

bassemer deJanan. 14. La Cour remarquera qu'après Hadd Janan, la frontière entreles mers territoriales de

Bahreïn et de Qatar se dirige vers une étenduede mer appartenant àl'Arabiesaoudite. L'accord

conclu en 1958entre celle-ci et Bahreïn ne fournit pas de pointde basela délimitation maritime

entre Bahreïn et Qatar. Commele fait observer à ce proposLimits of the Seas, «le point 1...ne

constitue pas un point triple pour les revendications deBahreïn, de l'Arabiesaoudite et de Qatar

surle plateau continental». Quantàlalimiteextérieuredelafrontièremaritimeseptentrionaledans

4)4 5 lesecteurnord,Qatarreconnaît - etje cite son mémoire- que «la Courn'a pascompétencepour

déterminerle tripoint QatarAraniBahreïnsans le consentementde 1'1ran))~~S.i cela est vrai pour

l'Iran,commentn'en serait-ilpasde même pour l'Arabiesaoudite?

15.Compte tenu des points de base et des lignes de base pertinentes,nous pouvons décrire

succinctement la ligne de délimitation entreles eaux temtoriales de Qatar et de Bahreïn dans le

secteur sud. La distance entre la ligne de partage des secteurs allant dRK' au point le plus

septentrionalde Fasht ad Dibal est d'environ 18millesmarins. Il n'y a ensuiteaucune ligne allant

du point RK'de Fashtad Dibaljusqu'au point situésur la laisse de basse merde Qit'atJaradah et

aupoint opposésur lacôte de Qatar àAl Arishdont la longueursoit supérieureàcette distance. La

frontièremaritime que la Cour est appelée à délimiter danscette zone déterminée estdonc celle

d'unemer temtoriale. La Courremarquerasurla carteaffichée à l'écranqueles pointsmédians de

chacunedeslignes reliantsur les côtesopposéeslespointslesplus proches, respectivement,ont été

reliés parune ligne rougecontinuequi vajusqu'à la régionbahreïnitede Zubarahet qu'on retrouve

ensuite àlalimiteinférieuredecette régionjusqu'à cequ'elles'approched'unvecteurtracé à partir

dela ligne dedélimitationentreBahre-inet l'Arabiesaoudite.

16.La ligne àlaquelle aboutit, dans le secteur sud, la démarcheque nous venons de suivre

est une véritableligne médianequi respecte toujours fidèlementles réalités géographiquedse

chaque Etat sans entraîner aucune desamputations territoriales que propose Qatar. Cette ligne

respecte le caractère d'Etat pluri-insulaire ou dYEtatarchipel de fait de Bahreïn, mais, je

m'empresse de le souligner, n'emploie que des points de base normaux et ne fait pas bénéficier

Bahreïn des lignes de base droites archipélagiques particulières donpteut se prévaloir un Etat

96MémoiredeQatar,par. 12.42.archipel qui retient la partie IV de la convention de1982 et les options qu'elle offre. Elle est

également équitabla eu sens de l'évolution dece terme dans la pratique de la Cour en matièrede

délimitationde frontièresmaritimes.

17.Monsieurleprésident, Madameet Messieursde la Cour,Qatarproposeque l'on ajustesa

ligned'équidistanceprovisoireen sa faveurpourtenir comptede laplus grande longueur de littoral

qu'il prétendavoir, dans un rapport qui serait de1'59 à 1. La Cour remarquera toutefois que la

longueurdes côtesdans le secteursud est essentiellement égale lorsque les îles Hawar sont à juste

titreindiquéescommeappartenant àBahreinet qu'elleaugmenteen fait de 25 pour cent environen

faveurde Bahrein si Zubarah lui est restituée. Bahrein soutienq t u'il n'est ni nécessainijustifié

d'ajusterla ligne d'équidistance,que ce soit en faveur de Bahreïnou de Qatar. Et même sip , our

raisonner surune considérationpurement hypothétiquo e,n acceptaitle rapport des façadescôtières

de 1 à 1,59 proposépar Qatar, un ajustement ne sejustifierait pas. Un ajustement de la ligne de

délimitationd'une zone de 200milles pourrait provoquer degravesdistorsions et des attributions

erronéesd'espacesmaritimes, ce quene fera pas,de par sa naturemême,une ligne de délimitation

de mer temtoriale. De plus, la seule affaire-qui ne concernait d'ailleurs pas la délimitation

d'une mer temtoriale- dans laquelle il a été procédé à un ajustement pour une disparitétrès

minimeétaitcelledu Golfedu aine^^ et cela,d'ailleurs,àcause de laconfigurationgéographique

particulièrede cetterégionet d'unesituation inhabituelle. Dansles autres affaires ~alte/~ib~e~e 't

Jan~a~en~o ~ù il a étprocédé àun ajustement de laligne médianeen raison de disparitéset du

rapport entre les longueurs de côte, ce rapport étaittrès supérieuret susceptible d'entraînerune

différence notableentre les façades côtières. Enfui, il convientde relever que l'ajustementde la

lignemédianeproposéen l'espècepar Qatar aurait poureffetd'empiétersur le territoire et les eaux

temtoriales d'un desEtats intéressés.

C. Délimitation dans ls eecteursudselondes qualificationssubsidiaires

18. Monsieurle président,Madame et Messieurs les Membresde la Cour, comme Bahreïn 7

l'a fait remarquer dans son mémoire,cette affaire est inhabituelle pmce qu'il faut trancher les

''Délimitation dlafrontière maritimedans la rdugolfe duMaine,arrêt, .I.J.Recueil1984,p. 246.
''Plateau continental(JamahiriyaarabeIibyenndMalte),a,r.I.Recueil1985,p. 13.

99Délimitationmaritimedansla régionsituée eleGroenlandetJanMayen,arrét,C.I.JRecueil1993,p.38. questionsterritorialesavant de pouvoir tracer les frontières maritil, tout en une seule phase

judiciaire. De sorte que les Parties n'ontpas d'autre choix que d'énoncerleurs conclusions

relatives aux frontièresmaritimes sous forme de variantes, puisqu'elles ignorent la position

qu'adopterala Courconcernantles questions territoriales. Dece pointde vue, on peutcaractériser

Bahreïn dedeuxmanières :

- Bahreïnpeut être considéré comm uneEtat continentalet pluri-insulaisi sa souveraineté sur

Zubarahest rétablie, u

- Bahreïnpeut être considéré comm ue Etat pluri-insulaireou un Etat archipelde fait, si la

régiondeZubarah n'estpas censéeluiappartenir.

Ces différentesqualifications concrètes engendrencthacune une conceptionjuridique particulière

de ce quedoit êtrlalignede délimitation uniquedansle secteursud.

19. Dans l'exposé principal de Bahreïnl,'hypothèse est que la Cour confirmera la

souverainetéde Bahreïnsur Zubarah et la rétablira. Au cas ou laCour en déciderait autrement,

0 4 7 quels que soient ses motifs,les points de base quej'ai énuméré psrécédemmend tevraientêtre

complétés par d'autrespoints, puisque nousnous retrouverions dansune situation où la côte

qatariennedans la régionde Zubarahet la côte de1'Etatde Bahreïn seferaient face. Le point de

base suivant à utiliser pour construire la ligne côtière deBahreiii serait donc l'île de Sitrah.

Comme nous l'avons déjd àémontré précédemment, Fash atl Ani faitpartie intégrantede l'île de

Sitrahdansla mesureoùil n'enest séparé queparun chenalétroitetartificiel,profond de3mètres,

qui fut draguéen 1982afinde permettre la navigation(iln'existaitpasde chenal naturel avant cette

date),maisqui nemodifiepasle statutjuridique international de l'î:cehaut-fondresteunepartie

de Sitrah. Qit'ahash Shajarah étantn haut-fonddécouvrant situé àmoins de 1 millede la laisse

de bassemer de la côte deFasht alAn appartenantà Sitrah,Bahreïnest en droit d'utilisercette

laisse cornmepoint de base, conformémen t l'article 13,paragraphe 1,de la conventionde 1982

sur le droit de la mer. De sorte que la côte de Bahreüi relierait la laisse de basse mer de

Qit'atJaradah à celle de Qit'ah ashShajarah. Permettez-moi d'ajouter,entre parenthèses, que

même siFashtal Azm n'étaitpas considéré comme faisap ntrtiede Sitrah,Bahre'ïnpourrait encore

se servirde Qit'ahash Shajarah comme d'un point de base d,ans la mesure ou cette formation estsituéeà moins de 12millesmarinsd'UmmJalidet de Qit'atJaradah.C'est là,une fois de plus, une

conséquence imputable au faiq tue Bahreïnest unarchipeltrèsdense.

20. Lespoints de basesur la laisse de bassemer de Qit'ahash Shajarahet le point de base le

plus proche de la côte qatarienne servent à tracer le segment suivant de la ligne médiane

reliantO (2) àun point situéà mi-distanceentre lepoint de basesur Qita'a elErge,quej'ai analysé

précédemment,et le point de base correspondant le plus proche sur la côte qatarienne, en

l'occurrence Rasum Hish. De là, nous tracerions une ligne médiane,équidistantedes points de

base de la côte deZubarah (dontje suppose,pour les besoinsdel'argument, qu'elle est qatarienne)

et des points de base opposéssur la côte de Bahreïn, qui descendrait vers le sud de la façon

suivante. La Cour notera que ce tracé nemodifie pas sensiblement le rapport entre les lignes

côtières desdeuxEtats, puisque nousavons toujoursle schémades côtes se faisant face ;de sorte

que, pour lesraisons queje viens d'évoquer,il n'y aurait pas lieu d'opérerle moindre ajustement

de lalignemédianeprovisoire en faveurde l'un desEtats ou del'autre.

21. Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, je ne saurais

conclure cette partie de mon exposésans mentionner le droit qu'a Bahreïn de demander, le cas

échéant, àbénéficied ru statut spécialreconnu aux Etats archipelspar la partieIV de la convention

de 1982 sur le droit de la mer. En 1937, en réponseà une demande de renseignements du

Gouvernement britannique, Bahreïn indiqua que son archipel incluait Fasht al Dibal,

QityatJaradah,Fasht al Jarim,KhorFasht, Al Benatet ((l'archipeldes Hawarquicomptait neuf îles

à proximitéde la côte qatarienne»'OOC . ette revendicationfut formuléede nouveauen 1947parle

souverain de ~ahreïn'" et, au cours des négociationsmenéesdans le cadre de la troisième

conférencedesNations Unies surle droit de la mer, le représentantde Bahreïnsoulevade nouveau

ce point, dès1974,sans susciter aucune oppositionde la part de~atar'O*.Bahreïnavaitpréparé les

documents requis pour se déclarerEtat archipel, mais fut empêché de les publier en raison de

l'injonctionà effet suspensif prononcéedans le cadre de la médiation : une injonction qui est

toujours en vigueursur le planjuridique et qui le restera en faitsqu'au prononcéde l'arrêtde la ,

IcmMémorandumde CharlesBelgrave,14août 1937,mémoiredeBahreïn,par. 661.
'O'Mémoirede Bahreïn,ibid.

'O2Mémoirede Bahreïn,ibid.Cour. L'un desparadoxes de la procédureactuelle est que Bahreïn risque de ne jamais pouvoir

réaliser ledestin que lapartiede la conventionde 1982 surle droit de la mer réserveaux Etats

archipelsrépondantauxconditions àremplir.

22. Le rapport de la superficiedes eauxà celle des terres de Qatarest d'environ 5à31 à

l'époquede lapleine merde vive eau ou de 3,4 à1 à l'époque desplusbasses mers astronomiques,

et remplit ainsi la condition obligatoireprévuepar l'article47, paragraphee la convention :il

s'agit de définirune zone où le rapport de la superficiedes eauà celle des terres, atollsinclus

soit compris entre1 à 1 et 9à l»lo3.Qatar conteste que Bahreïnpuisse se prévaloirde l'une des

options prévuespar la partie IV de la convention pou diverses raisons. Par exemple, le

professeurQuéneudecdéclareque Bahreïnn'est pas répertorié comme un archipel sur la liste du

département d'Etataméricain,ce qui l'empêcheraid te se déclarerEtatarchipel. Rassuronstout de

suitele professeur:la permission des Américains n'estas indispensableet un Etat n'a pas besoin

de figurer sur une liste du Gouvernement des Etats-Unispour pouvoir se déclarerarchipel. La

Jamaïque ne figurait passur la liste, ce quine l'a pasempêchée de seéclarerEtat archipel,alors

mêmequ'elle menaitdes négociations avec les Etats-Unis.Une telle déclarationne poseraitpas

non plus de problèmesde compétence à l'égarddes Etats tiers. C'estBahreïn qui se serait déclaré

Etat archipel en vertu de la partieV de la convention, et la Cour appliquerait simplement les

conséquences de cette déclaration à la frontièremaritime entre Bahreïn et Qatar, la question

relevant de sa compétence, maiselle ne les appliquerait pas à des Etats ou à des situations

échappantàcette compétence. L'exercicepar Bahre dinl'optionprévuepar la partieIVn'estpas

sujetà forclusion, carcette partie de la conventionne prévoitpas de date limiàrespecter en la

matière. D'ailleurs,les Etats n'exercent généralement cette optioqnue lorsque cela s'avère

nécessaire dans le cadre desnégociationsbilatéralesqu'ils mènentpour fixer leurs frontières

maritimes. Tout Etatarchipelayant la facultéde se définircomme telen vertu de la partieIVde la

conventionde 1982aparfaitementraisonde peser soigneusement lesavantageset les inconvénients

de sa décision. Prétendre, commele fait Qatar,que la partien'a pas de caractèrecoutumierau

contraire de la plupart des autres dispositions de la convention de 1982sur le droit de la mer,

'OArticle4 (1)delaConventiondesNationsUniessurle droitdelamerde 1982.aboutit à une absurdité :un Etat archipel serait un archipel à l'égardde certains membres de la

communautéinternationale mais pas pour d'autres, de sorte que, dans son texte même,la

convention telle que l'interprète Qatar iraità l'encontre de la prévisibilitéet de l'uniformité

d'applicationqui sont lafinalitéproprede tout acte législatif. La conventide Viennesur le droit

des traitésabhorre les interprétations absurdes.En résumér,ien ne s'oppose à ce que Bahreïnse

déclareEtatarchipel envertu de la partieIVde la conventionsur le droit de la mer de 1982.

23. Si on examine la situation de Bahreïndans l'optiquede la partieIV de laconventionde

1982, cet Etat a le droit de tracer les lignes de base archipélagiques généreuse psrévuespar

l'article 47. Si la Cour veut bien se donner la peine d'observerla carte affichéesur l'écran,elle

remarquera que les lignes de base archipélagiquesmontréesjoignent les dix îles et récifs

découvrantslesplus excentrés de l'archipel de Bahreïn.Il s'agitde Fashtal Jarimdans le nord, de

Fasht al Dibal,de trois îles du groupedes Hawar,du récifAlHu1à la pointe sud de Al Awal, d'un

rocher découverten permanencenomméAl Baynah Saghirahde la partie occidentaled'Al Awal,

d'un récifdécouvrantaunord d'AlBaynahSaghirahet deKhawrFasht.

24. La Cour observeraque la plus longue de ces lignesde base archipélagiquesn'excède pas

40 milles marins. Sil'on tient compte du fait que l'article47 autorise les Etats archipels àtracer

des lignes debasepouvant atteindre100millesmarinsetmême125millesmarinspour 3 % d'entre

elles et que la pratique des Etats a parfois dépasces limites,les lignes de base archipélagiques

soumises par Bahreïn sont trèsmodestes. La Courobserveraque les lignes de base ne s'écartent

pas sensiblementde la géographie générale de l'archipeetlqu'elles necoupent pasnon plus la mer

temtoriale de Qatar de la haute mer ou de la zone économique exclusive. Le rapport de la

superficie deseaux à celledes terres est,je le répète,de 5'3à 1àl'époque dela pleine merde vive

eau ou de 3,4à 1 à l'époquedes plus basses mers astronomiques. Le rapport dessuperficies est

donc nettement inférieur à la limite de 9à 1 prévuepar la partie IV de la convention. Tous les

droits de passage traditionnels exercéslégitimement parQatar entre ses côtes au sud des eaux

archipélagiquesdeBahreïndans le Golfe seraient protégés conformémea ntx articles51 et 52 de

la conventionde 1982,demême que le passage inoffensifprévupar l'article2, paragraphe 1dela convention. Maisces considérationssontparfaitement théoriquespuisque Qatar n'ajamais prouvé
050

nirevendiquél'unquelconquede ces droits.

25. Sur la base des lignes de base archipélagiques, uneligne médianedans le secteur sud

s'écarteraitde laligne partantdes Hawaren directiondu nord, telle queje l'ai déjàmontrée.Dans

cesconditions,lalignemédianeépouseladirectiongénéralede lc aôte de Qatar,de la péninsulede

Qatar,jusqu'au secteurnord.

26. Monsieurle président,Madame etMessieurs les Membres de la Cour, cette conclusion

de Bahreïn n'estpas et ne saurait êtreformelle,en raisonde la suspension quinous a imposée

parla médiationpuis par les procéduresjudiciaires en cours. Néanmoins, Bahreïndésireprésenter

lesfaitsàla Couret lui décrireles optionsjuridiques viables dont ildispose. La Cour utiliseraces

éléments d'informatiocnommeelle l'entend.

D. La délimitationdansle secteurnord

27. Je vaismaintenantparler du secteurnord. La Cour se rappellera que, contrairementau

secteur sud, ce secteur se caractérisenon pas par des côtes qui se font face mais par des côtes

adjacentes. Une deuxièmedifférenceimportante entre le secteur nord et le secteur sud est qu'à

l'exceptiond'unebande largede 12milles nautiquesqui suit laligne de côteutiliséepour lecalcul

entre les points les plus proches sur Fasht ad Dibaà Bahreïn et le point RK à Qatar, bande

constituéepar des eaux territoriales, les eaux et le fond océaniqueélimiter quis'étendentau

large jusqu'aux zones maritimes iraniennes font partie du plateau continental et de la zone

économiqueexclusive. Unetroisièmedifférence importante entrele secteurnord et le secteursud

tient au fait queles accordsen vigueur signés,un entrel'Iran et Bahreïn en 1971 et l'autreentre

l'Iranet Qataren 1969,doiventêtreprisenconsidération. Enfins,'il est vraique le secteurnordne

contientpas lesnombreusesîles bahreïnitesqui font partiede l'archipel de Bahreïn, on y trouve en

revanche les bancs d'huîtres perlièresqui appartiennentBahreïn, commeje l'ai expliquédans

monexposéprécédent.

28. La Cour remarquera que le point bissecteur de la ligne entre Bahreïn et Qatar est le

pointO(1). Ce point étant prolongé surla carte par une ligne en pointillé jusqu'à la frontièreIranIQatar fixéed'un commun accord, le vecteur correspondant constitueraitla ligne

051 d'équidistance. Le point Q sur cette ligne est situéexactement à une distance de 12 milles

nautiques des points de base lesplus prochesde Bahreïn et de Qatar quiont étéutilisépsour tracer

la ligne de partage entre secteurs. Par conséquent,le point Q représentela limite de la mer ..

territoriale entre Qatar et Bahreïn. Au nord de ce point sur le vecteur qui finit par couper la

frontièreIranjQatar fixéed'un commun accord, il convient de faire un ajustement pou tenir

compte des bancs d'huîtres perlièresde Bahreïn. Pour que lui soit attribuéela partie du plateau

continental contenant des bancs d'huîtres perlières, Bahreïn proposeque les points S,T et U

constituent les points de transition pour la frontière maritime de façon à tenir compte de la

souverainetéde Bahreïnsur ces bancs. La Cournotera que Bahreïna proposéquel'ajustementsur

le vecteur général est-sud-estommence non pas à la limite de la mer temtoriale,à savoir le

point Q, mais bien quelque 3 milles marins au large, au point R. Si Bahreïn propose cet

ajustement, c'est pour que la mer temtoriale de Qatar ne soit pas du tout amputéeni même

concernéepar l'ajustement qu'ilfaut apporterà toute la zone maritime situéeau-delà de la mer

temtoriale. Bahreïn propose un deuxièmeajustement en faveur de Qatar àl'extrémité nord de la

ligne de délimitation générale, où elle rencontre l'espacemaritime iranien. Au lieu de relierle

pointU, où se trouve le banc d'huîtres perlièresde Bahreïn Naywah Walid Ramadhan, au point

terminal de la ligne d'équidistance surun vecteur OQR, ce qui serait conforme au principe

d'équidistance, Bahreïn proposeque l'on utilisela ligneZ qui aboutit au point terminal de la

frontière maritimeIrdQatar. Bahreïn fait remarquer que l'accordIrdQatar n'oblige pas à

adopter ce point terminal qui avantage sensiblement Qatar puisqu'une ligne d'équidistancequi

attribuerait la colonne d'eau et le plateau continental à Bahreïn au sud de la ligne IranlQatar

n'auraitaucuneconséquencepourles Etatstiers.

29. Bahreïn soutient que cette ligne d'équidistance estéquitableet n'a pas besoin d'être

ajustée. Pour ses demandes d'ajustementen sa faveur dans le secteurnord, Qatara renoncé,dans

ses plaidoiriesà ce qu'il tentait dans son argumentation écrite,qui consistait à utiliser une

prétenduedisproportiondans le secteur sudpour obtenirun ajustementen sa faveurdans le secteur

nord. En revanche, il s'est efforcéde trouver la place une nouvellejustificati:nles prétendus

ratios entre les façades côtièresdansle secteur nord. Or, la côte qui entre en lignede comptepour tracer la lignede partageentre secteurs est contrpar un seulpoint de base de la mer temtoriale

sur chaque côte de sorte qu'il n'y a pas de façade côtière. C'estpourquoi la thèsede Qatar qui

repose désormaissur une prétendue disparité entre des façades côtières est dénuée de tout

fondement. De même, affirmec romme le fait Qatar que la partie nord de Bahreïn se trouverait

située à8 milles nautiques aunord de la partie la plus septenhionale de Qatar, ce qui créeraitun

résultat inéquitabler,elèvelà encore de la fiction. Dansl'affaire dite desIles anglo-normandes

/ O 5 2 (Royaume-Uni/FranceI, un demi-effet a été attribéux ~orlin~ues'~parce qu'ellessont situéesà

quelque 23miIIesmarins de la côte de Cornouailleset que la ligne qu'elles contrôlentest longue

d'environ 200milles marins. En la présenteespèce,un prolongementde 8 milles marins au-delà

d'une lignequi n'a pas plus de 50 milles marins de longueur fera peu de différence. Laligne qui

respecte les droits souverains deBahreïnsur ses bancsd'huîtresperlièresne coupe pasl'accèsàla

mer de Qatar car, comme le montre la carte que vous avez sous les yeux, Qatar est

géographiquement tourné vers l'est, ce qui correspondà l'orientation naturelle de sa masse

continentale.

Les pointsdebase

30.Pour ce qui estdespoints debase,Bahreïnrejette ceuxqui ont étésoumis par Qatarpour

ce que Qatarappelle la côte bahreïnite,parce que tant du point de vue géographiquequedu point

de vuejuridique, ils sont situéssur les mauvaisesformationsmaritimes et qu'ilsutilisent de façon

incorrectelesplus hautes mers astrologiquesplutôtque les plus bassesmers astrologiques. Quant

la descriptionpar Qatar de ses propres côtes,Bahre'h l'accepte, à l'exception évidemment dece

que Qatar dit de la régionde Zubanah et de la totalitédes îles Hawar, que Bahreïn rejette, nous

tenons àleredire. Commenous l'avonsdéjàdit, toutEtat est habilitéàdécriresa proprecôte dans

les limitesfixéesparle droit international.

31. Dans votre dossier, vous trouverez une liste de points de base approximatifs pour la

totalitédes côtes de Bahreïn. Comme la Cour le sait parfaitement, lorsqu'il s'agit dedélimiter

aujourd'hui les frontières maritimes, les programmesinformatiques de géodésie moderne

numérisenttoute la ligne de base territoriale desdeux côtes pour calculer une ligne médiane

'ORecueildes sentences arbitrales,vol.XVIII,p. 190. mathématiquementexacte alors que dans le passéon utilisait des points de base individuels.

Bahreïn supposeque la Cour utiliseracette méthode ou uneméthodevoisine maisil a soumisles

points de base approximatifsafin qu'en attendantde procéderà la délimitation,la Cour puisse

mieux comprendreetreproduireleslignes utiliséesdanssonargumentation.
t

Conclusion

32. Monsieur le président,Madameet Messieurs de la Cour, ainsis'achève l'exposé des

demandes principales et subsidiairesde Bahreïn en ce qui concerne la délimitation maritime.

/ O5 3 Comme il s'agitdu dernierexposéde 1'Etatde Bahreïn dans ce premier tour deplaidoiries, qu'il

me soit permis, aunom de tous les conseils de Bahreïn, deremercier la Cour pour son écoute

attentiveetsa courtoisie. Cela fut pourmoiunhonneurquedeprendrela paroledevantvous.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie beaucoup, professeurReisman. Je vais maintenant

donner laparole aujuge Vereschetinquisouhaiteposerdesquestions.

M. VERESHCHETIN :Merci,Monsieurle président.Ma premièrequestions'adresseà la

foisà Qataretà Bahreaïn.

Avant 1971, a-t-il étéconclu entre le Royaume-Uni,d'une part, et,de l'autre Qatar et

Bahreïn respectivementdes accords internationauxautres que ceux qui établissent poureux une

relation deprotectio? Le Royaume-Unia-t-ilconcluavant 1971des accordsinternationauxavec

des Etatstiers au nom de Qatarou de Bahreïn,ou bien pour lecompte de Qatar ou de Bahreïn ?

Dans l'affirmative,quelest aujourd'huile statutde cesaccordspourQataretpour Bahreï?

Ma deuxièmequestion estadresséeàBahreïnetje seraiégalementheureuxd'entendreàce

sujetles observations dela Partieadverse.

Dans la note britannique de 1971relatiàel'abrogationdu régimespécialde traitéentrele

Royaume-Uni et 17Etatde Bahreïn, Bahreïnest désignépar la formule : ((Bahrein et ses

dépendances)).Quelle était alorset quelle est aujourd'huila dénominationf~ciellede 17Etatde

Bahreïn ? Quelest le sensdu terme(dépendances) ) Et quelétait avant 19le statutjuridiquedes

((dépendancesdeBahreïn~par rapport à Bahreïnproprement dit?

Je vousremercie,Monsieurleprésident. The PRESIDENT: 1thank you. These questions are of course presented in writing to the

Parties, and the Court wouldbe happy if they could respond to them during the second roundof

oral arguments. This marks the end of today'sSitting. 1 wish to thank each of the Parties forthe

statementssubmittedto us in the course of this firstround of oral arguments. The Court willmeet

again as from Tuesday 20 June at 10.00a.m. to hear the second round of oral arguments of the

Stateof Qatar and of the State ofBahrain. As you know, the plan is that each of the Parties will

have three sittings of three hours for the purpose. 1should nevertheless like to rernind you that,

I pursuant to Article60, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court, the oral presentations must be as
054
succinctas possible. The purposeof this secondroundof oral arguments,1would add, is to enable

eachofthe Parties toreply,with customarycourtesy,to the argumentsadvancedorallyby theother

Party. The second round mustnot thereforeconstitutea repetitionof past statements. And it goes

without saying that the Parties are not obliged toavail themselves of the entire time allowedto

them. Thank you. The Courtis adjourned.

TheCourtrose ut12.50p.m.